AUTHOR:
Aneta Moszczyńska
ABSTRACT:
The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical principles and practical manifestations and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and maintaining balance between partners in government coalitions. The author found that such principles and mechanisms, especially at the background of inter-party relations rather than inter-institutional relations, are important in the context of the formation, functioning and responsibility of coalition governments, and hence their stability and effectiveness. The problem stems from the fact that government coalitions of parties are able to negotiate on a compromise on the essence of coalition policy within a particular type of multi-party government cabinet, but are unable to trust ministers from different parties to each other, and thus to implement the process of governance as effectively as possible. It was found that the situation can be corrected by variable principles and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and portfolio balancing in coalition governments. Taking them into account is important not only for ensuring the formation of coalition governments, but also for prolonging their functioning. However, they are quite different, and therefore they are the focus of the study.
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