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FEATURES OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL IN UKRAINE ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 2012/2014 AND 2014/2019

The electoral volatility at the national level based on the results of the 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 parliamentary elections in terms of general, intra-systemic and non-systemic volatility has been analyzed. The features of three types of electoral volatility at the level of the main regions of Ukraine: West, Center, South and East have been investigated. The importance of party preferences of regions in the context of electoral volatility has been outlined. The method of the total electoral volatility calculating using the M. Pedersen index and intra-system and extra-system volatility on the basis of the indices modified by E. Powell and D. Tucker have been worked out. The drawing on the analysis of the results of opinion polls, the grounds / motives for changing electoral support have been considered.

Keywords: M. Pedersen's electoral volatility index, general electoral volatility, intra-system electoral volatility, non-systemic electoral volatility, parties, stable parties, new parties, region, region, Ukraine.

Anatoliy Romanyuk

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЕЛЕКТОРАЛЬНОЇ ВОЛАТИЛЬНОСТІ НА РЕГІОНАЛЬНОМУ РІВНІ В УКРАЇНІ ЗА РЕЗУЛЬТАТАМИ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРІВ 2012/2014 ТА 2014/2019 РОКІВ

Проаналізовано електоральну волатильність на національному рівні за результатами парламентських виборів 2012/2014 та 2014/2019 років у вимірі загальної, внутрішньо системної та позасистемної волатильності. Досліджено особливості трьох видів електоральної волатильності на рівні основних регіонів України: Захід, Центр, Південь і Схід. Окреслено значення партійних переваг регіонів в контексті електоральної волатильності. Відпрацьовано методику обчислення загальної електоральної волатильності з допомогою індексу М. Педерсена та внутрішньо системної і позасистемної волатильності на підставі модифікованих Е. Пауеллом та Д. Такером індексів. Спираючись на аналіз результатів соціологічних опитувань розглянуто підстави/мотиви зміни електоральної підтримки.

Ключові слова: *індекс електоральної волатильності М. Педерсена, загальна електоральна волатильність, внутрішньо системна електоральна волатильність, позасистемна електоральна волатильність, партії, сталі партії, нові партії, регіон, область, Україна.*

The problems of electoral choice are among the determinants in every democracy. This is due to the political weight of the elections, as the preferences of citizens determine the passage of some political parties to parliament and not the passage of others; encouragement and ranking of the support level for political development programs represented in the elections by parties; ultimately outlining the direction of the country's political development for the period before the next election and the team of politicians who have to ensure the appropriate direction of development. The citizens' voting also reveals the level of adequacy of party proposals in the form of a program and specific candidates to current public expectations and challenges. Thus, the stability and variability of the electoral position of citizens is closely linked to the delineation of the list of major political actors represented in the legislature and who determine the vector of political development of the country or influence it, as well as with the party stability. As a result, a stable and changing electoral position of citizens can be considered an important indicator that can identify sensitive political phenomena and processes of democratic countries. The issues of electoral volatility in Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe have recently been the subject of analysis, both among Ukrainian scientists¹ and scientists from other countries². At the same time, the predominant focus of researchers on the problems of changing electoral agents at the national level is noteworthy, while regional features of volatility remain outside the scope of analysis. We assume that the view that the national indicator reflects mainly the average level for each region may take place. Instead, as a working hypothesis, we believe that there are regional features of electoral volatility both between existing regions and in relation to national characteristics.

We based the research methodology on the index of electoral volatility suggested by M. Pedersen, by which he meant «a net change in the system of polling stations due to individual

¹ Боднараш Г. Електоральна волатильність країн Центральної та Східної Європи: порівняльний аналіз // Політологічна та соціологічна ністудія. Т. X. Вибірчі процеси в Україні та постсоціалістичних країнах: зб. наук. праць / наук. ред. А. М. Крутлашова. – Чернівці: Букрек, 2011. – С. 120-135; Романюк А. С., Литвин В. С. Порівняльний аналіз політичних інститутів країн Вишеградської групи та інших країн Центрально-Східної Європи: монографія, А. С. Романюк, В. С. Литвин. – Львів: ЛНУ імені Івана Франка, 2016. – С. 344-348; Romanyuk A. Shift in electoral support at the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine // Studium Europaeum Środkowej Wschodniej, 2019, #11. – P. 6-15; Політичні партії і вибори: українські та світові практики: зб. ст. і тез за результатами четвертої міжнародної наукової конференції "Політичні партії і вибори: українські та світові практики" (пам'яті Юрія Романовича Шведи) від 9 листопада 2019 року / за ред. Анатолія Романюка і Віталія Литвина. – Львів: Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка, 2020. – Вип. 4. – 400 с.

² Sikk A. How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe // European Journal of Political Research. – 2005, V.44. – P.391-412; Mainwaring S., Zoco E. Political sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition. Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies // Party Politics, 2007, Vol. 13 (2). – P. 155-178; Jan-Erik Lane, Svante Ersson. Party System instability in Europe: Persistent Differences in Volatility between West and East? // Democratization, 2007, Vol. 14 (1). – P.92-110; Powell E.N., Tucker J. New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post communist Countries. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. – papers.ssrn.com; Epperly B. Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Post-Communist World // Comparative Political Studies, 2011, V.44. – P.829-853; Gherghina S. Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Enhancing voter loyalty. – Routledge, 2015. – 192 p.; Crabtree C., Golder M. Party System Volatility in Post-Communist Europe // British Journal of Political Science. – 2016, V.47 (1). – P.229-234; Emanuele V., Chiamonte A., Soare S. Does the Iron Curtain Still Exist? The Convergence in Electoral Volatility between Eastern and Western Europe // Government and Opposition. – 2020, Vol 55 (2). – P.308-326.

vote transfer», which indicates «the extent to which party power is redistributed from one election to another between parties who lost and won the election». He suggested a formula for calculating electoral volatility or the so-called electoral volatility index, according to which:

$$V = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{i(t)} - p_{i(t+1)}|}{2},$$

where: V is index of electoral volatility (Pedersen); n is the number of parties; p_i is the percentage of votes received by the party in the period t and $t + 1$; \sum^n is the sum of the results of the parties; and $i=1$ is designation of parties with seats in parliament (i.e. parties that have prosecuted their representatives to the legislature as a result of parliamentary elections)³.

The electoral volatility index is calculated on the basis of the results of two consecutive elections t and $t + 1$. The results of all political parties that participated in the elections and received a result of at least one vote or more are taken into account. The electoral volatility index is calculated in the range from 0 (no change) to 100 (complete change), provided that the smaller is the figure obtained by the calculation according to Pedersen's formula, the lower is the electoral volatility in any calculated case.

The suggested by M. Pedersen index is considered to be general indicator of electoral volatility. At the same time, the subsequent studies have led to a modification of the methodology by separating the electoral variability of the sustainable political parties, i.e. those that participated in both elections, and the electoral variability of new parties, i.e. those that participated only in the next / scheduled elections. We are using the practices of E. Powell and D. Tucker, who suggested calculating the internal systemic volatility (as type «B» of the electoral volatility) after the formula:

$$B.V = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{i(t)} - p_{i(t+1)}|}{2},$$

where: $B.V$ is index of intra-system (type «B») electoral volatility; n is the number of parties that are stable in terms of representation in parliament; p_i is the percentage of votes received by the party in the period t and $t + 1$; \sum^n is the sum of the results of the parties; and $i=1$ is designation of stable parties with seats in parliament (i.e. parties that, as a result of parliamentary elections, stably nominate their representatives to the legislature)⁴. Regarding non-systemic electoral volatility (as type «A» of the electoral volatility), the scientists have suggested the calculation after the formula:

$$A.V = \frac{\sum_{o=1}^n p_{o(t)} + \sum_{w=1}^n p_{w(t+1)}}{2},$$

where: $A.V$ is index of non-systemic (as type «A») electoral volatility; o are the political parties and / or blocs that «came out» and participated in the elections only in the period t ; w are the parties that «entered» and participated in the elections only in the period $t + 1$; n is the

³ Pedersen M. The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility / Morgens Pedersen // European Journal of Political Research. – 1979. – Vol. 7. – No. 1. – P. 1–26; Pedersen M. Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation / Morgens Pedersen // Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change / Hans Daalder, Peter Mair. – Beverly Hills, 1983. – P. 29–67.

⁴ Powell E.N., Tucker J. A. New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post-communist Countries. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. –P.6.

number of batches that are taken into account; p is the percentage of votes received by the parties o in the period t and w in the period $t + 1$; Σn is the sum of the results of the parties; $o = 1$ and $w = 1$ are designation of the respective parties with seats in parliament⁵. Accordingly, the total aggregate volatility index (V) will add up or predict the sum of both intra-systemic and non-systemic electoral volatility⁶.

We are up to analyze the results of the parliamentary elections of 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 at the national and regional levels of Ukraine. According to the constitution, Ukraine is a unitary state consisting of 24 regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and two cities with a special status. In 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the armed support of separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Ukraine temporarily does not control the territory of Crimea and part of the territories of these two regions. There are different approaches among researchers, journalists and politicians regarding the separation / separation of existing regions into separate regions, depending on the grounds for division. As a basis for our division, we have chosen the system of allocation of four regions adopted by the sociological agencies of Ukraine: West, Center, South and East⁷.

We calculated the results of political parties within the national multi-member constituency on the basis of official CEC (Central Electoral Commission) data. The practice of modifying the names of political parties between the two elections has raised certain questions. In particular, this applies to the case of the 2014/2019 elections. On the eve of the 2019 elections, the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko changed its name to «European Solidarity», moving away from using the name of the leader in its name. Since the basis of the party in organizational terms remained unchanged, we considered them as distinctive names of one party. Certain questions were raised by the situation with the «Opposition Bloc» party, which split into two parts on the eve of the 2019 parliamentary elections, and one of these parts retained its name. Based on the fact that the party did not significantly modify its own program and kept the name and part of the membership base and structure, we treat it as a successor.

By means of these indices, we have calculated indicators of general volatility and intra-systemic, which applies to stable political parties and non-systemic, relatively new parties at the level of Ukraine and individual regions from all four regions. In the Western community, we chose as an example: Volyn and Lviv regions; in Central – Vinnytsia and Chernihiv regions; in the South – Mykolaiv and Odessa ones. Since the Eastern region includes only three oblasts and in two of them – Donetsk and Luhansk – a certain part of their territories is controlled by separatists with the support of the Russian Federation, in this case we used data for only one oblast – Kharkiv one.

⁵ Powell E.N., Tucker J.A. *New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post-communist Countries*. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. – P.5.

⁶ Ibid. – P.7.

⁷ These regions include the following regions: West – Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi; Center – Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Kirovohrad; South – Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnieper; East – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk. See: ratinggroup.ua

In order to track the recipients of the transfer of electoral support, we used the results of a poll when studying the directions of the electorate. We are aware that the format of the poll is somewhat hypothetical, as only completed elections can record the change and transfer of electoral support. However, a poll allows you to get information, albeit subjective, from a particular citizen. Accordingly, in this way we can see the main options for new electoral preferences.

Table 1. Comparison of electoral volatility according to the results of the parliamentary elections 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 at the national level and in relation to certain regions of Ukraine

	2012/2014			2014/2019		
	Total	Sustainable parties	New parties	Total	Sustainable parties	New parties
Ukraine	84,13	20,87	63,26	74,9	22,66	52,24
Volyn region	83,94	29,42	54,7	69,64	17,93	51,71
Lviv region	87,94	34,71	53,23	59,74	31,86	27,88
Vinnytsia region	85,77	27,59	58,18	73,76	23,98	49,78
Chernihiv region	74,25	20,56	53,69	73,66	25,52	48,14
Mykolaiv region	81,71	15,51	66,20	81,71	23,51	58,20
Odessa region	82,61	34,15	48,46	82,62	22,33	60,29
Kharkiv region	84,26	15,7	68,56	79,61	26,28	53,33

As we can see, none of the regions has the same indicators of electoral volatility at the level of general and internal and non-systemic. The highest indicator of general electoral volatility in the case of the 2012/2014 elections is in Lviv region, and the lowest one is in Chernihiv region. Accordingly, the largest indicator of the change in the level of support for permanent political parties was in the Lviv region, which, in our opinion, indicates the preservation of relative trust in these parties and the assessment of their potential. At the same time, the relatively high volatility of regular parties affects / limits the level of support for new parties, or their choice. The highest rate of increase in the votes of new political parties fell on the Kharkiv region with a simultaneous minimal changed support of the sustainable parties. To some extent, these results are due to the specifics of the events of 2014, when early parliamentary elections actually recorded the results of the Revolution of Dignity, which led to powerful changes in Ukraine's political arena due to the de facto closure of one of the country's largest political parties– Party of Regions, and the formation of a number of new parties that have declared their European orientation and focus on reform: the Popular Front, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the Samopomich Association and the Civic Position (Anatoliy Hrytsenko). Together, they received more than 58% of the votes and, with the exception of Hrytsenko's party, entered parliament and formed the basis of the parliamentary majority.

In our opinion, electoral volatility in terms of oblasts cannot be considered in the abstract as a certain programmed sequence of the arrival of new political parties in the next elections. The positioning of new political parties, or awareness of the characteristics of these new parties, is a rather sensitive factor. We cannot interpret positioning as ideological, as it is difficult to classify the majority of political parties operating on the political scene of Ukraine in terms of their ideological orientation. However, there is a certain political positioning regarding the current parties. It does not concern the whole range of issues that are traditionally covered by ideology, but only a certain part of the issues that are particularly sensitive in Ukrainian society. In particular, they include dichotomous problems: Ukrainian language and Russian language; orientation to the West and the attitude to Russia; support for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the prospects of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate; attitude to the national liberation movements of the 20th century and an assessment of the Soviet past. In this context, all previous elections, especially the presidential elections, have shown differences in electoral preferences between voters in western and central Ukraine, on the one hand, and representatives of eastern and southern Ukraine, on the other. For the territories that include western and central Ukraine, the definition of historical Ukraine is often used, as they were mainly part of Kievan Rus and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Accordingly, the territories and populations of most of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine were formed after the end of the Russo-Turkish wars and the annexation of these territories and the Crimea to the Russian Empire in the late 18th century. Thus, the residents of the western and central regions mostly support political parties that defend the Ukrainian language, focus on democratic countries in the face of NATO and the EU, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and positively assess the national liberation movements of different times and mostly negatively the Soviet period in Ukrainian history. The residents of the eastern and southern regions mostly have divergent position on these worldview issues and on the support of political parties.

Regarding the parliamentary elections analyzed by us, the leaders of electoral sympathies were recorded at the level of Ukraine and the vast majority of regions. In particular, in 2014 – the Popular Front (PF) and the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (BP). Both parties declared their orientation towards the EU and the corresponding set of values. In the course of the elections, their opposition in terms of values and geopolitical orientations was the Opposition Bloc (OB). During the 2019 elections, the Servant of the People party gained an absolute advantage in the country and in the regions. In this election, the pro-Western program was typical for the following parties: European Solidarity, Voice, A-UU *Bat'kivshchyna* (Fatherland) and Groysman's Ukrainian Strategy. Accordingly, the promoter of the pro-Russian strategy was the party Opposition Platform – For Life. To characterize the predominant orientation of the four regions of Ukraine, we considered two leaders of the parliamentary elections in each region, since the selection of only one does not give an adequate picture in the context of the dominant mood of Ukrainian citizens: in 2014 due to the Revolution of Dignity and in the course of the 2019 parliamentary elections, which took

place after the confident victory of V. Zelensky in the presidential election and a strong public demand for change in society and the arrival of new politicians.

Table 2. Leaders of regional electoral sympathies in the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2019

Region	2014		2019	
	Name of the party	%	Name of the party	%
Volyn	Popular Front	33,22	Servant of the People	41,76
	BP	16,89	AUU Fatherland (Fatherland)	13,08
Lviv	Popular Front	33,03	Voice	23,09
	BP	20,42	Servant of the People	22,03
Vinnytsia	BP	37,49	Servant of the People	37,91
	Popular Front	22,41	Groisman's Ukrainian Strategy	15,39
Chernihiv	BP	21,46	Servant of the People	50,67
	Popular Front	19,49	AUU Fatherland (Fatherland)	14,28
Mykolaiv	BP	20,64	Servant of the People	52,18
	OB	15,88	OPFL	18,99
Odessa	BP	19,63	Servant of the People	47,03
	OB	18,05	OPFL	23,35
Kharkiv	OB	32,16	Servant of the People	42,72
	BP	15,17	OPFL	26,55

As we can see from Table 2, pro-Western political parties prevailed, in the regions of Western and Central Ukraine in the course of the 2014 and 2019 elections, while pro-Russian political parties prevailed in the regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. It is noteworthy the result of 2014 in Kharkiv region, where the Opposition Bloc received the largest number of votes, which testified to the special political position of some voters immediately after the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Accordingly, when we consider volatility indicators and record the parameters of intra-systemic and non-systemic, it is necessary to prevent that in the regions we have identified transitions occur among different sets of parties with clearly articulated geopolitical orientations and publicly delineated value orientations.

As a part of the poll conducted in Lviv region on August 4-15, 2020, we surveyed a group of respondents who changed their party preferences by refusing to support the political party

they voted for in the 2019 parliamentary elections. We have included to this reference group those who have declared their readiness to support another political party or will not run in local elections, as well as those who do not plan to confirm last year's election and have not yet determined which party he / she represents intend to vote. For this category of respondents, we asked about the reason for the change in their political preferences / priorities. Out of a total of 1,200 respondents, 373 stated / mentioned that they had changed the political party they were ready to support in the next (local) elections, which was 31.1%. We are aware that some respondents may have forgotten who they voted for or did not want to acknowledge the change in preferences. At the same time, an interesting trend, which we have already recorded earlier is being traced, and it consists in hiding one's own electoral choice in the last elections if it does not coincide with the dominant tendencies or does not correspond to the prevailing sentiments at the time of the poll. In particular, only 4.9% of our respondents said that they supported the candidates of the political party «Voice» in the 2019 parliamentary elections, although according to the results of these elections in Lviv region, the party received a relative majority of 23.09%. A similar situation is typical for the voters of the «Servant of the People» party, when only 16.5% of respondents confirmed their position, although 22.03% voted for it in the elections. Instead, 29.0% of respondents said that they voted for «European Solidarity», which at the time of the poll was the leader of the sympathies of the region's residents, but in the course of the 2019 parliamentary elections it was supported only by 19.87% of voters. In this case, we capture the psychological feature of the average voter to identify himself/herself with the leader of the group / lollipop and «to forget» the previous version, which from today's perspective looks already suboptimal, especially since no one will be able to check it.

Table 3. What caused you to change the party for which you are ready / will not vote?⁸

Motivation of the decision	%
Dissatisfaction with the results of work / non-fulfillment of election promises	61,7
In the local elections, I support a different political party than in the parliamentary elections	9,9
By the positive information for another political party	8,0
Be the negative information about the political party he/ she voted for	7,5
Influence of acquaintances	2,8
Other	6,4
Difficult to answer	13,6

As we can see from Table 3, the dominant motive for the political agent changing, respondents note dissatisfaction with the results of work, or non-fulfillment of election promises. It should be noted that to some extent this statement is convenient because it is universal and shifts responsibility from the voter to the political actor who was supported by the voter. The reason for this conclusion is that the participants of the focus groups, in their absolute majority, do not know

⁸ Current archive of the Ukrainian Center for Public Opinion Research "Socioinform".

the content of election programs / promises of political parties / party candidates in the majority constituencies and therefore such a statement is somewhat incorrect. We must also keep in mind that this assessment is subjective and reflects an emotional assessment of dissatisfaction with one's own expectations that determined the former choice. At the same time, we must recognize that the programs of the vast majority of parties and candidates in the majority constituencies are common and built on a single stencil «for all the good, against all the bad». They have little focus on the distinct interests of specific social groups, the only thing they take into account the regional political preferences mentioned earlier. This position is manifested in a quick disappointment in the previous «hope» and the search by the respondent / citizen for a new political agent who should «do as the voter wants». The phenomenon of such expectations, in our opinion, forms a group of voters who, after the previous and on the eve of the new elections, are looking for another «new» party that will «do them good». As we can see from the example of parliamentary elections within Ukraine, such a group of sympathizers of the «new» is significant, at the same time the presence of such a group determines a kind of public demand for the production of new parties on the eve of each election⁹. To some extent, this is a public demand for populism and the perception of populism by the parties themselves as a tool to attract support from voters.

The trend of electing / supporting a new political agent in the next parliamentary elections is clearly visible in the results of the parliamentary elections in Lviv region. Each election brought a new leader of sympathies, who received a relative majority over other political parties.

Table 4. Changing political agents / leaders of political preferences by voters of Lviv region

Election year	Pedersen's index	Party, leader, of the election	Result in %%	Key Campaign Messages
2002	62,56	Victor Yushchenko's «Our Ukraine» Bloc (2002) ¹⁰	63,93	Opposition to the power of President Leonid Kuchma. support for reformers
2006	63,13	«Our Ukraine» Bloc (2006)	37,95	Patriots, supporters of the Maidan, reforms
2007	15,81	Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	50,38	Other, more successful and more correct «orange»
2012	35,93	AUU «Freedom» (Freedom)	38,02	Radical patriots, able to resist the PR
2014	82,14	Popular Front (2014)	33,03	Participants of the Maidan of Dignity, participants and volunteers of anti-terrorist operation, supporters of the European integration
2019	67,76	VOICE (2019)	23,09	New politicians who were not in power

A common feature of all leaders of parliamentary elections in the Lviv region was their novelty and belonging to patriotic or national democratic political parties. The only exceptions

⁹ According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, which registers new political parties, 232 parties were registered in the run-up to the 2014 parliamentary elections, and an additional 43 parties were registered after the previous 2012 parliamentary elections. On the eve of the 2019 parliamentary elections, 352 parties (+ 120) were registered.

¹⁰ The year of proclamation / registration of the party / electoral bloc is indicated in the brackets

were the early parliamentary elections of 2007 and the early parliamentary elections of 2012. However, during the election it was not a question of a new agent of political sympathies, but of a more correct or more radical one in comparison with the previous elections. This to some extent explains the low volatility index in relation to these elections and the predominance of internal volatility.

Thus, we can state that the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2019 recorded a high level of electoral volatility in Ukraine, which is mainly due to the transfer of voter support to new and political parties. Within the main regions of West, Center, South and East, overall electoral volatility is generally similar or commensurate. Instead, there are differences in the characteristics of the political parties to which voter preferences are transferred. There is a relative proximity of political advantages of the inhabitants of the West and the Center, who prefer the party, oriented to the EU, the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and positively assess the national liberation struggle of the 20th century. The basis of electoral volatility, according to voters themselves, is frustration with the results of the parties that came to power as a result of the previous elections. The psychological attitude to the rapid success of new parties is an independent factor that stimulates the formation of new party projects and their predominantly populist orientation. Instead, the inhabitants of the South and East regions adhere mainly to opposite geopolitical and value orientations.

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND DIMENSIONS OF STABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Artykuł analizuje czynniki instytucjonalne i poziom stabilności rządów i systemów politycznych w kontekście teoretycznym i metodologicznym. Wśród nich uwaga skupia się głównie na istocie korelacji stabilności politycznej i rządowej z parametrami oraz typami ustrojów politycznych (demokratycznych, autokratycznych i hybrydowych), formami i systemami rządów (w tym prezydenckimi, parlamentarnymi i mieszanymi), partyjnymi i systemami wyborczymi. Ogólnie przyjmuje się, że spośród czynników, które bezpośrednio i pośrednio wpływają na stabilność rządów oraz na stabilność systemów politycznych, należy wyróżnić polityczne, społeczno-ekonomiczne, moralne, ideologiczne, społeczno-kulturowe oraz te, które można uznać jako instytucjonalne i nieinstytucjonalne.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, system polityczny, stabilność, stabilność rządów, ustrój polityczny, forma i system rządów, system partyjny, instytucja polityczna.

The article is dedicated to theoretical and methodological analysis of the institutional factors and dimensions of stability of governments and political systems. Among them, attention was mainly focused on the peculiarities of the correlation of political and governmental stability with the parameters and types of political regimes (i.e. democratic, autocratic and hybrid ones), forms and systems of government (including presidential, parliamentary and mixed ones) and party and electoral systems. In general, it was found that among the factors that directly and indirectly affect the stability of governments and the stability of political systems in general, it is necessary to distinguish political, socio-economic, moral, ideological, socio-cultural ones, which can be combined and structured into institutional and non-institutional based on the variability of their relationship and mutual influence.

Keywords: government, political system, stability, stability of governments, political regime, form and system of government, party system, political institution.

As noted in a number of scientific studies, the stability of governments is one of the determinants and indicators of assessing the stability and even the effectiveness of political systems in general, and in different countries and regions of the world. However, in the study of the stability of governments and political systems, in addition to its indicators and methods

of measurement, it is quite important to take into account the factors and measurements of the stability of governments, at least in the theoretical and methodological context. In this regard, researchers note that among the factors that directly and indirectly affect the stability of governments, it is necessary to distinguish political, socio-economic, moral, ideological, socio-cultural, which based on the variability of their relationship and mutual influence can be combined in institutional and non-institutional. Therefore, their selection, research and systematization are the task of the presented scientific article, though mainly in the context of appealing to the factors of institutional content and content.

The stated problem was revealed in the works of quite a number of scientists, including S. Barbera and M. Jackson¹, B. De Mesquita, J. Morrow, R. Siverson and A. Smith², L. Diamond³, H. Eckstein⁴, T. Gurr⁵, S. Huntington⁶, G. Luebbert⁷, E. Muller, and E. Weede⁸, G. O'Donnell⁹, A. Przeworski¹⁰. Based on the achievements of these and other researchers, it is established that the main factors of stability of governments are traditionally considered: the effective functioning of the political system and all its subsystems; consent of leading political groups and actors of the political process; the necessary level of public confidence in the activities of governments / cabinets, in particular on the basis of the ability of the former to adequately represent the interests of the latter; high efficiency and legitimacy of the political regime and legality of power; availability of an adequate legal system; reasonable and rational distribution of powers between central and local government, and thus optimizing the number of political subsystems and the level of their autonomy; leadership of the country in accordance with the basic traditions, norms of morality, ethics and religion; lack of acute social, national-ethnic and religious conflicts; effectiveness of political communication; the presence of common elements of political culture in political leaders and subordinates.

However, according to scientists, some of these factors are decisive, and some instead additional or situational. At the same time, perhaps as the most relevant researchers traditionally and unreasonably consider institutionally, first of all rationally, conditioned factors of

¹ Barbera S., Jackson M., Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules, *"The Quarterly Journal of Economics"* 2004, vol 119, nr. 3, s. 1011–1048.

² De Mesquita B., Morrow J., Siverson R., Smith A., *The Logic of Political Survival*, Wyd. MIT Press 2003.

³ Diamond L., Towards Democratic Consolidations, *"Journal of Democracy"* 1994, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 3–17.

⁴ Eckstein H., Authority Patterns: A Structural Pattern for Inquiry, *"American Political Science Review"* 1973, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 1142–1161.

⁵ Gurr T., Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971, *"American Political Science Review"* 1974, vol 68, nr. 4, s. 1482–1504; Gurr T., *Why Men Rebel*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1970

⁶ Huntington S., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1968

⁷ Luebbert G., Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe, *"World Politics"* 1987, vol 39, s. 449–478.

⁸ Muller E., Weede E., Cross-National Variations in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach, *"Journal of Conflict Resolution"* 1990, vol 34, nr. 4, s. 624–651

⁹ O'Donnell G., Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, *"Journal of Democracy"* 1998, vol 9, nr. 3, źródło: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16904>; O'Donnell G., *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1973; O'Donnell G., Schmitter P., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions and Uncertain Democracies*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1986

¹⁰ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.; Przeworski A., *Sustainable Democracy*, Cambridge 1995.; Przeworski A., Alvarez M., Cheibub J., Limongi F., *Democracy and Development*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2000

government stability. This is quite obvious against the background of a broad understanding of institutions and institutional policy, which in terms of research absorbs the various currents of neo-institutionalism¹¹. The main thing is that the main function of institutions, including political ones, is to ensure stability by smoothing changes in the ratio of the rules of the game. In this regard, D. North emphasizes that “institutions are the rules of the game in society or, formally speaking, man-made rules that limit their interaction”¹². Instead, A. Stepan defines institutions as rules of decision-making, S. Crawford – as rules, norms and compatible political strategies; P. Hall – as formal rules and procedures for reaching political agreement and standard political practices that structure relations between individuals; G. O’Donnell – as a collective action to implement management and expand the field of individual action, as well as patterns of interaction that regulate the political system. Thus, despite the external differences in the definitions of political institutions, it is clear that all representatives of institutional methodology agree that institutions are a set of formal rules, informal restrictions and mechanisms for their enforcement. Therefore, the main function of institutions is to ensure stability by smoothing out changes in relative political values for various actors in the political process.

It is extremely important that institutional stability enables the exchange of political activity and its results. But it should be emphasized that stability does not mean functional efficiency. Stability is rather a necessary condition for the complex interaction of political actors, and efficiency is one of the mechanisms for assessing stability. In this context, the basic factors of institutional efficiency should include rules and regulations, competition and decentralization of decision-making. In this regard, D. North emphasizes that effective rules are those that block unsuccessful actions and support successful actions¹³. However, the choice of institutions does not always contribute to the growth of social capital, and competition does not always ensure the rejection of ineffective “rules of the game”. This statement is equally true for political institutions and can be used to outline and detail the factors of stability of governments and political systems in general. Thus, it is obvious that the political evolution and functioning and stability of individual political institutions depend on the once chosen institutional trajectory. After all, new, more effective, rules games may remain idle because their introduction requires significant initial contributions, from which entrenched traditional institutions are exempt. This means that the institutions seem to push the country into a certain path from which it is difficult to get out. Accordingly, a mixture of effective and ineffective institutions is always formed, and their ratio determines the trajectory of the country’s development.

However, the question always arises: which institutions tend to provide stability. To answer it, at least within the framework of game theory, it is necessary to establish the spectrum

¹¹ Riker W., Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, *“American Political Science Review”* 1980, vol 75, nr. 2, s. 432–446

¹² North D., *Instituty i ekonomicheskiy rost: Istoricheskoe vvedenie*, *“Thesis”* 1993, vol 1, s. 3

¹³ North D., *Instituty, institucionalnyye izmeneniya i funkcionirovanie ekonomiki*, Moskva 1997, s. 86

of the game in which political institutions are endogenous. The structure of the process in which any political institution is located has three critical peculiarities. Initially, the process is recursive, and the rules for choosing solutions are direct. Eventually, the process becomes conducive, as institutions do not affect political benefits. Finally, a wide and disparate choice of institutional procedures – types of rules – is established. Such a process is traditionally called dynamic political games in terms of political institutions. Interestingly, the recursive stage of formation of political institutions is related to the “self-selected rules” of static political models, which is reflected, for example, in studies by S. Korea¹⁴, S. Berber and M. Jackson¹⁵, as well as in the model of infinite regressive choice of institutional rules Lagunoff¹⁶. The proposed approaches establish social orders of institutional rules, directly based on the results that these rules nominate and promote. And such rules operate on the basis of selection of a constant result. Accordingly, the recursive model of formation of political institutions usually has two peculiarities: the established choice of institutes takes place in real time; the real model of the establishment and functioning of political institutions is more specific than the nominal one.

In view of this, it should be noted that the institutional stability of governments / cabinets makes it possible to make a complex exchange between political activity / reality and its results. Nevertheless, the institutions of executive power are by no means limitless. After all, even in democracies, their borders are not positioned as democratically legitimized, constitutionally fixed and legally protected norms, and their observance is not controlled from the outside. However, the penetration of informal practices into formal legal institutions can add relative stability to the political system, but to strengthen it is problematic, as stability depends primarily on the specific configurations of political actors and their strategies¹⁷.

When considering the institutional factors of government stability, it is necessary to appeal to the issue of political regimes, which in this context are probably decisive. Democratic governments and political regimes are much less likely to use violence against their citizens than autocrats. Democracies also create common channels for expressing dissent and opposition within the political system. As a result, both the government and the opposition have less motivation to use violence against each other. Democracy also contributes to stability by providing the opportunity for regular change of political leaders and public policy. At the same time, in democracies with political stability, the situation is quite interesting. For example, A. Przeworski believes that democracy evokes a generalized consensus, which is self-implemented when all important political forces and actors have little minimum confidence and probability

¹⁴ Koray S., Self-Selective Social Choice Functions verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems, *“Econometrica”* 2000, vol 68, nr. 1, s. 981–996

¹⁵ Barbera S., Jackson M., Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules, *“The Quarterly Journal of Economics”* 2004, vol 119, nr. 3, s. 1011–1048

¹⁶ Lagunoff R., Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcomes Sets, *“Economic Theory”* 1992, vol 2, s. 465–480

¹⁷ O'Donnell G., Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, *“Journal of Democracy”* 1998, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 120, źródło: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16904>

to succeed in a specific system of political institutions¹⁸. B. Weingast expands A. Przeworski's model, including the role of the population. Thus, in A. Przeworski's model, the stability of democratic regimes depends on the consent of officials. Instead, B. Weingast further notes that the restriction of the ruling political elites may require the consent of the citizen to react to officials if they try to rig the election¹⁹. Since democracy is an established and institutionalized aspect of civil society, the value of consent to the representation of elites increases. As a result, democratic institutions inevitably limit the executive branch and institutionalize political participation, thus strengthening each other. Moreover, the citizen's consent to support constitutional restrictions increases, in particular, the cost of election results²⁰. L. Diamond mainly summarizes this feature of democracies and notes that political elites choose democracy in instrumental execution, because they feel that the cost of trying to suppress their political opponents will exceed the cost of recognizing them and involving them in a constitutionally regulated competition²¹.

As a result, political science mainly uses the incorporated understanding of the relationship between the stability of political institutions and the political regime, which is reflected in the concept of indices of democracy and autocracy. Thus, in order to assess the degree to which the state is democratic or autocratic, T. Gurr once proposed to measure the "scale" of democracy and the "scale" of autocracy. States are considered fully democratic if they recruit to the executive only in the form of competitive elections, executive parity and institutionalized participation.

Instead, successive autocracies recruit to the executive branch in the form of prescriptions, designations, or combinations thereof, unlimited executive power, suppressed political participation²². As a result of theoretical and methodological strengthening of such a scientific position on the combination of stability and political regime, D. Rastow in one of his works justified the need to take into account differences between the processes of genesis and functioning of democracies, as well as between stable political systems and their formation.

The fact is that the factors that ensure the stability and stability of democracy are not necessarily equivalent to the factors that give rise to this type of political regime, and therefore in explaining democracy it is necessary to distinguish between its functioning and genesis. The reason is very logical, because correlation is not the same as causation. The vector of causality is not always directed from social and economic factors to political and does not always lead from positions to actions. The process of the emergence of democracy and the transition to a phase of political stability does not necessarily have to be uniform in all hypothetical points of any spatial model of the political game, as many paths can lead to democracy and stability.

¹⁸ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991

¹⁹ Weingast B., The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, *"American Political Science Review"* 1997, vol 91, nr. 2, s. 255

²⁰ Weingast B., The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, *"American Political Science Review"* 1997, vol 91, nr. 2, s. 245–263.

²¹ Diamond L., Towards Democratic Consolidations, *"Journal of Democracy"* 1994, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 3–17.

²² Gurr T., Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971, *"American Political Science Review"* 1974, vol 68, nr. 4, s. 1482–1504.

Therefore, the process of the emergence of democracy and the acquisition of political stability does not necessarily have to be uniform in length of time: the duration of each of the transition phases can be determined by various institutional and non-institutional factors. In addition, the process of achieving stability does not necessarily have to be monotonous in socio-economic terms, because even when it comes to a common place and the same amount of time, the stimulating positions of politicians and ordinary citizens can differ significantly. Therefore, the empirical data that underlie the theory of the genesis of a political regime, in particular a democratic one should cover for each country the period from the moment immediately preceding the beginning of the transition process to the moment of its final completion. This means that in the study of the logic of political and systemic transformations within political systems can be left behind the brackets of the country, the main impetus to the transformation and stabilization of which was given from abroad. The model or ideal type of transit process can be obtained on the basis of careful study of two or more empirical examples, and then tested by applying to other cases²³. In addition, D. Rastow quite rightly notes the necessary conditions for the creation of a theory of transition to a stable democracy: we need diachronic data that do not relate to a single point, but instead cover a certain time continuum. In addition, such a theory should be constructed on the basis of the analysis of those cases where the process of genesis is already essentially complete²⁴.

It follows from this statement that the construction of the stable democracy model in relation to an individual country or group of countries is possible only after the completion of the transition process and is unlikely to be the time of its implementation. Moreover, the chronological duration of the process of transition to a stable democracy may be different, even in the case of the same region or group of similar countries.

Studying the processes of democratization in different countries and regions of the world, researchers believe that the process of democracy and the formation of stable political institutions does not have to be uniform and universal in time and various dominant factors, as the behavior and actions of political actors in democratic periods transit is largely determined by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. In other words, the algorithm for a successful transition to an institutionally stable democracy for each period of democratization and each region (or even country) is separate.

In general, there are many considerations about the dependence of the stability of political institutions on the type of political regime. However, most of them appeal to various expressions of consolidated democracy. In particular, one line of research emphasizes the class of political behavior of political actors and is presented by M. Berrington²⁵, S. Lipset, S. Rokkan²⁶, G.

²³ Rastou D., Perchodyi k demokracji: popyitka dinamicheskoy modeli, "Polis" 1996, vol 5, s. 5.

²⁴ Rastou D., Perchodyi k demokracji: popyitka dinamicheskoy modeli, "Polis" 1996, vol 5, s. 5

²⁵ Barrington M., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern Europe*, Wyd. Beacon Press 1966

²⁶ Lipset S., Rokkan S., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, Wyd. Free Press 1967.

Luebbert²⁷, or suggests to consider the influence of democratic “civic culture” as a major factor promoting political stability, as, for example, in the works of G. Almond, S. Verba²⁸ and R. Putnam²⁹, or even considers the influence of the level of wealth endowed by individual citizens or their groups, as in the works of A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, H. Cheibub³⁰. Instead, another line of comparative political science studies focuses on the analysis of the elitist behavior and the creation of pacts on successful transitions to democracy. It is represented by the names of such researchers as G. O’Donnell³¹, T. Carl, F. Schmitter³², A. Przeworski³³. Finally, the third line of research focuses on cultural and socio-economic factors that divide the population and can lead to civil and political conflicts. It is represented by such well-known names as S. Huntington³⁴, T. Gurr³⁵, A. Rabushka, K. Shepsle³⁶, T. Skokpol³⁷ and others.

Based on the achievements of these researchers, it is necessary to propose two models of institutional stability, in particular governments and political systems in general, for transition countries. The first model is a stability scenario and is characterized by the fact that the defects of democracy are more functional in terms of system stability. This is due to both the government’s ability to solve problems and the underdevelopment of civic culture and the strengths of the ruling elites. Accordingly, the intertwining of formal democratic institutions, as well as informal democratic defects, turns into an equilibrium that reproduces itself and leads to the stabilization of defective democracy. Such stability is maintained as long as the specific defects of democracy guarantee the domination of the ruling elites and contribute to the interests of the part of the population supporting the system. Instead, the second model is a scenario of progress and manifests itself in the fact that informal structures in a democracy are positioned incompatible with formal democratic structures and become an obstacle to the government’s fulfillment of social demands. Elites are gradually becoming accustomed to the fact that informal practices that restrict democracy are increasingly giving the way to a permanent constitution and projected rules and patterns of decision-making. As a result, defective informal institutions are losing their influence, and more and more attention is being paid to constitutional and legal institutions. Therefore, in such a scenario, a defective democracy is

²⁷ Luebbert G., Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe, “*World Politics*” 1987, vol 39, s. 449–478.

²⁸ Almond G., Verba S., *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Wyd. Sage 1963

²⁹ Putnam R., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1993

³⁰ Przeworski A., Alvarez M., Cheibub J., Limongi F., *Democracy and Development*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press

³¹ O’Donnell G., *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1973; O’Donnell G., Schmitter P., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions and Uncertain Democracies*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1986.

³² Karl T., Schmitter P., Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, “*International Social Science Journal*” 1991, vol 128, s. 267–282

³³ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991

³⁴ Huntington S., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1968.

³⁵ Gurr T., *Why Men Rebel*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1970

³⁶ Rabushka A., Shepsle K., *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory in Democratic Instability*, Wyd. Charles E. Merrill 1972

³⁷ Skokpol T., *States and Social Revolutions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1979.

transformed into a constitutional-legal democracy. In this context, it is interesting that the experience of the first and second “waves” of democratization has demonstrated the fact that “sustainable” democracies are only viable if they become liberal and constitutional and legal³⁸. However, this has not always been achieved in the third “wave” of democratization, as many democracies have destabilized, not consolidated or even deconsolidated over time. All this argues that constitutional-legal and liberal democracy is stronger than illiberal and purely electoral, not only normatively but also functionally. Although illiberal democracies have won over the constitutional and legal political regimes in many third-wave democratization countries, they cannot be considered equivalent alternatives to liberal democracies, including in terms of the stability of governments and political systems.

It is also important that in the categories of political, in particular governmental, stability, the distinction between autocracies and democracies is based on taxonomy in three dimensions, such as the election of leaders, restrictions on the executive in decision-making, and the degree of political participation. Thus, autocracies are defined as political regimes that experience shortcomings in elected or elected leadership, restrictions on the executive branch, and enormous effective political participation. Instead, democracies, in turn, are political regimes and systems that have effectively elected and elected leadership, restrictions on the executive branch, and enormous effective political participation. It theoretically follows that strong autocratic and resolute democratic regimes demonstrate the greatest political and institutional stability, which comes from institutional and socio-political balance, according to which the maintenance of the established state structure is in the interest of political elites, including through autocratic or democratic control. Instead, institutionally and politically contradictory political regimes (those that show a combination of democracy and autocracy) or, in other words, hybrid political regimes, experience imbalances and exist for less time. Thus, in general, this shows that institutionally consistent states are much more stable than institutionally inconsistent states. Moreover, one of the most stable political systems is dictatorships with high degrees of political participation. Instead, the most volatile configuration is inherent in states whose leadership is situational or coercive, and the electorate is described as very small.

Accordingly, the combination of autocratic and democratic institutions and establishments in one or another state creates an extremely complex and even “explosive” connection. Not without reason many comparative and political studies, including the works of G. Eckstein³⁹, T. Gurr⁴⁰, R. Sanhueza⁴¹, show that successive states (i.e., states with consistent democratic or autocratic regimes) are the most stable political systems. In general, both democratic and autocratic governmental and political stability in general depend on a balance of institutional

³⁸ Przeworski A., *Sustainable Democracy*, Cambridge 1995.; Putnam R., *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1993

³⁹ Eckstein H., Authority Patterns: A Structural Pattern for Inquiry, *American Political Science Review* 1973, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 1142–1161.

⁴⁰ Gurr T., Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971, *American Political Science Review* 1974, vol 68, nr. 4, s. 1482–1504

⁴¹ Sanhueza R., The Hazard Rate of Political Regimes, *Public Choice* 1999, vol 98, nr. 3–4, s. 337–367

and socio-political factors, and the service of the established power structure in a state is in the interests of officials through despotic or democratic control. Accordingly, where such a balance is lacking, political regimes are characterized mainly by political and governmental instability. In the end, this confirms the preliminary conclusion that purely democratic or autocratic, but not hybrid, political regimes are more stable⁴².

However, it is certainly important to destroy the two-dimensionality of the political regimes interpretation as democratic or autocratic, as it significantly limits the understanding of the functioning and reality of political institutions. In addition, the appeal to the simple dichotomous distinction between democracies and autocracies is also imperfect. By overcoming it, we can better differentiate some institutionalized arrangements from others. In addition we can differentiate between autocracy, democracies and institutionally inconsistent and hybrid states, as well as differentiate between different types of inconsistent and hybrid political regimes, thus providing additional understanding of the implications of different political institutions, in particular for their stability. In this context, G. Eckstein⁴³ and T. Gurr⁴⁴ clearly argue that institutions can be grouped on the basis of different dimensions, among which are important regulation of the way the executive is formed, the degree of privileges and nature of institutions that provide balances, checks and balances. However, the most important of these additional indicators is the primary incentives for political leadership and political actors to maximize their current and future power and authority.

It is also interesting in this context to answer the question of what makes the institutions of an ideal autocracy stable. It is an institutional arrangement that hinders the competitive access of elites to the political power. The elected elite assign and determine the dictator in terms of positions of complete control without challenging his power from another political actor or from civil society. Loss of such control typically means complete exclusion from political positions in the future. Accordingly, the incentive to maximize political power ensures that the dictator necessarily protects and safeguards his power and authority. Such a system is characterized by a narrow concentration of significant political power, which determines how political institutions and institutions affect the distribution of power in the political system and within interinstitutional relations. That is why the ideal autocracy concentrates power in the hands of the political leadership, thus limiting the access of potential contenders to the channels of political power and competition. When the executive branch is limited by other establishments and institutions, potential candidates for dictators have access to channels for nominating candidates for positions of power. Thus, without access to such channels, the expected costs of refuting the shortcomings of autocratic regimes outweigh the expected

⁴² Gurr T., Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971, *American Political Science Review* 1974, vol 68, nr. 4, s. 1482–1504; Muller E., Weede E., Cross-National Variations in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1990, vol 34, nr. 4, s. 624–651.; Sanhueza R., The Hazard Rate of Political Regimes, *Public Choice* 1999, vol 98, nr. 3–4, s. 337–367.

⁴³ Eckstein H., Authority Patterns: A Structural Pattern for Inquiry, *American Political Science Review* 1973, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 1142–1161

⁴⁴ Gurr T., Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971, *American Political Science Review* 1974, vol 68, nr. 4, s. 1482–1504

benefits of narrowing the power potential. And this, in turn, stabilizes the political system and its institutions. The fact is that the opening of alternative channels of power – either through the powers of competing institutions to recruit leaders or through an increase in the number of people involved in the executive – gives the opposition a better basis and opportunities for further decentralization. Thus, the autocrat has strong incentives not to leave power on any of these dimensions and seeks to ensure that the cost of maintaining the power of the political regime is sufficient to prevent political challenges from the opposition. The political system is thus self-determined, and the dictator's interest in maximizing and retaining power becomes an instrument for the long-term existence of autocratic political institutions.

In this regard, B. Bueno de Mesquita and J. Morrow⁴⁵ argue that the cabinets of autocratic states tend to stay in power much longer than their counterparts in democracies, but this does not mean that autocracy as a type of political regime is more stable, than democracy. The main problem facing autocracy is consistency. Autocracy is able to survive the decline of dictatorship. For example, absolute monarchies partially solve this problem on the principle of birthright and the succession of the throne. Some despotic non-monarchies (such as North Korea and Syria) also used this practice. Therefore, even cases of family “regicide” tend to affect the duration of the head of state / autocrat, rather than the entire political system.

The identical problem of maximizing the current and future power and authority is the reason for maintaining the stability of political institutions in a democracy. However, the anomaly is the fact that democratic states and institutions are long-lasting and democratic leaders are not. The reason is that democratic institutions ensure that power and authority are dispersed, thus incurring the costs of adjusting electoral results and the expected profits from the next election, which are likely to exceed the opposition's expected dividends from overthrowing the current democratic political regime. It is on this occasion that A. Przeworski⁴⁶ theoretically models democratic institutional balance and notes that democracy evokes generalized agreement when all political forces have little minimum probability of succeeding in a specific system of institutions. In other words, there are more options to benefit in the distant future by extending the power of democratic institutions rather than undermining or overthrowing them. In addition, constitutional restrictions also increase the cost of removing democratic institutions from power and ensure that the “fate of political battles” will be preserved⁴⁷. And the consent of citizens in a democratic political regime, in turn, is to support constitutional restrictions on further increasing the value of the election results⁴⁸. In this regard, as noted above, L. Diamond⁴⁹ concludes that the elites choose democracy in the

⁴⁵ De Mesquita B., Morrow J., Siverson R., Smith A., *The Logic of Political Survival*, Wyd. MIT Press 2003.

⁴⁶ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991, s. 30–31

⁴⁷ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991, s. 36

⁴⁸ Weingast, Barry R. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” *American Political Science Review* 91(2):245-63

⁴⁹ Diamond L., *Towards Democratic Consolidations*, *Journal of Democracy* 1994, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 3.

instrumental sense, because they feel that the cost of trying to overcome their political opponents will exceed the cost of changing institutional norms and rules.

Finally, as for inconsistent and hybrid political regimes, they are not and cannot be balanced and stable, as their power is not sufficiently monolithic, on the one hand, and democratized, on the other, to ensure that the political process will not be blocked. In this mode, political elites experience a desire to gain more power for themselves and to compete with each other, creating a volatile system of functioning of political institutions and establishments. Tracking each dimension set of thus established the institutional and political inconsistencies; the source of instability becomes apparent. The fact is that, unlike ideal autocracies, institutionally contradictory and hybrid regimes lack the degree of concentration of power that ensures the stability of governments and the political system as a whole. However, the government is concentrated enough to encourage groups or people to challenge it. On the other hand, unlike ideal democracies, institutionally inconsistent and hybrid regimes lack incentives for people to work for and maintain a system of democratic institutions.

On this basis, it is theorized that there are two stable equilibriums that come from a set of inter-institutional relations, institutional structure and political regime of a state. The first equilibrium concerns the democratic type of stability of governments and political systems and is characterized by recruitment to the executive branch through regulated, open and competitive elections; parity of executive power with legislative, as well as open and competitive participation. In contrast, the second equilibrium boils down to the autocratic type of stability of governments and political systems, characterized by recruitment to the executive through regulated but closed procedures, voluntary executive, and extremely limited and non-competitive participation.

At the same time, the institutional determination of the stability of governments and political systems is due not only to the correlation with the types of political regimes, but also to factors that take into account the peculiarities and specifics of forms and systems of government. Against this background, in modern political science there are many developments that relate to the stated issues and correlations. Thus, comparativists very often state that the parliamentary system of government is more optimal and stable as compared to the presidential or mixed / semi-presidential one, because it contributes more to the development of the party system. Instead, it has been found that the presidential system more often than the parliamentary system contributes to the collapse of democracy or hinders the consolidation of democracy⁵⁰. In addition, it is comparatively established that presidential and mixed / semi-presidential systems are more vulnerable in the context of government stability and efficiency if they (other things being equal) are characterized by such features as: the president has a large amount of power over the formation of the government cabinet, the legislative process and the institutionalization

⁵⁰ Di Palma G., *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*, Berkeley 1990

of parliament; simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on the basis of different procedures; presidential elections by an absolute rather than a relative majority⁵¹.

At the same time, in this case it is necessary to note a rather important role of the contextual conditions of institutional choice. Thus, in many cases, the choice in favor of semi-presidential / mixed systems of government is dictated by rational considerations. After all, in different historical conditions, semi-presidential / mixed systems were certainly more stable and efficient than even parliamentary, in particular due to the fragmentation of the party systems of the latter and the unwillingness of most political parties to work in coalition governments. However, in this case, the correlation of the stability of governments and political systems with government systems is largely conditional, as it always and inevitably depends on the type of political regime in which the patterns of interinstitutional relations are institutionalized in the triangle “head of state – government – parliament”. The fact is, for example, that the penetration of informal practices into formal legal institutions can add to the political system’s relative stability of its institutions, but also create much more institutional problems for it. Thus, the stability of governments in this context depends primarily on the specific configurations of political actors and their strategies, and they, according to G. O’Donnell⁵², can be changed because they are not established through formal institutions in the long run. Thus, in the medium and long term, such survival of governments and other political institutions, mainly due to informality, has a negative impact on their ability to reform and function effectively.

Accordingly, the choice of system of government is largely due to the ratio of forces of the democratic opposition and the ruling elite in the process of democratization or autocratization. The institutionalization of institutional choice and the way of inter-institutional relations largely depends on the cognitive abilities of political actors. This dependence, as A. Przeworski⁵³ argues, is determined, in particular, by the knowledge of political actors, firstly, the balance of power at the time when the institutional structure is adopted, and secondly, the result of this relationship, which may be equilibrium or no equilibrium. Based on knowledge and assessments of the institutional environment and taking into account their own institutional preferences, political actors choose specific types of institutions, while consciously or unconsciously determining how stable and effective such institutions will be in the future. Thus, a particular state chooses “its type” of government by resolving the dilemmas outlined above and by choosing the procedures. However, each state always considers that in case of failure, the risk of regression, hybridization and lack of any type of political regime consolidation increases significantly.

⁵¹ Shugart M., Kerri J., *Prezidentskie sistemy*, [w:] Golosov G., Galkina L. (eds.), *Sovremennaya sravnitel'naya politologiya*, Moskva 1997, s. 198–246.

⁵² O’Donnell G., Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, *Journal of Democracy* 1998, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 120, źródło: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16904>

⁵³ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991, s. 107–138

At the same time, the institutional factors of stability of governments and political systems revolve not only around the parameters of state and regime significance, but also around party and electoral systems.

Therefore, in determining the factors of governmental and political stability, attention should be paid to party systems. In this regard, scholars state that among the criteria for the consolidation of parties in political science use the degree of electoral instability and fragmentation. Unstable are those party systems in which a large proportion of voters who change preferences in the intervals between elections⁵⁴, and fragmented – those party systems that consist of a significant number of elements, including parties, coalitions or blocs, etc⁵⁵. At the same time, the differences between the institutional preconditions and the institutional framework for the consolidation of party systems are important. The first are the necessary but not sufficient conditions for consolidation; they arise in the initial phase of transit of any political regime. Instead, the second are typically necessary and sufficient parameters for the consolidation of any political regime, a positive result of the transition to a democratic or autocratic political regime and a certain system of governance. This approach and indicators allow us to assess with a certain degree of confidence and reliability the results of inter-institutional relations in the context of development towards the consolidation and stabilization of political systems and their individual institutions.

At the same time, it is important that in considering the factors of stability of governments and political systems in general, as noted above, there is a non-institutional component, in which a special place is occupied by socio-cultural and structural factors. Thus, the dependence of governmental and political stability on the socio-cultural equipment of political actors significantly clarifies the understanding of the conditions of its definition, support and prospects for use. In this sense, even institutional factors find a sufficient level of problems, because the protest activity of the population, for example, can destroy or shake the functional-role foundations of political power – mainly due to unmotivated events. This is manifested, in particular, in the fact that the effectiveness of government in some cases is not a sufficient condition for the preservation of a government, and hence political stability. In turn, the structural factors of stability of governments are manifested mainly in the fact that stability must combine such parameters of the executive branch, which reflect the style of government (given by the preferences of the ruling circles) and real sentiments and values of the public, what ultimately implies one or another degree of integration of the executive branch and society, and hence one or another level of governmental and political stability. However, such non-institutional factors require detailed consideration, which should be the subject of a separate study.

⁵⁴ Pedersen M., *Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation*, [w:] Daalder H., Mair P. (eds.), *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, Wyd. Beverly Hills 1993

⁵⁵ Laakso M., Taagepera R., Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 1979, vol 12, s. 3–27.

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CONDITIONALITY, FACTORS AND INDICATORS OF HETEROGENEITY AND TYPOLOGIZATION OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The article is dedicated to analyzing the conditionality, factors and indicators of heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidential system of government. Attention is focused on the fact that semi-presidentialism is formally (institutionally and procedurally) and factually (politically and behaviorally) a heterogeneous system of government, and therefore it must be subjected to a comprehensive typologization and taxonomy. Since different types of semi-presidentialism, having positives (advantages) and negatives (disadvantages) and generating different risks and prospects, have dissimilar effects on inter-institutional relations, political process, dynamics of political regime change, political stability and socio-economic efficiency. In this regard, the author singled out the main taxonomies of semi-presidentialism into: president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism; unified majority system, divided majority system, divided minority system and unified minority system; presidentialized (highly presidentialized), premierized (parliamentarized) and balanced semi-presidentialism. In addition, the article traces the clusters of typologizations of semi-presidentialism and different approaches to their content. Therefore, it is argued that hypothetically there is no reason to speak of any established and perfect model of semi-presidentialism, even if it is concentrated in one region or one part of the world. Consequently, it makes no sense to compare semi-presidentialism as a whole, but instead it is much more efficient to appeal to its formal, factual and both formal and factual types/attributes as well as to political and socio-economic consequences caused by them.

Keywords: system of government, semi-presidential system of government, heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism, typologization of semi-presidentialism, president, governmental cabinet, prime minister, parliament.

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ЗУМОВЛЕНІСТЬ, ЧИННИКИ Й ІНДИКАТОРИ ГЕТЕРОГЕННОСТІ І ТИПОЛОГІЗАЦІЇ НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКОЇ СИСТЕМИ ПРАВЛІННЯ

У статті проаналізовано зумовленість, чинники й індикатори гетерогенності і типологізації напівпрезидентської системи правління. Увагу сконцентровано на тому, що

напівпрезиденталізм формально (інституційно і процесуально) та фактично (політично і поведінково) є гетерогенною системою правління, а тому повинен піддаватись усесторонній типологізації і таксономії. Адже різні типи напівпрезиденталізму, маючи позитиви/переваги і негативи/недоліки й породжуючи різні ризики та перспективи, неоднаково впливають на міжінституційні відносини, політичний процес, динаміку зміни політичного режиму, політичну стабільність та соціально-економічну ефективність. У зв'язку із цим, виокремлено магістральні таксономії напівпрезиденталізму на: президент-парламентаризм та прем'єр-президенталізм; системи уніфікованої більшості, розділеної більшості, розділеної меншості та уніфікованої меншості; президентціалізований (високопрезидентціалізований), прем'єризований (парламентаризований) та збалансований. Крім того, прослідковано кластери типологізацій напівпрезиденталізму і різні підходи до їхнього наповнення. Аргументовано, що гіпотетично нема підстав говорити про певну встановлену й ідеальну модель напівпрезиденталізму, навіть якщо вона сконцентрована в одному регіоні чи одній частині світу. Отже, немає сенсу порівнювати напівпрезиденталізм у цілому, а натомість набагато ефективніше апелювати до його формальних, фактичних та формальних і фактичних типів/ознак, а також до політичних та соціально-економічних наслідків, спричинених ними.

Ключові слова: система правління, напівпрезидентська система правління, гетерогенність напівпрезиденталізму, типологізації напівпрезиденталізму, президент, урядовий кабінет, прем'єр-міністр, парламент.

Institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism give relevant grounds to argue that this system of government is or at least can be extremely diverse, and therefore it requires a comprehensive analysis of the conditionality, factors and indicators of its heterogeneity, typologization and taxonomy. This is even obvious given the almost common *definition of semi-presidentialism* as a system of government, which consists of such mandatory and separate attributes/ characteristics as: a) the existence of the institution of president (it does not matter whether individual or collective one, but necessarily as the head of state, although possibly both as the head of state and the head of the executive) that receives its power for a fixed term on the basis of popular (in particular, direct or indirect one) election outside the legislature and is not responsible to the legislature; b) the existence of the institutions of prime minister (not mandatory as the head of the executive, but necessarily as the head of governmental cabinet) and its governmental cabinet that do not gain powers for a fixed term on the basis of popular (in particular, direct or indirect) election outside the legislature, but are necessarily collectively responsible (in particular, based on the parliamentary votes of investiture and/or no confidence) to at least the legislature (or both to the legislature and the head of state); c) combination and dualization of the executive by a president (necessarily as the head

of state) and a prime minister (necessarily as the head of governmental cabinet) with his or her governmental cabinet¹. Such a definition of semi-presidentialism is largely proposed on the basis of a synthesis of the existing interpretations of the analyzed system of government, mainly in the researches of R. Elgie² and G. Sartori³. Consequently, the argument offered at the beginning of our study is extremely important given the fact that different types of semi-presidentialism (and other systems of government), being endowed with their own positives (advantages) and negatives (disadvantages), as well as creating different risks and prospects, theoretically and methodologically can have different effects on inter-institutional relations, political process, the dynamics of political regimes change, the indicators of political stability and socio-economic efficiency⁴. Therefore, it is obvious that scientific analysis of semi-presidential (or any other) system of government should be carried out as a comparison of the influences and consequences of different types of semi-presidentialism instead of understanding it as a whole.

All this corresponds to the theoretical and methodological remark of A. Bebler, according to which it is hardly to expect and imagine any progress in comparative Political Science without *classifications and typologizations*⁵. This is due to the fact that Political Science classifications and typologizations (in particular, on the problems of political institutions and processes, including systems of government) are particularly important for the scientific discipline itself, as there is no general theory of policy and politics all researchers would agree with. Moreover, as distinguished by T. Landman⁶, G. Sartori⁷ and O. Zaznaev⁸, typologizations or classifications are necessary elements of systematization of knowledge on a particular problem, and therefore make the world of politics and inter-institutional relations less complex, in particular by giving a researcher “data containers”, which organize empirical facts.

As for the conditionality, factors and indicators of *heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidentialism*, the scientific position of P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones, according to which the issue of diversification of this system of government is intrinsic and objectively initial, turns out to be rational one⁹. The fact is that scholars from the very beginning of the idea of semi-presidentialism as a new constitutional and political type have not argued the difference and disposition of the phenomenon of this system of government in the perspective of the

¹ Lytvyn V., Do otsiniuvannia klasychnykh i postklasychnykh ta formulivannia onovlenoho i syntetychnoho vyznachen napivprezidentalizmu, “*Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho universytetu: Filosofiia, sotsiologiia, politologiia*” 2016, nr. 3 (31), s. 30–46.

² Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 13.

³ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997, s. 131.

⁴ Elgie R., *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 1–13.

⁵ Bebler A., *Introduction*, [w:] Bebler A., Seroka J. (eds.), *Contemporary Political Systems. Classifications and Typologies*, Wyd. Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990, s. 6.

⁶ Landman T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2003, s. 5.

⁷ Sartori G., Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, “*American Political Science Review*” 1970, vol. 64, nr. 4, s. 1039.

⁸ Zaznaev O., *Klassifikatsii prezidentskoy, parlamentskoy i poluprezidentskoy sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Kazan 2006, s. 186–210.

⁹ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol. 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

concept of representation, including the notion of representative democracy. As a result, the debates over the conceptual status of semi-presidentialism proved to be one of the longest in contemporary Political Science, but they did not immediately substantiate the variability of this type of inter-institutional relations. The reason is that initially (even referring to the researches of M. Duverger¹⁰) it was clear that semi-presidentialism is determined and diversified at least bilaterally, i.e. formally (based on institutional and procedural attributes) and factually (based on political and behavioral attributes)¹¹. Scholars (especially J. Linz¹², M. Shugart and J. Carey¹³) followed a similar logic even some time later when they began to appeal to different constitutional and political understandings of semi-presidentialism. On the other hand, it was not substantiated that the heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism is objective (rather than relative) theoretically, methodologically and empirically, and therefore does not turn this constitutional and political type into an empty analytical set and residual category. In total, this generated two scientific problems. The first one revolves around the differences between the nature and logics of representation in different systems of government and inter-institutional relations, which determine them. Instead, the second one concerns the distinction among defining the systems of government on the basis of indicators of their institutional variability and institutional variability within certain systems of government, including semi-presidential one¹⁴.

Accordingly, as J. Cheibub argues, it was initially obvious that definition of semi-presidentialism (at least as a political rather than a constitutional type) is not always sufficient, as it is not always able to satisfactorily and comprehensively characterize the functioning of this system of government¹⁵. *On the one hand*, semi-presidential systems are considered to be valid and functional if presidents, whose positions are interpreted as desirable and determined by the competitive nature of political process¹⁶, have effective (constitutional or political) powers in the process of governmental cabinets' formation and resignation/termination, actively participate in governance and public administration and are at least partially considered to be responsible for the nature, features and consequences of politics (as in Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, etc.). *On the other hand*, semi-presidential systems are

¹⁰ Duverger M., *Echec au Roi*, Wyd. Albin Michel 1978.; Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, "European Journal of Political Research" 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.; Duverger M., Avril P., *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Presses Universitaires de France 1986.

¹¹ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

¹² Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 59.

¹³ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

¹⁴ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Philadelphia 2006.

¹⁵ Cheibub J., Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work, "Texas Law Review" 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.; Cheibub J., *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009.

¹⁶ Siaroff A., *Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2000, s. 105.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy*, [w:] Przeworski A., Stokes S., Manin B. (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 279–281.

also considered to be valid and functional, even when presidential elections are secondary and uncompetitive, as a result popularly elected presidents are commonly perceived as “the nominal heads of state and the symbols of unity” rather than “political leaders”¹⁷, inherited in the fact that the systems of inter-institutional relations are positioned and function as parliamentary one (as in Austria, Czechia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, etc.). In general, this means that identifying constitutions and constitutional systems of government as semi-presidential ones does not really guarantee that they function semi-presidentially in political practice. It is helpful in this context to take into account the role of the institutions of president and the legislature in the processes of governmental cabinets’ formation, functioning and responsibility and the organization of political process in the framework of constitutional semi-presidentialism. According to G. Sartori¹⁸, this suggests that not all semi-presidential countries are determined by presidents who effectively participate in political process and share the executive with prime ministers and governmental cabinets. By analogy, there are also the cases of semi-presidentialism, where presidents significantly replace prime ministers and governmental cabinets, and therefore encroach on the principle of the executive dualism (dual executive), which is conceptually inherent in this system of government. All this motivates and assumes that *semi-presidential constitutions are important*, since they affect the way politics is deployed and political process is implemented, determine the ability of governmental cabinet to govern, the accountability and responsibility of the executive to citizens, as well as outline the parameters of political regime (democratic, autocratic or hybrid one) consolidation¹⁹.

Complementing this feature of the positioning of semi-presidentialism with an empirical (historical and current) list of its cases, for example, in Europe, R. Elgie²⁰ notes that the choice of this system of government corresponds to a wide variety of cases. For example, there are countries that have never tested the experience of democracy since the selection of semi-presidentialism, but, nevertheless, their constitutions formally meet the requirements of the analyzed system of government (as in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, etc.). There are also the cases of semi-presidentialism, which at some point of time tested the minimum level of democracy (even in the form of a hybrid political regime), but decreased into autocracy (as in Russia and historically in Armenia). In contrast, there are semi-presidential countries, which contemporary are permanently democratic ones in the electoral and liberal (i.e. maximalist) sense (as in Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, etc.) or only in the electoral (i.e. minimalist) sense (as in Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,

¹⁷ Kristinsson G., *Iceland*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 86, 87.; Raunio T., *The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints*, “*Scandinavian Political Studies*” 2004, vol 27, nr. 2, s. 133–152.

¹⁸ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997, s. 131–132.

¹⁹ Cheibub J., *Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work*, “*Texas Law Review*” 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.; Cheibub J., *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009.

²⁰ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, etc.) (they could even be undemocratic before the relevant constitutions were adopted). Finally, the political regimes of many semi-presidential countries are permanently hybrid ones (and previously even democratic or autocratic), as they are determined by the patterns of democracy and autocracy (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and historically in Armenia and Turkey, etc.). Thus, the isolation of these and other cases raises the question of why some semi-presidential countries are more stable politically and institutionally and more efficient socially and economically than others.

Answering this question, R. Elgie and I. McMennamin²¹ argue that semi-presidentialism is not a unified constitutional and political type, as it is variably determined by inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”. For example, there are countries that have: strong (including very strong) presidents, weak prime ministers and weak legislatures; weak (including very weak) presidents, strong prime ministers and active or strong legislatures; balanced or significantly volatile over time institutions of presidents, prime ministers and legislatures, etc. Y.-S. Wu draws a similar conclusion and notes that semi-presidentialism (due to its widespread use, especially in the European countries) demonstrates a wide range of political and operational forms and procedures, which may border on parliamentarism or presidentialism or may be characterized by constant fluctuations²². Hence, an important theoretical and methodological remark on the understanding of semi-presidentialism lies in the fact that there is a wide range of variations with a different set of countries that use semi-presidential constitutions, but apply various political and inter-institutional practices. The consequence of such a heterogeneity of inter-institutional relations within the analyzed system of government is that all semi-presidential countries (including in Europe) are not a single entity, as they are systematically linked to different consequences of political process. This conclusion is confirmed by R. Elgie²³, J. Cheibub and S. Chernykh²⁴, who note that the variability of countries with a semi-presidential system of government means that there is no reason to expect that semi-presidentialism has the potential to be an independent explanatory and analytical category/variable, yielding to different types of semi-presidentialism in this role and context. This, for example, demonstrates that comparing stability and effectiveness of a list of semi-presidential countries lacks fundamental validity, especially in the context of their

²¹ Elgie R., McMennamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

²² Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

²³ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.; Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.; Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011, s. 24.

²⁴ Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?, *“Constitutional Political Economy”* 2009, vol 20, nr. 3–4, s. 202–229.; Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Constitutions and Democratic Performance in Semi-Presidential Democracies, *“Japanese Journal of Political Science”* 2008, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 269–303.

comparison with presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Accordingly, as R. Elgie²⁵ and K. Rybachok²⁶ note, the task of studying the effects and consequences of semi-presidential system of government should cover all possible systematic changes and variations within the list of semi-presidential countries and determine whether such changes and variations are related to specific consequences of inter-institutional relations and political process.

This is extremely important given that it is quite difficult or even impossible to assess the extensively changing political phenomena associated with semi-presidentialism and to identify the factors that determine its heterogeneity and typologization without taking into account the clusters of cases, which are countries with semi-presidential system government, and its main institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes²⁷. With this in mind, the main clusters of typologization of semi-presidentialism are the groups of countries that share such important patterns of structuring system of government as institutional legacy, political traditions and the history of development. In the case of semi-presidentialism, they are supplemented by such indicators as: variety of conditions and circumstances for the adoption of semi-presidential constitutions²⁸ (in particular, through the prism of the motives of the main political actors, public pressure, as well as taking into account the institutional legacy of previous periods of political development²⁹); the way and logics of responsibility of governmental cabinet and prime minister generated by the procedures of their nomination, appointment, formation and resignation by presidents and/or parliaments; the subject of concentration of maximum political power in state (president, parliament or both of them) and its support or non-support by political parties in legislature³⁰. R. Elgie³¹ averages and somewhat modifies the outlined analytical logics and identifies such ways of identifying the clusters of typologization of semi-presidentialism as various origins and sources of semi-presidentialism, variability of presidential powers in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, diversification of the party composition of the executive (and primarily of the governmental cabinet), support for the executive (especially for governmental cabinet) in legislature. Moreover, the researcher emphasizes that they are interdependent because they complement each other and create a “path dependency trajectory” of the previous development of semi-presidential system of government.

²⁵ Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.

²⁶ Rybachok K., *Alterations in Semi-Presidential Framework in Ukraine: Appointment and Dismissal Powers of the President*, Wyd. Central European University 2014.

²⁷ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

²⁸ Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 56–77.

²⁹ Frison-Roche F., *Le “modèle semi-présidentiel” comme instrument de la transition en Europe post-communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovaquie*, Bruylant 2005.

³⁰ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

³¹ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.

The situation is also compounded by the fact that typologization of semi-presidentialism can be constructed on the basis of regional and national characteristics and clustering of the institutional legacy of countries that use the analyzed system of government. For example, it is on this basis that R. Elgie, S. Moestrup and Y.-S. Wu³² clarify and group the parameters of clustering semi-presidentialism in Europe and identify such its options as Western European semi-presidentialism and post-communist (post-Leninist) semi-presidentialism. They dichotomize systems of government based on the different nature and logics of socio-political cleavages, which determine the reasons for introduction semi-presidential systems, and therefore probably influence the choice of ways and options for distribution of powers among political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”. Thus, Western European semi-presidentialism tends to endow the legislatures with significant powers and post-communist (post-Leninist) semi-presidentialism tends to empower mainly presidents. Hence, parliamentary traditions are stronger in Western and Northern Europe and much weaker in Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, such a clustering of semi-presidentialism is quite conditional, and therefore it needs to be comprehensively clarified based on a comprehensive typologization of the analyzed system of government.

Summarizing all the above, it is critical to note, as noticed by J. Johari, that Political (and Legal) Science does not have a single institutional, procedural, political and behavioral principle and criterion by which a comprehensive classification, taxonomy and typologization of systems of government, including semi-presidentialism one, can be carried out³³. This regulates that the issue of heterogeneity of semi-presidential system of government and the ways to solve it are multivariate and complex, rather than unilateral and instantaneous. Accordingly, they revolve around various factors and indicators of typologization of semi-presidentialism and not only around the widespread taxonomy, which is usually based on the division of semi-presidential systems (which are traditionally, though often erroneously, called mixed) into president-parliamentary and premier-presidential ones, in particular on the basis of taking into account the powers of presidents, parliaments and governmental cabinets (prime ministers), the way of formation, functioning and responsibility of governmental cabinet and the executive in general and the party composition of legislatures. The fact is that a detailed analysis of institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes of semi-presidentialism makes it possible to identify among the various factors of its typologization such groups of factors that mostly revolve around the problems of formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets (it is about a formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism), dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive (it is about a factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism) and the power of presidents and features of the executive dualism (it is

³² Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism: What Have We Learned?*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 264–274.

³³ Johari J., *Principles of Modern Political Science*, Wyd. Sterling Publ. Private Ltd. 1989, s. 407.

about both a formal and factual institutional, procedural, political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism). This is largely due to the fact that an important role in forming a governmental cabinet under semi-presidentialism belongs to both a president and a parliament³⁴, and therefore president may (though is not obliged to) have freedom in determining the composition of governmental cabinet, but cannot ignore the ratio of party and political composition in legislature, since when appointing or nominating a prime minister or some ministers (or forming a governmental cabinet in general) a president needs the consent (usually in the format of an investiture vote) of a parliament. Moreover, this is due to the fact that the competencies of presidents in semi-presidential systems of government always include separate (significant or insignificant) powers in the executive, which the heads of state can exercise independently or through governmental cabinets and its prime ministers. Accordingly, as J. Blondel³⁵, V. Bogdanor³⁶ and P. O'Neil³⁷ note, a president under semi-presidentialism (complementary to governmental cabinet as the highest executive institution) is the head of state who does not lack political (executive and administrative) power. At the same time, a president is not the sole and individual "ruler of state" due to the position of an influential prime minister, who is not strictly subordinate only to president, as he or she is responsible both to president and parliament or only to parliament. All these mean that inter-institutional relations between the head of state and governmental cabinet under semi-presidentialism are necessarily determined by the executive dualism. On the one hand, this proves that semi-presidentialism is an independent type of systems of government, but, on the other hand, this argues and requires detailing of variability and heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism.

Starting to outline the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, it is advisable to proceed from R. Elgie's remarks³⁸ that the definition of semi-presidentialism should avoid theoretical and methodological problems of unreliability and endogeneity, and therefore should serve as a basis for identifying variable types of the analyzed system of government. In other words, the typologization of semi-presidentialism should be carried out without reference to the powers of various political institutions and actors, but should be based exclusively on the texts of legal acts, especially national constitutions, which dispositionally outline the patterns of inter-institutional

³⁴ Lytvyn V., *Napivprezidentska systema pravlinnia: konstytutsiino-pravovi vyklyky ta perspektyvy dlia Ukrainy na foni svitovoho instytutsiinoho dosvidu*, [w:] *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy: polityko-pravovi vyklyky i perspektyvy: Vseukrainska naukovo-praktychna konferentsiia*, Wyd. LNU im. I. Franka 2014, s. 38–63.; Lytvyn V., *Napivprezidentska systema pravlinnia u konteksti respublikanskoj formy pravlinnia: typologizatsiia, konstytutsiino-pravovi i politychni vyklyky ta perspektyvy reformuvannia v Ukraini*, "Studium Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej" 2014, nr. 2, s. 156–181.

³⁵ Blondel J., *Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability*, [w:] Kavanagh D., Finer S., Peele G. (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*. Boulder 1984, s. 162–172.

³⁶ Bogdanor V., *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.

³⁷ O'Neil P., *Presidential power in post-communist Europe: the Hungarian case in comparative perspective*, "Journal of Communist Studies" 1993, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 177–201.

³⁸ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

relations within the system of government. Complementing this logics and conditionality of the typologization of semi-presidentialism, S. Choudhry and R. Stacey³⁹ note that options/ways of structuring relations between the executive and parliament or inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament” in general can be the basic factors of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism. They are usually reduced to such major issues as the features of governmental cabinets’ formation, the features of governmental cabinets’ resignation and responsibility, the parameters of legislative control over the activities of governmental cabinets, the possibility of dissolutions of parliaments and holding their early elections, the patterns of the legislative process and control of the agenda (veto powers of presidents, the powers to issue decrees with the force of law, the features of budget adoption, the powers in martial law and state of emergency, the features of announcing referendums), the appointing powers and powers in the field of defense and foreign policy (a detailed list of issues is given in table 1).

Interestingly that the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Shugart and J. Carey⁴⁰ is positioned as the main and classical in this context. Scholars distinguish such types of semi-presidentialism as president-parliamentarism (that is president-parliamentary system, president-parliamentary semi-presidentialism) and premier-presidentialism (that is premier-presidential system, premier-presidential semi-presidentialism; parliament-presidentialism is often considered as an analogy in other languages) mainly on the basis of taking into account the peculiarities of the appointment and dismissal of prime ministers and ministers, as well as the responsibilities of governmental cabinets⁴¹. The first type is characterized by the fact that it is supplemented by the position of popularly elected president, who is formally authorized to appoint and dismiss members of governmental cabinet (and almost always to dissolve legislature or issue decrees with the force of law), and by the fact that prime minister and governmental cabinet are responsible both to legislature and president. Instead, the second type is attributed with the fact that popularly elected president is endowed with significant constitutional powers, but prime minister and governmental cabinet are the subjects of confidence and responsibility only to legislature⁴². In view of this, the distinction between the subjects of prime minister’s and governmental cabinet’s responsibility is a determining factor in the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism.

However, according to P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones⁴³, this factor can be supplemented by other constitutional or normative indicators that detail the attributes of inter-institutional relations under semi-presidentialism. Considering them, we appeal first of all to such a factor of

³⁹ Choudhry S., Stacey R., *Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia*, [w:] “*NYU Law Working Papers*” 2013.

⁴⁰ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.

⁴¹ Lytvyn V., Heterohennist i faktory ta indykatory typolohizatsii napivprezidentskoi systemy derzhavnoho pravlinnia: teoretyko-metodolohichniy ziv. “*Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy*” 2017, nr. 2 (88), s. 318–345.

⁴² Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.

⁴³ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz*, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism as the endowment of presidents with quite different powers in the process of nomination/appointment of prime ministers and the formation of governmental cabinets. According to scientists⁴⁴, presidents in various semi-presidential systems can: only to agree or veto parliamentary decisions on providing governmental cabinets with investiture votes; to nominate candidates for prime minister or options of governmental cabinets who are subjected to parliamentary votes of investiture; to independently appoint prime ministers without the consent (investiture) of legislatures. By analogy, semi-presidential systems differ on the basis of the constitutional powers of legislatures to control the activities of governmental cabinets, as they are divided into cases where: legislatures are dominant in this cut; legislatures are subordinate to the heads of state in this cut; the heads of state and legislatures are commensurate political actors in this cut.

The verification of the possibility of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule (or at least to dissolve the leading chambers of bicameral legislatures) is also extremely important in the context of the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism. In this cut, all semi-presidential systems should be divided into the cases where presidents are either endowed or not endowed with such powers. As a consequence, as M. Shugart⁴⁵ argues, it is expedient to taxon semi-presidential systems on the basis of a synthesis of options of inter-institutional relations concerning the resignations of governmental cabinets and the dissolution of legislatures. With this in mind, all semi-presidential systems are divided into the following types, where: the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted only to legislatures, which cannot be dissolved by presidents ahead of schedule; the right to resign governmental cabinets is vested only in legislatures, which can be dissolved ahead of schedule by presidents; the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted both to presidents and legislatures, but the former are not authorized to dissolve the latter; the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted both to presidents and legislatures, but the former are authorized to dissolve the latter (including on the basis of non-confirmation and restriction of the decisions of parliaments on the resignation of governmental cabinets). According to the theoretical and methodological logics and on the basis of the so-called “neo-Madisonian perspective”⁴⁶, which is based on the importance of “hierarchical” (when one actor dominates another) and “transactional” (when two actors are endowed with independent sources of power and must cooperate their tasks) patterns of power and inter-institutional relations, they are respectively called parliament-like premier-presidentialism, classical premier-presidentialism (of Madisonian type), president-like president-parliamentarism and classical president-parliamentarism (of Madisonian type).

⁴⁴ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, *British Journal of Political Science* 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

⁴⁵ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 336–337.

⁴⁶ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

Table 1. Groups of factors and indicators of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The subjects of prime minister's and governmental cabinet's responsibility, the features of appointment and dismissal of government ministers	M. Shugart, J. Carey	President-parliamentarism; premier-presidentialism
Empowerment of presidents in the process of nominating/appointing prime ministers and formation of governmental cabinets	P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones	Only consent or veto on the parliamentary decision to form cabinet; nominating prime minister or forming cabinet with the consent of parliament; quite independent appointment of prime minister
The powers of legislatures to control the activities of governmental cabinets	P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones	Legislatures are dominant; legislatures are subordinate to the heads of state; legislatures and the heads of state are commensurate actors
The opportunities of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	With the right of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule; without the right of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule
The features of governmental cabinets' resignations, the opportunities of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule	M. Shugart	Parliament-like premier-presidentialism; classical premier-presidentialism; president-like president-parliamentarism; classical president-parliamentarism
The powers of presidents in the system of separation of powers, the extent of the prerogatives of parliaments, presidents and prime ministers	V. Chernov	President-parliamentarism; premier-presidentialism, parliament-presidentialism
Nomination of the heads of governmental cabinets by presidents; participation of parliaments in providing investiture votes to new governmental cabinets; the right of cabinets or prime ministers to test parliamentary confidence in governmental cabinets; the right of president to dissolve legislature and call its early elections; the right of president to convene extraordinary sessions of parliament; the right of legislative initiative by president; the right of president to promulgate acts of legislature; presidential veto powers; presidential power to issue decrees with the force of law; presidential power to initiate referendums; the right of president to independently represent the state in foreign policy; the right of president to sign international treaties; the right of president to declare a state of emergency or martial law; political immunity of president	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	Dichotomy of semi-presidentialism on the basis of confirmation or denial of the factor and indicator of its typology (yes or no)
A way to overcome a presidential veto	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	No veto power is provided; 1/2 + 1 MP; 3/5 of MPs; 2/3 of MPs; veto cannot be overcome
The types of parliamentary votes of investiture in new governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Without a vote of investiture; ex-ante vote of investiture; ex-post vote of investiture; both ex-ante and ex-post votes of investiture
The types of parliamentary votes of no confidence in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Simple vote of no confidence; constructive vote of no confidence; simple and/or constructive votes of no confidence
Minimum requirements for deciding on parliamentary investiture votes for new governmental cabinets or confidence votes in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Investiture or confidence votes in governmental cabinets are not provided; negative majority; simple majority; absolute majority
Minimum requirements for deciding on parliamentary no confidence votes in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Negative majority; simple majority; absolute majority; qualified majority

This, in turn, motivates V. Chernov to expand the classical typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Shugart and J. Carey and along with president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism to distinguish such a constitutional type as parliament-presidentialism (parliamentary-presidential system, parliamentary-presidential semi-presidentialism)⁴⁷. Moreover, this logics of allocating options of semi-presidentialism is conditioned not only by the formal, but also by the real or factual powers of the heads of state in the system of separation of powers and by the scope of prerogatives of parliaments, presidents and governmental cabinets/prime ministers. This, according to V. Chernov, means that presidents of semi-presidential countries are the strongest in the case of president-parliamentarism, some weaker – in the case of premier-presidentialism and the weakest – in the case of parliament-presidentialism.

Finally, in addition to the indicators of formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism, it is often important to take into account the fact that not all semi-presidential countries require the official nomination of the heads of governmental cabinets by presidents. By analogy, not all semi-presidential countries regulate the participation of parliaments (or their leading chambers) in granting investiture votes to new governmental cabinets, as well as the right of governmental cabinets or prime ministers to raise questions about parliamentary confidence in existing governmental cabinets. It is also important that according to the types of parliamentary votes of investiture for governmental cabinets, it is expedient to divide semi-presidential countries into cases where they are not involved or are involved in ex-ante, ex-post or both ex-ante and ex-post formats. In turn, all semi-presidential countries can be categorized into those that use simple, constructive or both simple and constructive votes of no confidence in existing governmental cabinets. According to the rules of decision-making on parliamentary votes of investiture in new cabinets or confidence in existing cabinets, semi-presidential systems are usually divided into those where: there are no votes of investiture and/or confidence in cabinets or there are used negative, simple or absolute majority rules. As for the rules and requirements for decision-making on parliamentary votes of no confidence in existing governments, then semi-presidentialism goes to the cases with negative, simple, absolute or qualified majority rules. The formal institutional and procedural heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism is also complemented by many dichotomies regarding the verification of such attributes of this system of government as the possibility of president to dissolve legislature and call its early elections, to convene extraordinary sessions of parliament, to have the right of legislative initiative, to promulgate parliamentary acts, to have the right of legislative veto, to issue decrees with the force of law, to initiate referendums, to represent country in foreign policy and sign international treaties, to declare a state of emergency or martial law, to have political immunity, etc. In addition, semi-presidentialism can be variable based on how legislature can overcome the presidential legislative veto, because there are systems where there is no

⁴⁷ Chernov V., *Sistemyi pravleniya v Evrope: klassifikatsiya i sravnitelnyy analiz na primere stran Evrosoyuza*, "Politiya" 2008, vol 1 (48), s. 142–159.

presidential veto and systems where veto can be overcome by 1/2 + 1 MP, 3/5 MP or 2/3 MPs or cannot be overcome at all.

As for the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, they, in contrast to formal factors, are determined mostly by the real powers of political institutions and patterns of relations between them, especially in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, including, as noted by M. Shugart and J. Carey⁴⁸, as well as A. Siaroff⁴⁹, based on the taking into account the results of elections and compositions of legislatures. In this regard, it is worth noting that historically the first factual political and behavioral typologizations of semi-presidentialism belong to M. Duverger, G. Sartori, F. Frison-Roche, G. Pasquino, R. Martinez and B. Nica, who initiated scientific research on placing the institutions of president and governmental cabinet (prime minister) in the environment of distribution and composition of parties in legislature (a detailed list of issues is given in table 2).

For example, M. Duverger⁵⁰ and G. Sartori⁵¹ are known to have singled out semi-presidential systems of divided and undivided (unified) government, considering primarily whether president and prime minister enjoy the support of majority in legislature. By analogy and interpreting semi-presidentialism as an “instrument of transition”⁵² of systems of government, F. Frison-Roche proposed and tested a scheme that describes political and behavioral variations in the powers of presidents depending on their relationship with governmental cabinets, prime ministers and parliamentary majority⁵³. Because of this, the scientist taxonomized semi-presidential system of government mainly on the basis of determining and taking into account the political position of presidents in relation to majority in legislatures. A similar result and a similar theoretical and methodological logics were achieved by G. Pasquino who dichotomized all cases of semi-presidentialism onto the systems of presidential support or non-support in legislatures⁵⁴. In turn, B. Nica by a similar logic, but more optionally and structurally, identified the options of semi-presidentialism, where: president enjoys the support of single-party majority in legislature; president enjoys the support of coalition majority in legislature; president is opposed by a cohesive/coherent majority in legislature; president is opposed by a fragmented majority in legislature⁵⁵. Finally, a similar

⁴⁸ Shugart M., Carey J. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

⁴⁹ Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

⁵⁰ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 186.

⁵¹ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

⁵² Frison-Roche F., *Le “modèle semi-présidentiel” comme instrument de la transition en Europe post-communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Bruylant 2005.

⁵³ Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 68.

⁵⁴ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.

⁵⁵ Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998, s. 19.

conclusion was reached in the scientific researches of R. Martinez, who argued that based on the comparing the party affiliation of presidents and the composition of political parties of the majority in legislatures, semi-presidentialism can be trichotomized into the systems according, where: parliamentary majority is created and functions in favor of president; parliamentary majority is created and functions against president; parliamentary majority is created and functions in support of president, but against his or her leadership in the executive and political system⁵⁶.

The result of the early factual political and behavioral taxonomies of semi-presidential system of government was the typologization by S. Skach⁵⁷. This researcher, based on the assumption that semi-presidentialism recognizes the possibility of the coexistence of two “executives” (two centers of the executive), that is president and prime minister, managed to clarify the impact of dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive on the analyzed system of government. On this basis, it was argued that the dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, as well as the legitimacy and responsibility of the two centers of the executive in semi-presidentialism, are significantly different, since prime minister and governmental cabinet necessarily depend on the procedures of delegation of powers by parliament and are responsible to it, but president is instead autonomous from legislature and can act in the absence of its support. Accordingly, the tense relations among presidents, prime ministers/governmental cabinets and parliaments are unconditional, since they are caused and determined by the structure of semi-presidentialism⁵⁸. However, it is expedient to subject these structures of semi-presidentialism to taxonomy on the basis of different options of coexistence (balances, imbalances, conflicts) of the centers of the executive, as a result of which S. Skach singled out such types of semi-presidentialism as unified/consolidated majority system, divided majority system and divided minority system.

The first option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of unified/consolidated majority system and the least conflicting one, assumes that the head of state is a member or supporter of the party of prime minister, so that president and prime minister are supported by an identical parliamentary majority or majority in legislature. Such a scenario can be described by the procedures of alternation or successive change of representatives of different parties in power, and it traditionally (but not necessarily, depending on the inter-party and intra-party structuring of political process) argues that president or prime minister is considered as the “undisputed leader of the nation”. Moreover, the cases where presidents are the “leaders of the nations” and prime ministers are “the heads of presidential staffs” are still more common⁵⁹. As a consequence, the logics of presidential system of government prevails in such an option of semi-presidentialism.

⁵⁶ Martinez R., *Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions 1999.

⁵⁷ Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93–121.

⁵⁸ Lytvyn V., *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatyvnyi riznovyd napyvprezidentalizmu: perevirka dotsibnosti vyokremlemnia ta kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy zvitnoi naukovoï konferentsii filozofskoho fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117–122.

⁵⁹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 171,172.

Table 2. Groups of factors and indicators of factual political and behavioral taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of factual political and behavioral taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The support of president by the majority in legislature	M. Duverger, G. Sartori	Divided government systems; undivided (unified) government systems
The scope of presidential powers, president's relationship with governmental cabinet/prime minister and parliamentary majority	F. Frison-Roche	Based on the outlining and taking into account the political position of presidents regarding the majority in legislatures
The support of president by the majority in legislature	G. Pasquino	Systems of presidential support in legislatures; systems of presidential non-support in legislature
Support or non-support of president in legislature	B. Nica	President enjoys the support of single-party majority in legislature; president enjoys the support of coalition majority in legislature; president is opposed by a cohesive majority in legislature; president is opposed by a fragmented majority in legislature
The party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties of the majority in legislature	R. Martinez	Parliamentary majority in favor of president; parliamentary majority against president; parliamentary majority in support of president, but against his or her leadership in the executive and political system
Dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, legitimacy and responsibility of the centers of the executive, the party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	S. Skach	Unified/consolidated majority system; divided majority system; divided minority system
The party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	A. Garrido	President heads a party or coalition that has a majority in legislature; the majority in legislature is in opposition to president; there is no majority in legislature, and minority governmental cabinets predominate
Dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, the party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	V. Lytvyn	Unified/consolidated majority system; divided majority system; divided minority system; unified/ consolidated minority system
The scope of presidential powers, presidential-parliamentary relations, the configuration of party system	Y.-S. Wu	Quasi-parliamentarism; the predominance of president; compromise; alternation + based on the roles of presidents as "brokers", "partners", "layout designers", "commanders"
Powers of presidents, the composition of political parties in legislature, the ability to determine the agenda of the legislative process in legislature	T. Jung-Hsiang	President-dominant; parliament-dominant; prime minister-dominant; cohabitation; balanced + scenarios of semi-presidentialism: strong president against strong parliament; strong president against weak parliament; weak president against strong parliament; weak president against weak parliament

The second option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of divided majority system and a moderately conflicting one, assumes that the head of state, unlike prime minister, is not endowed with the support of majority in legislature. This case is defined by the procedures of the so-called “cohabitation”, when the most important executive decisions are traditionally (but not necessarily) made by the prime minister. As a result, the logics of parliamentary system of government prevails in this option of semi-presidentialism. However, in contrast, cohabitation sometimes strengthens political and behavioral powers of presidents rather than prime ministers.

Finally, the third option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of divided minority system and the most conflicting one, assumes that neither president nor prime minister (and no one in this sense at all) has the support of majority in legislature, but provided that the and prime minister are political opponents of each other. This case synthesizes the attributes of the most problematic model of presidential system of government (that is a system of divided government) with the most problematic model of parliamentary system of government (that is a system of minority government), when president is party-separated from parliament and prime minister, but legislature is internally divided and excessively fragmented itself⁶⁰.

The logics of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism proposed by S. Skach is largely repeated, but essentially supplemented in the scientific works of A. Garrido⁶¹. The researcher correlates unified (consolidated) majority systems, divided majority systems and divided minority systems, accordingly, with the cases where: a) president leads or is able to lead a party or coalition that has a majority in legislature; b) the majority formed in legislature is in opposition (in the form of cohabitation or coexistence) to president; c) there is no clear form of majority in legislature, but situations of minority governmental cabinets’ formation prevail. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the outlined theoretical and methodological series of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism in the presentation by S. Skach, as well as the case of typologization of semi-presidentialism in the presentation by A. Garrido are hypothetically and empirically incomplete or need clarification. It is theoretically clear and empirically established that there is such an option of semi-presidential system of government (it should be called unified (consolidated) minority systems), when neither president nor prime minister (and no one in this sense) has the support of parliamentary majority or majority in legislature, but president and prime minister both are the members of the same party, are associated with the same party or are political allies of each other⁶². Consequently, unified (consolidated) minority systems are not necessarily determined by greater conflict in the system of the

⁶⁰ Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, *“International Journal of Constitutional Law”* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 104–105.

⁶¹ Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, World Congress of the IPSA, Santiago de Chile 2009.

⁶² Lytvyn V., *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatyvnyi riznovyd napiu prezylentalizmu: perevirka dotsihnosti vyokremlemnia ta kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy zvitnoi naukovo konferentsii filosofskoho fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117–122.

executive dualism than divided majority systems and divided minority systems, although they are inferior in their stability compared to unified (consolidated) majority systems.

Finally, supplementing the consideration of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism, it is expedient to appeal to the taxonomies by T. Jung-Hsiang and Y.-S. Wu, who also argue that the formal powers of presidents are not always consistent with their real political powers. In this regard, at least three scenarios of the ratio of formal powers and real political power of presidents are theoretically possible: a) when president has strong formal powers and controls parliamentary majority, then the former has the greatest political power; b) when president has weak formal powers, but controls parliamentary majority, then the former still has considerable political power; c) when president has strong formal powers, but does not control parliamentary majority, then political power of the former is severely weakened. Imposing the above-mentioned features of the factual political and behavioral positioning of semi-presidentialism on the ability of major political institutions to determine the order of legislative process in parliament, T. Jung-Hsiang⁶³ identifies five types or scenarios/phases of the analyzed system of government, i.e. president-dominant, parliament-dominant, prime minister-dominant, cohabitational and balanced ones. Moreover, the researcher proposes four scenarios of inter-institutional relations, which are able to determine the dynamics of the political positioning of the head of state and parliament: semi-presidentialism with the institutions of strong president against strong parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of strong president against weak parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of weak president against strong parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of weak president against weak parliament. By a similar logic, however on the basis of such indicators of the typologization of semi-presidentialism as the scope (significant or insignificant) of the powers of presidents, president-parliamentary (congruent/cohesive or non-congruent/non-cohesive) relations and the configuration (biparty or multiparty) of party system, Y.-S. Wu⁶⁴ identifies such types or scenarios/phases of implementation of the analyzed system of government as quasi-parliamentarism, the predominance of president, compromise and alternation. In addition, the scholar complements the typologization of semi-presidentialism with hypothetical roles of presidents (based on their appointing powers), in particular as “brokers”, “partners”, “layout designers” and “commanders”.

Lastly, as for the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, then they largely combine the above-mentioned attributes and features of other

⁶³ Jung-Hsiang T., Sub-Types of Semi-Presidentialism and Political Deadlock, *French Politics* 2008, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 63–84.

⁶⁴ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.; Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism and Nascent Democracies as a Research Agenda*, Paper presented at the XX World Congress of the IPSA, Fukuoka 2006; Wu Y.-S., *Exploring the “Power-Sharing” Mode of Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the 1st IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2011; Wu Y.-S., *Management of Incongruence in Semi-Presidentialism: Taiwan and Beyond*, Paper Presented at the 22nd World Congress of the IPSA, Madrid 2012.

groups of taxonomies. At the same time, their main attribute is to take into account the correlation of formal and factual powers of different political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, but with a predominance of the emphasis on the institution of president. This implies that semi-presidentialism in the proposed group of taxonomies is topologized primarily on the basis of determining the formal and factual status and powers of the head of state. We can notice this in the researches of such scientists as M. Duverger, V. Bogdanor, A. Lijphart, A. Siaroff, Y.-C. Shen, O. Zaznaev and R. Elgie.

For example, the typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Duverger⁶⁵ has already become a classic one, because the researcher taxonomized the analyzed system of government into options with strong or all-powerful president (who is endowed with broad powers), weak or nominal president (who performs only ceremonial functions) and with a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers (when president shares power with parliament). In parallel, V. Bogdanor, appealing to formal and factual powers of presidents, distinguishes three types of semi-presidentialism⁶⁶: systems, which operate according to the mechanisms and logics of presidentialism; systems, which operate according to the mechanisms and logics of parliamentarism; systems with the division of power between president and prime minister. Similarly, A. Lijphart, based on the formal and factual dominance of various political institutions in political process identifies semi-presidential systems with the dominance of presidents, semi-presidential systems with the dominance of parliaments and hybrid semi-presidential systems. M. Duverger⁶⁷ supplemented this logic with a position on the expediency of dividing all semi-presidential systems into the cases with “imaginary” and “effective” presidents and, accordingly, into the cases of incomplete and complete (full-fledged) semi-presidentialism. This idea was adopted by L. Metcalf⁶⁸ and A. Siaroff⁶⁹, who began to construct different types of semi-presidentialism based on the imposition of a conditional continuum of presidential powers from the least weak to the strongest ones with political institutions’ inter-relations. Therefore, this became the basis for the separation by Y.-C. Shen the variations of semi-presidentialism in the form of quasi-parliamentarism and quasi-presidentialism⁷⁰ (see details in table 3).

⁶⁵ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 167–177.

⁶⁶ Bogdanor V., *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.

⁶⁷ Duverger M., *La République des Citoyens*, Wyd. Ramsay 1982, s. 103–116.; Duverger M., *Le concept de régime semi-présidentiel*, [w:] Duverger M. (ed.), *Les régimes semi-présidentiels*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 8, 17.

⁶⁸ Metcalf L., Measuring Presidential Power, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 2000, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 660–685.

⁶⁹ Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

⁷⁰ Shen Y.-C., *Evolution of Semi-Presidentialism: Toward a Quasi-Parliamentary or a Quasi-Presidential System?*, Paper presented at IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference “Whatever Happened to North-South?”, Sao Paulo 2011.

Table 3. Groups of factors and indicators of formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The correlation of formal and factual powers of various political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, especially presidents	M. Duverger	Semi-presidentialism with strong or all-powerful president; semi-presidentialism with weak or nominal president; semi-presidentialism with a balance of powers between president and governmental cabinet/prime minister
Formal and factual powers of presidents	V. Bogdanor	Semi-presidentialism, which operates according to the mechanisms and logics of presidentialism; semi-presidentialism, which operates according to the mechanisms and logics of parliamentarism; semi-presidentialism with the division of power between president and prime minister
Formal and factual dominance of various political institutions from the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament” in political process	A. Lijphart	Semi-presidential system with the dominance of president; semi-presidential system with the dominance of parliament; hybrid semi-presidential system
The correlation of formal and factual powers of various political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, especially presidents	M. Duverger	Incomplete semi-presidentialism; complete (full-fledged) semi-presidentialism
Formal and factual powers of presidents	L. Metcalf, A. Siaroff	Types of semi-presidentialism based on a continuum of presidential powers from minimally weak to maximally strong
Formal and factual powers of presidents	Y.-C. Shen	Quasi-parliamentarism; quasi-presidentialism
The nature of political leadership, dominance model, consistency and variability of political leadership	R. Elgie	With one dominant pattern of leadership (of prime minister or president); with no dominant pattern of leadership; with a shift from one dominant pattern of leadership to another
The nature of political leadership	R. Elgie	Presidentialized or highly presidentialized semi-presidential system; prime ministerial or premierized (with a ceremonial president) semi-presidential system; balanced semi-presidential system
The nature of political leadership, dominance model, consistency and variability of political leadership	O. Zaznaev	The model of presidential domination (presidentialized semi-presidentialism); the model of domination of prime minister and parliament (premierized and parliamentarized semi-presidentialism); the model of alternation of dominance of president, prime minister and parliament (balanced semi-presidentialism)

However, the main progresses in this direction were the researches of R. Elgie, who tried to taxonomy semi-presidentialism based on the nature of political leadership in the analyzed system of government. As a result, several variable logics of the typologization of semi-presidentialism were identified. Firstly, based on the nature of the dominant model of leadership and its consistency and variability, semi-presidential systems were divided into types: with one dominant pattern of leadership (of prime minister or president, i.e. prime ministerial semi-presidential systems and presidential semi-presidential systems); with no dominant pattern of leadership or with a balanced leadership structure; with a shift from one dominant pattern of leadership to another (in particular, from president to prime minister, from balanced leadership to prime minister, etc.)⁷¹. Secondly, based on the reduction of the models of political leadership into “pure” types, the scientist identified such type as: presidentialized or highly presidentialized semi-presidential systems (with strong presidents and weak prime ministers); prime ministerial, premierized or parliamentarized semi-presidential systems (with weak or ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers); balanced semi-presidential systems or semi-presidential systems of balanced type (with a balance of powers of presidents and prime ministers, including on the basis of cohabitation)⁷². To a large extent, the proposed variability of types of semi-presidentialism was supplemented by O. Zaznaev, who singled out such scenarios as: the model of presidential domination (or presidentialized semi-presidentialism); the model of domination of prime minister and parliament (or premierized and parliamentarized semi-presidentialism); the model of alternation of dominance, when president dominates in one period of time, but prime minister and (alternatively) parliament in another one (balanced semi-presidentialism)⁷³.

In summary, the consideration of factors and indicators of typologization of semi-presidentialism allows us to argue that the general directions in this regard are to address the issue of formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibilities for the dissolution of legislatures (i.e. the formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism), dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive (i.e., the factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism) and the strength of presidents and the features of the executive dualism (i.e., formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy of semi-presidentialism). Accordingly, this scientific article confirmed R. Elgie's⁷⁴ conclusion that various factors and indicators of diversification of semi-presidentialism may indicate that the analyzed system of government

⁷¹ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 283.

⁷² Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 282–286.

⁷³ Zaznaev O., *Klassifikatsii prezidentskoy, parlamentskoy i poluprezidentskoy sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Kazan 2006, s. 190.; Zaznaev O., *Modeli dualnoy ispolnitelnoy vlasti*, “*Uchenyye zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye nauki*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 205–211.; Zaznaev O., *Measuring Presidential Power: A Review of Contemporary Methods*, “*Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*” 2014, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 569–573.

⁷⁴ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.

can be very multivariate, and therefore it should be considered in a complex and on the basis of permanent comparisons. This, in turn, means that hypothetically there is no reason to speak of any established and perfect model of semi-presidentialism, even if it is concentrated in one region or one part of the world. Consequently, it makes no sense to compare semi-presidentialism as a whole, but instead it is much more efficient to appeal to its formal, factual and both formal and factual types/attributes as well as to political and socio-economic consequences caused by them. By analogy, it is not entirely expedient to appeal to semi-presidentialism on the basis of its reduction to some standard or typical case, but instead, though with a degree of conventionality, it is worth talking about certain ideal manifestations of different types of semi-presidentialism.

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12. Duverger M., *La République des Citoyens*, Wyd. Ramsay 1982.
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14. Duverger M., Avril P., *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Presses Universitaires de France 1986.

15. Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.
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ON THE ESSENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN ETHNOPOLITICAL PROCESS: THEORETIZATION ON THE BACKGROUND OF EVENTS IN UKRAINE

Artykuł analizuje istotę zjawisk podmiotowości i upodmiotowienia mniejszości narodowych. Badania przygotowywane są w kontekście teoretycznym, ale w oparciu o teoretyzowanie rzeczywistych przejawów podmiotowości i upodmiotowienia mniejszości narodowych w Ukrainie. Uznano, że upodmiotowienie mniejszości narodowych jest jednym z warunków wstępnych ich upolitycznienia i odbywa się na takich płaszczyznach, jak ideologia, formacja elit, formacja społeczna i formacja państwowa. W efekcie argumentuje się, że problem politycznego upodmiotowienia mniejszości narodowych, w tym w Ukrainie, jako proceduralnej charakterystyki ustroju społeczeństwa, ma charakter dość złożony i sprzeczny, a zatem nie ma identycznych i utrwalonych reguł.

Słowa kluczowe: mniejszości narodowe, podmiotowość, upodmiotowienie, etnopolityka, przedmiot polityki, ideologia, formacja elit, formacja społeczna, formacja państwowa, Ukraina.

The article is devoted to analyzing the essence of the phenomena of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities. The research is prepared in a theoretical context, but on the basis of theorizing the real manifestations of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities in Ukraine. The author revealed that the subjectification of national minorities is one of the prerequisites of their politicization, which takes place at such levels as idea, elite, society and state formation. As a result, it was argued that the problem of political subjectification of national minorities, including in Ukraine, as a procedural characteristic of the political system of society is quite complex and contradictory in nature, and therefore has no identical and consolidated recipes for solving.

Keywords: national minorities, subjectivity, subjectification, ethno politics, subject of politics, idea, elite, society and state formation, Ukraine.

Today, in almost every European country or even every country in the world, there are ethnic / national groups that seek to preserve their cultural independence and demand recognition as a titular or individual ethnic group. Accordingly, national minorities become or are trying to become a subject of politics in the process of defending first of all their ethno cultural identity. In other words, the protection of ethno cultural specifics at the state level is the motivational

foundation of the interests of all national minorities, especially within the specific features of the political process in a given state. In this context, national minorities should be seen as one of the constituents in politics. The fact is that ethno politics in a country becomes much more meaningful and decisive only when it becomes clearer what goals and objectives it is aimed at, which subjects and objects are involved in its implementation at a certain historical stage development. In view of this, clarifying the essence of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities in the ethno political process opens wide possibilities for determining the attributes of relations between subjects and objects of ethno politics, features and parameters of forms of their political behavior, as well as ways of ethno political activities. It is suggested to follow this on the example of the practical experience of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities in the ethno political process of Ukraine theorizing.

The stated research issues are revealed in a number of scientific works of scientists both from Ukraine and abroad, but some of them directly, and some only indirectly serve to reveal the task actualized in our scientific article. The fact is that the history of the study of the political subjectivity of national minorities is relatively short. It is known that national minorities have repeatedly been the subject of research, not as actors, but mainly as objects of politics and law. This is due to the fact that the events of the 20th century – the collapse of European empires in the First World War, the processes of decolonization and national revolutions in many countries – did not allow the problem of national minorities to move from the center to the periphery of political and philosophical thought. This, in turn, means that the problem of political subjectivity of national minorities is complex and its full analysis is impossible without reliance on fundamental research by L. Wirth¹, J. Hutchinson and E. Smith², E. Gellner³, W. Kymlicka⁴, K. Popper⁵ and many other scientists. As for the research on the issue of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities in the ethno-political process of Ukraine, it was revealed in the works of researchers of both the past and present. To the first, historical group belong such Ukrainian scientists as V. Antonovych⁶, Y. Bachynskyi⁷, M. Hrushevskyi⁸, M. Drahomanov⁹,

¹ Wirth L., *The Problem of Minority Groups*, [w:] Linton R., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, New York 1945, s. 347.

² Hutchinson Dzh., Smit E., *Sheho take etnichnist*, [w:] *Natsionalizm: Antolohiia*, Wyd. Smoloskyp 2000, s. 468–475; Smit E., *Natsii ta natsionalizm u blobalnu epokhu*, Wyd. Nika-Tsentr 2006; Smit E., *Natsionalizm i modernizm: Krytycheskyi obzor sovremennyih teorii natsiy i natsionalizma*, Wyd. Praksis 2004; Smit E., *Natsionalizm: Teoriia, ideolohiia, istoriia*, Wyd. K.I.S., 2004; Smit E., *Natsionalna identychnist*, Wyd. Osnovy 1994

³ Helner E., *Natsii ta natsionalizm. Natsionalizm*, Kyiv 2003; Helner E., Prishestvie natsionalizma. Mify natsii i klasa, "Put: mezhdunarodnyiy filosofskiy zhurnal" 1992, vol 1, s. 9–61

⁴ Kymlicka W., Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State, "Ethics & International Affairs" 2006, vol 20, nr. 3, s. 281–304; Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995; Kymlicka W., *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

⁵ Popper K., *Otkrytie obschestvo i ego vrugi*, Wyd. Feniks 1992

⁶ Antonovych V., *Pro Kozatski chasy na Ukraini*, Wyd. Dnipro 1991.

⁷ Bachynskyi Y., *Bilshovytska revoliutsiia i ukrainitsi: Krytychni zamitky*, Berlin 1928.

⁸ Hrushevskyi M., *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy: v 11 t.*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 1991.

⁹ Drahomanov M., *Propashchyni chas: Ukrainitsi pid Moskovskym tsarstvom (1654–1876)*, Wyd. Tsentr pamiatkoznavstva AN Ukrainy 1992.; Hrinchenko B., Drahomanov M., *Dialohy pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu*, Wyd. NAN Ukrainy 1994

M. Kostomarov¹⁰, V. Lypynskiy¹¹, M. Mikhnovskiy¹² and others, who dealt with this issue indirectly. Instead, the second, newest, group is represented by Ukrainian and Russian researchers who appeal to the issues of subjectivity of national minorities, including in Ukraine, more directly, in particular O. Antonyuk¹³, Y. Bromley¹⁴, I. Varzar¹⁵, M. Guboglo¹⁶, V. Dubinin¹⁷, V. Yevtuh¹⁸, O. Kartunov¹⁹, G. Kasyanov²⁰, V. Kotygorenko²¹, I. Kresina²², I. Kuras²³, O. Maiboroda²⁴, V. Naulko²⁵, O. Nelga²⁶, V. Nikityuk²⁷, M. Obushnyi²⁸, M. Panchuk²⁹, O. Rafalskiy³⁰, Y. Levenets³¹, Y. Shapoval³², S. Rymarenko³³, L. Nagorna³⁴, A. Ponomarev³⁵, L. Shklyar³⁶ and many others. Interestingly that, in general, the subject of their scientific interest was issues of ethno-political nature, including the assessment of subjectivity and subjectivation of national minorities in Ukraine. However, at the same time, it has been recorded that the issues of national minorities in Ukraine have been and still are mainly dealt with by ethnologists, historians, philosophers, lawyers, sociologists, as a result of which national minorities are insufficiently examined as a political phenomenon, including in terms of their subjectivity and subjectification. However, even against this background, the works of these researchers

¹⁰ Kostomarov N., Dve russkie narodnosti (Pismo redaktora), "Osnova" 1861, nr. 3, s. 33–80; Kostomarov N., *Russkaya istoriya v zhbizneopisaniiakh glavnyskh ee deyatelnykh*, Wyd. Esmo 2007.

¹¹ Lypynskiy V., *Lysty do bratru-khliborobiv. Pro ideii i orhanizatsiiu ukrainskoho monarkhizmu*, Wyd. Kyiv-Filadelfia 1995

¹² Mikhnovskiy M., *Samostiina Ukraina*, Wyd. Diokor 2002.

¹³ Antoniuk O., *Formuvannia etnopolityky v Ukraini: teoretyko-metodolohichni ta kontseptualni zasady*, Kyiv 2001

¹⁴ Bromley Y., *Etnosotsialnye protsessy: teoriya, istoriya, sovremennost*, Moskva 1987.

¹⁵ Varzar I., *Iz kontekstiv mynulykh lit: Vybrane v kontseptualnykh i memuarnykh vymirakh*, Wyd. Fada 2003, vol 1.; Varzar I., *Politychna etnolohiia yak nauka: istoriolohiia, teoriia, metodolohiia, prakseolohiia*, Wyd. Shkoliar 1994.

¹⁶ Huboglo M., *Yazyki etnicheskoy mobilizatsii*, Moskva 1998.

¹⁷ Dubinin V., *Rol interesiv narodu u ustanovlenii ta rozrytku politychnoi systemy suspilstva*, Kramatorsk 2006

¹⁸ Yevtuh V., *Etnopolityka v Ukraini: pravnychi ta kulturolohichni aspekty*, Wyd. Feniks 1997.; Yevtuh V., *Etnosuspilni protsesy v Ukraini: mozhyvosti naukovykh interpretatsii*, Wyd. Stylos 2004.

¹⁹ Kartunov O., *Zakbidni konseptsii etnichnosti, natsii ta natsionalizmu*, Kyiv 2007.

²⁰ Kasianov H., *Teorii natsii ta natsionalizmu*, Wyd. Lybid 1999.

²¹ Kotygorenko V., Kompromis u mizhethnichnykh vzaiemnykh: poshuk pravovoi formuly v suchasni Ukraini, "Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy" 2001, vol 15, s. 180–188.

²² Kresina I., *Ukrainska natsionalna svidomist i suchasni politychni protsesy*, Ed. Vyscha shkola 1998.

²³ Kuras I., *Etnopolitolohiia v Ukraini. Stanovlennia. Shcho dali?*, Ed. Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy 2002.; Kuras I., *Etnopolitolohiia. Pershi kroky stanovlennia*, Ed. Hencza 2004.; Kuras I., *Skbid i Zakbid Ukrainy: problemy yednannia*, Ed. NAN Ukrainy 2001.

²⁴ Maiboroda O., *Rosiiskiy natsionalizm v Ukraini (1991–1998 rr.)*, Ed. KM Academia 1999.

²⁵ Naulko V., *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh svyazey na Ukraine*, Ed. Naukova dumka 1975.

²⁶ Nelha O., *Teoriia etnosu*, Ed. Tandem 1997.

²⁷ Nikitiuk V., *Status etnonatsionalnykh menshyn (porivnialno-pravnyi aspekt)*, Kyiv 1996.

²⁸ Obushnyi M., *Etnonatsionalna identychnist v konteksti formuvannia ukrainskoi natsii*, Ed. IPIEND 1999.; Obushnyi M., *Etnos i natsiia: problemy identychnosti*, Kyiv 1998.

²⁹ Panchuk M., *Natsionalni menshyny Ukrainy u XX stolitti: polityko-pravnyi aspekt*, Ed. IPIEND 2000.

³⁰ Rafalskiy O., *Natsionalni menshyny Ukrainy u XX stolitti. Istoriobrafichnyi narys*, Ed. Polius 2000.; Rafalskiy O., *Natsionalni menshyny Ukrainy u XX stolitti: polityko-pravnyi aspekt*, Ed. IPIEND 2000.

³¹ Levenets Y., *Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, Ed. Naukova dumka 1994.

³² Shapoval Y., *Etnopolitychnyi rozrytok Ukrainy: dosvid, problemy, perspektvy*, Kyiv 1997.

³³ Rymarenko S., *Samovyznachennia osoby, natsii, derzhavy*, Ed. lurydychna knyha 2000.

³⁴ Nahorna L., *Etnopolitychnyi rozrytok Ukrainy: dosvid, problemy, perspektvy*, Kyiv 1997.

³⁵ Ponomarev A., *Etnichnist ta etnichna istoriia Ukrainy*, Ed. Lybid 1996.

³⁶ Shkliar L., *Etnoderzhavoznavstvo. Teoretyko-metodolohichni zasady*, Kyiv 2001.

reveal some aspects of political subjectivity, on the one hand, although in general against the background of minority issues, on the other hand.

Based on the appeal to the works of these scholars, it has been established that the evaluative determinants of subjectivity and subjectification of national minorities in the ethno political process are the categories of subjects and objects of politics in general and ethno politics in particular. The political actors are people, their organizations, movements, institutions and individuals involved in the political life of society and the country, whose active practical activities are aimed at transforming the socio-political or other spheres of human life as relevant objects of politics. Thus, policy subjects are able to formulate and implement specific goals, have conscious interests and needs, purposeful activity, and i.e. are the main regulator of interaction with policy entities. In other words, subject of politics are those individuals, organizations or social groups who constantly and relatively independently participate in political life in accordance with their interests, influence the political behavior of other subject of politics and thus cause certain changes in their actions and perturbations in the political system and political process³⁷.

In the course of his activity, the subject of politics inevitably interacts with real socio-political relations and chooses from them the layer that has a certain interest in him. Therefore, the object of politics is the subject and specific branch of reality that has become significant, interesting and necessary for the subject of politics. The objects of politics – are real political reality with its inherent socio-political, but primarily political relations and the political system of society in general, its elements, forms of political life, as well as the sphere of political interests and contradictions in the political process, and within the state, and in the regional or global space. It follows that the object of policy forms an idea of what the subject of policy directs its activity in the form of transformative or destructive political activity or inaction.

In view of this, it is noteworthy that the subjects and objects of ethno politics are obligatory elements of ethno political relations and ethno political process, as a result of which they should be considered in dialectical unity, interconnection and interdependence. At the same time, each of them has its own characteristics and functions. Thus, the subjects of ethno politics include persons who show national self-awareness and ethnic community among themselves, and in general ethnic groups, nations and national (or ethnic) minorities, indigenous peoples, parties, state, ethnic leaders and institutions created by them and organizations that take an active and conscious part in the ethno-political and ethno-national development and process. It is the awareness of all of them of their ethno political interests that makes them subjects of ethno politics, and instead of not understanding them, they are objects of ethno politics. Accordingly, the objects of ethno politics are all those phenomena of ethno political and socio-political life, which are aimed at the activities of subjects of ethno politics. The objects of ethno politics are traditionally the political system of society, elements and forms of political

³⁷ Kolodii A., Klymanska L., Kosmyna Ya., Kharchenko V., *Politolohiia*, Wyd. Elha, Nika-Tsentr 2003, s. 83

life, the sphere of ethno political interests, the contradictions of the ethno political process, both in the national and world context.

The situation in Ukraine is no exception in this context, in which the development of ethno political life, the strength of the influence of political actors on decision-making in the ethno national sphere gave and gives the grounds to classify them into primary (basic) ones and secondary ones. The primary (basic) subjects of ethno politics are ethnically, nationally and politically conscious individuals, ethnic groups, nations, and national (ethnic) minorities, indigenous peoples, which arose in an objective and natural-historical way, and not as a result of purposeful action, and create their own associations that reflect their ethno political interests or promote their implementation³⁸. In contrast, the secondary subjects of ethno politics are socio-political actors derived from the primary subjects of ethno politics, including states, parties, ethno political and ethno national associations, ethnic elites, which participate in the decision-making and implementation associated with the activities of the primary subjects of ethno politics. It is noteworthy that in large social groups as the primary subjects of politics, their internal and mutual connection and separation, self-determination, self-organization and consolidation are the condition for the emergence of certain political organizations, social institutions and government agencies. Their interests outline the potential field of policy, the sphere of confrontation and cooperation, as well as the functions and boundaries of power. Without the need outlined by them, the effective functioning of parties, the development, dissemination and imitation of their strategies, programs, leaders and organizational forms and methods of activity are impossible. The proof of this, on the contrary, is the share of organizations that have lost, are losing or will lose public support in the future.

It is extremely important that the primary actors are decisive and initial in policy-making, especially in the ethno political sector. They are the bearers of political interests and needs on which conscious or unconscious political activity is based. Therefore, it is the interests and needs that motivate different socio-political communities to take political action. Instead, the secondary policy actors are derived from primary ones, both from a genetic point of view (because they were formed mainly in response to requests from certain groups) and from a functional point of view (because they perform an official and executive role for significant socio-political groups. By means of carrying out their tasks, such entities may differ significantly in the differentiated degree of independence or activity and efficiency. However, it is important that their main functions are to develop the values and goals of civic and political activity and the ethno political process.

Against this background, it is quite obvious that national minorities are the basic or primary subjects of ethno politics. Subjects of the same level are nations, ethnic groups and various social strata. Their political subjectivity does not presuppose the total participation of representatives of these relatively large groups in politics. Instead, it is enough to form public and

³⁸ Antoniuk O., *Osnovy etnopolityky*, Wyd. MAUP 2005.

socio-political organizations based on them, which would express and protect the interests of the whole group, and the group itself would be the basis for mass political action, nominating activists and leaders of the certain direction. Accordingly, the peculiarity of the basic subjects of ethno politics can be considered that they are at the same time subjects of other types of social activity – economic, cultural, etc.

In terms of space and time, it is important that national minorities arise in the process of historical development of states under the influence of a whole range of factors. Thus, R. Oliver notes among them the migration carried out for many centuries, resettlement on other continents with oppression of the local population, the importation of labor during the colonial period to the places where it was needed, the collapse of historical empires and the emergence of new states. In other words, as F. Hackmann points out, the formation of national minorities is based on the principles and factors of origin (ways of formation), structural and social position in society and political orientations.

It is also important that among the current classifications of policy actors, one of the most common and suitable for the analysis of national minorities is the division of policy actors into individual and group. Individual policy actors include individuals who are the main policy actors, as other group or collective actors are personal. However, “to be a subject” is not a mechanical and automatic political quality. After all, a person is not born a subject of politics, but becomes one only in the process of long-term political socialization, constant ties, and clear social relations with other political actors. Instead, group (collective) subjects of politics include social communities of people (nation, ethnic group and social groups), as well as political institutions (state, political parties, socio-political organizations). To become a subject of politics, social communities of people must at least realize their own common interests, institutionally institutionalize the relationship between members of a particular social community of people and realize these interests in practice. This leads to the conclusion that there is a dynamic system of relationships between policy actors – dependence, subordination and relative autonomy. The place and role of a political entity in this system is determined by its willingness to influence political processes, i.e. the presence of the necessary political qualities and political culture.

It is noteworthy that an individual actually becomes a subject of the political process only to the extent that he acts on behalf of any other interest group and has the support of this group. In this approach to the definition of political subjectivity, the real subjects of political activity are only and exclusively group subjects of politics – socio-political communities. Moreover, the identification of a member of the community with a particular subject of politics is the most important mechanism for entering the political process. Therefore, the starting point of a political subject is his position as a representative of the community on whose behalf he acts. Such relations of representation presuppose that millions of people do not exist as separate entities, but as communities formed by objective connections and means of self-awareness. But through their representatives, social communities realize themselves as an independent actor,

on whose decisions and actions the life of the whole society depends. That is why socio-political communities as subjects of politics are integral formations that are formed on the basis of certain socio-political and cultural-economic ties, tendencies and prospects of development, etc. Socio-political community operates only inherent in its beliefs. The hierarchical structure of group subjects of political activity also depends on the nature of socio-political communities and their functions and role in the political structure of society.

In view of this, it is obvious that the driving force of national minorities as basic subjects of politics is the presence of political (together and in dependence with others) interest³⁹. In this regard, scholars believe that the circle of political actors cannot be limited to political institutions, elites and leaders, leaving outside the vast majority of ordinary voters, especially those who do not vote at all. However, even in such non-participation, the political subjectivity of citizens is revealed, which may consist in passive opposition to the officially implemented policy of one or another state⁴⁰. At the same time, the essential fact that they are active by nature is an attribute of political actors. The scope of activity is determined by the ability of the subject to influence the behavior of people (interaction with other actors), the compliance of political actions with the developed goals and the challenges of change in the political environment. Thus, the subjectivity of minorities in politics is traditionally determined by the relationship between objective opportunities to act, which are limited by the structure of political forces, and the level of maturity, the maturity or formation of the political environment, subjective opportunities (knowledge, motivation, emotional state, etc.). In addition, political actors have their own special functions and are governed by legal relations and norms, as well as who is the main and who is the secondary person, and who is the mass, the crowd and the passive object of manipulation.

On this basis, scholars studying the forms of political subjectivity of national minorities, including in Ukraine, note the peculiarity of their inclusion in politics, which is that they can affect the socio-political life of the state individually (as equal citizens to participate in elections and referendums) and collectively (through institutionalized to varying degrees, the procedures and institutions of democracy – parliament, representative bodies of party and other public organizations, local authorities, etc.). In addition, national minorities may establish political institutions or participate in the work of existing ones⁴¹. All this is the basis for the argument that national minorities, in particular in Ukraine (as well as in other countries of the world), are a specific subject of politics / ethno politics. The explanation for this is clearly seen in the interpretation of the psychological foundations of nationalism, which is based on the assertion that all people have an innate and primordial desire to be united in groups. In this regard, scientists believe that human mental life is governed by both consciousness and collective memory.

³⁹ Panov M., Herasina L., Zhuravskiy V., *Politolohiia: Akademichnyi kurs*, Ed. In Yure 2006, s. 176.

⁴⁰ Shliakhtun P., *Politolohiia (teoriia ta istoriia politychnoi nauky)*, Ed. Lybid 2002, s. 156.

⁴¹ Poteriaiko H., *Osoblyvosti politychnoi subiektyvatsii natsionalnykh menshyn v Ukraini*, Kyiv 2005, s. 3.

They are both a complex mental formation, which is a consequence of the experience of distinguishing and opposing the “Me” and the world around us, “We” – the team, etc.⁴². Therefore, a person separates the individual from others and forms his own needs and interests. At the same time, a person identifies himself with the collective, but the belonging (even unconscious) of a person to the “national minority” determines the conditions of individual existence. Thus, the entry of national minorities into the political arena is determined not only by political interests, but also by ethno cultural identity, awareness of their uniqueness and belonging to another ethnic group. However, the most important thing is that ethnic groups and nations appear as subjects of politics mainly at the stage of struggle for the nation-state or national-territorial autonomy, in determining national priorities during the development of political institutions, in international relations, in the process of defending their ethno cultural specifics. However, even in this case, the volume of activity of such large social groups is often determined by the ability of political actors to influence people’s behavior (interact with other political actors), subordinate political actions to the goal, cause changes in the political environment and influence the political process⁴³.

It is this ability is defined in political science as “political subjectivity”, including of national minorities. It is traditionally positioned and interpreted as the ability of a political entity to make policy, confidently and independently participate in political life in accordance with their interests and interact with other policy actors. However, it is important that the activities of different policy actors can have different goals and different degrees of activity. The latter grows sharply in the crisis transition periods of public and political life, can have a socio-constructive and destructive and anti-social nature, which violates the legal norms institutionalized in the interests of the people. At the same time, political activity can manifest itself in many forms: in the negotiation process; activities of political leaders, elites, parties and the state apparatus; mass political actions (rallies, demonstrations and riots). As an extreme form of political activity is social revolutions, during which there is a radical destruction of existing social and political relations.

However, as noted above, national minorities become subjects of politics in the process and process of protecting their own ethno cultural specifics at the state level. At the same time, not all national minorities actively participate in the political life of society. Although, in general, national minorities as a subject of politics are a structural element of the political system of the multiethnic states, and in a broad sense they denote all ethno-national communities that do not belong to the titular ethnos, i.e. are not a national majority. Accordingly, in the context of the problem of political subjectivity of national minorities study we suggest to be guided mainly by a narrow understanding of this concept. In general, due to the variability of the definition of “national minority”, which is generated primarily by the plurality of forms of existence of

⁴² Mainouh K., *Anatomiiia natsionalizmu*, [w:] *Natsionalizm: Antolohiia*, Ed. Smoloskyp 2006, s. 149

⁴³ Volynets O., *Politolohiia*, Ed. Lvivska politekhnikha 2005, s. 105.

national minorities, in scientific research, including Ukrainian, as well as in international law there is no generally accepted interpretation of this concept. However, based on the analysis of various scientific approaches, the features of national minorities have been identified, which make it possible to consider them as subjects of politics. We are talking about such attributes of national minorities as: compact or dispersed residence on the territory of the state together with representatives of other national groups; the difference of original features of culture, customs, language; compulsory citizenship; the presence of a historical homeland, i.e. a country where the minority is the national majority.

In this context, it is crucial that in the course of ethno-national genesis, each of the subjects of ethno-politics develops its own vision of solving the national question, motivating it under the auspice of certain arguments and ideas. The set of relevant values, views and statements, which reflect the interests of a subject of ethno politics, is its ideology. In this context, it is mainly about ideology as a systematized set of concepts and ideas through which different ethnic entities (ethnic group, nation, ethnic groups, etc.) are aware of their ethno-national positions and interests, which are usually relevant motives for ethno-political activities of such ethnic entities⁴⁴. At the same time, the “core” of ideology is an idea that embraces the worldview inherent in the ethnos, reflects the peculiarities of its development and is based on such basic ethno cultural characteristics that allow optimal coverage of the best qualities and stimulate ethno genesis. In view of this, it is quite obvious that ideology is the initial or lowest level of political subjectivity of national minorities.

However, it is the elite – the most conscious and most active strata of society create, develop and spread ethnic and national ideology. Given this, the strategy of the ethnic elite or ethnic leaders is important. The functional role of the ethnic elite is that it creates a strategic policy course aimed at forming tolerance of the interethnic relations, and develops an ideology in ethno politics and serves as a model of behavior. Many of the features that distinguish a particular ethnic group are primordial. From another angle, assembling them into a set and then preserving them is a matter for the leaders. The ethnic elite often resort to instrumentalism and speculation on ethno-group solidarity for the sake of their own, often mercantile, interests. One of such speculative means is to involve the group in the election and election campaign, to create the impression of it as a group of like-minded people, ready to vote in solidarity for one or another subject of the election process to “bargain” its votes.

However, often the solidarity of the group is a very real fact. Thus, the next level of political subjectivity of national minorities is considered to be elite creation.

From this it is quite natural to position, according to which the political destiny and success of the ethno-national minority is or can be in the hands of the ethno-political party⁴⁵. The formation and activity of ethnic political parties is a clear characteristic of the political subjectivity

⁴⁴ Antoniuk O., *Osnovy etnopolityky*, Wyd. MAUP 2005, s. 35

⁴⁵ Varzar I., *Iz kontekstiv mynulyykh lit: Vybrane v kontseptualnykh i memuarnykh vymirakh*, Wyd. Fada 2003, vol 1, s. 298

of national minorities. After all, the existence of political parties, which are supported by a clear ideology, means the presence of conflict-generating potential in a multiethnic society. At the same time, by demanding power, national minorities not only associate themselves with the state through their political parties, but also introduce organized forms of representation of their own ethno-political interests. Therefore, by creating a political party on a national basis, national minorities reach the next level of political subjectivity – party formation.

As for the next level of political subjectivity – society formation – its role and significance is manifested in the fact that national minorities are an ethnic component of a multiethnic society, forming together with the titular ethnic group and ethnic minorities a single multiethnic society inherent in any state from the moment of its formation. Multiethnic society is considered as a social phenomenon, which is based on the definition of society as the objective existence of man, his existence in the material environment and culture, which are the principles of human communication, self-understanding and self-determination. National minorities in this context are effective actors and stable structural components of any society, including the Ukrainian one. This is especially evident against the background that the urgent problem of Ukrainian ethno politics, especially against the background of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict that began in 2013-2014, is the unification of all national minorities into a single society – a political nation.

In general, the problem of the relationship between the state and national minorities is extremely relevant for the relatively young Ukrainian state, which is in the process of forming a democratic civil society, which is particularly complicated, including artificially, in the last decade. In such conditions, a feeling of involvement in the development of the state in which they live has been and continues to be formed among national minorities, including Ukraine. In other words, national minorities demand a fair distribution of power at the state, regional and local levels, participation in foreign policy-making and protection of their ethno-national identity. Therefore, it is quite expedient to talk about state formation as a level of political subjectivity of national minorities, including in Ukraine. The fact is that the participation of national minorities in state-building processes is quite clearly explained by one of the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, in particular its preamble. It states that Ukrainian statehood, which has a long history, takes place on the basis of the exercised right to self-determination not only of the Ukrainian nation, but also of the entire Ukrainian people, which consists of citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities. This combination of words has absorbed the whole meaning of the polyethnic composition of the population of Ukraine and makes it possible to interpret it as a political term. On the other hand, this means that Ukraine has chosen the path of forming a political nation as a society based on statehood from the people who gave the name to the state and other ethnic groups living in this country.

In this regard, O. Kartunov's remark that the politicization of ethnicity is a process of entering the political arena of ethnic communities, as well as their transformation into subjects of history and politics is fully justified. In other words, it can be described as an ethno political

renaissance – a kind of continuation of the process of ethnic renaissance⁴⁶. However, the use of the term “politicization of ethnicity” is questionable because it offers a vague understanding of ethnicity itself, and thus does not define the parameters of politicization of national minorities as a special form of ethnicity. Instead, J. Rothschild notes that the “politicization of ethnicity” occurs at a time when the ethnic group penetrates the universal culture and technology, and the basis of politicization, he considers a unique ethno specific culture of the group. He calls this situation “the paradox of the politicization of ethnicity.” The result is a “general hybrid tendency” that simultaneously unites the desire to universalize and strengthen “ethno political devotion.” The scholar argues that “politicizing ethnicity” involves: giving people the opportunity to understand the role of politics in preserving their ethno cultural values and vice versa; stimulate their attention to this relationship; to mobilize them for the formation of ethnic groups with a single self-consciousness; to direct the behavior of such groups in the sphere of political activity, based on the existing consciousness and group self-consciousness⁴⁷.

This is a sufficient reason to postulate the conclusion that the process of acquisition of the basic features and attributes of a political subject by national minorities can be synonymously understood as the political subjectification of national minorities. Agreeing with some scholars, we insist that political subjectification should be understood as a complex process of acquisition of the basic features and attributes of political actors (including political consciousness, political interests, internal organization to achieve political goals, political activity aimed at participating in the adoption decisions and control over their implementation) by national minorities, that provides a certain level of political subjectivity as a formed capacity for political activity, which is characterized by a certain level of consciousness and organization of national minorities⁴⁸.

In this view, political subjectivation is considered to be, on the one hand, as one of the essential characteristics of self-determination of national minorities in the broadest sense of the word, and on the other hand – as a procedural characteristic of the political system of society, as it provides for the formation of political relations such as “state – national minorities”, the creation of socio-political organizations of national minorities and change of their political behavior and consciousness in accordance with current political principles and norms in the state. Among the conditions of political subjectification of national minorities are the achievements of the political history of national minorities, including in Ukraine, as well as the specifics of the ethno-national structure of Ukrainian multiethnic society and the nature of legislative support of this process and national minorities.

Despite the fact that the political subjectification of national minorities, on the one hand, is described by normative boundaries, it, on the other hand, is quite naturally influenced by the processes of ethno-national revival, which in theoretical political science are explained by the

⁴⁶ Kartunov O., *Vstup do etnopolitologii*, Kyiv 1999, s. 200.

⁴⁷ Mainouh K., *Anatomia natsionalizmu*, [w:] *Natsionalizm: Antologia*, Wyd. Smoloskyp 2006, s. 119

⁴⁸ Poteriaiko H., *Osoblyvosti politychnoi subiektyvatsii natsionalnykh menshyn v Ukraini*, Kyiv 2005, s. 3

awakening of ethnic identity, as well as the search for ways to effectively participate in socio-political processes and self-affirmation as effective factors in state formation, including the occupation of relevant niches in the political life of a state. The characteristic feature of these processes in Ukraine is the fact that they are both inherent in both national minorities and the titular ethnic group, which usually creates for them special conditions for participation in the political process.

The peculiarity of the forms of political subjectification of national minorities comes down to the fact that they can be included in politics, firstly, individually (as equal citizens of the state) and, secondly, collectively (and this way is the most effective for expressing social, ethno cultural and political needs of national minorities at the state level). And the democracy of the political system of a country is evidenced by the diversity of forms of participation of national minorities in political life – participation in elections and the creation of representative democracies, the formation of their own representative bodies, parties and public organizations, participation in the work of public authorities and local governments. Additionally, there are different types of autonomy as a form of self-preservation and self-organization of minorities. In this context, special attention should be paid to the problem of national and cultural autonomy. After all, it is obvious that national-cultural societies in a specific sense are not subjects of politics, because they are not created for the struggle for power, and political activity is not their essential characteristic. Nevertheless, the experience of Ukraine testifies to this, they can be political subjects, because they are more and more often interested in national interests and participate in the political life of society, and they can also significantly influence it.

Separately in the context of political subjectivity, which is extremely relevant in the case of Ukraine, the problem of separatism and irredentism should be revealed as strategic goals of political activity of national minorities aimed at changing the territorial integrity of the country mainly to create their own state (in the case of separatism, unrecognized DPR and LPR in Ukraine) or joining the territory of another state under the slogans of ethno cultural unity of the population (in the case of irredentism, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the case of Ukraine). And it is here that it is appropriate to advert to the stages of subjectivity of national minorities, which were discussed in detail above. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the subjectification of national minorities in politics is conditioned by objective opportunities to act, depends on the foreign policy conditions created by a certain model of political relations between the country (in particular Russia) and national minorities (concerning Ukraine). Accordingly, it is quite natural that the entry of national minorities into the arena of political life carries the potential danger of arbitrariness and violence, the source of which may be minorities and the state. The latter can influence national minorities as subjects of politics, thus defining the matrix of their political activity, as well as limiting the space of political activity. Moreover, the higher is the level of political subjectivity of minorities, the less they are the object of politics.

Therefore, attention must be paid to the fact that the mechanisms of internal mobilization of national minorities, their activity in the arena of political life and the struggle for the right

to participate in political decision-making may largely depend on the dispersed and compact settlement of different communities and external factors – terrorist movements, geopolitical strategies of other states, which contribute to the intensification and radicalization of irredentist and separatist sentiments. That is why the existence of divergent regional political interests, including in Ukraine, also requires a special mechanism for their implementation, under which the political interests of individual minorities do not interfere with national interests.

Finally, it is clear that the political subjectification of national minorities is due to their inclusion in the political processes of multiethnic states as a social subject of politics, the source of political activity which is due to the fact that in the development of a certain sovereign state, in particular Ukraine, along with the revival of ethnic identification of minorities formed a sense of complicity in the development of the country in which they live. As a result, the minorities, as a collective subject of politics, in one way or another seek to influence the domestic and foreign policies of a state, as well as call for a fair distribution of power at all levels. The ability to engage in political activity, which is characterized by the level of consciousness and organization of national minorities, is in fact the essence of political subjectivity, which is correlated with the political subjectification of national minorities. And when political subjectivity is the ability to participate directly or through political institutions in the political life of society, to influence the behavior of others and generate important changes in political relations, then political subjectification is actually the process of acquiring these qualities of a political subject. That is why the political subjectification of national minorities presupposes the attainment of a certain level of political consciousness, the presence of certain political interests, the internal organization for achieving political goals, political activity aimed at participating in political decision-making and monitoring their implementation. In this context, the criteria of political subjectivation are the awareness of national minorities of their common interests, strengthening of internal interconnection, as well as consolidation, self-organization and direct activity in politics as a representation of perceived common interests.

In this view and within the framework of such theorizing, the construction of the subjectification of national minorities in Ukraine was and remains quite specific, as it and the choice of its forms are influenced by several basic preconditions. First, the Ukrainian ethnos has historically been characterized by a conflict-free neighborhood with various ethno-national communities of other countries, as a result of which other national minorities against the background of the Ukrainian titular ethnos in this state are naturally perceived as separate elements of society and even politics. Secondly, the specifics of the ethno-national structure of Ukraine and the diversity of national minorities have previously made it impossible and even more so today makes it impossible the functioning of a single mechanism for the realization of the political interests of national minorities or even involves the introduction of various forms of participation in politics. Third, the subjectification of national minorities in Ukraine, although it has one of the most democratic political and legal support in the world, is not perfect in terms of mechanisms

and conditions for minorities to exercise their guaranteed political rights. Finally, and fourthly, the subjectification of national minorities in Ukraine typically takes place in parallel with the establishment of the Ukrainian titular ethnic group as a state-building one, which creates additional conditions and problems for political representation for participants in the political process. It follows that the formation and re-formation of the titular ethnic group as a subject of politics significantly or even decisively affects the political subjectivity of all national minorities in Ukraine. In general, this proves and argues that the problem is political subjectification of national minorities, including in Ukraine, as a procedural characteristic of the political system of society is quite complex and contradictory in nature. As a result, there are no identical and consolidated recipes for solving this problem.

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INFLUENCE OF MANIPULATIVE ELECTORAL TECHNOLOGIES ON THE POLITICAL VALUES OF THE POPULATION

Based on the analyzed material, the author proves that manipulative electoral technologies have a very important influence on the political values of the population and the results of their voting during the elections. In a post-industrial society, political manipulation, electoral technologies, and the power of the information become crucial in manipulating the society, since the vast majority of citizens perceive the world around them through the electoral process. The 2019 presidential election in Ukraine demonstrated a combination of manipulative, “dirty” and “clear” electoral technologies. And the media and the Internet, which are involved in this process, have now become one of the most important public institutions. The experience of political campaigns on Facebook in the United States and Europe shows that the right audience and the right messages aimed at it usually help to achieve success. The results of the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine showed how new political technologies affected their course, and helped one of the candidates win. In this election, new technologies clashed with the traditional ones that have been operating in Ukraine for decades, and the results showed that the new ones are much more effective.

The article notes that it is necessary to introduce “clear” electoral technologies into the political field of Ukraine, taking into account its social, political and economic reality and the global game rules. They must be created by intensive means, designed and implemented as science-intensive social engineering products.

Keywords: Ukraine, political values, “clear” and “dirty” manipulative electoral technologies, mass media, the Internet

Андрій Конет

ВПЛИВ МАНІПУЛЯТИВНИХ ВИБОРЧИХ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ НА ПОЛІТИЧНІ ЦІННОСТІ НАСЕЛЕННЯ

Автор, на основі проаналізованого матеріалу, доводить, що на політичні цінності населення, на результати його голосування в ході виборів досить важливий вплив мають маніпулятивні виборчі технології. В постіндустріальному суспільстві політичне

маніпулювання, виборчі технології та влада інформації стають вирішальними в управлінні суспільством, оскільки переважна більшість громадян сприймає навколишній світ саме через виборчий процес. Президентські вибори 2019 р. в Україні продемонстрували поєднання маніпулятивних, брудних та чистих виборчих технологій. А ЗМІ та мережа Інтернет, які причетні до цього процесу, перетворилися нині на один з важливих суспільних інститутів. Досвід політичних Фейсбук кампаній США і Європи свідчить, що правильно обрана аудиторія та зорієнтовані на неї потрібні меседжі, зазвичай допомагають досягти успіху. Результати президентських виборів 2019 р. в Україні показали, як нові політичні технології вплинули на їх хід, і допомогли одному з кандидатів вибороти перемогу. Нові технології зіткнулися у цих виборах з традиційними, які в Україні діяли десятиліттями, і результати виборів показали, що нові значно ефективніші.

У статті наголошено, що у політичне поле України необхідно впроваджувати чисті виборчі технології, враховуючи її соціальні, політичні й економічні реалії та правила гри світового оточення. Вони мають бути створені інтенсивними засобами, спроектовані і реалізовані як наукомістка соціотехнічна продукція.

Ключові слова: Україна, політичні цінності населення, маніпулятивні чисті та брудні виборчі технології, ЗМІ, мережа Інтернет

Relevance of the topic. The analysis of problems related to political values as a basis for influencing mass consciousness is quite relevant. After all, values significantly influence the political process. This is an integrated framework for small and large social groups and the entire nation. The concept of “value” in this context means a special reality that is not directly related to needs. The needs of people in politics represent the life world of a person in the structure of motivation. They are dynamic and change depending on the state of the subject’s life relations. And political values form the inner world of a person. Values point to the dynamic aspects of individual experience, the invariant aspects of the political experience that the individual learns. The values have a special status. “By giving an object the status of a value,” V. Malakhov writes, “a person, as if subjecting it, recognizes the right the object for its own voice.”

The specifics of political values of society are expressed by political tradition. Its core is the most stable and “persistent” political value that lives in generations. The power of tradition is immense. They control people’s minds at the level of the unconscious. C. G. Jung believed that this is the collective unconscious. However, this fact does not deny the existence of conscious representations of the subject about what is valuable for him, expressed in the concept of “value orientation” or aspects of orientation that bind it to compliance with certain norms, standards, and selection criteria.

Analysis of the main trends that operated during the election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2014. A specific feature of the post-Soviet societies is the

de-actualization of values. It is often that modern values do not stand up to competition with the values of the “bright past”. A sociological survey conducted by the Saint Petersburg Research Institute and the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Research in 2004 and 2006 shows that up to 60% of respondents believe that the priorities of the Soviet-era value system are better than the modern ones. In the same way, the features of a “classic” Soviet man of the 1950-70s win significantly in public opinion in comparison with the portrait of the modern time person¹. This is what various active politicians use, although it is losing its relevance nowadays.

The analysis shows that in the parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) in 2014, there was an important trend – de-ideologization of political forces. It is difficult to divide Ukrainian parties into “right” and “left”, and even the division into “pro-Russian” and “pro-European” is blurred in the election programs. Even S. Tigipko’s “Strong Ukraine”, which focused on the voters of Eastern Ukraine, promised to fight for European markets. There are two exceptions to this trend: the Communist party of Ukraine (KPU) and “Svoboda” party. These parties were balancing on the verge of electoral barrier. The KPU is the most pro-Russian party that stands for “Slavic unity”, despite the fact that even former “regionals” have already moved away from such rhetoric. “Svoboda” is constantly focused on the fact that it is anti-Russian and anti-Communist. The KPU is the only one that stands for the status of the second state language for the Russian language. Svoboda is the only one that promotes radical Ukrainization, with creating a quota (78%) for Ukrainian-language products in all media and the rejection of all Soviet holidays and symbols. These parties deviate from the liberal mainstream even more in the economy. Progressive tax, luxury taxes and the return of strategic enterprises to the state – traditionally “left-wing” promises are only present in the programs of the Communist party and “Svoboda” – seemingly different in ideological views and values political parties².

Political values are not only ideals, but also clearly defined norms that should be adhered to. It is difficult to know them directly, but the objective embodiments fixed in the political sphere – political symbols – help here. Political manipulation and manipulative technologies (latent control of people’s political consciousness and behavior in order to force them (not) to act in the interests of manipulators), as a form of hidden influence, create a danger for political values in the mass consciousness. The purpose of manipulation is to obtain, implement, and preserve power. It is successful when the objects of manipulation – the masses are sure that everything in society is natural and inevitable, when the contenders for power influence the formation of the necessary public opinion for them. Often, these methods of influence operate outside the legal framework, which leads to problems in society, social tension. Achieving power requires attracting and retaining attention and creating a favorable image of political leaders.

¹ Бабич-Декань О. (1999). Проблема використання політичного Паблік Рідейшнз у системі технологічного забезпечення сучасної соціальної політики. Вісник УАДУ. № 2. С. 225.

² Що обіцяють виборцям українські партії. URL: https://lb.ua/news/2014/10/14/282470_lyustratsiya_detsentralizatsiya.html

In Ukraine, power is obtained through elections and public support. Manipulators form voters' opinions about the support of a certain political force, guess social moods, and offer the optimal image of the candidate and the program. Here, political manipulation is the theory and practice of election technologies and the methods of conducting elections. Their strategy requires certain tactics: encouraging and retaining attention, creating a positive image of the candidate.

V. Amelin highlights in political manipulation: the introduction of content desirable for a certain group into the public consciousness under the guise of objective information; the impact on the painful points of public consciousness that form fear and hatred; the implementation of declared and hidden plans that the manipulator associates with the support of his position of public opinion .

Political technologies are used to solve the tasks and goals of political manipulation. Manipulation tools are classified by the following criteria: those established by law and those outside the legal norms; by methods of influence – direct and hidden; by functions – PR and campaign activity; by shape – propaganda, economic, administrative, provocative; by content – (anti) advertising; by level of impact – interpersonal, group and large-scale; by information carrier – printed, electronic, out-of-home etc.

Means of manipulation are based on the creation of certain myths or ideas in the mass consciousness that support the interests of manipulators and are accepted by the majority with faith, without serious reflection. Although the era of blind faith in myths has passed, the reality shows that this is not the case. "If a modern person," writes E. Cassirer, "no longer believes in natural magic, then, no doubt, this person professes a kind of "social magic"³. New political myths are created according to a precise plan, social psychology of people and the goals of manipulators. E. Fromm wrote that political manipulation deprives a person of the ability to create a certain picture of the world, replacing it with an abstract mosaic of tendential and related facts⁴. M. Lerner believed that a person gets a complete confusion of concepts and no relationship of events. The only system in which a person is able to put individual facts – is the system of stereotypes formed previously, which is focused, in particular, on competition and struggle, where the concepts of good and evil are taken for granted⁵.

Manipulators seem to act openly, with slogans about the general good, but most of the times there is a hidden mechanism in their actions, goal, idea that others do not notice. V. Pugachev divides the manipulation of the person into two main types: open (overt) and hidden (latent). With the explicit nature of manipulation, goals are set and implemented openly, with the latent – they are silenced and hidden. The advantage of a certain type, according to the researcher, depends on the degree of different interests of those who rule and those who are ruled; the

³ Кассирер Э. (1990). Техника современных политических мифов. Вестник МГУ. Сер. 7 (философия). № 2. С. 17.

⁴ Лернер М. (1992). Развитие цивилизации в Америке. Образ жизни и мысли в Соединенных Штатах сегодня / Пер. с англ. В 2-х томах. Том 2. М.: Радуга. С. 219.

⁵ Фромм Э. (2006). Бегство от свободы / Пер. с англ. М.: АСТ: АСТ Москва. С. 46.

civilization of society (the use of force, direct coercion in the public consciousness); opportunities and skills of the ruling elite to implement various ways of covert influence on the masses⁶.

Interaction of the type of political system and the development of manipulation technologies. Political manipulation is affected by the type of political system, how conflicts are resolved in it, and how political protests are prevented. The manipulation process has the following phases: arousing interest in the potential object of manipulation for actions, words of the manipulator; gaining the trust of the object of influence; intriguing the object of influence; distraction maneuver (switching attention to a minor detail; reporting sensational news that does not concern the case); substitution, concealment (words, actions, object); stating a fabricated result; hidden or explicit prompting of the object of manipulation to actions or behavior needed by the manipulator.

To root social myths, manipulation technologies have a rich arsenal of methods for influencing people's minds: direct manipulation of facts, silencing unwanted information, half-truths, spreading slander, labeling, etc. Another example of mass democracy simulation is the substitution of appealing to the public consciousness through expert manipulation of ratings. The ratings of a sample survey are only a model of the real opinion of the masses, which experts allegedly "animate" (the method of fragmentation is the presentation of information in a single stream; "white noise" – reducing the perception of facts through a large number of news, when it is difficult to sort them; method of creating facts—a combination of real and fictional facts; method of historical analogies; method of "throwing mud", which gives a negative ethical assessment to the subject of conversation; method of semantic manipulation, etc.)⁷.

The power of using disinformation is that it is involved at the moment of making an important decision, and when the truth comes out – the goal of disinformation will already be achieved. Refuting misinformation does not affect the current psychological attitude that has developed. For each genre of information, along with the general means of manipulation, there are special ones. So, in order to create a repulsive attitude towards undesirable politicians, TV uses unattractive angles of them or edits the footage accordingly.

The most high-quality messages of technologists appeal to the unconscious, manipulate fears and desires, do it latently, creating an "alibi for the consciousness." A natural mechanism of psychological protection of a person helps the technologists – it prevents information overload, blocking unpleasant, alien, incomprehensible. However, bypassing the blocked consciousness, messages get into the subconscious and continue to determine behavior. In conditions of information overload – and this is the norm now – the protective mechanism also works for important messages that are perceived critically under other conditions: when the protective mechanism operates, the analytical apparatus is disabled⁸. A skillfully composed message gets directly into the subconscious and, in the ideal course of actions for the technologist, becomes a guide to certain

⁶ Пугачов В.П.(2003). Технологии скрытого управления в современной российской политике. Вестник Московского университета. Сер. 12. Политические науки. № 3. С. 69.

⁷ Бебик В. (1995). Політичний маркетинг. Політологічні читання: Українсько – канадський шоквартальник. Київ. № 2. С. 199.

⁸ Борисенко И.(1996). О роли опросов и негативной рекламы в президентской кампании: (США). Компас. № 12. С. 57.

activity. American researcher J. Keller writes that messages directed at women use attributes of female sexuality as a powerful taboo. For example, a diet Pepsi-Cola tin, which is used mainly by women, is painted with bubbles and ice cubes so that you can see a fairly clear image of a woman's breast. Messages aimed at men are full of attributes of male sexuality⁹.

Emotionally colored, repressed information settles in the memory for a long time. The strongest emotions are related to sex and death. "Fallen for an idea" always add weight to an ideology. The effect of the death motive depends on the skill of the technologist. In the newspaper "Facts" it is combined with the sexual motive. Almost every issue of the newspaper contains a report about another bloody crime, the victims of which are "ordinary people", and on the last page—a there is a mandatory portrait of a naked beauty. And, of course, information "on political topics" which is presented like a background, therefore acts more effectively¹⁰.

Boundary states of consciousness are marked by an increased tendency for suggestion. These states are effectively created by sound and light of certain frequencies. This determined the popularity of advertising at concerts, attracting musicians to election campaigns. Such techniques have been actively used in Ukraine in the last decade. But often candidates act according to the old scheme: first, candidates come out, make solemn speeches, and then there is a concert. This is how the candidates' tour with the "Chervona Ruta" singers was organized. But the election programs did nothing but irritate the audience. Image-makers did not think to create an altered state of consciousness first, and then "launch" the messages. This technique was completely mastered during the "promotion" of the referendum in 2000. Between the musical numbers, the hosts called out the following slogan: "Let's say "Yes" to the referendum!". And the rhythm of the music also fell under the definition of "hypnotic"¹¹. This technology was used in the presidential election campaign of 2004 by the candidate V. Yanukovych.

Electoral technologies are corrective technologies for the development of society that operate exclusively before elections, with high tension, uncompromising competition, and a lack of time. Candidates are tempted to use any means of influencing voters. Therefore, media often write about "clear" and "dirty" methods of political struggle and manipulation. In this sense "classic" technologies are for falsifying electoral documents, simple bribery of voters, influence on the subconscious, psychological pressure on a competitor through the use of compromising material, and moral or physical elimination of competitors¹². The conditions under which such technologies operate – are thorough conspiracy, information pressure, and distraction of public attention to minor events.

The practice of electoral technologies is an objective consequence of transformations in the CIS countries. The incompleteness of the legislative framework, the weakness of the state,

⁹ Бурбан Ю.(1998).Проблеми законодавчого регулювання політичної реклами. Економіка. Фінанси. Право. №7. С. 29-30.

¹⁰ Власенко О.(1997).Пропонуємо виборчі технології: (Лабораторія сучасних виборчих технологій при Фонді сприяння місцевому самоврядуванню в Україні). Урядовий кур'єр. 11 груд. С. 6.

¹¹ Войтенко В. П.(1999). Виборчі технології у дзеркалі математики/ Передмов. А. С. Матвієнко; Інститут відкритої політики. Київ. С. 9.

¹² Геслі В.(2000).Чинники впливу на голосування українських виборців. Політична думка. № 3. С. 21.

and the immaturity of civil society in Ukraine not only allowed, but also stimulated the use of successful electoral technologies, according to their authors and users¹³. But in life, the victory by manipulating the minds of voters, achieving power at any cost, removing citizens from making a fateful decision did not benefit either the people, which was always obvious, or the winners in the struggle for power. This was obvious when they were dealing with vital problems of society, and sometimes it led to tragedies for the winners themselves.

The general result of using such shocking electoral technologies is always tension in society, and the lack of use of the creative potential of the people. The use of the described and similar shock, time- and space-focused selective technologies increases social entropy, creates grounds to define them as dirty and to oppose them with a worthy alternative¹⁴.

Now in Ukraine, objective prerequisites are maturing for the transition from “dirty” to “clear” electoral technologies. Global shifts towards a knowledge-based information society are also very important for Ukrainians. It is knowledge and experience that affect those who use news from TV, because according to research, TV loses the blind trust of its users. Respondents who do not trust the Ukrainian media explain their position, first of all, by the fact that the media is owned by oligarchs (43.4%), and by the fact that the Ukrainian government exerts pressure on the media (43.2%), second of all, among the reasons for distrust of the domestic media, respondents named the lack of representation of different points of view in the media (12.5%), and third of all – unsatisfactory content (11.9%).

The 2019 presidential election in Ukraine. However, the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine demonstrated a combination of manipulative, “dirty” electoral technologies and time- and space-distributed “clear” technologies¹⁵. It is through the widespread use of smart electoral technologies, the use of domestic and international knowledge, that Ukraine can make a “transformational leap” in relation to other countries of the world. “Clear” electoral technologies, as opposed to the “dirty” ones, maximize the creative and active energy of all citizens, without exception, in the processes of solving urgent problems of the state¹⁶. The “clear” electoral technologies are open; transparent; understandable; constructive; ordered; democratic; state-orientated¹⁷.

Ukraine will be able to move from the “dirty” to “clear” electoral technologies if it opens access to domestic and international knowledge to citizens about everyday life and strategic development of municipalities; if local communities are able to resist the use of “dirty” technologies against them; learn how to implement “clear” technologies and mechanisms for

¹³ Дем'яненко М. (2001). Вибори і новітні інформаційні технології (Інформатизація виборчих процесів). Голос України. 28 лютого.

¹⁴ Динес В., Николаев А. (2000). Административные технологии в региональных избирательных кампаниях: [Региональные выборы в России в 2000 г.]. Власть. № 9. С. 25.

¹⁵ Костенко Н. (1999). Мас-медіа у виборах: ціннісні орієнтації політичної сфери: [Медіа-культура у політ. сфері]. Політична думка. № 4. С. 100-120.

¹⁶ Почепцов Г. (2000). Це солодке слово – сакторат: [Роль політ. реклами партій під час проведення вибор. кампаній]. День. 21 груд.

¹⁷ Почепцов Г. (1997). Політична реклама України: стратегії виграву чи програшу. Київський ун-т ім. Т. Г. Шевченка. Вісник. Сер. Журналістика. Київ. Вип. 5. С. 34-36.

implementing election programs of winners; apply life management and social development technologies as “clear” electoral technologies.

This approach to organizing and implementing electoral processes is common in countries with stable institutions of power, society, and business. There is an unshakable principle of winning power: the day after the victory is the first day of the subsequent election campaign. The winning government, fulfilling its obligations to the voters, constantly carefully monitors the election rating. And the press, political parties, public organizations, and the opposition use their pressure to encourage the government to perform its functions. These circumstances create social barriers against the use of “dirty” electoral technologies and create conditions for the emergence of “clear” technologies, so to speak, in a natural way, based on traditions and political culture.

Modern democracy is impossible without elections, and therefore without “political manipulation” of public opinion. Still, the media should not “break away” from the society whose interests they should express. Otherwise, the media becomes a means of political influence of their owners and managers, and all other citizens are deprived of a real opportunity for public expression. Management and politics have now “diverged”. There was a differentiation of functions of depoliticized professional managers and the so-called public politicians – those who directly “live” the politics.

As a result of the elections, there is no longer a change of officials-experts who carry out routine management work in the “corridors of power”. The public politicians – the media image holders – are the ones to change. And power is not given to those who understand public problems and can offer effective solutions to them, but who have managed to “sell” themselves to the largest number of voters.

The 2019 presidential election campaign was significantly different from the previous ones that took place in Ukraine. The large number of presidential candidates (44), the absence of two clear leaders who should enter the second round, new channels of communication with voters and the active participation of non-professional politicians made this campaign an exceptional phenomenon in the history of the Ukrainian electoral process. We believe that there had been several reasons for this.

The first one is an external factor that had a significant impact on Ukraine. With the election of D. Trump as the President of the United States, new trends appeared in the election campaigns of countries around the world. D. Trump is not a classic politician, he is primarily a showman who accurately caught the mood of the nation and tried to respond to it. Trump’s case is not unique – we see the same in Europe, where so-called “anti-system” parties and politicians have become popular. They are gaining more and more votes in parliamentary elections and claiming the positions of heads of state. Examples of anti-system parties and leaders are E. Macron in France, the “Five Star” Movement in Italy, and A. Babis in the Czech Republic. These politicians are difficult to classify as classic “left”, “right”, or “centrists”. They work with a voter who is disillusioned with politics and have a good result.

Consequently, the main trend of the elections of recent years is the fatigue of societies from traditional politicians and their rhetoric.

The second reason is the technologies that affect the electoral process. We know about the activities of “Cambridge Analytica” company and their “big data” project, which collected dossiers on 200 million Americans¹⁸.

Political technologies are used in all elections: social networks can now be compared in influence with the leading media, a smartphone has now become the main source of news, the collection of voter data is put on stream and the result of the election depends largely on the quality of this data. Classical sociology and political science can no longer keep up with technological progress and cannot clearly explain what is happening. The election campaign is very dynamic and is becoming more and more like a show with elements of marketing. This was also the case in Ukraine according to the survey “3D profiles of participants of the presidential elections-2019”¹⁹, by the sociological company “Center for Applied Research”. According to the study, 73% of Ukrainians older than 18 years old are actively interested in politics. A new trend is the “rejuvenation” of interest in politics. The most active electoral group, in addition to pensioners and voters aged 55+, is the group of voters between 35-44 years old²⁰.

According to the same research, the Internet, as a news source, caught up with the TV for the first time in 2018. Almost 70% of voters receive information from TV and the web, often combining these two sources. At the same time, Facebook as a source of news has overtaken traditional online media. Thus, 49% of voters receive information from Facebook, and 43.5% from online media. The popularity of Facebook is clearly correlated with such a news source as friends/acquaintances – 48.6% of voters receive information from them. These data indicate an increase in distrust of traditional media and an increase in the role of informal communication²¹.

This is especially evident in the age range below 35 years old, where the Internet ranks first as a channel for getting information about politics, and here social networks are leading by a significant margin. In the 35-44 years old category, the Internet is perceived on an equal footing with TV; after 45 years old, the share of the Internet as a source of information is less, the main channel of communication is TV. The 65+ year old group has newspapers competing with TV²². “Electoral fatigue” and the development of new communications have significantly changed the electoral process. This explains the high rating of the candidate for President of Ukraine V.

¹⁸ Как *Cambridge Analytica* «выиграла» выборы д-ля Трампа: *The Guardian*. URL: <https://meduza.io/feature/2018/03/23/kak-cambridge-analytica-vyigrala-vybory-dlya-trampa-the-guardian>

¹⁹ Соціологічне дослідження «3D-профілі учасників президентських виборів-2019». URL: https://www.google.com/search?sxsrf=ACYBGNRr03ewV_kLruLLRjxP9KuFNEL4zQ%3A1582054720429&source=hp&ci=QD1MXrOzGKqOrwS3x

²⁰ Хто ті виборці, які обрали Зеленського та голосували за Порошенка – соціологи дали характеристики електоратам обох кандидатів. URL: https://www.irf.ua/khto_ti_vibortsi_yaki_obrali_zelenskogo_ta_golosovali_za_poroshenka_sotsiologi_dali_kharakteristiki_elektoratam_obokh_kandidativ/

²¹ Стало відомо, яким джерелам новин надають перевагу українці. URL: <https://glavcom.ua/country/society/stalo-vidomo-jakim-dzherelam-novin-nadajut-perevagu-ukrajintsi-645276.html>

²² Понад чверть українців ще не знають за кого голосуватимуть на президентських виборах у 2019 році – дослідження. URL: <https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/election2019/541361.html>

Zelensky, who clearly understood the society's request and tried to respond to it. It makes sense that that his campaign for the most part was online. He clearly focused on his voters and understood how to communicate with them.

And most Ukrainian politicians used online platforms to communicate with voters, primarily through Facebook advertising. Most active in this segment were Y. Tymoshenko, P. Poroshenko, O. Shevchenko, S. Taruta and A. Sadovyi. Their posts attracted millions of viewers and collected thousands of likes, shares, and comments. However, the analysis of the "targeting" of the advertising messages shows that all candidates chose all Ukrainian residents over 18 years old as their target audience. Almost none of the candidates segmented the audience and did not look for those who really should have been addressed this or that message. Consequently, this so-called "carpet bombing" of Facebook ads made politicians recognizable online, but this did not mean that likes became votes on the day of the election.

The experience of political Facebook campaigns in the USA and Europe shows that the main thing is to choose the right audience and focus on it the messages that interest it. The results of the 2019 presidential elections in Ukraine showed how new political technologies influenced their course and determined the result. New technologies collided with traditional technologies that have been operating in Ukraine for decades in this election, and the election results showed that they are much more effective.

Conclusions. Thus, summing up, it should be emphasized that the influence of manipulative electoral technologies on the political values of the population, on their decision in the course of elections, is quite important. In a post-industrial society, political manipulation, electoral technologies, and the power of information become crucial in managing society, since the vast majority of citizens perceive the world around them through the electoral process. Presidential election in Ukraine in 2019 has demonstrated a combination of manipulative, "dirty" electoral technologies and "clear" technologies distributed in time and space. The media and the Internet have become one of the most important public institutions, as well as the people involved in this process.

We believe that it is necessary to introduce "clear" electoral technologies into the political field of Ukraine, taking into account our social, political and economic realities and the rules of the game of the world environment. They must be created by intensive means, designed and implemented as science-intensive social engineering products.

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IMMIGRATION PROCESSES IN SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC: PROFILES, SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Artykuł analizuje profile, podobieństwa i różnice w procesach imigracyjnych na Słowacji i w Czechach. Określono ewolucję, strukturę i przyczyny imigracji do tych krajów. Stwierdzono, że na dzień dzisiejszy Słowacja i Czechy (ale te ostatnie w znacznie większym stopniu) są nieuchronnie pozycjonowane jako kraje migrantów, w których rośnie liczba cudzoziemców, którzy przyjeżdżają do nich na czasowy lub stały pobyt i pracę. Jednocześnie, odpływ obywateli (zwłaszcza młodych) do „starych” krajów UE w poszukiwaniu lepszych perspektyw pracy i życia, nadal wpływa na gospodarkę i strukturę społeczną Słowacji i Czech. Te równoległe procesy wymagają aktywnego zarządzania procesami imigracyjnymi, w szczególności w kierunku wykorzystywania ich korzyści oraz ograniczania ich zagrożeń i negatywnych konsekwencji.

Słowa kluczowe: migracja, imigracja, procesy imigracyjne, profile, podobieństwa i różnice procesów imigracyjnych, Słowacja, Czechy.

The article is devoted to analyzing the profiles, similarities and differences of immigration processes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The author identified the evolution, structure and causes of immigration to these countries. It was argued that both Slovakia and the Czech Republic (but the latter to a much greater extent) today are inevitably positioned as immigrant countries with a growing number of foreigners coming to them for temporary or permanent residence and work. At the same time, the outflow of citizens (especially young ones) of these countries to the “old” EU states in search for better employment and life prospects still affects the economy and social structure of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These parallel processes require states to actively manage immigration processes, in particular to take advantage of them and limit their risks and negative consequences.

Keywords: migration, immigration, immigration processes, profiles, similarities and differences of immigration processes, Slovakia, the Czech Republic.

Immigration has become one of the biggest challenges for different countries since the end of the 20th century, but to a greater extent since the beginning of the 21st century, however migration processes have affected different countries throughout their existence. At the same time, immigration is largely positioned as a favorable phenomenon, because it positively correlates with the socio-economic processes taking place in different countries. Accordingly, the analysis

of immigration processes in different countries of the world and in general is important, if not decisive, then at least important, because immigrants have become an integral, necessary and problematic part of life in different countries and regions, a means of solving demographic and economic (especially from 2008-2009 years) crisis and stimulator of exacerbation of social, religious, political and ethnic problems, etc¹. However, taking into account internal and external factors of migration processes significantly but variably affects the immigration situation in different countries, including Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which, although largely derived from the consequences of disintegration of the “Warsaw Pact” and once a single state, Czechoslovakia, but still are far from being positioned as homogeneous in terms of immigration. Thus, in total, it argues that the development of immigration processes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as in the former components of a single state, shows their significant similarities and differences, and therefore needs clarification and specification in each of them.

The stated problems are partially reflected in the scientific achievements of such scientists as V. Bench², S. Brouček³, S. Castles M. Miller⁴, D. Čermáková⁵, B. Divinský⁶, D. Drbohlav⁷, M. Horakova⁸, D. Münich⁹, M. Okolski¹⁰, V. Patiichukra, K. Lavreniuk¹¹, M.

¹ Patiichuk V., Lavreniuk K., Osoblyvosti suchasnoi mihratsiinoi sytuatsii v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy, “Naukovyi visnyk Skhidnoievropeiskoho natsionalnogo universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky. Seriya: Mizhnarodni vidnosyny” 2013, nr. 10 (259), s. 50–56

² Bench V., Mibratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochma sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektiva Slovachchyny, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskou chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rehymu. 2014, s. 103–117.

³ Brouček S., Aktuální problémy adaptace vietnamského etnika v ČR, [w:] Uherek Z. (ed.), *Integrace cizinců na území České republiky*, Wyd. Akademie věd České republiky 2003, s. 7–184

⁴ Castles S., Miller M., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Wyd. Palgrave 2009.

⁵ Čermáková D., Mibratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochma sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektiva Chekhii // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskou chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rehymu. 2014, s. 79–88.; Čermáková D., Schovánkova S., Fiedlerová K., Podnikání cizinců v Česku: vliv struktury příležitostí, “Geografie” 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 440–461

⁶ Divinský B., Labor market-migration nexus in Slovakia: time to act in a comprehensive way, Wyd. IOM2007.; Divinský B., *Migračné trendy v Slovenskej republike po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004–2008)*, Wyd. Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu 2009.; Divinsky B., Mihaly G., *Nové trendy a prognózy pracovnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike do roku 2020 s vyhladom do roku 2050*, Wyd. Trexima 2011

⁷ Drbohlav D., Imigrace a integrace cizinců v Česku: Několik zastavení na cestě země v její migrační proměně z Davida na téměř Goliáše, “Geografie” 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 497–517.; Drbohlav D., *Imigranti v České Republice (s důrazem na ukrajinské pracovníky a západní firmy operující v Praze)*, Wyd. Research Support Scheme 1999.; Drbohlav D., Immigration and the Czech Republic (with a Special Focus on the Foreign Labor Force), “*International Migration Review*” 2003, vol 37, nr. 1, s. 194–224.; Drbohlav D., *Migrace a (i)migranti v Česku: kdo jsme, odkud přicházíme, kam jdeme?*, Wyd. SLON 2010.; Drbohlav D., Lachmanova L., *Irregular Activities of Migrants in Czechia: a Delphi Study on Adaptations in a Globalising Economy*, [w:] Dostal P. (ed.), *Evolution of Geographical System and Risk Processes in the Global Context*, Wyd. Charles University 2008, s. 129–156.; Drbohlav D., Lachmanová-Medová L., Čermák Z., Janská E., Čermáková D., Džurová D., The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country, “*IDEA Working Paper*” 2009, nr. 11, 124 s.; Drbohlav D., Lesinska M., *The migration nexus of Visegrad and Eastern partner countries: concluding remarks and political guidelines*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 225–233.; Drbohlav D., Valenta O., *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 225–233.; Drbohlav D., Valenta O., *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 41–71.

⁸ Horakova M., *International Labour Migration in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs 2012.

⁹ Münich D., *A Tumultuous Decade: Employment Outcomes of Immigrants in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. International Labour Organization 2014

¹⁰ Okolski M., *The Effects of Political and Economic Transition on International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*, [w:] Massey D., Taylor J. (eds.), *International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2004, s. 35–57.

¹¹ Patiichuk V., Lavreniuk K., Osoblyvosti suchasnoi mihratsiinoi sytuatsii v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy, “Naukovyi visnyk Skhidnoievropeiskoho natsionalnogo universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky. Seriya: Mizhnarodni vidnosyny” 2013, nr. 10 (259), s. 50–56

Privarova A. Privara¹², J. Salt¹³, etc. But they have not developed a systematic vision of the profiles, differences and similarities of immigration processes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic as in the former components of the regimes of “real socialism” and once a single state, and today in some countries of the Visegrad Group. Therefore, the aim of the proposed article is to analyze (in the form of case studies and binary comparisons) profiles, similarities and differences of immigration processes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This was done consistently and historically in stages – first on the example of Slovakia, and later on the example of the Czech Republic. As a result, it allowed generalizing the features, similarities and differences of immigration processes in both countries, including against the background of other countries, and especially the countries of the Visegrad group.

As for *Slovakia*, this country of the Visegrad Group has not historically and usually now become one of the traditional destinations for foreigners after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, and is therefore characterized by a relatively small number of immigrants (various types, including legal and illegal), albeit differently determined by their origin¹⁴. It is, in fact, one of the EU countries with the lowest share of immigrants (especially migrant workers¹⁵ against the background of the traditional industrialization of Slovakia) among the total population of this country. However, during 2004–2008, at least in relative terms, Slovakia experienced one of the largest increases in the number of immigrants among all European countries. In addition, the second largest group of foreigners in Europe after London was recorded in the area around Bratislava. Moreover, the main reasons for such an unexpected increase in the number of immigrants (although with its further reduction and stabilization during and after the financial and of foreign investment and the geographical proximity of Bratislava to Vienna¹⁶. As a result, as of 2012, the share of foreigners in the Slovak population reached 1.35 percent, and in quantitative terms (relative to registered immigrants) was three times higher than in 2004 and twice as high as in 2007 (see Table 1).

¹² Privarova M., Privara A., Migration Policy Of Slovak Republic: Issues And Challenges, “*Aktuální problémy ekonomiky*” 2015, vol 10, nr. 172, s. 324–331

¹³ Salt J., *Current trends in international migration in Europe*, Wyd. Council of Europe 2007.

¹⁴ Bench V., *Migratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Slovacchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117

¹⁵ Salt J., *Current trends in international migration in Europe*, Wyd. Council of Europe 2007.

¹⁶ Bench V., *Migratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Slovacchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117.

Table 1. Number and origin of legal immigrants in Slovakia (2007 and 2012, total number at the end of the year, in annual terms)

Indicator	2007	2012
Total population, №	5 400 998	5 410 836
Citizens of Slovakia, №	5 360 094	5 337 911
Citizens of other EU countries, №	25 909	55 909
Share of citizens of other EU countries in the total population, %	0,48	1,03
Third-country nationals, №	14 995	17 016
Share of third-country nationals in total population, %	0,28	0,32
Citizens of the most important third countries:		
Ukraine	3 745	3 915
Vietnam	1 432	1 544
Serbia	1 418	716
Russia	1 354	1 835
China	1 198	875
South Korea	1 136	598
USA	769	861
Macedonia	651	403
Croatia	328	465
Turkey	171	214
Belarus	122	165
Moldova	76	57
Others	2 595	5 368

Source: Bench V., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] *Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu*. 2014, s. 103–117.

According to similar estimates, the number of foreigners living legally in Slovakia in 2015 was four times higher than on the eve of its accession to the EU, and amounted to 1.56 percent (see Table 2). In addition, the specificity of immigration in Slovakia is explained by the fact that it plays an important role in population growth in the country (against the background of declining population during the years of its negative natural growth), because if not for the positive balance of international immigration, Slovakia would face population decline in 2001–2002. This is due to the fact that Slovakia still receives more immigrants than emigrants leave it, and therefore is still an immigrant or at least a transit country¹⁷. This is complemented by the fact that the main criteria for accepting immigrants in Slovakia is their potential for the development of the Slovak economy and society, and preference is given to accepting immigrants who have the necessary qualifications and competence to meet sustainable demand for scarce occupations at the national labor market with an emphasis on culturally close countries.

¹⁷ Lauko V., Tolmáči L., Križan F., Mydlová A., *Slovakia: silent, steady and regulated immigration*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 111–127.

Table 2. Number and origin of the largest groups of legal immigrants with resident status in Slovakia (as of 2015, year on year)

Temporary residents		Permanent residents		Eligible residents	
Citizenship	Quantity, №	Citizenship	Quantity, №	Citizenship	Quantity, №
Ukraine	7 297	The Czech Republic	9 927	Syria	660
Serbia	4 988	Hungary	7 593	Ukraine	44
Russia	1 814	Romania	6 573	Vietnam	40
South Korea	1 140	Poland	5 333	Moldova	19
China	798	Germany	4 255	Serbia	18
Vietnam	626	Ukraine	3 365	Pakistan	10
Iran	481	Italy	2 458	Sudan	10
USA	440	Austria	2 257	USA	8
Macedonia	352	United Kingdom	1 835	Russia	7
Turkey	282	Bulgaria	1 757	Turkey	6

However, in this context, it is important that Slovak immigration statistics (due to imperfect population registration) are somewhat archaic and therefore do not reflect the full picture¹⁸, in particular compared to traditional Slovak emigrants, including the Czech Republic, USA, Canada, UK and Germany. But even so, it is known that the main countries of origin of immigrants in Slovakia are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.¹⁹. It is noteworthy that since Slovakia's accession to the EU, the share of immigrants from non-EU countries, especially from Ukraine, Russia, Vietnam, China, the United States, Serbia, South Korea and Macedonia, has increased²⁰.

It is recorded that the highest concentration of immigrants is observed in the western part of Slovakia, mainly due to better employment opportunities in this Region²¹. It was also found that in the past, the gender structure of immigrants in Slovakia was dominated by men²², but, for example, as of 2015 – women. Nevertheless, there are still more men in the group of registered immigrants, due to structural needs in the labor market. In addition, it was found that among immigrants from the third countries, as a rule, young people predominate (there are fewer of them in total), and among immigrants from EU countries – mostly middle-aged and older people predominate (there are more of them in total). It has been established that the average immigrant in Slovakia is a person from middle to old age, and the most desirable immigrant

¹⁸ Divinský B., *Migračné trendy v Slovenskej republike po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004–2008)*, Wyd. Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu 2009

¹⁹ Lauko V., Tolmáči L., Krížan F., Mydlová A., *Slovakia: silent, steady and regulated immigration*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 111–127.

²⁰ Lauko V., Tolmáči L., Krížan F., Mydlová A., *Slovakia: silent, steady and regulated immigration*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 111–127

²¹ Bench V., *Mihratsia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: nasledky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117

²² Lauko V., Tolmáči L., Krížan F., Mydlová A., *Slovakia: silent, steady and regulated immigration*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 111–127

is a young person with higher education who is a native of the EU²³. As for registered working immigrants in Slovakia, in recent years most of them are from Romania and other neighboring countries, but at the same time the number of working foreigners from France and South Korea is increasing²⁴.

In general, it can be concluded that today immigrants do not have much influence on the labor supply in Slovakia. Although it is known that most immigrants from Western Europe work in Slovakia as highly qualified specialists: company managers, service experts, teachers in educational institutions, consultants, sales representatives, etc.²⁵. Their work requires certain skills and experience, it is mostly temporary and is concentrated in the largest Slovak cities (Bratislava and Košice) and industrial areas²⁶. In contrast, immigrants from the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Asia are often employed as small entrepreneurs, retailers, service providers, builders, etc., or work in manufacturing (in low-paid industries such as textiles, clothing, and food), agriculture and household services. And among the representatives of such groups there are some differences: Ukrainians prefer to work in industry and construction, the Asian population is employed in retail business activities²⁷.

As for illegal immigrants, according to various sources²⁸, they are mostly (almost in half of the cases) natives of Ukraine. According to Slovak experts, the current share of illegal immigrants (who are in the country illegally or work without registration) is 30 percent of the total number of immigrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. They estimate that more than 30 percent of Ukrainian immigrants, almost 30 percent of Moldovans and more than 10 percent of Belarusians are illegal. It is also noteworthy that in the context of ethnic composition, illegal immigrants come to Slovakia from three main regions: the countries of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Georgia); some Asian countries (Vietnam, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh); Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia). However, in contrast, the phenomenon of illegal immigration in Slovakia has weakened in recent years (albeit by 2015-2016), which may be due to a significant decrease in the number of detained foreigners and a decrease in the number of asylum seekers. Moreover, more than half of the total number of detained illegal immigrants is accused of violating the rules of stay in Slovakia (informal employment, stay beyond the period set by the visa, etc.) In addition, this

²³ Mihaly, G., Divinsky, B. (2011). Nove trendy a prognóza pracovnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike do roku 2020 s vyhladom do roku 2050. Bratislava: Trexima. ; Domonkos T., Páleník M., Radvanský M., *Saturovanie dopytu po pracovnej sile prostredníctvom migrácie v SR*, Wyd. Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu 2010

²⁴ Bench V., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkiou ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117

²⁵ Privarova M., Privara A., Migration Policy Of Slovak Republic: Issues And Challenges, "Aktualni problemy ekonomiky" 2015, vol 10, nr. 172, s. 324–331

²⁶ Divinsky B., *Labor market-migration nexus in Slovakia: time to act in a comprehensive way*, Wyd. IOM2007.

²⁷ Bench V., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna situatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkiou ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117

²⁸ Divinsky B., *Migracné trendy v Slovenskej republike po ustupe krajiny do EÚ (2004–2008)*, Wyd. Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu 2009

is due to the fact that immigrants have largely legalized their status in recent years, and a strict migration policy has been successful in this regard²⁹. This is in line with the trend according to which, since Slovakia's accession to the EU and until 2014, illegal migration has decreased 8 times, but has significantly increased (as a result of the European migration crisis) since 2015.

In general, summarizing the features of immigration processes to Slovakia, we argue that its immigration profile is determined by such factors as: 1) geographical proximity and low transport costs to the countries of origin of immigrants, as well as their relative poverty and social tensions in some of the countries of origin of immigrants; 2) the desire for a better life, better work and better education, opportunities for entrepreneurship; 3) cultural, religious and psychological closeness of a certain share of immigrants with Slovaks and ease of language communication; 4) ethnic determination, because, for example, members of the Slovak minority in Ukraine have the right to the status of foreign Slovaks and receive certain immigration privileges; 5) interest in Slovakia as a transit country on the way to further immigration to other EU countries; 6) the role of family, friends, acquaintances or organizations of immigrants (official and informal immigration networks) both for entry and long-term stay of immigrants in Slovakia; 7) the growing economic attractiveness of Slovakia (all regions of Slovakia have the characteristics of the average EU regions and even catch up with the most developed regions of the EU)³⁰; 8) aging of the population and labor shortage (especially highly skilled) in the Slovakia labor market. In summary, this means that immigration to Slovakia corresponds, although often contrary to the migration policy of the Slovak Republic, to the logic of creating appropriate conditions in the field of immigration in relation to the priorities, needs and opportunities of immigrants, participation in partnerships with countries of origin and transit. Accordingly, the immigration emphasis is on the priority of highly skilled workers with an emphasis on countries with a close culture, albeit on the basis of their circular and seasonal involvement.

The fact is that in Slovakia there is a problem of long-term unemployment of certain vulnerable groups, especially the elderly and socially excluded groups. And in recent years there has also been a problem of youth unemployment. This situation not only creates obstacles to economic immigration from other countries, but also forces governments not to liberalize migration policies towards the third countries. On the other hand, all Slovak governments have historically used legislation and administrative levers to restrict foreigners' access to the labor market. Therefore, the Slovak labor legislation on foreigners is complex and provides for different employment regimes: some categories of immigrants cannot work full time or are deprived of the right to work under certain types of employment agreements; some immigrants,

²⁹ Divinsky B., Mihaly G., *Nové trendy a prognózy pracovnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike do roku 2020 s vyhladom do roku 2050*, Wyd. Trexima 2011.

³⁰ Bench V., *Mihratsiia mizh kvainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] *Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rehymu*. 2014, s. 103–117.; Lauko V., Tolmáči L., Križan F., Mydlová A., *Slovakia: silent, steady and regulated immigration*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 111–127

especially asylum seekers, have the right to find a job only one year after arrival or are not allowed to work at all; special restrictions on the employment of immigrants apply to persons who have a temporary residence permit for the purpose of employment or entrepreneurial activity, or a permissible stay. Scholars therefore argue that in some cases, the state actually forces immigrants to engage in illegal activities in order to survive or leave the country³¹. In addition, Slovakia lacks programs to help immigrants integrate into society and laws that enable them to earn a safe life³². That is why the desire to protect the country from immigration, in fact, is considered the main decisive factor arising from economic and social reasons. This confirms the position that the Slovak visa and immigration policy does not meet modern requirements, as it is largely restrictive, as it focuses mainly on labor immigrants.

In general, based on the analysis, it is obvious that: 1) Slovakia is gradually becoming as open as possible to immigrants, but still positions immigration primarily as the free movement of workers (especially highly qualified) between EU member states; 2) a significant weakness of immigration processes and the overall immigration policy of Slovakia is the insufficient integration of immigrants into Slovak society, due to high unemployment and strict employment conditions of immigrants in the country; 3) perception of immigrants primarily as a threat, rather than as a vulnerable group in need of additional protection; 4) positioning the Slovak immigration policy as the selective one³³.

In contrast, the Czech Republic is positioned as an openly immigrant country, as the number of immigrants has been increasing for about thirty years³⁴. Moreover, the process of integration of immigrants in the Czech Republic can usually be considered successful mainly due to the fact that most of them come / originate from countries with similar cultures (Slovakia, Ukraine, Russia, Poland, etc.) and countries where adaptation to new customs is acceptable (for example, Vietnam and China). At the same time, it is noticeable that as a result of the constant intensity of immigration processes to the Czech Republic (especially before and after its accession to the EU³⁵), this country is now at a crossroads where it is difficult to predict future changes in immigration and immigration policy especially considering the various

³¹ Bargerová Z., Divinský B., *Výzvy a odporúčania pre tvorcov politik*, Wyd. Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu 2008

³² Bench V., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirkoi ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Slovachchyny*, [w:] Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 103–117.

³³ Privarova M., Privara A., Migration Policy Of Slovak Republic: Issues And Challenges, "Aktualni problemy ekonomiky" 2015, vol 10, nr. 172, s. 324–331

³⁴ Drbohlav D., Valenta O., *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 41–71.; Drbohlav D., Lachmanová-Medová L., Čermák Z., Janská E., Čermáková D., Džúrová D., The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country, "IDEA Working Paper" 2009, nr. 11, 124 s.; Čermáková D., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES / Vyshehradskoi chetvirkoi ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna situatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chelkii // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 79–88.*

³⁵ Castles S., Miller M., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.; Drbohlav D., Imigrace a integrace cizinců v Česku: Několik zastavení na cestě země v její migrační proměně z Davida na téměř Goliáše, "Geografie" 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 497–517.

features and manifestations of the European migration crisis, which has begun or intensified since 2014-2015, and also considering that the Czech Republic after 1993 was not an emigrant country.

In evolutionary terms, it is clear that the Czech Republic became a country of pure immigration (ceasing to be a country of emigration) extremely quickly – immediately from the moment or in a short period after the moment of democratic transformations in 1989, i.e. in fact with the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. However, first transformed into a transit country, and later – actually into an immigrant country³⁶. The fact is that by the early 10's of the 21st century the number of immigrants in the Czech Republic has increased sixfold since 1993, when Czechoslovakia formally ceased to exist. At the same time, the period of dynamic growth of the foreign population began in 2001, when the number of immigrants amounted to about 25 thousand people per year and reached about 100 thousand people per year in 2007. Since 2008, the number of immigrants in the Czech Republic has begun to decline sharply, reaching in 2015 (both on average and before) 30 thousand people a year. This was mainly due to the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008³⁷, as well as the European migration crisis, which intensified in 2014-2015. However, yet, in the Czech Republic, one of the largest countries in the Visegrad Group (and Central and Eastern Europe in general³⁸), the share of immigrants in the total population is about 4 percent (at least as of 2015).

The fact is that the total number of immigrants to the Czech Republic during 1990-2015 amounted to more than 405 thousand people, and in 2015 alone – almost 30 thousand people. Among them, the share of immigrants from Eastern Europe (including Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) was almost 30 percent³⁹. In general, the main countries of origin of immigrants coming to the Czech Republic have remained stable since the 1990s. At the same time, it is known that immigrants from non-EU countries predominate: Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Russians. However, the share of EU citizens increased from 32 percent in 2010 to 37 percent in 2012 and to 49 percent in 2015. If we add illegal immigrants to the count, the picture will be a little less expressive and impressive⁴⁰. On the other hand, according to researchers, the share of illegal immigrants after 2010 is quite low compared to the results of previous studies and

³⁶ Čermáková D. *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshebradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chekhii* // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshebradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 79–88.

³⁷ Drbohlav D., Valenta O. *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 41–71.; Drbohlav D., Lachmanová-Medová L., Čermák Z., Janská E., Čermáková D., Džúrová D., *The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country*, "IDEA Working Paper" 2009, nr. 11, 124 s.

³⁸ Okolski M. *The Effects of Political and Economic Transition on International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*, [w:] Massey D., Taylor J. (eds.), *International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2004, s. 35–57

³⁹ Čermáková D. *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshebradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna situatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chekhii* // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshebradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 79–88

⁴⁰ Strielkowski W. *Does it pay off to do undeclared work in the Czech Republic? Peer review on "Tackling undeclared work: developing an effective system for inspection and prevention"*, Prague 2012

other Central and Eastern European countries, including Slovakia⁴¹ (from 2001 to 2008, it, instead, doubled⁴²) and probably corresponds to the number of illegal immigrants nominally registered in the country⁴³. It is also interesting that the majority of illegal immigrants in the Czech Republic (in relative terms) are from Belarus and Ukraine.

At the same time, the geographical composition of immigrants changed as a result of the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. Those who left the country were mostly immigrants from Ukraine, Moldova and Poland⁴⁴. But this did not and does not apply to migrants from Belarus, who are considered to be political rather than economic⁴⁵. The number of immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania (as well as from Ukraine with Romanian passports) has also increased, but mainly after these countries joined the EU in 2007. The situation is complicated by the fact that it is not known whether immigrants left the Czech Republic at this time, or simply became illegal and fell out of the statistical field. In addition, geographically it is observed that: 1) immigrants are distributed along the “east-west gradient”, and thus the number and share of immigrants increase when moving from the eastern to the western regions of the Czech Republic; 2) the capital agglomeration of Prague is the most popular destination for immigration in the Czech Republic; 3) higher proportions of ethnic and immigration groups can be found in the regions bordering their “home” / native countries (especially in the case of immigrants from Poland, Germany and Slovakia).

It is also interesting that the turning point in migration processes was 2012, when the number of foreigners with the right of permanent residence in the Czech Republic exceeded the number of foreigners with the right of long-term residence. The fact is that in the case of the Czech Republic, permanent residence (as opposed to long-term residence) provides a number of benefits for immigrants: a residence permit for five years, the ability to get a job or change jobs without a permit. In addition, in the case of family reunification, a work permit is not required at all⁴⁶. This trend has been linked to an increase in the number of immigrants fulfilling the five-year residence requirement, which is one of the conditions for obtaining a permanent residence permit in the Czech Republic. It is interesting in this regard that the increased interest of immigrants to obtain the right to permanent residence reflects the change of the most common model of immigration from short-term to permanent. So the Czech Republic is definitely

⁴¹ Drbohlav D., Lachmanova L., *Irregular Activities of Migrants in Czechia: a Delphi Study on Adaptations in a Globalising Economy*, [w:] Dostal P. (ed.), *Evolution of Geographical System and Risk Processes in the Global Context*, Wyd. Charles University 2008, s. 129–156

⁴² Horakova M., *International Labour Migration in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs 2012.

⁴³ Drbohlav D., Valenta O., *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 41–71

⁴⁴ Horakova M., *International Labour Migration in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs 2012

⁴⁵ Čermáková D., *Migratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chekhii // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidkyskasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu*. 2014, s. 79–88; Drbohlav D., Valenta O., *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 41–71.

⁴⁶ Čermáková D., *Migratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna situatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chekhii // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu*. 2014, s. 79–88.

an immigrant country with a tendency to the prevalence of a permanent type of immigration. On the other hand, circular or seasonal immigration is still represented in the Czech Republic.

Other categories of immigrants living in the Czech Republic, such as refugees and persons with subsidiary protection status, are quite small. Thus, between 1994 and 2012, 79,000 immigrants applied for asylum and only less than 2,000 received international protection. This makes the Czech Republic one of the lowest in terms of the number of asylum seekers among other EU member states (a similar situation was observed in 2016). Moreover, Belarusians (along with Russians) represent the national group with the highest share of persons granted refugee status during the period after 1993. The main reasons for the small number of refugees and asylum seekers are that: a) the Czech Republic does not lie on the border of either the EU or the Schengen area, and is therefore not a “buffer zone”; b) The Czech Republic has never allowed the organized immigration of large numbers of refugees from countries or regions affected by armed conflicts and other catastrophic events; c) the Czech Republic has established severe asylum procedures, as the state has previously experienced numerous attempts by illegal economic immigrants to seek asylum seekers⁴⁷.

The gender structure of immigration to the Czech Republic is dominated, as in Slovakia, by men (over 55 percent), but the share of women is growing slowly and steadily (unlike most Western European countries)⁴⁸, especially among permanent immigrants. What is more, the largest number of women can be seen among immigrants from the former Soviet republics (Russians, Kazakhs, Belarusians). In contrast, the lowest proportion of women is usually among Moldovans and Ukrainians, who are routinely or mostly temporary economic migrants, as well as Hungarians. There are also differences in the age structure of foreign immigrants, as there are many young people (25-39 years old) among immigrants, and the share of people of working age is insignificant. In general, immigrants are often concentrated in the capital and the metropolitan area. For example, as of 2012, the share of foreigners registered in Prague reached 37 percent of the total number of immigrants. However, the territorial distribution of foreigners indicates differences depending on nationality. For example, Ukrainians tend to be concentrated in Central Bohemia and South Moravia, Vietnamese in Prague and the regions bordering the Czech-German border, and Russians in Prague and the Karlovy Vary region. As for illegal immigrants, most of them are recorded in Prague⁴⁹. After all, the economic results of immigration also in the Czech Republic are different, in particular depending on the country of origin of foreigners. In addition, the Czech Republic has a theory of “dual labor market”, according to which foreigners mainly from Western Europe and the USA are highly qualified

⁴⁷ Drbohlav D., Lachmanová-Medová L., Čermák Z., Janská E., Čermáková D., Džúrová D., The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country, *IDEA Working Paper* 2009, nr. 11, 124 s.

⁴⁸ Drbohlav D., Lachmanová-Medová L., Čermák Z., Janská E., Čermáková D., Džúrová D., The Czech Republic: on its way from emigration to immigration country, *IDEA Working Paper* 2009, nr. 11, 124 s.

⁴⁹ Medová L., Drbohlav D. Estimating the size of the irregular migrant population in Prague – An alternative approach, *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 2012, vol 104, nr. 1, s. 75–89.

and work mainly in the “primary” sector, while immigrants from Eastern Europe work in the “secondary” sector of the Czech labor market for example, in industry and production⁵⁰). After all, a third of economically active foreigners in the Czech Republic are self-employed. The official average monthly salary of an immigrant before taxes is less than the average salary of a Czech citizen. However, the average salary may actually be higher, as many immigrants work at several jobs and very often overtime (as in other countries in the region, including Slovakia).

Summarizing the different historical circumstances and immigration schemes, we can distinguish three types of immigrants in the Czech Republic⁵¹: a) “Eastern immigrant” who move to the Czech Republic from less developed countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, and therefore more economically active in manual labor, especially in construction and some other industries; b) “Western immigrants” coming to the Czech Republic from Western Europe and North America are generally more heterogeneous in terms of gender, age and purpose of stay, highly qualified and work in professional fields; (c) “Asian” immigrants (mainly from Vietnam, China and Mongolia) working in certain economic segments, especially retail, business and food services⁵².

As for the key reasons for the immigration of foreigners to the Czech Republic, they are usually socio-economically determined. The Czech Republic, in contrast to Slovakia (by the logic of Czechoslovakia), is the most stable and prosperous country in Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the periods of the strongest economic growth (1990–1997 and 2003–2008) were accompanied by high demand for labor and, consequently, higher immigration flows. During these periods, the greatest demands in the labor market were the workers for the work in construction and manufacturing. But the structure of demand has changed over time. Today there is an increased demand for the labour in the household services sector. In addition, in recent years, interest in studying in higher education institutions (in public institutions where teaching is conducted in Czech – it’s free) has proved to be one of the main reasons why young immigrants come to the Czech Republic⁵³. The summary analysis of the factors of immigration to the Czech Republic allows to single out such among them as: a) socio-economic and political stability in the country⁵⁴, and hence the possibility of employment and entrepreneurship (as the most important factor); b) the existence of developed / established (legal,

⁵⁰ Čermáková D. *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Cherkhii* // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 79–88.; Münich D. *A Tumultuous Decade: Employment Outcomes of Immigrants in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. International Labour Organization 2014.; Horakova M. *Labour Migration in the Czech Republic in the Context of the Economic Crisis*, zdroj: http://www.vups.cz/sites/File/audit-clanky/horakova_trojanovice.pdf (odczyt: 25.10.2017).

⁵¹ Drbohlav D., *Immigranti v České Republice (s důrazem na ukrajinské pracovníky a západní firmy operující v Praze)*, Wyd. Research Support Scheme 1999

⁵² Brouček S., *Aktuální problémy adaptace vietnamského etnika v ČR*, [w:] Uherek Z. (ed.), *Integrace cizinců na území České republiky*, Wyd. Akademie věd České republiky 2003, s. 7–184.; Čermáková D., Schovánková S., Fiedlerová K., *Podnikání cizinců v Česku: vliv struktury příležitosti*, “*Geografie*” 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 440–461

⁵³ Drbohlav D., *Migrace a (i)migranti v Česku: kdo jsme, odkud přicházíme, kam jdeme?*, Wyd. SLON 2010

⁵⁴ Castles S., Miller M., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.; Drbohlav D., *Immigration and the Czech Republic (with a Special Focus on the Foreign Labor Force)*, “*International Migration Review*” 2003, vol 37, nr. 1, s. 194–224

semi-legal and illegal) immigration networks and “client systems” of immigration⁵⁵; c) lingual, cultural and geographical proximity; d) traditions of population movement in the region and historical ties, e) favorable, active (since 2005 “civic-oriented”), although quite rigid, restrictive, selective and changeable (from liberal to liberal-social, and later on social liberal – the examples of which were such programs as “Selection of highly qualified foreign workers” (2003), “Green Card” (2009), “Blue Card” (2009), visa application system “VISAPOINT”⁵⁶) Czech immigration policy, which largely depends on both the prerogatives of the EU and the national position of the Czech Republic⁵⁷; f) the demographic situation, in particular the negative natural increase and aging of the population, in the Czech Republic (since the 1970s), which is compensated by the influx of foreigners.

As a result, it is stated that both Slovakia and the Czech Republic (but the latter to a much greater extent) today are inevitably positioned as immigrant countries with a growing number of foreigners who come to them for temporary or permanent residence and work. At the same time, the outflow of citizens (especially young) of the analyzed countries to the “old” EU states in search of better working and living prospects still affects the economy and social structure of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These parallel processes (albeit to a lesser extent than in other Central and Eastern European countries) require states to actively manage immigration processes, in particular to take advantage of them and limit their risks and negative consequences. And among the latter: labor market deficits in certain sectors (the consequence of emigration and the cause of immigration), often centralized and passive government policy as to the human flows; insufficient integration policy towards foreign citizens; the need to generate a systematic and decentralized institutional system and better cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions at the central, regional and local levels; Insufficient integration of immigration policy into social policy, labor market, health care, housing and development; not always an effective labor market monitoring system to assess the real demand for foreign labor; not always adequate, balanced and complete information and educational policy on foreigners and immigration processes, as a result of which negative myths and unreasonable social fears are created around immigrants; insufficient involvement of immigrants, especially in the process of their economic integration, social partners⁵⁸. The outlined problems intensified especially against the background of the European migration crisis, which intensified in 2014, but especially in

⁵⁵ Čermáková D., Nekorjak M., Ukrainian Middleman System of Labour Organization in the Czech Republic, *“Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie”* 2009, vol 100, nr. 1, s. 33–43

⁵⁶ Barša P., Baršová A., *Česká republika jako přistěbovalecká země*, Wyd. ÚMV 2006

⁵⁷ Čermáková D. *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta probnoz. Perspektyva Chetviri // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu.* 2014, s. 79–88.; Kušniráková T., Is there Integration Policy being formed in Czechia?, *“Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power”* 2014, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 738–754.; Kušniráková T., Čizinský P., Dvacet let České migrační politiky: liberální, restriktivní, anebo ještě jiná?, *“Geografie”* 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 497–517.; Lachmanová L., Vývoj a úspěšnost modelů integrace imigrantů (na příkladu Rakouska, Francie a Nizozemska), *“Geografie”* 2007, vol 112, nr. 2, s. 221–236.

⁵⁸ Drbohlav D., Lesinska M., *The migration nexus of Visegrad and Eastern partner countries: concluding remarks and political guidelines*, [w:] Eröss Á., Karácsonyi D. (eds.), *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Wyd. HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 225–233

2015, and therefore became decisive in the current understanding of immigration processes in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

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3. Barša P., Baršová A., *Česká republika jako přistěhovalecká země*, Wyd. ÚMV 2006.
4. Brouček S., *Aktuální problémy adaptace vietnamského etnika v ČR*, [w:] Uherek Z. (ed.), *Integrace cizinců na území České republiky*, Wyd. Akademie věd České republiky 2003, s. 7–184.
5. Castles S., Miller M., *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Ed. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.
6. Čermáková D., *Mihratsiia mizh krainamy ES, Vyshehradskoi chetvirky ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: potochna sytuatsiia ta prohnoz. Perspektyva Chekhii* // Prohnoz mihratsii mizh ES, Vyshehradskoiu chetvirkoiiu ta krainamy Skhidnoi Yevropy: naslidky skasuvannia vizovoho rezhymu. 2014, s. 79–88.
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THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON THE NATIONALIZATION AND/OR DENATIONALIZATION OF REGIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: THEORIZATION AND EMPIRICAL MANIFESTATIONS ON THE EXAMPLE OF POLAND AND HUNGARY

The article theorizes and offers empirical manifestations of the impact of elections and electoral systems on the nationalization and/or denationalization of regional political process, in particular on the example of Poland and Hungary. It is argued that regional elections in these countries are mostly nationalized, albeit on the basis of different instruments. At the same time, it is noted that parties in Poland and Hungary mostly use national schemes to promote their party brands and make adjustments into regional electoral campaigns, mainly under the influence of significant regional peculiarities. However, the most important thing is that the type and features of electoral systems used in a country at both regional and national level have a significant or decisive influence on the phenomenon of nationalization of regional political process. On the other hand, it is found that the process of regionalization of regional political process in Poland and Hungary is insignificant and is characterized only by personification and departyzation of regional political space and process. Accordingly, regional elections in the analyzed countries are regarded and positioned as second-tier elections, both in importance and consequences.

Keywords: nationalization of party system, nationalization and denationalization of political process, regionalization, local elections, electoral systems, regional level of government, Poland, Hungary.

ВПЛИВ ВИБОРІВ І ВИБОРЧИХ СИСТЕМ НА НАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЮ ТА/АБО ДЕНАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЮ РЕГІОНАЛЬНОГО ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ПРОЦЕСУ: ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЯ ТА ЕМПІРИЧНІ ВИЯВИ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ПОЛЬЩІ Й УГОРЩИНИ

У статті здійснено теоретизацію та запропоновано емпіричні вияви проблематики впливу виборів і виборчих систем на націоналізацію та/або денационалізацію регіонального політичного процесу, зокрема на прикладі Польщі й Угорщини. Аргументовано, що

регіональні вибори у цих країнах здебільшого є націоналізованими, хоча й на підставі різних інструментів. Паралельно з цим, констатовано, що партії у Польщі й Угорщині здебільшого використовують загальнонаціональні схеми просування своїх партійних брендів та вносять корективи у регіональні виборчі компанії головню під впливом значних регіональних особливостей. Однак найважливіше те, що значний чи визначальний вплив на феномен націоналізації регіонального політичного процесу мають тип й особливості виборчих систем, які застосовують у тій чи іншій країні як на регіональному, так і на національному рівні. З іншої сторони, виявлено, що процес регіоналізації регіонального політичного процесу й урядування в Польщі та Угорщині є незначним і характеризується лише персоніфікацією та департизацією регіонального політичного простору й процесу. Відповідно, регіональні вибори в аналізованих країнах розцінюються і позиціонуються як вибори другого порядку, причому як по важливості, так і по наслідках.

Ключові слова: націоналізація партійної системи, націоналізація і денационалізація політичного процесу, регіоналізація, місцеві вибори, виборчі системи, регіональний рівень урядування, Польща, Угорщина.

The phenomenon of nationalization of regional party systems and regional political process in general is being quite actively, especially recently, discussed in the research literature. Therefore, at least three aspects of its interpretation have even been proposed in this regard. The first aspect is that the nationalization, or rather a type of dynamic nationalization, of regional political process is understood as the extent to which party support in the administrative and territorial units of certain countries changes over time. In contrast, the second aspect outlines the nationalization or the so-called “national nationalization” of regional political process and governance as a set of actions, events and measures that focus on the equal distribution of votes for different parties within different administrative and territorial units of certain countries. Finally, the third aspect of understanding the nationalization of regional political process in Political Science usually tends to the so-called nationalization of party ties, which concerns the extent to which candidates and representatives of certain parties at the regional level are united under national party brands in their activities and rhetorics. Nevertheless, despite the considerable diversity of approaches to the interpretation of the nationalization of regional political process and regional party systems, the scientific literature on this subject is still characterized by significant theoretical and methodological prejudices. The main one of them is typically the tendency and intention of researchers to appeal to the analysis of mostly not regional and national, but exclusively national level of governance, and hence national level of electoral process in this context. Although, as known from some empirical scientific researches¹, a practical comparative analysis of the nationalization

¹ Schakel A., Nationalisation of multilevel party systems: A conceptual and empirical analysis, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2013, vol 52, nr. 2, s. 212–236.

of party systems and regional political process, at least in European countries (including Central and Eastern Europe and, in particular, Poland and Hungary), shows that their regional authorities and regional governance, in particular on the basis of taking into account the peculiarities and results of national and regional elections, have a significant impact on regions and regional elections, but not always on political parties, party systems and the level of nationalization of electoral support of such parties and systems in regions. Consequently, the presented research is actualized by the scientific task to theorize and reveal empirical manifestations of the impact of elections and electoral systems on the nationalization and/or denationalization of regional political process, in particular on the example of Poland and Hungary.

Starting to solve the research task, we proceed from the already axiomatic remark of researchers that the processes of the nationalization of party systems and regional level of governance in general position and outline a fairly broad historical evolution towards the formation of national electorates and party systems of certain or all countries of the world, as a result of which peripheral and regional specifics disappear². In view of this, it is habitually in Political Science to theorize that the development of national parties and party systems and nationally homogeneous electorate has a stabilizing effect on political systems in general. Accordingly, as D. Bochsler points out, the post-communist (in the temporal sense) democracies in Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe are of significant research interest and resonance, since they combine a particularly relevant set of cases in this context, at least because some of them have highly regionalized party systems³. A clear manifestation of this is the fact that regional elections in certain countries have been or remain associated with denationalization and territorial differences in voting and electoral systems. The reason is that regional political arena, regional level of governance and the growing powers of regional governments inevitably give political actors the opportunity to politicize local or regional interests and to create regional parties⁴. As a result, regional elections can develop and even strengthen territorial differences in political process, which may ultimately hinder the nationalization of parties, party systems and political process⁵. This, in turn, additionally highlights the feasibility of a comparative analysis of regional elections for the problem of nationalization or denationalization of party systems and political process in general, at least in some countries.

Among the factors influencing the nationalization or denationalization of party systems and political processes, the researchers primary appeal to the level of decentralization of power in a certain country. The reason for this is that the relative power and strength of power of each level of governance in a certain country is often seen as a key institutional variable that can influence regional electorates and regional party strategies, and thus regional party systems. However,

² Caramani D., *The nationalization of politics: The formation of national electorates and party systems in Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004, s. 1.

³ Bochsler D., *Territory and electoral rules in post-communist democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2010.

⁴ Schakel A., Nationalisation of regional elections in Central and Eastern Europe, *“East European Politics”* 2015, vol 31, nr. 2, s. 229–247.

⁵ Schakel A., Nationalisation of regional elections in Central and Eastern Europe, *“East European Politics”* 2015, vol 31, nr. 2, s. 229–247.

only a very small number of scholars clearly determine the causal link between administrative decentralization or centralization and its impact on party systems. P. Chhibber, K. Kollman⁶ and L. Thorlakson⁷ are the most famous among them. In particular, P. Chhibber and K. Kollman⁸ proceed from the fact that politicians are always guided by certain individual and collective interests, which are aimed at controlling their constituencies (electoral districts), maximizing their electoral preferences in such constituencies, in particular through the formation and development of regional (formally or actually) or national parties that may influence the activities of governments and policy-making process in general. Moreover, the degree to which politicians are grouped into regional or national parties depends on the correlation of authority/powers at the national level with authority/powers at the regional level of political process. For example, if local governments are empowered to make important decisions, then it is not only important, but also necessary (if possible) for politicians to create local and/or regional political parties that allow them to outline regional issues and problems, as well as their individual and collective interests⁹.

The opposite situation arises when national governments make much more important decisions and, consequently, the powers of regional authorities are relatively smaller. Candidates from different political parties and political actors in general then need to promote and use the brands of national parties, in particular to position themselves in relation to the national policy of governments and to make it clear that they can become the part of the process of national governance. In this regard, P. Chhibber and K. Kollman¹⁰ argue that the amplitude of political centralization and incentives of political actors to promote party brands may vary depending on the degree of centralization or decentralization of state power in a certain country. Similarly, L. Thorlakson¹¹ claims that decentralization of power provides both parties and voters with an incentive and opportunity to mobilize and respond to local and/or regional issues that may lead to the development of “unique” party systems at the regional level. As a result, the regional level becomes an extremely imperative, if not more important place of political competition with the decentralization of power and governance. In addition, voters can independently recognize the importance or primacy of the regional level

⁶ Chhibber P., Kollman K., *The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2004.

⁷ Thorlakson L., An institutional explanation of party system congruence: Evidence from six federations, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2007, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 69–95.; Thorlakson L., Patterns of party integration, influence and autonomy in seven federations, *“Party Politics”* 2009, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 157–177.

⁸ Chhibber P., Kollman K., *The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2004.

⁹ Schakel A., Nationalisation of multilevel party systems: A conceptual and empirical analysis, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2013, vol 52, nr. 2, s. 212–236.

¹⁰ Chhibber P., Kollman K., *The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2004.

¹¹ Thorlakson L., An institutional explanation of party system congruence: Evidence from six federations, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2007, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 69–95.; Thorlakson L., Patterns of party integration, influence and autonomy in seven federations, *“Party Politics”* 2009, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 157–177.

of governance and vote according to their own assessment of the performance of regional and national authorities. All this means that parties at the regional political level often have incentives to divert/distance their policies from the national one, especially when the compliance with the policy of national party or parties presupposes and determines the electoral risks of political actors and the electorate at regional level. This is quite often reflected in the fact that regional institutions of power can use specific forms and manifestations of policy to construct distinct state identities. This is the case, for example, when political actors mobilize and politicize issues related to linguistic, cultural, industrial, agricultural or economic activities and areas, where differences can be effectively applied to regional voters, if they vary as a whole in a certain country¹². Another important element and perspective of the study of nationalization or denationalization of party systems and regional political process is the notion of congruence of elections and volatility of the electorate, which should be analyzed in terms of electoral support for political parties during several electoral cycles at the national and regional levels. To track the links between national and regional elections and their consequences, we will analyze and compare the experiences of two countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. Poland and Hungary.

In *Poland*, electoral congruence is relatively higher than electoral volatility, as evidenced by the fact that the Polish electorate votes relatively stably in national elections, but, at the same time, voters tend to change their votes between national and regional elections. In addition, electoral statistics also show that electoral congruence is fairly stable, while electoral volatility is much more instable. Accordingly, the stability of the Polish party system covers both electoral congruence and electoral volatility, and therefore it can be observed that the congruence of this party system is largely due to changes in electoral variability. However, there are certain factors that cause territorial differences in voting. Among them, there are two main factors, such as historical heritage and economics¹³. In general, in order to differentiate between voting in national and regional elections, it is advisable to take into account the electoral consequences of not only national, but also regional elections. The point is that regional elections can be characterized by lower voter turnout, a more active anti-government position, and thus by electoral preferences for the opposition, small and new parties and movements, especially compared to national elections. At the same time, the main assumption that explains the differences in voter turnout is mainly that electoral behavior in regional elections is formed because voters consider regional elections less important than national ones.

In this regard, using public opinion polls to observe the importance of Polish regional elections, it can be stated that Poles consider local elections as more important than national

¹² Schakel A., Nationalisation of multilevel party systems: A conceptual and empirical analysis, *European Journal of Political Research* 2013, vol 52, nr. 2, s. 212–236.

¹³ Bartkowski J., *Tradycja i Polityka: Wpływ tradycji kulturowych polskich regionów na współczesne zachowania społeczne i polityczne*, Wyd. Akademickie "Zak" 2003.

parliamentary or presidential elections¹⁴. In addition, two thirds of respondents traditionally mention local government as a very important section in the system of government and governance, and therefore show interest in elections at the level of local government¹⁵. However, other data from the analysis of public opinion show a completely different picture. For example, when respondents are asked to rate the importance of different types and levels of elections, they clearly label national parliamentary and presidential elections as far more important than regional or local elections. Nevertheless, regional and local elections instead are generally considered as much more important than elections to the European Parliament¹⁶. As for outlining support, then traditionally about 80–90 percent of respondents say that they have no problems deciding whom to support in presidential or mayoral elections, but about 40 percent of the electorate have difficulty deciding whom to vote for in regional elections. Similarly, voters take into account very different factors when voting at different types and levels of elections, so that it seems that respondents decide the fate of their choice on the basis of likes or dislikes of parties and movements rather than individual candidates within regional elections. This is reflected in the fact that, according to various estimates, about a quarter of respondents adhere to their party commitment when voting in regional elections, while only about ten percent of voters adhere to party commitment in municipal council elections and about 20 percent of voters – in the county elections. In practice, however, more than half of respondents explain the nature of their vote in regional elections by appealing to the characteristics of the candidates rather than the parties and movements they represent. This is complemented by the fact that public opinion data on the importance of subnational governance show that the turnout in regional elections should not differ significantly from the turnout in national elections. In addition, regional elections are held separately from national elections, but simultaneously/synchronously with the elections for mayoral office and in general at the local level that inevitably contributes to the turnout at regional elections.

At the same time, the situation regarding the nationalization or denationalization of regional political process in Poland is significantly complemented by other party and electoral factors, including the role of the so-called non-state national parties, electoral alliances/blocs and the congruence of governments and governance. The specificity of non-state national parties is that they are political organizations that seek to maximize their electoral votes and dividends only in one or more regions, and therefore their priority policy is often to represent only specific regional interests. A striking example of the phenomenon of such political parties is the situation in Poland, where, based on the specifics of distribution of votes and mandates

¹⁴ *Polacy o wyborach samorządowych ponad miesiąc przed głosowaniem*, Wyd. Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej 2010, źródło: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_145_10.PDF

¹⁵ *Czy trzeba chodzić na wybory? Przyczyny absencji wyborczej*, Wyd. Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej 2011, źródło: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_118_11.PDF

¹⁶ *Wojtasik W., Drugorzędność wyborów samorządowych w teorii i badaniach empirycznych*, [w:] Baranski M., Czyż A., Kubas S. (eds.), *Rola samorządu terytorialnego w modernizacji Polski*, Wyd. Śląsk 2010, s. 261.

in regions, there are at least two non-state parties, but they differ significantly in how they represent regional interests. The first of these political parties is the “German Minority” (MN), which is the only non-state party at the national level that participates in national elections and is represented in national parliament (or at least in the Polish Sejm). The peculiarity of this political party is that almost all the votes it receives in elections come from the Opole Voivodeship, and since 1997 the MN has been represented by one or two members in the national parliament (although previously its representation was even larger). However, its representation in the national parliament is possible only because the “German minority” according to formal norms is exempted from the obligation to overcome the 5 percent electoral barrier (which it never overcame). All this allows the political party, even at the national level and in party manifestos, to appeal primarily to the representation of the interests of the German minority, such as bilingual education in the Opole region, substantial support for multiculturalism, decentralization of economic development, education and social development at the regional level¹⁷. Though, the MN has no specific claims regarding the autonomy status of Opole Voivodeship. As for the second non-state national party, then it is about the “Movement for Autonomy of the Silesian Region” (RAS), which should be considered as an autonomist party. It is interestingly that the RAS emerged as an important non-state party in the 2010 regional elections, when it received 8,5 percent of the vote and won three seats in Silesia. The RAS also ran in the 1991–2015 national elections, but it was unsuccessful. The RAS ideology is based on the recognition of the Silesian nationality, which the party considers different from the Polish identity¹⁸. At the same time, the party is inspired by the Western European regionalism and the EU regional policy and calls for strong and independent voivodships, which should not be financially dependent on the central government and which should have independent tax powers, as well as autonomy in decision-making in the field of culture and education policy.

In addition to non-state national parties, local or regional electoral alliances or blocs formed either by former members of previously established and existing parties, or by other non-partisan representatives, or by some local representatives, such as city officials and mayors, are also important in this cut. It is interestingly that none of such alliances or blocs, at least in Poland, has autonomist or regionalist ambitions, nor does base its ideology on ethnic or regional differences and identities. Nevertheless, such electoral alliances and blocs do bring regional differences or peculiarities into regional elections, and therefore they are important in theoretical, methodological and empirical contexts. The fact is that the relations between the partners in electoral alliances or blocs can be interpreted as nationalization (when a larger national party clearly dominates) or as regionalization (when a certain non-state party dominates in a certain region and thus a particular national party can benefit from such a merger). Accordingly,

¹⁷ *Program wyborczy Komitetu Wyborczego Mniejszość Niemiecka w wyborach do Parlamentu 2011*, MN 2011, źródło: <https://www.mniejszoscnieiecka.eu/program/>

¹⁸ Pędziwiatr K., *Silesian autonomy movement in poland and one of its activists*, Wyd. Tischner European University 2009.

there are electoral alliances and blocs that participate in regional elections, but they are created purely at the national level and quite often by national parties. Since these electoral unions and blocks participate in elections in the same region, but within different types and levels of elections, it is safe to conclude that such electoral alliances can be considered as behaving like state parties. In addition, there are also electoral alliances that are specially created to participate in elections at the regional level. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of the electoral alliances, which are specially created to participate in elections at the regional level in Poland, are formed by national political parties.

From all the above, it is safe to say that the results of the analysis of several factors of nationalization or denationalization of regional political process indicate the nationalization of the Polish regional elections and the Polish regional governance. Though, it was stated that the most of the differences in the voting process between regional and national elections can be attributed to electoral congruence. This indicates that voters tend to change their votes between regional and previous national elections. Moreover, a significant part of such changes during voting arises as a result of electoral effects, due to which opposition parties gain electoral advantages compared to government political parties. In addition, the volatility between government and opposition parties appears to be linked to unemployment rate and deteriorating the economic development. However, despite the significant nationalization of regional governance and regional political process, some signs of regionalization of political process in Poland can also be identified. In particular, the voter turnout in regional elections is about the same as in national elections. In addition, the correspondence between regional and national voting depends on historical regional features. That is why national political parties are interested in creating and quite often create regional electoral alliances and blocs to get as many votes as possible at the regional level¹⁹.

As for *Hungary*, then it is evolutionarily and empirically established that the congruence of elections in this country is relatively high and stable over time, although with the exception of the first democratic elections in 1990, which, in turn, can be explained by the novelty of democratic procedures. At the same time, the difference in electoral congruence in the regions of Hungary is small one, which indicates that voters are more likely not to show regional preferences in national elections, but rather to make their choices based on stable party preferences. However, the assessments of the congruence of elections in Hungary should be interpreted with caution, especially in the context of retrospective analysis and taking into account the specifics of electoral systems applied at different types and levels of elections in this country, including after significant changes in electoral rules. In particular, it is known that there was used a non-parallel/dependent mixed electoral system in the national parliamentary elections in Hungary until 2011. Under this electoral system, voters voted for a candidate in a single-member constituency and for

¹⁹ Gagatek W., Kotmarowski M., *Poland: Nationalization Despite Fear of Regionalization* // [w:] Schakel A. (ed.), *Regional and National Elections in Eastern Europe: Territoriality of the Vote in Ten Countries*, Wyd. Palgrave MacMillan 2017.

a regional electoral list. Thus, voters had two votes, i.e. one in a single-member constituency and one for a regional party list in a multi-member constituency. At the same time, the national party list played a compensatory role, allocating the seats on the basis of surplus votes cast in single-member constituencies and by party lists²⁰. However, in 2011 the electoral system was reformed and regional lists were abolished. Therefore, the assessment of the congruence of elections in 2014 and beyond began to be based on the votes cast for national party lists and despite the different ways of calculating and using for analysis various types of electoral lists (regional, national). Nevertheless, the congruence rate was similar in size to previous elections²¹.

However, it was found that the stability of party system and the congruence of elections in Hungary still gradually increased in 1994–2010, but decreased slightly since 2014. In addition, party system and the congruence of elections began to have a stronger influence on each other. This showed that the differences between regional and national party systems in the country are largely determined by changes in electoral preferences in regional and national elections. However, it should be mentioned that in assessing the stability and linkage of voting in regional and national elections (or vice versa), different voters are analyzed and compared, especially due to the peculiarities of the electoral systems used in regional elections in the country. This is an extremely important caveat, since the previous research has shown that the split/cleavage between the city and the countryside forms the party preferences of voters and affects the development of the Hungarian party system²². This is also complemented by the fact that Hungary has a fragmented territorial structure, which affects the relationship between urban and rural residence and the choice of political parties during voting²³. In summary, it is likely that party system and the results of electoral congruence reflect the urban-rural division along with the change in votes between regional and national elections. The increase in congruence can also be explained by the consolidation and nationalization of party system, thanks to which the main national parties strengthen their ability to receive and attract larger shares of regional votes²⁴. At one time, this manifested itself in the fact that relatively early established parties had a significant advantage and were able to attract voters throughout the country, and thus prevented the creation of new political parties in the process of democratic transition. Therefore, in 2014, the party system at the national level, especially after the beginning of some autocratization of the political regime in Hungary, was spread at the local level and easily “merged”

²⁰ Benoit K., *Hungary: Holding back the tier*, [w:] Gallagher M., Mitchell P. (eds.), *The politics of electoral systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2005, s. 231–252.

²¹ Benoit K., District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties, *European Journal of Political Research* 2001, vol 39, nr. 2, s. 203–224.; Moser R., Scheiner E., Strategic voting in established and new democracies: Ticket splitting in mixed-member electoral systems, *Electoral Studies* 2009, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 51–61.

²² Evans A., Whitefield S., Social and ideological cleavage formation in post-communist Hungary, *European-Asia Studies* 1995, vol 47, nr. 7, s. 1177–1204.; Korosenyi A., *Cleavages and party system in Hungary*, [w:] Enyedi Z., Toka G. (eds.), *The 1994 elections to the Hungarian national assembly*, Wyd. Sigma 1999.

²³ Knutsen O., Social structure, social coalitions and party choice in Hungary, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 2013, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 29.; Tabit R., Towns with county status in Hungary, *Croatian and Comparative Public Administration* 2012, vol 12, nr. 2, s. 101–114.

²⁴ Agh A., The early-freezing of the East-Central European parties: The case of the Hungarian Socialist Party, *Budapest papers on democratic transition* 1995, vol 129.

into regional elections. Thus, it is clear that large national parties dominate regional elections in Hungary. Their dominance is supported by the strategies for nomination and promotion of national political parties in regions²⁵. In turn, the consolidation of party system has also led to the fact that the left-right ideological dimension of political competition has become the dominant factor in electoral campaigns, voter behavior and coalition formation. The sudden increase in the dimension of party system and party representation in the legislature since 2014 can be explained by the increase of the number of regional lists, and thus of the influential political parties of national importance. Although many of them arose as a result of the disintegration of previously existing and stronger left/center-left political parties.

The analysis of the data on the electoral turnout in national and regional elections in Hungary specifies a difference in their indicators and, in particular, the lower turnout in regional elections. A factor that contributes to lower voter turnout in regional elections may, among the other things, relate to the timing of regional elections compared to the timing of national elections. The fact is that regional elections are mostly held only six months after national elections. Therefore, most parties lose financial resources after national electoral campaign and are unable to fill their election budgets and funds for only six months. Voter fatigue from several consecutive electoral cycles can also play a role. For example, there were held three consecutive electoral cycles in 2014 in Hungary, including parliamentary elections, elections to the European Parliament and regional elections. At the same time, the latter ones were characterized by the lowest voter turnout. It is also noted that in the period between national and regional elections, there are also often formed new parties. They can receive some electoral support, but it is typically insufficient to win seats, especially if such parties did not participate in previous, particularly national, elections. In general, the analysis of the Hungarian party system shows that its nationalization and regionalization used to take place and still take place in parallel²⁶. To explain such mixed consequences of electoral processes, it can be assumed that new parties are popular with voters who are dissatisfied with government political parties and their position on regional issues. Therefore, in conclusion, one can draw ambiguous conclusions about the connection between national and regional voting in Hungary. The fact is that the turnout in regional elections is typically lower than in national elections, but historically (except for the last decade) government and opposition parties alternately, depending on the electoral cycles, lose or gain their electoral support. Thus, the time or breeding in time (electoral asynchrony) of national and regional elections can be a decisive explanatory factor for such ambiguous conclusions. As mentioned above, regional (and local) elections are held six months after national elections, and this is a very short period of time for voters to review and change their electoral preferences. The imminent timing of national and regional elections also leads to a lengthy

²⁵ Varnagy R., *Polgármesterek a Magyar Országgyűlésben*, Wyd. Ad Librum Kiado 2012.

²⁶ Enyedi Z., Casal-Bertoa F., *Patterns of party competition 1990–2009*, [w:] Lewis P., Markowski R. (eds.), *Europeanising party politics? Comparative perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe after enlargement*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2011.

electoral campaign, during which opposition parties often exhaust their resources before regional elections. Finally, the short period between national and regional elections does not provide much time and space for identifying and analyzing the shortcomings of parties in government (e.g., pursuing unpopular policies) and encouraging protest voting in regional elections.

The discrepancy between national and regional elections in Hungary is or may also be the result of the activities of regional parties that are more successful in regional rather than national elections. At first glance, it is not appropriate to expect the phenomenon of regional parties in Hungary, as the voting of national minorities in this country is not mobilized by ethnic or regional political parties, and national minorities vote for the same parties as other Hungarians²⁷. Finally, the emergence of strong regional parties is also significantly hampered by institutional barriers. On the one hand, the peculiarities of the electoral system applied at the local/regional level certainly allow public associations to participate in regional electoral campaigns. However, on the other hand, the election law, by allowing these organizations to participate in regional elections, gives them exclusively a civil legal status. Thus, they are not political parties in the sense that they have no ambition to run in national elections, but they often run in regional elections. This is reflected in the fact that such organizations often represent the interests of their municipalities in large communities at the regional level. Instead, in smaller communities, organizations often form electoral unions and alliances based on common interests (for example, the alliances of retirement clubs or agricultural organizations, etc.) or to unite the electorate (since in almost every district there is one or another “alliance of mayors” or “alliance of villages”). At the same time, regional parties, i.e. parties that receive votes and win seats only in one region, are absent in constituencies, since most civil society organizations participate in elections only in their regions. In this cut, the electoral success of these public organizations can be seen as an indicator of the regionalization of voting and electoral process. That is why the growing participation of civil society organizations in elections has encouraged national parties to form alliances with these organizations. Such cooperation is beneficial to both partners, because: local organizations increase their chances of gaining power in regions; national parties receive wider coverage in local communities. Although, in contrast, the cooperation between national parties and local civil society organizations is rather weak. This has been particularly pronounced since 2010, when the local electoral system was reformed before the next regional elections, as a feature of which the elements of the majority (two-round) electoral system were introduced. This novation contributed to the further ousting of public associations by national parties from the regional electoral process, and thus from the regional level of government²⁸.

²⁷ Bohm A., *Lokális és regionális identitás, "Comitatus"* 2002, vol 12, nr. 4, s. 29–33.

²⁸ Dobos G., *Elmozdulás középszinten: A 2010-es önkormányzati választási reform hatásai a megyei önkormányzatokra, "Politikatudományi Szemle"* 2011, vol 20, nr. 4, s. 61–83.

Accordingly, in general, it can be stated that elections in Hungary are very nationalized, and over time we can see an increasing dominance of national parties at both local and regional levels. At the same time, the electoral turnout in regional elections is (much) lower than in national elections, but government parties do not systematically lose, and opposition parties do not always win a share of votes. Rather, regional voting reflects the option of testing the popularity of national government during elections in regions. However, the nationalization of elections in regional constituencies does not mean that there is no regionalization of regional voting in Hungary. On the contrary, many new parties are being formed at regional level, which receive or at least have previously received a significant share of votes. Though, such parties actually are civil society organizations that are allowed to participate in regional, but not national elections. In addition, the nationalization of electoral system and electoral process is carried out and supported by ongoing reforms of the institutional and electoral systems. Thus, despite the fact that civil society organizations with strong roots in local communities used to be able to compete successfully in regional elections, today, mainly due to the majority (two-round) electoral system at the local level, the strength of these organizations is significantly restrained. In addition, the recent electoral reforms have contributed to two major national parties that are positioned as the governmental ones. This is mainly due to greater synchronization of national and regional elections, i.e. resource impact on the opposition, especially at the local level, that will inevitably continue to have a significant impact on the congruence of elections²⁹.

In conclusion, it should be noted that based on the analysis of the impact of elections and electoral systems on the nationalization or denationalization of regional political process, in particular in Poland and Hungary, it can be concluded that regional elections in these countries are mostly nationalized. Each electoral cycle at a different level of elections establishes certain relationships, which are both long-term (traced over several elections) and temporary (disappear after the next elections). At the same time, the phenomenon of decentralization of power is an important aspect of the analysis of the nationalization of regional electoral process in two countries. Since it has been established that the more powers an electoral body has, the more interest it arouses among political actors and the more weight it has in the eyes of voters. In view of this, national parties in Poland and Hungary mostly use national schemes to promote their party brands and make adjustments to regional electoral campaigns, mainly under the influence of significant regional features. However, the most important thing is that the type and features of the electoral system used in a country at both regional and national levels have a significant or decisive influence on the phenomenon of nationalization of regional political process in Poland and Hungary. Such criteria as the method of nominating candidates, the possibility of participation of independent/non-partisan candidates, the possibility of creating electoral alliances, blocs and public formations are significant in this regard. In

²⁹ Dobos G., Varnagy R., *Hungary: Are Neglected Regional Elections Second-Order Elections?*, [w:] Schakel A. (ed.), *Regional and National Elections in Eastern Europe: Territoriality of the Vote in Ten Countries*, Wyd. Palgrave MacMillan 2017.

general, the process of regionalization of regional political process and governance in Poland and Hungary, especially at the background of their erosion of democracy, is insignificant and is rather characterized by personification and departyzation (if the type of electoral system allows it) of regional political space and process. Accordingly, regional elections in all the analyzed countries are regarded and positioned as second-tier elections, both in importance and consequences. In turn, parties use regional electoral process as a way to “investigate” the situation and/or obtain an assessment of the actions of government political parties and teams.

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Parliamentary opposition and its influence and dividends from the formation and functioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies

Artykuł analizuje problematykę wpływu i dywidend opozycji parlamentarnej z procesów tworzenia i funkcjonowania rządów mniejszościowych, w szczególności na przykładzie europejskich demokracji parlamentarnych. Celem badania było sprawdzenie założenia, czy tworzenie i funkcjonowanie rządów mniejszościowych w europejskich demokracjach parlamentarnych jest określone przez alternatywę partii parlamentarnych w wyborze między rządem a opozycją. W tym względzie stwierdzono, że rządy mniejszościowe są wynikiem zarówno spodziewanego wpływu, jak i oczekiwanych dywidend partii opozycyjnych, których wsparcie jest wykorzystywane przy tworzeniu rządów mniejszościowych. Jednocześnie ustalono, że opozycja parlamentarna w perspektywie rządów mniejszościowych ma szczególne, ale nie zawsze jednostronne i decydujące znaczenie, gdyż zarysowane konstrukcje gabinetów w dużej mierze zależą od uwarunkowań instytucjonalnych. Generalnie stwierdzono, że parametry relacji między partiami rządowymi i opozycyjnymi na tle tworzenia rządów mniejszościowych w europejskich demokracjach parlamentarnych są dość ważne, ale kontekst – zależny i zmienny.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, gabinet rządowy, rząd mniejszościowy, opozycja parlamentarna, partie rządowe i opozycyjne, demokracja parlamentarna.

The article is dedicated to analyzing the issues of the influence and dividends of parliamentary opposition within the processes of minority governments' formation and functioning, in particular on the example of European parliamentary democracies. The aim of the study was to test the assumption that formation and functioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies is often outlined by the alternatives of parliamentary parties in the choice between the government and the opposition. In this regard, it was stated that minority governments are a function of both the expected influence and the expected dividends of opposition parties, whose support is used in formation of minority governments. At the same time, it was revealed that parliamentary opposition, especially in the perspective of minority governments, has a superior, but not always unilateral and decisive significance, as the outlined constructions of governments largely depend on institutional determinants. In general, it was found that the parameters of relationship between governmental and oppositional parliamentary parties during the process of minority

governments' formation in European parliamentary democracies are quite important, but context-dependent and variable.

Keywords: *government, governmental cabinet, minority government, parliamentary opposition, governmental and oppositional parties, parliamentary democracy.*

The formation and functioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies is often outlined by the alternatives of parliamentary parties in the choice between the government and the opposition. In view of this, minority governments are more often formed when the political-power differential (which is almost always institutionally determined) between the status of the governmental and opposition parties becomes decisive. The fact is that the reason that determines political parties in the event of a choice of government or opposition to choose the latter is due to the availability of opportunities to implement the party course and political and ideological goals of the party, supported by voters. This is fully in line with the paradigm according to which the basic paradigm of European policy is the ability to defend the interests of certain social groups and implement their own party program. This program, i.e. the party's political and ideological goals, can be implemented from the seats of the opposition, and not only from government cabinets. Accordingly, this vision of the political process fits into the logic of interpreting and positioning of the minority government cabinets in European parliamentary democracies, and in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe, not necessarily as scenarios of "crisis and instability." All this actualizes the issue of the influence and dividends of the parliamentary opposition from the processes of formation and functioning of minority governments, in particular on the example of European parliamentary democracies.

These issues are clearly reflected in the practice of inter-institutional and inter-party relations regarding the formation and functioning of minority governments in European countries. In addition, it is quite well represented in the works of scientists, in particular, such as T. Bale and T. Bergman¹, E. Damgaard², C. Green-Pedersen and P. Mortensen³, V. Herman and J. Pope⁴, M. Matilla and T. Raunio⁵, P. Norton⁶,

¹ Bale T., Bergman T., A Taste of Honey Is Worse Than None at All? Coping with the Generic Challenges of Support Party Status in Sweden and New Zealand, *"Party Politics"* 2006, vol 12, nr. 2, s. 189–202.; Bale T., Bergman T., Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand, *"Government and Opposition"* 2006, vol 41, nr. 3, s. 422–449

² Damgaard E., *Parliament and government*, [w:] Esaiasson P., Heidar K. (eds.), *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic experience*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 2000, s. 265–280

³ Green-Pedersen C., *The Political Agenda in Denmark: Measurement and Trends since 1953*, Wyd. Aarhus University 2005.; Green-Pedersen C., Mortensen P., Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 2010, vol 49, nr. 2, s. 257–281

⁴ Herman V., Pope J., Minority Governments in Western Democracies, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 1973, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 191–212

⁵ Matilla M., Raunio T., Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries, *"European journal of political research"* 2004, vol 43, nr. 2, s. 263–285

⁶ Norton P., Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies, *"Journal of Legislative Studies"* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1–2, s. 6–19

J. Olsen⁷, S. Otjes and T. Louwse⁸, H. Seeberg and F. Christiansen⁹, K. Strøm¹⁰, G. Thesen¹¹ and many others.

Appealing to the available theoretical and practical manifestations of the operationalization of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, it has been established that such types of government cabinets are “crisis” only when they come to power in the absence of any parliamentary or legislative majority¹². However, as noted by M. Matilla and T. Raunio¹³, this is almost not typical of the Scandinavian countries, which are often based on the prevalence of minority governments stand out from other European parliamentary democracies and are not positioned and perceived as a crisis. Scholars note that the deviant Scandinavian tendency to form predominantly or very often minority governments is usually, among other things, including institutional and constitutional factors, explained and determined by the powers enjoyed by the parliamentary opposition. The fact is that the powers of the parliamentary opposition are most evident in the fact that minority governments do not focus mainly on their composition and parliamentary representation, but instead on the so-called parliamentary or legislative coalitions (“floor coalitions”), which consist of formally governmental parties, and from formally opposition / non-governmental parties. This means that already at the time of their formation, minority governments are counting on the support of opposition parties, in particular for the passage of government bills in parliament. Accordingly, the position that in some countries the frequency of minority government formation directly depends on the “force” of the potential influence of the parliamentary opposition on the activities and policies of government cabinets is appropriate. This is understandable given the statistical fact that minority governments in some countries, in particular Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and to a lesser extent Finland and Iceland, in some countries, in particular Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and to a lesser extent Finland and Iceland, are more likely to be formed when the parliamentary opposition is more influential (institutionally and politically). That is why the growing powers of the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary democracies increase the “attractiveness” of the idea of political parties not to form government cabinets and not to join them, which may explain the high frequency and duration of minority

⁷ Olsen J., *Organized Democracy: Political Institutions in a Welfare State – The Case of Norway*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1983

⁸ Otjes S., Louwse T., A Special Majority Cabinet? Supported Minority Governance and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Netherlands, *“World Political Science Review”* 2014, vol 10, nr. 2, s. 343–363

⁹ Seeberg H., Christiansen F., *Government and opposition in issue competition: Legislative agreements as a trade of criticism for policy*, Prepared for the 22nd annual IPSA Conference, Madrid, July 8–12, 2012

¹⁰ Strøm K., A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 1990, vol 34, nr. 2, s. 565–598.; Strøm K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583–605; Strøm K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Strøm K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions, *“Comparative political Studies”* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.; Strøm K., *Parliamentary government and legislative organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1995, s. 51–82

¹¹ Thesen G., *Making and shaking government? External support parties as political agenda-setters*, Wyd. International Research Institute of Stavanger 2011.; Thesen G., When good news is scarce and bad news is good: Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda-setting, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2013, vol 52, nr. 3, s. 364–389.

¹² Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *“American Political Science Review”* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 31.

¹³ Matilla M., Raunio T., Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries, *“European journal of political research”* 2004, vol 43, nr. 2, s. 270–271

governments in some European countries. According to some researchers¹⁴, this is further facilitated by the relationship of close inter-party cooperation, especially within the legislatures, and therefore the outlined conclusion largely blurs the traditional differences between the government cabinet and the parliamentary opposition in parliamentary democracies.

Explaining the empirical logic of the influence of the “force” of the parliamentary opposition on the frequency of formation of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, K. Strom notes that the political-power differential between the status of government and opposition party concerns the differentiation of parliament¹⁵. Against this background, it is worth distinguishing between two forms of differentiation of parliamentary roles that affect the different prospects of opposition parties – hierarchization and specialization. Legislatures with a low degree (level) of hierarchy and a high degree (level) of specialization usually contribute to the influence of opposition parliamentary parties. Because government parties traditionally control the “command heights of parliament¹⁶”, hierarchical mechanisms within parliaments facilitate the dominance of government parties over the opposition ones. At the same time, however, a high level of specialization within parliaments strengthens them and the legislature in general as opposed to governments and the executive, making the correlation between government and opposition more significant and structured.

This conclusion of K. Strom is relevant because all national legislatures of European parliamentary democracies are structurally hierarchical. However, a special place among them is occupied by the Scandinavian parliaments, which are structured on the principles of equality, informality and “moderation”, on the basis of which hierarchy as a form of differentiation of parliamentary roles is less pronounced than in parliaments of other European countries. The fact is that discrimination between parties in the Scandinavian parliaments is limited, and therefore they have little or no distinction between government and opposition political forces. And this, as, for example, in the Norwegian Storting (parliament), is the reason that deputies at sittings are physically placed after the districts, instead of after fractions, despite the fact that all positions between parties in parliament distribute strictly proportional. In addition, committees and other parliamentary staff are non-partisan, and the time for speeches in parliament is distributed in proportion to the force / representation of the parties in the legislature, whether governmental or oppositional. According to B. Rush¹⁷ and J. Olsen¹⁸, in the case of Norway, the peculiarities of the hierarchization of the parliament are utmost noticeable in the so-called Council of Presidents and the functioning of meetings of parliamentary factions. These are the

¹⁴ Damgaard E., *Parliament and government*, [w:] E. Saastad, P. Heidar K. (eds.), *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic experience*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 2000, s. 265–280.; Arter D., *Scandinavian politics today*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 1999, s. 200–244

¹⁵ Strom K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 591–592

¹⁶ Strom K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 591

¹⁷ Rasch B., Stortingets Uformelle avstemningsregler, *“Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning”* 1983, vol 24, s. 221–242

¹⁸ Olsen J., *Organized Democracy: Political Institutions in a Welfare State – The Case of Norway*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1983, s. 58.

structures that unite the work of the parliament and support the government. Thus, the Council of Presidents of Norway consists of six persons (speakers), who are three pairs (presidents and vice-presidents), represented by parties on the basis of proportional consideration of the “force” of the representation of the largest of them. Each of the pairs of presidents (or speakers) of the parliament rotates leading powers in the legislature monthly. However, it is as a result that the weakly hierarchical Council of Presidents plays a minor role in the Norwegian parliament’s political decisions, so it is not a mechanism for the government cabinet and government parties to dominate the parliamentary opposition. The situation is similar for other Scandinavian countries, even though the speakers of their parliaments (especially in Sweden) play a key role in the negotiations leading up to the formation of government cabinets¹⁹.

As for the meetings of the factions of the parliamentary parties, they are also rather weakly hierarchized in the Scandinavian countries, although they are more important hierarchical components of the parliaments than the leadership of the parliaments. The fact is that the Scandinavian parties are very disciplined, and therefore the cohesion of parliaments is very tangible²⁰. Therefore, according to G. Hernes²¹, deputies of national parliaments of different Scandinavian countries can usually initiate only legislative issues that concern the interests of their constituencies and freedom of conscience. It should also be noted that the leaders of parliamentary parties are endowed with a number of “sanctions” against some members of their factions. The latter, for example, may not be represented in certain parliamentary committees. Instead, everything, including the issue of the party’s course on certain issues of state development, is decided by party leaders and meetings in parliaments. Based on this and the tradition of consensual decision-making in the Scandinavian countries, it is obvious that all or most of the issues and problems of the majority in the legislature are accommodated and / or settled by the parliamentary minority²².

At the same time, in order for opposition parties to be influential in the context of the functioning of government cabinets, in particular minorities, it is critical for them that parliamentary rules and procedures be hierarchical in terms of systematic discrimination against them. Returning to the Scandinavian countries, for example, such discrimination is found to be substantially limited, as a fair distribution of positions, rules and procedures between government and opposition parties is maintained at virtually every level and in every aspect of parliamentary activity. For example, each Norwegian MP is given a position in only one standing committee of parliament, and each committee is formed as much as possible on a proportional basis. The situation is similar for other, not necessarily Scandinavian, countries, including Greece, Estonia,

¹⁹ Arter D., *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis*, Wyd. Hurst 1984, s. 147

²⁰ Bjurulf B., Glans I., *Fran tvablockssystem till fraktionalisering. Partigrupper och ledamoters rostning i norska stortinget 1969–1974*, “*Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*” 1976, vol 3, s. 231–252

²¹ Hernes G., *Interest, Influence and Cooptation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1971

²² Strøm K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 592

Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Hungary, France and Sweden²³. However, not all of them are dominated or formed by minority governments at all. On the one hand, minority government cabinets are often formed or have been formed in Italy, which has had a so-called Legislative Committee since 1997, consisting of ten deputies – five from the majority (government parties) and five from the minority (opposition parties). A similar situation among Central and Eastern European countries is observed in Slovenia, where all committees are formed on a proportional basis, i.e. taking into account the party-political configuration of the lower house of parliament (shares of parliamentary parties), and in the Public Finance Control Committee and the oversight of the intelligence and security services, the vast majority of seats are made up of members of opposition parliamentary groups.

On the other hand, minority governments are not very or not at all typical of countries such as Austria, Luxembourg, Malta, Germany, Serbia, the United Kingdom and Hungary, where the powers of the parliamentary opposition are very important. For example, in Hungary, despite the proportional distribution of members of most standing committees between parties, some standing committees are formed on the basis of the principle of parity, i.e. the number of members from government parties is equal to the number of members from the opposition parties. In addition, the country stipulates that the National Security Committee (by law) and the Audit and Budget Committee (by political agreement) must be headed by members of opposition parties, although minority governments are almost non-existent. A similar situation with the absence of minority governments is typical for Montenegro, which clearly stipulates that the chairman and deputy chairman of a standing committee may not simultaneously represent only governmental or only opposition parliamentary parties.

In this regard, it is established that the relative lack of hierarchy between the parties and their representatives / deputies is manifested in other relations as well. Minority governments are much more often, again on the example of the Scandinavian countries, formed / supported by so-called “working parliaments”, in which little attention is paid to the speeches of unsurpassed speakers or experienced politicians. Or, in other words, minority governments are more often formed as institutional consequences of parliaments that are poorly differentiated and hierarchical on the basis of the principles of individuality. Accordingly, minority governments are more likely to have political systems that have few “senior” and experienced MPs in their parliaments (despite the likely respectable age of parliamentarism and long life expectancy in a country). Thus, it is generally stated that minority government cabinets are much more common in European parliamentary democracies, where parliaments have relatively “flat and non-hierarchically structured structures”²⁴. After all, egalitarianism and informality are common in this case, as a result of which opposition parliamentary parties do not experience systemic

²³ Arter D., *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis*, Wyd. Hurst 1984, s. 191.; Strøm K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 592

²⁴ Strøm K., Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583–605

discrimination in resource allocation procedures. Even though parliamentary faction meetings are central decision-making arenas and party discipline is high, relations between government and opposition parties, i.e. between government and opposition, are usually close / sincere, and significant inter-party conflicts are impossible, including at the plenary sessions of parliaments. Such situations provide favorable conditions for the legislative influence of opposition parties. This necessarily means that opposition parties are “thriving” in a functionally differentiated and specialized parliamentary environment.

It is important that without specialization parliaments are unable to function as effective tools for scrutinizing and holding back government cabinets and bureaucracies. In addition, it is much more difficult for the government cabinet and the leadership of the parliament to control the decentralized discussion process, which actually accompanies specialization. Accordingly, specialized standing committees of parliaments, given their very variable attributes, form completely alternative sources of knowledge, information and identification. This is important given the fact that, as established by a number of scholars, minority government cabinets are more often formed in the absence of reliable information, in particular on the adoption of expected regulations and bylaws. Another aspect that, in the context of the specialization of parliaments, affects the frequency of formation of minority governments concerns consensus-oriented decision-making by legislature committees. The fact is that minority governments are formed more often when the laws and regulations of parliaments provide for closed rather than open meetings of parliamentary committees. If decisions are made in this way in committees, they are almost always made in plenary sessions of legislatures, and this, provided that the previous requirements are met, contributes to the formation of minority governments for institutional and party reasons. Therefore, K. Strom²⁵ emphasizes that minority governments should more often be formed in those political systems in which the work of standing parliamentary committees is organized in such a way as to promote specialization and cooperation between government and opposition parties, i.e. between the expected and the current government and the opposition. At the same time, one cannot ignore the factors that significantly limit parliamentary specialization, in particular the significant parliamentary variability and change in the successive legislatures of deputies and parties, as well as the change of membership in parliamentary committees by deputies. These factors and the low level of professionalism of parliamentarians create even greater priorities and advantages for opposition parties, and therefore they contribute to the formation of minority governments. In view of this, it has been established that taking into account the committees of legislatures, in particular their institutional and quantitative attributes, is of relative importance in determining the influence of the parliamentary opposition on the frequency of formation and functioning of minority governments in European democracies. Instead, the influence of such attributes of parliamentary

²⁵ Strom K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, “*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583–605

committees as their strength and specificity is brighter and more tangible²⁶. In general, it is generally believed that systems of strong parliamentary committees (for example, in Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Spain and Sweden) help to strengthen parliamentary opposition, which in total increases parliamentary influence. committees and parliamentary opposition to government activities and policies. Accordingly, it is in this case that minority governments should be formed much more often.

However, in the context of defining the role of the parliamentary opposition in the formation and functioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, the question of the “benefits” and dividends received by the opposition parties themselves remains open. The fact is that such parties deliberately refuse to pursue their power goals. However, according to researchers²⁷, this does not mean that opposition parties do not achieve political, ideological and electoral goals. In addition, scholars²⁸ argue that opposition parties, especially in opposition to minority governments, have several tools to influence the political process, including the agenda of legislatures in their competition with the executive authorities. For example, as S. Soroka notes, opposition parliamentary parties, based on their negative bias through the media, can significantly politicize the issues and problems of the weakness of minority governments²⁹. This is especially evident when there are minority government offices for which there is too little “good news” in the media. Thus, through the media, opposition parliamentary parties, in contrast to government parties minorities are capable of achieving more political-ideological and electoral goals³⁰. This occurs as opposition parties in this context have a greater opportunity to constantly focus on issues that benefit them exclusively, and government parties must respond to issues raised by the agenda of existing party systems. Thus, without controlling the agenda of party systems, opposition parties of the legislature can force government cabinets to act to address specific issues addressed to them³¹. This shows that party reactions to news in the media play an extremely important role in the competition between the government cabinet and the parliamentary opposition in a parliamentary democracy³². While the cabinet responds to good news in the media, including news that reflects a positive

²⁶ Ström K., *Parliamentary government and legislative organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1995, s. 51–82

²⁷ Bale T., Dann C., Is the Grass Really Greener? The Rationale and Reality of Support Party Status: A New Zealand Case Study, *Party Politics* 2002, vol 8, nr. 3, s. 350

²⁸ Green-Pedersen C., Mortensen P., Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting, *European Journal of Political Research* 2010, vol 49, nr. 2, s. 257–281.; Thesen G., When good news is scarce and bad news is good: Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda-setting, *European Journal of Political Research* 2013, vol 52, nr. 3, s. 364–389

²⁹ Soroka S., The Gatekeeping Function: Distributions of Information in the Media and the Real World, *Journal of Politics* 2012, vol 74, nr. 2, s. 514–528

³⁰ Thesen G., When good news is scarce and bad news is good: Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda-setting, *European Journal of Political Research* 2013, vol 52, nr. 3, s. 364–389

³¹ Green-Pedersen C., Mortensen P., Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting, *European Journal of Political Research* 2010, vol 49, nr. 2, s. 273

³² Thesen G., *Making and shaking government? External support parties as political agenda-setters*, Wyd. International Research Institute of Stavanger 2011, s. 4

solution to existing social problems, opposition parties use bad news to criticize the government cabinet and focus mainly on its incompetence. In this case, the “skew” of news in the media almost always works mainly in favour of opposition political forces. That is why, without being governmental, they are able to achieve their own political and ideological goals through minority governments and government parties, and without the participation of minority governments – their electoral goal.

Therefore, the statement of K. Strom is quite correct, who notes that the direct difference between parties in the government cabinet and parties outside the government cabinet in many multi-party democratic systems is not always equal to the difference between parties with influence and without influence and responsibility³³. This is especially true of parliamentary democracies, which have traditionally formed minority governments, including Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Spain and Romania, and previously Italy. For most of them, it was or is the minority government cabinets that operate in an influential parliamentary opposition³⁴. This confirms that minority governments and their periods of operation, and therefore their “viability and effectiveness”, are possible only through various types of arrangements to support minority governments between the minority governments themselves and the various opposition parties in the legislature. These agreements can be informal (oral) or formal (written). They may concern some or all of the activities of minority government cabinets and the political and ideological goals of opposition parliamentary parties³⁵.

With this in mind, T. Bale and T. Bergman note that in countries where minority government cabinets often take place, agreements between opposition and government parties on the specifics of the functioning of such cabinets and the political and ideological goals of governmental and non-governmental parties can be constructed on the basis of strictly institutionalized rules, which in political science are referred to as “contract parliamentarism”³⁶. It outlines the situation in which a governmental (coalition or one-party) minority cabinet has formal written arrangements with one or more non-governmental / opposition parties. The essence of such agreements is that non-governmental / opposition parties support the minority government, while the minority government assists non-governmental / opposition parties in achieving their political and ideological goals. In addition, “contract parliamentarism” can fulfill the power goals of opposition parties, because on the basis of agreements with government parties, opposition political forces can generally be endowed with positions in the executive branch. The practice of “contract parliamentarism” is typical for Sweden, and to a lesser extent for Denmark and Norway.

³³ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 42.

³⁴ Gallagher K., Laver K., Mair P., *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 2005, s. 388–391

³⁵ Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Cambridge 1982, s. 143.

³⁶ Bale T., Bergman T., Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand, “*Government and Opposition*” 2006, vol 41, nr. 3, s. 422–449

A somewhat different type of agreement between government and opposition parties is the so-called “externally supported government offices” (externally supported cabinets), which theoretically singled out K. Strom³⁷. They are based on advance (even before the formation of the Government) stipulated, comprehensive and clear (not necessarily written) arrangements, which guarantee the support of the opposition parties to minority governments, and can be traced or previously traced, for example, in Italy, France, Finland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, less-in Denmark and Norway. These agreements are often referred to as the “negotiating parliamentarism” (negotiating parliamentarism)³⁸. Finally, sometimes, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, government minority offices have a place on the basis of exceptionally informal and unwritten agreements and arrangements. However, support guaranteed by such agreements can be both consistent and situational³⁹.

In this context, it is important to note that the prospects of opposition parties from not participating in the formation and functioning of minority government cabinets, as well as the prospects for minority governments to take into account the goals of opposition parties, depend on the governmental and formative potential of these opposition parties. If they are treated as hypothetical components of alternative government coalitions, then their potential and expected prospects in terms of ensuring political and ideological goals by minority governments increase. If the opposition parties are not treated as hypothetical components of alternative government coalitions, then their potential to embody their own political and ideological goals is significantly limited⁴⁰.

That is why the strategies of relations between governmental and opposition parties under the conditions of functioning of minority governments are different. The first strategy, or so-called support party bonus strategy, provides that opposition parties that remain outside government cabinets (including minorities) have a better chance of avoiding the “position effect”, which is reflected in the form of a decrease in the electoral popularity of parties that were government before the election. In this regard, the researchers argue that the expected electoral costs of government (ie from participation in the formation and operation of government offices) are relevant to the decision not to govern (ie non-participation in the formation and operation of government offices)⁴¹. Therefore, when testing such a strategy, opposition parliamentary parties usually criticize government parliamentary parties and their government cabinets in every possible way, as expected to increase their electoral preferences, but formally

³⁷ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 61–62

³⁸ Sannerstedt A., *Negotiations in the Riksdag*, [w:] Stenelo L.-G., Jerneck M. (eds.), *The Bargaining Democracy*, Wyd. Lund University Press 1996, s. 17–58; Mattson I., *Förhandlingsparlamentarism. En jämförande studie av Riksdagen och Folketinget*, Wyd. Lund University Press 1996

³⁹ Herman V., Pope J., *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 1973, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 191–212

⁴⁰ Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 104

⁴¹ Rose R., Mackie T., *Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability?*, [w:] Daalder H., Mair P. (eds.), *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1983; Narud H., Valen H., *Coalition Membership and Electoral Performance*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 369–402

or informally remain parties supporting such government cabinets (especially minority governments). Instead, the second strategy, or the so-called support party trade-off strategy, stipulates that opposition political forces that remain outside government cabinets (including minorities) “share” political responsibility for their activities with government parties governments, and therefore not very or not at all critical of government cabinets. The point is that, according to the outlined strategy, opposition parties fear that their criticism of government cabinets (including minorities) will undermine the reputation of constructive cooperation between the government and the opposition, leading to a loss of electoral support for government and opposition political forces⁴².

In addition, in the perspective of the opposition parliamentary parties not to participate in the formation and functioning of minority governments, the remarks of G. Sieberg and F. Christiansen⁴³ that minority governments through non-governmental / oppositional political parties propose non-governmental / opposition political parties influence in exchange for avoiding criticism of minority government cabinets by the parliamentary opposition. In fact, in this case, the legally oriented agreements of the minority and opposition governments, ie the governmental and opposition parties have the format of bargaining and negotiations. They aim to make the parliamentary opposition as co-responsible as possible for the political policies of governments minority, which is why to limit the ability of opposition parties to criticize minority governments⁴⁴. This is most true of European parliamentary democracies, which are examples of “contract parliamentarism” systems, in particular for Sweden and Denmark, and less so for Norway⁴⁵. In addition, in this case, cooperation between government and opposition parties is mutually beneficial, as the advantages and miscalculations of it take into account both government and opposition political forces⁴⁶ (especially when political parties are relatively proportionate and agreements between them are “broad”). However, they are still largely taken into account by government parties and their government cabinets, which consider various types of arrangements with opposition parties to be necessary for the adoption of government bills in the legislature. Accordingly, the interpretations of J. Buchanan and G. Tallock⁴⁷, K. Shepsl and B. Weingast⁴⁸, R. Klemmensen and S. Norgaard⁴⁹ are appropriate in this context, which indicate that the “income from bargaining” of minority governments with opposition parties is the formation and support for legislative institutions that help political representatives with different interests to achieve individual goals. As a result, opposition parties

⁴² Bale T., Bergman T., A Taste of Honey Is Worse Than None at All? Coping with the Generic Challenges of Support Party Status in Sweden and New Zealand, *Party Politics* 2006, vol 12, nr. 2, s. 206

⁴³ Seeberg H., Christiansen F., *Government and opposition in issue competition: Legislative agreements as a trade of criticism for policy*, Prepared for the 22nd annual IPSA Conference, Madrid, July 8–12,

⁴⁴ Green-Pedersen C., *The Political Agenda in Denmark: Measurement and Trends since 1953*, Wyd. Aarhus University 2005

⁴⁵ Klemmensen R., Forlig i det danske Folketing 1953–2005, *Politica* 2005, vol 37, nr. 4, s. 440–452

⁴⁶ Christiansen F., *Politiske forlig i Folketinget*, Wyd. Aarhus University Press 2008

⁴⁷ Buchanan J., Tullock G., *The calculus of consent*, Wyd. The university of Michigan Press 1962

⁴⁸ Shepsle K., Weingast B., *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1995.

⁴⁹ Norgaard S., Klemmensen R., Hvorfor stemmer oppositionen for regeringens lovforslag?, *Politica* 2009, vol 41, nr. 1, s. 68–91

are able to work with minority governments to agree on public policies, that is, they are able to assist them in governing⁵⁰.

In the context of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, this is particularly evident in the fact that it is the opposition parties that are effective in controlling and influencing the legislative agenda⁵¹. As a result, researchers often note that minority government offices “do what the opposition says”⁵². In addition, governments agree on such an agenda, because if the politicization of the parliamentary opposition is not stopped, it will negatively affect the electoral prospects of government parties⁵³. The fact is that opposition parliamentary parties are fairly well aware of the vulnerabilities of government cabinets, especially minority government cabinets⁵⁴. Therefore, all successful politicians also instinctively understand which issues and problems benefit them and their parties and which issues and problems do not. So the trick is to politicize the former and depoliticize the latter. However, in the context of the outlined conclusions, it is clear that the parliamentary opposition may or may not address issues that benefit minority governments: it all depends to a large extent on the goals (including government-forming) of opposition parties and their relationship with government parties. Accordingly, the opposition and opposition parties may or may not abandon the strategy that they do not win the election, but force the government and government parties to lose⁵⁵.

In summary, this means that in the case of minority governments in parliamentary democracies (especially those where minority governments are formed on a regular basis), arrangements between governmental and opposition parties tend to give rise to political positions of the parliamentary opposition that are too difficult for government parties to abandon⁵⁶. The fact is that minority governments themselves still have only two strategies to “reserve their stability” – to rely on external support (non-governmental / opposition parties to support minority governments) or to negotiate “friendly restraint” of non-governmental / opposition parties⁵⁷. According to K. Strom, minority governments that rely on external support are “disguised majority governments.” Instead, minority government cabinets, which agree on the “friendly restraint” of non-governmental / opposition parties in providing legislative support for certain issues of government are de facto minority governments⁵⁸. In other words, minority govern-

⁵⁰ Norton P., Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies, *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1–2, s. 6–19

⁵¹ Green-Pedersen C., Mortensen P., Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting, *European Journal of Political Research* 2010, vol 49, nr. 2, s. 257–281.

⁵² Seeberg H., Christiansen F., *Government and opposition in issue competition: Legislative agreements as a trade of criticism for policy*, Prepared for the 22nd annual IPSA Conference, Madrid, July 8–12, 2012.

⁵³ Green J., The dynamics of issue competence and vote for parties in and out of power: an analysis of valence in Britain, 1979–1997, *European Journal of Political Research* 2011, vol 51, nr. 4, s. 469–503.; Robertson D., *A theory of party competition*, Wyd. Wiley 1976.; Riker W., *The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1996

⁵⁴ Carmines E., The Logic of Party Alignment, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1991, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 75.

⁵⁵ Norris P., Apathetic Landslide: the 2001 British General Election, *Parliamentary Affairs* 2001, vol 54, nr. 1, s. 576

⁵⁶ Strom K., A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties, *American Journal of Political Science* 1990, vol 34, nr. 2, s. 565–598

⁵⁷ Russo F., *Two steps forward and one step back: the majority principle in the Italian Parliament since 1994*, Paper prepared for the SISP annual conference, University of Perugia, September 11–13, 2014, s. 14

⁵⁸ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990

ments that rely on stable external support from opposition parliamentary parties are so-called supported minority governments. Instead, such minority governments that rely on situational (ad hoc) external support from opposition parties or their “friendly restraint” are so-called unsupported minority governments⁵⁹.

However, even so, Strom notes that in a trivial sense, all minority governments rely on external support, as they, having a minority in the context of government parliamentary parties in the legislature, are obliged to receive votes of support from non-governmental (opposition) parties, in particular for beginning to perform their duties and adopt their own bills in the legislature. Thus, the scholar proposes a more substantial definition of external support for minority government cabinets, which is based on the separation of two types of such government cabinets – “formal” and “substantial” (“substantivized”)⁶⁰. On this basis, Strom argues that a minority government should be classified as “externally supported” only if it enjoys the parliamentary support of any party that is not represented in the government cabinet, but always provided that the support of such a party: was determined and agreed before the formation of the minority government; takes the form of a clear, comprehensive, and more than short-term commitment to government policy and “survival.” This position of delineating “external support” is critical given that minority governments are a priori the result of two counts. First, any relevant / substantial parliamentary party has short- and long-term goals that may conflict with each other. Therefore, one or another party, formally supporting the government cabinet of the minority, must realize and take this into account. Secondly, any relevant / substantial parliamentary party a priori wants to influence the political process, but it can do so by gaining power, as well as by participating in legislative activities.

Therefore, each party, supporting the minority government cabinet, must understand this situation. Taking these points into account by hypothetical non-governmental parties directly affects the possibility of forming “formal” or “externally supported” minority government cabinets. This means that “formal” or “externally supported” minority governments, as opposed to “substantial” or “substantivized” minority governments, are always the result of rational calculations by parties as to whether they can achieve their own goals and interests outside government cabinets⁶¹. A. Lijphart⁶² takes a somewhat controversial position, pointing out that both the first and second types of minority governments (based on the different nature of support or “restraint” of opposition parties) should be defined for theoretical and practical reasons as “oversized” types of majorities. Especially since the commitments of “external support” parties in minority government cabinets are never as strong as with the participation of

⁵⁹ Strom K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.; Bale T., Bergman T., *Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand*, “*Government and Opposition*” 2006, vol 41, nr. 3, s. 422–449

⁶⁰ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990

⁶¹ Robert A., *Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement*, “*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1278.

⁶² Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999

“external support” parties directly in government cabinets. However, in one case or another, in the periods of formation and functioning of majority government cabinets, inter-party divisions and conflicts between the status of the governmental and coalition parties are greater than in periods of formation and functioning of minority governments⁶³. Accordingly, in the perspective of minority governments, the parliamentary opposition has a special, though not unilateral, influence.

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⁶³ Otjes S., Louwse T., A Special Majority Cabinet? Supported Minority Governance and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Netherlands, *“World Political Science Review”* 2014, vol 10, nr. 2, s. 343–363

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THE PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS OF PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AND MAINTAINING BALANCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS' PARTNERS: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTEXTS

Artykuł analizuje teoretyczne zasady i praktyczne przejawy oraz mechanizmy alokacji tek i utrzymania równowagi pomiędzy partnerami w koalicjach rządowych. Ustalono, że takie zasady i mechanizmy, zwłaszcza na tle stosunków nie tyle międzyinstytucjonalnych, co międzypartyjnych, są ważne w kontekście powoływania i funkcjonowania oraz odpowiedzialności rządów koalicyjnych, a co za tym idzie ich stabilności i skuteczności. Problem wynika z tego, że partyjne koalicje rządowe potrafią wynegocjować kompromis w sprawie obecności polityki koalicyjnej w ramach określonego typu gabinetu wielopartyjnego, ale nie są w stanie ufać ministrom z różnych partii, a tym samym jak najskuteczniej realizować proces rządzenia. Stwierdzono, że sytuację tę mogą korygować zmienne zasady i mechanizmy alokacji i równoważenia tek w rządach koalicyjnych. Ich uwzględnienie jest ważne nie tylko dla zapewnienia formowania rządów koalicyjnych, ale także dla przedłużenia ich funkcjonowania. Jednak są one zupełnie inne i dlatego są przedmiotem badań.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, gabinet rządowy, rząd koalicyjny, koalicja rządowa, minister, teki, partia, podział portfela.

The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical principles and practical manifestations and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and maintaining balance between partners in government coalitions. The author found that such principles and mechanisms, especially at the background of inter-party relations rather than inter-institutional relations, are important in the context of the formation, functioning and responsibility of coalition governments, and hence their stability and effectiveness. The problem stems from the fact that government coalitions of parties are able to negotiate on a compromise on the essence of coalition policy within a particular type of multi-party government cabinet, but are unable to trust ministers from different parties to each other, and thus to implement the process of governance as effectively as possible. It was found that the situation can be corrected by variable principles and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and portfolio balancing in coalition governments. Taking them into account is important not only for ensuring the formation of coalition governments, but also for prolonging their functioning. However, they are quite different, and therefore they are the focus of the study.

Keywords: government, government cabinet, coalition government, government coalition, minister, portfolio, party, portfolio allocation.

Coalition government cabinets are statistically the most common type of government in most representative democracies, not only in Europe but in the world at large. Therefore, in the context of their formation, functioning and responsibility, the principles and procedures of portfolio allocation and maintaining balance between partners in government coalitions are of extreme importance, especially in parliamentary democracies, which are mainly determined by attributes not so much inter-institutional as inter-party relations. However, the stated issues are relevant both in theoretical and practical-empirical contexts, because, on the one hand, it testifies to the mechanics and dynamics of coalition and actions and positions of governmental and non-governmental parties, and, on the other hand, deepens the understanding of the phenomenon of coalition government offices as such.

This is manifested in the fact that the research topic presented in the proposed scientific article has previously found, and still reflects the whole array of scientific works of various scholars who address the nature and features of delegation and balance of positions and powers in multi-party / coalition government cabinets, especially to the issue of portfolio allocation and management of members of government coalitions. Among the most famous among them are researchers such as R. Andeweg (author of “Ministers as Double Agents? The Process of Delegation Between the Cabinet and Ministers”¹), M. Hallerberg (author of “The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budget Process Within Europe”² as part of a collective monograph), W. Mueller (author of “Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Delegation and Accountability”³), L. Martin and G. Vanberg (author of the article “Coalition Politics and Legislative Review”⁴) and others. They argue on average that government coalitions of parliamentary parties are able to negotiate a compromise on the nature of coalition policy within a particular type of multi-party government cabinet, but are unable to trust ministers from different political parties to each other, and thus the most effective (as in the case of single-party governments) to implement the governance process. This is the case, for example, when the efforts of individual ministers of certain government parties significantly affect the effectiveness of the coalition government, in particular when such ministers do not go beyond their functional jurisdiction.

In this regard, the political science literature identifies and suggests at least three basic ways in which government coalition partners gain and pass fairly effective mechanisms to control each other and, as a result, reduce the consequences of “agency loss” when each partner

¹ Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395

² Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106

³ Muller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2000, vol 37, s. 309–333.

⁴ Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, *“American Political Science Review”* 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106

of a hypothetical government coalition and the impact of delegating of the another partner. Thus, first, L. Martin and G. Vanberg⁵ note that partners in any government coalition can use the parliamentary process and the general parliamentary arena as a tool through which they are able to obtain information about each other's actions and positions. In contrast, second, W. Müller, K. Strom⁶, and M. Zaiss⁷ argue that junior ministers or assistant ministers from one party within a government coalition are able to assist in overseeing cabinet members and ministers from another or other parties within the same government coalition.. Finally, and thirdly, M. Hallerberg⁸, D. Kim and G. Loewenberg⁹ note that parliamentary committees and their direct members can also control the ministers of coalition government cabinets, in particular by influencing their tenure in office and the stability of coalition government cabinets in general. At the same time, it is quite important to take into account which specific ministries or departments in each specific government coalition are subject to inter-party control and / or balancing / counterbalance procedures. So, if members of government coalitions distribute positions mainly crosswise and alternating, and each government coalition partner also chooses which positions will belong to him within a particular government cabinet, in particular with a view to minimize "agency losses", than it is clear that each government coalition minister is likely to be in the shadow of the distribution of seats in parliamentary committees, especially if: the functional jurisdiction of a particular ministry is more important for certain partners; a certain ministerial / government party has serious differences in policy over the functional jurisdiction of the ministry with other ministerial / government parties; positions in profile parliamentary committees are more influential than the corresponding positions in ministries.

In this context, it is important to outline the features and parameters of the "chain" of the powers delegation and responsibilities, which in a representative democracy not only determine the formation of government cabinets, including coalition, but also outline the role and importance of election procedures, who, through parties as political principals, delegate to members of parliaments the opportunity to elect appropriate government cabinets as a whole and individual ministers and other employees of such government cabinets, including coalition ones¹⁰. The fact is that at each stage of the "chain" of the authority and responsibility delegation there is a question about what the principals (in this case, the party and the legislature) can do to ensure the fulfillment of their political and electoral interests by their agreed agents. This

⁵ Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, "American Political Science Review" 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106

⁶ Müller W., Strom K., *Schlu.: Koalitionsregierungen und die Praxis des Regierens in Westeuropa*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Koalitionsregierungen in Westeuropa*, Wyd. Signum 1997, s. 736

⁷ Thies M., Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr. 3, s. 580–598

⁸ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106.

⁹ Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, "Comparative Political Studies" 2005, vol. 38, s. 1104–1129

¹⁰ Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395

is manifested in the fact that principals (those who in this case delegate power to individual government ministries, and thus distribute and balance positions in a coalition) must bear the costs of losing control of their agents (governments and individual ministers), for only then will the reasons and mechanisms for the distribution of portfolios and the maintenance of balance between partners in governmental coalitions become apparent, and thus in the inter-party control system within coalition governments. In purely theoretical terms, this means that any coalition government cabinet is formed and functions as a tool to ensure the mutual costs and dividends of the parties that make it up, including the mutual distribution and control of their and not necessarily their ministerial positions. In this regard, M. Laver and K. Shepsl argue that when each particular ruling party of the governing coalition is aware of the ideal policy and position of its coalition partner, then the “mutual loss of control” over certain aspects of government can lead to stable results of the coalition government cabinet¹¹. In addition, the researchers note, this event is a good recipe for the financial problems solution of the powers and responsibilities delegation which otherwise lead to excessive losses¹². In other words, this means that all members of the governing coalition must, in principle, be provided with their own and quite relevant dividends if the governing coalition is able to “punish” the mistakes of the compromise policy.

At the same time, some researchers, in particular W. Mueller, W. Philipp, P. Gerlich¹³, R. Andeweg¹⁴ and M. Hallerberg¹⁵ emphasize that the position of the head of the government – the prime minister – is quite problematic in such a construction, because it is not known how strongly he should be authorized and in the hands of which of the parties of the government coalition. The fact is that in any coalition government, the prime minister cannot a priori be as “strong” as in the case of a one-party government, especially of the majority and therefore cannot “place” and subordinate government ministers cabinet linearly. In addition, the position of prime minister is not collegial, but rather individual, so when the head of government is a representative of one of the parties in the coalition cabinet, other political forces are driven to simply believe him, because they naturally have no good reason to believe that the head of government will certainly act exceptionally sincerely and for the purposes of the entire government coalition. Instead, they are convinced that even more important in this case are the matrices of the political interests of individual political forces of the government coalition. Similar situation characterizes the procedures and consequences of the coalition government

¹¹ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996

¹² Bawn K., Rosenbluth F., Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector, *American Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 50, nr. 2, s. 251–265; Persson T., Roland G., Tabellini G., How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies?, *NBER Working Paper* 2003, nr. 10176.

¹³ Muller W., Philipp W., Gerlich P., *Prime ministers and cabinet decision-making processes*, [w:] Blondel J., Muller-Rommel F. (eds.), *Governing together: The extent and limits of joint decision-making in Western European cabinets*, Wyd. Macmillan 1993, s. 232–236

¹⁴ Andeweg R., Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers, *European Journal of Political Research* 2000, vol 37, s. 377–395

¹⁵ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106

delegating a person to the post of finance minister, as the latter is positioned as extremely important against the background of other portfolios and in the context of inter-party disputes in the coalition government¹⁶. All this means that even the understanding of coalition government only in a narrow sense, i.e. as a coalition government cabinet or a kind of “government coalition committee”, does not solve the problem of collective governance due to the unresolved dilemma of collective leadership and the gravity of political coalition / government, and to individual / party goals. This is reflected in the fact that any format of collective leadership in any example and type of coalition government will not be able to provide constructions when all ministerial proposals, without exception, are considered and resolved and appropriate decisions and actions will be taken. Moreover, as M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz¹⁷, L. Martin and G. Vanberg¹⁸ note such a design of a kind of comprehensive “police patrol car” can be extremely erroneous and very expensive. In contrast, collective leadership in government coalitions is designed in such a way that a kind of system of mutual control is established, on the basis of which any ministerial proposals should authorize key agents in the government to delay certain legislation, thus giving time to collective leadership as such to consider those parts of legislation that do not provoke mutual resistance, neither in terms of their support, nor in terms of their denial.

The situation is complemented by the fact that, as noted above, especially in the case of minority coalition governments that the distribution and balancing of portfolios between government coalition partners is significantly affected by the role of positions in parliamentary committees, which can be positioned as a counterweight to the governments and the cabinet members. This is due to the fact that more specialized, better informed and more influential and powerful portfolios and seats in parliamentary committees are positioned as expected to be more promising, sometimes even compared to the portfolios of ministers in coalition government cabinets. In this regard, D. Kim notes that if there is an established and institutionalized system of control based on the distribution of portfolios or mandates, then each of the members of a government coalition expects a distinctive or separate pattern of control by parties of such a government coalition or parties outside it, especially when mandates in committees are delegated to a greater extent to non-governmental parties¹⁹. It has been established on this basis, that there are at least two defining or general potential counterbalances to members of coalition government cabinets, in particular, the availability of junior ministers or deputy ministers and the specifics of the distribution of seats in parliamentary committees. Depending on them, the parameters of control and monitoring of the activities of representatives of different

¹⁶ Hallerberg M., *The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within Europe*, [w:] Strauch R., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy*, Wyd. Kluwer 2000, s. 87–106

¹⁷ McCubbins M., Schwartz T., Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, *American Journal of Political Science* 1984, vol 28, s. 165–179.

¹⁸ Martin L., Vanberg G., Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review, *American Political Science Review* 2004, vol 99, s. 93–106

¹⁹ Kim D.-H., Loewenberg G., The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag, *Comparative Political Studies* 2005, vol 38, s. 1104–1129

parties of coalition cabinets may change, as well as access to information and powers due to potential counterbalances of coalition (and sometimes non-governmental) parties, but one. In so doing, these factors can be considered both as completely separate and as complementary, as a result of which they differently balance and counterbalance of the procedures of distribution and control of portfolios within the coalition government cabinets.

On this basis, political science has developed a consolidated position that in various representative, however, mainly parliamentary democracies, there are different (separate or related) commonly used principles and mechanisms for allocating and balancing / counterbalancing of all or key government portfolios between government coalition partners. Against this background, let's focus on the most common and not more effective among them. One of the procedures stipulates that the post of prime minister receives the party that receives and enjoys the largest number of votes of the electorate or the mandates of deputies in the legislature, at least against the background of other governmental political forces. This means that the practice of forming a coalition government cabinet is typically considered to be the consolidation of the position of the head of government by a relatively strongest partner in the government coalition, since the leader of a political party with support and parliamentary representation (this almost always occurs in a directly proportional correlation) is usually recognized and appointed by the prime minister of the new government. In addition, W. Mueller notes that quite often this is not necessarily a formal rule (although this happens), but rather an informal inter-party and political agreement (often institutionalized), which, however, is followed or is being tried in most countries, mainly with a multiparty system²⁰. Another fairly common mechanism is giving the post of a deputy prime minister or speaker of parliament or its leading chamber in the case of bicameralism to the representative of the another partner in relative strength and representation in the government coalition. This is according to the determination, on the basis of which the appointment of a representative of the strongest / most represented coalition partner by the Prime Minister does not mean that this partner and his party are given all or absolute power in the coalition government cabinet. After all, the second or third largest party in a coalition government usually receives a quota for the post of Deputy Prime Minister or Speaker of the Legislature. Thus, it ensures the impossibility of concentrating power in the hands of one political force within the government coalition. This is accompanied by a third principle, according to which the most important positions are distributed among the relatively strongest partners in the government coalition. In particular, special attention is paid to the distribution of such important government positions as Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defense, etc. This is especially evident against the background of the fact that in many cases countries also hold separate negotiations on each specific position in the coalition government cabinets. For example, in Germany, the

²⁰ Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000

largest government party typically receives the posts of Chancellor and Minister of Finance and Defense, and other members of government coalitions are usually Deputy Chancellors and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy²¹. Although, on the contrary, in some countries of the world there are no clear models of distribution of government portfolios, instead it is more not systematized, but situational.

On the other hand, less important portfolios in government coalitions are typically distributed among coalition members in proportion to the electoral support of parties in such coalitions, although weaker partners in government coalitions often receive slightly more representation in government cabinets and parliamentary committees. This is due to the fact that the distribution of less important portfolios in coalition government cabinets allows to “encourage” smaller parties for their consent to cooperate with the new government coalitions²². Considering, that most (if not all) leadership positions in coalition government cabinets are typically filled by members of the strongest government parties, smaller coalition parties traditionally receive a relatively large share of “sub-par” positions²³, what, according to P. Mitchell, gives them even more representation than can be calculated on the basis of a purely proportional distribution²⁴, in particular based on the votes of voters and seats in parliaments²⁵ obtained by such and all government political forces. Because such a mechanism for distributing and balancing of portfolios and maintaining counterbalance between partners in government coalitions is positioned as quite relevant and widespread in various countries around the world, it is traditionally called the “relative weakness effect”²⁶. Nevertheless, very important is the principle according to which the distribution of portfolios within government coalitions usually takes place on the basis of coordination with the party interests of the members of such coalitions. In this regard, T. Saalfeld emphasizes that, in addition to the principle of proportionality, the distribution of government portfolios within coalitions traditionally takes into account the specific political interests of the parties that form such coalitions²⁷. As a result, if a coalition party is interested in a particular area of politics and government, a representative of such a party is often appointed to the specific ministry it targets. This conclusion is supplemented by E. Damgaard, who believes that in fact the practice of distribution of government portfolios by political significance for parties, represented in coalition governments is very common, as it

²¹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

²² Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

²³ Müller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

²⁴ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

²⁵ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

²⁶ Browne E., *Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique*, Wyd. Sage 1973.

²⁷ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70.

promotes open consideration of the interests of various political forces, which, in turn, contributes to the stabilization of coalition government cabinets and greater inter-party trust within them²⁸. After all, this is mechanically complemented by the fact that a mechanism, on the basis of which the distribution of the ministerial and other portfolios that reflects the distribution of ministerial and other portfolios is used, reflects the desire of political actors to balance power and representation between government coalition partners. As a result, as can be seen from the above principles and mechanisms for portfolio allocation within coalition governments, this means that the process of allocating positions is based on the principles of balancing and / or equality of parts / parties in government coalitions. This is especially important at least because it is a manifestation of the natural desire of any government coalition that wants to maintain unity and stability in its ranks. At the same time, member parties of the governing coalition must see that their contribution is valued and that they play an important role in policy-making and governance. This is complemented by the fact that today, in addition to the principles and mechanisms for the distribution of portfolios between the partners of coalition government cabinets, there are quite strong and proven principles for achieving and maintaining balance between parties in the coalition governments.

It is important that all the mechanisms that coalition governments can use to balance power and representation between members of government coalitions are certainly seen as a factor in increasing government stability. Interestingly that one of the most logical, at first glance; ways to balance government power between members of government coalitions is to divide government portfolios between different coalition parties. However, this method is characterized by obvious limitations, as the number of ministerial positions in coalition governments is limited, and therefore this tool is not suitable or not always suitable for achieving a representative balance. On this basis, other, more sophisticated, methods and means of distribution of power within coalition governments have been developed and tested at various times. In general, the methods described below involve the division of control over positions in coalition governments, either by creating additional positions within existing ministerial or departmental portfolios, or by dividing traditional areas of responsibility into narrower segments and clusters. Such approaches are sometimes referred to as the “heterogeneity principle”, where no partner in the governing coalition has sole control over a particular area of the political process and governance²⁹.

Among all the existing ways and mechanisms to ensure a balance between the coalition parties, the instrument of appointing junior ministers, which are called differently in different countries is often used, in particular secretaries of state, deputy ministers with broad powers or simply deputy ministers, into important or most important ministries. Thus, if, for example, the Ministry of Finance is headed by a representative of Party A, then the junior ministers within

²⁸ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000

²⁹ Saalfeld T., *Germany: Stable Parties, Chancellor Democracy, and the Art of Informal Settlement*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 67–70

that Ministry may be representatives of Party B and / or Party C. Some junior ministers may have their own responsibilities and perform, for example, broad oversight and control functions, while other such positions are assigned mainly to specific policy areas within the ministry that they have significant influence over. In addition, the procedure for appointing junior ministers differs from country to country. In many countries, junior ministers are appointed only to specific key ministries. In other countries, on the other hand, each minister receives several junior ministers, in particular one position for each coalition party in each government ministry, government agency or department³⁰. However, in any case, using the tools of junior ministers as a “counterweight” has several important advantages. For example, W. Mueller in his work “Coalitions Management in Western Europe” argues that this mechanism not only helps to balance the distribution of government representation among coalition parties, but also generates “an important mechanism by which coalition agreements are implemented in individual ministries”³¹. However, even despite the popularity of the coalition balancing method, it should be noted that not all junior ministers serve this purpose. Thus, in some cases, as in Sweden and Belgium, the positions of junior ministers are not taken into account at all to balance the powers in the ministries of coalition governments. The fact is that they are appointed by the ministers themselves and they represent the same political party as full-fledged ministers. Moreover, in Belgium, where junior ministerial positions were once used to balance coalition representation, it was decided that this system led to unnecessary conflicts between ministries, and thus in the early 1990s of the 20th century it was abandoned³².

The next tool to ensure balance between coalition parties is considered to be holding different ministerial positions as an important way of dividing leading positions in the government among members of government coalitions. For example, in the same Sweden where the junior ministers do not perform the function of a “counterweight”, some important ministerial and departmental positions are held or have been previously held by several full-fledged ministers at the same time. T. Bergman emphasizes that this was the case, for example, with the Ministry of Finance and Budget in the coalition governments of Sweden in the period 1976-1979³³. Another rather interesting example is Belgium, where, as mentioned above, there are no junior ministers at all, but quite often two ministers from different parties are appointed to occupy their “the most important ministries”. In this context, J. Nouziainen reports that each of these ministers receives its functional jurisdiction within the relevant ministry, but there is no clear hierarchical relationship between the ministers of the coalition government cabinets and in

³⁰ Muller W., *Austria: Tight Coalitions and Stable Government*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 108–109.

³¹ Muller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 24–25

³² De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 325–326.

³³ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 217

general³⁴. It happens, however, that the two mechanisms of balancing the parties of coalition government cabinets are used in parallel and as complementary. In contrast, a slightly different mechanism for the power balancing between members of coalitions is the creation and separation of positions of so-called “ministers without portfolios”. This method is also widely practiced in Sweden, where cabinet ministers are often responsible for a particular area of policy and governance, but do not have control over the specific institutional apparatus and the entire sector³⁵. Interestingly that the advantages of this approach are that the participants in the negotiation process receive or hypothetically can get more freedom to meet the interests of coalition parties, mainly at the stage of the coalition government cabinet forming. However, the obvious disadvantage of this method and tool is that ministers without portfolios often face significant difficulties in implementing their initiatives and goals, as they do not have the institutional support at the same level as “ordinary” ministers. Quite often this shortcoming is compensated by another tool for achieving a representative balance within the coalition government cabinets – the creation and testing of new ministries and, accordingly, new ministerial positions. For example, in Denmark For example, in Denmark, the number and functional jurisdiction of major government ministries is not fixed. That is why they can be changed to reflect the interests of the parties, especially in the case of the formation and functioning of government coalitions. Thus, during the formation of a government coalition, the structure of the government cabinet can be the subject of inter-party “bidding”, which significantly increases the flexibility of the political process³⁶. A somewhat less radical example is the case of Ireland, in which the number and functional jurisdiction of government ministries and departments is enshrined in the constitution. Thus, for example, during negotiations to form a governing coalition in 1994, the position of the so-called “senior junior minister” was created, specifically for the smaller party of the governing coalition, which required two ministerial posts, although the coalition could allocate only one³⁷.

After all, some representative, mainly parliamentary democracies have developed and successfully used an additional tool called the scoring system. Through this mechanism, each party of the governing coalition receives proper representation in the government cabinet. Such a system, for example, was being used in Romania, where coalition partners agreed on a kind of “exchange rate” in 2004. Thus, under this system, one full ministerial position corresponded to three positions of state secretaries (equivalent to junior ministers) and so on. A more complex example of its time was Belgium, where the “counting rule” has been used to allocate government

³⁴ Nousiainen], *Finland: The Consolidation of Parliamentary Governance*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 283

³⁵ Bergman T., *Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000

³⁶ Damgaard E., *Denmark: The Life and Death of Government Coalitions*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 250

³⁷ Mitchell P., *Ireland: From Single-Party to Coalition Rule*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 143

positions since 1980³⁸. According to this rule, each position in the coalition government receives a share: three points – for the post of Prime Minister, two points – for a ministerial position, as well as for the positions of Speakers of the Lower House and Senate (two chambers of the bicameral parliament), one point – for the position of Secretary of State (analog of the junior minister). At the same time, during the negotiations, the coalition parties first determine the same number of points for the Flemish and French-speaking communities, as the Belgian Constitution requires equal or equivalent rights for both ethno linguistic groups. Points are then distributed among each party on the basis of its electoral support and parliamentary representation, and party leaders take turns choosing the portfolios in which they are interested. Moreover, in this case, the right to choose the first has the relatively strongest party, and instead the last chooses the party with the smallest number and share of votes and mandates. Finally, after the completion of the initial selection procedure, a second round of negotiations begins, during which parties can “exchange” their portfolios.

Against this background, in the context of systematizing the principles and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and maintaining balance between partners in government coalitions is a rather interesting issue is the stability of coalition governments. It would be plausible to assume, and so it is averaged, that the most stable should be one-party majority governments, but it does not always happen and sometimes, in some countries, it happens that coalition governments last longer than one-party governments. A good and theoretically sound explanation for this result is that prime ministers in the countries where one-party majority governments are formed are often endowed with the authority and right to dissolve legislatures and call early parliamentary elections, even when they are, especially in parliamentary systems of government consider it expedient purely for political reasons. Accordingly, early parliamentary elections, followed by the formation of new governments in such countries, take place quite often, as in the United Kingdom,

Spain, and Greece, etc. Against this background, it is argued that a small number of major political parties have traditionally had a positive effect on government stability, however, as the number of political parties increases, so do the number of factors on which government stability will depend. In this regard, D. Diermeier and P. Van Roosendaal note that the higher the effective number of political parties, the greater the possibility of forming coalition governments, although, in their opinion, we must take into account the prospect of longer formation of a coalition government³⁹. However, from the same perspective, the principles and mechanisms of portfolio allocation and maintaining the balance between government coalition partners mentioned above are very important, though not the only one, important for stabilizing coalition governments.

³⁸ De Winter L., *Belgium: On Government Agreements, Evangelists, Followers and Heretics*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 333

³⁹ Diermeier D., Van Roosendaal P., The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 1998, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 622–623

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PARTY DETERMINANTS OF FORMATION, FUNCTIONING AND STABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL CABINETS IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT

W artykule na poziomie teoretycznym i metodologicznym omówiono czynniki partyjne powstawania, funkcjonowania i stabilności gabinetów rządowych w demokracjach parlamentarnych. Zadanie to okazało się istotne ze względu na to, że w krajach, które są instytucjonalnie definiowane jako demokracje parlamentarne, przy czym niezależnie od systemów rządów, zazwyczaj powstają i funkcjonują partyjne gabinety rządowe. Biorąc to pod uwagę, gabinety rządowe jako szczyty władzy wykonawczej w takich krajach najczęściej określone są wpływem czynników partyjnych, które wyznaczają parametry tworzenia, funkcjonowania i stabilności gabinetów rządowych w różnych demokracjach parlamentarnych. Stwierdzono, że wśród czynników partyjnych na kształtowanie, funkcjonowanie, odpowiedzialność i stabilność rządów najbardziej wpływają atrybuty systemów partyjnych, w szczególności zmienność wyborcza i podział partii na frakcje, a także chęć osiągnięcia przez partie statusu minimalnie zwycięskich w gabinetach rządowych. Jednocześnie stwierdza się, że partyjna determinacja procesów powoływania, funkcjonowania, odpowiedzialności i stabilności rządów, chociaż podlega ocenie, nie powinna być jednokierunkowa, ponieważ jest określona przez specyfikę krajową i regionalną, w tym instytucjonalną.

Słowa kluczowe: partia, system partyjny, podział na frakcje systemów partyjnych, rząd, gabinet rządowy, status minimalnie zwycięski, zmienność wyborcza.

The article is theoretically and methodologically dedicated to analyzing party factors of formation, functioning and stability of governmental cabinets in parliamentary democracies. This task proved to be relevant at the background of the fact that party governments are usually formed and function in countries that are institutionally defined as parliamentary democracies, even regardless of their systems of government. In view of this, governmental cabinets as the top executive in such countries are inevitably and typically marked and characterized by the influence of party factors that outline the parameters of formation, functioning and stability of governments in different parliamentary democracies. The author found that the attributes of party systems, including electoral volatility and party fractionalization, as well as the desire of parties to achieve the status of minimally winning governmental cabinets, have the greatest impact on the formation, functioning, responsibility and stability of governments. At the same time, it was stated that the party determination of the processes of government

formation, functioning, responsibility and stability, although it is amenable to averaging, should not be unidirectional, as it is additionally determined by national and regional, including institutional, specifics.

Keywords: *party, party system, fractionalization of party systems, government, governmental cabinet, minimum-winning status, electoral volatility.*

Party government cabinets are usually formed and function in the countries that are institutionally defined as parliamentary democracies, and almost independently of the systems of government that have been tested in them. In view of this, government cabinets as the top executive in such countries inevitably, in addition to the institutional factor and the influence of inter-institutional relations, are typically marked and characterized by the influence of party factors that outline the formation, functioning and even stability of government cabinets in different parliamentary democracies. This, in turn, is an extremely important research problem, at least in theoretical and methodological terms, as it allows identifying and clarifying the functional and operational attributes and roles of parties in the context of inter-institutional relations, which, in particular, give some idea of the nature of governments and governance in parliament democracies.

This can be judged from a number of scientific works, which consider and even systematize the functional attributes of parties and inter-party competition in democratic systems, which, among other things, determine the parameters and conditions of formation, functioning and stability of government cabinets. In particular, the stated scientific issues of different times were presented in the studies of such scientists as K. Beyme¹, J. Blondel², I. Budge and H. Keman³, L. Dodd⁴, M. Duverger⁵, V. Goati⁶, R. Katz⁷, M. Laakso and R. Taagepera⁸, S. Lipset and S. Rokkan⁹, P. Mair¹⁰, W. Müller¹¹,

¹ Beyme K., Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodern Party State?, "Government and Opposition" 1996, vol 31, nr. 2, s. 135–159

² Blondel J., Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies, "Canadian Journal of Political Science" 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180–203

³ Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993

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⁹ Lipset S., Rokkan S., *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction*, [w:] Lipset S., Rokkan S. (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Wyd. Free Press 1967, s. 1–64

¹⁰ Mair P., *The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage 1991, s. 41–70

¹¹ Müller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 309–333

D. Rae¹², W. Riker¹³, A. Romaniuk¹⁴, D. Russell and M. Wattenberg¹⁵, G. Sartori¹⁶, M. Taylor and V. Herman¹⁷ and many others.

Their monitoring and systematization make it possible to state that political parties are typically ascribed such two the most important functions within parliamentary democracies as the expression of citizens' interests and representative activities, mainly in legislatures and cabinets. In this context, the function of expressing the interests of citizens is particularly interesting, because it generates or restores the strategies of parties to promote political, social and cultural objections, etc. into the demands of political action. In this context, the explanation of S. Lipset and S. Rokkan regarding socio-political divisions in most parliamentary democracies adds to this argument and the phenomenon of manifestations of a kind of the "split structure"¹⁸. The fact is that, according to researchers, the struggle between political parties is the main arena of conflict in democracies, as other interested political and parapolitical groups play an extremely insignificant and indirect role in politics. After all, if they want to increase their influence on the formation of political programs, they must become political parties. Thus, political parties and their relative strength in the political process, and in the case of parliamentary democracies – the power in the legislature, can be seen as a reflection of socio-cultural processes, because they transfer the main problems of local people in the debate in parliament. This process depends to a certain extent on the peculiarities of one or another type of electoral system, which can inevitably and directly transform the votes of the electorate into parliamentary seats, and through them – in the portfolio in government offices. On the other hand, it is clear that not every political concern is expressed by existing political parties, which is why the process of party formation in most parliamentary democracies is ongoing. This is true even against the background of the fact that the formation of new parties is considered to be a difficult process, but it is not impossible. In general, against this background, it is quite obvious that political parties are institutions of social and political life virtually of all parliamentary democracies, which significantly influence other institutions, such as parliaments and government cabinets, etc.

In view of this, it is well known that one of the most important variables in identifying and measuring the functionality of government cabinets is taking into account their party composition and the involvement of political parties in the processes of formation, functioning, responsibility, and thus stability of government cabinets. Probably the first attempts to explain the functionality and stability of government cabinets through the prism of parties and the

¹² Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1967

¹³ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962

¹⁴ Romaniuk A., *Politychni partii ta partiini systemy*, [w:] *Osnovy politychnoi nauky. Chastyna 2*, Wyd. Kalvariia Romaniuk A., *Porivniabryi analiz politychnykh institutiv kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.

¹⁵ Russell D., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

¹⁶ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

¹⁷ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, "American Political Science Review" 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

¹⁸ Lipset S., Rokkan S., *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction*, [w:] Lipset S., Rokkan S. (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Wyd. Free Press 1967, s. 50

effects of the size and complexity of party systems appear in the middle – second half of the 20th century. This is especially relevant in the case of multiparty systems, which most researchers believe quite often (though not always) run functionally limited and relatively unstable governments because they lack a majority party capable of forming a one-party government cabinet. By this logic, the result of such a political process is the formation of government coalitions of parties, continuous trade and compromises in competition between parties, which, in turn, can significantly destabilize government cabinets. In this context, one of the simplest but also the strictest ways to link party composition to the functioning and stability of government cabinets is to include in the count all political parties that support a particular government cabinet, regardless of whether they are represented by positions in the office or not. However, even in this case, especially in parliamentary democracies, one must consider the wide variety of possible options for supporting government cabinets by different governmental and non-governmental parties in the legislature.

For example, A. de Swaan states¹⁹ that the nature of support for government cabinets by parties in legislatures is due to a kind of “the exhaustive lists of support”. The problem with these lists is that information on the voting behavior of certain parties or individual representatives of these parties is quite difficult to understand. Therefore, according to the researcher, the definition of ruling / government parties should include only parties that are represented in the government or cabinet. This means that only parties that are unquestionably and directly part of a government cabinet, which in the case of parliamentary democracy is in fact defined as the summation of all current parliamentary political forces, which are endowed with ministerial and government portfolios, and not only provide government cabinets support of parliaments are positioned as governmental ones. Against this background, A. Romaniuk believes that the main indicators through which distinguish political parties from other political and social institutions, are the presence of organization, attraction to power and ideological nature²⁰. This is clear from the consideration of the main tasks of political parties proposed by R. Dalton and M. Wattenberg: simplification and structuring of electoral processes; organization and mobilization of election campaigns; articulation and unification of disproportionate socio-political and other interests; communication, consultation and debate on political and managerial issues; structuring of constituencies; think tanks of politics; organization of government policy²¹.

Accordingly, political parties act and are positioned as an immanent institution of any democratic regime, especially parliamentary democracies. In this regard, R. Katz emphasizes that the phenomenon of party governments, and thus the involvement of parties in the processes of formation, functioning and responsibility of government cabinets, is quite often synonymous

¹⁹ De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations. A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973, s. 26–33

²⁰ Romaniuk A., *Politychni partii ta partiini systemy*, [w:] *Osnovy politychnoi nauky. Chastyna 2*, Wyd. Kalvariia.1997, s. 232–233

²¹ Russell D., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

with representative democracy. Against this background, the researcher notes²², the phenomenon of party government is inevitably characterized by such attributes as the presence within the political community and political system of a competitive party system, which is a consequence of the principle that declares the freedom to form political parties. This model of competitiveness of the party system is equally the result of the influence of the values of liberal democracy, but at the same time determines it. Another attribute is the existence of a competitive party system, which inevitably institutionalizes the freedom of political choice exercised within society and the right of the opposition to put forward alternative options for the development of the political process and government. Accordingly, the effect of the competitiveness of political parties is that the party that wins the election is rewarded with complete control over the governance process, although this is mostly the case in the format and composition of the governing coalition. It is in this way that the state power allocated through the party or parties gains democratic legitimacy, because the party or parties implement in practice the will of the sovereign – the people – expressed in relation to the parties in the election act. All this means that according to the outlined logic, the state power is responsible to the society, because it is entrusted to persons who are organized into political parties, who owe their position in the process of governing to electoral approval. And this is manifested mainly in the fact that there is certainly a group of politicians loyal to the government party or parties and responsible to the electorate, which plays a special role in the process of socio-political bargaining and negotiations between political parties.

V. Goati approaches the definition of the functional significance of political parties within representative democracies somewhat slightly, arguing that all functions of political parties can be structured into manifest (available, open, which can be identified and traced) and latent (hidden, which are not advertised by the party or parties, but are implemented in society)²³. The defining manifest functions of modern political parties include: articulation, selection and aggregation of interests of various social and socio-political groups; development of ideologies and political doctrines; control over the activities or determination of the main activities of state bodies and institutions, and under certain conditions – the tendency to control and direct the activities of state bodies and institutions; promoting and ensuring the activities of institutions and mechanisms of a democratic society and government; training and nomination of candidates for senior government positions, including within government institutions; activation and integration of social and socio-political groups; formation of public opinion, etc. Against this background, W. Mueller notes that political parties contribute to the electoral process in a given state and the functioning of parliaments and government cabinets, which is especially relevant in the case of parliamentary democracies. Accordingly, without political parties, these

²² Katz R., *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987, s. 12

²³ Goati V., *Savremene političke partije. Komparativna analiza*, Beograd 1990, s. 253

institutions of state power cannot actually perform their functions in a democratic society²⁴. Instead, to the latent functions of political parties W. Goati usually includes: guaranteeing privileges to members of political parties and their supporters, especially in the event of victory of parties in elections or their membership in government teams or coalitions; promoting and providing opportunities for social uplift to members of underprivileged social groups through party careers; providing privileges for business representatives who provided sponsorship to the party or parties, especially in the case of coming to power or conducting / lobbying business interests; reservation of unpaid work, when party activists and sympathizers perform various actions, which is especially noticeable during election campaigns²⁵.

However, the influence of parties and party systems on the peculiarities of the formation, functioning, responsibility, and thus the stability of government cabinets in parliamentary democracies is quite different and differently dependent. On the one hand, the parameters of consolidation of party systems and their fractionalization influence, however, on the other hand, party-determined attributes of the size of government cabinets. In political science, the direct criteria for the consolidation of party and political systems are often considered to be a measure of electoral variability and fragmentation of party systems²⁶. On this basis, party systems in which a large proportion of voters change their electoral preferences between consecutive elections are considered unstable, while fragmented or fractionalized party systems consist of a large number of parties, mainly relevant, i.e. represented in the legislatures. It is interesting that such party systems, of course, are not always the case, but in most cases they are characteristic of quite a few countries that are parliamentary democracies. It is also important that electoral variability and factionalization of party systems are indicators that systematically testify to the features, roles and influences of parties on inter-institutional relations in a given country, as well as reveal the signs and attributes of party systems in them. Thus, the degree of fractionalization indicates the degree of dependence or independence of a party system of a country from the power of one or more parties, as opposed to being equally divided among all parties in the system. The traditionally used measure of factionalization of party systems was developed by D. Rey²⁷ and is based on the assumption that two legislators or two parliamentary parties, which are chosen at random in a particular legislature, should represent different political forces. It is with this in mind that M. Taylor and W. Herman note that the increasing factionalization of party systems usually complicates the process of forming government cabinets, and is negatively correlated with the stability of governments²⁸. This conclusion is clarified by D. Sanders and W. Herman, who note that the phenomenon and features of the factionalization of party systems

²⁴ Muller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, *European Journal of Political Research* 2000, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 312

²⁵ Goati V., *Savremene političke partije. Komparativna analiza*, Beograd 1990, s. 253

²⁶ Golosov G., Formaty partiynih sistem v novyh demokratsiyah, *Polis* 1998, nr. 1

²⁷ Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1967.

²⁸ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *American Political Science Review* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

become particularly important explanatory variables in the formation and responsibility of governments, even when the size and representation of anti-system parties in a country increase²⁹.

And this, in turn, puts on the agenda the issue of relevance or materiality of political parties in a country. In this context, J. Sartori's clarification has become a classic remark or rule, according to which only those political forces that are endowed with either "coalition potential" or "blackmail potential" should be taken into account in the identified influences of political parties on government cabinets. At the same time, a party has the potential for coalition if it participates in the formation of the government cabinet or if it is regarded as a possible partner of hypothetical government coalitions by other parties. On the other hand, political forces that are unacceptable to other parties in parliament but regularly receive a significant percentage of seats and even ministerial portfolios have the "potential for blackmail"³⁰. Although, in contrast, more and more often today, especially in parliamentary democracies, all political parties represented in the legislatures are considered relevant or significant. However, the problem with this counting rule is mainly that all batches, once considered relevant or substantial, are taken into account equally, and their relative size is not always taken into account. Therefore, the best way to classify party systems and the influence of parties on the formation, functioning and responsibility of government cabinets, in our opinion, is to follow the scheme, for example, J. Blondel, who distinguishes four types of party systems in representative democracies: bipartisan systems, systems with two and a half parties, multiparty systems with a dominant party, real multiparty systems without dominant parties, including the so-called "atomized" party systems. It is important that the main criterion in this case is a quantitative cut, according to which the basis for the division of party systems into separate types, in particular in determining their influence on government cabinets, is the number of political parties operating in the country. M. Duverger notes in this regard that the difference on the basis of "one-party, two-party, multi-party system" can be the main way to classify modern political regimes, as all other differences are superimposed on it or combined with it³¹.

Based on the quantitative criterion, there are one-party, two-party and multi-party systems. However, many scholars, agreeing with the importance of this criterion, emphasize its inadequacy in the classification of party systems. Thus, J. Sartori in his study of party systems came to the conclusion that it is necessary to take into account not all political parties operating in a particular country, but only a certain part of them, as determining the number of political parties between which there is competition within the party and political system, allows us to see "... the level to which political power is fragmented or fragmented, concentrated or scattered"³². In view of this, the scholar proposed the following criteria for selecting political parties, which

²⁹ Sanders D., Herman V., The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe, "Acta Politica" 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 371.

³⁰ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 122–123.

³¹ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, New York 1963, s. 393.

³² Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 120

should be considered as elements of the party system: first, parties that have a “mandate force”; second, parties that have “coalition potential”; third, parties that have the “potential for blackmail.” Based on the selected criteria, he developed a typology of party systems, which today is considered by most researchers as basic. It distinguishes such types of party systems as one-party systems, systems with a hegemonic party, systems with a dominant party, bipartisan systems, systems of moderate pluralism, systems of polarized pluralism, and atomized systems, which are defined as a residual type³³. At the same time, J. Sartori singles out “a system with a dominant party” as an independent category, understanding by this phenomenon party systems in which many political parties can compete with each other, but during a number of election cycles (up to four times in a row) / government power comes the same party. Although, instead, it happens that less than two cycles of domination of one political force are enough to de facto classify a party system of a country as a system with a dominant party.

Quantitative criterion as a basis for characterizing party systems and determining their impact on government cabinets used and P. Meyer, who proposed to take them into account structuring and clustering into “large” and “small” parties. He refers to “small” parties as those that receive 1 to 15 percent of the vote in the election, and “large” parties should have the support of more than 15 percent of voters. At the same time, according to the scientist, the amount of party support should in no way be associated with the weight and influence of parties³⁴. On this basis, the scientist identified four types of party systems: systems of large parties, in which large parties together receive a significant advantage of votes; small party systems, where small parties together gain a greater advantage than large parties; medium-party systems, where large and small parties receive an approximately equal number of votes; transitional party systems, which are characterized by the transition from the first group of party systems to the second and vice versa. The advantage of the outlined theorizing and operationalization is that the size of some parties is weighted relative to the size of other parties in the system, but still one important problem remains: this classification is made “manually” and therefore risks being shifted based on the subjectivity of one or another researcher.

However, this problem can be solved with the help of the often used in political science index of the effective number of parties, as one of the measures of party factionalization, which directly affects the role of parties in determining the formation, functioning and responsibility of governments and thus their stability. Being proposed in the late 70's of the 20th century. M. Laakso and R. Taagepera³⁵, the index of the effective number of parties is a mathematical reflection of the votes or shares of the parliamentary mandates of the parties and thus helps to prevent classification failures. The index is calculated on the basis of determining the relativity

³³ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 125

³⁴ Mair P., *The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage 1991, s. 47

³⁵ Laakso M., Taagepera R., Effective Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 1979, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 3–27.

of the amount of support for all parties in the system during and after the election results. At the same time, there are two options for determining the amount of such support: the first is based on the results of parliamentary elections, i.e. based on the percentage of votes received by parties; the second is on the basis of indicators of the number of deputy / parliamentary mandates of parties based on the election results. It is important that the presence of two approaches to calculating the index of the effective number of parties is due to the fact that quite often the first and second indicators differ. The main reason for the difference is the impossibility to ensure the 100% transformation of the votes received by the parties in the elections into the appropriate share of parliamentary seats. In general, this means that the index of the effective number of parties is the number of hypothetical parties of equal size that would have the same effect on fractionalized party systems as the actual parties of unequal size³⁶. The most interesting thing in this regard is that the index is an effective quantity parties are very clearly correlated with the most common classifications of party systems, including those mentioned above, and can therefore be used as an effective tool for defining the real role of parties in structuring the processes of formation, functioning and accountability of governments in parliamentary democracies.

In this regard, A. Leiphart takes an interesting and well-argued point of view, emphasizing that the index of the effective number of parties is inversely proportional to the degree of factionalization of party systems³⁷. This is due to the fact that the degree of factionalization of party systems explains the relationship between the number of parties and the stability of government cabinets, which is affected by inter-party relations, in particular through changes among political authors. It is on this basis that the position that, on equal terms, the number of potentially viable government cabinets is directly proportional to the number of parties is quite relevant. In turn, the greater the feasible options of government cabinets, the more complex is the desire for political parties to agree with each other, and therefore it is likely that slight unrest in inter-party relations is more likely to lead to the termination of a government cabinet³⁸. All this means that the larger is the number of parties, the less is lasting the "power" and thus the stability of any government cabinet. As a result, the effective number of parties and the degree of fragmentation / fractionalization of the legislature are based on parameters that are always taken into account as determinants of the formation of government cabinets, especially coalition ones. Therefore, all parties with parliamentary representation, and not just partners in a hypothetical government coalition, should be included in the study of the influence of parties on the processes of formation, functioning and responsibility of governments. The fact is that more fragmented parliaments typically hold more factionalized government

³⁶ Laakso M., Taagepera R., Effective Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1979, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 4.

³⁷ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majority and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.

³⁸ King G., Alt J., Burns N., Laver M., A unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1990, vol 34, nr. 6, s. 848

cabinets, especially coalitions. In addition, a large number of effective parties implies that several different viable and hypothetical government coalitions can be formed at any time. The existence of a large number of alternatives can make a real government cabinet “fragile” in the sense of increasing the likelihood of such a parliamentary vote of no confidence due to the threat of partners to withdraw their support for the government and participate in other possible government cabinet options.

In a purely political dimension, the growth of the index of the effective number of parties can be influenced by a number of factors. Quite important among them is traditionally considered to be the limitation of the fierce ideological confrontation between, for example, “capitalist” and “communist” (as in the post-communist space), liberal and conservative, or any another antagonistic party system, which certainly leads to overcoming the dichotomy “us” – “them” in the perception of voters of their own states political parties the nature of political competition and national political process. Accordingly, it fosters ideological pluralism, giving voters the opportunity to opt out of mandatory or result-oriented voting and to prefer voting according to their real / actual preferences. It is also important that large parties claiming power / cabinet are often forced to focus on broad electorate groups and on more general public or socio-political interests in order to gain the support of the maximum number of voters. As a result, particular interest groups are not taken into account or cannot even be taken into account and, accordingly, they are mostly represented by other – typically smaller parties. It is also important that new internal and / or global societal challenges emerge: the threat to the environment, the problems of war and peace, the need to ensure the equal status of different kinds of minorities, and a focus on values different from those accepted by the majority. The “promoters” of these problems are usually not large and not the main parties that focused on the whole population, but smaller political forces that target specific social or socio-political groups. In addition, it often happens that the factionalization of party systems increases when voters feel tired of traditional or “old” political parties that have been in power many times and have not borne any real political responsibility for shortcomings in various spheres of public life and government of their own states, and hence for their isolation from society, inability to effectively perform the functions that belong to them or belonged before³⁹. Interestingly, this phenomenon mainly concerns political parties of the mass type, which form or have previously formed a stable “core group” of parties. Finally, the introduction of a system of state funding of political parties at the legislative level also contributes to the transformation of party work, if not profitable, then into one that ensures a sufficient standard of living and proper social status of party functionaries and activists. And this, of course, contributes to improving professionalism in party work and political responsibility. As a whole, public funding becomes an additional

³⁹ Beyme K., Party Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodern Party State?, *Government and Opposition* 1996, vol 31, nr. 2, s. 149–150.

incentive for political parties to work better, focusing on the interests of voters, this leads to an increase in the factionalization of party systems⁴⁰.

On this basis, as noted above, political science has stated that parties influence the formation, functioning, responsibility and stability of governments mainly on the basis of the party dimension of government cabinets, in particular the number of parties within government cabinets and their ability to achieve the status of minimally victorious. Thus as it was as mentioned above, M. Taylor and W. Herman⁴¹ once concluded that the number of parties in government, as well as the factionalization of the government cabinet on the basis of parliamentary representation of political forces negatively affects the likelihood of a hypothetical government and its stability. This was confirmed by D. Sanders and W. Herman, who stated that the relative party dimension of government cabinets is decisive in the formation and survival of the latter⁴². A similar conclusion is reached by J. Blondel⁴³, who, for example, notes that a one-party government cabinet is a probabilistic factor that brings the greatest determination to the expected stability of party governments, which is the norm in parliamentary democracies. All this proves the relevance of the conclusion that the government cabinets of the majority last longer than the government cabinets of the minority, and in general government stability is negatively related to the growing degree of party factionalization of legislatures and government cabinets.

In this perspective, the scientific conclusion of L. Dodd⁴⁴ and W. Riker⁴⁵ that the influence of parties and inter-party relations on the formation and functioning of governments depends on the party composition of the latter is quite important. Thus, it is clear that minimally victorious government cabinets (given the one-party majority governments, which by this logic are also minimally victorious) are and should be much more stable than minority government cabinets and / or “oversized” or so-called over-victorious government offices. This means that the status of “minimum victory”, especially against the background of inter-party competition, is one of the most powerful explanatory variables of the influence of parties and party systems on the processes of formation, functioning, responsibility, and thus stability of governments. Especially given that the minimum-victorious status of a hypothetical government cabinet is directly related to the form and type of party system, because, following a clear logic, it is clear that more divided and polarized party systems are likely to lead to the formation of governments that are more likely to deviate from the status of minimally victorious⁴⁶. As a result, the stability of governments is necessarily a function of the extent to which government cabinets

⁴⁰ Romaniuk A., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.

⁴¹ Taylor M., Herman V., Party Systems and Government Stability, *“American Political Science Review”* 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28–37.

⁴² Sanders D., Herman V., The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe, *“Acta Politica”* 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346–377.

⁴³ Blondel J., Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies, *“Canadian Journal of Political Science”* 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 199

⁴⁴ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976, s. 142–143

⁴⁵ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁴⁶ Dodd L., Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game Theoretic Analysis, *“American Political Science Review”* 1974, vol 68, nr. 3, s. 1093–1117.

deviate from the conditional minimum sufficient to win (gain a majority in the legislature), in particular by overcoming their previous status⁴⁷.

However, in this context, the question remains as to why minimally victorious government cabinets, especially if they are in coalition, are positioned as longer than any other type of party governments. In this regard, P. Van Rosendaal emphasizes that if government cabinets are minimally victorious, then each party in the government is likely to have an equally imminent threat of losing parliamentary support. Conversely, a party whose votes are not critical to parliamentary support for the government can afford to leave the cabinet, thus technically accelerating its disintegration and resignation⁴⁸. In contrast, some scholars, including B. Groffman, argue that the relationship between the minimally victorious cabinets and their stability is quite artificial⁴⁹. To demonstrate this, the scholar notes that the hypothesis of a minimum victory or a minimum-victorious status cannot explain the significant change in the length of government cabinets in most parliamentary democracies. Instead, B. Groffman suggests that the relationship between the stability of government cabinets and their minimum winning status, which arises from specific national specifics, is largely the result of the high average length of government cabinets in countries where there are only two or three significant / relevant political parties, that is, where exactly the minimum-victorious government cabinets are the norm. This view is shared by J. Budge and H. Keman, who believe that not in all countries that are parliamentary democracies, victorious government cabinets are the most stable⁵⁰. After all, it often happens that the most stable in one or another sample of countries in general are, if not the government cabinets of the minority, then the overly victorious government cabinets. All this means that the party determination of the processes of formation, functioning, responsibility and stability of governments, although easily averaged, should not be unidirectional, as it is additionally determined by either national or regional, including institutional, specifics. Therefore, parties in parliamentary democracies are important “principals” of government processes, but they are not the only ones in this context.

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⁴⁷ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976

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CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF UKRAINE

The article analyzes the causes of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive branches in Ukraine, reveals their factors, and considers technologies for preventing and resolving conflicts between the branches of government.

Having studied the reasons for the appearance of conflicts in the interaction between the Legislative and Executive powers in Ukraine, it should be pointed out that they exist on the surface of relations between these two branches of government. Therefore, the author believes that we cannot hope for the existing conflicts in Ukraine between the Legislative and Executive branches to be solved without deep and fundamental reforms in all spheres of public life.

Keywords: conflict, causes of conflicts, interaction between the Legislative and Executive powers, branches of government, public relations.

ПРИЧИНИ ПОЯВИ КОНФЛІКТІВ У ВЗАЄМОДІЇ МІЖ ЗАКОНОДАВЧОЮ ТА ВИКОНАВЧОЮ ВЛАДОЮ В УКРАЇНІ

У статті проаналізовано причини появи конфліктів між законодавчою та виконавчою владою в Україні, розкрито їх фактори та розглянуто технології попередження і вирішення конфліктних ситуацій між гілками влади.

Розглянувши причин появи конфліктів у взаємодії між законодавчою та виконавчою владою в Україні, варто вказати, що вони існують на поверхні відносин між цими двома гілками влади. Тому, авторка вважає, що не потрібно надіятись на розв'язування існуючих конфліктів в Україні між законодавчою та виконавчою владою без глибокого та корінного реформування в усіх сферах суспільного життя.

Ключові слова: конфлікт, причини появи конфліктів, взаємодія між законодавчою та виконавчою владою, гілки влади, суспільні відносини.

Problem statement. Today, in our country, the problem of conflict is included in more than one research direction. Conflict as a phenomenon exists in the research field of political science, public administration, sociology, history, pedagogy, philosophy, psychology, etc. Important role in the study of problems and causes of conflicts within the public authorities was played by the studies of functional conflict by L. Coser, R. Dahrendorf's concept of the conflict model of society, the general theory of conflict by K. Boulding, and the concept of the social conflict universality which is inherent in A. Touraine's post-industrial society, sociology of social conflicts by L. Kriesberg, conflict sociology by R. Collins, and E. Mayo's human relations approach. This approach to the conflict interaction between the government and the public is based on the approaches of all these authors to the foundations of society. However, this problem is not yet fully investigated, so we need to consider the main causes of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive branches in Ukraine more in-depth.

The relevance of the topic is due to the fact that conflicts in the interaction between the Legislative and Executive branches in Ukraine are quite frequent, so it is worth learning about the causes of conflict moments between the branches of government to eliminate or mitigate them.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Given the specifics of the study on the causes of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive power in Ukraine, there is a need to use a large number of theoretical materials, as well as articles and analytical studies.

The sources of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive branches, as well as factors and technologies for their prevention and resolution, are examined by a lot of foreign and Ukrainian scientists, among which we should mention the works of A. Bandurko, I. Vashchenko, N. Dovgan, O. Kravchenko, O. Zdravomyslova, O. Salienko, N. Fedchun, and others.

At the same time, a number of problems that require further analysis remain without the attention of researchers.

Presentation of the main research material. The interaction of the Legislative and Executive branches in a democratic legal state aims to spread the democratic rights, freedoms and influence of citizens to all spheres of public and state life. But if the system of interaction between the Legislative and Executive authorities is not effective, does not bring the expected results and does not perform the role of communication and dialogue, then conflicts or certain protest phenomena occur. However, such a social phenomenon as conflict accompanies humanity at all stages of existence and it is not possible to avoid it. But, in our opinion, the conflict between the Legislative and Executive power can also give positive results if we clearly recognize the reasons for its appearance.

However, conflicts between the branches of government should not only be resolved in a timely manner, but also prevented at the right time. At the highest state level, this is the function of the head of state as a guarantor of compliance with the Constitution, and at lower levels, such a restraining role can and should be carried out by the heads of regions, administrations, representative and judicial bodies, etc.

The presence of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive branches of government in Ukraine is due to a number of legal and social factors. The most significant, in our opinion, should include:

- transitional state of public relations;
- departure from one dominant ideology;
- departure from the leadership of one political party to a political and ideological diversity;
- the lack of significant experience in solving complex state-building issues by using consensus among government structures at the national and local levels;
- the gap between the procedural legal norms of the Constitution and the material;
- the lack of a sufficient set of organizational and legal mechanisms for resolving conflicts between various subjects of the legal and state relations;
- low level of political and legal culture of various segments of the population –and of representatives of the state apparatus in particular;
- the desire of the Legislative and Executive branches to obtain as much authority as possible;
- the interference of the Legislative branch with the competence of the Executive branch, and vice versa;
- contradictions in the legislation;
- poor legal regulation of public relations;
- violation of the Constitution provisions, laws and regulations by the subjects of legal state relations;
- different interpretations of the Constitution by the branches of government.

The technologies for preventing and resolving conflicts between the branches of government include systematic negotiations between the representatives of conflicting branches, document exchange, work of conciliation commissions, etc. Legal and political means of conflict resolution are intertwined and successfully complement each other. In particular, the political settlement of conflicts should end with the development and signing of documents that have legal force. At the same time, there is no single universal way to resolve conflicts, because, being an extremely complex phenomenon, conflicts require an integrated approach for their peaceful resolution.

We believe that the main cause of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive powers in Ukraine is the functional fragmentation of the system of the entire state apparatus, which is expressed in:

- the desire of the Legislative and Executive authorities to appropriate each other's functions;
- the overlapping of the management functions of these two state bodies;

- chronic inconsistency of the planning and budget financing processes;
- constant competition between the electoral and lobbying methods for representing mass and group interests.

Considering the activities of the Legislative and Executive authorities in Ukraine, it is worth analyzing the conflict phenomena that arose between them and suppressed the democratic development of the state. The Legislative and Executive branches each – have their own competence, an independent system of bodies, and are guided by the according legislation. However, in real life, the functions of the two branches of government sometimes overlap or enter into mutual contradictions, which causes a conflict with characteristic features.

Yes, conflict is a relationship between the subjects of social interaction, characterized by their confrontation based on opposing motives (needs, interests, goals, ideals, beliefs) or judgments (opinions, views, assessments, etc.).

Therefore, conflicts between the branches of government should always be resolved by legitimate, constitutional means. Violation of the Constitution is exactly what creates a conflict between the authorities. Even if the conflict between the branches of government was resolved by non-constitutional means, its conclusion must have a legal form. Moreover, there is no higher arbiter over the two branches of government than the sovereign people themselves. Therefore, the conflict in the sphere of power distribution can be considered and resolved either by the government itself or by the people – through a referendum or such a direct expression of will that is typical for revolutionary situations. In addition, a long-term conflict between the branches of government creates a political and social crisis in society and has a negative impact on different aspects of life. Therefore, the resolution of such a conflict requires quite a broad involvement of various political forces in the situation that has arisen.

Modern performance of the Legislative and Executive authorities in Ukraine shows that their mutual claims are mostly fair. Even though the legislative power was the one to lay the foundation for implementing fundamental reforms by adopting more than 500 laws, the pace of legislative work is far from meeting modern requirements. The quality and stability of the legislation, planning and organization of the legislative work face a lot of criticism. The scientific validity of laws is insufficient, there is no proper system of accounting for public opinion, and there are quite a few flaws in the use of legislative technology. The level of political and legal culture of many deputies prevents them from making extremely necessary compromise decisions and does not allow them to get rid of legal nihilism.

Significant shortcomings and deviations from the requirements of the laws are also inherent in the activities of the Executive power. Its work is affected by the fact that a single national Executive vertical from the President to the local administration has not yet been created. This creates a lack of clear distribution of powers between the Executive and Representative authorities in the field. There is no clear legislative regulation of relations between various centers of

the Executive power – the Office of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries, and local Executive bodies. State discipline is of low quality. It is necessary to strengthen the control over the activity of the Executive power, proper use of mechanisms of legal responsibility for violation of law and discipline.

In our opinion, to overcome the inherent shortcomings in the activity of both the Legislative and Executive authorities today, we need a clearer distinction between the Legislative and Executive branches of government, improvement in the quality of work of each of them. It is about overcoming the obvious interference of the branches of government into each other's sphere of competence and preventing the branches from going beyond their constitutional powers. It is necessary to eliminate the gap of the lack of a sufficiently detailed delineation and consolidation of measures of interaction between the Legislative and Executive branches of government, a system of their mutual checks and balances. A significant contribution to this was made through the adoption of a constitutional agreement between the Verkhovna Rada and the President of Ukraine.

Therefore, we believe that we should consider one of the controversial activities of the government of Ukraine during the years of its independence. In our opinion, the most conflicted is the government of Yulia Tymoshenko (both the first and the second). The first government of Y. Tymoshenko – the Government of Ukraine in the period from February 4 to September 8, 2005, approved after the Orange revolution. It should be noted that in this Cabinet of Tymoshenko-2005 there were no Ministers from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), except for Y. Tymoshenko herself. It is also worth noting that V. Yushchenko did not appoint a single head of the regional state administration from the BYuT party.

The main points that characterized the internal economic activity of the Cabinet of Ministers of Y. Tymoshenko were:

1. increase of salaries, pensions, and scholarships by one and a half to two times (in September-2005 compared to June-2004.);
2. fulfilling the pre-election promises of the President V. Yushchenko – the government increased the size of the “one-time allowance at the birth of a child” in 2005 by 12 times;
3. statements about the need for mass re-privatization of 3000 enterprises. In the end, the state re-gained control only over the largest metallurgical plant “Krivorozhstal”;
4. in April-May 2005, the so-called “gasoline, sugar, and meat crises” took place, when prices for sugar and gasoline rose by 30% -50% in 2-3 weeks. These “crises” had signs of a “price fixing” – the government of Y. Tymoshenko returned the prices to their previous levels in a month and a half (using mainly market methods – “market interventions”):
 - the “meat crisis” was caused by the fact that Y. Tymoshenko increased salaries and pensions by 1,5 times in the first months of her Premiership. This caused an increase in demand for meat – the government removed duties on meat import, speculative prices fell, but political opponents of Y. Tymoshenko – V. Yushchenko

and V. Yanukovich – continued to criticize the government of Y. Tymoshenko. At the same time, the government decided to significantly increase the production of poultry meat, as a result of the implementation of this program – in a few years Ukraine turned from an importer to an exporter of “chicken meat”;

- the “sugar and gasoline crises” had signs of “price fixing that led to a 30% -50% price jump”. The government organized the delivery of a batch of cane sugar and canceled duties on the import of petroleum products to Ukraine. And for a month or two, the prices had returned to the previous level. In addition, the “sugar crisis” was investigated by the Antimonopoly Committee, which (a whole year later, in April 2006) decided that the “sugar crisis” was a “conspiracy of monopolists”, and counted fines of more than \$20 billion on the perpetrators. It was during the “gasoline crisis” that V. Yushchenko, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council in May 2005, for the first time made a sharp remark to Y. Tymoshenko for “pressuring the gasoline wholesale distributors”.

On August 24 – the Independence Day of Ukraine – in his speech on the Maidan square, the President V. Yushchenko called the government of Y. Tymoshenko “the best”. However, two weeks later, on September 8, 2005, V. Yushchenko dismissed the Cabinet of Y. Tymoshenko due to the conflicts within the Executive branch of government. V. Yushchenko claimed that Y. Tymoshenko acted in the interests of certain business circles, saying, in particular, that the Government’s decision to re-privatize the Nikopol Ferroalloy plant “became the last straw that forced Yushchenko to dismiss the government”.

On September 13, 2005, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko accused former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of betraying the ideals of the Maidan. In an interview with the Associated Press news agency, he said that when Y. Tymoshenko headed the UESU Company, she accumulated 8 billion hryvnias of debts and used the position of Prime Minister to get them written off.

Y. Tymoshenko’s second Premiership came during the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, due to which her government had to overcome numerous non-standard challenges that threatened the collapse of the country’s economy. In addition, the government’s work was complicated by numerous provocations from the President V. Yushchenko and his team, as the government of Tymoshenko has repeatedly stated.

On December 18, 2008, Y. Tymoshenko for the first time accused the national Bank of Ukraine (NBU) of deliberate manipulation of the hryvnia, and the President V. Yushchenko – of collusion with the NBU leaders, which led to the fall of the national currency to the level of 8 hryvnia for 1 US dollar.

The gas crisis unfolded, during which V. Yushchenko took the position of protecting the corrupt intermediary “RosUkrEnergo”. Despite this factor and the pressure from the President, the crisis was overcome, and Y. Tymoshenko became V. Yushchenko’s first enemy.

On February 5, 2009, the Verkhovna Rada did not support the decision to dismiss the government of Y. Tymoshenko for the second time. On February 10, 2009, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), President V. Yushchenko sharply criticized Y. Tymoshenko and the economic policy of her government. The Prime Minister denied the accusations.

Despite the confrontation with the President, opposition, and most importantly – at the peak of the global economic crisis, Y. Tymoshenko managed to keep off the country's default.

Conclusion. Therefore, it is appropriate to note that the balance of powers of the Executive and Legislative authorities is, without a doubt, a key, but not decisive, circumstance that characterizes the observance of the principle of separation of powers in Ukraine. One of the most important issues of state construction in modern Ukraine is the differentiation of subjects of competence and powers between state authorities.

However, at the present stage of development of the Ukrainian state, the issue of solving the problem of political conflicts quickly, effectively and without harmful consequences for society is relevant. Therefore, overcoming political conflicts should be accompanied by further satisfaction of the interests of the conflicting parties and obtaining a progressive result for the entire society after the conflict situation.

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PARTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS – EVOLUTION OF COORDINATION PATTERNS IN POLAND

The intelligence supports the decision-makers in the planning and implementation of political actions, assisting them with in preparing the most optimal decisions. Information products are delivered on the basis of such sources as HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, ISINT and must be reliable, substantive, high-quality and in real time. Autonomy, competition, rivalry, overlapping competences and quantity of agencies are challenges. Having information about the threat in your resources and not using it for reasons of organizational malfunction is the worst offense of secret services. The transformation of the political system in Poland after 1989 resulted in the separation of the civil and military, intelligence and counterintelligence branches, as well as the creation of new agencies and the reconstruction of the coordination structure. Currently, coordination is the domain of the minister responsible for supervision, control and coordination of secret services, with reservation that intelligence is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. The College for Secret Services retained its advisory status. Following the example of the Anglo-Saxon Intelligence Community, the Government Information Community (WIR) was established. However, after the Constitutional Tribunal ruling of 2004, the Community formula was abolished in 2005. At present, the most important political decision-makers are overloaded with information through parallel channels. This results in a flood of materials that are used to a doubtful extent in decision-making processes. Till now, the problem of a professional service management center has not been resolved.

Keywords: intelligence, government, political system, secret services, information, management, decision-making, coordination.

UDZIAŁ SŁUŻB SPECJALNYCH W POLITYCZNYM PROCESIE DECYZYJNYM – EWOLUCJA MODELU KOORDYNACJI NA PRZYKŁADZIE POLSKI

Wywiad obsługuje decydenta w trakcie planowania i realizacji działań politycznych pomagając mu w jak najbardziej optymalnych rozstrzygnięciach. Produkty informacyjne dostarczane są w oparciu o takie źródła jak HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, ISINT i muszą być rzetelne, merytoryczne, o wysokiej jakości i w czasie rzeczywistym. Autonomizacja, rywalizacja, zbyt duża ilość oraz nachodzące się kompetencje stanowią wyzwania. Posiadać w swoich zasobach

informacje o zagrożeniu i jej nie wykorzystać z powodów dysfunkcyjności organizacyjnej to najgorsze przewinienie służb. Transformacja systemu politycznego w Polsce po 1989 roku skutkowałą ograniczeniem pionu cywilnego i wojskowego oraz wywiadowczego i kontrwywiadowczego, jak również powstaniem nowych agencji oraz przebudową struktury koordynacji. Aktualnie za koordynację każdorazowo odpowiada minister właściwy w zakresie nadzoru, kontroli i koordynacji służb specjalnych, z zastrzeżeniem, że służby odpowiadają bezpośrednio przed Prezesem Rady Ministrów. Swoją rolę doradczą utrzymało Kolegium do Spraw Służb Specjalnych. Wzorem anglosaskiego *Intelligence Community* powołano Wspólnotę Informacyjnej Rządu (WIR). Jednak po wyroku TK z 2004 roku zlikwidowano formułę Wspólnoty w roku 2005. Obecnie najważniejsze osoby w państwie są zasilane informacjami równoległymi kanałami. Skutkuje to zalewem materiałów, które w wątpliwym stopniu wykorzystywane są w procesach decyzyjnych. Do dziś nie rozwiązano problemu profesjonalnego centrum zarządzania służbami.

Słowa kluczowe: wywiad, rząd, system polityczny, służby specjalne, informacja, zarządzanie, podejmowanie decyzji, koordynacja.

Secret services are an inevitable element of the structure of any state. Undoubtedly, the criteria determining whether a given structure falls within the conceptual scope of espionage are: (a) co-creation of the national security system, (b) secrecy, (c) a unique position in the constitutional order, (d) specific nature of tasks, (e) characteristically organized coordination and supervision, (f) specific methodology of work, (g) participation in the political decision-making process, (h) increased responsibility, (i) high rank of importance, (j) rationed, strict method of employee recruitment¹. It should be pointed out that defining intelligence as a center for acquiring, processing and preparing information in the perspective of new conditions related to the global environment of the information age is not easy². Ambiguity, multidimensionality, multiculturalism, differentiation of social life, and finally, digitization and interoperability – all these factors require more data of the political gameparticipants³.

Michael Herman, a theoretician of the history of intelligence, emphasizes the importance of the classic definition, which indicates such elements constituting secret services as: specific kind of knowledge, organizational forms producing this knowledge, and the type of activity undertaken by these organizations (activity pursued by the organization)⁴. The main activity of intelligence is gathering and using information. Analysis of all sources and the so-called hidden actions are further elements. The common feature of all services is undoubtedly the sensitivity

¹ Faligot R. Kauffer R., *Służby specjalne*, Warszawa 1998; Zalewski S., *Ewolucja modelu polskich służb specjalnych*, Warszawa 2003; Zalewski S., *Służby specjalne w państwie demokratycznym*, Warszawa 2005.

² Rydlewski G., *Rządzenie w świecie megazmian*, Warszawa 2009, p. 16-69; *Decydowanie publiczne*, Rydlewski G. (eds.), Warszawa 2011, p. 50-51; Castells M., *Spoleczeństwo sieci*, Warszawa 2007.

³ Beck H., *Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej: nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*, Warszawa 2005; Porębski L., *Elektroniczne oblicze polityki – demokracja, państwo, instytucje polityczne w okresie rewolucji informacyjnej*, Kraków 2004.

⁴ Herman M., *Intelligence services in the information age – theory and practice*, Londyn, Portland, Or 2001, p. 3.

and delicacy that must accompany their activities, which obviously result from balancing on the border of the legality of the methods of obtaining data and protection of sources⁵. For these reasons intelligence works under cover of confidentiality, which is its trademark, and also the foundation of relations with the government⁶. The architecture of intelligence structure most often reflects the following division:

- military and civilian,
- responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence tasks,
- political and criminal.

Marek Karpiński, in turn, draws the dividing demarcation line of the basic tasks (competences) of intelligence. According to him „we are dealing with the specialization of three basic intelligence divisions: operational (obtaining information), analytical (comparing and verifying information) and communication (providing information). This tripartite has remained in effect until today”⁷.

Andrzej Żebrowski takes the position that we are living in „the reality in which humanity functions consists of three basic elements: matter, energy, information. (...) The latter has always been an integral part of the work of every human being. Its significance results from the increasing complexity of the external and internal environment in which individual organizations operate and from the increasing amount of data that this complexity generates. Anyone who receives information, regardless of its content and essence, has to decide what to do with it. Some information can be stored for possible further use, while others are grouped to create new quality of information. Some of this information is used on an ongoing basis, some is shared with other users and some is discarded altogether”⁸.

Intelligence supports its “clients” in the planning and implementation of political activities. The goal is to simultaneously secure your own and obtain information on others relevant for proper functioning of the organization. At no time in history has any country been deprived of intelligence services. As Sun Tzu said „intelligence is a prelude to victory”⁹. Secret services are therefore to help the client in the most optimal, decision-making process. This effectiveness depends on the quality of the information provided. In the broadest sense, the task of the intelligence service is to informally support the decision-making process of the client, who is most often a political decision-maker. The intelligence is supposed to obtain information needed to implement the state’s policy, then process it and prepare it properly as material ready to be transferred to the authorities. „In order to exercise power, we need knowledge about our

⁵ Braciak J., *Prawo do prywatności*, Warszawa 2004; Höffe O., *Etyka państwa i prawa*, Kraków 1992; Mednis A., *Prawo do prywatności a interes publiczny*, Warszawa 2006; Jabłoński M., *Dostęp do informacji i jego granice: wolność informacji, prawo dostępu do informacji publicznej, ochrona danych osobowych*, Wrocław 2002.

⁶ Herman M., op. cit., p. 4-5.

⁷ Karpiński M., *Historia szpiegostwa*, Warszawa 2003, p. 42.

⁸ Żebrowski A., Kwiartkowski W., *Bezpieczeństwo informacji III Rzeczypospolitej*, Kraków 2000, p. 36.

⁹ Ockrent Ch., de Marenches A., *Sekrety szpiegów i książąt*, Warszawa 1992, p. 117.

surroundings – the closer and more distant. Information about the risks and their nature is needed. Performing imperative functions also requires full identification in basic relations – such as one’s own – a stranger, related to the citizens of a given state, and thus subject to the norms binding in its territory”¹⁰.

Proper functioning of secret services is the main issue of every leader of the executive branch of state. Information products provided by the secret services are to be reliable, substantive, legible, in real time and of course at high level of quality. Each high-ranking government member is well aware that access to intelligence and counterintelligence information determines his political position. Information is the undisputed leader among unconventional weapons, especially in the era of technocratic society. This is probably why such a common slogan of politicizing these formations is the most often an accusation. In the ideal model, secret services are to serve apolitically the state and citizens by providing policymakers with the information they need to exercise power. The reality, as it usually happens, is different. Abuses can be prevented by well-designed structurally and systemically resistant model of functioning.

So what is so special about the work of intelligence agencies, which still allows them to maintain a *raison d'être* and, consequently, an information advantage in times of free, interactive, multi-dimensional data exchange. What distinguishes information from intelligence information is the institutional and purposive context. The information should be “tailored” to some extent, and the tasks should be adjusted. Count Alexandre de Marenches, who led the French secret services of SDECE¹¹ for eleven years, expressed the view that intelligence (institutionally and functionally) is „a huge sieve into which hundreds of thousands of pieces of information are thrown every day to then obtain an essential core or a few countable drops, intended for example to feed a newsletter which will be sent to the Elysée Palace”¹².

Over the years, various methods have been used to obtain information needed to force an advantage. From traditional control of correspondence, practiced since the 16th century, through wiretapping and tracking, to the most modern satellite reconnaissance systems. From this perspective, at the very beginning, information sources can be divided into generally available, with limited availability, and relatively unavailable¹³. The literature indicates four main types of intelligence sources, which are:

1. Human intelligence (HUMINT) – information derived from the so-called human sources, e.g. from the diplomatic corps, informants, local people;
2. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) – data from intercepted electronic signals of all types;
3. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) – information from various types of image materials (e.g. photographic and satellite photos, radar charts, probes, infrared effects);

¹⁰ Zalewski S., *Funkcja informacyjna służb specjalnych w systemie bezpieczeństwa RP*, Warszawa 2005, p. 8.

¹¹ French secret services from the post-war period to the reorganization in 1981 and the change of name to DGSE are considered to be one of the best but also one of the most brutal. Galicki Z., *Status prawny służb specjalnych w wybranych państwach zachodnich*, Warszawa 1996.

¹² Ockrent, Ch., de Marenches A., *op.cit.*, p. 103.

¹³ Zalewski S., *Służby specjalne w państwie...*, p. 74.

4. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) – information available in the open media and other public sources, e.g. the Internet¹⁴.

A feature that distinguishes intelligence activities from the others is the fact that obtaining information, in most cases, takes place without the knowledge of its owners (infiltrated objects and entities) and thus their consent. At the same time, the intelligence services keep secret all traces of their own activities. „MI-6 officers are not allowed to write memoirs or give interviews and are not subject to the thirty-year confidentiality clause”¹⁵.

Confidentiality grows to the level of special importance because of the new civilization and information conditions already signaled, including technologization, digitization, interoperability of data exchange space, multiplication of actors participating in the flow of information, or interoperability and real time of transfer. Wide spectrum of new sources forces secret services to search for and develop new ways of carrying out their tasks over the years. It should also be noted that the process of strengthening information role in the public sphere is also the result of an increased transfer of information in the classified sphere. Taking into account the phenomenon of the appreciation of the importance of information conditions in the contemporary world, as well as all technological and digital factors supporting the transfer of information, impose the need for theoretical update and practical redefinition of the role, function and place of intelligence not only in the state structure but also in global transnational alliances.

Michael Herman noticed this changes in 2001. „The current picture is therefore the result of a gradation in both levels of instability and sensitivity. Sources of special significance are completely surrounded and drowned out by information noise. In such environment, one can only speak of a higher or lower level of protection and reliability of sources. There are no longer any reliable sources that guarantee full conspiracy. Intelligence protection should in all cases be based on risk and source utility analysis. There are no more absolute secrets, only the relative ones remain”¹⁶. And further: „The problems are not only procedural and technical. It is about the basic attitude towards the institution of intelligence. The mere provision of information displaces the functions of understanding and forecasting. Societies still identify intelligence through the prism of secret actions. (...) Intelligence support for international activities is still seen as issues of joint bilateral cases resolved behind closed doors. There is much talk at the United Nations about the need for factual and reliable analyzes. However, there is no difference between what may be called the intelligence assessment policy and what is called the policy of analyzing the actions to be taken. It would be a benefit for all if international arrangements would take into account the effects of the latter policy”¹⁷.

¹⁴ Müller-Wille B., *For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers 2004, no. 50.

¹⁵ West N., *MI-6, Operacje brytyjskiej Tajnej Służby Wywiadu 1909-1945*, Warszawa 2000, p. 14.

¹⁶ Herman M., op. cit. p. 5.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 5.

The participation of the intelligence service in the political decision-making process

The constitutional separation of powers does not provide the legalistic participation of services in issuing legal acts. In that case, it is reasonable to try to mark the place and position of secret services (especially intelligence) in the political decision-making process. Whoever has made at least one important decision, the effect of which would cause a change among more than one person, is aware of the responsibility associated with it, and of the consequences in case of a wrong choice. Even with less significant decisions, we try to gather such information resources, so that the effectiveness of the step taken is maximized. This is the key – the elimination of the risk accompanying each choice. Apart from pathological and extreme cases (e.g. threats, coercion), every person tries to choose for himself and his surroundings such way of action that would bring positive results.

The multidimensional nature of social phenomena, limited economic resources and the multiplicity of addressees whose decisions involve, makes it impossible to take decisions that could satisfy everyone. Politicians almost always choose the lesser evil in the decision-making process. The role of secret services is to enable decision-makers to locate this lesser evil. Count de Marenches uses an eloquent comparison to convey this role. „Many intelligence targets resemble an airplane. In the cockpit, the one to which the decisions belong – the pilot, the head of state. It cannot do without precise instructions. If he has bad services, led by amateurs, fools, or incompetent people, the responsibility will fall on him. Its international position will weaken, it is obvious. It will lack the determinants of a decision”¹⁸.

It is worth noting that the role of intelligence services grows in proportion to the scale of the threat. The most power they gain during the wars. One should consider what choices are made by decision-makers in the conditions of the ever-present information shortage and uncertainty. Their attitudes can be reduced to three possible variants of acting:

- moving in the dark without looking too much (attitude of a brave or unconscious innovator),
- imitating the actions of others and thus protecting against risk,
- trying to lighten up the situation so that one can move faster¹⁹.

Of course, uncertainty about the consequences cannot be completely ruled out, but can be reduced. The following proportion seems to be close to the truth: the greater the knowledge of the factors related to the decision, the greater the probability of making the right decision. Now one can clearly see the position and role of secret services in the decision-making process. It materializes in providing the rulers with sufficient information to make decisions based on

¹⁸ Ockrent Ch., de Marenches A., op.cit., p. 105.

¹⁹ The authors describe the case of a Californian company as an example of a blindfolded activity. This company in 1987 developed a television decoding device in the form of a unique microprocessor – which was a result of large financial investment process. A few weeks later, this market collapsed as TV networks decided to use their own encoding systems for broadcast programs. As for the clearing-up activities, it is obvious that Japanese concerns such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo commonly uses the support of secret services. Martinet B., Marti Y.M., *Wywiad gospodarczy. Pozyskiwanie i ochrona informacji*, Warszawa 1999, p. 11-12.

the awareness of the factors of influence. The point is that the authorities should have a sense of solid ground underfoot and not act with „eyes closed”.

As part of their duties, intelligence services prepare a ready-made information product, which is the result of: obtaining information, its appropriate analysis, and finally its preparation. It should be borne in mind that secret services, despite their valuable contribution, do not directly construct political decisions – which is left to the discretion power of legal principals. At the same time, the involvement of secret services in the final effect, which is a political decision, is indisputable. Micheal Herman leaves no doubt in this regard. „Today, it is believed that intelligence is an integral part of the decision-making process in the state structures. (...) Every government requires good, reliable information from its intelligence structures. A government that wants to operate effectively must take into account the opinion and forecasts of the intelligence service; this also applies to commercial, private companies, which sometimes pay a lot of money for risk assessments of planned activities. Of course, it may happen that studies and information provided by the intelligence service turn out to be incomplete, inaccurate or even misleading. However, decision-makers who use them on a regular and planned basis always have a better overview of the situation; as data provided by the government’s services, with all its shortcomings, makes it possible to rely on more than mere guesswork and wishful thinking”²⁰.

Political decisions in modern countries are shaped on the basis of reports prepared by intelligence services. Nowadays, the entire process, the culmination of which is taking action by authorities and governments, must take into account the latest achievements in such areas as: political marketing, management, economy, social psychology, etc. Grzegorz Rydlewski distinguished several elements characterizing the government decision-making system, namely:

- complex nature which can be attributed to the decision-making process, and includes the stage of generating initiatives, their analysis and selection, transforming them into projects, clarifying and resolving disputes, legal evaluation, settlements, informing the public opinion about decisions and their implementation,
- location of the decision-maker in the political and legal system,
- relations with the social environment – decisions are made in the conditions of competition of goals and programs, conflict of interest and uncertainty²¹.

In a rapidly changing world, any wrong decision of politicians can result for them in the loss of social support, resignation, or even complete political “death”. Politics requires quick and effective decisions. The rulers have no time to waste. The entire information apparatus is under severe time pressure; timeliness is an absolutely required condition.

Leading state affairs resembles in some extent enterprise management. Policymakers have many paths and many options for action. They must take into account the rules of the

²⁰ Herman M. op. cit., p. 145.

²¹ Rydlewski G. *Rządowy system decyzyjny w Polsce*, Elipsa, Warszawa 2002, p. 32-33.

free market and competition, as well as the shortage of production factors. They are never sure what effect or outcome their actions will bring. Sometimes they decide to make risky investment moves, not sure of the profitability of the venture, only to gain an advantage over other participants in the market game. „First, businesses tend to collect more information than was required by their decision-making needs. Decision-makers (usually people other than those collecting the information) have at their disposal a set of information, usually not sufficient to be 100% sure that the decision made is correct. After taking a decision, they continue to search for information to reassure themselves that they did the right thing or, if their choice was good or wrong, to justify that there was no rational alternative for him. Information obtained after making a decision is in each case an excess (in relation to the decision-making needs of the enterprise)²². However, the difference between business and state management is the consequences. In the worst case scenario, failure to manage the enterprise properly means bankruptcy. There is no need to write much about the consequences of inept political decisions.

The information package provided by the services, however, is often not the key argument in the decisions. Politicians are often guided only by their own instincts, or the so-called „intuition” in a given matter. Despite the extremely important rank and significance of the data obtained from intelligence bodies, their final impact of the decision is only indirect. The act of decision itself is also influenced by a multitude of other, often irrational or illogical factors. „Intelligence and the results of its work are somehow at the mercy of sometimes completely unpredictable attitudes of different people. However, as an institution, it tries to convince and justify its arguments, *inter alia*, through personal contacts or through the appropriate form and scope of information provided. One of the reasons for the preparation of routine, periodic studies is the habit to the use of intelligence information and the credibility of an institution. Intelligence never treats the user as a *tabula rasa*, where information and ideas are placed at its own discretion and choice, but tries to take into account its attitudes and character. But even then, the user uses the information provided to him rather selectively”²³.

The information provided by the intelligence will always be processed through the prism of one’s own subjective feelings, life experiences, knowledge, and even phobias or prejudices. „In addition, decisions are influenced by decision-makers own judgments, political flair, leadership skills, and commitment to achieving their goals. (...) It is impossible to define precisely the relationship between intelligence information and actions being taken. Sometimes, intelligence information, for example, is completely ignored. Governments can also exclude intelligence completely from the decision-making process when it comes to serious and delicate matters

²² Martinet B., Marti Y.M., op. cit., p. 22.

²³ Significant amount of the intelligence information does not result in any decisions being taken. Instead, they contribute to increasing the knowledge and awareness of decision-makers. So one can see the role of intelligence in educating decision-makers. Knowledge provided, initially not used, may turn out to be useful and be the basis for decisions in the future. Such education of recipients directly influences their style of operation. Herman M., op. cit., p. 149-150.

(...)”²⁴. Sometimes the decision-makers are convinced to exact decision path much earlier, and in the provided material they try to find only those elements that will speak in their favor. Often, political and party considerations are also decisive. If certain intelligence bodies, being a state apparatus after all, are considered to be dominated by a specific party faction (which should ideally not be the case), then in a situation where the user is a representative of a different faction, it is not without effect.

Therefore, the conclusion should remain that the image of the actual share of the effects of the activities of intelligence services on the decision-making process depends on many factors. However, the user himself seems to be the most important. It is primarily up to him to what extent, selectively or holistically, the hints of the services will be used. This, in turn, will be the result of the condition of the secret services, the state of mutual relations, trust in these institutions, and adopted activity model. All the unpredictable elements that always accompanies social phenomena must be added.

The problem of intelligence actions coordination

The security policy implemented by all state bodies must be coherent, which is dictated by the need to maintain high efficiency in this area. Government cannot afford to bear the consequences of the lack of information flow in a timely manner, with relevant level of quantity and quality. Moreover, the authorities involved in the preparation of information reports aimed at reaching political decisions should not compete with each other. Rivalry, although is a natural phenomenon, and often positively identified as an effective remedy needed to rationalize activities, can be dysfunctional in relation to intelligence. An example may be the ineffectiveness of American security agencies in counteracting terrorism, and, consequently, allowing the attacks of August 11, 2001 to take place. Criticism fell on the secret services, which, as it turned out, had enough information to pacify the attacks in the bud. The intelligence had full details of the terrorists, but was unable to gather them at the right place and time.

Years later, it is recognized that this dysfunction was due to several reasons²⁵. First of all, the American security system brings together many institutions dealing with security. The list of various agencies established in this area is long. Using only abbreviations, it is worth mentioning: CIA, DIA, NSA, FBI, AFOSI, NCIS, CGIS, USACIC, as well as intelligence offices in the Department of Defense, State, and a number of other offices in various institutions at the state and federal level (not involving private intelligence institutions)²⁶. This shows paradoxically, that high number of agencies do not mean security, especially when it comes to cooperation.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 147.

²⁵ Rogala-Lewicki A., *Informacja jako autonomiczny czynnik wpływu. Studium władztwa informacyjnego*, Częstochowa 2013, p. 256-258.

²⁶ CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency), NSA (National Security Agency), FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), AFOSI (Air Force Office of Special Investigations), NCIS (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), CGIS (Coast Guard Investigative Service), USACIC (United States Army Criminal Investigation Command).

Secondly, the American security system is characterized by the presence of two parallel institutional spaces: the sphere of „Law Enforcement Communities” and the sphere of „Intelligence Communities” (information and intelligence agencies). There are separate procedures and methods of operation within one state organism. Different standards apply to information that is to be used for national security purposes (e.g. in connection with counteracting terrorism) and information used in criminal proceedings²⁷. Before the reform resulting from the adoption of the famous Patriot Act, the transfer of information between the above-mentioned spaces required the intermediation of a special unit – the Criminal Division of the General Attorney. It was this entity that was the only „interface” connecting the world of intelligence services with the police and *vice versa*, despite the fact that both divisions often worked in the same building. The transfer of information from the area of „Intelligence Communities” to the sphere of „Law Enforcement Communities” until the entry into force of the patriotic law was based on the so-called a minimization procedure that did not allow information to be used beyond the necessary measure. Even in a situation where information got from one organizational order to another, it was most often reformatted in such a way that it could not be easily associated with another thread, in another case – which *de facto* paralyzed the existence of an effective mechanism of using information at the disposal of the security agencies.

The American model of information exchange between security institutions experienced a real revolution with the passing of the Patriotic Act. Although it has forced a comprehensive reorganization of the approach to information management across the entire system, it is believed that it also legalized unfettered surveillance on a scale never seen in the history of any democratic state.

Based on the above-mentioned example, it can be concluded that, as a rule, competition should be admissible, and it should only take place in the first phase of intelligence activities (i.e. when obtaining information). On the other hand, when information becomes the subject of „intelligence processing”, all authorities and agencies must be able to cooperate effectively in the preparation of the final material.

The goal for the creators of national security systems should be to create a system of institutions that will create a functional and effective mechanism. Coordination mechanisms must be subordinated to this objective. „Shaping of coordination functions is therefore both a legal process and (perhaps even to a greater extent) an information process”²⁸. Legislator’s task in this respect is, on the one hand, to prepare an appropriate platform for the exchange of information and expectations between institutions, and on the other hand, at the same time imposing a sanctioned obligation to cooperate.

²⁷ Vervaele J.A.E., Terrorism and information sharing between the intelligence and law enforcement communities in the US and the Netherlands: emergency criminal law, *Utrecht Law Review* 2005, vol 1, no. 1.

²⁸ Zalewski, S., *Funkcja informacyjna służb...*, p. 77.

Coordination, from the perspective of various definitions, is a form of general agreement of the entities participating in this agreement to act in proper manner. It can be compared to a contract in which the parties undertake to implement an honest, reliable and full (in relation to their best knowledge and collected materials) approach to each other in the matters that they must jointly deal with. „Coordination can be understood as information exchange procedures. In the organizational sense, coordination is a management function that is continuous, but not cyclical, such as planning, organizing and controlling. So that means it is present at all stages of leadership”²⁹.

The theory of organization has developed a definition of coordination, describing it as „reconciliation of the mutual actions of various factors that make up organized cooperation”³⁰. Over the years, a clearly outlined process of restructuring the organizational structure of various organizations can be seen. Hierarchy, as the basic factor around which closed social groups were organized, became ineffective. In the new type of organization, „hierarchy is abandoned in favor of communication links, followed by a transition from a vertical organization to a horizontal organization”³¹. It seems, however, that the full process of restructuring the organization model, departing from the vertical structure, is not feasible, especially in public organizations dealing with security. The hierarchy cannot be fully eliminated as it is a natural phenomenon. Social structures have an internal tendency to organize themselves according to evaluative characteristics. The trick is to construct an organizational model in such a way that the hierarchy does not interfere with the implementation of duties. Sławomir Zalewski distinguished several possible barriers that could prevent coordination, including:

- barriers inherent in the internal security of the organization,
- functional barriers,
- staffing barriers,
- legal barriers,
- psychosocial barriers³².

Despite the obvious fact that there are barriers in coordination processes, in response to the threats of the modern world, it is necessary to try to guarantee the highest possible coordination of all state institutions, so that no entity would be excluded from the information circuit. „In addition to the army, police, intelligence, counterintelligence, customs services, fiscal services, border protection and the government, there is a number of new institutions and services responsible for combating corruption, drugs, illegal migration and terrorism”³³. All of them, being included in the system of institutions responsible for security policy, must

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 75.

³⁰ Hatch M.J., *Teoria organizacji*, Warszawa 2002, p. 155.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 40.

³² Ibidem, p. 85-86.

³³ Zalewski S., *Funkcja informacyjna służb...*, p. 73.

have instruments allowing implementing measures together. Coordination has now become one of the most important elements of the functioning of secret services. „In a situation of diversification of institutional and organizational forms in the field of security, in the conditions of increasing number and powers of state entities operating in this area, in the era of necessary specialization, the problem of coordination is gaining in importance”³⁴. In the face of contemporary threats, especially counterintelligence institutions must establish cooperation with all organizations that can offer information and operational assistance. All services must do it to make their operation more effective. They cannot afford to allow a situation in which a tragedy occurs due to the lack of communication and despite having sufficient information material. The risk is too high, so the services, in order to be able to effectively carry out their mission, must change their attitude from competitive to cooperative³⁵.

Internal cohesion and effectiveness of the national security system is the frequently undermined by occurring autonomy of intelligence agencies phenomenon – which have a negative impact on the coordination. This problem is common and affects almost all institutions with so-called special status. „In the conditions of extending both the statutory powers to conduct operational and reconnaissance activities and the scope of tasks of the secret services, the areas of activity may flow, which is particularly unfavorable in the case of a weak central coordination center”³⁶. Undoubtedly, due to the nature of the duties imposed on intelligence bodies, they must be equipped with a special „independence mechanism” that will ensure their resilience to changes in the political scene. Secret services in a democratic state cannot be a tool in the hands of politicians to eliminate political competition. Hence, an extremely difficult postulate to implement is the skillful balancing of the proportions between, on the one hand, the independence of secret services, and, on the other, maintaining democratic control. Intelligence, despite their unique role and specific position in state system, cannot be excluded from the brackets of democratic principles.

Coordination of services activities in the example of the model applicable in Poland

The transformation of the political system in Poland after 1989 left initially two parallel services combining intelligence and counterintelligence functions: the Office for State Protection (Urząd Ochrony Państwa – UOP) and the Military Information Services (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne – WSI). Until October 1, 1996, the only body coordinating the activities of the Office for State Protection and Military Information Services was the Prime Minister, as

³⁴ Zalewski S., *Służby specjalne – programowanie, nadzór, koordynacja*, Warszawa 2003, p. 36.

³⁵ In addition to internal coordination mechanisms, there are also transnational ones that materialize within international alliances and political associations. For example, Polish representatives take part in inter-ministerial meetings at the supranational level as part of the military structures of NATO and civil cooperation of European Union countries. Rogala-Lewicki A., European Intelligence Community – the unfulfilled pillar of the European Union, *„Mysl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”* 2016, no. 3 (54). At the same time, the supranational organizations also have their own intelligence agencies, such as NATO (Military Committee, NATO Intelligence Board) or the EU (SITCENT, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator). Minkina M., Wywiad Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego i Unii Europejskiej, *„DOCTRINA Studia społeczno-polityczne”* 2008, no. 5.

³⁶ Zalewski S., *Służby specjalne – programowanie...*, p. 23.

the direct head of the Ministries: Internal Affairs and National Defense, which were responsible for the work of these agencies. After that date, UOP was separated from the internal structures of the ministry. The institution was given a separate status and was subordinated, through the head of the agency, directly to the prime minister. At the same time, it was decided to create the first in the history of the Third Polish Republic, a body supervising and coordinating the work of the services, derived from the executive authority. The establishment of the College for Secret Services (Kolegium do Spraw Służb Specjalnych), as a consultative and advisory body to the Council of Ministers, was an element of a larger reform of the so-called administrative center³⁷. „The College was composed of the Prime Minister– as the chairman – and the Minister of Interior and Administration, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, Head of the State Protection Office, Secretary of the National Defense Committee, chairman of the permanent Committee of the Council of Ministers responsible for external and internal security – as members”³⁸.

In addition to the duties of programming tasks and supervision, the College was also responsible for coordinating the activities of the State Protection Office and Military Information Services, as well as the Police, Border Guard, and Military Police, but only in the field of state security. The College was headed by the so-called „Minister Coordinator of Secret Services”. As part of the reform, Prime Minister lost several important prerogatives related to the supervision and coordination of the secret services’ activities, which effects on rise of a number of legal doubts. „The legal status of the minister coordinator of secret services caused some formal and legal controversies. The scope of this minister’s activity has been defined quite broadly, while at the same time being insufficiently equipped with legal instruments of coordination and control. It is worth noting here that the performance of the coordinator role could not violate the statutory responsibility that was borne by the Prime Minister for UOP activities, and for the activities of the WSI – the Minister of National Defense (...) In this situation, the role of the coordinator of special services materialized mainly in performing the function of the Secretary of the College for Secret Services. Although the position of the minister – member of the Council of Ministers, responsible for the coordination of secret services, did not turn out to be a permanent element in the structure of state structure and was liquidated in 2001, his role in the first period of the College’s activity contributed to the increased importance of coordination in the state security system”³⁹.

³⁷ In Poland, after the changes of year 2008 and the liquidation of the function of the Minister-Coordinator of Special Services, Prime Minister himself exercises direct supervision over the services. At the same time, he execute the position of the chairman of the College for Secret Services, which is a consultative and advisory body with control and coordination powers. Aside him and the secretary at the College are among others: ministers of internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance, the head of the National Security Bureau, heads of secret services and the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Special Services. Bożek M., *Nadzór Prezesa Rady Ministrów nad służbami specjalnymi i sposoby jego realizacji w świetle obowiązującego ustawodawstwa*, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2010, No. 3 (98).

³⁸ The Secretary, appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister, as well as the Head of the Military Information Services, participated in the works of the College. The President of the Republic of Poland delegated his representative to participate in the meetings of the College. Zalewski S., *Służby specjalne – programowanie...*, p. 10-14.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

Another important stage on the way to strengthen the coordination system was the great reform of Polish intelligence model in 2002, during which the pattern of cooperation between agencies, implemented on the basis of the function of the minister coordinator, was abandoned. The most important change, however, concerned the separation of the intelligence and counter-intelligence parts in the civil branch of the intelligence. Thus, the new Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW) and the new Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu – AW) were established. In terms of ensuring the coordination of the activities of the newly-created agencies and the WSI, initially unchanged, several significant steps have been proposed.

Firstly, the coordination mechanism, was defined by the Prime Minister act of September 12, 2003, where scope and mode of cooperation, and the detailed division of powers between the Internal Security Agency, the Foreign Intelligence Agency and the Military Information Services⁴⁰, was defined. It stated that the cooperation of the AW, ABW and WSI was to take place on the basis of partnership, reciprocity, secrecy, and coordination of jointly conducted activities. The cooperation took place by means of written or direct contacts at all organizational levels of these institutions. The heads of organizations could set up permanent or *ad hoc* teams. The services cooperated with each other, as part of their own tasks, in the following activities: (1) intelligence, (2) counterintelligence, (3) analysis and information, (4) technical matters, (5) records and archives, (6) training⁴¹. Methods of cooperation proposed in the document included, in particular:

- sharing information allowing for the assessment of problems requiring action by other special services,
- consulting draft basic decisions in the areas related to the statutory tasks of each of the secret services and the activities they design,
- analysis of the forms of cooperation used in terms of the effectiveness of the implementation of statutory tasks of each of the secret services⁴².

Cooperation of intelligence agencies within security systems took place not only on the basis of broad agreements and within the framework of coordination of national activities, but also through bilateral partnership agreements, providing for e.g. joint training of officers, securing facilities, or protection of secret documents (AW and ABW). The cooperating bodies also carry out operational and investigative actions together. The head of the Intelligence Agency was the central body coordinating the activities and competent in the matter of the external security of the state, while the authority deciding about the final division of powers between public institutions and the Internal Security Agency (ABW) in the field of operational and reconnaissance was the Head of the Internal Security Agency.

⁴⁰ Zarządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów 12.09.2003 w sprawie zasad, zakresu i trybu współdziałania oraz szczegółowego rozdziału kompetencji pomiędzy Agencją Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, Agencją Wywiadu i Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne (M.P. 19.09.2003 No. 44, item 656).

⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁴² Ibidem.

Secondly, the competences of the College for Secret Services were extended. Coordination covered such institutions as: the Government Protection Bureau (Biuro Ochrony Rządu), customs authorities, tax offices, fiscal control authorities, financial information authorities and the intelligence authorities of the Armed Forces and their cooperation in the field of state protection and security. The college, after the reform, could also speak in matters of cooperation of secret services with other state bodies and with secret services of other states.

Thirdly, the College was considered to as important, that within the act of 2 July 2002 on the detailed procedure and rules for the functioning of the College for Secret Services⁴³ imposed on the members of the College the obligation to attend meetings personally⁴⁴. In addition, in justified cases, with the consent of the Chairman of the Board, the meeting could be attended by a person appointed by a member of the Board, who replaces him/her in the position which entitles him to participate in the meeting of the Board.

Fourth, the College established a Team for the coordination of operational and reconnaissance activities in combating political terrorism, whose task was to assess threats in the indicated scope and to improve the cooperation of secret services. The team was chaired by the Head of the Internal Security Agency (ABW).

Fifth, following the structure of Western systems, there was made an attempt to organize a Government Information Community (Wspólnota Informacyjna Rządu – WIR), modeled on the Anglo-Saxon Intelligence Community, which would include all administrative entities. A unique position in this system was entrusted to the Head of the Intelligence Agency, who, as the chairman, organized work of this community. State administration bodies, immediately upon receipt of important, for state security reasons, information and, if possible, in the content and form in which they received it, should pass it to the chairman. This obligation materialized through the presentation of the information received at the oncoming meeting of the WIR. Then, pursuant to the findings of the Government's Information Community, the obligated body immediately forwarded the information, together with the Community's position, to the appropriate addressees. The Government Information Community became the target entity to which information from administration authorities should be sent in the fields as follows:

1. external threats affecting the security, defense, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Poland,
2. threats to international alliances, political arrangements and military arrangements to which the Republic of Poland is a party,
3. international terrorism and extremism as well as international organized crime groups,

⁴³ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów 2.07.2002 w sprawie szczegółowego trybu i zasad funkcjonowania Kolegium do Spraw Służb Specjalnych oraz zakresu czynności sekretarza tego Kolegium (Journal of Laws 2002 No. 103, item 929).

⁴⁴ It is worth noting that the report of the Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) of November 2005 stated that the compulsory participation of members of the Commission was incomplete and negligently complied with. *Informacja o wynikach kontroli organizacji służb specjalnych oraz nadzoru nad nimi*, Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Warszawa 2005.

4. international trade in arms, goods, technologies and services of strategic importance for the security of the Republic of Poland and for the maintenance of international peace and security,
5. implementation of international agreements on disarmament and the threats related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
6. threats in areas of international conflicts and crises,
7. threats to achieving the objectives of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland,
8. threats to the economic interests of the Republic of Poland⁴⁵.

The Government Information Community was also responsible for the preparation of periodic (at least every quarter) reports by preparing the “Agreed Analysis of the Government Information Community”, which includes, *inter alia*, forecast of threats to external security and the international position of the state.

Table 1. Model of information exchange within the Government Information Community in Poland 2002–2005

Head of Intelligence Agency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • convenes and chairs meetings, • organizes cooperation and exchange of information between state authorities, • presents the results of the work of the information community to the recipients, • presents the protocol from the meeting for approval by participants, • appoints working teams.
Representatives of governmental agencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • submit requests regarding the content of the meeting, • could present information about external security threats at meetings, • prepare opinions, expert reports and positions at the request of the Head of the Intelligence Agency.
Methods implemented in Government’s Information Community
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • exchange, development, analysis of information, • agreeing position, • expressing position (opinion).
Government’s Information Community “products”
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agreed analysis of the Government’s Information Community, • stance on information about threats to state security, • analyzes and forecasts, • periodic evaluation of the activities of the Government’s Information Community, • internal documents (minutes, reports, etc.)
Government’s Information Community „products” recipients
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President of the Republic of Poland (Agreed Analysis of WIR), • Speakers of the Sejm and Senate (Agreed Analysis of WIR), • Prime Minister (Agreed Analysis of WIR – position on information about threats, analytical documents and forecasts, and internal documents).

Source: Zalewski S., *Śłużby specjalne – programowanie, nadzór, koordynacja*, Warszawa 2003, p. 34.

⁴⁵ Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów 2.07.2002 w sprawie szczegółowego trybu i zasad funkcjonowania Kolegium do Spraw Służb Specjalnych oraz zakresu czynności sekretarza tego Kolegium (Journal of Laws 2002 No. 103, item 929).

The reform model proposed at that time was based on British schemes. „The solution adopted in Poland was only the first step towards building a system based on the philosophy of operation of the British model. The remaining elements that determine its effective functioning have not been introduced to this day. The system established at that time remains unchanged in its assumptions, despite its supplementation in 2006 with a special anti-corruption service, i.e. the CBA, and the military services of the SKW and SWW, which were built on the place of liquidated WSI. Apart from the increase of the number of existing services with statutory status of secret service, there is still no permanent, professional management center for the entire system, in particular carrying out tasks in the field of coordination, accounting and control of the intelligence, as well as acting as an analytical center for the government”⁴⁶. The Government’s Information Community was declared unconstitutional in 2004 and liquidated a year later. It was argued that the Community was not an institutional entity, but only a form of cooperation between government administration bodies⁴⁷.

At present the minister responsible for supervision, control and coordination of secret services is each time responsible for the coordination of activities of the intelligence services. He performs the tasks assigned by the Prime Minister, while legally the services report directly to the Prime Minister⁴⁸. At the same time, the College for Secret Services, supported in its work by the Department of National Security at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, maintained its advisory status⁴⁹.

It should be noted that the problem of a professional intelligence management center that would coordinate system has not been resolved up to now. According to Grzegorz Malecki, the former head of the Intelligence Agency „currently Prime minister and President are *fed* with information through parallel channels by all services. This results in a flood of materials that are hardly used in the political decision-making processes. Although in some government offices, secret service coordinators were appointed, but it is not permanently implemented into the structure of government, and most importantly, it does not have the tools to actually manage secret services”⁵⁰.

⁴⁶ *Reforma służb specjalnych z perspektywy 15 lat*, Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego, Warszawa 07.05.2017, https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Raport_reforma_sluzb_FKP.pdf, (access: 07.07.2020).

⁴⁷ Constitutional Tribunal sentence 20.04.2004,K 45/02 (OTK-A 2004/4/30).

⁴⁸ The detailed scope of activities of the Minister Coordinator of Special Services is defined in the Regulation of the Prime Minister of November 18, 2019 (Journal of Laws 2019, item 2273).

⁴⁹ Chodak P., Zarządzanie w służbach – nadzór, kontrola i koordynacja realizowana przez Koordynatora Służb Specjalnych, *Journal of Modern Science* 2016 vol 2(29), p. 283–306.

⁵⁰ Malecki G., *Bezglowe służby*, <https://www.rp.pl/Publicystyka/305079942-Bezglowe-sluzby.html>, (access: 07.07.2020).

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Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Ukraine

The basic principles of preventing and combating discrimination are enshrined in international legal instruments and implemented at the national level, but this does not guarantee the effective implementation of protection of persons against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. The lack of a clear and effective mechanism for responding to any manifestations of discrimination, its prevention and counteraction creates new forms of discrimination and further exacerbates the already unresolved problems in society. Given that the LGBT movement is a discriminatory stratum, the need to effectively combat and protect against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity in order to realize the rights of individuals in various spheres of society is emphasized.

Keywords: discrimination, gender identity, sexual orientation, equality of rights.

Дискримінація на підставі сексуальної орієнтації та гендерної ідентифікації в Україні

Базові засади запобігання дискримінації та її подолання визначені у міжнародних правових документах та реалізовані на національному рівні, однак не гарантують успішного захисту осіб, які зазнають дискримінації за сексуальну орієнтацію та гендерну ідентифікацію. Відсутність чіткого і успішного механізму реагування на всі види дискримінації, її недопущення та протидія творять нові форми дискримінації і додатково погіршують вже існуючі проблеми в суспільстві. Беручи до уваги, що рух LGBT є групою, яка зазнає дискримінації, наголошено на необхідності успішного подолання та охорони стосовно дискримінації з точки зору сексуальної орієнтації або гендерної ідентичності з метою реалізації індивідуальних прав у різних суспільних сферах.

Ключові слова: дискримінація, гендерна ідентичність, сексуальна орієнтація, рівність прав.

Dyskryminacja ze względu na orientację seksualną i tożsamość płciową w Ukrainie

Podstawowe zasady zapobiegania dyskryminacji i jej zwalczania są zapisane w międzynarodowych instrumentach prawnych i wdrażane na szczeblu krajowym, ale niegwarantuje to skutecznego wdrożenia ochrony osób przed dyskryminacją ze względu na orientację seksualną i tożsamość płciową. Brak jasnego i skutecznego mechanizmu reagowania na wszelkie przejawy dyskryminacji, jej zapobieganie i przeciwdziałanie tworzy nowe formy dyskryminacji i dodatkowo pogarsza i tak już nierozwiązane problemy w społeczeństwie. Biorąc pod uwagę, że ruch LGBT jest warstwą dyskryminującą, podkreślając potrzebę skutecznego zwalczania i ochrony przed dyskryminacją ze względu na orientację seksualną lub tożsamość płciową w celu realizacji praw jednostek w różnych sferach społecznych.

Słowa kluczowe: dyskryminacja, tożsamość płciowa, orientacja seksualna, równość praw.

Categories “sexual orientation” and “gender identity”.

Usually, in the legal literature one can find the statement that discrimination has two main forms: de jure (or legal), enshrined in law; de facto (or unofficial), rooted in social customs. However, to claim that discrimination is legal in nature is erroneous. Discrimination can be considered as a phenomenon, but not a legal one, despite the fact that it can be manifested both at the law enforcement level and in the content of normative legal acts.

In this context, we should definitely agree with the opinion of such scholars as Lawrence Solotoff and Henry S. Kramer, who emphasized in this year's research, that in cases involving alleged intentional sex based discrimination (disparate treatment), there is the possibility to fall within either of two categories, “pretext” or “mixed motive” claims; because the term “glass walls” refers to the problem of the concentration of managerial persons in fields that generally do not lead to top executive positions.¹

Discrimination, unfortunately, has its manifestations and forms both in the activities of public authorities and administration, in the person of their officials, and in society. Every state that recognizes itself as legal and democratic proclaims the equality of rights and freedoms of its citizens at the level of national legislation. This is especially true of gender equality, which serves as an indicator of fundamental human rights.

However, it should be noted that people often report that their subjective rights are violated on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity, which limits the degree of their life and professional activity in various spheres of society. This is especially evident in labor relations; both when hiring a citizen and in the process of performing, in the future, his labor functions.

¹ Solotoff L., Kramer H. S. *Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in the Work Place. Law Journal Press* 28.02.2020, Ss. 30-31.

Millions of people in Europe are discriminated against, stigmatized and even victims of violence because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.² This phenomenon has a globalizing character.

For instance, in Belarus, despite of the fact that homosexual sex was decriminalized in 1994, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights in Belarus are still severely limited, and, due to the Viachaslau Bortnik`s words, LGBT persons are facing harassment, violence and physical abuse nowadays.³

Sexual orientation is a typical example of emotional and sexual attraction to women, men, both or neither. Orientation is not related to gender identity, for example, a transgender person may be heterosexual or gay in the same way that another person may be heterosexual or gay. However, these two aspects of identity are often related to each other and affect how lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender people (LGBT) are perceived.⁴

It is noteworthy that the representatives of LGBT community in most Eastern European countries have to take the same path of development from complete intolerance to effective legal protection. Researchers from various Eastern European countries agree that in the late 1980s a new era began in the consolidation and practical implementation of fundamental human and civil rights, guaranteeing all levels of freedom regardless of gender, sexual preferences and gender identity.

According to Romiana Stoilova, an important problem faced in the study of sociostructural dimensions of gender is their location within the context of socioeconomic transformations in Bulgaria after 1989. After the collapse of the communist regime and the establishment of a multiparty democratic system, a labor market emerged and institutional differentiation grew stronger in various social spheres of Bulgarian legislation.⁵

Following the collapse of state socialism in 1989, Eastern European nations underwent profound economic transformations, shifting from the security provided by free market economies marked by large scale deregulation in Poland.⁶

At this period, the topics of homosexuality, abortion and prostitution deeply divided Romanian society and sparked heated public debates involving the political class, religion leaders, the local academic community, mass media and the public at large. Discussions generally revolved around the adoption of new laws that would allow Romania to conform to European Union standards and solve the country`s most delicate social problems.⁷

² *Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe* Official web-site. Retrieved from: URL: https://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf

³ Bortnik V. Intolerance, discrimination and hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the OSCE region, presented at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw 2014, S. 319.

⁴ *Gender*. Official web-site. Retrieved from: URL: <https://www.coe.int/uk/web/compass/gender>

⁵ Stoilova R. *The Influence of Gender on Social Stratification in Bulgaria*. *International Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 42, No. 3, *Aspects of Social Stratification in Bulgaria* (Fall 2012), S. 11.

⁶ Mishtal J. Z. *Understanding low fertility in Poland: Demographic consequences of gender discrimination in employment and post-socialist neoliberal restructuring*. *Demographic Research*. Vol. 21 (JULY – DECEMBER 2009), S. 600.

⁷ Turcescu L., Stan L. *Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania*. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 57, No. 2 (Mar., 2005), S. 291.

For this moment of time the predominantly institutional and reformist approach used by activists and a focus of discrimination have left many issues out of the debate, especially when they relate to sex. As Michael J. Bosia states, the defence of LGBT rights in Europe has mostly taken the path of identity recognition and the protection from discrimination rather than a more libertarian approach of a promotion of the freedoms to be who you want to be (with a proliferation of sexual identities) and to do as you wish.⁸

From the point of view of official medicine, all three types of sexual orientation – heterosexual, bisexual and homosexual – are normative and do not constitute disease or behavioral disorder in themselves: the official Ukrainian edition of ICD-10 states that “sexual orientation in itself should not be considered as deviation».⁹

Gender identity refers to the gender to which a person believes he or she belongs, which may or may not be the same as the gender assigned to him or her at birth. This refers to a deep awareness of the inner and individual experience of a person of each sex and includes personal feelings of the body and other expressions such as clothing, language and manners.¹⁰ Of course, this problem exists all over the world. However, it is perceived differently by different generations of people in each country. It depends on many factors, both objective and subjective. In particular, the mentality of the people, the specifics of its historical, ethnic, spiritual, moral development, upbringing and family traditions, religious beliefs, etc. For example, a number of Christian churches and religious organizations in Ukraine have made statements about the inadmissibility of the norm on “sexual orientation”.¹¹

But in other words, sexuality is one area where the churches have worked together with, and often against, the post-communist state to impose their views and define acceptable and unacceptable sexual behavior for society, their followers and members of the clergy. In Romania sexual behavior and practices have been a contested territory for church and state throughout the last century. In a traditional society like Romania mores and mentalities have remained close to the conservative villages, which rejected homosexuality, scorned prostitutes, while tacitly accepting adulterous husbands, and denounced abortion, while developing an impressive knowledge of medicinal plants able to induce it.¹² As it was aptly summarized by British scientists William Eskeridge Jr. and Robert Wilson, religious freedom and religious liberty stand for

⁸ Bosia M. J. McEvoy S. M. *The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2020, S. 159.

⁹ Herts A. A. *Prava človeka, orientacija seksualna i ravnost' plci: podrečnik [Prava ljudiny, seksual'na orientacija ta henderna ravnost': navchal's'nyj posibnyk]*. Kijów 2018, S. 115.

¹⁰ *Gender*. Official web-site. Retrieved from: URL: <https://www.coe.int/uk/web/compass/gender>

¹¹ *Kościół ewangeliczny: Ukraina musi zachować tradycyjne wartości rodzinne i moralne poprzez integrację z UE [Yevanbel's's'ki cerkvy: Ukraïna maie zberebty tradyčijni simejni ta moral's'ni čimosti, intebruyuchys' do YeS]* Rada Ewangelicznych Kościołów Protestanckich Ukraïny: oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL: <http://repcu.org/?p=433>; *Wystąpienie Świętego Synodu Ukraïńskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego w sprawie projektu Ustawy Ukraïny „W sprawie zmian niektórych ustawodawczych aktów prawnych Ukraïny dotyczących zapobiegania i przeciwdziałania dyskryminacji na Ukraïnie” [Zvernennya Svyasbhenmoho Synodu UPC z pryvodu projektu Zakonu Ukraïny «Pro vnesennya zmin do deyakyx zakonodavchyx aktiv Ukraïny shhodo zapobihannya ta protydyi dyskryminaciyi v Ukraïni»]* // Ukraïński Kościół Prawosławny: oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL: <http://orthodox.org.ua/article/>

¹² Turcescu L., Stan L. *Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania*. *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 57, No. 2 (Mar., 2005), S. 291.

nothing except hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Christian supremacy, or any form of intolerance.¹³

The specifics of the development of Ukrainian society and its mentality do not provide a definite basis for claiming that it is ready to discuss the problems of people with non-traditional sexual orientation and protect their rights. However, Ukraine, which recognizes itself as a legal, democratic and social state, has made a number of international legal obligations to protect human rights, including anti-discrimination and anti-discrimination.

Given the significant politicization of the problem of preventing discrimination against LGBT people and taking into account the historically conditioned conservative views of the majority of Ukrainian society on issues related to sexual identity, as well as the need to respect equal rights for all citizens, including non-traditional sexual orientation, Ukraine needs a certain transition period in the process of implementation of international legal norms on protection of rights and prevention of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as taking into account its own socio-cultural peculiarities when ratifying international instruments.¹⁴

LGBT people in Ukraine are discriminated against and stigmatized because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. A certain percentage of Ukraine's population is made up of LGBT people (homosexuals, bisexuals and transgender people) who need to settle their de facto family relationships as same-sex family partners. Although the exact proportion of LGBT people in the population is unknown, various studies estimate it at 2-10%. Taking into account that the population of Ukraine over the age of 14 (excluding the occupied Crimea) is about 36 million, we can estimate the total adult LGBT population of Ukraine from 720 thousand to 3.6 million people. According to a very rough estimate, the number of stable same-sex couples in Ukraine may already be at least 100-200 thousand.¹⁵

At the end of 2016 and in January 2017, the Our World Center conducted an online survey among LGBT people in Ukraine. 1519 people took part in this survey – 1263 men and 250 women; 6 people, answering the question about gender, chose the answer «other». 88.9% of those surveyed cited the problem of «the need to pretend to be someone you are not when communicating with strangers.»

In addition, 15.7% of respondents faced problems with registration of property rights to jointly purchased valuables, and 13.1% of respondents with registration of real estate ownership. 11.2% of respondents emphasized the difficulties in drawing up the inheritance. 13.8% of respondents stated that it is difficult to apply for subsidies due to the uncertain status of same-sex couples. Various government and commercial entities offer certain family-friendly benefits, all

¹³ Eskridge W. Jr, Wilson R. *Religious Freedom, LGBT Rights, and the Prospects for Common Ground*. Cambridge University Press 2018, P. 156.

¹⁴ Herts A. A. *Prawa człowieka, orientacja seksualna i równość płci: podręcznik [Prava lyudyny, seksual»na oriyentaciya ta henderna ravnist»: navchal»nyj posibnyk.]*. Kijów 2018, S. 84.

¹⁵ Svyashchuk A. L. *Ochrona prawna społeczności LGBT. Podręcznik sposob. [Pravovyj zachyst LHBТ-spil»noty]* Kijów 2018, S. 128.

of which are not available to same-sex couples. 24.4% of respondents mentioned this as a problem. 12.3% of all respondents took part in the rejection of adopted children (22.0% of women).

The vast majority of Ukrainian society has a negative attitude towards LGBT people in general and the effective realization of their human rights, in particular, to personal and family life. A poll conducted in early 2016 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at the request of the Our World Center showed that 60% of Ukrainians have a negative attitude towards LGBT people, and only 4% have a positive attitude; 45% believe that there should be certain restrictions on their rights.

However, it should be noted that almost a third of respondents are indifferent to LGBT, that is, neutral; also, a third of respondents, in principle, support equal rights for LGBT people. A large-scale nationwide survey of discrimination conducted by the Maidan Monitoring Information Center and the Sociologist Research Bureau found, in particular, that only 11% of Ukrainians believe that our society is ready to legalize same-sex marriage. However, the modern democratic state has a duty to take into account, as far as possible, the interests of all social groups and to counteract the manifestations of intolerance against vulnerable groups – in particular, homophobia, as stated in many international documents concerning Ukraine.¹⁶

Legislative guarantees of prevention and counteraction of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity.

Ukraine, which recognizes itself as a social state governed by the rule of law, supports the ratification of almost all international instruments on the protection of human rights. The course of European integration requires, above all, compliance with international standards in all spheres of public relations, including the protection of the rights of the LGBT community. This requires appropriate national policies.

To this end, Ukraine has adopted a number of legislative acts, including: “On the Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine”, “On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men”, “On Preventing Domestic Violence”. Ukraine has a National Human Rights Strategy approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of August 25, 2015 № 501/2015, the purpose of which is to ensure the priority of human rights and freedoms as a determining factor in determining public policy, decision-making by public authorities and bodies Local Government. The implementation of the Strategy should result in the introduction of a systematic approach to the implementation of tasks and ensuring coherence of actions of public authorities and local governments in the field of human rights and freedoms, creating an effective: accessible, understandable, predictable mechanism for implementing and protecting human rights and freedoms.¹⁷

¹⁶ Svyashchuk A. L. *Ochrona prawna społeczności LGBT. Podręcznik sposob. [Pravovij zachyst LHBT-spil>noty]* Kijów 2018, S. 130.

¹⁷ *Narodowe strategie w dziedzinie praw człowieka: Dekret Prezydenta Ukrainy z 25 sierpnia 2015 r. № 501/2015 [Nacional>na stratebiji u sferi prav hudydyny: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 25 serpnja 2015 roku № 501/2015]* Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: <http://https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/501/2015>

An important point for the national legislation in the field of hired labor was the introduction of a rule according to which: “Any discrimination in the field of labor is prohibited, including violation of the principle of equality of rights and opportunities, direct or indirect restriction of workers’ rights, religious and other beliefs, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnic, social and foreign origin, age, health status, disability, suspicion or presence of HIV / AIDS, marital and property status, family responsibilities, place of residence, membership in a trade union or other association of citizens, participation in a strike, appeal or intention to appeal to a court or other bodies to protect their rights or provide support to other employees in defending their rights, reporting possible corruption or corruption-related facts offenses, other violations of the Law of Ukraine «On Prevention of Corruption», as well as assisting a person in carrying out so notification, on linguistic or other grounds, not related to the nature of the work or the conditions of its implementation «(Art. 2-1).

On October the 1st, 2007, the non-governmental international standard “Social Responsibility (SA8000)” was adopted, which stipulates that a company should not apply or maintain discrimination in employment, remuneration, access to training, promotion, dismissal, or retirement on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, disability, sex, sexual orientation, membership of any organization, political opinion or age” (paragraph 5.1).¹⁸ The provisions of the Standard state that «a company should not interfere with the exercise of the right of employees to adhere to principles or customs or to fulfill their needs related to race, nationality, religion, disability, sex, sexual orientation, membership in any organization or political views» (p.5.1).¹⁹

On the 31st of March 2010, at its 1081st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation CM / Rec- (2010) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on measures to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, which is valid for Ukraine.²⁰ This document, in particular the preamble, sets out the provisions addressed by the Council of Europe on certain issues concerning the fight against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

In particular, the preamble to the Recommendation recognizes that “lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender people have for centuries experienced and continue to experience homophobia, transphobia and other forms of intolerance and discrimination even within their

¹⁸ *Międzynarodowy standard. Społeczna odpowiedzialność (SA8000) [Międzynarodowy standard. Social»na vidpovidal»nist»]* Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL:<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0015697-07#Text>

¹⁹ *Międzynarodowy standard. Społeczna odpowiedzialność (SA8000) [Międzynarodowy standard. Social»na vidpovidal»nist»]* Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL:<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0015697-07#Text7-07#Text>

²⁰ *Zalecenie CM / Rec (2010) 5 Komitetu Ministrów Rady Europy dla państw członkowskich w sprawie walki z dyskryminacją ze względu na orientację seksualną lub tożsamość płciową przyjęte przez Komitet Ministrów w dniu 31 marca 2010 r. na 1081. spotkaniu wiceministrów [Rekomendacija SM / Rec (2010) 5 Komitetu Ministrów Rady Europy derzhavam-chlenam «Prozaxodyzborot»byprotydystryminacyizaoznakamyseksual»noyiorientacyiyabohendernoyiidentychnosti» Uxvalenakomitetomministriw 31.03.2010r. na 1081-mu zasidannizastupnykiwministra]*. Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL:file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/medpr_2014_1_12.pdf

families – including criminalization, marginalization, social rejection and violence. sexual orientation or gender identity, as well as the fact that special actions are required to ensure the full enjoyment of these rights and freedoms by these persons”; stipulates that the European Court of Human Rights, like other international bodies, “recognizes sexual orientation as a ground for prohibiting discrimination”; enshrines “the principle that no cultural, traditional or religious values, nor norms of” dominant culture “may be used to justify... any... forms of discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity”; noted that “discrimination and social exclusion based on sexual orientation or gender identity can best be addressed through measures aimed at both those who experience such discrimination or rejection and at society as a whole.”

The member states of the Council of Europe are instructed: «to review existing legislative and other measures, to review them, and to collect and analyze relevant information in order to track and eliminate direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity» (paragraph 1); «Ensure the adoption and effective implementation of legislative and other measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity in order to ensure respect for human rights against and tolerance of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people» (paragraph 2); «Ensure that victims of discrimination (based on sexual orientation or gender identity) are aware of and have access to effective remedies from national authorities, and that measures to combat discrimination include, where appropriate, , punishment for violation and provision of appropriate compensation to victims of discrimination ”(paragraph 3).

On June the 17th, 2011, Ukraine acceded to the signatory countries of UN Human Rights Committee Resolution A / HRC / 17 / L.9 / Rev.1,²¹ which states “that the dynamics of acts of violence and discrimination in all regions of the world committed against persons on the basis of SOGI, needs to study such practices and search for effective mechanisms for international protection of human rights from such violations.”On the basis of the Resolution, the High Commissioner introduced a systematic analysis of the country’s legislation on discrimination on the grounds of SOGI and a dialogue aimed at making appropriate recommendations for the protection of the rights of LGBT people.

Thus, both governmental and non-governmental international standards reaffirm the need to apply the key principle that human rights are inalienable and belong equally to all people. To this end, the need for special action to ensure respect for human rights of LGBT people is emphasized and the appropriate measures required of the governments of the CoE member states are outlined.

Due to the globalization processes caused by digital technologies, the place of each country in the world economic system is changing. This, in turn, leads to a certain type of cooperation

²¹ *Prawa człowieka, orientacja seksualna i tożsamość płciowa. Oficjalna strona internetowa [Pravache loveka, seksual>nayaor yentacyayhender-naya ydentychnost>. Oficjalna strona internetowa]. Źródło: URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G11/141/96/PDF/G1114196.pdf?..>*

between states in certain sectors of the economy. In the last decade, we can note the constant presence of foreign labor in labor markets, which ensures the simultaneous competitiveness and stability of the economy of each developed country. Ukraine is no exception in this respect.

On February the 16th, 1994, an Agreement was concluded between the Minister of Labor of Ukraine and the Minister of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Poland on cooperation in the field of labor and social policy.²²

This agreement (Article 2) the parties have established that cooperation will cover, among others, the following areas: the formation of labor relations in a market economy; organization, functioning and management of the labor market; improving the management structure in the field of labor and employment services; system of measures for social protection and social insurance; problems of economic migration; a set of measures to improve working conditions and safety; cooperation with other states and international organizations. However, there is no provision in the Agreement that provides for working conditions and social rights of employees, where the parties could provide that “employees enjoy the rights and benefits provided by the legislation of the Host State, without any form of discrimination on the grounds of race or sex, sexual orientation, marital status, religion, beliefs, etc.». Thus, the parties to the Treaty would make a direct commitment not to discriminate against Ukrainian nationals working in Poland under the terms of the Treaty on the grounds of sexual orientation.

If we consider the adoption of the legal framework as a mechanism for policy-making in the field of prohibition of discrimination on sexual orientation and gender identity, then this mechanism is formed. However, if we talk about the mechanism of its implementation, today it is absent. After all, the validity of international legal standards and, accordingly, national regulations does not mean their practical implementation.

On the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights has prepared a short overview of the situation in Poland. According to *Agnieszka Mikulska's report*, this country still remains a relatively homogenous one (ethnically, racially and in gender identification questions). Poland has also failed to establish a special institution that would promote the principles of equal treatment for all irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. In accordance with Directive recommendations, the institution's tasks would include conducting independent research concerning discrimination, publishing independent reports and formulating recommendations as well as assistance to victims of discrimination.²³

Despite the existence of a system of specialized legal framework in Ukraine, its norms are still deprived of an effective mechanism for implementation in practice and are declarative in

²² *Umowa między Ministrem Pracy Ukrainy a Ministrem Pracy i Polityki Społecznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o współpracy w dziedzinie pracy i polityki społecznej z dnia 16.02.1994 r.* [Dobovir між Ministrom praci Ukrajinny i Ministrom praci ta social>noyi polityky Respubliki Pol>sbha pro spivrobotnytvo v haluzi praci ta social>noyi polityky vid 16.02.1994 r.] Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_040#Text

²³ Mikulska A. Ethnic and racial discrimination in Poland – overview. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights Program Coordinator, 2007. Official web-site. Retrieved from: <https://humanrightshouse.org/articles/ethnic-and-racial-discrimination-in-poland/>

nature. In addition, among the problems of the current legislation of Ukraine in the field of observance and protection of the rights of the LGBT community is the lack of enshrinement of their rights in national law and the lack of a mechanism to protect the rights and interests of the LGBT community in legal practice and national courts.

Indicative in this regard are the court decisions in the case where homosexuality is proposed to be classified as mitigating circumstances, indicating as a physical defect. Thus, in the Decision of the Vinnytsia City Court of the Vinnytsia Region on Case 127/16253/15-k of July 17, 2015 it is stated: manifestations of prejudice against his client, who due to his physical defects – non-traditional sexual orientation has the right to use additional guarantees to protect their rights and legitimate interests, respect for human dignity ».²⁴

An analysis of national jurisprudence shows a negative perception of homosexuality and non-gender, and therefore the issue of gender minority rights is virtually no cause of litigation.

The evolution of approaches to the category of gender identity, as well as other changes in society, significantly affect the content and nature of the legal sphere, which should create effective mechanisms to ensure the realization of freedom and human dignity. Important in this aspect is the recognition of gender identity at the official level.

It is important to dwell on the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 May 2017 on application № 40296/16 on the admission of the case to consideration “P v. Ukraine ». The case concerns intersex, whose gender is defined in the birth certificate as male, but who identifies himself as female. Medical tests have found that at the level of chromosomes, a person is female.

However, at the 215 level of biological development, her body contains both male and female traits, so she was recognized as intersex. The problem arose when the applicant requested a change in her gender in the identification documents from male to female. She was denied such a request, as the change of the sex marker in the documents under domestic law is possible only after the relevant operation. But this operation, by law, can be performed on a person only if diagnosed with «transsexualism». As for intersexes, such a possibility is not defined.²⁵

The European Court of Human Rights has also confirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is “the embodiment of heterosexual majority bias against homosexual

²⁴ *Postanowienie Sądu Miasta Winnicy regionu Winnicy z dnia 17 lipca 2015 r. w sprawie 127/16253/15-k* [Uxwała Winnicy » kohomis » kohosudu Winnicy » koyioblastivid 17 lypnya 2015 roku pospravi 127/16253/15-k]. Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL: <http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/48165753>

²⁵ *Wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka z dnia 5 maja 2017 r. W sprawie wniosku nr 40296/16 o dopuszczenie do rozpoznania „Przeciwko. Ukraina » [Rishbeniya Yevropeys'kyobosuduzpravlyudnyvid 5 travnya 2017 roku z azayavoyu № 40296/16 prodopuskspravyydoroz'blyadu «Pt. Ukraine »]* Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL: <http://hudoc.echr.coc.int/app/conversion/docx/pdf?library=ECHR&id=001-174001&filename=P%20v.%20UKRAINE.pdf&clgEvent=False>; Gerbut V. S. *Prawo do orientacji seksualnej i tożsamości płciowej: podstawowe treści i gwarancje ochrony „Uniwersytet Narodowy w Użgorodzie”. Rozprawa doktorska o stopniu kandydata na prawo (doktor filozofii) w specjalności 12.00.02 „Prawo konstytucyjne; prawo miejskie » [Prawo na seksual'nu oryentatsiyu ta bendernu identychnist': sutnistyy zmist ta harantyyi zakhystu «Uzhhorod's'ky natsional'nyy universytet», Uzhhorod – 2018. Dysertatsiya na zdobuttya naukovoho stupenya kandydata yurydychnykh nauk (doktora filozofii) za spetsialnistyu 12.00.02 «Konstytutsyne pravo; munitsypalne pravo »]* Uzhhorod 2018, S. 214-215.

minorities, and such a negative attitude cannot be a sufficient basis for a differentiated approach more than a similar or negative attitude towards skin color».²⁶

Thus, as argued above, we see that recently the problem of recognizing the rights of the LGBT community is not just a matter of law enforcement and judicial protection in case of violation, but above all a matter of self-identification of each European nation (whether the rights of all without exception of persons, including sexual minorities in all spheres of society).

So that is why we need to agree with Michael J. Bosia, who pointed out that the recognition of LGBT rights is indeed increasingly used to define what it means to be European, both at the national level and more recently at the European level. The new emphasis on LGBT rights intersects with the history of European civilizational rhetoric, which has painted some individuals, groups, and cultures as less civilized and thus locates them behind the European standart. This association between Europeans and non-Europeans and among Europeans. Indeed, the lack of acceptance of LGBT rights or the criticism raised by some groups or individuals is often interpreted as a sign that those who express these views are not European enough (if they belong to Europe) or not European at all (if they are located “outside” of Europe and or want to join).²⁷

Conclusions

1. Ukraine must adhere to and implement its international obligations in the field of human rights protection. When ratifying international documents, take into account the historical, cultural and spiritual heritage of Ukraine;
2. By adopting regulations we need to create an effective mechanism to eliminate any manifestations of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity in public and private enterprises, in order to ensure and implement equal rights and opportunities in various spheres of society;
3. Given the historical, cultural and spiritual heritage of Ukraine, the mentality of the people, the conservative views of the majority of Ukrainian society on issues related to sexual identity, based on the need to equal rights of all citizens, it is necessary to involve everybody to the public discussions on this issue. Of course, it should be carried out with the participation of scientists, public activists and experts and be based solely on a professional basis in order to find a compromise version of civilized coexistence of all groups of the population that make up the Ukrainian society;
4. It must be acknowledged that the LGBT movement is a relatively large group in Ukrainian society, which is subject to discrimination both by public authorities, officials and society as a whole. This, in turn, requires the creation of an effective

²⁶ *Zdrowie i prawa człowieka: przewodnik po zasobach. Centrum Zdrowia i Praw Człowieka Francois-Xaviera Banyu oraz Fundacja Otwarte Społeczeństwo [Okhorona zdorov'ya i prava lyudyny: resursy posibnyk. Tsentr zdorov'ya ta prav lyudyny imeni Fransua-Ksav'ye Banyu ta Fond vidkrytoho suspilstva]* Kijów 2015, Oficjalna strona internetowa. Źródło: URL: http://medicallaw.org.ua/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81_%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BB_8.pdf

²⁷ Bosia M. J. McEvoy S. M. *The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2020, S. 160.

mechanism for counteracting and protecting against discrimination of these groups at all levels of legal regulation, both by the state and society as a whole.

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THE CONSEQUENCES AND EFFECTS OF MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEM IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTEXTS

Artykuł analizuje i systematyzuje skutki modernizacji i rozwoju logistyki, infrastruktury i systemu transportu w krajach wyszehradzkich na poziomie teoretycznym i praktycznym. Twierdzi się, że inwestowanie w system transportowy i infrastrukturę krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej skutecznie i w różny sposób wpłynęło na poziom działalności eksportowej, ogólny poziom inwestycji i aktywności kapitałowej krajów, wolumeny transportu, a co za tym idzie, na wahania dochodów, produktu brutto i inflacji. Jednak mimo to kraje Grupy Wyszehradzkiej historycznie pozostają w tyle za średnimi europejskimi wskaźnikami inwestycji w transport. Generalnie stwierdzono, że modernizacja i rozwój logistyki, infrastruktury i systemów transportowych w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. miały i mają istotne konsekwencje, różniące się od następstw rozwoju transportu przez większość XX wieku. W efekcie dało to wystarczające podstawy do stwierdzenia, że logistyka, infrastruktura i system transportowy w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, choć charakteryzują się znaczącymi efektami modernizacji, nadal mają istotne luki w ich rozwoju, które wymagają uzupełnienia.

Słowa kluczowe: transport, infrastruktura, logistyka, system transportowy, Grupa Wyszehradzka.

The article is devoted to analyzing and systematizing the effects and consequences of modernization and development of transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad countries, in particular at theoretical and practical levels. It was argued that investing in the transport system and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries has effectively and variably affected the level of trade activity and exports, the overall level of investment and capital activity of countries, the transportation volumes, and thus the income, gross product and inflation fluctuations. However, the countries of the Visegrad Group have historically been characterized by the lagging behind investment in transport from the European average indicators. In general, it was found that modernization and development of transport logistics, infrastructure and systems in the Visegrad Group countries during the late 20 – early 21 century have significant consequences that differ from the consequences of transport development for most of the 20 century. As a result, it gave sufficient grounds to state that transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad Group countries,

although characterized by significant modernization effects, still have significant gaps in their development that need to be solved.

Keywords: *transport, infrastructure, logistics, transport system, the Visegrad Group.*

Modernization and development of transport logistics, infrastructure and systems in the Visegrad Group during the late 20 – early 21 centuries had and have significant consequences and effects that differ significantly from the consequences of the transport development in the region for most of the twentieth century. Moreover, these consequences and effects are obvious in both theoretical and practical-empirical terms and are primarily socio-economic, as they affect the competitiveness and competitiveness of national economies of the Visegrad Group. The fact is that transport logistics and infrastructure, or rather their advantages and disadvantages in market conditions, are crucial for achieving competitive priorities and advantages and increasing the productivity of socio-economic systems. This is especially noticeable against the background of the growing integration of world economies and the involvement of the Visegrad Group countries in this process (especially after their reform and accession to the EU). Thus, the presented research is mainly relevant to the need to solve the research problem of clarifying and systematizing, both in theoretical and practical contexts, the consequences and effects of modernization and development of transport logistics, infrastructure and system in the Visegrad Group.

From a purely theoretical and historiographical point of view, it is known that the processes of management and production of goods are constantly characterized by trends: reduction of life cycles of production of goods and services; reduction of prices for goods and services; speeding up the transportation of cargoes, goods, services and passengers and informing about it; implementation of the production process with a view to meeting customer needs¹. Thus, such permanent changes in the socio-economic environment lead to the increased interest to the control over the flow of people, materials, money and energy in order to efficiently and productively use limited resources, which within the transport system are adjusted logistically and infrastructurally², in particular at the micro (individual enterprises) and macro level (national economy). The fact is that it is empirically and therefore theoretically justified that revenue growth due to improved customer service, as well as increased product availability and punctuality of orders can be directly related to the capabilities of logistics and infrastructure organization in transport³. In this regard, D. Waters notes that without transport logistics and infrastructure do not do the processes of production and movement of goods and services, as a result of which

¹ Lin S.-C., Liang G.-S., Ye K.-D., Lee K.-S., Relational Analysis between the Indices for Production Stage in an International Logistics System Developed by Airports and National Resources Factors, *Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies* 2005, vol 6, s. 2852–2867

² Klaus P., Logistics as a science of networks and flows, *Logistics Research* 2010, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 55–56

³ Klaus P., Logistics as a science of networks and flows, *Logistics Research* 2010, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 55–56.

“without logistics there can be no operations or organizations”⁴. A similar conclusion is held by M. Christopher⁵, who notes that infrastructure and logistics have always been and remain the central and essential feature of all economic activity. A. Rushton, P. Croucher and P. Baker go even further, pointing out that although there are costs associated with the movement and storage of goods and services, infrastructure and logistics still have a more positive effect on their value⁶. This is of course explained by the fact that logistics and infrastructure operations provide the means by which a product or service can reach the customer and the end user in the appropriate condition and location. In this way, companies can compete by providing the product with the lowest price factor and the highest value factor for the customer⁷.

At the same time, transport logistics and infrastructure, according to M. Fender⁸, play a very important role in corporate strategy and competition. This can be explained by several factors: the rapidly growing internationalization of the economy and companies not only in their structures but also in their business operations, including production; introduction by internationalized companies of new organizational schemes in the networks of suppliers and distributors, in particular in order to reconcile the needs of globalization with the requirements of adaptation to specific national and local conditions; the existence of a new microeconomic base of competitiveness, which increasingly is the result of the quality and relevance of the relations created among the participants in the “value chain”; the presence of organizational effects that prevail over traditional forms of the “labour productivity”. As a result, most scholars agree that transport logistics and infrastructure affect economic activity and the socio-economic system through at least four manifestations of benefit⁹: the form of benefit (specific product or service that the company offers to potential customers), possession of benefit, time of benefit (value added when the need for a product or service) and place of benefit (availability of goods or services where needed)¹⁰.

In addition, transport logistics and infrastructure affect the national level of socio-economic development¹¹, as they are activities that make extensive use of human and material resources that affect the national economy¹². In this regard, B. Serhat and S. Harun¹³ note that today it is

⁴ Waters D., *Logistics: An introduction to Supply Chain Management*, Wyd. Palgrave MacMillan 2003

⁵ Christopher M., *Logistics and Supply Chain Management. Creating Value-Adding Networks*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 2005.

⁶ Rushton A., Croucher P., Baker P., *The handbook of logistics and distribution management*, Wyd. Kogan Page Limited 2014.

⁷ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, *“European Perspectives – Slovenia’s Role in Visegrad Group”* 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100.

⁸ Fender M., *Global Supply Chain Management*, [w:] Wieser P., Perret F-L., Jaffeux C. (eds.), *Essentials of Logistics and Management: The Global Supply Chain*, Wyd. Eptl Press 2013

⁹ Coyle J., Bardi E., Langley C., *The Management of Business Logistics: A Supply Chain Perspective*, Wyd. South-Western 2003

¹⁰ Fawcett S., Fawcett A., The firm as a value-added system, *“International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management”* 1995, vol 25, nr. 5, s. 24–42

¹¹ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, *“European Perspectives – Slovenia’s Role in Visegrad Group”* 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100

¹² Rushton A., Croucher P., Baker P., *The handbook of logistics and distribution management*, Wyd. Kogan Page Limited 2014.

¹³ Serhat B., Harun S., Analyzing the Dependency Between National Logistics Performance and Competitiveness: Which Logistics Competence is Core for National Strategy?, *“Journal of Competitiveness”* 2011, vol 4, s. 4–22.

a mistake to look at transport logistics and infrastructure exclusively at the level of individual firms and organizations, but instead more attention needs to be paid to industry at the global / supranational and national levels. Therefore, scientists argue, logistics and infrastructure management is a competitive weapon and an important aspect of competitive strategy. In a somewhat broader context, A. Maciulis, A. Vasiljauskas and G. Jakubauskas¹⁴ believe that modern society can function effectively only through an efficient system of transport, infrastructure and logistics. Another position is mainly determined by the fact that transport logistics and infrastructure are the kind of “amplifiers” and “accelerators” of national economic development, because logistics and infrastructure “permeate” every sector of the national economy. Accordingly, the level of their development is an indicator of the degree of modernization of a particular country and an important indicator of its national strength.

In general, there are two resumptive views on the relationship between economic growth and socio-economic development, on the one hand, and modern transport logistics and infrastructure, on the other. The first, in the form of a “logistical push” theory, argues that logistics and infrastructure can contribute to regional economic development. The second, in the form of the theory of “economic traction”, determines that rapid / intensive economic development contributes to the further development of modern logistics and infrastructure¹⁵. They are synthesized by J. Stoke and D. Lambert¹⁶, who note that the main reason for the strong link between logistics and infrastructure and national economy is globalization. After all, as a significant component of each country’s GDP, transport logistics and infrastructure affect inflation, interest rates, productivity, energy costs, affordability and other aspects of the economy¹⁷. On the other hand, transport logistics and infrastructure itself, given the use of land, labor and capital and their impact on living standards, are business and economic¹⁸. Accordingly, achieving a high level of efficiency of transport logistics and infrastructure is extremely important for the profitability and efficiency of national and world economies¹⁹. Therefore, both corporations and states should be interested in infrastructure and logistics efficiency measures at the micro and macro levels. In particular, because efficient logistics and infrastructure are vital for economic growth, diversification and poverty reduction²⁰. As a result, transport logistics and infrastructure, including in the Visegrad Group countries, have already become a socio-political interest of governments, regional and international organizations, although mostly by private

¹⁴ Maciulis A, Vasiljauskas A., Jakubauskas G., The impact of transport on the competitiveness of national economy, “*Transport*”2009, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 93–99.

¹⁵ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, “*European Perspectives – Slovenia’s Role in Visegrad Group*”2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100.

¹⁶ Stock J., Lambert D., *Strategic Logistics Management*, Wyd. Mc-Graw Hill Irwin2001.

¹⁷ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, “*European Perspectives – Slovenia’s Role in Visegrad Group*”2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100

¹⁸ Stock J., Lambert D., *Strategic Logistics Management*, Wyd. Mc-Graw Hill Irwin2001

¹⁹ Brewer A., Button K., Hensher D., *Handbook of Logistics and Supply Chain Management*, Wyd. Elsevier Science Ltd.2001.

²⁰ Popescu A., Sipos C., *Logistics Performance and Economic Development – A Comparison within the European Union*, Multidisciplinary Academic Conference on Economics, Management and Marketing, 2014.

and private-state operators. At the same time, their analysis demonstrates the relationship between logistics productivity and infrastructure and economic development (including GDP per capita, national competitiveness, prosperity and productivity, trade volumes)²¹.

The example of the Visegrad Group countries is mainly reflected in the fact that increasing the productivity of transport logistics and infrastructure in the region was and remains one of the previous and main prerequisites for increasing national competitiveness in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary²². Moreover, one of the main indicators of logistics and infrastructure activities has recently become a modal split in domestic freight. It is obvious (see Table 1) that road freight transport (not to mention the use of cars in passenger and private transport) has become the most common method of freight transport in all countries of the Visegrad Group. At the same time, against the regional background, Poland and the Czech Republic are positioned as countries only with the use of road and to a lesser extent rail freight, and Hungary and Slovakia as countries where the use of inland waterways partially replaces road and rail transport in freight transport.

Table 1. Percentage of each mode of transport in the total volume of domestic freight traffic in the Visegrad Group countries, in tonne-kilometers (as of 2013)

Type of transport	Railway,%	Automobile,%	Internal water transport %
Poland	17,0	82,9	0,1
Slovakia	21,4	76,0	2,6
Hungary	20,5	75,5	4,0
The Czech Republic	20,3	79,7	0,0
On average	19,8	78,5	1,7

Source: Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, "European Perspectives – Slovenia's Role in Visegrad Group" 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100.

Imposing such features of transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries on the parameters of competitiveness of their national economies, it is obvious that the quality of the logistics and infrastructure sector in transport is directly proportional to the quality of national economies. In particular, it was found that the countries of the Visegrad Group are characterized by a fairly high rate of such a measure of the efficiency of transport logistics as timeliness. At the same time, it was found that the studied countries

²¹ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, "European Perspectives – Slovenia's Role in Visegrad Group" 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100; Serhat B., Harun S., Analyzing the Dependency Between National Logistics Performance and Competitiveness: Which Logistics Competence is Core for National Strategy?, "Journal of Competitiveness" 2011, vol 4, s. 4–22.; Karmazin G., Markovits-Somogyi R., Bokor Z., Effects of infrastructure extension on the competitiveness of Hungarian logistics providers, "Acta Technica Jaurimensis" 2013, vol 6, nr. 4, s. 71–78

²² Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, "European Perspectives – Slovenia's Role in Visegrad Group" 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100.

differ significantly regionally. Thus, in Poland the most important factor influencing transport on competitiveness is infrastructure, but in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – customs procedures. In addition, it has been recorded that in recent years the indicators of transport logistics efficiency ratings in the region have decreased slightly, in particular against the background of transport development in Western Europe. In the issuance, all this allowed us to argue that the theoretical expectations about the inevitable impact of transport logistics and infrastructure on the competitiveness of national economies and vice versa are somewhat exaggerated, as their correlations are quite variable and sometimes unexpected in practice. Moreover, this indicates that the state of transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries today is sometimes (particularly in some respects) not quite optimal (see Table 2 for more).

This has different implications and effects for the regional (country level), national, sub regional and even local political and administrative processes, demonstrating that investing, financing and promoting the development of transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad countries can be beneficial not only for transport sector²³, but also for trade, national and regional growth and governance, etc²⁴. However, in contrast, the role of transport logistics and infrastructure in socio-economic growth and governance in the region (especially at the level of several countries) may be smoothed over by other factors. It is in this context that the research position should also be variable – theoretical one and practical-empirical one.

From a purely theoretical point of view, it is obvious that the role of transport logistics and infrastructure is of great importance for economic integration in a particular region or group of countries. This is especially true in the case of the Visegrad Group countries, which, as members of the EU, are served within tools such as: the Cohesion Fund, which forms the EU's spatial planning by supporting some transnational logistics and infrastructure projects and complexes (including environment and transport); structural funds (primarily the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund), which directly allocate funds for the development of transport logistics and infrastructure²⁵. However, from a practical point of view, the effectiveness of such programs, and hence the effectiveness of modernization of transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries depends on: which institutions support the tasks of transport logistics and infrastructure to stimulate socio-economic growth by reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade; what is the connection between the real impact of some countries in the region and the challenges

²³ Kramar U., Sternad M., Cvahte T., Logistics performance and its connection to competitiveness of the national economy in Slovenia and the Visegrad Group, *“European Perspectives – Slovenia’s Role in Visegrad Group”* 2015, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 83–100.

²⁴ Bafoif F., Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *“Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs”* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119

²⁵ Mairate A., The ‘Added Value’ of the European Union Cohesion Policy, *“Regional Studies”* 2007, vol 40, nr. 2, s. 167–177.; Barca F., *An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A Place-based Approach to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations*, Wyd. DG Regio 2009.

of transport logistics and infrastructure, such as increasing access to public goods for the least developed countries and populations; which groups of actors are involved in the creation of different infrastructure networks, through which transport should unite different groups and activities²⁶. In addition, the efficiency of transport logistics and infrastructure depends on the political effect that transport-related economic benefits have or may have. Or, in other words, whether and how transport infrastructure reduces regional disparities (between individual countries and between urban and rural areas), facilitates access to public goods and generates measures to overcome social inequality, thus ensuring the veracity of the scientific position that economic convergence is conducive to political stability.

Theoretically and in general, this means that transport is “first and foremost an access program aimed at fully unlocking the potential for growth and development²⁷”. Accordingly, transport logistics and infrastructure are the connecting element between different sectors of management and socio-economic development. The point is that transport is in fact a tool to increase the efficiency of factors of production, as it combines goods with markets, workers with industry, people with services, and the poor in rural areas with growth centers in the cities. In other words, transport infrastructure reduces costs, expands markets and facilitates trade, or in general causes socio-economic growth and poverty reduction in a number of areas of interchange. Additionally, it is important that transport and transport infrastructure support the distribution of benefits from socio-economic growth, promoting trade and regional integration. This is reflected in the fact that transport plays a key role in promoting trade efficiency, and trade openness is a factor in socio-economic growth, in particular due to its positive impact on the economic productivity²⁸. As a result, well-developed transport logistics and infrastructure and efficient transport are able to reduce transport delays, make goods and services sold more accessible, increase consumer choice and help developing countries integrate into more complex suppliers and industries network²⁹. Together with the reduction of national, regional and international transport costs for trade in goods and services, the price of which is determined by international supply and demand, it can increase the disposable income of producers and contribute to both economic and socio-economic growth³⁰. In addition, trade depends on an efficient transport and logistics system, which consists of shippers, traders and recipients. These are

²⁶ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.

²⁷ *Safe, Clean, and Affordable Transport for Development – The World Bank Group’s Transport Business Strategy 2008–2012*, Wyd. World Bank 2008

²⁸ Hallaert J.-J., A History of Empirical Literature on the Relationship between Trade and Growth, *Mondes en Développement* 2006, vol 34, nr. 135, s. 63–77.

²⁹ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119

³⁰ *Safe, Clean, and Affordable Transport for Development – The World Bank Group’s Transport Business Strategy 2008–2012*, Wyd. World Bank 2008

the main users of the outlined system, who use it for the efficient movement of goods as both source data and business results.

At the same time, under certain circumstances, the assumption and theoretical conclusion presented above may be incorrect. The fact is that transportation and transportation costs depend not only on the quality and capacity of the infrastructure used by suppliers of goods and services, but also on the political and institutional structure and environment, in which they work³¹. These include factors such as rules and regulations on imports and exports of goods and services, financial regulation, registration and licensing of suppliers of goods and services, customs and border crossing procedures, etc. In other words, transport costs also include indirect costs, which can be combined: by slow, incorrect and unreliable transit (which increases the cost of inventory); by excessive operating and storage costs due to poor infrastructure; by losses related to theft, by deterioration and damage to goods (or excessive insurance costs to cover these risks); by bribes to officials. Accordingly, high transport costs can increase the impact of distance and reduce trade opportunities, and thus affect socio-economic growth in a country or even in the region. This is complemented by the position of some researchers that the link between transport logistics and infrastructure and socio-economic growth is not entirely clear³². However, according to which the improvement of transport logistics and infrastructure must inevitably lead to socio-economic growth only if the rules of the game are strictly adhered to. This means that more developed transport logistics and infrastructure do contribute to development, but in compliance with competition rules. Hence the general postulate is the fact that reducing of the transport costs leads to improved and simplified trade, greater access to public goods and increased mobility of factors of production. In addition, the straightforward impact of transport development on socio-economic growth may be hampered by such factors as corruption, interest groups and rental behavior. This is compounded by inefficient governance built on mistrust between players or a lack of coordination between different investors, resulting in increased transaction costs that hinder development.

Applying these well-known theorizations to the situation in the Visegrad Group countries, we get the result that the positive correlation between the development of transport infrastructure and logistics and socio-economic growth is often defected by the negative consequences of “bad” governance at national and local levels, and also difficulties in defining the boundaries of decentralization and socio-economic growth³³. In addition, the

³¹ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119

³² Hill H., *Regional Development: Analytical and Policy Issues*, [w:] Balisacan A., Hill H. (eds.), *The Dynamics of Regional Development: the Philippines in East Asia*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2007, 68–92.; Weiss J., *Globalization, Geography and Regional Policy*, [w:] Balisacan A., Hill H. (eds.), *The Dynamics of Regional Development: the Philippines in East Asia*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2007.

³³ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.

transport systems of the Visegrad Group countries have always worked and continue to work “in pursuit of” with the transport systems of most Western European countries. The situation is complicated by the fact that the level of their national or domestic funding is much lower than in homologous countries in the West. For example, in 2000–2006, the Visegrad countries and other Central and Eastern European countries invested on average only 8 percent of the total investment made by Western European countries in the same period³⁴, although over time the situation began to level off primarily in favor of the new countries EU members. In the regional context, the situation was also variable, after all, as of the same 2006 investments in transport per capita, for example, in Hungary amounted to slightly more than 30 Euros (a similar situation was in Poland and Slovakia), and in the Czech Republic – more than 200 Euros (a relatively similar situation was in 2015-2020). Accordingly, the effect of transport logistics and infrastructure was to bring to the fore road and rail transport, but with constant competition between them, which was not previously characteristic of the transport systems of the Visegrad Group (see Table 2). At the same time, it was found that since 2007 the situation has significantly deteriorated, first of all in the framework of the development of rail and partly inland water transport, and instead slightly improved in the development of the automobile transport.

Table 2. Indicators of transport infrastructure development in the Visegrad Group countries, cluster section (as of 2007 and 2016)

Indicators of the transport infrastructure development	Poland		Slovakia		Hungary		The Czech Republic	
	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016
Railway transport cluster								
Transportation of passengers by rail, in million passengers / km	19 524	18 753	2 165	3 484	8 752	7 710	6 898	8 738
Transportation of goods and cargo by rail, in 1000 tons	245 307	222 523	51 813	47 548	51 523	50 047	99 777	98 034
Total annual passenger turnover, 1000 pass.	265 995	285 094	46 984	69 150	149 551	146 010	184 184	178 766
Total annual turnover and cargo turnover, 1000 tons	245 307	222 523	51 813	47 548	51 523	50 047	99 777	98 034
Length of railway tracks, km	20 107	19 132	3 629	3 206	7 808	7 811	9 588	9 564
Density of railway tracks, in% per 100 square km	6,34	6,04	7,54	7,54	8,88	8,72	12,29	12,26
Length of electrified railway tracks, km	11 898	11 874	1 578	1 587	2 738	3 018	3 060	3 236
Percentage of electrified railway tracks,%	60,9	63,6	43,5	43,8	35,1	39,0	32,2	34,0
Number of locomotives, №	4 427	4 004	1 057	940	1 036	1 170	2 414	2 003
Number of carriages, №	104 982	87 598	27 538	15 786	12 966	9 145	47 659	34 596

³⁴ Bafoil F, Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE). *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119.

Indicators of the transport infrastructure development	Poland		Slovakia		Hungary		The Czech Republic	
	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016
Automobile transport cluster								
Total annual passenger turnover, in million passengers / km	270 359	244 511	7 936	5 987			87 661	87 257
Transportation of goods and cargo by road, in 1000 tons	984 237	1 501 811	179 409	176 750	243 299	188 250	453 533	459 433
Total annual freight and cargo turnover, in million tons / km	164 930	290 749	29 276	36 139	35 759	40 002	50 877	50 315
Length of highways, km	663	1 640	365	463	858	1 924	657	1 223
Length of national roads, km	18 546	19 388	3 366	3 580	31 182	30 062	6 191	5 807
Length of provincial / regional roads, km	155 814	153 865	3 742	3 611	166 170	174 599	48 736	48 727
Length of municipal roads, km	209 333	246 983	36 344	36 817	0	0	74 919	74 919
Density of roads, in km on 100 square km	125	136	91	114	215	226	72	72
Number of cars, in 1000 units.	14 589	21 675	1 434	2 122	3 262	3 313	4 280	5 308
Number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants	383	571	267	390	325	338	414	502
Inland water transport cluster								
Transportation of goods and cargo by inland water transport, in 1000 tons	6 444	3 911	8 013	6 758	8 410	8 224	1 141	832
Total annual freight and cargo turnover, in million tons / km	277	108	1 101	903	2 250	1 975	28	36
Length of navigational inland waterways, km	3 660	3 655	172	172	1 587	1 864	664	720
Number of self-propelled vessels / barges, №	107	91	26	10	74	68	49	30
Other modes of transport								
Transportation of goods and cargo by sea, in 1000 tons	52 433	72 926	–	–	–	–	–	–
Length of pipelines, km	2 278	2 483	509	506	2 208	2 215	675	642
Number of commercial airports, №	10	12	4	4	3	4	5	5
Other modes of transport								
Transportation of goods and cargo by sea, in 1000 tons	52 433	72 926	–	–	–	–	–	–
Length of pipelines, km	2 278	2 483	509	506	2 208	2 215	675	642
Number of commercial airports, №	10	12	4	4	3	4	5	5

Źródło: Transport Database, Eurostat, Źródło: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/transport/data/database>

At the same time, the key indicators of the decline in transport infrastructure on the railway were the decline in such clusters as: transportation of goods and cargo by rail (all countries in the region), transportation of passengers by rail (primarily Hungary), length and density of railways (especially Poland and Slovakia), the number of locomotives and cars (all countries in the region). However, the situation with the length and percentage of electrified railways in the region has improved somewhat over the last decade (with the possible exception of Slovakia). In turn, inland waterway transport has declined mainly due to reduced transport of goods and cargo, as well as a reduction in the number of self-propelled vessels / barges, although it was characterized by some increase in the length of navigational waterways (primarily in Czech

Republic and Hungary). In contrast, the progress of road transport development after 2007 was reflected in the increase in the length of highways (all countries in the region) and national roads (Poland and Slovakia), increasing of the road density (excluding the Czech Republic), increasing the number of cars (except Hungary), increasing the volume of transportation of goods and cargo (especially in Poland and Slovakia), although characterized by some reduction in annual passenger traffic in Poland and Slovakia, etc.

Another feature and even paradox of the transport infrastructure development of the Visegrad Group countries has become and often remains the fact that in one case their relatively small investment per capita (as, for example, in Hungary and Poland) still led to a significant increase in the transport network, and otherwise their relatively significant investment per capita (as, for example, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic) has led and continues to lead to less development of the transport network³⁵. This shows that in some countries of the region, the nature and type of investment has been and remains more sophisticated due to the financing of higher technologies and better available transport infrastructure. In addition, this reflects a certain efficiency and inefficiency of investment management in the transport infrastructure of the Visegrad Group countries. This was often due to the fact that these countries were historically part of highly developed empires and were not fully dependent and generated in the era of planned economies³⁶. This means that the rationality of investment in transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries was due to past development experience and theoretical expectations and ideological ideas about the role of transport in the region, in particular within the EU. This was complemented by the burden of the former transport structures that were developed in the region during the communist regime and were focused on the Soviet and later the Russian market. Finally, it should be noted that in the Visegrad countries the vision of the multimodal transport system was voiced in terms of design and theory, but still the development of transport has taken place almost entirely and is funded by automotive projects. This means that the incentives to create cleaner transport infrastructures in the region were and still are less important than the preferences of citizens and the group interests of road transport³⁷.

As a result, it can be stated that the development of transport infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries mainly depended on the successful transition to a market economy, accession to the EU, rapid growth of domestic needs, ability to attract foreign direct investment and increase small and medium enterprises, in particular through As a result, it can be stated that the development of transport infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries mainly depended on

³⁵ Bafoil F., Ruiwen L., Re-examining the Role of Transport Infrastructure in Trade, Regional Growth and Governance: Comparing the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 2010, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 73–119

³⁶ Bafoil F., *Central Europe. Europeanization and Social Change*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.; Barca F., *An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A Place-based Approach to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations*, Wyd. DG Regio 2009.

³⁷ *OECD Territorial Reviews: Poland*, Wyd. OECD 2008

the successful transition to a market economy, accession to the EU, rapid growth of domestic needs, ability to attract foreign direct investment and increase small and medium enterprises, in particular through growth income and trade liberalization. income As a result, it can be stated that the development of transport infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries mainly depended on the successful transition to a market economy, accession to the EU, rapid growth of domestic needs, ability to attract foreign direct investment and increase small and medium enterprises, in particular through the income growth and trade liberalization³⁸. This has led to the liberalization of trade between the old and new EU member states and has been particularly useful for the Visegrad countries, which today have greater access to markets for goods and services. In addition, the countries of the region have also experienced an increase in exports from the EU as a result of the successful internationalization of their products, strong integration with international markets and trade diversification. Although, in contrast, the initially low level of transport infrastructure in the countries of the region, in particular after the collapse of the USSR, was considered as an obstacle to further improving intra-regional trade³⁹. The desire of the Visegrad Group countries to integrate into the EU has remedied the situation, as this process has succeeded in building an integrated and single market that requires harmonization of trade rules and regulatory systems, as well as mutual recognition of different national rules that meet all EU guidelines⁴⁰.

At the same time, the development of transport logistics, infrastructure and the system of the Visegrad Group countries resulted in the diversification of the latter, and for different parameters. But the common effects were such processes of significant changes in the geographical directions of foreign trade and quality requirements for transport services, such as: growing demand for high added value of goods instead of raw materials; a radical increase in the importance of the service supply chain; changes in the structure of cities and an increase in the number of private cars; reorientation of transport and trade flows from east to west; growth of the tourist services and flows; changing the nature of the modal split in the direction of the share of the automobile transport increasing and the share of rail transport reducing⁴¹; introduction of mechanisms of planned investments and reconstruction of transport, which require the application of complex procedures for assessing its efficiency, which is compatible with European transport. As a result, it reflects the construction that more and more EU and Visegrad Group politicians recognize the fact that EU enlargement and its transformation into a more competitive region is impossible without intensive development of transport logistics

³⁸ Badinger H., Breuss F., What has Determined the Rapid PostWar Growth of Intra-EU Trade, "IEF Working Paper" 2003, nr. 48.

³⁹ Assawanmanakul N., Bafoif F., Fenn W., LeCompte A., Ruiwen L., Chung-A. P., *Transport Infrastructure and Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion and Eastern Europe – A Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. MPA Sciences Po. 2009

⁴⁰ Barca F., *An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A Place-based Approach to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations*, Wyd. DG Regio 2009.

⁴¹ Bekefi Z., Kiss L., Tanczos K., Multicriteria Analysis of The Financial Feasibility Of Transport Infrastructure Projects In Hungary, "Information Systems and Operational Research" 2003, vol 41, nr. 1, s. 105–126.

and infrastructure, as only an integrated transport network can “include” new markets in a geographical sense. In this context, it is noteworthy that the development of transport in the region took place and takes place mainly within the so-called “framework dimension” of European integration, when they tried and are trying to establish norms in the areas where conflicts of interest between EU member states allow them to develop only such policies, which are vague and more or less symbolic⁴². Therefore, the Europeanization of transport in the Visegrad Group countries cannot be reduced exclusively to compliance with EU legislation or the transposition and implementation of EU directives. After all, the Europeanization of transport, although less powerful and influential, has also begun to take shape through the formation of relevant beliefs and expectations at the level of EU member states, as internal transformation processes began to manifest themselves in the beliefs and opinions of political and economic players or in the political and socio-economic discourse.

A clear example of this was and remains the state of development of railway transport, not only in the Visegrad countries, but also in the EU and Europe in general. The fact is that despite the plan to liberalize the European passenger and freight market by rail, the relevant measures still remain quite symbolic, without significantly changing the institutional context in which foreign and domestic market players operate, and without offering the specific institutional results to be achieved⁴³. Although, in contrast, proposals for the liberalization of European rail transport have been on the European Commission’s agenda since the mid-1970s, however, the relevant legislative proposals did not overcome the initial stage of the legislative process. There were and are several reasons for this. First, there were significant difficulties in reaching an agreement, as rail transport (as opposed to automobile transport), especially in Poland and Hungary, was not only a subject of economic activity, but was also seen as a provider of a socially significant service with social commitments supported for political reasons. Second, the European Commission had limited legal and institutional powers to overcome the resistance of EU member states. Accordingly, since the start of the reform of the railway sector (since the 1990s), the main goal of this process has been to change the policy-making environment in the EU Member States, in particular by increasing support for the suggested reform agenda. However, this did not work, but instead exacerbated the modal divide between rail and automobile transport in the Visegrad countries.

The outlined logic of the development of the transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the countries of the Visegrad Group was supplemented by the fact of their differentiated development not only at the international level, but also at the level and within individual sub regions. As a result, there is a situation when within some countries some sub regions are more developed in transport, and other sub regions – less. This is due to interethnic and sub regional

⁴² Prokopenko L., Rudik O., Bashtannyk V., *Protses yevropeizatsii ta yoho osoblyvosti v postkommunistychnykh krainakh Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. NADU 2010.

⁴³ Prokopenko L., Rudik O., Bashtannyk V., *Protses yevropeizatsii ta yoho osoblyvosti v postkommunistychnykh krainakh Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. NADU 2010.

territorial differences in the dynamics of socio-economic development, as well as aspects of different quality of life in the countries of the analyzed region⁴⁴. Thus, the socio-economically backward regions of individual countries are usually characterized and determined by the spatially marginal or peripheral state of development of their transport systems and infrastructure, etc⁴⁵. For example, in Slovakia, southern regions of the center of this country and northeastern Slovakia are considered by various researchers to be such regions. They have a peripheral position on important transport corridors and suffer from the low quality of their own intra-regional transport networks – without motorways and well-developed railways. By analogy, some parts of Poland and Hungary, which border on the transport peripheral regions of Slovakia, are relatively marginal. This is primarily due to the fact that in total these subregions of the Visegrad Group countries are outside the European multimodal corridors, which prevents them from applying for funding from EU state or financial resources for the development of transport infrastructure and modernization of their transport networks⁴⁶.

In general, the study found that the Visegrad Group countries have historically lagged behind the average European indicators of investment in transport. Even though, in general, investment in the transport system and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries has effectively and variably affected the level of trade activity and exports, the overall level of investment and capital activity of the region, transportation volumes, and hence the level of income, gross product and inflationary fluctuations. In general, the modernization and development of transport logistics, infrastructure and systems in the Visegrad countries during the late 20 – early 21 century had and have significant consequences that differ from the consequences of transport development for most of the twentieth century. Moreover, it was found that these consequences are obvious both in theoretical and practical terms and are primarily socio-economic, as they affect the competitiveness of national economies of the Visegrad Group. But in the end, it still gives grounds to state that transport logistics, infrastructure and the system in general in the Visegrad Group countries, although characterized by significant modernization effects, still have significant gaps in their development that need to be addressed.

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⁴⁴ Hornak M., *Identification of Regions of Transport Marginality in Slovakia*, Warsaw Regional Forum 2005

⁴⁵ Pasiak J., Gajdos P., Faltan E., *Regional Patterns in Slovak Development*, [w:] *Central Europe in Transition: Towards to EU Membership*, Wyd. Regional studies association 2001, s. 330–363.; Halás M., *Cezhraničné väzby, cezhraničná spolupráca (na príklade slovensko-českeho pohranicia s dôrazom na jeho slovenskú časť)*, Wyd. Univerzita Komenského Bratislava 2005

⁴⁶ Hornak M., *Identification of Regions of Transport Marginality in Slovakia*, Warsaw Regional Forum 2005.

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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

The author proves that political parties are an important element of the political system, a force that represents the interests of various social groups, provides communication between them and forms the domestic and foreign policy of the state. It is noted that Bulgaria's path to the European Union was quite diverse in historical and political context and contributed to positive changes in the political and economic sphere of society. Political parties played an important role in the European integration processes of the Republic of Bulgaria. In the early 1990s a consensus had been formed among the leading political parties on the need for its accession to the EU. Due to this, the course of European integration of Bulgaria was successfully implemented, despite the change of socialist, liberal or conservative political forces in the government.

The official programs on European integration of the most influential political parties in Bulgarian society that had representation in the Parliament and were part of the government since 1989 – the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Union of Democratic Forces, the National Movement “Simeon II”, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the “Attack”, the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) – were analyzed.

It is pointed out that political consensus between political parties is extremely important in achieving the main goal of Bulgarian society – accession to the European Union and development of the Republic as a member of this international organization.

Keywords: Republic of Bulgaria, political parties, political programs, European integration.

РОЛЬ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ПАРТІЙ В ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСАХ РЕСПУБЛІКИ БОЛГАРІЯ

Автор доводить, що політичні партії є важливим елементом політичної системи, силою, яка представляє інтереси різних соціальних груп, забезпечує комунікацію між ними та формує внутрішню й зовнішню політику держави. Наголошено, що шлях Болгарії до Європейського Союзу був досить різноплановим в історичному і політичному контексті та сприяв позитивним змінам в політичній та економічній сфері суспільства.

Важливу роль в євроінтеграційних процесах Республіки Болгарія відіграли політичні партії. На початку 1990-х рр. склався консенсус провідних політичних партій щодо необхідності її вступу до ЄС. Завдяки цьому курс на європейську інтеграцію Болгарії був вдало реалізований, незважаючи на зміну при владі соціалістичних, ліберальних чи консервативних політичних сил.

Проаналізовано офіційні програми щодо питань європейської інтеграції найбільш впливових політичних партій болгарського суспільства – Болгарської соціалістичної партії, Союзу демократичних сил, Національного руху «Симеон II», Руху за права і свободи, Атаки, Громадяни за європейський розвиток Болгарії, які починаючи з 1989 р. мали представництво у парламенті та були в складі уряду.

Вказано на необхідності політичного консенсусу між політичними партіями як надзвичайно важливого у досягненні основної мети болгарського суспільства – вступу до Європейського Союзу та розвитку Республіки Болгарія як члена цієї міжнародної організації.

Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, політичні партії, політичні програми, європейська інтеграція.

Statement of the scientific problem and its significance. Political parties in both Ukrainian and Bulgarian society occupy a special place and play a significant role in social and political life, influence the formation and the activities of the state authorities, economy, social processes and foreign policy of the country. The phenomenon of political changes and European integration of the Republic of Bulgaria should be considered as a kind of experience that is useful in the context of modern political processes in Ukraine. That is why it is advisable and especially relevant to study the role of Bulgarian parties in the process of European integration and their support of the government's policy of joining the European Union.

Analysis of recent research on this issue. Scientific approaches to understanding the essence of the concept of “political party” are defined in the works of M. Duverger, G. Sartori, K. Janda. Some aspects of Bulgarian society's adaptation to the EU membership and the influence of political parties and European integration processes were analyzed by V. Burdiak, M. Milova, and H. Karasimeonov. The reference of the article also includes analysis of the official programs on European integration of the main political parties in Bulgaria.

Formulation of the purpose and objectives of the article. The purpose of the article is to determine the role of the political parties of the Republic of Bulgaria in the European integration processes. To achieve this goal, the author sets tasks to determine the essence of the concept

of “political party”, analyze the official programs of the Bulgarian political parties and find out the role of the most influential political parties in determining the European course of Bulgaria.

Presentation of the main material. The constant high level of scientific interest in political parties is related to the theoretical and practical significance of these political institutions.

In modern political science, there are many definitions for the term “political party”. In particular, the founder of modern party research, M. Duverger, defined parties as organizations that “try to seize power or participate in its implementation” and rely on “the support of the general masses”, in contrast to the pressure groups¹. By G. Sartori’s definition, a party is “any political group that has an official name and participates in elections and is able to fill public positions with its candidates through elections”².

K. Janda proposed a broader definition of a political party³. He considered it as an organization that has the goal of filling in government positions with its own designated representatives. Therefore, it is obvious that political parties are an important element of the political system, a force that represents the interests of various social groups, provides communication between them and forms the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

Participation of Bulgarian parties in preparation for EU membership. It should be noted that Bulgaria’s road to the European Union was quite diverse both in historical and political context. In 1995, the Republic of Bulgaria officially declared its desire to join the European Union. Preparation for EU membership stimulated and financially ensured the implementation of economic reforms in the country. During this period, new political and managerial institutions were created and legal norms were adopted that contributed to the development of business and competitive environment.

At the end of the negotiation process on the European Union accession (2000-2004), the Republic of Bulgaria, according to the European Commission, mostly fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria: formed a functioning market economy, a democratic state that ensures the observance of human rights; mostly harmonized the national legislation with the common law of the European Union⁴.

However, the reforms that were carried out did not improve the standard of living of the population, and the Republic of Bulgaria was not admitted to the European Union on May 1, 2004, like the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, in April 2005, the European Parliament voted for the Republic’s accession to the European Union on January 1,

¹ Александров К. Картельные политические партии: особенности возникновения и политического участия. 2011. URL: <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kartelnye-politicheskie-partii-osobennosti-vozniknoveniya-i-politicheskogo-uchastiya>.

² Sartori G. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 370 p.

³ Janda K. *Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory*. URL: http://janda.org/comparative%20parties/Janda_on_parties.htm.

⁴ Бурдяк В. Особливості адаптації Болгарії до умов розвитку в складі Європейського Союзу. URL: <http://politologia-rdgu.v.ua/images/pan14/59.pdf>

2007. Thus, the Republic of Bulgaria joined a large European community, which joined more than 500 million people, and the economy, which at that time totaled about 5 trillion euros. This allowed the Republic of Bulgaria and its citizens to assess their own capabilities and make rational use of the billions of dollars of investment that it receives from the European funds in order to improve infrastructure and solve the development problems of other sectors⁵.

It is worth noting that political parties played an important role in the European integration processes of the Republic of Bulgaria. In the early 1990s a consensus was formed among the leading political parties of the Republic of Bulgaria on the need for its accession to the European Union. Due to this, the policy of European integration of the Republic of Bulgaria was successfully implemented, despite the changes of political forces in the government.

The consensus on the priority of the European Union membership persists even now in the Republic of Bulgaria, which contrasts with the spread of eurosceptic sentiments in some European countries. To confirm this idea, we consider it appropriate to analyze the official programs of the most influential socialist, liberal, conservative, nationalist political parties in Bulgarian society, which have had representation in the Parliament since 1989, as well as were a part of the governments that directly dealt with issues of European integration.

Analysis of the programs of the most influential political parties in Bulgaria concerning European integration. The initial foreign policy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) fully corresponded to the Soviet policy of “new political thinking”, but quickly evolved: if in December 1989 the relations with socialist countries were declared a priority, then in February 1990 the emphasis was placed on Bulgaria’s participation in the creation of a “common European home”. We should note that in 2008, delegates of the 47th Congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party adopted a new party program, which consolidated the changes that occurred in the foreign policy strategy of the socialists. Membership in the European Union was seen as an opportunity to realize the full potential of the country, ensure economic development, strengthen democracy and social justice⁶.

An alternative foreign policy to the Bulgarian Socialist Party was pursued throughout the 1990s by the center-right Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), formed on December 7, 1989, from a wide range of opposition parties and movements.

The block’s heterogeneity affected its foreign policy program. The first leaders (Z. Zhelev, P. Dertliev, P. Beron) took moderate positions, focusing on the “new political thinking” of M. Gorbachev. It was believed that Bulgaria should participate in the creation of a pan-European system of collective security. Close relations with the USSR were to be maintained, but the

⁵ Мілова М. Проблеми європейської інтеграції в діяльності Народних Зборів Республіки Болгарія: уроки для України // Наукові праці [Чорноморського державного університету імені Петра Могили]. Сер.: Політологія, Т. 175, Вип. 163, С. 45-48. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Npohdipol_2011_175_163_11

⁶ Програма на Българската социалистическа партия „За България: свободни граждани, справедлива държава, солидарно общество“ // Съвременен показател. 2008. № 21. С. 35–37.

need for greater economic independence was proclaimed at the same time. The Union of Democratic Forces advocated the development of friendly relations with all the Balkan States and the restoration of good neighborly relations with Turkey⁷.

At the end of 1990-1991, after moving away from the moderate wing of the party and strengthening the positions of radicals (F. Dimitrov, S. Savov, S. Ganev), the foreign policy program of the Union of Democratic Forces had changed⁸. The SDS begins to focus its activities on moving away from the USSR, withdrawing Bulgaria from the Soviet sphere of influence, and forcing a rapprochement with the West, primarily with the United States. F. Dimitrov said: “We do not want the former dependence on Moscow. And we don’t need allied relations as well”. In relations with neighboring States, the Union of Democratic Forces favored multi-lateral cooperation, and advocated close cooperation with NATO members in South-Eastern Europe – Greece and Turkey.

New splits of the party in 1992-1994 led to the fact that reformers headed by I. Kostov, whose foreign policy orientation was determined by pragmatic motives, were put forward for the first positions within the Union of Democratic Forces¹⁰. In their opinion, only cooperation with developed Western States, primarily the European Union States, can lead Bulgaria out of the economic crisis. Regarding the South-Eastern Europe, the reformists continued the course of their predecessors, advocating cooperation with Greece and Turkey, but condemned Serbia’s policy of the day. However, it should be emphasized that the economic component of regional cooperation has been strengthened as an important condition for the development of the Bulgarian economy and the strengthening of stability in the Balkans¹¹.

After the loss in the parliamentary elections in 2001 and several splits in the Union of Democratic Forces, this political force has significantly lost its influence, and a sharp drop in the popularity of the SDS caused the strengthening of new center-right political leaders. A conservative party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), created in December 2006, immediately took the leading position of electoral preferences.

The main foreign policy objective of the party was declared a “full integration of the Republic of Bulgaria into the European Union.” GERB opposes euroscepticism, believing that “in a dynamic, rapidly changing world, the European Union is Bulgaria’s only chance to protect and implement national interests on a global scale”¹².

⁷ Предизборна платформа на САС „45 години стигат. Времето е наше“ (1990). URL: http://www.omda.bg/page.php?title=%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%A1%D0%94%D0%A1_1990&IDMenu=209&IDArticle=1631.

⁸ Katsikas S. *All change: The reform effect of image modification within Bulgarian political parties on their foreign policy agendas during the 1990s* // Etudes balkaniques. 2006. № 1. P. 70.

⁹ Млечин Л. И курица птица, и България за граница. Новое время. 1991. № 34. С. 20.

¹⁰ Карасимеонов Г. Партийната система в България. София: Nik, 2010. С. 101–102.

¹¹ Katsikas S. *All change: The reform effect of image modification within Bulgarian political parties on their foreign policy agendas during the 1990s* // Etudes balkaniques. 2006. № 1. P. 74–75.

¹² Политическа рамка на ГЕРБ. URL: <http://www.gerb.bg/Political-frame>.

Centrist parties tried to overcome the split between the left and the right by offering a compromise foreign policy program. In 2001, centrist groups united around the former Bulgarian Tsar Simeon II, who returned to Bulgaria.

As the head of the newly formed party – the National Movement “Simeon II” (NDSV) – Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha won the parliamentary elections and was elected Prime Minister. He led the Government until 2005. Subsequently, during another parliamentary cadence (until 2009), the NDSV was part of the Parliament and Government coalitions. The main foreign policy priority for this political force was for the Republic of Bulgaria to achieve full membership in the European Union¹³. The NDSV advocated for the country’s integration into the EU as quickly as possible, supporting accession to the currency union and the introduction of the Euro as the national currency¹⁴.

The political orientation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), which is close to the NDSV, is influenced by two key factors: the ethnic (Turkish) character of the party and its liberal ideology. Since its creation, the DPS has supported the European integration of the Republic of Bulgaria¹⁵, as this would ensure the protection of the rights of national minorities¹⁶. But in the early stages, this process was associated with the normalization of relations with Turkey. In June 1990, party leader A. Dogan declared that “Bulgaria’s path to Europe runs through the Bosphorus”¹⁷.

Since the mid-1990s, after leaving the religious wing of the party (M. Khoja, N. Gendzhev) and in the context of a sharp deterioration in the economic situation of the Turkish minority, the DPS has strengthened the provisions of the party’s program regarding the Republic’s accession to the European Union as its main priority in foreign policy and significantly reduced the intensity of relations with Turkey.

The priority of solving economic problems forced the DPS to reconsider its approaches to developing relations with Greece and Russia. The party leadership actively promoted the opening of new checkpoints on the Bulgarian-Greek border, as well as the development of Bulgarian-Russian relations in the field of tobacco production and trade, which would have a positive effect for the Bulgarian Turks¹⁸. Unconditional support for the Bulgaria’s integration into the European Union and NATO continued into the next decade. The DPS played an important role in the negotiations on the Republic’s accession to the EU. At that time, according to A. Dogan, the policy of European integration was a top priority for the country¹⁹.

¹³ Декларация за основните ценности на НДСВ. URL: <http://www.ndsv.bg/content/28.html>.

¹⁴ Манифест на НДСВ «Политиката, от която се нуждае България». URL: <http://www.ndsv.bg/content/1139.html>

¹⁵ *III* Велико народно събрание. Първо тържествено заседание (София, вторник, 17 юли 1990 г., продължение). URL: http://www.parliament.bg/pub/StenD/2013030802490517071990_1%20тържествено%20заседание.pdf

¹⁶ *Доган А.* Под знака на евроинтеграцията. [w:] България и новият световен ред. София: Институт за либерални изследвания, 2001. С. 68.

¹⁷ Katsikas S. *Negotiating Diplomacy in the New Europe: Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Bulgaria*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. P. 70.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* P. 71-72.

¹⁹ Baeva I., Kalinova E. *Bulgarian Turks during the Transition Period* [in:] *Bulgaria and Europe: Shifting Identities* / Ed. by S. Katsikas. London: Anthem Press, 2011. P. 76.

A significantly different position is held by the right-wing party “Attack”, which proclaims a departure from the one-sided orientation to the West. Amongst the new foreign policy areas that the Republic of Bulgaria should focus on, representatives of this party name India, the Far East, Russia, post-Soviet and Arab States. The party insists on Bulgaria’s neutrality and non-participation in military blocs. At the same time, “Attack” does not seek the Republic’s withdrawal from the European Union, although it insists on revising some of the conditions for its stay in this organization²⁰.

Analyzing the main results of the Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union, the Bulgarian political party researcher G. Karasimeonov notes that, firstly, the Bulgaria’s experience has shown that membership is possible if there are several factors: a democratic, reformist government that clearly aims its activities at joining the European Union and NATO; a strong civil society that is ready to join the political elite and support such efforts and a favorable international environment, especially from the largest and most important countries of the European Union²¹.

Second of all, since Bulgaria and Romania had been somewhat behind in their own political and economic development, their membership was accompanied by strict conditions and control from the European Union. The same, and even more severe, situation should be expected for other countries that will join the European Union in the future, including Ukraine. However, in the end, such measures fully met the interests of Bulgaria²².

Third, there is a significant difference between being at the door of the European Union during the negotiation process and being inside the European Union as a full member. Then such requirements of the European Union members for new members are much higher, and the criticism is more severe, compared to the period of negotiations²³.

Fourth, the main challenge for a country like Bulgaria, same as for the most other post-Communist countries, is the transition from a clientelist political system to a modern democracy. The most difficult task is to strengthen the supremacy of law and eliminate the influence of organized crime on the economy and political system. At the same time efforts should be directed towards creating a new type of legal, open and transparent market economy and destroying the so-called shadow economy that still dominates Bulgaria. In other words, the main task is to introduce transparency and responsibility in political and economic processes, while resisting those political and economic forces that use the old ways of conducting negotiations based on the protectionism of the state bureaucracy and corrupt practices²⁴.

²⁰ 20 точки на партия Атака. URL: http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&cid=13&Itemid=51.

²¹ Карасімеонов Г. Досвід Болгарії як члена НАТО та ЄС (що може використати Україна?) URL: http://gurt.org.ua/uploads/news/2009/02/04/book_ukr.pdf

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

Conclusions. The overthrow of Todor Zhivkov's regime and the dismantling of the command and administrative system became a reality because the Bulgarian society said "no" to the totalitarian past, planned economy, socialist internationalism, and chose the path of democratic development and European integration. The consensus dialogue of the leading parties declaring socialist (BSP), liberal (NDSV, DPS), conservative (SDS, GERB) nationalist ("Attack") ideologies played a key role in determining the European integration course of the Republic of Bulgaria and contributed to positive changes in the political and economic spheres of society.

It should also be emphasized that the study of the Bulgarian experience of European integration is also relevant for other post-Communist States – it is an opportunity for the political elite to take advantage of effective experience by learning individual lessons, and create conditions for more constructive interaction of the most influential political parties in strengthening democratic transformations on the way to EU membership.

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Theoretical and Methodological Grounds of Public Opinion Research in Ukraine

The article describes the main approaches of understanding public opinion, its structure, psychological, ethical and relationalist interpretations, as well as functions. The article reveals us the stages of public opinion development, shows which methods of its research are the best, determining the relation between quantitative and qualitative methods of its study. The relation between dynamic and static approach in the development of public opinion, balance between rationality and social control, as well as public opinion as a social institution, control and activity are shown in this article.

Keywords: public opinion, functions, methods, structure, stages of development.

Теоретико-методологічні основи вивчення громадської думки в Україні

Стаття описує ключові підходи до розуміння громадської думки, її структури, функції, а також психологічні, етичні та реляціоністські трактування. Стаття відкриває етапи розвитку громадської думки, показує, які методи дослідження є найкращі, детермінацію взаємозв'язку між кількісними та якісними методами дослідження. У статті також показано взаємозв'язок між динамічними та статичними підходами у розвитку громадської думки, баланс між раціональним та соціальним контролем, так само як громадська думка як соціальний інститут, контроль та активність.

Ключові слова: громадська думка, функції, методи, структура, етапи розвитку.

Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania opinii publicznejna Ukrainie

Artykuł opisuje główne podejścia do zrozumienia opinii publicznej, jej strukturę, interpretacje psychologiczne, etyczne i relacyjne, a także funkcje. Artykuł ujawnia nam etapy rozwoju opinii publicznej, pokazuje, które metody jego badań są najlepsze, a także określa związek między metodami ilościowymi i jakościowymi. Pokazano związek między dynamicznym i statycznym podejściem w rozwoju opinii publicznej, równowagą między racjonalnością a kontrolą społeczną, a także opinią publiczną jako instytucji społecznej, kontroli i działania.

Słowa kluczowe: opinia publiczna, funkcje, metody, struktura, etapy rozwoju.

Public opinion is one of the topical issues of today's social and humanitarian sciences. The researchers have different views regarding the degree of its development. On the one side, the public opinion has been thoroughly studied in the recent years and much of its specifics has been determined in quite a detail (the interest in it is particularly high during electoral campaigns). For example, Lippmann considers that the public opinion is one of the most interesting and rather ill-researched manifestations of human spirit, stating that "... in today's sociology one can scarcely find another notion with the meaning as vague and arising as numerous discussions" (Lippmann, 2004, 386 p.)¹

Indeed, the academic literature contains loads of diverse definitions of "public opinion" proving how complex and multidimensional this phenomenon is. As a general matter, each definition places emphasis on some aspect of public opinion's manifestation and is attributed to a certain approach to its analysis. Having analyzed the approaches of national and foreign sociologists (M.A. Bokiy, Yu.V. Kirilov, L.V. Shapiro), we should note that all the subsistent definitions might be reduced to two different public opinion concepts.

1. Public opinion as rationality. In this respect, public opinion serves as a tool in the process of developing and taking decisions in the democratic context.
2. Public opinion as social control. In this case, public opinion favors social integration and assures the adequate level of consent for the actions and decisions to rely on.

Along with that, we'll try to specificate the varied approaches to public opinion understanding and consider some of the major dimensions of interpreting this phenomenon.

¹ Lippman U. Public Opinion / Prov. from English. M.: Institute of Public Opinion Foundation, 2004. 386 p

1. In the psychological definitions, public opinion is viewed as a mass phenomenon of group psychology, psychical state of the masses, social and psychological communication phenomenon. The rationale of this definition consists in the following: it points at the base of public opinion – social psychology of masses, their social feelings, emotions, attitudes. Along with that, reducing opportunities of the public opinion to mere ability of reproducing phenomena and facts of reality in the language of social psychology would be incorrect.
2. The ethical interpretations of public opinion describe it as a manifestation of certain morale and morality of society. Thus, D. Potapeiko views public opinion as “a distinctive type of morally extended arrangement”. D. Chesnykov stresses that public opinion is “more or less organized group assessment of human deeds, characters, thoughts, feelings, customs, habits, recognition of the one and condemnation of the other”. From this perspective, public opinion is one of the most significant criteria of the character of social development, conformity or non-conformity to its humanistic ideal.

Ethical definitions of public opinion show that whichever the moral activity of the public opinion is, linking its nature exclusively to morale as a form of social consciousness means reducing its understanding to merely moral judgment, merely domain of moral relations.

3. The relationist (from French “relation”) definitions consider public opinion to be a specific (judgmental) attitude of individuals, social groups, social communities (objects) to facts, events, phenomena of public life and, through them, to their bearers (subjects). “Public opinion, according to B. Hrushyn, is a state of mass consciousness encompassing (latent or obvious) attitude of different people to events and facts of social reality. (Grushin, 2007, 400p)²

In this case, public opinion serves as an interaction of the object and the subject where the object affects the subject with evaluative judgment (thought).

This vision of public opinion allows revealing its structure with the following major components: object, subject, forms, mechanism and manifestation methods.

In the meantime, the attempts to consider the phenomenon of public opinion from the single perspective allow seeing only certain aspects of it. In the real world, public opinion as a multifaceted phenomenon, includes the unity of relations and functions.

Therefore, by the public opinion we mean attitude of the individuals, social groups, social communities to specific facts, processes, phenomena of public life that help them to affect, subjugate and control these. Public opinion is an open, public articulation (transfer) of the

² Grushin An opinion on the world and a world of opinions. Problems of the methodology of public opinion research. – M.: Politizdat, 2007. – 400 pp. <http://www.uky.edu/AS/Polisci/Peffley/pdf/473Measuring%20Public%20Opinion.pdf>

attitudes of the object to the subject, not a simple summary of the private thoughts people share in the narrow circle of family or friends. Public opinion is a state of social consciousness expressed in public and affecting the functioning of society and its political system. It is the opportunity of population to openly, publicly express opinions regarding topical issues of public life, and its influence on development of social relations reflects the sense of public opinion as a distinct social phenomenon. Indeed, the society has witnessed the development and stable functioning of the response mechanism as regards socially important issues through expression of judgments by the interested population groups. This sort of population response is far from random and sporadic, it is a constant factor of the public life. Functioning of public opinion as a social phenomenon means that it acts like “a social authority” that is “authority granted with will and ability to subjugate the behavior of the social interaction subjects”. Obviously, it is possible where, firstly, there is a civil society with a broad range of rights and freedoms, and, secondly, the government accounts the position of society. Not until then can we speak of public opinion as of the civil society institute. Therefore, we should bear in mind that public opinion can function not in every society.

For instance, the Ukrainian sociologist Natalia Chernysh considers that there is no public opinion in Ukraine and what we call “public opinion” should be called “social attitudes”. This comment is partially based on the lack of influence, of the public opinion, on political and social system – that is, the government fails to consider the position of society (Chernysh, 2003, 543)³.

Along with that, the question of what the public opinion is encounters an issue of public expression of attitudes as well. Many sociologists consider that the public opinion exists only in the case of open articulation (public demonstration). Instead, in the case of attitudes and evaluative judgments in the latent, not publicly expressed, form or articulated in the narrow circle — and thus, not influencing the social processes — this is the phenomenon of social attitudes (Natalia Chernysh, 2003, p. 10)⁴ or social thought (Andrzej Mlyniec, 2011, p.87)⁵.

It should be mentioned that in the theoretical and methodological perspective the public opinion is considered in the structure of social relations and may be viewed through the categories of 1) “activity” and 2) “social institute”.

In the first case, the public opinion in the broad sense is considered as a collectively interested value-related, evaluative and practical activity of subjects, as well as a result of this activity.

In the second case, public opinion is considered a social power, participating in the social relations management via social influence mechanisms, transfer of standards, values and traditions. Therefore, it (public opinion) might be defined as a specific social institute with its functions.

Social institute is a certain arrangement of activity and social relations. This is a set of purposefully oriented standards of behavior of the individuals in various situations. It has

³ Chernysh N. Sociology. Course of lectures: a textbook. – Lviv: Calvariya, 2003. – 543 p.

⁴ Chernysh N. Sociology. Course of lectures: a textbook. – Lviv: Calvariya, 2003. – 543 p.

⁵ Andrzej Mlyniec.- Social Theory and Public Opinion.- Annual Review of Sociology/ V 11. 2011, p.87.-107 <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102659>

a purpose, specific functions, a set of social positions and roles as well as a system of incentives (or penalties).

Social institutes assure stability of social connections and relations in society. The type of the institute (political, economic, cultural etc) stipulates its functions. In the sociological context, a function (from Latin word for “performance, execution”), has the following interpretation:

1. a role, performed by a certain element of social system in its organization as a whole;
2. a dependence of various social processes, expressed in functional interconnections of variables;
3. a social action that became standardized, regulated by certain standards and social institutes⁶.

While exploring the phenomenon of public opinion we should pay special attention to the functions it performs as a social institute.

1. Adaptive function (including socialization, educational and disciplinary functions). An ability to foster, in the individuals, the standards, values, rules of behavior in the changing conditions. An educational function synthesizes theoretical and daily consciousness. Though, this synthesis may have prevailing elements of the daily, the results of implementing the educational function may be considerable. They are seen in stating new information and developing, on this basis, the new knowledge on the phenomena and processes of social reality, in extension of cognitive and evaluative opportunities of personality, in strengthening of “educatory relations” between the people, person’s digestion of moral and ethical standards, values and patterns of behavior, as well as raising the feeling of high responsibility for his or her deeds.
2. Control and regulatory function. It controls the activity of authoritative and governmental bodies on the issues affecting the interests of public opinion subjects. It provides for implementation of certain social relation standards. Public opinion is able to perform its control and regulatory function due to its standing. It is peculiar that the public opinion is almost always able to passionately follow the activity of social institutes, “rise above them”, control them, as well as produce and implant, in the members of society, the standards of social relations. At this, the public opinion acts as a regulator of relations not only between separate people, but also between a personality and a group, the group and the society, as well as between the society and the personality.
3. Advisory function Public opinion might provide advice, recommendations to other social institutes on the possible solutions of certain problems. The content of the advisory function is stipulated by the very name and means that, in case of necessity,

⁶ Short Dictionary of Sociology. M.: Politizdat, 2008. P.438

the public opinion may consult, advise or provide suggestions to some sort of a social institute. They might contain a way of resolving the pressing social and political, economic, moral and other issues.

4. Defensive function. Public opinion “takes tutorship” of individuals or official institutes.
5. Prescriptive function. Through the referendum or by means of direct pressure, it points to the ways of conducting the policy on the issues of interest of public opinion. It shows itself in the case when the public opinion results in decisions concerning various aspects of the society’s life and having the predetermined character. This means that the public opinion may not only advise, suggest and consult, but also prescribe and order the social management bodies how to deal with some sort of issue.
6. Mobilization function. An ability of public opinion to mobilize people for certain actions.

While performing a set of functions, public opinion acts in all the spheres of the society’s life. The most important features of public opinion are its prevalence, intensity and stability. The degree of prevalence depends on the public opinion subject that is the social unity this public opinion initiates and depends on the topicality and urgency of the issue. Stability of the public opinion depends on the social needs and interests. Intensity – with the degree of judgment expression (from the urgency of the issue).

We may state that the public opinion is a complex social phenomenon that might be well attributed to the systemic objects. It basically conforms to most features and criteria, approved in the systemic analysis: integrity; various types of internal connections; structural hierarchy; availability of objective and integral character; self-organization; functioning and development.

Considering the public opinion as an holistic phenomenon, able to institutionalize, we may define its objective as satisfaction of certain needs and interests. It neither occurs, nor vanishes all of a sudden — that is, it has its own development cycle. Public opinion has its internal structure, as well as hierarchical build, and functions as a social institute.

From the systemic view, public opinion consists of three components — rational, emotional and volitional.

The rational (cognitive, intellectual) component is about people’s knowledge of events, phenomena, facts being the object of social attention. It greatly depends on the subject’s education and awareness. We might accept the following definition of this component: “talking of the rationally thinking public is possible only on the following conditions: 1) People have gained enough information on this issue as it cannot be discussed without previous knowledge. Therefore, the main requirement here is correctness and volume of information, needed for developing the opinion; 2) Readiness to answer the questions without emotions;

3) Whether the detailed analysis of answers to the relevant questions finds certain connection between them.

The emotional component is closely related to the rational. This entails the moods and feelings as regards the public opinion object. The ratio of the rational and the emotional components in the public opinion allows speaking of the possibility to manipulate it. The prevalence of the emotional component makes the public opinion more susceptible to psychological pressure. Interaction of these two components (that refer to the spiritual part of the phenomenon) results in a social judgment. Though, the public opinion is not only a judgment, but also a practical activity on satisfying the needs and the interests. Therefore, the third component will be volitional that is defined actions of the public opinion subjects. All these components are interdependent and intercomplementary, providing the public opinion with the distinct spiritual and practical integrity.

And if we consider the internal structure of the social opinion, we may see consecutive change of its peculiar stages: from its occurrence to disappearance. This is usually called the dynamic structure of the public opinion. There are several stages within this structure:

- occurrence: the widespread interest in the issue, along with active search for information, expressed by multiple people. A person experiences a need to express his/her opinion (judgment), exchange it with other people and this way the group opinion is formed;
- forming: in the process of the exchanging the opinions and words between the groups with different judgments, big groups (masses) of people emerge. The active work on the search and contact of the like-minded takes place; the dominating opposite opinions are determined and around them the major forces are concentrated;
- functioning: the dominating opinion is legalized and is able to serve as a partner (an opponent) of the managing bodies and organizations, having developed some sort of issue. It (the issue) is in the attention focus. The positions of the majority are well defined;
- decline: it is a fall of the mass interest in the issue (it becomes untopical for most of people (either solving the issue is impossible at the moment, or it is solved, or there emerges something to overshadow this issue). The social content is narrowed, the conflict severity is lost. But the issue still arises the interest;
- disappearance: the opinion loses its public (mass) character, transforms into isolated thoughts of separate individuals and groups. The social judgment fades away. We should note that the boundaries between the stages are movable, blurred. There might simultaneously exist several public opinions regarding different issues (with different objects) and stand on different stages.

The public opinion has its own channels of expression: behavior during the elections (of all levels); participation in legislative activity via referendums, plebiscites, gatherings, meetings

etc; with the mass media and communication means (including rumors); rallies, protests, demonstrations, strikes etc. (that is mass behavioral manifestations of the public opinion); through lobbying structures and pressure groups. And one more, specific, purposefully arranged – sociological one.

The distribution between the channels depends on the social and political situation and is determined by the pattern of self-compensation. It consists in the fact that in case of closing some of numerous channels of the public opinion expression, the flows are redistributed between the remaining channels. Even in case of a strong repressive regime, having made everything for suppressing negative (for the regime) public opinion, it proceeds functioning through the channels like: interpersonal communication; interaction of small groups; education and upbringing etc.

And if “the people are silent”, the simple process of accumulating the public opinion potential takes place. This is its peculiar and highly dangerous form due to inability to predict the behavioral component, on the one side, and the place of the social (political, economical) “explosion”, on the other. Determination of the public opinion change tendencies, systemic analysis of its change and possibility of forecasting reactions to implementation of certain management solutions, first and foremost, belong to the very bases of human life – economical, political and social.

In spite of the fact that the public opinion as a social phenomenon is well-researched in the foreign and national literature, there are no, as of today, a unified approach as regards the methodology of its research.

Following the experts in the methodology of political research J. Mannheim and R. Rich, “a poll provides the researcher with information of five types: facts, perceptions, opinions, attitudes and behavioral reports of the respondents... The group of opinions includes the respondent’s judgment regarding his/ her views to certain objects and events (Mannheim, 1997, p. 184).⁷

According to O. Vyshniak, the public opinion, contrary to the individual opinions and attitudes, is not subject to polling at all. Public opinion polls do not exist and may not exist. One may conduct polls of citizens, voters, consumers, viewers etc, but public opinion might be only researched after filtering the “blank answers” of the people who take absolutely no interest in a certain problem and do not have a definite stand on these issues. (Vyshniak, 2003, 73p).⁸

It should be noted that all the citizens of Ukraine may have their own attitude to various events and processes that take place in the society. Along with that, not all the citizens are willing to express it to the interviewers. And those individuals who express their opinion have far from equal weight in the public opinion forming. So, to find the public opinion on the basis of

⁷ Mannheim D.B., Rich R.K. Political scientists. Research methods. – M., The whole world, 1997. – P. 184.

⁸ Vishnyak O. Technology and results of public opinion research Political Management, 2003 <http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/11595/07-Vushniak.pdf?sequence=1>

voicing on certain issues, expressed by individual citizens in the sociological polls, the answers of those without an opinion on this issue have to be filtered out.

We cannot omit the fact that the public opinion is a key institute of democracy neither authorities in power, nor opposition can ignore. At the same time, it might become a manipulation tool as it passes off the attitude of uninformed, unqualified and unconcerned citizens to a certain issue as the public opinion. Therefore, a need to find an adequate means for the public opinion analysis rises to the fore.

The sociology of public opinion, like many other applied scientific disciplines, has many methods of studying and analysing the information it requires. The whole set of methods and practices can be conditionally structured into two large groups: quantitative and qualitative research methods. Such separation is related to the diametrically opposite origin of these methods, in particular in the city of information gathering, its nature and processing tools. However, this division is still conditional, because firstly, to cover the totality of the data, researchers combine these methods in one way or another, and it is rare to find purely quantitative or qualitative studies. Secondly, methods can be easily transformed from one type to another; For example, for example, we can transcribe an interview (qualitative method), encode responses through content analysis (qualitative method) and create a statistical model of public opinion and its trends (quantitative method). Therefore, by describing the different methods within the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy, we will note those methods that can equally be related to both groups (C Williams, 2007, p.65)⁹.

Actually methods of sociological research have a long history of functioning. The qualitative method was used the first one to describe the social phenomena – it was directly contemplation of society and analysts on its basis. With the development of the sciences in the academic environment, the dominant paradigms have been positivism and scientism, so in the 20-30s of the last century, quantitative methods of sociology emerged in the attempt to fit the methodology of the natural sciences under the social and behavioural sciences. This approach remained dominant until the 60s, when along with certain changes in the political space, scientific paradigms were changing, becoming more focused on the individual and his inner world. For example, in political science there was the formation of behavioralism, and in sociology – the “renaissance” of qualitative methods. Nowadays, most researchers are trying to combine both methods, as we mentioned above. Actually, their functional separation occurred: quantitative methods were used to studying macrosocial phenomena, while qualitative methods were used for microsial phenomena (Brady, 2011)¹⁰.

Since quantitative methods are more popular, let's start with them. The first and simplest quantitative method is document analysis. It is about sorting a certain information medium

⁹ Carrie Williams, *Research Methods*, Journal of Business & Economic Research – March 2007, pVolume 5, Number 3, file:///C:/Users/Julietta/Downloads/2532-Article%20Text-10126-1-10-20110207.pdf

¹⁰ Brady Overview Of Political Methodology: Post-Behavioral Movements and Trends, 2011, <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-048>

– at first they were mostly printed sources, today they are mostly different Internet messages. There are two types of it: the traditional one, which is simply an interpretation of the message, so it will be referred to qualitative methods; and a content analysis method that involves encoding certain concepts or topics (if we are talking about paragraphs or a system of texts) to translate nominal data into numbers. In general, it is a simple, cheap, and universal method of research. And what is more important, it's quite transparent and objective: there is a clear object, namely a document and a coding system. We need now technically make “two and two”. Moreover, everyone can reproduce the results of the study with similar results. The only drawbacks to the method are its attachment to the document (which may indeed reflect a social phenomenon or not) and the contradictory origin of the code, as different notions may be coded differently depending on the researcher's view. The question may arise even to the very structure of the code: can we adequately express the object of study through this symbolic system (Kohlbacher, 2006,)¹¹.

Surveys, questionnaires, interviews and testing are the other important quantitative methods. We have referred these methods to one set, since in our opinion they all reflect the same process of measuring public opinion by bringing different respondents' opinions into common denominators. Methodologically, they are, of course, different: I have clear instructions what questions to ask during the interview and how long it should last, how to ask the questionnaire correctly, how to conduct the interview and what is the best way to give the test.

Each method has its own types accordingly: the survey differs by the means of conducting (on the street or in a certain place; by means of technical devices and live, etc.), tests and questionnaires are divided according to the structure of questions, and interviews by the specifics of the conversation between the interviewer and the respondent.

However, in the end we get a set of raw direct data, which are pre-processed and decomposed into categories at the stage of the process and which are subsequently translated into statistical information by code. The last one is amenable to mathematical analysis, which allows it to be better interpreted. In particular, this allows us to extrapolate and identify trends (and this is exactly what all current sociology holds). In our opinion, these are the best methods of sociological research, which is supported by their exceptional popularity. They allow to capture the information about the studied phenomenon, and a large amount of data almost completely eliminates the personal factor – even statistically, the larger the number of variables, the smaller the percentage of the influence of the fluctuations of one of them.

However, even here there are disadvantages; the high cost and technical complexity of these methods are the greatest ones. The cost does not allow the research to be too massive. The complexity questions not so much the methodology of the research as its result. We mean that the research and its review require special knowledge, so there is a good opportunity for various errors and speculations. For example, the question arises of how representative a sample

¹¹ Kohlbacher, 2006 Volume 7, No. 1, Art. 21 – January 2006 <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/%0Barticle/view/75/153>

of a study is, that is, how it reflects the position of the general population. Moreover, the same special knowledge is needed to test the validity of the study (for example, in the place of operationalization of the research mechanisms to its tasks).

And it depends on the ordinary citizen now whether to believe the research or not. A little salvation is the authority of a research institution, but as practice shows, it sometimes does not save politically motivated manipulations (for example, news agencies can selectively submit data from a reputable source and thus create a desirable interpretation for the reader).

Separately, we would put a sociological experiment and sociometry. This is in fact because they are more hybrid methods than quantitative ones, as the interpersonal interaction of the 'respondent-respondent' and the 'respondent-researcher' plays a significant role here. The essence of the experiment is to simulate within a particular, often small, group of people and to code their behavioural strategies accordingly. In this way, we get certain scenarios of thought or behaviour and, by assuming their relevance to a particular social environment, make a generalized conclusion for society as a whole or for a particular social group.

The experiment is enabled when the researcher is within the study group) and is not included (when the researcher is only an observer). In our opinion, the second option is more appropriate because it contains a smaller chance of consciously correcting participants' responses and reactions, since the former cannot receive a simultaneous reaction (as it often happens during the exams when a student tries to guess via professor's facial expression whether he is right or not).

The quintessential essence of this is sociometry, when the researcher, through certain rigidly structured questions, measures the positions within a tightly integrated thought. Thus, with the help of guiding questions, the researcher forms different situations of interaction between the members of the group, in order to see in the concrete examples, who can be a potential leader of the group. This is necessary because a simple group poll can give you distorted information: if a group has a positional leadership that belongs to one individual, while in communication, the power is taken over by another member of the group.

These methods are good for studying atypical social situations that often cannot be covered by surveys or questionnaires. Moreover, it is deprived of the possibility of dishonesty of the respondent, because the phenomenon occurs in the eyes of the researcher. However, the methods are sensitive to the professional skills of the researcher, who can easily distort the results by their behaviour and consequently objectivity and the breadth of application of methods suffer.

Focus groups are the most common qualitative method in sociology. Due to the method several groups of respondents, selected according to pre-worked criteria, form an opinion from different perspective by means of moderation. The method includes active involvement of both respondents and researchers.

The point of such a study is to get not only the averaged point of view of the totality of individuals, but rather the point of view which can be interpreted as "general" or "public" opinion,

or the opinion of the group as a whole. The specifics of the conduct, in particular the strong involvement of the participants and the conventionality of the discussion, make it possible to obtain what is called “normal distribution” in statistics by cutting off extremes or critical indicators (maximum positive and maximum negative attitude).

The pros and cons of this method are similar to the two previous ones, in particular, the role of the researcher’s personality is also important. However, it should be emphasized that it is the best way to use this method and its types when it is not necessary to obtain clearly structured facts, but a system of perceptions and ideas of the population, that is, it is logical – to answer the question not “how many” but “what?”

Observation is the last method we want to mention today. In fact, any of the above methods can be called observation to some extent, because in any case we have to consider the phenomenon to describe it. An exceptional feature of “proper observation”, the reason why we refer it to qualitative methods, is its essence, and pure contemplation and interpretation of the phenomena of reality. That is, we write about what we see. In fact, it was one of the first methods of research in sociology. There are different types of this method, depending on the location of the researcher, the length of time and the structure of the observation itself. The advantages of this method are its technical simplicity and volumetric result, but it has not been used seriously for a long time because of its high subjectivity and frequent one-sided conclusions.

So, as we can see, sociology of public opinion in its methodology aims at objective reproduction of reality, which is what we see as the pragmatism of sociologists (since it is applied science, they need the most convenient and accurate tools). However, it cannot ignore the human factor completely, so mutual compromise of qualitative and quantitative elements became a compromise, since only finding the balance between the most accurate results them can be achieved.

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