



Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

NR 8 GRUDZIEŃ 2017

PÓŁROCZNIK

STUDIUM EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ

ISSN 2353-8392

KUTNO 2017



Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie Wydział Studiów Europejskich

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Mazowieckie Centrum Poligrafii
Nakład: 250 egz.

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Inter-party democracy as a democracy development factor in Ukraine

The search for the causes of the hybrid political regime, the slow and limited implementation of reforms, involves the study of all possible factors. Political parties have become important actors of political life in Ukraine. Accordingly, their activities and their own characteristics are an independent factor. The level of development of democracy in society depends on the level of inter-party democracy. The state of democracy in modern parliamentary parties of Ukraine is considered.

Keywords: political party, democracy, parliament, inter-party democracy, parliamentary party, factor

СТАН ВНУТРІШНЬОПАРТІЙНОЇ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ ЯК ЧИННИК РОЗВИТКУ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ В УКРАЇНІ

Пошук причин гібридного політичного режиму, повільного і обмеженого проведення реформ, передбачає вивчення дії всіх можливих факторів. Політичні партії стали вагомими акторами політичного життя в Україні. Відповідно їх діяльність і власні характеристики виступають самостійним чинником. Окреслено, що рівень розвитку демократії в суспільстві залежить від рівня демократії всередині політичної партії. Розглянуто стан демократії в сучасних парламентських партіях України.

Ключові слова: політична партія, демократія, парламент, внутрішньопартійна демократія, парламентська партія, чинник.

Evaluation of the level of inner-party democracy is not just a significant theoretical-methodological task, but also an essential element of understanding the prospects of democratic society formation. It is difficult to imagine that a political party, which according to its constitution and practice is not democratic, can establish/assert democracy development at the national or regional/other level. For analysis we selected the parliamentary parties, which passed the 5% threshold at the pre-term parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that took place on October 26, 2014. In the process of preparing materials we have examined political parties' regulations, survey reports, election results and experts' opinions (heads of regional centers and people's deputies from the abovementioned parties).

Table 1. Main characteristics of the parliamentary parties in Ukraine as of November 11, 2017

	Party name	Registration date	Results of the 2014 parliamentary elections		Rating of political parties as of October 2017 y % ¹
			% in a multi-mandate electoral district	Total number of deputies	
1	Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"	May 5, 2000	21,82	132	13,6
2	People's Front	March 31, 2014	22,14	82	2,0
3	Party "Samopomich" Union"	December 29, 2012	10,97	33	5,9
4	Political party "Opposition Bloc"	April 23, 2010	9,43	29	8,6
5	Oleh Liashko Radical Party	September 28, 2010	7,44	22	6,5
6	All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	July 09, 1999	5,68	19	10,0

In the course of evaluating the level of political party democracy the most popular are indices, formulated by S. Kanonchuk and O. Yarosh: 1) decentralization of party activity, delegation: balance between managerial functions in the center and in periphery, determination and delimitation of authorities; electoral mechanisms of governing bodies formation; 2) democratic mechanisms of decision making process, inclusivity: inner-party decisions are taken on a collegial basis (by means of voting or consensus); decisions concerning general issues are made, taking into account the position of local centers, there is a possibility of "lower initiative"; decisions concerning local issues are within the competence of local centers; 3) transparency while working with resources: local centers and ordinary members have access to financial data to the extent it does not threaten party interests; 4) accountability: leadership of the party and its central bodies regularly make and present the party with reports concerning its political activity, organizational and financial matters; there are control and auditing organs². We agree that these criteria represent key aspects of democratic activity. At the same time we assume that when it comes to the parliamentary parties a totality of indices must be modified. To our mind, the indices must comprise the following characteristics of parties:

1. construction of organizational composition: vertical, including the grounds of democratic centralization or a possibility to form horizontal bonds at the levels of every party link regardless of the party center;
2. description of the parliamentary faction place in the organizational structure of the party, its functional load and influence on the process of decision making;
3. whether governing bodies, indicated in the party regulations, function on a regular basis and within their competence; existence of formations beyond the party regulations, which influence the process of decision making;

¹ Attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to public institutions, electoral orientations [Electronic resource]. – 2017 – Access mode: <http://razumkov.org.ua>

² Main procedures of inner-party democracy. Analytical review / Prepared by S.H.Kononchuk, O.A.Yarosh / Ukrainian independent center of political investigations. – K., 2012. – P.13.

4. a level of decentralization concerning organization of the party activity/who prioritize the “agenda” of regional party structures and in the process of taking political decisions;
5. a process of decision taking presupposes common discussions over various initiatives including ad hoc, or a prepared decision is brought up for approval and it is anticipated that it will be supported, correspondingly other options are excluded;
6. transparency while working with finances, when the party organizations know: the sources of party funding and arrangements, according to which this funding takes place and they are aware of a general form of financing local centers in the off-election periods and during the election campaigns.

We deliberately counted out the issue of accountability, which presupposes that the party’s leadership and its central bodies make and present the party with reports concerning its political activity, organizational and financial matters; there exist control and auditing organs. The reason is that all parties’ regulations comprise such requirements. When normative regulations concerning state funding of political parties came into force, the latter on a quarterly basis provide and publish reports on financial activities. However, such reports and accountability in general are formal (we assume that the peculiarity of first experience and in future the system of effective control). Currently, there is no practice of liability of the party leader and higher level managers for low results at elections, mistakes/inappropriate decisions and activities in the off-election periods. Change of leadership of regional/oblast party structures takes place upon a direct request of the party governing bodies or involving them/when approved publicly or silently. The exceptions exist, but they are rare.

The regulations of the abovementioned political parties define vertical construction of organizational composition. In particular, according to the Regulations of the political party All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (p. 4.1): “Structurally the party is organized on the territorial principle in accordance with administrative-territorial formation of Ukraine and with regard to the election legislation and is composed of local party organizations and central regulatory and control and auditing organs of the party”³. In the Regulations of the “Samopomich” Union (p. 3.1) it is stated that “The Party structure is formed by its central bodies, regional and local, initial centers of the party”⁴. Regional structures are subordinated to the party national governing bodies. In their turn, regional structures continue the vertical down: district, city and initial organizations. Whereas, horizontal bounds between the party organizations of one level are not described in the Regulations and actually are almost absent. In fact, in practice they actualize key bases of democratic centralism⁵.

³ Regulations of the political party All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” [Electronic resource] – 2016. – Access mode: <http://kyiv.ba.org.ua>

⁴ Regulations of the party “Samopomich” Union [Electronic resource] – 2016. – Access mode: <http://samopomich.ua>

⁵ The principle of democratic centralism is in the foundations of the structure and activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It presupposed: appointment of all party posts and bodies from bottom to top by election; accountability of higher bodies before the lower ones; party discipline, when minority is subordinated to the decisions taken by majority. Functionally this principle served as an instrument in power struggle.

Regulations of none of the parties presuppose determination of the place of its parliamentary faction within the party structure. Sitting deputies of the Verkhovna Rada predominantly function in their surrounding, they are recommended to cooperate with governing bodies of their regional structures, if before the elections they work in the region or are ascribed by supervisors to any regional organization if their regional affiliation differs or if the number of deputies from one and the same region is too big. The notion of supervisors is not clearly defined in the parties' regulations. The position of people's deputies within the party governing bodies is not determined either. Like in the "Opposition Bloc" some deputies/part of deputies form the composition of the Political Bureau/governing bodies, the rest is considered to work in their specialization fields (as a rule specialization complies with the area of the parliamentary committee)⁶. The exception is the "Samopomich" Union, the regulations of which presuppose that party parliamentarians must be a part of the Leadership of the Party, which carries out consulting and advisory functions and is made up of the members of the Party Political Council and heads of regional organizations. The fact that among people's deputies there are a lot of party functionaries does not withdraw a question. Parliamentary deputies have profound influence on the process of decision making, but mainly those decisions which are raised in the parliament. When it comes to the party decisions namely, if they are not party functionaries then their influence is determined/depends on a personal position/initiative of a deputy, their personal relations and connections with national and regional party leadership.

On the basis of the parliamentary parties' regulations along with the party sessions and controlling bodies to the governing bodies belong: *the Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"*: Central Council of the Party, Presidium of the Central Council of the Party and Head of the Central Council, besides the Regulations include the position of the Honorary Head of the Party; *the People's Front*: Political Council, Coordination Council (members of the political council and heads of regional organizations), Military Council and its Head; *the Samopomich Union*: Political Council, Executive Committee, Leadership of the Party and its Head; *the Opposition Bloc*: Political Council, Political Executive Committee and its Head; *Oleh Liashko Radical Party*: the Head, Political Council and Presidium; *the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"*: Political Council, Presidium and its Head. The Regulations presuppose the procedure of governing bodies concerning who and how must compile it and periodicity of sessions. Among the abovementioned parties Oleh Liashko Radical Party and All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" are considered to be parties of a leadership type. In both cases leaders of the parties dominate over other governing bodies. The latter assemble periodically, mainly on the leaders' requirements. Besides, many current and other issues are determined by the leaders and a group formed by them (in Batkivshchyna such group

⁶ It should be admitted that the parliamentary faction of the Opposition bloc comprises along with the party members other non-party deputies, who position themselves as an opposition to the ruling coalition.

usually comprised 6-7 people, including both party leaders and individual deputies). The Samopomich Union assumes almost the same position as all main questions belong to the competence of A. Sadovyi and the leader of the party faction O. Bereziuk. In the Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" the Central Council and Presidium assemble/function on a periodic base and not in accordance with the procedure. All current party work is supervised by the member of the Presidium Berezenko S. I. and the member of the Presidium and the head of the Secretariat Savrasov M. V. The case of the Opposition Bloc may be treated as an individual case. It is connected with the fact that the party leadership is represented by three dominant groups of influence: R. Akhmetov's, S. Lovochkin's and V. Medvedchuk's. Their specific personal interests presuppose that all decisions are taken on a collegial basis. As the abovementioned groups are not institutionalized within the party, then the role of mediators/representatives is also determined not by the Regulations but as situations demand. Governing bodies function periodically. However, regional party organizations are oriented on one of the mentioned groups. Such system is inherent to the People's Front, providing that the number of "centers" is bigger and they are of different "weight", orientation of the heads of regional organizations on a certain influential figure in the party is very distinct.

Designation of the agenda of regional party structures is mostly peculiar of the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna". Experts believe that central leadership determines up to 90% of tasks and directions of work for regional party structures. Coordination of work of regional structures, especially in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine is inherent to the Opposition Bloc. However, determination of the agenda is two-sided and focused on the format of opposition/contradistinction to the authorities' actions and ad hoc topicality of current events. As to the rest of the parties, their governing bodies are fully concentrated on the work of the faction and leader of the party. Regional organizations have a possibility to plan and actualize projects independently. However, under conditions of low central funding and individual search for sponsorship the number of such projects is not big. Correspondingly, activity of regional organizations largely depends on the initiative of their regional leaders. In most cases, under conditions of poor funding from the center the work of regional structures is mainly focused on party deputies in regional, city, district councils if there are any, and ad hoc concerning the events of national and regional levels. In the period of the elections it is possible to observe a tendency of tough centralization in the context of presidential and parliamentary elections, close cooperation when the center is dominating over the deputies of regional and city councils.

Decisions, taken at the party sessions by party governing bodies as a rule are prepared by leadership of the party and are handed over for formal approval by delegates or representatives at corresponding levels. The same algorithm is inherent to all other levels of party structure; at least they are striving for it. At the same time at levels of regional, city and district structures there can be some exceptions or deviations from the "standard". As the

practice shows there are situations when there is an open competition between two or more party centers. As a rule, such centers are represented by functionaries or businessmen who are party members or support work of a regional party leader/party organization. Change of management/victory of a certain center, which may resemble inner competition, is possible only when one of the parts is supported by the party leader. In this case it is referred not to the party leader but to the representatives of higher governing bodies. One of the spread ways of “democratic victory” or “procedural democracy” is a sharp increase in membership of primary or district party structures to the level, when it is possible to gain advantage with the help of new controlled members within the composition of party meeting or delegates. The example is the elections of the head of Ivano-Frankivsk regional organization of the Samopomich Union in October 2017.

In 2016 the Committee of voters of Ukraine (CVU) conducted a research during which they interrogated the representatives of regional party organizations concerning the system of funding. The respondents stated that one third of party centers depended on centralized funding; another third part was funded by private sponsors⁷. Both ways of funding lead to further dependence of regional structure of party leadership on their donors. Correspondingly, it determines a kind of restriction for party leaders and party structures as well, what in general do not contribute to the development of inner-party democracy. Since 2017 the country introduced direct state funding for parties’ regulatory activity, which is not connected with their participation in the elections and partial refunding of parties’ expenses on pre-election campaigns during the elections⁸. Consequently, all parliamentary parties received their share of state funding. Experience of regional party structures testifies that at this stage there is neither an established algorithm of funding political parties which would be general for all parties nor a peculiar one for a specific party. Currently, in particular central party leadership decides where the money, given by the state, will be directed. By this, regional party organizations are dependent on the position of the party leader in questions of funding.

Display of inner-party democracy

All abovementioned parties are characterized by another level of pluralism concerning work of the party faction in the Verkhovna Rada. All experts agree that deputies may have an opportunity to discuss the agenda, subject matters of the party faction concerning certain questions put on agenda in the parliament and the way of voting: obligatory or free etc. Quite often there are situations when the party and faction leadership express the desirable variant, however it does not automatically mean positive result. Faction leadership has all instruments to exert influence on a deputy’s position, but taking into account numerous voting,

⁷ The CVU’s report: State of political parties before the beginning of state funding [Electronic resource] – Access mode: <http://cvu.org.ua>

⁸ Law of Ukraine № 2123a “On alterations to some legislative acts of Ukraine concerning prevention and fight against political corruption” [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=55655

support provided to one draft-law cannot be seen as a guarantee for further disciplined approach concerning other questions. As the practice shows in cases of principal voting the leadership of the party faction must work individually with a large number of deputies to understand their positions and variants of voting. Special status of the party faction, its organizational apartness from the whole party does not extend the idea of inner-party pluralism over the party. Such experience is rather an “individual case”, forced specificity. In particular, it is proved by the experience of the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”, which constantly, since the time of its registration, obtains its parliamentary status, however, it is difficult to find indicators of gradual democratization in the inner-party life.

Factions in regional and city councils also have distinctive parameters of inner democracy if compared with party structures. Domination of economic issues leads to contraction of pluralism in approaches/positions. At the same time, presence of non-party deputies in the compositions of local councils limits a range of enforcement tools as to all deputies.

Another variant of exception can be a period before the elections and during them. Organization of the election process, if we speak of the importance of the outcomes, extensively requires from the party leadership to draw highly-qualified political consultants/managers of election campaigns. Both, as in case of providing a post to a party member or inviting someone from outside, during the campaign the party leadership must authorize campaign managers. Besides, during this period party structures exercise additional or instrumental function. However, after the elections party bureaucracy makes up loses despite the achieved result.

The third variant can be traced during the local elections, especially over last 2 years, during the elections to the regional territorial communities. As these elections take place according to another schedule, there is a practice of providing regional and city organizations with higher independence in the process of preparing and conducting elections. Doing this the party leadership revises party active functionaries as to their qualification to carry out campaigns and simultaneously provides training. Positive results of the elections may contribute to the fact that some party functionaries will become responsible for organization and conduction of elections to the Verkhovna Rada and the post of the President of Ukraine, predominantly within the region.

Factors, which precondition current state of inner-party democracy

1. By a large number of officially registered political parties in Ukraine (352 as of January 1, 2017) only a small number of them take part in political life/are represented in the parliament. Efficiency index according to the concept introduced by Laakso and Taagepera concerning the 2014 pre-term parliamentary elections in the format of electoral parties was 8.5 and as to the parliamentary parties – 7.7⁹.

⁹ Nosenko D.K. Main tendencies of party system development in Ukraine over 1998-2014 // Hrani, 2015, № 1. – P.127.

2. Current political parties, except the All-Ukrainian Union *Batkivshchyna*, are characterized by a badly-developed structure of party organizations (Table 2) and a low level of membership. As of January 1, 2014 in Ukraine there were 490 administrative districts. In accordance with the Law each new party must be represented in 2/3 of districts. Nowadays, if we reject districts in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and Sevastopol (14+4) and count just a half of districts in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, then there are only 454 districts. Consequently, two thirds of them equal 303 districts. According to the data in Table 2 the parliamentary parties are differently represented by their party organizations at the district level. Quite questionable are equally high measures of an average representativeness in a hypothetical district and minimal or token representativeness. According to the data provided by the sociological group “Rating” in December 2016 less than 2% of respondents stated that they were members of one of the political parties¹⁰. It should be pointed out that a low percent of party membership among citizens is additionally determined by a complex procedure of joining a party.
3. Lack of knowledge concerning the activity of political parties in democratic countries presupposed interpretation of a party as an effective instrument of power struggle. Such interpretation of an institute of a party is additionally predetermined by the fact that in the majority of political parties a crucial role in organizational construction was played by party members who gained experience while functioning in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.
4. Specific nature of the electoral legislation of Ukraine lies in: regular changes to the electoral law just before the scheduled parliamentary elections; existence of a nationwide electoral district within the frames of a proportional component and an introduced system of expensive elections. These and other characteristics of the electoral law and practice of organization and conducting elections additionally stimulate political corruption and absolute power of the party leaders.
5. Technological character of the elections not only at the national, but also regional levels. When success depends not on the activity of party centers and party programs but on a size of funding and effectiveness of advertising campaign and organizational skills of management/political consultants. Correspondingly, it predetermines the situation when at the elections “two columns”, party and technological function in different combinations (in parallel, together, separately etc.).

¹⁰ Affective evaluation of living conditions of Ukrainians: the report on the data provided by the sociological group “Rating”, December 2016. [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <http://ratinggroup.ua>

Table 2. Number of party centers of the parliamentary parties in Ukraine and Lviv region (as of 2016)

Party name	According to the CVU ¹¹	According to the OPORA ¹²	Lviv region ¹³	Number of party organizations per one district in Ukraine/region
Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"	1 712	1 786	50	5,7/2,5
All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	17 296	16 862	564	55,6/28,2
People's Front	631	633	30	2,01/1,5
Oleh Liashko Radical Party	736	738	38	2,4/1,9
Party "Samopomich" Union"	195	196	30	0,6/1,5
Political party "Opposition Bloc"	654	843	7	2,8/0,35

Therefore, we may state that party structures of all parliamentary parties are predominantly centralized with a low level of inner-party democracy. A dominant role in organization of party work is played by the party leaders, whereas the role of party members is secondary¹⁴. A kind of exception is parliamentary factions, which may have/presuppose sufficient level of democracy during discussions and less at decision making. However, such case is presupposed not only by the status of a parliamentary deputy (absence of imperative mandate), but also by dependence of the elections results on personal characteristics of deputies. Correspondingly, absence or partial character of reforms, corruption, generally low level of democracy in the country are predetermined by a low level of inner-party democracy as well.

Additional consequence is negative attitude of the majority of citizens to a political party as a public institution. According to the data provided by Razumkov Centre on October 2017, 75.1% of respondents spoke of absolute or more or less distrust in current political parties of Ukraine. Only 13.1% of respondents¹⁵ reported on their full or partial confidence in Ukrainian parties.

¹¹ The CVU's report: State of political parties before the beginning of state funding [Electronic resource] – Access mode: cvu.org.ua

¹² Party coverage of regions of Ukraine: who has the biggest number of representative offices? [Electronic resource]. – 2016. – Access mode: <https://www.oporaua.org/novyny/42514-partiine-pokryttia-rehioniv-ukrainy-khto-maja-najbilshche-predstavnytstv>

¹³ Party coverage of regions of Ukraine: who has the biggest number of representative offices? [Electronic resource]. – 2016. – Access mode: <https://www.oporaua.org/novyny/42514-partiine-pokryttia-rehioniv-ukrainy-khto-maja-najbilshche-predstavnytstv>

¹⁴ Additionally the reason for such conclusion is information as to the possibility to buy a party. In particular, journalists state that on the website OLS in the division "Business for sale" there were several advertisements concerning selling a political party. See: Party in Ukraine can be bought for \$20 000 - \$75 000. [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <http://arksam.livejournal.com>

¹⁵ Attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to public institutions, electoral orientations [Electronic resource]. – 2017 – Access mode: <http://razumkov.org.ua>

The Stages of Installation and Institutional, Procedural, Political and Behavioral Attributes of Semi-Presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine: Comparative Analysis¹

The research is dedicated to conceptualization, systematization and comparing the attributes and stages of installation and development of semi-presidential system of government in Poland and Ukraine. It was argued that semi-presidentialism should be defined the least subjectively or minimally (or in an institutional and procedural way), but should be classified the most broadly or maximally (or in an institutional, procedural, political and behavioral way). Based on this, it was found that we need to classify semi-presidentialism in a versatile way, i.e. institutionally, procedurally, politically, behaviorally and synthetically. Accordingly, it was found that reflection on semi-presidentialism in singular can be only definitive, but such a logic is unacceptable in the classification of semi-presidentialism, because different “adjectives” and attributes of semi-presidentialism refer to different formal and factual types, phases and scenarios of the analyzed system of government. The researcher reasoned that as of 2017 Poland and Ukraine experienced very similar types of semi-presidentialism, which were determined with the unified majority systems within the constructions of balanced premier-presidentialism. At the same time, it was found that the powers of the various political actors within the conditions of semi-presidentialism are determined with formal, constitutional, institutional, procedural, political, behavioral, party, electoral and personal factors.

Keywords: semi-presidentialism, attributes and types of semi-presidentialism, Poland, Ukraine.

Етапи становлення та інституційно-процесуальні і політично-поведінкові атрибути напівпрезиденталізму в Польщі й Україні: порівняльний аналіз

Дослідження присвячено концептуалізації, систематизації і порівнянню атрибутів й етапів розвитку напівпрезидентської системи державного правління в Польщі й Україні. Аргументовано, що напівпрезиденталізм повинен дефініюватись якомога менш суб'єктивно або мінімалістсько (інституційно-процесуально), але має типологізуватись якомога

¹ The article is prepared (in terms of its translation and correction) and published with the financial assistance of the International Visegrad Fund, in particular within the Visegrad University Studies Grant No. 61450033, which is conducted by the Department of Political Science of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv and aims at the implementation of the course “Comparative analysis of political institutions of V4 and other CEE countries”. Vitaliy Lytvyn is one of the coordinators of the ongoing grant.

ширше або максималістсько (інституційно-процесуально і політично-поведінково). На цій підставі виявлено, що типологізувати напівпрезиденталізм треба різносторонньо – інституційно-процесуально, політично-поведінково і синтетично. Відтак в однині про напівпрезиденталізм можна говорити винятково дефінітивно, але це неприпустимо типологізаційно, бо різні «прикметники» й атрибути напівпрезиденталізму відсилають до різних формальних і фактичних різновидів й фаз/сценаріїв цієї системи правління. Умотивовано, що станом на 2017 р. в Польщі та Україні було здебільшого апробовано дуже схожі різновиди напівпрезиденталізму, які детермінувались системами уніфікованої більшості у межах конструкцій збалансованого прем'єр-президенталізму. Водночас, виявлено, що повноваження різних політичних акторів в умовах напівпрезиденталізму детермінуються формально-конституційно, інституційно-процесуально, політично-поведінково, партологічно, електорально, особистісно тощо.

Ключові слова: *напівпрезиденталізм, атрибути і види напівпрезиденталізму, Польща, Україна.*

Semi-presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism) is one of the most common scenarios of inter-institutional relations in the world and in particular in European countries. At the same time, semi-presidentialism is diversified in contemporary Political Science, especially when it is tangent to various empirical situations of its isolation and operationalization. As a consequence, Political Science usually separates two approaches to the definition of semi-presidentialism. The first one is minimalist approach, which appeals to the institutional and procedural provisions regarding the arrangement of the power institutions and structures, which are contained in constitutions. The second one is maximalist approach, which refers both to the formal institutional and procedural provisions of constitutions and to the actual/real political and behavioral powers of the key institutions of state power in the “president – cabinet – parliament” triangle. It regulates that the maximalist theorizations of semi-presidentialism can be politically or behaviorally oriented. Therefore, they can be based only on the actual powers of political actors, but they also can be both constitutionally (or institutionally) and politically (or behaviorally) oriented or be based on formal (constitutional) and actual (political) nature of the powers of political actors and the system of government itself. Instead, the minimalist theorizations of semi-presidentialism can be exceptionally formally or institutionally oriented, since they are primarily based on the formal (constitutional) nature of the powers of political actors, and their actual or political/behavioral positioning is assessed as auxiliary or indicative.

The situation is clearly evidenced by the situation around defining and theorizing, selecting and allocating the regional cases of semi-presidentialism, in particular in such countries as Poland and Ukraine. These cases, especially the first one, often contradict or combine the minimalist and maximalist theorizations of semi-presidentialism. This is due to the peculiarities of theoretical and

methodological field of various Political Science schools and traditions, which (in Poland, but especially in Ukraine) have only recently begun to explore and operationalize the concept of semi-presidentialism. As the result, today they are characterized by significant regional (especially regional and linguistic) features of verification and choice of theoretical and methodological approaches to the definition of semi-presidentialism. For example, according to Brunclik and Kubat² and on the basis of the minimalist approach, Poland and Ukraine are verified as semi-presidential systems in English-language Political Science, but the scientific positions are significantly different in non-English Political Science based on the maximalist approach. In particular, Poland is often defined as a parliamentary system on the basis of such clarifications as parliamentary-governmental system, deformed and dysfunctional parliamentary system, parliamentary system with strengthened/reinforced president. Somewhat less often, Poland is called a mixed system or a system that is prone to the French model, a system that is averaged between the model of the Fifth Republic and the parliamentary-governmental model, partly parliamentary and partly non-parliamentary system, which tends to a parliamentary-presidential model, a “hybrid” of rationalized parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. On the contrary, Ukraine, continues to gravitate to its definition as a semi-presidential system of government. This is due to the fact that both institutionally and procedurally Poland and Ukraine are consistent with semi-presidentialism, but politically and behaviorally (in particular, taking into account the powers of various political institutions in the “president – cabinet – parliament” triangle) they are differently operationalized as semi-presidential ones. Accordingly, the tasks of theoretical and methodological substantiation of the cases of semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine and of empirical assessment and comparison of their institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes and stages of installation and development are quite interesting and relevant.

In solving the tasks, we appeal to the conceptualization of the needs of the least subjective (or the most dispositive, i.e. institutional and procedural) definition of semi-presidentialism, but also to the broadest (and therefore, relative – on the basis of institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes) typology and taxonomy of semi-presidentialism. This, in turn, means that the selection and defining of semi-presidentialism must be minimalist, and its typology and operationalization should be maximalist. However, this does not mean that semi-presidentialism can be different and can be taxonomied only politically and behaviorally, although, on the other hand, some institutional and procedural attributes are decisive and definitive, while the other attributes are typologizational for semi-presidentialism.

In view of this, we propose to adhere minimalist and the most widespread in Political Science definition of semi-presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism) as a constitutional model of inter-institutional and procedural relations, for which there is a position of popularly elected for a fixed term president (usually as a head of state, but sometimes as a head of state and a head of the executive), as well as positions of prime minister and cabinet, who are necessarily collectively

² M. Brunclik, M. Kubat, *Contradictory Approaches: Discussing Semi-Presidentialism in Central Europe*, „Analele Universității din București. Seria Științe Politice” 2016, vol 18, nr 1, s. 67-79.

responsible to parliament/legislature³. Theoretically, methodologically and operationalizing this definition, we proceed from the assumption that semi-presidentialism can be typified in various ways, i.e. both institutionally and procedurally, on the one hand, and politically and behaviorally, on the other hand, and also on the basis of their synthesis. On the one hand, this is understandable in view of the fact that the method of formation, activity and responsibility of a cabinet and the whole system of executive are the main features of semi-presidentialism, because in the analyzed system of government, an important (albeit differentially distinctive) role in the formation of a cabinet belongs simultaneously to president and parliament, but they are influenced both by institutional and procedural determinants (regulated by law) and by political and behavioral determinants (strongly influenced by the parity of political and party groups in parliament). On the other hand, this is due to the fact that semi-presidentialism is typically characterized by institutionalization and approbation of an inter-institutional model of the so-called “dual executive”, when both president and prime minister/cabinet (which are different in their powers) simultaneously or adjacently (but not almost equally) are endowed with executive powers.

As a result, semi-presidentialism is institutionally, procedurally and formally divided into premier-presidentialism/parliament-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism (in particular, on the basis of the way of collective responsibility of cabinet)⁴. In the first case, the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible exclusively to parliament, and the relations between the institutions in the “president – cabinet – parliament” triangle are traditionally transactional. Instead and in the second case, the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible both to president and parliament, and therefore the relations between political institutions are hierarchical and transactional. In turn, semi-presidentialism is politically, behaviorally and actually divided into the unified majority, divided majority, divided minority⁵ and unified minority⁶ systems (in particular, taking into account the influence of the party composition of parliament and cabinet and of the party membership of president on the division of powers of political institutions). In the unified majority system, the head of state is a member or supporter of the course of the party of the prime minister, but the president and the prime minister being the members of a single “cabinet team” (i.e. not being the opponents of each other) are supported by an identical parliamentary majority. In the divided majority system, which is described by the term of “cohabitation”, the head of state, unlike the prime minister, is not endowed with the majority in legislature, is not a member or supporter of the course of the party of the prime minister and does

³ R. Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism: An Increasingly Common Constitutional Choice*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, Y.-S. Wu (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Springer 2011, s. 1-20.; R. Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations*, „Political Studies Review” 2004, vol 2, nr 3, s. 314-330.; R. Elgie, *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1-21.

⁴ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; M. Shugart, *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] A. W. Rhodes, S. Binder, B. Rockman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344-365.; M. Shugart, *Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns*, „French Politics” 2005, vol 3, nr 3, s. 323-351.

⁵ C. Skach, *The Newest Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism*, „J-con” 2007, vol 5, nr 1, s. 93-121.

⁶ V. Lytvyn, *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatyvnyi riznovyd naptivprezydentalizmu: perevirka dotsilnosti vykremlemnia ta kontseptualizatsii*, Tezy zvitnoi naukovoii konferentsii filosofskoho fakultetu LNU im. I. Franka, Liutyi 2017.

not constitute a “cabinet team” (instead of being his opponent). In the divided minority system, neither the president nor the prime minister (and no one in this perspective in general) being opponents of each other does not have the majority support in legislature. In the unified minority system, neither the president nor the prime minister has the support of parliamentary majority, but the president and the prime minister are from the same party or are associated with an identical political party/coalition or are political associates of each other. Finally, semi-presidential systems are synthetically (institutionally, procedurally, politically and behaviorally) and both formally and actually divided (in particular, on the basis of the peculiarities of dual executive, as well as of the strengths of formal and actual powers of presidents and prime ministers) into those, where there are: weak/nominal (or ceremonial/figurehead) heads of state and strong prime ministers/cabinets (i.e. parliamentarized semi-presidentialism); strong (or very strong/all-powerful) heads of state and weak/nominal prime ministers/cabinets (presidentialized semi-presidentialism); balanced/compatible scenarios by the executive powers of heads of state and prime ministers/cabinets (balanced semi-presidentialism)⁷. Or, similarly, on the basis of formal and actual powers of presidents and parliaments regarding the implementation of legislation and actual party composition of legislatures, semi-presidentialism stadially or phasely should be classified for such varieties⁸ as: president-dominant (when president has unilateral powers to issue decrees with the force of laws, veto powers and controls parliamentary majority), premier-dominant (when president does not have significant powers and is a symbolic leader, but prime minister manages a majority in legislature), parliament-dominant (when president does not have significant powers, cabinet is a minority one and opposition manages legislative majority against president and cabinet), cohabitational (when president is given a reserve mandate, head of cabinet controls legislative majority and belongs to the party, which is in opposition to president), balanced (in which mutually oppositional president and parliament have the same actual political powers and therefore compete for power to legislate).

Theoretically and methodologically, this means that by imposing on the minimalist definition of semi-presidentialism its versatile and diffused typologies we obtain the maximalist concept of a semi-presidential system of government with “adjectives”. This argues that semi-presidentialism in the singular can only be said to be definitive, but this is unacceptable in the context of typologies. The fact is that various “adjectives” and attributes of semi-presidentialism send us to various formal and actual varieties and phases/scenarios of this system of governance, which are indicated in the cut of relationships between constitutional or legislative norms and political or behavioral practice. This empirically and operationally determines that as of 2017 Poland (only actually – in 1990/1992–1997, but constitutionally and actually – since 1997) and Ukraine (only actually – in 1991–1995, but constitutionally and actually – since 1996) were positioned as semi-presidential countries according to their systems of government (as shown in Tables 1–5).

⁷ O. Amorim Neto, K. Ström, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2006, vol 36, s. 619-643.; R. Elgie, *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 1-13.

⁸ T. Jung-Hsiang, *Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock*, „French Politics“ 2008, vol 6, nr 1, s. 63-84.; C. Skach, *Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy*, „Constitutional Political Economy“ 2005, vol 16, s. 347-368.

Table 1. The minimalist defining attributes of semi-presidentialism and their descriptors in Poland and Ukraine (as of 2017)⁹

Country (the years of the introduction of semi-presidentialism)	Popular election of the president for a fixed term	Fixed term of presidential powers, years	The maximum number of presidential terms	Collective responsibility of prime minister/ cabinet to legislature	Regulation of the parliamentary vote of no confidence in prime minister/ cabinet	The subjects of the election of prime minister of cabinet	The dualization of executive by president and prime minister/ cabinet	Presidential status as head of state	The status of prime minister as head of cabinet
Poland (1990/1992)	Yes (29)	5 (29.4)	Not > than 2 in total (29.4)	Yes + individual (66, 67.1)	Yes (64)	President (and parliament) (57)	Yes (28, 53)	Yes	Yes
Poland (1997)	Yes (127.1)	5 (127.2)	Not > than 2 in total (127.2)	Yes + individual (157)	Yes (158)	President (and parliament) (154)	Yes (126.1, 148.1)	Yes	Yes
Ukraine (1996/2006/2010/2014)	Yes (103)	5 (103)	Not > than 2 in total + ∞ cycles (with pauses) (103)	Yes (not specified)	Yes (115)	President (and parliament) (114)	Yes (102, 114)	Yes	Yes

Źródło: Z. Elkins, T. Ginsburg, J. Melton, *The Endurance of National Constitutions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. V. Lytvyn, *Napiwprezydentski systemy v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: determinanty definiuvannya*, [w:] Z. Baloblockiy, A. Romanyuk (eds.), *Transformacje ustrojowe w Europie Srodkowej i Wschodniej*, Kutno 2012, s. 207-225.

⁹ The brackets contain the articles of the constitutions regulating the distinct attributes and descriptors of semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine. No appeal to special laws has been made.

This is primarily apparent in a definitive way, since there were the positions of popularly elected for a fixed term president as well as prime minister and cabinet, which were collectively responsible to parliaments/legislatures both in Poland and Ukraine (see Table 1). However, semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine has been and remains highly diversified. Firstly, the reasons for choosing a semi-presidential system of government are significantly different. For example, in Poland and Ukraine in the early 90's of the XX century, there primarily were attempts to reach a compromise by political elites between the supporters of presidentialism and parliamentarism, in particular regarding the introduction of the institution of a popularly elected head of state. At the same time, Poland was determined by the fact that the rational appeal to the constitutional model of inter-institutional relations as an objective and instrument for the regulation of executive in the conditions of political instability played an important role in choosing the "option" of semi-presidentialism. Secondly, the key constitutional powers of political institutions in the "president – cabinet – parliament" triangle also vary and differ greatly. This mainly concerns the powers of popularly elected presidents, which, although they allow to interpret Poland and Ukraine as semi-presidential systems, essentially differentiate them institutionally, procedurally, politically and behaviorally (see Table 2). Thirdly, the evolution and cross-taxonomic logic of semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine also differ markedly (see Tables 3 and 4). The explanation is that: a) in Poland, unlike Ukraine in the period of 1995–1996 (when the presidentialism was tested), there was no experience of any other system of government, except semi-presidentialism; b) in Poland, there was exclusively premier-presidentialism, and in Ukraine, there were both premier-presidentialism (in 2006–2010 and since 2014) and president-parliamentarism (in 1996–2006 and 2010–2014); c) in Poland, semi-presidentialism actually (or politically and behaviorally) and traditionally manifests itself in all possible variations, but both formally and actually it turns out as balanced semi-presidentialism. In contrast, in Ukraine, semi-presidentialism actually functions primarily as the unified majority system or the divided majority system, but both formally and actually it mostly turns out as presidentialized or balanced semi-presidentialism. This is accompanied by institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes, peculiarities and differences of formation, functioning and responsibility of cabinets and prime ministers, which are incorporated into parliamentary procedures of investiture votes for new cabinets and parliamentary procedures of votes of confidence or no confidence for current cabinets, as well as by the parameters of party and electoral systems' influence on semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Poland and Ukraine (institutionally and procedurally and to a lesser extent politically and behaviorally) used mostly similar types of semi-presidentialism as of 2017: these types were determined by the unified majority systems within the frameworks of balanced premier-presidentialism. This means that semi-presidentialism outlined the parameters of inter-institutional relations that maximally led to the scenarios of equalization and balancing of the powers of presidents and prime ministers/cabinets.

Table 2. The list of key constitutional (institutional and procedural) powers of popularly elected presidents and their descriptors in semi-presidential Poland and Ukraine (as of 2017)¹⁰

Country	The requirement of official nomination of the head of cabinet by president	The possibility of initiation / confirmation of the resignation of the head of cabinet by president	The possibility of nomination / approval of cabinet by president	The ability of president to dismiss any member of cabinet	The ability of president to dismiss the entire cabinet	The ability of president to dissolve parliament and appoint its election	The ability of president to convene extraordinary sessions of parliament	The power of legislative initiative by president	The way to overcome the presidential veto by legislature	The ability of president to issue decrees with the force of law	The ability of president to initiate a referendum
Poland (1990/1992)	Yes (57)	No/no (64, 66)	Yes/no (57)	No (66, 67)	No	Yes (62)	Not specified	No (15)	2/3 (18.3)	Yes (45)	Yes (19)
Poland (1997)	Yes (154)	No/yes (158.1)	Yes/no (154.1)	No (156.2, 159)	No	Yes (98.4, 98.5, 144.3.3, 225)	Not specified	Yes (118.1, 118.2)	3/5 (122.5, 121.3)	No	Yes (125.2)
Ukraine (1996)	Yes (114)	No/no (115)	No/yes (114)	No (87, 115)	Yes	Yes (90, 106.8)	Yes (83)	Yes (93)	2/3 (94)	Yes (15.4)	Yes (72)
Ukraine (2006)	Yes (114)	No/no (115)	No/no (114)	No (87, 115)	No	Yes (90, 106.8)	Yes (83)	Yes (93)	2/3 (94)	No	Yes (72)
Ukraine (2010)	Yes (114)	No/no (115)	No/no (114)	No (87, 115)	Yes	Yes (90, 106.8)	Yes (83)	Yes (93)	2/3 (94)	No	Yes (72)
Ukraine (2014)	Yes (114)	No/no (115)	No/no (114)	No (87, 115)	No	Yes (90, 106.8)	Yes (83)	Yes (93)	2/3 (94)	No	Yes (72)

Źródło: Z. Elkins, T. Ginsburg, J. Melton, *The Endurance of National Constitutions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009.

¹⁰ The brackets contain the articles of the constitutions regulating the distinct attributes and descriptors of semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine. No appeal to special laws has been made.

Table 3. Institutional, procedural, political and behavioral evolution and typology of semi-presidentialism in Poland (1990–2017)

Period	System of government	Formal type	Formal and actual type		Phase/Scenario	Presidents	Prime ministers	Conflict of executive dualism
			Actual type	Semi-Presidentialism				
December 1990 – October 1992	Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-Presidentialism	Unified majority	Balanced Semi-Presidentialism	President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism	L. Wałęsa (1990–1995)	T. Mazowiecki	Weak
			Divided minority		Parliament-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		J. Bielecki	Medium
			Divided minority		Parliament-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		J. Olszewski	Medium
October 1992 – April 1997	Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-Presidentialism	Divided majority	Balanced Semi-Presidentialism	Cohabitation Semi-Presidentialism	L. Wałęsa (1990–1995)	W. Pawlak 1	Strong
			Divided majority				H. Suchocka 1	Strong
			Divided majority				H. Suchocka 2	Strong
			Divided majority				W. Pawlak 2	Strong
			Unified majority				J. Oleksy	Strong
			Unified majority				W. Cimoszewicz	Weak
April 1997 – and still	Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-Presidentialism	Divided majority		Cohabitation Semi-Presidentialism	A. Kwaśniewski (1995–2000, 2000–2005)	J. Buzek 1	Strong
			Divided minority		Balanced Semi-Presidentialism		J. Buzek 2	Strong
			Unified majority		President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		L. Miller 1	Weak
			Unified minority		Balanced Semi-Presidentialism		L. Miller 2	Weak
			Unified majority		President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		M. Belka	Weak
			Unified minority		Balanced Semi-Presidentialism		K. Marcinkiewicz 1	Weak
			Unified majority		President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		K. Marcinkiewicz 2	Weak
			Unified majority		Balanced Semi-Presidentialism		J. Kaczyński	Weak
			Divided majority		Cohabitation Semi-Presidentialism		D. Tusk 1	Strong
			Unified majority		Premier-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		D. Tusk 2	Weak
			Unified majority				E. Kopacz	Weak
			Unified majority				B. Szydło	Weak

Źródło: Döring H., Manow P., *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].;

L. Sonntag, *Politica*, źródło: <http://www.kolumbus.fi/raajla/sson/> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

Table 4. Institutional, procedural, political and behavioral evolution and typology of semi-presidentialism in Ukraine (1991–2017)

Period	System of government	Formal type		Formal and actual type		Phase/Scenario		Presidents	Prime ministers	Conflict of executive dualism
		Formal type	Actual type	Formal and actual type	Formal and actual type	Formal and actual type	Formal and actual type			
August 1991 – June 1995	Semi-Presidentialism	President-parliamentarism	Divided majority	Balanced Semi-Presidentialism	Parliament-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		L. Kravchuk (1991–1994)	V. Fokin L. Kuchma Y. Zviagilsky V. Masol Y. Marchuk P. Lazarenko 1 P. Lazarenko 2 V. Pustovoitenko V. Yushchenko A. Kinakh V. Yanukovich 1 Y. Tymoshenko 1 Y. Yekhanurov	Weak Strong Medium Weak Medium Medium Strong Weak Strong Weak Weak Strong Weak	
June 1995 – June 1996	Presidentialism	–	–	–	–					
June 1996 – January 2006	Semi-Presidentialism	President-parliamentarism	Unified majority	Presidentialized Semi-Presidentialism	President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		L. Kuchma (1994–1999, 1999–2004)	V. Yanukovich 2 V. Yanukovich 3 Y. Tymoshenko 2	Medium Strong Strong Medium Strong	
January 2006 – October 2010	Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-Presidentialism	Unified majority Divided majority Unified majority	Balanced Semi-Presidentialism	Cohabitation Semi-Presidentialism		V. Yushchenko (2005–2010)	M. Azarov 1 M. Azarov 2 M. Azarov 3	Medium Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak	
October 2010 – February 2014	Semi-Presidentialism	President-parliamentarism	Unified majority	Presidentialized Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		V. Yanukovich (2010–2014)		Weak Weak Weak	
February 2014 – and still	Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-Presidentialism	Unified majority	Balanced Semi-Presidentialism	Premier-dominant Semi-Presidentialism President-dominant Semi-Presidentialism		O. Turchynov (acting) (2014) P. Poroshenko (2014 – and still)	A. Yatsenyuk 1 A. Yatsenyuk 2 V. Groysman	Weak Medium Weak	

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]; F. Casal Bértoa, *Database on Who Governs in Europe and Beyond*, Wyd. PSGo 2017, Źródło: <http://www.whogovems.eu> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]; L. Sonntag, *Politica*, Źródło: <http://www.kolumbus.fi/taqilaesson/> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

It is noteworthy that the premier-presidential nature of Polish and Ukrainian semi-presidentialism (see Table 5), at least as of 2017, gave all bases to argue that premier-presidentialism contributed to inter-institutional balance and compromise between presidents and parliaments with regard to formation, functioning and responsibility of cabinets, as well as to national governance, political system and political process. The explanation is that the heads of states traditionally (to a greater extent in Poland and to a lesser extent in Ukraine) had no unilateral power neither over cabinets nor over legislatures, and therefore their influence on the systems of government hypothetically could be complicated in the case of opposition to majority in parliaments¹¹. In this section, the definition of the relationship between presidents and legislatures on the basis of verifying and taking into account whether heads of states control parliamentary majority and its structure was a determinant factor of inter-institutional relations in premier-presidentialism. In this context, the traditions and peculiarities of governance, inter-institutional relations and constitutional culture, patterns of party and electoral systems, as well as unconstitutional factors, in particular personal characteristics of presidents, prime ministers, speakers of parliaments, peculiarities of the concrete historical context and specifics of political traditions in every premier-presidential state (both at the level of separate political actors and of the whole society) had a supplementary value.

More specifically and typologically, it was noticed that as of 2017 the systems of balanced semi-presidentialism used in Poland and Ukraine were not theoretically characterized by the decisive dominance of the powers of president or prime minister/cabinets, in particular regarding the exercise of executive. Instead, this type of systems was characterized by the shift in the supremacy of presidents and prime ministers to a stronger personalization of the systems of government (in particular, by the powers of presidents or prime ministers) and accordingly by complication of executive dualism. According to some scholars, this logic theoretically and methodologically is able to generate different scenarios of “blocked” constitutional and inter-institutional conflicts, especially when voters do not provide a parliamentary majority to any of the centers/actors of the executive¹² (which was not a characteristic of neither Poland nor Ukraine at the time of the analysis). At the same time, neither president nor prime minister in this version of semi-presidentialism are not symbolic national leaders as they are entrusted with significant powers to influence the adoption and implementation of political and executive decisions. But the paradox is that this causes or at least may cause intensifying the conflicts between president and prime minister in the system of dual executive, since their constitutional and legal powers are compatible or almost compatible, but prime minister actually prevails on most issues.

¹¹ P. Schleiter, *Mixed Constitutions and Political Instability: Russia 1991-1993*, „Democratization“ 2003, vol 10, nr 1, s. 1-26.; R. Elgie, *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011, s. 19-42.

¹² J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, s. 286.; V. Lyrvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kohabitatsii v napivprezidentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, „Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii“ 2011, vol 4, s. 140-149.

Table 5. The attributes and parameters of premier-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine (as of 2017)¹³

Country	President's ability to dismiss cabinet	Parliament's ability to dismiss cabinet (vote of no confidence in cabinet)	The requirement for an official nomination of prime minister by president	The possibility of official nomination of cabinet by president	The requirement for parliament to participate in the vote of investiture in prime minister (composition of cabinet)	The possibility of official confirmation of the composition of cabinet by president	The requirement for official confirmation of the resignation of prime minister by president	The ability of president to dismiss any members of cabinet	The ability of president to dissolve parliament and appoint its election	The ability of president to issue decrees with the force of law	The ability of president to initiate a referendum on his own
Poland (1990–1997)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poland (since 1997)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ukraine (2006–2010)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ukraine (since 2014)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

Źródło: Z. Elkins, T. Ginsburg, J. Melton, *The Endurance of National Constitutions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009.

¹³ Gray highlights indicate the periods of semi-presidentialism, when premier-presidentialism had been tested earlier, but was not relevant at the time of the analysis.

At the same time, the models of balanced semi-presidentialism in Poland and Ukraine, being the unified majority systems in 2017, were further determined by the way they were influenced by the positions of presidents and prime ministers in the structure of their parties' hierarchy. It is theoretically known that when a party leader becomes a head of state he dominates the executive system. Instead, if head of state is not a leader of a political party and a party is headed by head of cabinet, the format of their relations depends on the internal party parameters. However, it often happens that head of cabinet and not head of state dominates the balanced construction of semi-presidentialism (for example, in Poland during the presidency of B. Komorowski and the premiership of D. Tusk or in Ukraine during the period of O. Turchynov's interim presidency and the premiership A. Yatsenyuk). Similarly, the opposition of a popularly elected president to a parliamentary majority, whose leader is prime minister, or the combination of the leadership potential of president and prime minister in a situation, when head of state is a disciplined member of the majority in legislature, does not mean that head of state is weaker than head of cabinet and cannot act against his or her will¹⁴. In addition, the powers of presidents may be weaker than the powers of prime ministers, even if the former relies on his (his party) parliamentary majority, which guarantees the support of prime minister and cabinet from the same political party. Finally, a rather significant factor in structuring inter-institutional relations within the framework of balanced semi-presidentialism is the possibility when neither president nor prime minister is the head of the party of parliamentary majority (as in Poland during the presidency of A. Duda and the premiership B. Szydlo who were the representatives of "Law and Justice"), but instead political leadership in the system of government is informed "from the outside". For example, by the first person in the party hierarchy, even though such a person does not necessarily have to be endowed with an official position (as Y. Kaczynski in the role of the leader of "Law and Justice"). This situation is also theoretically and methodologically diversified by the fact that not all presidents and not all prime ministers are affiliated or related to certain political/parliamentary parties.

In sum, all this argues that the "contours" of the powers of presidents and other political institutions in a balanced semi-presidentialism are at the "crossing" of formal and informal inter-institutional relations of political actors. Political actors, in turn, are characterized by the attributes of inter-party, intra-party and non-party competition within legislatures, which, as stated above, are imposed on the formal powers of political actors and on the historical traditions of the rule of each of them. In other words, the political powers of heads of states and other political actors in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are determined formally, constitutionally, institutionally, procedurally, politically, behaviorally, electorally, personally etc. and cannot be defined as statically established and exclusively normatively determined¹⁵. Such a conclusion is particularly relevant in the case when the constitutional powers of presidents

¹⁴ R. Elgie, *Diverger, Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype*, „West European Politics“ 2009, vol 32, nr 2, s. 248-267.

¹⁵ J. Cheibub, *Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work*, „Texas Law Review“ 2009, vol 87, nr 7, s. 1375-1407.

and other political institutions within semi-presidentialism are balanced and even dualized/ paired as much as possible or when the powers of political institutions/actors are very weakly (constitutionally and legally) clarified/regulated.

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7. Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism: An Increasingly Common Constitutional Choice*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Springer 2011, s. 1-20.
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Votes of confidence/investiture as conditions for formation of minority governments in the European Parliamentary Democracies: a statistical cut

Political theory and practice show that parliamentary democracies, including in Europe, independently or almost independently of the forms and systems of government that they are implementing, are divided into systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. An indicator of the dichotomy is presence (constitutionally provided) or absence (constitutionally unprovided) of the vote of confidence/investiture in expected/hypothetical government. It actualizes the issue of the influence of vote of confidence/investiture on the formation of minority governments (and other types of governments) in the European parliamentary democracies. Accordingly, the article is dedicated to analyzing the institute of vote of confidence/investiture and statistical outlining its impact on the formation of minority government in European parliamentary democracies. It is argued that the presence or absence of votes of confidence/investiture and their combinations and procedural patterns affect the frequency of formation of minority governments in different ways. Among such patterns there are the following: participation or non-participation of parliament in the procedure of vote of confidence/investiture and formation of government (presence or absence of vote of investiture); type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture («ex ante» or «ex post»); the rule of deciding on a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in a government (by absolute, relative or negative parliamentary majority); permissible number of formateurs or alternatives of governments for parliamentary vote of investiture; the right to nominate prime ministers/formateurs or alternatives of governments; the number of attempts to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture; consequence of the failure to get vote of confidence/investiture. As a consequence, checking the correlation between the various patterns of votes of investiture and the frequency of formation of minority governments generally shows that the institutional design of votes investiture mostly and averaging does not affect the frequency of formation of minority governments, although some patterns of votes of investiture are decisive.

Keywords: government, minority government, parliamentary democracy, vote of confidence/investiture.

ВОТУМИ ДОВІРИ/ІНВЕСТИТУРИ ЯК УМОВИ ФОРМУВАННЯ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ: СТАТИСТИЧНИЙ ЗРІЗ

Проаналізовано інститут вотуму довіри/інвеститури і статистично окреслено його вплив на формування урядових кабінетів меншості у європейських парламентських демократіях. Аргументовано, що наявність чи відсутність вотумів довіри/інвеститури і їхні комбінації та процедурні патерни по-різному впливають на частоту формування урядів меншості. Зокрема, перевірка кореляції різних патернів вотумів інвеститури та частоти формування урядів меншості узагальнено демонструє, що інституційний дизайн вотумів довіри/інвеститури здебільшого усереднено не впливає на частоту формування урядів меншості, хоч окремі патерни вотумів довіри/інвеститури у цьому контексті є визначальними.

Ключові слова: уряд, уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, вотум довіри/інвеститури.

Political theory and practice prove that parliamentary democracies, including those in Europe, independently or almost independently of the forms and systems of government actualized in them are divided into the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. An indicator of such dichotomy is the presence (constitutionally provided) or absence (constitutionally unprovided) of the vote of confidence/investiture in expected/hypothetical governments. Herewith, the votes of confidence/investiture are distinguished first of all on the basis of the fact whether voting for government formation is constitutionally conditioned and presupposed, what is especially actual from the perspective of minority government formation. Moreover, the rules of government formation differ on the basis of the procedural features of gaining vote of confidence/investiture by the cabinets on the part of legislature: in the format of absolute, relative or negative majority. Finally, the vote of confidence/investiture in governments is important with a glance to their subject and the stage of government-forming processes they are actualized at. In general it raises the problem of influence of the vote of confidence/investiture on the formation of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies.

It can be traced in reliance on theoretical-methodological and empirical results of research by T. Bergman¹, D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan and A. Merlo², J. Druckman and M. Theis³, T. Lou-

¹ T. Bergman, W. Müller, K. Strøm, M. Blomgren, *Democratic delegation and accountability: cross-national patterns*, [w:] K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 109–220.; T. Bergman, *Formation Rules and Minority Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 55–66.

² D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, A. Merlo, *Bicameralism and Government Formation*, "PIER Working Paper Archive" 2007, nr. 07–010.

³ J. Druckman, M. Theis, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2002, vol 46, nr. 4, s. 760–771.

werse⁴, A. Lupia⁵, C. Nikolenyi⁶, U. Sieberer⁷, K. Strom, W. Muller and D. Smith⁸, J. Huber⁹, G. Tsebelis and J. Money¹⁰, J. Cheibub, S. Martin and B. Rasch¹¹ and many others. However, we argue that the statistical review of influence of votes of confidence/investiture on minority governments formation in European parliamentary democracies is poorly researched and thus it becomes the aim of the current paper.

Appealing to modern scientific literature, while solving the operating objective, as well as taking into account institutional-electoral patterns of minority government formation and specification of votes of confidence/investiture in European parliamentary democracies we distinguish several distinctive parameters of classification of attributes of parliamentary votes of investiture in governments and compare them with the frequency of minority government formation within the European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism (or in general in European parliamentary democracies) over 1944–2016. We propose to consider a range of basic markers of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in European parliamentary democracies over the defined time period (see Table 1) and their (each one separately) total correlation with the frequency of minority government formation as to all (party and non-party) governmental cabinets (see Table 2).

First of all, it is necessary to take into consideration the simplest distinction of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture, elaborated by K. Strom, W. Muller and D. Smith, the essence of which reduces to distinguishing the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism among European democracies, in which are present (constitutionally provided) or absent (constitutionally unprovided) parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governments¹². Thus, it is proposed to take into account the fact whether the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament (sometimes, as in Italy and Romania, two chambers of bicameral

⁴ T. Louwse, *Unpacking “positive” and “negative” parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, 18 s.

⁵ A. Lupia, *Delegation and its Perils*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman (ed.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.

⁶ C. Nikolenyi, *The Impact of Government Formation Rules in Four Post-Communist Democracies*, Paper prepared for delivery at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Fukuoka, July 10, 2006, 23 s.

⁷ U. Sieberer, *Live or Fire? The link between cabinet selection and removal in European Democracies*, Wyd. University of Konstanz, 2012.

⁸ K. Strom, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 261–289.; K. Strom, W. Müller, D. Smith, *Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 2010, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 517–535.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary democracy and delegation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 55–108.

⁹ J. Huber, *The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Political Science Review” 1996, vol 90, nr. 2, s. 269–282.

¹⁰ G. Tsebelis, J. Money, *Bicameralism*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

¹¹ J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper presented at the workshop on “The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights”, Istanbul, October 23–25, 2013, 25 s.; J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins*, Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, 44 s.; B. Rasch, *Institutional Foundations of Legislative Agenda-Setting*, [w:] S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, K. Strom (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 455–480.; B. Rasch, S. Martin, J. Cheibub, N. Ajenjo, *Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules*, Wyd. University of Oslo 2015.; B. Rasch, *The vote of investiture in parliaments: types, origin, causes and political consequences*, Proposal for the ECPR Research Sessions, EUI Florence, June 19–22, 2012.

¹² K. Strom, W. Müller, D. Smith, *Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 2010, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 517–535.

parliament)¹³ participates in the procedure of vote of confidence/investiture in government formation. Such distinction is principal, as it argues that parliaments' (positive and negative) votes of confidence/investiture in governmental cabinets are peculiar not only of all systems of positive parliamentarianism in Europe, but also even of some systems of negative parliamentarianism in Europe (in particular in Portugal and Sweden). This means that the presence or absence of any type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture should not be regarded as a direct conclusion of the type of parliamentary democracy, both positive or negative parliamentarianism, though in case of negative parliamentarianism parliaments' votes of confidence/investiture in governments are not usually found. On the contrary, there are some evidence of the systems of positive or negative parliamentarianism like a combination of factors: a) absence or presence of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governments; b) in case of presence of votes of confidence/investiture in governments – their procedure-distinctive attributes. In the context of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies such conclusion is rather valuable, as it argues that minority governments are formed with the same frequency in the systems, where parliamentary votes of investiture in governmental cabinets are constitutionally provided (30,1%) and constitutionally unprovided (28,7%). At the same time, in European systems of negative parliamentarianism minority governments are formed more often in those countries where parliamentary (though negative) votes of confidence/investiture in governments (Portugal, Sweden) are regularized, than in the countries, where parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture are not regularized (in particular Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, France and the United Kingdom). Quite interesting is the fact that the frequency of minority government formation under condition of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture is higher in the systems of negative (54,7%) and not positive (27,0%) parliamentarianism (regardless whether in Western (22,5%) or Central-Eastern (29,7%) Europe).

Secondly, it is necessary to take into account procedure-distinctive attributes of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governments, especially the stage of government-forming process or inter-party negotiations at which the voting for confidence/investiture in governmental cabinet takes place. The point is that the vote of investiture in government can be actualized at the beginning of negotiations over government formation or nominally at the end of such negotiations (if they are to be successful). Thus, as scientists state, it is possible to distinguish advanced ("ex ante") and subsequent ("ex post") variants of the vote of investiture¹⁴. In the first case we speak of a political (political-legal) act, by means of which the parliament or leading

¹³ J. Druckman, M. Theis, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2002, vol 46, nr. 4, s. 760–771.

¹⁴ J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper presented at the workshop on "The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights", Istanbul, October 23–25, 2013, 25 s.; A. Lupia, *Delegation and its Perils*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman (ed.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary democracy and delegation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 55–108.

chamber of the parliament elects or reelects the way of formation of the expected (hypothetical) governmental cabinet. Consequently, in case of the advanced vote of confidence/investiture a large part of government-forming negotiation process, in particular what concerns structuring of the government's political platform and division of ministerial posts between parties, takes place immediately after receiving the vote of investiture by the government. However, taking into account the subsequent vote of confidence/investiture we speak of approbation of the procedure, in according to which the expected (hypothetical) governmental cabinet and its composition (and also predominantly the government's political program) are tested for the status quo and support of the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. In fact we are referring to the scenario of a "factual" vote of confidence/investiture in the governmental cabinet, when deputies of the parliament or its leading chamber check the support of the prime-minister, composition of the government and/or its program.

Table 1. Peculiarities of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism and their correlation with number/frequency of minority government formation (1944–2016)¹⁵

Country	Number (frequency) of minority governmental cabinets	Participation of parliament in vote of confidence/investiture and government formation	Tolerance: quantity of forming bodies or alternatives to governments for investiture	Right to nominate prime-ministers/ forming bodies or alternatives to governments	Number of attempts to get parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture	Type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture	Rules to adopt decision as to parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture	Effect of failure to get parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES								
Belgium (1946–1994)	7/46 (15.2)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Absolute majority	New attempt
Belgium (since 1994)		Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Absolute majority	New attempt
Greece (1974–2001)	2/24 (8.3)	Yes	1	Head of the state, Party groups	Unprovided	Advanced	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament
Greece (since 2001)		Yes	1	Party groups	Unprovided	Advanced	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament
Ireland (since 1944)	13/27 (48.1)	Yes	1	Parliament, head of the state	Unprovided	Advanced + subsequent	Relative majority	New attempt
Spain (since 1977)	1/15 (7.3)	Yes	1	Head of the state, speaker of the parliament	Unprovided	Advanced	Absolute majority/ Relative majority	New attempt/ Dissolution of parliament
Italy (since 1946)	26/66 (39.4)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Relative majority	New attempt
Malta (since 1962)	1/15 (6.7)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Advanced	Absolute majority	New attempt
Germany (since 1949)	0/25 (0.0)	Yes	>1	Head of the state, 25% of deputies, party groups	3	Advanced	Absolute majority/ Relative majority	Government under head of state or dissolution of chamber
Finland (since 2000)	0/10 (0.0)	Yes	>1	Parliament, head of the state	3	Advanced	Relative majority	Government formation
France (1946–1958)	3/26 (11.5)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Advanced	Absolute majority	Dissolution of parliament
SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM IN CENTRAL–EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES								
Bulgaria (since 1990)	5/73 (38.5)	Yes	1	Head of the state, party groups	3	Advanced + subsequent	Relative majority	Provisional government + dissolution of parliament
Estonia (since 1992)	4/16 (25.0)	Yes	>1	Head of the state, parliament	3	Advanced	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament
Latvia (since 1990)	9/24 (37.5)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Relative majority	New attempt
Lithuania (since 1990)	6/19 (31.6)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Advanced + subsequent	Relative majority	Unprovided
Poland (1989–1992)	3/5 (60.0)	Yes	1	Parliament	Unprovided	Advanced	Absolute majority	Unprovided
Poland (1992–1997)	0/4 (0.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state, parliament	4	Subsequent	Absolute majority/ Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament/ Provisional government

¹⁵ Frequency analysis of minority governments – in relation to party and non-party governments. The analysis comprises temporary in charge governmental cabinets. The table is made up on the basis of existing statistical data and national constitutions.

Table 1 continuation

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Poland (since 1997)	3/12 (25.0)	Yes	>1	Head of the state parliament, 10% of deputies	3	Subsequent	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Romania (since 1990)	14/22 (63.6)	Yes	1	Head of the state	2	Subsequent	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Serbia (since 2007)	0/5 (0.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Absolute majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Slovakia (1990–1999)	6/17 (35.3)	Yes	1	Head of the state	3	Subsequent	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Slovakia (since 1999)	4/16 (25.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state	3	Subsequent	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Slovenia (since 1990)	4/16 (25.0)	Yes	1 > 1	Head of the state, party groups, 10 deputies	3	Advanced	Absolute majority/ Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Hungary (1990–2011)	2/11 (18.2)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Advanced + subsequent	Absolute majority	New attempt	
Hungary (since 2011)	6/11 (54.5)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Absolute majority	New attempt	
Croatia (since 2000)	5/16 (31.3)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Relative majority	Provisional government + dissolution of parliament	
Czech Republic (1990–2013)	5/16 (31.3)	Yes	1	Head of the state	3	Subsequent	Relative majority	Government under head of state accepted by the speaker of parliament or dissolution of parliament	
Czech Republic (since 2013)	0/5 (0.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state	3	Subsequent	Relative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Montenegro (since 2006)	0/5 (0.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Absolute majority	New attempt	
SYSTEMS OF NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES									
Austria (since 1945)	2/34 (5.9)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Denmark (1945–1953)	36/39 (92.3)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Denmark (since 1953)	6/33 (18.2)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Iceland (since 1946)	0/21 (0.0)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Luxembourg (since 1945)	8/32 (25.0)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
The Netherlands (1946–1983)	20/31 (64.5)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
The Netherlands (since 1983)	4/10 (40.0)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Norway (1945–2006)	7/14 (50.0)	Yes	1	Head of the state	3	Subsequent	Negative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
Norway (since 2006)	3/26 (11.5)	Yes	1	Head of the state	Unprovided	Subsequent	Negative majority	New attempt	
Portugal (1975–1982)	9/44 (20.5)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
Portugal (since 1982)	8/39 (20.5)	No	–	Head of the state	–	–	–	–	
The United Kingdom (since 1945)	23/31 (74.2)	Yes	1	Head of the state	4	Advanced	Negative majority	Dissolution of parliament	
The United Kingdom (before 2000)	23/31 (74.2)	Yes	1	Speaker of the parliament	4	Advanced	Negative majority	Dissolution of parliament	

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.06.2017]

As many scientists¹⁶ state an advanced type of vote of investiture is more flexible, as the parliament or its leading chamber have several “implicit” variants/alternatives for the expected/hypothetical governmental cabinets. In this case there is a higher possibility of forming minority cabinets, especially in those countries, where there is no confidence in majority government formation. Though, on the other hand, namely advanced votes of confidence/investiture are more longstanding, and thus make an artificial obstacle in the way of minority government formation.

The situation becomes more complicated due to those European parliamentary democracies, where exists the combination of advanced and subsequent votes of confidence/investiture in governments. As a rule they are characterized by a staged manner, as at first they apply the advanced vote of confidence/investiture to confirm a candidacy for a post of the prime-minister (forming body) and/or personal composition of the government and later use the subsequent vote of confidence to approve the political program of the government (or a political program and personal composition of the government). The examples of such combination of two types of votes of investiture among European parliamentary democracies are Ireland, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary (exclusively systems of positive parliamentarism). The frequency of minority government formation in such systems is rather high (36,7 %), though it is limited by a small number of instances of minority governments. Among all European parliamentary democracies minority cabinets are the most frequently formed as a result of a combination of advanced and subsequent votes of confidence/investiture (36,7 %), less commonly as a result of applying subsequent votes of confidence/investiture (30,9 %) and most rarely in case of using advanced votes of confidence/investiture (27,3 %). But the conclusion is not performed in case of some groups of parliamentary democracies. Thus, in systems of positive parliamentarism in Western Europe minority governments are the most frequent when the advanced and subsequent votes of investiture are combined (Ireland – 46,2 %), less frequent – in case of applying the subsequent vote of investiture (Belgium, Italy – 29,7 %), the least commonly used – when the advanced vote of investiture is applied (Greece, Spain, Malta, Germany, Finland (since 2000), France (in 1945–1958) – 12,7 %). Another situation is observed within the systems of positive parliamentarism in Central-Eastern Europe: the most common are cases of the subsequent vote of investiture (Latvia, Poland since 1992, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic – 37,4 %), less common are cases of the advanced vote of investiture (Estonia, Poland 1989-1992m Slovenia – 31,4 %), the least frequent are cases when the advanced and subsequent votes of investiture are combined (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary – 31 %). In general, the situation in European systems of positive parliamentarism and all parliamentary democracies follows the logics of the countries with positive parliamentarism in Western Europe. A bit different are the systems of negative parliamentarism where the

¹⁶ J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper presented at the workshop on “The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights”, Istanbul, October 23–25, 2013, 25 s.; T. Romer, H. Rosenthal, *Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agenda, and the Status Quo*, “Public Choice” 1978, vol 33, nr. 1, s. 27–43.

minority governments are mainly promoted by the advanced votes of confidence/investiture (Sweden – 74,2 %), less – advanced votes of confidence/investiture (Portugal – 40,9 %), the least cases are absence of vote of confidence (the rest of European systems of negative parliamentarianism – 30,9 %). And this proves the conclusions concerning the usage of the advanced distinctive marker of votes of investiture.

Thirdly, quite profound procedural significance in the context of applying votes of confidence (investiture) in the process of government formation belongs to the rules of decision making concerning the votes of confidence (investiture). As the scientists state, the votes of confidence/investiture are divided into positive and negative. Positive votes of investiture are ensured by the support of the qualified, absolute or relative parliamentary majority (including the “rule of majority”¹⁷), whereas negative votes of investiture – are characterized by support of negative (including the “rule of fewer than majority”) parliamentary majority (or by non-objecting absolute parliamentary majority, as there are no other cases for votes of investiture)¹⁸ (see Tables 1, 2, 3). As among European parliamentary democracies as a rule there are no systems of qualified majority for gaining the votes of confidence/investiture, then it is supposed that the strictest parliamentary rule is the system of absolute majority¹⁹.

Among all parliamentary democracies the most frequently minority governmental cabinets are formed in the systems, where negative rules as to the votes of confidence/investiture are standardized, that is within the systems where the votes of confidence/investiture must be supported by a negative majority or be non-objected by an absolute majority of deputies in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. It is peculiar of Portugal and Sweden, where the total/average frequency of minority government formation equals 60,4%.

¹⁷ T. Louwse, *Unpacking “positive” and “negative” parliamentarianism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, s. 4.

¹⁸ T. Bergman, *Formation Rules and Minority Governments*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 57.; J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper presented at the workshop on “The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights”, Istanbul, October 23–25, 2013, 25 s.; J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *To Invest or Not to Invest? Modes of Government Selection in Parliamentary Democracies and their Origins*, Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on «The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences», ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, s. 9.; T. Louwse, *Unpacking “positive” and “negative” parliamentarianism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, s. 3-4.; B. Rasch, *Institutional Foundations of Legislative Agenda-Setting*, [w:] S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, K. Strom (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 455–480.; B. Rasch, S. Martin, J. Cheibub, N. Ajenjo, *Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules*, Wyd. University of Oslo 2015.

¹⁹ J. Cheibub, S. Martin, B. Rasch, *Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Paper presented at the workshop on “The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights”, Istanbul, October 23–25, 2013, 25 s.; J. Druckman, M. Theis, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, “American Journal of Political Science” 2002, vol 46, nr. 4, s. 760–771.; T. Louwse, *Unpacking “positive” and “negative” parliamentarianism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, s. 3.

Table 2. Correlation of frequency of minority government formation in European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism and distinctive parameters of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governments or their absence²⁰

Distinctive parameter of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture	SPP (WE)		SPP (CEE)		SPP (E)		SNP (E)		EPD	
	NMG/ NAG, №	FMG, %	NMG/ NAG, №	FMG, %	NMG/ NAG, №	FMG, %	NMG/ NAG, №	FMG, %	NMG/ NAG, №	FMG, %
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. PARTICIPATION OF PARLIAMENT IN THE PROCEDURE OF VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE AND FORMATION OF GOVERNMENTS (PRESENCE OF THE VOTE OF INVESTITURE)										
Yes	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	32/53	60,4	155/484	32,0
No	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6
2. TYPE OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE										
Advanced	14/110	12,7	11/35	31,4	25/145	17,2	23/31	74,2	48/176	27,3
Subsequent	33/111	29,7	40/107	37,4	73/218	33,5	9/22	40,9	82/240	34,2
Advanced + subsequent	12/26	46,2	13/42	31,0	25/68	36,7	–	–	25/68	36,7
Absence of parliamentary vote of investiture	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6
3. RULE OF DECISION-MAKING CONCERNING THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE										
Absolute majority	11/87	12,6	9/33	27,3	20/120	16,7	–	–	20/120	16,7
Relative majority	40/123	32,5	51/131	38,9	91/254	35,8	–	–	91/254	35,8
Absolute majority/Relative majority	8/37	21,6	4/20	20,0	12/57	21,1	–	–	12/57	21,1
Negative majority	–	–	–	–	–	–	32/53	60,4	32/53	60,4
Absence of the parliamentary vote of investiture	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6

²⁰ Key: SPP – systems of positive parliamentarism; SNP – systems of negative parliamentarism; EPD – European parliamentary democracies; WE – Western Europe; CEE – Central-Eastern Europe; NMG – number of minority governments; KBY – number of all governments; FMG – frequency of minority governments. On the contrary to other data and taking into account present statistics, the analysis was conducted as of April 2015, i.e. retrospectively of some governments, formed over April 2015 – December 2016.

Table 2 continuation

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
4. PERMISSIBLE NUMBER OF FORMING BODIES OR ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENT'S FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE										
1	59/213	27,7	53/143	37,1	112/356	31,5	32/53	60,4	144/409	35,2
>1	0/34	0,0	11/41	26,8	11/75	14,7	–	–	11/75	14,7
Absence of the parliamentary vote of investiture	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6
5. RIGHT TO NOMINATE THE PRIME-MINISTERS/FORMING BODIES OR ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENTS										
Head of the state	37/152	24,3	45/121	37,2	82/273	30,0	99/313	28,8	181/586	30,9
Head of the state and parliament (speaker of the parliament)	20/47	42,6	7/29	24,1	27/76	35,5	–	–	27/76	35,5
Head of the state and party groups/deputies	2/48	4,2	9/29	31,0	11/77	14,3	–	–	11/77	14,3
Parliament (speaker of the parliament)	–	–	3/5	60,0	3/5	60,0	23/31	71,0	26/36	72,2
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6
6. NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE										
2 attempts	–	–	14/21	66,7	14/21	66,7	–	–	14/21	66,7
3 attempts	0/34	0,0	26/85	30,6	26/119	21,8	4/10	40,0	30/129	23,3
4 attempts	–	–	0/4	0,0	0/4	0,0	23/31	74,2	23/35	65,7
Unprovided	59/213	27,7	24/74	32,4	83/287	28,9	5/12	41,7	88/299	29,4
Absence of the parliamentary vote of investiture	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6
7. EFFECT AFTER FAILURE OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE/INVESTITURE										
New attempt to form government	54/164	31,1	11/38	28,9	65/202	32,2	5/12	41,7	70/214	32,7
Dissolution of parliament	5/49	10,2	30/81	37,0	35/130	26,9	27/41	65,9	62/171	36,3
Government under head of state (provisional government)/ dissolution of parliament	0/34	0,0	14/42	33,3	14/76	18,4	–	–	14/76	18,4
Unprovided	–	–	9/23	39,1	9/23	39,1	–	–	9/23	39,1
Absence of the parliamentary vote of investiture	–	–	–	–	–	–	90/291	30,9	90/291	30,9
Total	59/247	23,9	64/184	34,8	123/431	28,5	122/344	35,5	245/775	31,6

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.06.2017]

However, negative rules of decision-making concerning votes of confidence/investiture are inherent exclusively to the systems of negative parliamentarianism, where in such way minority governments are formed even more often, than in case of absence of formal requirements as to the votes of investiture (this concerns the rest of European systems of negative parliamentarianism, frequency of minority government formation equals 30,9%). Speaking of the systems of positive parliamentarianism minority governments are most frequently formed on the basis of the rules concerning the votes of confidence/investiture by an absolute parliamentary majority (in Western Europe (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Finland since 2000) – 32,5 % of minority governments, in Central-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland since 1997, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic) – 38,9 % of minority governments, and in all European systems of positive parliamentarianism – 35,8 % of minority governments). Minority governments are less frequently formed within the systems where the synthesized variants of institutional rules of adopting the votes of confidence/investiture are regularized and approbated: at first by an absolute parliamentary majority, in case of failure – by a relative parliamentary majority. In the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Western European countries (Spain, Germany) the frequency of minority government formation in accordance with such rules of adopting the votes of confidence/investiture equals 21,6 %, in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Central-Eastern European countries (Poland 1992-1997, Slovenia) is 20% and in all European systems of positive parliamentarianism is 21,1%. Finally, in total/on average among all European systems of positive parliamentarianism minority governments are the least frequent in case of applying the institutional rules of approving the votes of confidence/investiture in governments by an absolute parliamentary majority. In positive parliamentarianism in Western European countries (Belgium, Malta, France in 1945-1958) the frequency of minority government formation according to such rules equaled 12,6 %, in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Central-Eastern European countries (Poland 1989-1992, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Montenegro) – 27,3 %, and in all European systems of positive parliamentarianism – 16,7%. In general it proves, that minority governments in case of formal requirements concerning parliamentary votes of investiture proportionally are more often formed in case of simplifying institutional bases concerning adoption of votes of investiture: from the systems of negative majority to the systems of absolute majority.

Fourthly, it is possible to speak of the side distinctive-procedural significance of institutional influence on minority government formation of such a marker in comparative analysis as permissible number of forming bodies or alternatives to governments for the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture. In European democracies, where the parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture in governments are formalized, minority cabinets are more frequently (in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Western and Central-Eastern Europe and in the systems of negative parliamentarianism in general) formed in case of existence of only one alternative to a forming body or one alternative to a cabinet. Frequency of minority government

formation in such cases is: within the systems of positive parliamentarism in Western Europe – 27,7 %, in the systems of positive parliamentarism in Central-Eastern Europe – 37,%, in all European systems of positive parliamentarism – 31,5 %, in all European systems of negative parliamentarism – 60,4 %, and in all European parliamentary democracies 35,2 % correspondingly.

Table 3. Rules of decision-making concerning the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in government and their approbation in European parliamentary democracies (1944–2016)²¹

Rule of decision-taking concerning the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in government	Mathematical representation of the rule of decision-taking concerning the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture	Type of parliamentary democracy	Examples among European parliamentary democracies
System of absolute majority	$Y > (N + A)$	Positive parliamentarism	Belgium (since 1946), Spain (since 1977, first attempt of government formation), Malta (since 1962), Germany (since 1949, first and second attempt of government formation), Poland (1989–1992), Poland (1992–1997, first and second attempt of government formation), Serbia (since 2007), Slovenia (since 1990, first and second attempt of government formation), Hungary (since 1990), France (1945–1958), Croatia (since 2000), Montenegro (since 2006)
System of relative majority	$Y > N$	Positive parliamentarism	Bulgaria (since 1990), Greece (since 1974), Estonia (since 1992), Ireland (since 1944), Spain (since 1977, second attempt of government formation), Italy (since 1946), Latvia (since 1990), Lithuania (since 1990), Poland (1992–1997, third and fourth attempt of government formation), Poland (since 1997), Romania (since 1990), Slovakia (since 1990), Slovenia (since 1990, third/last attempt of government formation), Finland (since 2000, first and second attempt of government formation), the Czech Republic (since 1990)
«Rule of majority»	$Y1 > Yn$ for every n	Positive parliamentarism	Germany (since 1949, third/last attempt of government formation), Finland (since 2000, third/last attempt of government formation)
System of negative majority	$(Y + A) > N$	Negative parliamentarism	Portugal (since 1975), Sweden (since 1944)
«Rule of fewer than majority»	$Y > M (Y + N + A),$ $M < 0,5$	Positive parliamentarism	Greece (1952)
Absence of the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in government	–	Negative parliamentarism	Austria (since 1945), Denmark (since 1945), Iceland (since 1946), Luxembourg (since 1945), the Netherlands (since 1946), Norway (since 1945), the United Kingdom (since 1945), Finland (1945–2000), France (since 1958)

Źródło: T. Louwse, *Unpacking «positive» and «negative» parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop «The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences» of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014, s. 5.

²¹ Key: Y – votes for vote of confidence/investiture in government; Y_n – votes for vote of confidence/investiture in alternative government n ; N – votes against vote of confidence/investiture in government; A – absent deputies and/or votes of those who abstained from vote of confidence/investiture in government; M – requirement to gain vote of confidence/investiture (in %).

Significantly less number (more than twice) of minority governmental cabinets are formed in case of more than one alternative to a forming body, or more than one alternative to a governmental cabinet. Total number of such minority governments in European parliamentary democracies is 14,7%: in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Western Europe (Germany, Finland since 2000) such governments are absent, in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in Central-Eastern Europe (Estonia, Poland since 1997, Slovenia) – 26,8 %, in the systems of negative parliamentarianism such rules are not provided. It proves that minority governments in parliamentary democracies, which are characterized by the parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture, are rather deliberate, but not accidental decisions.

Fifthly, descriptive procedural significance of influence of votes of investiture on minority government formation (in particular in the context of the previous marker) includes such marker of analysis as a rule to nominate the prime-minister/forming body or alternative to the government. Among all European parliamentary democracies (systems of positive and negative parliamentarianism) minority governments are most frequently formed in those cases when the right to initiate governmental cabinets and nominate prime-ministers belongs only to the parliaments/leading chambers of the parliaments or speakers of the parliaments/leading chambers (Poland 1989–1992, Sweden). In such situation the frequency of minority governments is over 70% of all cabinets. Minority governments are formed much rarely in those cases when the right to nominate prime-ministers and alternatives to governments belongs both to the head of the state and speakers of the parliaments/leading chambers: totally in European parliamentary democracies and systems of positive parliamentarianism the frequency of minority government formation under such conditions is 35,5%; within the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Western Europe (Ireland, Spain, Finland since 2000) – 42,6 %; in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Estonia, Poland since 1992) – 24,1 %. Even less number of minority governments is formed when the right to nominate prime-ministers and alternatives to governments belong only to the head of states (even in the systems of negative parliamentarianism, where do not exist any parliamentary votes of confidence, whereas nominating for the position of the prime-minister/government by the head of the state means automatic government formation): totally in European parliamentary democracies it is 30,9 %; in European systems of negative parliamentarianism – 28,8 %; in European systems of positive parliamentarianism – 30 %; in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Western Europe (Belgium, Italy, Malta, France 1945-1958) – 24,3 %; in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Montenegro) – 37,2 %. Finally, the least common way to form minority government is when the right to nominate prime-ministers and governments belongs both to the head of states and party groups (factions)/deputies of the parliaments/leading chambers of the parliaments. In total in European parliamentary democracies and systems of positive

parliamentarianism the frequency of minority government formation under such conditions is 14,3 %; within the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Western Europe (Greece and Germany) – 4,2 %; in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Slovenia) – 31 %. In general we may argue that there is no strict institutional connection between the initiators of government-forming processes and initiators of governmental cabinets and frequency of minority government formation in European parliamentary democracies, though it is possible to trace a tendency to the increase of number and frequency of minority governments in the systems, where in the context of government-forming processes prevail parliaments.

Sixthly, as the practice of European parliamentary democracies testifies, the frequency of minority government formation does not depend on such institutional predictor as a number of efforts to gain parliaments' vote of confidence/investiture by the expected government or forming body/prime-minister. For instance, the experience shows that minority governments are formed in those cases when there are only two constitutionally presupposed attempts to initiate a governmental cabinet (in other words two attempts of government-forming process), which may result in dissolution of the parliament. On the other hand, the same results are received in Sweden, where it has been approbated that minority governments are often formed when there are four constitutionally presupposed attempts to initiate a governmental cabinet (in other words four attempts of government-forming process), which also results in dissolution of the parliament. Generally, in such cases minority governments compose over 65% of all governmental cabinets. Controversial instances in European parliamentary democracies are shown by such institutional systems, where there are three attempts to initiate governmental cabinets: on average according to such scenario minority governments occupy 23,3 % of all governmental cabinets, specifically: in the systems of negative parliamentarianism – 40 %, whereas in the systems of positive parliamentarianism – 21,8 %; within the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Western Europe (Germany and Finland since 2000) – 0 %; in the systems of positive parliamentarianism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland since 1997, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic) – 30,6 %.

Seventhly, little prognostic significance for the frequency of minority government formation as well has such a descriptor of parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture as failures of votes of confidence/investiture, i.e. effects of government non-formation. In general, in European parliamentary democracies minority governments are most frequently formed when the anticipated result of failure in government-forming processes is dissolution of parliaments/leading chambers of parliaments (36,3 %), more rarely – when the anticipated result of failure in government-forming processes is beginning of new government-forming processes (32,7 %), and the least frequent are cases when the anticipated result of failure in government-forming processes is formation of provisional governments (18,4 %). However, determined conclusions are not fully exercised in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarianism. For instance,

in the systems of negative parliamentarism and Central-Eastern European systems of positive parliamentarism the “weight” of the anticipated consequences of government non-formation and their influence on minority government formation is lowering in the abovementioned order, whereas in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism and generally in the systems of positive parliamentarism – in the order from new attempts to form governments to dissolution of parliaments, as well as to formation of provisional governmental cabinets.

Drawing conclusions we argue that the influence of constructions of votes of confidence or investiture on minority government formation (as well as other types of governmental cabinets) is significant. It is revealed both in simple verification of how the constitutions and legislations in some countries regulate parliamentary votes of investiture in governmental cabinets and in determining an institutional design of the parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture as heterogeneous rules and procedures, which should not be always synthesized into integral analytical groups. Taking this into account, it becomes obvious that the presence or absence of votes of confidence/investiture and also their combinations and procedural patterns in different ways influence the frequency of government-forming processes, in particular formation of minority governments. Among such patterns we distinguish: participation or non-participation of the parliament in the procedure of vote of confidence/investiture and government formation (presence or absence of vote of investiture); type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture (advanced or subsequent); rules of taking decisions concerning the parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in governmental cabinets (by absolute, relative or negative parliamentary majority); permissible number of forming bodies or alternatives to governments for parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in government; the right to nominate prime-ministers/forming bodies or alternatives to governments; number of attempts to gain parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture; effects of failure in case of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture.

However, verification of correlation of the outlined patterns of votes of confidence/investiture and frequency of minority government formation generally show that the institutional design of the votes of confidence/investiture does not mainly influence the frequency of minority government formation, though some patterns of votes of investiture are key in this context. In particular, crucial role belongs to the position according to which the institutional criterion of absolute majority as a rule for vote of confidence/investiture is insensible towards the frequency of minority government formation, as in some countries governments are formed not on the basis of absolute, but relative majority of deputies in the parliaments or leading chambers of the parliaments. It proves the research position that the processes of minority government formation is influenced not only by intra-parliamentary (party/inter-party) political attributes, but also by extra-parliamentary (constitutional and institutional) levers, in particular institutional relevance of competitive candidates for the prime-minister’s position, right to nominate candidates for the post of the prime-minister, peculiarities of finding the majority to actualize

the vote of investiture, way of voting for vote of confidence (investiture) in hypothetical/expected governmental cabinet (particularly, the prime-minister, composition or program of the governmental cabinet) and so on.

In parallel, J. Cheibub, S. Martin and B. Rasch²² suppose that the process of formation of different types of governments (in particular minority governments) in parliamentary democracies, i.e. democracies of “assembly/parliamentary confidence” is influenced not only by formalized and traditional parliamentary votes of confidence/investiture (or their absence) as well as their patterns and constructions, but also by other (some were mentioned above) institutional rules, which are incorporated in the parliaments/leading chambers of the parliaments. Among them are: role of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament when selecting a governmental cabinet (forming body or prime-minister and composition of the governmental cabinet); number of chambers of the parliament, which are involved into the process of government election and formation, as well as the rules of decision making concerning the vote of confidence/investiture in governments in each of the chambers; political consequences and further actions if the governmental cabinet has not been elected or formed. However, they do not form the object of the current research and thus require additional analysis.

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Institualization of early conflict – warning in political system

The first and main instrument of every country, political system to resolve conflicts is political decisions. But modern international situation shows that decision making process should be developed according to future and present threats. Last events on Middle East and Eastern Europe showed that modern decision making process can't effectively react on crisis and threats. So as a result decision making process should be transformed and include Early Warning System of conflict, which should work as a strong annalistic center. The main task of that system is to track social climate and detect potential situations that can transform in to conflict.

Keywords: early warning system, political system, decision making process, security, conflict, threat.

Institualization wczesnego ostrzeganiakonfliktów w systemie politycznym

Pierwszym i głównym narzędziemrozwiązywania konfliktów systemu politycznegokażdego krająsą decyzje polityczne. Ale współczesna sytuacja międzynarodowa pokazuje, że proces decyzyjny powinien być opracowany zgodnie z obecnymi i przyszłymi zagrożeniami. Ostatnie wydarzenia na Bliskim Wschodzie iw Europie Wschodniej pokazały, że nowoczesny proces podejmowania decyzji nie może skutecznie reagować na kryzys i zagrożeń. Więc jako wynikproces decyzyjny powinien zostać przekształcony i obejmują systemu wczesnego ostrzegania o konflikcie, który powinien działać jako silny ośrodek annalistic. Głównym zadaniem tego systemu jest śledzenie klimat społeczny i wykrywać potencjalne sytuacje, które mogą przekształcić się w konflikt.

Słowa kluczowe: system wczesnego ostrzegania, system polityczny, proces decyzyjny, bezpieczeństwo, konflikt, zagrożenie.

ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЯ РАНЬОГО ПОПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ КОНФЛІКТІВ У ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ СИСТЕМІ

Першим і головним інструментом кожної країни під час розв'язування конфліктів у політичній системі виступають політичні рішення. Сучасна міжнародна ситуація показує,

що процес прийняття рішень має бути вибудований відповідно до актуальних та майбутніх загроз. Останні події на Близькому Сході та у Східній Європі продемонстрували, що існуючий процес прийняття рішень не може успішно реагувати на кризи та загрози. Як результат процес прийняття рішень має бути переформатований і має охоплювати систему попереднього попередження конфліктів, відповідно він має діяти як потужний аналітичний центр. Головним його завданням має бути вивчення суспільного клімату та виявлення потенційних ситуацій, які можуть перетворитися у конфлікт.

Ключові слова: *система раннього попередження, політична система, процес прийняття рішень, безпека, конфлікт, загроза.*

Conflict is a part of every society. Conflicts appears in society life not only as war or revolution. Conflict is a part of different common events: competitions, elections, decision making process, political reforms and other processes that consists of number of interests, social interests. Conflict become a background where different social, political, pressure groups try to satisfy their interests. Without conflict there are be no competitions between interests. Conflict is an energy that helps society to develop and transform.¹

From this point of view, conflict is essential element of society and political system. But conflicts have two sides of medal. Till the moment while conflict can be controlled, it is possible to operate it and direct it transformation in necessary direction. Unless conflict become uncontrolled it transforms into destructive element for political system and society. Conflict transforms into revolutions, wars and crisis that can change or destroy political system.²

That's why every political system should be able to control conflicts and hold them in latent form, preventing possibility for conflict transformations. Also, political system should be able to observe society and look for new conflicts that can appear.

Political system has only one instrument that can handle this tasks and this is political decision. Only political decisions are the tool that can answer on all challenges that appear in front of social life and political system.

But history and modern political situation shows that many of political decisions are not enough effective to satisfy some part of social interest or prevent appearance of conflict or crisis.

We can count a big number of reasons why decisions don't work, but the main problem is that many of decisions were made to late because of different communication, organization problems.

For example, annexation of Cry Mea is a result of bad communication between superior and low commanders. Also absence of mechanism to make quick decisions in critical situation.

Another example is Syrian conflict. Absence of full image of situation and possible number of consequences allowed to make crisis much more complicated and hard resolved. As a result,

¹ Arthur F. Bentley., *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967

² Lewis Coser., *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: The Free Press, 1956.

political and military crisis on Middle East provoked migrant crisis that made a great influence on Europe policy.

Thus, it seems that decisions that were made were short time decisions, that were directed only for short time result. Now, it is possible to analyze different conflicts, for example Syria, to see that big conflict with various actors and sides is full of short, situational decisions. This decision system reminds physical rule “for every action there is resistance”.

Because of that it is difficult and almost unreal to make prognoses and predict how, in which way situation will develop and transform. This become a big threat for political system, because in any moment situation and environment can change and this can be critical for country. Thus, it became necessary to be able to operate conflicts and critical situations. Also, big meaning for decision making process is possibility to predict conflicts at the latent level, and prevent possibility of conflict transformation.

To give these possibilities to political system it is necessary to develop decision making process, using modern technologies and methods. First of all, decision making process should be separated on the small elements, what will help to understand structure of decision making process and find the weakest elements.

The typical structure of decision making process consists of few steps. First is collecting information from environment, analyzing society interests. After, second level, is comparing society interests with values, country interests, political possibility. Now system can define the most important and critical interests that should be satisfy.

Next levels related with decision making, where political system creates variety of decisions, and only then when the number of decisions are presented, one of them being chosen and then begins implementation process of decision, feedback about results of decision implementation and beginning of new decision making process.

Every of that elements, levels are important but it is possible to highlight few elements that make more influence on decision making process and result straightly depends on their functionality quality. Also, time and effectiveness of the decisions depend on this few main elements.

Thus, everything begins from the head. The main element of decision making process are the analyzing process that help to filter all income information and find the main idea or hidden messages. Analytic centre should be fundamental element for political decision, giving the full range of information and creating completed image of critical situation in society. Using this information, it is become possible to create various decisions that can resolve problems and prevent crisis situations.

The idea is to create a structure, system that includes all possible departments and organizations that can give information about different areas of social life, starting from individual and his interests, finishing with political climates and political attitudes.³

³ Brooks Tigner, *NATO looking for joint ISR capabilities*, Janes journal, 2016

Present analytic departments, offices and organizations in most of cases work as private organization, international non-government organizations and also big number of analytic departments that exist as a part of different country institutions. All these centers have big disadvantage.

All these analytic centers and organizations work in short range area or in the fields that can give them good profit. Big analytic centers can work for international funding and discover questions that are interesting or important for investors. Because of that in every country exist big number of analytic organizations that work in similar areas and explore similar questions and problems.⁴

Also there is a “area” question. Most of organizations work with popular social questions, for example level of democracy in different political systems, election systems, freedom level, level of unemployment and other. But small part of this analytic organization work to predict the possible future. Most of organizations trying to give short range predictions for future elections, or some important event as NATO conference or similar.

Thus, as consumption present analytic centers can fully help in decision making process especially in crisis or conflict situations. They are working in popular social areas that give them social support and international funding. Also the number of such organizations grows every day. But quality is too low.

Now in the 21 century it is necessary to distinguish two main problems in analytic process. First of all, we live in informational time, we are depended on information and every day mass of information grows. It became hard to work with all information using typical analytic methods. For good analysts it is important to use as much information as possible but in time of internet it is quite hard to track all information so it is easy to lose some important information.

Second problem is that today any country, maybe except USA, has one big analytic center that give full range of information for decision making process in country. Usually there are a lot of small analytic offices as part of different country departments that make analysis only for them self. Because of that it is hard to combine all information in one. This situation makes decision making process to long and sometimes ineffective.

International organization as NATO at the 27-th summit in Warsaw, announced about new program that should develop and provide intelligence for Alliance and called it JISR (Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). This program includes idea of Early Warning System. JISR is a first step in creating EWS.⁵

The task of Early Warning System is to track social climate and detect potential situations that can transform into conflict. That means that Early Warning system should find “latent conflicts” that in future can become a conflict or crisis that will have destructive influence on political system.

⁴ Official webpage of NCI Agency, *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*

⁵ Official webpage of NATO, *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*, 2016

All famous scientists of conflictology (A. F. Bentley, R. Dahrendorf; L. A. Coser) talking about individual origin of the conflict based on the needs that arise in the individual. Then comes the formation of a group that will defend its interests. Further there is a clash of opposing the wishes of other groups, which fully develops the conflict. There is a struggle between groups, leading to different consequences: consensus between groups, or total victory of one group over another.

It means, to be able to predict threats and warn the conflict it is necessary to find the problems from the beginning, on individual level or when individual interest transforms into group interest but conflict still on latent level.

That's why a good underground for EWS will be modern develop society. It means that there should be develop a great number of groups, social organization that know, how and should always connect with each other discussing different problems and important questions for them. For discussing and expression their positions and ideas society should have a number of tools. For example: social network, membership in different government and nongovernment organization. Also there should be organized possibility to contact with government on different levels, like e-Government, different informational and social departments.

Main task to create and teach people to speak about things that concern them. This will help to collect as much information as possible.

All information collected from society, other intelligence departments (military, foreign), government departments, should pass across analytic filter which will process all information and choose the main facts, events and ideas.

The Neural Network will play the role of this analytic filter. Exactly neural network should transform and develop intelligence work. This system is main tool of information processing. It can process a huge number of information and separate it on different categories and find the main informational line. This function will reduce time for finding and analyzing information. Also neural network has possibility to self education, system should be taught only on basic stages of system implementation. During the work process, neural network will develop function will be able to process more information and find connections between facts and events.⁶

After analyze neural network will give the main thesis and problems about different arias. System will point at the most problem arias of social, political and international life.

All information received from neural network will be replaced into big Data Bases. This will help to keep the most important and precious information for further processing and developing neural network work.

Next element of EWS is modeling and scenario making process. When neural network highlight problem points experts trying to model situations, using information given by neural network, and create all possible scenarios that can occur under different conditions.

⁶ Quantized Neural Networks: *Training Neural Networks with Low Precision Weights and Activations*, 2016

Using results of modeling and scenario making process, experts form a list of necessary decisions that can help to resolve existing problems or prevent threats and possibility their transformation.

List of decisions transmitted to government, department, organization or institution which is responsible for decision making process.

Early Warning System also can work with conflicts which are now going. System works in the same way creating list of decisions.

Implementation Early Warning System is a new step in decision making process. This system can resolve present problems that exist. Also it can give new opportunities for political systems and protect system from crisis or conflicts.

Early Warning System can advance reaction of political system on different events and threats. Also system will help to control all possible informational sources that can contain important information.

Possibility to make long time predictions helps to plane political process for years ahead. Also EWS give possibility to make corrections on the way to success, because system will include to the models new options and information that could give you new future scenario.⁷

It will become possible to manage the conflicts that exist and prevent future threats. Political system will have opportunity to choose the directions and expect for predicted results.

There is one important thing in implementation of Early Warning System in political system. EWS should become an institutional part of political system. This will be guaranty that results of the system will be included in decision making process and will make influence on it.

There is a big problem that political system can ignore predictions made by analytic centers. In Ukraine exists to powerful analytic centers that can make predictions and track social climate changes. It is Razumkovecentre and Institute of strategic research. Razumkovecentre works as non government organization and tracks different social changes and trends. All the time centre publishes results of their work.

Institute of strategic research is another strong analytic centre that track social climate in Ukraine and world, creating different prognoses and predictions of possible crisis and conflict situation. There is information that institute was the one who knew about possible revolution in 2013 in Ukraine but had no support and interest from the government. These organizations can become a good background for Early Warning Systems in Ukraine. Main problem that these organizations have low level of influence on decision making process in Ukraine political system. Most of analytic work that made by these organizations not even considered by government.

For example, in USA there is a whole program that is directed for creating system similar to Early Warning System. This program includes development of intelligence system. Main members of that program are Lickheed Martin and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

⁷ Peleshchuk Ihor, *COLLECTIVE instrument of conflict prevention*, Defense Express journal, 2016

Lokheed Martin from 2012 develops his Integrated Crisis Early Warning System. This system is similar to Early Warning System described in this article. Office of Director of National Intelligence have the same task but directs their work on implementing modern technology in intelligence process.

The main idea of this to projects is to advance analytic process in intelligence systems of USA, using modern technologies that can help to handle all possible threats.

This organization have strong support from the government and big interest from other countries, because this projects will be a background for NATO JISR program.

Another example is Russian Institute of strategic research that is responsible for annexation of Crimea and war on East of Ukraine. This institute for few years worked on creating military operation against Ukraine.

Thus, it is necessary to organize system that will combine all possible analytic structures that will enforce decision making process. Main task to transform this Early Warning System in to institution that wont depends on government political views. This institution should be similar to the other institutions in country as election institution that similar for different political organization and different elections. Early Warning System should be also independent from political changes. It should help to develop decision making process in questions with crisis, conflicts and possible threats.

XXI shows that we are quite far from the world peace, and all modern intelligence systems can't fight all conflicts and prevent their appearance. And that's why we should develop intelligence system, and they could give necessary answer for all present and future threats.

Critical situation on Middle East, War on Donbas and annexation of Crimea, absence results in Minsk negotiation, unpredictable behavior of Turkish government, regular terroristic attacks in Western Europe, migrant crisis and other conflicts and crisis all this events and process are a result of intelligence work and inability to react in time on main threats.

Also there is a big threat from different nongovernment organizations, conclaves that are supported by different organizations and countries. This organizations and conclaves can be activated in any time and make big damage to world, national security.

To resolve present conflicts, crisis and prevent the appearance of new threats and conflicts it is necessary to develop decision making process, which can work in modern conditions.

According to present world situation distinguishes several basic problems with decision making process. First of all, it is a bad cooperation with other organizations and departments. As it exists a lot of different analytic centers which work in different areas, appears a problem with communication and scenario making process. This provokes long time for coordination and cooperation. As a result, a lot of time spends on different bureaucratic procedures. Also it limits informational exchange between departments and organizations, so it is become harder to make prognoses for future.

Lack of power or political lobby such analytic centers can influence on decision making process giving the variety of decisions that can help to react effectively on crisis situations and conflicts.

Thus, it is necessary to create Early Warning System as a part of political system, that will enforce decision making process independently from political views and organizations.

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Non-party (formed by presidents) governments: design, appointment and peculiarities of operationalization in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe

The article is dedicated to outlining the design, appointment and the reasons for the formation and operationalization of non-party governments in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe. It was argued that non-party governments in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe are the governments that are formed and run by the presidents according to their purpose and logic. They both determine the presidentialization and autocratization of political systems and regimes and depend on these factors. It was revealed that non-party governments under the conditions of president-parliamentarism are not technocratic, although different political actors usually defined them as such ones. Instead, non-party governments under president-parliamentarism are pseudo-technocratic, as they cause deformation of the logic of technocratic governance.

Keywords: non-party government, technocracy, pseudo-technocracy, president, presidentialisation, semi-presidentialism, president-parliamentarism, authoritarianism, autocracy, Eastern Europe.

НЕПАРТІЙНІ (СФОРМОВАНІ ПРЕЗИДЕНТАМИ) УРЯДИ: КОНСТРУКЦІЇ, ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ОПЕРАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ В ПРЕЗИДЕНТ-ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ КРАЇНАХ СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ

У статті було окреслено конструкції, призначення та особливості і причини формування й існування непартійних урядів у президентсько-парламентських країнах Східної Європи. Аргументовано, що непартійні уряди в президентсько-парламентських країнах Східної Європи за своїм призначенням і логікою функціонування є урядами, які сформовані й керовані президентами. Вони як зумовляють президенціалізацію й автократизацію політичних систем і режимів, так і залежні від цих чинників. Виявлено, що непартійні уряди в умовах президент-парламентаризму не є технократичними, хоча й політичними акторами зазвичай окреслюються саме такими. Натомість непартійні уряди в умовах президент-парламентаризму є псевдотехнократичними, оскільки зумовляють деформацію логіку технократичного урядування.

Ключові слова: непартійний уряд, технократизм, псевдотехнократизм, президент, президенціалізація, напівпрезиденталізм, президент-парламентаризм, авторитаризм, автократія, Східна Європа.

Political practice in Eastern European countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), which at the time of the research were exclusively semi-presidential (in particular, to presidential-parliamentary belong Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia; to parliamentary-presidential – Armenia, Georgia (amendment to the constitution were introduced for the country to become a parliamentary one), Moldova and Ukraine) systems of government, proves that both party and non-party governments/governmental cabinets are formed there. A characteristic feature is that the former mainly prevails in the systems of parliamentary-presidential republics, the latter within the systems of presidential-parliamentary republics (to which, apart from the abovementioned countries, historically belonged all Eastern European countries, except Moldova). It puts on the agenda the issues, how different types of governments in the semi-presidential systems correlate with consolidation of power in the hands of presidents or prime-ministers. However, the emphasis is on various constructions and peculiarities of operationalization of non-party governments, which expectedly and hypothetically especially under conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism, form the extension of the vertical power structure of the heads/presidents, and thus do not position themselves as independent institutes of executive power.

These, as well as other attributes of non-party organizations can be observed in the works by such scientists as O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels and K. Strom¹, L. Graham², O. Kryshchanovskaya³, A. Lijphart⁴, J. Linz⁵, M. Mommsen⁶, E. Morgan-Jones and P. Schleiter⁷,

¹ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, "Comparative Political Studies" 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.; O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective*, "Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies" 2010, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 10–23.; O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies* // Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002, 33 s.

² L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 212–228.

³ O. Kryshchanovskaya, *Anatomie der russischen Elite. Die Militarisierung Russlands unter Putin*, Wyd. Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2005.

⁴ A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 90–115.

⁵ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras (ed.), *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 1–10.

⁶ M. Mommsen, *Sarkows: Souveräne Demokratie: Formel für einen russischen Sonderweg?*, „Russland Analysen“ 2006, vol 114, nr. 6, s. 2–4;

M. Mommsen, *Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Krenl und die Schatten der Macht*, Wyd. Verlag C. H. Beck 2004.

⁷ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

N. Parison⁸, G. Peters⁹, O. Protsyk¹⁰, J. Staun¹¹, A. Sundakov¹², L. Shevtsova¹³ and others. However, current research do not provide a unified answer to a range of theoretical-methodological questions, including: 1) what non-party governments are and how they correspond with the governments formed by experts (technocratic governments); 2) what is the essence of non-party and technocratic mechanisms of government formation; 3) whether non-party governments are obligatory grounded on the ideas of technocracy and technocratism; 4) why in some systems of inter-institutional relations we may usually come across party governments, whereas in other systems prevail non-party governments etc.; 5) why some non-party governments are less stable and effective than other non-party governments etc. Thus, a very important place belongs to the problems of correlation between different constructions of non-party governments and various institutional mechanisms of political systems functioning (first of all presidential-parliamentarism), including the countries of Eastern Europe.

Grounding on the position that the idea of non-party nature and technocratism is not a new one, we note that it is operationalized quite variably: in one case aiming at logics of effective managerial decisions implementation¹⁴; in other focusing on enhancing powers of other political actors, first of all heads of states, however in “disguise” of the idea of implementation of effective managerial decisions. In any case the idea of non-party nature of governance is closely connected with politics, as by means of non-party (including technocratic ones) governments the center of power (in particular the institute of the head of the state) can exert influence on the process of adoption and implementation of managerial and political decisions, which are of benefit to it.

It is particularly noticeable in semi-presidential countries of Eastern Europe, first of all in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia. Though earlier it was peculiar of all countries in the region, except Moldova (mostly of Georgia and Armenia till the end of the 90s of the 20th century-early 21st century, and also of Ukraine during different periods of its political development). The point is that in these countries (which were or still are presidential-parliamentary republics)

⁸ N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, ECSP, The World Bank: Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000, 12 s.

⁹ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339–358.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 232–254.

¹⁰ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemeč (eds.), *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NIS-Pačee 2006, s. 15–26.; O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2003, vol 25, nr. 4, s. 427–442.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

¹¹ J. Staun, *Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy*, „DIIS Report” 2007, vol 9, 69 s.

¹² A. Sundakov, *The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine*, [w:] P. Cornelius, P. Lenain (eds.), *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market: Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 1997, s. 275–288.

¹³ L. Shevtsova, *Russland im Jahr 2006. Die Elite stellt sich auf für den Kampf um die Sicherung ihrer Machtpositionen*, „Russlandanalysen” 2006, vol 122, nr. 6, s. 2–4.

¹⁴ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339–358.

non-party governments serve as an instrument for strengthening powers and authority of the elected presidents, and thus considerably contributed to autocratization of political regimes. On the other hand, it is presupposed by the fact that in the abovementioned countries formation of non-party governments quite often is a derivative of the constitutional attributes of presidential-parliamentarism (in particular traditionally or mainly non-parliamentary way of government formation), current political regimes (as it was observed, that non-party governments are more often formed in authoritarian and hybrid regimes), political and cultural traditions, peculiarities of party-electoral systems and so on, which are generally reduced to the special roles of heads of countries not only in the process of government formation and responsibility, but in overall political process. Therefore, it is absolutely obvious that non-party governments in most Eastern European countries are or were cabinets, formed (managed) by presidents.

That is why, formation of non-party governments in the majority of Eastern European countries is predetermined by the fact that this type of governments let informally enhance already powerful enough presidential powers and authority – first of all within the political systems, determined as semi-presidential of presidential-parliamentary type (and in due time in the presidential systems). The point is that forming non-party governments, presidents receive additional influence on determination of political process – this is done on the basis of direct/indirect impact on election (choice and selection) of governmental ministers. Thus, it means that domination of non-party ministers is justified in case when the head of the state wishes to preserve their assigned authority. Besides, it has positive effect on hypothetical nature of current presidents' reelection, limiting by this the chances of prime-ministers or other acting political figures to become presidents. This promotes informal autocratization of a political regime. That is why, scientists often combine non-party (formed by presidents) governments with existence of authoritarian and hybrid political regimes¹⁵.

Especially this attribute of assignation/role of non-party governments is actualized in those authoritarian regimes, where a prime-minister has no chances to become a president after the elections (Azerbaijan, Belarus). Mitigation of such "personalization" (on the basis of non-party government formation by presidents) of the head of the state is peculiar of hybrid and some authoritarian regimes, where the prime-minister is a part of security ministries of the executive vertical (Russia, Ukraine over some periods). The point is that under such political regimes prime-ministers sometimes receive a stimulus to increase their political significance in the context of electoral advantages before the presidential elections. Drawing a conclusion it is necessary to mention that in most Eastern European countries (especially in those with authoritarian regimes) non-party governments serve an instrument for transformation the idea

¹⁵ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.

of representative democracy into “delegative or personal dictatorship”¹⁶. As there does not exist a “contract of delegation”, which is peculiar of representative democracy, formed on the basis of a systematic unification of political parties. However, violation of the formula of representativeness takes place not only in presidential republics (often it is justified and is regarded as a pattern of such systems), but also in semi-presidential, which theoretically may copy various models of government formation (including non-party ones) – parliamentary and presidential.

Thus, non-party governments in most Eastern European countries position themselves as presidential cabinets and first of all are peculiar of presidential systems (sometimes earlier) and presidential-parliamentary semi-presidential systems. Besides, it is empirically obvious that non-party government formation more often takes place in the systems of semi-presidential type (as well as under conditions of semi-presidentialism, which is constitutionally absent in the region), as the head of the state is nationally elected and has more influence on cabinet formation processes, than the president, elected within the frames of parliamentary procedures. Moreover, it is intuitively clear that the president’s influence on appointing non-party ministers is determined by electoral preferences and electoral power of political actors. Herewith, in general it is hypothetically correct to believe that the growth of number of non-party ministers and correspondingly non-party governments under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarism happens as a result of: prevalence of systems of the unified majority; growth in electoral variability; increase of a number of agents in the process of cabinet formation; complication of the procedure of obtaining parliamentary majority to support one or another cabinet; growth in factional typology of the parliament; social-economic crisis, which is determined by low indices of social-economic development; dominance of elements of authoritarian and hybrid political regime, for which non-party character of ministers is a stimulus for the growth of presidents’ authorities; increase in presidents’ legislative powers¹⁷. Additional reasons which contribute to formation and “explanation” of non-party nature of governments in Eastern European countries are or previously were such factors as: excessive segmentation of the society (Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan); wish to satisfy interests of clans (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia); providing support to the regime (especially authoritarian – Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan); idea of enhancing government’s effectiveness (Georgia and Russia); providing neutralizing position in the system of divided minority, when none of political actors possess distinctive influence on the political process (Russia, Ukraine and Armenia); factional character of party systems (Belarus, earlier Russia, Ukraine); presidential character of political systems (all countries in the region, except Moldova); peculiarities of electoral systems (especially majority or mixed parallel systems – Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, earlier Russia and Ukraine); formal and

¹⁶ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.; K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

¹⁷ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies* // Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002, 33 s.

factual “weakness” of prime-ministers (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus); weakness of governments’ collective responsibility to parliaments (all countries, except Moldova and Armenia). Growth in number of non-party ministers under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism also depends on such determinants as: increase in factional nature of party systems¹⁸; reduction of professional character of bureaucracy¹⁹; worsening (and negative character) of economic situation in the country²⁰; lowering of the democracy level in the country or development of the country in an autocratic direction (by weakening the development of party system). In this regard, O. Protsyk associates non-party government formation in Eastern Europe first of all with the fact that in the countries, where it is actualized, are functioning rather weakly developed party systems, which are characterized by a low level of party mobilization²¹. Thus, non-party governments in the region during the process of their initialization and formation are usually determined by a primary perspective, aimed at exclusion of any (or all) party-ideological components, as the ability to solve effectively tasks set before the government is predominantly determined on the basis of its non-party composition.

The most interesting thing is that non-party (formed by presidents) governments in most Eastern European countries are positioned by their “creators” as technocratic, i.e. those composed of ministers-professionals. But in fact such non-party (“pseudo-technocratic”) governments if do not originate a range of problems concerning their efficiency then may do it. Most of all it is represented from those perspectives of decision-making by non-party cabinets as: changeability of the state and governmental policy²²; fragmentation of the decision-making processes in hybrid regimes and unilateralism in authoritarian regimes²³; restriction of ministers’ interests²⁴. Thus, specific orientation of some ministers prevents deriving collective state policy of non-party governments. That is why, common for all Eastern European countries conclusion

¹⁸ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

¹⁹ L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 212–228.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who’s Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 232–254.

²⁰ O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective*, “Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies” 2010, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 10–23.

²¹ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAcee Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007, 9 s.

²² O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemec (eds.), *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NISPAcee 2006, s. 15–26.

²³ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, “Post-Soviet Affairs” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.; N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, ECSPE, The World Bank: Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000, 12 s.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.; A. Sundakov, *The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine*, [w:] P. Cornelius, P. Lenain (eds.), *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market: Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 1997, s. 275–288.; K. Wołczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*, Wyd. CEU Press 2001.

²⁴ O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAcee Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007, 9 s.

shows that non-party (formed by presidents) governments are marked by “emergence” of weakness of party-electoral systems and absence of institutional stimuli to consolidate the latter²⁵. On the other hand, party systems in the countries, where one may find non-party governments, are client-oriented and cartelized, as a result of what parties are especially “vulnerable” depending on pressure of governance and meeting the requirements of different groups of interests.

The most vivid example is Russia and the process of government formation under the influence of non-party ministers, which are traditionally but very conventionally called “technocrats”. Relativeness is explained by the fact the political regime in this country is in fact constructed not on the president’s position as the head of the state, but on the president’s position being a strong politician. Besides, governance in Russia is executed by those categories of officials known as “security officials” (and partially, especially before) by “liberal technocrats”. However, the latter are characterized by a distorted significance, as bureaucrats in Russia are “powerful”, being directly and strongly connected with Russian business and powerful-executive vertical. In this situation, the president is positioned as a “mediator”. Moreover, the president is traditionally regarded as a “security broker”, as namely he prevents direct opposition between various groups of political elites. Their mutual relation is in constant shift and enhancement of authoritarian nature of the head of the state (president), who adjusts relations between different elements (in fact at different times) of non-party governments, in particular between the so-called “family” (representatives of Yeltsin regime, who were the first to get political and authoritative priorities), the so-called “Saint-Petersburg” group (V. Putin’s friends of the time when he lived in the city) and “heads of security ministers”²⁶ or in other words, between “politicians”, “security officials”, “bureaucrats”, “big business”²⁷. Thus, the main idea of non-party nature of governments (and non-party policy in general) in Russia lies in the fact, that the country must be ruled (governed) by the so-called “consolidated vertical” – powerful and centralized executive branch, headed by the president²⁸.

That is why the main peculiarity of non-party governments in presidential-parliamentarian countries in Eastern countries is their subordination and responsibility. In the countries with weak party systems and where non-party governments are formed only under client-oriented conditions (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, and in due time Georgia), namely president possesses great powers and authority. In these countries party-electoral parameters of cabinets’ responsibility have the least significance. Therefore, non-party governments are subordinated and

²⁵ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr. 4, s. 447–472.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

²⁶ O. Kryshchanovskaya, *Anatomie der russischen Elite. Die Militarisierung Russlands unter Putin*, Wyd. Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2005, s. 149; M. Mommsen, *Sarkous: Souveräne Demokratie: Formel für einen russischen Sonderweg?*, „Russland Analysen” 2006, vol 114, nr. 6, s. 2–4.; M. Mommsen, *Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Kreml und die Schatten der Macht*, Wyd. Verlag C. H. Beck 2004.

²⁷ L. Shevtsova, *Russland im Jahr 2006. Die Elite stellt sich auf für den Kampf um die Sicherung ihrer Machtpositionen*, „Russlandanalysen” 2006, vol 122, nr. 6, s. 2–4.

²⁸ J. Staun, *Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy*, „DIIS Report” 2007, vol 9, 69 s.

liable only to the heads of states, though formally they are responsible to both²⁹. Consequently, non-party governments under the conditions of Eastern-European presidential-parliamentarianism are positioned as those which directly oppose the idea of a “governmental cabinet” (more precisely, the idea of “cabinet governance”). The essence of the latter is in the fact that formation of political-governmental area, where the prime-minister is predominantly “first among the equals” and cabinets’ meetings form an arena, where all important governmental decisions are taken with contributions from all ministers. The point is that non-party nature of the cabinet is regarded as the biggest challenge to the collective nature of the government. Due to this, non-party cabinets in East European countries face a great number of obstacles while working out a consolidated governmental decision. However, prime-ministers in non-party governments are positioned as “executive managers” in the processes of implementing presidential initiatives³⁰, and thus considerably strengthen the latter in the political process and political system. It is supplemented by the fact that under conditions of presidential-parliamentarian system the role of ministers in case of non-party governments is in fact defined by presidential position and strategy³¹. It is specifically correct in the case of a presidential system of government, when the president is regarded as a leading actor in the process of governmental decision making processes and resignation, while the parliament plays a role of a supporting actor in this process (what is inherent to almost all or the majority of presidential-parliamentarian systems in Eastern Europe, where the president is supported by a pro-presidential party, possessing majority in legislature). Therefore, we argue that non-party governments are immanently peculiar of presidential-parliamentarianism, but their formation is additionally presupposed by the result of client-structured party systems existence. Besides, main factors of non-party governments in Eastern Europe are relations of submission and intraparty weakness. While absence of ideological liabilities or of obligatory party principles of activity make institutional loyalty especially dependable on sanctions or rules, outlined in constitutions. It means that in presidential-parliamentary systems non-party governments formed and managed by presidents are sometimes even more presidential, than in case of presidentialism. Consequently, namely non-party governments make these systems, characterized by powerful presidents, even more presidentialized.

In general it signifies that political systems which are not typified by promotion of institutionalization of political regimes on the basis of political parties would rather be characterized by formation of non-party cabinets or party-cabinets with a large number of non-party ministers. Even despite the logics they apply: a) either the logics of one-party majority systems

²⁹ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.

³⁰ O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2003, vol 25, nr. 4, s. 427–442.

³¹ O. Amorim Neto, K. Ström, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.

– and this is a traditional variant for authoritarian or hybrid regimes (or systems of competitive autocracy), which seek support of pro-presidential parties (Azerbaijan, Russia), or of non-party agents to provide support for the government in the parliament (Belarus); b) or the logics of a divided majority or minority – what is a traditional variant for hybrid political regimes (till 1999 in Armenia, till 2006 in Ukraine, till 2003 in Russia and so on). Besides, in presidential-parliamentarian semi-presidential systems non-party governments provide rather specific articulation of political interests, as especially in the case, when inter-institutional relations resemble those under the conditions of presidentialism, articulation of political interests by governments becomes almost invisible and impossible, as in such systems governments in the process of their survival absolutely depend on the position of the head of the state. It is mostly notable due to impossibility (formal or/and factual) of cohabitation within the system of presidential-parliamentarianism. As from the formal side, in case of direct opposition between the president and cabinet, the former has a right to resign the latter. On the other hand, in fact non-party government in opposition with the head of the state does not possess any articulated and consolidated support in the parliament, which is a base for cohabitation. In this case, there is special sense in the conclusion concerning combination of the role of non-party governments and authoritarian/hybrid political regimes.

In conclusion we argue that under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism, as well as due to the soviet heritage “technocratism” and autocratic regimes may coexist, enhancing each other as phenomena of political management. At the same time, technocratic governance is regarded as a way of non-ideological and autocracy is positioned as one of the types of political regime. However, the difference is that the so-called “technocrats” in Eastern European countries usually have nothing to do with the heritage of economics or political science in western world. On the contrary, logics of non-party governance in the region of Eastern Europe can rather be called “pseudo-technocratism”. It is presupposed by the fact that historically the notion of technocracy has been used in the analyzed countries as a sign of non-party affiliation. It resulted in the question of preservation of political regimes and exclusion of elements of ideological opposition.

Thus, of great importance for Eastern European countries is the aspect that the so-called “technocratic” ministers and “technocratic” cabinets are usually regarded as conventional, as sometimes “technocrats” must be determined a bit wider, as in Belarus, where one observes formation of non-party cabinets, but the leading role belongs to non-party parliaments; sometimes, the so-called “technocrats” are members of parties, and thus in their activity they often actualize both their party’s program and their non-party roles (most notably it is in Ukraine, Armenia and Russia). That is why there is sense to distinguish two types of “technocrats” and non-party officials, who belong to non-party governments in Eastern Europe – apolitical and political. Such theorization clearly proves the fact that technocratic nature of non-party phenomenon in the region and its effects should be treated separately. In one case, it is positioned as an instrument

and way to preserve integrity of a political system (but not in non-personified direction). In another case implementation of non-party cabinet's course of action mainly becomes the ground for further staying in power, as well as the means to strengthen the positions of formal/informal head of the government – president. Thus, (at least statistically) non-party governments are mainly “distorted”/modified in authoritarian systems and are defective in hybrid regimes. In general, it proves that the countries of Eastern Europe (first of all presidential-parliamentarian republics – current and historical) distorted the initial idea of technocracy in favor of their government institutions survival. As a result of this, the system of scientific values was not created, but took place a simple substitution of notions. Besides, in the practices of all analyzed countries of Eastern Europe the rules of gaining powers and authorities have been violated, as power is predominantly achieved by means of political delegation, transfer of authority and rights, which in fact do not guarantee effectiveness of governance, but only stability of power.

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POLITICAL OPPOSITION AS A PREREQUISITE OF THE BEGINNING OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES (1989–1993): COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The article is devoted to the consideration of the place and features of the structuring of political opposition in the Visegrad group countries as a prerequisite and indicator of the beginning of democratization in them. It was revealed that in the course of the analyzed period, political opposition in the region managed to pass two stages of development: pre-institutional (in the form of socio-political protest) and institutional (in the form of political institution). The author proposed a theorization, according to which the lines of division between separate types and models of processes of the beginning of democratization in the countries of the Visegrad Group were excessively blurred and unconfirmed. It was generalized that as a result of the beginning of democratization in the Visegrad group countries, political opposition almost immediately began to be understood primarily as a parliamentary or party-parliamentary opposition. At the same time, not only the parliamentary opposition became a manifestation of political opposition in the region, since the latter also included socio-political groups, movements and organizations.

Keywords: political opposition, democratization, democracy, transition, the Visegrad group.

Політична опозиція як передумова початку демократизації в країнах Вишеградської Групи (1989–1993): порівняльний аналіз

Стаття присвячена розгляду місця та особливостей структуризації політичної опозиції в країнах Вишеградської групи як передумови та індикатора початку демократизації в них. З'ясовано, що в своєму розвитку впродовж аналізованого періоду політична опозиція в регіоні зуміла пройти два етапи розвитку: доінституційний (у формі суспільно-політичного протесту) й інституційний (у формі політичного інституту). Запропоновано теоретизацію, згідно з якою лінії поділу між окремими типами і моделями процесів початку демократизації в країнах Вишеградської групи були надмірно розмитими і неуніфікованими. Узагальнено, що в результаті початку демократизації в країнах Вишеградської групи політична опозиція майже одразу почала розумітись передусім як парламентська чи партійно-парламентська опозиція, а відтак як потенційована своїми претензіями та перспективами з приводу

набуття статусу суб'єкта влади. Водночас не лише парламентська опозиція стала виявом політичної опозиції в регіоні, оскільки до останньої увійшли і суспільно-політичні групи, рухи та організації.

Ключові слова: політична опозиція, демократизація, демократія, транзит, Вишеградська група.

З огляду на процеси, які детермінували спочатку занепад, а потім і колапс режимів «реального соціалізму» та зумовили трансформацію авторитарних режимів спочатку у гібридні, але зрештою у демократичні, актуальною є проблематика кореляції інституційних та процесуальних атрибутів демократизації і політичної опозиції на прикладі політичного поступу країн Вишеградської групи, які сьогодні здебільшого характеризуються як консолідовані чи напівконсолідовані демократії. Але з'ясування особливостей кореляції інституційних і процесуальних атрибутів демократизації і політичної опозиції не є одномоментним завданням, оскільки воно залежить як від особливостей проходження та наслідків самої демократизації, так і від ролі в ній та наслідків за її результатами для політичної опозиції. Це означає, що теорії політичного транзиту не можуть пояснити всю складність і специфіку демократичних трансформацій, якщо вони не охоплюють феномену та ознак політичної опозиції. Відповідно, окреслена проблема є досить актуальною, оскільки її розкриття сприяє виявленню специфіки формування й розвитку політичної опозиції як легітимного учасника політичного процесу в умовах транзиту у спочатку посткомуністичні чи поставторитарні (як гібридні), а згодом і в демократичні режими країн Вишеградської групи. Це очевидно з огляду на те, що «просування» до демократії в країнах регіону значною мірою залежало від «нової альтернативної» сили – опозиції, – яка створювала реальну політичну конкуренцію та підривала монополію «партії влади». Окрім того, конструктивна діяльність опозиції була основою побудови громадянського суспільства, бо її вихідний плюралізм зумовив появу різних груп політичних інтересів, цінностей, програм й ідеологій. А ці групи, у свою чергу, по-різному розуміли і сприймали демократію як в період режимів «реального соціалізму», так і в період початку транзиту до демократії. Відтак заявлена проблематика потребує деталізованого та поетапного розгляду, адже вона може відповісти на питання про взаємозв'язок між політичною опозицією та демократизацією/демократією не тільки на прикладі країн Вишеградської групи, а й загалом, тобто може мати прикладне і прогностичне значення для інших політій.

Це прослідковуємо на підставі апелювання до наукових доробків таких дослідників, як А. Арато¹, Дж. Батт², З. Бауман³, Т. Бейліс⁴, А. Бозоки⁵, Г. Бруннер⁶, В. Бусленко⁷, Г. Дейл⁸, Г. Екіерт⁹, Й. Елстер¹⁰, Д. Фрідхайм¹¹, Г. Генов¹², Дж. Грей¹³, Г. Кітчелт¹⁴, Х. Лінц і А. Степан¹⁵, В. Меркель¹⁶, К. Оффс¹⁷, Д. Ост¹⁸, А. Пшеворські¹⁹, М. Сцабо²⁰, Р. Токес²¹, К. Вон Бейме²², Х. Велш²³, С. Вайт²⁴, Г. Зеленько²⁵ тощо. У них з'ясовано поетапні особливості кореляції політичної опозиції та «ранньої»/початку (у 1989–1993 рр.) демократизації у країнах Вишеградської групи. Однак вони доволі значною мірою не є синтезованими

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- ²⁵ Zelenko H., *Peredumoty formuvannia konstruktivnoi opozytii v krainakh Vyshegradskoi hrupy*, "Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i emonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy" 2015, vol 2, s. 64–84.

узагальненими, а тому їй потребують і перегляду, і систематизації, що власне і є метою представленої наукової розвідки.

З'ясовано, що спершу, здебільшого наприкінці 80–х, але інколи й на початку 90–х рр. ХХ ст., громадянське суспільство в сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи ототожнювалось з демократією, зокрема з опозиційними громадськими антикомуністичними, а тому переважно й демократичними суспільно-політичними рухами, які виступали проти інститутів «сильної держави». Натомість, партії як такі сприймалися як «супротивники» демократії, бо традиційно асоціювались саме із державою. Відповідно, групи опозиційності очікували «неписаного та неінституціоналізованого консенсусу» між громадянським суспільством і державою²⁶. Принаймні до того періоду, поки політичний процес в Польщі, Угорщині і Чехословаччині окреслювався довкола інститутів «партії-держави». Але згодом таке трактування демократії політичною опозицією було змінене на конструкти плюралізму і розподілу інтересів. Окреслена логіка бачення суті та процесів демократизації почала засновуватись на ідеях «повернення» країн регіону «до старої Європи», а тому політична опозиція навіть почала апелювати до різних варіантів трансформації – чи то ідеї «третього шляху», чи то ідеї «ліберального укладу», чи то концепту «соціальної ринкової економіки»²⁷. Це було зумовлено потребою вирішення надзвичайно важливих питань політичного та соціально-економічного розвитку країн Вишеградської групи і, у свою чергу, ускладнило логіку кореляції політичної опозиції та демократизації. Хоча би тому, що демократизація чи загалом транзит у сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи не були консолідованими, унілатеральними й однотипними. Більше того, трансформаційні та модернізаційні процеси в регіоні не були лінійними, а зумовлювались складними й дифузними бар'єрами. Відповідно, атрибутизація ролі і наслідків процесів демократизації для політичної опозиції (і навпаки) в регіоні теж виявилась диверсифікованою. Це передусім проявляється у тому, що різними були напрями, темпи та наслідки (сумарно – моделі) транзиту авторитарних режимів країн регіону до демократії. Частково це було зумовлено й тим фактом, що по-різному на способи «зламу» авторитарного політичного режиму в Польщі, Угорщині, Чехії та Словаччині (Чехословаччині) вплинув рівень розвитку опозиційних антикомуністичних суспільно-політичних рухів²⁸.

Відтак сьогодні у політичній науці є чимало спроб типологізації чи таксономії моделей початку демократизації/переходу до демократії, а також місця у цьому процесі політичної опозиції в країнах Вишеградської групи. Для прикладу, Є. Вятр²⁹ зазначає, що в Польщі та Угорщині демократичний перехід варто класифікувати як реформу, узгоджену між політичною (як комуністичною) владою і політичною (як антикомуністичною)

²⁶ Bozoki A., *Democratization in Central Europe*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2008, vol 4, nr. 2, s. 1–27.

²⁷ Bozoki A., *The Rhetoric of Action: The Language of the Regime Change in Hungary*, [w:] Bozoki A. (ed.), *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe*, Wyd. Central European University Press 1999, s. 263–283.

²⁸ Arato A., *Some perspectives of democratization in East Central Europe*, "Journal of International Affairs" 1985, vol 38, nr. 2, s. 321–335.

²⁹ Wiatr J., *Transformacja totalitaryzmu i autorytaryzmu w nowoczesnej demokracji*, Tallynn 1991.

опозицією. За такої моделі демократизації/транзиту мала місце «самовідмова» від влади частини правлячої авторитарної політичної еліти, яка стала можливою за наявності високого/достатнього рівня розвитку опозиційних рухів і партій (політичної опозиції як суспільного протесту), політичного плюралізму і розмаху руху «реформаторів» всередині правлячого режиму³⁰. На противагу, модель транзиту до демократії в Чехії і Словаччині (у межах Чехословаччини) варто характеризувати як «перелом» чи «абдикацію»³¹. Вона окреслювалась тим, що ніякої попередньої процедурної згоди між політичною (як комуністичною) владою і політичною (як антикомуністичною) опозицією та громадськістю, зокрема у фазі формування «протоінститутів» («правил гри»), не було, внаслідок чого колапс авторитарного політичного режиму відбувся дуже стрімко й майже миттєво. І тільки після цього, а також з огляду на «ефект доміно» у формі врахування політичних процесів в Польщі та Угорщині, почались вимушені переговори між представниками комуністичного режиму і виразниками інтересів мобілізованих мас громадськості й опозиційності³².

Схожу, але етимологічно диверсифіковану логіку пропонують й інші вчені. Так, К. вон Бейме³³ зауважує, що в Польщі і Угорщині транзит до демократії відбувся у формі «переговорної революції», а в Чехословаччині – у формі «імплзії режиму». Г. Екіерт³⁴, Г. О'Доннелл і Ф. Шміттер³⁵ зауважують, що транзит в Польщі й Угорщині відбувався у формі «узгодженості», а в Чехословаччині – у формі «швидкої політичної мобілізації» або так званого «всенародного підйому». У свою чергу, А. Степан, Х. Лінц³⁶ і Дж. Батт³⁷ вказують, що в Польщі та Угорщині було апробовано модель транзиту у формі пактування різних гравців авторитарних режимів (політичної влади та опозиції), однак сам пакт був ключовим завданням опозиції як суспільного/суспільно-політичного протесту. Такий сценарій в аналізованих країнах був уможливлений з огляду на те, що вони були авторитарними політичними режимами із «елементами консенсусу та лібералізму». Натомість, такий сценарій не «пройшов» у Чехословаччині, яка наприкінці 80–х рр. XX ст. ще досі позиціонувалась прикладом «замороженого посттоталітаризму», через що опозиція в ній просто не мала інструментів ведення переговорів із представниками влади та режиму.

³⁰ *Politychna vlada i opozyttsiia v Ukraini: porivniialnyi analiz iz zarubizhnyimi krainamy: monobrafia*, ed. F. Rudych, Wyd. IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 345.

³¹ *Politychna vlada i opozyttsiia v Ukraini: porivniialnyi analiz iz zarubizhnyimi krainamy: monobrafia*, ed. F. Rudych, Wyd. IPiEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 348.

³² Zelenko H., *Peredumovy formuvannia konstruktivnoi opozyttsii v krainakh Vyshebradskoi hrupy*, «Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy» 2015, vol 2, s. 64–84.

³³ Von Beyme K., *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996.

³⁴ Ekiert G., *Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration*, «British Journal of Political Science» 1991, vol 21, nr. 3, s. 285–313.

³⁵ O'Donnell G., Schmitter P., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1986, s. 53–56.

³⁶ Stepan A., *Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory*, «Government and Opposition» 1997, vol 32, nr. 4, s. 657–678.; Stepan A., *State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America*, [w:] Evans P., Rueschmeyer D., Skocpol T. (eds.), *Bringing the State Back in*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1985, s. 318.

³⁷ Batt J., *The End of Communist Rule in East-Central Europe*, «Government and Opposition» 1991, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 368.

Тому Д. Фрідхайм аргументує, що транзит до демократії в Польщі та Угорщині відбувався у формі «пакту», а в Чехословаччині – у формі «коллапсу режиму»³⁸.

Це важливо з огляду на те, що ефективність політичної опозиції в ході очікування демократизації режиму в аналізований період вимірювалась спроможністю опозиції впливати на такі компоненти авторитарного режиму, як: ядро прихильників режиму, апарат примусу і підтримки режиму, пасивні прихильники режиму, недемократичні противники режиму, активні демократичні противники режиму й пасивні противники режиму. А це ж, у свою чергу, означає, що ключовими демократизаційними функціями опозиції в авторитарних режимах Польщі й Угорщини і меншою мірою Чехословаччини були: формування і збереження свого статусу чи загалом функціональності; спротив (опір) кооптації в авторитарний режим; «охорона» «зон автономності» і спротиву (опору) авторитарному режиму; оскаржування легітимності авторитарного режиму; підвищення витрат на функціонування та дії недемократичного правління авторитарного режиму; формування «надійної» демократичної альтернативи авторитарному режиму. Відтак ключова стратегія груп політичної опозиційності авторитарному режиму в регіоні полягала у тому, щоби: а) «переманити» та «перетворити» принаймні пасивних прихильників авторитарії (влади/режиму, політичної еліти) хоча б у пасивних прихильників демократії (опозиції, політичної контреліти); б) «перетворити» пасивних прихильників опозиції в активних прихильників демократії і опозиції; в) перетворити «стичне громадянське суспільство в опозиції» у «політичне суспільство в консолідованій демократії»³⁹. Водночас, як зауважує А. Бозокі⁴⁰, ознакою транзиту від режимів «реального соціалізму» до демократії в сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи було «самообмеження» поведінки їхніх учасників/»гравців». Річ у тому, що, будучи радикальними у своїх цілях, пов'язаних зі зміною політичного режиму, вони були витонченими і самообмеженими своїй політичній поведінці.

Відповідно, знаменником початку транзиту країн Вишеградської групи до демократії було те, що він відбувався під цілеспрямованим чи випадковим тиском опозиційних сил (організацій) і/або мас громадськості, внаслідок чого кокус комуністичних партій був змушений вступити у переговорний процес, який увійшов в історію як «переговори за круглим столом»⁴¹ (у випадку ж Угорщини доволі часто фігурує найменування цього процесу як «переговорів затрикутним столом»). Зумовлено це було і тим, що, слідуючи логіці Р. Даля⁴², «витрати на толерування» політичної опозиції в умовах авторитарного режиму були більшими, аніж «витрати на репресії» політичної опозиції у відповідних політичних

³⁸ Friedheim D., *Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1993, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 512.

³⁹ Linz J., Stepan A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. JHU Press 1996, s. 272.

⁴⁰ Bozoki A., *Democratization in Central Europe*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2008, vol 4, nr. 2, s. 1–27.

⁴¹ Welsh H., *Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 1994, vol 26 nr. 4, s. 379–394; Colomer J., Pascual M., *The Polish Games of Transition*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 1994, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 275–294.

⁴² Dahl R., *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1971, s. 15.

умовах. Відтак наслідком виявилась розрізнена стратегія співпраці домовленостей влади і опозиціонерів, яка згодом (у різний час в різних країнах) стала однією з підвалин реалізації та поєднання моделей консенсусної та консоціальної демократії, адже «переговорники» принципово відсіяли від «круглих столів» радикальні/екстремістські й антисистемні групи опозиційності. Це, у свою чергу, особливо в Чехословаччині, стало підставою створення інституційного середовища для відторгнення екстремістсько/радикально налаштованих організацій⁴³, а відповідно суттєвої, хочі «незавершеної», лімітації значимості антисистемної політичної опозиції в регіоні. З іншої сторони, як вказує Дж. Марусяк⁴⁴, інституціональною умовою формування передусім конструктивної, а не екстремістської опозиції в Чехословаччині (Чехії і Словаччині) був незадекларований консенсус з приводу нових «правил гри». Таким чином, «круглі столи» виконали основну роль – формування відповідних «правил гри», узгодження інтересів й вироблення на консенсусній і конкурентній основі принципів і юридичних норм переходу до демократичної та правової держави⁴⁵.

У Польщі це було результовано у факті, що внаслідок переговорів за «круглим столом» у червні 1989 р. було проведено частково вільні вибори до Сейму та повністю вільні вибори до Сенату⁴⁶, за результатами яких опозиційні групи в першому (відповідно до домовленостей із комуністичною владою) отримали 35% мандатів, а в другому (без домовленостей із комуністичною владою) – 99% мандатів, що дозволило суттєво модифікувати Конституцію 1952 р.⁴⁷ і внести в неї поправки в формі перехідної «Малої Конституції». У Гурціні, у свою чергу, зокрема зважаючи на так звану стратегію «революції–еволуції» у взаєминах/переговорах комуністичної влади й антикомуністичної опозиції⁴⁸, спершу було прийнято суттєві зміни (інколи вважають, що у формі «нового основного закону») до Конституції 1949 р. (так званій «Закон XXXI»)⁴⁹, зокрема стосовно правил взаємодії влади і опозиції, а також детермінування своєї рідної процедурно-консенсусної демократії, і лише згодом було проведено перші вільні/демократичні вибори (система яких також була безумовним наслідком перемовин влади та опозиції), які після цього позначились продовженням переговорів про моделювання політичної системи (зокрема системи правління⁵⁰). Нарешті,

⁴³ *Polityczna władza i opozycja w Ukraini: porównawczy analiz z zarubiznymy krajinamy: monografija*, ed. F. Rudych, Wyd. IPiEND im. I.E.Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 346.

⁴⁴ Marusiak J., *The Normalisation Regime and its Impact on Slovak Domestic Policy after 1970*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2008, vol 60, nr. 10, s. 1809.

⁴⁵ Bermeo N., *Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship*, "Comparative Politics" 1992, vol 24, nr. 3, s. 276.

⁴⁶ Rüb F., *Schach dem Parlament! - Über semi-präsidentielle Regierungssysteme in einigen postkommunistischen Gesellschaften*, Leviathan 1994, vol 22, s. 272.

⁴⁷ Brunner G., *Neue Verfassungen in Osteuropa*, „Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien» 1993, s. 103.; Schade W., *Zur Verfassungsdiskussion in Polen*, „Osteuropa» 1995, vol 45, s. 638–650.; Buslenko V., *Pryroda kooperatyvnoi vzaiemodii vlady ta opozytzii v umovakh liberalizatsii politychnoho rezhymu (na prykladi Polshebi ta Uhorschchyny)*, „Panorama politolohichnykh studii» 2015, vol 13, s. 125–131.

⁴⁸ Brunner G., *Die neue Verfassung der Republik Ungarn: Entstehungsgeschichte und Grundprobleme*, "Jahrbuch für Politik" 1991, vol 1, s. 297.

⁴⁹ Szabo M., *Ungarn auf dem Weg zur Demokratie*, Wyd. Europa Union Verlag 1994, s. 84.

⁵⁰ Bokalo M., Trokhymchuk S., *Problemy i perspektyvy demokratyzatsii v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy (na prykladi Vyshehradskoi cheviryky)*, Lviv 2000, s. 29.

у Чехословаччині, особливо коли режим «реального соціалізму» «посипався», зокрема під впливом мобілізованої громадськості, правлячі комуністичні політсили, розуміючи стан громадської думки та споглядаючи приклад Польщі й Угорщини, були змушені, у тому числі й за наслідками переговорів, піти на запровадження схожих процедур, які стосувалися проведення вільних виборів та внесення відповідних змін до конституції. Водночас, атрибутом демократизації в Чехословаччині було те, що виявом так званої «оксамитової революції» був не лише компроміс/консенсус між політичною владою і політичною опозицією, а й майже повне заміщення правлячої сліти опозиційними силами (контрелітою)⁵¹. Більше того, демократизація в Чехословаччині розпочалась та була ініційована не безпосередньо шляхом переговорів, а швидше шляхом «колапсу режиму і оксамитової революції»⁵² й переговорів. Це сприяло мирному «розлученню» Чехії та Словаччини в 1992–1993 рр., оновленню їхнього конституційного порядку та їх дистинкції від прикладів транзиту і демократизації в Польщі й Угорщині⁵³ (детально див. табл. 1).

Таблиця 1. Систематизовані особливості транзитів від авторитарних режимів «реального соціалізму» до елементів демократії й участь у них політичної опозиції в країнах Вишеградської групи (1989–1990 рр.)⁵⁴

Особливості транзиту	Польща	Угорщина	Чехословаччина
Тип режиму “реального соціалізму”	Авторитарний „тимчасовий”/ бюрократично-авторитарний + націонал-адаптивний	Авторитарний «військовий» / націонал-адаптивний	Авторитарний (посттоталітарний) / бюрократично-авторитарний
Політична єдність авторитарного режиму	Низька (або падаюча)	Низька (або падаюча)	Висока (або стабільна)
Прихильність політичної еліти авторитарного режиму до комунізму	Слабка (або падаюча)	Слабка (або падаюча)	Сильна (або стабільна)
Спроби реформ авторитарії в 80–х рр. ХХ ст.	Так, провалені	Так, провалені	Ні
Ініціатори радикальних реформ в авторитарії	Помірковане крило комуністичної партії	Помірковане крило комуністичної партії	Суспільно-політичні рухи
Тип політичної опозиції в умовах авторитарії	Уніфікована / консолідована	Розділена / неконсолідована	Уніфікована / консолідована
Спосіб формування політичної опозиції в умовах авторитарії	Завчасний / ендегенний	Завчасний / ендегенний	Ситуативний / екзогенний
Статус політичної опозиції в умовах авторитарії	Толерована	Толерована	Репресована

⁵¹ *Polityczna władza i opozycja w Ukraini: porównawczy analiz z zarubieźnymi krajami: monografia*, ed. F. Rudych, Wyd.IPiEND im.I.F.Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 348.

⁵² Batt J., *The End of Communist Rule in East-Central Europe*, “Government and Opposition” 1991, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 384.

⁵³ Elster J., *Explaining the Breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation*, “East European Constitutional Review” 1995, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 38.

⁵⁴ Bozoki A., *Democratization in Central Europe*, “Taiwan Journal of Democracy” 2008, vol 4, nr. 2, s. 1–27.; Dale G., *Modelling Democratic Transition in Southern and Central Europe: Did East Germany Experience “Transición” or “Ruptura”*, [w:] Stivachtis Y. (d.), *The State of European Integration*, Wyd. Ashgate 2007, s. 197–219.; Dauderstädt M., Gerrits A., *Democratization After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion*, “International Politics and Society” 2000, vol 4, s. 361–376.; Kitschelt H., *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Cambridge 1999, s. 35.

Особливості транзиту	Польща	Угорщина	Чехословаччина
Спосіб зміни політичного режиму	Узгоджений і переговорний (мирний)	Узгоджений і переговорний (мирний)	Мобілізаційний і переговорний (мирний)
Модель транзиту від автократії до демократії	Реформа / пактування / пакт / переговори	Реформа / пактування / пакт / переговори	Абдикація / імплізія / колапс режиму / розрив / "оксамитова революція"
Тип переговорів і торгів між владою й опозицією	Реформа	Конкуренція	Втрата контролю і поділ влади
Швидкість транзиту від автократії до демократії	Поступова	Поступова	Стрімка
Характер приватизації після зміни режиму	Спонтанний	Спонтанний	Контрольований державою
Межі демократичного суспільства	Задані	Задані	Зумовлені поділом
Перші вибори	Частково вільні (1989 р.)	Вільні (1990 р.)	Вільні (1990 р.)
Перший поствиборний варіант посткомуністичної системи правління	Напівпрезиденталізм	Парламентаризм	Парламентаризм
Доля комуністичної або посткомуністичної партії	Фрагментована	Реформована	Фрагментована
Етнічна композиція	Уніфікована / гомогенна	Уніфікована / гомогенна	Розділена / гетерогенна

Підсумовуючи водночас відмінні і схожі патерни початку транзиту від автократії до демократіїв країнах Вишеградської групи, Х. Велш⁵⁵ аргументує, що незалежно від способу «переходу» вирішальне значення у розумінні трансформації зайняла концепція «торгу і переговорів». Річ у тому, що учасники торгу в такому випадку були зобов'язані досягти деякої міри політичного врегулювання, хоч і апелювали передусім до вигідних найперше для себе умов. Внаслідок цього, навіть попри те, що в ході «торгу та переговорів» могли бути сконструйовані різні форми національного інституційного та політичного дизайну, рання демократизація і демократія загалом не позиціонувались такими, що могли бути продиктовані, а натомість традиційно «виходили з переговорів»⁵⁶. Однак самі конструкції таких переговорів і торгу, а відповідно й моделі та наслідки «раннього» транзиту до демократії були варіативними, що унаслідковано досвідом Польщі, Угорщини, Чехії і Словаччини (Чехословаччини)⁵⁷. Навіть попри те, що вони розпочалися з майже ідентичних причин, зокрема спільного сприйняття комуністичною владою і антикомуністичною опозицією факту важких наслідків політичної і соціально-економічної кризи в режимах

⁵⁵ Welsh H., *Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 1994, vol 26 nr. 4, s. 379–394.

⁵⁶ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991, s. 80.

⁵⁷ Genov G., *The Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Paradoxes of Social Rationalization*, "International Social Science Journal" 1991, vol 128, nr. 2, s. 336.; Richter E., *Upheavals in the East and Turmoil in Political Theory: Comments on Offe's "Capitalism by Democratic Design?"*, "Social Research" 1991, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 898.; Gray J., *From Post-Communism to Civil Society: The Reemergence of History and the Decline of the Western Model*, "Social Philosophy and Policy" 1993, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 26–50.; Sztompka P., *The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to Democracy*, "Studies in Comparative Communism" 1991, vol 24, nr. 3, s. 306–307.; Baylis T., *Plus Ça Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European*, Paper at the Twenty-fourth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, November 19–22, 1992, s. 20.; Offe C., *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts*, Wyd. Campus 1994, s. 20.; Merkel W., *Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe*, "Estudio Working Paper" 1996, nr. 86.

«реального соціалізму». Річ у тому, що в Польщі політичні сили (еліта і контреліта) погодилися винятково на поступове «відкриття» і демократизацію політичної системи, зокрема на підставі стратегії поділу влади. У свою чергу, в Угорщині силами політичної опозиції було досягнуто миттєвого «відкриття» політичної системи, а також негайного переходу до демократії без формальних домовленостей про поділ влади. Сумарним наслідком для двох країн виявилось те, що домовленості про лібералізацію та демократизацію своїм первинним наслідком мали встановлення «стратегій» політичної змагальності. Натомість, у Чехословаччині переговори почалися за іншою логікою, оскільки були унаслідковані від втрати комуністичними партіями у своїх функціях контролю опозицією, зокрема внаслідок мобілізації мас громадськості та результатом внаслідок цього поділу влади (див. табл. 1).

Відповідно, як аргументує Х. Велш⁵⁸, переговори і торги у різних країнах сучасної Вишеградської групи відбувались вкрай по-різному: 1) у Польщі – в формі реформи, оскільки на першому етапі і як первинний наслідок переговорів були цілком очевидними переваги комуністичного політичного режиму⁵⁹, але на другому етапі, за підсумками виборів і сумарно, прослідковувались суттєві переваги користь антикомуністичної опозиції⁶⁰, внаслідок чого громадськість поставила під сумнів доцільність продовжувати дотримання угоди⁶¹; 2) в Угорщині – у формі конкуренції та змагальності, оскільки, відстоюючи концепт «одноетапного переходу до демократії», опозиційні групи відкинули будь-які гіпотетичні транзитні формули поділу влади і наполягли на максимальній електоральній боротьбі⁶², хоч і для реформування системи правління проводили переговори у кілька етапів; 3) в Чехословаччині (тобто в Чехії та Словаччині) – у формі зміщення від втрати контролю до поділу влади, адже, не зважаючи на вплив груп опозиційності, комуністична влада була нездатна не реагувати на вплив мас громадськості, а тому в результаті втратила контроль над політичною системою та була змушена домовлятися про поділ влади з політичною опозицією (зокрема у формі уряду національної єдності). Синтезувались вони тим фактом, що в періоді максимальної напруженості за лінією політичного поділу «комунізм – антикомунізм» опозиційні рухи й організації об'єднувались у всеохоплюючі (хоч і тимчасові)

⁵⁸ Welsh H., *Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 1994, vol 26, nr. 4, s. 379–394.

⁵⁹ Ziemer K., *Probleme des politischen Systemwechsels der Republik Polen. Eine Zwischenbilanz nach drei Jahren*, „Jahrbuch für Politik" 1993, vol 3, s. 100.; Colomer J., Pascual M., *The Polish Games of Transition*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 1994, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 291.

⁶⁰ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991, s. 79.; Ost D., *Towards a Corporatist Solution in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1989, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 152–174.

⁶¹ Kaminski B., *Systemic Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland: The Shadow of the Round-table Agreement*, "Studies in Comparative Communism" 1991, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 173–190.; Grudzińska I., *Post-Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of Polish History*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1992, vol 6, nr. 2, s. 146.; Przeworski A., *Economic Reforms, Public Opinion, and Political Institutions: Poland in the Eastern European Perspective*, [w:] Pereira L. (ed.), *Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993), s. 132–198.

⁶² Bozoki A., *Democracy across the Negotiating Table*, "The New Hungarian Quarterly" 1992, vol 33, nr. 1, s. 65.; Bozoki A., *Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1993, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 276–308.; Bruszt L., Stark D., *Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition*, [w:] Banac I. (ed.), *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1992, s. 13–71.; Tokes R., *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Bozoki A., *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2002.

«парасолькові структури» різної ідеологічного чи позаідеологічного та фрагментованого характеру, природнім компонентом яких була лише антикомуністична спрямованість⁶³.

Сумарно це регламентує, що запровадження елементарних правил політичної конкуренції в країнах, які сьогодні становлять Вишеградську групу, призвело до повного оновлення політичної влади в регіоні. Як наслідок, було створено умови для утвердження конструктивної опозиції, адже опозиційним силам не потрібно було вдаватися до неконвенційних політичних дій для того, щоби заявити про свою політичну позицію і реалізувати свої програмні положення, перейшовши шляхом виборів у розряд правлячої політичної сили⁶⁴. Водночас це означає, що початок транзиту до демократії в країнах аналізованого регіону детермінувався тим фактом, що ступінь легітимності авторитарних режимів «реального соціалізму» був обернено пропорційним ступеню суспільної чи суспільно-політичної самоорганізації громадянських суспільств, які становили основу політичної опозиції як суспільного протесту⁶⁵. Безпосереднім виявом цього був той факт, що більша ліберальність авторитарних режимів у Польщі й Угорщині зумовила формування політичної опозиції владі та утвердження політичного плюралізму в масштабах всього суспільства. Натомість, у Чехословаччині (зокрема, в її чеській та словацькій частинах) виявом було те, що жорсткіша політика авторитарного режиму стримувала загальнодержавні форми суспільно-політичної самоорганізації, а тому вела до формування суспільно-політичних рухів, а згодом і політичних партій здебільшого за географічним критерієм.

Подібного висновку дотримується А. Пшеворські, який зазначає, що стабільність політичного режиму залежить від присутності/відсутності переконливої альтернативи цьому режиму у той момент, коли він втрачає свою легітимність⁶⁶. Річ у тому, що якщо на момент занепаду політичного режиму йому немає жодної іншої альтернативи, тоді громадяни не можуть зробити осмисленого вибору на користь утвердження нових компромісних політичних інститутів. Відповідно, ініціативу перехоплює лише частково «заміщена»/змінена номенклатура. З цього приводу, як аргументують Н. Бокало та С. Трохимчук, цілком очевидно, що вплив на формування «правил гри» між політичною владою і політичною опозицією в сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи мала тривалість підготовчої фазираннього транзиту країн регіону до демократії. Наприклад, у Польщі вона налічувала майже десять років, в Угорщині – декілька місяців, а в Чехословаччині

⁶³ White S., *Communist and Postcommunist Political Systems: An Introduction*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1990, s. 155.; Bauman Z., *Poland: On its Own*, "Telos" 1989, vol 79, s. 47–63.; Ost D., *The Transformation of Solidarity and the Future of Central Europe*, "Telos" 1989, vol 79, s. 63–95.; Staniszki J., *The Obsolescence of Solidarity*, "Telos" 1989, vol 80, s. 37–51.

⁶⁴ *Polityczna władza i opozycja w Ukraini: porównawczy analiz z zagranicznymi krajami: monografia*, ed. F. Rudych, Wyd. IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 348.; Zelenko H., *Peredumovy formuvannia konstruktyvnoi opozytii v krainakh Vyshegradskoi hrupy*, „Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2015, vol 2, s. 64–84.

⁶⁵ Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Polityczna strukturyzatsiia parlamentiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy: monografia*, Wyd. PAIS 2014, s. 163–167.

⁶⁶ Przeworski A., *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

підготовчої фази як такої не було, оскільки «демократизація практично одразу ж ввійшла у фазу вирішення»⁶⁷.

Як наслідок – теоретизація, згідно з якою лінії поділу між окремими типами і моделями процесів початку демократизації в країнах Вишеградської групи були надмірно розмитими, але навіть попри це виявилися дві тенденції: по-перше, Польща і Угорщина демократизувались ендогенно й зважаючи на те, що розвиток опозиції уможливувався завдяки політиці лібералізації, здійснюваної свого часу режимами «реального соціалізму»; по-друге, Чехословаччина (зокрема, Чехія та Словаччина) демократизувалась спонтанно й екзогенно, бо опозиція в ній була фрагментованою радше ситуативною, а політичний режим порівняно більш репресивним⁶⁸. Також важливою є теоретизація, згідно якої в процесі початку демократичного транзиту (чи початку політичного транзиту до демократії) політична опозиція в країнах регіону пройшла два етапи свого становлення та розвитку – доінституційний (у формі суспільного/суспільно-політичного протесту) й інституційний (у формі політичного інституту).

Доінституційний етап становлення і розвитку політичної опозиції припав на період лібералізації і окреслився організаційним, хоч внутрішньо структурно-фрагментованим (інколи антидемократичним⁶⁹) оформленням політичних сил (суспільно-політичних рухів і партій), які (щоправда, в умовах досить певного балансу сил між владою та опозицією) опиралися правлячій комуністичній партії та прямо або опосередковано вели проти неї боротьбу за державну владу⁷⁰. Політична опозиція у цей період розумілась та позиціонувалась як досить організована, громадянсько- і масово-мобілізована, але, на противагу, доволі ідеологічно й програмно фракціоналізована, внаслідок чого вона спочатку більше відповідала принципам прямої, а згодом представницької демократії. Безпосереднім свідченням цього слугує зауваження А. Степана про те, що демократична/антикомуністична опозиція, передусім в Польщі Угорщині і дещо меншою мірою в Чехословаччині, виконувала функції «опору» інтеграції в рамках авторитарного режиму, захисту «зон автономії» проти політичного режиму, підриву легітимності політичного режиму, збільшення політичної ціни авторитарного режиму та створення сприйнятливої альтернативи у формі демократії та демократичного політичного режиму⁷¹. Відповідно, опозиція у формі суспільного чи суспільно-політичного протесту в цей час була якщо не повною, то доволі значною мірою антисистемною.

⁶⁷ Bokalo M., Trokhymchuk S., *Problemy i perspektivy demokratyzatsii v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy (na prykladi Vyshegradskoi chetviry)*, Lviv 2000, s. 35.

⁶⁸ *Politychna vlada i opozytzia v Ukraini: porivniialnyi analiz iz zarubizhnyimi krainamy: monohrafiia*, ed.F. Rudych, Wyd.IPiEND im.IFKurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, s. 346.

⁶⁹ Przeworski A., *Perekhody do demokracji: liberalizatsiia i demokratyzatsiia*, [w:] Protsenko O. (ed.), *Demokratiia: Antolohiia*, Wyd. Smoloskyp 2005, s. 645.

⁷⁰ Buslenko V., *Politychna opozytzia v perekhidnykh demokratiakh: katehoriialnyi analiz fenomenu*, „Studia politologica Ucraino-Polona” 2013, vol 3, s. 311–317.

⁷¹ Stepan A., *On the Task of a democratic Opposition*, „Journal of Democracy” 1990, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 45.

У свою чергу, інституційний етап розвитку політичної опозиції в регіоні був детермінований трансформацією суспільно-політичних рухів/організацій і колишніх комуністичних політичних сил у нові партії, відновленням «історичних» і формуванням зовсім «нових» партій, особливо в той час, коли вони змогли конкурувати між собою в ході проведення виборів до органів влади. Більше того, «інституціонального сліду» політичній опозиції надало те, що політичні партії і рухи (у ролі партій) почали використовувати легальні форми політичного суперництва, створювати власні програмні та персональні альтернативи, а влада для них стала об'єктом, на який спрямовувався спільний політичний інтерес⁷². Річ у тому, що саме боротьба за владу значною мірою скоригувала характер, форми й методи діяльності політичної опозиції, через що вона конструктивізувалась та трансформувалась у невід'ємний політичний інститут представницької демократії в регіоні. Суплементарним наслідком стало те, що в результаті початку демократизації в країнах Вишеградської групи політична опозиція майже відразу почала розумітись передусім як парламентська чи партійно-парламентська опозиція, яка потенційована своїми претензіями та перспективами з приводу набуття статусу суб'єкта влади. Водночас, це не означає, що лише парламентська опозиція стала виявом політичної опозиції в регіоні, оскільки до останньої входять і різноманітні суспільно-політичні групи, рухи, організації, а також позапарламентські партії, які основним чи допоміжним інструментом оспорування влади вважають суспільно-політичний протест і які традиційно не потенційовані набуттям статусу суб'єкта влади.

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⁷² Status opozitsii: vitchyzniansyi ta zarubizhnyi dosvid, rekomendatsii: Informatsiino-analitychne doslidzhennia, Kyiv 2006, s. 4.

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Revolutionary and military crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding practices of social political activism (based on the Ukraine's example of 2014-2016)

The article analyzes the experience of Ukraine in the use of social and political crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding. These technologies are studied in the time period of 2013-2016 on the example of their application for the Revolution of Dignity and maintaining the country's defensive capacity in the course of the undeclared hybrid war with Russia. It is emphasized that it is through public initiatives that the vector of the state to its democratization and Euro-Atlantic cooperation has been modified. It is noted that the projects based on the "collective intellect" and popular investments have become an alternative to inefficient government activities to maintain the country's defensive capacity and support the military and internally displaced people.

Keywords: social and political activism, crowd-sourcing, crowd-funding, Revolution of Dignity, hybrid warfare, anti-terrorist operation.

Революційні та військові краудсорсингово-краудфандингові практики громадсько-політичного активізму (на прикладі України 2014-2016 років)

У статті аналізується досвід України застосування ресурсу громадсько-політичного краудсорсингу та краудфандингу. Ці технології вивчаються на часовому проміжку 2013-2016 років на прикладі їх застосування під час Революції Гідності та для підтримки обороноздатності країни у ході неоголошеної гібридної війни з Російською Федерацією. Підкреслюється, що саме завдяки громадським ініціативам було змінено вектор розвитку держави до її демократизації та євроатлантичної співпраці. Наголошується, що проекти, засновані на «колективному розумі» та народному інвестуванні, стали альтернативою неефективній державній діяльності у забезпеченні обороноздатності країни та підтримки військових і внутрішньо переміщених осіб.

Ключові слова: громадсько-політичний активізм, краудсорсинг, краудфандинг, Революція Гідності, гібридна війна, антитерористична операція.

In 2013-2016 Ukraine faced numerous challenges caused by cruel coercion of Ukraine to Eurasian integration under Russian auspices and blocking Kiev's movement toward European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation. The revolution of dignity and further developments in the Crimea and Donbas were a response to the Russian expansionist policy in the post-Soviet area. The Russian armed aggression against Ukraine has been going on for three years; it is the third year of Ukraine's anti-terrorist operation in the Donbas. It has become a real challenge for a nation with a weakened, understrength and obsolete army, without the necessary resources to withstand the aggressor country. The crucial role in the fight for the future of Ukraine, in our opinion, at this critical time has been played by the activist public, which has undertaken many organizational functions to determine the future development of the nation, enhancing the country's defensive capacity and supporting those affected by the conflict (participants in the antiterrorist operation, internally displaced persons, families of soldiers killed in action and others).

The task of the research is to reveal the role and formats of Ukrainian public participation in organization of the protests, waging the struggle against those blocking Ukraine's movement toward European Community and her independence in decision making concerning the vector of the nation's development, violating her territorial integrity and sovereignty. This task will be fulfilled by analyzing the two innovative practices and techniques, used by the Ukrainians, i.e. crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding.

Crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding are relatively new technologies of fulfilling a task by public means. These collective initiative practices, brought about by the third millennium, were launched by the business in order to create and promote innovative products. But very soon the potential crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding practices were admitted and applied in politics and the public life. Today we can witness the appearance of an independent type of crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding – the social political one.

We believe that such generic name as "social political" (not just "political") is more correct for an analysis of social practices that are the subject of our study (revolutionary and military) because: crowd-sourcing as "the collective wisdom" represents the interest of a community of people sharing the same views in solving specific problems; crowd-funding as co-financing reflects the materialized willingness of the community to act in the common interests to implement public social and political projects.

Social political crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding belong to those modern occupational technologies which underline a free exchange of resources (ideas, finance) between the participants interconnected through horizontal network links. In our opinion, the leading trend nowadays is revitalization of social and political discourse through its virtualization due to the latest information and communication technologies, while crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding underline this trend. Crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding are the formats of interaction, with

which the public interest is realized. Such network forms of interaction are the embodiment of modern philosophy of collaboration and solidarity.

Social political crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding, unlike their business counterparts are characterized by a high motivational component, they are not intended to gain material benefits. Surely, among the public and political projects there are those that involve certain (usually symbolic) reward, however social (non-cash) practices prevail. In the Ukrainian format the vast majority of crowd-sourcing or crowd-funding socio-political projects imply absence of any material motivational incentives, while intangible reward is widely used, such as a public mention of the donor, etc. Many of the problems of the recent troubled years were solved by the Ukrainians using the two new methods - collective generation of ideas and their co-financing. This short but highly efficient experience requires a further study.

REVOLUTIONARY (PROTEST) CROWD-SOURCING AND CROWD-FUNDING

The revolutionary (protest) movement is one of the best examples of the simultaneous combination of crowd-sourcing (as a collective popular initiative) and crowd-funding (as popular funding). Let us note that crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing as techniques to achieve collective goals are themselves a kind of revolution in the organizational approach to fulfilling the task. And these “revolutionary” (or more correctly “innovative”) techniques are quite appropriate to achieve the objectives of protest movements against the regime.

The revolutionary crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing, unlike other (i.e., peaceful, non-protest) varieties of these technologies have a number of specific features, especially when it comes to their use under anti-democratic regimes which the people’s energy is intended to change. Because of the repressive character of the government, the people’s creative formats can not have an open, public form. For example, the classical method of raising funds by crowd-funding is: among Internet users; on special crowd-funding platforms; as money transfers and not as any other material or immaterial assistance. However, in our opinion, in the case of protests aimed at overthrowing the regime, the government will try to quickly cut off the channels of revenue and technologically counteract the opposition on the Internet. Therefore, even though it does not comply with the theory of crowd-funding, we regard all formats of micro-investing as the revolutionary crowd-funding.

In the revolutionary (protest) crowd-funding those small investments by a large number of people to support a public project can have, in our opinion, not only financial characteristics. According to I. Kosulia, the concept of crowd-sourcing “combines the activities, such as “brainstorming”, volunteering, charity, etc.”¹. In this context, we agree with the definition of political crowd-funding by A. Sokolov: “collecting funds for various political projects”²; the

¹ I. Косуля, Краудсорсинг та краудфандинг: нові поняття чи нові феномени, „Методологія, теорія та практика соціологічного аналізу сучасного суспільства”, 2014 nr. 20, s. 268.

² А. Соколов, Особенности возникновения политического краудфандинга в российской политической практике, „Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия Политология” 2014 nr. 2, s. 33.

nature of these tools is rightly not specified by the researcher, probably due to their diverse nature. We agree that the definition of the essence of “tools” is inappropriate in this situation, they can take a variety of forms - both materialized (e.g. mobile phones prepaid cards, heating equipment, tents, fuel, medicines, etc.), and conditionally materialized (e.g. removal of the password to private or corporate wi-fi near the places of protest that will allow the protesters broader communication capabilities, donating blood to save the wounded, transporting heating equipment for the protesters, etc.).

The Ukrainian experience has demonstrated that nowadays mass movements can raise funds domestically even without external funding sources, though foreign support (e.g. diasporas and the public sector of other countries) can be a tangible addition to the budget of the revolution. The government cannot completely control the process of accumulation of finance by the protesters, because the financial system is generally apolitical.

Nowadays it is possible to collect the required amount through e-money systems, coordinating the process through social networks. Both the former and the latter operate beyond the government control (though non-democratic states are trying to bar this format). Therefore, both the citizens of the country and people from abroad, members of the diaspora and the like, can support any social and political action. Thus, the area of financial support is greatly expanded. For example, today about 15 million Ukrainian and their descendants live outside Ukraine. Such basis for crowd-funding can accumulate a huge capital.

In our opinion, the use of crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding opportunities for support of the protests in Ukraine has undergone at least two evolutionary stages. The first stage is connected with the events of the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. Then crowd-funding was largely the transfer of money, clothes, food and the like for the needs of the Maidan. The then President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko said about “millions of creditors, answering questions on the financing of the Maidan in 2004: “I think, millions. Millions of people”. At the same time, crowd-sourcing as association, coordination of participants was poor, as the global social networks were not developed sufficiently: the number of Facebook users among the Ukrainians was very low (created in February 2004), and Twitter as a platform did not exist at all (created in 2006).

Thus, the method of social organization and communication in 2004 was fundamentally different from the subsequent revolution of 2013-2014. During the “Orange Revolution” the number of regular Internet users was relatively small, about 4 million people. However, even in 2004, the online media provided the most accurate and most expeditious information, the feeble online community formed “night patrols” of citizens who watched the polling stations, and shadowed the police vehicle movements through publications on forums.

However, during the second stage of evolution of crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding practices in Ukraine (Revolution of Dignity, 2013-2014) due to the advanced information and communication technologies (the number of regular Internet users in 2014 increased to almost 19 million people) the online communication offered new ways to enhance public and mobilize

their capital. Crowd-funding as a mechanism has been known in this period in Ukraine, national crowd-funding platforms existed already, but we recorded only isolated instances of using these platforms for revolutionary (protest) tasks; resource mobilization avoided these specialized platforms. Instead, we note the rapid evolution of crowd-sourcing practices as a result of the rapid expansion of Internet communication.

Therefore, comparing the two Ukrainian revolution as two evolutionary stages of crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding practices in the protest movement, we can state: 1) the revolutionary crowd-sourcing developed indeed, suggesting many new formats; 2) the revolutionary crowd-funding, because of its opposition, anti-government orientation which despite the relatively apolitical character of the financial system makes it impossible to collect funds openly without the threat of losing contributions, has retained the virtually unchanged format, i.e., was not consolidated in the form of specialized crowd-funding platforms.

The Revolution of Dignity, in our opinion, can be analyzed as an expression of social and political crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding of the Ukrainians, their collective energy. This is expressed by one of the revolutionary symbols and messages – a drop – with the words “I am a drop in the ocean, which will change the Ukraine”. The drop falling into the blue and yellow ocean has become a symbol of the protest (along with the barricades, burning tires, etc.). We understand this drop as a symbol of small individual contributions - financial, organizational, intellectual, etc. - in a joint state-building cause. The revolutionary (protest) crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding is based on the belief that one thing the government fears is a people united for a common purpose.

In order to organize a long-term protest a material and financial support is necessary. It is difficult to calculate “a day on the Euro-Maidan” in financial and material terms, but reports were voiced of not less than 300 thousand UAH/day – to feed the activists, rent the stage and the House of Trade Unions, transport costs, communications, medicine and so on. After the start of the bloody confrontations these needs increased dramatically. Their provision was possible due to the collective energy of the participants of the Revolution of Dignity, manifested in many formats of socio-political crowd-funding. Let us analyze the major ones.

1. *Financial revolutionary crowd-funding proper* - a direct cash assistance to satisfy the needs of the Maidan. Since the government at the time of the Euro-Maidan tracked and blocked the card accounts of activists, they were often changed. It was necessary to provide continuous information about the change of bank details. Also collection of cash among the public of the cities was organized. An example is the initiative of the public organization “Kyiv residents for the reform”, which launched in the domestic crowd-funding platform “The Great Idea” the campaign “Warm and feed Maidan” (<https://biggggidea.com/project/385/>) to raise funds to support protesters. Specifically within this campaign efforts of 1060 benefactors brought nearly 262 thousand UAH. Let us note that according to the crowd-funding rules, funds are provided only after they have been collected within a certain time period, but in the time of emergency

the administration of the “The Great Idea” made the conditions of the project flexible, i.e. daily transfers of cash receipts.

However, it should be noted that not every crowd-funding initiative during the Euro-Maidan was successful. For example, the campaign “Voice of the Street at the Euro-Maidan” (<https://bigggidea.com/project/383/>) failed (only 24 benefactors supported the project with the amount of 2,725 UAH). We assume that the former project (“Warm and feed Maidan”) was supported, because it was about the food, medicines, and the latter, extremely significant but not vital, was about information support of the Maidan (filming video addresses of citizens in the global community in different languages and their translation).

2. *Material (logistical) revolutionary crowd-funding* – provision of housing for Maidan participants (for example, Kiev citizens letting their apartments to protesters to have a rest); transport support (e.g. transportation of the participants to (from) Kyiv and within the city, evacuation of the wounded from the capital, because after 19.01.2014 when turning to Kyiv hospitals the victims were often kidnapped); collecting food, clothes, protection means, medicines; lending wi-fi from homes or offices located in the vicinity of the protests - by removing the password to private (corporate) networks.

3. *Media crowd-funding* - for example, during Euro-Maidan nearly 4,000 benefactors gathered 1,243,381 UAH by crowd-funding through the “Great Idea” site to support the multimedia project “Public television”. At the same time “Public Radio” was created; for its operation the Ukrainians collected nearly 200 thousand UAH. Another large-scale project in the media industry in 2013 was implemented through crowd-funding - “Vavylon’13”, a set of Ukrainian short films that tell of the civic protests in Ukraine and further developments in different languages to deliver the essence of the events in Ukraine to the foreign public. 31 thousand 650 UAH were raised by more than a hundred benefactors.

Let us single out the types of revolutionary social and political crowd-sourcing.

1. *Coordination crowd-sourcing* (establishing various “hot lines” (IP-telephony) such as “Housing for Maidan” and “Euro-Hostel” services or KyivHost group at the Facebook and so on. That is, organizational support of housing provision (mentioned when describing the material format crowd-funding (free housing), but in terms of organization we are dealing precisely with crowd-sourcing of the organizers of this communication). Coordination crowd-sourcing was used to find missing people, lost documents and belongings of the protesters, monitoring the persecution of activists, the movement of security forces and their equipment, providing certain provisions and means of heating, disinfecting places of mass gatherings, etc., coordination of numerous groups of self-defense.

2. *Consulting crowd-sourcing*, i. e. organization of social and psychological services directly in situ and online; legal counselling and representation of protest participants at courts.

3. *Information and communication crowd-sourcing*, i.e. stream broadcasts and organization of online TV: <http://euro-online.kiev.ua>, <http://dozor.tv>, www.Hromadske.TV, www.spilno.tv,

AronetsLIVE, GromTV, “Public radio” and so on. This was also organization of offline street actions using the site www.diyaty.org, initiating international anti-government online petitions, recording the events (photos, video) for international agencies. An important manifestation of this type of crowd-sourcing was the organization of an international information support for international mass media, translating news for international media. Communities like “Euro-Maidan SOS”, “Euro-Maidan” were news aggregators. The same type of crowd-sourcing includes hash-tagging of information, organization of virtual flash mobs and tweeter storms and so on. This also can include the creation of interactive online maps at the public opposition self-support site Galas.org.ua, which could report an emergency, ask for help, find prisoners and wounded, offer assistance. Site visitors put a mark on the interactive map of Kyiv, tagging the events.

4. *Security crowd-sourcing*, manifested primarily in the voluntary grouping of townspeople to patrol the city quarters by self-defence detachments, because in order to counter the street protests the Yanukovich regime used criminals (the so-called “titushky”). After the “Nights of wrath” (seizure of administrative buildings that embodied the regime in the cities of Lviv, Ternopil, Lutsk on the night of 19.02.2014), those who were conscious of the threat of anarchy organized themselves through social networks to ensure the public order in their cities: the temporary self-defence detachments replaced the police and effectively ensured the public order. Also, after the pogroms, the volunteers organized volunteer actions to clean the cities. All the actions were aimed at preventing riots, wherefore thousands of volunteers were organized in foot, automobile and bicycle patrols. An important role in the coordination of human resources in these spontaneous dynamic processes was played by social networks as coordinating centers.

5. *Cyber-crowd-sourcing*, when online communities (such as “Cybercompany” on the Facebook) were created that thoroughly used computer networks for political purposes (a kind of hacktivism): a) counteracting “ITtushky”³ who hacked the sites and accounts, blogs, e-mail of the opposition in social networks; b) preventing attacks on mobile phone numbers of Maidan hot lines; c) blocking sites and account of bots and Ukrainophobes in social networks that clogged hashtag #euromaidan stream, misinforming the public and spreading lies. Even a simple click “report for spam” was also a manifestation of social and political crowd-sourcing.

6. *Artistic crowd-sourcing*, a collective creativity that illustrated and occasionally formed the agenda of the Maidan. In the spirit of the “culture of non-violence”, it was manifested as a versatile energy: painting ornaments on helmets, pianists before police cordons and on the barricades, the revolutionary installations and street art, literary reading, “Open University”, a library and lecture hall in the “Ukrainian House”, posters, stickers, cartoons, etc.

³ ITtushky – a political neologism that emerged during the Revolution of Dignity to describe hackers, hacking sites and accounts of the opposition in social networks or clogged them with misinformation. The word is formed by merging the words IT (Information Technology) and purely Ukrainian coined slang “titushky” – young people of strong build, often athletes who were were paid to illegally prevent the constitutional manifestations of organized civil resistance. Note that the word “titushky” and “EuroMaidan” in 2013 led the ranking of the most popular words in Ukraine.

MILITARY CROWD-SOURCING AND CROWD-FUNDING

One of the types of social and political crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing is the military one. Since the beginning of anti-Ukrainian aggression, including the annexation by the Russian Federation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, serious problems in the country's defense came out. Ukrainian army actually had to recover to be on war footing. At the beginning of 2014 only 4% of the Ukrainian troops were provided with necessary things (such as helmets and body armor), this is the information of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The necessity to help the Army was caused by the following reasons: lack of resources (clothes, personal protection, medicines, food); lack of battle-ready equipment; insufficient logistic basis, etc. The government was unprepared to respond effectively to the challenges and to operate in extreme conditions of territorial annexation and occupation of Ukrainian territory. Therefore, with the beginning of active hostilities public initiatives emerged aimed at providing the military, first, with basic protective means, and then, with the necessary equipment for combat. At this point, the Ukrainian civil society demonstrated an impressive ability to consolidate and mobilize, managing to create an effective network of social initiatives and organizations that undertook to solve urgent problems. The community was filled with the spirit of the proverb: "He who does not feed the army of his own, sooner or later will feed the army of the others".

Crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding are unrestricted in creative variations. For example, one may speak about the military artistic social and political crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing. For example, Ukrainian artists through Kickstarter and other platforms collected money to release pin up calendars, dedicated to the Ukrainian military. Part of the proceeds from the sales went to support the army. Such actions can be considered as crowd-sourcing because they are intellectual contribution to the fight against the aggressor; on the other hand, it is crowd-funding, as the products was specifically prepared and implemented as a fundraiser for specific military purposes.

Crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing are such new social practices to Ukraine, that they have not yet been legally registered. Since there is no regulatory legislation, the support recipients have problems with taxation. In this regard, A. Fomenko notes that "the funds collected are often referred to as investment, sponsorship, charity or donations"⁴.

On 15.03.2014 the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine announced fundraising by sending text messages costing 5 UAH to the short number 565. Cell-phone benefactors are the people of advanced technologies and operational decisions. Most of these transfers were made impulsively, as an instantaneous response to the request of help. By the end of December 2014 37 million UAH were transferred, and by mid-2015, they had already collected more than 40 million

⁴ А. Фоменко, Сучасні умови розвитку краудфандингу в Україні, "Вісник Бердянського університету менеджменту і бізнесу", 2013, № 3 (23), с. 95.

UAH. But six months after the start of fundraising questions were asked concerning the usage of the funds raised and the likelihood of corruption.

If we look back at the historical experience of collective funding of the army by concerned citizens, we recall that the Kaiser's Germany a wooden statue was erected in each city, where they sold nails of three denominations - from the most expensive gold ones, to the cheap iron ones. The driven-in nails converted the statue into the "Iron Man" and the money went to finance soldiers on the fronts of World War I. A similar example was recorded in 1916 in Lviv. The artists carved in wood and painted the patron of the city, George the Conqueror; into his shield anyone willing to donate money to the army hammered in a metal plate, thereby making a symbolic knight's armor. In this way the residents supported the defense of the city, promoting the purchase of weapons for the Austrian army. This crowd-funding format was restored in 2014 by the townspeople of Lviv to raise funds for the Ukrainian army. For the modern knight army to be strong, everyone who contributed at least 100 hryvnias drove in a nail capped with an engraved trident into the knight's shield. Only after a month of fund-raising in the summer of 2014 the Knight collected nearly 400 thousand UAH for the needs of the Ukrainian army.

The main types of the public support of the army have been: material assistance (food, ammunition, drugs and their delivery destinations), support of the wounded, military hospitals; support of the families of the antiterrorist operation participants (psychological, rehabilitation, humanitarian aid); technical support (refurbishment, repair, upgrading and armoring of combat vehicles).

The fundraising for the army and the accumulation of ideas have been maintained primarily through online communication, which is the most expeditious way to mobilize the public. An example of effective crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding is the national project "Peoples project" (<http://www.peoplesproject.com/>). It draws attention to a particular issue, organizes discussions, accumulates ideas and finances for its solution. The main directions in 2014-2016 were: biotech-rehabilitation of the wounded; establishment of the "skin bank" (regeneration of the skin after burns using cellular technology); organization of military everyday life (mobile laundries and sleeping facilities); providing the military with collapsible quadcopters for reconnaissance and monitoring the enemy; repair and restoration of damaged equipment; purchase of easy to install fortified dugouts with residential and accommodation space, etc. Also, "Peoples project" organized a crowd-funding campaign to raise funds for the development and commissioning of serial production of drones, which could be used for reconnaissance, photo and video filming and even firing at targets. Only for individual kits for soldiers the "Peoples project" collected over 4.4 million in 2015-2016.

A novel format of fundraising is crowd-funding flash mob. One of the most original flash mobs that came from the West, being somewhat re-formatted in Ukraine, was the "Ice Bucket Challenge", but unlike channeling funds to research diseases of the central nervous system (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis), the Ukrainians poured cold water over themselves handing the

relay baton to three other contributors to raise funds, including for the army. This flash mob (despite its somewhat frivolous form) involved not only the youth, as the ice-cold relay was first promoted by rectors of universities, mayors, top managers, politicians, artists, clergy, diplomats of some nations... Through this unusual forms of mobilization millions were collected and many lives saved. So, in our opinion, flash mobs despite being still rejected by a part of the public, is one of the fastest growing methods of community cohesion, and its “bonding” in order to solve common problems. After this flash mob gained popularity, in order to enhance the fundraising it was organized not just in the traditional individual form but as a collective one, particularly in parks where facilities for changing cloths were organized, providing hairdryers, buckets and water, and of course - donation boxes for the needs of the army. The relay was caught and passed by the ultras, educational institutions, various labor groups ... This action seemed strange to many, because one can simply transfer funds. But for socially active people it was a challenge.

Another creative approach to fundraising was the “dating auction”. Its mechanism is simple: on the Facebook page pictures of girls as auction lots were placed that could go on a date. Bidding was in the comments. There were lots in form of meeting celebrities for a cup of coffee, selling things with their autograph. Only the Facebook has hundreds of pages and groups like “charity auction dates”. A specific feature of crowd-funding through auctions is that when transferring money to the army the person receives as a reminder of the donation not a cheque or invoice but a souvenir (for example, a calendar for the next year, the memory of meeting with an interesting person, etc.).

In Ukraine for several years national crowd-funding platforms have been operating: “Na-Starte” (<http://na-starte.com/>), “Spilnokosht” (BigIdea) (<https://biggggidea.com>), “Seven stars” (<https://simzirok.com/>), “JQStar” (<http://jqstar.com/>) and others. Many of these platforms are useful for individuals who, for example, seek loans for business development; thanks to them funds for start-ups, environmental and social action work of new media, organizing festivals and performances, shooting videos and the like were accumulated. But projects related to support of the army were initially not numerous on those platforms (2014), and later on only a few of them (for example, “Ukrainian Philanthropic Marketplace”) developed this type of national investment. Our analysis shows that the fundraising campaigns were launched not so much on crowd-funding platforms, but on individual web resources, such as narodniy.org.ua.

One of the national platforms which develops social and political segment of microfinancing is “Ukrainian Philanthropic Marketplace” (<https://ubb.org.ua/>); here thematic projects “HELP_UA” are being developed. On this platform funds are accumulated for: 1) restoring infrastructure facilities in areas liberated by the Ukrainian troops during the antiterrorist operation in the Donbas (primarily reconstruction of destroyed schools, orphanages, hospitals, kindergartens); 2) raising funds for the purchase of important things for internally displaced persons (medicines, clothes, shoes, food, hygiene); 3) the technical needs of the military (optical devices, lighting generators); 4) the treatment and rehabilitation of the antiterrorist operation

participants (for example, the first in Ukraine specialized intensive care unit for severely wounded comatose soldiers at the Main Military Clinical Hospital) and others. For example: Project “Medical Battalion 2” enabled 350 doctors in the area of the anti-terrorist operation to be issued NATO standard medical bags; project “Light for the Warriors of Light” was implemented for the purchase of power generators for lighting and charging the signal equipment for the military.

The unique character of military crowd-funding is that: 1) anyone willing can help at any time, regardless of location or health status (when talking about money transfers); it made possible diverse forms of money contribution: cash payments in the bank, payments from bank cards, e-money transfer, payments from cell phones, terminals, ATMs, cash contributions, etc; 2) the help can be not only financial, but also: a) informational by posting a link about the project at a social network account, sending a link in any other convenient way. Because of this, the chances of attracting new members to the project increase; b) moral, for example, writing a letter to a soldier, recording a video, drawing a picture, propagating a hash tag, etc.

Those who wish to support the army can use social networks, primarily, Facebook, where various auctions are held and calls for help placed. Charity Flea Markets and fairs are organized for offline fundraising. There were touching facts when athletes sold their medals and donated the receivings, and low-income pensioners brought home-canned food to send to the combat zone. In food-catering facilities visitors were asked to add a hryvnia to the account for its subsequent transfer for the army needs.

In some projects, the funds are collected “for the army” (no specifics), in others for certain army units or specific soldiers (bullet-proof vest, helmet, goggles, payment of medical treatment). People’s initiative and people’s money in Ukraine became the basis of the supplies of personal safety means, clothing (uniform), winter equipment, food, signal equipment, transport, legal assistance, exchange of prisoners and so on for the military from abroad.

Ukrainian crowd-funding initiatives are studied by Ukrainian sociologists. According to a study conducted by the “Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Fund” jointly with the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 32.5% Ukrainians only in May-September 2014 transferred funds to the Ukrainian army. Another 23% of respondents used the help of charitable and volunteer organizations, donating money, clothes and food through these public institutions. 9% of citizens took part in promotions in shops, buying goods on the list for the army and handing them in to volunteers. 7% of Ukrainians personally helped IDPs with things and money. 3% were involved in direct collecting of money, medicines, goods, delivering them in the antiterrorist operation area.

Ukrainians were asked: “Recently, residents of Ukraine have provided assistance to the military and the people who suffer from the hostilities in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Did you personally provide such assistance during May-September this year? If so, what was this assistance?” 60% of Ukrainian provided help to the military and the people who suffer from the

hostilities in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in at least one way, 11% did not provide such assistance, 29% - hesitated with their answer or refused to answer this question.

The most common type of aid to Ukrainian military was money transfer to accounts of the Ukrainian army - practiced almost by every third Ukrainian (32.5%). In addition, 23% transferred money, things, food to charitable foundations and volunteer organizations. Almost one in ten (9%) participated in promotion campaigns (buying goods at the recommended list and put them in the box for the needs of the army). 7% of Ukrainian aided IDPs with personal belongings and money, 3% - collected or brought their own funds, medicines, other items, etc, were volunteers, and 1% - provided housing to IDPs⁵.

The results of the research have shown differences in macro-regions of Ukraine: the farther to the east of Ukraine, the smaller the proportion of the population that in some way helped the military or IDPs in general. Money transfers to the accounts of the Ukrainian army were most active in Western Ukrainian macro-region (52%); 38% in the Central, 27% in the Southern and 8% in the Eastern macro-regions. Similar breakdown is observed with transfers of money, goods, food to charitable foundations and volunteer organizations: in the Western macro-region, 43% provided the money, in the Central - 26%, in the Southern - 12% and in the Eastern 6%. Donations were collected in shops mostly in the Central region - 15%, Western - 11%, Southern - 5%, and Eastern - 1%. The residents of the eastern regions have the lowest share of those who practiced at least one form of charitable aid - only 34%, that is, one in three. Instead, in the western region at least in one way 82% of the population provided help, in the Central - 71%, in the South - 49%. In general, about the same proportion of the rural and urban population helped the military or refugees at least in one way - 70% and 65%, respectively. 46% of rural population and only 12% of urban population transferred money, clothes and food to charitable funds. 40% of rural population and 28% transferred money to accounts of the Ukrainian army. By contrast, 12% of urban population and only 3% of rural population participated in promotion campaigns in shops (probably because such campaigns were carried out mainly in the cities by network hypermarkets)⁶.

According to the results of another nationwide poll - "Opinions and attitudes of the population of Ukraine: December 2014", conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology 04-19.12.2014 g., the most common form of the aid to the army in late 2014 was money transfers for the military (36.9% of respondents). The collection and dispatch of medicines and warm clothes, as well as material support for families of the wounded, the dead, care for the wounded is much less popular with voluntary assistants to the Ukrainian army. 21.2% of respondents find any help the Army unnecessary on principle (explained this as a direct responsibility of the state), and another 11.2% ignore such a process without explanation. Thus, a third of the

⁵ Ругонова Д. Благодійна допомога, яку надавали українці військовим та вимушеним переселенцям у травні-вересні 2014 року. [http://kiis.com.ua/materials/KMIS-Review/08\(02-2015\)/ds.php?file=08_KR_3_SocEkon1.pdf](http://kiis.com.ua/materials/KMIS-Review/08(02-2015)/ds.php?file=08_KR_3_SocEkon1.pdf)[18.04.2017].

⁶ Ibidem.

population does not support the army in any way. Among them, most residents of Donbas (57%) and Donetsk region in particular (67.5%), where the attitude of the population to the Ukrainian military is not always positive.

A similar survey was conducted by the “Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives” and the Razumkov Centre on 14-22.11.2015. In the course of 2015 41% of Ukrainians provided various financial support, often in order to help the Ukrainian army. The highest activity was observed among the residents of the West (88.9%) and Center (81.6%), the lowest - among residents of Donbass (56.2%).

In 2015-2016 (compared with 2014) because of the crisis, the deteriorating economic situation, despite the persisting acute problems of financing the army, some “burnout” among the donors has been observed. An average citizen income declined and, therefore, somewhat fewer resources were allocated for the needs of the army. It has become more complicated to attract charitable funds which led to the emergence of new fundraising formats, such as charitable sporting events (marathons), involvement of large business companies, etc.

Unfortunately, fundraising for the needs of the army led to a number of frauds with funds collected. In Ukraine, a separate category of criminal scammers who, concealing behind the good intentions to help the army, created fake fundraising sites on the internet or cloned the sites of famous structures (such as “Army SOS”, “People’s rear service”, etc), unauthorized persons collected funds in the streets and food in supermarkets. Under these conditions, another focus of the active public is the struggle against hundreds of street and Internet swindlers. The public has repeatedly stressed that the government authorities (fiscal, for example) should establish and maintain a Web inventory of all structures that collect donations and publish online their monthly reports.

While the military crowd-funding is aimed primarily at raising money, food, medicines, etc., the military crowd-sourcing, in our opinion, is to unite the collective power of people to support the troops. And that energy is embodied in a particular construction of a certain mechanism with collective intellect - be it technical, or operational.

An example of military crowd-sourcing can be the organization of military ammunition being carried across the border by the residents of border areas in the spring and summer of 2014 (used and discarded bullet-proof vests and Kevlar helmets), in particular through the pedestrian border crossing point “Shehyni - Medica”. They were quite risky nightly raids under the auspices of public organizations (“Self-defense of Lviv”, “People’s Control”), because the participants were not guaranteed against sanctions (e.g. canceling a Schengen visa at the border with the use of additional administrative sanctions (long-term ban on entering the country, recording the information on the offender in Schengen Information System, administrative arrest with the use of penalty (financial sanctions), expulsion, deportation). Volunteers (they were called “ants”, “armor-clads”) understood their mission as “one night raid = one bulletproof vest = one saved the life at the frontline”. This example (and they were numerous) shows the collective intellect, self-organization and initiative of the Ukrainians.

The public is involved in organization and practical manufacturing of the equipment (make clothes, weave camouflage nets, assemble drones for military intelligence), evacuates people from the antiterrorist operation area, provides professional psychological assistance to the military suffering from post-traumatic syndrome, the families of the fallen, takes care of the wounded in hospitals, etc.

Almost a quarter of all the Ukrainians is somehow involved in military crowd-sourcing or crowd-funding, because they produce ideas, spend their free time in important interactions, contribute money or various things for the needs of the army or for solving other problems associated with counterterrorist operation and its devastating consequences.

Other crowd-sourcing activities include: helping those who can not leave the area affected by hostilities on their own (the elderly, disabled and children); animal protection related to evacuating and finding shelter for the homeless pets; activities to free hostages; planning the evacuation of citizens from the area of antiterrorist operation; organization of professional psychological assistance to the military with post-traumatic syndrome; information crowd-sourcing like prompt notification of the urgent needs of the army and the servicemen, attracting attention to the poor quality of military administrative agencies, instances of corruption, etc.

Another type is the "IT-crowd-sourcing": programmers, engineers and volunteers developing electronic firing charts for artillerymen, automating the military communication systems, designing drones. A whole culture of hacktivism is being created in Ukraine which should be distinguished from, for example, cyber-terrorism - the ideological motivation is the main difference between hacktivists and cybercriminals. Ukrainian cybertroops hacked the sites of the separatists to deliver accurate information or blocking dissemination of false rumours, tracked the correspondence of the militants, obtained lists of Ukrainian prisoners, searched for missing persons.

Having analyzed the manifestations of military crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing, we would like to draw attention to another of its types, related to the problems of those suffering from the hostilities. There has already formed a separate social group in Ukraine, i. e. internally displaced persons; according to official data it includes 1.3 million people, while unofficially this number is much larger (2 million people). It would be more correct to speak about crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding practices aimed at supporting internally displaced persons, singling out a particular type of social practices - migration crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding. But given the short format of the article, we will describe the problems of supporting the internally displaced persons in Ukraine within the framework of military crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding.

The vast majority of those who were forced to leave their homes because of hostilities and occupation have become totally defenseless: their homes, property, jobs remained in the occupied territory and they are uncertain about the prospects of a return home soon. The government slogans of help remain declarative, the support is symbolic, almost each of IDPs experienced discrimination regarding employment, housing, participation in elections and so on.

Ukraine has a number of regulations that protect IDPs, but the implementation of the proposed mechanism of protection is hindered by bureaucratic red tape, many possibilities provided by the law remain declarative. Therefore many issues have been taken over by the public, from providing humanitarian aid to assistance in finding jobs.

Crowd-sourcing was manifested in the creation and maintenance by the community of hotlines for the needs of internally displaced persons: departure from the antiterrorist operation area, receiving humanitarian aid, registering permits, certificates, assistance for persons in captivity or released from captivity, representation and protection of the interests of the inhabitants of the conflict area in state institutions, assistance in finding temporary housing, organization of retraining, work with immigrants to overcome post-traumatic syndrome, social adaptation projects for internally displaced persons. For example, in June 2014 Donbas SOS was launched (<http://donbasssos.org/uk/>). These “hot line” is a social psychological support (overcoming the stress, overcoming isolation, involvement in the network relationships, etc.).

The activists and volunteers created a number of electronic channels in social networks. For example, at the Facebook resources, community and groups to support internally displaced persons in Ukraine were created. At these forums they exchange views, announce specific needs in helping concrete internally displaced persons.

Regarding migration crowd-funding, its tasks in the first days after the onset of problems (we will call it “initial crowd-funding”) and after some stabilization (“consequent crowd-funding”) are different. “Initial crowd-funding” was manifested in financial assistance to leave homes (evacuation), carrying the basic belongings, getting temporary housing with minimum necessary facilities, food packages, clothing, household chemicals, medicines, etc. “Consequent crowd-funding” is an assistance by creating opportunities (model of “involvement” or “open opportunity”) rather than continuing “compassion”: raising money for special counseling centers, payment of legal support and so on. This type of crowd-funding is also evident in fundraising for the construction of modular camps.

The support for internally displaced Ukrainians is an activity of two crowd-funding platforms - “Spilnokosht” (“Big Idea”) and “Ukrainian Philanthropic Exchange”. “Spilnokosht” raises funds for the project “Ticket to Success” for the teens from the annexed Crimea, to run the Office of Employment of internally displaced persons in the regions, etc. “Ukrainian Philanthropic Exchange” has a number of projects under symbolic names “Misfortune happens to anyone” “Give childhood back to children”, “Restore school after the war”, “Medicines for immigrants” and others.

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing of 2014-2016 by its scale has become an unprecedented manifestation of public self-organization. The crisis in the country and external influences have jeopardized the existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which was seen

by citizens as a personal challenge, a threat to their identity. The patriotic enthusiasm in the society resulted in a large number of creative initiatives.

The recent three years have witnessed a sharp increase of Ukrainian public activism, including such advanced formats as social and political crowd-sourcing and crowd-funding. Flexible forms of public activity in practice were the most productive, for bypassing bureaucratic red tape in such extraordinary circumstances saves time and lives. In Ukraine crowd-funding and crowd-sourcing have become the operational mechanisms that helped the public to take on the solution of vital problems of the army and internally displaced persons along with the government, or even ahead of it.

Nowadays, an image of Ukrainian society with an unprecedented self-organization and solidarity has been formed in the world. On the one hand, it is a society with numerous differences, but due to the collective idea it is becoming a cohesive community.

New media and modern society: political interaction

The purpose of the article is to reveal the peculiarities of the interaction and interdependence of new media and modern societies. The essence of such interaction is disclosed through the prism of both object-subject, and subject-subject relations. New media not only influence public opinion, but also have to focus on requests from the bottom – to support the interest of the modern audience. This should encourage social development in the direction of maximum social justice. But research proves that there is an increasing social inequality in the world. It is paradoxical, but with easy access to information formed, for the most part, politically unconscious population.

Keywords: new media, modern societies, political interaction, social inequality, politically unaware populations.

Nowe media i nowoczesne społeczeństwa: interakcja polityczna

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie osobliwości interakcji i współzależności nowych mediów ze współczesnymi społeczeństwami. Istota interakcji ujawnia się poprzez pryzmat zarówno relacji obiektowo-subiektywnych, jak i subiektywno-subiektywnych. Najnowsze media nie tylko wpływają na opinię publiczną, ale także skupiają się na wnioskach skierowanych od dołu – aby popierać poglądy i interesy współczesnej publiczności. Ten stan rzeczy powinien być zachęcać do rozwoju nowoczesnego społeczeństwa w kierunku osiągnięcia maksymalnej sprawiedliwości, poszanowania równości społecznej. Badania pokazują jednak, że we współczesnym świecie coraz więcej nierówności społecznej. Sprzecznością jest to, że mimo łatwego dostępu do informacji, w nowoczesnych społeczeństwach powstaje politycznie nieświadoma populacja, wykazująca głównie wąskie konsumenckie interesy.

Słowa kluczowe: nowe media, nowoczesne społeczeństwa, interakcja polityczna, nierówność społeczna, politycznie nieświadoma populacja.

НОВІ МАС-МЕДІЇ ТА СУЧАСНІ СУСПІЛЬСТВА: ПОЛІТИЧНА ІНТЕРАКЦІЯ

Мета статті – розкрити особливості взаємодії та взаємозалежності новітніх мас-медій та сучасних суспільств. Суть такої взаємодії розкрито крізь призму як об'єкт-суб'єктних, так й суб'єкт-суб'єктних відносин. Нові медії не лише впливають на громадську думку, але й змушені орієнтуватися на запити, спрямовані знизу – підтримувати інтереси сучасної аудиторії. Це мало б спонукати до максимального розвитку соціальної справедливості. Але дослідження доводять, що в світі все більше соціальної нерівності. Парадоксально, але при легкому доступі до інформації формується, здебільшого, політично несвідоме населення.

Ключові слова: нові мас-медії, сучасні суспільства, політична інтеракція, соціальна нерівність, політично несвідоме населення.

Współczesny świat zmienia się szybko: w gospodarczych, politycznych, duchowych i innych sferach ludzkiej egzystencji. Wraz z rozwojem Internetu, innymi najnowszymi technologiami mobilnymi, specyfika mediów (mass mediów, środków masowego przekazu, środków masowego komunikowania) została ostro przekształcona. Najnowsze funkcje zasobów mediów internetowych są z powodzeniem wykorzystywane przez polityków, duże przedsiębiorstwa i zwykłych obywateli, którzy mogą uzyskać maksymalną ilość informacji, prowadzić działalność polityczną i gospodarczą. Takie doświadczenie jest również interesujące dla Ukrainy, która również aktywnie rozwija się w tej dziedzinie. Współczesne media masowe wpływają nie tylko, kształtują, nakładają swoje opinie na innych, ale też kierują się potrzebami i wymaganiami społeczeństwa. Właściwie obserwując ukraińskie kanały telewizyjne, na przykład, ich treść, możemy mieć prostą konkluzję: produkt jest w większości niski, ponieważ widz chce tego oglądać. Dlatego problematyczne stwierdzenie w kluczu do współzależności, wzajemnego wpływu mediów i odbiorców na obecny etap rozwoju społeczeństwa wydaje się bardzo istotne.

Badanie pozycji mediów we współczesnym społeczeństwie, ich wpływ na procesy społeczno-polityczne, gospodarcze prowadzone jest przez naukowców z różnych kierunków: psychologów, polityków, socjologów, naukowców kultury i innych. Wszystkie podkreślają znaczenie funkcji najnowszych mass mediów we współczesnych społeczeństwach. Ponadto uważa się, że dziś w wirtualnym świecie powstaje nowa osoba, w tym polityczna. Być reprezentowanym w tym świecie wirtualnym – to jest główne zadanie wszystkich mediów, które chcą być popularne, lub pozostać w ogóle na powierzchni.

Naukowcy (przede wszystkim uczeni zachodni) w sferze wzajemnego oddziaływania, współzależności ze środków masowego przekazu i społeczeństwa od dawna studiują osobliwości funkcjonowania sfery politycznej w społeczeństwie informacyjnym poindustrialnym. Główne cechy tego procesu i zjawisk są wyraźnie wyrażane w społeczeństwach rozwijających się, które

bez wątpienia można przypisać Ukrainie. Na przykład naukowiec E. Cassirer widzi w takich interakcjach żyzną ziemię do tworzenia mitów politycznych¹. J. Baudriard uważa, że rewolucja informacyjna doprowadziła do nowej jakości rzeczywistości wypełnionej doskonałymi kopiami rzeczywistości (często) bez jakiegokolwiek oryginalności – hiperrawitacji, gdzie media odgrywają kluczową rolę². W. Burszta, wyrażając swoje przemyślenia na temat dominacji mitologicznej w XXI wieku, T. Buksinski, ze szczególnym naciskiem na depersonalizację procesu politycznego, przynoszą media do czołówki, wraz z klubami zainteresowanymi i organizacjami pozarządowymi³.

Współcześni społeczeństwa charakteryzujące się decentralizacją administracyjną, rozproszonym uczestnictwem politycznym, różnorodnymi wyzwaniem spowodowanymi skutkami procesów globalizacji nie mogą skutecznie istnieć bez mediów. Najnowszych media, przedstawionych w Internecie, aplikacje mobilne i inne formy postępu technologicznego. Gdzieś, szczególnie dla młodszego pokolenia, środkami komunikacji (interakcji) masowej służą wyłącznie sieci społeczne w trybie online.

Jednocześnie nowe mass media, podobnie jak klasyczni środki masowego przekazu (czasopisma drukowane, radio i telewizja), są absolutnie w stanie przekazywać wiadomości polityczne nieograniczonej liczbie osób, odgrywając kluczową rolę w nagłych zmianach, które nagle doganiają nie tylko społeczeństw rozwijających się, ale także dotyczą bogatych stabilnych krajów. W pierwszym przypadku Ukraina może służyć jako żywy przykład, w którym dzięki sieciom społecznym obywatele wielokrotnie zbierali się do masowych protestów, a nawet – zmiany władzy. W drugim – zwycięstwo D. Trumpa w ostatnich wyborach prezydenckich w Stanach Zjednoczonych.

Zdaniem H. Hymana środki masowego przekazu odgrywają szczególną rolę w społeczeństwach, które podlegają głębokim przemianom jakościowym (gospodarczym, politycznym, kulturowym). Są skuteczne i wystarczająco silne, aby pokryć nawet duże populacje, które trzeba zmodernizować. Ich standaryzacja pomaga tworzyć powszechne jednolite spojrzenia i zachowania⁴.

Długoletnie badania ukraińskich uczonych, w szczególności z Instytutu Socjologii Narodowej Akademii Nauk Ukrainy, Międzynarodowego Instytutu Socjologii w Kijowie pokazują, że istnieje ogromne zaufanie publiczne do mediów jako instytucji społecznej. W różnych czasach Ukraińcy wykazali więcej zaufania tylko do kościoła, rodziny, armii, wolontariuszy (w tym NGO). W okresie od 1994 do 2005 roku poziom zaufania ukraińskiego społeczeństwa do mediów stale wzrastał – prawie w 1,5 razy⁵. Telewizja nadal jest głównym źródłem wiadomości

¹ E. Cassirer, *Esej o człowieku. Wstęp do filozofii kultury*, Warszawa 1998, s. 54

² J. Baudriard, *Przed koncem*, Warszawa 2001, s. 73

³ T. Buksinski, *Współczesna filozofia polityki*, Poznan 2006, s. 29-32; W. Burszta, *Logos i mythos w antropologii kultury*, <http://nauki.scielki.pl/index.php?p=psy/14.php> [20.09.2017].

⁴ H. Hyman, *Mass Communication and Political Socialization*, Princeton 1999, s. 43

⁵ Н. Паніна, *Українське суспільство 1994-2005 рр.: соціологічний моніторинг*, Київ 2005, s. 23-35; *Довіра соціальним інституціям*, <http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&cid=678&page=1> [21.09.2017].

dla Ukraińców, ale spadek popularności nadal trwa. Coraz więcej Ukraińców pragnie otrzymywać wiadomości online. Interakcje polityczną przez Internet wybiera przede wszystkim kategoria do 35 lat. Faktycznie młodzi ludzie uzyskują informacje nie tylko w web-witrynach z nowościami, jak ze agregatorów typu ukr.net i z serwisów społecznościowych (takich jak Facebook czy V Kontakte). Odsetek korzystania z Facebook w celu otrzymywania wiadomości w porównaniu do innych sieci społecznościowych w ostatnich latach znacząco wzrósł – do 36%⁶. W przypadku ukraińskich realiów ważne jest, że w ostatnich dwóch-trzech latach jest znaczny spadek zaufania obywateli do rosyjskich mediów.

Oddzielnie, zwrócimy uwagę na korzystanie z Internetu przez Ukraińców. W Google przedstawili wyniki badania „Connected Consumer Study 2017” w sprawie specyfiki zachowań ukraińskich użytkowników Internetu⁷. Tabela 1 pokazuje, że w ciągu ostatnich pięciu lat liczba urządzeń podłączonych do Internetu w Ukrainie wzrosła ponad dwukrotnie. I to pomimo trudnej sytuacji gospodarczej w kraju. Badanie wykazało, że 66% Ukraińców regularnie korzysta z Internetu w celach osobistych. Dla porównania, na poziomie globalnym, ta liczba wynosi 82%. Najbardziej popularnymi działaniami online są: korzystanie z wyszukiwarek (91%), sieciów społecznościowych (83%) i oglądanie filmów online (84%).

Tabela 1. Średnia liczba urządzeń podłączonych do Internet (na mieszkańca Ukrainy)

rok	średnia liczba gadżetów
2012	0,6
2013	0,8
2014	1
2015	1,1
2016	1,2
2017	1,4

Źródło: <https://www.consumerbarometer.com/en/trending/?countryCode=UA&category=TRN-NOFILTER-ALL> (odczyt: 25.11.2017).

Tymczasem niektóre badania przeprowadzone na uniwersytetach w Stanach Zjednoczonych pokazują, że sieci społeczne zwiększają poczucie osamotnienia ludzi, promują izolację społeczną i mają negatywny wpływ na poczucie własnej wartości dzieci⁸. Ale czy to oznacza, że sieci społeczne tworzą osobowość apolityczną? We współczesnej Ukrainie jest wiele faktów, że ludzie poprzez sieci społeczne gromadzą się, aby uczestniczyć w różnych imprezach społeczno-politycznych.

⁶ *Українські онлайн-ЗМІ на піку популярності*, <http://imi.org.ua/news/ukrajinski-onlayn-zmi-na-piku-populyarnosti-a-dovira-ta-koristuvannya-rosiyiskimi-zmi-skorochuetsya-doslidjennya/> [21.10.2017].

⁷ *Google розповіла, як українці поводяться в інтернеті*, http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/google_rozpovila_yak_ukraintsi_povodyat_sebe_v_interneti/ [25.11.2017].

⁸ *Соцмерекі підсилюють почуття самотності*, <http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-39178881> [21.11.2017].

Zachodnie media (Ameryka Północna, Europa Zachodnia, przede wszystkim) są uważane za najbardziej obiektywne na świecie. Niezależność finansowa (choć nie wszystkie) środków masowego przekazu pozwala im zajmować ich pozycję w życiu politycznym społeczeństwa. W warunkach liberalnej demokracji działania mediów nie ingerują w władze państwowe, pierwsze z nich podlegają minimalnej regulacji prawnej⁹. Na Ukrainie przeciwnie, podejmowane są pierwsze kroki w kierunku tworzenia publicznych mediów, web-strony społeczno-polityczne działają praktycznie nieocenzurowane (a często nieodpowiedzialne). Ważne jest również, że dziś Ukraińcy wiedzą, kto jest właścicielem lokalnych i krajowych mediów – często do 50% respondentów. Ponad 40% respondentów uważa, że przejrzystość struktury własności mediów jest bardzo ważna¹⁰.

Kwestia podporządkowania się wolności słowa, sfery komunikacji (dostępu do informacji, prawa do jego różnorodności) pozostaje poważnym problemem w stosunkach między mediami a społeczeństwem na obecnym etapie rozwoju, a logiką rynkową komercjalizacji. Niektórzy uczeni uważają, że sama logika mediów zorientowanych na rynek „jest sprzeczna z zasadami zachowania i rozwoju sfery publicznej”, ponieważ takie środki masowego przekazu charakteryzują wysoki poziom płatności za dostęp, wysoką koncentrację własności i politycznie konserwatywne i rozrywkowe odchylenia ze względu na ich zależność z przychodów z reklam¹¹. Ponadto niedawne badania pokazują, że Ukraińcy mają mniej rozróżnienia między niestandardowymi materiałami zawierającymi ukryte reklamy, nie uważa ich za poważny problem i są gotowi zaakceptować pewną ilość ukrytych reklam w mediach¹².

O bezpośrednim mechanizmie oddziaływania jednego z głównych instytutów formowania obywatela politycznego można mówić poprzez pryzmat głównych pojęć (koncepcji) medialnych opracowanych przez zachodnich uczonych. Tak więc współczesna naukowa wizja wpływu mediów na proces interakcji, socjalizacji politycznej człowieka opiera się na trzech kluczowych pojęciach: określenie porządku dziennego, skupienie uwagi publiczności (*priming*) oraz wykorzystanie standardowych form (*framing*)¹³.

Jednocześnie środki masowego przekazu nie zawsze mogą osiągnąć pożądaną rezultat, skłaniając nas do myślenia (jak analizować i co wyciągnąć z tych wniosków (podejmować decyzje), ale mogą „bezw warunkowo odnieść sukces”, wskazując „co mamy myśleć” (co analizować, o czym dyskutować)¹⁴. W naszym konkretnym przypadku oznacza to, że media próbują ukształtować świadomość polityczną osoby, która obejmuje poziomy poznawcze, afektywne i konstruktywne.

⁹ J. Keane, *Media i demokracja*, Londyn 1997, s. 45-49

¹⁰ *Українські онлайн-ЗМІ на піку популярності*, <http://imi.org.ua/news/ukrajinski-onlayn-zmi-na-piku-populyarnosti-a-dovira-ta-koristuvannya-rosiyskimi-zmi-skorochuetsya-doslidjennya/> [21.10.2017].

¹¹ Z. Bauer, E. Chudziński, *Granice wolności mediów*, Kraków 2007, s. 41-63

¹² *Українські онлайн-ЗМІ на піку популярності*, <http://imi.org.ua/news/ukrajinski-onlayn-zmi-na-piku-populyarnosti-a-dovira-ta-koristuvannya-rosiyskimi-zmi-skorochuetsya-doslidjennya/> [21.10.2017].

¹³ K. Крос, P. Гакет, *Політичні комунікації та новинні засоби масової інформації у демократичних країнах: конкуруючі підходи*, <https://studfiles.net/preview/2299243/> [22.09.2017].


¹⁴ M. Kunczik, A. Zipfel, *Wprowadzenie do nauki o dziennikarstwie i komunikowaniu*, Warszawa 2000, s. 57

Zwolennicy brytyjskiej szkoły dziennikarskiej zastanawiają się nad materiałami informacyjnymi w wyniku wpływu „kulturowych punktów orientacyjnych”, które sugerują, że życie publiczne dzieli się na kilka konkretnych dziedzin (sport, polityka, ekonomia itp.). Uważa się, że społeczeństwo składa się z indywidualnych jednostek, które samodzielnie kontrolują własne przeznaczenie i są odpowiedzialne za ich własny wybór i działania, podkreślają subiektywno-subiektywny charakter interakcji mediów i społeczeństwa. To społeczeństwo, z natury podatne na konsensus, ma strukturę hierarchiczną i scentralizowaną; a niektóre wydarzenia i sfery społeczne są ważniejsze od innych¹⁵.

Amerykańscy badacze podkreślają pewne „wieczne wartości” dziennikarstwa w Stanach Zjednoczonych: etnocentryzm, altruistyczną demokrację, odpowiedzialny kapitalizm, duszpasterski wizerunek życia w prowincji, indywidualizm i umiar¹⁶. W zasadzie różni uczeni uważają, że wiadomości popierają i przyczyniają się do wzmocnienia podstawowych wartości w społeczeństwie. A na świadomość publiczności wpływa nie tyle sama informacja, jak moc powtórzenia, która jest nieodłącznie związana z mediami.

Uważa się, że zdolność środków masowego przekazu do określenia porządku dziennego i skupienia uwagi publiczności jest znacznie ograniczona, jeśli publiczność jest zainteresowana życiem publicznym, ma silne przekonania polityczne i dostęp do alternatywnych źródeł informacji. Jeśli natomiast publiczność wcale nie jest zainteresowana kwestiami politycznymi, nie jest też wystarczająca zdolność kierowania (skupienia) uwagi mediów. Mało prawdopodobne, żeby środki masowego przekazu zdarzyli „uwolnić” zupełnie sztuczny i nieistniejący problem, a odwrotnie, aby uciszyć ten, który naprawdę przeszkadza ludziom¹⁷. Ponadto same media są przedmiotem wpływu, w tym różnych elit. Media nie jednostronnie określają polityczny porządek dzienny. Są tylko jednym z elementów wielkiego procesu jego powstawania, obejmującego interesy grupowe, partie i elity, które współdziałają ze sobą w złożonym i niestabilnym otoczeniu społecznym i gospodarczym.

Rysunek 1. Klasyczny mechanizm interakcji między mediami a społeczeństwem



Źródło: K. Kpoc, P. Faker, <https://studfiles.net/preview/2299243/> (odczyt: 25.11.2017).

¹⁵ *The Media in Western Europe*, red. J. Libbey, London 2001, s. 35-36

¹⁶ Y. Zassoursky, *Media for The Open Society*, Moscow 2001, s. 203

¹⁷ *Nowe media w komunikacji społecznej XX wieku*, red. M. Hopfinger, Warszawa 2002, s. 25-41

Najnowszy mass media działa jako odrębny, często samowystarczalny instytut, który „formuje” osobowość metodą wypoczynku. Wypoczynek jest postrzegany przez młodych ludzi jako najważniejsza forma życia, i satysfakcja z tego ma wpływ na zadowolenie z życia w ogóle. Największym wpływem mediów jest kształtowanie poglądów na temat obecnego stanu społeczeństwa, poziomu sprawiedliwości społecznej oraz najbardziej typowych cech współczesnego życia¹⁸. W mniejszym stopniu wpływają na kształtowanie różnych aspektów ideału publicznego, związanych z ideami o idealnym stylu życia, idealnym porządku społecznym, ideałem sprawiedliwości społecznej i pożądanymi cechami człowieka.

Innym ważnym aspektem interakcji między najnowszymi mediami a społeczeństwem są nowoczesne foremki informacyjne (*fake, bot, trolling*) i subiektywne postrzeganie informacji. Liczne badania naukowe pokazują, że zazwyczaj wierzymy w to, co jest dla nas wygodne i że możemy postrzegać oczywiste na różne sposoby. W tym bardzo szerokim temacie podkreślamy tylko jedną rzecz: *fake* we współczesnej interakcji między mediami i społeczeństwem często dystrybuują się podczas kampanii wyborczych. Na przykład badacze zauważyli, że podczas kampanii wyborczej w Niemczech (ostatnie wybory do Bundestagu), boty sieciowo-społecznościowe i fałszywe wiadomości miały mniejszy wpływ niż w wyborach prezydenckich w Stanach Zjednoczonych, w których zwyciężył D. Trump. Użytkownicy *Twitter* z Niemiec byli „bardziej obrzydliwi” wobec fałszywych wiadomości niż wyborcy w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Ponadto ta społeczna sieć jest używana przez Niemców, Amerykanów i mieszkańców Wielkiej Brytanii¹⁹.

W ukraińskich realiach wpływ mediów na społeczeństwo oczywiście odbywa się w odmienny sposób. Ukraina próbuje się zbliżyć do demokracji, maksymalnie biorąc pod uwagę prawo każdego do wolności myśli, do swobodnego wyrażania swoich poglądów i przekonań. Pozostaje duży problem, że krajowe kanały telewizyjne, media wielkoformatowe nadal znajdują się w rękach dużego kapitału, które próbuje łobować na własne potrzeby, a media kontrolowane przez takich przedsiębiorców nie dbają o tworzenie adekwatnych wartości społeczeństwa. Tak więc, najbardziej wolny obszar myślenia to Internet w ogóle, sieci społeczne, w szczególności. Jednak tam nie jest mniej zagrożeń dla stworzenia odpowiedniej tożsamości dla zdrowego społeczeństwa.

Dlatego jednym z ważnych powodów, dla których obecne ukraińskie mass media nie zajmują miejsca w procesie konstruktywnego oddziaływania ze społeczeństwem, jest ich niechęć do tego. Ważną rolę odgrywają czynniki gospodarcze, polityczne i psychologiczne: wewnętrzna cenzura, zależność finansowa, a przede wszystkim brak solidarności korporacyjnej wśród dziennikarzy. I, oczywiście, jest to brak wystarczającego poziomu odpowiedzialności za słowo mówione lub pisane. Ważnym punktem jest również profesjonalne szkolenie dziennikarzy. Paradoksem jest to, że profesjonalnymi i demokratycznymi media stać się sami sobie nie mogą, gdy obywatele społeczeństwa, konsumenci końcowego produktu, praktycznie zaspokoją istniejący stan rzeczy.

¹⁸ *Media, człowiek, społeczeństwo. Doświadczenie Europejsko-Amerykańskie*, red. T. Zasepa, Częstochowa 2002, s. 43–46

¹⁹ *Far right makes most noise on Twitter in German election*, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-twitter/far-right-makes-most-noise-on-twitter-in-german-election-idUSKCN1BU2KS?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=Social [22.09.2017].

Powracając do dość szerokiego przekonania, że nowoczesne media, zwłaszcza telewizja, Internet, są rodzajem „uzależnienia od informacji i rozrywki”, należy podkreślić w dalszej części. Media narzucają stereotypy percepcji, myślenia i zachowania. Trudno jest uciec, ponieważ masa tych środków masowego przekazu stanowi standardowe podejście. Jednocześnie przestrzeń informacji online oferuje alternatywę. Wielu ludzi wolą otrzymywać informacje bezpośrednio przez Internet, ignorując telewizję, prasę.

Nie mniej popularny jest pogląd, że światowe media, w szczególności telewizja i Internet, stanowią integralną część kultury XXI wieku, są integralną częścią życia politycznego, duchowego społeczeństwa i osobowości. Silny rozwój mediów zwiększa zdolność uczestniczenia w różnych wydarzeniach, czyni naukę i kulturę dostępną dla mas, rozszerzając granice świata życia każdego człowieka na skalę włączającą. Oczywiście, istnieją słuszne zwolennicy obu punktów widzenia, ponieważ, podobnie jak jakiegokolwiek zjawiska społeczne, istnienie nowych mediów ma zarówno pozytywne, jak i szereg negatywnych konsekwencji. Jednak udział tego ostatniego znacząco wzrasta wraz ze spadkiem wieku widzów, czytelnika, słuchacza, wirtualnego użytkownika. Szczególnie, jeśli mówimy o aktualnej polityce, interes do której niemal całkowicie pozostaje zignorowane przez młode pokolenie.

Podsumowując powyższe, biorąc pod uwagę specyfikę współczesnych przemian w polityce światowej i ekonomii, należy skupić się na następujących głównych aspektach. Główną współzależnością (interakcją) współczesnego społeczeństwa i najnowszych mediów jest to, że radykalnie się zmieniają. Zmieniają się nawzajem. Internet tworzy nową osobowość, nowe pokolenie online wymaga retransmisji własnych dobrowolnych preferencji. Telewizja, media drukowane, stacje radiowe zmuszone są dogonić Internet. Niepopularne dzisiaj nie ma szans na sukces. Konsekwentnie przejmują kulturę masowa, nie powodując racjonalnej świadomości w zdecydowanej większości przedstawicieli społeczeństwa. Ten stan rzeczy jest idealny do globalnej elity biznesowej, która ma okazję do dalszego wzbogacania się kosztem nieprzytomnej populacji.

W sferze politycznej interakcja i współzależność najnowszych środków komunikacji masowej i odbiorców jest ograniczona do uzyskania powierzchownych idei dotyczących rzeczywistości tych ostatnich. Tymczasem pozytywne jest to, że nowe media i zaangażowani użytkownicy są niezwykle mobilni. Dlatego w dużym stopniu klasyczne techniki manipulacji politycznej są wyrównane, ponieważ odbywa się operacyjne informowanie obywateli.

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The historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the electoral systems' formation at the local level in the modern countries of the Visegrad Group

the article is devoted to the comprehensive generalization of the historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level. The problem-descriptive approach and the method of generalization are used in the research, by which the countries were analyzed as separate cases and then subsequently systematized based on this. The unifying factor that influenced the formation of the electoral legislation and electoral systems at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries was the process of transformation and democratization of their political systems as well as the implementation of administrative and territorial reforms and decentralization. The electoral systems used at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries are dependent on several factors. The first one is the type of the elective body of local government, i.e. individual or collective. The second one is the size (depending on the number of voters) of the collective elective bodies of local government. It has been determined that collective elective bodies are usually elected on the basis of proportional electoral systems of lists (including those with preferences), but rarely on the basis of majoritarian electoral systems (either of two-round majority systems or first-past-the-post majority systems or even systems of preferential block voting). On the other hand, for individual elective bodies, mostly a majoritarian electoral system (of two-round or first-past-the-post voting) is common, although sometimes mayors have been elected or are still elected by indirect elections. The throughout logic of the study is the periodization of the transformation of the Visegrad Group countries electoral systems at the local level.

Keywords: local elections, electoral systems, the formation of electoral systems, countries of the Visegrad group.

ІСТОРИЧНІ І ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЙНІ ПЕРЕДУМОВИ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФОРМУВАННЯ ВИБОРЧИХ СИСТЕМ НА МІСЦЕВОМУ РІВНІ У СУЧАСНИХ КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ

Стаття присвячена комплексному узагальненню історично-трансформаційних передумов та особливостей формування й реформування виборчих систем країн Вишеградської

групи на місцевому рівні. У роботі застосовуються проблемно-дескриптивний підхід і метод узагальнення, з допомогою яких спочатку всі країни проаналізовані як окремі випадки, а згодом на підставі цього систематизовані. Об'єднуючим чинником, що вплинув на становлення виборчого законодавства та виборчих систем на місцевому рівні країн Вишеградської групи виявилась трансформація і демократизація їхніх політичних систем, а також проведення адміністративно-територіальних реформ і здійснення процесів децентралізації. Виборчі системи, які використовуються на місцевому рівні країн Вишеградської групи, залежать від кількох чинників. Першим є тип самого виборного органу місцевого самоврядування – одноосібного чи колективного. Другим є розмір (залежний від кількості виборців) колективного виборного органу місцевого самоврядування. Визначено, що колективні виборні органи на місцях зазвичай обираються за пропорційною виборчою системою списків (у тім числі й з преференціями), а рідше – за мажоритарною виборчою системою (чи то абсолютної більшості, чи то відносної більшості, чи то преференційного блочного голосування). Для одноосібних виборних органів на місцях характерна здебільшого мажоритарна виборча система відносної чи абсолютної більшості, хоча інколи мерів обирали чи досі обирають шляхом непрямих виборів. Наскрізною логікою дослідження є періодизація трансформації виборчих систем країн Вишеградської групи на місцевому рівні.

Ключові слова: місцеві вибори, виборчі системи, формування виборчих систем, країни Вишеградської групи.

Legal fixing of favorable and effective norms and procedures for the election of representative bodies of local government and direct involvement of citizens/population of administrative and territorial units of states into the adoption of political and government decisions is a condition for the instituting and proper functioning of local and regional representative and electoral democracy. The main trend in this process is the foundation and consolidation of a constitutional/legal state, which (among the other things) is inherited in the formation or reformation of the electoral system, both at the national and local levels. As the result, the formation or reformation of the electoral system of state, both at the national and local levels, is a part and one of the elements of the implementation of comprehensive national reforms (in particular, of the administrative and territorial one) in this direction. The countries of the Visegrad Group, i.e. the Czech Republic/Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, are not the exceptions to the specified processes. They, due to their political, economic, social and other characteristics, have undergone extremely individual stages of political, socio-economic and systemic transformation. This, among the other things, originally activated the generation (statutory regulation) and subsequently caused the reformation (statutory changes) (or vice versa) of the laws on local government bodies' elections, which comprehensively regulate the electoral

process and outline the essence of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level. In sum, this means that the research of the stated problem is extremely relevant and multifaceted, since it provides the opportunity, on the one hand, to develop a systematic vision of the algorithms, historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the Visegrad Group countries' electoral systems at the local level, and, on the other hand, to create the mechanisms for their hypothetical application in other countries, which are culturally, politically and culturally close to the analyzed region, but are still on the path to the formation of representative and electoral democracy.

The proposed problem of the presented study was primarily reflected in the legislation of the studied countries and in the contributions of such scholars as A. Klaizner¹, Y. Mansvietov, A. Kliuchkovych², D. Kovryzhenko³, M. Lendel⁴, Y. Manilov⁵, S. Rudnytskyi, N. Nyzhnyk⁶, V. Lemak, A. Sauer⁷, I. Savchenko⁸, T. Slobodian⁹, G. Soós¹⁰, H. Wollmann, T. Lankina¹¹, Y. Yuriichuk¹² and many others. However, it should be noted that they, while substantially enriching Political Science, are rather fragmented and are not directed at the systematic and synthetic outline of our research. Therefore, the purpose of the article is not just a review, but a comprehensive synthesis of historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the Visegrad Group countries' electoral systems at the local level. The solution to this goal will help to answer the question of how the effectiveness of electoral systems used to form local government bodies (in particular, on the example of the Visegrad Group countries) depends on the sustainability of political and legal rules, which regulate the conduct of the elections.

¹ A. Klaizner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uborschyni, Slovachchyni, Plshchi ta Chekhii: porivnialniy analiz*, źródło: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

² A. Kliuchkovych, *Partiina systema Slovachchyni: strukturni kharakterystyky ta tendentsii rozvytku*, [w:] Lendel M., Mitriaieva S. (eds.), *Uzhhorodski slovatski naukovi chytannia: istoriia, kultura, polityka, pravo*, Wyd. Polihrafsentr Lira 2014, s. 102-109.

³ D. Kovryzhenko, *Vyborchi systemy dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Vybory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78.

⁴ M. Lendel, *Osoblyvosti vidvorennia mistsevykh politychnykh elit u Slovatskii Respublitsi*, [w:] Lendel M., Mitriaieva S. (eds.), *Uzhhorodski slovatski naukovi chytannia: istoriia, kultura, polityka, pravo*, Wyd. Polihrafsentr Lira 2014, s. 110-116.

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⁶ N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reforma v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby” 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

⁷ A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper” 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

⁸ I. Savchenko, *Elektoralna sytuatsiia v Cheskii Respublitsi v konteksti yevropeiskoi intebratsii*, „Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky” 2009, vol 3.

⁹ T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

¹⁰ G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

¹¹ H. Wollmann, T. Lankina, *Local Government in Poland and Hungary: from post-communist reform towards EU accession*, [w:] Baldersheim H., Illner M., Wollmann H. (eds.), *Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2003, s. 91-122.

¹² Y. Yuriichuk, *Vyborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: shliakhy demokratyzatsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii” 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

In resolving this goal, it is decided to use the problem-descriptive approach and the method of generalization, with the help of which all countries are analyzed as separate cases, for the first, and systematized in the form of a sample, for the second. Moreover, the lower boundary of the study was defined as 1989, when then-existing countries of the not yet obtainable Visegrad Group, i.e. Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and Poland, entered a transformational curve and began to modernize politically, socially, economically and systematically. And on the contrary, the upper boundary of the research is the current situation in these countries. However, with the remark taken into account in the study, according to which the Czech Republic and Slovakia became the independent countries only on January 1st, 1993, and before that (in particular, in 1989–1992, within the limits of the proposed time sampling), they were formally positioned as the separate parts of the federal Czechoslovakia, although they had already developed quite different electoral systems at the local level. Consequently, they were continuously analyzed both as formally subnational units (until 1992) and as completely independent states (since 1993) leading to the succession of the electoral systems at the local level.

Thus, in **the Czech Republic**, the first local elections in 1990 were conducted in accordance with the law of the Czech National Council on the elections to representative offices in communities, the 1994 and 1998 elections – on the basis of the identical law, but with the amendments approved in 1992¹³ and 1994¹⁴, and the 2002 and subsequent elections – in accordance with the current Law No. 491/2001¹⁵ on the election to local councils and on the basis of changes to some other laws. Moreover, the changes in electoral legislation at the local level mainly concerned the methodology of determining the number of voters' signatures, which must be secured by non-party candidates who want to run for local councils.

Particularly interesting is the fact that the administrative and territorial reform, which was carried out in two stages and lasted for about 10 years, became one of the main reasons for the development of electoral legislation at the local level in the Czech Republic. The first stage of the reform began with the change in the structure of the administrative and territorial division and with the extension of the powers of the local government bodies at the basic level. In 1990, the Czech Republic (formally as part of Czechoslovakia) abandoned the three-tier structure of the administrative and territorial system, i.e. the municipality, the district (the rayon) and the region, introduced in 1960 and turned into a two-tier structure¹⁶. The region was abolished as a form of administrative and territorial formation that did not meet the traditions of local government in the Czech Republic, and its responsibilities were transferred to districts and

¹³ Zákon č. 298/1992 Sb. České národní rady ze dne 15. dubna 1992 o volbách do zastupitelstev v obcích a o místním referendu, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdroj: <http://www.epi.sk/zz/1992-298> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

¹⁴ Zákon č. 152/1994 ze dne 22. června 1994 o volbách do zastupitelstev v obcích a o změně a doplnění některých dalších zákonů, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1994-152> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

¹⁵ Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

¹⁶ N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administrativna reforma v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yeuropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby“ 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36

communities. Thus, the order of formation and the volume of powers of the local government bodies at the lowest level has also changed. It turned out, first of all, that communities received the right to elect municipal governments, to hold local referenda, to formulate and manage their budgets and to secure their socio-economic, cultural and communal needs. However, in December 1997, the reform process was continued by the adoption of the constitutional law of the Czech Republic, which provided the creation of 14 higher administrative and territorial units of local government¹⁷. Nevertheless, the real introduction of the new administrative and territorial system of the Czech Republic took place only in 2000, in particular after the first regional elections and adoption of the Law No. 129/2000 on the regions, which regulates the definition of their status, powers and relations with local and central government. As the result of the administrative and territorial reform, the distribution of powers between central and local government bodies has also changed. However, the change of powers of local government authorities provided for a change in the quantitative and personal composition of the relevant bodies. According to the Czech law, the councils of 14 lands/regions, including the capital city of Prague as a separate land/region (since 2000, they are characterized by the so-called regional elections) and the municipalities of 76 districts, 75 cities and 6242 other settlements (since 1990, they are characterized by the so-called municipal elections) are the electoral bodies of local government¹⁸. Each of them is characterized by elective representatives and executive bodies, i.e. committees, departments, councils, magistrates, admirers and village elders.

The first regional elections of the councils of the newly formed administrative entities, i.e. lands/regions, took place in 2000. An exception was the capital city of Prague, where such elections took place only in two years. It is legally established that the citizens who have reached the age of 18 vote in regional elections on the basis of secret, universal, equal and direct suffrage and within the lists of candidates of political parties, movements and electoral coalitions. In addition, they can put four votes of preferences in a candidate list. Voters can change the order of candidates in a list with their help. The number of elective representatives of a land/region depends on the number of its inhabitants and vary between 45 and 65 persons. The mandates are given to the candidates who hold top positions in the electoral rolls and on the basis of votes of preferences, but only for those parties, movements and coalitions that receive 5 percent of the votes at least. Any citizen of the Czech Republic who has attained the age of 18 and permanently resides in the land/region may be elected to the regional council¹⁹.

At the lowest level, there are 6242 municipalities. The municipal councils include deputies elected by the direct vote for a four-year term. Every council, from among its deputies, elects

¹⁷ N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reforma v krajinakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby“ 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

¹⁸ M. Mykhalchenko, Z. Samchuk, *Porivniialnyi analiz yevropeiskyykh vyborchyykh system*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy“ 2010, vol 50, nr. 6, s. 267-286.

¹⁹ A. Klazner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uhorsbchyni, Slovachchyni, Plsbchi ta Chekhii: porivniialnyi analiz*, zródlo: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

the members of the executive body, i.e. the so-called municipal committee, including the mayor and the deputy mayor. This executive body forms commission. Meanwhile, a mayor is not elected popularly, but by a council and its members for a four-year term, heads the municipal committee, administration and represents the council. The mayor of the capital city of Prague (which is both a separate land/region and a municipality) is not the exception, but the Prague mayor also has the status of “the leader of the region” at the same time. In the municipalities, where the municipal committee has fewer than 15 members, the executive is represented only by an unpopularly elected mayor. This is one of the differences between the Czech Republic and the other countries of the Visegrad Group, since the mayors of the Czech Republic are only unpopularly elected and the mayors of the other countries of the region (at least at the time of the analysis), are popularly elected, in particular using different electoral systems (i.e. two-round majority systems/TRS and first-past-the-post majority systems/FPTP)²⁰.

The so-called communal elections, i.e. the elections in city municipalities, are one of the varieties of municipal elections in the Czech Republic. They are held once every four years on the basis of secret, universal, equal and direct suffrage. The settlements are electoral districts in such cases. The electoral districts are territorially divided into electoral sub-districts (polling stations), which organize the informing of residents about the elections, the process of voting, filling of ballots and the peculiarities of votes' counting. Polling stations are formed in such a way that they do not violate the established geographical boundaries of the territorial units and ensure the availability of electoral rooms for voters. The change of the boundaries of polling stations (in accordance with the law of the Czech Republic No. 491/2001 on the election to local councils) is only possible in the case of a significant change in the number of voters (increasing or decreasing in their number by one third) or in the case of changing the boundaries of the settlements. In addition, distant areas of settlements may form independent polling stations, provided they have at least 10 voters²¹.

The institution of list of voters is organizationally linked to polling stations. Lists of voters in the Czech Republic are guided by the principles of official obligation and regularity. This means that such lists are not created separately for each election, but are constantly maintained by the administrations of settlements, and changes to them are made by official duty or at the request of the voters. The control of their correctness and completeness is carried out every year. The specific conditions for the formation of permanent voters' lists are governed by the law of the Czech Republic No. 133/2000 on population registration and identification numbers. Therefore, the citizens who have the right to vote are included in permanent lists at the place of their permanent residence. Each voter can be submitted to only one list of voters. The

²⁰ *Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů*, Zákon pro lidi. Cz, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

²¹ *Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů*, Zákon pro lidi. Cz, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

authorities, which maintain permanent lists based on their own records, communications with state bodies or complaints results, are empowered to make changes to lists of voters.

It is important that the number of elective representatives in a municipality (regardless of its type) depends on the number of inhabitants of a settlement they represent. In the Czech Republic, the number of deputies in a local council is directly proportional to the number of inhabitants of a settlement: from 10001 to 50000 people – from 15 to 35 representatives/deputies; from 50001 to 150000 persons – from 25 to 45 representatives/deputies; more than 150001 inhabitants – from 35 to 55 representatives/deputies²². At the same time, for the election of municipal councils in the Czech Republic, both the first-past-the-post electoral system and the proportional electoral system with preferential lists are used. The first one occurs when it is necessary to choose the municipal councils with the number of elective representatives no more than 15 people²³. The second one is the situation in all other cases. It is also noteworthy that in the Czech Republic, in addition to political parties, political movements, associations and coalition of parties and movements, independent candidates and unions of independent candidates may be subject of nomination of candidates for local/municipal councils. In the case of the proportional electoral system with preferences, each voter can elect separate candidates from party lists or independent candidates from non-party lists, as well as can vote for lists of parties, coalitions or independent candidates in general. If they are combined by a voter, the advantage is given to independent candidates, and the remainder of votes goes to candidates from the party elected by a voter. If the number of elective representatives is reduced by at least one-third or the number of elective representatives becomes less than seven persons or a new settlement is created, the law provides for early or new elections.

Thus, it can be generalized that the changes to the electoral legislation at the local level in the Czech Republic are conditionally positioned as multi-stage: the first stage took place in the process of democratization and implementation of the administrative and territorial reform in 1990–2000; the second stage is connected with the continuation of the reform of the administrative and territorial system of the Czech Republic and directly with the adoption of the legislation on regions (2000) and local elections (2001).

In **Slovakia**, like the Czech Republic, the basic law on the elections of bodies of local government was adopted in 1990, that is during the Czechoslovak period of democratic transformation and transition. This law was evolutionarily modified by numerical changes, which depended both on the objective needs of the adaptation of the normative base to the conditions of social and political transformation and reality, and on the subjective factors, in particular on the desire of the ruling political elites (especially in the period of the premiership of V. Mečiar, when Slovakia was not positioned as a democracy, but rather as a hybrid political regime) to form an

²² Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů, *Zákony pro lidi*. Cz, zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

²³ I. Savchenko, *Elektorálna sytuatsiia v Cheskyi Respublitsi v konteksti yevropeiskoi intebratsii*, „Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky“ 2009, vol 3

institutional design of the electoral system, which is beneficial for them²⁴. The 1992 Constitution of the Slovak Republic consolidated the provisions of the basic law on the elections of bodies of local government and regulated the norm, according to which only the citizens who reside in the territory of a particular community for a long period of time, may be the candidates for the positions of local deputies and mayors. Unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia has chosen the model of direct and popular elections of the high-ranking officials of community, i.e. of mayors. Moreover, it was regulated by the two-round majority system. Instead, for the election of councils in all types of Slovak communities, the first-past-the-post majority system with preferential block voting in multi-mandate constituencies is used. In particular, with the rule that a multi-mandate constituency may have a magnitude of no more than 12 deputy mandates. An exception is made only for small rural communities, where only one constituency may be formed (Article 9 of the relevant law)²⁵. This system is mostly atypical not only for the Visegrad Group countries (it was also earlier and for a limited time used in Poland, and at the time of the analysis it was also limitedly used in Hungary), but also for the world as a whole.

It is also interesting that the prevalence of a small number of residents in most of the Slovak local communities led to the approval of the 2002 amendments to the basic law, which concerned the reduction of the number of deputies. In the smallest communities, where fewer than 40 citizens live, only 3 representatives are elected, in the communities with a population of up to 500 people – 3–5 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 1 thousand people – 5–7 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 3 thousand people – 7–9 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 5 thousand people – 9–11 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 10 thousand persons – 10–13 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 20 thousand people – 13–19 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 50 thousand people – 15–25 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 100 thousand people – 19–31 representatives, and in the communities with a population of more than 100 thousand people – 23–41 representatives. Moreover, the exact number of representatives elected at any subsequent elections is determined by the current composition of a local council on the eve of the start of the election campaign. As in the Slovak Republic, as stated above, the maximum district magnitude during local elections is 12 mandates and the number of votes coincides with the number of mandates to be distributed in every constituency, then every Slovak voter may have at most 12 votes²⁶.

²⁴ D. Kovryzhenko, *Výborchi systeny dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Výbory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78

²⁵ Y. Yuriichuk, *Výborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: sbliaakhy demokratyzatsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii“ 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

²⁶ *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]

Since the Slovak system for the election of local councils is the majoritarian one with a preferential block voting, voters can vote for candidates from different subjects of their nomination. This makes the selection by the residents of "their best personalities" they know personally an important principle of local elections. Representatives of parties and non-partisan candidates may apply for local deputies and mayors. However, they must collect the required number of signatures in their petition to the election commission, depending on the number of residents in a constituency. In the communities, where fewer than 50 citizens live, 10 signatures must be collected, 20 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 citizens, 40 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 500 citizens, 100 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 2 thousand citizens, 200 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 thousand citizens, 400 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 thousand citizens, and 600 signatures are needed in the communities with more than 100 thousand citizens²⁷.

It should also be noted that in Slovakia in 1998, an attempt was made to radically change the design of the electoral system for the election of the bodies of local government communities. Its initiator was the ruling coalition led by the Prime Minister V. Meciar, which before the regular local elections in 1998 tried to increase its representation in local councils. As the result, in March 1998, the Slovak parliament (National Council) introduced the changes to the basic law, the essence of which was the introduction of a proportional system of lists with an election in a single-member constituency, which would cover the whole territory of the community. There was also initiated a novel, according to which all ethnic minorities representing more than 5 percent of the population of a particular community as of 1991 should have representation in local councils. This, in turn, required the registration of the nationality of candidates in the ballot papers. However, the intentions of the ruling coalition with the help of legal changes to influence results of the elections to local government bodies were appealed to the Constitutional Court by different oppositional parties, local government associations and non-governmental organizations and were eventually declared unconstitutional. This happened in parallel with the change of the political regime of V. Meciar at the national level, when after the elections of the Slovak parliament (National Council) in 1998 V. Meciar's political party/coalition ceased to be a government. Thus, it is quite obvious that in Slovakia, the vectors of political and inter-party competition at the national level (and the most in the analyzed region) influenced the process of formation of electoral legal field, including the local level²⁸. We mean, in particular, unsuccessful attempts of the most powerful party to create (through the legislation) a system of control over local processes and (as a response) successful attempts to deny the possibility of introducing such a hierarchy from the side of the opposition.

²⁷ *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]

²⁸ Y. Yuriichuk, *Výborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: sbliakhy demokratsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii“ 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

It should also be noted that in Slovakia, in the same way as in the Czech Republic, a new administrative and territorial unit, i.e. self-governing land/region, arose in 2001. Self-governing land/region or higher administrative and territorial unit is the highest body of territorial local government in Slovakia. Today there are 8 self-governing lands/regions in the country, including the cities of Kosice and Bratislava. Self-government at the level of land/region is carried out through elected bodies, i.e. the council and the president of every self-governing land/region. The term of their powers during 2001–2017 was 4 years and from the moment of regional elections in 2017 is 5 years. The first-past-the-post majority electoral system is invariably applied at the elections of regional councils. Instead, the correlation of the use of electoral systems was noted at the elections of the presidents of self-governing lands/regions: initially (in 2001–2017) it was the two-round majority electoral system and subsequently (since 2017) it became the first-past-the-post majority electoral system. The reason for the increase of the terms of office and change in the electoral system of representative bodies in lands/regions was a very low turnout of voters in regional elections, as well as changes made to save money for holding the second round of elections²⁹.

Summing up the case of Slovakia, it should be emphasized that the transformation of the electoral legislation at the local level (inherent in it) was not primarily in the design of a new electoral law, but in the introduction of amendments to the basic law on local elections. Among the reasons for making changes one should consider the impact of democratization, political reforms and political expediency.

No less interesting, but at the same time more problematic is the case of **Poland**, where the first completely free local elections (after the partly free national elections in 1989) were held in 1990. This was due to the fact that the law on the regulations of elections to the councils of gminas (communes or municipalities), which was adopted on March 8, 1990 and was used in the elections of local bodies in 1990 and 1994, had some disadvantages, but allowed to hold elections to gminas' councils democratically, freely and transparently. It is also noteworthy that this legal act proposed different principles for the formation of local councils, in particular, according to the population size in the communities. For example, in the gminas with a population of no more than 40 thousand people, the first-past-the-post majority electoral system was introduced, resulting in electoral competition unfolding among "personified" candidates who competed in single-mandate constituencies. Instead, for the gminas with a population of more than 40 thousand people, a proportional electoral system of lists was proposed³⁰.

²⁹ *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]

³⁰ T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk“ 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

Nevertheless, the electoral system initiated in 1990³¹ for the formation of local government bodies was not linear and unchanged. The fact is that since its approbation in 1990 and 1994, since 1998, the work has been carried out on electoral legislation and mainly on the administrative and territorial reform of local government, which included the formation of counties/powiaty and the introduction of local government at the level of counties and provinces/voivodeships. Consequently, the implementation of administrative and territorial reform necessarily forced to return to the electoral legislation and to bring it in line with the other legal regulations. Especially considering that fact that at that time, only the elections to the councils of the gminas were, as stated above, legally regulated³².

The first detailed and systematic technology of organizing, holding and summing up the elections to representative bodies of local government was defined in the so-called law on the regulations of the elections to councils of gminas, councils of powiaty and sejmiki of voivodeships approved in 1998. According to the regulatory act, a completely new and hierarchical/heterogeneous electoral system was established for the election of various bodies of local governments. The elections to the councils of gminas with a population of up to 20 thousand people took place under the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in the electoral districts with a magnitude of 1–5 mandates (which actually meant the combination of the FPTP majoritarian system (in districts with a magnitude of one mandate) and the majoritarian system of preferential block voting (in districts with a magnitude of 2–5 mandates)). In gminas with a population of more than 20 thousand inhabitants, elections to the councils of gminas were regulated by the proportional electoral system of lists with distribution of mandates on the basis of the D'Hondt method. In the cities on the rights of counties/powiaty, powiaty and voivodeships, the councils and sejmiki were also formed on the basis of the proportional electoral system of lists with a 5 per cent electoral barrier and the D'Hondt method of mandates' distribution. With the fact that in the gminas, which had the status of cities on the rights of counties/powiaty, only those electoral lists, which overcame the designated electoral barrier on the scale of whole cities, were taken into account during the distribution of mandates in councils³³.

It is noteworthy that the philosophy of Polish legislators, which in 1990 introduced, and in 1998 modified the diversification of the gminas by the criterion of population, was as follows: in small communities, voters traditionally focus on personal (moral, professional, managerial, etc.) qualities of candidates whom, in view of the limited socio-political space, they know personally; in large gminas, that is, in cities, the voting for the effectiveness of individual politicians

³¹ *Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19900160095> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

³² A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper“ 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

³³ *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Sejmików Województw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

is illusory, and therefore the targeting of programs presented by organized political forces is more rational³⁴.

It is also of the utmost importance that the so-called “election committees”, which may be formed by political parties and their coalitions, associations or other public organizations, as well as individual voters, were defined as the subjects of electoral companies to the bodies of local government in Poland. These structures should be at least of 5 persons, each of which has the right to form the only one list of candidates. At the same time, one and the same person has the right to run for the elective bodies only through one list. To do this, in the communities with a population of less than 20 thousand persons, at least 25 signatures must be collected under the candidate lists. In the case of the population of more than 20 thousand people, at least 150 signatures are required for this.

There is also a differentiated number of members of the councils of different communities, since it directly depends on the number of community inhabitants. In particular, there is a differentiation between the gminas with a population of less than 20 thousand inhabitants, where it was possible to choose from 1 to 5 representatives from each constituency, and the gminas with a population of more than 20 thousand inhabitants, where the number of deputies from each constituency varied from 8 to 12³⁵. In 2001, certain amendments to the basic law on local government were adopted on this subject and they concern the reduction of the number of deputies of local councils. For example, if according to the previous regulation, in the gminas with a population of up to 4 thousand people, it was necessary to choose 15 representatives, then, according to the new provision, in the gminas with the number of inhabitants of up to 5 thousand people, it was provided for the election of only 12 deputies³⁶. Approximately identical proportions of reducing the number of local representatives have been introduced in communities of all other types and sizes: with a population of up to 20 thousand people – from 24 to 19 representatives, with a population of up to 40 (50) thousand people – from 28 to 21 representatives, with a population of up to 100 thousand people – from 40 to 23 representatives, and in the largest communities – from 60 to 34 representatives. The logic of the legislator was to reduce the cost of maintaining local government structures, but the quantity and quality of service they provided was not proportional to the number of local representatives. This is largely in line with the law on administrative and territorial local government, according to which the division of every gmina into electoral districts/constituencies is carried out by a voivode (article 27). For example, in the case when the number of villages included in gmina does not exceed the number of representatives (elective deputies), then the territory of each village is

³⁴ Y. Manilov, S. Rudnytskyi, *Místeví vybory v Polskchi: evoliutsiia vyborchoi systemy*, „Osobystisne zrostantia: teoriia i praktyka“ 2016, vol 2, s. 45–48.

³⁵ *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wzyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Seimików Wójewództw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

³⁶ *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wzyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Seimików Wójewództw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

the only one constituency. Since the number of villages belonging to gminas is larger than the number of deputies, at least in half of the village gminas, then a certain part of villages is not represented in councils. In particular, after the 2002 elections, the number of councils where the number of deputies was smaller than the number of villages increased from 40 to 59 per cent. In turn, the division of urban/city gminas into constituencies takes place on the basis of their distribution into administrative districts.

After 2002, Poland introduced some changes to electoral legislation, but they did not have a decisive and systematic impact on the functioning of the electoral systems at local level. The codification of electoral norms became an important moment in the development of Polish electoral legislation, including at the local level. This applies primarily to the Electoral Code adopted in 2011³⁷, which includes the laws that had been drafted, adopted and acted before. So it was understandable that they had lost their validity. Despite the almost identical logic of the constructing electoral systems in Poland (in particular, comparing with the period of 1998–2010, as noted above), since 2011 formally (that is, from the moment of adoption of the Electoral Code) and since 2014 actually (that is, from the moment of the first local elections organized according to its rules), an innovation was introduced. Its essence is that in all gminas, regardless of the number of their population (less or more than 20 thousand people, as before), the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in single-mandate constituencies was introduced. In the cities on the rights of powiats, the legislator still regulated the use of the proportional electoral system of lists. In addition, the Electoral Code introduced the rule that all proportional elections in Poland should be conducted using the D'Hondt method to distribute mandates.

The Polish specificity of the formation of the local executive bodies, the same as in the case of the other countries of the Visegrad Group, plays an important role in determining the electoral systems at the local level. It is known that during the period of 1990–2002, the functions of the executive bodies of local councils were carried out by collegial presidencies, led by mayors, which were unpopularly/indirectly elected by the deputies of local councils. In practice, this caused the instability of presidiums' compositions, the dependence of the process of occupying the mayoral positions on the majority compositions in local councils, which, among the other things, had the right to shift/remove mayors from their offices and led to inefficiencies in the processes of local government³⁸. The situation was corrected by the law on the direct elections of wojts, burgomasters and presidents of cities, adopted on June 20, 2002. According to it, individual executive bodies are elected (simultaneously with the elections of local councils) by a popular direct vote for a term of four years using the two-round majority system. The position of the head of gmina should belong to the candidate who receives more than half of the actual

³⁷ *Poland 2011 Election Code*, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, źródło: <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/poland-2011-election-code/view> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

³⁸ A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper“ 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

votes, which often involves the holding of the second round of elections in practice. The right to nominate candidates for the offices of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities falls to parties and their coalitions, public/civic unions and voters themselves, but using the mechanism of the relevant election committees. Eliminating the person who holds the position of mayor, whose powers have significantly increased in comparison with the previous legal field, is possible only through a local referendum. Consequently, the introduction of direct elections of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities became a truly positive phenomenon in the socio-political life of Poland. It increased the level of democracy of local government, promoted political activation of communities and formation of local political elites³⁹.

So, summing up, it is expedient to note that the formation of the electoral system at local level in Poland took place in several periods. The first period (1990–1998) was clearly characterized by the restoration of local government, establishment of the FPTP majoritarian system for the election of councils of *gminas* with a population of up to 40 thousand inhabitants and of the proportional electoral system of lists for the election of councils of *gminas* with a population of more than 40 thousand inhabitants. The second period (1998–2002) was marked by the introduction of the elements of local government at the level of *powiats* and voivodeships and by the establishment of the FPTP majoritarian system in *gminas* with a population of up to 20 thousand and of the proportional electoral system of lists both in *gminas* with a population of more than 20 thousand residents as well as in the cities on the rights of *powiats*, *powiats* and voivodeships. The third period (2002–2011) is determined by the continuation of previously issued electoral rules (with some technical regulations) as well as with the introduction of the TRS majoritarian system in the elections of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities. The fourth period (from 2011 till now) is marked by the transfer of local elections in all *gminas* exclusively to the FPTP majoritarian system in single-mandate constituencies as well as by elections in all cities on the rights of *powiats*, *powiats* and voivodeships in accordance with the proportional system of lists using the D'Hondt method to distribute mandates⁴⁰.

In the end, the legal status of local government and local elections in **Hungary** are directed by the 1990 law on local government and local elections, as well as by the new Hungarian Constitution, which came into force in early 2012. The last one, among the other things, introduced the changes to the legislation, which regulates local elections, in particular certain limitations regarding the acquisition of passive electoral right, the number of collective elective bodies of local government and the duration of election campaigns, etc., but did not modify the electoral system itself, although it somewhat corrected it⁴¹.

³⁹ *Ustawa z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r. O bezpośrednim wyborze wójta, burmistrza i prezydenta miasta*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20021130984> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

⁴⁰ T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

⁴¹ G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

After analyzing the legislation concerning the administrative and territorial organization and the procedures of local elections' holding in Hungary, it should be noted that there is, at least as of 2017, a two-tier system of local government in this country. The first level is 19 counties and the city of Budapest (which are conventionally united into seven regions) with relevant general assemblies. The second level is villages, towns and cities (except the city of Budapest) as well as 23 districts of the city of Budapest with their respective general assemblies⁴².

In the elections to general assemblies of the settlements with the number of voters up to 10 thousand people, the Hungarian legislation, at least as of 2017, provides for the use of the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in a single multi-mandate constituency, the borders of which coincide with the boundaries of the settlement. Thus, it is a matter of the majoritarian electoral system with preferential block voting. The fact is that each voter has as many votes as there are mandates to be distributed in the constituency. The mandates are obtained by the candidates (according to the number to be elected in the multi-mandate constituency), which received the largest number of votes. In this case, if several candidates receive the same number of votes for their support, but one or more of them may not be elected by virtue of the district magnitude, then the mandate is given to the candidate determined by the draw procedure. Conversely, in the case when the number of candidates is less than the number of seats in the multi-mandate constituency, the law provides for re-election/repeated elections⁴³.

With regard to general assemblies' elections in the settlements with more than 10000 voters, as well as to elections of assemblies of districts in Budapest and assemblies of cities with the status of provinces, the Hungarian legislation, at least as of 2017, uses a mixed electoral system. Procedurally it looks like this: the entire territory of the administrative and territorial unit is divided into single-mandate constituencies, in which elections are held by the first-past-the-post majority electoral system; however, in parallel with an application of the mechanism of obtaining "compensatory" mandates, which, as practice shows, are usually about 40 percent of the nominal composition of assemblies. At the same time, "compensatory" mandates are not allocated according to the FPTP component of the mixed electoral system, but instead, only those subjects of the electoral process who nominated their candidates in at least 25% of single-member constituencies are allowed to participate in their distribution/allocation. The votes given for candidates from such parties in single-mandate constituencies are summed up, and the results are divided into divisors ("1,5", "3", "5", "7", "9" and other odd numbers, which in fact outlines the use of the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method)). This continues until all the "compensatory" mandates are distributed among the parties. The distribution of mandates

⁴² N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reformna v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby" 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

⁴³ H. Wöllmann, T. Lankina, *Local Government in Poland and Hungary: from post-communist reform towards EU accession*, [w:] Baldersheim H., Illner M., Wöllmann H. (eds), *Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2003, s. 91-122.

(received by parties) between candidates is carried out in a sequence defined by the “compensatory” party list.

In turn, in the elections to general assemblies of villages, towns and cities (except for the provincial cities mentioned above), the law, at least as of 2017, uses a proportional electoral system of closed lists with voting in two multi-mandate constituencies. The number of mandates distributed in each constituency depends on the number of voters registered in its territory. Each voter has one vote and can vote for only one list of candidates in his or her constituency. Entities of the electoral process are allowed to participate in the distribution of mandates, when their lists in their constituencies received at least 4 percent of the votes. Previously, the division of mandates between parties was based on the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method), and from the 2014 elections it's regulated on the basis of the D'Hondt method. It is also interesting that the distribution of mandates among candidates is unconditionally carried out in the order of priority, defined by the corresponding closed list⁴⁴.

A proportional electoral system with a somewhat different construction and formula is also used in the elections of general assemblies of 19 counties and in the elections of the assembly of the capital city of Budapest⁴⁵. In 19 counties, the distribution of seats between parties is carried out by using the D'Hondt method between those political parties or blocs, which overcame the corresponding electoral barrier. In Budapest, the law determines the use of a proportional electoral system with closed-list voting in a single multi-mandate constituency, which previously (as of 2010) distributed 66 mandates, but starting from 2014 (due to the revision of the electoral law) it distributes 35 mandates. The distribution of seats between parties and blocs previously (by 2010) was made on the basis of the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method), and from the 2014 elections it's based on the D'Hondt method. Parties that do not overcome the electoral barrier are not allowed to participate in the distribution of mandates. As of 2010, it was 4 percent for all election subjects, and starting from 2014 it is: 5 percent of the votes for parties, 10 percent of the votes for the blocks of two parties and 15 percent of the votes for the blocks of three or more parties. The term of office of these elective bodies was 4 years until 2014, and it is 5 years since 2014⁴⁶.

Finally, with regard to the election of mayors of all cities in Hungary, it must be said that they (from 1994 onwards) invariably and irrespective of the urban population are held on the basis of the use of the first-past-the-post majority electoral system. It is this component of the

⁴⁴ G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

⁴⁵ D. Kovryzhenko, *Vyborchi systemy dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Vybory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78.

⁴⁶ M. Mykhalchenko, Samchuk Z., *Porivniabryi analiz yevropeiskykh vyborchykh system*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2010, vol 50, nr. 6, s. 267-286.

electoral rules that is perhaps the most stable component of the electoral system in Hungary at the local level⁴⁷.

To conclude, it should be noted that the formation and transformation of the electoral legislation at the local level in Hungary took place under the influence of democratization of the countries of the Visegrad Group and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, strengthening of decentralization processes, territorial reorganization and the emergence of new political actors (for example, the introduction of the post of the mayors of cities since 1994). The changes mostly concerned the improvement of election procedures, although the technical parameters and formulas of electoral systems were also sometimes changed. Conditionally, the logic of the development of electoral systems at the local level in Hungary can be submitted as the periodization: the first stage (1990–1994) – general reform and democratization, including some of the electoral rules; the second stage (1994–2010) – application and improvement of legislation along with the formation of new elective bodies; the third stage (since 2010) – improvement of electoral legislation with partial modification of electoral systems.

So, summing up, it should be noted that the formation of the electoral legislation and electoral systems at the local level in the countries of the Visegrad Group took place in an identical time period, and the transformation and democratization of their political systems was the unifying factor for all the countries of the region in this section. The implementation of administrative and territorial reforms and of decentralization processes was another common cause for periodic revisions of the election laws and electoral systems of all the countries of the region. Consequently, the expansion of the circle of subjects of the election process, especially of those who have the right to nominate candidates for local elections, was a characteristic of the formation of electoral legislation. In summary, it was noted that the Visegrad Group countries' electoral legislation at the local level is characterized by relative stability. At a time, when the major changes to current electoral laws, in addition to the adoption of new laws, usually relate to the procedures of conducting elections, provisions of the electoral register, methodology for determining the number of voters' signatures, which must be secured by non-party candidates who wish to stand for councils.

However, even despite this, the Visegrad Group countries have developed in markedly different ways of transforming and reforming their legislation on local elections. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic adopted a new legislation on local elections, whereas Slovakia and Hungary used and modified existing/previously adopted electoral laws. In addition, the electoral systems used at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries depend on several factors. The first one is the type of elective body of local government, i.e. individual or collective. The second one is the size (depending on the number of voters) of the collective elective body of local government. In this context, it has been observed that collective bodies are usually

⁴⁷ A. Klaižner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uhorskehychyni, Slovachchyni, Plsbchi ta Chekhii: porivniálny analiz*, zdrojlo: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

elected on the basis of a proportional electoral system of lists (including those with preferences), but instead are rarely operationalized by a majoritarian electoral system (whether a two-round majority system, a first-past-the-post majority system or a preferential block voting). On the other hand, for individual bodies of local government there is an exclusively majoritarian electoral system of a two-round or first-past-the-post voting, with the exception of the Czech Republic, in which mayors are elected through indirect elections. The addition and completion of the synthesis is the fact that reducing the size of representative bodies of local government with a simultaneous increasing the terms of their powers is typical for the transformation of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level.

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The party-electoral dimension of the formation of local self-government bodies

The party-political aspects of the formation and functioning of local self-government bodies are considered. The peculiarities of electoral systems applied at the local level are analyzed. The factors determining the choice of a certain type of election procedure are determined. The dependence between the population of the community, the quantitative composition of the local self-government body and the way of its formation are studied.

Keywords: parties, elections, electoral systems, bodies of local self-government, candidates, deputies, constituencies, administrative-territorial units.

Partyjno-elektoralny pomiar kształtowania samorządu terytorialnego

Uwzględniono partyjno-polityczne aspekty tworzenia i funkcjonowania organów samorządu lokalnego. Analizowane są specyfiki systemów wyborczych stosowanych na poziomie lokalnym. Omówiono czynniki decydujące o wyborze określonego rodzaju procedury wyborczej. Badana jest zależność między populacją społeczności, składem ilościowym organu samorządu terytorialnego oraz sposobem jego powstawania.

Słowa kluczowe: partie, wybory, systemy wyborcze, organy samorządu terytorialnego, kandydaci, posłowie, okręgi wyborcze, jednostki administracyjno-terytorialne.

Партійно-електоральний вимір формування органів місцевого самоврядування

Розглянуто партійно-політичні аспекти формування та функціонування інститутів місцевого самоврядування. Проаналізовано специфіку виборчих систем, які застосовувалися на місцевому рівні. Визначено чинники, які детермінували вибір конкретної процедури виборів. Досліджено залежність між населенням території, кількісним складом інституту місцевого самоврядування та способом його формування.

Ключові слова: партія, вибори, виборча система, інститути місцевого самоврядування, кандидат, депутат, виборчий округ, адміністративно-територіальна одиниця.

Organy samorządu reprezentują władzę terytorialnej wspólnoty, działają w jej imieniu i na jej rzecz. Zgodnie z warunkami lokalnej autonomii organy samorządu mają szeroką swobodę w zarządzaniu w ramach подведомственной im terenie i użyć jej w celu zapewnienia wysokich standardów socjalnych życia obywateli, realizacji ich osobistych, politycznych, ekonomicznych, społecznych i innych praw i wolności¹.

Samorząd jest obowiązkowe instytutem, z rozwiązaniem którego nie może nie liczyć się ludności terytorium, w ramach którego jest realizowany. Taka wyraźny instytucjonalny charakter, obecność specyficznego urzędu, który wykonuje miejskiej władzy, pokój z łazienką (materialno-finansowa, nadanie samorządu нормотворческими funkcji (w zakresie przekazanych im przez państwo funkcji, organy samorządu terytorialnego mogą wydawać przepisy lokalnego charakteru) ma duży wpływ władzy na ziemi, przy tym mogą wystąpić takie sytuacje, gdy samorzady będą pracować nieefektywnie, pracownicy mogą nadużywać swoich uprawnień, co destrukcyjnie wpływa na dobrobyt społeczności, odpowiednio duże znaczenie ma właściwie proces kształtowania organu samorządu terytorialnego. W rzeczywistości czynniki, które na niego wpływają rozważmy w tym temacie.

Większość przedstawicieli demokratycznej opinii publicznej w krajach rozwiniętych krajach europejskich uważa, że lokalne problemu nie da się rozwiązać неполитическими metodami. Rozwiązania określonego problemu (np. o remoncie szkoły z internatem), być może głównie przez przyjęcie przez organ samorządu terytorialnego jakiegokolwiek administracyjno-technicznego rozwiązania. Ale kiedy rodzi się pytanie, czy w ogóle robić ten remont i ile to kosztuje itd, itp., to do jego rozwiązania są nie tylko rozwiązania techniczne, ale i wola polityczna tego organu. W polsce ponad uważa się, że najlepsze opcje decyzji administracyjnych określony tylko konkretnych okoliczności, a nie względy polityki lokalnej.

Ale partie polityczne nie tylko reprezentują interesy różnych grup, ale i sporządza i uzasadniają ich ideologicznie – w postaci zorganizowanych programowych wymagań w zakresie kształtowania strategii rozwoju społeczeństwa, polityki państwa w ogóle. Nie tylko wyrazem pełnych społecznych interesów, partie organizują i przedstawiają je w politycznym spektrum, na czele walki w wyborach za prawo do uczestnictwa w kształtowaniu i realizacji polityki państwa, przyczyniając się do rozwoju aktywności politycznej obywateli². Aby bardziej precyzyjnie określić właściwą rolę partii politycznych Ukrainy w wyborach lokalnych, należy szczegółowo analizować odpowiednią praktykę w demokratyczny krajach europejskich.

¹ Л.Богачова, Відповідальність органів та посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування за порушення прав людини w: Проблеми удосконалення правового регулювання місцевого самоврядування в Україні: Матеріали міжнар. наук.-практ. конф., м. Харків, 25 травня 2004 р., ред. Ю.Битяк, Харків 2004, s.207.

² П.Ворона, Місцеве самоврядування і політичні партії в Україні, Харків 2008, s.165.

Podstawy lokalnej polityki w tych krajach opracowuje się na lokalnych wyborach, w których partie polityczne i ich bloki oferują wyborcom swoje rozwiązania lokalnych problemów. Dlatego system lokalny wyborów tutaj opiera się na głębokie tradycje partyjne³. Organizacyjno-polityczna praca z członkami terytorialnej wspólnoty wymaga głębokiej wiedzy od partyjnych menedżerów. Na przykład w Republice Federalnej Niemiec (RFN) z jej tradycji demokratycznych czasami brakuje kandydatów na stanowiska partyjne, które совмещали działalność społeczną, wiedzę i intuicję, nie mówiąc już o partyjnych kandydatów w gminnych rad. Przecież od członka partii w organach samorządu terytorialnego wymagana jest stała współpraca i zainteresowanie jak najszerszego spektrum problemów gospodarczej, społecznej i innych dziedzin życia. Dlatego w RFN szczególną uwagę zwraca się na dobór kandydatów na wybrane stanowiska wśród partyjnych działaczy, ponieważ tylko partie mają prawo je polecić do władz lokalnych⁴.

Udział w kształtowaniu woli politycznej obywateli wymaga od partii pełnienia funkcji pośrednika między lokalnymi interesami i nad regionalnymi lub krajowymi organami władzy. Do procesu kształtowania woli politycznej, który realizują partie, odnosi się i wyznaczanie nowych celów i kierunków polityki lokalnej. Partii od czasu do czasu przeglądać wykonaną pracę; czuć nad nowymi problemami, aby nie wypuścić ze swojego uwagę tych problemów, które niepokoją mieszkańców. Martwią się o lokalne interesy, aby zasłużyć na uznanie wyborców, dążą do osiągnięcia tego celu współpracy swoich frakcji i organizacji partyjnych⁵.

W tym samym czasie partie polityczne nie są panaceum na wszystkie bolączki w samorządzie lokalnym, a jedynie narzędziem do realizowania skutecznej polityki miejskiej.

Zgodnie z pkt. 1, art. 21 Ustawy zasadniczej RFN, partie biorą udział w kształtowaniu woli politycznej narodu. Na poziomie lokalnym to oznacza kształtowanie partyjnej pozycji względem celów/problemów i interesów społeczności lokalnych i tym podobne. Oświadczył, bliskość do ludzi wymaga orientacji wewnętrznej pracy na dialog z różnymi grupami społecznymi⁶.

Konflikty występujące na poziomie lokalnym, partie polityczne powinny rozwiązywać otwarcie, co uzyskuje się poprzez upolitycznienie i demokratyzację samorządu terytorialnego. Zagraniczne doświadczenia pokazują, że polityczny interes obywateli występuje wtedy, gdy mają informacje na temat oficjalnych i alternatywnych projektów uchwał i gdy lokalne problemy dotyczą ich bezpośrednio. To prowadzi do tego, że oficjalne projekty uchwał nie mają wyłącznego prawa na rozwiązanie problemu, a zmuszają autorów poddać ich optymalizacji, w tym poprzez rozpatrzenia alternatywnych zdań od społeczeństwa.

We Francji partie odgrywają znaczącą rolę w wyborach lokalnych. Jeśli gmina jest niewielka to duże znaczenie w wyborach mają osobowości, ale jeśli to miasto liczące ponad 10-15 tys. mieszkańców, to dużą rolę odgrywają partie.

³ H.Daalder, P. Mair, *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*. - London 1993, s.198.

⁴ Н.Сауров, Германские партии и "партийное государство", "Право и политика", 2001 г.4, с. 19-25.

⁵ В.Куйбіда, Місцеве самоврядування України в контексті розвитку місцевої демократії, Хмельницький 2008, с.310.

⁶ Н.Сауров, Германские партии... с.21.

Weźmemy, na przykład, małe miasto, gdzie wybierany 49 miejskich radnych. Każda ze stron przedstawia swoją listę i w nią powinno być 49 nazwisk. Na czele podobna lista przyszły burmistrz miasta. W drugiej rundzie partia, która otrzyma najwięcej głosów wyborców, tworzy większość i burmistrzem zostanie ten, kto stoi na czele listy⁷. W ogóle polityka Francji w sprawie organizacji samorządu terytorialnego prowadzona jest w dwóch kierunkach: dekoncentracji – szersze delegowanie przez państwo swoich funkcji administracyjnych na miejsca, i decentralizacji – przekazywanie przez państwo części swoich władczych uprawnień lokalnych organów samorządu⁸.

W oparciu Polskiej koncepcji reformy samorządu terytorialnego⁹ jest pomysł, że nie „zarządzanie” jest funkcją państwa, a tylko stworzenie stabilnych warunków dla działalności osób, przedsiębiorstw lub grup obywateli. Tworzenie samorządu było podstawą dla wszystkich innych reform w Polsce. Pierwszym krokiem w tym kierunku było utworzenie w 1990 r. samorządowy gmin – najmniejszych i podstawowych jednostek samorządu terytorialnego. Gmina jest podstawową jednostką samorządu lokalnego i terytorialnego podziału państwa. Zakresem jej kompetencji są wszystkie zadania, które nie są zabezpieczone innymi organami władzy publicznej. Gmina – najmniejsza wspólnota mieszkańców, która jest osobą prawną, ma prawnie przypięty samodzielność, a także majątek i dochody, którymi ma prawo rozporządzać według własnego uznania i na własną odpowiedzialność.

Powiat – to jest lokalna społeczność, która obejmuje ludność i terytorium kilku gmin. Działalność powiatu mająca na celu zaspokojenie potrzeb władz starostwa społeczności skali, wyższej od poziomu gminy. Zadaniem powiatu jest udzielanie takich usług, które w społeczności większej niż gmina są bardziej efektywne i skuteczne. W przeciwieństwie do gmin, powiat wykonuje tylko te zadania, które są zamocowane za nim prawnie. Przepisy bardzo szczegółowo dzielą zadania gminy i powiatu.

Województwo jest regionalnym stowarzyszeniem, a także największą jednostką terytorialnego podziału kraju. Głównym zadaniem 16 samorządów województw jest promowanie rozwoju regionalnego w państwie. Działalność województwa skierowana nie na bezpośrednią obsługę mieszkańców (to sprawią gmina i powiat), a na długoterminowe działania regionalnej skali.

Wysuwać kandydatów mogą partie polityczne, organizacje społeczne oraz wyborcy. Ostatnie dla wysuwania kandydatur powinny tworzyć wyborczy komitet w składzie co najmniej 5 osób. Lista kandydatów w okręgu w gminie do 20 tys. mieszkańców musi mieć tylu kandydatów, ile przewidziano w nim miejsc, a w gminie, gdzie ponad 20 tys. ludności, – nie mniej niż 5 kandydatów. Dokładnie tak, stymuluje tworzenie koalicji, które są niezbędne do tworzenia większości. Kandydować można tylko w jednym okręgu i tylko z jednej listy. Ale listy wyborcze

⁷ П.Ворона, Дихотомія політичних уподобань як наслідок недосконалості виборчої системи України в Теорія і практика державного управління: зб. наук. пр., ред. Ю. Амосов. – Харків 2005, nr 2 (11), s. 32-36.

⁸ Реформа для людини: збірник матеріалів про шляхи реалізації адміністративно-територіальної реформи в Україні, ред. А. Москалюк, Київ 2005, s.216

⁹ П. Ворона, Місцеве самоврядування і політичні партії в Україні, Харків 2008, s.165.

w Polsce są otwarte, głosując na partię polityczną, społeczny komitet wyborczy lub blok bezpartyjnych, wyborca stawia znak przeciwko konkretnemu nazwiska na liście partii, tym samym tworząc kolejność kandydatów na liście do otrzymania mandatu deputowanego. Dlatego ten, kto był pierwszym w wyborczym liście partii lub innego podmiotu wyborów, może uzyskać inne miejsce na podstawie wyników wyborów.

Istotną cechą organów samorządu terytorialnego w chwili obecnej jest to, że ich wyznaczenie odbywa się za bezpośredniego lub pośredniego udziału wspólnoty terytorialnej przez partie polityczne, które działają w ramach odpowiednich administracyjno-terytorialnych formacji. Zazwyczaj dzieje się to wyłącznie poprzez wybory. Wybory będziemy rozumieć jako demokratyczną procedurę tworzenia okresowych lub nadzwyczajnej zmiany składu osobowego organów państwowej (ustawodawczej) lub przedstawiciel władzy, sposób ustalania kręgu urzędników, a co najważniejsze - uznanie ich legalnych uprawnień poprzez wolnej woli obywateli w drodze głosowania na kandydatów, które zostały wysunięte według ustawowych zasad¹⁰.

Europejska Karta samorządu terytorialnego nalega na elekcyjności jako jedynym sposobie tworzenia lokalnych rad¹¹. Wybory są nieodłącznym atrybutem demokratycznego społeczeństwa, właśnie poprzez wybory w nim się dzieje i reprodukcję legitymacje władczych instytucji samorządu terytorialnego.

Sami formy i metody organizacji i przeprowadzenia wyborów samorządowych znacznie różnią się w różnych krajach. Wątpię, czy można wyróżnić jakieś modele wyborów samorządowych na wzór modeli samorządu terytorialnego, jednak możliwe jest zaznaczenie opcji dla zróżnicowania wyborów lokalnych. Można wyróżnić takie podstawowe cechy, którymi różnią się wyborze systemy na miejscach:

- stopień integracji z systemem ogólnokrajowych wyborów;
- obecność wyborczych kwalifikacji;
- odstępach czasu przeprowadzenia wyborów;
- sposób określenia liczby posłów;
- funkcje tworzenia okręgów wyborczych;
- typ systemu wyborczego.

Stopień integracji z systemem ogólnokrajowych wyborów

Psychicznie, technologicznie i instytucjonalnie wybory centralnego i lokalnego poziomów są różne. Jednak w wielu krajach na świecie wybory lokalne zintegrowane z elektoralnym systemem przyjętym centralnego poziomu. Często zasady centralnych i lokalnych wyborów są takie same, a same wybory odbywają się w jeden dzień. Zaletą takiego systemu polega na tym, że frekwencja na pewno będzie więcej, bo ludzie będą mogli głosować na swoich wybrańców za

¹⁰ О. Батанов, Місцеве самоврядування в політичній системі України: історія, проблеми, перспективи, "Часоп. Київ. ун-ту права", 2004 nr 1, s. 38.

¹¹ Європейська хартія місцевого самоврядування, Страсбург, 15 жовтня 1985 року, http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_036 [07.10.2017].

jednym razem. Wadą jest to, że wybory lokalne, zwykle pozostają w cieniu ogólnokrajowych, które tradycyjnie wywołują większe zainteresowanie wyborców.

W wielu krajach europejskich wybory lokalne odbywają się za rok lub dwa, aż do wyborów parlamentarnych. Różne ramy czasowe przeprowadzenia krajowych i lokalnych wyborów z jednej strony przyczyniają się do zaangażowania samorządów jasne, przywódców politycznych, z drugiej – pozwalają społeczeństwu mniej lub bardziej adekwatnie ocenić wyniki wyborów, które odbyły się wcześniej, i odpowiednio dostosować swój kolejny wybór¹².

Częstotliwość wyborów – jedna z głównych zasad prawa wyborczego, zapisaną w Deklaracji o kryteriach wolnych i uczciwych wyborów, przyjętej w 1994 roku na 154 sesji Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego Rady Europy. Okresowe tworzenie struktur władzy, które by spełniały interesy i aspiracje każdego członka społeczeństwa, a także racjonalne istnienie społeczeństwa w ogóle – jest główną funkcją i celem politycznych wyborów. Zasada okresowości wyborów zapewniona w wyborach lokalnych we wszystkich krajach świata i jest ustalana na okres kadencji organów przedstawicielskich. Ostatni waha się od 2 do 6 lat. Na przykład, minimalny okres kadencji rad w Szwecji, Estonii (3 lata), maksymalny okres – w Belgii i Francji (6 lat)¹³. Zalety krótkich kadencji rad wiążą się z tym, że członkowie rady muszą mieć szczególną i stałą uwagę dlatego, czego naprawdę chcą wyborcy, ponieważ te ostatnie mają dość ścisłą kontrolę nad działalnością swoich przedstawicieli, wady – deputowanych rad za krótki okres kadencji mogą nie zdążyć zapoznać się z charakterem i specyfiką pracy w organach przedstawicielskich samorządu terytorialnego. Zalety długich kadencji rad wiążą się z jednej strony z argumentami oszczędności finansowej, bo wybory wymagają znacznych nakładów z budżetu lokalnego, z drugiej – z większą zdolnością do podejmowania trudnych politycznie niepopularnych decyzje, które mogą być istotne dla długoterminowego dobrobytu obywateli. Również w radach o przedłużonej kadencji powszechna praktyka wyborów w kilku etapach, w wyniku czego następuje okresowa aktualizacja rad. Oznacza to, że w wyborach w osobny samorząd za jednym razem wybierana jest tylko część członków rady. Argument na rzecz takich kolejnych wyborów polega na tym, że przyczyniają się one do ciągłości i stabilności w składzie rady, ponieważ niewielu urzędników mogą jednocześnie odejść na rezygnacje. Argument przeciwko kolejnych wyborów w tym, że oni pozbawiają niezadowolony elektorat możliwości wprowadzić drastyczne zmiany w wyniku pewnych wyborów¹⁴.

Sposób określenia liczby posłów. Liczba posłów, którzy będą reprezentować interesy wspólnoty terytorialnej, zazwyczaj, określa się na podstawie liczby ludności zamieszkującej w odpowiedniej miejscowości. Choć odpowiednia zależność jest charakterystyczne dla większości krajów, liczebność organów przedstawicielskich znacznie różni się¹⁵.

¹² Зарубіжний досвід організації роботи місцевої влади, ред. П.Ворона, Полтава 2009, s.288.

¹³ Вибори в Європейському Союзі, ред. Д. Ковриженко. – Київ 2006, s.156.

¹⁴ Electoral systems and voting procedures at local level: Report by Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy in Series "Local and regional authorities in Europe", 1998 nr 68, s.29.

¹⁵ K. Finegold, *Experts and Politicians: Reform Challenges to Machine Politics in New York, Cleveland, and Chicago*, Princeton 1995, s. 71-74

W literaturze przedstawiono wiele argumentów na rzecz zarówno małych, jak i licznych rad. Większość północnoamerykańskich badaczy twierdzą, że mniejsze rady – lepiej, niż duże. Niektórzy uważają, że rada gminy musi być podobna do rady nadzorczej prywatnej firmy; jej członkowie nie muszą się mieszać w politykę, a zajmować się tylko określeniem tego, co jest najlepsze dla interesów miasta w ogóle¹⁶. Inni autorzy wskazują na to, że zbyt duże wskazówki borykają się z wieloma problemami – czas osobistego zatrudnienia posłów znacznie się skraca i/lub nawet znika, znaczna część pracy jest przekazywana organom, zaangażowanie posłów w wielu sprawach jest ograniczone, ocena działalności posłów staje się trudniejsza, jeśli w ogóle możliwe, cierpi motywacja, system mniej otwarty na krytykę i dla ewentualnych zmian, i dla administracji staje się łatwiejsze do kontroli najwyższej z pomocą taktyki „dziel i rządź”¹⁷. W ten sposób małe rady działają wystarczająco skutecznie w przypadku, gdy składają się z doświadczonych specjalistów-menedżerów, bez szczególnych preferencji partyjnych. Kiedy w miejskiej polityce aktywnie zaangażowane partie polityczne, tym lepsze stają się stosunkowo duże rady, ponieważ strony mogą wnieść pewną kolejność i przewidywalność zbiorowych zachowań.

Ponieważ w wielu krajach rolę partyjnego czynnika wzrasta w miejskiej polityce, europejski doświadczenie wykazuje tendencję do wzrostu liczby organów przedstawicielskich samorządu terytorialnego, przede wszystkim w terytorialnych wspólnotach, gdzie jest wielu mieszkańców. Ostatnia również ze względu na chęć w największym stopniu być zgodne z zasadą demokracji i zagwarantować kolegialność, obiektywizm i legalność ich działalności. W większości krajów europejskich liczba deputowanych, reprezentujących interesy dużych i małych wspólnot terytorialnych, znacznie się różni. Na przykład, liczba deputowanych w lokalnych radach Austrii waha się od 7 do 100 członków (Wiedeń – 100), we Włoszech – od 12 do 80, w Niemczech – od 5 do 80, Finlandii – od 17 do 85, Francji – od 9 do 69 (ale Paryż przedstawiony 163 doradcami, Marsylia – 101, Lyon – 73), Szwecji – od 31 do 101 i tym podobne. W niektórych krajach europejskich działają stosunkowo niewielkie rad gmin wraz z licznymi poradami regionalnej lub pośredniego poziomu. W szczególności, w Portugalii liczba radnych gminnych i miejskich rad waha się od 4 do 19, natomiast regionalne zgromadzenie ustawodawcze Madery przedstawione 61 doradcą, Azorów – 52 doradcami; w Hiszpanii rady gmin składają się z 5-25 członków (z przyrostem o 1 członka na każde 100 000 wyborców), a ustawodawczych 17 autonomicznych regionów i 2 samodzielnych miast składają się z 25-135 członków; w Holandii rady gmin składają się z 7-45 członków, a zgromadzenie ustawodawcze prowincji – z 43-83 członków¹⁸.

Kształtowanie okręgów wyborczych. Ta lub inna wyborcza łódź musi określać: deputowani do rady muszą startować na jednym administracyjnym okręgu lub na kilku. Administracyjny

¹⁶ Місцеві вибори в Україні: проблеми правового регулювання, ред. Д.Ковриженко, Київ 2006, s. 136.

¹⁷ Зарубіжний досвід організації роботи місцевої влади..., s.139.

¹⁸ В. Яворський, Місцеве самоврядування і вибори в Україні в Державне будівництво та місцеве самоврядування: зб. наук. пр., Харків 2002, s.48.

okręg - podział geograficzny jednostki organizacyjnej samorządu terytorialnego, z którego wybierają jednego lub więcej członków organu zarządzającego. W przypadku, gdy wybierają jednego członka organu, chodzi o jednomandatowy okręg wyborczy; w przypadku, gdy decyduje się dwóch lub więcej członków rady – chodzi o wielomandatowy okręg wyborczy. Oznacza to, że wybór rodzaju okręgu wyborczego jest związany z typem systemu wyborczego. W warunkach systemu większościowego wyborów w okręgu mogą być jednomandatowe i wielomandatowe, w warunkach proporcjonalnego systemu – tylko wielomandatowy.

Jak zauważa J. Szweda, aby każdej okolicy dać możliwość uczestniczenia poprzez swoich przedstawicieli w rozwiązywaniu lokalnych problemów, często wybory odbywają się w jednomandatowych okręgach wyborczych. Ponieważ takie dystrykty bardzo małe, są one dość podobne, i to na ogół dobrze. Ale jeśli chcesz osiągnąć różnorodność przedstawionych interesów w wyborach do organów samorządu terytorialnego, w celu tworzenia okręgów można zastosować tak zwaną zasadę „segmentacji”. W tym przypadku wyborcze okręgi nie powstają wokół konkretnych obszarów, a w postaci jakby wyciętych segmentów koła od centrum miasta i podmiejskich okolic¹⁹.

Cięcie okręgów wyborczych mogą być zbieżne, albo nie zbieżne z administracyjno-terytorialnym podziałem kraju. W administracyjno-terytorialnych jednostkach z dużą ilością ludności okręgi przycinane specjalnie dla wyborów. Zaletą obecności okręgów polega na tym, że gwarantuje reprezentację od każdej części terytorium, co jest szczególnie ważne dla lokalnych samorządów, które znajdują się w bardziej zaludnionych obszarach o znacznym stężeniu w poszczególnych częściach terytorium jednolitego na tle pochodzenia etnicznego ludności²⁰. Braki w tym, że przedstawiciele okręgów mogą być bardziej zainteresowani o dobro mieszkańców swojego okręgu, niż w populacji ogólnej.

Typ systemu wyborczego

Typ systemu wyborczego (większościowy, proporcjonalny, mieszany) – najbardziej istotny parametr różnicowania wyborów lokalnych. Zastosowanie tego lub innego typu systemu wyborczego zależy od wielu czynników: historycznych warunków, specyficznych zadań rozwoju politycznego, kulturowo-historycznych tradycji i tym podobne. W każdym konkretnych warunkach wybrany typ systemu wyborczego może zapewnić wpływ partii politycznych na kształtowanie i realizację polityki miejskiej, efektywne funkcjonowanie systemu organów samorządu terytorialnego, przedstawicielstwo mniejszości narodowych i kobiet w organach władzy, związek między wyborcami a wybranymi posłami, wzmocnienie zasobów kadrowych partii i tym podobne. Warto zauważyć, że dziś jednym z najbardziej istotnych czynników, które wpływają na wybór typu systemu wyborczego w wielu krajach są liczby

¹⁹ Ю. Швед, *Вибори та виборчі системи. Європейські стандарти та досвід для утвердження демократії в Україні*, Львів 2010, s.44.

²⁰ *Зарубіжний досвід організації роботи місцевої влади...*, s.223.

wyborców zarejestrowanych w obrębie danego terytorium. Przynajmniej w jednej trzeciej państw europejskich liczba wyborców jest decydującą przy udzielaniu odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, w jakim systemie należy przeprowadzać wybory samorządowe do rad najniższego poziomu. To podejście jest stosowane w Grecji (w gminach z liczbą wyborców do 5000 stosuje się jeden system wyborów; w dużych gminach – inny), Hiszpania (w społecznościach, przedstawionych 250 wyborców, wybory odbywają się według ordynacji *większościowej*, w dużych społecznościach – proporcjonalne), Włochy (15000 wyborców), Luksemburg (3000 wyborców), Polska (20000 wyborców), Słowenia (rady, w których liczba członków jest mniejsza niż 12, stosuje się system ordynacji *większościowej*, w radach z dużą ilością członków – proporcjonalny system); Węgry (10000 wyborców), Francja (3500 wyborców)²¹.

Reprezentatywne organy, które, w rzeczywistości, są najważniejszym składnikiem samorządu terytorialnego, zazwyczaj wybierani są według bezpośrednich wyborów populacji danej administracyjnej jednostki terytorialnej. Praktyka innych krajów do stosowania w wyborach lokalnych systemów wyborczych jest dość zróżnicowana. Wybory do organów lokalnej władzy zdarzają się większościowego, proporcjonalne i mieszanego systemów, który zawiera elementy poprzednich typów, starając się łączyć mocne strony. Naszym zdaniem, to oznacza tylko jedno – jedyne właściwe podejście w wyborze systemu wyborczego nie istnieje, jednak opierając się na doświadczenie demokratycznych krajów europejskich, można określić podstawowe trendy w jego wyborze.

²¹ Вибори в Європейському Союзі..., s.76.

Migrations and migration processes in the Visegrad Countries: legal principles of regulation and features of modern patterns

The article is devoted to analyzing the legal principles of regulation of migrations and migration processes in the Visegrad countries. It is clarified that the peculiarities of regulation of migrations and migration processes in the Visegrad countries are determined by the legislation of the respective countries, which are coordinated with the legislation of the EU and international legal acts. The author recognized that modern patterns of migrations and migration processes in the Visegrad countries are based on the following principles: protection of the EU external borders and the importance of fulfilling the obligations of the EU legislation; effective identification of the main causes of migratory flows in order to reduce the number of migrants; refusal of the “open door” migration policy; the importance of decision-making for European integration, which is based on the consensus among the EU member states.

Keywords: migration, migration process, visa, asylum, refugee, the Visegrad countries.

МІГРАЦІЇ ТА МІГРАЦІЙНІ ПРОЦЕСИ У КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ Й ОСОБЛИВОСТІ СУЧАСНИХ ПАТЕРНІВ

Проаналізовано правові засади регулювання міграції та міграційних процесів у країнах Вишеградської групи. З'ясовано, що особливості регулювання міграції та міграційних процесів у країнах Вишеградської групи визначаються нормами законодавства відповідних країн, узгоджуючись із законодавством ЄС та міжнародно-правовими актами. Встановлено, що сучасні патерни міграції та міграційних процесів у країнах Вишеградської групи базуються на таких принципах: захист зовнішніх кордонів ЄС та важливість виконання зобов'язань, що містяться в законодавстві ЄС; ефективне встановлення основних причин міграційних потоків з метою скорочення кількості мігрантів; відмова від міграційної політики «відкритих дверей»; важливість прийняття рішень на основі консенсусу між державами-членами ЄС щодо європейської інтеграції.

Ключові слова: міграція, міграційний процес, віза, притулок, біженець, країни Вишеградської групи.

Under modern conditions the situation concerning migration in the majority of the European Union (EU), especially in the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) is extremely actual, though the latter pay much attention to migration flows of population and take different (sometimes relevant, sometimes not relevant) migration arrangements. It is notable on the background of the so-called “migration crisis” since 2014-2015, i.e. an incredible flow of immigrants from Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and so on. In this context quite relevant is determination of legal principles of control and peculiarities of current patterns of migration and migration processes in the Visegrad countries (that is the aim of the research).

Peculiarities of migration and migration processes regulation in the Visegrad countries are defined by the norms of the law in the corresponding countries, confirming with the EU legislation and international legal acts. The Visegrad countries are the members of the Schengen zone. The Schengen zone member states arrange visas, which allow visa-holders to enter and reside in the territory of the Schengen zone: 1) short-term visa “C” – grants a right to stay in the territory of the Schengen zone up to 90 days, during any 180 days’ period¹; 2) national visa “D” – grants a right to stay in the territory of any Schengen zone country-member for more than 90 days.

Let’s analyze fundamental legal principles of migration regulation in *Hungary*. In 2001 the National Assembly (parliament) of Hungary adopted the Act “*On Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries*”. According to the act Hungarians who reside abroad get on the territory of Hungary a legal status, different from that of other foreigners, what can be proved by such documents as “the ID of a foreign Hungarian” and “the ID of a foreign Hungarian’s family member”². They may free-of-charge use libraries, on preferential terms visit state libraries and cultural establishments. Students, who belong to the group of foreign Hungarians enjoy all rights, guaranteed for the citizens by the Act “*On higher education*”, i.e. they may receive scholarship, refunding for medical services etc. Foreign Hungarians have a right to work in Hungary during 3 months of every calendar year, and such permit is granted out of quotas and regardless the situation on the national labor market, what is taken into account in relation to other foreign employees. Working in Hungary, foreign Hungarians become a part of the local system of social insurance and medical services, i.e. pay corresponding fees and may use all appropriate services³.

¹ The procedure of arranging short-term visa is regulated by the Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council № 810/2009 “A Community Code on Visas” (“Visa Code”) of 13 July 2009. In accordance with Article 1 of the EU visa code, the Schengen visa may be issued only with the aim of a short-term stay – no more than 90 days during any 180 days’ period. While counting the duration of stay in the territory of the countries which belong to the Schengen zone, the periods of stay on the basis of the permission or long-term visa are not taken into account. Stay in Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Romania, Cyprus and in the United Kingdom are not taken into consideration as the countries are not the Schengen zone members. Thus, short-term stay in the countries which are not the EU members but are a part of the Schengen zone (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), are taken into account while checking the principle “90/180 days”.

² O. Malynovska, *Polityka susidnykh krain shchodo spivvitchyznykiv yak instrument popovnennia liudskykh resursiv: vyklyky ta uroky dlia Ukrainy*, «Stratehichni priorityty», 2013, nr. 3, s. 139.

³ G. Andreeva, *Vengerskij zakon o zarubezhnykh sootchestvennikah (obzor)*, „Social’nye i gumanitarnye nauki. Otechestvennaya i zarubezhnaya literatura”, Seriya 4: Gosudarstvo i pravo, 2004, s. 36–38.

On January 1, 2011 was adopted the Act “*On Amendments to the Law of the Hungarian Republic of 1993 “On Hungarian Citizenship”*”, which allows ethnic Hungarians permanently living in the neighboring countries to receive Hungarian citizenship according to the simplified procedure. Hungarian citizenship is mainly acquired on the basis of one of the parents, who is ethnical Hungarian or by naturalization (at least one of the parents is ethnical Hungarian, despite the country of birth). The fact that the person is born on the territory of Hungary does not presuppose automatic citizenship. The exceptions are children, born by unknown parents and by persons without nationality⁴.

Hungarian citizenship may be gained by the way of naturalization under the following conditions: 1) 8 years of continuous residence in Hungary; 2) presence of stable means of existence and place of residence; 3) no record of convictions; 4) passing a test, concerning the knowledge of the Constitution in the Hungarian language⁵.

People over 65; legally incompetent people; people with reduced capabilities; people who studied the Hungarian language in school or higher educational establishment; people who cannot take a test due to continuous and inconvertible disease may be free from taking the test on the Constitution of Hungary. Hungarian citizens, who hold other citizenship (double citizenship) and reside abroad, may refuse Hungarian citizenship. People who wish to refuse from Hungarian citizenship must apply in written form to the president of Hungary.

Another important question is that of *renaturalization*. A person, who has lost Hungarian citizenship, may send an application and be naturalized on the same grounds as an ethnic Hungarian. A person must prove their knowledge of the Hungarian language. An applicant must have a certificate of no criminal convictions from the country of previous residence as well as a clean record in Hungary. Their naturalization must not carry a threat to the civil order and national security of Hungary.

The Constitution of Hungary states that protection is provided after receiving a request for getting an asylum by non-Hungarian people, who suffer persecution in the native country or in the country of their permanent residence, due to their race, nationality, affiliation to any social group, religious or political convictions or whose concerns to become a victim of persecution are grounded, on condition that neither the country of origin nor any other country provides them protection (p. 3 art. 13)⁶.

In accordance with the Act of 2007 “*On Asylum*” *the application for seeking asylum may be declared inadmissible if*: 1) an applicant is a citizen of one of the Member States of the European Union; 2) an applicant was recognized by another Member State as a refugee or this country granted subsidiary protection to him/her; 3) the applicant submits new application for seeking asylum, if the previous application was rejected in Hungary and the new application does

⁴ Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, źródło: <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/5331> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵ Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, źródło: <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/5331>

⁶ Hungary's Constitution of 2011, źródło: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

not comprise any new elements; 4) an applicant has travelled through or stayed in a safe third country, and s/he would have had the opportunity to apply for effective protection; 5) an applicant has relatives in that country and may enter the territory of the country; 6) the safe third country requests the extradition of the person seeking recognition (for instance, if they committed a crime); 7) the reasons for asylum are groundless; 8) it is impossible to ascertain the applicant's country of origin by providing false information; 9) an applicant did not seek for asylum in due time, though had a possibility to do it earlier⁷.

If the application is declared inadmissible, the applicant may make an appeal to the Immigration and Asylum Office. The judicial authority must hold an interview with a foreigner. As a result of the appeal the court may take one of the following decisions: 1) support the appeal and provide one of the protection statuses; 2) partially support the appeal and cancel the decision of the Immigration and Asylum Office, and compel the Office to conduct another procedure and review the case for providing asylum; 3) to reject the appeal and retain the decision in force.

The court's decision is binding and without appeal. A foreigner may start another procedure of seeking asylum, but only in case of providing new important facts or circumstances, which were not taken into account in the course of previous application processing⁸.

Hungary shall grant subsidiary protection to a foreigner who does not satisfy the criteria of recognition as a refugee but there is a risk that, in the event of their return to their country of origin, they would be exposed to serious harm and they are unable or, owing to fear of such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin (art. 12).

No subsidiary protection shall be granted to a foreigner if: 1) they committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity; 2) they committed a crime, which is punishable by a term of five or more years imprisonment under the relevant Hungarian law; 3) they committed a crime contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 4) their stay in the territory of Hungary violates its national security (art. 15).

Hungary shall grant temporary protection to a foreigner who belongs to a group of displaced persons arriving in the territory of Hungary en masse which was recognized a) by the Council of the European Union as eligible for temporary protection under the procedure determined in Council Directive of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof; b) by the Government as eligible for temporary protection as the persons belonging to the group had been forced to leave their country due to an armed conflict, civil war or ethnic clashes or the general, systematic or gross violation of human rights, in particular, torture,

⁷ Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (2016 June), źródło: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&dclid=5773d2594> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁸ Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (2016 June), źródło: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&dclid=5773d2594> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (art. 19). Timeframe of temporary protection is one year⁹.

No temporary protection shall be granted to a foreigner, if: 1) they committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity as defined in international instruments; 2) they committed a serious, non-political criminal act outside the territory of Hungary prior to the submission of the application for recognition as a beneficiary of temporary protection; 3) in whose case a final and absolute court judgment established that they had committed a crime which is punishable by a term of five or more years imprisonment under the relevant Hungarian rules of law; 4) they committed a crime contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 5) whose stay in the territory of Hungary violates the interest of its national security (art. 21)¹⁰.

Hungary shall grant protection in the form of tolerated stay to a foreigner not complying with the criteria for recognition as a refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection (art. 25/A).

Recognition as person with tolerated stay shall be revoked if a person with tolerated stay acquired a right to stay in other country; has acquired new nationality; has voluntarily re-established him/herself in the country of origin; the circumstances in connection with which they had been recognized as a person with tolerated stay have ceased to exist; during the procedure to review the tolerated stay status, they fail to appear at the acting refugee authority upon its notice – within three months of that notice (art. 25/D)¹¹.

In Poland there are the following rules of granting long-term touristic visas: 1) long-term visas (as a rule, period of validity is 1 year) with a right for multiple entrance are granted to those people, who plan touristic trips (including individual tourism), who have already been issued at least two Schengen touristic visas (including one Polish), which were used according to the intended purposes and upon the availability of confirmation of payment (fully) of a touristic service in the territory of the Republic of Poland (RP) for at least for three days; 2) people who previously did not have at least two Schengen touristic visas may submit applications for touristic visas with a right for two enters and period of validity up to 6 months, on condition that they provide confirmation of full payment of touristic services in the territory of the RP in two different terms, which are included into the abovementioned period.

To receive a national visa “D”, which grants a right to stay in the territory of the RP more than 90 days, it is necessary to submit a visa application not less than a week before the planned trip. All “D” type visas grant a right to move across the Schengen zone during three months

⁹ In accordance with the decisions taken by the EU council and Hungarian government, the timeframe of temporary protection may be prolonged (art. 23, 24 of the act “On Asylum”).

¹⁰ Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (2016 June), źródło: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5773d2594> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹¹ Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (2016 June), źródło: <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5773d2594> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

in each 6 months' period, similarly to the permits for stay. The maximum period of validity of a "D" type visa is 1 year. Applicants, who apply for the national visas do not provide their fingerprints.

In general, it is possible to single out the main following provisions of the current Polish legislation concerning foreigners¹²: 1) those concerning issues of foreigners' residence in Poland (the Act of December 12, 2013 "*On Foreigners*"¹³). Regulations of the Act includes general rules, concerning entrance, transit, residence and exit of foreigners from the territory of Poland and determines the effects of illegal residence in the territory of Poland; 2) those regulating a special status of citizens from some countries, which resulted from the European integration processes: from the general provisions of the Act "*On Foreigners*" are excluded the citizens of the European Union and the European free Trade Association (EFTA) – parts of the European Economic Space and the Swiss Confederation, who enjoy the right for free movement. The EU legislation also exerts influence on the Polish legislation by means of regulating the Schengen zone and visa rules. The main legislation, which regulates this sphere is the Act of 14 July 2006 "*On the Entry into, Residence in and Exit from the Republic of Poland of Nationals of the European Union Member States and their Family Members*"¹⁴; 3) includes providing international protection, that attends a possibility to guarantee a kind of protection to a foreigner in Poland, first of all to be granted asylum or provide additional protection according to the Act of 13 June 2003 "*On Granting Protection to Foreigners within the Territory of the Republic of Poland*"¹⁵; 4) connected with repatriation of ethnic Poles from other countries and their naturalization in Poland, especially with respect to those people, who were forcibly deported to the USSR. The most significant legal act concerning this issue is the Act of 7 September 2007 "*On the Pole's Card*"¹⁶.

The Act of 12 December 2013 "On Foreigners", which came into force on 1 May 2014, included the following crucial changes concerning foreigners: 1) *A foreigner shall file an application for a permanent residence permit in person, no later than on the last day of their lawful stay in the territory of the Republic of Poland*¹⁷ (in fact at any time till the validity date of the permit (visa/ card). A foreigner, who wishes to continue their period of stay on the grounds of the Schengen visa or national visa, must submit an application for its prolongation to the voivode at the place of residence, no later than on the last day of its validity term. If we refer to the permit

¹² M. Lelonek, *Zakon Polszchi «Pro inozemtsiv»*, źródło: <http://www.polukr.net/uk/blog/2015/12/zakon-polszchi-pro-inozemciv/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹³ Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20130001650> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹⁴ Ustawa z dnia 14 lipca 2006 r. o wjeździe na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, pobycie oraz wyjeździe z tego terytorium obywateli państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej i członków ich rodzin, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20061441043> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹⁵ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzieleniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹⁶ Ustawa z dnia 7 września 2007 r. o Karcie Polaka, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20071801280> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

¹⁷ Earlier the application for continuation of stay in Poland was to be submitted at least 45 days before the validity date of the previous authorization document.

for temporary residence (the so-called card of temporary stay (pol. karta czasowego pobytu)), the changes, first of all, concern the maximum term of its validity. The card is granted up to 3 years. The procedure of submitting an application has also been changed. An application must be submitted personally: while applying fingerprints are scanned and this excludes a chance of solving the problem by means of an authorized person. Besides, the foreigner must indicate the place of residence; 2) *granting permits for work and residence in one document*¹⁸. After May 1, 2014 a voivode decides whether a foreigner will have a chance to get a job they are applying for, checks whether the salary offered corresponds to the Polish legislation and market conditions. Due to this, a foreigner within the frames of one procedure may get permit for work and residence. This procedure allows avoiding a situation, when a person has valid permit for work, but the permit for residence has expired. A foreigner may be unemployed for a month not losing the permit for work and residence. However, in the course of 15 days since they lose job a foreigner must inform voivode at the place of residence; 3) *simplified procedures for students and graduates from Polish educational establishments*. A student, who comes to Poland for full-time studying in the establishments of the I, II, III levels, as well as for participation in preparatory courses in these establishments, gets the first permit for stay up to 15 months' term. Studying in the educational establishment is a ground for getting permit for stay and it presupposes a foreigner's residence in the territory of the RP up to 1 year, the first permit is granted for the term of the academic year. The same procedure concerns the permit for residence for the purpose of participating in the preparatory courses before entering university, which is granted for the term of the courses' duration plus 3 months. Foreigners, who continue studying, get permit for temporary residence up to 3 years. If a student gets permit for residence on the basis of permit for work, they cannot apply for permit for residence reasoning that they are studying; 4) *granting permit for temporary residence, taking into account "other circumstances"*. This possibility may be used, for instance by graduates of Polish educational establishments, who are searching for a job in the territory of the RP. They must have money for residence, medical insurance and a place of residence. Permit for temporary residence taking into account "other circumstances" is granted for 1 year; 5) *a term "forcible deportation from the country" has been replaced with "liability to return"*. An undesirable foreigner must leave the territory of Poland during 14 days. In such cases bans on trips to Poland may vary from 6 months to 5 years¹⁹.

Principles, conditions and procedures governing the acquisition and loss of Polish citizenship are stipulated by the Act of 2 April 2009 "*On Polish Citizenship*", which came into force on August 15, 2012. According to article 30 of the Act the following people are recognized as Polish citizens: 1) a foreigner who has resided within the territory of the Republic of Poland over

¹⁸ Till May 1, 2014 to obtain a possibility to come and work in Poland usually it was necessary to get these two types of permission. An application for permission for residence was in charge of a voivode, who as the first instance dealt with the issues of legalization of residence, whereas permission for employment was granted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy.

¹⁹ Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20130001650> [odczyt: 05.09.2017]; Zmiany w zakoni pro inozemtsiv Polshchi, źródło: <http://viza.vn.ua/zminy-v-zakoni-pro-inozemciv.html> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

the period of at least 3 years (has a permit for residence or permit for long-term stay in the EU or has a permanent place of residence) and who has a stable and regular source of income and a legal title to inhabitable premises; 2) a foreigner who has resided within the territory of the Republic of Poland over a period of at least 2 years (the conditions are the same as the mentioned above), who is a person without citizenship (no citizenship at all) or who is married to a Polish citizen for the period of at least 3 years; 3) a foreigner residing continuously on the territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 2 years, has permit for residence, obtained in relation with the refugee status, granted in the Republic of Poland; 4) a minor foreigner, whose one parent is a Polish citizen, whereas the other parent, being a non-Polish citizen, has given consent to the citizenship recognition of the minor. A minor foreigner must reside in the territory of the RP, have permit for a long-term residence in the EU or permit for permanent residence; 5) a minor foreigner, whose one parent has renounced Polish citizenship, whereas the other parent, being a non-Polish citizen, has given consent to the citizenship recognition of the minor. A minor foreigner must reside in the territory of the RP, have permit for a long-term residence in the EU or permit for permanent residence; 6) a foreigner residing continuously and legally on the territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 10 years, who is a holder of permit for residence, permit for a long-term residence in the EU, permit for permanent residence and has a stable and regular income within the Republic of Poland as well as a legal title to the occupied living premises; 7) a foreigner residing continuously on the territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 2 years on the basis of a permit for residence, which he was granted in relation with their Polish origin²⁰.

People, who are trying to obtain Polish citizenship (except minor) must take the test in the Polish languages and prove it by an official certificate (art. 30). A foreigner shall not be acknowledged as a Polish citizen by a voivode if any of the abovementioned criteria has not been obtained, as well as access to citizenship would be a threat to the national security, defense of the state or public order (art. 31). An application for citizenship is submitted to a voivode (art. 34)²¹. In accordance with the administrative code in case of refusal a person may again submit an application and complaint to voivode administrative court.

Political measures, applied to ethnical Poles who are living abroad and want to return to Poland have a long-standing history. Current wave of repatriation, which is actively stimulated by Polish governments, started in the early 1990s. In the course of time the interest in repatriation fell down (only 120 repatriation visas were granted in 2012). In general, the biggest flows of repatriates came from four countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. Due to the lack of funding for the program of repatriation and its small effectiveness, the Pole's Card was introduced in 2007. The Pole's Card may be granted to a person, who at the moment of

²⁰ Ustawa z dnia 2 kwietnia 2009 r. o obywatelstwie polskim, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20120000161> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²¹ Ustawa z dnia 2 kwietnia 2009 r. o obywatelstwie polskim, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20120000161> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

submitting the documents is a citizen of one of the countries of the former USSR or has a status of a stateless person in one of these countries.

The conditions for obtaining the Pole's Card are the following: 1) knowledge of the Polish language, at least at the elementary level; knowledge and practicing Polish traditions and customs; 2) signing the declaration of affiliation to the Poles people; 3) official confirmation that one person in parents' or grandparents' generation or two persons in great-grandparents' generation were Poles by nationality or citizens of Poland.

The Pole's Card gives a right: 1) to receive visa to Poland free-of-charge; 2) to work officially in the territory of the RP without a need to get permit for work; 3) to carry out entrepreneurship activity in Poland on the same grounds as the Polish citizens; 4) to exercise the right for a free-of-charge system of education in Poland at the elementary, secondary and higher levels on the same terms as the citizens of the RP and to request financial assistance and scholarship, designed for foreigners who study in Poland; 5) to exercise the right for free-of-charge medical services; 6) to use discount (37%) for railway tickets within the territory of Poland; 7) to visit state museums in Poland free-of-charge²². The card allows the holder to overcome the most difficult legal obstacles like to gain permit for work and necessity to obtain visa regularly, and therefore, it is a factor that promotes migration²³.

The conditions for granting the refugee status are regulated by the Act of 13 June 2003 "On Granting Protection to Foreigners Within the Territory of the Republic of Poland" and correlate with the Convention relating to the status of refugee 1951 (Geneva Convention 1951) and the Protocol relating to the status of refugees 1967. In accordance with article 13 of the Act persecution may be revealed in: 1) use of physical or psychological force; 2) use of judicial, administrative, police or court means of discriminatory nature; 3) violation or carrying out criminal procedure or sentence which is of discriminatory or improper nature; 4) absence of a right to appeal sentence which is of discriminatory or improper nature in court; 5) violation or carrying out criminal procedure, or sentence due to refuse from military service during the conflict, in case if doing military service would be considered a crime; 6) actions, aimed against people, due to their sex or age minority²⁴.

The decisions concerning granting the refugee status in the territory of Poland is made by the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners (art. 23). The refugee status is granted to all family members, mentioned in the application, in particular, minor children, foreigner's spouse, if the latter provides written consent (art. 25, 26).

²² Ustawa z dnia 7 września 2007 r. o Karcie Polaka, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20071801280> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²³ M. Lelonek, *Zakon Polshchi «Pro inozemtsiv»*, źródło: <http://www.polukr.net/uk/blog/2015/12/zakon-polszczi-pro-inozemciv/>; Ustawa z dnia 7 września 2007 r. o Karcie Polaka, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20071801280> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²⁴ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

The reasons to refuse a foreigner in granting the status of refugee are: 1) does not contain any grounds to recognize that there is well-founded fear of persecution in the country of origin; a foreigner has already enjoyed protection, by means of bodies or UN agencies (but not the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), on condition that under such circumstances a foreigner has a factual and legal opportunity to return to the territory where such protection or assistance is available, without a threat to their life; 2) a foreigner has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; 3) a foreigner has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 4) a foreigner has committed a serious non-political crime outside the Republic of Poland prior to their submission for obtaining refugee status; 5) the Republic of Poland authoritative bodies consider a foreigner a person who has rights and liabilities, concerning those of Polish citizenship; 6) a foreigner submitted another application for the status of refugee, however the concerns as to persecution are based on the circumstances they deliberately created after the last refusal in obtaining the refugee status (art. 19)²⁵.

A foreigner loses the refugee status if after granting this status the authoritative bodies found out that a foreigner: 1) again voluntarily accepted protection from the country whose citizens they are; 2) having lost citizenship of own country and then voluntarily took it; 3) received new citizenship and benefit protection from the country whose citizenship they adopted; again voluntarily resides in the country, which he had left due to the threats of persecution; 4) cannot refuse any more from protection of the state, whose citizen they are, or being an apatriote can return to the country of his previous residence, due to cessation of circumstances, due to which they gained the status of refugee and thus the concerns are groundless; 5) a foreigner has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; 6) a foreigner has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 7) a foreigner concealed information or documents or provided untruthful information or documents, which are of great significance for providing the refugee status (art. 21)²⁶.

Subsidiary protection – is a form of protection, granted to a foreigner, who does not meet the requirements necessary to obtain the refugee status, in case if their expulsion to the country of origin may be dangerous and affect them, where they could be subjected to death penalty or execution, tortures, inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment, whose health or life could be under serious threat, what is the result from general violence done towards civil people, in case of international or national military conflict, and that is why a foreigner cannot or does not want to accept protection of the country of origin (art. 15)²⁷.

²⁵ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²⁶ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²⁷ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

A foreigner shall be refused subsidiary protection if: 1) there is no factual threat to life or health; 2) a foreigner has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; 3) a foreigner has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 4) a foreigner committed in the territory of the RP a crime or committed beyond this territory an action, which in accordance to the Polish legislation is a crime, and they left the country of origin to avoid punishment; 5) a foreigner may constitute a threat to the state security and defense as well as to the public security and policy.

A foreigner shall be deprived of subsidiary protection if: 1) the reasons for granting tolerated stay have ceased to exist, or changed in a way that protection is no longer needed, and these reasons must be of continual character; 2) after providing protection it was revealed that a foreigner has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; 3) has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; 4) a foreigner committed in the territory of the RP a crime or committed beyond this territory an action, which in accordance to the Polish legislation is a crime, and they left the country of origin to avoid punishment; 5) a foreigner may constitute a threat to the state security and defense as well as to the public security and policy or provided untruthful information or documents, which are of great significance for providing subsidiary protection (art. 22)²⁸.

Tolerated stay – is an additional form of protection. A foreigner who shall not be granted the refugee status or subsidiary protection may be granted permit for tolerated stay in Poland if: 1) a foreigner may be excluded only into a country, where their right to life, to freedom and personal safety could be under threat, where they could be subjected to tortures, or be deprived of a right for fair judicial proceedings or be punished without any legal reasons; 2) exclusion affects the right for family life and child's rights and put at threat their psychophysical development; 3) exclusion is impossible due to the reasons independent of the bodies which execute decisions concerning exclusion of a foreigner; 4) exclusion can be made only to a country, where a person cannot be excluded on the basis of the court or the minister of justice decision, concerning refusal to exclude a foreigner and the interests of Poland.

The reasons for termination of tolerated stay are: 1) granting a foreigner the refugee status or providing them subsidiary protection; 2) granting a foreigner Polish citizenship; 3) information in written form sent to the head of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners by a foreigner, who is refusing from tolerated stay; 4) granting permit for temporary residence or stay²⁹.

An application for obtaining the status of refugee is considered simultaneously with an application for subsidiary protection. The application must be submitted by a foreigner personally. It may include a spouse as well, if the latter is maintained by a foreigner, minor children, who accompany them, if they are not married. In this case it is necessary to provide a written

²⁸ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzieleniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

²⁹ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzieleniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

consent from a spouse. Rendering agreement by a spouse to submit an application on their behalf is considered to be authorization to act on children's behalf as well. An application for obtaining the refugee status may be applied on the border or being in the territory of the Republic of Poland. If a person wants to submit an application concerning the refugee status they must inform a representative of border police during the border check. Temporary ID card of a foreigner is a document that identifies a foreigner's identity, provides their personal data and renders permit for temporary residence in the territory of Poland. This document is valid only in the territory of the RP and does not allow crossing the state border. Temporary ID card of a foreigner is issued by the body responsible for granting refugee status in Poland. Usually the first temporary ID card is issued by border police and it is valid for 30 days.

The Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, first of all, assesses an application for the refugee status from the perspective of its grounding. The official body interprets an application as groundless, if an applicant: 1) gave other reasons but not persecution by race, religion, citizenship, social group affiliation or political convictions or risk of a real threat or did not inform about the circumstances, connected with concerns of persecution or risk of a real threat; 2) came from a safe country, which is in the list of third countries, adopted by the European Union, in case if an applicant is a citizen of such country or is apatriote, who earlier permanently resided in this country; 3) concealed information or documents or provided untruthful information and documents; 4) submitted an application for the refugee status, which contained different personal details; 5) provided disputable information concerning persecution; 6) submitted an application with the aim to slow down the decision concerning their exclusion or to break its execution; 7) constitute a threat to state and public security or had already been excluded from Poland due to this reason³⁰.

If the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners decides that an application for the status of refugee is groundless, it gives its final decision in the course of 30 days since submitting the application. An application concerning annulment of granting the status of refugee must be submitted in the course of 5 days since it is received.

Interview – is an important part in the procedure of granting the status of refugee. All facts, obtained during the interview are vetted and compared to those in an application and other evidence, as well as materials concerning the situation in the country of origin. On the basis on this a final decision is taken³¹. A foreigner, who does not agree with the decision of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, has a right to make an appeal. An appeal is submitted to the

³⁰ Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

³¹ In cases of emergency the interview with a foreigner who is seeking refugee status in Poland is not hold. It can happen under following conditions: the decision can be taken on the grounds of present evidence; an applicant cannot take part in an interview due to bad health conditions, psychological reasons; an applicant while submitting application provided other reasons for obtaining the status of refugee than just concerns as to persecution based on race, religion, social group affiliation, political convictions or risk of real harm or did not inform about the circumstances connected with concerns of persecution or risk of real harm (the exception is if an applicant is minor or is left without a guardian).

Refugee Board through the mediation of the Head of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners for the period determined by a decision (not exceeding 14 days from the date of delivery). An exception is a situation, when an application for the refugee status is defined as groundless, then the term for making an appeal is 5 days from the date of delivery. The decision made by the Refugee Board is final in administrative proceedings. It does not concern the annulment of the resolution made by the body of first jurisdiction as to the subsequent re-examination. In such instance the case is sent back to the Head of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners³².

Let's analyze fundamental legal principles of migration and migration processes regulation in *Slovakia*. The Act of 21 October 2011 "*On Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts*" defines that the grounds for granting permit for temporary residence for foreigners in Slovakia are: for the purpose of business; for the purpose of employment; for the purpose of special activity (sports, cultural, activity of accredited journalists, providing medical assistance, internship and so on); for the purpose of study; for the purpose of family unification; for the purpose of research and development; for the purpose of performing service obligations by civil units of armed forces; people who have the status of a Slovak living abroad; people who have the status of a person with long term residence in another EU member state, "blue card" of the European Union (art. 21)³³.

If a third country national is applying for temporary residence for the purpose of employment, special activity or research and development a permit is granted maximum for 3 years; for the purpose of family unification, performing service obligations by civil units of armed forces, as well as in case of people who have the status of a Slovak living abroad or people who have the status of a person with long term residence in another EU member state a permit is granted maximum for 5 years, for the purpose of study up to 6 years.

The Blue card is a work permit allowing high-skilled foreigners by means of employment to enter, reside and work in the territory of the Slovak Republic (SR). High-skilled employment requires high professional qualification, confirmed by the certificate of higher education or a document testifying more than 5-year professional qualification in the corresponding sphere, issued by the Center of documents acceptance of the Ministry of Education of the SR (confirmation as to high-professional employment is issued by the Department of information-consulting services of the Center of labor, social policy and family in Bratislava).

Besides, the Act distinguishes the *following types of permits for permanent residence*: 1) permanent residence for five years (an application is submitted to the Consular office or police department for foreigners); 2) permanent residence of unlimited duration (an application is submitted to the police department for foreigners); 3) residence of a third country national

³² Ustawa z dnia 13 czerwca 2003 r. o udzieleniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031281176> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

³³ Zákon č. 404/2011 Z. z. Zákon o pobyte cudzincov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2011-404/znenie-20170901> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

with acknowledged status of a person with long term residence in the European Union (an application is submitted to the police department for foreigners)³⁴.

Submitting an application for obtaining permit for residence for 5 years an applicant must provide: purpose of residence, clean record of convictions, financial resources for residence, provision of accommodation. For being granted residence of unlimited duration or permanent residence, a foreigner who has the status of a person with long term residence in another EU member state first of all must provide: financial resources for residence and health insurance.

Tolerated residence is a specific type of residence, granted for a foreigner for maximum 180 days in case of meeting of one of the requirements: 1) if there is an obstacle for administrative expelling of a foreigner from the country; 2) if expelling of a foreigner is impossible; 3) if they are a minor found in the territory of the SR; 4) if they are victims of human trafficking and at least 18 years old; 5) if it is required due to respect towards private and family life of a foreigner, who does not carry a threat to the security of the country or civil order; 6) if it is an illegally employed foreigner under conditions of worker exploitation or illegally employed minor; 7) if a foreigner corresponds to the requirements necessary for granting permit for temporary residence for the purpose of family unification or permit for permanent residence up to 5 years, the immigration police department may grant them permit for tolerated residence due to respect towards private and family life of a foreigner, only in case if they do not have valid foreign passport and can prove their identity in any other way³⁵.

The Act of 19 January 1993 “*On Nationality of the Slovak Republic and Amendments of Some Acts*” (amendments of 2015) determines three main conditions of acquisition of nationality of the Slovak Republic: by birth, adoption and naturalization³⁶.

A child acquires the nationality of the Slovak Republic *by birth* if 1) at least one of the parents is a national of the Slovak Republic, despite whether a child is born in the country or abroad; 2) the child is born in the territory of the Slovak Republic and its parents have no nationality; 3) the child is born in the territory of the Slovak Republic, its parents are aliens and the child acquires none of their nationalities upon birth (art. 5). Unless alien nationality is proven, a child is considered to be a national of the Slovak Republic if it was born in the territory of the Slovak Republic; was found in the territory of the Slovak Republic and its parents are not known unless it is proven that the child acquired nationality of another state upon birth (art. 5).

According to article 6 of the Act “*On Nationality of the Slovak Republic and Amendments and Supplementation of Certain Acts*” if a child who is not a national of the Slovak Republic is

³⁴ Zákon č. 404/2011 Z. z. Zákon o pobyte cudzincov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2011-404/znenie-20170901> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

³⁵ Zákon č. 404/2011 Z. z. Zákon o pobyte cudzincov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2011-404/znenie-20170901> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

³⁶ Zákon č. 40/1993 Z. z. Zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/1993-40/znenie-20150720> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

adopted under special law by adoptive parent or parents of whom at least one is a national of the Slovak Republic.

Nationality of the Slovak Republic can be granted to applicants who are *not nationals of the Slovak Republic* and who: 1) have uninterrupted permanent residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic for at least eight years immediately preceding the filing of an application for granting nationality of the Slovak Republic; 2) have no record of convictions; 3) were not sanctioned by court by the penalty of being expelled; 4) have no criminal or extradition proceedings, or proceedings on performance of European warrant of arrest are maintained against them, no proceedings on administrative deportation and no proceedings on forfeiture of asylum are maintained against them; 5) have proven that they master the Slovak language both orally and in writing and have proven their general knowledge about the Slovak Republic (during the interview) this shall not apply if applicants are less than 14 years old at the time of filing the application; 6) fulfill their duties implied by the provisions of law regulating the stay of aliens in the territory of the Slovak Republic (art. 7).

Conditions of acquiring the refugee status are determined by the Act of 20 June 2002 “*On Asylum and Amendment of Some Acts*”. The Ministry shall grant asylum (refugee status) to an applicant who has well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, ethnic origin or religion, for reasons of holding certain political opinions or belonging to a certain social group in the country of their nationality or, in case of a stateless person, in the country of their residence and in view of this fear they cannot or does not want to return to that country.

Subsidiary protection is granted to a foreigner, if the conditions for granting asylum have not been entirely fulfilled, but in case of their return to the country of origin or permanent residence, a foreigner becomes a subject to a real threat of rightlessness, for instance: death penalty; torture or inhuman treatment, punishment; threat to life due to random violence during an armed conflict³⁷.

Subsidiary protection is granted for 1 year and it can be repeatedly continued.

A foreigner may be granted international protection in the following cases: 1) entering the territory of the SR in any border check point or airport; 2) if a foreigner already is on the territory of the SR, then in any police department; 3) in a police department for refugees, provided near refugee camps; 4) if a foreigner is in hospital, juvenile facility or jail, then with the help of personnel of these establishments they apply to the nearest police department.

After submission of an application for international protection a foreigner is sent to a refugee camp, where they must be registered during 24 hours after getting free-of-charge travelling permit. The officers of the Border and Immigration police take foreigner’s photo and have their fingerprints scanned (this data is sent to the EURODAC system). When registering an

³⁷ Zákon č. 480/2002 Z. z. Zákon o azyle a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2002-480/znenie-20160701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

application for asylum in written form, the following information is taken into account: personal data, foreigner's document details; information concerning a trip to the Slovak Republic.

If the Migration service before granting international protection recognizes that another state is responsible for dealing with the request (Dublin-III regulations are applied), a foreigner is expelled to the mentioned state. Besides, the Migration service checks truthfulness of the facts, connected with the reasons of submitting an application for international protection. In the course of reviewing the case of granting asylum a foreigner receives a document of an applicant for asylum. For this purpose the Migration service holds a detailed interview. All the facts, provided by a foreigner in the course of an interview, are unregistered.

After a comprehensive study of an application the Migration service takes one of the following decisions: 1) to grant permit for asylum (refugee status); 2) not to grant asylum, but provide subsidiary protection; 3) to deny a request for international protection.

If the Migration service takes a decision to refuse permit for international protection, a foreigner has a right to appeal. Besides, an appeal can be made in case, when a foreigner is refused permit for asylum, but is granted subsidiary protection³⁸.

Let's analyze fundamental legal principles of migration and migration processes regulation in the *Czech Republic*. The Act of 30 November 1999 "*On Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic*" (amendments of 2017) determines conditions and requirements as to several types of residence due to the purpose of residence. In accordance with the Act international immigrants are divided into two types: 1) EU citizens: a) *temporary residence* is granted for immigrants, whose period of stay in the territory of the Czech Republic exceeds 3 months; b) *permanent residence* – a document testifying a permit for permanent residence is granted to immigrants after 5 years of continuous residence in the Czech Republic; in case of family reunification it is possible to submit an application after 2 years of continuous residence; 2) third countries' citizens: a) *short-term visa* up to 90 days; b) *long-term visa* (more than 90 days), maximum period of validity is 1 year for special purposes (work, business, study, scientific research or family unification); c) *long-term residence* is granted in case of residence which exceeds 6 months for one of the abovementioned purposes; d) *permanent residence* as a rule after 5 years of continuous residence in the Czech Republic, a foreigner may apply for permit for permanent residence and be granted a *certificate of permanent residence*³⁹.

According to the Act of 2004 "*On Employment*" (amendments of 2017), citizens of the EU and European Economic Area (EEA), as well as the members of their families are not regarded as foreigners and thus they have the same legal status as the citizens of the Czech Republic and, consequently, they have free access to the Czech labor market. Work permit is not required from the citizens of the EU and EEA. Their employers must inform regional state employment

³⁸ Zákon č. 480/2002 Z. z. Zákon o azyle a o změně a doplnění některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2002-480/zmenie-20160701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

³⁹ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zmeni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

service (employment center) about workers from the EU or EEA. In their turn, citizens from the third countries (i.e. countries which are not members of the EU/EEA) obtain the right to work only in case if they have an official work permit (on the basis of a labor contract) and a long-term visa or a long-term permit for residence for the purpose of employment⁴⁰. These permits are granted by the state bodies (permit for residence is granted by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. Permit for employment is granted by the regional state employment service)⁴¹.

The Act "On Employment" also defines the conditions when the citizens of the third countries shall not provide work permit. It concerns those citizens of the third countries who: 1) are granted asylum; 2) have permit for permanent residence; 3) have permit for long-term residence for the purpose of family unification with the EU citizens; a person, who has a right for permanent residence; 4) graduates from the Czech secondary and higher educational establishments; 5) scientists/scholars of higher educational establishments, student (up to 26 years), sportsmen, accredited journalists and so on⁴².

If these "special types" of international immigrants are employed in accordance with the Act *"On Employment"* employers are not obliged to inform the State employment service. That is why these immigrants are not registered in any of bases concerning economic activity of foreign citizens.

Besides, there were proposed other measures aimed at attracting foreign workers. In the Czech Republic there is special long-term permit for residence for the purpose of employment, known as the "Green card"⁴³. "The Green card" is designed for foreigners, citizens of the countries, which are not the EU members⁴⁴ (the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Ukraine). This measure was introduced in 2009 aiming at increasing the level of immigration from the third countries to fill some positions on the Czech labor market. The "Green card" also simplifies access to the labor market by means of combining permits for residence and employment in one document. The "Green card" also simplifies access to the labor market for foreigners, whose qualification is in demand in the Czech Republic (CR). There are three types of the "Green Card": 1) "A" type – for qualified employees with high-education and for key personnel; 2) "B" type – for employees, who require undergoing at least some training to get a certain position; 3) "C" type – for all other employees.

⁴⁰ Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb. o zaměstnanosti, zdroj: <http://www.podnikatel.cz/zakony/zakon-c-435-2004-sb-o-zamestnanosti/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁴¹ Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb. o zaměstnanosti, zdroj: <http://www.podnikatel.cz/zakony/zakon-c-435-2004-sb-o-zamestnanosti/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁴² Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb. o zaměstnanosti, zdroj: <http://www.podnikatel.cz/zakony/zakon-c-435-2004-sb-o-zamestnanosti/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁴³ Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb. o zaměstnanosti, zdroj: <http://www.podnikatel.cz/zakony/zakon-c-435-2004-sb-o-zamestnanosti/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁴⁴ To be employed in the territory of the Czech Republic citizens of the EU countries, as well as Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Switzerland and members of their families do not require either "green" or "blue" card.

The “Green card” may be granted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for the period of no more than 2 years with an option to renew it (it is not applicable to “C” type)⁴⁵.

Within the competence of the Consular department falls short-term visa application processing. The decisions concerning the Schengen/short-term visa (up to 90 days) are taken by the diplomatic representative bodies, which accept an application.

The procedure of granting long-term visa, long-term residence and permanent residence is regulated by the Act of 30 November 1999 “*On Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic*”⁴⁶. Decision concerning granting long-term visas and residence over 90 days (“D” type visa) is within the competence of the MIA, in particular of the Department for Asylum and Migration Policy. A *long-term visa* is a visa for residence for over 90 days with a maximum period of stay up to 1 year. If a person is willing to stay in the Czech Republic for longer time and do the same type of activity, on the basis of which a long-term visa was granted, (i.e. have the same purpose of stay), then they may extend the right for residence by submitting an application for long-term residence in the Czech Republic. A permit for long-term residence is a status of residence, for which it is necessary to submit an application before the first arrival to the Czech Republic, but in most cases it is possible after being granted a long-term visa. This permit is granted maximum for 2 years.⁴⁷

Primary duty of a foreigner in the Czech Republic is to register their arrival within 3 working days since entering the territory of the country: if a foreigner has a long-term visa, they must be registered in the Police department for foreigners at the place of residence; if a foreigner arrives to the Czech Republic for the purpose of “receiving a visa/permit for residence”, i.e. to be granted permit for long-term residence, they are registered in the MIA office, where they provide biometric data to receive a biometric ID/permit for residence. A foreigner is not a subject to registration, if they have already done it via a person, providing them accommodation (for example hotel, students’ dormitory). Registration is not necessary for people under 15.

If a person studies in the Czech Republic for more than 90 days, depending on the type of studying, they may submit an application in the diplomatic representative office in the Czech Republic to be granted one of the following *types of visas or permits for residence*: 1) *permit for long-term residence for the purpose of “study”* – an application must be submitted to the diplomatic representative office in the Czech Republic by a foreigner who is going to stay in the territory of the Czech Republic for more than 3 months (for the purpose of study), except for studying in secondary school or conservatory, which is not the subject to the exchange program or paid-up special practice; 2) *long-term visa for the purpose of “study”* – an application must be submitted to

⁴⁵ D. Drbohlav, O. Valenta, *Czechia: the main immigration country in the V4* [w:] Á. Eröss, D. Karácsonyi, *Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Partners*, Budapest, HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014, s. 47–48.

⁴⁶ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zmeni-20170701>

⁴⁷ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zmeni-20170701>

the diplomatic representative office in the Czech Republic by a foreigner who is going to stay in the territory of the Czech Republic for more than 3 months (for the purpose of study). In this case secondary schooling or attending conservatory cannot be a subject to the exchange program; special practice may be paid-up; 3) long-term visa for "other" educational purpose – an application must be submitted to the diplomatic representative office in the Czech Republic by a foreigner who is going to stay in the territory of the Czech Republic more than 3 months in case if in accordance with the Act "On Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic" this educational activity is not studying⁴⁸.

To get successful access to the Czech labor market it is necessary to have valid permit for residence and know whether there is free access to the labor market. Free access to the labor market depends on the right for residence, type of work and other conditions. Access to the labor market is free for such categories: 1) the EU citizens and members of their families; 2) foreigners, who have permit for permanent residence; 3) people who are granted international protection (asylum or subsidiary protection); 4) foreigners who have valid permit for long-term residence for the purpose of family unification with a foreigner, who has a right for permanent or long-term residence or is granted asylum; 5) foreigners, who are systematically training for their future profession (for example students of the accredited full-time studying); 6) foreigners who obtained secondary or higher education in the Czech Republic etc⁴⁹.

To apply for a job these categories of foreigners do not require work permit, an employment card or a blue card. An employer is just obliged to inform a corresponding department of the Center of Employment in the Czech Republic as to their employment not later than a day of commencement. It means that an employer intends to place in a job a foreigner, who does not have free access to the labor market, except the signed labor contract or an agreement for labor activity, a foreigner must also receive work permit, an employment card or a blue card.

Employment card is a special type of permit for long-term residence for the purpose of employment. As a rule it combines a right for long-term residence up to 2 years and right to execute work at a certain position.

Preconditions for granting an employment card are: 1) an employer announces that is searching for a certain position a foreigner who has an employment card; 2) a position was not held by a citizen of the EU or Czech Republic or a foreigner with free access to the labor market; 3) a foreigner confirmed their complying with qualification requirements for the position; 4) gross monthly income equals at least to the main minimum salary rate, a working week in accordance with a labor contract or an agreement for labor activity is at least 15 hours⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁴⁹ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵⁰ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

After arrival to the Czech Republic a foreigner within 3 working days is obliged to register and provide biometric data to receive a biometric ID/permit for residence in the MIA department. In case if the purpose for long-term residence of a foreigner is employment and a foreigner: a) has free access to the labor market; b) is granted a work permit; then an employment card serves a permit for long-term residence. Validity of the card can be extended during a special term: an application is submitted not before than 120 days and not later than 30 days before the expiry date of the card⁵¹.

In accordance with implementation of the European Council Directive of 2009 “*On the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment*”⁵² in the legislation of the Czech Republic appeared the notion of a “blue card” aimed at attracting highly-qualified employees from third countries to fill specific job positions in the labor market. Foreigners who have a right to obtain a “blue card” must have higher education (education and qualification level of bachelor or master)⁵³. A labor contract with an employer must be concluded before arrival in the territory of the Czech Republic, i.e. before applying for a “blue card”. A labor contract is signed for a term not less than 1 year; it includes information concerning weekly labor hours established by the law, as well as the amount of gross monthly or annual salary, which is 50% higher than an average annual salary in the Czech Republic.

If a foreigner resides in the territory of the Czech Republic being granted long-term visa or does not correspond with the requirements for a permit for long-term visa for the purpose of family unification, the members of the family may submit an application for a *long-term visa for “family” purpose*. An important factor is a sufficient amount of financial means to maintain the family members. The process of decision making concerning such applications may take up to 120 days. Members of a foreigner’s family may also apply for a permit for long-term residence for the purpose of family reunification, if a foreigner has a permit for long-term residence and is residing in the Czech Republic for at least 15 months or has an employment card and is in the territory of the Czech Republic for at least 6 months. However, it should be taken into account whether a foreigner has enough financial means to maintain the family. In such a case it is necessary to prove a regular monthly total net profit of a foreigner and their family; and the amount of income must exceed the sum of monthly accommodation expenses and minimum living wage of all persons, who are reviewed. The process of decision making concerning such applications may take up to 270 days⁵⁴.

⁵¹ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵² Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment // Official Journal of the European Union, L 155/17, zdrojlo: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0050&from=EN> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵³ Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2013b: Blue Cards in the Czech Republic, zdrojlo: http://portal.mpsv.cz/sz/zahr_zam/modka [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵⁴ Zákon č. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinců na území České republiky a o změně některých zákonů, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-326/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

On January 1, 2014 came into force the Act “*On Citizenship*”, which comprises all ways and conditions of granting and withdrawing citizenship in the Czech Republic⁵⁵. The Act establishes the following preconditions for acquiring citizenship of the Czech Republic: 1) *by birth* – on the day of child’s birth at least one parents should be a citizen of the Czech Republic despite the place of child’s birth (art. 4–5); 2) *by determination of paternity*: a) A child, whose father is a citizen of the Czech Republic and mother is not a citizen of the Czech Republic but is a citizen of another EU member state, the Swiss confederation, Iceland, Norway or Lichtenstein or has a permit for permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic may acquire citizenship of the Czech Republic since the time of signing a consent (declaration) as to determination of paternity of a Czech citizen (p. 1 art. 7); b) A child, whose father is a citizen of the Czech Republic and mother is neither a citizen of the Czech Republic nor a citizen of any EU member state, the Swiss confederation, Iceland, Norway or Lichtenstein nor has a permit for permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic – in this case there are two options: parents make a concerted declaration of parents on the determination of paternity of a Czech citizen and results of a genetic test, proving paternity of a Czech citizen (p. 2 art. 7); or parents make a concerted declaration of parents on the determination of paternity of a Czech citizen and submit an application for acquiring citizenship of the Czech Republic for their child (art. 28); 3) *by adoption* – at least one of the adoptive parents be a citizen of the Czech Republic; if a child is adopted by a decision of an authority of a foreign country the adoption shall be admitted by the Czech Republic official authorities (art. 8–9); 4) *by declaration*. A person may acquire citizenship of the Czech Republic by declaration if they belong to one of the categories: 1) a person who on January 1, 2014 was deprived of the Czech or Czechoslovakian citizenship (art. 31), except for those who were deprived of Czechoslovakian citizenship: a) on the basis of the Constructional Decree of the President No. 33/1945, on citizenship of German or Hungarian nationals; b) on the basis of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Subcarparhian Ruthenia, No. 186/1946; c) to those who became or would have become, on January 1, 1969, a citizen of the Slovak Socialist Republic or acquired, after January 1, 1969, the citizenship of the Slovak Socialist Republic and has remained a Slovak citizen. According to article 31 of the Act a declaration may be submitted by a person, who had been a Czechoslovak citizen and had, prior to their departure from the Czech Republic, permanently resided on the territory of the Czech Republic or the Czech Socialist Republic, unless they are, on the day of the declaration, a citizen of the of the Slovak Republic; 2) A physical person, who was, on December 31, 1992, a citizen of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and was neither a Czech citizen nor a citizen of the Slovak Republic (art. 32). To acquire citizenship of the Czech Republic by declaration is not possible for those people who acquired citizenship of the Slovak Republic; people who are direct descendant of

⁵⁵ Zákon č. 186/2013 Sb. o státním občanství České republiky a o změně některých zákonů (zákon o státním občanství České republiky), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2013-186> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

former Czech citizen may acquire citizenship of the Czech Republic by declaration only if they did not acquire Czech or Slovak citizenship; 3) A physical person born in between October 1, 1949 and May 7, 1969 outside the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic to at least one parent who was, on the day of the child's birth, a Czechoslovak citizen and became or would have become a Czech citizen as of January 1, 1969. In this case a declaration might have been submitted only to January 1, 2015 (art. 33); 4) people who had received a certificate of the Czech citizenship by incompetence of the respective authority and who remained, in a good will, convinced they are a citizen of the Czech Republic and provided such certificate was not abolished in the period of 10 years after the issue of such certificate (art. 34); 5) people may acquire the citizenship of the Czech Republic by declaration no later than 3 years after having reached the age of eighteen (18) provided they: a) having a permit for permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic; b) have legally resided, at least since the age of 10 to the date of such declaration, for at least two thirds of the time on the territory of the Czech Republic; c) no record of convictions⁵⁶.

Decision concerning granting asylum is made by the Department for Refugees and Immigrants within the MIA of the Czech Republic. A refugee may apply for asylum in written or oral form to the police office, at the border, in refugee camps (reception center), in the police department for foreigners and in camps for detained foreigners. Besides, a refugee may submit an application for asylum to the MIA, if they are in medical centers or are detained by the police. The MIA of the Czech Republic is entitled to check and ascertain facts, required for making a decision as to granting asylum. The MIA is also obliged to guarantee safety of the documents with personal information of an applicant⁵⁷.

The procedure of granting asylum may be ceased if: 1) an applicant for asylum twice fails to appear for an interview without compelling reasons or provides false information; 2) if an applicant withdraws own application; 3) if an applicant does not correct the mistakes in the application in due time; 4) if a refugee on their way to the Czech Republic is passing through a "safe country"; 5) if an applicant for asylum illegally stayed in the territory of any other country or tried to cross the border with another country shall not be entitled to do it⁵⁸.

The procedure may be temporarily ceased: in case of an applicant's illness or due to any other reasonable excuses (for not more than 90 days); for time necessary to correct mistakes in an application (for not more than 14 days).

To be granted the status of refugee an applicant for asylum is obliged to: 1) assist the MIA of the Czech Republic in getting information and provide direct and full data, required to ascertain

⁵⁶ Zákon č. 186/2013 Sb. o státním občanství České republiky a o změně některých zákonů (zákon o státním občanství České republiky), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2013-186> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵⁷ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁵⁸ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

the details of a case; 2) have fingerprints scanned and photo taken (this information is included into EURODAC) system; 3) undergo medical examination in a temporary refugee camp (reception center) and stay there till they shall not be granted a permit for residence and ID card of a person seeking asylum; 4) not leave the territory of a temporary refugee camp, situated on the territory of an international airport, if an application was submitted there; 5) show up for an interview; 6) follow the rules of residence in temporary refugee camps; 7) submit ID card of a person seeking asylum to competent authorities; 8) immediately inform the police in case of a loss, damage, destruction or theft of an ID card of a person seeking asylum; 9) in case of birth of child in a family of a person seeking an asylum, a person must inform the MIA of the Czech Republic within 15 days.

An asylum seeker has a right: 1) to request assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations in charge of the refugees' rights; 2) to engage services of a representative on the basis of a power of attorney; 3) in case if a power of attorney was submitted to a person who is not a lawyer it must be officially attested; 4) to communicate in mother tongue or a language understandable for an asylum seeker. The MIA of the Czech Republic provides a free-of-charge interpreter; 5) to engage the services of their own interpreters, paying by themselves; 6) to apply for legal assistance while undergoing the procedure to one of the organizations which provide legal assistance to refugees and asylum seekers. Such assistance is provided free-of-charge. However, an asylum seeker may engage services of any other lawyer, paying for the services by themselves⁵⁹.

An asylum seeker has a right for repatriation – voluntary, safe and decent return to the country of origin. They have a right for recovery of loss, necessary for return to the country of origin if: 1) they withdraw an application for asylum; 2) they get rejection of granting asylum; 3) if they are deprived of asylum; 4) if the decision to cease the procedure of granting asylum is taken⁶⁰.

A refugee must submit a written application for repatriation and loss compensation within 24 hours on the entry into force of the corresponding judicial decision. An application is submitted to a social department in refugee camp (where an applicant is living or where he extends his ID card of a person seeking asylum). The Department for refugees within the MIA of the Czech Republic is in charge of repatriation.

An application for asylum may be rejected as groundless if an applicant: 1) gives only economic reasons for leaving the country of the origin; 2) with no reasonable reasons provides personal data, which does not reflect actual situation or refuses to provide information at all; 3) seeks asylum only to avoid the situation of necessity (for instance needs as a result of war or flood); 4) during the subsequent submission of an application for asylum provides the same reasons as in the first application the existence of which was known to them at the time of submitting the first application

⁵⁹ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/znemi-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶⁰ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/znemi-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

for asylum; 5) has passed the country regarded by the Czech Republic as the “third safe country” or if the country of origin is safe, if opposite is not proved; 6) has more than one citizenship and has not enjoyed protection of any country he is a citizen of and cannot prove that was not able to use their protection due to valid reasons; 7) provides inaccurate details of their life; 8) had an opportunity to find protection in the other part of the country of origin or another part of the country of previous inhabitance; 9) for the purpose of complicating a real situation has destroyed, damaged or concealed own foreign passport or other important documents of for the same purpose has provided a forged or fake foreign passport or another document; 10) has submitted an application for asylum with the aim to avoid deportation or not to become a subject to criminal liability abroad, though earlier had an opportunity to submit such application⁶¹.

A decision to reject such application as admittedly groundless may be taken during 30 days since submitting an application for asylum (fast-track procedure). The decision may be appealed within 7 days from the date of receiving the refusal. In case if an asylum seeker is under 18 and does not have an official representative, an application may be rejected as admittedly groundless. If an application is not identified as groundless, it is admitted to examination according to the standard procedure. The MIA of the Czech Republic must take a decision during 90 days since the beginning of the procedure, but if the procedure cannot be examined within this period the MIA may extend this term. An asylum seeker is informed about this in written form. To get a decision as to the status of the refugee, an asylum seeker is invited by a special notification, which specifies time and place of decision delivery. A decision, as a rule, is delivered in the presence of an interpreter in the institution for refugees (where an applicant is living or where he extends his ID card of a person seeking asylum). If an asylum seeker fails to appear in the specified place at the specified time, despite the fact of receiving the notification, then the day designated to receive the decision is regarded as a day when the decision was delivered⁶².

In case if an asylum seeker failed to receive the status of the refugee, the decision may be appealed in the Supreme Court. An appeal may be made in the course of 7 days from the date when a negative decision is delivered in the following cases: an application was rejected as admittedly groundless; a refusal was issued when a refugee was in a reception center in the transit territory of the international airport (Prague-Ruzyně); a refusal was issued in a camp for detained foreigners⁶³.

Apart from the fundamental legal principles of migration and migration processes regulation in the Visegrad countries a significant place belongs to determination of principles which are in the basis of these processes.

⁶¹ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶² Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶³ Zákon č. 325/1999 Sb. o azylu a o změně zákona č. 283/1991 Sb., o Policii České republiky, ve znění pozdějších předpisů, (zákon o azylu), zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1999-325/zneni-20170701> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

Modern patterns of migration and migration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group are based on the following principles: 1) *protection of the EU foreign borders and significance of fulfillment of obligations, which are in the grounds of the EU legislation* (in particular, the Schengen borders code and Dublin Regulation). Preservation of integrity of the EU foreign borders became the basis of the Visegrad countries' migration policy. As it has been already mentioned, the Schengen borders code was ratified in 2016 and is applied to all people who cross internal or external borders of the EU members. The mechanism of sharing and transferring responsibility over asylum seekers was regulated by the Dublin Regulation. The migration crisis of 2015-2016 complicated execution of the legal norms (determined by the Schengen borders code and Dublin Regulation), especially due to various approaches as to their implementation by the Schengen member countries. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and Norway temporarily initiated internal borders. In accordance with the approach to avoid collapse of the Schengen zone the Visegrad countries introduced measures concerning protection of external borders of the Schengen zone. That is why Hungary closed the borders with Serbia and Croatia. Besides, the Visegrad countries stood up against closing internal borders and the idea of "mini-Schengen", which was introduced by the Netherlands with the aim to develop less-open border-zone (between the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria) and control over the external borders⁶⁴. It should be mentioned that the Visegrad countries vote for reformation of the Dublin Regulation. However, while the Visegrad group members do not find agreement as to this problem, they must adhere to the rules which require protection of foreign borders⁶⁵. On the other hand, in accordance with the policy of these countries, the system of punitive sanctions (€ 250 000 for each refugee) for refusal to implement the mechanism of sharing responsibility for asylum seekers (as a mechanism of the Dublin Regulation functioning) is inadmissible⁶⁶; 2) *efficient determination of the main reasons for migration flows* aiming at reducing the number of immigrants. To solve the migration crisis, the Visegrad countries offer to adopt decisions beyond the EU borders. First of all, it is necessary to identify the reasons for migration⁶⁷. The main reasons for migration flows are armed conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, political, military and economic instability in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as in some countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. To stabilize the situation in the countries-sources of migration flows it is offered to apply various means (political, military and humanitarian). Secondly, the Visegrad countries propose to increase financial, technical and expert support to the countries, which either give

⁶⁴ Euractiv. Mini-Schengen is not an option for now (25 January 2016), źródło: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/mini-schengen-not-an-option-for-now/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶⁵ Visegrad Group (2016a): Joint Declaration of Ministers of the Interior: Meeting of Interior Ministers of the Visegrad Group and Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia (19 January 2016), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-declaration-of> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶⁶ Visegrad Group (2016b): Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries on the 25th V4 Anniversary (15 February 2016), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/jointstatement-of-the> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶⁷ Visegrad Group (2015a): Joint Statement of the Heads of Government of the Visegrad Group Countries (4 September 2015), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-150904> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

rise to or promote transit of migration⁶⁸. Another element of the Visegrad countries' rhetoric is repetition of the concept of "flash points" inside and beyond the EU borders, emphasizing importance of developing FRONTEX and EURODAC⁶⁹. From this perspective, the Visegrad countries supported the agreement of 18 March 2016 between the EU and Turkey concerning readmission of immigrants for the purpose of breaking the flow of refugees through the east Mediterranean area⁷⁰ and solution of the migration crisis⁷¹; 3) *refusal from the migration policy of "open door", proposed by Germany*. In September 2015 Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in contrast to Poland, refused to take refugees from Greece and Italy. When in 2015 in Poland the parliamentary elections were won by the party Law and Justice (PiS) all Visegrad countries stood up against a new proposal made by the European commission in May 2016, concerning taking in 400 000 people, who required international protection. In August 2016 the Visegrad countries were against the introduction of a mandatory system of quotas for involuntary distribution of refugees. The Prime minister of the Czech Republic B. Sobotka at the meeting of the Visegrad group government leaders with German Chancellor A. Merkel in August 2016 claimed the necessity to create a unified European army to provide better protection of the internal bodies from uncontrolled mass migration⁷²; 4) *significance of decision making on the basis of consensus* between the EU member states, concerning the problem of the European integration⁷³. This consensus is important for the Visegrad countries from the perspective of implementation of the agreement between the EU and Turkey in 2016, protection of the European Union external borders, implementation of effective policy of returning refugees and determination of the main reasons for migration.

Therefore, peculiarities of migration and migration processes regulation in the Visegrad countries are defined by the norms of the law in the corresponding countries, confirming with the EU legislation and international legal acts. The main legislative and statutory instruments, which regulate migration and migration processes in Hungary are: the Act "On Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries" (2001), the Act "On Amendments to the Law of the Hungarian Republic of 1993 "On Hungarian Citizenship", (2011), the Act "On Asylum" (2007); in Poland – the Act "On Granting Protection to Foreigners within the Territory of the Republic of Poland"

⁶⁸ Visegrad Group (2015b): Joint Statement on the Occasion of the First Summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group and the President of the Republic of Korea (3 December 2015), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-on-the> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁶⁹ Visegrad Group (2015a): Joint Statement of the Heads of Government of the Visegrad Group Countries (4 September 2015), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-150904> [odczyt: 05.09.2017]; Visegrad Group (2015b): Joint Statement on the Occasion of the First Summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group and the President of the Republic of Korea (3 December 2015), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-on-the> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁷⁰ In accordance with the agreement, for each asylum seeker who is returned back the EU is obliged to admit one refugee from Syria, who is in Turkey, but no more than 72 000 who are to be distributed among the EU members.

⁷¹ Uhoda YeS i Turechchyny shchodo mihrantiv ne maie alternatyvy – vise-prezydent YeK, źródło: <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2016/04/28/7048537/> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁷² «Visegrad countries» are against Merkel's 2016 migration policy, źródło: <http://politobzor.net/show-104190-vyshegradskaya-chetverka-protiv-migracii-politiki-merkel.html> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

⁷³ Visegrad Group (2016c): Joint Declaration of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers (08 June 2016), źródło: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-declaration-of-the-160609> [odczyt: 05.09.2017].

(2003), the Act “*On Foreigners*” (2013), the Act “*On the Pole’s Card*” (2007), the Act “*On Polish Citizenship*” (2009); in Slovakia – the Act “*On Residence of Aliens and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts*” (2011), the Act “*On Asylum and Amendment of Some Acts*” (2002), the Act “*On Nationality of the Slovak Republic and Amendments of Some Acts*” (1993); in the Czech Republic – the Act “*On Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic*” (1999), the Act “*On Citizenship*” (2013). Modern patterns of migration and migration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group are based on the following principles: protection of the EU foreign borders and significance of fulfillment of obligations, which are in the grounds of the EU legislation; efficient determination of the main reasons for migration flows aiming at reducing the number of immigrants; refusal from the migration policy of “open doors”; significance of decision making on the basis of consensus between the EU member states, concerning the problem of the European integration.

Present-day security threats to Ukraine in the informational sphere

The author argues that informational security is an inevitable part of building an information society. Its development is proceeding by means of expanding technological possibilities while carrying out information exchange, deep understanding of the necessity to implement all measures concerning information resources and provision of information security in the country by all subjects of information relations (owners of information, consumers, producers of information technology and means, information suppliers, state). The number of threats to the Ukrainian information security is rather high. These problems of information security have received their coverage in the regulatory acts and scientists' research. To organize counteractions to information war it is necessary to be aware of the factors, which facilitate the risks, threats and insecurities in the ideological-informational sphere, their essence, to be able to evaluate and determine probability and level of negative effect on the state and society.

Keywords: Ukraine, national security, information space

СУЧАСНІ ЗАГРОЗИ БЕЗПЕЦІ УКРАЇНИ В ІНФОРМАЦІЙНІЙ СФЕРІ

Автор доводить, що інформаційна безпека – невід’ємна від побудови інформаційного суспільства. Його розвиток відбувається шляхом нарощування технологічних можливостей проведення інформаційного обміну, глибоке усвідомлення всіма суб’єктами інформаційних відносин (власниками інформації, користувачами, виробниками інформаційних технологій і засобів, постачальниками послуг, державою) потреби здійснення всіх заходів щодо інформаційних ресурсів та забезпечення інформаційної безпеки держави. Перелік загроз інформаційній безпеці України досить великий. В нормативних актах, в дослідженнях науковців висвітлені ці проблеми інформаційної безпеки. Для організації протидії інформаційній війні слід знати чинники, які сприяють виникненню ризиків, загроз і небезпек в ідеологічно-інформаційній сфері, їх суть, уміти оцінити та визначити ймовірність і рівень негативного впливу на суспільство й державу.

Ключові слова: Україна, національна безпека, інформаційний простір

The analysis of political and military situation, which has arisen over the last years in and beyond Ukraine, gives us reasons to assume that since proclamation of independence the state is an object of intense propaganda manipulations and continual psychological influence on the part of Russia, which with a sore heart and sadness cannot give up its imperial past and does not dismiss the idea of restoring the Russian Empire in a renewed format that would be incomplete without Ukraine. The “hybrid war” conducted «by Russia against Ukraine is a qualitatively new approach in leading military campaigns, the key aspect of which is psychological and informational influence of local population, application of harsh image diplomacy at the well-prepared geospace of the state, what allows now not only to carry out active disguised intervention in the east of Ukraine, but also to annex some parts of the territory, like the Crimea, for its own benefit.

The image of Ukraine in the Russian information space has been built on the basis of inferiority of Ukrainians, absence of Ukrainian culture and in general inexpediency of Ukraine as an independent sovereign state, which as the Russian propaganda declares is the outskirts of the Russian Federation, whereas the image of Russians and Russia until quite recently in most Ukrainian mass media was formed under the influence of Russia and pro-Russian forces as an image of a friendly nation, “big brother”, reliable partner. That is why Ukraine faced a difficult challenge – to fend off that negative information flow of the “Kremlin” propaganda, which is continually being broadcast, published in the Russian press, websites and so on. However, if at the territory subordinated to the Ukrainian government the situation is not so critical, then in Russia and the territory under its control, audio and video space is completely regulated by the Russian authorities, which is constantly doing its best to escalate mutual hatred between the Ukrainian citizens and Russian, Ukrainians of west and east.

Both opposing parties comprehend that victory in a real war greatly depends on the win in the information field, thus there is a necessity in searching new methods of conducting information struggle, effective under current conditions, aimed at exerting influence on information consumers not only at the territory of the conflict but also beyond it – in all countries around the world. Taking these circumstances into consideration, quite urgent is the analysis of psychological aspects while forming the image of the Russian Federation (RF) in the informational space (ISp) of Ukraine.

Systematic approach to the information security (ISc) requires specification of its subjects, means and objects, information concerns, their sources, directionality of dangerous information flows. There are the following definitions of information threat:

- it is an informational influence, which causes potential or factual threat of changing the direction, paces of progressive development of the state, society, individuals¹;

¹ *Boichenko O. V.* Polityka informatsiinoi bezpeky v systemi informatsiinoho zabezpechennia orhaniz vnutrishnikh sprav // Forum prava. 2009. № 1. P. 51.

- threat of doing harm to vital interests of an individual, state by means of information influence on consciousness, information resources;
- total number of factors, which prevent development and applying information environment in the interest of personality, society and state².

Deep research of the ISc problems must be referred to the priorities of information legislation development in Ukraine. Threats to national securities of Ukraine which appear in the sphere of national information resources, stipulate applicability of scientific studies, concerning the problem of appropriate usage of telecommunications in the present-day information society, judicial mechanisms of cybernetic threat countermeasures³. The level of modern challenges and threats in information security proves rightfulness and exclusive significance of article 17 of the Ukrainian Constitution that the defense of state sovereignty and provision of the ISc is one of the main functions of the state and the Ukrainian nation⁴.

Information security as a component of national security due to modern development of its theory in general, is based on the following basic elements: national interests – threat – defense⁵. Namely threats to the state of security of social relations are an important element of providing the ISc. We assume, that it is explained by the fact that information danger is created by information threats, known in the ISp. Information threat – is a totality of conditions and factors, which endanger significant interests of an individual, society or state in the ISp. Taking into account, that the ISc is an inevitable part of national security, its regulation requires active mechanisms in the form of political decisions or adoption of regulatory legal acts.

Efficiency of a certain mechanism is achievable only under conditions of a corresponding level of scientific conceptualization of theoretical points concerning the ISc in general and the essence of threats in particular. The factors which may escalate threats to the ISc are of a complex character – they cover all spheres of person's, society's and state's life and are of cross-sectoral nature. Thus, the analysis of threats is a subjective process of perceiving some factors by a person or a social group in terms of personal interests and professional level. However, objective designation of the threats gives a clear vision of the parameters, beyond which any certain phenomenon loses its ability for self-regulation and requires interference to preserve stability of the social system, as well as the conditions, which transform the same factors either into a factual or a potential treat⁶.

² *Luzhetskyy V. A., Voinovych O. P., Dudatiev A. V.* Informatsiina bezpeka. Vinnytsia: UNIVERSUM-Vinnytsia, 2009. P. 71.

³ *Marushchak A. I.* Priorityty rozvytku informatsiinoho prava Ukrainy // Informatsiia i pravo. 2011. № 1. P. 22.

⁴ *Pylypchuk V. H.* Systemni problem rozvytku pravovoi nauky v informatsiinii sferi // Visnyk Akademii pravovykh nauk. 2011. № 3. P. 16-27.

⁵ *Olshnyk O. V.* Orhanizatsiino-pravovi zasady zakhystu informatsiinykh resursiv Ukrainy: avtorcf. dys. ... kand. yuryd. nauk; 12.00.07. Kyiv, 2006. P. 8.

⁶ *Bodrjuk O.* Struktury voiennoi bezpeky: natsionalnyi ta mizhnarodnyi aspekty: monohrafiia. Kyiv: NIPMB, 2001. P. 37.

Studying relations in the sphere of the ISc provision, scientists pay attention to such notion as “threats to information security”. Its analyses let researchers determine divergences in views as to classification of some threats both at the regulatory-legal and the scientific levels.

In accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Foundations of the National Security of Ukraine” to the threats to the national interests and security in the information sphere belong: display of restrictions to free speech and people’s access to information; mass media propaganda of the cult of violence, cruelty, pornography; computer crimes and terrorism; disclosure of information, which contains national security or other state information, determined as such by the law, as well as confidential information, which is owned by the state or aimed at providing needs and national interests of the state and society; attempts to manipulate public opinion by means of spreading unreliable, incomplete or prejudiced information⁷.

The doctrine of the ISc of Ukraine 2009 determined main factual and potential threats, classifying them in accordance with the spheres of social life of a person, society and state: in the sphere of foreign political, state security, military security, internal, economic, social and humanitarian, science-technological and ecological security⁸. But the document expired.

After the victory of the Euromaidan and removal of V. Yanukovich from power, the government started work on a new Doctrine of information security, which would adequately represent current situation. At present time, on the President’s website there is a draft of a new doctrine of information security. According to the draft at the current stage the main factual and potential threats to information security of Ukraine are:

- in the sphere of foreign policy: spread in the world information space untrustworthy, unreliable and prejudiced information which affects the national interests of Ukraine and creates negative image of Ukraine as an unreliable partner for international relations; low level of integrity of Ukraine in the world information space; displays of cyber-crimes and cyber-terrorism, which threaten stable and safe functioning of national information and telecommunication systems; external destructive information influences on public opinion by means of mass media and Internet; employment of information space for interference into internal affairs of Ukraine⁹;
- in the sphere of national security: waging of subversive campaigns in the national sphere of cyberspace; attempts to interfere into the national affairs of the state by means of social networks, spread of the cult of violence, cruelty, ethnic, religious and racial intolerance in the national sphere of cyberspace; spread of negative information influence on person’s consciousness, which can change mental state, psycho-

⁷ *Zakon* Ukrainy «Pro osnovy natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy» vid 19.06.2003 № 964-IV, v redaktsii vid 01.01.2015 // VVR Ukrainy. 2003. № 39. Art. 351.

⁸ *Doktryna* informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy, zatverdzhena Ukazom Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 8 lypnia 2009 roku № 514/2009. URL: <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/514/2009> (accessed date: 22.10.2013).

⁹ *Proekt* Doktryny informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy. URL: http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=113319&cat_id=61025 (accessed date: 12.10.2017).

logical and physiological characteristics, manage freedom of choice; unauthorized access and cyber-attacks on national information resources and information-telecommunication systems; destructive information influence, aimed at undermining constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the national borders of Ukraine; operation of mass media, Internet to propagandize separatism along with ethnic, language, religious and other lines; increase in the number of crimes involving modern information-telecommunication technologies; expansion of information technologies by foreign subjects without corresponding control by the state what weakens the ISc of Ukraine; imposing by foreign companies such conditions of the systems, including those at the objects of critical infrastructure, which can lead to the loss of information sovereignty of the state; breach of confidentiality, integrity and availability of restricted information, as well as information which, according to the law, must be protected; non-conformity of information infrastructure of Ukraine, level of its development and protection to the requirement of modern time; insufficient level of protection of the state information resources; starting information struggle (spread of computer “viruses”, launching software and hardware equipment, various radio-electronic devices for information interception by technical means and premises, interception and deciphering of information, imposing fake information, radio-electronic influence on password and key systems, radio-electronic masking of communication channels and control systems etc.); illegal import, spread and usage on the territory of Ukraine special technical reconnaissance systems; placing stationary devices (centers) of technical reconnaissance on the objects with extraterritoriality status etc¹⁰.

- in the military sphere: usage of the ISp to prepare and accomplish armed aggression against Ukraine, possibilities to draw Ukraine into armed conflicts or struggles with other countries by using the ISp; infringement of legal requirements concerning accumulation, processing, storage and transfer of restricted information in the bodies of military administration and at the enterprises of military-industrial complex of Ukraine; unauthorized access to national information and telecommunication networks and systems, which may infringe activity of military formations, bodies of military administration, the Armed Forces of Ukraine in general or interference into the automatically-controlled weapon systems; implementation of software and mathematical measures and employment of information technologies with the aim to break correct functioning of management systems in the military sphere and defense sector; exerting negative information influence on the citizens of Ukraine

¹⁰ *Proekt* Doctryny informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy. URL: http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=113319&cat_id=61025 (accessed date: 12.10.2017).

with the aim to bring discredit on military-political management of the country, instigation of citizens to prevent the activity of military formations (organizations, establishments, enterprises), deterioration of military service image; exerting negative information influence on military personnel of military bases and military units to bring discredit and losing credibility to military command, decrease the level of moral and psychological state and readiness of military personnel to defend the country; information and psychological influence on the population of Ukraine, including personnel of military bases and units, to weaken their readiness to defend the country and discredit the image of military service; active strengthening of potentials of the majority countries of the world in the military and defense sphere concerning possibilities to act on the front of the ISp and protection from the analogical actions on the part of opponents; infringement of the established norms and requirements concerning opposition to the technical counter-reconnaissance in the sphere of military objects, weapon models, military and special equipment; deliberate actions, human errors while working in information and information-telecommunication systems etc¹¹.

- in the sphere of internal politics: imperfection of party-political system, non-transparency of political and civil activity, which creates preconditions for restrictions to free speech, social consciousness manipulation; inferiority of the system of state management in the ISp; spread of untrustworthy and prejudiced information by subjects of information activity to bring discredit on the bodies of state power, destabilization of social and political situation, which greatly complicates the process of taking political decisions; interference into editorial policy of the bodies of state power, local authorities, mass media owners, influential civil and political figures and businessmen¹².

Additionally are discussed threats in economic, scientific and technical, ecological, social and humanitarian spheres. The Law “On fundamentals of development of information society in Ukraine for 2007-2015” denotes the threats to information security: incompleteness, untruthfulness of information provided; negative information influence; negative consequences of information technologies; unauthorized spread, employment and infringement of integrity, confidentiality and accessibility of information¹³.

The National Standard of Ukraine “Information protection. Technical protection of information. Fundamentals” (State Standards of Ukraine (DSTU) 3396.0-96) does not provide

¹¹ *Proekt* Doctryny informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy. URL: http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=113319&cat_id=61025 (accessed date: 12.10.2017).

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Zakon* Ukrainy «Pro osnovni zasady rozvytku informatsiinoho suspilstva v Ukraini na 2007-2015 roky» // VVR Ukrainy. 2007. № 12. Art. 107.

a direct classification of threats, but presupposes possible ways of threat activities. In particular it gives a chance to imagine or determine possible threats in the information sphere (concerning accumulation, processing and collection of information). Point 4.1.3 part 4.1 art. 4 describes that threats may actualize:

- technical, i.e. channels of subsidiary electro-magnetic beams and leveling, acoustic, optic, radio-, radio-technical, chemical channels etc;
- channels of special influence by means of forming spaces and signals aimed at destroying the systems of protection or infringement of information integrity;
- unauthorized access – logging on to devices and communication channels, masking under the authorized user, tiding over protection measures to use information or impose fake information, application of software or hardware, launching computer viruses¹⁴.

As the criteria one may take the ways of influence on information or ways of threats implementation. The Act of the Cabinet of Ministers “On approval of the rules to provide information protection within information, telecommunication and information-telecommunication systems” includes paragraph 16 of the rules of protecting information within information, telecommunication and information-telecommunication systems, which defines that to protect information in the system there must be created a complex system of information protection (hereafter – system of protection), which is designated to protect information from:

- leak of information by means of technical channels, among which are channels of subsidiary electro-magnetic beam and leveling, acoustic-electric and other channels, which are formed under the influence of physical processes in the course of functioning means for information processing, other technical means and communications;
- unauthorized activities with information, including computer viruses;
- special influence on the facilities of information processing, which is carried out by means of forming physical fields and signals and may lead to infringement of its integrity and unauthorized blocking¹⁵.

The National Standard of Ukraine “Information protection. Technical protection of information. Fundamentals” (State Standards of Ukraine (DSTU) 3396.2-97) gives a list of terms connected with the ISc and which have direct connection to classification of the threats and there is their interpretation as well¹⁶. In particular “Threat to information” includes the

¹⁴ *Zakhyst informatsii. Tekhnichniy zakhyst informatsii. Terminy ta vyznachennia: DSTU 3396.2-97 [Chynnyi vid 01.01.1998]. Ofitsiyniy sait Derzhavnoi sluzhby spetsialnoho zviazku ta zakhystu informatsii Ukrainy. URL: http://www.dstszi.gov.ua/dstszi/control/uk/publish/article?jsessionid=5D34EDB7C9C9D4491C0171ACCAD297E1?art_id=38934&cat_id=38836 (accessed date: 14.10.2017).*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Zakhyst informatsii. Tekhnichniy zakhyst informatsii. Terminy ta vyznachennia: DSTU 3396.2-97 [Chynnyi vid 01.01.1998]. Ofitsiyniy sait Derzhavnoi sluzhby spetsialnoho zviazku ta zakhystu informatsii Ukrainy. URL: http://www.dstszi.gov.ua/dstszi/control/uk/publish/article?jsessionid=5D34EDB7C9C9D4491C0171ACCAD297E1?art_id=38934&cat_id=38836 (accessed date: 14.10.2017).*

following definitions: leakage of information – uncontrolled spread of information, which leads to its unauthorized obtaining; infringement of inviolability of information – misrepresentation of information, its damaging or destructing; blocking information – failure to get authorized access to information.

Correspondingly, classification of threats is the following: threat to information leakage; threat to integrity of information; threat to block information. General criterion has not been defined. Such variety of classification in the current legislation is presupposed not only by different approaches to the selection of classification characteristics and aims of classifications, but also by the absence of corresponding theoretical verification for the essence of the threats to the ISc. Aiming at generalization of present scientific approaches to classification of the threats to the ISc and determination of a conceptual approach to definition of this element of legal arrangements we propose to look into some of them.

V. Lipkan offers to classify the threats to the ISc in accordance with a general classification of the threats to the national security: to the sources of origin: natural, technogenic, anthropogenic; to the level of hypothetical harm: threat and danger; to times of occurrences: frequent and continual; to the spheres of origin: exogenous and endogenous; to the possibility of realization: probable, impossible, accidental; to the level of determination: regular, accidental; to the meaning: acceptable, unacceptable; to the structure of influence: system, structural, elemental; to the character of implementation: factual, potential, actualized, imagined; to attitude: objective and subjective; to the object of influence: individual, society, state¹⁷. He does not deal with various approaches and ways of solving the problem, but determines such types of threats: reveal of information resources; infringement of their inviolability; equipment failure¹⁸.

The same views on the list of threats to the ISc enumerate A. Lohinov in his dissertation¹⁹. However, B. Kuzmenko and O. Chaikovska bring forward a classification of threats, which is based on definition of information characteristics: threats to confidentiality of information, due to which information becomes obtainable for an unauthorized subject; threats to integrity of information: any intentional misrepresentation of information, processed by automatized systems; threats to information accessibility, which may appear when access to any resource of automatized systems for legal users is blocked²⁰.

S. Hutsu²¹ and O. Lytvynenko²² share the same views that the main threats to ISc may be as follows: threats of the influence of poor-quality information (untruthful, fake, disinformation)

¹⁷ *Lipkan V. A., Maksymenko Yu. Ye., Zbelikhovskiy V.M.* Informatsiina bezpeka Ukrainy v umovakh yevrointehratsii. Kyiv: KNT, 2006.280 P.

¹⁸ *Lipkan V. A., Maksymenko Yu. Ye., Zbelikhovskiy V.M.* Informatsiina bezpeka Ukrainy v umovakh yevrointehratsii. Kyiv: KNT, 2006.280 P.

¹⁹ *Lohinov A. V.* Administratyvno-pravove zabezpechennia informatsiinoi bezpeky orhaniv vykonavchoi vlady: dys. ... kand. yuryd. nauk; spets. 12.00.07. Kyiv, 2005. P. 22.

²⁰ *Kuzmenko B. V., Chaikovska O. A.* Zakhyst informatsii. Kyiv: Vyd-i viddil KNUKiM, 2009. P. 6-7.

²¹ *Hutsu S. F.* Pravovi osnovy informatsiinoi dialnosti. URL: <http://studrada.com.ua> (accessed date: 15.10.2017).

²² *Lytvynenko O. V.* Spetsialni informatsiini operatsii ta propahandytski kampanii: monohrafiia. Kyiv: VKF «Satsanha», 2000. P. 14.

on a person, society, state; threats of unauthorized and illegal influence of other people on information and information resources (their production, systems of formation and employment); threats to the individual's information rights and freedoms (right for information production, its circulation, search, obtaining, transmission and usage; intellectual property right for information, including material one).

L. Yevdochenko forming her own approach to classification of information threats and with the aim to work out recommendations, concerning organization of effective forms and methods of providing the ISc by the state, determines and classifies the threats according to several criteria: as to the ways of exerting influence on the objects of information security (information, physical, software and mathematical, organizational and legal); as to the sources of origin (internal and external); as to the character of display (political, economic, organizational-technical)²³.

Key thesis for the process of scientific comprehension is that: interpretation of the problems concerning the ISc for different categories of subjects may significantly differ, as security for closed state organizations and commercial structures does not just only mean protection of information. It is absolutely different notion. A subject of information relations may suffer economic and/or non-economic damage not only due to an unauthorized access to information, but also from harm done to the system and cause its malfunction²⁴. Thus, it is rather logical to believe and take into account those classifications of threats, which are of more specific narrow character, like threats to the ISc of network resources. M. Makarova names such threats in the network: data are deliberately intercepted, read or modified; users identify themselves incorrectly (as a part of a fraud scheme); a user gets an unauthorized access from one network to the other²⁵.

Much wider classification is offered by A. Pohrebniak, stating that the threats may be accidental and deliberate. To the accidental threats he belongs: personnel and users errors; loss of information as a result of its incorrect storage; accidental destruction or alteration; equipment, power, system failure, failure of additional elements of the network; software malfunction, in particular by computer virus infection etc²⁶.

To deliberate threats belong: unauthorized access to information and network resources; disclosure and modification of software and data, their copying; disclosure, modification or substitution of traffic in the network; developing and spread of computer viruses, enrooting logical bombs into software; theft of magnetic media and calculation documents; ruining archive information or its deliberate destruction; falsehood of messages, denial to get

²³ *Yevdochenko L. O. Udoskonalennia systemy derzhavnogo zabezpechennia informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy v umovakh hlobalizatsii: avtoref. dys. ... kand. nauk z derzh. upr. 25.00.01. Lviv, 2011. P. 8.*

²⁴ *Vasyljuk V. Ya., Klymchyk S. O. Informatsiina bezpeka derzhavy. Kyiv: KNT; VD «Skif», 2008. P. 20.*

²⁵ *Makarova M. V. Elertronna komertsia. Kyiv: Vydavnychiy tsentr «Akademii», 2002. 272 c.*

²⁶ *Pohrebniak A. V. Tekhnolohii kompiuternoi bezpeky: monohrafiia. Rivne: MEHU, 2011. P. 46-47.*

information or change of time of its receiving; interception and studying of information, sent by communication channels²⁷.

Therefore we assume that a list of threats to information security of Ukraine is rather big. Its interpretation is in normative acts and is analyzed by researchers while studying the problems of information security of Ukraine. Threats appear in all spheres of state life. To organize counteractions to information war it is necessary to be aware of the factors, which facilitate the risks, threats and insecurities in the ideological-informational sphere, their essence, to be able to evaluate and determine probability and level of negative effect on the state and society.

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Ethnonational reality and expectations in the context of representation of Russian and other minorities in Ukraine (1989–2017)

The article is devoted to analyzing ethnonational reality and expectations in the context of the representation of Russian and other minorities in Ukraine in 1989–2017, in particular against the background of the annexation of the Crimea and occupation of the part of Donbas by Russia. It is revealed that ethno-political reality in Ukraine is a complicated and controversial issue due to the lack of reliable statistics on the population of Ukraine (as of the moment of analysis), as well as due to the fact that a significant part of the multinational population of Ukraine is outside the jurisdiction of the official Kyiv and thus beyond the scope of various studies. The author argued that there are several groups/cohorts of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, but the Russian one is most represented. At the same time, it was found that the relative and absolute number of ethnic Russians in Ukraine is decreasing. This is especially noticeable against the background of the processes of annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of part of the Donbas districts, by virtue of which it was recorded that as of 2017, Ukraine if did not become yet, then it becomes a mono-state power with the dominant ethnic core of the Ukrainian nation, bilingualism, significant percentage of representatives of other ethnic groups and polyconfessionalism. This corresponds to the construction of the concept of a civil/political nation in Ukraine.

Keywords: ethnonational/ethnic minority, ethnonational reality, ethnonational expectations, Russians, Ukrainians, political nation, mononational state, Ukraine.

ЕТНОНАЦІОНАЛЬНІ РЕАЛЬНІСТЬ ТА ОЧІКУВАННЯ У КОНТЕКСТІ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАТИВНОСТІ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ТА ІНШИХ МЕНШИН В УКРАЇНІ (1989–2017)

У статті проаналізовано етнонаціональну реальність й очікування у контексті репрезентативності російської та інших меншин в Україні впродовж 1989–2017 рр., зокрема на тлі анексії Криму та окупації частини Донбасу Росією. З'ясовано, що етнополітична реальність в Україні – це складна та суперечлива проблематика в силу відсутності достовірних статистичних даних про населення України станом на момент аналізу, а також внаслідок того, що значна частина багатонаціонального населення України опинилась поза рамками не тільки юрисдикції офіційного Києва, а й за

рамками різноманітних досліджень. Аргументовано, що в Україні є декілька груп/когорт етнонаціональних меншин, але найбільш російська. Водночас виявлено, що відносна й абсолютна чисельність етнічних росіян в Україні зменшується. Це особливо помітно на тлі процесів анексії Криму та окупації частини районів Донбасу, в силу чого зафіксовано, що станом на 2017 р. Україна якщо не стала, то прискорено стає мононаціональною державою із домінуючим етнічним ядром української нації, двомовністю, значним відсотком представників інших етносів та поліконфесійністю. Це відповідає конструюванню концепту громадянської/політичної нації в Україні.

Ключові слова: етнонаціональна/етнічна меншина, етнонаціональна реальність, етнонаціональні очікування, росіяни, українці, політична нація, мононаціональна держава, Україна.

Ethno-political reality in Ukraine is a complicated and controversial issue at least for two reasons. Firstly, due to the fact that the last census in the country was held in 2001 and the subsequent censuses for several times have been postponed. Secondly, because over the period of 2014-2017 took place annexation and occupation of the Ukrainian territories, in particular the Crimea and separate parts of Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) by the Russian Federation, as a result of which a large part of the multinational population in the official Ukraine found themselves beyond the jurisdiction of official Kyiv, but also beyond various research and surveys, dealing with the composition of population and ethno-political reality in Ukraine. Thus, at present time it is extremely difficult to speak of a factual picture of ethno-national reality in Ukraine, as it: a) on the one hand is being based on the censuses of 1989 and 2001 it represents real situation; b) taking into consideration military-political events in and around Ukraine, as well as the failure to conduct a planned census of population and mainly within the frames of analytical-prognostic estimations as to the composition of Ukraine, on the other hand, is rather an expectation. Correspondingly, quite actual and urgent is comparison of ethno-national reality (taking into account at the most data of the last census in 2001) and ethno-national expectations (as of 2017 according to various sociological and analytically-prognostic research) in the context of representativeness of the Russian minority and other minorities in Ukraine (1989-2017). Actualization of this scientific task let us answer the question whether in Ukraine is taking place or will happen a shift in ethno-national reality and as a result formation of a civil nation.

To solve this task we have applied referred to both statistical and scientific papers. The statistical data is represented by the censuses of 1989¹ and 2001², and sociological surveys and research, conducted in 2017³. The scientific part of the research is represented by works by V.

¹ *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy: Ch. 1. (za danymy Vsesoiuznogo perepysu naselennia 1989 roku)*, Wyd. Minstat Ukrainy 1991.

² O. Osaulenko, *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy ta yoho movni oznaky za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku*, Wyd. Derzhkomstat Ukrainy 2003.

³ *Osnojni zasady ta shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti bromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Krubloho stolu 12*

Arbienina⁴, M. Dnistrianskyi⁵, V. Kotyhorenko⁶, V. Krysachenko⁷, S. Kulchytskyi i L. Yakubova⁸, I. Kuras⁹, E. Libanova, M. Dmytrenko, V. Horbulin and S. Pyrozhkov¹⁰, Y. Nikolaiets¹¹, Y. Ohulchanskyi¹², O. Osaulenko¹³, O. Rafalskyi, V. Kotyhorenko and M. Panchuk¹⁴, V. Romantsov¹⁵, V. Skliar¹⁶, I. Terliuk¹⁷, V. Yevtukh, V. Troshchynskyi, K. Halushko and K. Chernova¹⁸, V. Zynych¹⁹ and others²⁰.

They cover the peculiarities of ethno-national processes in Ukraine and its separate regions, in particular in Donbas, before and after 2014, but it is recorded that the statistics, concerning the number of ethnical groups, which inhabit Ukraine is mystified. Thus, some authors use the data, telling that Ukraine is inhabited by the representatives of over than 120 nationalities, whereas others speak of only up to 90. However, accuracy does not fix anything, as another question is of crucial importance: whether Ukraine is polyethnic country or not (at least in the political context). The solution of the problem is partially historically preconditioned. Thus, if we put beyond that the fact in the structure of population in Ukraine the most numerous minority is Russians, then in accordance with the census of 1989²¹, there lived about 5% of other ethnical population, which did not always correspond to all generally accepted characteristics (quantitative, socio-cultural, religious, traditional-domestic and other features). If we take into account the official statistics as to the number of population in separate ethnical communities, then in Ukraine one can distinctly single out several main groups. The first, absolutely individual

kvitnia 2017 r., Tsentr Razumkova 2017.

- ⁴ V. Arbienina, *Etnosotsiolohiia*, Wyd. KhNU imeni V. N. Karazina 2007.
- ⁵ M. Dnistrianskyi, *Etnopolitychna beohrafia Ukrainy: problemy teorii, metodolohii, praktyky*, Wyd. Litopys 2006.
- ⁶ V. Kotyhorenko, *Etnichni protyrychchia i konflikty v suchasni Ukraini: politolohichni kontsept*, Wyd. Svitohliad 2004.
- ⁷ V. Krysachenko, *Dynamika naseleennia: populatsiini, etnichni ta hlobalni vymiry*, Wyd. NISD 2005.
- ⁸ S. Kulchytskyi, L. Yakubova, *Trysta rokiv samotnosti: ukrainskyi Donbas u posbukakh smysliv i Batkivshchyny*, Wyd. Klio 2016.
- ⁹ I. Kuras, *Etnopolitohiia. Pershi kroky stanovlennia*, Wyd. Genera 2004.
- ¹⁰ E. Libanova, V. Horbulin, S. Pyrozhkov, *Polityka intebratsii ukrainskoho suspilstva v konteksti vykykiv ta zabroz podii na Donbasi. Natsionalna dopovid*, Wyd. NAN Ukrainy 2015; E. Libanova, M. Dmytrenko, *Chomu same Donbas stav mistsem natsionalnoi trahedii? Posbuk nepolityzovanoi vidpovid na polityczne pyttannia*, „Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy“ 2015, vol 5-6 (79-80), s. 4-55.
- ¹¹ Y. Nikolaiets, *Poselenska struktura naseleennia Donbasu: etnopolitychnyi aspekt dynamiky: Monohrafia*, Wyd. IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2014.
- ¹² Y. Ohulchanskyi, *Etnichna struktura ukrainskoho suspilstva: uivni ta diisni problemy*, Wyd. KMA 2006.
- ¹³ O. Osaulenko, *Naseleennia Ukrainy za mistsem narodzhennia ta bromadianstvom za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naseleennia 2001 roku*, Kiev 2004.
- ¹⁴ O. Rafalskyi, V. Kotyhorenko, M. Panchuk, *Politychni aspekty kryzy na Donbasi: diabnostyka stanu ta napriamy vrehuliuvannia. Analitichna dopovid*, Wyd. IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2015.
- ¹⁵ V. Romantsov, *Ukrainskyi etnos: na odvichnykh zemliakh*, Wyd. Vydavnytstvo im. O. Telihy 2004.
- ¹⁶ V. Skliar, *Rozseleennia rosiiian na terytorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepysiv naseleennia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, vol 12, s. 55-58.; V. Skliar, *Osoblyvosti etnomovnoho skladu naseleennia pidporiadkovanykh Ukraini ta okupovanykh terytorii Donbasu*, „Problemy ta perspektyvy formuvannia natsionalnoi humanitarno-tekhnicnoi elity“ 2017, vol 47 (51), s. 218-236.
- ¹⁷ I. Terliuk, *Rosiiani za khbidnykh oblastei Ukrainy (1944-1996 rr.): Etnosotsiolohicne doslidzhennia*, Wyd. Svit 1997.
- ¹⁸ V. Yevtukh, V. Troshchynskyi, K. Halushko, K. Chernova, *Etnonatsionalna struktura ukrainskoho suspilstva: dovidryk*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 2004.
- ¹⁹ V. Zynych, *Suchasni etnodenohrafichni protsevy v Ukraini*, Wyd. RVPS Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy 2004.
- ²⁰ *Donbas v etnopolitychnomu vymiri*, Wyd. IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2014.
- ²¹ *Natsyonalnyi sostav naseleennia po respublikyam SSSR*, [w:] *Vsesoiuznaia perepys naseleennia 1989 hoda*, źródło: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=2

group as we speak namely of ethnical (ethno-ethical) minorities, was composed of Russians. In 1989 their general quantity equaled almost 11.2 mln people, what in the nationwide structure was almost 22% of all the population in Ukraine. In terms of the 2001 census the number of Russians was 8.3 mln people or 17.3% of all population of Ukraine. It means that the status of Russians in the group division of minorities remained the same in its qualitative scope, though the tendency to quantity reduction of Russians in Ukraine²² was observable (in detail and on the background of the events of 2014-2017 it would be speculated below).

Another cohort was represented by ethnic groups, the number of which did not even reach a landmark of 1 million people, but exceeded a 100 000 barrier. According to the official statistics there were 8 such ethnic groups (both in 1989 and in 2001). These were Jews, Belarusians, Moldavian, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians (taking into account the annexed Crimea and occupied territories of Donbas region). In 2001 they were approached by the ethnical group of Armenians, whose number in comparison with 1989 growth in 1.8 times and officially equaled 99 000. Thus, in 2001 one could assume that in practice this group should be related to the second cohort of ethno-national groups in Ukraine. Besides, quite observable were the following tendencies: quantity reduction of such ethnical groups as Belarusians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Poles and Jews; expansion in the number of such ethnic groups as Crimean Tatars and Armenians; the number of Romanians was relatively stable. A general quantity of the representatives of this cohort of minorities in 1989 was 4% and in 2001 equaled 3.3% of the whole population.

The third cohort involves the ethnic groups, whose quantity was more than 50 000 but less than 100 000 people. In Ukraine in 1989 there were 4 such ethnic groups, namely Greeks, Kazan Tatars, Armenians and Germans, and in 2001 there were 3 of them (including Armenians) – Armenians, Greeks and Kazan Tatars. The general number of their representatives was 0.6% in 1989 and 0.4% in 2001 (if one counts Armenians). The fourth cohort includes the ethnic groups whose number of representatives varies from 10 000 up to 50 000 people. In Ukraine in 2001 existed 5 such groups – Gypsies, Azerbaijani, Georgians, Germans and Gagauz. In 1989 there were only 3 of them – Gypsies, Gagauz and Georgians. Their general proportion in the nationwide structure of population in 2001 equaled 0.5%, and in 1989 – 0.2%. And finally the fifth cohort is represented by ethno-national groups, whose number does not exceed 10 000, but is more than 1 000 people. In Ukraine (both in 1989 and in 2001) there were at least 6 of them. In the nationwide structure their quantity equaled approximately 0.1%. However, the specified statistical data may vary, though not very significantly, to exert a profound influence on the gross findings. The main reason was migration processes, as a result of which in Ukraine appeared numerous ethnical groups, which composed of several thousand people, but not being ranked as citizens they did not fall under the general estimation of ethno-national reality and population structure in Ukraine.

²² *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia*, [w:] *Pro kilkist ta sklad naselennia Ukrainy za pidsumkamy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku*, źródło: <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/>

Taking into account other statistical data concerning ethno-national reality in Ukraine (in particular pattern of redistribution of the abovementioned ethno-national groups, type of settlements and dominant religious affiliation – see Table 1 in detail) it is obvious that the biggest ethno-national minorities in Ukraine predominantly lived densely or geography specific. Their leading religious affiliation was orthodox Christianity, rural type of settlement prevailed, but as to the quantitative indicators urban population predominated. Density and urbanization more contributed to politicization of ethno-national minorities, than dispersion character and rural type of settlement. The ethnic groups whose quantity was above the average lived equally, both densely and in dispersion. Urban type of their settlement predominated and as for the religious features predominated Christian (though confessions variegated) affiliation. There also were representatives of Islamic and protestant confessions. On the contrary to the previous cohort, here there were no groups, which would have a direct contact with their historical motherlands, what in fact intensified the feeling of isolation from their ethnic core, but at the same time it allowed them to preserve their own ethnic identity. In Ukraine also existed the ethnic groups, which belonged to the third cohort, the number of whom varied from 10 000 up to 50 000. According to the 1989 statistics there were only 3 of them and in 2001 – four. Herewith, statistical data show a predominant dispersive character of settlement with a relative balance between the urban and rural types; Christian affiliation predominated, though it had some confessional divergences. To this cohort belonged two peoples: gypsies – an ethnic group which formed its own social organization – camps, and living among other ethnical groups perceived their religious affiliation as its own; and Gagauz – one of the 4 ethnic groups on the Ukrainian territory, which could be regarded as an autochthon (together with Ukrainians, Karaites and Crimean Tatars), as its ethnogenesis took place on the territory of its contemporary inhabitation. Another cohort, whose quantity is between 1 000 to 10 000 comprises ethnic groups with “a quantity of people lower than average population” in the structure of population of Ukraine. Table 1 shows that in this ethnic group prevails dispersive pattern of settlement, predominantly urban one. Here also predominates Catholic-protestant confession. The peculiarity of this cohort was that here belonged such group as Karaites, an ethnic group of autochthon origin, characterized by clear ethnical identity, language and anthroponyms preservation, and Hebrew religion.

Thus, ethno-national reality over the period of 1989-2001 let us speak of such phenomenon as particularization of ethno-national interests, their fragmentation and separation by preference. All this formed a special alternative to consolidated and consociated processes, which according to logics and expectations were to take place in Ukraine. It was especially observable against the background of the biggest minority – Russians, as well as prospects and anticipations of its politicization, first of all in the Crimea and some regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where ethnical Russians sometimes formed a relative majority of the total population²³.

²³ It is quite notable on the basis of the results of various scientific research and results of the All-Ukrainian census in 2001. In detail see: V. Skliar, *Rozseleattia rosiiian na teritorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepystv naselemtia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, vol 12,

Table 1. Ethno-national reality in the context of representativeness of Russian and other minorities in Ukraine, in 1989 and 2001

Ethnic group	Total number (1989)	Total number (2001)	Settlement pattern	Settlement type	Religious affiliation
Russians	11,2 mln	8,3 mln	Predominantly dispersive	Predominantly urban	Orthodox
Jews	486 thousand	103 thousand	Dispersive	Urban	Hebrew
Belarusians	440 thousand	276 thousand	Predominantly dispersive	Predominantly urban	Catholic, Orthodox
Moldavians	325 thousand	259 thousand	Predominantly dense	Predominantly rural	Orthodox
Crimean Tatars	280 thousand	248 thousand	Dense	Predominantly rural	Islamic
Bulgarians	233 thousand	204 thousand	Dense	Predominantly rural	Orthodox, Catholic
Poles	219 thousand	144 thousand	Regionally disperse	Urban	Catholic
Hungarians	163 thousand	156 thousand	Dense	Predominantly rural	Catholic, Protestant
Romanians	135 thousand	151 thousand	Dense	Predominantly rural	Orthodox
Greeks	99 thousand	92 thousand	Dense	Rural and urban	Orthodox
Kazan Tatars	90 thousand	73 thousand	Dispersive	Predominantly urban	Islamic
Armenians	60 thousand	100 thousand	Dispersive	Urban	Armenian-Gregorian
Germans	50 thousand	33 thousand	Predominantly dense	Predominantly rural	Protestant
Gypsies	49 thousand	48 thousand	Predominantly dispersive	Mixed	Orthodox
Gagauz	30 thousand	32 thousand	Dense	Predominantly rural	Orthodox
Georgians	25 thousand	34 thousand	Dispersive	Predominantly urban	Georgian autocephalous
Slovaks	9,5 thousand	N/a ²⁴	Dense	Predominantly rural	Catholic
Czechs	9 thousand	N/a	Dispersive	Predominantly urban	Catholic
Latvians	7 thousand	N/a	Dispersive	Urban	Lutheran
Lithuanians	5 thousand	N/a	Dispersive	Urban	Catholic
Estonians	5 thousand	N/a	Predominantly dispersive	Predominantly urban	Protestant
Karaites	1,5 thousand	N/a	Predominantly dense	Urban	Hebrew

Źródło: *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia*, [w:] *Pro kilkist ta sklad naselennia Ukrainy za pidsumkamy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku*, źródło: <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/>

s. 55-58.; V. Yevtukh, V. Troshchynskyi, K. Halushko, K. Chernova, *Etnonatsionalna struktura ukrainskoho suspilstva: dovidnyk*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 2004.; S. Piskunov, *Vidtvorenia naselennia Ukrainy: etnichnyi aspekt (demostatystychnyi analiz)*, [w:] *Etnonatsionalnyi rozvytok v Ukraini ta stan ukrainskoi etnicznosti v diaspori: sutnist, realii konfliktnosti, problemy ta prohnoz y na porozzi XXI stolittia: Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii*, Kyiv-Chernivtsi 1997., I. Terliuk, *Rosliany zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy (1944-1996 rr.): Etnosotsiologichne doslidzhennia*, Wyd. Svit 1997.; O. Osaulenko, *Naselennia Ukrainy za mistsem narodzhennia ta bromadianstvom za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku*, Kiev 2004.; O. Osaulenko, *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy ta yoho movni oznaky za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku*, Kiev 2003.

²⁴ За офіційними даними ці національності в переписі 2001 р позначені як інші.

The point is that from the time of gaining independence, as V. Skliar²⁵ states (and it can be seen from Table 1) in Ukraine took place changes in its ethnical composition. The census results appeared to be the most comprehensive and reliable statistical data for further analysis of these changes. Thus, the analysis of the censuses of 1989 and 2001 let us determine main tendencies, concerning dynamics the population of Ukraine, Ukrainians and ethnical minorities before gaining independence and over the first decade of it (what will be discussed later). A key tendency of the ethnical processes during the independence of Ukraine became an intensive reduction of ethnical minorities and their migration from some regions to other. And vice versa in 1959-1989, as O. Khomra states, due to migration and assimilation the number of Russians in Ukraine went up by 2.23 mln people, whereas the number of the Ukrainians decreased by 1.3 mln people²⁶. That is why the influence of assimilation and migration processes on the change in Russian and Ukrainian population profoundly differs during the Soviet times and that of the independent Ukraine. These differences were caused by a change in the status positions of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine under the condition of a factual and not formal independence as it was during the USSR time. It quite sharply contradicted the previous historical situation, as before gaining the independence Ukrainians made up a mass ethnic group or a “subordinated majority”, whereas Russians composed a dominant minority. It directly resulted in the fact that Russians in Ukraine during the Soviet time did not suffer language assimilation as Ukrainians did, though the latter made up a majority but were assimilated by the language. In the language environments of other ethnic groups predominated processes of Russification, but not Ukrainization. It supported R. Skemerhon’s statement that the dominant position in the society may belong either to majority or minority, as under the conditions of the lack of sovereignty, minority can become a predominant group, whereas majority will be subordinated and compose a “mass ethnic group”²⁷.

Only the collapse of the USSR contributed to transformation of Russians into an ethnic minority and loss of their dominant position. As a result, Russians in new countries suffered an ethnical identity crisis. V. Arbininan believes that the most widely-spread “traumatic problem” for the most representatives of Russian diaspora was the loss of their habitual “first role” in a multinational state. It was peculiar of a large part of Russians in Ukraine²⁸. Besides, the change of the status and position of Russians in Ukraine resulted in the fact that they started suffering an acute necessity either to change the environment or to undergo more complex and profound adaptation to “another ethnical environment”, but not that they were living in. Therefore, an intensive reduction of the number of Russian population in Ukraine over a short period of time (1989-2001) was caused by several factors. The first factor was a depopulation process

²⁵ V. Skliar, *Rozseleennia rositian na terytorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepysiv naseleennia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, vol 12, s. 55-58.

²⁶ O. Khomra, *Mihratsii na Ukraini: etnodemografichni aspekty*, „Visnyk AN Ukrainy“ 1992, vol 2, s. 33.

²⁷ R. Skemerhon, *Etnichnist i menshyny*, [w:] O. Protsenko, V. Lisovuy (eds.), *Natsionalizm: Antolohiia*, Wyd. Smoloskyp 2000, s. 456-457.

²⁸ V. Arbinina, *Etnosotsiolohiia*, Wyd. KhNU imeni V. N. Karazina 2007, s. 122.

which started in 1992 as a result of birth rate reduction and death rate growth²⁹. Also it was influenced by cessation in migration of Russians to Ukraine and even their partial migration to their historical motherland, what was especially observed in the early 90s of the 20th century under the conditions of the social-economic crisis. But in general, over the defined period and even after it the reduction in number of Russian population in Ukraine was not significant, as for instance, the migration balance of Russians though became negative in 1993-1994, but equaled only 15.8 and 85.5 thousand people³⁰.

At the same time, the most significant influence on reduction of Russians had not migration but ethnic assimilation processes. Among Russians rather widely-spread were not only endogamic (monoethnic) but also exogamic (cross-ethnic) families. For example, in accordance with the statistics of the 2001 census, only 56.5% of Russians lived in monoethnic families. As a result of the revival of the Ukrainian nationhood ethnical processes became natural phenomena, in conformance with which native majority assimilated ethnical minority, predominantly by means of cross-ethnic marriages. Children in such families acquired double ethnical identity, but mainly determined their ethnical origin in favor of the dominant (Ukrainian) ethnic group. A part of Russians, who were characterized by a mixed ethnical origin, i.e. were born in Ukrainian-Russian families in 1989 regarded themselves as Russians, whereas in 2001 they interpreted themselves as Ukrainians, what proved the change of ethnical self-identification. As a result of this, a general number of Ukrainians in 1989-2001 grew only due to Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The point is that it was much easier to admit Ukrainian ethnical origin, than to restore the lost language as your native one. Thus, by means of reducing the number of Russians in Ukraine the number of Ukrainians grew. And such growth took place on the background of depopulation among Ukrainians, which started in 1991 (and in the rural region in 1979)³¹. That is the changes among the number of Ukrainians as well as Russians over 1989-2001 were predominantly influenced by ethnical processes.

It is necessary to underline that the predominant majority of Russians were the migrants of the Soviet epoch and their second generation. Thus, according to the 2001 census 40.45% of Russians who lived in Ukraine were born outside it. Besides, till 1991 Russians did not find themselves as an ethnical minority and in fact they became it after the independence of Ukraine. Taking this into account it is quite obvious that Russians in Ukraine actually were the “first generation of minority”, in particular from the point of their self-awareness of their real status. At the same time in 1989-2001 reduction of the number of Russians was observed in all regions of Ukraine without exceptions, though the pace of the process differs. Among the four regions

²⁹ S. Piskunov, *Vidtvorennia naselennia Ukrainy: etnichnyi aspekt (demostatystychnyi analiz)*, [w:] *Etnonatsionalnyi rozvytok v Ukraini ta stan ukraïnskoi etnicznosti v diaspori: sutnist, realii konfliktnosti, problemy ta probnoz y na porozzi XXI stolittia: Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovopraktychnoi konferentsii*, Kyiv-Chernivtsi 1997, s. 264.

³⁰ V. Yevtukh, V. Troshchynskiy, K. Halushko, K. Chernova, *Etnonatsionalna struktura ukraïnskoho suspilstva: dovidnyk*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 2004, s. 147.

³¹ O. Osaulenko, *Naselennia Ukrainy za mistsem narodzhennia ta bromadianstvom za danyymi Vseukraïnskoho perepysu naseleinnia 2001 roku*, Kiev 2004, s. 214.

(if we divide into West, East, South and Center) the highest rate of reduction in numbers of Russians was marked in the west of Ukraine, what was presupposed by the processes of changing ethnical self-identification under the conditions of a dispersive pattern of their settlement. Over the period of 1989-2001 their quantity was down by half: from 491 800 in 1989 to 255 800 in 2001, i.e. – by 47,98%. The rate of reduction in western Ukraine was much higher than average numbers across Ukraine – 26,61%. Despite these differences, the percent in the region as compared to the All-Ukrainian reduction in numbers of Russians in the country over 1989–2001 was insignificant and equaled only 7.81% (see Tables 2, 3, 4).

Table 2. Total number of inhabitants (1), Ukrainians (2), ethno-national minorities (3) and Russians (4) in Ukraine as of 1989 and 2001 (number of people)

Region	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001
	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	4
Regional data								
West	9 713 693	9 552 886	8 663 924	8803330	1049769	749 556	491789	255 819
Volyn	1 058 438	1 057 214	1 001 329	1 024 955	57 109	32 259	46 900	25 132
Zakarpattia	1 245 618	1 254 614	976 749	1 010 127	268 869	244 487	49 458	30 993
Ivano-Frankivsk	1 413 211	1 406 129	1 342 888	1 371 242	70 323	34 887	57 005	24 925
Lviv	2 727 410	2 605 956	2 464 739	2 471 033	262 671	134 923	195 116	92 565
Rivne	1 164 241	1 171 445	1 085 729	1 123 401	78 512	48 044	53 634	30 129
Ternopil	1 163 974	1 138 500	1 126 395	1 113 516	37 579	24 984	26 610	14 194
Chernivtsi	940 801	919 028	666 095	689 056	274 706	229 972	63 066	37 881
Center	16830962	15645245	14509700	14168245	2321262	1477707	1758551	1094122
Vinnitsia	1 920 783	1 763 944	1 757 948	1 674 135	162 835	89 809	112 484	67 501
Zhytomyr	1 537 604	1 389 393	1 306 140	1 254 855	231 464	134 538	121 443	68 851
Kyiv city	2 572 212	2 566 953	1 863 674	2 110 767	708 538	456 186	536 707	337 323
Kyiv	1 934 369	1 821 061	1 729 240	1 684 803	205 129	136 258	167 938	109 322
Kirovohrad	1 228 093	1 125 704	1 046 984	1 014 616	181 109	111 088	144 076	83 929
Poltava	1 748 716	1 621 207	1 536 630	1 481 167	212 086	140 040	178 965	117 071
Sumy	1 427 498	1 296 763	1 220 487	1 152 034	207 011	144 729	190 050	121 655
Khmelnyskyi	1 521 564	1 426 649	1 374 749	1 339 331	146 815	87 318	88 018	50 686
Cherkasy	1 527 353	1 398 313	1 381 742	1 301 183	145 611	97 130	122 308	75 577
Chernihiv	1 412 770	1 236 065	1 292 106	1 155 354	120 664	80 711	96 562	62 207
South	13563892	12780497	8076789	8304894	5487103	4475603	4455901	3405951

Region	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001
	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	4
Dnipropetrovsk	3 869 858	3 561 224	2 769 560	2 825 781	1100298	735 443	935 749	627 531
Zaporizhzhia	2 074 018	1 926 810	1 308 038	1 364 095	765 980	562 715	664 085	476 748
Mykolaiv	1 328 306	1 262 899	1 003 591	1 034 446	324 715	228 453	257 964	177 530
Odesa	2 624 245	2 455 666	1 432 737	1 542 341	1191508	913 325	719 039	508 537
Kherson	1 236 970	1 172 689	936 944	961 584	300 026	211 105	249 522	165 211
Crimea (AR Crimea and Sevastopol city)	2 430 495	2 401 209	625 919	576 647	1804576	1824562	1629542	1450394
AR Crimea	2 037 480	2 024 056	544 772	492 227	1492708	1531829	1336937	1180441
Sevastopol city	393 015	377 153	81 147	84 420	311 868	292 733	292 605	269 953
East	11343487	10261567	6168640	6265224	5174847	3996343	4649341	3578249
Donetsk	5 311 781	4 825 563	2 693 432	2744 149	2618349	2081414	2316091	1844399
Luhansk	2 857 031	2540 191	1 482 232	1 472 376	1374799	1067815	1279043	991 825
Kharkiv	3 174 675	2 895 813	1 992 976	2 048 699	1181699	847 114	1054207	742 025
Total number								
West and Center	26544655	25198838	23173624	22971575	3371031	2227263	2250340	1349941
South and East	24907379	23042064	14245429	14570118	10661950	8471946	9105242	6984200
Ukraine	51452034	48240902	37419053	37541693	14032981	10699209	11355582	8334141

Źródło: V. Skliar, *Rozselelnia rosijan na terytorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepysiv naselelnia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, vol 12, s. 55-58.

Reduction in number of Russians in western Ukraine took place along with the growth in number of Ukrainians by 1.61% (139 400 people). Due to the reduction in numbers of Russians the population level of Western region dropped by 1.66% (160 800 people). Thus, the rates of reduction in numbers of Russians were considerably higher in comparison with the overall population rates not only in relative, but also in absolute indices. Besides, the rates of reduction of their quantity were twice of that among the number of ethnical minorities in the region (47.98% and 28.60% correspondingly). Thus, on the background of an overall reduction in number of minorities in Western region in 1989-2001 the number of Russians was 78.34%. Due to the fact that their proportion among ethnical minorities was twice as little – 34.13% in 2001, not only an overall number of population, but also a number of ethnical minorities has reduced due to Russians. Therefore, in western Ukraine amount of Russians though was the smallest, but in 1989-2001 it was reducing the most intensively, in comparison with other regions of Ukraine. Thus, within a short time the number of this minority fell almost by one half. Due to Russians a total number of population in the region as well as the quantity of ethnical minorities has reduced.

Depopulation rate among Russians in 1989-2001 in the central region was lower in relative indices, but higher in absolute measures in comparison with the west of Ukraine. In 1989 their amount in the center of Ukraine equaled 1.76 mln people and in 2001 it was 1.09 mln people, i.e. less by 37.78% (664 400 people). A regional part in comparison with the general reduction of Russians in Ukraine over 1989-2001 was 22.00%. Relative and absolute indices of depopulation of Russians in the central region were considerably higher than those of Ukrainians – 2.3 % (341 500 people), and if speaking of the relative indicators, they exceeded those of total population – 7.04% (1,19 mln people). Total number of the population in the region suffered reduction due to Russians. Their part in comparison with the reduction of total population over 1989-2001 was 56.07%. The proportion of Russians as compared to the population in the region was only 6.99%. In Kyiv city depopulation of the Russians was accompanied by a large increase of the Ukrainians – by 13.26% (247 100 people). Thus, total population of the central region over 1989-2001 decreased not only due to the Ukrainians, but also Russians, as the percentage of their reduction was disproportionately high (see Tables 2, 3, 4).

The number of the Russians in the south of Ukraine was considerably higher than in the western and central regions all together. In particular, if in 1989 in South Ukraine lived 4.46 mln people, than in 2001 – 3.41 mln people. In the course of 1989-2001 their population was cut down by 23.56% (1.05 mln people). Reduction in number of the Russians in the South in relative indicators was much lower than absolute indices in comparison with west and center. In the central region, like across Ukraine over 1998-2001, reduction in number of the Russians took place on the background of the growth of the Ukrainians by 2.82%. But reduction in number of the Russians in absolute indices was higher than increase of the Ukrainians –1.05 mln and 228 100 people correspondingly. Due to the Russians became less the total number of population in the South by 5.78% (783 400 people). Herewith, depopulation of the Russians was even more intensive than the drop in ethnical minorities in south Ukraine – 23.56% and 18.43% correspondingly. Quite interesting is a fact that the lowest rate of depopulation among the Russians was observed in the Crimea (the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and Sevastopol city) – 10.99% (179 100 people). However, as in other regions it was possible to observe here reduction in numbers of the Russians and growth of the Ukrainians. In southern regions the rate of reduction in number of the Russians was more intensive than of other population. Therefore, in the south of Ukraine over 1989-2001 actually due to the Russians reduced both the number of total population and general quantity if ethnical minorities. Herewith, the number of the Ukrainians grew (see Tables 2, 3, 4).

Table 3. Geographical distribution of total number of inhabitants (1), Ukrainians (2), ethno-national minorities (3) and Russians (4) in Ukraine as of 1989 and 2001 (in percentage terms)

Region	1989	2001	1989-2001	1989	2001	1989-2001	1989	2001	1989-2001	1989	2001	1989-2001
	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4
Regional data												
West	18,88	19,80	+0,92	23,15	23,45	+0,30	7,48	7,01	-0,47	4,33	3,07	-1,26
Volyn	2,06	2,19	+0,13	2,67	2,73	+0,06	0,40	0,30	-0,10	0,41	0,30	-0,11
Zakarpattia	2,42	2,60	+0,18	2,61	2,69	+0,08	1,92	2,29	+0,37	0,44	0,37	-0,07
Ivano-Frankivsk	2,75	2,91	+0,16	3,59	3,65	+0,06	0,50	0,33	-0,17	0,50	0,30	-0,20
Lviv	5,30	5,40	+0,10	6,59	6,58	-0,01	1,87	1,26	-0,61	1,72	1,11	-0,61
Rivne	2,26	2,43	+0,17	2,90	2,99	+0,09	0,56	0,45	-0,11	0,47	0,36	-0,11
Ternopil	2,26	2,36	+0,10	3,01	2,97	-0,04	0,27	0,23	-0,04	0,23	0,17	-0,06
Chernivtsi	1,83	1,91	+0,06	1,78	1,84	+0,06	1,96	2,15	+0,19	0,56	0,46	-0,10
Center	32,71	32,43	-0,28	38,78	37,74	-1,04	16,54	13,81	-2,73	15,49	13,13	-2,36
Vinnitsia	3,73	3,66	-0,06	4,70	4,46	-0,24	1,16	0,84	-0,32	0,99	0,81	-0,18
Zhytomyr	2,99	2,88	-0,11	3,49	3,34	-0,15	1,65	1,26	-0,39	1,07	0,82	-0,25
Kyiv city	5,00	5,32	+0,32	4,98	5,62	+0,64	5,05	4,26	-0,79	4,73	4,05	-0,68
Kyiv	3,76	3,77	+0,01	4,62	4,49	-0,13	1,46	1,27	-0,19	1,48	1,31	-0,17
Kirovohrad	2,39	2,33	-0,06	2,80	2,70	-0,10	1,29	1,04	-0,25	1,27	1,01	-0,26
Poltava	3,40	3,36	-0,04	4,11	3,95	-0,16	1,51	1,31	-0,20	1,58	1,40	-0,18
Sumy	2,77	2,69	-0,08	3,26	3,07	-0,19	1,47	1,35	-0,12	1,67	1,46	-0,21
Khmelnyskyi	2,96	2,96	0,00	3,68	3,57	-0,11	1,05	0,82	-0,23	0,77	0,61	-0,16
Cherkasy	2,97	2,90	-0,07	3,69	3,46	-0,23	1,04	0,91	-0,13	1,08	0,91	-0,17
Chernihiv	2,74	2,56	-0,18	3,45	3,08	-0,37	0,86	0,75	-0,11	0,85	0,75	-0,10
South	26,36	26,50	+0,14	21,58	22,12	+0,54	39,10	41,83	+2,73	39,24	40,87	+1,63
Dnipropetrovsk	7,52	7,38	-0,14	7,40	7,53	+0,13	7,84	6,87	-0,97	8,24	7,53	-0,71
Zaporizhzhia	4,03	4,00	-0,03	3,50	3,63	+0,13	5,46	5,26	-0,20	5,85	5,72	-0,13
Mykolaiv	2,58	2,62	+0,04	2,68	2,76	+0,08	2,31	2,14	-0,17	2,27	2,13	-0,14
Odesa	5,10	5,09	-0,01	3,83	4,11	+0,28	8,49	8,54	+0,05	6,33	6,10	-0,23
Kherson	2,41	2,43	+0,02	2,50	2,56	+0,06	2,14	1,97	-0,17	2,20	1,98	-0,22
Crimea (AR Crimea and Sevastopol city)	4,72	4,98	+0,26	1,67	1,53	-0,14	12,86	17,05	+4,19	14,35	17,41	+3,06
AR Crimea	3,96	4,20	+0,24	1,45	1,31	-0,14	10,64	14,31	+3,67	11,77	14,17	+2,40
Sevastopol city	0,76	0,78	+0,02	0,22	0,22	0,00	2,22	2,74	+0,52	2,58	3,24	+0,66
East	22,05	21,27	-0,78	16,49	16,69	+0,20	36,88	37,35	+0,47	40,94	42,93	+1,99
Donetsk	10,33	10,00	-0,33	7,20	7,31	+0,11	18,66	19,45	+0,79	20,40	22,13	+1,73
Luhansk	5,55	5,27	-0,28	3,96	3,92	-0,04	9,80	9,98	+0,18	11,26	11,90	+0,64
Kharkiv	6,17	6,00	-0,17	5,33	5,46	+0,13	8,42	7,92	-0,50	9,28	8,90	-0,38
Total number												
West and Center	51,59	52,23	+0,64	61,93	61,19	-0,74	24,02	20,82	-3,20	19,82	16,20	-3,62
South and East	48,41	47,77	-0,64	38,07	38,81	+0,74	75,98	79,18	+3,20	80,18	83,90	+3,62
Ukraine	100	100	-	100	100	-	100	100	-	100	100	-

Źródło: V. Skliar, *Rozselenia rosijan na terytorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepysiv naselennia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, vol 12, s. 55-58.

Finally, among all regions of Ukraine the least rates of depopulation of Russians over 1989-2001 in relative indices, but the highest rates in absolute indices were observed in eastern part – 23.04% (1,01 mln people). But even regardless of this reduction, east remained the main area where lived Russians in Ukraine – 4.65 mln people in 1989 and 3.58 mln people in 2001. As in the south, in the eastern region the number of Russians was reducing on the background of the growth in number of the Ukrainians, though a little one – 1.57% (96 600 people). Due to Russians the total number of population and ethnical minorities in the region reduced. A proportion of Russians among the people whose number reduced over 1989-2001 was 99.00%. Herewith, the least were the relative rates of reduction among Russians, however the highest absolute rates were observed in Donetsk region – 20.37% (471 700 people). In Luhansk region the number of Russians was reducing more dynamically than the number of Ukrainians. Thus, in 1989-2001 among four regions of Ukraine the highest reduction in absolute indices was observed in the east, though it was the smallest in relative figures. The rates of depopulation among Russians were higher than the rates of ethnical minorities all together. Correspondingly, due to Russians total amount of population and national minorities fell down, while the number of Ukrainians grew.

Table 4. Change of total population (1), Ukrainians (2), ethno-national minorities (3) and Russians (4) In Ukraine as of 1989 and 2001 (people, in percentage terms)

Region	1		2		3		4	
	People	%	People	%	People	%	People	%
Regional data								
West	-160 807	-1,66	+139 406	+1,61	-300 213	-28,60	-235 970	-47,98
Volyn	-1 224	-0,12	+23 626	+2,36	-24 850	-43,51	-21 768	-46,41
Zakarpattia	+8 926	+0,72	+33 378	+3,42	-24 382	-9,07	-18 465	-37,33
Ivano-Frankivsk	-7 082	-0,50	+28 354	+2,11	-35 436	-50,39	-32 080	-56,28
Lviv	-121 454	-4,45	+6 294	+0,26	-127 748	-48,63	-102 551	-52,56
Rivne	+7 204	+0,62	+37 672	+3,47	-30 468	-38,81	-23 505	-43,82
Ternopil	-25 474	-2,19	-12 879	-1,14	-12 595	-33,52	-12 416	-46,66
Chernivtsi	-21 773	-2,31	+22 961	+3,45	-44 734	-16,28	-25 185	-39,93
Center	-1 185 010	-7,04	-341 455	-2,35	-843 555	-36,34	-664 429	-37,78
Vinnitsia	-156 839	-8,17	-83 813	-4,77	-73 026	-44,85	-44 983	-39,99
Zhytomyr	-148 211	-9,64	-51 285	-3,93	-96 926	-41,88	-52 592	-43,31
Kyiv city	-5 259	-0,20	+247 093	+13,26	-252 352	-35,62	-199 384	-37,15
Kyiv	-113 308	-5,86	-44 437	-2,57	-68 871	-33,57	-58 616	-34,90
Kirovohrad	-102 389	-8,34	-32 368	-3,09	-70 021	-38,66	-60 147	-41,75
Poltava	-127 509	-7,29	-55 463	-3,61	-72 046	-33,97	-61 894	-34,58
Sumy	-130 735	-9,16	-68 453	-5,61	-62 282	-30,09	-68 395	-35,99
Khmelnyskyi	-94 915	-6,24	-35 418	-2,58	-59 497	-40,53	-37 332	-42,41
Cherkasy	-129 040	-8,45	-80 559	-5,83	-48 481	-33,29	-46 731	-38,21
Chernihiv	-176 705	-12,51	-136 752	-10,58	-39 953	-33,11	-34 355	-35,58
South	-783 395	-5,78	+228 105	+2,82	-1 011 500	-18,43	-1 049 950	-23,56

Perion	1		2		3		4	
	People	%	People	%	People	%	People	%
Dnipropetrovsk	-308 634	-7,98	+56 221	+2,03	-364 855	-33,16	-308 218	-32,94
Zaporizhzhia	-147 208	-7,10	+56 057	+4,29	-203 265	-26,54	-187 337	-28,21
Mykolaiv	-65 407	-4,92	+30 855	+3,07	-96 262	-29,65	-80 434	-31,18
Odesa	-168 579	-6,42	+109 604	+7,65	-278 183	-23,35	-210 502	-29,28
Kherson	-64 281	-5,20	+24 640	+2,63	-88 921	-29,64	-84 311	-33,79
Crimea (AR Crimea and Sevastopol city)	-29 286	-1,20	-49 272	-7,87	+19 986	+1,11	-179 148	-10,99
AR Crimea	-13 424	-0,66	-52 545	-9,65	+39 121	+2,62	-156 496	-11,71
Sevastopol city	-15 862	-4,04	+3 273	+4,03	-19 135	-6,14	-22 652	-7,74
East	-1 081 920	-9,54	+96 584	+1,57	-1 178 504	-22,77	-1 071 092	-23,04
Donetsk	-486 218	-9,15	+50 717	+1,88	-536 935	-20,51	-471 692	-20,37
Luhansk	-316 840	-11,09	-9 856	-0,66	-306 984	-22,33	-287 218	-22,46
Kharkiv	-278 862	-8,78	+55 723	+2,80	-334 585	-28,32	-312 182	-29,61
Total number								
West and Center	-1 345 817	-5,07	-202 049	-0,87	-1 143 768	-33,93	-900 339	-40,01
South and East	-1865315	-7,49	+324 689	+2,28	-2 190 004	-20,54	-2 121 042	-2329
Ukraine	-3 211 132	-6,24	+122 640	+0,33	-3 333 772	-23,76	-3 021 441	-26,61

Źródło: V. Skliar, *Rozselennia rosijan na terytorii Ukrainy: za materialamy perepysiv naseleennia 1989 ta 2001 rr.*, „Ukrainoznavstvo” 2008, vol 12, s. 55-58.

Total number of Russians in Ukraine in 1989 was 11 355 582 people, however in 2001 it was 8 334 141 people, thus it reduced by 26.61% (3 021 441 people). Reduction in number of Russians was in contrast with growth of Ukrainians by 0.33% (122 640 people). *Generally speaking, mainly due to the depopulation of Russians in 1989-2001 the total number of population in Ukraine suffered reduction by 6.24% (3 211 132 people).* Herewith, the reduction percentage of Russian as compared to the total population of Ukraine in 1989-2001 was 94.09%. Rates of reduction in number of Russians at that time were higher than the rates of all national minorities, 26.61% and 23.76% correspondingly. Rather high was a reduction of Russians as compared to the total number of national minorities in Ukraine in 1989-2001 – 90.63% (see Tables 2, 3, 4). It means that the general number of ethnic minorities in Ukraine was reducing only due to one of them – Russians.

The same situation was observed over 2001-2013, but dramatically changed only after the annexation of the Crimea and occupation of separate districts in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine in 2014-2017, the area where the number of Russians was the biggest in absolute indices as compared to the total population (i.e. population of all other ethno-national groups). Taking into account this as well as the fact that in Ukraine over 2001-2017 there was not conducted any census, we may argue that the ethno-national reality, which was earlier interpreted as ethno-national expectations, has radically changed. First of all it is revealed in pursuing various sociological surveys which may prove or predict the ethno-national situation in Ukraine. One of

such research was conducted in 2017 by Tsentrazumkova³². It states that directly as a result of military-political actions (in particular the Crimea annexation and occupation of some Donbas districts) and indirectly as a result of a change of Ukrainians' position, 92% of respondents regard themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, 6% – ethnic Russians, 1,5% – representatives of other ethnical groups, 0,5% – are undecided (no response). It argues that at least sociologically and politically the identity of the Ukrainian citizens is still being formed in the direction of comprehending themselves as a separate society and political nation, which has own state, history, music, culture, mutual vision of its future and which is conducting war against the aggressor (the Russian Federation) for the right on actualization of its choice³³. The most significant indicator of the process, as it is shown by the sociological surveys, is a higher level of patriotism, nation-wide and Ukrainian sociocultural self-identification, more optimistic predictions concerning the future prospects of Ukraine made by younger categories of respondents.

There are also other tendencies, for instance:

- a. it is observed that in Ukraine there is a tendency towards the growth of a part of respondents who regard themselves as ethnic Ukrainians; moreover age of the respondents is lowering (from 87% among those who are 60+ and up to 96% among those who are 18-29) and decrease in a number of ethnic Russians (from 10% to 3%) (see Table 5).

Table 5. Age distribution of ethno-national expectations concerning the composition of the population in Ukraine in 2017 (in percentage terms)

Age	Ukrainians, %	Russians, %	Other, %	No response, %
18–29	96,2	2,8	0,7	0,3
30–39	93,5	4,6	1,4	0,5
40–49	92,5	5,7	1,5	0,3
50–59	92,1	5,9	0,8	1,2
60 +	87,1	9,7	2,6	0,6
Total	92,0	6,0	1,5	0,5

Žródło: *Osnovni zasady ta sbliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentrazumkova 2017, s. 26.

- b. it is argued that the biggest part of ethnic Ukrainians among the respondents live in the west (94.7%) and center (96.1%), a bit lower quantity (90.1%) live in the south, and the least part in Donbas (68.6%). Quite controversial logics is working out in case of the number of ethnic Russians, whose amount is the highest in Donbas (28.0%)

³² *Osnovni zasady ta sbliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentrazumkova 2017, s. 6.

³³ *Osnovni zasady ta sbliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentrazumkova 2017, s. 3.

and the least is in the west and center of Ukraine (1.7% and 3.2% correspondingly) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Regional structure of ethno-national expectations concerning the composition of the population in Ukraine in 2017 (in percentage terms)

Region	Ukrainians, %	Russians, %	Other, %	No response, %
West	94,7	1,7	2,3	1,3
Center	96,1	3,2	0,4	0,3
South	90,1	5,4	4,1	0,4
East	88,7	10,1	0,5	0,7
Donbas	68,6	28,0	3,4	0,0
Total	92,0	6,0	1,5	0,6

Źródło: *Osnovni zasady ta shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentr Razumkova 2017, s. 26.

Besides, the sociological survey proved that if among ethnic Ukrainians 77% feel their affiliation only to one nationality, and if we speak of ethnic Russians this number is only 39%. Their affiliation to one or more nationalities feel 10% and 30% correspondingly; to none nationality – 5% and 20%³⁴ correspondingly. Thus, along with biethnicity and polyethnicity we may speak if not of refusal then of “removal” from ethnic self-identification, which (like bi- or polyethnicity) is largely inherent to ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Most frequently inhabitants of Donbas (26.5%), southern (24.1%) and eastern (19%) regions (in the west and center only 6.1%) feel their affiliation to two or more nationalities. The same situation is with people who do not feel affiliation to any nationality (20%, 10%, 12%, 2% and 1% correspondingly). Additional attention was paid to the problems of biethnicity and polyethnicity as one of the aspects of ethnic identity formation. The point is that 74% of respondents in Ukraine feel their affiliation only to one nationality, 12% – to two or more nationalities, 6% – to none nationality, 8% – are undecided.

It is quite notable that in Ukraine prevails nationwide identity. The point is that 95% of respondents would absolutely or rather agree with the statement “I identify myself a citizen of Ukraine”³⁵. The statement “I am a citizen of Ukraine” is absolutely or rather supported by 97% of the western region, 96% – of the central, 95% – of the southern, 91% – of the eastern, 89% – in Donbas. Their affiliation to the local communities proved 64% of people from the west and 60% of people from the south; whereas in the center of Ukraine this number equals only 50%, in Donbas – 45% or in the eastern part – 40%. Finally, only 27% of respondents in Ukraine identify themselves as the citizens of the former USSR: most frequently – in the south

³⁴ *Osnovni zasady ta shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentr Razumkova 2017, s. 6-7.

³⁵ *Osnovni zasady ta shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Kruhloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentr Razumkova 2017, s. 28.

(48%) and in the east (41%). The conclusion is that ethnical Ukrainians more often than ethnical Russians identify themselves as the citizens of Ukraine (96% and 81% correspondingly). Ethnical Russians more often regard themselves as the citizens of the former USSR (26% and 38% correspondingly).

In this context quite specific is the situation in Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine) which as of 2017 should be formally divided into occupied and non-occupied³⁶. Taking into account the fact that demographic situation in both parts of Donbas over 2014–2017 has radically changed, in particular as a result of the “hybrid war” and hostilities it is quite obvious that: a) within the occupied territories the number of Ukrainians (according to the census of 2001) was 50.73%, while on the territories that are under control of Ukraine it was – 67.03% (in general in Donbas – 57.24%); b) absolute majority of Ukrainians of Donbas lived on the occupied territory – 53.20%, but the level of all population across the occupied territory was much higher – 60.03%; c) Ukrainians constitute an absolute majority (at least in accordance with the 2001 census) among the total population across both occupied and non-occupied territories of Donbas; d) an absolute majority of Russians in Donbas are immigrants and their first generation; e) on the occupied territories the number of Russians as compared to other nationalities is much bigger than over the Ukraine-controlled territories – 44.99% and 28.77% correspondingly, as a result of which a majority of Russians from Donbas are on the occupied territories – 70.13%³⁷. Thus, in general it is argued that the ethno-national composition of population across the occupied and non-occupied territories of Donbas varies considerably³⁸, especially taking into account the fact that an absolute majority of Russians inhabited the occupied territories of Donbas.

All this proves that the processes of forming the set of values of Ukrainians and their identity and their peculiarities take place under complicated social-political conditions, characterized by a war conflict in the east of Ukraine, the Crimea annexation, prolonged economic crisis and political instability as well. It is supplemented by the fact that social-psychological atmosphere in the Ukrainian society is marked by a low level of confidence (especially in government institutions)³⁹. However, even despite this in the Ukrainian society, especially in that part which stands against the military-political influence of Russia, taking into account profound social processes (concerning the issues of identity and foreign policy directions) is generated the ground for political phenomena of civil or political nation as one which opposes the Kremlin strategic goals. It is especially observable on the background of succession of generations, as divergences in value

³⁶ V. Skliar, *Osoblyvosti etnomovnoho skladu naseleennia pidporiadkovanykh Ukraini ta okupovanykh terytorii Donbasu*, „Problemy ta perspektyvy formuvannia natsionalnoi humanitarno-tekhnichnoi elity” 2017, vol 47 (51), s. 218.

³⁷ V. Skliar, *Osoblyvosti etnomovnoho skladu naseleennia pidporiadkovanykh Ukraini ta okupovanykh terytorii Donbasu*, „Problemy ta perspektyvy formuvannia natsionalnoi humanitarno-tekhnichnoi elity” 2017, vol 47 (51), s. 221–224.

³⁸ V. Skliar, *Osoblyvosti etnomovnoho skladu naseleennia pidporiadkovanykh Ukraini ta okupovanykh terytorii Donbasu*, „Problemy ta perspektyvy formuvannia natsionalnoi humanitarno-tekhnichnoi elity” 2017, vol 47 (51), s. 221–224.

³⁹ *Osnovni zasady ta shliakhy formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti bromadian Ukrainy: Informatsiino-analitychni materialy do Krubloho stolu 12 kvitnia 2017 r.*, Tsentr Razumkova 2017, s. 13.

orientations and identity of the representatives of old and young generations show, that if perception of an older generation is mainly formed under the influence of social-political circumstances and ideology of the Soviet epoch, then perception of a younger generation more corresponds to present realities and construction of the concept of a civil/political nation.

This and the results of sociological surveys conducted in 2017 correlate with T. Plakhtii's remark that Ukraine if not become, then is in the process of growing into a mononational state in the real sense of this notion. The point is that if we take into account the national identity of population in Ukraine, then Ukrainians form one of the most homogenous societies in Europe. Herewith, modern Ukrainian national identity is open, but not close, attractive and dynamic, as it may assimilate people, who identify themselves with other ethnical groups or must belong "by blood" to "others". Therefore, in accordance with classical politological definitions, Ukrainian national process (so called nationalism) is ethnically inclusive, and not exclusive, or civil and not ethnical. In general, it shows that after the "Revolution of dignity" and the Crimea annexation and occupation of Donbas Ukraine started rapidly approaching to the model of a national state with a predominant ethnical core of the Ukrainian nation. And it is so, even despite the fact that Ukraine is characterized by bilingualism, high percentage of other ethnic groups' representatives and polyconfessionalism⁴⁰.

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⁴⁰ *Natsionalne pyttannia: Ukraina yak Yevropa*, «Dzerkalo tyzhnia» 17 chervnia 2017, źródlo: https://dt.ua/internal/nacionalne-pyttannia-ukrayina-yak-yevropa-245832_html

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Principles of Communist Parties' Structural Organization: Crucial Aspects of Correlations with Political Regime Type

The current article defines basic principles of the communist parties' structural organization. The thorough analysis of the peculiarities inherent to democratic centralism is represented as a core principle of the structural and organizational model, which is important for development and functioning of the left, primarily communists' parties. The specifics of democratic centralism standards implementation are determined for various types of political regime. This study reveals that the liberalization and democratization of a particular political regime are determined to strengthen a democratic component in the activities of the party. In addition, this investigation proves that authoritarianization of a certain regime leads to the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies within the party, moreover, this process has a crucial emphasis that is set on harsh centralism and hierarchy in order to increase the role of a leader in the general system of the party.

Keywords: communist party, structural organization of a political party, democratic centralism, revolutionary centralism, authoritarian (totalitarian) bureaucratic centralism.

Принципи структурної організації комуністичних партій: особливості кореляції з типом політичного режиму

У статті визначено основні засади структурної організації комуністичних партій. Проаналізовано специфіку демократичного централізму як стрижневого принципу структурно-організаційної стратегії розвитку та функціонування «лівих», насамперед комуністичних партій. Встановлено особливості вияву принципів демократичного централізму за різних типів політичного режиму. Обґрунтовано, що лібералізація та демократизація політичного режиму детермінує посилення демократичної складової у діяльності партії і, навпаки, авторитаризація режиму призводить до посилення авторитарних тенденцій всередині партії, акцентування на суворому централізмі та ієрархичності, а також до збільшення ролі окремої людини (вождя) у житті партії.

Ключові слова: комуністична партія, структурна організація політичної партії, демократичний централізм, революційний централізм, авторитарно- (тоталітарно-) бюрократичний централізм.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and “real socialism” system in the Central and Eastern Europe countries led to the global crisis of communist ideology and communist parties as its main institutional carriers, which, as a result of the failure ideological project were discredited. In this regard, for the sake of their own political survival, the Communist and other left radical parties were forced to accept measures that would facilitate a process of their adaptation to new socio-political and socio-economic conditions.

In response to the challenges associated with the democratization of political regimes, these parties chose different vector of adaptation options that might be reviewed through a prism of conditional continuum, which, on the one hand, is limited by the strategy of transformation into the social democratic parties, and on the other hand is confined because preservation of the old identities with its gradual inclusion proffered new political and economic context¹. It is noteworthy to underline that the adaptation strategy occurred as a result of temporary difficulties and it involved two elements. These elements are considered as the ideology and organizational structure of the party. Hence, these components have a substantial impact on a degree of change/preservation of the ideological principles that are necessary for party's activities as well as a basis of its structural organization. Thus, the issue of the first strategy implementation is based on the rejection of revolutionary Marxism and democratic centralism. The second strategy might be characterized by an adherence to the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism both ideologically and in terms of organizational procedure.

According to Maurice Duverger, the genuine essence and arrangement of modern political parties cannot be explicitly examined through parties' political programs and class composition. The author states that a party is a community, which is based on a specific structure². Therefore, we assume that the elucidation of their structural organization might be explained through the initial methodological setting as this issue has a reflection in the studies on essence and peculiarity of the ideological and institutional adaptation of the communist parties to the contemporary postcommunist realities.

Duverger's approach focuses on two pivotal types of the aforementioned issue. Consequently, the author constitutes that there are mass political parties that are predominantly oriented on individual membership. Furthermore, Duverger points that there are indirect parties, which are functioning on collective membership option. These units are not created by individual members, but they are arranged by non-political associations (unions, cooperatives, religious organizations, insurance desks, circles of intellectuals, etc.)³. In this regard, the first type might be described as the most popular model, which is inherent to socialist and social democratic parties. For instance, it was popular in Continental Europe throughout the late nineteenth and

¹ L. March, *Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe. From Marxism to the Mainstream?*, “International Policy Analysis”, Berlin, Wyd. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2008, s. 1-20.

² M. Djuverzhe, *Političeskie partii* [per. s franc. L. Zimina], Izd. 3-e, Moskva, Wyd. Paradigma 2005, s. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, s. 116-117.

early twentieth century. The second type could be delineated as an exclusion that, for example, occurred in UK Labor Party, which was founded in 1900.

Duverger is concerned that one of the main reasons for the existence of direct or indirect organizational structure of the left party is its doctrinal relation or incompatibility with studies of Karl Marx. The indirect arrangement is a characteristic of those parties which are not motivated by the Marxist doctrine. Thus, the parties which are dependent on the role of an ideological issue are organized according to the principle of direct membership. Duverger stresses that the structure of Labor Party and similar parties is precisely predetermined by a pragmatic orientation⁴. As a result, they seek for reformist activity and are not concerned with doctrinal problems.

In addition, Duverger offers differentiation of the mass political parties on the basis of their initial structural elements: socialist and social democratic parties (territorial section as its initial structural element); communist parties (party cell); fascist and national-socialist parties (paramilitary subdivisions or militia)⁵.

It is necessary to emphasize that Duverger provides the depiction of two types of parties, which are estimated by a degree of members' engagement and inclusion. The author accentuates that there are specialized and totalitarian instances of this diversification. In this regard, there is a stable correlation between organizational structures that is predominantly based on the party cell or militia, vertical type of ties and centralization, and the totalitarian type of party. Consequently, the aforementioned features might have a certain complement as the active participation in the life of its members is a wide-spread tendency in this case. Furthermore, the establishment of control over their spiritual beliefs and values is an inalienable part of system's control. These parties are imposing a certain ideology through various methods. A tension-building process is a tool of totalitarian ideology, as their main purposes are to become a secular religion and to transform a party into the object of worship. In addition, the absence of internal movements and opposition, as well as strict admission regulations, could be mentioned as elements of the communist, fascist, and Nazi parties⁶.

The organizational structure of the specialized parties is based on committees. They have diametrically opposite characteristics. Hence, these parties are poorly integrated and also decentralized. The field of relations between the party and its members is confined exclusively to the political sphere. Moreover, the doctrine does not have fundamental meaning. This fact completely rejects the possibility of idealization both of the party and the procedures of joining it. In addition, there are many factions and opposition groups (intraparty heterogeneity) within the party. Duverger referred conservatives and liberals to this type of political party⁷.

⁴ Ibid., s. 54-55.

⁵ Ibid., s. 59.

⁶ Ibid., s. 170.

⁷ Ibid., s. 165.

The author derives a certain emphasis to socialist and social-democratic parties that are formed on the section basis. According to Duverger, however, in their origin, these parties relate to totalitarian type, but the discussion practice and their fractions transform them into specialized parties. These units could be also distinguished by a coherent structure and centralization⁸.

Thus, Duverger's definition of communist parties as totalitarian units is majorly focused on specifics of its organizational structure. In this regard, a detailed analysis of democratic centralism principles becomes a necessity. Furthermore, it is important to accentuate the peculiarities of its manifestation in the communist parties' practical activities that is inherent to various types of political regime.

The basic principles of the Communist Party ("a party of a new type") structural organization were defined by Vladimir Lenin (Ulyanov). They are presented, in his study "What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement" (1902)⁹. These principles are complemented by a comprehensive work "A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks" (1902)¹⁰. Therefore, it is noteworthy to underline that Lenin highlights several elements of revolutionary political party mechanism. His theoretical concept explicitly shows that the following principles have a first priority: 1) strict conspiracy; 2) centralization, hierarchy, and discipline, which, in particular, symbolizes and an idea of subordination of the minority the majority; 3) strict selection of members and rejection of the mass party. A party member is defined by Lenin as an individual that is ideologically and practically (professionally engaged in revolutionary activity) trained and loyal; 4) leaders' selection depends on skills and individual potential of the prospective political leaders. Consequently, Lenin is concerned that they should encourage the party and a society to support a revolution; 5) the party performs a certain function that could be compared with vanguard as their main goal is to take over the leadership, which would promote a consolidation of propaganda and revolutionary aspects; 6) rejection of the classical principles of intra-party democracy (publicity, electoral and universal control) and the introduction of so-called "comradely democracy" is based on mutual trust between members of the party and their sense of responsibility for a joint revolutionary affair.

Lenin started the practical realization of his organizational plan after the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903. His opponent Julius Martov (Tserdibaum), assumed that above-mentioned plan is an intention to create an authoritarian organization of the closed type (Leninism as hypertrophy of centralism and suppression of the opposition)¹¹. The difference in organizational issues between the supporters of Lenin and Martov led to a split of the party into two factions, which were defined as the Bolsheviks and

⁸ Ibid., s. 165, s. 170.

⁹ V. Lenin, *Chtodelat'?* *Nabolevshievoprosnyashbegodvizhenija*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoesobraniesochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-e, Tom 6, Moskva, Wyd. Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1963, s. 1-192.

¹⁰ V. Lenin, *Pismo k tovarishbu o nashiborganizacionnyh zadachah*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoesobraniesochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-e, Tom 7, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1967, s. 1-32.

¹¹ *Lenin, o kotorom sporjat segodnja*, orv. red. M. Mchedlov, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1991, s. 168-169.

Mensheviks. Lenin strongly believed that Bolshevism existed as a flow of political thought and as a political party, which was fueled by a theory of Marxism, since 1903¹².

Lenin's party-building plan was perceived as an ambiguous idea not only among the Russian Social Democrats but also by Western counterparts, and even representatives of the "left" wing. Thus, Rosa Luxemburg vividly constituted in the article "Organizational Issues of Russian Social Democracy" (1904) that Lenin's centralism is ultra-centralism, in which the Central Committee is the only powerful part of the party, and the rest of the organizations are its executive bodies. This point of view has a particular context as it demonstrates that the depicted form of political organization is also a system of merciless. Moreover, Rosa Luxembourg provides a clear notion about Lenin's suggestions and states: "Nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straightjacket, which will immobilize the movement and turn it into an automaton manipulated by a Central Committee"¹³.

It is necessary to underscore that Lenin's conception of democratic centralism as the organizational basis of the new type party, which led to the collapse of Russian and the rejection Western social democracy, still defines the discussion lines of differentiation. This particular phenomenon is no longer so important for the contemporary politics, but it still has a certain topicality for the scientific discourse. The academic community prefers to categorize this conceptual supposition and, thus, two main points of view prevail among them. Therefore, they are assessing Leninism as a special organizational theory. In addition, according to the most widespread approach, Leninist organizational plan is to be conceptualized as a strategy for the creation of a top-down, closed, strictly centralized and disciplined party, which minimizes the democratic component and maximizes the principle of centralism that would in practice transform it into hyper-centralism. In other words, this strategy is considered exclusively as a tool of an arrangement of the authoritarian political sect that could be reviewed through a totalitarian prism.

American researchers Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond described modern political parties based on the aforementioned organizational principles, namely, Leninist parties singling out the following main features: 1) the main objective is to topple the government of the existing political system and to implement revolutionary changes for the construction of a new society; 2) a closed structure based on the semi-secret cell; 3) membership is extremely selective, the party demands strict loyalty and discipline from all its members; 4) intense and uncompromising ideological indoctrination of party members; 5) decision-making within the party is highly centralized and authoritarian, even if democratic centralism often allows for open debate prior to the taking of an official stand; 6) the party defines itself as the vanguard of the proletariat, taking on the direct role of leadership to control the working class as well

¹² V. Lenin, *Detskaja bolezn' «levizny» v kommunizme*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-c, Tom 41, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1981, s. 6-7.

¹³ A. Shubin, *Socializm. «Zolotoj vek» teorii*, Moskva, Wyd. Novoliteraturnoe obozrenie 2007, s. 441.

defines interests; 7) the anti-system position is inherent to the electoral processes participation as well as semi-loyal opposition; 8) the party attempts to establish hegemonic control over the political and economic system¹⁴.

According to an alternative point of view, this approach is a very simplified as it rather resembles a distorted interpretation of Leninism than a genuine conceptual examination of it. In regard, according to Lars Lih, the concept of Lenin requires a substantial redefinition or rethinking as his reputation as a villain had a great resonance in Western countries¹⁵. Lih is concerned that this reconceptualization of the Lenin's stereotypical portrayal has to exclude enthusiastic criticism that is a disapproval of ideas, which are mostly related to Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Pyotr Tkachev, and Mikhail Bakunin. The Canadian researcher points that the rethinking should be based on consideration other theorists' studies, for instance, Karl Kautsky, August Bebel, Paul Lafargue and Jules Guesde. Thus, it is important to highlight that Lenin was inspired by the experience of Western European Social Democracy, primarily the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the theoretical views of Kautsky represented on Erfurt Program¹⁶.

Paul Kellogg also insists on the necessity of substantial rethinking of Lenin's organizational theory. His initial thesis is, to some extent, an assertion that only an interpretation of this theory based on the research of Leninism in a certain historical context would be adequate from a scientific point of view¹⁷. This, in other words, means that Leninism is not a constant phenomenon. Moreover, it has evolved continuously, undergoing significant changes due to the influence of external socio-political factors. Thus, according to Kellogg, the conceptualization of Leninism should not be explored through a pure prism of authoritarianism, strict centralization, hierarchy and discipline. Consequently, the stated principles of party building activity were crucial for the effective functioning of the party throughout a period of tsarist autocracy¹⁸.

It is important to emphasize that the external circumstances changed the circumstances of revolution. For example, in 1905-1906, the tsarist autocracy has weakened. In this regard, Leninism became unrecognizable. It was an impetus that motivated Lenin to reduce centralism in order to underscore a need for the development of intraparty democracy. That decision helped him to understand the significance of sufficiently broad autonomy of local committees, total freedom of intra-party discussion and critique, and political decisions of Congress. However, Lenin believed in the possibility of an ideological struggle, but he assumed that some decisions of the Congress could be considered as unacceptable. This assertion was also decisive in case of the violation of criticism freedom as it would contradict the general standards of unity or certain joint party actions¹⁹.

¹⁴ L. Diamond, R. Gunther, *Species of Political Parties: A New Typology*, "Party Politics", 2003, vol. 9, nr.2, s. 179-180.

¹⁵ L. T. Lih, *Lenin Rediscovered: What Is to Be Done? In Context*, Chicago, Wyd. Haymarket Books 2008, s.494.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 471-473, s. 552, s. 555-556.

¹⁷ P. Kellogg, *Leninism: It's Not What You Think*, "Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies", 2009, vol. 5, nr. 2, s. 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 41-43.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 48-51.

Lenin did not really use the term democratic centralism until 1906 and the first notion about it is dated by 1905-1906, in particular, during the IV Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in Stockholm (April 1906). Thus, in November 1905, he stated that the terms of the party's activity had radically changed because the freedom of assemblies and unions was achieved. This, in turn, meant the need to develop new organizational forms of activity and a new course for the party. Lenin stresses that the party literally stagnated and suffocated. Therefore, he called for strengthening the principles of party electoral as well as for the development of new organizational forms based on independent structural components²⁰. In the article "Party Organization and Party Literature" (1905) Lenin underlines a need to guarantee a full freedom of speech in the party, in case of complete ideological safety. He affirmed: "The Party is a voluntary association which would inevitably fall to pieces, at first ideologically and then materially if it did not purge itself of members who advocate anti-Party views"²¹.

In April and May of 1906, Lenin pointed the need to implement principles of democratic centralism in the organization of the party. In addition, he advocated the autonomy of any party organization, tolerated the ideological struggle between various trends of social democracy within the party, and, hence, the possibility of the factions formation. In the report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., he highlighted an important matter: "The road has been mapped out, the principles have been proclaimed, and we must now work for the complete and consistent putting into effect of this organizational ideal"²². However, this idea of democratic centralism was not realized, due to the change in the socio-political context, but the significant restriction of political freedoms become a reality as a result of the reaction and defeat of the revolution in 1907. These conditions, led Lenin and Bolsheviks to the idea to limit democracy within the party. Furthermore, they enhanced conspiracy and centralism, which ended up as ideological, institutional and organizational collapse between them and Mensheviks.

The aforementioned arguments become a reasonable evidence of the existence of a directly proportional correlation between a political regime type and the essential content of democratic centralism. Hence, it is a key principle of special structural and organizational strategy for the development and activity of the left and, as a rule, communist political parties. The essence of this correlation could be described as the liberalization and democratization of the political regime that determines to strengthen of the democratic component in the party's activities. Furthermore, the authoritarianization of the regime leads to the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies within the party, the emphasis on harsh centralism and hierarchy, and also to a growth of the leader's role in the life of the party.

²⁰ V. Lenin, *O reorganizacii partii*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-e, Tom 12, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury 1968, s. 83, s. 86, s. 88-89, s. 91.

²¹ V. Lenin, *Partijnaja organizacija i partijnaja literatura*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-e, Tom 12, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury 1968, s. 102-103.

²² V. Lenin, *Doklad ob ob#edinitel'nom s#ezde RSDRP (Pis'mo k peterburgskim rabochim)*, [w]: V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij*, V 55 t., Izd. 5-e, Tom 13, Moskva, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury 1972, s. 60-61.

In conclusion, the current study offers a detailed examination of the following matter:

- The anti-system activity of the party under conditions of the hostile authoritarian or totalitarian regime has an impact on the prevalence of centralism over democracy. The party limits its circle of members to professional revolutionaries and functions in form of a closed organization, in which the classic intraparty democracy is replaced by a specific “comradely democracy” of the party conspirators. Therefore, a revolutionary centralism is formed as a result.
- The party’s activities within the democratic regime correlate with a decrease of intraparty centralism and the expansion of democracy. The party has an opportunity to conduct effective legal opposition, which enables it to increase its membership base. A democratic centralism is formed in this case. The party’s vector on illegal activities within the framework of a democratic regime can lead to its prohibition, and, consequently, make the transition to a completely illegal position and, as a result, a rollback to the authoritarian intra-party revolutionary centralism.
- The party’s activities as a dominant political actor are performed in the format of the party of power. In this case, it is necessary to make a notion that under particular conditions of a one-party authoritarian or totalitarian regime, the intensification of centralism and rapid decrease of intraparty democracy is a reality. This tendency manifests itself in the form of bureaucratic centralization of administrative processes, when the adoption of important political decisions both at the party level and at the level of the whole state concentrates in the hands of a limited circle of party leadership headed by the party leader (dictator) that become less accountable to democratically formed party bodies. The party is massive, but, at the same time, its ordinary members are virtually alienated from the processes of governance and decision-making. Hence, the authoritarian (totalitarian) bureaucratic centralism is formed.

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Eurointegration and europeanization as innovative goals of political and socio-economic development of the Visegrad Countries: features and stages of implementation

The article is devoted to analyzing the features and stages of the implementation of Eurointegration and Europeanization as innovative goals of political and socio-economic development of the countries of the Visegrad Group. It was argued that Western countries played an important role in reforming and political and socio-economic development of the Visegrad countries. The author proved that the support of the countries of the region in their socio-economic and political modernization and democratic transformations, on the one hand, is the innovative goal of political and socio-economic development of the countries of the Visegrad Group, on the other – the goal of foreign policy of the West. The researcher also singled out the stages of Eurointegration and Europeanization of the Visegrad Group countries. It has been established that the importance of Eurointegration and Europeanization of the Visegrad Group countries during all years of transformation were subordinated to the implementation of the modernization strategy and the fulfillment of formal criteria for the EU membership. As a result, Eurointegration and Europeanization processes have become a kind of “catalyst” and innovative logic not only for political and socio-economic development, but also for the formation of civil society infrastructure.

Keywords: Eurointegration, Europeanization, political and socio-economic development, EU, Visegrad group.

ЄВРОІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ТА ЄВРОПЕЇЗАЦІЯ ЯК ІННОВАЦІЙНІ ЦІЛІ ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО РОЗВИТКУ КРАЇН ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА ЕТАПИ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ

Стаття присвячена аналізу особливостей та етапів реалізації євроінтеграції та європеїзації як інноваційних цілей політичного та соціально-економічного розвитку країн Вишеградської групи. Аргументовано, що важливу роль у реформуванні та політичному й соціально-економічному розвитку країн Вишеградської групи відіграли країни Заходу. Автор довів, що підтримка країн регіону в їхніх соціально-економічних та політичних модернізаційних і демократичних трансформаціях із одного боку інноваційною ціллю політичного та соціально-економічного розвитку безпосередньо країн Вишеградської групи, а з іншого – ціллю зовнішньої політики

країн Заходу. Виокремлено етапи євроінтеграції та європеїзації країн Вишеградської групи. Встановлено, що значення євроінтеграції і європеїзації країн Вишеградської групи впродовж усіх років трансформацій було підпорядковане реалізації модернізаційної стратегії та виконанню формальних критеріїв членства у ЄС. Відтак євроінтеграційні і європеїзаційні процеси стали своєрідним «каталізатором» й інноваційною логікою не лише політичного і соціально-економічного розвитку, а й формування інфраструктури громадянського суспільства.

Ключові слова: євроінтеграція, європеїзація, політичний і соціально-економічний розвиток, ЄС, Вишеградська група.

The Visegrad Group countries – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic – are consolidated or semi-consolidated democracies, members of the European Union. It became possible to achieve this status due to complex usage of instrumental opportunities, provided by democracy, as well as their geopolitical location and consolidated position of the political class as to social-political changes on the background of democratization/democratic transition of the countries of the region from the authoritarian regime to liberal democracy¹. Herewith, it is quite obvious that the important role in reforming and political and social-economic development of the Visegrad countries, in particular taking into account their foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR, organization of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for mutual economic assistance, belonged to the Western countries, namely the members of the European Union and the USA. Besides, none of the Visegrad countries managed to flinch from such intensive influence of the West, as they initially occupied a middle geopolitical position between the West and East. Thus, the desire to contribute to their stable development was one of the most objective reasons of heightened attention to the countries of the Visegrad Group on the part of the Western countries, especially the EU. At the same time, support for the countries of the region concerning their social-economic and political modernization and democratic transformations, which was an external-political precondition for implementation of reforms in these countries on the part of the international partners, first of all the EU, appeared to be, on the one hand, an innovative aim of political and social-economic development of the Visegrad countries directly, and on the other hand, was the goal of the West countries' foreign policy. This actualizes rising of the scientific range of problems concerning the influence of Euro-integration and Europeanization on political and social-economic development of the Visegrad countries.

¹ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekonomicznych faktoriv v protsesakh novolennia politychnoho klasu v kraïnach Tsentralno-Slbidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro neï” 2009, vol 17, s. 118.

Current range of problems was a direct or an indirect subject to scientific research, conducted by P. Bukalska², P. Buriak, O. Hupalo³, A. Dimitrova⁴, V. Filipchuk⁵, A. Jablonski⁶, T. Karozers⁷, Y. Kish⁸, C. Knill⁹, H. Kravets¹⁰, J. Olsen¹¹, V. Poselskyi¹², L. Prokopenko, A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialoblotska¹³, O. Rudik, V. Bashtannyk¹⁴, B. Sittermann¹⁵, A. Vakhudova¹⁶, M. Vink¹⁷, M. Yakhtenfuks, B. Kolier-Kokh¹⁸, H. Zelenko¹⁹ and others.

They argue that influence of the West on political and social-economic innovations of the Visegrad countries was initially exerted by means of providing: diplomatic assistance (in form of close cooperation between the governments of the Visegrad countries and those of the Western countries); economic assistance (by means of considerable western investment and growth in commodity circulation with the Visegrad Group); institutional and military assistance (on the basis of opening prospects for integration of the Visegrad countries into the European and Transatlantic political, economic and military structures); cultural assistance (by means of providing support to educational projects, civil initiatives and scientific exchange programs between the countries of the region and other EU members) etc²⁰. It should also be marked that one of the most important external factors, which influences the peculiarities of reformation and development of the Visegrad countries was western investors' and international organizations' policy as to introducing their own correction into the transformational process in the countries of the region. While exerting such kind of influence on the countries of the region, the EU and US for the most rapid separation of the former USSR satellites from

² P. Bukalska, *Nowa Grupa Wyszehradzka w nowej Unii Europejskiej – szanse i mozliwosci rozwoju*, Warszawa 2003.

³ P. Buriak, O. Hupalo, *Yevropeiska intebratsiia i hlobalni problemy suchasnosti*, Wyd. Khai-Tek Pres 2008.

⁴ A. Dimitrova, *Enlargement Governance and Institution Building in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of the European Union's administrative capacity requirement*. The paper was presented at the ECPR General Conference, at the University of Kent, Canterbury, 6-8 September 2001, 46 s.

⁵ V. Filipchuk, *Yevrointebratsiini zasoby derzhavotvorennia*, „Publichne upravlinnia: teoria ta praktyka” 2013, vol 4, s. 78-84.

⁶ A. Jablonski, *Europeanization of Public Administration in Central Europe. Poland in Comparative Perspective. Final Report*, “NATO Research Fellowship Report” 1997, 69 s.

⁷ T. Karozers, *Pomoshch Zapada stanovleniuiu brazhdanskoho obschestva v Vostochnoi Evrope y byshem Sovetskom Soiuze*, “KPVO” 2000, vol 1, s. 2-10.

⁸ Y. Kish, „Yevropeiska karta” krain Vyshehdzkoii chetviryky: istoriia rozrytku i format spivrobnytsva, „Naukovyi visnyk Mykolaiivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni VO. Sukhomlynskoho”. Ser: Istorychni nauky 2012, vol 3, nr. 33, s. 259-267.; Y. Kish, *Tsentralna Yevropa v suchasniui systemi yevrorehablnoi intebratsii: Monobrafiia*, Wyd. Lira 2008.

⁹ C. Knill, *The Europeanization of National Administration: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2001.

¹⁰ H. Kravets, *Postkomunistychni transformatsii yak novyi typ protsesu suspilno-politychnykh peretvoren*, „Aktualni problemy polityky” 2014, vol 53, s. 54-63.

¹¹ J. Olsen, *The Many Faces of Europeanization*, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2002, vol 40, nr. 5, s. 921-952.

¹² V. Poselskyi, *Rozshyrennyi soiuz ta rozshyrenna Yevropa: sproba systemnoho analizu yevropeiskoi perlyferii*, „Visnyk Kyivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka. Zhurnalistyka” 2005, vol 13, s. 22-35.

¹³ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialoblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014.

¹⁴ L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Bashtannyk, *Protes yevropeyzatsiui ta yoho osoblyvosti v postkomunistychnykh krainakh Tsentral'noyi ta Skhidnoyi Yevropy*, Wyd. NADU 2010.; L. Prokopenko, *Vstup do yevropeiskoi intebratsii*, Wyd. Milenium 2009.

¹⁵ B. Sittermann, *Europeanisation – A Step Forward in Understanding Europe?*, Munster 2006.

¹⁶ A. Vakhudova, *Nrozhdilena Yevropa: demokratsiia, vazbeli vplyvu ta intebratsiia pislia komunizmu*, Wyd. Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia 2009.

¹⁷ M. Vink, *Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies*, “European Integration online Papers” 2002, vol 6, nr. 13.

¹⁸ M. Yakhtenfuks, B. Kolier-Kokh, *Yevropeiska intebratsiia*, Wyd. Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia 2007.

¹⁹ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobehnykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovleniia politychnoho klasu v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 117-127.

²⁰ T. Karozers, *Pomoshch Zapada stanovleniuiu brazhdanskoho obschestva v Vostochnoi Evrope y byshem Sovetskom Soiuze*, „KPVO” 2000, vol 1, s. 2-10.

Russia applied various methods – from providing simple grants for economic and educational programs to annulling debts and loans. It is quite interesting that at first the Paris and later the London Club of creditors in 1991-1994 wrote off Poland a half of \$ 47 billion of its foreign debts. Besides, the Polish economy over the period of transformation received investment from the French, German and American companies that equaled more than \$ 50 billion²¹. On the basis of this Z. Bzhezinskyi later called Germany the main investor of Poland to join the EU, and the US – to enter the NATO²². Even despite the fact that though Poland was a leader among the countries, which were financed from the “above”, other members of the Visegrad Group, in particular Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, received almost 60% of all financial investments into development of the post-communistic countries of the region²³.

But even regardless the fact that various international institutions like the UNO, OSCE, Council of Europe and others, financial and economic structures like the IMF, EBRD etc., exerted significant influence on transformation of political, legal, financial, social-economic systems of the Visegrad countries, the region was more under the influence of internal processes²⁴. Or at least internal processes which had connection to foreign orientation of the Visegrad countries, concerning their “return to Europe” and entering the EU. Thus, namely Euro-integration and Europeanization after the collapse of the USSR became an innovation aim for political and social-economic development of the Visegrad countries.

It is notable, that Euro-integration and later Europeanization were not a goal in itself, but rather a goal aimed at the Visegrad countries withdrawing from the sphere of the former USSR influence, first of all from Russia's, especially in the context of comprehending the necessity of restoration of previous political regimes. It was represented in the very formation of the Visegrad Group (“V4”), which initially positioned itself as a basic idea/logics and an intermediate link on the way to the EU membership. Even despite the fact, that at first the Visegrad union did not have any clear-cut organizational structures, it acted as a body, whose main goals of activity were: coordination of actions in the sphere of foreign policy and extension of relations between the European institutions and international organizations; cooperation in the security sphere; extension of economic relations, mutually beneficial trade relations and further cooperation in the sphere of protection of human rights and national minorities, environment, energy, infrastructure and information²⁵. Thus, in case of the Visegrad countries (“V4”) one could initially trace the example of a group movement towards the European Union. Also, it is necessary to pay attention that first steps of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the EU

²¹ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekonomicznych faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasu v kraïnach Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro net” 2009, vol 17, s. 118.

²² Z. Bzhezinskyi, *Velyka shakhiivnytsia; Amerykanska pershist ta yii stratezhichni imperatyry*, Wyd. Lilcia – NV 2000, s. 70.

²³ K. Skubiszewski, *Czym jest polska racja stanu wobec aktualnych wyzwan politycznych, gospodarczych i spolecznych*, „Zbior dokumentow” 1993, nr. 1, s. 9-10.

²⁴ H. Kravets, *Postkommunistychni transformatsii yak novyi typ protsesu suspilno-politychnykh peretvoren*, „Aktualni problemy polityky” 2014, vol 53, s. 55-57.

²⁵ F. Golemski, *The Visegrad Group*, „The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs” 1994, vol 2, s. 37.

direction were made by the very Visegrad countries, but not the countries of the West²⁶. But gradually, especially in the sphere of implementation of the set tasks, the Visegrad group has evolved from a simple formal union to a harmonious regional formation. The point is that in the early 90s of the 20th century were signed interstate agreements at first between the countries of the “Visegrad three” (when Czechoslovakia was formally a joint state), and later the “Visegrad four” (though, as it is known Czechoslovakian-Hungarian was not signed). In fact, creation of the “Visegrad three/four” as a formula of cooperation in the then destabilized Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe was very demonstrative and positive example of cooperation both within the region and in a broader European-wide context, as from that time started the negotiations and talks between various regional formations in western Europe and the Visegrad group. The most important indicative, positive and crucial example of common actions for the Visegrad countries, as well as the instance of profound mutual work of diplomats in these countries was almost simultaneous submitting of the applications for full-membership in the EU²⁷. Thus, the “V4” commenced an initial stage in Euro-integration and Europeanization of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic as an innovational aim of their political and social-economic development.

The Visegrad group clearly comprehended, that the European Union is a formation of European countries, which by means of creating a common market, economic and currency union, as well as by means of implementation of mutual policy and activity are aiming at providing continual economic growth, social development and unity of the country-members²⁸. On the other hand, they realized that the enlargement of the EU to “the East” was a large-scale process. As if before the collapse of the communist regime the EU on the international arena conducted negotiations gradually and not more than with two-three candidate countries, then with the emergence of new independent states on the European continent they had to hold them in parallel²⁹.

In this context, the most interesting fact is that the EU’s promises to enlarge its borders, made in due time, gave the post-communist countries of the Visegrad group, which were striving to become a part of the big European community, a dream to change their position as the “peripheral countries”³⁰. Emergence of a new goal – the EU membership, became the most innovative and uniting factor for the countries in the region. A real to chance to “return to Europe” again and become the members of a powerful international organization was a new important stimulus for the countries of the region within the frames of modernization and

²⁶ Y. Kish, *Tsentralna Yevropa v suchasni systemi yevrorehionabnoy intehratsii: Monografija*, Wyd. Lira 2008, s. 131.; P. Bukalska, *Nowa Grupa Wyszehradzka w nowej Unii Europejskiej – szanse i mozliwosci rozwoju*, Warszawa 2003, s. 6.

²⁷ Y. Kish, „Yevropejska karta” kvain Vyszehradskoi chetvirky: istoriia rozvytku i format spivrobitystva, „Naukovyi visnyk Mykolajivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V.O. Sukhomlynskoho”. Ser.: Istorychni nauky 2012, vol 3, nr. 33, s. 262-263.

²⁸ Y. Surmin, V. Bakumenko, A. Mykhnenko, *Entsyklopedychmyi slovnyk z derzhavnogo upvalimnia*, Wyd. NADU 2010, s. 224.

²⁹ P. Buriak, O. Hupalo, *Yevropejska intehratsiia i hlobalni problemy suchasnosti*, Wyd. Khai-Tek Pres 2008.

³⁰ Y. Kahanov, *Tsentralno-Skbidna Yevropa yak istorychmyi rehion: zmist ta evoliutsiia kontseptsii*, „Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakultetu Zaporizkoho derzhavnogo universytetu” 2005, vol 19, s. 333-341.

democratization transformations³¹. The point is that Euro-integration and Europeanization became the means of influence on the transformation of the institutional system of the Visegrad countries, which were of excessive uniqueness and justification.

Besides, in the EU policy of “influence” or policy of “mild power” one should distinguish passive and active leverages of influence on changes of political and social-economic development of the Visegrad countries. By means of passive leverages the EU was a kind of attraction force and was able to exert influence on internal political conditions of life of the potential candidate countries of the Visegrad group, referring only to the nature of its existence and peculiarities of its activity. The main components of this influence were: political and economic benefits from such membership; concerns to suffer great losses in case of denial of access to the EU market; non-membership to the legal field of the EU; attitude on the international level towards the countries which were/were not the EU members; protection from the EU. To active leverages of the EU we may refer goal-oriented and result-oriented policy towards the candidate countries. Such policy meant determination, application and control over the implementation of a range of requirements needed to join the EU, tasks which were put before each country-member from the Visegrad group, as well as conduction of negotiations with candidate countries, signing agreements of entering the EU and the very process of joining the EU³². This process was characterized by its goal-oriented nature, as was regarded as successful, if it includes: asymmetric interdependence (countries of the region were much weaker than the EU members in economic, political and other spheres); compulsion (could be tough, but fair); meritocracy; presence of the principle “more for more”. Thus, preparatory and entrance processes, expenditures and benefits were constructed so that the prospect of satisfying the set requirements and tasks was rather tempting, and in case of failure it was disadvantageous. Adhering to the position of uniqueness of modernization processes in each country of the Visegrad group A. Vakhudova accentuated attention on the point that considering the innovation goal of political and social-economic development the region was “united” by the fact that it immediately started its movement towards liberal democracy³³.

This conclusion was a result of deliberate and rational setting objectives by citizens of the countries in the region and corresponded to the remark made by J. Robinson and D. Acemoglu that to determine the vector of the community development it is necessary to pay attention to the type of political and social-economic institutions, which show the motivation of people’s behavior. The point is that the institutions lead to formation of positive or negative stimuli by their citizens³⁴. And these stimuli are an engine which may move the society, impel to some

³¹ V. Poselskyi, *Rozshyrenyi soiuz ta rozshyrenia Yevropa: spraha systemnoho analizu yevropeiskoi periferii*, „Visnyk Kyivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka. Zhurnalistyka” 2005, vol 13, s. 22-35.

³² V. Filipchuk, *Yevrointebnatsiini zasoby derzhavotvorennia*, „Publichne upravlinnia: teoriia ta praktyka” 2013, vol 4, s. 79.

³³ A. Vakhudova, *Nerozdilena Yevropa: demokratsiia, vuzbeli vplyvu ta intebnatsiia pislia komunizmu*, Wyd. Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia 2009, s. 134-137.

³⁴ D. Acemoglu, J. Robinson, *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty*, Wyd. Profile Books 2012.

actions. These can be not only laws or certain decisions of social institutions but, to a greater extent, their everyday practical functioning. Namely, political and social-economic goals and institutions lead society to development or degradation and they were completely implemented in case of the post-communist countries of the Visegrad group in the early 90s of the 20th century.

It was revealed in the fact that depending on the access of broad masses of population in the countries of the region institutions were characterized by openness. Moreover, the EU is a community with open social-economic and political institutions. Thus, Euro-integration and Europeanization of the Visegrad countries was an ideology, which supported introduction of the same/identical type of institutions inside the countries, aiming at improving social-economic and political situation of people. It resulted in the fact that when the candidate countries from the Visegrad group submitted their applications for joining the European Union, it immediately started employing its active leverages of influence. As the significant foreign-policy aim of these countries was to enter the European Union, and then it was possible to achieve it only by means of absolute changes in their internal political and social-economic life (what was realized behind the schedule only in Slovakia). At the initial stage the elements of the EU active leverages of influence (“benefits” from membership and a long list of requirements) were created not to encourage the changes within the candidate countries of the Visegrad group, but, first of all, to protect the EU itself from those countries which could not develop themselves in the direction of the countries-members. However, later these components became powerful active leverages of influence, while stages and mechanisms of the joining process just structured the usage of restrictions on the part of the European Union³⁵.

In this context it is important to state that taking into account “asymmetrical interdependence”, the EU in no way depended on the candidate countries from the Visegrad group, both in political and in social-economic spheres. However, the post-communist Visegrad countries, which were planning to enter the European Union, understood their own social-economic and political dependence on Euro-integration and Europeanization. Prospects for membership were raising in case of meritocracy in the Visegrad countries. Thus, the position of the candidate countries to join the European Union depended on the successes in implementing the tasks and requirements which were set before them. The system of evaluating the level of country’s readiness was usually based on its success, achieved on the way to the EU. In this regard, V. Filipchuk supposes that the pre-accession process in case of the Visegrad countries could not take place without any kind of compulsion, however this compulsion would become senseless, if the process itself was not based on the objective and technical standards of evaluation the level of readiness of the candidate countries from the Visegrad group to carry out its transition to the following stage. Besides, in the countries of the region, where till 1989, did not exist any liberal and united oppositional forces (Slovakia), the EU active leverages of influences contributed to their emergence. Such leverages influenced the civil pro-European groups and put into shape their political programs, views and

³⁵ V. Filipchuk, *Yevrointehratsiini zasoby derzhavotvorennia*, „Publichne upravlinnia: teoria ta praktyka“ 2013, vol 4, s. 80.

forms of activity of oppositional forces in the course of election campaigns, choosing allies for further cooperation before and after the elections and the way of their governing after coming into power. Additionally, the EU at least in three ways contributed to the shifts in institutional, social-economic and political environment in the Visegrad countries: firstly, the EU provided potential possibility for cooperation between disunited oppositional political forces; secondly, along with other international subjects the EU offered useful information to oppositional elites, which, in such a way, adapted to political-economic programs, compatible with the EU membership; finally, the EU provided assistance actualization of the state policies in various economic spheres to the political parties, which guaranteed implementation of such programs after their getting into power³⁶. In their turn, due to the EU constant supervision over the pre-accession process, oppositional forces could not just pretend, that some changes were taking place in the country, but had actually to implement the already declared decisions, starting the implementation of political and social-economic reforms after getting into power.

Thus, A. Vakhudova states that after a “deep penetration” of the Visegrad countries into the pre-accession process, losses which could be suffered in case of leaving the process motivated even former liberal ruling parties to build their political strategy depending on the EU membership (especially it is notable on the example of the Czech Republic). Therefore, an intensive political struggle in combination with the desire to become the EU-member, made the bigger part of political parties search for mutual agreement as to the main vector of internal political and social-economic reforms and foreign policy. During the election campaigns parties and movements in the Visegrad countries realized that they could coordinate their agenda with the process of entering the EU and by this get considerable electoral support³⁷. The conclusion is that if we do not take into consideration the overall situation in the region, which was dependable on a large number of factors, but just pay attention to the effectiveness of the EU active leverages of influence it becomes clear that namely the countries characterized by non-liberal and imitated democratic regime (as Slovakia) gained much more benefits from such influence, than the countries which were already liberal and democratic. At the same time, the procedure of entering the European Union presupposed that the governments of the Visegrad countries adopted strategies of long-standing political and social-economic reforms, which would continue even after the end of their term. Thus, the actions commenced by the EU active leverages of influence made the governments of the Visegrad countries introduce long-term political courses, which in future would enhance effectiveness and liability of subsequent governments. Some of the requirements made by the European Union presupposed a time consuming process and that is why there were formed mid-term and long-term projects, and this, in its turn, gave the European Union possibilities to conduct substantial transformations within the political and social-economic systems of the Visegrad group countries. In the

³⁶ V. Filipchuk, *Yevrointelnatsiini zasoby derzhavotvorenia*, „Publichne upravlinnia: teoriia ta praktyka” 2013, vol 4, s. 81-82.

³⁷ A. Vakhudova, *Nervozdilenia Yevropa: demokratsiia, vuzbeleni vplyvu ta intebratsiia pislia komunizmu*, Wyd. Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia 2009, s. 139.

countries, where the modernization process was mainly commenced due to the internal factors, any intervention, even an indirect one, on the part of the EU could meet with the opposition and refusal to reform already successful institutions or change the vector of their movement. In the countries, where did not exist any internal factors, such dilemmas were absent either³⁸.

In general, it becomes obvious that due to the facilities, which were used by the EU in the form of active and passive leverages of influence in the post-communist countries of the Visegrad group, the processes of reformation of political and social-economic systems and systems of state governing had a long-term and inconvertible character. It was presupposed by a direct dependence, as progress in the pre-accession process was connected with adoption of laws and introduction of reforms, and the process itself served a mechanism of devotion to steady reformation, as the change of direction could be just disadvantageous for any subsequent government. Thus, deepening into the process, national governments adopted predictable courses of social-economic policy, which served as an important signal for internal and external political and economic players. And therefore approaching the EU membership the Visegrad group countries have gradually changed the character and influence of different civil groups. All these means and mechanisms in general were not just a “pure”, but rather a “changeable” precondition, as the states, economies and societies were changing as a result of being involved into the processes, which were gradual and planned. It argues that the prospects of the Visegrad group countries to become the members of the European society profoundly influenced the democratic transformations in the countries of the region³⁹.

Thus, the EU not without reasons was regarded by the Visegrad countries as one of the most successful integration projects in the world. The value of the Euro-integration and Europeanization process is in the fact that the integration which started on the European continent in the second half of the 20th century as an economic process has gradually transformed into a political process of unification on the ground of democratic values. And it seemed as if achievement of the criteria for membership was drawing the Visegrad group countries to a certain “standard”. And as the Euro-integration process touched on the socio-cultural and political spheres, it was almost impossible to meet the criteria of membership just technically without qualitative changes within the political, economic and social systems. Taking into account this, Euro-optimist in the early 90s of the 20th century stated that possible extension of the European Union towards the Visegrad countries must bring exceptionally positive consequences both for “old” and “new” members. Even despite the fact, as the sociological research data show, the highest level of Euro-optimism in the countries of the region was observed in the early-mid 90s of the 20th century and reached its peak at 80-90%, the ruling classes represented the will of their societies⁴⁰ and were “unbreakable” in the context of implementing an innovational goal of political and social-economic development.

³⁸ A. Vakhudova, *Nerozdilena Yevropa: demokratiia, vazheli vplyvyv ta intelektualna pisnia komunisty*, Wyd. Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia 2009, s. 140.

³⁹ V. Filipchuk, *Yevrointehratsiini zasoby derzhavotvorenia*, „Publichne upravlinnia: teoriia ta praktyka” 2013, vol 4, s. 83.

⁴⁰ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobennykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasu v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i polityohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 121.

It is notable that the very process of Euro-integration of the Visegrad countries comprised four stages⁴¹. The first stage covered 1989-1991, when the countries of the Visegrad group declared their intention to start a large-scale geopolitical project “return to Europe”, and on the part of the EU it was marked by readiness to search for the forms of integration. During this period politicians and civil society leaders of the former “people’s democracy” countries actively supported the ideas of liberalization of political regimes. The initiator of providing practical assistance in negotiating the issues of possible integration of two parts of Europe was the president of France F. Mitterrand, who on October 25, 1989 initiated in the European parliament the project concerning the foundation of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the aim of which was to promote changes in the post-communist countries (it was created in 1990, and started its activity in 1991)⁴². It was a period of economic penetration into the EU markets. The most important events of these years were: establishing of diplomatic relations with the Visegrad countries, creation of the regime of the most mutual assistance in trade according to the rules of the GATT, signing European associated agreements with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Over this period extended economic support of reforms in the countries of the Visegrad group on the part of the EU was being provided under the program PHARE, initiated by the European Union council in December 1989 and at the initial stage was created to provide economic assistance to Poland and Hungary for reforming their economic systems and later spread over other countries. It was focused on providing financial help, carrying out economic expert evaluations and inviting investment for further economic reforms, and later became the main financial instrument to implement the strategy of extending of the European Union to the East⁴³. Later there were proposed several regional formations, emergence of which was presupposed by a mutual wish of the countries of the region to join the European community. It included some countries from the Visegrad group⁴⁴ (for additional information see Table 1).

The second stage was dated 1992-1993 and was characterized by the beginning of the political dialogue between the EU and the countries of the Visegrad group. The grounds for further intensification of political cooperation became European agreements on association. In 1990 the head of the European commission offered the countries of the region to sign the agreements on association, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were the first countries to hold negotiations over association in comparison with other Central-Eastern European countries. Thus, the first agreements were signed in 1991 with Poland and Hungary. The agreement with Czechoslovakia was signed after its dissolution into two new states the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993⁴⁵. At that time the EU finally agreed all membership criteria. It was greatly

⁴¹ O. Kovalova, *Strategii yevrointehratsii: yak realizувaty yevropejskyi vybir Ukrainy: Monohrafiia*, Kiev 2003, s. 86.

⁴² A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialobłotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabryi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 340.

⁴³ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzohemnykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasu v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro neï” 2009, vol 17, s. 122.

⁴⁴ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialobłotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabryi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 341.

⁴⁵ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialobłotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabryi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 342-343.

contributed by the fact that in the Visegrad countries in power were liberally-democratically oriented groups, which traditionally were pro-European⁴⁶. At the same time there continued to appear regional formations, into which some countries of the Visegrad group were involved, in particular the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CTFTA) and so on (for additional information see Table 1).

The third stage covered 1994-1998 and started with the submission of the applications concerning joining the EU by the candidate countries. At that time complex evaluation of social-political transformations in the Visegrad countries was conducted and on the basis of verification of the conformity of state of internal institutional reforms to the Copenhagen criteria and the decision as to their ability to assume responsibilities of the members⁴⁷. Besides, in 1994 the program PHARE was adapted to the priorities and needs of every country of the Visegrad group. In 1997 this program was reformatted into the instrument of providing assistance to the countries, which submitted applications to join the EU. Also in December 1994 the European Council approved the "Strategy for entering the EU" for Central-Eastern European countries, in particular the Visegrad countries. In 1995 the European Commission elaborated proposals, concerning the applications of the countries of the region to become members of the EU and to conduct the analysis of the financial aspects of the EU extension and its influence on various spheres⁴⁸. In 1997 the European Commission published the "Program 2000", which included evaluation of the level of transformation of the Visegrad countries, which submitted the applications to join the EU. The Supplement "Partnership program of preparation to accession 1998-2001" was adopted in 1998. The main goal of the program was creation of legal and organizational frames for elaboration of mutual actions of the European Commission and the candidate countries (for additional information see Table 1).

Table 1. Stages of Euro-integration and Europeanization of the Visegrad countries (1991–2004)⁴⁹

Country	Signing of association documents, year	Date of submitting the EU membership application	Date of joining the NATO	Date of joining the EU
Poland	1991	08.04.1994	12.03.1999	01.05.2004
Slovakia	1993	27.06.1995	29.03.2004	01.05.2004
Hungary	1991	01.04.1994	12.03.1999	01.05.2004
The Czech Republic	1993	23.01.1996	12.03.1999	01.05.2004

⁴⁶ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobehnykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasi v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 122.

⁴⁷ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobehnykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasi v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 122.

⁴⁸ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialoblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 342-343.

⁴⁹ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialoblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivniabnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 343.

The fourth stage of the EU enlargement started with the adoption of the communicative strategy, elaborated by the European Commission, actualization of which was planned on 1999-2006. The aim of the strategy was provision of population of the EU member-countries with information about goals, tasks and effects of joining the EU countries from the Visegrad group (and other Central-Eastern European countries), as well as promotion of comprehension of the political leaders and citizens of the candidate countries a direct connection between the social transformations and the prospects of entering the EU. In 1999 the European Union started the program “Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession”, aimed at providing financial support to the investment projects in the spheres of environmental protection and transport. In 1999 the EU adopted the decision and in 2000 the Special pre-accession program for agricultural sphere and development of villages entered into force. Since 2000 the program PHARE has been gradually transforming into a structural fund aimed at promoting economic development. The abovementioned programs were three main instruments of providing financial help to the candidate countries in the process of their preparation for joining the EU⁵⁰ (for additional information see Table 1).

The outlined processes happened in parallel with a change in the structure of social-economic development of the countries of the Visegrad group. Besides, along with that they developed bi- and multilateral cooperation in the military sphere (as a result Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic entered the NATO). Thus, in 1992 almost half of export of the countries in the region pertained to the European Union, whereas the percent of export, which had earlier pertained to the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, decreased to 1/5. Besides, the level of west-European investment into the countries of the region grows dynamically⁵¹. By this, the European agreements of the 90s in the 20th century became the main legal instruments in implementation of integration strategies by the candidate countries from the Visegrad group. In general, up to 2000 preparation of political institutions and the EU members and the candidate countries from the Visegrad group was carried out in two directions: actualization of the pre-accession strategy and conduction of negotiations as to the accession “enhanced” by additional political or financial instruments. While realizing this strategy the candidate countries reformed their political institutions, state governing systems, regulated social-economic relations, internal market, agricultural sphere, transport, social sphere, environmental protection, regional policy and so on. Access to educational programs, programs of professional training, scientific research provided the representatives of the candidate countries from the Visegrad group with possibilities to form professional skills in terms of west European countries, contributed to introduction of rules of financing projects in the abovementioned spheres etc.

⁵⁰ A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bialobłocka, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU 2014, s. 345-347.

⁵¹ *Tsentralno-Vostochnaia Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX veka. V 3 vol, vol 3, ch. 1*, Moskva 2002, s. 96.

Therefore, by means of both governments and non-governmental organizations took place acceleration of the process of implementation of the EU legal procedures into the legislation of the candidate countries from the Visegrad group; was carried out administrative reform and actualization of other requirements as to further accession to the EU. To do this, in the candidate countries were created special groups, which involved “leaders of public opinion”, interested representatives of business-elite and members of non-governmental organizations. The communicative strategy of the EU enlargement was characterized by broad public discussion. In the course of actualization of the communicative strategy were realized various research projects, public discussions, conferences, media-projects and training sessions for journalists, projects for youth and non-governmental organizations, cooperation with bodies of state power, projects in the sphere of cross-border cooperation and so on⁵².

Besides, under the influence of a complex of measures aimed at Euro-integration and Europeanization took place profound changes in the structure of mass consciousness, forms of activity of the political class in the Visegrad countries. Together with democratic transformations the states of the region by corresponding legal acts approved their course on protection of human rights for each and every citizen, having ratified the European Human Rights Convention, joined the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and others. It proved an innovational desire to implement the European standards of human rights into their national legislations. It had a significant effect as in the course of time the countries of the Visegrad group entered top-40 countries as to the indices of human development.

Therefore, we argue that the significance of Euro-integration and Europeanization processes on the Visegrad countries, including the policy conducted by the governments of the countries in the region, during all years of transformation were subordinated to the implementation of the modernization strategy and the fulfillment of formal criteria for the EU membership. As a result, Euro-integration and Europeanization processes have become a kind of “catalyst” and innovative logic not only for political and socio-economic development, but also for the formation of the civil society. Besides, the strategy of Euro-integration and Europeanization was a gradual process of “cultivation” of the benefits from membership, and not a mechanical imposition of the EU requirements. That is why, by means of the communicative strategy within the societies of the Visegrad countries it was possible to overcome “skepticism and fear of the unknown”⁵³.

⁵² H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobennykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasu v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 123-126.

⁵³ H. Zelenko, *Rol ekzobennykh faktoriv v protsesakh onovlennia politychnoho klasu v krainakh Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka. Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 126.

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Comparative analysis of political cleavages in the countries of East and Central Europe

In this article specific of political cleavages in the countries of East and Central Europe was defined, the main accent made on new lines of political cleavages, that structurize political sphere. Moreover, main theory-methodological approaches to the analyses of political cleavages are provided. Also author analyses peculiarities of political cleavages in the East and Central Europe on the examples Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania.

Keywords: political cleavage, transit democracies, party system, East and Central Europe.

Analiza porównawcza społeczno-politycznych podziałów w Krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej

Ten artykuł przedstawia konkretne społeczno-polityczne podziały w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, skupia się na nowych liniach podziału, którzy tworzą strukturę przestrzeni politycznej. Ponadto przedstawia podstawowe teoretyczne i metodologiczne podejścia do analizy społeczno-politycznych podziałów. Autor analizuje również cechy społeczno-polityczne podziałów w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej na przykładzie Węgier, Rumunii, Słowacji, Polski i Litwy.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczno-polityczny podział, przejściowe demokracji, system partyjny, Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia.

Порівняльний аналіз соціополітичних поділів в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи

В статті проаналізовано соціополітичні поділи в країнах Центральної та Східної Європи. При цьому наголос зроблено на нових лініях поділів, які формують структуру політичного простору. Окрім того розглянуто головні теоретичні та методологічні підходи до аналізу соціополітичних поділів. Автор також проаналізувала характерні риси соціополітичних поділів в країнах Центральної та Східної Європи на прикладі Угорщини, Румунії, Словаччини, Польщі та Литви.

Ключові слова: соціополітичний поділ, перехідна демократія, партійна система, Центральна та Східна Європа.

Kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej pod wpływem globalizacji, integracji międzynarodowej i regionalizacji niezmiennie zwiększa znaczenie całego spektrum zagadnień dotyczących społeczno-politycznego podziału. Jednakże, szczególnie ważnego znaczenia ta problematyka nabywa w krajach postkomunistycznych, gdzie tylko tworzą się stabilne systemy polityczne. Trudno nie zauważyć szczególne znaczenie tych badań dla Ukrainy, która wciąż stoi ryzykiem podziału.

Dlatego celem niniejszego artykułu jest opracowanie odpowiednich narzędzi teoretycznych i metodologicznych dla stosowania koncepcji społeczno-politycznego podziału w celu badania krajów post-komunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej.

Niewątpliwie badania rozróżnienia społeczno-politycznego musi zaczynać się od analizy prac naukowych S. Lipseta i St. Rokkana, którzy zidentyfikowali cztery klasyczne rozróżnienie, a mianowicie: między centrum a peryferiami, kościołem i państwem, miastem i wsią, właścicielami i pracownikami¹. Ten model społeczno-politycznych podziałów znajduje szerokie zastosowanie i akceptację w kręgach akademickich, dając podstawową ideę podziału i ich wpływów na kształtowanie systemów partyjnych.

Jednak pomimo faktu, że od czasu wprowadzenia tego terminu społeczno-polityczny podział w teorii politycznej przez S. Lipseta i St. Rokkana minęło prawie pół wieku i jeszcze nie osiągnięto jednolitego zdefiniowania. Często pod tym względem rozumiemy 1) wszystkie sprzeczności, które pojawiają się w społeczeństwie z powodu zróżnicowania społecznego, różnic kulturowych, regionalnych i innych, oraz 2) wyłącznie ich zinstytucjonalizowane form w systemach partyjnych.

Naszym zdaniem, najbardziej celowym jest wskazanie trzech grup podejść do zrozumienia społeczno-politycznego rozróżnienia, a mianowicie: konfliktowy, instytucjonalny, socjalny i kulturowy. Podejście konfliktowe odwołuje się do tego, że w podstawie rozróżnień leżą różnego rodzaju konflikty - zarówno strukturalnie zakorzenione oraz potencjalne. Podejście socjalne i kulturowe wskazuje, że struktura społeczna określa społeczno-polityczny podział w kraju. Instytucjonalne podejście zmniejsza polityczny podział wyłącznie instytucjonalnego konfliktu w społeczeństwie². Pod względem społeczno-politycznego podziału należy rozumieć względnie stabilne różnice istniejące między przedstawicielami grup, którzy mają swoją własną tożsamość i reprezentację instytucjonalną.

Bez względu na fakt, że klasyczne rozróżnienie związane z państwami Europy Zachodniej, w różnym stopniu, także są charakterystyczne dla krajów postkomunistycznych

¹ Lipset S. Struktury podziałów, systemy partyjne i preferencje wyborców. Uwagi wstępne / S. Lipset, St. Rokkan // Nauka polityczna.- 2004.- № 4.- S. 204-234.

² Romaniuk A. Od zjednoczenia do niepodległości: stan i dynamika integracji społeczeństwa ukraińskiego w ramach europejskich procesów / Romaniuk A., Sokyrrka J. M. - Lwów: CPD, 2009. - 140 s.s. 10-12.

Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, a mianowicie podziały na społecznej, ekonomicznej, językowej, religijnej i terytorialnej podstawie. W tym samym czasie otwartym pozostaje pytanie - dlaczego w krajach o podobnych społecznych separacjach są tworzone różne systemy partyjne? Tak więc, E. Meleshkina zwraca uwagę na znaczenie instytucjonalnych progów, odnoszących się do społeczno-politycznych podziałów, czyli progów legitymizacji, integracji, reprezentacji, rządów większości³. Naukowiec wskazuje, że obecność wysokich progów ogranicza możliwości instytucjonalizacji separacji, podczas gdy niski próg przeciwnie stymuluje ten proces.

Według S. Elisejewa, na proces konsolidacji systemów partyjnych w krajach postkomunistycznych wpływa kilka czynników, a mianowicie:

1. instytucjonalne dziedzictwo autorytarnego reżimu oraz w pierwszej kolejności: a) tradycje instytucjonalne i normy, b) partii-spadkobiorcy ideologicznych pozycji współczesnych reżimów, c) partie, które stworzone są na podstawie ruchów masowych i demokratycznych,
2. struktura instytucjonalna nowych demokracji, która obejmuje: a) formy rządów, b) format systemu wyborczego, c) wzmocnienie granic politycznych i prawnych⁴.

Ogólnie należy zauważyć, że cechy społeczno-polityczne podziałów w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej wynikają przede wszystkim przez historyczne cechy rozwoju regionu, doświadczenia reżimów autorytarnych, specyfikę przemian demokratycznych. Szczególnie jasne jest to, że socjalistyczna przeszłość pozostawiła głębokie piętno na społecznej strukturze, politycznych kierunkach, a także na tradycjach organizacji politycznej w większości krajów postkomunistycznych.

Jak zauważył K. Lawson, wyraźną cechą istniejących podziałów społeczno-politycznych w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej jest podział między mniejszością, „która rozwija się w procesie postkomunistycznej transformacji” i „większością tych, którzy żyją nieszczęśliwie”, próbując zwolnić i zachować przedrewolucyjną sytuację. Partii dążą do wspierania nadziei większości, ale po osiągnięciu władzy, zazwyczaj stosują się do woli mniejszości⁵.

Koncentrując się na specyficznych podziałach społeczno-politycznych w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, A. Rommele wnioskuje, że klasyczna teoria podziałów nie wytrzymuje sprawdzenia przez rzeczywistości post-totalitarne. On wskazuje na cztery główne różnice w politycznych podziałach w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, w przeciwieństwie do Europy Zachodniej.

Jest to, po pierwsze, *przebieg i trudność tranzytu*. Postkomunistyczna Europa rzeczywiście przeżywa potrójny tranzyt, który oferuje nie tylko demokratyzację, ale również na dużą skalę

³ Meleshkina E. Koncepcja podziałów społeczno-politycznych: problem uniwersalności / E.J. Meleshkina // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 11-29.

⁴ Elisejew S. Społeczne i polityczne podziały, uwarunkowania instytucjonalne i warunki konsolidacji systemów partyjnych w przejściu do demokracji / Elisejew S. // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 64-89.

⁵ Lawson K. Podziały, partie i wyborcy / K. Lawson // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 51-55.

przejście do gospodarki rynkowej oraz budowy państwa. Fakt, że w Europie Zachodniej zajęło to kilka wieków (od stworzenia państwa narodowego do kapitalizmu, a ostatecznie do demokracji), kraje postkomunistyczne muszą wypełnić to jednocześnie w najkrótszym czasie.

Po drugie, *różnica elektoratu*. Chociaż zachodnie systemy partyjne, prawdopodobnie już nie są więcej zamrożone i zachodnie sojusze wyborcze wskazują na coraz większą niestabilność w systemie partyjnym, która rozwinęła się na Zachodzie pozostaje silna tendencja do następstwa oraz inercji. Z drugiej strony, w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej elektorat jest znacznie bardziej otwarty oraz poddaje się wpływom, znacznie bardziej niestabilny i niepewny.

Po trzecie, *różnice w rodzaju partii*. W formie, w jakiej one powstały, partie Europy Zachodniej były w stanie zmobilizować zbiorowe tożsamości polityczne. Gdy zaczęły one tymczasowe relacje z tymi, które znajdowały się po jakiejś stronie ważnych rozróżnień, były w stanie wykorzystywać potencjał już istniejące sieci organizacyjne. Elektorat w ten sposób został skutecznie podzielony na bloki względnie stabilne i zamknięte. Okoliczności zniszczenia komunizmu, które spowodowały dużą rezygnację z już istniejących wcześniej tożsamości i sieci oraz nie potrafiły dać tym nowym partiom w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej takich zalet. Nowe strony stały się bardziej charyzmatycznymi i konsumenckimi, a niż programowymi.

Po czwarte, *rola mediów*. W krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej media podlegały ścisłej cenzurze i kontroli przez reżimy komunistyczne. Służyły one jako narzędzie elit rządzących, dzięki którym polityka państwowa oraz ideologia panująca stała się bardziej popularną⁶.

D.-L. Sale, z kolei, uważa, że główna różnica między krajami post-komunistycznymi oraz krajami zachodnimi, opiera się na doświadczeniu tych państw w „rewolucji międzynarodowej». Zgodnie z tym pojęciem rozumie on przejście od kapitalizmu do kapitalizmu ponownie przez socjalizm, który osiągnięty został przez byłe państwa komunistyczne⁷.

Z kolei według A. Moreno, przejściowe demokracje krajów postkomunistycznych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej charakteryzują się obecnością trzech głównych podziałów wartości: wartości reformatorskich oraz antyreformatorskich, wartości liberalno-demokratycznych, liberalnych i fundamentalnych oraz demokratycznych i autorytarnych.

Pierwszy podział wartościowy obejmuje stosunek do reform gospodarczych - rząd przeciw własności prywatnej i indywidualizmu gospodarczego, stosunek wobec reform politycznych i przemian społecznych oraz wobec aborcji, nacjonalizmu i religii. Bieguny tego podziału określone są jako liberalne, demokratyczne oraz rynkowe z jednej strony, a także konserwatywne, autorytarne i statyczne preferancje z drugiej strony. Ta linia konfliktu określana jest jako podział reform.

⁶ Remmele A. Struktura podziałów i systemy partyjne w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej / Remmele A. // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 30-45.

⁷ Sale D.-L. Czy można stosować podziały Rokkana w Europie Środkowej? (Referat) / D.-L. Sale // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 56-63.

Jeśli chodzi o rozróżnienie na podstawie wartości liberalnych i fundamentalistycznych, to zawiera ono stosunek wobec religii, autorytaryzmu oraz aborcji w różnych krajach. Liberalny i fundamentalistyczny podział przyciąga wartości kulturowe, takie, jak religia i nacjonalizm oraz kontrastuje z bardziej liberalnymi poglądami, które pojawiły się w analizie postaw wobec aborcji.

Trzeci rozróżnienie - jest to postawa wobec autorytaryzmu, a także bardziej otwartego i demokratycznego rządu. Ten podział jest tylko obecny we wszystkich społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych. Zauważyliśmy to, że wokół dominujących wartości politycznych i toczy się główna walka sił politycznych w krajach postkomunistycznych, która określa również odpowiednią konfigurację systemu partyjnego⁸.

Należy podkreślić, że w latach 90-tych powstały dwa punkty widzenia na temat wpływu podziałów na kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. W pierwszym podejściu - pojęcie «czysta deska» (R. Markowska, P. Mayer) - przestrzeń polityczna charakteryzuje się brakiem struktury i chaotycznością oraz podziały społeczno-polityczne powstały tylko po upływie okresu przejściowego⁹.

W drugim podejściu, reprezentowanym przez G. Kitchelta – podziały społeczno-polityczne powstają pod wpływem czynników (ekonomicznych, społecznych, kulturowych, wartościowych, ideologicznych, itp.), tak zwanej «linii przyczynowości»¹⁰.

G. Koks przedstawia założenie, że rozdrobnienie systemów partyjnych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej może być postrzegane, jako problem koordynacji działań elit politycznych, a mianowicie systemy partyjne stabilizują się i „zamrażają” się według strukturyzacji propozycji partyjnej. Tak więc, proces instytucjonalizacji podziałów wygląda w następujący sposób: partie określają swoje założenia programowe w zależności od społecznych, wartościowych, ideologicznych oraz behawioralnych cech swego elektoratu, a następnie przekazują ich do systemu partyjnego. Po sformułowaniu propozycji partyjnej i upolitycznieniu głównych kierunków podziałów, następuje kształtowanie przestrzeni politycznej i «zamrożenie» systemu partyjnego¹¹.

Jednak O. Donowa odrzuca taką koncepcję, przedstawiając argumenty przeciw «zamrożeniu» systemu partyjnego w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, a mianowicie:

1. Podczas tranzytu instytucjonalny obraz jest bardzo niestabilny i prowadzi do powstania względnie niestabilnych zasad gry.
2. Demokracja występuje w warunkach niedojrzałości społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, które gromadzi interesy i przesyła je do systemu politycznego; struktury go-

⁸ Moreno A. *Political Cleavages. Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy.* — Westview Press. — 1999. — 205 p.

⁹ Mair P. *Party system change: approaches and interpretations.* — Oxford, 1997.

¹⁰ Kitschelt H. *Post-communist party systems: competition, representation and interparty cooperation* // Cambridge studies in comparative politics. — N. Y., 1999. — p. 112-143

¹¹ Donova E. *Společno-politické rozmrażání a ich transformácia v systém politický v Európe Strednej a Východnej* / E.V. Donova // *Nauka polityczna.* - 2004. - № 4. - S.101-125.

spodarcze nie ułatwiają rozwój niezależnych organizacji społecznych lub tożsamości zbiorowych.

- Przez to, że partie nie zostały ustalone w ramach rozszerzonego prawa wyborczego na nowe grupy społeczne (jak w Europie Zachodniej), a w warunkach wyborów powszechnych, relacje między elektoratem i elitą od początku były bardzo słabe. W warunkach reżimu komunistycznego nie istniało konkurujących partii politycznych, które mogłyby służyć jako obiekty przyciągania wyborców, oraz w nowych demokracjach przez brak świadomości na temat grup społecznych i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, partie były tworzone nie z dołu go góry, tylko z góry do dołu.

Według Donowoi, struktury społeczne i polityczne podziały w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej są bardzo odmienne od podziałów, które istnieją w Europie Zachodniej. A przede wszystkim odzwierciedla się to w umysłowych cechach wyborców, zwłaszcza w wartościowych instytucjach silnego państwa i silnego lidera. Określa to również podstawowy konflikt między komunistycznym elektoratem i demokratycznie zorientowanymi wyborcami lub konflikt pokoleń. Doprowadziło to do powstania wielu «kolorowych» rewolucji, które przetoczyły się w byłych republikach radzieckich - młodymi tranzytowymi demokracjami.

Przed tym jak przejść bezpośrednio do rozpatrzenia funkcji społeczno-politycznych podziałów w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, należy zauważyć, że klasyczne podziały, które tworzą strukturę przestrzeni politycznej i promują tworzenie odpowiedniej konfiguracji systemów partyjnych są tu również korzystne¹². Rozważmy krótko cztery klasyczne rozróżnienie Lipseta-Rokkana w odniesieniu do praktyki politycznej w krajach postkomunistycznych.

Pierwsza różnica jest między centrum, który ustanawia narodową kulturę oraz zbuntowanymi mieszkańcami podbitych prowincji, które różnią się cechami etnicznymi, religijnymi i językowymi. Socjalizm sprzycał umocnieniu podziału, dając początek nowym partiom, które wyraziły zainteresowanie centrum i peryferii.

Po upadku reżimów radzieckich w wielu krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej pojawiły się nacjonalistyczne organizacje, które wyrażały interesy centrum (zwykle największej grupy etnicznej), a także wielu partii peryferyjnych, które chroniły interesy mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych (jak na przykład partia węgierska w Słowacji).

Druga różnica jest między państwem narodowym oraz przywilejami kościoła. Przed wojną w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej było wiele partii chrześcijańskich demokratów. Po upadku reżimów komunistycznych konflikty między kościołem a państwem często występowały odnośnie własności, która została skonfiskowana przez rządy komunistyczne.

Trzeci konflikt interesów był między mieszkańcami wsi, przemysłowcami oraz przedsiębiorcami, który umocnił się pod czas rewolucji przemysłowej.

¹² Romaniuk A. Analiza porównawcza instytucji politycznych w Europie Zachodniej: Monografia. - Centrum publikacji LNU imienia Iwana Franki, 2007. - 391 s.

Jednakże, zgodnie D.-L. Sale, oddzielenie się miasta od wsi w krajach postkomunistycznych jest przede wszystkim spowodowane ekonomicznymi podstawami. Najlepiej to jest widoczne na Węgrach, gdzie i teraz ten podział na tej że podstawie istnieje w systemie partyjnym.

Czwarty konflikt był to konflikt pomiędzy właścicielami a pracownikami lub konflikt na podstawie społeczno-gospodarczej. Jeśli w Europie Zachodniej z rozwojem stosunków kapitalistycznych, ze szczególnym naciskiem na rozwój prywatnej przedsiębiorczości on miał wyraźnie określony charakter, to w Europie Wschodniej 40 lat reżimu komunistycznego miały największy wpływ szczególnie na tą konfrontację. Kolektywizacja produkcji, wywłaszczenie kapitału zniszczyły ten podział. Jednak redystrybucja majątku została przeprowadzona w interesie rządu, partyjnej nomenklatury, wielu biurokratów. Przed dołączeniem do reżimu komunistycznego, większość krajów Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej nie posiadały wystarczająco rozwiniętego systemu kapitalistycznego, aby opierając się na konflikt pomiędzy dwoma podstawowych klasami, tworzyć partie ¹³.

Wyraźne zróżnicowanie w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej można zobaczyć na konkretnych przykładach Węgier, Rumunii, Słowacji, Polski i Litwy.

W ten sposób przykład Rumunii pokazuje, że na zamiast tradycyjnemu podziału komuniości oraz antykomuniości pojawiły się kwestii kompetencji i korupcji. Pogarszająca się sytuacja gospodarcza doprowadziła również do powstania podziałów na podstawach społeczno-gospodarczych.

Jeśli chodzi o Węgry, badania empiryczne wskazują na to, że najbardziej stabilnymi czynnikami, które mają wpływ na wybór partyjny, są religia, przynależność do partii komunistycznej, miejsce zamieszkania (miasto czy wieś), a także wiek. Obecny system partyjny na Węgrach koncentruje się na społeczno-ekonomicznych podstawach zróżnicowania. Jest wyraźnie przedstawiony podział Wschód-Zachód, gdzie Zachód bardziej koncentruje się na spektrum partii prawicowych oraz uprzemysłowionych Wschód - na lewice.

Geografia wyborcza Litwy wskazuje na główny podział prawica i lewica. Gospodarczo stabilne południe wspiera większość partii prawicowych, ze względu na fakt historyczny, ponieważ w okresie między wojnami światowymi tutaj znajdowała się stolica oraz również mała liczba mniejszości etnicznych. Środkowa i wschodnia części kraju preferowały lewicę, pod wpływem tradycyjnego wsparcia socjalistycznych i radykalnych ideologii, zacofania gospodarczego.

W kategoriach geopolitycznych główne linie działań w Republice Czeskiej istniały pomiędzy centrum (duże miasta przemysłowe) i peryferią (reszta kraju). W Czechach jest duża liczba emigrantów i imigrantów (zwłaszcza z Rumunii), którzy przeprowadzili się tu w poszukiwaniu pracy. Ponadto, w oparciu podziałów w Czechach jest religia, a Morawia zawsze występowała, jako konserwatywny katolicki region, wsparcie chrześcijańskich demokratów. W rezultacie, określona jako konfesjonalna i partyjna strona linii podziału - między regionami katolickimi i innych regionami.

¹³ Sale D.-L. Czy można stosować podziały Rokkana w Europie Środkowej? (Referat) / D.-L. Sale // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4. - S. 56-63.

Polska wykazała obecność dwóch klasycznych podziałów: centrum-peryferie, lewica-prawica. Istnieje zależność wyników głosowania wobec zatrudnienia w sektorze przemysłowym. Tradycyjne konserwatywne przemysłowo rozwinięte regiony na wschodzie Polski głosują w większości na prawicę oraz centrum i północ - na lewicę.

Słowacja charakteryzuje się wyraźnym podziałem na bazie etnicznej między Słowacką większością i mniejszością etniczną Węgier. Istnieje wyraźna różnica między Bratysławą, regionami południowymi oraz niektórymi północnymi prowincjami, co zbiega się z podziałem centrum-peryferie. Trzeci podział jest na osi wschód-zachód¹⁴.

Podsumowując, możemy zauważyć, że schemat struktury poznawczej podziałów bardzo skomplikowany: historyczne linie podziałów na społeczno-ekonomicznych, językowych, terytorialnych, religijnych podstawach oparte są na wartościach obywateli państw post-komunistycznych i uporządkowane są, jako nowoczesna konfiguracja systemów partyjnych. Naszym zdaniem, te dwie teorie wpływu społeczno-politycznych podziałów na strukturę przestrzeni politycznej - „czystej deski” oraz współzależności od przeszłości historycznej, ta ostatnia zasługuje na większą uwagę naukowców.

Głównym podziałem w krajach postkomunistycznych ze względu na przeszłość historyczną i cechy umysłowe wyborców pozostaje konflikt między postkomunistami, minimalistami i zwolennikami gospodarki społecznej z jednej strony oraz demokratami i maksymalistami i ultraliberałami - z drugiej, co często prowadzi do konfliktu pokoleń.

Bezsporny jest fakt, że społeczno-polityczny podział w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej nosi piętno historycznej retrospektywy oraz wpływu przeszłości komunistycznej, również określają cechy struktury instytucjonalnej, systemu partyjnego, tradycji i norm, które rozwinęły się, formą rządów, rodzajem systemu wyborczego, w szczególności rolę mediów, a co najważniejsze, specyfiką przemian demokratycznych.

¹⁴ Dunajewa J. Społeczno-polityczne podziały w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej / J.V. Dunajewa // Nauka polityczna. - 2004. - № 4 - S. 93-96

Language policy in the European union in the context of the spread of english as a global language

The article traces the pattern of formation of the language of transnational communication under conditions of globalization. It shows the global role of English and considers the essence of language policy in the EU, with its core efforts being aimed at maintaining the principles of multilingualism. The article reveals the essence of multilingualism and its role for the deepening of European integration. The objective necessity to introduce the language of international communication into the linguistic space of the EU is highlighted. The existing contradictions in some language programmes of the EU policy are elucidated.

Keywords: globalization, multilingualism, language policy, European Union, English

Мовна політика Євросоюзу в контексті поширення англійської мови як засобу транснаціонального спілкування

Підкреслюється закономірність формування світової мови транснаціональної комунікації в умовах глобалізації. Показано глобальну роль англійської мови. Висвітлюється зміст мовної політики Європейського Союзу, головним напрямом якої є затвердження принципів багатомовності. Розкривається сутність мультилінгвізму та його значення для поглиблення євроінтеграції. Зазначено об'єктивну потребу впровадження мови міжнародного спілкування у лінгвістичний простір ЄС. Підкреслюється суперечливість деяких програм мовної політики ЄС.

Ключові слова: глобалізація, мультилінгвізм, мовна політика, Євросоюз, англійська мова

Globalisation of international relations exerts its unifying, centripetal influence on international relations not only with regard to the sphere of economic and humanitarian relations but also to global politics. There is no doubt that global trade has become a principle factor of the economic aspect of the phenomena of globalization. However, integration processes in the world economy require coordinated policy, goals and objectives of all the nations and peoples of the world.

In the era of globalization, it is objectively required that all the actors of international political relations comply with unified rules and principles, adhere to the generally recognized

criteria and norms of political behavior. The rules and criteria are formed and declared on the basis of consensus agreements between the states within the framework of various international organisations, both international and regional. It is worth mentioning that these organisations make supranational binding decisions, hence the governments of the states that support these decisions are to comply with these decisions in conducting their foreign and home policy.

At present, the most influential and reputable international association of states is the United Nations Organisation (UNO). It is this organization that regulates the relations between all the nations in the world. It determines the fundamental principles and criteria by which the relations between the states are guided, and which are of binding character for the governments of states – parties to the organization. The principles of international trade and financial relations are determined by such organisations as the World Trade Organisation, The International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, etc. The international organisations, whose activity is recognized and supported by all the countries of the world, are responsible for the formation of the structure of the global political system.

At the same time influential regional and inter-regional organisations also play an important role in the formation of the global system of international relations. The European Union, which now is composed of 27 European countries; NATO (28 member states); a regional forum “Association of First and foremost the organisations such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN-ARF) comprising ten Southeast Asian states (26 member states) are examples of the biggest regional and interregional organisations. There are also regional organisations set up in North and South America, Africa, Arab world, the customs Union that unites 5 countries on the territory of the former USSR.

Regional and subregional economic unions are aimed at harmonizing economic interests of member states; they establish free trade zones, define the scope of their competence and powers of the members, regulate custom tariffs and investment policy and facilitate the establishment of equitable trade relations between the states. There is no doubt that the activity of such organisations has a significant impact on the political shape of the world.

It is clear that the globalization of international relations promotes the expansion of cooperation between both global and regional unions of states. Various contacts between governments, organisations and individuals have reached an unprecedented scale. For efficient coordination of opinions as well as actions of the states-members of such international organisations, for making the most optimal decisions – a single universal language was needed. So beginning with the first half of the 20th century, for a number of historical reasons English began to fulfill this role.

That's why English became a major working language of most international congresses and the official language of most influential and widespread international organizations. As a result, in 1990ies there were about 12,5 thousand international organisations. According to the estimates made by D. Crystal, « out of random 500 organisations taken in alphabetical

order 424 (85%) of the organisations used English as the official language, and 169 (i.e. one third) use only English in their work. Such influential regional associations as European Free Trade Association (EFTA) the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) use English as their sole working language.

It should be mentioned that some international organisations not only actively use English in their activity but also strive to contribute to its global spread. Since for some international organisations global expansion of English in the world linguistic space is not only the evidence, but also the tool for establishing their dominance. Historical, geopolitical, economic, cultural factors are among a number of reasons for English acquiring the status of international language.

In conditions of globalization of the world economy, the dominance of English speaking countries (first and foremost the USA) remains clearly visible in all spheres of international relations, that is confirmed by practically all researchers of this problem¹. Therefore it is not surprising that these countries actively engage various international organisations in promoting their interests, in particular, in establishing English as the means of international communication. Considering the aforesaid, the role of English in the work of the European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and many others is exceptionally important. According to D. Crystal, more than 85 % of international organisations use English as the working language.² Among such organisations are primarily the United Nations Organisation, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The same underlying principles regarding the use of languages are at the heart of the UNO, together with more than 50 of its different institutional structures, constituting the organization. The functioning of English as the means of international communication in the activity of the UN structures is of great importance, since it is within the framework of these organisations that the most significant communication between representatives of different nations and peoples takes place.

A number of multi-faceted relations are being developed within the institutionally established interstate unions, in particular in the European Union. Free movement of goods, services, labour and capital is guaranteed within the borders of integrated Europe, which promotes the expansion of interpersonal communication between representatives of different nations. This process raises the relevant issue of determining the means and languages of international communication. The aggravation of the situation results from a constant expansion of the European Union. Back in 1958, when the Treaty of Rome under the name of European Economic Community was signed (EEC), its article 217 stated that the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall be determined by the Council, acting unanimously and

¹ Michael Harriman and Barbara Burnaby. *Language Policies in English-Dominant Countries*. – Clarendon: Multilingual Matters, 1996. – P.15-22.

² David Crystal. *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

that German, French, Italian and Dutch shall be the official and working languages of the community. However, given even four official languages, 12 language combinations were in use in the EEC activity (for instance, the documents in German needed translation into 3 other languages—three combinations,). However, in 1995, when the EEC expanded by way of the accession of new members and grew to encompass 11 states, the number of language combinations increased by 110. The subsequent enlargement has brought membership to twenty-eight members since the foundation of the European Union, therefore the number of language combinations drastically increased. The current language situation in the EU calls for a critical appraisal since the language problem is escalating and needs resolution.

It should also be mentioned that some regional languages (Catalan, Scottish) also claim the status of official European Union languages. If they are given this status, it will make the language situation in the EU, which is complicated as it is, even more complicated. According to the head of German mission in the European Union V. Schoenfeld, « there is no more acute issue in the EU than the language issue »³, in addition to this, some members of European parliament consider the language issue to be a serious and dangerously explosive problem for Europe.»⁴.

Since the European legislation declares the equality of languages of all the EU member states, the documents of the EU are supposed to be translated into their languages. Citizens and governments have the right to address EU bodies in any of the 24 EU official languages, and to receive a reply in that language. The European Commission has a permanent staff of 1 750 linguists and 600 support staff, and also uses freelance translators all over the world. The translation flow is an enormous challenge to the EU. There are several responsible bodies in charge of translation, such as the two Directorates General for Translation of the European Commission and of the European Parliament and the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union based in Luxembourg, which serve the EU agencies. The Centre currently has 210 staff members, 100 of them being translators. The other EU institutions also have their own translation units. Hence, the EU spends large sums of money on translation services. The European Commission's DG Translation costs 330 million euro per year. In 2004-2007 with the increase of EU's official languages from 11 to 23 the translation costs increased by 20%. However, there are a number of challenges in the translation service. Since the national languages of the EU have peculiar features, belong to different language groups, misunderstandings and mistranslations are a common type of problem in translation and especially in interpretation. So lack of semantic equivalence and precision in translating the EU documents from one language into another is oftentimes a source of confusion and misunderstanding. Research Professor R. Phillipson, a renowned advocate of multilingual education as a factor of peace and

³ Schonfeld Wilhelm. – "Suddeutsche Zeitung", 2005, 1 April.

⁴ Phillipson Robert. The new linguistic imperial order: English as an EU lingua franca jr lingua frankensteinia? In "Unions: past-present-future", Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies. Vol.1: Issue 2, 2008, p.189.

of linguistic rights against cultural and linguistic homogenization processes, writes, that the «basic notions, such as language, dialect, nation, mean different things in different languages and states...Semantic inconsistencies ... are certain to hamper reaching full international understanding .These problems are complicated by the fact the EU funds different language policies that contradict each other.On the other hand such practice and policy consolidates the positions of English.»⁵.

Undoubtedly, the English language has the status of one of the world's most important languages which serves as a means of international communication. In D.Crystal's words, « international English is the political and cultural and reality.»⁶An authoritative weekly magazine with a global focus on business and politics «Economist» offered an insight that English has fundamentally established itself as the global standard language.»⁷.

However, in the European Union English acquired the official status of a working language only in 1972, when Great Britain became a member of the EU. Despite this fact, English quickly gained the leading position among other EU languages. It is evidenced by the changing trends of language choice regarding the official EU documents of various European institutions. In 1970 60% of all the documents were written in French and 40% in German, whereas in 2006, 72% of all the documents are written in English, 14% in German and only 3% in German. It is worth mentioning that no other than these languages were used in drafting the EU documents back in 1970.Currently,11% of the documents are drafted in the language of member states.⁸. These proportions are a proof to the complexity of the current language situation in the European Union.

It is obvious that English is quickly and rather aggressively ousting other national languages of the EU member states. It is easy to conclude that homogenization of the linguistic space of the EU may pose a real threat to the very existence of some “small” European languages (for example Dutch, Estonian, Latvian), which can gradually disappear from the linguistic map of Europe. In conditions of globalization of international relations English is acquiring the status of lingua franca not only in Europe, but also globally.In ancient times the term *lingua franca* was used to describe a language systematically used to enable effective communication between people with different native languages.The Italian language was the primary composition of the lingua franca with the language featuring many Italian words and phrases. Other languages whose words made up the lingua franca include Old French, Occitan, Arabic, Greek, Turkish, and Portuguese. The earliest English record proving the existence of the term lingua franca was in 1632 where it was known as “Bastard Spanish”. In times of globalization the English language is capable of effectively fulfilling the functions of an international means of communication.

⁵ Phillipson Robert. Op. cit., p.190.

⁶ David Cristal. Op. cit., p.9.

⁷ Language and Electronic. – Economist, 1996, 21 December.

⁸ Phillipson Robert. Op. cit., p.192.

However, establishing English as a means of global communication can be described as a complex and complicated process. It is worth mentioning that in some countries, mostly Asian and African one can observe a negative, if not hostile attitude to English and to the process of its global spread. For example the president of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta back in 1974 said that the national language is the «foundation on which any independent state is built. That is why we can't continue using the language of our colonists.». In 1908 an Indian national leader Gandhi emphasized: «To give the masses the knowledge of English means to deprive them of freedom, to enslave them»⁹.

It means a certain opposition to the spread the English language results from the desire of some countries to get rid of colonial legacy, to ensure the development of their national cultures and languages. But the British colonial expansion, accompanied by the migration of substantial numbers of English speakers from Great Britain, stipulated the global spread of English. No wonder, that many peoples and nations associate it with suppression and domination, with some former British colonies (the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, partially SA) considering it their native language, whereas other African and Asian countries often rejecting it.

Random occurrences of a negative attitude towards English as a global means of communication can, however, also be observed within the European Union. Some linguists, in particular, R. Phillipson, identify the spread of English with the policy of «linguistic imperialism», used by the anglosaxon world to establish and strengthen its global dominance.¹⁰

According to a Danish researcher P. V. Christiansen, a democratic linguistic foundation is of paramount importance in EU integration processes in order to ensure a democratic union.¹¹ However, on reflection it may seem obvious, that the dominance of English in the European Union linguistic environment in essence, contradicts the officially proclaimed and legally-established principle of linguistic equality of all the countries-members of the EU. However, different languages can't be considered equal in terms of their socio-economic and political status. If we consider the language potential of a particular language as a type of commodity, we will clearly see that the popularity, or even the demand for different languages is different, with some languages (those of least populous nations) having very low degree of demand and popularity. If we consider the the positions of European languages by the number of native speakers, Latvian, Hungarian, Estonian totaling 1.8, 1.3, 1.1 million speakers correspondingly, we will see that they have no potential competitive advantages.

The opponents of establishing global means of communication strongly resist implementing the policy of conducting most classes in English in European educational institutions. For example, the document of the European commission, called «Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity' An action plan 2004-06. » emphasizes that «in non-anglophone countries, recent trends to provide teaching in English may have unforeseen consequences on the

⁹ David Cristal. Op. cit., p.157.

¹⁰ Див.: Robert Phillipson. Linguistic Imperialism. – Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1998.

¹¹ Language policy in the European Union European/English/Elite/Equal/Esperanto Union?.p.26

vitality of the national language. University language policies should therefore include explicit actions to promote the national or regional language. »¹². The European approach to promoting linguistic diversity also means «actively encouraging the teaching and learning of the widest possible range of languages in our schools, universities, adult education centres and enterprises. Taken as a whole, the range on offer should include the smaller European languages as well as all the larger ones, regional, minority and migrant languages as well as those with ‘national’ status, and the languages of our major trading partners throughout the world. The imminent enlargement of the European Union will bring with it a wealth of languages from several language families; it requires a special effort to ensure that the languages of the new Member States become more widely learned in other countries. Member States have considerable scope to take a lead in promoting the teaching and learning of a wider range of languages than at present», which shows the relevance of the language issue as well as the concerns the linguistic diversity causes. D.Kristall calls the national languages «the most universal symbol of national identity and individuality.»¹³ That is why the countries –members of the EU try to protect their native language from the dominance of the English language. In France, one of the few countries with governmental laws protecting its language, for instance, a law was passed on the protection and development of the French language. In fact, France, which prides itself on the preservation of its language, has installed governmental and cultural barriers to keep other languages out, in order to uphold the purity of its mother language. The opinion of the former president of France Jacques Chirac, who supported the preservation of the French language and its integrity: “Nothing would be worse for humanity than to move toward a situation where we speak only one language”¹⁴ is widely shared and supported by the government, which installed regulations specifically for the media to ensure they were using the French language over foreign vocabulary.

The representatives of demographically “small” languages, such as Danish, Swedish, languages of Baltic states and Eastern and Central Europe have enough grounds to fear that their languages will be considered as secondary in the linguistic market of Europe, moreover, they will be gradually ousted from the competitive field by other, more popular European languages. In this regard R. Phillipson remarks that «the complexity of language policy of the EU is connected with various roles that the languages play in the member states and in the European integration»¹⁵. That’s why some EU countries take pains to assert the priority of their languages in the linguistic environment of the continent.

Western scientific terminology uses the term «linguistic nationalism» with reference to such situations. It is noteworthy, that nationalism, the priority of national identity are not supported or encouraged in the EU: since the EU membership itself means limiting state sovereignty of the

¹² Phillipson Robert. Op. cit., p.198.

¹³ David Cristal. Op. cit., p.190.

¹⁴ Johnson, Paul. “Must the Whole World Speak English?” Forbes.Com. 29 Nov. 2004

¹⁵ Phillipson Robert. Op. cit., p.186.

nation states to a certain degree, then the people of these nation are supposed to refuse from some of their values and interests. In Europe not national, but European identity is prioritised which implies the creation of multicultural and multilingual society in Europe.¹⁶ However, according to Gerard Delanty European identity can be seen, not as an identity that is outside or anti-national, but as an internal transformation of national identities. In these terms, it is not a case of European versus national identities, but of the Europeanization of national identities that is significant. Thus it is the case that many national identities have found within the project of European integration the means of advancing their interests, but too often re-orienting their self-understanding. Building up and strengthening solidarity within the framework of the *European Union* but not emphasizing National Cultural Differences or causing social alienation within integrated Europe is the foundation of humanitarian strategy of the EU. It can be concluded that current migration policy of the EU may gradually and subtly lead to erosion of national diversity of the demographic pattern of European society and to its homogenization.

However, languages are and will yet remain for a long time the fundamental national value in the European countries. That is why many Europeans view the spread of English as a threat for their linguistic culture. Moreover, the aspiration of the people to maintain their culture and preserve linguistic identity contradicts the needs for homonisation of the European linguistic space, the functioning of linguistic means of international communication. In this connection D. Crystal states: «The need for understanding each other and at the same time the need for sociocultural *identification as a nation*, perceiving themselves as a nation divides peoples and nations. ... First of all it encourages learning an international language, which in most cases is English, second, it calls to maintain and propagate local languages and local cultures.»¹⁷. These two trends in the language policy of the European Union contradict each other, furthermore, this contradiction may have unpredictable consequences.

The objective factors and historical circumstances, which lead to the deepening of the the integration processes in the European Union (primarily of political nature) demand that a common language should be introduced into the practice of international relations in Europe and it is only English that can perform this role, which is already *established* as the de facto lingua franca, as a dominant language on the continent.

Moreover, many experts consider that this language itself can facilitate and foster the unification of Europe: functioning of English as the European lingua franca can avert the potential language conflicts between the countries and peoples of the European Union. Contrary to the requirements of modern times, the European institutions aspire to adhere to the principle of linguistic equality and multilingual diversity. To this end, at the initiative of the European Parliament the «*A European Agency for Linguistic Diversity and Language Learning*»

¹⁶ Див.: Смокотин В.М. Новый этап в развитии принципов многоязычия в Европе: построение многоязычного и поликультурного общества // Вестник Томского государственного университета, 2010, №337. – С.81-86.

¹⁷ David Cristal. Op. cit., p.192.

was established. The agency developed and adopted an *Action Plan to promote linguistic diversity* and language learning *in the framework of the Lifelong Learning programme* which ran from 2007-2013. However, according to this programme, the funding of support of regional languages and languages of national minorities was curtailed (from 1.2 million euros to 149 thousand euros per year). To some extent it is the evidence of inconsistency of the linguistic policy of the European institutions in *promotion of multilingualism* and *linguistic and cultural diversity* in the linguistic environment of the EU. Contrary to the requirements of modern times, the EU institutions are committed to adhere to the declared principle of linguistic equality and multilingualistic diversity. The adoption of the resolution on a European strategy for multilingualism in November 2008 is another evidence of implementing the policy of multilingual and cultural diversity. The document notes that: «linguistic and cultural diversity is part and parcel of the European identity; it is at once a shared heritage, a wealth, a challenge and an asset for Europe.»¹⁸ Besides, the European Agency for linguistic diversity and language learning was established following the requirement of the European parliament. The Agency developed and approved the plan for promoting the linguistic diversity within the framework of the EU *programme on «Integrated Life Long Learning»*, for the *period 2007-2013*. However, in accordance with this programme, centralized funding for the support of regional languages and languages of ethnic minorities was curtailed (from 1,2 mln.euros to 149 thousand euros per year). To some extent it points to some inconsistency and contradictions in the EU institutions regarding promotion of *multilingualism* in the linguistic space of the EU.

The European Strategy for Multilingualism (ESM), a rather ambitious framework project developed by The European Council (2005), states among other things: “multilingualism is still the most effective language regime among the alternatives usually examined in the literature.”

The ESM sets itself the goal-promotion of multilingualism for the purpose of “strengthening social cohesion, intercultural dialogue and European construction.”¹⁹ The Strategy recommends that the governments of the EU member states adhere to the following standards in the field of language policy and education:

- implementing the commitment to teach at least two foreign languages from a very early age, and mastering at least two foreign languages, with the emphasis on effective communicative ability
- mother tongue plus two other languages: making an early start
- developing the National Curriculum to promote multilingualism;
- adopting a holistic approach to the teaching of language, which makes appropriate connections between the teaching of ‘mother tongue’, ‘foreign’ languages, the lan-

¹⁸ ENDANGERED LANGUAGES AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/495851/IPOL-CULT_NT\(2013\)495851_EN.p.23](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/495851/IPOL-CULT_NT(2013)495851_EN.p.23)

¹⁹ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/573460/IPOL_STU%282016%29573460_EN.pdf p13. Research for Cult Committee-European Strategy for Multilingualism: Benefits and Cost

guage of instruction, and the languages of migrant communities; as well as improving the quality of teaching foreign languages²⁰

- Better language teaching; identifying the core pedagogical and linguistic skills necessary for today's language teachers, and proposing a framework for their assessment.
- early language learning;
- combining language teaching with interdisciplinary teaching (integrated approach); Higher education institutions play a key role in promoting societal and individual multilingualism. Proposals that each university implement a coherent language policy clarifying its role in promoting language learning and linguistic diversity, both amongst its learning community and in the wider locality, are to be welcomed;
- language learning in secondary education/vocational training;
- establishing a European language competence indicator, that is the assessment of language;
- skills universal for all EU countries;
- active use of foreign languages in multilingual economy

However, upon scrutiny of the above listed requirements we can conclude, that the implementation of these provisions will increase the role of English in the linguistic environment of the EU. So the citizens of the United Europe, when choosing a language to learn in the European educational institutions will give (already give preference) to English. As a matter of fact the The European Strategy for Multilingualism suggests and declares that learning English become mandatory in all the educational institutions - from kindergarten and primary schools to universities. Hence, the European Union unofficially admits the role of English as the means of international communication within the EU linguistic area.

The strategic goal of promoting the spread of English as the linguistic means of international communication is the formation of a global English speaking society without territorial, state and sociocultural borders. In fact, this aim contradicts multilingualism and multiculturalism as the foundation of European language policy.

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Rola monarchii brytyjskiej we współczesnym świecie

W ogólnym, a jednocześnie podstawowym rozumieniu, rola to udział jednostki albo grupy ludzi, ewentualnie pewnego organu, instytucji w bliżej niezdefiniowanym zdarzeniu.¹ Innymi słowy, rola to do pewnego stopnia zaangażowanie jednego podmiotu w działanie innego. Co więcej, trzeba zwrócić uwagę na wagę wspomnianej partycypacji, jak również zajęte przez stronę stanowisko w konkretnej sprawie. Rola to działanie w jakimś charakterze, zmierzające do osiągnięcia postawionych celów. Działanie to może być nakierowane na jednostkę, zespół jednostek albo szeroko rozumiane dobro ogółu.

W naukach politycznych, rola rozumiana jest jako suma postaw i zachowań, zmierzających do celu, który w rozumieniu Roberta Dahla i Bruce'a Stinebrickner'a jest zdefiniowany w mniej lub bardziej konkretny sposób.² Zachowanie wówczas postrzegane jest jako aktywność jednostki albo ogółu społeczeństwa, przejawiająca się w regularnych działaniach, prowadzących do efektywnych zmian, rozwiązań. Jednocześnie, podjęcie określonych działań jest wymogiem stawianym przez rząd społeczeństwu, albo odwrotnie.

Właśnie tym drugim przypadkiem, tj. zachowaniami rządu Wielkiej Brytanii wobec społeczeństwa i jego oczekiwaniami m.in. będzie zajmował się ten rozdział. Rola monarchii brytyjskiej, a więc to, jakie działania podejmuje jako twórca państwowości i aktor na arenie międzynarodowej w dużej mierze uzależnione jest od Rządu i Opozycji Jej Królewskiej Mości. Niemniej, trudno mówić o roli monarchii brytyjskiej patrząc przez pryzmat jej rządu, a nie znając jego dokładnej definicji.

Na drodze historycznego rozwoju poszczególnych form państwowości, termin ten przybierał różne wyjaśnienia, skupione wobec niejednorodnych celów, stawianych przez reprezentacje poszczególnych systemów. W efekcie wypracowano definicję, która rząd przedstawia jako strukturę państwową, której celem jest wytyczanie polityki państwowej i zagranicznej oraz określanie zasad, na podstawie których wspomniane rodzaje polityk będą realizowane.³ Nie jest tajemnicą, że przynajmniej w teoretycznym założeniu, celem rządu jest przyjmowanie, a jednocześnie dostosowywanie kierunków polityki do celów społeczeństwa, wprowadzając i zachowując stabilizację, nie tylko społeczną, ale i gospodarczą.⁴

Tak więc, rząd jest strukturą, odpowiedzialną za kształtowanie państwa w rozumieniu tak administracyjnym, jak i społecznym. W momencie określenia charakteru uprawianej polityki,

¹ B. Dunaj, *Współczesny słownik języka polskiego*, Wyd. Langenscheidt, Warszawa 2007., s. 1546.

² R. Dahl, B. Stinebrickner, *Współczesna analiza polityczna*, Wyd. Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2007., s. 66.

³ M. G. Roskin, et al., *Wprowadzenie do nauk politycznych*, Wyd. Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2001., s. 55.

⁴ Ibidem., s. 62, 55.

wyznacza granice, w obrębie których nie tylko on, jako nadrzędny organ państwowości musi działać, ale zobowiązuje też inne podległe mu instytucje, tj. związki, grupy do ich przestrzegania. Jakiegokolwiek złamanie, a więc przekroczenie którejs z zdefiniowanej granicy, zmusza rząd do podjęcia działań, mających na celu zmuszenie do egzekwowania ustanowionych przez siebie praw. Jednocześnie, wyłania nam się jeszcze jedna kompetencja rządu, jako części systemu politycznego, niemal każdego rodzaju, tj. podsystemu. Rząd odpowiada za formy, zmuszające do przestrzegania określonych wcześniej reguł, mających na celu usprawnienie funkcjonowania państwa.⁵

W literaturze, rząd przedstawiany jest również jako pewien zbiór urzędów, działających w ramach jakiegoś systemu politycznego, który z kolei rozumiany jest jako wpływ albo wywieranie wpływu na inny podmiot, który z założenia powinien być pozytywny.⁶ W obrębie wspomnianego systemu, urzędy te spełniają tzw. określoną rolę polityczną w postaci tworzenia prawa, jego interpretacji, aż wreszcie egzekwowania.⁷ W odróżnieniu od definicji zaprezentowanej, na samym początku rozdziału, Robert Dahl i Bruce Stinebrickner dodają jeszcze, że w gestii rządu leży również posiadanie monopolu na wykorzystanie siły, przy jednoczesnym określeniu granic jej użycia.⁸

Na podstawie analizy obu definicji tego samego pojęcia, można powiedzieć, że rząd to organ, który odpowiedzialny jest za nakreślanie kierunku polityki, tak państwowej, jak i międzynarodowej, definiowanie jej celów, mając na względzie szczególne dobro ogółu, tj. społeczeństwa, zachowując przy tym równowagę gospodarczą. Rząd ustala także granice swojego działania i organów mu podległych, uwzględniając sposoby egzekwowania ustalonych reguł, przy posiadaniu wyłączności na określanie granic użycia siły.

Na potrzeby niniejszego rozdziału, warto również zastanowić się nad pojęciem opozycji, które na pierwszy rzut oka wydaje się być terminem oczywistym, wręcz banalnym. Termin ten używany jest do opisywania nie tylko działań, ale i postaw, które podejmowane są tak indywidualnie, jak i zbiorowo, mające na celu przeciwstawienie się rzeczywistym zjawiskom, zaistniałym sytuacjom.⁹ Innymi słowy, to forma kwestionowania np. ideologii, charakterystycznej dla jakiegoś systemu, przyjętej przez władzę i instytucje w państwie. Taki opór może zostać zorganizowany przeciwko zjawiskom szerokim, jak np. system polityczny, albo tym, bardziej zawężonym, tj. panującej władzy, instytucjom albo instytucji, wreszcie przeciwko pojedynczej jednostce.

We współczesnej polityce, opozycja postrzegana jest jako zorganizowana grupa społeczna, z jasno wyznaczonymi priorytetami, leżącymi na przeciwległych biegunach ideologicznych niż te, obowiązujące. Taka grupa obiera sobie również pewną ścieżkę działania oraz instrumenty jej

⁵ Wnioski napisane na podstawie: M. G. Roskin, op.cit., s. 57.

⁶ R. Dahl, B. Stinebrickner, op. cit., s. 54.

⁷ Ibidem., s. 55.

⁸ Ibidem., s. 57.

⁹ S. Bożyk, *Pojęcie opozycji politycznej i jej zasadnicze typy*, w *Prawnoustrojowy status opozycji parlamentarnej w Sejmie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Wyd. Temida, Białystok 2006., s. 15.

odpowiadające, w celu podkreślenia swojego istnienia na państwowej scenie politycznej. Poprzez instrumenty, należy rozumieć tutaj pewnie mechanizmy o charakterze instytucjonalnym, które umożliwią jej dokonanie wpływu na rodzaj, jak również samą treść podejmowanych decyzji.¹⁰

Wówczas można powiedzieć o próbie tworzenia własnych struktur organizacyjnych, których celem jest ustanawianie praw, zdaniem opozycji najbardziej odpowiednich i ich publiczne prezentowanie. Wtedy mówi się o działalności typowo politycznej, które de facto, jest już zjawiskiem zupełnie normalnym i powszechnym we współczesnych systemach politycznych. Opozycja postrzegana jest jako część składowa rządu, partii politycznych, organizacji, szerzej mówiąc polityki państwowej.¹¹

Jak już zostało konkretnie powiedziane, rząd w największym stopniu wywiera wpływ na politykę państwową danego kraju, również Wielkiej Brytanii, która od zarania jest monarchią. System ten nie odbiega od założeń teoretycznych, gdyż rząd spełnia tam rolę organu dowodzącego, odpowiedzialnego za kierowanie polityką, a więc wywieranie wpływu, z myślą o potrzebach społeczeństwa, dbając jednocześnie o odpowiedni poziom rozwoju gospodarczego, a co za tym idzie ekonomicznego. Nie tylko w sferze państwowej, ale również tej, międzynarodowej rząd brytyjski ma dość duży zakres kompetencji, żeby nie powiedzieć, całkowity. W dużej mierze, dzięki niemu i w mniejszej dzięki opozycji, Wielka Brytania, jako monarchia odgrywa pewne role, tak w sensie państwowym, jak i międzynarodowym. Jest chociażby członkiem Wspólnoty Europejskiej, albo Paktu Północno Atlantycznego, NATO, czy też Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ, oraz Rady Europy G7, G8, G20, OECD i WTO.¹² Dlatego też, niezwykle istotne jest, aby przeanalizować struktury państwowe Wielkiej Brytanii, jakimi jest rząd i opozycja, dzięki którym polityka brytyjska nie stanowi zamkniętej enklawy.

Zasady funkcjonowania systemu politycznego, a więc i rządu Wielkiej Brytanii, jako jednego z części składowych polityki, nie są opisane w konstytucji, jak jest to w przypadku innych państw Europy Zachodniej, gdyż państwo pozbawione jest jednolitego aktu normatywnego, a reguły, na podstawie których działa są zbiorem ustaw i spisanych praw zwyczajowych, które de facto, sprawdzają się. Na ich podstawie można powiedzieć, że królowa Wielkiej Brytanii, spełnia funkcję jedynie reprezentacyjną. Nie można pominąć faktu, że rola monarchy w literaturze przedmiotu, często utożsamiana jest z rolą całej monarchii.¹³ Nie powinno to nikogo dziwić, bo przecież Królowa Elżbieta II, zgodnie z prawem stanowi ucieleśnienie władzy.¹⁴

Pomimo faktu, że każdy akt normatywny jest ustanawiany w imieniu Jej Królewskiej Mości, w rzeczywistości królowa nie posiada realnego wpływu na jego rodzaj, kształt i wreszcie treść. Nie stanowi nawet organu doradczego. Niemniej, zarówno w ustawodawstwie pierwotnym, jak i wtórnym, efekt końcowy w dużej mierze zależy od tego, w jakim przedziale czasowym

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² *Wielka Brytania*, Wikipedia Wolna Encyklopedia., http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wielka_Brytania., dostęp 2.09.2014.

¹³ Ibidem., s. 78.

¹⁴ Ibidem., s. 81.

monarcha asygnuje przedstawiony jej dokument. Wówczas dopiero wtedy może on zostać podany do wiadomości publicznej, a tym samym, wejść w życie. W pierwszym z zaprezentowanych ustawodawstw, ustawy uchwalane są przez Parlament Zjednoczonego Królestwa w Londynie i mogą one obowiązywać albo na terenie całego Zjednoczonego Królestwa albo w jednej, ściśle określonej jego części. Projekt ustawodawczy zanim trafi do rąk Jej Wysokości, musi przejść szereg procedur, w postaci pierwszego i drugiego czytania, czyli formalnego przedstawienia projektu z późniejszym podjęciem tzw. debaty ogólnej. Po tym, następuje szczegółowa analiza treści aktu, po której przedstawiciele parlamentu, tj. Izby Gmin, a dokładniej komisji legislacyjnej, *Public Bill Committee*, mogą zgłaszać poprawki, po których następuje etap sprawozdania, czyli możliwości wniesienia dalszych zmian. Trzecie czytanie, z kolei, stwarza ostatnią możliwość przeprowadzenia debaty, w trakcie której członkowie Izby Lordów mogą zasugerować swoje pomysły i wnieść poprawki. Ten etap poprzedza, zatwierdzenie dokumentu przez obie izby, po czym następuje jego odesłanie do Jej Królewskiej Mości, która zobowiązana jest go podpisać, tzw. *Royal Assent*.¹⁵

Ustawodawstwo wtórne, natomiast, przyjmowane jest na mocy kompetencji, które nadane są przez Królową Elżbietę II, Jej Królewską Mość, która w rzeczywistości zasiada w radzie, zwanej *Her Majesty in Council* albo *the Privy Council*¹⁶. Akty mogą być wydawane na podstawie rozporządzenia przygotowanego przez Radę, albo odpowiednich ministrów, czy też ich departamenty. Takie ustawodawstwo nazywane jest także delegowanym, natomiast wydawana ustawa to ustawa umocowująca, której zadaniem jest nadawać uprawnienia organom, albo jednostkom. Pokazując tę różnorodność nazewnictwa w brytyjskim ustawodawstwie, nie można pominąć ustawy macierzystej, która to nazwa również funkcjonuje. Z kolei, wypracowane akty ustawodawstwa wtórnego są nazywane trojako, albo rozporządzenia, *Statutory Instruments*, albo przepisy prawa wtórnego, *Statutory Rules*, ewentualnie każdy z osobna może mieć swój tytuł. Egzemplifikację stanowić może *Orders in Council* i *Regulations* albo *Rules*.¹⁷

Obydwa przykłady pokazują, że monarchia w zakresie ustawodawstwa państwowego pełni rolę jedynie reprezentacyjną, co wynika z kompetencji królowej w tym zakresie. Elżbieta II nie jest postrzegana jako aktywny partycypant stanowienia prawa, gdyż w rzeczywistości jej rola ogranicza się do złożenia podpisu pod zaprezentowaną jej ustawą, która wcześniej była przedyskutowana przez kompetentne organy, jakimi jest izby wyższa i niższa Parlamentu, odpowiednio Izba Lordów i Gmin. Jak wynika z przeprowadzonej analizy procesu legislacyjnego, nawet poprawki wprowadzane i analizowane są na poziomie parlamentarnym. Jedyna kwestia, która jest ściśle zależna od Jej Królewskiej Mości to czas, kiedy zostanie ustawa zaprezentowana opinii publicznej od czasu jej ustanowienia, gdyż wcześniej musi zostać asygnowana.

¹⁵ *Anglia i Walia. Prawo państwa członkowskiego*, European e-justice, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_member_state_law-6-ew-maximizeMS-pl.do?member=1, dostęp 2.09.2014.

¹⁶ *The Privy Council* to Tajna Rada Wielkiej Brytanii, składająca się z grupy osób, wyżej postawionych w polityce, których nadrzędnym zadaniem jest doradzać królowej, ale którzy w rzeczywistości mają bardzo ograniczoną władzę, w zasadzie są jej pozbawieni.

¹⁷ *Anglia i Walia. Prawo państwa członkowskiego*, European e-justice, op. cit., dostęp 2.09.2014, aktualizacja 9.10.2014.

W jednym z przykładów ustawodawstwa wtórnego, odniesiono się do tzw. *the Privy Council*, której istotne jest, aby poświęcić odrobinę miejsca, gdyż stanowi jedną z części składowej Rządu Jej Królewskiej Mości, a jednocześnie bezpośrednio odnosi się do państwowego 'działania' samej Królowej. Struktura, której główną członkinią, a zarazem jej przewodniczącą jej najstarsza monarchini Europy, Elżbieta II, należy do jednej, z najstarszych form legislatywy, jakie działają w Zjednoczonym Królestwie. Swą historią sięgająca XVII-ego wieku, kiedy to król i wspomniana rada stanowili podstawowy organ decyzyjny, rada odpowiedzialna jest za reprezentantów władzy wykonawczej, tj. egzekutywy, chociaż jej współczesna rola w monarchii konstytucyjnej została ograniczona jedynie do tej, formalnej, reprezentacyjnej.¹⁸

Spotyka się raz w miesiącu, w miejscu, bliżej nieokreślonym, gdyż jest to zależne od tego, gdzie aktualnie przebywa Królowa. Źródła pokazują, że może to być oficjalna rezydencja, *Buckingham Palace*, albo *Windor Castle*, ewentualnie w porze letniej, *Balmoral*.¹⁹ W trakcie każdego spotkania, radni, będący bezpośrednimi podwładnymi Jej Królewskiej Mości, przedstawiają monarchini liczne postanowienia, dalej zwanymi *Orders*, wyrażając tym samym swoją prośbę o królewską akceptację. Obecna liczba radnych w *Privy Council* liczy 400, wśród których wymienia się członków Gabinetu, średniej rangi ministrów, przedstawiciele partii opozycyjnej, sędziego – seniora, jak również kilku delegowanych, będących przedstawicielami poszczególnych państw Commonwealth'u.²⁰

Nie da się ukryć, że rada, której bezpośrednio przewodniczy Królowa, jest wyłącznie symbolicznym elementem składowym rządu. Jak pokazują przykłady jej kompetencji, a raczej ich brak²¹, rada najwięcej uwagi poświęca zapoznaniu się z przedstawionymi jej dokumentami, które de facto zostały opracowane przez odpowiednie organy i instytucje rządowe, których przedstawiciele zasiadają w radzie, lecz tylko po to, aby bronić swojej wizji zmian wprowadzonych w dokumentach. Wszystko, co trafia do *Privy Council*, a w następstwie do Królowej, jest już dokładnie przedyskutowane i zmienione. Wymaga jedynie oficjalnej akceptacji przedstawicielki monarchii brytyjskiej, aby dokument stał się prawomocny.

Oprócz reprezentacyjnego ustawodawstwa państwowego, należy zwrócić również uwagę na symboliczną rolę monarchii, bezpośrednio utożsamianej z osobą Królowej, w procesie wyboru 'głowy rządu', ministra oraz jemu podwładnych współpracowników. W poprzednim rozdziale, *Zasady ustrojowe Wielkiej Brytanii*, a dokładniej w podrozdziale poświęconym rządowi brytyjskiemu, zauważono, że premier wybierany jest przez Elżbietę II, natomiast odpowiedni

¹⁸ *Queen and the Privy Council*, The official website of the British Monarchy, <http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandGovernment/QueenandPrivyCouncil.aspx>, dostęp 3.09.2014.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ W opracowaniach można znaleźć informację, że do głównych uprawnień Rady należy podejmowanie ostatecznych decyzji z zakresu wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Za rozstrzygnięcia odpowiedzialny jest Komitet Sądowniczy Tajnej Rady Wielkiej Brytanii, który jest jednym z Sądów Najwyższych Zjednoczonego Królestwa i którego decyzja jest przedstawiana Jej Królewskiej Mości, na podstawie M. Grzybowski, *Systemy ustrojowe państw współczesnych*, Wyd. Temida 2., Białystok 2012., s. 41.

ministrowie w porozumieniu z szefem rządu. W rzeczywistości, proces ten swą formą odbiega od jego teoretycznego założenia.

Prawdą jest, że monarchini powołuje premiera. Niemniej, wyłania się on sam poprzez uzyskanie największej liczby głosów w trakcie wyborów powszechnych w jednomandatowych okręgach wyborczych.²² Sentencja ta może stanowić egzemplifikację tezy, że Królowa Elżbieta II nie ma realnego wpływu na decyzję, kto będzie miał powierzony gabinet, zbudowany z wyższej rangi urzędników państwowych, tworzących rząd. W praktyce, decyzja ta podejmowana jest przez społeczeństwo, partycypujące w wyborach, zawierające swoje interesy odpowiednim, według nich, kandydatom do Izby Gmin. Osoba, uzyskująca większość w izbie niższej Parlamentu, zostaje premierem.²³ W tym przypadku, funkcja monarchini ogranicza się do oficjalnego powołania na stanowisko osoby, która już i tak została wybrana przez poddanych.

Podobnie jest w przypadku wyboru odpowiednich ministrów. Jediną zauważalną różnicę stanowi fakt, że premier wyłania się na drodze wyborów, ministrowie zaś wybierani są przez osobę, zasiadającą na miejscu najważniejszego ministra rządu. Premier po uzyskaniu oficjalnej 'zgody' Królowej na sprawowanie rządów, spotyka się z monarchinią w celu przedyskutowania i ukształtowania personalnego składu rządu. Praktycznie wygląda to tak, że premier idąc na spotkanie ma swoje propozycje osób, które widziałby na konkretnych stanowiskach i z którymi jemu dobrze by się współpracowało.²⁴ Swoje propozycje przedstawia Królowej, która zatwierdza wybór. Stanowi to jeszcze jeden przykład na potwierdzenie założenia, że obecnie Królowa Elżbieta II pełni jedynie funkcje reprezentacyjne, biorąc pod uwagę rolę monarchii w sferze państwowości. Choć mówi się, że powoływanie premiera i ministrów, czyli kompletnego składu rządu w Wielkiej Brytanii, leży w gestii monarchini²⁵, w praktyce jest on jedynie przez nią zatwierdzany.

Interesujący jest fakt, że w obydwu przypadkach, kiedy Elżbieta II jako monarchini zatwierdza wybory tak na szefa rządu, jak i licznych ministrów, może wykorzystać swoje prawo weta, które oficjalnie posiada.²⁶ W praktyce, nigdy nie jest ono wykorzystywane przez władczynię. Ostatni raz, kiedy ta siła została użyta wobec wcześniej podjętych decyzji, miał miejsce ponad 300 lat temu.²⁷ Wówczas, w 1707 roku Anna Stuart z niego skorzystała.²⁸ W efekcie, niewykorzystywane prawo weto traktowane jest jak gdyby w ogóle go nie było.²⁹ Może być to

²² *The British Government: The Structure of Her Majesty's Government*, Britannica Panorama, <http://www.britannica.com/gov/gov11.html>, dostęp 4.09.2014., aktualizacja, 20.12.2014.

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ E. Gdulewicz, W. Kręcisz, *Ustrój polityczny Wielkiej Brytanii*, w *Ustroje Państw Współczesnych*, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Marii Curie – Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2001., s. 44.

²⁵ P. Bromhead, *Life in modern Britain*, Wyd. Longman., London 1973., s. 18.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ *Historia brytyjskiej monarchii – najciekawsze fakty, nieznanne tajemnice*, Super Express, http://www.se.pl/technologie/nauka/historia-brytyjskiej-monarchii-najciekawsze-fakty-nieznanne-tajemnice_183081.html, dostęp 4.09.2014., informacja potwierdzona w publikacji C. Campbell, *Królowa – nieznaną historią Elżbiety Bowes – Lyon*, Wyd. Znak litera nova, Kraków 2013.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ P. Bromhead, op. cit., s. 19.

kolejny przykład, potwierdzający stwierdzenie, że rola monarchini, a tym samym monarchii jako systemu politycznego w zakresie ustawodawstwa państwowego ogranicza się jedynie do podkreślania swojego istnienia poprzez podpisywanie wcześniej podjętych decyzji oraz przygotowanych dokumentów. Znowu sprowadza się to do wniosków, że monarchia pełni funkcję reprezentacyjną.

Ostatnią egzemplifikacją może być otwieranie sesji Parlamentu brytyjskiego, w trakcie którego Elżbieta II prezentuje plany działania rządu na najbliższy rok.³⁰ W rzeczywistości, jest to wydarzenie, jak przystało na Wielką Brytanię, niewątpliwie o charakterze symbolicznym. Jest to jedna z niewielu sytuacji, kiedy najstarsza monarchini Europy, a jednocześnie symbol Brytanii, prezentuje się w oficjalnym stroju ceremonialnym (patrz Załącznik nr 4).³¹ W trakcie otwarcia sesji Parlamentu, Królowa odczytuje mowę, która nota bene napisana zostaje przez osobę, obecnie sprawującą urząd premiera. Ogłaszane są plany dla rządu na najbliższy rok, co postrzegane jest jako sytuacja z lekka symboliczna, gdyż innymi słowy jest to oficjalne zapoznanie obywateli z wybranym sposobem tzw. 'uprawianej polityki'.³² Tak więc, ostatnie otwarcie sesyjne dotyczyło wyższych emerytur dla obywateli Wielkiej Brytanii, tańszej opieki nad dziećmi, jak również praw dla nisko opłacanych pracowników.³³

Zaprezentowany przykład nie powinien wzbudzać wątpliwości, co do reprezentacyjności, biorąc pod uwagę rolę, jaką wówczas odgrywa monarchini. Obecność Jej Wysokości jak również księcia Filipa, jako współmałżonka, nadaje całemu wydarzeniu splendoru i symbolicznego charakteru. Bowiem, nikt nie wyobraża sobie otwarcia nowej 'ery parlamentarnej' bez obecności królowej, której obowiązek uczestnictwa jest następstwem uwarunkowań historycznych. Jedynymi wyjątkami, kiedy wydarzenie to musiało odbyć się bez Elżbiety II to lata 1959 i 1963, kiedy monarchini była w stanie błogosławionym.³⁴ Jednakże, obecność Królowej nie ma żadnego praktycznego wymiaru. Nie zabiera ona głosu, prezentując swoje własne poglądy i wizję sprawowania władzy. To, co pada z jej ust jest wynikiem pracy zespołu ludzi, zaangażowanych w budowanie realnego systemu monarchii parlamentarnej.

Grupa polityczna, szumnie nazwana opozycją działającą pod nadzorem Edwarda Milliband'a, lidera Opozycji Jej Królewskiej Mości,³⁵ pełni funkcję części składowej rządu. Jest to ugrupowanie, które swą wielkością zajmuje drugie miejsce w Izbie Gmin. Zastrzega się jednak,

³⁰ *Koronowane głowy na sesji otwarcia Parlamentu.*, Newsweek Polska, <http://swiat.newsweek.pl/elzbieta-ii-krolowa-otwarcie-sesji-parlamentu-newsweek-pl.galeria,340959,1.html>, dostęp 5.09.2014., aktualizacja 20.12.2014.

³¹ Pod pojęciem oficjalnego stroju ceremonialnego Królowej Elżbiety II rozumie się przede wszystkim posiadaną przez nią w danej chwili koronę, która wykorzystywana jest tylko na obchody wydarzeń, ściśle związanych z historią i kulturą Wielkiej Brytanii, a przeciw otwarcie sesji Parlamentu niewątpliwie do takich wydarzeń należy, np., *Otwarcie sesji Parlamentu.*, <http://thequeen.blog.onet.pl/2014/06/04/otwarcie-sesji-parlamentu/>, dostęp 4.06.2014.

³² *Przemówienie Królowej na otwarcie sesji parlamentu.*, Czarnym Ciapkiem, Marudzenie człowieka niedostosowanego, <https://czarnym-ciapkiem.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/przemowienie-krolowej-na-otwarcie-sesji-parlamentu/>, dostęp 4.06.2014.

³³ *Otwarcie sesji parlamentu.*, op. cit., dostęp i aktualizacja 10.10.2014.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ H. Pidd., *Ed Miliband must cease Hampstead Heath politics to win election - MP.*, The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/dec/23/ed-miliband-cease-hampstead-heath-politics-win-general-election-says-labour-mp>, dostęp 11.11.2014.

że monarchini ma prawo do zmiany osoby na tym stanowisku, i co ciekawe, nowy deputowany nie musi spełniać wymogu bycia członkiem rządu.³⁶

Zaliczając Opozycję Jej Królewskiej Mości do jednego z elementów rządu Wielkiej Brytanii, którego celem jest nie tylko przeciwstawianie się istniejącemu porządkowi, mówi się przede wszystkim o założeniu Rodney'a Brazier'a, który jasno podkreśla, że lider partii opozycyjnej czasami zobligowany wręcz jest do zaferowania partii rządzącej swej pomocy w procesach decyzyjnych.³⁷ Istotne jest jednak, aby zaznaczyć, że współudział partii przeciwnej jest ograniczony do tzw. dobrej woli premiera. Pod pojęciem tym, wspomniany autor publikacji *Constitutional Practice: The Foundations of British Government* rozumie ofertę, jaka składana jest przez premiera przedstawicielowi opozycji w postaci zaproszenia do współpracy nad danym projektem, który w rozumieniu społecznym ma służyć dobru ogółu.³⁸ Założeniem takiej postawy jest odpowiednie przygotowanie przewodniczącego partii przeciwnej do ewentualnego, natychmiastowego przejścia rządu w sytuacji kryzysowej kraju.³⁹

Podobnej opinii, że opozycja w Wielkiej Brytanii postrzegana jest wręcz jako partner w sprawowaniu rządów jest Erskine May, który w pracy zatytułowanej *Parliamentary Practice* zaznacza, że zadaniem rządu jest branie pod uwagę opinii partii opozycyjnej i wypracowanie wspólnego konsensusu.⁴⁰ Dlatego też, w systemie sprawowania władzy brytyjskiej, ustanowiono dzień, w którym odbywają się dyskusje partii rządzących nad wprowadzeniem zmian, w ustawodawstwie rozumianych jako poprawki.⁴¹ W tym miejscu, nie da się pominąć faktu, że opozycja stanowi elementarną część Rządu Jej Królewskiej Mości, przez co teoretycznie podlega jej bezpośredniemu wpływowi. Na podstawie zdobytej do tej pory wiedzy z przeprowadzenia poszczególnych analiz krytycznych, można domyślać się, że współpraca między partią wiodącą a tą, przeciwstawiającą się stanowi pewnego rodzaju siłę państwową, której decyzje przedstawiane królowej i zaakceptowane przez nią, będą wprowadzone w życie zwykłego obywatela.

Opozycja Jej Królewskiej Mości może brać aktywny udział w konsultacjach, mających na celu wypracowanie jednolitego, akceptowalnego rozwiązania, pod warunkiem, że rozmowy te mają charakter nieformalny. Odbywają się one dzięki tzw. *usual channel*, które ustanowione są przez *Chief Whip* największej partii opozycyjnej.⁴² Przykład ten pokazuje, w jakim stopniu partia przeciwna partycypuje w procesach legislacyjnych, w których może wpływać na kształt odpowiednich ustaw, lecz dodać trzeba, że w przeciwieństwie do władzy zwierzchniej Królowej Elżbiety II, nie posiada prawa weta.⁴³ W praktyce oznacza to, że ustawa musi zostać przyjęta w takiej postaci, w jakiej została zaprezentowana królowej. Po konsultacjach, a więc już w czasie

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ R. Brazier, *Constitutional Practice: The Foundation of British Government*, 1998, s. 160-171.

³⁸ R. Brazier, op. cit., s. 175-180.

³⁹ Ibidem., s. 182.

⁴⁰ E. May, *Parliamentary Practice*, XXIII edycja., s. 247.

⁴¹ Ibidem., s. 248.

⁴² Ibidem., s. 250.

⁴³ Ibidem.

prezentowania aktu normatywnego monarchini, opozycja nie może przeciwstawić się jej projektowi. Jedyną osobą, posiadającą to prawo, jak powszechnie wiadomo jest sama Królowa.

Opozycja Jej Królewskiej Mości posiada również prawo zadawania pytań i proszenie o wyjaśnienia poszczególne departamenty, w momencie pojawienia się wątpliwości.⁴⁴ Co istotne, osoby zasiadające w ławach po przeciwnej stronie Parlamentu, mogą zadać więcej niż jedno pytanie, co jest ustanowione normami prawnymi Wielkiej Brytanii.⁴⁵ Raz w miesiącu Opozycja Jej Królewskiej Mości może pytać w Chamber, a raz w tygodniu może otwarcie zapytać Premiera, sprawującego władzę o kwestie najbardziej sporne.⁴⁶ Ważne jest to, że w kulturze politycznej Wielkiej Brytanii, wypracowano pewien wzór porozumienia między partią rządzącą a opozycyjną. Zadawanie pytań stanowi pewnego rodzaju zaczątek dyskusji nad tym, co powinno, co może być zmienione oraz jaki sposób powinien być wybrany do przeprowadzenia zmian, aby były one podjęte z pożytkiem dla społeczeństwa.

Wszystkie zaprezentowane przykłady działania Opozycji Jej Królewskiej Mości pokazują, że stanowi ona raczej grupę służącą radą i pomocą dla partii rządzącej. Za jej funkcję uważa się nie tylko przeciwstawianie się przyjętemu porządkowi, ale próbę podjęcia dyskusji nad kolejnymi zmianami, co do których przekonane powinny być obydwie stronnictwa parlamentarne. Rząd Jej Królewskiej Mości i Opozycja Jej Królewskiej Mości w Wielkiej Brytanii to nie przeciwstawianie się sobie nawzajem, ale próba porozumienia i utrzymywania realnej władzy.

Egzemplifikacje te pokazują również, jak bardzo ograniczona jest rola Królowej Elżbiety II jako monarchini. Jej zadanie ogranicza się bowiem do wysłuchania projektów ustaw, jakie są już wcześniej opracowane przez rząd i przedyskutowane wspólnie z opozycją, uwzględniając już wniesienie odpowiednich poprawek. Oprócz zapoznania się z nowymi prawami, Królowa odpowiedzialna jest za oficjalne przyjęcie prawa, które asygnowane jest przez nią osobiście, co jest równoznaczne z wejściem w życie. Trudno nie zgodzić się z tezą, że rola monarchini, a tym samym monarchii w kwestiach państwowych ograniczona jest do tej symbolicznej, reprezentatywnej.

Do tej pory podjęto temat roli monarchii brytyjskiej, jako narodowego systemu politycznego, stanowiącego podstawę funkcjonowania odpowiednio organów państwowych jakim jest Rząd Jej Królewskiej Mości i Opozycja Jej Królewskiej Mości. Niemniej, nie można zapominać, że Wielka Brytania to państwo, które nie jest zamknięte wewnątrz swojej własnej kultury politycznej, ale stanowi jeden z elementów funkcjonowania polityki międzynarodowej. Dlatego też, nie można pominąć roli, jaką odgrywa monarchia brytyjska w strukturach międzypaństwowych, jakimi są Unia Europejska albo Pakt Północno – Atlantycki, NATO, czy też Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych, ONZ.

⁴⁴ M. Durkin, O. Gay, *Her Majesty's Opposition*, House of Common Library, 2006., s. 5.

⁴⁵ M. Durkin, O. Gay, *op. cit.*, s. 6.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

Celem tego krótkiego podrozdziału nie jest zaprezentowanie faktografii rozwoju i przynależności Wielkiej Brytanii do wspomnianych struktur, ale przywołanie współczesnych przykładów z życia państwa, aby pokazać jego prawdziwą rolę, jaką odgrywa jako aktor stosunków międzynarodowych.

Obserwując współczesną brytyjską scenę polityczną, bez problemu można zauważyć, iż zdecydowanie dominuje euro sceptycyzm zarówno wśród przedstawicieli władz oraz obywateli. Biorąc pod uwagę pierwszy ze wspomnianych aspektów, przynależność do UE, jak również korzyści z tego wynikające stają się głównym tematem debat przedwyborczych, w których uczestniczą przedstawiciele partii rządzącej, David Cameron i lider opozycji, Ed Milliband. Jak przystało na przedstawicieli dwóch odrębnych ugrupowań, jeden popiera pomysł pozostania w strukturze upatrując w tym korzyści nie tylko dla kraju, ale i Unii, podczas gdy ten drugi jest zdecydowanie temu przeciwny.⁴⁷ Odnosząc się z kolei do badań *Transatlantic Trends 2014*, przeprowadzonych przez The German Marshall Fund of the United States, trzeba powiedzieć, że 51% jest zdecydowanie przeciwna pozostaniu państwa w UE.⁴⁸ Ponad połowa społeczeństwa brytyjskiego opowiada się za wystąpieniem ze struktury, upatrując w tym większe korzyści dla państwa.

Jak twierdzi Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, takiego stanu rzeczy należy upatrywać w przeszłości, cofając się do wydarzeń II-iej wojny światowej, kiedy państwo brytyjskie skutecznie odparło atak wojsk Wehrmachtu. Zdaniem politologa, wydarzenie to stało się symbolem stabilności i bezpieczeństwa, jakie jest w stanie zagwarantować kraj swojemu społeczeństwu. Bowiem zasada przyświecająca Brytyjczykom po dziś dzień to „nie należy majstrować przy dobrze funkcjonującym urzędzeniu”.⁴⁹

Obecność Wielkiej Brytanii w Unii przez jej przedstawicieli postrzegana jest jako wysoce pożądana. Brytania bowiem odznaczająca się niezachwianą stabilnością oraz profesjonalizmem politycznym pozytywnie wpływa na odłamy odpowiednich polityk, budujących całą strukturę. Innymi słowy, Wielka Brytania w UE postrzegana jest jako silny partner decyzyjny w procesach kształtujących teraźniejszość i przyszłość polityczną państw przynależących.⁵⁰

W tym miejscu zaznaczyć trzeba, że monarchia brytyjska jako narodowy system polityczny na arenie międzynarodowej nie odgrywa symbolicznej roli, ale aktywnie partycypuje w życiu politycznym struktury. Co ciekawe, uważana jest za ostoję wartości narodowych, którym obywatele dzięki sprawnie działającym strukturom rządowym pozostają oddani i wpływają na ich dalszy rozwój. Przedstawiciele władzy brytyjskiej cieszą się dużym zaufaniem w zakresie polityki

⁴⁷ *Wielka Brytania ucieka z Unii Europejskiej? Referendum nie zaszkodzi naszej gospodarce*, TVN 24 BIS, <http://tvn24bis.pl/wiadomosci-gospodarce,71/wielka-brytania-ucieka-z-unii-europejskiej-referendum-nie-zaszkodzi-naszej-gospodarce,486981.html>, dostęp 10.11.2014.

⁴⁸ *Transatlantic Trends 2014*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States., s. 25.

⁴⁹ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski., *Pozycja Wielkiej Brytanii w Unii Europejskiej w świetle odrzucenia przez Zjednoczone Królestwo paktu fiskalnego*, Nowa Politologia, <http://www.nowapolitologia.pl/politologia/europeistyka/pozycja-wielkiej-brytanii-w-unii-europejskiej-w-swietle-odrzuconia-przez-zjednoczone-krolestwo->, dostęp 1.10.2014.

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

zagranicznej.⁵¹ Dlatego też oficjalnie mówi się, że Wielka Brytania to partner potrzebny UE, który swą obecnością zaznaczać będzie wartości przynależności społecznej i nada państwowego charakteru całej strukturze. Obecnie, jest to jedno z najpotężniejszych państw tworzących Wspólnotę Europejską.⁵²

Wielka Brytania wspólnie z Republiką Federalną Niemiec, jak również z Włochami i Francji tworzy tzw. 'wielką czwórkę' unijnych mocarstw. Zajmuje czwarte miejsce, biorąc pod uwagę skalę płatnika netto do wspólnego budżetu Unii Europejskiej.⁵³ Nie można jednak pominąć faktu, że i w tej kwestii Zjednoczone Królestwo odznacza się przynajmniej minimum suwerenności w postaci 'rabatu brytyjskiego'. Oznacza to, że państwo płaci zdecydowanie niższe składki niż jest to w przypadku czołowych przedstawicieli 'czwórki'. Niemniej, obecność państwa brytyjskiego wydaje się być niezwykle korzystna z ekonomicznego punktu widzenia.

Ponad to, nie wolno pomijać faktu, że znaczenie Wielkiej Brytanii jako najpotężniejszego mocarstwa światowego sukcesywnie maleje chociaż wciąż pozytywnie wpływa na wiele gałęzi życia międzynarodowego. Jak pokazują dane Banku Światowego 2010, Wielka Brytania zajmowała 6 – te miejsce na świecie, analizując wielkość jej gospodarki.⁵⁴ Obecne dane statystyczne utrzymują te wskaźniki na względnie porównywalnym poziomie. Wciąż uważa się, że brytyjska gospodarka odgrywa znaczącą rolę w światowej produkcji surowców i odznacza się znacznym liberalizmem gospodarczym wśród krajów wspólnotowych.⁵⁵ Londyn, natomiast jako stolica kraju, uchodzi za czołowy ośrodek usług finansowych i postrzegany jest za jeden z trzech, najważniejszych centrów dowódczych gospodarki światowej.⁵⁶ Wspólnie z Nowym Jorkiem i Tokio, stolica Zjednoczonego Królestwa uchodzi za głównego koordynatora przedsięwzięć gospodarczych. Zjednoczone Królestwo należy również do grona państw, dysponujących bronią jądrową. Badania przeprowadzone przez Sztokholmski Międzynarodowy Instytut Badań nad Pokojem w 2011 roku pokazał, że państwo to posiada 225 głowic (160 gotowych do natychmiastowego użycia).⁵⁷ To samo badanie, z kolei przeprowadzone dwa lata później, tj. w 2013 roku pokazało, że Zjednoczone Królestwo nie zaprzestało swoich działań mających na celu umocnienie uzbrojenia. Wydatki na obronność zostały zwiększone dwukrotnie, a Wielka Brytania zajmuje czołowe miejsce w tej kwestii, tuż obok Rosji, Chin, Arabii Saudyjskiej, jak również Japonii czy Francji.⁵⁸ Jest to egzemplifikacja brytyjskiej wiarygodności i stabilności,

⁵¹ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, op. cit.

⁵² Wielka Brytania. Polityka zagraniczna., Stosunki Międzynarodowe info., http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/kraj/Wielka_Brytania.polityka_zagraniczna, dostęp 10.10.2014.

⁵³ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, op.cit.

⁵⁴ Wielka Brytania. Rola Międzynarodowa., Stosunki Międzynarodowe.info., http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/kraj/Wielka_Brytania.rola_miedzynarodowa, dostęp 8.10.2014.

⁵⁵ Gospodarka Brytyjska., Ambasada Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Londynie., http://www.londyn.msz.gov.pl/pl/wspolpraca_dwustronna/informacje_ekonomiczne/gospodarka_brytyjska/, dostęp 9.10.2014.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Sztokholmski Międzynarodowy Instytut Badań nad Pokojem., http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/haslo,Sztokholmski_Miedzynarodowy_Instytut_Badan_nad_Pokojem, dostęp 12.11.2014.

⁵⁸ *Zachód wydaje na wojsko coraz mniej. Reszta świata się zbroi.*, Polskie Radio., <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1100014,Zachod-wydaje-na-wojsko-coraz-mniej-Reszta-swiatea-sie-zbroi>, dostęp 11.11.2014.

która niewątpliwie jest potrzebna i wykorzystana przez strukturę, jaką jest NATO. Obecność Wielkiej Brytanii w Pakcie Północno – Atlantyckim, nadaje mu status silnego, a tym samym, pożądanego.

W tym miejscu, trzeba dodać, że brytyjskie wojsko to jedno z najsprawniejszych w Europie. Nie tylko sprawność odgrywa tutaj znaczącą rolę, ale również ich duże doświadczenie bojowe oraz umiejętności nie tylko teoretyczne, ale i te, taktyczne. Za przykład posłużyć mogą działania zbrojne w Afganistanie i Iraku, albo Libii.⁵⁹ Odpowiednio w 2001, 2003 – 2011 i 2011, armia brytyjska, w której od początku zaszczepia się ducha walki i spójności, partycypowały w walkach, które nierzadko zostały uznane za wygrane. W konsekwencji, Wielka Brytania jest jednym, z najważniejszych członków, a za jej atut podaje się zdolności dyplomatyczne i pragmatyzm na drodze podejmowania decyzji taktycznych. Zjednoczone Królestwo to także stały, a jednocześnie aktywny członek Rady Bezpieczeństwa Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych.⁶⁰ Uważa się, że to jedno z najbardziej liczących się państw na arenie międzynarodowej. Z decyzjami rządu Wielkiej Brytanii liczą się Stany Zjednoczone, gdyż zawarły one ze sobą tzw. specjalne stosunki.⁶¹ Niewątpliwie pozwala to na wywieranie zdecydowanie większego wpływu niż mogłoby to mieć miejsce biorąc pod uwagę tylko potencjał polityczny i gospodarczy Królestwa.⁶²

Powyższe sytuacje mogą posłużyć jako egzemplifikacja roli monarchii brytyjskiej na arenie międzynarodowej. Pozwalają one na sformułowanie wniosku, że Zjednoczone Królestwo to nie zamknięte wewnętrzne państwo, które funkcjonuje tylko w ramach zasad historycznie ustalonych i konwenansów, opartych głównie na symbolice. To również militarnie, politycznie i społecznie silne państwo, partycypant procesów decyzyjnych Unii Europejskiej, NATO i ONZ. Swoim potencjałem może wpływać na kształtowanie polityki tak ekonomicznej, gospodarczej jak i społecznej innych uczestników struktur międzypaństwowych. Postrzegane jako symbol stabilności i jedności narodowej, realnie również wpływa na to, co może się wydarzyć w przyszłości poprzez utrzymywanie odpowiednich ośrodków decyzyjnych (Londyn), jak i surowców mineralnych i militarnych jednocześnie. Przez to staje się również niekwestionowanym uczestnikiem wydarzeń, jakimi były szczyty G7, G8, G20, gdzie Wielka Brytania dość jasno przedstawiała swoje stanowiska i propozycje rozwiązań poszczególnych sporów.

⁵⁹ Wielka Brytania. Rola Międzynarodowa., op. cit.

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ Ibidem.

⁶² Ibidem.

Development of sovereign Slovenia as a social state

the author argues that successful stability in modern Slovenia was facilitated by a number of factors, which were being formed, when it was a part of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – highly developed industry and living standards, ethnically homogeneous population, sophisticated traditions of corporatism etc. Quite significant connector for Slovenia became the process of joining the EU. Euro-integration facilitated modernization of social, cultural and economic spheres. Global financial-economic crisis revealed all problems in the state's economy and the government had to start gradual reduction of a large number of social benefits for population. Current government wishing to regain the trust of population is trying to change the situation for the better, what is indicative of political stability. Owing to the EU assistance the country recovered the GDP, index of economic activity. Thus, it will considerably influence further development of Slovenia as a social state.

Keywords: Slovenia, social state, EU, Euro-integration.

РОЗБУДОВА НЕЗАЛЕЖНОЇ СЛОВЕНІЇ ЯК СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ

Автор доводить, що успіху стабільності незалежної Словенії сприяв ряд факторів, які сформувалися, коли вона входила до СФРЮ – високий розвиток промисловості та рівня життя, майже однорідне в етнічному плані населення, розвинені традиції корпоративізму тощо. Потужним об'єднуючим для Словенії став процес приєднання до ЄС. Євроінтеграція сприяла модернізації соціальної, культурної й економічної сфер. Глобальна фінансово-економічна криза виявила негаразди в економіці держави й уряд був змушений поступово скорочувати значну частину соціальних пільг для населення. Чинний уряд прагне повернути довіру людей, виправляє ситуацію, що вказує на ріст політичної стабільності. Завдяки допомозі ЄС відновили ВВП, показники економічного розвитку. Тож це суттєво впливатиме на подальший розвиток Словенії як соціальної держави.

Ключові слова: Словенія, соціальна держава, ЄС, євроінтеграція.

Cooperation between the EU and the states of the Balkan Peninsula has a long and varied culture, which first of all is predetermined by their geographical neighboring. After the collapse of Yugoslavia the countries of the region started a new stage of their relations with the EU. The influence of the society was expressed not only in strengthening of trade and economic ties,

but also in policy of integration towards the southern-east. Since 1990 this direction of the EU policy has been intensifying. The states of former Yugoslavia are main recipients of regulations, rules and vales, elaborated by the EU, which quickly carried out transformation (shifted to the market economy and democratization of the political systems), having conducted all reforms necessary for membership in the EU¹. Nowadays, their foreign policy is aimed at the EU membership, while relations are characterized by active cooperation, extension of the European integration process.

Slovenia² and Croatia³ have already become the EU members. And among the candidates are Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and former Yugoslavia republic Macedonia⁴. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are also striving to become the EU members. For them, participation in the Euro-integration processes, first of all means modernization and democratization of political and economic institutes, civil society, development in the sphere of social policy. They also wish to have European future. For the EU Euro-integration and association of the Balkan states is provision of stability and security at the external boundaries, possibility to strengthen its positions at the international arena, due to well-considered policy and extension of its influence.

In the course of 1991-2000 in Slovenia were conducted numerous reforms in political, economic and social spheres. Most of these changes are closely connected with a many-sided process of “descending” Europeanization, which predetermined for authorities the boundaries of necessary reforms and became their main catalyzer. The process of Europeanization in Slovenia took place in the context of integration, which the EU wanted to unify for the Balkan countries, in particular, applying the policy of conventions, similar mechanisms and instruments (European Union Association Agreement with Slovenia “Stabilization and Association Process with Croatia and Serbia”⁵; financial assistance for introducing changes), influence of regulations, principles and practicalities. However, Slovenia had its own specificity, determined by objective and subjective internal and external factors.

Slovenia was successfully approaching the EU, establishing new institutions and conducting social reforms. The peculiarity of the country was that certain transformations were carried out in the atmosphere of high social consent, without “civil servant screening” and categorical objection of previous economic and social achievements. A top priority direction for the country’s development was maintenance of social security system, i.e. development of sovereign Slovenia

¹ Yevropeiskii Soiuz v 21 veke: vremia ispytaniy / Ed. by O. Yu. Potemkina (publ.edit.), N. Yu. Kaveshnikova, N. B. Kondratieva. – Moscow: Ves Mir, 2012. P.74.

² *Europe Agreement* establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part. Luxembourg: 10.06.1996. Entry into force 01.02.1999. URL: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=1995071> (accessed date: 02.10.2013).

³ *Ispolnilsia god, kak Khorvatiia vstupila v Yevropeiskii Soiuz*. URL: <https://ria.ru/world/20140701/1014274031.html> (accessed date: 01.07.2014).

⁴ *Politico / Ulazak u EU: Albanija 2025, Srbija i Crna Gora 2027, Makedonija 2030, a BiH?* URL: <https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/ulazak-u-eu-albanija-2025-srbija-i-crna-gora-2027-makedonija-2030-a-bih/247800> (accessed date: 16.12.2016).

⁵ *Stabilization and Association Process*. European Commission Enlargement Policy. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm (accessed date: 02.10.2016).

as a social state. This regulation is formalized in legislation in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, adopted on December 23, 1991⁶. Article 2 of the Fundamental Law declares that “Slovenia is a legal and social state”. In the Constitution there is also a separate chapter, devoted to regulation of economic and social relations, first of all in the sphere of employment and labor protection, participation in the union activities etc.

The level and character of Euro-integration influence had positive effect on Slovenia: the state rapidly meet all the requirements and became the EU member. However, it should be mentioned, that the relations between the SFRY and EU have been actively developing since the second half of the 20th, thus one should not assume that the EU started asserting its influence on Slovenia only in 1991. Cooperation between the EU and Yugoslavia states has not always been developing within the sphere of the Balkan states joining the Union, at first cooperation was based on the bilateral agreements. The SFRY which chose the “third direction” in the economy and headed the movement against the accession was actively cooperating with socialistic states and the Union, obtaining significant benefits from such cooperation⁷. In the 1960s the parties signed first foreign trade agreements⁸. First restrained attempts of the SFRY on approaching western states in the sphere of political relations. In particular, these were the Brioni Agreement, signed by I. B. Tito and W. Brandt, European Union Association Agreement (1980) in economic and social issues, which had political significance⁹.

Though Slovenia not so long ago was a part of Yugoslavia, but culturally and historically it is closely connected with Austria, and thus it was not treated in Europe as an absolutely foreign country. Slovenia was the most economically-developed republic. Due to the specificity of an active scheme of labor division, the bulk of SFRY industry was concentrated in Slovenia, which had profound economic ties with neighboring EU countries. After the collapse of the SFRY Slovenia obtained considerable economic infrastructure: 17% of social production, which was manufactured in the country, 19% of industrial production and 7% of agricultural production. Economic crisis in the SFRY in the late 80s considerably affected Slovenia: about 800 enterprises suffered financial collapse, the number of unemployed raised, the country experienced a lack of foreign currency, general living standards decreased¹⁰. But in comparison with other parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, at most criteria, earlier approached an average level of development of current EU members that is why affiliation of Slovenia into the European Union is rather a formal fact.

⁶ *Ustava Republike Slovenije*. URL: <http://www.egov.ufsc.br/portal/sites/default/files/anexos/21387-21388-1-PB.htm> (accessed date: 01.11.2012).

⁷ *Montanari M.* EU Trade with the Balkans: Large Room for Growth? // *Eastern European Economics*. 2005. Vol. 43. № 1. P. 73.

⁸ *Berezin A. V.* Stanovlenie YeS kak subekta vneshnei politiki na primere Balkanskogo regiona // *Aktualnye problem Yevropy*. 2006. № 4. P. 83.

⁹ *Chuvakhina L. G.* Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Yugoslavii c SShA i stranami YeES (1945-1985). Moscow: Ekonomika, 2015. P. 124.

¹⁰ *Kornilov Yu.* Sloveniia: Na puti vykhoda iz federatsii? // *TASS: BPI*. Moscow. 1991. 4 March. P. 16.

In the course of the continuous cooperation between the EU and the states of former Yugoslavia, which lasted for more than two decades, there were several stages during which the EU foreign policy towards them was conducted within the frames of Europeanization development. The influence of Europeanization on Slovenia was always considerable. It is proved by the Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, signed in 1970. E. Brinar and M. Svetlicic suppose that there are several stages of Slovenia integration, which would have started even earlier than in 1990s if not obstructed by Yugoslavian ideology¹¹. Approaching of Slovenia towards the EU started after its withdrawal from the SFRY¹² and accession to power politicians from the Party of Democratic Renovation (PDR), who supported integration¹³. The PDR acted under the slogan “For European quality of living”¹⁴, which determined a foreign policy strategy for next years.

In Slovenia in the 1980s-1990s prevailed strong nationalistic movements, however the authority realized that a small country could compete and show sustainable development only being a part of the states’ community¹⁵. Despite obviously pro-Western position of the ruling party, “for quite a long period of time the ruling elite did not have absolutely clear vision as to necessity to take responsibilities which seriously limited sovereignty of the country”¹⁶, and this was connected with the Union. Such interpretation of the situation facilitated the process of development of socialization of political elite in Slovenia by the EU and helped to strengthen positive vision of Euro-integration.

The EU tried to prevent withdrawal of Slovenia from the SFRY¹⁷ and assisted during the military conflict¹⁸. Proclamation of Slovenia independence on June 25, 1991 became a trigger to the 10-day war, in the course of which Slovenian authorities looked to Europe for help and support considering it to be a powerful mediator. For the members of the Union it was one of the first opportunities to display to the world their ability to solve regional conflicts and they succeeded: on the basis of their initiative the Brioni Agreement, which put an end to war of Slovenia for independence¹⁹, was signed. The Agreement stressed the necessity to form an

¹¹ *Brinar E., Svetlicic M.* Enlargement of the European Union: the case of Slovenia // *Journal of European Public Policy*. 1999. Vol. 6. № 5. P. 807.

¹² Вилић Д., Годоровић Б. Разбијање Југославије 1990-1992. Београд: ДИК Књижевне новине-Енциклопедја, 1995. С. 143.

¹³ *Shmelev B. A.* Balkanski horki // *Mir peremen*. 2004. № 3. P. 42.

¹⁴ *Churkina I. V.* Istoriia Slovenii // *Vestnik Rossiiskogo humanitarnogo nauchnogo fonda*. 2009. № 4 (57). P. 64.

¹⁵ *Yozhe M.* Bez iluzii ili Sloveniia mezhdru slomom sotsializma i krizisom kapitalizma // *Vestnik Yevropy*, 2014. №37. URL: <http://www.vestnik-evropy.ru/issues/without-illusions-or-slovenia-between-the-collapse-of-socialism-and-the-crisis-of-capitalism.html> (accessed date: 10.09.2015).

¹⁶ *Kniazev Yu. K.* Sloveniia kak regionalnyi lider // *Mir peremen*. 2008. № 3. P. 143.

¹⁷ Сотировић В. Б. Социјалистички аспект распада Југославије и српско национално питање. Виљнус: Едукологија, 2013. С. 29.

¹⁸ *Slovník D.* Sto osamosvojitvenih dni. Ljubljana: Delo, 1991. S. 183; *Holbruk R.* Put u Dejton: Od Sarajeva do Dejtona i posle. Beograd: Dan Graf, 1998. S. 201.

¹⁹ *Yazykova A. A.* yuho-vostochnaia Yevropa v epokhu kardinalnykh peremen. Moscow: Ves Mir. 2007. P. 56.

Observation mission of the Union, which would “guarantee further participation of the EU in the situation in Yugoslavia”²⁰.

Solving the political problems the EU extended its influence on the economic and social development of the country, including it into PHARE assistance programme, aimed at restructurisation of CEE countries’ economies in accordance with the market model. Slovenia received funds within the frames of the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), aimed at performing reforms for *acquis communautaire*²¹; and the programme of 7-year development of agriculture as a part of the SAPARD programme²². An effective instrument for including Slovenia into the EU orbit was its cooperation since December 1992 with the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It started its activity in 1991 engaging CEE and SEE²³ countries in cooperation. The EBRD and Slovenia cooperate within the lines of restructurisation of a corporate sector, enlargement of the role of a private sector, stabilization of a financial sector, supporting energy stability.

The process of Europeanization had system and planed character and was based on the elaborated frame programmes and conditions²⁴. In 1993 especially for CEE and SEE states, which were preparing to join the EU, the European Commission worked out the Copenhagen criteria, which included the requirement, concerning stable institutions, effective market economy, and ability to undertake commitments of the EU members²⁵. In 1995 the European Commission prepared “A White paper including a list of legislative acts, according to which candidate-countries must adapt their national legislations”²⁶. The list “*acquis communautaire*”, involved all legislative spheres of the EU and presupposed, that candidate-countries would accept and implement those requirements, and thus it was a direct mechanism for creating a legislative base for national states²⁷. Therefore, the boundaries of the EU influence, which bore compulsory character and testified of Slovenian interest in joining the EU was another instrument of Europeanization.

All reforms were implemented under control of a well-branched system of institutional structure, which provided coordination of transformations. The main institutional structures

²⁰ *Schneider M. K.* Brioni Agreement // *War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia*. Editor: Hall R.C., ABC-CLIO, 2014. P. 47.

²¹ *The enlargement process and three pre-accession instruments: Phare, ISPA, Sapard* // European Commission Enlargement directorate General, 2002. URL: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bulgaria_phare_ispa_sapard_en.pdf (accessed date: 10.09.2014).

²² *Andreou G., Bache I.* Europeanization and multi-level governance in Slovenia // *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. 2010. Vol.10. № 1. P. 32-33.

²³ *Slovenia overview*. European Bank for reconstruction and development. URL: <http://www.ebrd.com/where-we-are/slovenia/overview.html> (accessed date: 10.09.2014).

²⁴ *Slovenia's road to the EU* // European Stability Institute URL: <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&cid=395> (accessed date: 21.02.2014).

²⁵ *Fontaine P.* *Yevropa v 12 urokakh*. Luxembourg: The Bureau of the Official publications of the EU. 2010. URL: http://ceas.europa.eu/delegations/ru./documents/publications/europe_12_lessons_ru.pdf (accessed date: 14.05.2012).

²⁶ Glinkina S.P., Kulikova N.V., Sinitsina I.S. *Strany Tsentralno-Vostochnoi Yevropy: yevrointegratsiia I ekonomicheskii rost*: Scientific report. Moscow: Institut ekonomiki RAN, 2014. P. 9.

²⁷ *Conditions for membership*. European Commission URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (accessed date: 14.05.2012).

of Euro-integration, which acted at the national level since 1997 were: the State department of European affairs and Department for the EU integration (MFA department under the guise of the prime-minister); working parties and inter-governmental committees; Team of negotiators from the Republic of Slovenia for joining the EU consisted of 10 experts²⁸.

Slovenia actively implemented all requirements of the EU: diplomatic relations with the European Union were established in 1992, and in 1993 Slovenia and the EU signed the Association Agreement, what opened the doors for further membership. In 1996 Slovenia submitted a membership application and at the same day signed the European Agreement, which gave the green light for further accession. At first, Slovenia entered the list of six countries, ready to conduct negotiations in 2000 and then joined the number of CEE states, which joined the EU in 2004. The main incentive for accepting the process of Europeanization and advantages it brought, was that "Europeanization became a substitution for the old ideology" in Slovenia²⁹. This presupposed an accelerated wish of the Slovenian society to join the EU.

One of the characteristics and consequences of a regional integration is obtaining mutual benefits³⁰. At the preparatory stage Slovenia actively implemented all the requirements of the EU, what provided it with a range of advantages: growth in foreign investments; getting funding from different financial programs; conducting reconstruction after withdrawal from the SFRY. During the transitional period the structure of public production in the state has changed: the sphere of providing services has grown³¹; liberalization and privatization in energy industry, in banking sector etc. In the system of the state management appeared new bodies and committees, new functions were added, working pattern of the cabinet of ministers changed (now it was in charge of Euro-integration), an agenda started with the information concerning the process of integration with the EU³².

After joining the EU Slovenia adapted to the requirement of the Union in the sphere of political activity and high competition at the markets. The country confirmed the reforms conducted before joining the EU; integrated into the institutional system of the EU; participated in various programmes of financial assistance (in particular there acted a Transitional programme, intended for the EU new members), which provided economic inclination of Slovenia to the EU. After joining the EU the state had to deepen Europeanization processes, though the interest towards it fell down, as the admission requirements were accomplished. Obstacles appeared when the right-of-center government came to power.

²⁸ *Fink-Hafner D., Lajh D.* Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanisation of the Slovenian Core Executive // OUEU PHASE I, Occasional Paper 6.1 – 09.03, Ljubljana. 2003. P. 11.

²⁹ *Krasovec A., Lajh D.* The Slovenian EU Accession Referendum: A Cat-and-Mouse Game // West European Politics. 2007. Vol. 27. № 4. P. 617.

³⁰ *Butorina O.* Yevropeiskaia integratsiia. – Moscow: Publishing house «Delovaia literatura». 2011. P. 457.

³¹ *Kniazev Yu. K.* Sloveniia kak regionalnyi lider // Mir peremen. 2008. № 3. P. 147.

³² *Fink-Hafner D., Lajh D.* Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanisation of the Slovenian Core Executive // OUEU PHASE I, Occasional Paper 6.1 – 09.03, Ljubljana. 2003. P. 14.

Integration became more profound in 2004–2017 as it was implemented in several directions, in particular: joining the Euro zone (the process started in 2004 by the mechanism of currency exchange and finished in 2007) and presiding in the EU Council in 2008, was marked by a number of successful projects and proposals for the EU. Successfulness of the results of integration and Europeanization in Slovenia can also be proved by the fact that in 2014 it got the 6th place as to the index of transformations, which studied quality of democracy, market economy and political governing; active participation of the state in the EU political life.

However, the period of Slovenia adaptation to the EU had not only positive consequences. It revealed a range of problems connected with the EU financial state, as well as the necessity to conduct new reforms, in particular in the judicial branch. Opening of the agricultural market in Slovenia led to an unsustainable competitiveness for Slovenian farmers. Despite this, in accordance with the OECD report, a probability of a debt crisis in Slovenia grew, and the level of investors' credibility in it lowered.

Enhancing development of social policy and striving for achieving success in the social sphere, Slovenian government took a number of measures, aimed at their optimization and achieved factual improvement of living conditions. It positively marked it out in comparison with governments in other countries of the region. The government purposefully solved the issues, which could potentially lead to conflicts between the state, employers and employees within the frames of the Special Public Agreement of 1994, in particular creating the Economic and Social Council of the Republic of Slovenia (ESC)³³ – a tripartite body, consisted of 15 members (5 representatives from the government, employers and employees, correspondingly). Usually, the Council is headed by the Slovenian government's representative.

The main function of the body is to deal with various problems in the economic and social spheres of the state, solve problems, disturbing any of the parties. The council raises a point (at request of one of three social partners or by own initiative), which touches on the interests of the government, employers and employees, in particular concerning: economic system and economic policy (including the state's budget); issues of employment and labor relations; citizens' social rights and social policy; problems of taxation and price forming; activity of trade unions etc³⁴. Moreover, the ESC may participate in the process of preparing legislative acts, consulting and making recommendations as to them, initiate adoption of new laws or make amendments to the existing ones. These proposals and recommendations are sent by the ESC for consideration to the National Assembly and the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia, and distribute them among the trade unions and wide public circles.

The ESC already celebrated its 20th anniversary (April 2014). Fruitfulness and necessity of the ESC activity is indicated not only by its continual existence but by over 250 conducted

³³ *Ekonomsko-socialni svet*. Ustanovni akt. URL: <http://www.ess.si/ess/ess-si.nsf/ekonomsko-socialnisvet/ustanovni-akt-ekonomsko-socialnega-sveta> (accessed date: 20.05.2015).

³⁴ *Foshchan Ya*. Shliakh do natsii: slovenska model postsotsialistichnoho suspilnoho rozvytku. URL: <http://veche.kiev.ua/news/5947/> (accessed date: 02.03.2017).

board meetings, at which about 1000 issues concerning social dialogue between the authorities and public representatives have been discussed. Especially for the anniversary the Head of the Council and Minister of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of Slovenia A. Kopach Mrak prepared a publication, where she emphasized the effectiveness of the ESC for the last decade and underlined that the Council has gained its good reputation and social significance and this must prevent the government from ignoring its point of view while adopting important social decisions, harmonizing salary policy, legislative acts as to regulation of employees' rights etc³⁵.

A. Kopach Mrak supposed that social dialogue is a great historical achievement of the European model of development, which provides ideal way of solving interests of all three parts³⁶. Social partnership is important while confirming main directions of Slovenia development, ways out of the economic and social crisis. Thus, the ESC as a higher form of a social dialogue plays a key role in this process. The leader of the party "Positive Slovenia" and the prime-minister A. Bratusek (over the period of March 20, 2013 up to September 14, 2014) was convinced that "having reached the consensus, concerning the state budget revenues, we could preserve in Slovenia free-of-charge school education, health care and many other social benefits. However, in future we are to think of the type of the state we need. We must realize: the more social benefits we have, the higher the level of taxation is, but I assume, that namely such scheme is suitable for Slovenia"³⁷.

The European Social Model (ESM) which is currently functioning in the EU is characterized by: a high level of social protection (large part of the GDP is directed at the social needs); various problems which periodically appear in the social sphere (in the course of labor relations, environment, pension fund scheme etc.), are solved by means of the social dialogue between partners and including independent experts; in the social sphere along with the state organizations and trade unions, at the national and local levels function numerous NGO (charitable, confessional, public and so on), which act as collective representatives of a civil society³⁸. Let us mention, that on the basis of this, in Slovenia are well-developed organizations of civil society – one of the characteristics of the ESM, which at the same time is an inseparable part of a social state.

Introduction of new approaches to implementation of social policy, decentralization of power, initiatives of powerful religious organizations and other NGOs, led the "Third sector" of Slovenia at such level of development, that it became one of the biggest suppliers of social

³⁵ *Ekonomsko-socialni svet*. Economic and Social Council of Slovenia: 2004-2014. Ljubljana: Javno podjetje Uradni list Republike Slovenije, 2014. C. 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.* P. 6.

³⁷ *Bulanov* A. Slovenii blizhe skandinavskaya model. URL: <http://expert.ru/countries/2013/05/slovenii-blizhe-skandinavskaya-model/> (accessed date: 28.06.2015).

³⁸ *Mudroljubova* N. Pivnichnoyevropeyskiy dosvid sotsialnoi derzhavy na prykladi korolivstva Shvetsii. URL: <http://www.viche.info/journal/843/> (accessed date: 20.05.2015).

services³⁹. In the state there are quite strict laws, in comparison with other EU members as to establishing and functioning of NGOs. Thus, in accordance with Slovenian legislation the number of an NGO founders must be not less than 10 people (in most EU countries it equals 2-3 persons) and the legislation prohibits aliens to establish such organizations⁴⁰.

In accordance with the adopted programme of the state health care system in Slovenia for 2015-2025⁴¹, in the state there are mechanisms of direct and indirect participation of people in problem solution in medical sphere. Slovenians may take personal part in public parliamentary hearings, concerning the plan of action in the sphere and in regional committees of insured people, who provide active participation of the society in the system of managing the sphere of medical insurance.

Besides, the citizens may deal with the issues connected with the health care system through their representatives in some state organizations, NGOs, associations etc⁴². The system of health care uses commercial, compulsory and voluntary medical insurance. It should be mentioned that in Slovenia the bulk of compulsory payment for social expenses of the state are on the working population. The share expenses paid by employees and employers in general is the same – 50% to 50% (as of 2012)⁴³. However, according to the data, provided by the international sociological survey in 2007 the level of life satisfaction was the highest in Slovenia among all new EU members⁴⁴, but the 2008 global financial-economic crisis proved that the sphere in fact required changes.

Before the crisis in the state new laws were adopted, some amendments were made, however matters did not come to implementation of the laws. The government was satisfied with the growth of economy and assumed it would be forever. But the crisis changed the situation. Slovenia lost time necessary for implementing thorough structural reforms for economic welfare. Such policy led to the most profound crisis developments among the EU countries. Economic and social crisis fully displayed all vain anticipations and expectations in the course of implementing changes, for strengthening economic competitiveness, as well as protection of the state of common welfare⁴⁵. Though the government was seeking the ways to fight the effects of the crisis, enhanced by local unfavorable conditions, but negative phenomena in the economy of Slovenia actualized the question of the change of government.

³⁹ *Povysbenie urovnja zhyzni kak prioritset sotsialnoi politiki. Obzor zarubezhnoho opyta.* Minsk: UNO representative office /PROON in the Republic of Belarus, 2005. P. 66.

⁴⁰ *Vinnikov O.* Hromadski orhanizatsii u Yevropeiskomu Soiuzi: yak vony utvoriiuutsia chy diiut? URL: <http://www.ucipr.org.ua/pages/7> (accessed date: 20.05.2015).

⁴¹ *Ministrstvo za zdravje RS* predstavilo predlog Resolucije «Skupaj za družbo zdravja». URL: http://www.mz.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/article/670/7007/3d7b53be2b2a515a956386b79545091a/ (дата звернення: 10.06.2016).

⁴² *Model hrmadskoho kontroliu za vytratamy v sfiri okhorony zdorovia* / [Remiha O., Tatarevskiy O., Melnyk N. and others]; Ed. By N. Tsisyk. Kyiv: Mizhnarodnyi Tsentr perspektyvnykh doslidzhen, 2006. P. 20.

⁴³ *Tkachenko L.* Fiskalni populizm kak diaгноз. URL: http://gazeta.zn.ua/finan-ces/fiskalnyy-populizm-kak-diaгноз-ovozmozhnostyah-snizheniya-razmera-cdinogo-socialnogo-vznosa_html (accessed date: 20.08.2016).

⁴⁴ *Put v Yevropu* / Ed. by: I. M. Kliamkina and L. F. Shevtsova. Moscow: Novoe izdatelstvo, 2008. P. 325.

⁴⁵ *Ekonomsko-socialni svet.* Economic and Social Council of Slovenia: 2004-2014. Ljubljana: Javno podjetje Uradni list Republike Slovenije, 2014. C. 3-4.

In February 2013 after the governmental crisis which lasted for almost two months, the Cabinet of Ministers of Slovenia and the prime-minister J. Jansa forcedly resigned. The reason for this was the vote of no-confidence in the government. Political forces created a new coalition around the party “Positive Slovenia”, formed new government, which, for the first time since proclaiming independence was headed by the prime-minister – woman, Alenka Bratusek, who for many years was in charge of the economic sector of Slovenia⁴⁶.

In December, in one of the interviews, A. Bratusek explained her vision of peculiarities of the contemporary social system in Slovenia and directions of its further development. “Slovenia is a social state, – she said. – Some of the EU countries, chose the way which gave them an opportunity to recover the pace of economic growth quite relatively, however they had to sacrifice their social sphere. Speaking of Slovenia I stand for the Scandinavian model, where taxes are a bit higher and so is the amount of social rights. This is the model I am going to implement, as I am sure that is the model we must have in our country”⁴⁷. Thus, the aim of the government was to develop socially comfortable state. Despite certain economic problems, the government managed to preserve a high number of social benefits.

However, minister A. Kopach Mrak expressed less optimism as to preservation of a current amount of social benefits in Slovenia. To her point of view, a large part of the society mistakenly believe that Slovenia can maintain high standards of the state of social welfare, regularly high salary, make great expenses on the health care system, education, pension fund, provided benefits for some social groups. “Herewith, people do not pay attention to the fact that the country is in huge debts and on its way to overcoming the crisis the government will have to reconsider a number of social-economic rights, which were provided people at better times”⁴⁸. Thus, the Cabinet of Ministers admitted problems while supporting a level of social protection to which people had already used to and made it clear that they would take such an unpopular step as reduction in social benefits.

In 2014 continual crisis situation provoked the fourth change of the head of the Slovenian government. In late April at the session of the party “Positive Slovenia” A. Bratusek was removed from the post of the party leader and on May 5th she resigned the post of the prime-minister. On June 1st President of Slovenia B. Pahor signed the decree on dissolution of the Parliament after the 2 weeks’ time, in the course of which deputies were to have chosen another candidacy for a post of the prime-minister.

The pre-term parliamentary elections which took place on July 13, 2014, were won by a newly created left-of-center party headed by a lawyer M. Cerar under the “Party of Miro

⁴⁶ *Alena Bratusek vedet Sloveniiu k "positiviu"?* URL: <https://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/easteurope/04-03-2013/1146998-slovenia-0/> (accessed date: 28.03.2014).

⁴⁷ *Bulanov A. Slovenii blizhe skandinavskaja model.* URL: <http://expert.ru/countries/2013/05/slovenii-blizhe-skandinavskaya-model/> (accessed date: 28.06.2015).

⁴⁸ *Ekonomsko-socialni svet.* Economic and Social Council of Slovenia: 2004-2014. Ljubljana: Javno podjetje Uradni list Republike Slovenije, 2014. C. 5.

Cerar” (PMC), which got 34,6% of votes. The Slovenian Democratic Party of the two-times prime-minister J. Jansa won 20,6% of votes. The third place got the oldest Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia with 10,2% of votes. The Party “The Union of Alenka Bratusek” created on June 1st 2014 obtained more than 6% of votes and also entered a new parliament⁴⁹.

The results of the pre-term parliamentary elections showed that the society is dissatisfied by the policy of harsh economic rationalization, conducted by A. Bratusek’s government. It was also clear, as M. Cerar stated, Slovenian got tired of politicians-corruptors. Just on the eve of the elections 2-year imprisonment and €37 000 fine were awarded to the former long-term prime-minister J. Jansa, who managed his pre-electoral campaign from prison. Slovenians again (as it was in case of A. Bratusek) made a bid for “new faces” in politics. The Party of M. Cerar received over 1/3 (34 out of 90) of places in the parliament and to create a governmental coalition gained support of two other left-of-center parties – the Social-Democrats of Slovenia and the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, who got 6 and 10 places in the State Assembly – parliament of the state, correspondingly.

Therefore, successful stability in modern Slovenia was facilitated by a number of factors, which were being formed, when it was a part of the SFRY – highly developed industry and living standards, ethnically homogeneous population, sophisticated traditions of corporatism etc. Quite significant connector for Slovenia became the process of joining the EU. The process of Euro-integration facilitated modernization in a number of spheres, in particular social, cultural and (to some extent) economic. Global financial-economic crisis revealed all problems in the state’s economy and the government had to start gradual reduction of a large number of social benefits for population.

New prime-minister M. Cerar wishes to regain the trust of population and the situation is gradually changing for the better, what is indicative of political stability. Revenue growing to the state budget has been supported by the EU funding, the GDP has significantly recovered, index of economic activity has improved, and thus, it will considerably influence further development of Slovenia as a social state.

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⁴⁹ *Tsentravno-Vostochnaia Yevropa: razvitie v novykh heopoliticheskikh realiiakh.* Monograph / Ed. by. N. V. Kulikova. Moscow: IE RAN, 2016. P. 280.

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The features of technocracy in the “Chinese model” of governance

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of technocratic management in the “Chinese model” of governance. It is argued that China, as an authoritarian political regime, is traditionally incorporated into the technocratic style of governance and hence into the mixed (technocratic, corporate and political) style of inter-institutional relations, which largely determines the growth of the efficiency of capitalist industrial production and management. At the same time, it was found that in China there is a significant technocratic-oriented modernization of the authoritarian political regime, although the authoritarianism itself is not a modernization one. It has been recorded that there is implemented the version of “capitalist authoritarianism” in China today, but it “rationalizes tyranny” under the guise of local traditions and culture. The author determined that friendship and particularism are the decisive factors in the technocratization of the authoritarian political regime and governance in China. Therefore, the technocratic nature of power in China is partially denied.

Keywords: governance, technocratic governance, technocracy, authoritarianism, China.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТЕХНОКРАТИЗМУ В «КИТАЙСЬКІЙ МОДЕЛІ» УРЯДУВАННЯ

Стаття присвячена дослідженню феномену технократичного управління в «китайській моделі» урядування. Аргументовано, що Китай як авторитарний політичний режим, традиційно інкорпорується технократичним стилем урядування, а відтак і змішаним (технократичним, корпоративним і політичним) стилем міжінституційних відносин, що значною мірою детермінує зростання ефективності капіталістичного промислового виробництва та управління. Водночас виявлено, що в Китаї відбувається значна технократично орієнтована модернізація авторитарного політичного режиму, хоча сам авторитаризм у країні за суттю переважно не є модернізаційним. Зафіксовано, що в Китаї сьогодні швидше реалізовано варіант «капіталістичного авторитаризму», але він «раціоналізує тиранію» під прикриттям місцевих традицій і культури. Простежено, що вирішальне значення у технократизації авторитарного політичного режиму й управління в Китаї мають кумівство і партикуляризм. Відтак частково заперечено технократичну природу влади у Китаї.

Ключові слова: урядування, технократичне урядування, технократія, авторитаризм, Китай.

Political theory and practice prove that in modern world the process of governance is in correlation with patterns of party/political and technocratic/non-party/apolitical components. Herewith, the crucial role in this context belongs to different processes and institutes/institutions, which determine the features of governance, in particular the system of state government, territorial-administrative formation, political regime etc. Nevertheless, there is an established practice, according to which the higher level of democracy in the country is, the less it is apolitical and the more it is characterized by a multi-party nature in the process of its governance; the more country is personalized (or is described by personalization of power), the less it is political and is more marked by single-party features in its governance and so on. From this perspective a specific case is represented by the post-war (communist) China, which being an authoritarian political regime, is traditionally incorporated into the technocratic style of governance and hence into the mixed (technocratic, corporate and political) style of inter-institutional relations. It largely determines the growth in effectiveness of a capitalistic industrial production and management in China, and thus, from a theoretical point of view, it promotes emergence of some scientific views on government mechanisms in accordance with the results of a synthesis of technocratism, bureaucracy, corporatism and politics¹. Hence, the problematics of an overall coverage of technocratic peculiarities in the “Chinese model” of governance and under conditions of the established authoritarian regime is currently topical, interesting and theoretically and methodologically significant, as it can testify the existence of a separated cluster of political systems, which goes beyond the already conceptualized parameters and types of governance.

Declared range of problems has been partially described in the works by C. Cao², L. Cheng, L. White³, Y. Huang⁴, M. Jacques⁵, V. Lytvyn⁶, W. Mills⁷, M. Pei⁸, H. Ping-ti⁹, R. Scalapino¹⁰,

¹ T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California Press 1982.

² C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

³ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, “The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, nr 1, s. 1-35.; L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, “Asian Survey” 1998, vol 38, nr 3, s. 231-264.; L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, “Asian Survey” 2003, vol 43, nr 4, s. 553-597.

⁴ Y. Huang, *Rethinking the Beijing Consensus*, “Asia Policy” 2011, nr 11, s. 1-26.

⁵ M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Wyd. Allen Lane 2009.

⁶ V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

⁷ W. Mills, *Generational Change in China*, “Problems of Communism” 1983, vol 32, nr 1, s. 16-35.

⁸ M. Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard 2006.

⁹ H. Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*, Wyd. Science Editions 1967.

¹⁰ R. Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Wyd. University of Washington 1972.

X. Zang¹¹, B. Zhiyue¹². On this basis it is appropriate to argue that in China is characterized by a significant technocratic-oriented modernization of the authoritarian political regime, although the authoritarianism itself is not modernizational¹³. The point is, that: firstly, there is no single approach to interpretation of causality of modernization tendencies in China (one group of scientists states that China "has thrown down a challenge" to current western-oriented model of the world order¹⁴; another group proves that China is experiencing a "prolonged stagnation"¹⁵, as economic prosperity is not stable till there are established principles of democracy and supremacy of law); secondly, under current state of affairs it is necessary to determine the notion of the "Chinese model" (which, however, is not defined as an "economic miracle"). Therefore, some scholars insist on interpreting the "Chinese model" as an alternative to western liberal democracy, while other state that such model is "offensive", as it neglects human rights, is corrupted and characterized by bad management, economic exploit, inequality, even though it is marked by annual GDP growth.

Hence it is relevant to argue that nowadays in China the version of the "capitalist authoritarianism" is implemented, but it "rationalizes tyranny" under the guise of local traditions and culture¹⁶. The features of such political regime are: 1) co-existence of economic modernization and technocracy and non-democratic policy; 2) stable predominance of the state control over "dominant heights" of economy; 3) economic management "from top to bottom"; 4) gradual (or additional) reforms of various spheres of the system. They are supplemented by such attributes of the Chinese "capitalistic authoritarianism" as: 1) the "Confucian variant" of a proportion between managers and workers (people are "obliged to obey", and legitimacy of authority is based on its ability to provide "benefit" to people); 2) the principle of connection with Leninists centralism – the so-called "intraparty democracy"; 3) the idea that development is impossible without stability.

On the other hand, it is not possible just to state that "capitalistic authoritarianism" is functioning in China, as historically it has never been monolithic. This is the ground for distinguishing several "Chinese models" of development: experimental "upward" agrarian reform after 1978; economic decentralization and partial liberalization in the 1980s; repressiveness and strengthening of the state control after the Tiananmen Square protests; reformation of the state enterprises by Zhu Rongji in the late 1990s; focusing on Deng Xiaoping's remark that "to be

¹¹ X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787-803.

¹² B. Zhiyue, *The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups*, "Journal of Contemporary China" 2004, vol 13, nr. 39, s. 223-256; B. Zhiyue, *The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation*, "Issues & Studies" 2008, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 1-41.

¹³ V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesuabni vymiry analizu: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

¹⁴ M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Wyd. Allen Lane 2009.; A. Subramanian, *The Inevitable Superpower*, "Foreign Affairs" 2001, vol 90, nr. 5.

¹⁵ M. Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard 2006.

¹⁶ V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesuabni vymiry analizu: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

rich is glorious” (the idea of creation of a great number of small and medium businesses); egalitarian and socially-oriented construction of the “scientific development” by Hu Jintao; modern trend introduced by Xi Jinping “that state sector is approaching – private sector is retreating”. From stage to stage we may observe the rise of technocratic component of governance in China. However, even despite this a great many of the Chinese scientists state the impossibility of distinguishing a pure “Chinese model”¹⁷. The popularity of its concept is largely presupposed by the consequences of the world financial-economic crisis (2008-2009), to be more precise by its influence on western norms and values (and on revealing the drawbacks of “the Washington Consensus” model).

Taking this into consideration, it becomes clear that the “Chinese model” should rather be treated as an anti-model or a coherent economic-managerial approach¹⁸. As it legitimizes cultural relativism and exceptionality and puts a stress on the state/national sovereignty. Thus, of great importance is evaluation of prospects as to the stability of the Chinese “capitalistic authoritarianism”, in particular on the basis of verification and consideration of its technocratic effectiveness. All this forms the ground for a conclusion that the tendency of the “Chinese authoritarianism” development does not fully correspond with modernization authoritarianism, but is determined by technocracy of political management and governance. To a great extent quite significant is an ability of the Communist Party of China to adjust to changes. Moreover, a range of “reforms” were an exclusive and incontestable example of “political improvisation” aiming at preservation of popularity and stability of the authoritarian regime. Besides, economic successes of China are often connected not with the authoritarian mechanism of their implementation but with liberalization¹⁹. Thus, it clearly testifies that the “Chinese model” of authoritarianism positions itself as a unique paradigm, the essence of which is reduced to the motto “do everything what can be done”, however basing on the principles of technocratic and meritocratic governance. And that is why evaluation of technocratic nature of the authoritarian political regime in China is important and rational while determining the essence of the country’s political regime itself. It must be done from the historical perspective and must determine general peculiarities of technocracy (but unnecessarily modernization) of authoritarianism.

Technocratic elements of governance in communist China penetrate almost through the whole history of the country. Thus, in the early 1980s the post-Maoist China has been regulated by three generations of technocrats. As a result of a mass transformation of elite in the course of “new” governance by Deng Xiaoping technocrats in the 1980s composed the core of the top-echelon of the Communist Party of China. Besides, at that time China was regulated by a bigger number of people who got education in the systems of science and technology.

¹⁷ *Dialogue with China: Towards ‘Harmonious Society’ Governance, Participation, and Social Cohesion*, Wilton Park conference, November 4-7, 2010.

¹⁸ V. Lyytyn, *Polityczni reżymy suchości: instytucyjny i proteseualny wymiary analizy: nauč. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

¹⁹ Y. Huang, *Rethinking the Beijing Consensus*, “Asia Policy” 2011, nr. 11, s. 24.

Therefore, a full-rate technocratic management rooted in the Chinese politics. Over the last decades successive generations of technocratic government in China have often been described as "engineers, who transformed into politicians" who have contributed to the growth of the national economy and sometimes to modernization of the country. That is why technocratic tendencies are incorporated into the Chinese politics and at present time have significant effect on social, economic and political issues. It is also revealed in the fact that after the death of Mao Zedong a new generation of managers, which was described as technocratic, occupied dominant positions in the political sphere of mainland China. In the time of Deng Xiaoping, in particular in the early 1980s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) "enrolled" new members to their political force from various social and professional groups²⁰. Though, the CPC in the days of Mao Zedong was mainly under the rule of soldiers, peasants and workers, in the post-Maoist China all of them were changed by high-educated scientists and engineers.

To realize successful political and economic reforms Deng Xiaoping and his satellites in the course of the twelfth party congress (1982-1987) in the early 1980s started changing the revolutionary political elite by a generation of a technocratic elite²¹. Later, such transformation of elite reached its peak at the 13th (1987-1992), 14th (1992-1997) and 15th (1997-2002) party congresses. It appeared, that the majority of new leaders in the post-Maoist China are men, qualified as engineers and natural scientists, who worked as economic executives and industrial managers²². All this was inherited for future, as technocrats were represented in the structure of the Central Committee of all subsequent CPC congresses and thus they were interpreted as a political elite of China. Thus, the conclusion that is the "technocratic rotation", which took place in the early 1980s, in fact marked a turning point in the political process of authoritarianism development in China as it became a step of national modernization and economic development of the country. Successful reforms in the frames of technocratic management/governance since the 1980s has led to unprecedented rate of economic increase in China and has been inherited in future, in particular after the world financial-economic crisis, which took place in 2008-2009.

Significant transformation of the elite and great influence of technocratic experts on the politics of China have also paved the way to enlargement of the scientific elite in the Chinese society. Thus, such "elite transformation" in the post-Maoist China has led to social changes over the last decades, as during this period: 1) significantly growth the number of students in colleges; 2) the majority of students became entered into engineering specialities; 3) most of personnel are moderately or highly educated²³. Besides, over the last decades they observe a large

²⁰ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

²¹ W. Mills, *Generational Change in China*, "Problems of Communism" 1983, vol 32, nr. 1, s. 16-35.

²² X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 789.

²³ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

increase of students who get foreign and national diploma of higher education, especially in the sphere of science and technology. As a result there is a large number of people, who obtain sufficient potential to become technocratic elite in future.

At the same time, it is quite notable that technocracy in China does not correspond with the theory of the western type. The main reason is its implementation under the conditions of functioning and with the aim to preserve authoritarian (not democratic) political regime. Thus, the notion of western technocracy cannot be suitable in the case of the post-Maoist technocratic governance. It is especially evident taking into account M. Weber's remark that modern politics consists of two groups of new elites – technically trained professional career administrators and professional party politicians. However, such statement cannot be applied to China in which there is no strict division line between technocrats and party functionaries²⁴. On the contrary, some scientists argue that China belongs and traditionally belonged to a meritocratic type of society, but such peculiarity was modified in the times of Mao's regime, especially during the so-called "Cultural revolution". The point is that, in traditional China education was the main route to the upward social mobility. And though not all members of the ruling circle received education "taking official examinations was the only mechanism of social and political mobility"²⁵. Some Chinese scientists also state that "money may directly transfer a person into a higher status by buying studentship, offices and official names"²⁶, but education, as a rule is the "ladder to success"²⁷. Such logics was not eclipsed even by the republican period over 1912-1949, when "China was suffering continuous civil conflicts between the field commanders"²⁸, and later between political parties (Communist and Nationalistic). As at that time the prevailing majority of political leaders ascended from the warfare sphere. On the other hand, in the times of Mao a large number of peasants, workers and soldiers, many of whom were illiterate, "floated" to the Red Army and the CPC. As a result the majority of political leaders were soldiers, peasants and representatives of people of lower classes²⁹. Therefore, enrolment of personnel, as a rule, was originated on class affiliation, work experience and political loyalty, but not on the level of education, technical training, and competence.

But this tendency was annulled when Deng Xiaoping entered the top echelon of power, in particular after the death of Mao in 1976. In 1978, being the prime-minister, Deng Xiaoping declared that "intellectuals should not be treated as "someone's weapon", but on the contrary

²⁴ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

²⁵ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 17.

²⁶ H. Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*, Wyd. Science Editions 1967, s. 256.

²⁷ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

²⁸ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 18.

²⁹ R. Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Wyd. University of Washington 1972.

must be respected as the "core of modernization program"³⁰. Being a leading reformist, he commenced post-Maoist reforms from the "driving forces": 1) first of all, the party under the head of modernizers started working for the sake of economic restoration and overcoming of complete poverty in the country; 2) the party and other elites in the governmental and military spheres were united by the idea of promoting China towards establishment of modern, industrial economy of welfare and advanced technologies. Therefore, in the process of reforms old revolutionary staff was replaced with people, who were politically reliable, young, energetic, better educated, competent and professional. The majority of new leaders were qualified engineers. Herewith, this massive transition of leaders in the early 1980s predetermined appearance of technocracy and technocratism in the post-Maoist authoritarian government.

Of great interest is the fact that the Chinese political elite in the early 1980s was mainly composed of professionals, who obtained education in the spheres of natural and physical sciences, and not universalists. That is why, the key attributes of that time technocrats were technical education, professional activity and leadership positions. Studying the level of education, speciality, career and structure of the Central Committee of the CPC of that time the researchers found out that technocrats played both the role of party workers and state officials. Besides, a new elite of technocrats came into power both due to their advanced education and being evaluated as protégé of the existing system. Thus, enrolment and promotion of new technocratic leaders at that time was based on personal ties, as well as educational criteria and formal procedures. X. Zang states that on the contrary later post-Maoist leaders were regarded as "bureaucratic or political technocracy, and not just simple technocracy"³¹. The scholar singled out two important terms – technocrats and bureaucrats. The latter are state or party personnel, who work in the system of state management and organization, irrespective of the engineering education level. That is why the scholar argues that the "growth of technocratic experts in politics has not led to their monopoly in the political sphere in the post-Maoist China, as career officials remained a significant political force as well"³². The Central Committee of the CPC of that time (first half of the 1990s) "was determined as the union between career bureaucrats and technocrats". As a result career bureaucrats required technocrats' assistance, advice and expert evaluations with respect to the national aims of economic development and modernization, and thus, the former were obliged to share power with the latter. Technocrats "were also to cooperate with career bureaucrats to climb the political hierarchy. Hence, in the post-Maoist China technocrats came into power, because it was required by their party leaders, as well as due to their party membership. Besides, technocrats were and still are interested in China efficiency.

³⁰ L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 12.

³¹ X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 792.

³² X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 801.

Later, as L. Cheng and L. White note, the most powerful technocrats came out of the shadows of their political patrons or other outstanding leaders. Thus, in the composition of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC (in the late 1990s – early 2000s) technocrats were obviously predominating. All members of the Permanent Committee of the Central Committee, which was the most powerful group, were technocrats³³. On the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, top-technocrat Jiang Zemin became the core of the third generation of the CPC leadership. That is why, under the charge of Jiang Zemin the 15th party congress approved a “full-scale” technocratic governance. Scholars also state that though the Chinese technocratic elite came to power because of the education level and professional qualification, but friendship and particularism are still influential in the process of the Central Committee formation.

To examine the origin and characteristics of technocrats in the political circle of China, the biggest two elite groups in the country have been analyzed – the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Permanent Committee of the Central Committee and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). In account were taken three data types as to the members of the abovementioned groups of elites: 1) demographic information, concerning age and gender; 2) education level; 3) career and job experience, including participation in various organizations (party, state management and military service). All basic data, which are analyzed, were mainly obtained from the research carried out by X. Zang³⁴, L. Cheng and L. White³⁵, C. Cao³⁶, B. Zhiyue³⁷ and other scholars.

According to X. Zang³⁸, “the Central Committee was a useful option, which helped leading politicians to transfer the ideas of the Chinese society, and its composition may be treated as an institutional representation of various approaches. In general, all members of the Central Committee represent the elite in the political picture of China, while “changes in the Central Committee show wide social, economic, and political changes in the country in general”. In particular, the Permanent Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee are the most powerful political figures in the Chinese politics. These three political elites design technocrats as people, described by three features: technical education at the level of college or higher educational institution, professional experience and management experience. This research also deals with a scientific elite group of China – the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. The CAS is an apex of the scientific hierarchy in the CPR and is one type of the academies, which combines research and practical activity. The CAS is a unique group of scientists

³³ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, “Asian Survey” 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 231-264.

³⁴ X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787.

³⁵ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, “Asian Survey” 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

³⁶ C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

³⁷ B. Zhiyue, *The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation*, “Issues & Studies” 2008, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 1-41.; B. Zhiyue, *The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups*, “Journal of Contemporary China” 2004, vol 13, nr. 39, s. 223-256.

³⁸ X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787.

from China, which has reputation similar to those in other countries of the world³⁹. It is designed for academic leadership in developing and implementation of policy in the spheres of science and leading measures at the national level. An important aspect of the CAS is that its members are loyal party members, especially members of the Central Committee of the CPC. According to C. Cao, as a rule the CAS' members are a double elite. In particular, the CAS presidents are elite natural scientists and party members. To become a member of the Central Committee of the CPC means for the scientific elite to be a part of the political elite and improve their own social image. As the majority of the Central Committee members are scientists and engineers, the scientific elite is also offered to join the ruling circles of the CPC.

Provided statistical data show that: 1) in China one can always observe a significant circulation of elites in the history of the CPC leadership⁴⁰, herewith a growing number of leaders are technocrats; 2) the main composition of the Political Bureau and the Permanent Committee of the CPC is represented by professional engineers and senior engineers, who obtained higher education (often are doctors of sciences), as well as officers from military academies⁴¹; 3) an average age of members of the Political Bureau is from 55 to 67, though there is a tendency to youthification; 4) in gender perspective there is over-representativeness of male among political leaders, especially male-technocrats⁴². Besides, there are other educational tendencies among last Chinese leaders: a) a bigger number of diploma holders; b) a less number of "S&E" degree holders; c) a bigger number of foreign students or those with experience of working abroad.

It is notable that career paths of current Chinese leaders have much in common, as over 20% of members of the Central Committee of the CPC mix their careers (e.g. former experience in two or more sectors). Most of them "make their political career being the heads of plants, bureaus in the industrial spheres, mayors or ministers in the State Council"⁴³. Almost the same number of the Central Committee members climb the ladder as party personnel. However, official career paths for technocrats are usually formed on the background of family, school relations and work with top-leaders (being personal assistants etc.). Thus, L. Cheng and L. White⁴⁴ state, that friendship and particularism are the decisive factors in formation the Central Committee of the CPC and for technocracy of the authoritarian political regime in China. And this makes some researchers deny the technocratic nature of authority in modern China, as they believe that technocrats must be real technical experts, whereas some modern leaders in China belong to this group in name only. Their "technical expert evaluation" is more concerned with supporting their political status, than with the ability to solve the problems of

³⁹ C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

⁴⁰ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

⁴¹ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

⁴² L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, "Asian Survey" 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 243.

⁴³ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 588.

⁴⁴ L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, "Asian Survey" 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 243.

China. Besides, the upper hand belongs to the idea that in the Chinese leadership exists a disproportion of the engineers, interpreted as politicians. However, such personalities represent a very modest percent of the Chinese society.

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Participation of political forces in parliamentary elections and national development of the Czech Republic

The author argues that Central-Eastern European countries after quitting the system of socialism show more divergences than traits in common. At the first free elections communist parties failed and then a “left wave” came. In the second half of the 90s the country experienced a “right wave”. And the situation in the Czech Republic was different. The status of the “left” party in the Czech Republic was unchangeable, extreme or moderate. At the elections it got a little number of votes, but during all post-communist years it enters the parliament. Other political parliamentary parties in the Czech Republic delimit themselves from the CPBM (The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) and quite reluctantly cooperate with communists.

Keywords: Central-Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Czech “left”, social-democrats, communists, parties, elections, parliament, governance.

УЧАСТЬ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ СИЛ ЧЕХІЇ В ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРАХ І РОЗВИТКУ ДЕРЖАВИ

Автор статті доводить, що країни Центрально-Східної Європи після виходу з системи соціалізму демонструють більше відмінностей, ніж спільного. На перших вільних виборах комуністичні партії тут зазнали поразки, а далі настала «ліва хвиля». У другій половині 90-х рр. пройшла «права хвиля». У Чехії ситуація була іншою. Положення «лівої» партії в Чехії залишилися незмінним, крайнім чи поміркованим. На виборах вона збирає невелику кількість голосів, але впродовж всіх посткомуністичних років постійно проходить до парламенту держави. Інші політичні парламентські партії Чехії відмежовуються від КПЧМ, неохоче йдуть на співпрацю з комуністами.

Ключові слова: Центрально-Східна Європа, Чехія, чеські «ліві», соціал-демократи, комуністи, партії, вибори, парламент, управління.

Postwar development of Eastern-European countries under the authority of the USSR took a heavy toll on them, as the consequences were rather considerable even after the collapse of the “real socialism”. Notwithstanding the fact that throughout their modern development CEE countries have had plenty of differences, which have been distinctly revealed since the beginning of the Euro-integration process and in the course of their membership in the European

Union, they have much in common as well and it should not be neglected. CEE countries have experienced many historical and political events what represent their common pattern, though each of the countries is self-sufficient and their specific nature provokes profound interest among researchers. However, the Czech Republic is the most unique among them. The transformations, which took place in the country in 1989 after the “Velvet Revolution”, are still in progress not only at the political level, but also in all spheres of the society. First of all, it is clearly noticeable in the processes of democratization of the political system, where multiplicity of parties became the norm of political life, important component of activity and development of various political institutions, which are fundamentally new for the Czech Republic etc.

Thus, from the point of view of general political processes in CEE the Czech Republic is of significant interest. After the “Velvet Revolution” in 1989 and till the mid-1998 in the state the power was in hands and within the competence of the “right forces”, represented by two politicians – Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus. Only the last elections of the 20th century, which took place in June 19-20, 1998 changed the picture and gave a possibility for moderate “left” forces headed by social-democrat Milos Zeman to come into power. However, “left” politicians not only took over the government far late, but the governance process, initiated by them, was quite different from other processes in the region. The processes in CEE both similar and divergent are of great interest, as the way experienced by the Czech Republic can become an example for other countries.

Almost simultaneously all countries of the region observed failures of former ruling (communist) parties in the course of the revolutions in 1989 and at the first parliamentary elections, then, however, an unexpected “left wave” swept over nearly all CEE countries and in the second half of the 90s took place the second now “right wave”, which changed the situation in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary in all post-communist countries in general. Studying the experience of the parliamentary elections in CEE countries is of great significance for their further development, as the elections there take place quite often and citizens show their preference to one or another political force, their program, strategy of further development of the state etc. and namely this actualizes the problem.

The aim of the current paper is to analyze participation of left-wing oriented political forces in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic and their influence on the development of the country over the last decades.

The problems of the electoral system and electoral process development have been studied by many Ukrainian and foreign scholars, like V. Burdiak, E. Valeva, H. Holosov, M. Duverger, H. Zelenko, E. Zadorozhniuk, Ye. Kish, S. Kalchenko, S. Kyselov, N. Korovitsyna, S. Lipset, O. Maiorova, I. Kresina, V. Marina, A. Meleshevyh, K. Nikiforov, Yu. Novopashyn, S. Rokkan, A. Romaniuk, F. Rudyh, G. Sartori, Ye. Shapoval and others.

In the process of study it is important to determine how the Czech Republic, which was created on January 1, 1993, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (into the Czech Republic

and Slovakia) managed to avoid a “left wave”. We assume that the main reasons lie in the dissolution of the Czechoslovakia Republic, which existed for 75 years as well as in peculiar historical traditions of the country¹. The dissolution played a significant role in further development of the Czech Republic, when it preferred independent development. Having pulled away from economic problems of Slovakia, the Czech Republic became self-sufficient, with developed economy and population of western-European mentality headed to Europe.

In its activity the Czech Republic clearly showed national egoism, as in the process of approaching to the European Union it tried to preserve its privileged position, delimiting itself from the neighbors. In that manner many famous declarations were made by Czechoslovakian and since 1993 Czech president Vaclav Havel². The Czech Republic has always been standing apart from other more or less similar CEE countries. In the far 19th century in the course of the national-liberation movement the Czechs preferred the so-called “natural activity” within the frames of the Austrian constitution, on the contrary to organization of armed revolutions, as the Poles did or creation of secret organization as the southern Slavs did. The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) also differed from the neighboring states being in the 30s of the 20th century the only country in Eastern Europe, where the democracy did not submit to authoritarian or totalitarian political systems which predominated in the neighboring countries.

After the WW2 parliamentarism in the Czech Republic maintained desperate resistance up to February 1948, trying to separate itself from the Stalin political model. Czechoslovakia was the last out-post of democracy in Eastern Europe, while the other countries were establishing the regime of “people’s democracy”, unless in September 1947 the Communist Information Bureau was created. During the period of destalinization after 1953 Czechoslovakia preferred evolutionary, economic mechanisms of changes, which preserved the country from disturbances in 1956 (as it happened in the neighboring Hungary), and in the second part of the 60s provoked the first in the region attempt to conduct a revolution of state political regime towards the “socialism with a human face”³. This attempt was tragically stopped by intervention of forces by five state-members of the Warsaw Pact, which started in August 21, 1968⁴ and this heralded a beginning of the end of socialism in Europe. Eventually, 20 years after the unsuccessful attempt of Czechoslovakia to “humanize” the socialist system the similar step was taken by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. But the reforms offered by him were inadequate to the realias of development of socialist countries and lifestyle of their citizens and also they were commenced too late. This attempt also failed.

¹ Готовска Т. 1993 – *Чехословакизмът кръстотопът* // Международни отношения. 1995. Кн. 5-6. С. 77.

² Havel V. *Boj proti korupci – Hlavním úkolem české vlády a společnosti* // Právo. 2002. 27 unora; Havel V. *Český úděl?* // Literární noviny. 2007. № 52. S. 19-21; Havel V. *Na tema opozice* // Literární listy. Praha. 1968. Č. 6. S. 4-7; Havel V. *Open letters: selected writings 1964-1990* / selected and edited by P. Wilson. New York: Knopf, 1991. 415 p.; Fiala P. *Komunismus v České republice: vývojové, systémové a ideové aspekty působení KSČM a dalších komunistických* / P. Fiala, J. Holzer, M. Mares, P. Pseja. Brno: Masaryk University, 1999. 315 s.; Готовска Т. Същата. «Нежният развод» – развод по сметка // Международни отношения. 1998. Кн. 1. С. 41.

³ Dubcek A. *Nadeje umíra poslední: vlastní životopis*. Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda-Libertas, 1993. S. 108.

⁴ Басва И. България и Пражката пролет 1968 г. // Политически изследвания. 1993. Кн. 1. С. 85.

“Real socialism” could not be reformed anymore; despite all pains and efforts to “bring it back to life” it collapsed.

In autumn 1989 during the period of East-European revolutions, in the country appeared its own term the “Velvet Revolution”, by which they meant profound transformations, conducted by peaceful means. Thus, at that time it was possible to speak of violent political changes in case of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, as in Poland and Hungary this transition was elaborated and conducted by the leaders of that time communist parties – the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP). Czechoslovakian “Velvet Revolution” extended the regime of M. Jakes, having transformed the dissident movement “Charter 77” into a mass movement the “Civil Forum” in Prague and the “Society against violence” in Slovakia, ensuring a smooth transition of power from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) to the newly-created political institutions⁵.

Transition in Czechoslovakia started with negotiations (Round Table), but everything happened quite rapidly. The process was simplified by resignations of ministers and deputies, who left the CPC organization, became non-party and supported new political forces. The most representative example was shown by prime-minister M. Calfa, who deserted his post, left the CPC and being non-party formed first transitional government. That time communist parliamentary majority adopted democratic changes to the Constitution⁶, which, in fact, opened the door for new political forces to victory at the first free and democratic elections, which took place on June 8-9, 1990. At the elections throughout the country the ruling Communist Party absolutely failed, gaining the support of 13% of voters⁷.

Over the first months and years of the transformational period the divergences between the CPC and other communist parties of the region were defined. While all other left-wing oriented parties were urgently looking for a way-out from such unanticipated and sharp changes, like the PUWP in Poland and the HSWP in Hungary, which at first voluntarily dissolved and then declared about their creation or as the Bulgarian Communist Party, which rejected its previous name and changed it into a new one – the Bulgarian Socialist party, the CPC was strictly preserving its identity. By all means, it had to change a large number of its program positions, take new democratic order and ideas of democratic socialism, but the party managed to preserve maybe the most important thing – succession from the CPC, taking its new name – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM).

Conservatism of the CPC was not occasional. It was formed as a result of changes, which took place in the state, after the intervention of the Soviet troops into the CzSSR in August 1968. Interference of the USSR into the domestic situation of Czechoslovakia was not only

⁵ Ash T.G. *The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague*. New York: Random House, 1990. P. 29.

⁶ Judt T.R. *Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia. Eastern Europe in Revolution* / Ed. by I. Banac. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. P. 102.

⁷ Wheaton B., Kavan Z. *The Velvet Revolution. Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991* // West-view Press. 1992. P. 150.

military, but first of all political. It caused profound transformations in the CPC – deprivation of not only Alexander Dubcek, but also other reformists from power, mass purges of the party and all important state institutions, both political and cultural⁸. Such purge was called “normalization”, conducted by a new leader of the CPC Husav Husak assisted by the head of the controlling commission M. Jakes⁹.

And at that time the CPC returned to neo-Stalinism times. Thus, when at the end of 1989 changes became unavoidable, the CPC did not possess reformative potential, which could execute factual transformation. A newly created organization – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was doomed to become reserve for traditional communists, as it had changed only to the extent it was required by the new conditions. The CPBM contained almost 10% of population, those nostalgically inclined Czechs, who bore social burden from one year to another over the whole period of changes. Here also belonged repressive “official screening” laws of the “right” government¹⁰, which created the CPBM an image of persecuted and provided them with a constant place in the parliament and the role of the extreme “left” opposition.

Absence of reformatory Communist Party created in the Czech Republic unique chances for social-democracy. In each country of the region, after the first, initial euphoria of popularity, social-democracy, which was prohibited till 1989, could not hold its political grounds as a real force in the political process. Anticommunism of old social-democracy was attractive just for several months, while factually “right” anti-communist formations were created, which later absorbed social-democrats – anticommunists, while really “left” parties chose rather to stay in an organized and experienced reformatory left-wing, which embodied post-communist parties in Eastern Europe¹¹.

However, in the Czech Republic “left” and democratically thinking people should not be identified with those CPBM members, who were expelled from the party in the early 70s and during the period of transformation established a new social-democratic party. It preserved its popularity in the Czech society by the fact that among its members was a significant leader of the “Prague Spring” A. Dubcek (being a social-democrat he headed new National assembly till tragic death in 1993). Due to former communists, reformers from the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP), for instance leader of the party M. Zeman, could not only hold their place in a tight space between an extreme right heel and new formations, conservative “left” neo-communists, but also become a unique moderate and serious parliamentary opposition, which continually tried to create an alternative to the “right” government, headed by V. Klaus. This is one of the reasons of the absence of a “left wave” in the Czech Republic, strong reformatory post-communist party and dissipation of “left” forces between two parties – the CPBM

⁸ Dubcek A. *Nadeje umira posledni: vlastni životopis*. Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda-Libertas, 1993. S. 203.

⁹ Mlynar Z. *Night frost in Prague. The End of Humane Socialism*. N. Y.: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 1980. P.47.

¹⁰ *The Screening Act: Anti-Communist or Anti-Democratic?* // East European Reporter. 1992. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 94.

¹¹ Fedorchak T.P. *Osnovni napravany dialnosti Chekhoslovatskoi sotsial-demokratychnoi partii u period transformatsii suspilstva* // Politolohichni i sotsiolohichni studii. Zb. Naukovykh prats. Vol. II. Chernivtsi: Prut, 2002. P. 219.

and the CSDP, which were rather delimited in the epoch of “normalization”, when one were persecuted and others “purged”.

Second no less important reason for constant governance of “right” forces is in organizing capabilities of the “right”. At the first election won the “Civil Forum” headed by V. Havel, who became the first post-communist president (succeeded H. Husak at this post in December 1989), created the first absolutely non-communist government headed by V. Klaus. However, after first successes V. Klaus’ desire to transform amorphous civil formation into a real “right” political party led to a breakdown within the Civil Forum as well as political competitiveness between two leading politicians¹². The conflict corresponded with the time and this revealed in other CEE countries, in particular in a big oppositional coalition “Solidarity” in Poland, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria etc., which broke down under the pressure of multi-directional interests, which were united around the idea of anticommunism. When a strong enemy – the communist party disappeared, the coalition started to flame out and appeared numerous multi-party political systems.

In the Czech Republic there always were contradictions between the intellectuals, dissidents, who supported president V. Havel and pragmatic technocrats, backing up V. Klaus. There were formed two points of view – moral-ethical position for “life in the truth”, which was extremely significant in the times of opposition to the non-democratic system¹³ and the position of new politicians, who supposed successes in governance to be the most important goal and who till 1989 were silent and endured violation of the system, and when great changes took place started their activity. In the Czech Republic as well as in other post-communist countries pragmatists took the upper hand in all contradictions. V. Havel had minimal powers, but remained the president till the time when the Civil Democratic Party (CDP), formed by V. Klaus on the basis of the Civil Forum won the 1992 elections and ensured themselves the post of the prime-minister.

V. Klaus managed to avoid social dissatisfaction in the course of transformation and at the same time prevented a “left wave” in the politics. In fact it was an incontestable achievement of V. Klaus’ governance. His pragmatism made V. Klaus reject such radical measures as “shocking therapy”, implemented by L. Balcerowicz in Poland. In accordance with M. Thatcher’s statement the most successful model of the post-communist development of economics was implemented and the architect of the model was “the best minister of finance in Europe” – prime-minister of the Czech Republic V. Klaus¹⁴. Being economist by education V. Klaus till 1989 worked in the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Science and was a dedicated follower of monetarism, but as a politician, he did not act in correspondence with the theory

¹² Mrklas L. *Koncept stranických rodin a české politické strany (nejen) po listopadu 1989* // II. kongres českých politologů: Praha-Suchdol, 09.2003. Praha: ČSPV, 2003. S. 279.

¹³ Басва И. Днешните проекции на делото на първия президент на Чехословакия Томаш Г. Масарик // Ново време. 1997. Кн. 5. С. 115.

¹⁴ Kříukov E. *Kompromatnyi zalp po Cbebiu* // Rossia i mir. 1997. № 52. P. 32.

he supported, but in line with the practice of management, which he tried to develop. To act in conformity with realias and not ideal desires was a rare quality among politicians in Central-Eastern European countries, but it was typical of the Czech history.

The Czech Republic inherited from Czechoslovakia a powerful and well-organized trade-union movement, wealthy society, which traditionally kept to their privileges and conveniences. This reality made V. Klaus start the transformation, which differed from an absolutely “right” one, taken in the neighboring countries by the “Solidarity” or the Hungarian Democratic Forum. He implemented a right-of-center transformation, which focused on the introduction of market mechanisms while preserving, if possible, social achievements and big agricultural economies, which were developing on the basis of a legal return or restitution of property rights, without division of agricultural cooperatives, but by means of returning compensations to the owners, denationalization by means of mass privatization¹⁵.

Quite interesting was “right” policy of V. Klaus, which was distinctly represented in political grounds for newly adopted laws. The Czech Republic was the first country, which adopted the Act on “Screening of officials” – rejecting everything connected with the CPC. On the contrary to the protests of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, numerous non-party citizens and international human rights groups, “screening” acts were implemented in the life of the Czech Republic¹⁶. The opposition in the civil life of the Czech Republic concerning the new law was understandable, as after the purge and events of 1968 in the Czech Republic when during the period of “normalization” all “politically unreliable people” were put aside, since this method, which was already known for the Czechs, could not but cause profound civil protest. “Right” and foreign policy of the country, which led the Czech Republic to withdrawal from the East-European structures (the Warsaw Pact was annulled in July 1, 1991 in Prague), rapidly reoriented to the EU and NATO.

However, pragmatic governance, even regardless of V. Klaus’ ability to adhere to the accustomed course of events, did not save the society from the political problems. It should be stated that establishing of the Czech Republic was accompanied by enhancement of parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary pluralism, effective electoral system gave an opportunity by democratic means to form legislative and executive government authorities at all levels. In May-June 1996 in the country took place the parliamentary elections, at which 5% barrier was overcome by the CDP, the Czech Social-Democratic Party (CSDP), the Civil Democratic Alliance (CDA) the Christian Democratic Union – the Czech People’s Party (CDU-CPP) the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM), the Republican Party (RP). The parties of the ruling coalition (CDP, CDA, CDU-CPP) gained 99 places out of 200 and formed the government of the parliamentary minority, headed again by V. Klaus, whereas the position of

¹⁵ Mareš M. *Czech Militant Democracy in Action: Dissolution of the Workers’ Party and the Wider Context of This Act* // East European Politics and Societies. 2012. Vol. 26. №. 1. P. 39.

¹⁶ Linek L., Mansfeldova Z. *The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004* // The Journal of Legislative Studies. 2007. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 17.

the speaker of parliament was taken by the leader of social-democrats M. Zeman. But in order to form a new government V. Klaus had to turn for help to the Christian-Democratic Union, headed by J. Luks.

At the end of that year the Czech Republic faced economic problems – the banking system was under threat of bankruptcy, production rates decreased and at the end of 1997 the government had to depreciate national currency by 10%. The attempts to start “tightening belts” failed. In November 1997 revelation of frauds, concerning the assignments to the electoral fund of the CDP conducted the governmental crisis¹⁷.

That was the time of V. Havel. He took advantage of illegal funding of the CDP by the Christian Democratic Union and together with the opponents of V. Klaus, from his own CDP, forced the latter to resign, what happened in November 30, 1997. A new government of parliamentary majority was headed by a former head of the National Bank J. Tosovsky. It started a prolonged political crisis in the Czech Republic, which led to pre-term parliamentary elections in June 1998¹⁸.

In January 1998, V. Havel was elected President for the second time. Finally, in 1998 political changes were commenced in the Czech Republic. According to all sociological surveys since 1997 the CSDP became a leading party which headed all “right” parties that offered the Czechs protection from the social state, affordable education and healthcare, fight against corruption, stimulation of the Czech national entrepreneurs, and state care over providing new employment opportunities, especially provision of public amenities. The CSDP ideas corresponded with the principles of the European social-democracy and consequently they won the majority.

At the 1998 pre-term parliamentary elections the CSDP won, however as at the previous elections its majority was relative – 32.3% and just 74 deputies out of 200. The biggest surprise of the elections was positive results for CDP, headed by V. Klaus. The party won the second place with 27.7% of votes and 63 deputies. The election observers expected that they would lose their enthusiasm and activity after charge of corruption in February 1998, when the former minister of interior affairs I. Ruml left the CDP with his adherents and formed the Freedom Union (FU). However, V. Klaus as a real politician could organize and conduct exclusively tough election campaign and returned a large part of their followers.

Other political forces gained the following results: the third place got the CPBM with 11% of votes and 24 deputies correspondingly; the fourth place got the Christian-Democratic Union, headed by J. Luks (9% of votes and 20 deputies); the fifth place belonged to the FU (8.6% of votes and 19 deputies). However, such a big number of political parties which entered the parliament did not give much hope to overcome the political crisis. Two “left” parties – the CSDP and the CPBM did not gain the absolute majority and M. Zeman was strongly against

¹⁷ Linek L., Outly J. *Czech Republic: Is it Possible to Buy Political Stability?* // Roper S. Public Finance and Post-Communist Party Development / Steven D. Roper, Janis Ikstens. Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington, 2008. P. 77-94.

¹⁸ Křiloušek J. *ODS a její vnitřní fungování* // Balík S. Občanská demokratická strana a česká politika: ODS v českém politickém systému v letech 1991–2006. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2006. S. 248-249.

any kind of cooperation with communists. “Right-wing” parties could not form the parliamentary majority as well, taking into account recent past, when J. Luks and I. Ruml, just half a year before the elections helped to pull down V. Klaus¹⁹.

It seemed that the situation was in a deadlock unless in July 9, 1998 two leading parties achieved sudden mutual understanding. It was rather strange as the CSDP and CDP were furiously fighting with each other during the election campaign – the CSDP accused the CDP of lowering standards of living, whereas the CDP threatened the voters with “return to communism” if the CSDP won the elections. However, after prolonged and worthless search for coalitional allies the leader of the CSDP M. Zeman and the head of the CDP V. Klaus managed to overcome their mutual negative feelings, reached an agreement, and made an unprecedented deal in the history of the Czech and European parliamentarianism – signed Stabilization agreement. The parties shared the posts.

V. Klaus promised to support the government of minority, if it was formed by the CSDP and even promised not to vote for its non-confidence. In his turn, M. Zeman gave his word to appoint V. Klaus the head of the parliament and give his power the most important economic missions. Eventually, it happened so – V. Klaus became the speaker of the parliament, while the government was formed by the CSDP and its leader M. Zeman became the prime-minister. The new government carried on the attempts of the predecessors, aimed at economic growth and “return” to Europe, started harmonization of the Czech legislation in accordance with the norms and rules of the EU²⁰.

Concerns as to such peculiar broad coalition were expressed by President V. Havel and leaders of “right” parties, but at that time such decision was the only one, which could help avoid new pre-term parliamentary elections. We assume that another important question which played a significant role was how it is possible to form the “left” government of minority, when the elections absolutely relied on the votes of the “right” deputies?

Nevertheless, at that period, 9 years since the transformation changes started, “left” political forces in the Czech Republic got an opportunity to show how it was possible to carry out socially-oriented transformation to democracy and market economy. Though, anticipations that these intentions could be actualized were minimal. The government, headed by M. Zeman did not have an essential majority, and it meant that even if it was not resigned by voting non-confidence in it (with the support of V. Klaus), then this government would have enough time to adopt in the parliament all required laws, which were aimed at changing the economic model, inherited from “right” parties.

These were the election promises of the CSDP. When his governmental team came to power M. Zeman by all means and absolutely delimited himself from even silent support of

¹⁹ Krejčí O. *Nová kniha o volbách*. Praha : Professional Publishing, 2006. S. 117.

²⁰ Kopecky P, Mudde C. *The 1998 parliamentary and Senate elections in the Czech Republic* // Electoral Studies. 1998. Vol. 18. №. 3. P. 415-424.

the CPBM, the party which despite its third place at the elections was not even invited to the meeting of president V. Havel with the parliamentary parties. Ideological convictions of the past continued limiting the possibilities of “left” parties to adhere to the pragmatic position, though monetarists of V. Klaus continuously showed in practice that in case of complicated political situations they could not be restrained either by Zeman’s “left” platform or any keen social accusations.

Thus, we may conclude that in the course of the first decade after transformational changes, the position of the “left” party remained the same, extreme or moderate, it was not engaged into governance at the level of parliamentary commissions, not to reveal itself and prove that had already overcome own past, contradictions, for which others paid and were still paying. Other political parties of the Czech Republic reluctantly cooperated with the CPBM. These speculations are supported by the results of the survey, conducted in the Czech Republic in February 2011²¹, when for abolishing of the communist party were 50.1% of respondents, against – 40%. As Radio Praha informed, abolishment of the communist party in the Czech Republic first of all would be approved by the citizens between 30-40 and elder people. At the same time, a special group by the Ministry of inferior affairs of the Czech Republic in the mid-February 2011 started preparation of normative documents as to probable abolishment of the CPBM. The initiative, concerning abolishment of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was announced by the ruling Civil Democratic Party. However, the initiative was not supported by other parties and the CPBM is still functioning in the Czech society and parliament: in 2010 it gained 11,27% of votes and 26 deputies, at the 2013 parliamentary elections it got 14,91% of votes and 33 deputies correspondingly and at the last elections which took place in October 20-21, 2017 it gained 7,8% of votes and 15 deputies correspondingly.

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Judicial reform in Ukraine: problems of implementation

The article is devoted to the research of judicial reform in Ukraine and problems of its realization. The changes to the Constitution of Ukraine in the part of justice are analyzed. The changes in the construction of the judicial system of Ukraine are researched. Competition to the Supreme Court is described. The reform of procedural legislation in Ukraine is analyzed. The problems arising in practice during the implementation of judicial reform in Ukraine are revealed. The stages of judicial reform in Ukraine are identified and possible ways of its improvement are outlined.

Keywords: court, judicial reform, judicial system of Ukraine, Supreme Court.

СУДОВА РЕФОРМА В УКРАЇНІ: ПРОБЛЕМИ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ

Стаття присвячена дослідженню судової реформи в Україні проблем її реалізації. Проаналізовано зміни до Конституції України в частині правосуддя. Досліджено зміни у побудові судової системи України. Охарактеризовано конкурс до Верховного Суду. Проаналізовано реформування процесуального законодавства в Україні. Виявлено проблеми, що виникають на практиці під час впровадження судової реформи в Україні. Встановлено етапи судової реформи в Україні та окреслено можливі шляхи її вдосконалення.

Ключові слова: суд, судова реформа, судова система України, Верховний Суд.

Currently the judicial system of Ukraine is in the process of reform, which began with the introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine and the adoption of the new wording of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and Status of Judges” in 2016. This judicial reform is the most extensive in the history of our state because it includes the elimination of the existing courts and the formation of new ones, the adoption of new procedural codes, the selection of new judges on a competitive basis. There is no unanimity of opinions in the estimations of the mentioned reform which is quite logical in view of its scale.

The analysis of judicial reform was carried out by many scientific and practical workers, namely: O. Selivanov, B. Lviv, O. Belyanevich, V. Reznikova, V. Serdyuk and others.

The purpose of this article is analysis of the stages of judicial reform in Ukraine, identification of problematic issues arising during its implementation, as well as giving practical recommendations for solving such issues.

Each state dreams of an independent judiciary, which is trusted by both its own citizens and others. Recently the level of trust in the judicial system in Ukraine has reached a minimum, indicating the need for radical changes in this area. However, only the reformatting the judicial system will not produce the desired results. As correctly noted by A. Selivanov, the criterion of forming a new understanding of their role in society for judges means to completely exclude the possibility of seeking each participant in legal proceedings means of unlawful influence on judges, which may give him the benefits in obtaining the desired judicial decision¹. First of all, it concerns those who are trying to influence the judicial power in any way and by any means, forgetting about the need to adhere to the principle of the distribution of power. It is worth agreeing with I. Butyrska who indicates that the judiciary is considered a law-enforcement element in the state-legal mechanism, whose main task is to consider and resolve specific disputes². Ordinary citizens also have a disregard for judges, which manifests itself in continuous not only on the moral but also on the physical pressure. At the same time the state does not react to the cases of such arbitrariness.

Judicial reform in Ukraine began with the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (in part of Justice)” of the 2nd of June, 2016 which in the new wording sets forth Section VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine “Justice”. These changes, among other things, substantially expanded the grounds for dismissal of a judge, which are:

1. failure to exercise authority over the state of health;
2. violation by a judge of incompatibility requirements;
3. committing a material disciplinary offense, gross or systematic neglect of duties, which is incompatible with the status of a judge or has revealed his inconsistency with his position;
4. submission of the application for resignation or dismissal from office at his own discretion;
5. disagreement with the transfer to another court in case of liquidation or reorganization of the court where the judge holds a position;
6. violation of the duty to confirm the legality of the source of the property.

The last two grounds are innovations and at the same time they include additional measures of influence on the judge and that's why. On the 29th of December, 2017 the President of Ukraine signed a number of decrees on the liquidation or reorganization of all courts in Ukraine and now, in fact, each judge can be released if he does not agree to transfer to another court. At the same time the judge cannot choose the court to which he wants to be transferred, such a court

¹ Selivanov A.O. Sudova vlada maye proyty reformu ponovlennya svoho avtorytetu i doviry // Suchasni vyklyky ta aktualni problemy sudovoyi reformy v Ukraini : Materialy Mizhnarodnoyi naukovoï konferentsiyi (Chernivtsi, 26-27 zhovtnya 2017 r.). – Chernivtsi : Tekhnodruk, 2017. – P. 43.

² Butyrska I.A. Sudoviy pretsedent yak skladova pryntsyphu “zhyvoho prava” // Erlikhivskyy zbirnyk. Yurydychnyy fakul'tet Chernivets'koho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Yuriya Fed'koviycha. Vypusk 6. – Chernivtsi: ChNU, 2012. – P. 149.

for him is elected by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, which is a state body of judicial self-governing acting in the system of justice of Ukraine on a permanent basis. However, the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine may propose such a court for transferring to that nobody will agree to be transferred there – for example, in a place near which the fighting is taking place.

Violation of the obligation of confirming the legality of the source of the property is also a rather subjective criterion and in one case it may be the reason for the dismissal of the judge, and in the other case it will not have any legal consequences. Such situations took place massively during the contest to the Supreme Court, when in the same circumstances diametrically opposed decisions were made.

Also on the 2nd of June, 2016 a new edition of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and Status of Judges” was adopted, which in Art. 17 stipulates that the judicial system in Ukraine is based on the principles of territoriality, specialization and authority; the Supreme Court is the supreme court in the system of justice; the system of judicial system consists of:

1. local courts;
2. courts of appeal;
3. The Supreme Court which includes: the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Cassation Administrative Court, the Cassation Economic Court, the Cassation Criminal Court and the Cassation Civic Court.

As a result of the changes, the judiciary turned from four-level to three-level system and the Supreme Court was formed entirely from new judges on the basis of the competition. The list of persons who may be judges of the Supreme Court is also substantially expanded. If earlier to be a judge in this court could only a judge of the lower courts, now a judge of the Supreme Court may be a person who meets the requirements for candidates for a judge, according to the results of the qualification assessment confirmed the ability to administer justice in the Supreme Court, and meets one of the following requirements:

1. has at least ten years of experience as a judge;
2. has a scientific degree in law and experience of scientific research in the field of law for at least ten years;
3. has experience in the professional activities of a lawyer, including representation in court and/or defense against a criminal charge for at least ten years.

In our opinion, the extension of the circle of persons who may be the judge of the Supreme Court is inappropriate, because a person who has never worked in the judicial system cannot consider cases in a court of cassation and to put a final point in the resolution of disputes.

The transition to a three-level judicial system in Ukraine is the result of lengthy discussions about the need for the elimination of higher specialized courts. If we look at the experience

of European countries we can see that the three-level judicial system prevails in Europe. Also relevant is the education of Belarus and Russia, where also are eliminated High Commercial and High Arbitration Courts respectively.

However, it should be noted that the choice of the model of judicial system depends on several factors. One is the number of people in the state. So, for a small country, a three-level judicial system is appropriate because the higher court has a small number of cases in the state, and vice versa, in the states with a large population (Germany) there are higher courts of lands and in fact the four-level judicial system operates. Ukraine is also a country with a large population but it is not a federation and it is impossible to form higher courts of lands, and therefore the problem of a heavy load on the Supreme Court of Ukraine was took off by the expense of the higher specialized courts, which reviewed all cases in cassation, and the Supreme Court of Ukraine independently decided which cases to take for consideration and which not. The current judicial system of Ukraine has identified the Supreme Court as a court of cassation consisting of up to two hundred judges, although only the remainder of cases transferred from higher specialized courts is sixty-five thousand. Such a situation will lead to the Supreme Court being overwhelmed with cases, which will extend over the years, which inevitably will increase the number of complaints to the European Court of Human Rights.

It should be noted that judicial reform does not include any systematic and clear rules of the game. Thus, the selection of judges in the courts of first instance (600 vacancies), selection of judges to the High Specialized Intellectual Property Court and selection of judges in the number of more than two thousand persons are ongoing in parallel. And all this process is carried out by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine consisting of sixteen people.

The formation of a new Supreme Court which is the highest court in the system of judicial system and which has the duty to ensure the sustainability and unity of judicial practice in the manner and manner prescribed by the procedural law is an extremely important stage of judicial reform in Ukraine. The Law of Ukraine "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" provided that the occupation of positions of judges of the Supreme Court takes place through a competition held by the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine. In Part 9 of Art. 79 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Judiciary and Status of Judges" established that the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine conducts a competition for occupying vacant positions of judges of the Supreme Court based on the ranking of participants according to the results of the qualification assessment. In turn, the ratings of qualification evaluation are: competence (professional, personal, social, etc.), professional ethics and integrity.

The qualification assessment is conducted in accordance with the Regulations on the procedure and methodology of qualification assessment, indicators of compliance with the criteria of qualification assessment and the means of their establishment, approved by the decision of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine on November 3, 2016. According to this Regulation, professional competence is estimated at 300 points, professional ethics and

integrity – by 250 scores. Thus professional ethics and integrity are estimated at 500 points, and professional competence – only 300 points, which indicates the superiority of moral indicators in the professional ones.

Legislative determination of professional ethics and integrity does not exist. In general professional ethics can be seen as a complex of moral duties that reflect the judge's attitude to his specialty and derivative relationships (with parties, colleagues, representatives of his family and members of society) and also certify moral responsibility and readiness to perform his official duties. In turn integrity is the moral and ethical foundation of the judge's activity, which determines the boundary and way of behavior, which must be based on the principles of good relations with individuals, society and the state, as well as integrity in the way of life, the fulfillment of professional duties and the disposal of material Resources³. That is, professional ethics and integrity are purely evaluative concepts due to which there are possible double standards during the qualification evaluation that took place during the contest to the Supreme Court⁴.

The next stage of judicial reform in Ukraine is the introduction of new editions of procedural codes, in particular: the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine and the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine.

The norms of these codes have been in fact unified which completely does not take into account procedural peculiarities of different processes. A person appealing to the court for protection of her broken or disputed right expects a qualitative and prompt resolution of the dispute. A peculiar feature of the activity of commercial courts has always been the efficiency of the resolution of commercial disputes. In the vast majority of cases the economic dispute, taking into account the appeal and cassation proceedings, were resolved within a period of up to six months. The economic process has always been characterized by the convenience and simplicity of use inherent in the previous edition of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine.

Consequently, the developers of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine unified it with the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine and the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine in such a way that all the positive features that existed in the previous version of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine were lost.

After that the President of Ukraine issued a number of decrees on the elimination of existing courts (local courts, courts of appeal, economic and administrative courts) and the formation of new district courts – also local courts, courts of appeal, administrative and administrative courts, but with the addition that the newly formed courts are district courts.

The further progress of the judicial reform is unknown, the same is unknown what will be with liquidated courts, when new courts will start working, what will be with the existing judges.

³ Glushenko S. Shcho rozumity pid profesiynoyu etykoyu ta dobrochesnistyu v konteksti kvalifikatsiynoho otsinyuvannya suddiv? [Electronic resource] // Zakon i biznes. – Access mode: <https://goo.gl/LLgxao>.

⁴ Butyrskiy A.A. Konkurs do Verkhovnoho Sudu: problemy teorii ta praktyky // Suchasni vyklyky ta aktual'ni problemy sudovoyi reformy v Ukraini: Materialy Mizhnarodnoyi naukovoyi konferentsiyi (Chernivtsi, 26-27 zhovtnya 2017 r.). – Chernivtsi: Tekhnodruk, 2017. – P. 11.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the judicial reform in Ukraine today has passed four stages: 1) the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (in part of Justice)” of the 2nd of June, 2016 which in the new wording has set Section VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine “Justice” and the new wording of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and Status of Judges”; 2) conducting a competition to the Supreme Court; 3) adoption of new procedural codes; 4) decrees of the President of Ukraine about eliminating the existing courts and the formation of new district courts. Judicial reform is carried out chaotic and without any concept. In order to adhere to the rule of law in Ukraine, it would be advisable to develop a holistic concept for reforming the judiciary with the involvement of leading scholars and practical workers, and only then to adopt reform laws clearly defining the sequence of the reform.

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Political and socio-economic modernization as a pledge of transformation of post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe: theoretical, methodological and logistic cut

The article is dedicated to analyzing the theoretical, methodological and logistic cut of political and socio-economic modernization and transformation in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is analyzed. It was found that the transformation of the post-communist countries of the region proved to be successful mainly because they upgraded different spheres of national life not consistently, but as simultaneously as possible (even against scientific skepticism about this). This was due to the so-called unnatural modernization for Central and Eastern European countries, where the decisive for the countries of the region was the influence of developed countries, which were positioned as an example or benchmark, which should be sought in the course of transformations. It was motivated that modernization of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe was theoretically, methodologically and logistically successful because it was “a kind of hope for the future.”

Keywords: modernization, political modernization, socio-economic modernization, democratization, transformation, “dilemma of simultaneity”, “double transition”, post-communism, Central and Eastern Europe.

ПОЛІТИЧНА ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНА МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЯ ЯК ЗАПОРУКА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ПОСТКОМУНІСТИЧНИХ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ І ЛОГІСТИЧНИЙ ЗРІЗ

У статті проаналізовано теоретико-методологічний і логістичний зріз політичної та соціально-економічної модернізації і трансформації в посткомуністичних країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. З'ясовано, що трансформація посткомуністичних країн регіону виявилась вдалою здебільшого через те, що вони модернізували різні сфери національного життя не послідовно, а якомога більш одночасно (навіть супроти науковому скепсису з цього приводу). Це відбулось тому, що для країн Центрально-Східної Європи була притаманна так звана неорганічна модернізація, коли вирішальним для країн регіону був вплив з боку розвинених країн, які позиціонувались певним прикладом чи орієнтиром, до якого варто було прагнути у ході перетворень. Вмотивовано, що модернізація для

посткомуністичних країн Центрально-Східної Європи теоретико-методологічно і логістично була успішною тому, що вона була «свого роду надією на майбутнє».

Ключові слова: модернізація, політична модернізація, соціально-економічна модернізація, демократизація, трансформація, «дилема одночасності», «подвійний перехід», посткомунізм, Центрально-Східна Європа.

In the course and after the collapse of the USSR and the system of political and social-economic relations in terms of the “Warsaw Pact” the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe, taking into account logistics and theoretical-methodological comprehension of the plans for their modernization were not only to expand political democracy and market economy, but also sometimes create new state institutions and even modern nations. As a result, nowadays it is a fact that transformations in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe had their own peculiarities, which did not resemble the analogous processes in other post-communist and non-communist countries. With regard to the scale of the tasks which were to be solved in the course of political and social-economic modernization, the elites in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe faced the question: which sphere or spheres required top-priority modernization/reformation. Especially, concerning the fact that in the then (in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20th century) and contemporary science two approaches as to solution of a problem have been elaborated: the first appealed to the consistent stages of social-economic and political modernization (on the pattern of the majority of Western European countries), while the second focused on the “simultaneity” of stages of diversified modernization (what had not been peculiar of state reforms logistic and scientific research before). However, the most interesting appeared to be conclusions and outcomes of the processes of modernization in different post-communist Central-Eastern European countries, as on the average the most successful were the countries which modernized all spheres of national life not gradually, but simultaneously. It became the reason for focusing on theoretical-methodological and logistical perspective of political and social-economic modernization in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe.

The theoretical and methodological aspects of the abovementioned range of problems, especially on the basis of Central-Eastern European countries have been studied in scientific works by V. Dzyundzyuk, O. Kotukov, O. Radchenko¹, R. Inglehart², R. Kollmorgen³, O. Novakova⁴,

¹ V. Dzyundzyuk, O. Kotukov, O. Radchenko, *Politychna modernizatsiia: teoriia ta istoriia*, Wyd. NADU 2011.

² R. Inglehart, *Postmodern: meniyayushchiesya tsemnosti i izmeniyayushchiesya obshchestva*, „Polis“ 1997, nr. 4, s. 6-32.

³ R. Kollmorgen, *Theories of Postcommunist Transformation. Approaches, Debates, and Problems of Theory Building in the Second Decade of Research*, “Studies of Transition States and Societies” 2013, vol 5, nr 2, s. 88-105.

⁴ O. Novakova, *Politychna modernizatsiia ta rozvytok demokratychnykh protsesiv v suchasnyy Ukraini*, Kiev 2007.; O. Novakova, *Politychnyy protses: sumnist, zmist ta suchasni tendentsiyyi rozvytku*, Wyd. Elton-2 2010.

L. Tomanevych⁵, H. Zelenko⁶ and many others. However, the logistical component of political and social-economic modernization has been in the focus of such researchers as L. Armijo, T. Bierkster⁷, Z. Brzezinski⁸, A. Bul'vins'kyy⁹, V. Bunce¹⁰, B. Crawford, A. Lijphart¹¹, R. Duch¹², J. Elster¹³, O. Encarnacion¹⁴, H. Zelenko¹⁵, V. Krasyl'shchykov¹⁶, N. Latyhina¹⁷, J. Linz¹⁸, W. Merkel¹⁹, C. Offe²⁰, D. Ost²¹, H. Perepelytsya²², L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Bashtannyk²³, *A. Przeworski*²⁴, P. Roeder²⁵, Y. Seleny²⁶, D. Travin, V. Gelman²⁷, A. Umland²⁸, G. Vainshtein²⁹, J. Weintraub³⁰,

⁵ L. Tomanevych, *Sotsioekonomichna modernizatsiia yak chynnnyk staloho rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Naukovyy visnyk Lvivskoho natsional'noho universytetu vetrynarnoyi medytsyny ta biotekhnolohiy im. Ghzhyts'koho” 2013, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 361-367.

⁶ H. Zelenko, *Navzdobinna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polschi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003.

⁷ L. Armijo, T. Bierkster, *The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions*, [w:] L. Diamond, M. Plattner (eds.), *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Baltimore 1995.

⁸ Z. Brzezinski, *The Great Transformation*, „The National Interest” 1993, vol 33, s. 6.

⁹ A. Bul'vins'kyy, *Osoblyvosti suspil'no-politychnoyi modernizatsiinyi krizyny postradyans'koho prorstoru: monohrafiya*, Wyd. Instytut vesvni'noyi istoriyi NAN Ukrainy 2017.

¹⁰ V. Bunce, *Comparing East and South*, „Journal of Democracy” 1995, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 87-100.

¹¹ B. Crawford, A. Lijphart, *Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International Pressures*, „Comparative Political Studies” 1995, vol 28, nr. 2, s. 171-199.

¹² R. Duch, *Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union*, „American Political Science Review” 1993, vol 87, nr. 3, s. 590-608.

¹³ J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

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¹⁵ H. Zelenko, *Navzdobinna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polschi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003.

¹⁶ V. Krasyl'shchykov, *Modernizatsiia i Rossyia na porobe XXI veka*, „Voprosy fylosofyy” 1997, nr. 7, s. 40-56.

¹⁷ N. Latyhina, *Demokratyzatsiia v krainakh Tsentral'noyi ta Skhidnoyi Yevropy: riznomani'tni pidkbody i universal'ni oznaky*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2008, vol 37, s. 233-244.

¹⁸ J. Linz, *Transitions to Democracy*, „Washington Quarterly”, Summer 1990.

¹⁹ W. Merkel, *Die Konsolidierung postautoritärer und posttotalitärer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung*, [w:] H. Sißmuth (ed.), *Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas*, Wyd. Nomos 1998, s. 39-61.; W. Merkel, *Plausible Theory, Unexpected Result: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft” 2011, vol 2, s. 11-29.; W. Merkel, *Theorien der Transformation post-autoritärer Gesellschaften*, [w:] K. von Beyme, C. Offe (eds.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Wyd. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1996, s. 30-58.

²⁰ C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social Research” 1991, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 865-881.; C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur” 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292.; C. Offe, *Dilemma odnovernemosti: demokratyzatsiia i rinochnyya ekonomika v Vostochnoy Evrope*, [w:] P. Shrykov, S. Shvanits, V. Gelman (eds.), *Pocorotyi istorii: Postsotsialisticheskie transformatsii glazami nemetskih issledovatelye*, Wyd. Letniy sad 2003, vol 2, s. 6-22.

²¹ D. Ost, *Labor, Class and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist Society. Markets, States and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation*, Wyd. Westview Press 1995.

²² H. Perepelytsya, *Transformatsiyni protsesy u krainakh Vyshebmed'skoyi hrupy ta Ukrainy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Wyd. Stylos 2013.

²³ L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Bashtannyk, *Protsey yevropeyzatsiinyi ta yoho osoblyvosti v postkomunistychnykh krainakh Tsentral'noyi ta Skhidnoyi Yevropy*, Wyd. NADU 2010.

²⁴ A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

²⁵ P. Roeder, *The Revolution of 1989: Postcommunism and the Social Science*, «Slavic Review» 1999, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 743-755.

²⁶ Y. Seleny, *Stroytel'stvo kapitalizmu bez kapitalystov – try puty perekhoda ototsyalyzma k kapitalizmu*, „Russkyye chtenyia” 2006, vol 3.

²⁷ D. Travin, V. Gelman, „Zagonybryi” rossijskoy modernizatsii: smena pokoleniy i traktorii reform, „Neprikosnovennyiy zapas” 2013, vol 4, nr. 90, źródło: <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2013/4/2g.html> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2017].

²⁸ A. Umland, *Pobemu Evropejskomu Sojuzu sleduet predstavit stranam Vostochnogo partnerstva perspektivu chlenstva v ES*, „Geopolitika”, źródło: http://www.geopolitika.lt/index.php/ru/wikipedia.org/wiki/file_download.php?artc=5685 [odczyt: 1 listopada 2017].

²⁹ G. Vainshtein, *Postkommunistycheskoe nazrytye blazamy zapadnoi pytolohyy*, „Myrovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya” 1997, vol 8, s. 144-154.

³⁰ J. Weintraub, *Democracy and the Market. A Marriage of Inconvenience*, [w:] M. Nugent (ed.), *From Leninism to Freedom. The Challenges of Democratization*, Wyd. Boulder 1992.

H. Wiesenthal³¹ and others. In general, they argue that the actualized scientific problematic is two-fold and is spinning around the issues of theoretical-methodological and logistical aspects of political and social-economic modernization.

Determining the first theoretical-methodological aspect it is reasonably to start with the point that modernization is an essential precondition for establishing a new order in the world. The notion “modernization” even today is still undetermined, ambiguous and in different ways interpreted by numerous scientists, what is clearly represented in the view of the “theory of modernization”, which with each new stage of development has been transforming and gaining new features and peculiarities. At the present stage of social advancement a modernization process (modernization) should appropriately be treated as a combination of economic, political, social, cultural and other (but first of all political and social-economic) transformations in the spheres of social life³². Besides, modernization must be interpreted as a state’s directive on pursuing qualitative transformations in the society not by means of copying leading countries’ experience, but due to combination of the most widespread political structures, institutions and values, endowed with a universal and common nature with traditional specificity of certain societies³³.

In this regard R. Inghart states that “First of all, modernization is a process, in the course of which the economic and political opportunities of a certain society are growing: economical – by means of industrialization, political – due to bureaucratization. Modernization is highly attractive as it allows the society to move from poverty to prosperity. Thus, the core of the modernization process is industrialization; economic growth becomes a predominant social aim, while a main goal at the individual level is determined by the achieved motivation. Transition from the preindustrial society to the industrial one is characterized by “the overall rationalization of all social spheres” (as stated by M. Weber), leading to the shift from traditional, usually religious values to the rationally legal values in economic, political and social life”³⁴.

Taking all this into account, we interpret political and social-economic modernization as elements of a general process of modernization. By social-economic modernization we mean solution of three interrelated problems, namely: modernization of state economic policy, engineering and manufacturing base of economy and system of social protection of population. To the instruments of social-economic modernization belongs implementation of reforms, aimed at introduction of the most effective principles, mechanisms and formats of social-economic process management³⁵. In its turn, political modernization is a process of formation and expansion of political institutions and practices, which can provide implementation of the main

³¹ H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives“, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.

³² H. Zelenko, *Navzdohimna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 16-17.

³³ V. Dzyundzyuk, O. Kotukov, O. Radchenko, *Politychna modernizatsiia: teoriia ta istoriia*, NADU 2011, s. 5.

³⁴ R. Inghart, *Postmodern: menyayushchiesya tselesty i izmenyayushchiesya obshchestva*, „Polis“ 1997, nr. 4, s. 20.

³⁵ L. Tomaneych, *Sotsioekonomichna modernizatsiia yak chynnnyk staloho rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Naukovyy visnyk Lvivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu vetrynarnoyi medytsyny ta biotekhnolohiy im. Gzhytskoho“ 2013, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 361-367.

function of political system – integration, setting and achievement of a goal, reproduction of own cultural pattern and adjustment to leading modern challenges³⁶.

It is notable, that some scientists unify the process of modernization with democratization of political systems (in other words, exceptionally with political modernization). But to our mind, it is necessary to take into consideration the experience of political development in the late 20th c., and consider the fact that different countries are moving towards modern society under diverse social-cultural and political conditions. That is why, examining the political-state evolution of countries, which belong to a transitional type, in particular the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe, it is obligatory to distinguish at least two models of political modernization – authoritarian and democratic (see table 1).

Table 1. The essence and attributes of authoritarian and democratic modernization/political modernization³⁷

Authoritarian modernization/political modernization	Democratic modernization/political modernization
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on the will of the ruling class, effectiveness of applying bureaucratic compulsion and control over instruction execution; • Enhanced role of national sovereign state in implementation of all modernization projects (material and ideological compulsion); • Existence of avant-garde party, which has monopoly on power and whose legitimacy is based on the phenomenon of ideological canonization of top leaders; • Compulsory (voluntary or compulsive) consolidation of society around a single modernization ideology, elimination of alternative positions and views, which is based on the party-hegemon and several parties (usually puppet-parties) that support the main ideological line, what creates an extremely high level of management centralization, enhancement of bureaucratization of the society; • Civil society, if any exists, is being developed under the authority of state officials and within the frames of the leading ideological direction; • Model of authority is based on an unequal development of social-political spheres, when central executive structures and the institute of the head of the state are developing in a hyperbolized manner, and a legislative branch, local authorities and all variants of civil activity are under control of the executive branch and usually are described by formal character. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on applying mechanisms for self-organization of society, while the state and elites must provide favorable conditions for successful modernization; • Recognition of a necessity to create a national sovereign state not as an apparatus of violence, but as an effective mechanism for self-organization of the society; weakening of traditional elites' positions and their legitimacy; appearance and enhancement of modernization elite; openness and competitiveness of ways of elite formation; • Open character of political elites' and state bodies' activity, transparency of state policy, accountability of political actors to the society; • The position of the head of the state as the top-level representative of the nation and determinant of national interests; rational and pragmatic attitude towards all central institutions and establishments of the state power; • Provision of political pluralism in the process of implementing systematic transformations in the society, with the help of which it is possible to achieve consolidation, cooperation and competitiveness of all political actors as leading subjects of modernization; • Establishment and development of state management functioning, which would be characterized by a more open nature, what provides its high adaptive potential, ability to resist effectively all modern challenges.

Herewith, democratic modernization itself, as most scientists believe, is more effective and promising, however, the majority of the countries in transition prefer the authoritarian model of modernization. Any changes, which take place in economic, social, cultural or political spheres of society are closely interrelated and very often come under mutual influence and interdependence. Thus, from theoretical-methodological perspective it makes us argue that modernization transformations in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern

³⁶ O. Novakova, *Polityczna modernizacja i rozwój demokratycznych procesów w współczesnej Ukrainie*, Kiew 2007, s. 5.

³⁷ O. Novakova, *Polityczny proces: skutki, zmiany i współczesne tendencje rozwoju*, Wyd. Elton-2 2010, s. 128-129; P. Myronenko, *Forma prawliny: polityczni transformacji na złoty wiek: monografia*, Wyd. Akademia 2014, s. 120-122.

Europe differ in their peculiarities and dissimilarities in comparison with the same processes in countries without communistic past. The unifying factor for the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe can be considered not only their geographical position, but a set of common traits due to their affiliation to the “socialistic camp” at the beginning of the transformational period. The most important were: predominating ideology (as the years of communistic ideology and authoritarian regime rooted the tendency of state values prevalence over social intentions and the principle of “excessive hierarchism” when a party elite predominated in social-political relations³⁸); complete or partial absence of private property and market relations; close institutional models of state organization (from the outside they looked like parliamentary republics, but in fact were different versions of the party-state); common traits if not in political culture, then in many of its components.

Thereafter, starting the analysis of the second, logistical aspect it is necessary to appeal to the conceptual remark made by H. Zelenko³⁹ concerning the point that crucial factors of modernization in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe were socio-cultural/social, economic and political level of social development in one or another country, as well as the fact that in the post-communist countries of the region (at least in those which managed to modernize themselves successfully or relatively) did not exist arguments as to the “necessity or uselessness” of reformation. However, in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe namely political modernization was of top-priority, as in the countries with an unnatural type of modernization political sphere traditionally became synthesizing in comparison with other⁴⁰. It influenced the ways of modernization in the post-communist countries of the region which were commenced in the sphere of politics, i.e. started from political wish for changes. Therefore, consequent political modernization was a kind of provision for improvements in other spheres of social life. Significance of political modernization also revealed in the fact that it guaranteed institutional functioning of democracy and included: differentiation of the political structure, when there was formed a branched network of social-economic and political institutions, which were aimed at providing stability and order; structural-essential change of the political system, focused on disclosing its potential possibilities, formation of political structure of social action, formulation of political strategies and tactics as instruments for further changes. Besides, the initial political modernization appeared to be important, as it contributed to implementation of democratic procedures into all spheres of the social process, what meant: rationalization and authority’s performance assurance as crucial factors of public confidence in government; wide participation of people in political life; creation of an integral and mutually coordinated at different levels system of political socialization; focusing on providing a feedback in relations between the political system and

³⁸ P. Myronenko, *Forma pravlinnyia: politychni transformatsiï na zlomi stolit’: monohrafiia*, Wyd. Akademiya 2014, s. 129.

³⁹ H. Zelenko, *Navzdohinna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

⁴⁰ V. Krasyl'shchykov, *Modernyzatsiïa i Rossiya na porohe XXI veka*, „Voprosy fylosofyy” 1997, nr. 7, s. 44.

personality⁴¹. As a result, namely political modernization/democratization determined the scenarios of further modernization/reformation process.

This induced such significant logistical feature of young post-communist democracies in Central-Eastern Europe as the necessity for simultaneous and extremely synchronized accomplishment of social-economic and political transformations⁴². It explained the fact that transformations in the post-communist countries of the region could have and quite often had synchronized character and took place simultaneously in political, economic, socio-cultural and even national spheres. Besides, great influence on the course of modernization transformations had the fact that reforms in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe often happened with affirmation of sovereignty. As T. Kuzio⁴³ mentions it means that in the post-communist countries of the Central-Eastern Europe modernization was actualized in three or even four aspects or spheres (i.e. in the form of a “threefold” or “fourfold” transit).

At the same time, in the political science there never has been mutual theoretical-methodological and logistical understanding as to the problem whether multidirectional modernization and reformation in the post-communist countries must be consequential or simultaneous. Thus, some researchers insisted on incompatibility of simultaneous transformations of economic and political spheres and stated that before establishing democracy post-communist governments should have focused on implementation of economic reforms, or on the contrary – it was necessary to develop democracy before starting economic reforms⁴⁴. A. Aslund also insisted on the initial nature of political reformation stating that for the post-communist countries democratization was an obligatory precondition for successful transition to the market economy⁴⁵. The same thought is shared by Z. Brzezinski who believes that “political reform is initial factor, a basis for efficient economic reform and some democratic political consensus and effective political process are essential preconditions for the first critical transformational stage for the post-communist countries”⁴⁶. Controversial points of view were promoted by the followers of the “dilemma of simultaneity” concept, namely C. Offe⁴⁷, J. Elster⁴⁸, W. Merkel⁴⁹,

⁴¹ O. Babkina, V. Horbatenko, *Politohiia: Posibnyk dlia studentiv viyschchykh navch. zakladiv*, Kiev 2001, s. 280-282.

⁴² H. Zelenko, *Nauzdobinna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

⁴³ T. Kuzio, *The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition*, „Contemporary Politics“ 2000, vol 6, nr 2, s. 143-164.

⁴⁴ L. Armijo, T. Bierkster, *The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions*, [w:] L. Diamond, M. Plattner (eds.), *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Baltimore 1995, s. 230.

⁴⁵ G. Vainshtein, *Postkommunistyckoe razvitye blazany zapadnoi polityolohy*, „Myrovaia ekonomyka i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya“ 1997, vol 8, s. 145.

⁴⁶ Z. Brzezinski, *The Great Transformation*, „The National Interest“ 1993, vol 33, s. 6.

⁴⁷ C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social Research“ 1991, vol 58, nr 4, s. 865-881; C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur“ 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292; C. Offe, *Dilemma odnovenemosti: demokratizatsiya i rinochnaya ekonomika v Vostochnoy Evrope*, [w:] P. Shyrykov, S. Shvanits, V. Gelman (eds.), *Povoroty istorii: Postsotsialisticheskie transformatsii glazami nemetskikh issledovately*, Wyd. Lemniy sad 2003, vol 2, s. 6-22.

⁴⁸ J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

⁴⁹ W. Merkel, *Die Konsolidierung postautoritärer und posttotalitärer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung*, [w:] H. Süßmuth (ed.), *Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas*, Wyd. Nomos 1998, s. 39-61.; W. Merkel, *Plausible Theory, Unexpected Result: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“ 2011, vol 2, s. 11-29.

A. Przeworski⁵⁰, A. Umland⁵¹, V. Gelman and D. Travin⁵², H. Wiesenthal⁵³, who clearly stated that successful reforms in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe, especially since 1989, though could be called multidirectional, but were to take place simultaneously. Finally, another group of scholars, for instance H. Zelenko⁵⁴, argued that there could not be any unified recipe for consequent post-communist transformations in Central-Eastern Europe. However, as the vicennial experience of the analyzed countries shows (nowadays they are mostly not interpreted as post-communist), there was an opposition between a factual actualization and positive verification of successfulness of simultaneous reforms and modernization.

In this context V. Bunce states that transformations, which have taken place in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe after 1989, were not just simple political transitions. It was rather a revolution, which covered transitions in economy, identity, social structure and the state⁵⁵. From this perspective some scientists suppose that the proposal to join the European Union, which was made to these countries, was rather presupposed by political than economic reasons. As at that time neither macroeconomic indices nor development level reached the average level of the EU members, as well as both pace and results of reforms did not show the ability of Central-Eastern European countries to join the “unified Europe” easily and quickly. On this subject, stating the future place of the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe in the EU, Y. Seleny says, that there existed a high possibility that those countries would become a periphery of the European Union, and thus it is possible to suppose that it will be the so-called “neo-colonialism in the long-term outlook”⁵⁶.

Applying this way of thinking to the logistical model of the “dilemma of simultaneity” we appeal to the remarks made by a number of scientist, who speak of at least a “threefold” character of reformation in Central-Eastern European countries, namely: introduction of pluralistic political system, market economy and new sovereignty⁵⁷. P. Roeder holds the same position noticing the flow of “three revolutions” in the post-communist countries in Central-Eastern Europe, in particular: national (emergence of new national states), political (demolishing powerful authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century), and economic (transition to the market economy). Each of these revolutions took place at the same period (late 19th century) in most countries of

⁵⁰ A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

⁵¹ A. Umland, *Pochemu Evropeyskomu Soyuzu sleduet predostavit stranam Vostochnogo partnerstva perspektivu oblenstva v ES*, „Geopolitika“, źródło: http://www.geopolitika.lt/index.php/ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/file_download.php?artc=5685 [odczyt: 1 listopada 2017].

⁵² D. Travin, V. Gelman, „Zagugulinyi” rusyjskoy modernizatsii: smena pokoleniy i traektorii reform, „Neprikosnovennyi zapas” 2013, vol 4, nr. 90, źródło: <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2013/4/2g.html> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2017].

⁵³ H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives”, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.

⁵⁴ H. Zelenko, *Navzdohimna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

⁵⁵ V. Bunce, *Comparing East and South*, „Journal of Democracy” 1995, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 87-100.

⁵⁶ Y. Seleny, *Stroytel'stvo kapitalizmu bez kapitalystov – try puty perekhoda ot sotsyalizmu k kapitalizmu*, „Russkyye chteniyya” 2006, vol 3.

⁵⁷ N. Latsyhina, *Demokratyzatsiyya v kraysnykh Tsentral'noyi ta Skhidnoyi Yevropy: riznomanitni pidkhoty y universal'ni oznaky*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2008, vol 37, s. 234.

the region and caused appearance of new independent states and “new political realities”⁵⁸. Thus, we believe that this rather difficult moment in the course of modernization changes in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, both theoretically-methodologically and logistically, was not only the necessity of “simultaneous” accomplishment of a whole range of set tasks, but also the fact that the prospect of such reformation seriously depended on probability and real possibility to combine the goals, which were different in their essence. This issue caused much discussion among the scientists, who study post-communist transitions.

In particular with the help of the concept of a “double transition” the scientist outlined the phenomenon of simultaneous reformation of political and social-economic spheres. In 1990 J. Linz remarked that “all transitions in the countries with communistic past significantly differ from the transitions which took place in western-European countries not characterized by it, due to ineffective and centralized socialistic economies”. He believed that the countries of Central-Eastern Europe had to conduct reforms in social-economic and political spheres simultaneously. However, he argued that implementation of changes in economy and social spheres would be more complicated than in politics. Especially, because there was no transitional model from command economic to the market one⁵⁹. We may trace it taking into account historical regularities of social-political development, on the basis of which it is possible to deduce that the precondition and impulse for establishing democratic political regime in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe was gradual “ripening of capitalism”. On this subject R. Duch says that in the past days, in particular before the emergence of new post-communist countries, market economy appeared earlier than democratic institutions did⁶⁰. But the desire of Central-Eastern European countries to make a synchronized transition towards both democratic regime and market economy became an attempt to create a model of connection between social-economic and political transformations/modernizations as opposed to the old one, which has been emerging for many years.

As a counter to it, having evaluated the prospects of success of this “new” model, some scientists denied a possibility of simultaneous radical transformations in the social-economic and political spheres. Moreover, arguments as to the thesis of “impossibility of a double transition” were adduced from both sides and positions⁶¹. On the one hand, argumentation for this thesis was concentrated on a procedural aspect of introducing changes in the social sector and economy, also under the conditions of the fact that system velocity and determination of actions towards democratization are impossible, though necessary for radical transformations in the social-economic sphere. It meant that if under democratic regime there is no chance to achieve

⁵⁸ P. Roeder, *The Revolution of 1989: Postcommunism and the Social Science*, «Slavic Review» 1999, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 743.

⁵⁹ J. Linz, *Transitions to Democracy*, “Washington Quarterly”, Summer 1990, s. 156.

⁶⁰ R. Duch, *Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, vol 87, nr. 3, s. 594.

⁶¹ J. Weintraub, *Democracy and the Market. A Marriage of Inconvenience*, [w:] M. Nugent (ed.), *From Leninism to Freedom. The Challenges of Democratization*, Wyd. Boulder 1992, s. 47.

consensus on certain issues, then the solution will require actualization of difficult and prolonged political bargaining and search of a compromise. G. Nelson supposes that in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe, where “new democracies” appeared, the process of decision making was even more complicated. The legislative process was largely “bound” by a great number of new parties and interests, which compete against each other. They were striving for “paralyzing some aspects of the economic reform” to derive maximum benefit for themselves⁶². Under existence of a “new democracy” a procedural complexity of decision-making processes was also enhanced by undetermined relations within the newly created authoritative structures. Therefore, it all had negative effect on reforms in the social-economic sphere and sharply slowed down paces of social-economic modernization and transformation.

On the other hand, various arguments adduced by scientists were focused on a negative character of social-psychological and political consequences of radical social-economic changes and transformations under the condition of democratic transition. Some scholars stated that the process of democratization could largely harmed social-economic reforms and vice versa⁶³. The point is that deterioration of living conditions of people, which was caused by reformation of the economic system, declining of living standards and growth in social and material instability could lead to bitter disappointment among various social layers. Therefore, negative effects of reforms in the economic sphere largely influenced the possibility to conduct successful process of democratization.

Besides, a great number of scientists, who spoke about impossibility to combine social-economic and political variants of modernization with democratic political regime, are equally of the opinion that not to “come to the deadlock of incompatibility” it is necessary to avoid simultaneous reformation in the social-economic and political spheres. However, they proposed different variants how to prevent such situation of “simultaneity”. Thus, some researchers noted that reformation in economy required succession, determination and unpopular decisions, what is inherent to strong authoritarian regimes, and that is why the process of carrying out economic reforms must go before democratization of the political system. Other researchers believe such strategy to be very risky as usually authoritarian regimes fail under liberalization of the economic system, while regimes which actualize successful economic reforms lose in short-term prospects and impulses towards democratization and take advantage of successes in economic transformations for the sake of stabilizing authoritarianism⁶⁴. Therefore, such scientists insist that before introducing market reforms it is necessary to strengthen democracy. Thus, democratic transition must be an initial step towards political and economic reformation and modernization of society, as it creates preconditions for further transition to market relations⁶⁵.

⁶² *Politycheskiye ynstytuty na rubezhe tysyachelety*, Wyd. Fenyks+, 2001, s. 148.

⁶³ L. Armijo, T. Bierkster, *The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions*, [w:] L. Diamond, M. Plattner (eds.), *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Baltimore 1995, s. 229.

⁶⁴ O. Encarnacion, *The Politics of Dual Transitions*, “Comparative Politics” 1996, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 478.

⁶⁵ A. Åslund, *The Case for Radical Reform*, “Journal of Democracy” 1994, vol 5, nr. 4, s. 63-74.

All this generated the situation according to which in the early 90s of the 20th century west-European and American researchers were dismissive towards the development of the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe after the end of the “cold war”. They consider that the outcomes of democracy development and establishing of market relations in the countries of the region were rather vague. Among the main reasons of such pessimistic attitude they named implicit or very weak preconditions for democracy, for instance: insufficient level of multi-party system development, lack of professional politicians, low level of civil society development, non-understanding of supremacy of law and so on⁶⁶. Quite interesting was the view, proposed by some scientists that social-economic heritage of the communist regimes was incompatible with establishment of democracy due to a very strong “herd instinct”, social indifference, egalitarian-paternalist model of behavior⁶⁷. Scholars were convinced that successful democratic transformation and political modernization in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe depend on how quickly they would overcome the economic crisis, which was prolonged due to the social-political chaos and which weakened social and institutional foundations of democracy. Therefore, such pessimistic scientific (theoretical-methodological and logistical) predictions disclose a chance of coming into power various authoritarian-populist political regimes at the stage of radical nationalism, or at the best case “dictatorship of intellectuals”, who would rely on “military support”⁶⁸. Also there were concerns as to spread of “mass disturbances”, which could affect modernization of society. However, only a small part of researchers anticipated a possibility of stable social-economic and political development of the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe⁶⁹.

However, despite the fact that a large number of analysts after the fall of the “Iron curtain” were skeptical of the prospects for successful process of social-economic and political modernization and democratization of the society, the post-communist countries, which chose the pro-European vector of development, defined their main goal (joining the EU) and focused on quick and qualitative passing the stages of liberalization of the planned economy, restoring civil society, building an independent national state and introducing the process of political system reformation. As these transformations were to be implemented in all spheres of society simultaneously, it means that reforms in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe since 1989 have been accompanied by the “dilemma of simultaneity”, what implied fast and synchronized transformation of political, social and economic systems⁷⁰. Transition in each country was to be

⁶⁶ B. Crawford, A. Lijphart, *Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International Pressures*, ‘Comparative Political Studies’ 1995, vol 28, nr. 2, s. 89.

⁶⁷ J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

⁶⁸ D. Ost, *Labor, Class and Democracy: Shaping Political Antagonisms in Post-Communist Society. Markets, States and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation*, Wyd. Westview Press 1995, s. 342.

⁶⁹ G. Ekiert, J. Kubik, *Strategies of Collective Protest in Democratizing Societies: Hungary, Poland and Slovakia since 1989*, 10Th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago 1996, s. 181.

⁷⁰ J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

successful in order to guarantee successfulness of all other reforms. Even despite the fact that in multiple cases the result of reformation of one sphere was blocked by reforms in other spheres. For instance, a great number of those who suffered losses due to the economic reforms took advantage of political power and pressure on voters during the elections in order to eliminate from the political arena those who introduced those economic reforms⁷¹.

Therefore, in the early 21st century the majority of the post-communist countries in Central-Eastern Europe succeeded in achieving their aim, joining the European Union and being transformed into consolidated democracies. These countries for approximately over 15 years managed to create competitive economies, stable liberal democracy, integrated national society, fundamental administrative structure. In spite of all underestimated previous predictions of skeptical analysts in the early 90th of the 20th century, the prospects of entering the EU became a counter-force, which managed to neutralize the “dilemma of simultaneity” and refute the “theorem of impossibility”. That is why modernization processes in the post-communist countries in Central-Eastern Europe in the 90s of the 20th century, which revealed in simultaneous transformations in the social-economic and political spheres, led to emergence of new political systems. B. Greshkovych focuses on the structural and functional essence and states that taking this in consideration it is possible to call these systems “dual democracies”⁷². The essence of dualism is in basing of the mechanism of decision-making on the union of the ruling elite and “strategic opposition” with the aim to neutralize the majority in opposition. It also allows arguing that modernization in Central-Eastern European countries differs from other countries in its simultaneity and extremely fast rate of not even three, as the scientists thought before, but four different processes: democratic transformation of the political system, development of the social society, transition to the market economy and formation of the national state. In conclusion we suppose that all pessimistic predictions of the majority made in the early 90s of the 20th century can be named unconvincing, as notwithstanding a profound economic crisis and simultaneous implementation of social-economic and political transformations none of the democratic systems in the region failed. Moreover, protests in the society were of local and non-violent nature and were organized by authoritarian-populist and nationalist movements on the part of the ruling elites, though had different variations, but in no way influenced political pluralism⁷³.

In conclusion we consider quite appropriate the remark that Central-Eastern European countries managed to conduct simultaneous and multi-directional transformation if only because they were characterized by the so-called unnatural modernization, when the decisive for the countries of the region was the influence of developed countries. The latter were positioned as an example or benchmark, which should be sought in the course of transformations. Therefore,

⁷¹ C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur“ 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292.

⁷² C. Acuna, W. Smith, *The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform*, [w:] W. Smith, C. Acuna, E. Gamara (eds), *Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform*, Wyd. University of Miami 1994, s. 17.

⁷³ N. Lasyhina, *Demokratyzatsiya v krizytnykh Tsentral'noyi ta Skhidnoyi Yevropy: riznomanitni pidkbody y universal'ni oznaky*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy“ 2008, vol 37, s. 240.

modernization of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe was theoretically, methodologically and logistically successful because it was “a kind of hope for the future”⁷⁴.

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⁷⁴ H. Zelenko, *Nawzdohinna Modernizatsiïa: Dosvid Polshchita Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 13.; V. Krasyl’shchikov, *Modernyzatsiïa i Rossyiïa na porohe XXI veka*, „Voprosy fylosofiï” 1997, nr. 7, s. 45.

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Cultural and mental determinants of political corruption and counteracting it: the example of Ukraine

The author researches the problems of political corruption in Ukraine and creating the system of counteracting it from the point of view of cultural and mental determinants. The article investigates the mental foundations of political corruption. The focus is made on the main characteristics of anticorruption culture and anticorruption mentality. It determines the role of anticorruption values in the formation of democratic political and legal mentality. It emphasizes the gap between the value and functional levels of corruption perception by the citizens of Ukraine and describes the phenomenon of corruption pragmatism. The author substantiates the significance of anticorruption culture as a basis of corrupt actions counteraction in politics.

Keywords: political corruption, anticorruption policy, political and legal culture, anticorruption culture, political and legal mentality, anticorruption mentality.

Determinanty kulturowo-mentalne korupcji politycznej i przeciwdziałania jej: przykład Ukrainy

W artykule badane są problemy korupcji politycznej na Ukrainie oraz tworzenia systemu przeciwdziałania jej z punktu widzenia determinant kulturowo-mentalnych. Zbadano podstawy mentalne korupcji politycznej. Zaakcentowano podstawowe charakterystyki kultury antykorupcyjnej oraz mentalności antykorupcyjnej. Określono rolę wartości antykorupcyjnej w kształtowaniu demokratycznej mentalności polityczno-prawnej. Podkreślono różnicę pomiędzy poziomem wartościowym i funkcjonalnym percepcji korupcji przez obywateli Ukrainy. Zwrócono uwagę na fenomen pragmatyzmu korupcyjnego. Uargumentowano znaczenie kultury antykorupcyjnej jako podstawy systemu przeciwdziałania praktykom korupcyjnym w polityce.

Słowa kluczowe: korupcja polityczna, polityka antykorupcyjna, kultura polityczno-prawna, kultura antykorupcyjna, mentalność polityczno-prawna, mentalność antykorupcyjna.

W ciągu ostatnich lat na Ukrainie tworzona jest swego rodzaju matryca antykorupcyjna, a termin „walka z korupcją” stał się prawdziwym trendem, który jest na tyle popularny, że stał się centrum dyskursu osób rządzących państwem, sektoru publicznego, a w szczególności różnej maści populistów. Bez względu na zadeklarowaną priorytetowość polityki antykorupcyjnej dla naszego państwa, totalne skorumpowanie systemu politycznego pozostaje problemem dla

zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Odnosi się wrażenie, że dziś na Ukrainie odbywa się walka pomiędzy „antykulturą korupcji” oraz „kulturą antykorupcji”. Można mówić o dychotomii „mentalność korupcyjna” – „mentalność antykorupcyjna”.

Korupcję polityczną można badać przy pomocy różnych podejść, w tym także jako fenomen antykultury pewnego społeczeństwa, który może być zakorzeniony w tradycjach, cechach narodowych, mentalności (aspekt kulturologiczny analizy praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce). Przez pryzmat takiego spojrzenia powstaje pytanie: w czym leży przyczyna stabilnie wysokiego poziomu korupcji politycznej oraz innych jej rodzajów na Ukrainie? Poszukiwania odpowiedzi mogą być prowadzone poprzez analizę przejawów korupcji politycznej w kontekście świadomości masowej, grupowej oraz osobistej, a także zachowania na tle sytuacji, w której korupcja staje się codziennością.

Wychodzimy z hipotezy roboczej, że udana polityka antykorupcyjna, bez względu na znaczną ilość strategii, koncepcji, doktryn itd., zatwierdzonych przez ustawodawców, jest niemożliwa bez fundamentalnych zmian w świadomości społecznej i indywidualnej, istotnych pozytywnych korektyw w normach, zasadach i zachowaniu nie tylko grup docelowych (polityków, urzędników państwowych i innych), lecz także przeciętnych obywateli jako ważnych aktorów politycznych. Konceptualizacji wymaga fenomen demokratycznej mentalności polityczno-prawnej jako mechanizmu zapobiegania praktykom korupcyjnym w procesie politycznym.

Zanim przejdziemy do badania wartości antykorupcyjnych jako elementu demokratycznej mentalności polityczno-prawnej, przede wszystkim rozpatrzeć należy kwestie teoretyczno-metodologiczne dotyczące rozumienia mentalności oraz mentalności polityczno-prawnej. Umożliwi to dalszą analizę specyfiki mentalności polityczno-prawnej Ukraińców oraz przejawu jej charakterystyk w płaszczyźnie praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce.

Mentalność jest „charakterystyką percepcji i interpretacji świata w systemie życia duchowego tego czy innego ludu, narodu, podmiotów społecznych [...]”¹. Jest ona złożonym fenomenem społeczno-psychologicznym, zawierającym w sobie nastawienia („matryca mentalna”), sposób widzenia świata („matryce percepcji”), wyobrażenia ludzi („kody kulturowe”), które są inkorporowane przez pewną wspólnotę. Mentalność rozumiana jest jako składnik psychologii ludowej: „mentalność odzwierciedla istotę świadomości zbiorowej”²; jako „jedna z decydujących charakterystyk współczesnego myślenia, wyjaśniająca specyfikę percepcji aksjologicznej Ukraińców”³. Łącząc racjonalne z podświadowym, emocjonalne i logiczne, przekonania dotyczące wartości i inne, mentalność odzwierciedla sposób, charakter, metodę myślenia społecznego i grupowego, charakteryzuje stabilny stan umysłu podmiotu społecznego i grupowego polityki”⁴. Mentalność staje się tłem dla realiów społeczno-politycznych społeczeństwa oraz czynnikiem

¹ Філософський енциклопедичний словник, ред. В. Шинкарук, Київ 2002, s. 369-370.

² В. Дем'яненко, Ментальні характеристики політичної свідомості українців, „Людина і політика”, 2002 nr 1, s. 93-94.

³ С. Денисюк, Ментальна природа сучасної політичної комунікації, „Політологічний вісник”, 2011, nr. 56, s. 353.

⁴ Н. Новікова, Менталітет як детермінанта формування політичної культури в Україні, „Наукові записки НАУКМА. Серія Політичні науки”, 2015 nr 173, s. 31.

świadomości politycznej podmiotu społecznego⁵. Przewiduje ona, że przedstawiciele pewnej wspólnoty mają pewny wspólny światopogląd⁶, zachowanie, „można znaleźć zależności, związane z tą wspólnością ich stanowisk światopoglądowych i zasad behawioralnych”⁷. Mentalność „przejawia się w świadomości i zachowaniu, języku i innych systemach znakowo-symbolicznych, a w szerokim rozumieniu – w ideach i znaczeniach polityki”⁸. Pojęcie mentalności odzwierciedla „tło psychologiczne społeczeństwa”⁹ jako jeden z czynników wpływu środowiska zewnętrznego na wymiar instytucyjno-procesowy.

W strukturze mentalności wyodrębnia się między innymi mentalność polityczną i mentalność prawną. Naszym zdaniem, w analizie korupcji politycznej mentalność polityczną i prawną należy syntezować jako mentalność polityczno-prawną. W celu skonstruowania tego łączącego pojęcia zwróćmy na chwilę uwagę na ramy treści dwóch pojęć, które je tworzą:

- mentalność prawna stanowi całość (system) stabilnych „archetypów światopoglądowych, zasad, matryc, standardów, stereotypów prawa pewnego podmiotu społecznego, uwarunkowanych przez czynniki historyczne, społeczno-ekonomiczne, polityczne, tradycyjne, naturalne i inne, realizowanych w sposobach i formach jego życia prawnego”¹⁰;
- mentalność polityczna jest sposobem odzwierciedlenia oraz przyswojenia rzeczywistości politycznej. Jej podstawy stanowi całość orientacji pewnego społeczeństwa, stanowiących bazy poziomu kształtowania reakcji jej członków na sferę polityczną. Z tego punktu widzenia można mówić o zasadniczych różnicach w stosunku do korupcji politycznej (biurokratycznej i innej) na przykład w Niemczech i Kirgistanie, Szwecji i Rosji – istnieje między nimi rażąco kontrast.

Z rozumienia mentalności prawnej i politycznej wypływa istota mentalności polityczno-prawnej. Ukraiński politolog I. Poliszczuk określił ją jako „sposób myślenia, ogólne nastawienie duchowe, zestaw nastawień prawnych i psychologicznych narodu ukraińskiego do państwa i polityki w ogóle”¹¹. Naszym zdaniem ważną charakterystyką mentalności polityczno-prawnej jest stosunek do korupcji politycznej i innych jej form – odrzucenie, brak akceptacji ich jako nielegalnych i acojalnych praktyk, lub wręcz przeciwnie, tolerowanie ich, zawołowane uznanie akceptowalności antytechnologii korupcyjnych w procesie politycznym, gotowość do uczestnictwa w takich nielegalnych działaniach.

⁵ О. Бондаренко, Українська національна ментальність як політична цінність, „Гуманітарний вісник Запорізької державної інженерної академії”, 2009 nr 36, s. 58.

⁶ М. Попович, І. Кисляковська, Н. Вяткіна. Проблеми теорії ментальності. Київ 2006, s. 110.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Л. Савинов, Коррупция как ментальность нации и этноса, „Государственная власть и местное самоуправление”, 2011 nr 3, s. 37.

⁹ С. Брехаря, Сучасні теоретичні підходи до вивчення політичної ментальності, „Політичний менеджмент”, 2006 nr 1, s. 109.

¹⁰ І. Муляр, Правова ментальність: змістові рамки поняття та український аспект, „Гілея”, 2015 nr. 103, s. 194.

¹¹ І. Поліщук, Політико-правова ментальність українства: концептуально-методологічні засади дослідження, „Вісник Національного університету „Юридична академія України імені Ярослава Мудрого”. Серія Філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія”, 2016 nr. 2 (29), s. 33.

Dlatego w naszej analizie wychodzimy z rozumienia tego, iż: a) mentalność jest sposobem myślenia, ogólnej postawy duchowej, nastawienia podmiotów polityki; b) dominujące cechy mentalności pewnej wspólnoty wpływają na proces politycznych; c) natomiast życie polityczne, innowacje prawne transformują, modyfikują mentalność polityczno-prawną; d) demokratyczna mentalność polityczno-prawna przejawia się w stabilnym zakorzenieniu wartości antykorupcyjnych w polityce, a antydemokratyczna toleruje korupcję polityczną; e) przy pomocy badania wymiaru mentalnego życia społecznego można badać formy, treść, ukierunkowanie działalności podmiotu polityki w konkretnych warunkach, a w szczególności w sytuacjach, które stanowią podatny grunt dla praktyk korupcyjnych w procesie politycznym.

W dyskursie politologicznym przedstawione zostały przeciwstawne punkty widzenia odnośnie tego, czy właśnie mentalność stanowi przyczynę powszechności korupcji, w tym również na Ukrainie. Na ile uzasadnione jest przypuszczenie, że Ukraińcy „żyli się z korupcją, uczynili ją częścią swojej mentalności”¹²? Na podstawie wyników badań opinii społecznej (czyli w ocenie samych obywateli, korzenie korupcji leżą w mentalności. Wydaje się, że w sondażach mimo wszystko przeważają opinie emocjonalno-oceniające dotyczące ukraińskiej rzeczywistości społeczno-politycznej. Podamy kilka uzasadnień:

- w ramach kompleksowego badania korupcji na Ukrainie przez Kijowski Międzynarodowy Instytut Socjologii przeanalizowane zostały orientacje wartościowe obywateli odnośnie korupcji: dwie trzecie respondentów zgodziło się z tezą, że „łapownictwo stanowi nieodłączną część ukraińskiej mentalności”¹³;
- zdaniem ukraińskiej badaczki N. Korczak, „korupcja nie jest częścią ukraińskiej mentalności ani tradycją narodową. Korupcja to sztucznie stworzone warunki życia dla kilku pokoleń Ukraińców, które wpłynęło na wszystkie sfery ludzkiej działalności oraz za uznanie zachowania korupcyjnego za właściwe”¹⁴;
- tolerancyjny stosunek Ukraińców do korupcji, zdaniem ukraińskiego politologa I. Waliuszki, spowodowany jest reakcją adaptacyjną w warunkach nieefektywności mechanizmów przeciwdziałania. Obniżenia standardów zachowania wśród polityków oraz urzędników państwowych nie można należycie uzasadnić typowymi cechami mentalności narodowej¹⁵. Takie argumenty używane są w totalnie skorumpowanych państwach, aby jakoś usprawiedliwić obecność ogromnej korupcji przez czynniki obiektywne i niemożliwe do pokonania, takie jak kultura lub mentalność.

Nie ulega wątpliwości, że korupcja nie jest zjawiskiem nowym, ma ona długie tradycje na ziemiach ukraińskich. W szczególności, dokumentalne potwierdzenie istnienia korupcji znajdujemy

¹² О. Базалук, Корупція в Україні: ментальність правителів і судьба народу. Геофілософія України, Київ 2016, s. 3.

¹³ Стан корупції в Україні. Порівняльний аналіз загальнонаціональних досліджень: 2007, 2009, 2011 та 2015. Київ 2015, s. 28.

¹⁴ Політична корупція: як розпізнати та подолати, red. К. Давиденка, Київ 2016, s. 3.

¹⁵ І. Валюшко, Інститути громадянського суспільства у системі антикорупційної політики України, Київ 2017, s. 8.

z ruskich kronikach z XIII wieku. Natomiast w tekście „Konstytucji Filipa Orlika” (1710) czytamy: „...wśród takich (ludzi) znajduje się wielu nieuczciwych laponików, szczególnie wśród sług, którzy nie mają żadnej podstawy prawnej do tej wielkiej ilości¹⁶, której, kiedy urzędnicy miejsy lub wiejscy im odmawiają, żądają przy pomocy wulgarnych słów i bicz, by wymienieni urzędnicy dla zmniejszenia należności pobłażali im przyniesionymi pieniędzmi [...]”¹⁷. Jeśli spojrzymy na okres przebywania ziem ukraińskich w składzie Imperium Rosyjskiego, warto wspomnieć, iż urzędy imperatorskie, nie mając możliwości adekwatnego płacenia urzędnikom, pozwalały im na uzyskiwanie środków na życie poprzez „karmienie”: po zapłacie podatków i innych danin ze swojej posiadłości, urzędnik carski mógł zostawić sobie wszystko, co „wycisnął” dodatkowo.

O „mentalności ordy”, która nadal hamuje rozwój Ukrainy, pisał znany ukraiński pisarz i publicysta J. Hucalo. W książce „Mentalność ordy”¹⁸ akcentuje on skostniałe tradycje cywilizacji grabieżców z niebywale rozdętym aparatem biurokratycznym, który pracuje nie dla społeczeństwa, lecz dla własnego istnienia i reprodukcji, a korupcja i łapownictwo w gabinetach urzędniczych, sprzedażność sędziów stanowią bukiet przewlekłych chorób imperium.

Jeśli zwrócimy się do cech tradycyjnej mentalności polityczno-prawnej Ukraińców, badacze wyodrębniają w niej „indywidualizm egzystencjalny, egocentryzm, introwersję, eskapizm, konserwatyzm, kordocentryzm, egalitaryzm społeczny, wspólnotocentryzm, prowincjonalność, apolityczność, anarchizm”¹⁹. Do najnowszych charakterystyk mentalnych należy nihilizm prawny²⁰, niska kompetencja w zarządzaniu sprawami społeczeństwa oraz państwa, brak rozwiniętych postaw obywatelskich, poddańcze relacje z jakimkolwiek centrum rzeczwiszej władzy itd.²¹ Znacznym wyzwaniem na drodze do pokonania mentalności postradzieckiej jest paternalizm, który stanowi wciąż jeszcze istniejącą wiarę Ukraińców we wszechmoc władzy, przekonanie, że właśnie państwo powinno rozwiązywać wszystkie ich problemy.

Do przejawów korupcji politycznej należą nepotyzm i kumoterstwo, które mocno zakorzeniły się na Ukrainie. Zdaniem S. Brechari, „praktyka nepotyzmu i promowania krajanów w [...] polityce koresponduje z cechami polityczno-mentalnymi indywidualizmu i kordocentryzmu”²². Zdanie to podziela I. Poliszczuk²³: „Ukraińcy reprodukują wzorce relacji rodzinnych w sferze społeczno-polityczne poprzez tworzenie wspólnot lokalnych, które funkcjonują na zasadach analogicznych z rodziną”²⁴.

¹⁶ Маються на увазі законні пільги.

¹⁷ „Пакти й Конституції законів та вольностей Війська Запорозького”, w: Історія української конституції, ред. А.Слюсаренко, М.Томенко, Київ 1993, s. 34.

¹⁸ Є. Гуцало, *Ментальність орди: публіцистичний цикл*, Київ 2007.

¹⁹ І. Поліщук, *Ментальність українців: політичний аспект*, „Людина і політика”, 2002 nr. 1, s. 86.

²⁰ Є. Мянуйлов, О. Дзьобань, *Українська правова ментальність: до проблеми розуміння сутності*, „Гуманітарний часопис”, 2007 nr. 4, s. 49.

²¹ І. Поліщук, *Історична політична ментальність українства: проєкція у сучасність*, „Studia politologica Ucraino-Polona”, 2013 nr. 3, s. 335.

²² С. Брехаря, *Сучасні теоретичні підходи до вивчення політичної ментальності*, „Політичний менеджмент”, 2006 nr. 1, s.114.

²³ І. Поліщук, *Історична політична ментальність українства: проєкція у сучасність*, „Studia politologica Ucraino-Polona”, 2013 nr. 3, s. 334.

²⁴ І. Поліщук, *Ментальність українців: політичний аспект*, „Людина і політика”, 2002 nr. 1, s. 88.

Bez względu na podjęte w okresie niepodległości próby przeciwdziałania korupcji politycznej i biurokratycznej przez różnorodne ogólnopaństwowe i lokalne akcje protestowe, inicjatywy ustawodawcze i inne, najwyraźniej protest antykorupcyjny przejawiał się w Rewolucji Godności. Wtedy istniał wyraźny sprzeciw ludu – „społeczeństwo, które niby już pogodziło się z sytuacją korupcjogenną, zademonstrowało możliwości przeciwdziałania korupcji na wszystkich poziomach życia społeczno-państwowego”²⁵. Wydaje się jednak, że takie falowe uniesienie ruchu antykorupcyjnego nie jest nieodwracalne: na tle faktycznej bezkarności skorumpowanych polityków, wkrótce zaobserwowano swego rodzaju recesję świadomości społecznej. Według wyników sondażu przeprowadzonego przez Transparency International Ukraine w 2017 roku, prawie 86% Ukraińców jest rozczarowanych walką z korupcją i nie wierzy, że rząd może ją pokonać. Odsetek sceptyków wzrósł w ciągu ostatnich lat: w 2013 roku 80% ankietowanych Ukraińców uważało, że rząd nie może pokonać korupcji²⁶.

W ocenach procesów mentalnych, które odbyły się na Ukrainie w okresie po Rewolucji Godności, zauważalne są dwie przeciwstawne oceny: jedni konstatają „tektoniczne transformacje mentalne” („Właśnie na Majdanie narodził się nowoczesny naród Ukraiński!”, „Ukraińcy już nigdy nie będą tacy jak wcześniej!”)²⁷, inni zaś nie podzielają zdania odnośnie strukturalnych, głębokich zmian w świadomości Ukraińców po Rewolucji Godności. Zdaniem J. Potapenki, „postmajdanowskie” myślenie stopniowo zastępuje myślenie postradzieckie z jego kluczowymi cechami: obojętnością, paternalizmem, biernością, lękiem przed przejawieniem inicjatywy, sakralizacją władzy²⁸.

Jednocześnie zauważalna jest następująca tendencja: większość obywateli przyznaje, że w państwie panuje korupcja, regularnie ma do czynienia z jej przejawami i uważa polityków oraz wysokich urzędników państwowych za zbyt skorumpowanych, by można było poprawić tę sytuację. Wskutek tego istnieje praktyka odsuwania się obywateli od rozwiązywania problemu na wszystkich poziomach. Sceptyczny stosunek przeciętnych podmiotów polityki do swoich możliwości pokonania tradycji korupcyjnej jest kluczowym problemem oraz przeszkodą wobec zakorzenienia wiary w przyszłość bez korupcji oraz zmian w modelach codziennego zachowania obywateli.

Ukraińcy aktywnie (szczególnie na poziomie codziennych rozmów) osądzają korupcję, ale niezmiernie rzadko demonstrują własne uczestnictwo w celu zwiększenia przejrzystości, odpowiedzialności i uczciwości aktorów politycznych. Interesujące tendencje w ewolucji wartości antykorupcyjnych Ukraińców można zaobserwować na podstawie danych badania monitoringowego z lat 2007, 2009, 2011 i 2015 Kijowskiego Międzynarodowego Instytutu Socjologii²⁹. Bez względu

²⁵ І. Валошко, Інститути громадянського суспільства у системі антикорупційної політики України, Київ 2017, s. 14.

²⁶ Опитування: Українці не вірять у перемогу над корупцією. <http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3886269-opytuвання-ukraintsi-ne-veryat-u-peremoɦu-nad-koruptsiieiu>, [odczyt: 20.10.2017].

²⁷ Я. Потепенко, Рецепція Євромайдану у сучасному українському соціокультурному дискурсі, „Наукові записки Інституту політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І. Ф. Кураса НАН України”, 2015 nr. 4 (78), s. 16.

²⁸ Ibidem, s. 19.

²⁹ Стан корупції в Україні. Порівняльний аналіз загальнонаціональних досліджень: 2007, 2009, 2011 та 2015, Київ 2015.

na to, że badanie nie było ukierunkowane na wąskie badanie korupcji politycznej, zbadane zostały tendencje, z punktu widzenia których analizować można również ten rodzaj praktyk korupcyjnych: 1) faktyczne zachowanie obywateli pozostaje dość bierne: odsetek tych, którzy składają skargi na działania skorumpowanych urzędników nie przekracza 2% ofiar; natomiast znacznie więcej osób (około jednej trzeciej) deklaruje gotowość do przeciwstawiania się łapownikom; 2) wzrasta odsetek tych, którzy obarczają odpowiedzialnością za walkę z korupcją przeciętnych obywateli (2007 – 15,8% respondentów, 2011 – 18%, 2015 – 24,0%). Nasuwa się wniosek: są zmiany w świadomości obywateli (wzrost samoodpowiedzialności), ale na razie nie znalazły one swojego odzwierciedlenia w codziennym zachowaniu antykorupcyjnym (przeciwdziałaniu). Połowa (49,8%) dorosłej ludności Ukrainy zadeklarowała w wymienionym sondażu prawdopodobieństwo własnego udziału w działaniach korupcyjnych w przypadku, kiedy takie zachowanie będzie dla nich opłacalne.

Dominuje negatywny stosunek Ukraińców do władzy politycznej na poziomie makro (oczywiście jest to skutkiem długotrwałej zależności kolonialnej oraz późniejszej antypaństwowej polityki rządzących). Jest to powodem wysokiego poziomu nieufności ludności Ukrainy wobec tych reform antykorupcyjnych, które przeprowadzane są w ostatnich latach – są one postrzegane jako populistyczne deklaracje. Ukraińskie społeczeństwo jest przekonane (i ma ku temu powody), że poziom korupcji w państwie nie obniża się, top-korupcjoniści nie są należycie pociągani do odpowiedzialności, utrzymuje się wybiórczy wymiar sprawiedliwości itd. Bez względu na pewne osiągnięcia ostatnich lat (szczególnie w sferze transformacji instytucjonalnych), ukraińskie społeczeństwo nadal w znacznym stopniu pozostaje postronnym obserwatorem, a nie uczestnikiem przemian antykorupcyjnych. Tworzenie nowych państwowych organów antykorupcyjnych, pojawienie się szeregu społecznych instytucji antykorupcyjnych nie zmieniło w istotny sposób dynamiki stosowania antytechnologii korupcyjnych w ukraińskiej polityce, ale aktywizowało społeczny dyskurs antykorupcyjny.

Z jednej strony, poziom publicznego potępienia dla korupcjonistów w ukraińskim społeczeństwie stopniowo rośnie, obniża się tolerancja ludności wobec przejawów korupcji. Dość powoli, ale jednak Ukraińcy zaczynają zdawać sobie sprawę z długoterminowego ryzyka związanego z działaniami korupcyjnymi i niebezpieczeństwa dalszego tolerowania korupcji. Z drugiej strony, światopogląd Ukraińców pozostaje ambiwalentny w sferze współistnienia dwóch przeciwieństw: korupcja postrzegana jest jako zjawisko negatywne, ale jej istnienie dopuszczalne jest jako alternatywny sposób rozwiązania problemu (szczególnie o charakterze prywatnym, w kwestiach z oczekiwaną korzyścią). Taka przepaść pomiędzy poziomem wartościowym a funkcjonalnym postrzegania korupcji powoduje zdeformowane stanowisko: własne zachowania korupcyjne są usprawiedliwane, a cudze potępiane. Wśród obywateli dominuje przekonanie, że osobiście są oni dalecy od korupcji politycznej: jest ona charakterystyczna dla elity rządzącej. Jednocześnie brak jest rozumienia, że korupcja polityczna może pośrednio przejawiać się nie tylko w działaniach, ale także w zaniechaniach: obojętności, oderwaniu od prób zatrzymania działań korupcyjnych (na przykład związanych z przekupywaniem wyborców, agitacją w dniu wyborów itd.).

Oczyszczenie Ukrainy od korupcji politycznej nie odbędzie się, dopóki aktorzy polityczni nie odejdą od postrzegania korupcji jako nieodłącznej charakterystyki procesu politycznego (stereotyp polityczny o nieodzowności składnika korupcyjnego w polityce). Jakikolwiek tolerowanie praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce powinno być postrzegane jako asocjalne. Niezbędna jest szeroko zakrojona praca państwa, instytucji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego z obywatelami w zakresie rozwoju i wzmocnienia mentalnego przekonania o nieakceptowalności korupcji w polityce. Ważne jest kształtowanie atmosfery odrzucenia korupcji politycznej, biurokratycznej i innych jej rodzajów. Będzie to możliwe przede wszystkim dzięki bezwzględniemu przestrzeganiu przez państwo zasady nieuchronności kary za popełnienie przestępstw korupcyjnych, co można osiągnąć poprzez stworzenie niezależnego sądu antykorupcyjnego.

Jesteśmy następującego zdania: przez długi czas istniał i w znacznym stopniu wciąż utrzymuje się tolerancyjny stosunek Ukraińców do różnych rodzajów korupcji, ale nie jest to częścią ukraińskiej mentalności. Ukraińcom w zawaolowany sposób narzucana była akceptowalność i prawie bezkarność zachowania korupcyjnego (chodzi przede wszystkim o korupcję w życiu codziennym, a nie polityczną). Wskutek tego ukształtował się fenomen pragmatyzmu korupcyjnego: „orientacja znacznej części ludności na niezgodnie z prawem rozwiązywanie kwestii życiowych, wskutek czego korupcja z anomalii społecznej staje się zasadą zachowania; niska gotowość psychologiczna, więc także słaba aktywność ludności oraz struktur niepaństwowych w sferze przeciwdziałania korupcji”³⁰. Jednak naszym zdaniem takie przekonania mogą zostać szybko pokonane poprzez uruchomienie naprawdę efektywnych mechanizmów przeciwdziałania antykorupcyjnego, rzeczywistą otwartość oraz przejrzystość władzy, niedopuszczalność bezkarności za przestępstwa o charakterze korupcyjnym itd.

Chociaż korupcja stała się tematem dyskursu władzy oraz opozycji, centralnym tematem kampanii wyborczych itd., na poziomie oddolnym nie ma znacznego sprzeciwu (nie chodzi o okresowe akcje, lecz o prawdziwą „wojnę” społeczności przeciwko korupcjonistom). Wciąż utrzymuje się wysoki poziom lojalności wobec korupcji, co czyni działania antykorupcyjne nieefektywnymi. Konieczne jest mocny pozytywny odbiór przez obywateli ważności przeciwdziałania korupcji, uświadomienie sobie jej nieakceptowalności, jeśli chce się budować demokratyczną państwowość. Konieczne jest pokonanie nihilizmu prawnego oraz kształtowanie w społeczeństwie rozwiniętej kultury polityczno-prawnej na bazie wartości antykorupcyjnych.

U podstaw przeciwdziałania korupcji politycznej na Ukrainie leżeć powinien nie tylko mechanizm instytucjonalny, lecz także wartości antykorupcyjne – swego rodzaju fundament, na którym będzie budowane przeciwdziałanie polityczno-prawne praktykom korupcyjnym. Dzięki kulturze antykorupcyjnej (jako jednostce strukturalnej kultury polityczno-prawnej) stopniowo przyjmie się tolerancyjny stosunek do wartości antykorupcyjnych, ukształtuje się zerowa tolerancja wobec antytechnologii korupcyjnych w polityce. W związku z tym problem

³⁰ І. Валюшко, Інститути громадянського суспільства у системі антикорупційної політики України, Київ 2017, s. 9.

tolerowania wartości antykorupcyjnych i wykorzenienia antywartości korupcyjnych należy rozpatrywać właśnie przez pryzmat kultury antykorupcyjnej.

Kształtowanie się antykorupcyjnego systemu wartości jest procesem długotrwałym. Przewiduje on rezygnację całych pokoleń z zakorzenionej lojalności wobec szybkich metod osiągnięcia pewnych celów przy pomocy nieprzejrzystych środków i metod. Obecnie na Ukrainie brak jest całościowego rozumienia kultury antykorupcyjnej, jej mechanizmu, chociaż zapotrzebowanie na nią nie jest negowane ani przez władzę, ani przez społeczeństwo w kontekście rozumienia ważności środków prewencyjnych zapobiegania korupcji politycznej. Kwestie leżące w płaszczyźnie strategii kształtowania nowoczesnej demokratycznej kultury antykorupcyjnej, zawarte są w szeregu aktów normatywnych o ukierunkowaniu antykorupcyjnym, ale nie doczekały się swojej odrębnej integralnej konsolidacji prawnej.

Na Ukrainie wciąż jeszcze jest brak dokładnego rozumienia niebezpieczeństw związanych z korupcją polityczną oraz świadomości roli kultury antykorupcyjnej w ich pokonywaniu. Taki typ kultury obecnie postrzegany jest jako obiektywna konieczność, którą powinna tylko opanować wspólnota ukraińska. Aktualizuje to kwestię konstruowania matrycy, która uwypuklałaby współczesne spojrzenie na kulturę zapobiegania korupcji politycznej, proponowałaby jej merytoryczną budowę.

Kultura antykorupcyjna jest charakterystyką zarówno indywidualnych, jak też zbiorowych podmiotów społecznych. Ustala ona charakterystyki ich świadomości politycznej, aktywności politycznej odnośnie korupcji politycznej (przeciwdziałanie, obojętność lub jej tolerowanie (antykultura)). Od poziomu, treści semantycznej kultury antykorupcyjnej przede wszystkim zależy powszechność praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce na wszystkich jej poziomach. Kształtowanie systemu wartości antykorupcyjnych w polityce warunkuje maksymalne zwężenie sfery antykultury korupcyjnej, opierającej się o latentne poparcie lub nawet bezpośrednio zaangażowanie w praktyki korupcyjne w procesie politycznym.

Kultura antykorupcyjna osoby nie jest po prostu pragnieniem budowania zachowania zgodnie z normami prawnymi, lecz także gotowością do wstrzymania łamania prawa w trakcie procesu politycznego, jeśli związane jest ono z korupcją. Do charakterystyk jej wysokiego poziomu mogą należeć osobiste powstrzymywanie się od działań korupcyjnych w polityce, przeciwdziałanie praktykom korupcyjnym, rozumienie istoty składnika korupcyjnego w pewnym procesie politycznym itd. Kultura antykorupcyjna jest odzwierciedleniem aktywności cywilnej indywidualium, sprzyja realizacji jego praw. Może mieć ona istotny wpływ na regulację procesów polityczno-prawnych (przykładem czego są protesty antykorupcyjne w Rumunii w 2017 roku). Jeżeli jej poziom jest wysoki, odbywa się konsolidacja różnych grup społecznych w celu wsparcia oraz wzmocnienia przestrzegania prawa w społeczeństwie. Właśnie kultura antykorupcyjna jest wskaźnikiem świadczącym o tym, na ile zakorzeniły się w danym społeczeństwie postępowe, demokratyczne wartości polityczne.

Przejawy korupcji politycznej mogą być oceniane w różny sposób: niektóre jako przestępcze (na przykład naruszenie zasad finansowania partii politycznych), a inne jako amoralne (na przykład kumoterstwo, które stanowi przeszkodę dla merytokracji). Ale bez względu na to, czy działania o charakterze korupcyjnym w procesie politycznym są przestępcze czy tylko amoralne, powinny one podlegać negatywnej ocenie w świadomości antykorupcyjnej obywateli. Naszym zdaniem żadne kodeksy moralne, formalne lub nieformalne uzgodnienia pomiędzy aktorami politycznymi, a nawet zaostrzenie sankcji nie powstrzyma praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce, dopóki sam człowiek nie będzie miał wewnętrznej potrzeby przestrzegania zasad.

U podstaw zapobiegania korupcji politycznej powinna leżeć nie tylko koncepcja represyjna, lecz „kulturorepresyjna”³¹, która przejawia się w połączeniu „kultura + represja (odpowiedzialność)”. Radykalnym środkiem przeciwdziałania jakimkolwiek formom korupcji jest czynnik ludzki (kultura antykorupcyjna obywateli), a różnorodne mechanizmy instytucyjne są „jedynie narzędziami, efektywność stosowania których zależy od stanu wymienionego czynnika ludzkiego”³².

W wymiarze moralno-etycznym przeciwdziałanie korupcji politycznej jest równoznaczne z walką z ludzkimi grzechami – chciwością, żądzą przyjemności, a także pragnieniem uzurpacji władzy, chęcią osiągnięcia zwycięstwa za jakąkolwiek cenę itp. We wszystkich definicjach korupcji dominuje akcent na interesownym charakterze działań korupcyjnym, dlatego walka z praktykami korupcyjnymi w polityce powinna być zorientowana na najtrudniejszą ludzką „przywarę”, związaną z interesownymi motywacjami.

Poziom świadomości antykorupcyjnej, a więc także kultury antykorupcyjnej, zależy od stopnia uświadomienia sobie przez osobę oraz społeczeństwo destabilizującej roli korupcji politycznej, jej wywrotowej roli w państwie. Właśnie niszczący wpływ korupcji politycznej (i innych jej rodzajów) stanowi przyczynę tego, że kształtowanie kultury nietolerancji wobec korupcji jest najważniejszym elementem strategii antykorupcyjnych państw rozwiniętych.

Wśród mechanizmów zapobiegania i przeciwdziałania korupcji na Ukrainie państwo jako priorytet określiło przede wszystkim udoskonalenie sfery prawnej. Ale w praktyce wyłącznie normatywno-prawne uregulowanie przestępstw korupcyjnych nie powoduje obniżenia poziomu korupcji. Przyczyny powszechności praktyk korupcyjnych w polityce łączyć należy z kulturą, mentalnością, tradycjami pewnego społeczeństwa. Dlatego, naszym zdaniem, ważnym zadaniem w przeciwdziałaniu korupcji politycznej jest skonstruowanie antykorupcyjnej kultury polityczno-prawnej. Popularyzacja wartości antykorupcyjnych powinna stać się mechanizmem prewencyjnym.

Bez względu na trudność zadania, konieczne wydają się środki, które aktywizowałyby ludność w jej współpracy z organami antykorupcyjnymi w zakresie znanych im faktów nadużyć ze składnikiem korupcyjnym – przynajmniej w sferze elektorальной jako maksymalnie widocznej dla

³¹ О. Костенко, Яким „каменем” зневажили „будівничі” вітчизняної антикорупційної політики?, „Віче” 2016 nr 3-4, s. 12.

³² Ibidem.

przeciętnego obywatela. Obecnie odsetek ludności aktywnej w takiej współpracy jest niewielki ze względu na szereg przyczyn: wysoki stopień lojalności ludności wobec korupcji; potępienie faktów informowania o korupcji jako nieetycznego zachowania; niski poziom zaufania wobec organów ścigania; brak wiary w efektywność środków antykorupcyjnych; lęk przed karą za poinformowanie o podejrzeniu kogoś o korupcję i inne. Według danych badania „Barometr światowej korupcji”, opublikowanego pod koniec 2016 roku, 42% ankietowanych Ukraińców uważało, że nie warto informować odpowiednich organów o fakcie korupcji: zdaniem niektórych niczego to nie zmieni, a inni boją się skutków takiego zgłoszenia³³.

Ukraiński badacz-politolog J. Newmerżycki, badając wpływ kultury na powszechność korupcji w państwie, akcentuje uwagę na specyficę klimatu społeczno-psychologicznego, który sprzyja prosperowaniu korupcji na Ukrainie, a w szczególności: istnieniu podwójnych standardów moralnych, zgodnie z którymi korupcja oficjalnie uważana jest za nieakceptowalną społecznie, a jednak stała się ona, szczególnie na dolnym poziomie, nieodzowną częścią życia przeciętnego Ukraińca; brak zrozumienia przez większość poważności problemu korupcji, niebezpieczeństw z nią związanych; brak należytego szacunku wobec prawa i sądu ze strony polityków oraz przedstawicieli władzy państwowej³⁴. W danym przypadku chodzi nie tylko o korupcję stricte polityczną, lecz raczej o codzienną, ale podane argumenty można przenieść także na klasyczne przypadki głosowania „za kaszę gryczaną” (lub inną „paszę elektoralną”), uczestnictwo w „karuzelach wyborczych”, brak oporu wobec stosowania zasobów administracyjnych itd.

Wydaje się, że ukraińskie społeczeństwo ogólnie trzyma się z dala w swoim przeciwdziałaniu korupcji politycznej. Zachowanie obywateli można ocenić jako ambiwalentne, gdyż z jednej strony mamy publiczne oburzenie korupcją, a z drugiej tolerowanie jej, o ile droga korupcyjna wydaje się być najłatwiejszą metodą rozwiązania problemu lub przynosi korzyść osobistą. Mamy sytuację, w której z jednej strony absolutna większość Ukraińców jest przekonana, że poziom korupcji w kraju się nie obniża, rząd nie chce ujawniać korupcjonistów, a sędziowie uniewinniają ich, a z drugiej strony sama ludność nie widzi siebie w aktywnych rolach antykorupcyjnych (na przykład jako osób ujawniających korupcję, społecznych ekspertów projektów ustaw itd.).

Wydaje się, że kształtowanie demokratycznej kultury antykorupcyjnej leży przede wszystkim w płaszczyźnie pokonywania pierwotnych przyczyn niechętnego stosunku ludności do swojej roli antykorupcyjnej. Niezbędne jest podniesienie poziomu zaufania wobec organów antykorupcyjnych (który powinny jeszcze wypracować swój kapitał reputacyjny), realnej kary dla korupcjonistów. W sytuacji, kiedy szerokie masy społeczne wiedzą o tym, że znaczą ilość spraw przeciwko urzędnikom wysokiego szczebla, podejrzanym o przestępstwa korupcyjne, nie kończy się ich oskarżeniem, nie można liczyć na kształtowanie się przestrzeni zaufania. W związku z tym aktualizuje się jak najszybsze stworzenie na Ukrainie specjalistycznego sądu antykorupcyjnego

³³ People and corruption: Europe and Asia 2016. <https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/7493> [odczyt: 19.10.2017].

³⁴ *Є. Невмерзіцький, Корупція як соціально-політичний феномен, Київ 2009, s. 19.*

oraz późniejsze medialne wsparcie jego działalności. Ogólnie potencjał antykorupcyjny środków, mających na celu zaangażowanie ludności do ujawniania oraz informowania o faktach korupcji jest potencjalnie wysoki, o czym świadczy doświadczenie państw obcych. Ale obecnie ten potencjał Ukraińców nie jest stosowany z wymienionych wyżej powodów.

W warunkach utrzymywania się wysokiej tolerancji Ukraińców wobec korupcji niezbędne jest integralne rozumienie systemu środków (programu) kształtowania kultury antykorupcyjnej, ukierunkowanej na maksymalne obniżenie tolerancji społecznej wobec korupcji. Na czasie jest korekcja mentalności społeczeństwa w zakresie percepcji korupcji politycznej, a także powstanie silnego zapotrzebowania społeczeństwa, wywierającego presję na władzę, żądają realnych zmian: nie można uzyskać od rządu otwartości, przejrzystości, nie udając się do wymogów, kontroli.

Ukraina potrzebuje rozwoju antykorupcyjnych inicjatyw społecznych, na przykład rozwoju tematycznych i regionalnych sieci osób walczących z korupcją, informacyjno-mobilizacyjnych kampanii antykorupcyjnych, szkolenia zorganizowanych grup obywateli w zakresie narzędzi przeciwdziałania korupcji politycznej (zadanie to szczególnie aktualizuje się wraz ze zbliżaniem się kampanii wyborczej) itd. Aby powstała się zerowa tolerancja wobec korupcji politycznej potrzebna jest zarówno wola najwyższego kierownictwa państwa, jak też nieobojętna wspólnota o wysokim poziomie kultury antykorupcyjnej, opierającej się o znajomość prawa i wysoką odpowiedzialność społeczną.

Przekonanie o tym, że korupcję polityczną można pokonać wyłącznie poprzez udoskonalenie bazy normatywno-prawnej, jest błędna. Obecnie prowadzi ono do braku realnego postępu w minimalizacji praktyk korupcyjnych w ukraińskiej polityce. Dzisiejszej ukraińskiej polityce, gronu jej podmiotów, do uzdrowienia od choroby korupcyjnej brakuje „leków”, którymi powinny się stać wartości antykorupcyjne. Właśnie rozwój „potencjału antykorupcyjnego czynnika ludzkiego”³⁵, uzupełnionego o narzędzia represyjne, powinien stać się podstawą strategii zapobiegania korupcji politycznej na Ukrainie. Na czasie jest kształtowanie takiego klimatu społecznego, w którym indywiduum nie popełnia czynów korupcyjnych nie ze względu na lęk przed karą, lecz ze względu za uznanie takich czynów za niegodne, stojące w sprzeczności z jego zasadami życiowymi. Zmiana świadomości polityczno-prawnej ludności Ukrainy powinna stać się zasadniczym krokiem w transformacjach antykorupcyjnych w państwie.

³⁵ О. Костенко, Яким „каменем” зневажили „будівничі” вітчизняної антикорупційної політики?, „Віче” 2016 nr 3-4, s. 13.

Modern Ukraine: challenging by reforms

The article analyzes the reforms in Ukraine in the post-revolutionary period. The author observes that Ukraine proves to be in exceptional circumstances owing to the deep political and economic crisis, occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and holding of an anti-terrorist operation in the East. Therefore, the study of the new reforms creation in the post-revolutionary period in Ukraine is quite expedient.

Having considered the new reforms in Ukraine in the post-revolutionary period, the author can argue that the state is in a transitional stage of development to a democratic society.

Keywords: Revolution of Dignity, post-revolutionary period, reform, administrative reform, constitutional reform, public administration reform, anti-corruption reform, democratic changes.

Сучасна Україна: випробування реформами

у статті проаналізовано реформи в Україні у постреволюційний період. Автор зазначає, що Україна перебуває у виняткових обставинах внаслідок глибокої політичної та економічної кризи, окупації Автономної Республіки Крим та проведення антитерористичної операції на Сході країни. Тому дослідження створення нових реформ у постреволюційний період в Україні є досить доцільним.

Розглянувши нові реформи в Україні у постреволюційний період автор можна стверджує, що держава знаходиться на перехідному етапі розвитку до демократичного суспільства.

Ключові слова: Революція Гідності, постреволюційний період, реформа, адміністративна реформа, конституційна реформа, реформа державного управління, антикорупційна реформа, демократичні зміни.

Problem statement. Ukraine proves to be in exceptional circumstances owing to the deep political and economic crisis, occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and holding of an anti-terrorist operation in the East. However, the basis of the crisis is deeper than the current political and economic upheaval or aggression on the part of the Russian Federation. We believe that the crisis is caused by delay of introducing necessary reforms over the course of 26 years of independence. Among the Eastern European powers, Ukraine is one of the least active reformers - the changes that have taken place since the collapse of the communist regime in our country are

much smaller than in the neighboring states - EU members. The consequences of such a delay have become catastrophic for Ukrainian citizens.

The relevance of the issue is due to the fact that the main “trend” of the last three years is the strengthening of negative tendencies in the development of the situation around and within Ukraine.

Analysis of the recent research and publications. Taking into account the novelty and specificity of the study of new reforms in Ukraine in the post-revolutionary period, there is a need to use a large number of theoretical materials as well as articles and analytical studies.

The source grounds of the research of the events of the post-revolutionary period in Ukraine make up the articles of modern scholars, in particular I. Alekseenko “The interaction of branches of power as a factor in the development of the form of government in modern Ukraine”¹, V. Shatilo “The problems of organization of state power in Ukraine”², V. Protsiuk “Modern approaches to understanding of the principle of state power division”³ and V. Kampo “On the issue of a new judicial protection of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens in Ukraine”⁴.

At the same time, beyond the attention of researchers there are a number of problems that require further analysis.

Description of the main research material. Ukraine is a country that is still in a transitional stage from the authoritarian political system and the corrupt, clan capitalism that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the Orange Revolution, which took place more than ten years ago, there were attempts to accelerate the reforms. But in the end, the revolution failed, because its leaders turned out to be “products of the past”, which managed to take only a few steps towards reforming the economy and fighting corruption.

New leaders have proven themselves during the Revolution of Dignity, and have also been successful within the old system. But they are only figures of the transition stage. In some cases, they use old methods, while recognizing the need for at least some reforms.

However, according to former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, now in the post-revolutionary state there is a new group of young and “impatient” leaders who have never been part of the old elite. Some of them became ministers and deputy ministers⁵. In our opinion, new leaders are the key to quick and thorough reforms.

¹ Alekseyenko I. «Vzayemodiya hilok vlady yak chynnyk rozvytku formy pravlinnya v suchasniy Ukraini». URL: http://www.ipiend.gov.ua/uploads/pm/pm_46/alekseenko_vzaemodia.pdf (data zvernennya: 10.11.2017).

² Shatilo V. «Problemy orhanizatsiyi derzhavnoyi vlady v Ukraini». URL: <http://applaw.knu.ua/index.php/arkhiv-nomeriv/4-6-2013/item/235-problemy-orhanizatsiyi-derzhavnoyi-vlady-v-ukrayini-shatilo-v-a> (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

³ Protsiuk V. «Suchasni pidkhody do rozuminnya pryntsypu podilu derzhavnoyi vlady». URL: http://dspace.nlu.edu.ua/bitstream/123456789/2034/1/Protsiuk_3.pdf (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

⁴ Kampo V. «Do pytannya pro novyy sudovyy zakhyst konstytutsiynykh prav i svobod hromadyan v Ukraini». URL: <http://sud.ua/ru/news/blog/108328-do-pitannya-pro-noviy-sudoviy-zakhist-konstitutsiynikh-prav-i-svobod-gromadyan-v-ukrayini> (data zvernennya: 27.10.2017).

⁵ Herbst Dzh. «Ochikuvannya i realnist' reform v Ukraini». URL: <http://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/herbst/ochikuvannya-i-realnist-reform-v-ukrajini-1565916.html> (data zvernennya: 27.10.2017).

It should be emphasized that Ukraine in its quest for reforms is supported by Western European forces: the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In their view, the people of Ukraine have clearly expressed on the Maidan their desire to create an open democratic society, and are ready to help it in reforming. The representatives of western organizations support the Ukrainian people on their way to changes, helping to set goals for reforms, providing technical advice and offering targeted financial assistance.

Over the past three years, the reformers and the Western community have come up with a common position on accelerating reforms. In particular, the combined efforts of Western specialists and Ukrainians identified the steps to be taken. “The assistance provided by the international financial institutions, the European Union and the United States has become a powerful tool - not only to convince Ukrainian leaders to carry out complex but necessary changes, but also to explain to still powerful figures with personal interests why actions are being taken against their preferences”, – J. Herbst emphasizes⁶. After the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) Ukraine decided on the choice of a strategy for socio-political development: chose the European integration path.

Actually, after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the democratic changes began, due to its European integration political course. So, the constitutional reform of the judicial power which began in 2016 was intended to provide higher standards for the implementation and protection of constitutional rights as well as the freedoms of Ukrainian citizens. The reform has consolidated the right of citizens to a constitutional complaint, updating of the foundations of the judicial system, the extension of the rights of the advocacy, and others like that⁷. So, we can talk about the formation of a new judicial protection of human rights in Ukraine, first of all, the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. Of course, the reform is not yet complete; it has many problems and contradictions, so this defense is not yet perfect. But the issues of ensuring the realization and protection of constitutional rights and freedoms are of global character for the Ukrainian society. Therefore, the effective completion of the constitutional changes is important.

The reform of public administration is also implemented. In 2015 The Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers made the institutional changes in various levels of government. These measures concerned:

- deregulation and reducing of the business impact on state power;
- introduction of regulatory models and functions of control bodies in accordance with the EU standards and the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states;
- reducing the number of controlling bodies and their functions in accordance with European standards;

⁶ HerbstDzh. «Ochikuvannya i real'nist' reform v Ukraini». URL: <http://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/herbst/ochikuvannja-i-realnist-reform-v-ukrajini-1565916.html> (data zvernennja: 27.10.2017).

⁷ Tam samo.

- decentralization and regional development regarding the transfer of additional budgetary powers and stable sources of income to local self-government bodies;
- opening of “transparent offices” in the regions;
- reduction of the number of civil servants and rotation of state personnel;
- elaboration and adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Civil Service”⁸ in the new wording;
- introduction of competitive selection for public office;
- introduction of electronic administrative services;
- development and adoption of laws on open data⁹ to be made public by the State Agency for E-Governance.

The most positive expectations in society are connected with the prospects of budgetary and resource stabilization at the level of local self-government. The adoption of the new Law “On Civil Service” was foreseen by the international obligations of Ukraine and is an important step towards modernizing the civil service system on a European basis.

A system of prosecution for corruption offenses, which is highlighted in the anti-corruption reform, has been formed. At the end of 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office fully began their activities.

On November 10, 2015 the Law of Ukraine “On the National Agency of Ukraine on the Detection, Investigation and Management of Assets Received from Corruption and Other Crimes”¹⁰ was adopted as a preventive anti-corruption body. And on November 12, 2015 the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law “On the State Bureau of Investigations”¹¹, which is defined as a central executive body that carries out law enforcement activities in order to identify, disclose and investigate the most dangerous crimes and crimes committed by specific actors: crimes of criminal organizations, terroristic crimes, corruption crimes, etc.

During two years, many steps were taken to combat corruption, but this is still not enough to overcome the key internal obstacle for Ukraine’s development. The coalition of NGOs “Re-animation Package of Reforms”¹² presents the Roadmap for Reforms for 2016-2017. All defined tasks are aimed at achieving four key goals in the implementation of anti-corruption reform.

One of the few positive changes in the country over the past two years has been the creation of a new police force. Due to the considerable efforts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

⁸ Zakonoproekt #2490 vid 30 bereznya 2015r., napravlenny na pidpys Prezydentu Ukrainy 18 hrudnya 2015 r. URL: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54571 (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

⁹ Zakony Ukrainy «Pro vnesennya zmin do deyakykh zakoniv Ukrainy shchodo dostupu do publichnoyi informatsiyi u formi vidkrytykh danykh». URL: <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/319-19> (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

¹⁰ Zakon Ukrainy «Pro natsional'ne ahent-stvo Ukrainy z pytan' vyvavlennya, rozshuku ta upravlinnya aktyvamy, oderzhanymy vid koruptsiynykh ta inshykh zlochyniv», 2015 r. URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/772-19> (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

¹¹ Zakon Ukrainy «Pro Derzhavne byuro rozsliduvan'», 2015 r. URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/794-19> (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

¹² Dorozhnyia karta reform. URL: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0ByJP2W93RiyaTXc1cnZmTnEwdVU/view> (data zvernennya: 11.11.2017).

active assistance from international partners and public activists there have been taken a number of important steps towards truly radical changes in one of the most discredited and corrupt force structures.

In the course of 2015, there was created the legal and regulatory framework for the functioning of the National Police, some necessary structural changes and personnel appointments were made. The newly created units of the patrol police in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities managed to change the situation with the total distrust of the society to the law-enforcement bodies in a rather short time¹³.

But despite the openness to change, Ukraine is still a weakened country, which is actually in a state of war with Russia, and under such conditions is not capable of self-discipline for the rapid reforming not only of the economy, but also the army and navy, therefore it is unlikely to interest some country as an ally or partner in the drawing of the next world solitaire. The Ukrainian government has clearly reached the critical edge of both internal and external trust. If in the nearest future no fundamental steps are taken to remedy the situation, the country will be on the verge of another state disaster. At the same time, in such a situation the Ukrainian society is disappointed, because any revolution gives rise to considerably overestimated expectations¹⁴. Sometimes you can hear from someone, that it would better not to have had this Maidan, because people have changed, but the authorities have not. And it is getting harder and harder to live day by day. But here one could listen to the Poles. “Our experience in Eastern Europe shows that democracy does not always come with economic prosperity. The period of change can take 3-5 years”, – says Polat Y. Tombinsky¹⁵, the head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

At present, many politicians say that initially it is necessary to consider a complex of urgent anti-crisis measures, then to lay down a mechanism for eliminating destructive regulations of the authorities and establishing adequate relations with the occupied Ukrainian territories. Next, the complex of reforms in the economy must be determined.

Therefore, there were adopted the strategic priorities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which determine five priority measures to be implemented by 2020:

- economic growth;
- effective governance;
- human capital development;
- rule of law and fighting corruption;
- security and defense¹⁶.

¹³ Ukrayina 2015-2016: vyprovuvannya reformamy. URL: http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2015-2016_Pidsumky.pdf (data zvernennya: 12.11.2017).

¹⁴ Osnovni vyklyky ta ryzyky dlya Ukrayiny u druhiy polovyni lyutoho 2016 roku. URL: http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/2016/Osn_ryzyk_dlya_Ukrainy_v_drug_polovyn_lyutoho_2016_2016.htm (data zvernennya: 30.10.2017).

¹⁵ Shcho zminylosya pislya Maidanu: «zrady» ta «peremohy». URL: <https://www.depo.ua/ukr/life/shcho-zminilosya-pislya-maydanu-veliki-zradi-ta-peremogi-03112015174500> (data zvernennya: 30.10.2017).

¹⁶ Plan priorytetnykh diy Uryadu Ukrayiny do 2020 roku vid 30 hrudnya 2016 r. URL: <https://hromadske.ua/posts/uriad-ukrainy-oprylyudnyv-plan-dii-do-2020-roku> (data zvernennya: 30.10.2017).

“This plan stipulates what we will do in the economy in particular, so that it will grow, how governance in our country will be improved, what we will do in the security and defense sector, how we will develop human capital, how we will provide services, how we will increase social standards, how people will receive wages”, – said V.Groisman¹⁷, the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

We believe that the ways of solving problems that arose after the revolutionary events in Ukraine are quite promising and quite achievable. Also, an important factor in overcoming the transformational crisis of Ukrainian society is the creation of a modern, effective public administration system. The new system should be created through administrative reform.

In order to achieve the goal of administrative reform in the course of its implementation, a number of tasks should be solved:

- formation of an effective organization of executive power at both central and local levels of governance;
- formation of a modern system of local self-government;
- introduction of a new ideology of the functioning of the executive and local self-government as activities to ensure the implementation of the rights and freedoms of citizens, the provision of state and public services;
- organization of civil service and service in local self-government bodies on the basis of new principles;
- creation of a modern system of training and retraining of managerial personnel;
- introduction of a rational administrative-territorial system¹⁸.

Administrative reform should be carried out in several directions. The first is the creation of a new legal framework regulating public administration in Ukraine. The second is the formation of new institutes, organizational structures and instruments for the implementation of public administration. The third is staffing of a new system of public administration. The fourth is strengthening and formation of new financial and economic foundations for the functioning of public administration. The fifth is the scientific and informational support of the system of public administration, formation of the mechanisms for scientific and informational monitoring of its functioning¹⁹. This reform is designed for a relatively long period of its implementation and includes three stages:

- The “Concept of Administrative Reform”²⁰ and “Administrative Reform Program”²¹ should be developed and officially approved during the preparatory stage of the re-

¹⁷ Uryad pidhotuvav plan diy do 2020 roku. URL: <http://glavcom.ua/news/uryad-pidgotuvav-plan-diy-do-2020-roku-390295.html> (data zvernennya: 30.10.2017).

¹⁸ Zahalni zasady administratyvnoyi reformy. URL: <http://www.kr-admin.gov.ua/Reforms/Ua/div1.html> (data zvernennya: 30.10.2017).

¹⁹ Tam samo.

²⁰ Pro zakhody shchodo vprovadzhennya Kontseptsiyi administratyvnoyi reformy v Ukraini. URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/810/98> (data zvernennya: 12.11.2017).

²¹ Pro cherhovi zakhody shchodo dal'shoho zdiysnennya administratyvnoyi reformy v Ukraini. URL: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/345/2001> (data zvernennya: 12.11.2017).

form. At this stage, the top priority issues related to the current improvement of the elements of the existing system of public administration are solved;

- the second stage introduces the organizational and legal framework for reforming the key elements of the public administration system;
- In the third stage, transformation processes are deepened, new institutes, organizational structures and instruments of state administration are formed²².

At all stages of the reform, measures are being taken on its legislative, personnel, scientific and information support, strengthening and updating of new financial and economic foundations of state administration. Therefore, the content of administrative reform involves comprehensive reorganization of the existing system of public administration in all spheres of public life in Ukraine. On the other hand it involves the development of some institutions of public administration, which Ukraine has not yet created as a sovereign state.

A brief overview of post-revolutionary reforms in Ukraine makes it possible to draw the following **conclusions**:

When investigating these events, it is worth noting that these are internal threats and challenges that pose the greatest danger to the Ukrainian state. The inability of the Ukrainian leadership and policy to begin real reforms in all spheres of social and public life accumulates a negative potential, which, under certain conditions, can destroy not only the achievements of the Revolution of Dignity, but also the foundations of Ukrainian statehood. It should be also noted that the failure of reforms in Ukraine also causes weakening of the state's position in the foreign arena. It is sensed that Ukraine again loses the dynamics of the subject of international relations and returns to the usual positions of the "world's backstage" object.

Nevertheless, over the past three years, Ukraine has managed to change the president and the composition of the government twice, sign an association with the EU, stand in the war with Russia in the Donbass, dress and arm the army, and create a civil society.

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