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Wstęp

2014 рік став особливим для України, країн Центральної Європи і цілого світу. Ця особливість зумовлена низкою подій, які мали і мають місце в Україні і детермінували національний, регіональний і світовий політичний процес. Початок цим подіям дала Революція Гідності, яка охопила значну частину України і чітко окреслила незгоду більшості українського суспільства із втратою європейської перспективи та прагнення суспільно-політичних змін. Драматичні події кінця лютого 2014 року, коли правлячий авторитарний режим використав брутально силу для придушення акцій протесту, призвели до падіння режиму і зміни політичної конфігурації у Верховній Раді України. Якщо події на Майдані в Києві і багатьох інших майданах за формою та наслідками подібні до революції, то анексія Криму Російською Федерацією та вибух сепаратизму в східних та південних областях за активної підтримки Росії концептуально подібні до контрреволюції. Повноцінність революційної парадигми певною мірою узалежнена від результатів дострокових парламентських виборів 26 жовтня 2014 р., які мають закріпити/легітимізувати її результати та здатності інституту президента і нового парламенту прийняти комплекс реформ так необхідних українському суспільству. Розвиток контрреволюційної складової відбувався згідно традиційних лекал: спроба зберегти стару систему і опертя на допомогу сусіда, зацікавленого у відсутності змін і внутрішній слабкості України. При цьому висока вартість ставки щодо змін в Україні спровокувала порушення керівництвом Росії низки міжнародних угод/норм стосовно територіальної цілісності, невтручання у внутрішні справи. Росія, яка тривалий період після падіння Берлінського муру сприймалася Європою і демократичним світом в якості партнера по конструюванню європейського мирного дому, внаслідок свого брутального втручання в події на Україні, перетворилася на потужну загрозу для країн регіону і цілої Європи. Сам факт означених подій безповоротно змінив ситуацію в регіоні і цілій Європі. Відповідно, наукова оцінка політичних процесів в регіоні залишається актуальною для розуміння ходу політичного процесу в окремих країнах і цілому регіоні та виокремлення чинників, що впливають на інституційні зміни. Піврічник присвячений широкому спектру політичних проблем регіону Центрально-Східної Європи і відображає кут зору польських та українських дослідників. Сподіваємося, що наші публікації разом з іншими будуть сприяти кращому розумінню стану справ та тенденціям політичного розвитку цієї частини Європи.

Great Britain's Attitude Towards the Ukrainian Crisis

Artykuł zatytułowany *Stosunek Wielkiej Brytanii do obecnego kryzysu na Ukrainie* ma na celu przedstawienie podejścia Zjednoczonego Królestwa do walk, których załączkiem stały się Majdańskie protesty w listopadzie ubiegłego roku. Tekst ten stanowi swoistą analizę o charakterze krytyczno – dyskursywnym, której poddane zostały fakty zaczerpnięte z najnowszych publikacji o charakterze polityczno – społecznym. Mowa tutaj o międzynarodowych materiałach, nie tylko w postaci zwartych woluminów, jak *Londongrad* autorstwa M. Hollingsworth'a i S. Lansley'a, ale również artykułach publikowanych tak w prasie naukowej, jak i codziennej. Opracowanie to rozpoczyna się wstępem, który ma na celu przybliżenie wydarzeń, które stały się źródłem najpierw protestów o charakterze lokalnym, z czasem zaś przemieniły się w otwartą walkę, która zwraca na siebie uwagę opinii publicznej niemal z każdego państwa w Europie. A i te, leżące poza starym kontynentem nie pozostają obojętne na obecne wydarzenia. Główna część pracy to pokazywanie argumentów, popartych konkretnymi przykładami mającymi na celu wykazanie powodów, dla których państwo brytyjskie prowadzi albo prowadziło tzw. politykę izolacjonizmu. Pokazane jest także, jak stopniowo ten stosunek ulegał zmianie wraz z rozwojem wydarzeń na wschodzie (sankcje, zestrzelenie malezyjskiego Boeing'a 17 oraz podkreślanie jedności państw tworzących struktury NATO). Zakończenie to swoiste podsumowanie zebranych faktów i próba dyskusji nad zagadnieniem, czy Wielka Brytania jest w stanie zmienić swój stosunek do tego, co się dzieje za naszą wschodnią granicą, czy nie.

Słowa kluczowe: stosunek, dyplomacja, polityka izolacjonizmu, kryzys, sankcje, NATO, City, oligarchowie, inwestorzy, zestrzelenie MH17

The main aim of this article was to present the United Kingdom's attitude towards the Ukrainian crisis. In order to do that a critical discourse analysis of the particular materials was done. It was based on the new books, such as *Londongrad*, for instance as well as articles published in the daily and weekly magazines and newspapers. It starts with the short description of the conflict historical background. Then, it presents in details the reasons why Great Britain carried out a splendid isolation policy and would not like to engage in such a conflict as well as why its attitude might be described as the diplomatic one. It ends with conclusion, in which it was being tried to answer the question whether Great Britain would change its attitude or not.

Keywords: *attitude, diplomacy, splendid isolation, crisis, sanctions, NATO, City, oligarchs, investors, MH17 crash*

The main aim of this article is to present the United Kingdom's attitude to the Ukrainian crisis. In order to do that, it needs to be started with a short description of crucial facts shaping the whole conflict. It is necessary to show many of them in the light of British politicians' decisions to attempt to achieve a balanced opinion.

It was begun on November last year, when the massive protests against the Government were being organized in the centre of the national capital – Kiev. In this way, the Ukrainian society desired to express its strong disagreement on the decisions made by the local rulers. They had refused to sign an accession treaty as well as to create a free trade area. According to them, such an agreement would not be able to guarantee a recompense for the country when it did not trade properly with Russia. Apart from Kiev, the places of society's strikes were Luck, Ivano-Frankovsk, Donnie and Kharkov¹. The people's disagreement met with the opposition's favour. J. Timoshenko, for instance, wanting to show her support for all those striking, decided to starve in prison where she was spending several months.² It was the time, when the whole conflict become to have an anti-governmental character. As it was being shown in the international media, there was even an attempt to destroy V. Yanukovich's residence after which the March of Millions was organised during which Lenin's monument was in ruins.³ The facts forced the president to organise the round table's debate whose the effects were desirable.⁴ Several days later, Ukraine made the decision to sign quite new agreements with Russia guaranteeing low prices for gas being imported from the east border as well as participating the Russian capital investments in the national ones. Time was passing and the situation in Ukraine was becoming more dangerous. Next people among whom not only politicians but also journalists and activists were remanded in custody. The example may be T. Chornovol, both the Euro maiden's correspondent and activist as well as A. Ilienکو, the representative of Svoboda, the oppositional party.⁵ Then, the rulers started to use punishments for all those taking part in the public meetings whose character might be described as illegal.⁶ Besides, it was the time when the new terms such as 'social organisations' begun to be introduced in the policy, trying to play the role of foreign secret agents. Moreover, the Ukrainian governors desired to make easier the process of repealing immunity, which in effect led to provoking next

¹ *Ukraine crisis*, BBC News Europe., <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275>, [access on 8.07.2014].

² L. Dearden., *Ukraine crisis: A timeline of the conflict from the Euromaidan protests to MH17 and civil war in the east*, The Independent., <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-timeline-of-the-conflict-from-the-euromaidan-protests-to-mh17-and-civil-war-in-the-east-9706999.html>, [access on 8.07.2014].

³ S.Webb., *Cars Worth millions, chandeliers everywhere and a gold-plated bidet: Protesters discover treasure trove at home of ousted Ukrainian president*, The Daily Mail., <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2568468/The-spoils-corruption-The-opulent-valuable-downright-gaudy-artefacts-former-home-ousted-Ukrainian-president-Viktor-Yanukovich.html>, [access on 8.07.2014].

⁴ *Germany's Steinmeier seeks round- table debate in Ukraine*, D.W., <http://www.dw.de/germanys-steinmeier-seeks-round-table-debate-in-ukraine/a-17630916>, published by Reuters., [access on 8.07.2014].

⁵ *Two arrests reported in Chornovol beating*, Kyiv Post., <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/journalist-and-protest-activist-chornovol-beaten-near-kyiv-334224.html>, [access on 9.07.2014].

⁶ *Ibidem*, [access on 9.07.2014].

riots, in which almost two hundred people were hurt and three human beings killed as a result of being shot with the use of gum bullets.⁷

When the prime minister, M. Azarov resigned from his public function and the demonstrations were increasing in strength, the representatives of foreign countries of the West Europe, especially Poland, France and Germany decided to meet with the Ukrainian president as well as the particular representatives of the national opposition. Amid the Foreign Affairs Ministers, there were both R. Sikorsky and L. Fabius as well as F. W. Steinmeier.⁸ In a consequence, the Ukrainian president and opposition signed an agreement, which allowed the governor to bring the constitution from 2004 back in the time of forty – eight hours. This particular decision was respected by the local rulers. Apart from this, it was mentioned creating the new Government by coalition and forming new constitution up to September 2014 as well as national election's organising to December this year.⁹ As a result, V. Yanukovic decided to leave the country. This particular event started to make the Russian governors worry about the international political situation. The prime minister, D. Miedvediev started to criticise the western countries for accepting new rulers in Ukraine, who started to govern after the 27th of February. From this time, the Ukrainian prime minister is A. Jaceniuk whereas A. Deszczyca is responsible for Diplomatic Resort, A. Avakov for international affairs, J. Prodom for energetic affairs and P. Szeremeta for the economic.¹⁰ In D. Miedvediev's opinion, countries from the West have begun to present an aberration, a temporary change from typical or usual way of behaving. The prime minister claimed that their reaction was rather artificial, quite unnatural. Almost the same stance was maintained by the Ukrainian president, who also was sure that the whole responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis should be completely shared by the countries placing on the west part of the old continent.¹¹

In this place, it is worth mentioning that Great Britain was not engaged in the international meeting of the West Europe with the East one. The main voices of Europe and, at the same time, of the European Union were Poland, France and Germany.¹² Those representatives were brave enough to express their views and support or negate the whole situation. They played the role of so called mediators whose main aim was to stabilize the situation without the use of military power and to save as many people as it was only possible. They tried

⁷ L. Dearden. Op. cit., [access on 9.07.2014].

⁸ *Gewalt in der Ukraine: EU beschliesst Sanktionen.*, Spiegel Online Politik., <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-steinmeier-fabius-und-sikorski-bleiben-in-kiew-fuer-gespraech-a-954712.html>, published by Reuters, [access on 10.07.2014]. It was translated from the German language into English by the author of this article.

⁹ *Joint Statement on Ukraine of the Weimar Triangle Foreign Ministers Frank Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Laurent Fabius (France), Radoslaw Sikorsky (Poland) in Weimer.*, Federal Foreign Office., http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2014/140331_Gemeinsame_Erkl%C3%A4rung_zur_Ukraine.html, [access on 11.07.2014].

¹⁰ Ibidem., [access on 14.07.2014].

¹¹ L. Dearden. Op. cit., [access on 12.07.2014].

¹² *Weimar Triangle: Joint Statement on Ukraine by Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland.*, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany London., http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/__pr/Latest_News/04/Weimar-Triangle.html, [access on 14.04.2014].

to persuade both sides of the conflict, the Government and the opposition, to sign an agreement. Furthermore, they discussed on the theme of dangers which may be faced by the particular countries if the conflict would escalate. As media showed, the debate was also dedicated to methods of safe saving by countries, which could be engaged in the conflict's sides.¹³ Up to this time, the United Kingdom was almost anonymous. It did not want to engage in conflict and express its views. It did not want to be in favour or negate neither the Ukrainian crisis nor the EU's decisions. Probably, it was because Great Britain is the famous one for having the economic contacts with the Ukrainian's east neighbour. Its engagement at the first level of the international conflict might be started to be perceived as an aggressive one and in this way, the UK could lose too many contacts as well as potential investors. It is a fact that Great Britain belongs to the group of countries which are characterized as caution not only in the political sphere but also the economic and social ones. It is known for having the tradition of splendid isolation, as far as its foreign policy is concerned. The United Kingdom has a tendency to be far from the most important and, at the same time, influential affairs taking place amid the European Union's countries. In most cases, it does not desire to participate actively, it would rather stay away alternatively to support the conflict's sides but only diplomatically. It may be assumed that it was because Great Britain is completely aware of the fact that its international meaning is definitively lower than it was several years earlier, when it played the role of superpower together with the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Therefore, it has started to be in favour of the future both global and regional superpowers.

The whole situation has started to be changed gradually, when on the 2nd of March both Great Britain and France as well as the USA and Canada have decided to stop participating in preparations devoted to summit meeting's organisation, called G8 that would take place in Sochi in June this year.¹⁴ The next step taken by the UK was threaten of sanctions for Russia in the case of its Cry's attachment was accepted by the whole east country. Great Britain was decided to restrict Moscow in many spheres among which the most important was this economic one.¹⁵ In this way, Queen Elizabeth II's country desired to show the solitary with the whole European Community. However, as it was extremely easy to predict, it wanted to support the West countries' idea but only to some extent. As it was claimed by BBC, the British Government has written a document whose main goal was to define, which of the British particular areas could be excluded from the limits.¹⁶ The financial one belongs to such an area and, at the same time, the British City, which is for major group of Russians living in England, the place of investing the largest money.

¹³ Ibidem., [access on 14.07.2014].

¹⁴ M. Chastain., *UK, France stop prep meetings for G8 due to Russia aggression towards Ukraine.*, Breitbart., <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/03/02/UK-France-Stop-Prep-Meetings-for-G8-Due-to-Russia-Aggression-Towards-Ukraine>., [access on 15.07.2014].

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ M. Rybarczyk., *Londongrad.*, Newsweek 32/2014., p. 49., Into English translated by its author.

The city refers to the most enormous cities in England, which are habited by the largest groups of people, whose main goal is not only to live there but first of all to invest their capitals creating new businesses, organizations as well as institutions. To such a group of cities belong London, Birmingham, Chelmsford, St Asaph and Perth.¹⁷ The representatives of the east society such as B. Berezovsky,¹⁸ R. Abramovic¹⁹ or A. Temerko²⁰ have emigrated there because it is known as a place where people are more free from tax system than it is in Ukraine and Russia. From the 4th of January 2011 in Great Britain, the Value Added Tax (abbr. VAT) is 20%.²¹ It is claimed by the economist, that this is one of the highest in the comparison with the rest of countries belonging to the European Union Community. However, for Russians this particular system is definitively more clear and unambiguous than it is in their mother country. In England, there is an obligation to pay eight different kinds of tax: Income Tax, Corporation Tax, Pre-owned Tax, National Insurance Contribution, Capital Gains Tax, Inheritance Tax, Council Tax and Stamp Duty Land Tax.²² It is necessary to be emphasized that emigrants or all those who are from another countries and, who have the British citizenship granted, are not expected to pay them. They have to spend on the chosen ones. By this, Income Tax and Corporation Tax are meant.²³ The whole tax policy is completely different in the east countries, in which its sum is definitively lower. Besides, there are only three types of this paying (18%, 10%, 0%) but regulations are so complicated that those, engaged in transacting their own businesses, do not want to do that in the east.²⁴ More profitable for them is to pay the higher tax than to the lower one in Russia or Ukraine. Needless to say, millionaires choose those places as their destinations since it has quite flexible bank system. They do not have any problems with getting the loans because individuals, interested in this particular form of gaining capital in order to be invested, are not obliged to possess such a high financial security as it is in the case of countries from the east Europe. People from Russia, living and investing in the UK, have an opportunity to cooperate with banks of different kinds and even placed in distant parts of the world. In this way, they have a chance to borrow money from the next bank with a view to pay off this one, requested in the previous. Moreover, banks in Great Britain allow businessmen

¹⁷ S. Sheerin, J. Seath, G. White., *The City.*, in *Spotlight in Britain.*, p. 18-20.

¹⁸ B. Berezovsky was a Russian Business oligarch, government official and mathematician.

¹⁹ R. Abramovic is a Russian businessman, investor as well as politician. He is the main owner of the private investment company Millhouse LLC and Chelsea Football Club.

²⁰ A. Temerko is a prominent businessman in the energy sector, currently a director and Deputy Chairman of the UK-based company OGN Group.

²¹ *VAT for consumer.*, GOV.UK., <https://www.gov.uk/vat/overview.>, [access on 18.07.2014].

²² *Ibidem.*, [access on 18.07.2014].

²³ *Ibidem.*, [access on 18.07.2014].

²⁴ *VAT in Russia.*, Russian European Chamber of Commerce., <http://www.ruscham.com/en/rossinfo/db/23.html>, [access on 22.07.2014].

to transfer money to another account to avoid paying the handling charges, which are extremely high.²⁵

Taking very characteristic lives of people from the East Europe into consideration, Great Britain was and still is a country of freedom as well as independence. Society staying there feel free from regime before which they would have to escape in case of they would decided to stay in their own countries. The UK offers them democratic life style, thanks to which they can not only work but also educate their relatives in schools, which are characterized as pretty exclusive as well as egalitarian. City is the place combining people of different nationalities but the same or almost the same social status. It is meant, all those individuals who have a chance to be in a higher position in organizations and, at the same time, the British policy. Frequently, there are organised not only charity balls but also the auctions of art works. It creates a chance to meet and make new relationships with the influential people. It is not difficult to predict that the main themes of discussions during such occasions mainly are the economical and financial or strategic and social. During the events in the time called “the open season” the east investors have an opportunity to be amid the Royal Family representatives and British people strictly connected with the national budget as well as all those responsible for making decisions process.²⁶ It may be said, that in this way, people wanting to invest in creating a new business can attempt to influence the Government representatives’ decisions. Apart from this, as it is claimed by A. Muczinska, the Russian individuals love being among the most important people in Great Britain. It allows them to feel more prestigious. It is true that Russians love lavish life, pomp and etiquette as such.

In the time when the major part of the EU’s countries desired to put sanctions on Moscow, Great Britain wanted to do that too. However, as it was mentioned above, leaving City completely free. After an analysis that was presented in the earlier part of this article, it must be said that the UK decided to exclude this group of cities in order to avoid the potential problems with the national economy and, at the same time, to save the peace. It wanted to keep the bank system balanced and it allowed the budget not to raise the value of money.²⁷ Moreover, it led not to introduce changes in the international exchanges, thanks to which goods remained at the same level, as far as their prices were concerned.²⁸ The UK can still both sell and purchase the products in the east market whereas the vast majority of countries from the centre of Europe have embargo imposed. It is worth mentioning that at the very beginning of the conflict, the UK acted with due caution simultaneously taking both adequate and reasonable precautions. Mainly, the country had its self – interest not to pay too much attention to what was decided by another members of the European Union Community. It does not mean that

²⁵ M. Rybarczyk., op. cit., p. 48.

²⁶ M. Hollingsworth, S. Lansley., *Londongrad.*, published by OLE, Krakow 2014., p. 186.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ M. Hollingswort, s. Lansley., op. Cit., p. 187.

it did not support the idea of them but they did it with reserve attempting to stay in a good relationship with the east side. By this, it is meant that Great Britain's actions, at that time, could be characterised as pretty diplomatic. Keeping an active economic life with Russia, the UK cooperated with the countries with which creates the international community. In this particular way, any of the conflict's sides cannot be accused of being not loyal. It is a fact that such a stance is extremely comfortable for Great Britain and its policy.

Apart from excluding City from the sanctions sphere, the UK decided also to work out technical assistance package for Ukraine as well as gas supplying. This particular action could be treated as a kind of solidarity demonstration. Furthermore, Great Britain, according to the article published by *The Guardian*, did not agree with the idea of NATO's armed intervention.²⁹ Instead of that, the UK was decided to send OSCE's observers, eventually the UN's ones.³⁰ Being one of the many United Nations' members, Great Britain was of the opinion that army's involving could be treated like the west countries' attempt of provocation. Probably, it was afraid of triggering a military conflict on the wider scale. In this case, countries being affiliated could be exposed to danger of participating in such a battle. Agreeing with the fact that NATO could take part in the Ukrainian crisis would mean the beginning of violent clashes not only between these two particular countries but also two separated parts of Europe, the west and the east one. Therefore, the idea of leaving the observers from two, completely independent international organisations seemed to be the perfect solution. It was definitely less invasive than gathering militaries from the west countries. It would be treated like a strategic form of cooperation between the conflict's sides. Russia could not accuse west Europe of being encroached because the main idea of that was only to observe them discretely. It created a fantastic chance not only for Great Britain but also all west countries to have their fingers on the pulse and react in the moment of real danger. Otherwise, it would be the time of ending the road of Brussels' cooperation with Moscow.

Great Britain followed the conscious policy not wanting to disturb its good relations with countries of the east. The UK restricted only to a threat of sanctions for illegal Cry's incorporation into the Russian Federacy.³¹ Apart from the embargo's imposition, the next warning from Great Britain was a threat of Russian's excluding from the group of G8 countries. It was said officially during the meeting taking place in Hagan, organised by the American President, B. Obama. When the representatives of all countries belonging to G7 as well as the EU were gathered, the British prime minister, D. Cameron expressed the country's desire to punish Russia through its elimination from the countries' group, which are still known as the most industrial. In the minister's opinion, not enforcing sanctions would result in deterioration of

²⁹ L. German., *When NATO learns the lessons of previous wars, we will stop protesting*, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/04/nato-wars-protesting-ukraine-iraq>, [access on 23.07.2014].

³⁰ *Ibidem.*, [access on 23.07.2014].

³¹ M. Rybarczyk., *op. cit.*, p. 47.

political and, at the same time, financial situation in countries such as Great Britain as well as the USA, France and Germany. According to them, they would be obliged to pay definitively too high price for leaving it in the community.³²

The most decisive moment, when Great Britain have begun to change its attitude to the Ukrainian crisis was on the 17th of June, when the Malaysian aircraft with 9 British passengers on board was shot down. It was the time when the British Government's representatives have started to present more radical stance and appreciate the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.³³ According to M. Fallon, the British Minister of Defence, this particular organisation is the basic one for the British board's protection. During the meeting with R. Sikorsky and T. Siemoniak, even the role of British and Polish relations was emphasized.³⁴ The British politicians have started to notice how both world and its policy is unpredictable. The role of particular organisations about the communal character started to be emphasized. It was clearly said that Great Britain expect decisive and effect actions from NATO in order to feel more safe.³⁵ At the same time, it must be said that in this particular moment, the UK has begun to notice the other countries' being present. The British legislators have wanted to be in touch with the representatives of countries being in the EU to work on a plan of action in the case of facing the potential danger. In this place, it may be said that Great Britain has stopped to work on its own and conduct a fantastic splendid isolation and has started to cooperate with all those whose decisions should also be taken into consideration as the members of the larger organisation. However, it must be highlighted that the British actions were not strict or aggressive but reasonable and balanced. It has been started to be said about an intensive military training course "Black Eagle" that would be organised in Poland by Great Britain.³⁶ It was even mentioned by M. Fallon that both British and Polish pilots are watching over the territories of Baltic countries.³⁷ It is expected that in the course it would participate 1300 British soldiers as well as 350 armoured vans. The main aim of the training will be preparation the military representatives of both countries how to react if the territories would be in hazard.³⁸ The next sign that Great Britain is against the antagonistic policy is mentioning again about the sanctions that would be put on Moscow when Russia would not stop sending the military support to Ukraine for the Russian separatists. It was claimed several times by P. Hammond, that

³² Ibidem., p. 48.

³³ *MH 17 Malaysia plane crash in Ukraine*, BBC News., <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880>, [access on 24.07.2014].

³⁴ *Polscy i Brytyjscy politycy: Stoimy ramię w ramię wobec kryzysu na Ukrainie*, Polska Agencja Prasowa., www.pap.pl/palio/html.run?_Instance=cms_www.pap.pl&_PageID=1&s=infopakiet&dz=kraj&idNewsComp=169624&filename=&idnews=172935&data=&status=biezace&_Checksum=1467351555, [Access on 24.07.2014]., translated by its author.

³⁵ Ibidem., [access on 25.07.2014].

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibidem.

destabilization of completely free and independence country, by the Russian military, would face with strict restrictions, as far as the Russian economy is concerned.

It is true that the UK expressed its deep hope that the NATO summit, which would take place in Wales would end with an explicit statement considering this particular organisation's future. Great Britain's politician, P. Hammond, emphasized the role of organisation in keeping and supporting the international peace and, in his opinion, it should be done everything which is only possible to strengthen the character of this particular association. It was also stressed the aim of NATO, whose is to assure the national stability. The UK has started to emphasize its membership in this organisation and offer the another ones to cooperate in order to be prepared for dangers from the outside.³⁹ P. Hammond being the voice of Great Britain, highlighted the role of unity as well as solidarity of being in the community, which should have the same reason of beings. By this, protection from social evil and moral wrong were meant. Taking the fact, that at the very beginning of the conflict into consideration, the UK did not identify with NATO, some months later, when the situation has partly started to touch its citizens, it has begun to discern the organisation's crucial role. Probably, in this way, Great Britain saw its chance of success in explaining the reasons why the civilian aircraft was violently shot down and catching as well as punishing people responsible for death of so many people.⁴⁰ In fact, Great Britain counted on starting a large international investigation in which the representatives of the EU's countries would be engaged. It may be assumed that with the use of foreign help, the UK would be able to get to the place of the catastrophe. Thanks to that, they would have an opportunity to assess it on their owns and bring the guilty to court.

Shooting down the Malaysian aircraft has contributed to British public opinion's deterioration. It's indignation has resulted in toughen the regulations for all those Russians, whose capitals has been invested in London City. As it is claimed by M. Rybarczyk, in his article *Londongrad*, G. Osborne, the Chancellor of State Treasury is thinking about introducing the Property Tax for Russian immigrants, who are still known as the holders of housing estates, left uninhabited several years ago.⁴¹ Among many of them, the most popular are those, located in the centre of London, mainly near the Harrods Street. The current possessor of football club, Chelsea F. C., R. Abramowicz belongs to the group of people from the East, living in this particular place in Great Britain.⁴² Apart from this, it was announced by her, that the official inquiry establishing the circumstances of A. Litwinienko's⁴³ death is going to be conducted. It was also unsuccessful attempt to create a kind of conservative association of Russia's followers.

³⁹ *NATO must show fight over Russia*, The Daily Mail, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-2740957/Nato-fight-Russia.html>, [access on 29.07.2014].

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, [access on 30.07.2014].

⁴¹ M. Rybarczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁴² M. Hollingsworth, S. Lansley, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

⁴³ A. Litwinienko is considered to be one of the most known agent, who worked for KGB and was murdered in cold blood in London, in 2003.

As it is emphasized by the American professor, F. Cohen, the idea of forming such an organization may be perceived as an FSB's intrigue but the Russian lobby has suffered a defeat.⁴⁴

It is not clear, whether Great Britain will finally decide to impose sanctions for Moscow and, at the same time, for the richest people who, in fact, are in favour of W. Putin, the Russian President, and his decisions. Such people like B. Berezovsky or R. Abramowicz, the millionaires living as well as investing in the British businesses and organizations, are the oligarchs, partly thanks to whom W. Putin had an opportunity to substitute the previous president, B. Jelcyn.⁴⁵ Acting against them would be perceived as acting against the whole nation. Objecting to them would mean trade relations deterioration, which could influence negatively both sides. By this, the British and Russian ones are meant. It is true that both nations have own shares in their countries. Russian people invest not only in organizations, such as banks in Great Britain but also in the cultural and educational places. They are perceived as the main sponsors for the events like exhibitions, for instance. Besides, they spend money on schools, in which their children have a chance to educate, too. The example of such a school is the one focused on the political science, placed in Oxford.⁴⁶ Apart from this, they invest in media through purchasing daily newspapers as well as magazines. In order to illustrate this, the A. Lebediev's case may be presented.

One of the most prosperous individuals, has bought the newspaper *Evening Standard*, after which some time later decided to buy yet another one, the daily one, titled *The Independent*.⁴⁷ It is worth mentioning the fact that both of them were on the brink of ruin. The Russian millionaire occurred to be the last hope. He acquired it, saving a major group of employee from recession. At the same time, A. Lebediev offered them work places, thanks to which he has won recognition as well as honour. Yet another example may be A. Mamut buying the bookshops Waterstones, being the most famous ones in London.⁴⁸ Similar to the oligarch, previously presented, this one also desired to protect them from bankruptcy. In both cases, the influences of different policy and culture are visible, although it is tried to become neutral. The newspapers attempt to balance their opinions however, it is rather impossible, especially in the time of the Ukrainian crisis escalation. In the British bookshops being under the control of Russian oligarch, it is pretty easy to find a book devoted to the East problems presented from its perspective.

⁴⁴ M. Rybarczyk., op. cit., p. 49.

⁴⁵ The main aim of the oligarchs, who paid millions in two last decade of 80's and at the very beginning of the 90's, was to choose such a person in the place of B. Jelcyn, who would be as submissive and tractable as his predecessor. It was because the richest in Russia desired to protect their capitals and estates from being verified. (According to M. Hollingsworth & S. Lansley., *Londongrad*, OLE., Krakow 2014., p. 80.)

⁴⁶ M. Hollingsworth, S. Lansley., op. cit., p. 199.

⁴⁷ M. Rybarczyk., op. cit.

⁴⁸ M. Hollingsworth, S. Lansley., op. cit., p. 210.

Considering the Russian's influence on the British economy, it is impossible to omit the fact that Great Britain is also engaged in developing the East trade. The oil concern BP belonging to the British country has obtained 20% of share in the Russian mining industry, Rosneft.⁴⁹ These particular examples illustrate to how much degree the British economy and trade is dependent on the Russian one, and all those, responsible for making decisions there. Those two countries are mutually influenced by themselves. The British actions against what is being happened between Russia and Ukraine would mean contacts' problems with their main business partners. In fact, it would mean suspending in the international good exchange and, at the same time, financial as well as economic problems. Those cases perfectly show, how crucial is to maintain the relations with Russia, by Great Britain. It is even a goal of the British politicians to be in favour of what is being decided by the Russian ones. With the use of their financial potential, the Elizabeth II's country has an opportunity to be both strong and save. The British people are dependent on the Russian capital.

This analysis of facts enables us to understand better, why Great Britain officially claim that any of the EU's countries do not need to export weapon, whereas this particular one is the first to send it to Russia. As it has been checked by AFP agency, there is 251 licences, that were signed by the British Government allowing it to sell the military goods, whose the whole value may be assessed at 167 mln euro.⁵⁰ Among many of them, the most important are snipping guns, ammunitions, bulletproof vests as well as night vision devices.⁵¹ In this way, Great Britain attempts to maintain good relations with Russia. It is done in order to prevent the whole country, and at the same time, the nation from being deprived of new investors coming from the East. If they stopped arriving and spending money there, it would mean Britain's financial collapse. Without the supporters from the East, Great Britain would not be able to prosper as good as it is today. It constitutes also the reason why the British Government's representatives do not change their minds, as far as their attitude toward the Ukrainian crisis is concerned. In fact, Great Britain will stay totally passive. It was even clearly said by P. Hammond, the Minister of British Defence, that Great Britain is not going to use its military power.⁵² The only help that might be offered the Ukrainian army is to provide the East soldiers with places in the British Military Academy. Apart from this, the British politicians has decided to support the future reforms that would be initiated in the Ukrainian or Russian army.⁵³

⁴⁹ M. Rybarczyk., op. cit., p. 47.

⁵⁰ *Wielka Brytania nadal eksportuje broń.*, Polska Agencja Prasowa., <http://www.rmf24.pl/raport-ukraina/fakty/news-wielka-brytania-nadal-eksportuje-bron-do-rosvi.nld,1473176.>, [access on 2.08.2014].

⁵¹ *Ibidem.*

⁵² T. Shipman., *Britain has not lost its resolve to use military force.*, The Daily Mail., <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2590342/Britain-not-lost-resolve-use-military-force-Putin-warned-Hammond-calls-Nato-European-allies-raise-game-boost-defence-spending.html>, [access on 9.08.2014].

⁵³ T. Sipman, op. cit.

Феномен, історія становлення та ресурси «східного» регіоналізму й сепаратизму в контексті політизації російської ідентичності в українському донбасі (1991–2014)

У дослідженні розкрито суть «східного» регіоналізму (у форматі федералізму і сепаратизму) в структурі інституціоналізації російської ідентичності в українському Донбасі. Означено ознаки «східного» регіоналізму, федералізму та сепаратизму в процесі становлення російської етнічності в Україні. Запропоновано теоретико-методологічні уточнення з приводу політизації етнічності на основі регіонального поділу. Розглянуто індикатори регіоналізму в структурі інституціоналізації російської ідентичності в Україні. Оцінено ознаки та виокремлено етапи розвитку «східного» регіоналізму. Проаналізовано діяльність громадських організацій та партій у структурі «східного регіоналізму». Визначено ресурси «східного регіоналізму».

Ключові слова: регіоналізм, сепаратизм, федералізація, іредентизм, політизація етнічності, автономія, державний устрій, національно-регіональна ідентичність, російська меншіна, «східний регіон», Донбас, Україна.

The phenomenon, history of formation and resources “eastern” regionalism and separatism in the context of politicization of russian identity in ukrainian donbas (1991–2014)

The article is dedicated to revealing the essence of “Eastern” regionalism (in the form of federalism and separatism) in the structure of institutionalization of Russian identity in Ukrainian Donbas. The author outlined the features of “Eastern” regionalism, federalism and separatism in the process of Russian ethnicity incipience in Ukraine, suggested theoretical-methodological clarifications about the politicization of ethnicity from the regional division, considered the indicators of regionalism in the structure of Russian identity institutionalization in Ukraine, appreciated features and singled out stages of “Eastern” regionalism, analyzed the activities of civil society organizations and political parties in the structure of the “eastern regionalism”, determined resources of “Eastern” regionalism.

Keywords: regionalism, separatism, federalization, irredentism, politicization of ethnicity, autonomy, government/polity, national-regional identity, Russian minority, “Eastern region”, Donbas, Ukraine.

The events that took place in 2014 in two eastern regions of Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk regions – and were related with formation of so-called self-proclaimed “Donets People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” are interpreted in different ways by politics, experts, scientists and journalists: antiterrorist operation, war, terrorism, struggle for federalization or decentralization of power, but the most often as *separatism/irredentism* and *regionalism*. Certainly those event should be considered in complex, since they have both internal (inside Ukraine) and external (from outside of Ukraine) grounds. The problem of “internal” (on the territory of Ukraine) and “external” (outside the borders of Ukraine, and first of all on the part of Russia) *politicization of Russian national/ethnic minority* in Ukraine has a very important perspective in the context of reasons for regionalism and separatist/irredentism tendencies in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. Consequently, phenomenon, history of emergence and resources of so-called “eastern” *regionalism and separatism* in section of the Russian minority politicization in Ukrainian Donbas will be the subject of the presented research. We call it “Eastern”, since Donetsk and Luhansk regions ethno-politically form so-called “eastern region”: those two regions directly border Russia and they are more industrialized, urbanized and russified than other regions of Ukraine¹. The language russification of in Donetsk and Luhansk regions is combined with very high share of ethnic Russians, which creates “strong majority of Russian-speaking population”² in the “eastern region”, which, starting from 1991 (the Ukraine’s Independence Act), the forces hostile to the idea of Ukrainian statehood use (whether effectively or not) as the main resource in the context of aspirations to regionalization or federalization, as well as irredentism or separatism. It requires scientific consideration, which we propose to perform as follows: *at first* to outline in theory and methodology the essence of regionalism and separatism phenomena, *then* to denote empirically the sources of “eastern” regionalism and separatism in section of the Russian minority politicization in Ukrainian Donbas, and *at conclusion* to forecast the ways of weakening and solving the problem of regionalism and separatism in “eastern region”.

Regionalism and separatism/irredentism – on condition of their politicization with ethnic problem (i.e. when those phenomena are strategic goals of ethnic/national minorities’ political activity) – are two mutually related concepts. At the same time, taken separately the category “regionalism” is much more complicated than categories “regionalism” and “irredentism”. *Separatism* is aspiration of certain groups of population or organizations to separate themselves; it’s a movement for complete separation of a part of the state and creation of a new state. *Irredentism* is the movement for other state’s territory annexation on the basis of ethnic origin and/or prior owning it; it is a movement to annex territory of another state under slogans of ethnocultural unity of population. At the same time, *regionalism* is a complex concept, since the science has very many definitions and approaches to it. Without going deep into the essence of all of them (it isn’t the scope of our research), we present

¹ V. Hesli, *Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns*, „Europe-Asia Studies” 1995, vol 47, nr 1, s. 19–21.

² D. Arel, *Federalism and the Language Factor in Ukraine*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, 19–22 November 1992, s. 13.

the most popular definitions for regionalism: philosophical and historical concept that provides for possibility of integration processes within a 'region' as a certain group of countries, which are united by neighboring geographical situation and common features of culture, as the result of which the relevant groups of countries acquire status of actors of historical and political process³; state and process of a country's division into separate part and formation of several countries combination that act as one; form of state system, which is an intermediary type between federalism and unitarianism, i.e. is a unitary decentralized system⁴; mass political movement for self-government of the territories, which based on peculiarities of their historical development and cultural inheritance differ from other parts of the country; the way, by which certain political parties and other organizations promote the idea of the region's specificity and detachment⁵; ideology and strategy that are used with the purpose to ensure advantages for the region; totality of sociocultural and political movements that speak against unification, as well as centralization tendencies in many spheres of people's and state's life⁶; difference of regions in the nature of public relations, which lead to spread on the relevant territories of specific orientations and models of conduct, as well as regional identity⁷. P. Ukarainen believes that the term "regionalism" can cover miscellaneous processes, in particular movement for ethnic rights, separatism, decentralization of state system, transnational cooperation of administrative-territorial entities, regional network integration, etc.⁸ A. Harrel defines such categories of regionalism: social unity of ethnic, racial and language groups that reside in the same area; complementarity of business and industrial entities operating within the territory; commonality of general values related with culture, religion, historical traditions; and political solidarity⁹. Due to that regionalism should be understood sociologically and politically: what sociologists consider as regionalism, political science deems as totality of prerequisites for regionalism emergence.

Regionalism and separatism in the context of politicization of Russian ethnic/national minority in Donetsk and Luhansk regions is *substantial with regard to*: 1) quantitative correlation of ethnic Russians in "eastern region" (in Donetsk and Luhansk regions number of Russians is much higher¹⁰ than in other regions of Ukraine); 2) idea creating specificity of "eastern region", which manifests in pulverized Russian national identity; 3) party creating specificity of "eastern region", which is explained by a more progressive growth of pro-Russian public organizations and parties; 4) language specificity

³ A. Muradian, *Rehyonalyzm kak problema polytolohyy*, „Vestnyk Moskovskoho gosudarstvennogo unyversyteta“, Seryia 18: „Sotsyolohyia y polytolohyia“ 1995, vol 3, s. 83–89.

⁴ M. Koter, *Region polityczny – geneza, ewolucja i morfologia*, [w:] *Region, regionalizm – pojęcia i rzeczywistość*, Wyd. SOW 1993, s. 73.

⁵ E. Tompson, *Rehiony, rehionalizatsiia ta rehionalizm u suchasniy Yevropi*, [w:] *Hlobalizatsiia. Rehionalizatsiia. Rehionalna polityka*, Wyd. Alma-mater 2002, s. 95–110.

⁶ A. Smyrnov, *Rehyonalyzm*, [w:] H. Semyhyn, *Polytycheskaia entsyklopedyia : V 2–kh t.*, Wyd. Mysl 2000, t. 2, s. 333.

⁷ O. Stehniy, M. Churylov, *Rehionalizm v Ukraini yak ob'iekt sotsiologichnogo doslidzhennia*, Kiev 1998.

⁸ P. Jukarainen, *Any Space for the Postmodern Identity?*, [w:] *International Conference: „Border Regions in Transition“*, 14–18 June 1997.

⁹ A. Hurrel, *Expanding in Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics*, „Review of International Studies“ 1995, vol 21, nr 4.

¹⁰ W. Skljär, *Rozsiedlenie Rosjan na terytorium Ukrainy: na podstawie spisów ludności z 1989 i 2001 roku*, „Ukrainoznavstvo“ 2008, nr 12, s. 55–58, s. źródło: <http://uaznavstvo.univ.kiev.ua/ua/visnyk/Visnyk-12/Skljar.pdf> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

of “eastern region”, which is characterized by dominating use of the Russian language in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; 5) existence of attempts to form state creating concepts and practices¹¹.

In 1991–2014 politicization of Russian ethnicity in “eastern region” to a large extent was caused by challenges of *particular regionalism*, whose important aspects were danger of alienation due to political regionalization and differences between geopolitical orientations of different parts of population; violation of effective interaction on the line “center-region” and/or interregional relations; attempts of political and economical autonomation or federalization of the region; differentiation of social indicators and population’s quality of life; imperfection of administration on regional and local levels¹². “Eastern region” in ethno-national and political measurement is specific: the policy of assimilation made its impact, the language issue is rather acute and the influence of “Russian factor” on consciousness and outlook of population is felt. That results in heterogeneity of ethnic, political and cultural identification of “eastern region”. It manifests in the fact that although certain political circles of Donbas espoused center-directed disintegration processes in the region, in general the issue of Russia-oriented regionalism and autonomism (as its consequence) before 2014 arose sporadically and didn’t always constitute system-wide phenomenon¹³. It is confirmed by history of regionalism and autonomism ideas in the “eastern region” of Ukraine (we will speak about it later). On the other part the Ukrainian national idea hasn’t become the dominating one in the consciousness of the “eastern region” population, since abrupt change of status characteristics of Ukrainians and Russians is still occurring multidirectionally, as they cannot put up with their status of minority. Besides there is a strong historical, economic and cultural region’s orientation at Russia. At the same time Russia regularly calls out to use the language card and slogans to protect its nationals and “violated rights of Russians”. That’s where the “Russian problem” of the “eastern region’s” ethnopolitical development manifests, in the body of factors of which it is necessary to search for the reasons for pro-Russian

¹¹ *Politicization of ethnicity* defines the final stage of ethnic processes – *ethnic conflict development*. At that stage the national groups express political demands, trying to influence on power distribution and take part in controlling distribution of social benefits and economic resources; activities of ethnic groups are activated and those groups switch from only social and cultural demands to political demands. *Politicization of ethnicity* (i.e. ethnic communities’ coming to political arena and transformation into political actors that declare their readiness to protect their interests. In certain cases ethnic groups create their own political parties and organizations. *To politicize ethnicity means* to enable people to realize the role of politics in preservation of their ethnocultural values and vice versa; to stimulate their attention to this mutual relation; to mobilize them with regard to ethnic groups formation, which have the same self-consciousness; to direct behavior into the sphere of political activity on the basis of realization and group self-consciousness. In the opinion of O. Maiboroda, politicization of ethnicity is the final stage of *ethnic consolidation*, which goes through three stages of development. *At the first stage* unions of national nature are created mostly spontaneously; communities, clubs, associations; representatives of a certain ethnicity, which used to be dispersed, feel themselves as an ethnic group and realize their ethnogroup unity. *At the second stage* mobilization of an ethnic group takes place – representatives from ethnic elite articulate significance of national problems and describe the ways of their solving by uniting around common goal. Group solidarity mostly starts from humanitarian problems, namely language, cultural and religious problems, and then it encompasses the matter of social and economic status of an ethnic group. The consciousness of its members registers inextricable connection between the problem of preserving ethnic identity, their status in society and the level of material well-being. And *at the third stage* politicization of ethnicity takes place, i.e. transformation and problems realized by the group into political slogans and programs. See M. Skworcow, *Etniczność w procesie społecznych zmian*, „Socialjnopolitickij žurnal” 1996, nr 1, s. 29–43.; O. Majboroda, *Debjutuje etnopolityka*, „Wicze” 1992, nr 5, s. 122–134.

¹² I. Zwaricz, *Wplyw regionalizmu na polityzacjju etniczności*, „Suczasnaja ukrajinjska polityka. Polityky i politology pro nej”, Specwypusk: Polityczni technologiji, s. 119–135.

¹³ It is confirmed by the following researches: A. Manewicz, *Aksiomy ukrajinjskoj polityki, ili Kto ugrożajet bezopasnosti Ukrainy*, „2000. Jeżenedel’nik” 2008, nr 13 (408), s. 3.; O. Krywycjka, *Regionaljni modyfikaciji politikulturnych widminnostej Ukrainy*, „Naukowy zapysky”, Kurasiwyski czytanja 2005, Ser. „Politologija i etnologija”, vol 30, nr 1, s. 248–264.

identity popularity, eastern regionalism and autonomism in Donbas. Also it is important that Donbas is in so-called zone of increased ethno-political proneness to conflict – “big Eurasian arc of ethno-political instability”¹⁴. It means that “eastern” regionalism and autonomism have twofold nature – geopolitical one (outside Ukraine) and ethnocultural one (both outside and inside Ukraine). At the same time, regionalism or autonomism of Ukrainian Donbas have much wider nature: they are not limited exclusively to the matter of ethnicity politicization, but include linguistic, economic, social, territorial, world outlook, religious, historical, geographical, demographical and other components¹⁵. While factors of regional identification of Donbas include resettlement, ethnicity and language, religious beliefs, education, gender and age, economic condition, historical prerequisites for national identity formation, geographical/territorial proximity to Russia, external political orientation, information space, etc.

Peculiarity of “eastern” regionalism (since Ukraine’s independence) manifested in the fact that that phenomenon at the same time caused *separatism* and merged with it. That’s why back in 1990-ies the most often fear related with the “eastern region” of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) was expected separatism’s tendency, which lead to split on the basis of regionality and failure of Ukraine’s statehood. Back in 1994, S. Larraby, representative of RAND corporation, outlined the centrifugal tendencies, which could lead to “fragmentation of the country... even to civil war, when Russian military intervention cannot be excluded”¹⁶. Ukraine’s national security concept, adopted in January of 1997, also officially appealed to existence of separatist tendencies among certain (mostly left and left-of-center) political powers that demanded closer integration within CIS and strategic partnership or union with the Russian Federation in the “east” of Ukraine and defined them as one of the “main potential threats” to national security of Ukraine¹⁷. Broad talks about merged “eastern” regionalism-separatism should be started at the initiative of the Party of regions, to conduct referendum concerning status of the Russian language in Donetsk region. That fact is that in 1994 polling about federalization of the country took place in Donetsk region (at the same time with Ukraine’s parliamentary elections). That’s why in 2005 B. Kolesnikov, who was the head of Donetsk Regional Council, publically promised that there will be another such referendum after parliamentary elections of 2006. Also he spoke about conducting all-Ukrainian referendum on the matter of federative

¹⁴ J. Kucj, *Etnopolityczni derzawotworczy procesy w Ukraini: upravlinjskij aspekt*, Kharkiw 2002, s. 155.

¹⁵ I. Kuras, *Etnopolitologija. Perszi kroky stanowlenja*, Wyd. Geneza, Kyjiw 2004, s. 204–206.; J. O’Loughlin, *The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?*, „Post-Soviet Geography and Economics” 2001, vol 42, nr 1, s. 1–33.; A. Kolodij, N. Pogorila, *Regionalni podily w Ukraini: kiljka zapereczenj proty dychotomiji “Schid – Zachid”*, „Dialog” 29 kwintja 2004 r., źródło: <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/project/page1332.html> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

¹⁶ S. Larrabee, *Ukraine: Europe’s Next Crisis?*, „Arms Control Today” July/August 1994, s. 14–16.; E. Rumer, *Will Ukraine Return to Russia?*, „Foreign Policy” 1994, vol 3, s. 129–144.; T. Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, Washington 1995, s. 35–51.

¹⁷ H. Nemyria, *L’état et les regionales ukrainiennes et la consolidation de l’Etat*, [w:] R. Berton-Hogge, M-A. Crosnier [red.], *Ukraine, Bielorussie, Russie: Trois États en Construction*, Wyd. La documentation française, Paris 1995, s. 25–36.; B. Tarasiuk, *Ukraine in the World*, [w:] L. Hajda [red.], *Ukraine in the World: Studies in International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, Wyd. Ukrainian Research Institute 1998, s. 14.; S. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C 1997, s. 17.; H. Nemyria, *A Qualitative Analysis of the Situation in the Donbas*, [w:] K. Segbers, S.D. Spiegleire, *Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union. – Vol. II: Emerging Geopolitical and Territorial Units. Theories, Methods and Case Studies*, Wyd. Nomos, Baden-Baden 1995, s. 451–466.

structure. In 2007 B. Kolesnikov decided to fulfill his promise and declared collection of signatures for referendum. It seemed that two congresses in Severodonetsk were quintessence of the Russian or Russian language issue aggravation. The first congress took place in November 2004 with ideas of *Ukraine's federalization* and creation of *autonomous Southern-Eastern republic*. The second congress took place in March of 2008 and it had the item on humanitarian policy on its agenda, and actually – on ultimatum to the government with regard to *protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine*. Those events substantively destabilized interethnic situation in the “eastern region” and the entire country¹⁸. However, as it was discovered six years later, the events in Donbas in 2014, when unacknowledged “referendums” were conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and self-proclaimed “*people's republics*” were created with the “assistance” of Russia, after which the conflict between the center and “region/periphery” turned into open/armed phase, became the peak of regionalism-separatism and even irredentism. However such somewhat side-effect of regionalism/separatism in Ukrainian Donbas is not enough to understand its essence and resource base. This is because the history of “eastern” regionalism and separatism is complicated and gradual.

Everything started in the autumn of 1989 from avant-garde groups of *International movement of Donbas*. The authors of creating this public union were scientific intellectuals, student and school youth¹⁹. The main tasks were defined as consistent *struggle against “manifestations of nationalism”* on ideological, political and domestic levels and protection of national human rights. “Nationalism” was understood as “special world-view”, which interprets nation as supreme ahistoric form of people's community... while interests of the nation were deemed as higher than interests of classes and people that formed the nation”. International Movement of Donbas (Interrukh) was one of the first public organizations in the Eastern Ukraine, which aimed at implementation of “*state bilingualism*” in Ukraine. In Manifesto of Interrukh the notion “state language” for the sake of multiethnic society was defined as violation of human rights, moreover when such status is granted only to one language²⁰. According to the authors of Manifesto, with disappearance of the language the nation will not perish, but “transfer to another language”. In 1991 “Interrukh Donbasu” was the only organization, which stood for *autonomous statuses of Donetsk region*. On August 28, 1991 the Central Board of Interrukh made a statement “*On social and political situation*”, in which it expressed “alarm by the fact that Donbas can become an arena of serious clashes of different political forces”. That's why a referendum was supposed to be held before December 1, 1991 about granting Donetsk region status of autonomy in the framework of Ukraine²¹. After such statement Interrukh Donbasu was *accused in separatism* and its leader D. Kornilov had state on a number of occasions that autonomy is not a new state, but redistribution of powers between the central and territorial authorities. Disputes of that time were

¹⁸ V. Holenko, V. Tykhonov, *Severodonetsk: tochky ne budet*, Wyd. PTs „Maksym“ 2008.

¹⁹ A. Iwanow, I. Syczew, *IDD i SSSR, ili kak sozdawalosj Interdviženie Donbassa*, „Goworit Donetsk“ 29 janwarja 2010 g., źródło: <http://goworit.donetsk.ua/idd-i-sssr-ili-kak-sozdawalos-interdviženie-donbassa.html> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

²⁰ T. Bolbat, W. Lykow, E. Halimow, *Donetskaja oblast: Polityczeskie partiji, dwiženija, obszestwenyje organizaciji*, Wyd. „Lebedj“, Donetsk 1994, s. 47–98.

²¹ *Zajawlenie Centralnogo Soweta: Interdviženie nie boczet nowogo Karabacha*, „Perwaja linija“ 30 nojabrja 1991.

mainly explained by failure to understand definitions of such notions as “federalism”, “autonomy” and “separatism”. Opponents mistakenly called adherents of federative structure (federalization) as “separatists”²². At the same time certain public unions and organizations of Donetsk region at the dawn of Ukraine’s independence were truly *the separatist ones*, since during the period from August 24 to December 1, 1991, the question was openly put not only about federative structure of the country (i.e. autonomy of Donetsk region), but also on creation of an independent state formation or jointing Russia²³.

In Luhansk region Movement “*Democratic Donbas*”, created at the initiative of People’s Movement of Luhansk region, cadets and historical and cultural society “*Vidrozhennya*” (Renaissance) was deemed as separatist organization. In September of 1991 Luhansk newspaper “*Molodohvardiits*” published an article of one of the members of organization committee of Movement “*Democratic Donbas*” – H. Lytvak. It was a call to deputies of the region to conduct Donetsk Assembly and to pass a resolution on creation of an independent republic “*Malorosiiia*” (Small Russia) consisting of Donetsk and Luhansk regions with center in Luhansk. The condition was: if Ukraine splits from the USSR, Malorosiiia will remain an independent state, otherwise, it will become an “autonomy and it will be protecting its interests in Ukraine’s parliament”²⁴. At the constituent assembly of Movement “*Democratic Donbas*” 24 delegates left the room after speech of B. Lokotosh (leader of “*Vidrozhennya*” society). They were indignant at the proposal made in the speech to create *own armed forces* in the region for “protection of borders”. At the same time the statement on creation of republic “*Malorosiiia*”²⁵ wasn’t supported. The Program of Movement “*Democratic Donbas*” and Communication to citizens of Ukraine proclaimed implementing federative structure of Ukraine into new Constitution of Ukraine as one of the basic tasks of the organization²⁶.

At the same time with the mentioned organizations, *some parties and societies* arose in Donbas, which intended to protect Russian national minority in the region: Constitutional-Democratic

²² T. Bolbat, *Problema nacionaljno-gosudarstvennogo ustrojstva w programnych dokumentach obshestvennykh objedinenij Donbassa (konec 1980–b–1993 rr.)*, [w:] *Tezy dopowidej na mizregionalnij nauk.-prakt. konf. „Regiony w nezalezhnij Ukraini :poszuk strategiji optymaljnogo rozwytku“* (Charkiw, berezenj 1994 r.), Charkiw 1994, s. 91–119.

²³ On July 20, 1991 newspaper “*Komsomolets of Donbas*” published an article by a member of Yenakiiwo city organization of Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine V. Cherednychenko “*Donetsk autonomous republic – maybe it’s a way out?*” Being worried by appearance of “national-fascists” in Ukraine (that’s how nationalists were taken) with slogans “Ukraine is only for Ukrainians”, he offered to conduct a regional referendum and to figure out the matter of whether Donetsk region should remain as a part of Ukraine or should it form an autonomy in its structure, or to joint Russia as a region or autonomy, or to “increase their status and become Donetsk republic”. However social-democrats of Yenakiiwo distanced themselves from that publication and on August 4, 1991 they excluded V. Cherednychenko from the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine for “distortion of the party’s ideas”. In September and October of 1991 analogous articles were published in the same newspaper. They were dictated by people’s deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR A. Boiko and V. Honcharov. The latter said that it was necessary to “regain” a number of eastern Ukrainian regions and to create territorial autonomous formation (republic, region, etc.), however not to split from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Publications of V. Mamutov also spoke about “*Donets Federative Province*” in the framework of Ukraine. Please see for details: W. Czeredniczenko, *DAR –możet eto wyhodz*?, „*Komsomolec Donbassa*” 20 iulija 1991.; *Mnenije social-demokratow*, „*Komsomolec Donbassa*” 23 awgusta 1991.; A. Bojko, *Ja priderżywajusz socialisticzeskoj idei*, „*Komsomolec Donbassa*” 4 sentjabrja 1991.; *Czego choczet W.Gonczarow?*, „*Komsomolec Donbassa*” 4 sentjabrja 1991.; N. Iwanow, W. Mamutow, N. Prokopenko, *Kak predotwratij nacionalnij konflikt?*, „*Zywnj*” 2 sentjabrja 1991.

²⁴ G. Litwak, *Boris, ty snowa byl praw*, „*Molodogwardejec*” 17 sentjabrja 1991.

²⁵ S. Szejnikow, „*Intery*” na *Luganszynie*, „*Gorod*” 21-27 oktjabrja 1991.

²⁶ Obrazsenije DDD k grażdanam Ukrainy, „*Luganskaja prawda*” 2 sentjabrja 1991.

Party of USSR (till 1991), All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks – VKP(b) with office in Luhansk, organization “Unity” (which stood for Marxism-Leninism ideals)²⁷, regional branch of group “Union” in Donetsk, etc. However after declaration of Ukraine’s independence in the autumn of 1991, *confrontation of public union*, which were “for” or “against” federalization took place in Donbas. On one side those were Interrukh of Donbas, Movement “Democratic Donbas”, Democratic Movement of Donbas “Bratstvo” (Fraternity), People’s Movement of Luhansk region, society “Vidrozhennia” (Renaissance), on the other side – regional organizations of Ukrainian Republican Party, Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Renaissance of Ukraine, People’s Movement of Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Society of the Ukrainian language and Union of Ukrainian Youth²⁸. As the result a session of Donetsk Regional Council of people’s deputies adopted an appeal to the Supreme Council of Ukraine proposing to make *provision on federative framework of the state* to the new Constitution of Ukraine. On October 26, 1991 a *Council of people’s deputies of all levels of the South and East of Ukraine* took place in Donetsk, to which applied delegates of constituent conference of Democratic Movement of Donbas “Bratstvo” (Fraternity) with the call to support the idea of federalism, which makes it possible to preserve historical, economic and national-cultural uniqueness of regions. Participants of the Council adopted an appeal to the people and petition to the Supreme Council of Ukraine. That’s how *the first stage* of regionalism development in the “eastern region” ended.

Thus, concerning the period after Ukraine’s gaining independence, *it is expedient to conclude*, that: separation of Donbas from Ukraine wasn’t included into program documents; there were only statements of separate persons, whose opinions were not supported by the majority. Attempts of certain public unions to distribute powers between the central and local government bodies, expressed in their demands to create federative territory “Donbas” or granting that region status of autonomy in the framework of Ukraine, cannot be called separatism. It was rather concern of certain public unions about the circumstances connected with adoption of the Ukraine’s Independence Act. They were worried by perspective of forced Ukrainization, which could lead to interethnic confrontation

²⁷ T. Bolbat, *Periodyzacija istoriji gromadjanjskich objednanj shidnoji Ukrainy (kwitnij 1985 – czerwenij 1996 rr.)*, „Doneckijki wisnyk nauk. Towarystwa im. T.Szewczenka” 2006, nr 13, s. 107–123.

²⁸ The confrontation was expressed in different forms. The most often the expressions were used, which were not moderate enough and had a rather offensive nature. One of the parties accused the “separatists-Bolsheviks” in raising idea of creating “soviet-type republic”, while the other party accused “repainted partycrats” or “hardcore nationalists that hate everything Russian”. Resolutions of the authorized bodies of the organizations were equally categorical. The statement of organization of Democratic Party of Ukraine, Kirovske of Donetsk region stated, “Separatists wish to create communist preserve” in Donbas, that’s why they instigate interethnic hostility. Appeals of Luhansk organization of People’s movement of Ukraine to regional Council of people’s deputies and statement of its report and election conference were analogous. “National-chauvinists” from “Democratic Donbas” were accused of calls to creation of separatist princedoms that provoked the population of eastern regions of Ukraine to interethnic hostility. The confrontation reached its peak in October of 1991, when the session of Donetsk regional Council of people’s deputies considered the issue of the region’s status. On October 6, 1991 protest meetings took place in many cities with the slogan, “No to Donetsk soviet-type republic!” On October 8, 1991 picketing of the regional Council’s building took place under the same slogans, in which representatives of national-democratic organizations and miners took place. At the same time, in the central square of Donetsk members of Interrukh of Donbas performed collection of signatures in support of Donbas autonomy. Please see details: *Protokol zboriw Kirowskoji misjkoji organizaciji Demokratycznej partiji Ukrainy*, Archiw Kirowskoji misjkoji organizaciji DemPU 4 zowtnja 1991, nr 5, s. 4.; *Zwernenja Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji Narodnogo Ruchu Ukrainy do oblastnoji Rady narodnych deputativ*, Archiw Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji NRU HPY 1991.; *Zajawa III zwitno-wyborczoji konferencji Luganskoji krajowoji organizaciji Narodnogo ruchu Ukrainy*, „Molodogwardeec” 17 weresnja 1991.; S. Grebenjuk, *Federatiwnaja zemlja Donbass?*, „Perwaja linija” 12 oktjabrja 1991.

due to majority of Russian-speaking population in Donbas. Also they were afraid of outburst of national-extremism. That's why the idea of federative structure found its adherents among numerous public organizations, which saw federalism as prerequisite to preserve economic and national-cultural uniqueness of the region, as well as the social and interethnic peace²⁹.

The second stage of regionalism development in "eastern region" fell on 1992–1994, when *social and political pallet was actively forming* in Donbas. Due to the region's specifics, social organizations and parties of left, right and centrist range emerged. In the middle of 1990 the phenomenon of high degree of the society's politicization was clearly reflected in public organizations. They kept to *certain political landmarks*. For political forces, which stood for interests of Russian national minority, such were: democratic state with Eurasian (including pro-Russian) orientation (those were "Movement for Donbas revival", "International Movement of Donbas", "Donetsk Regional Congress of Public Actions", Donetsk Regional Committee for Peace Protection, branch of Ukrainian Peace Foundation)³⁰; socialist/communist state with predominantly Eurasian orientation (those were Movement for the USSR Revival, Donetsk Regional Organization of Lenin's Communist Union of the Young People of Ukraine); indifferent/polyvariant foreign-policy orientations with establishment for market and private ownership as dominant means for society reforms; polyvariant professional interests. In such conditions *regional consultative referendum on the matters of autonomy, as well as free functioning of the Russian language* was conducted in Donetsk region in 1994. The ballot contained two questions. The first one was, "Do you agree that Russian will be used in record-keeping, education and science parallel to Ukrainian?" The second question was about implementing into Constitution of Ukraine (which didn't exist at that moment) the principle of federative structure of Ukraine. Donetsk region "gave" 90 percent of votes for federalization of Ukraine, and 80 percent for the Russian language³¹. The General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine protested against the legitimacy of the referendum and sent the case to court, which judged that conclusions of the local referendum had no legal status. However, that's how Donbas expressed its claims for *special status in Ukraine*. The results of will expression were presented to Kyiv as a suggestion to the draft Constitution of Ukraine³². *Other actions*, made in identical direction (to protect the idea of Ukraine's federalization and granting special status to the "eastern region"), directly or indirectly *were*: miners' pickets of the Parliament (Supreme Council) of Ukraine in October of 1992 (as the result of which the speaker of the Ukraine's parliament I. Pliushch adopted the idea of federalization); failure of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine to react to actions of federalization adherents; proposal to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from

²⁹ T. Bolbat, *Problema nacionalno-gosudarstvennogo ustrojstwa w programnych dokumentach obszestwennych objedinenij Donbassa (konec 1980-h – 1933 rr.)* [w:] Tezy dopowidej na mizregionalnij nauk.-prakt. konf. «Regiony w nezaleznij Ukrainii: poszuk strategii optymalnogo rozwytku» (Charkiw, berezenj 1994 r.), Charkiw 1994, s. 91–119.

³⁰ W. Bileckij, *Gromadsko-polityczni ruchy na Doneczczynie: zarodzenja, rozwytok, transformacija*, [w:] Z. Lychobolowa [red.], *Nowi storinki istorii Donbasu, Kn. 7*, Donetsk 1999, s. 104.

³¹ W. Gwarin, *Batjky doneckjogo separatyzmu*, „Wseukrainskij zagalnopolitycznyj oswitjanckij tyżnewik „Personal“ 2007, nr 35 (238), źródło: <http://www.personal-plus.net/238/2480.html> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

³² W. Krawczenko, *Ednannja czerez riznomanitnistj. Decentralizacija wladny i formuwannja regionalnych elit w umowach demokratycznogo onowlenja suspiłstwa*, [w:] S. Maksymenko [red.], *Rozwytok gromad i regioniw Ukrainy*, Kyjw 1999, s. 135.

Donetsk Regional Council to implement economic and legal experiment in Donetsk and Prydniprovs'k (near Dnipro) region with creation of stabilization mechanisms for industry and structural rebuilding of the economy, which included extension of powers of the "eastern region" administrations (the actual proposal to create free economic zone)³³; decisions of Donetsk Regional Council to implement temporary standards for deductions with regard to consideration of "federative" issue (April 1993); miners' strike in June 1993, which demanded autonomation of Donetsk region in the form of establishing standards of deductions for the budget of the region from general state taxes and duties on the level of average indicators in Ukraine, but no less than 70 percent; creation in the autumn of 1993 of regional economic self-government by four regions of Ukraine; approval of decision to establish the standards of deductions by approving own regional budget by Donetsk Regional Council against decision of the Supreme Council of Ukraine in March of 1994, which actually blocked deductions from the region to the state budget³⁴.

It is interesting that the majority of manifestations of "eastern" regionalism and separatism in the middle of 1990-ies were caused by *economic problems*. It is clearly seen from the position of Donbas miners. On the one hand they demanded granting autonomous status to Donbas, but on the other hand they were the most active and the best organized opponents to Soviet regime and founders of new Ukrainian statehood in the region in the end of 80-ies and in the beginning of 90-ies of the 20th century. In the opinion of V. Biletskyi, during those years a formula was tested, which united all directions, – it was the idea of spiritually and materially rich nation. It set aside the question "socialism or capitalism?"; it wasn't enemy for non-Ukrainians, it consolidated all the citizens of Ukraine. It was that idea that worked in 1991, since industrial Donbas was the most consolidating state-creating entity, which voted on the level of 93 percent for Ukraine's independence on referendum of December 1, 1991³⁵. Nevertheless that idea of rich nation helped to reduce the problem of regionalism/separatism in the middle of 1990-ies, and actions of the National Bank of Ukraine and the new president L. Kuchma, elected at early presidential elections in 1994, strengthened unitary model of state structure of Ukraine, since in August of 1994 L. Kuchma subjected to himself previously publicly elected chairmen of regional, city and district councils. It was a very important event, since after that the unitary model of power distribution in Ukraine was depicted at first in Constitutional Agreement of 1995, and later in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996.

However even that didn't fully help to solve the issue of "eastern" regionalism/separatism in Ukraine. *The third stage* of regionalism development in Ukrainian Donbas started in the end of

³³ It was characteristic regime for banks functioning, delegation to the regional level of the right to determine quotas and to issue licenses for products and, passing the center, to enter into relations with foreign investors.

³⁴ Politicians, which at that time were associated with federalization or separatism, as well as persons that helped them in this: V. Chuprun, P. Symonenko, Yu. Boldyriev, O. Bazyliuk (and other "red directors"), A. Mryl, D. Kornilov, V. Yanukovych, L. Kravchuk, I. Pliushch, Ye. Zviahil'skyi, V. Landyk. Between political forces/organizations of analogous direction were as follows: "Movement for Donbas Revival", Party "Slovianska", "Interrukh Donbasu" as well as Independent Trade-Union of Miners of Ukraine.

³⁵ W. Bilecjkij, *Gromads'ko-polityczni ruchy na Doneczczyjni: zarodzen'ja, rozwytok, transformacija*, [w:] Z. Lychobolowa [red.], *Nowi storinki istoriji Donbasu: Kn. 7*, Donecjk 1999, s. 90–107.

1990-ies. That's when they understood that processes in Donbas are very interesting and indicative, important not only for the coal and metallurgy region, but for the entire Ukraine. A certain "matrix" of the Ukraine's society civilization choice, standards of attitude with regard to the past and future and specific stylistics of political behavior³⁶ were formed there. The problem is in the fact that Donbas *doesn't have historically formed ethnocultural identity*, since for numerous advantages of Ukrainian national element it is sometimes called "the region of Russian culture." That's the consequence of the Soviet reception. That's why the identity of Donbas isn't Russian, but rather Soviet. Yes, this is Ukraine, but Soviet Ukraine to a large extent. That's why we observe there cultivation of Soviet period, its symbols, cultural codes, red flags, sickles and hammers, Soviet heroes, traditions and customs. "Capitalism with Bolshevik grin" is striking, when "sharks of large capital", which would have been immediately expelled from the communist party, demonstrate their love to the Soviet symbolics, monumental propaganda, red army and the Soviet past. The "Bolshevik grin" manifests in workers' complete rightlessness toward their employers, control of local oligarchs over the government bodies and judicial system. The criminal world also holds a special place. That's why, at the dawn of the Ukraine's independence the Ukrainian language, culture and history held a rather non-prestigious place at the outskirts of political, social and cultural life of the "eastern region".

The *Party of Regions*, formed in 1997, embodied the peculiarities of mental separation of Donbas. From the very beginning it started to position itself as political power, which developed "eastern" regionalism, and later, as political power, which depending on political consequences in the state, espoused the principles of "eastern" separatism/federalism. "Ukrainian" was never an asset for the Party of Regions and its leaders, only something electoral and situational. It caused several conflicts: how could political force, which had been only the party of "eastern region" before, become the party of numerous regions of the country, where did the changes start – in Donbas's drift toward Ukraine or Ukraine's drift toward Donbas; whether the Russia-oriented position of the Party of Regions would influence on the Russian national minority? The specifics of that party was predominantly in the fact that it was permanently supported by those circles of voters, which still don't accept (didn't accept before) the Ukraine's independence and see/saw the party as the implementator of their views. That's why it is obvious that in the "Ukrainian" perspective the Party of Region, representing the region with almost completely destroyed Ukrainian language and cultural tradition, turned out separated from civilizational advance of Ukraine. That concealed the "root" of regionalism/separatism of the Party of Regions and, obviously, its electorate and "eastern region", which practically started to manifest from the middle of 2000s. For example, during the election presidential campaign of 2004 at the meeting in Alchevsk of Luhansk region people refused to listen to V. Yushchenko in Ukrainian, that's why he was forced to speak Russian. Starting from 2010 the successful experience of effective total deukrainization of Ukraine, accumulated in Donbas,

³⁶ I. Losew, *Donbasyzacja Ukrainy*, „Ukrainskij Tyzdenj” 11 Listopada 2009 r., nr 50 (111).

spread to the entire country. As the result of this the Party of Regions, as electorally successful party, especially during 2004-2012, became stronghold for those, for whom Moscow is “the capital of Motherland” and Ukraine is a temporary phenomenon or a whim of the history. Since the majority of persons with such views are in the “eastern region”, it is another proof for the fact that the Party of Regions from the moment of its creation was “dissident”, “separatist” and truly “regional” (although, pursuant to the Ukraine’s legislation it is prohibited to form regional parties in Ukraine). A good example of that were statistical data of I. Volosevych that in 2006 37% of adherents of the Party of Regions wished to unite with Russia. Such tendency was supported by representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which electorally was also mainly oriented at the “eastern region”. On the contrary, openly pro-Russian projects, such as “Russian block” and party “For Ukraine, Belarus and Russia” turned out to be ineffective.

The key *reasons and events* that characterize *the third stage* of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism development are as follows: losing results of presidential elections in 2004; influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, for example, call for creation of “South-Eastern Ukraine” (by metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol); congresses in Severodonets in 2004 and 2008, where at first they raised the issue on federalization of Ukraine and creation of autonomous South-Eastern republic, and later – on rights protection of Russian-speaking population of Ukraine; winning results of presidential elections in 2010. The “Eastern” regionalism from the beginning of 2000s outlines so-called *regional patriotism*. In fact it is “*masked separatism*”. It is interesting that till certain time, while “Donetsk group” hoped to “get control over” the entire Ukraine, they didn’t speak about separatism. For example, before 2005 the Party of Regions refused to perform administrative reform, which was supposed to unite Donetsk and Luhansk regions. However, when it became clear that the Party of Regions lost the presidential elections in 2005, they hurriedly produced the plan of Donbas separation, and then separation of the entire south-eastern Ukraine and their joining to Russia. Analogous situation took place in 2014, when the revolutionary events toppled the dictatorship autocratical regime of V. Yanukovich. However it is the subject and reason for singling out entirely different kind of “eastern” regionalism and separatism, about which we will speak later. In general, the specifics of the third stage of “eastern” regionalism and separatism, unlike the second stage, became the fact that it merged the economic constituent of the regional processes, peculiar to 1990-ies, but at the same time superimposed the national/ethnic constituent on it, which became especially popular in the beginning of 2000s, having become the key means for electoral manipulations.

On this basis the specific “eastern” Donetsk/Donbas *national-regional identity* (with regional flavor) has been formed³⁷ – not pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, but Soviet (although the number of people that position themselves with Russian identity in the “eastern” region has been significantly decreasing during 1991–2014)³⁸. From this perspective it is also interesting that the majority of Donbas population doesn’t identify Ukraine’s citizenship with belonging to Ukrainian nation. It shows the success of communist policy of denationalization and creation of “new historical community – Soviet people” (that’s why the “eastern region” is still considered as the “Soviet region”); also it rejects hypothesis that people with denationalized consciousness (which, according to terminology of E. Wilson and T. Kuzio, is marginal, ambivalent, inconsistent, wavers between Russian and Ukrainian identity) were a “buffer” in relations between Ukrainians and Russians, not allowing the flame of separatism to flare up. Hence, from theoretical and mental part, people of multiple identity, with indefinite and unformed national identity in general are not an independent reason for separatism actualization³⁹. However, if specific national and regional identity is subjectified from outside, on the contrary it serves as the reason for separatist tendencies, in particular in the “eastern region” (it was especially true in 2014). Then the latter turn out very dangerous, since the bearers with attributes of imperial consciousness of Soviet type manifest intolerance with regard to everything national, manifest mania of state greatness and enemy attitude toward other civilizations. Over the decade the national and regional identity went through two peaks of its development: the first one in 2004, when strengthening of regional divisions was observed as the result of struggle during the presidential elections, and the second one in 2013–2014, when strengthening of separatist divisions was observed due to determination of further vector of Ukraine’s geopolitical development, collapse of V. Yanukovich and Party of Region’s political regime, which turned out to be promoters of federalization and separatism.

In 2013–2014 *a new development stage* of “eastern” regionalism and separatism started, which combined the features of all the previous stages, but was strengthened and actualized on the basis of external subjectification in the form of Russia’s influence. It is noteworthy that in the course of initially peaceful and then armed actions of both the representatives of the “eastern region” and the foreign mercenaries, both separatism and irredentism were detected. It was relevant for active representatives of “eastern” *national and regional identity*. At the same time aspiration to federalization, which had

³⁷ J. Hrytsak, *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Z. Gitelman, L. Hajda, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk [red.], *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 263–281.; J. Hrytsak, *Peretjaguwanja Ukrainy*, „Forum. – Czasopys „Krytyka” 4 lypnja 2001.; J. Hrytsak, W. Kipenij, *Czy možlywa uniwersalnja modelj naciji, abo czogo wczytj pryklad Donbasu*, Rozsyzfrowka audiozapysu kruglogo stolu, jakij widbuwsja 30 czerwnja u meżach VI Miznarodnogo kongresu ukrainistiw, Donecjk, 28 czerwnja – 01 lypnja 2005 r.

³⁸ A. Kolodij, *Radjansjka identycznistj ta jji nosiji w nezaleźnij Ukraini*, [w:] *Ukraina w suczasnomu switi. Socialjni, etniczni i kulturni aspekty globalizaciji ta Ukraina* (Konferencija dlja ukrajnsjkich wypusknjukw program naukowego stażuwania u SZA. – Jalta, 12–15 weresnja 2002 r.), Wyd. Strylos, Kyiv 2002, s. 36–37.

³⁹ T. Kuzio, *The National Factor in Ukraine’s Quadruple Transition*, “Contemporary Politics” 2000, vol 6, nr 2.; J. Hrytsak, *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Z. Gitelman, L. Hajda, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk [red.], *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 276.

prevailed at the previous stages of separatism development, faded into insignificance. On the other part the passive part of conflict between the center and “eastern region” still keeps to the position on necessity of federalization or decentralization of power, i.e. of deepening of “eastern” regionalism, not separatism. That is a good evidence that regionalism in format of separatism in Ukrainian Donbas remains non-systemic and predominantly artificial phenomenon. Another peculiarity of this fourth wave of “eastern” regionalism is in the fact that the latter to a large extent has lost language orientation and is determined by geopolitical and economic vector. At the same time seeing the center also as regional, although enemy to “eastern region”, identity, even despite the fact that there are a lot of its adherents in Donbas, remain unchanged. Nevertheless it is the fact that the “eastern” regionalism is internally outlined not simply as opposition to generic notion of Ukraine, but also to specific notion of European choice of Ukraine, which is territorially, geographically, culturally and mentally closer to Europe. It is in this context that “eastern” regionalism and separatism are actualized by politicization phenomenon of Russian national/ethnic minority, which is predominantly not European, but rather anti-European. It also allows to conclude that modern “eastern” regional identity (especially in the light of events of 2014) also isn't the system of equal parameters of social choice. On the one hand it depends on stable objective features, with which an individual and community identify themselves (it is so-called cognitive element, on which access to information has a significant influence). On the other hand it is a subject way of perceiving and substantiating (or emotionally-affective element). Their synthesis can be different and it outlines in different ways, without system, the essence of “eastern” regionalism: in one case as aspiration to decentralization, in the other case to federalization and in the third case – to separation. Only external subjectification of events makes us think about modern “eastern” regionalism as about separatism and irredentism.

Allocation of resources and setting up stages of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism formation allows to *conclude* that: 1) the majority of population of the “eastern region” still isn't ready to perceive the principle of “nationality in accordance with citizenship”; 2) the majority of population of the “eastern region” includes into the notion of a “nation” also its ethnicity (interpretation of “nation by blood” prevails); 3) according to definition of Y. Haberman the majority of the “eastern region” doesn't know to “reasonably identify”⁴⁰, also today they express respect to the place of their permanent residence as to their motherland more often, that place doesn't coincide with the Ukraine's borders; 4) the “eastern region” being motley⁴¹, internally is different from the point of view of selection of the kind of regionalism – autonomization, federalization, separation, etc.; 5) the “eastern” regionalism is still a form of preservation of conservative “Soviet” ideology and psychology, it has no own content (deficit of own philosophy and identity, as well as political conservatism are peculiar to it); 6) sometimes the “eastern” regionalism is positioned as a tool for customary system and ideas preservation,

⁴⁰ J. Habermas, *W poskach nacjonalnoy identycznosti. Filozofskie i polityczeskie statji*, Donetsk 1999, s. 5.

⁴¹ N. Czernysz, O. Malanczuk, *Dynamika identycznej mieszkanow Ljwowa i Donecjk: komparatywny analiz (1994–2004 rr.)*, [w:] *Ukraina moderna („Lwów – Donecjk: socjalni identycznosti w suczasnij Ukraini”. Specjalnyj wypusk)*, Kyjiw-Ljwów 2007, nr 12 (2), s. 75.; *Ukraina moderna („Lwów – Donecjk: socjalni identycznosti w suczasnij Ukraini”. Specjalnyj wypusk)*, Kyjiw-Donecjk 2007, nr 12 (2).

i.e. it has a “protective” feature; 7) the linguistic factor gradually loses its influence in the “eastern” regionalism, definition of the Ukrainian language as the native one serves as the determinant for loyalty to the Ukrainian state, and the language of communication mostly doesn’t coincide with the national self-perception and identity⁴²; 8) the “eastern” regionalism manifests as “bereaved of ethnic origin”, since it doesn’t have clear signs of interest to the process of Russian nationalism development in Russia, and the regional identity in the “eastern region” is neither monoethnic nor multiethnic – simply the factor of the Russian language prevails⁴³; 9) the “eastern” regionalism at the same time with regional identity, specific transitional identity, which reacts to the current government policy and existing economic conditions instead of influence of ideological pressure; 10) in accordance with the experience of 1991 – 2014 the main tendencies of the “eastern” regionalism are increase of regional autonomy and control over resources in the context of the central government national construction strategy, increase of regional autonomy in the middle of Ukraine, increase of regional autonomy by way of gradual transfer of power within the frames of European policy and regulation of closer integration with Russia; 11) turning of the “eastern” regionalism into separatism supports the veracity of the following formula: “the less etatism – the more separatism”, “the more regionalization/decentralization – the less separatism”.

Specification of *the “eastern” regionalism resources* allows to single out such key groups of elites that take part in the “regions” institutionalization and politicization of Russian national/ethnic minority in it: 1) *“the old nomenclature”* is a group of former high party functional bureaucrats, directors and top managers in coal industry, metallurgy, military and industrial complex that have managed to keep their positions; 2) *“the second echelon”* is the former middle level, party and Komsomol leaders and managers of industrial enterprises, which are pragmatic without any ideological complexes, they have managed to keep their old connections and to set up new ones, based on obvious commercial interest or on aspirations to political career; 3) *“modernizers”* – business from “shadow” economy, which accumulated wealth by brokerage and commercial transactions, as well as the people that came to politics in the turbulent years of glasnost and perestroika, including the ones that have managed to turn the political capital into material wealth and vice versa; 4) *national-democrats* are representatives of scientific circles, as well as the intellectuals and former dissidents that embrace the idea of the “national revival” and strong political identity, that are explicitly pro-European and often anti-Russian and recreate priorities of cultural and national construction. The variety of elite-agents of the “eastern” regionalism, although in favor of nomenclature, second echelon and modernizers, also shows lack of system in regionalism in the “eastern region”. At the same time that variety of elite, which used to be only a danger, today is the factor, which cannot assist in consolidation of the “eastern

⁴² N. Chernysh, *Pokolinnewi modeli grupowych identychnostej ljuwujjan ta doneczczan (1994–2004rr.)*, [w:] *Ukraina moderna („Lwiv – Doneckjk :socjalni identychnosti w suchasnij Ukraini”. Specialnyj wypusk*, Kyjiw-Ljwiv 2007, nr 12 (2), s. 113.; *Regionalna identychnostj w Ukraini : widminnosti, podobnosti, dynamika*, „Litteralis“ 28 zowtnja 2009 r., źródło: <http://www.litteralis.com/2009/10/regional-identity-in-ukraine/> [odczyt: 01.09.2014].

⁴³ J. Bugajski, *Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine*, [w:] S. Wolchik, V. Zwiglyanich [red.], *Ukraine. The Search for a National Identity* Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2000.

region” in producing the vision for further development. It is another feature of the “eastern region’s” elite – its provinciality⁴⁴. Donbas is an example of adaptation, but not confrontational changes of elites (at least to a larger degree than the entire Ukraine).

In general, on the basis of the “eastern” regionalism and separatism analysis, its stages are singled out as follows: the first stage – 1989–1992 (with regard to determination of further fate of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the status of the “eastern region” within its framework); the second stage – 1992–1994 (with regard to expansion of financial and economic powers of the “eastern region”); the third stage – 1997–2013 (with regard to synthesizing financial, economic, national and ethnic constituents of the “eastern region’s” individuality); the fourth stage – from 2013 (on the basis of applying geopolitical reasons for further development choice, as well as the struggle forms radicalization).

⁴⁴ A. Moryl, B. Krawchenko, *Ukraine: from empire to statehood*, [w:] I. Bremmer, T. Ray [red.], *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997.

Парламентська підтримка як індикатор стабільності урядів у країнах Східної Європи (1991–2014)

у статті проаналізовану парламентську підтримку як індикатор стабільності урядів у країнах Східної Європи в 1991–2014 рр. Виокремлено групи країн у регіоні на основі ролі парламентів у формуванні та припиненні повноважень урядів. Проаналізовано сутність впливу партійної та персональної структуризації парламентів на стабільність урядів. Уточнено різницю понять «парламентська коаліція» і «парламентська більшість». Запропоновано розгляд базових теоретико-методологічних та емпіричних атрибутів парламентської підтримки урядів у країнах Східної Європи. Визначено різновиди парламентської підтримки урядів у країнах Східної Європи. На цій підставі зіставлено типи підтримки урядів та урядову стабільність (у формі урядової тривалості та індексу урядової стабільності).

Ключові слова: виконавча влада, президентська республіка, парламентська республіка, напівпрезидентська республіка, дуалістична виконавча влада, президент, уряд, урядовий кабінет, парламентська підтримка, стабільність урядів, тривалість урядів, індекс урядової стабільності, структуризація парламенту, парламентська коаліція, коаліційна більшість, парламентська більшість, голосування, Східна Європа.

Parliamentary support as indicator of cabinet stability in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)

The article is dedicated to analyzing parliamentary support as indicator of cabinet stability in Eastern European countries in 1991–2014. The author identified groups of countries in the region based on the role of parliaments in the formulation and termination of cabinets, analyzed the nature of party and personal structuring parliaments' impact on cabinet stability, differentiated concepts of "parliamentary coalition" and "parliamentary majority", proposed review of theoretical, methodological and empirical attributes of parliamentary support of cabinets in Eastern Europe, determined types of parliamentary support of cabinets in Eastern Europe, compared types of cabinet support and cabinet stability (based on cabinet duration and index of cabinet stability).

Keywords: executive, presidential republic, parliamentary republic, semi-presidential republic, dual executive, president, cabinet, governmental cabinet, parliamentary support, cabinet stability, cabinet duration, index of cabinet stability, structuring of parliament, parliamentary coalition, coalition majority, parliamentary majority, voting, Eastern Europe.

The regularity of political development of most countries of the world (including in post-Soviet and Eastern Europe – namely in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) is the concentration of key authorities in the executive power institutes. The scholars treat this phenomena as an objective result of modern statehood evolution. Logically, executive power is a complex of state bodies and institutions conducting governmental-political and governmentally-administrative functions. Depending upon the constitutional governmental schemes the top of executive power system may be represented solely by the *president* (which is not characteristic of the East-European Countries, as now the classical *presidential republics* are not represented in the region¹), unilaterally, the government in the person of the prime-minster (characteristic of Moldova, which is a classical parliamentary republic) or simultaneously the president and the government (which is characteristic of Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, which are formally half-presidential republics, i.e. independent of formal and actual authorities of the president and prime-minister realize the schemes of *dualistic executive power*, with visible institutional roles of both the president and the government). In this context in the selection of the East-European countries special attention should be paid to the evaluation of governments, their stability, and dependence upon inter-institutional design. The matter is that the region is characterized by such governmental systems where the government (in the context of formation and possible early termination of authorities) directly depends *either upon the parliament* (Moldova), or upon the *parliament and the president* (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine). Accordingly, parliamentary support of the governments – is the guarantee of their activity, and accordingly indicator of the governments' stability.

In order to outline the interrelation between the governments stability and parliamentary support of governments among the East-European Countries during 1991–2014 it is necessary to define a set of notions and definitive analysis parameters. Namely – government, governmental cabinet, cabinet of ministers, parliamentary support, stability of governments, duration of governments, index of governmental stability. *Government* is one of the supreme state bodies whose competence is only conventionally restricted to the law-enforcement and tasks in the sphere of administration; organization exercising the administration in the whole country or its part; specified number of leading politicians and specialists, formally appointed

¹ Today among the East-European countries there are no "classical" presidential republics with no position of prime-minister, and the head of state is the president. Nevertheless, such situations were characteristic of the countries of the region before – Azerbaijan (before 1995), Byelorussia (1994–1996), Georgia (1995–2003), Ukraine (1995–1996).

by the head of state, though really elected by the prime-minister (or the prime-minister and the head of state)² on condition of support in the parliament who have the right to make decisions on all issues related to the competence of the executive power branch. *The governmental cabinet* is the part of government, where the prime-minister or president form the cabinet of ministers with the delegation of respective ministries to the latter. *Cabinet of ministers* is the committee formed out of number of the most important members of government, namely, prime-minister (president) and ministers³. *Parliamentary support* is a number of deputies of the parliament who, with the parliamentary government formation (in the parliamentary and half-presidential republics) provide the government with the vote of confidence/ investiture and support it in the process of fulfillment of its obligations. *Governments stability* is the ability of government to continue functioning; stable functioning of government which is characterized by the ability of long-lasting operation and preserving of essential internal and external governmental parameters. *Government duration* is the time (in days, months, or years) measured between the «beginning» and «end» of certain period of the government existence. *Index of governmental stability* is the index which reflects the part of maximum time possible – term of parliament/president cadence (depending upon the constitutional peculiarities of the government formation) – of the government operation⁴.

The interrelation between the stability of governments and parliamentary support of government depends upon the activity of legislative power - *unicameral or bicameral parliaments* – and their party and personal *structuration*. This is very actual as it provides that the government stability is not unilateral and direct result of functioning of *different types* of governments. For instance, despite the fact that in the East-European countries normally non-party governments operate (this is mostly characteristic of Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine), their activity directly depends upon the placement of the party and non-party forces within national parliaments. Such situation becomes even more important because the parliaments structuring and parliaments as political institutes (in every country) act in the role of constitutionally provided agents of governments *formation / resignation* (it results from the fact that half-presidential and parliamentary republics, governmental cabinets collectively responsible in front of the parliaments operate in the region). That is why the comparative evaluation of influence of party and personal structuring of parliaments for the purpose of support/opposition of governmental cabinets shall be considered one of the indicators of governmental stability. In this context the *parliaments* shall be treated as the voting systems, as the voting system in modern political science is defined as an organizational rule which determines the fact of approval or disapproval of the decision on the basis of voting results. This

² M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

³ P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998, s. 128.

⁴ D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, "Acta Politica" 1977, vol 12, s. 346–377.

definition is directly applicable to the possibility of formation and resignation of governments in the East-European countries⁵.

The matter is that only on the basis of the voting procedure the deputies make all the parliamentary decisions. They are deemed made if the number of votes given for them, exceeds the *votes quota*, which is determined by certain national voting procedures. For instance, if there four and more parties in the parliament, most probably, neither of them is represented by the number of votes exceeding the determined quota, and may not make a decision on its own. Therefore the parties ally or enter into the “coalitions”. In this case the said interpretation of coalition not as «governmental», but as “*parliamentary*” – to describe such associations appearing in the parliament due to the support or no-support of political decisions, which provide or resist the realization of governmental cabinet⁶. With this in mind, and taking into account that the parliamentary support is often determining and primary factor of the government formation, in the determination of the type of parliamentary support to the government we should keep in mind that the category «parliamentary support» (resulting in the positive decision made in the form of the vote of confidence – in our case the fact of the new government formation) is equal to the category «*parliamentary majority*». The category “Parliamentary support” is connected with the government typology by the fact that the parliamentary majority may be the party and non-party. In its turn the party majority may be the single-party and coalitional. Besides, as it is shown by the practices of the East-European countries, majority may be mixed: mostly party, modified by the non-party mandates; mostly non-party, modified by the party mandates; simultaneously party and non-party (on condition the number of the party and non-party deputies in the parliamentary majority construction are equal). It means that in the evaluation of the government cabinets in the context of their parliamentary support, we should judge by what *parliamentary coalition* actually is – as an association which appears in the parliament as a result of support or non-support of making the political decision. Besides, we should always take into account those parliamentary coalitions, which provide for the parliamentary majority, as it is necessary in case of government formation and provision of the support of its course – that is in the context of provision of the vote of confidence). With this in mind, obviously, parliamentary coalitions *do not necessarily*

⁵ Noteworthy, as of 2014 the parliament is an exceptional agent of governmental authorities termination in the following East-European states: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Instead, in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, and Russia the parliaments are quite influential in the context of possible early termination of governments' authorities, though, the desire to fire the governments (motion of censure) may be repelled by the presidents (in these countries the governments may be fired directly by the presidents). Analogically, in case of the government formation: without decision of parliament (vote of confidence) the government may be formed in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; in case of absence of the parliament decision (vote of confidence) the governments may be formed directly by the presidents in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, and Russia.

⁶ V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.02: zakhyshch. 09.04.2010: zatverdzhena 06.10.2010*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 132.

constitute the cases of the party support: they may be exclusively party or party modified non-party mandates, and may be non-party or modified non-party⁷.

⁷ The minority governments are formed on the basis of understanding of the category «parliamentary coalition» as association appearing in the parliament due to the support or non-support of political decision-making. The minority government in the party context consists of the parliamentary parties which cumulatively constitute minority. Though, the minority government always relies upon the mandates of these parties or non-party deputies, cumulatively constituting parliamentary majority, i.e. has the support of majority. In this case it is worthy to clarify the notion of majority. For this purpose we may use the following two notions: 1) *coalitional majority* – this is the majority which corresponds to the coalitional nature of the governmental cabinet (the same with the coalitional minority); 2) *parliamentary majority* (or *majority in the parliament*) – is the constant or situational majority in the systems of government, where the principles of the coalitional governments formation are not applicable, and majority operates only to make these or those successive solutions and provision of constitutionally determined requirement about the governmental cabinet support by the parliament.

Table 1. Governmental stability in the countries of Eastern Europe in the light of their parliamentary support (1991–2014)⁸

| Prime Minister | Terms of cabinet stay in power | Party of Prime Minister | Type of cabinet | Parliamentary support for cabinet | Parties/MPs of parliamentary support for cabinet | CD, d. | CD, y. | ICS |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|--------|--------|------|
| Azerbaijan | | | | | | | | |
| H. Hasanov | 18.10.1991–04.04.1992 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | AXC+n/p | 166 | 0,45 | 0,72 |
| R. Huseynov | 16.06.1992–30.01.1993 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | AXC+n/p | 224 | 0,61 | 0,47 |
| P. Huseynov | 28.04.1993–30.06.1993 | AXC | T | SPMN+ | AXC+n/p | 62 | 0,17 | 0,13 |
| S. Huseynov | 30.06.1993–07.10.1994 | n/p | T | AS | – | 457 | 1,25 | 0,20 |
| F. Guliyev | 07.10.1994–20.07.1996 | YAP | T | AS | – | 643 | 1,76 | 0,36 |
| A. Raszadze 1 | 26.11.1996–11.10.1998 | YAP | T | CMN+ | YAP+p+n/p | 675 | 1,86 | 0,37 |
| A. Raszadze 2 | 11.10.1998–04.08.2003 | YAP | T | CMN+ | YAP+p+n/p | 1733 | 4,75 | 0,96 |
| I. Aliyev | 04.08.2003–04.11.2003 | YAP | T | SPM+ | YAP+n/p | 90 | 0,25 | 0,05 |
| A. Raszadze 3 | 04.11.2003–29.10.2008 | YAP | T | SPM+ | YAP+n/p | 1795 | 4,92 | 1,00 |
| A. Raszadze 4 | 29.10.2008–22.10.2013 | YAP | T | CM+ | YAP+p+n/p | 1793 | 4,91 | 1,00 |

⁸ The indexes of the governmental stability which operated/operate in 2014, were measured for the following governmental cabinets: 1) not operating (terminated their authorities in 2014); 2) operate in 2014, though appeared not earlier than July 31, 2013. Governmental cabinets which appeared after July 31, 2013, or in 2014, and for the moment of analysis were operating, were not subject to the counting of the governmental stability indexes. The governmental stability indexes were counted as of July 31, 2014. In the table all governmental cabinets which were recorded but not analyzed are marked in grey. Among them the governments headed by the following prime-ministers: A. Raszadze (starting from 22.10.2013) in Azerbaijan, H. Abrahamyan (starting from 13.04.2014) in Armenia, I. Garibashvili (starting from 20.11.2013) in Georgia, A. Yarsenyuk (starting from 27.02.2014) in Ukraine. Up till July 31, 2014 the governments were analyzed headed by the following prime-ministers: M. Myasnikovich in Byelorussia (analyzed period 28.12.2010 – 31.07.2014), I. Leancă in Moldova (analyzed period 31.05.2013 – 31.07.2014), D. Medvedev in Russia (analyzed period 08.05.2012 – 31.07.2014). Conventional signs: CD, d. – cabinet duration (in days); CD, y. – cabinet duration (in years); ICS – index of cabinet stability; p – affiliation to the party (party membership); n/p – non-affiliation to the party (non-party membership); T – technocratic (non-party) cabinet; P – party cabinet; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ+ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support; AXC – Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, YAP – New Azerbaijan Party, ASB – Agrarian Party of Belarus, KPB – Communist Party of Belarus, LDPPB – Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, AzhM – National Democratic Union, PANM – Pan-Armenian National Movement, H – Republic, M – National Unity, HHHT – Armenian Revolutionary Federation, HHK – Republican Party of Armenia, OEK – Rule of Law, BHK – Prosperous Armenia, RT-FG – „Round Table - Free Georgia”; BM – Block of peace; I.1.10 – Block „11 October”, SMP – Green Party, UCG – Citizens Union of Georgia, EDA – National Democratic Party, DAP – Democratic Union for Revival, NMD – National Movement – Democrats, ENM – United National Movement, KO – Georgian Dream, FPM – Popular Front of Moldova, PCM – Party of Communists of Moldova, PDAM – Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, BTI – Election alliance, „Block of peasants and intellectuals”, FPCC – Christian Democratic Popular Front, CDM Democratic Convention of Moldova alliance, PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova, DFP – Party of Democratic Force, PCRIM – Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, PL – Liberal Party, AMN – Party Alliance Our Moldova, DPR – Democratic Party of Russia, VR – Russia’s Choice, APR – Agrarian Party of Russia, PRES – Party of Russian Unity and Harmony, NDR – Our Home – Russia, Yabloko – Russian United Democratic Party „Yabloko”, DVR – Democratic Choice of Russia, Y – Interregional movement „Unity”, OVR – Fatherland – All Russia, ER – United Russia, KPU – Communist Party of Ukraine, NRU – The People’s Movement of Ukraine, SelPU – The Peasant Party of Ukraine, SPU – The Socialist Party of Ukraine, VOH – All-Ukrainian Association „Community”, NDPU – The People’s Democratic Party, SPU+SB – Electoral bloc of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Peasant Party of Ukraine, PPPU – The Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, SDPU(o) – The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), PR – The Party of Regions, ZYU – For United Ukraine, BYT – The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, NU – The Our Ukraine, NU-NS – The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc, BL – The Lyryyn Bloc, B – All-Ukrainian Union „Fatherland”, UDAR – The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vitalii Klitschko, SEU – the group of MPs „Sovereign European Ukraine”, S – The All-Ukrainian Union „Svoboda”.

| A. Resizade 5 | 22. 10. 2013 – Incumbent | YAP | T | SPMJ+ | YAP + n/p | Not analyzed |
|-----------------|--------------------------|-------|---|-------|----------------------------|----------------|
| Belarus | | | | | | |
| V. Kebich | 19.09.1991 – 21.07.1994 | n/p | T | NPJU | n/p | 1022 2,80 0,56 |
| M. Chirir | 21.07.1994 – 18.11.1996 | n/p | T | AS | – | 837 2,29 0,32 |
| S. Ling | 19.02.1997 – 18.02.2000 | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + ASB | 1079 2,96 0,42 |
| V. Vermostin | 14.03.2000 – 01.10.2001 | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + KP8 + ASB + LDP8 | 557 1,53 0,21 |
| G. Novitsky | 10.10.2001 – 10.07.2003 | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + KP8 + ASB + LDP8 | 630 1,73 0,39 |
| S. Sidorsky 1 | 19.12.2003 – 08.04.2006 | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + KP8 + ASB + LDP8 | 829 2,27 0,51 |
| S. Sidorsky 2 | 10.04.2006 – 27.12.2010 | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + KP8 + ASB + LDP8 | 1697 4,65 1,00 |
| M. Myasnikovich | 28.12.2010 – Incumbent | n/p | T | NPJM+ | n/p + KP8 + ASB | 1293 3,54 0,71 |
| Armenia | | | | | | |
| V. Manukyan | 13.08.1990 – 22.11.1991 | AZM | T | SPMN+ | AZM + n/p | 459 1,26 0,25 |
| G. Harutyunyan | 22.11.1991 – 30.07.1992 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | PANM + n/p | 248 0,68 0,14 |
| K. Harutyunyan | 30.07.1992 – 02.02.1993 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | PANM + n/p | 182 0,50 0,10 |
| H. Bagratyan 1 | 03.02.1993 – 29.07.1995 | PANM | T | SPMN+ | PANM + n/p | 896 2,45 0,50 |
| H. Bagratyan 2 | 29.07.1995 – 04.11.1996 | H | T | SPMN+ | H + n/p | 455 1,25 0,26 |
| A. Sargsyan | 04.11.1996 – 19.03.1997 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | H + n/p | 135 0,37 0,25 |
| R. Korbayyan | 20.03.1997 – 03.02.1998 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | H + n/p | 313 0,86 0,59 |
| A. Dalibnyan | 10.04.1998 – 11.06.1999 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | H + n/p | 421 1,15 0,24 |
| V. Sargsyan | 11.06.1999 – 27.10.1999 | M | P | GMJ | M + HHT | 136 0,37 0,08 |
| A. Sargsyan | 03.11.1999 – 02.05.2000 | M | P | GMJ | M + HHT | 179 0,49 0,10 |
| A. Margaryan 1 | 12.05.2000 – 05.03.2003 | M | P | GMJ | M + HHT | 1013 2,78 0,57 |
| A. Margaryan 2 | 05.03.2003 – 25.03.2007 | HHK | P | GMN+ | HHK + OEK + HHT + n/p | 1460 4,00 0,82 |
| S. Sargsyan 1 | 25.03.2007 – 12.05.2007 | HHK | P | GMN+ | HHK + OEK + HHT + n/p | 47 0,13 0,03 |
| S. Sargsyan 2 | 12.05.2007 – 19.02.2008 | HHK | P | GMJ | HHK + BHK + HHT + p | 277 0,76 0,17 |
| T. Sargsyan 1 | 09.04.2008 – 27.04.2009 | HHK | P | GMJ | HHK + BHK + HHT + p | 378 1,04 0,23 |
| T. Sargsyan 2 | 27.04.2009 – 06.05.2012 | HHK | P | GMJ | HHK + BHK + OEK | 1089 2,98 0,60 |
| T. Sargsyan 3 | 06.05.2012 – 13.04.2014 | HHK | P | SPJU | HHK | 697 1,91 0,38 |
| H. Abrahamyan | 13.04.2014 – Incumbent | HHK | P | SPJU | HHK | Not analyzed |
| Georgia | | | | | | |
| Z. Gamsakhurdia | 09.04.1991 – 26.05.1991 | RT-FG | P | SPJU | RT-FG | 47 0,13 0,07 |
| B. Gupushvili | 23.08.1991 – 06.01.1992 | RT-FG | P | SPJU | RT-FG | 133 0,36 0,19 |
| T. Sjua 1 | 06.01.1992 – 11.10.1992 | n/p | T | AS | – | 275 0,75 0,39 |
| T. Sjua 2 | 11.10.1992 – 05.08.1993 | n/p | T | GMN+ | BM + 11.10 + SMP + p + n/p | 294 0,81 0,27 |
| O. Patsatsia | 20.08.1993 – 05.10.1995 | n/p | T | GMN+ | BM + 11.10 + SMP + p + n/p | 765 2,10 0,69 |
| N. Lekshvili | 08.12.1995 – 26.07.1998 | UGG | T | GMJ | UGG + EDA + DAP | 948 2,60 0,59 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------|------|---|-------|---------------------------|------|--------------|------|--|
| V.Lorkipanidze | 07.08.1998 – 11.05.2000 | UGG | T | CMJ | UGG + EDA + DAP | 634 | 1,74 | 0,40 | |
| G.Asenishvili | 11.05.2000 – 21.12.2001 | UGG | T | SPMJ | UGG | 580 | 1,59 | 0,43 | |
| A.Iobezadze | 21.12.2001 – 27.11.2003 | UGG | T | SPMJ | UGG | 696 | 1,91 | 0,52 | |
| Z.Zhvania 1 | 27.11.2003 – 28.03.2004 | NM-D | T | AS | – | 121 | 0,33 | 0,05 | |
| Z.Zhvania 2 | 28.03.2004 – 03.02.2005 | NM-D | P | SPMJ+ | NM-D + n/p | 305 | 0,84 | 0,21 | |
| Z.Noghaideli | 17.02.2005 – 16.11.2007 | n/p | T | SPMJ+ | NM-D + n/p | 989 | 2,71 | 0,69 | |
| L.Gurgentz'e 1 | 22.11.2007 – 20.01.2008 | n/p | T | SPMJ+ | NM-D + n/p | 58 | 0,16 | 0,04 | |
| L.Gurgentz'e 2 | 20.01.2008 – 01.11.2008 | n/p | T | SPMJ+ | NM-D + n/p | 281 | 0,77 | 0,13 | |
| G.Mgabishvili | 01.11.2008 – 30.01.2009 | n/p | T | SPMJ | ENM | 89 | 0,24 | 0,04 | |
| N.Giauri | 06.02.2009 – 04.07.2012 | n/p | T | SPMJ | ENM | 1228 | 3,36 | 0,56 | |
| V.Merabishvili | 04.07.2012 – 25.10.2012 | ENM | T | SPMJ | ENM | 111 | 0,30 | 0,05 | |
| B.Ivanishvili | 25.10.2012 – 20.11.2013 | KO | P | SPMJ | KO | 385 | 1,05 | 0,18 | |
| I.Garibashvili | 20.11.2013 – Incumbent | KO | P | SPMJ | KO | | Not analyzed | | |
| Moldova | | | | | | | | | |
| V. Muravschi | 27.08.1991 – 01.07.1992 | FPM | P | CMJ+ | FPM + PCM + n/p | 304 | 0,83 | 0,21 | |
| A. Sancheli 1 | 01.07.1992 – 27.02.1994 | PDAM | P | SPMJ+ | PDAM + n/p | 556 | 1,63 | 0,42 | |
| A. Sancheli 2 | 27.02.1994 – 24.01.1997 | PDAM | P | CMJ | PDAM + BTI + FPCD | 1047 | 2,87 | 0,70 | |
| I.Ciubuc 1 | 24.01.1997 – 22.05.1998 | PDAM | P | CMJ | PDAM + BTI + FPCD | 478 | 1,31 | 0,30 | |
| I.Ciubuc 2 | 22.05.1998 – 01.02.1999 | CDM | P | CMJ | CDM + PDM + DPP | 249 | 0,68 | 0,24 | |
| I.Sturza | 19.02.1999 – 01.12.1999 | CDM | P | CMJ | CDM + PDM + DPP | 282 | 0,77 | 0,27 | |
| D.Brighis | 21.12.1999 – 25.02.2001 | n/p | T | CMJ | CDM + PDM + DPP | 424 | 1,16 | 0,40 | |
| V.Iarlev 1 | 19.04.2001 – 06.03.2005 | PCRM | P | SPMJ | PCRM | 1397 | 3,83 | 0,96 | |
| V.Iarlev 2 | 19.04.2005 – 20.03.2008 | PCRM | P | SPMJ | PCRM | 1051 | 2,88 | 0,71 | |
| Z.Greceanii 1 | 31.03.2008 – 10.06.2009 | PCRM | P | SPMJ | PCRM | 430 | 1,18 | 0,29 | |
| Z.Greceanii 2 | 10.06.2009 – 09.09.2009 | PCRM | P | SPMJ | PCRM | 89 | 0,24 | 0,08 | |
| V.Flat 1 | 25.09.2009 – 28.11.2010 | PLDM | P | CMJ | PLDM + PL + PDM + AMN | 423 | 1,16 | 0,88 | |
| V.Flat 2 | 14.01.2011 – 25.04.2013 | PLDM | P | CMJ | PLDM + PDM + PL | 821 | 2,25 | 0,56 | |
| I.Leancă | 31.05.2013 – Incumbent | PLDM | P | CMJ | PLDM + PDM + PL | 420 | 1,15 | 0,44 | |
| Russia | | | | | | | | | |
| B. Yeltsin | 25.12.1991 – 15.06.1992 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | DPR + n/p | 170 | 0,47 | 0,13 | |
| Y.Gaidar | 15.06.1992 – 14.12.1992 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | DPR + n/p | 179 | 0,49 | 0,13 | |
| V.Chernomyrdin 1 | 15.12.1992 – 23.12.1993 | n/p | T | SPMN+ | DPR + n/p | 368 | 1,01 | 0,27 | |
| V.Chernomyrdin 2 | 20.01.1994 – 09.08.1995 | n/p | T | GMN+ | VR + APR + PRES + n/p | 919 | 2,52 | 0,51 | |
| V.Chernomyrdin 3 | 10.08.1996 – 23.03.1998 | NDR | T | NPMM+ | NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p | 583 | 1,60 | 0,43 | |
| S.Kiryenko | 24.04.1998 – 23.08.1998 | n/p | T | NPMM+ | NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p | 119 | 0,33 | 0,09 | |
| Y.Prinakov | 11.09.1998 – 12.05.1999 | n/p | T | NPMM+ | NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p | 241 | 0,66 | 0,18 | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------|------|---|-------|-----------------------------------|------|--------------|------|--|
| S. Sepashin | 19.05.1999 – 09.08.1999 | n/p | T | NPMN+ | NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p | 80 | 0,22 | 0,06 | |
| V.Putin 1 | 16.08.1999 – 26.03.2000 | NDR | T | NPMN+ | NDR + Yabloko + DVR + n/p | 220 | 0,60 | 0,16 | |
| M. Kasjanov | 17.05.2000 – 24.02.2004 | n/p | T | CMN+ | Y + OVR + n/p | 1357 | 3,72 | 0,95 | |
| M. Fradkov 1 | 05.03.2004 – 07.05.2004 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | ER + n/p | 62 | 0,17 | 0,05 | |
| M. Fradkov 2 | 12.05.2004 – 12.09.2007 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | ER + n/p | 1200 | 3,29 | 0,84 | |
| V.Zubkov | 14.09.2007 – 07.05.2008 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | ER + n/p | 233 | 0,64 | 0,16 | |
| V.Putin 2 | 08.05.2008 – 07.05.2012 | ER | T | SPWJ | ER | 1439 | 4,00 | 1,00 | |
| D.Medvedev | 08.05.2012 – Incumbent | ER | T | SPWJ | ER | 803 | 2,20 | 0,37 | |
| Ukraine | | | | | | | | | |
| V. Fokin | 24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | KPU | 397 | 1,09 | 0,27 | |
| L.Kuchma | 13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | KPU | 338 | 0,93 | 0,23 | |
| Y.Zvyahilsky | 27.09.1993 – 16.06.1994 | n/p | T | SPMI+ | KPU | 259 | 0,71 | 0,18 | |
| V.Misol | 16.06.1994 – 04.04.1995 | n/p | T | NPMN+ | NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p | 288 | 0,79 | 0,20 | |
| Y.Marchuk | 08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996 | n/p | T | NPMN+ | NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p | 349 | 0,96 | 0,18 | |
| P.Lazarenko 1 | 28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996 | VOH | T | NPMN+ | NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p | 37 | 0,10 | 0,01 | |
| P.Lazarenko 2 | 11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997 | VOH | T | NPMN+ | NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p | 351 | 0,96 | 0,18 | |
| V.Pustovitenko | 16.07.1997 – 30.11.1999 | NDPU | T | NPMN+ | NRU + SePU + SPU + p + n/p | 854 | 2,34 | 0,44 | |
| V.Yushchenko | 22.12.1999 – 28.04.2001 | n/p | T | CMN+ | NRU + SPU+SB + NDPU + p + n/p | 486 | 1,33 | 0,26 | |
| A.Kriakh | 29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002 | PPPU | T | CMN+ | SDPU(o) + SPU+SB + NDPU + p + n/p | 527 | 1,44 | 0,29 | |
| V.Yanukowych 1 | 21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005 | PR | T | CMN+ | ZYU + SDPU(o) + p + n/p | 764 | 2,09 | 0,41 | |
| Y.Ymoshenko 1 | 04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005 | BYT | T | CMN+ | NU + BYT + SPU + p + n/p | 214 | 0,59 | 0,12 | |
| Y.Yekhanurov | 22.09.2005 – 26.03.2006 | NU | T | CMN+ | NU + SPU + p + n/p | 184 | 0,50 | 0,10 | |
| V.Yanukowych 2 | 04.08.2006 – 17.10.2006 | PR | P | CMJ | PR + NU + SPU + KPU | 73 | 0,20 | 0,13 | |
| V.Yanukowych 3 | 17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007 | PR | P | CMJ | PR + SPU + KPU + p | 421 | 1,15 | 0,77 | |
| Y.Ymoshenko 2 | 18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010 | BYT | P | CMJ | BYT + NU-NS | 795 | 2,18 | 0,43 | |
| M.Azarov 1 | 11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010 | PR | P | CMN+ | PR + KPU + BL + n/p | 268 | 0,73 | 0,14 | |
| M.Azarov 2 | 09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012 | PR | T | CMJ+ | PR + KPU + BL + n/p | 714 | 1,96 | 0,39 | |
| M.Azarov 3 | 13.12.2012 – 28.01.2014 | PR | T | CMJ+ | PR + KPU + n/p | 405 | 1,11 | 0,22 | |
| A.Yatsenyuk | 27.02.2014 – Incumbent | B | T | CMN+ | B + UDAR + SEU + S + n/p | | Not analyzed | | |

Źródło: <http://zarate.eu/countries.htm> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; Z. Bialoblotskyj, *Stabilnist ta efektywnist uriadiv u politycznykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: Monohrafiia*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Iana Franka 2013.

Having determined the *parliamentary parties statuses* (in the context of their mandates to the parliament complete composition – i.e. majority or minority: fixed amount of mandates in the table 1 was not provided with regard to the fact that it changes each year due to some objective and subjective reasons) in the East-European countries we differentiate between several types of parliamentary support: single-party majority, coalitional majority, single-party majority with the influence of non-party mandates (or complemented by non-party deputies), coalitional majority with the impact of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), single-party minority with the impact of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), coalitional minority with the influence of non-party mandates (complemented by non-party deputies), non-party majority with the support of party mandates (or complemented by the party deputies), non-party minority with the support of party mandates (complemented by the party deputies), absence of parliamentary support. The result of almost each type of parliamentary support is *parliamentary majority* obtainment. This in the constitutional systems of government serves as inter-institutional reason for the beginning of its authorities (vote of confidence/ investiture). Sometimes the scenarios are possible, when the governmental cabinet does not have the support of parliamentary majority). Appealing to the experience of the governments formation in the East-European countries on the basis of parliamentary support assessment (for details see table 1) the following results were obtained:

Table 2. Types of parliamentary support of governments in East-European countries (1990–2014)⁹

| Country | SPMJ | SPMJ+ | CMJ | CMJ+ | SPMN+ | CMN+ | NPMJ | NPMJ+ | NPMN+ | AS | Total |
|-----------------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| Azerbaijan | – | 2 | – | 1 | 3 | 2 | – | – | – | 2 | 10 |
| Belarus | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 6 | – | 1 | 8 |
| Armenia | 1 | – | 6 | – | 8 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 17 |
| Georgia | 8 | 4 | 2 | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | 2 | 18 |
| Moldova | 4 | 1 | 8 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 14 |
| Russia | 2 | 3 | – | – | 3 | 2 | – | – | 5 | – | 15 |
| Ukraine | – | 3 | 3 | 2 | – | 6 | – | – | 5 | – | 19 |
| Total | 15 | 13 | 19 | 4 | 14 | 14 | 1 | 6 | 10 | 5 | 101 |
| Share, % | 14,9 | 12,9 | 18,8 | 4,0 | 13,85 | 13,85 | 1,0 | 5,9 | 9,9 | 4,9 | 100,0 |

In Azerbaijan the following governmental cabinets prevail complemented with the modifying influence of non-party parliamentary mandates: up till 2003 – single-party and coalitional governments, where the minority parties were complemented by non-party mandates; since

⁹ Conventional signs: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support. Out of governments which operated /still operate in 2014 the following ones were taken into account: 1) not operating (terminated their authorities in 2014); 2) operate in 2014, though, appeared not earlier than July 31, 2013. Governmental cabinets which appeared after July 31, 2013 or in 2014 and as of the moment of analysis were operating, were not subject to counting.

2003 – single-party and coalitional governments, where the majority parties were also modified by the non-party mandates. In Byelorussia, is characterized by the governmental formats of parliamentary majority formed by the non-party mandates, but is modified by the party deputies. Exception is only the governmental cabinet which in 1994-1996 was headed by the prime-minister M. Chigir: the government was formed in the constitutional format of presidentialism (presidential republic), therefore it should not have relied upon the support of parliamentary majority. Besides, during this period the Byelorussian development was characterized by the inter-institutional conflict of the head of the state (and as a head of executive power) and the parliament. In Armenia at the first stage of development of its governmental cabinets (before 1999) the single-party parliamentary support modified by the non-party mandates was dominating. After this the coalitional support of the governmental cabinets was institutionalized – on the basis of the majority or minority of the party mandates in the parliament (in the latter case through modifying influence of non-party mandates). In 2012 the governmental cabinet was formed whose prime-minister T. Sargsyan relies upon the support of the single-party majority of Armenian Republican Party. In Georgia since 2000 the single-party parliamentary support of the governmental cabinets has been dominating, but in 2004–2008 it was additionally modified by the non-party mandates. Instead, within 1991-2000 Georgia was characterized by the variability of the formats of parliamentary support of governmental cabinets. First of all, the cabinets were functioning which relied upon the support of the single-party majority (1991–1992), then – on the support of the coalitional minority complemented by the non-party mandates (1992–1995), still later – on the support of coalitional majority (1995–2000). Moldova is the only country of region where starting from 1994 the party support of governmental cabinets has been prevailing (without involvement of the nonparty mandates): in 2001–2009 the single-party and in 1994–2001 and 2009–2014 coalitional. In Russia up till 2004 the mixed party and non-party support based on different configurations of latter was dominating, though there was a determining situation here when the party or non-party minority was complemented by non-party or party mandates. However, since 2004 the parliamentary support of governmental cabinets shifted to the single-party, but up till 2008 was also modified by the nonparty mandates. In Ukraine the situation was similar: the minority formats (party/non-party), modified by the party or non-party deputies were prevailing in 1994–2006. In 2006–2010 and 2012–2014 the configurations of the party support on the basis of the parliamentary coalitions were operating. In 2010 the cabinet was functioning whose prime-minister M. Azarov relied upon the support of the coalitional minority, complemented by the non-party mandates. In 2014 with the similar pattern of the cabinet support was provided, headed by A. Yatsenyuk.

Generally, in Eastern Europe in 1991–2014 : 1) the party and the party-modified constructions of the parliamentary support of governmental cabinets are dominating; 2) out of the pure party support the coalitional is prevailing; 3) in the party-modified support the single-party is dominating; 4) out of the party and party-modified support the support prevails

based on the party majority; 5) out of the party and non-party support the support based on the majority is dominating; 6) in the non-party support the support is dominating based on the non-party minority, modified by the party mandates; 7) out of the party and non-party support the modified type of the governmental support is prevailing (through involvement of additional party/non-party mandates). In the context of the interrelation of governments duration (as one of the government stability indexes) and the type of parliamentary support in Eastern Europe within 1991–2014 the situation is as follows:

Table 3. The governments duration (in the years), formed according to different types of parliamentary support, in the countries of Eastern Europe (1990–2014)¹⁰

| Country | SPMJ | SPMJ+ | CMJ | CMJ+ | SPMN+ | CMN+ | NPMJ | NPMJ+ | NPMN+ | AS | Total |
|--------------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| Azerbaijan | – | 2,59 | – | 4,91 | 0,41 | 3,31 | – | – | – | 1,51 | 2,09 |
| Belarus | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2,80 | 2,78 | – | 2,29 | 2,72 |
| Armenia | 1,91 | – | 1,40 | – | 1,07 | 2,07 | – | – | – | – | 1,35 |
| Georgia | 1,12 | 1,12 | 2,17 | – | – | 1,46 | – | – | – | 0,54 | 1,21 |
| Moldova | 2,03 | 1,63 | 1,42 | 0,83 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1,57 |
| Russia | 3,10 | 1,37 | – | – | 0,66 | 3,12 | – | – | 0,68 | – | 1,46 |
| Ukraine | – | 0,91 | 1,18 | 1,54 | – | 1,11 | – | – | 1,03 | – | 1,11 |
| Total | 2,04 | 1,52 | 1,54 | 2,43 | 0,71 | 2,21 | 2,80 | 2,78 | 0,89 | 1,45 | 1,64 |

In Azerbaijan the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are those formed with the support of coalitional majority, modified by the non-party mandates, and the least long-lasting are the governmental cabinets formed with the support of the single-party minority, modified by the non-party mandates. In Byelorussia the most long-lasting governments are the ones formed on the basis of simple non-party majority modified by the non-party mandates. In Armenia the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are the ones formed on the basis of coalitional minority support, complemented by the non-party mandates, as well as on the basis of the single-party majority support. However, the least long-lasting governmental cabinets are the ones formed on the basis of the single-party minority support, complemented by the non-party mandates. In Georgia the most long-lasting governmental cabinets are those formed on the basis of coalitional majority, and the least long-lasting are the ones which do not rely upon the parliamentary support. In Moldova the most long-lasting governments rely upon the support of the single-party majority. However, the less long-lasting governments rely upon the support of the coalitional majority, complemented by the non-party mandates. In Russia the governments which rely upon the support of the single-party majority and support of coalitional minority complemented by

¹⁰ Designations: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support.

the non-party mandates are equally stable. However, the unstable governmental cabinets rely upon the support of the single-party minority complemented by non-party mandates and on the support of non-party minority complemented by the party deputies' mandates. In Ukraine which is characterized by less stable governments in the region in general, the most long-lasting are the governments relying upon the support of coalitional majority complemented by the non-party mandates, and the least stable are the ones relying upon the support of the single-party majority complemented by the non-party mandates. Generally, the most long-lasting governmental cabinets in Eastern Europe are formed on the basis of the support of simple non-party majority or on the basis of the support of non-party majority modified by the party mandates. The non-party support (namely, modified) is more stable than the party (namely modified). However, the least long-lasting governments in the region are the ones based on the support of the single-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates and on the support of the non-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates and on the support of non-party minority complemented by the party mandates. In the context of the party support of governments, more long-lasting governments make the following constructions: 1) coalitional majorities and coalitional minorities complemented by the non-party mandates; 2) out of single-party and coalitional – coalitional; 3) out of party and party with the non-party mandates – party (without modifications by the non-party mandates); 4) out of majority and minority governments (including with the modification by the non-party mandates) – majority governments. Some specifications in the course of the governmental stability and the nature of parliamentary support of governments in the Eastern Europe should be made on the basis of accounting of the governmental stability index:

Table 4. Indexes of the governments formed according to the different types of parliamentary support in the countries of Eastern Europe (1990–2014)¹¹

| Country | SPMJ | SPMJ+ | CMJ | CMJ+ | SPMN+ | CMN+ | NPMJ | NPMJ+ | NPMN+ | AS | Total |
|------------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| Azerbaijan | – | 0,53 | – | 1,00 | 0,44 | 0,67 | – | – | – | 0,28 | 0,53 |
| Belarus | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0,56 | 0,54 | – | 0,32 | 0,52 |
| Armenia | 0,38 | – | 0,29 | – | 0,29 | 0,43 | – | – | – | – | 0,31 |
| Georgia | 0,26 | 0,27 | 0,50 | – | – | 0,48 | – | – | – | 0,22 | 0,31 |
| Moldova | 0,69 | 0,42 | 0,47 | 0,21 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 0,51 |
| Russia | 0,69 | 0,35 | – | – | 0,18 | 0,73 | – | – | 0,18 | – | 0,36 |
| Ukraine | – | 0,23 | 0,44 | 0,31 | – | 0,22 | – | – | 0,20 | – | 0,26 |
| Total | 0,51 | 0,36 | 0,43 | 0,51 | 0,30 | 0,51 | 0,56 | 0,54 | 0,19 | 0,27 | 0,40 |

¹¹ Designations: SPMJ – single-party majority; SPMJ+ – single-party majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; SPMN+ – single-party minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMJ – coalition majority; CMJ+ – coalition majority, supplemented by non-party MPs; CMN+ – coalition minority, supplemented by non-party MPs; NPMJ – non-party majority; NPMJ+ – non-party majority, supplemented by party MPs; NPMN+ – non-party minority, supplemented by party MPs; AS – absence of support.

The specifications are about the following: 1) governments based on the party and non-party support, are almost equally stable; 2) in the context of the single-party or coalitional variants of the support coalitional governments are the most stable; 3) in the context of simple or modified constructions of the governmental support simple ones are more stable; 4) in the context of majority (including modified) or minority (just modified) less stable are the governments formed with the support of parties/coalitions of majority; 5) among constructions of the party support of governments the less stable are the governments relying upon the support of the single-party majority, complemented by the non-party mandates, and the single-party minority complemented by the non-party mandates. The party model of the governmental support by its governmental stability is similar to the non-party model of the governments' support.

Сучасна економічна криза: нові виміри і виклики

у статті проаналізовано особливості сучасної економічної кризи, її відмінності від попередніх криз та сильний вплив сукупності імперативів глобалізації. Автор доводить, що ця ситуація неминуче веде до створення міжнародних мереж, які діють під приватним контролем і які розкинулися на декількох континентах. Зростаюча складність системи вимагає більшої точності регулювання. Вона спирається на систему сформованих в останні десятиліття міжнародних інститутів і взаємозв'язків, але як і раніше базується на тих же ринкових принципах.

Ключові слова: сучасна світова економічна криза, фінансова криза, криза капіталізму, криза економіки сучасного капіталізму, ринковий механізм, антициклічний макроекономічний інструментарій.

Current economic crisis: new dimensions and challenges

the paper focuses on the peculiarities of the current economic crisis, its distinctions from the previous crises and the powerful impact of the whole imperatives of globalization. The author argues that this situation inevitably leads to creation of international networks, which are under the private control and which have spread to several continents. The increasing complicity of the system requires more accurate regulation. It is based on the system of institutions and interconnections, which have been formed during the last decades, but nevertheless it is grounded on the same market principles.

Keywords: current world economic crisis, financial crisis, capitalist crisis, crisis of modern capitalist economy, market mechanism, countercyclical macroeconomic tools.

In the modern world any crisis can be defined as a reaction of a complex system to the imbalance (of original proportions) between its elements, which occurs when the disbalance exceeds the acceptable defined bounds. In most cases such reaction has rather concise and painful character. The consequence of the crisis becomes apparent in the renewal of the violated proportions, which ensures the possibility for the succeeding normal functioning (progressive development) or in the destruction of the system.

We suppose that this cited general definition of a crisis can be also applied to the specific occurrence of the modern economic system crisis. Arguing over the development of the recessionary processes, the scientists and experts actively employed such notions as the “financial crisis”, “economic crisis”, “capitalism crisis” etc. They all are closely interrelated with each other, though they are not identical and have their own definitions. First of all, the question is about that relatively independent subsystem of a national economy, which is formed with the help of various financial mediators which fulfill their functions by means of a wide range of financial tools. Precedently, many crisis phenomena commenced in the very financial sector and the current crisis have not become the exceptions. Secondly, the notion of the “economic crisis” can be used in two ways. It is related either to the whole economic system (along with the financial subsystem) or to the phenomenon of the “non-financial sector” as distinct from the financial subsystem, which main elements are industrial production, agriculture, construction. From this point of view, both notions presuppose the extension of the crisis phenomena beyond the ranges of the financial subsystem, and this makes the situation essentially complicated.

Thirdly, the notion of the “capitalism crisis” belongs to the social and economic type of a society, which exists in most countries around the globe. On the contrary to two former notions that define the current state, here the main focus is on the reasons, one analyzes why it all happen and if it is possible to avoid analogous phenomena in future.

Following this interpretation it is possible to suppose that the answer to the question concerning the appearance of the current crisis is directly connected with the nature of the capitalist society. Having united two former notions we can get another one – the “*crisis of the modern capitalist economy*”. In this case the question is about some certain macroeconomic proportions (between various economic sectors and their individual branches, between savings and investment, between production and consumption etc.), which are necessary for certain stable development of any national economy, and about capitalism as a peculiar social and economic type of economy, which regards market as the main means of coordination of all market participants’ activity.

It is difficult to imagine capitalist economy without millions of various independent market participants, each of them individually strives for improvement of their own welfare. Thus, up to 2003 only in 19 EU countries there had existed more than 19 277 000 small and medium-sized enterprises where 97 420 000 people had been employed, in 2000 in the USA their number was 21 164 000, and in 2001 in Japan it equaled 4 690 000 people. Constantly increasing number of market participants acts independently in the flows of economically relevant and continually changing information and should take rational business decisions perpetually. Total number of huge enterprises in the aforementioned world regions approached to 1151. It should be highlighted, that in most cases they include multinational enterprises as to the

¹ Johnson D., Turner C. *European Business: Second edition*. London and New York, Routledge, 2006. – P. 147.

sphere of their activity. Nevertheless, the coordinating potential of the market economy has always been limited. Hence, gradual accumulation of disbalance and disproportion seems to be inevitable and conclusively causes economic crises. Even taking into account rather high level of state regulation, which is a characteristic feature of many highly-developed countries of Western Europe and Eastern Asia, capitalism has no real alternative to a crisis as a means of renewal of the abovementioned proportions.

During the last decades functioning of the world economic system has been under constant influence of the whole imperatives of globalization. It makes companies extend the geographical boundaries of their operations (starting with the research and development products and research and engineering developments, productive activity and finishing with goods delivering to the immediate consumer and organizing after-sale support) far beyond the national borders, including all main economic regions around the world. Such situation inevitably leads to creation of international networks, which are under the private control and which have spread to several continents. The increasing complicity of the system requires more accurate regulation. Though it is based on the system of institutions and interconnections, which have been formed during the last decades, but nevertheless it is grounded on the same market principles.

At the same time as a result of globalization various separate local disproportions within the frames of the already formed networks expand on an international scale, approaching most countries of the world. The current crisis has clearly demonstrated it. During numerous discussions as to the causes and nature of the current crisis and possible way-outs, the idea of the “new capitalism” creation is actively popularized².

It should be mentioned, that the attention must be paid to the point that for the number of reasons the term “capitalism” is not neutral. Negative treatment of the term is inherent to the biggest part of the globe. Not by accident “capitalism” has not been able to receive the same status as its competitor and potential alternative “socialism”. Not so long ago, it was widely used in the official names of a number of countries (the USSR, the SFRY etc.).

On the contrary, none of the highly developed countries (the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany etc.) has ever used the term “capitalistic” and it will hardly be used in future. Even Friedrich von Hayek, who, in a number of mass media, is deservedly named “free market pontiff”, during one of his interviews, stated that the word “capitalism” had been made up by the enemies of the market system and created an erroneous concept that this system acted only in capitalists’ interests³.

² Bauman Z. *Liquid Modernity* / Translation from English. – Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2008. – 240 p.; Eurostat. *European Business – Facts and Figures. – Data 1995–2004*. 2006; *The Culture of the New Capitalism*. Yale University Press, 2006. 214 p.; Bauman Z. *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. – 162 p.; Maslov O.Yu. *23 Reasons for the World Crisis (Chronicle of the Current World Crisis)* [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <http://www.polit.nnov.ru/2009/10/13/crisisology23cause36/>; Shatun V.T. *Conceptual Principles of Informational Policy under Conditions of Informational Society Formation* / V.T. Shatun // *Bulletin of the Centre of International Security*. – 2012. – № 1-2 (25-26). – Pp.72-80.

³ Hayek F. von. *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*. – M.: Novosti, 1992. – 286 p.

To our mind, the noun “capitalism” in combination with the adjective “new” cannot be regarded as historically appropriate or promising one. Therefore, for almost two centuries (the first crisis occurred in 1825) the history of the capitalist society has been accompanied by the economic crises of different gravity and continuity. In comparison with the first half of the 19th century capitalism has undergone a number of changes and has been repeatedly renewed. But all this could not release it from the crises. That is why, we believe that when a society wants to receive something really new it must change the basis of the system and it will not be capitalistic any more⁴. If the society prefers capitalism, it must keep its grounds and then the novelty will have rather limited character. From our point of view, disputes over the boundaries and possibilities capitalism modernization in the classical understanding of this notion, are historically connected with the question of admissible limits (and real opportunities) of the state regulation in national economic systems. They acquire new acuteness due to the globalization of the economic processes and struggle for the increase of competitiveness of national economic systems⁵.

The world crisis has clearly demonstrated that the modern economy requires the creation of the complex system of regulation, which would act at the subnational, national, regional and global levels. The key question is how to make this system of regulation stable and rather effective. Firstly, national states can acquire international regulation as a peculiar threat to their economic sovereignty. In many cases such concernment has some certain grounds. Secondly, in the course of regulation there is some conflict between regional and global levels. Thus, an impressive increase in the number of regional trade groups which has been taking place during the last 10-15 years to some extent undermines those universal rules of international trade, which are elaborated and are in charge of the World Trade Organization. Because it conducts its activity on the grounds of non-discrimination, however regional trade groups provide various types of privileges on the selective basis, thusly discriminating third countries. At the same time there is no necessity to cast doubt on the need for complex regulation.

It should be underlined, that among market theorists, neo-liberal minded opponents of the processes of state and global regulation of the intereconomic processes do not change their views. Neoliberalism holds serious positions in western economic studies, and concerning these traditions the works have been written by G. Reisman, M. Tannell and L. Tannell⁶. Besides, as E. Janeway states, the adherents of the approach which is contrary to the role of

⁴ Hayek F. von. *Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. Vol. 2. The Mirage of Social Justice.* The University of Chicago Press, 1976. – 196 p.; Hayek F. von. *Competition as a Discovery Procedure // World Economy and International Relations.* – 1989. № 12; Seldon A. *Capitalism.* Cambridge, Mass., 1990. – 419 p.

⁵ Nye J. S. Jr., Donahue J. D. *Governance in a Globalizing World. Why People Don't Trust Government.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. – 386 p.

⁶ G.Reisman *The Government Against the Economy.* Ottawa: Jameson Books, 1979. – 207 p.; Tannell M., Tannell L. *The Market for Liberty. Is Government Really Necessary?* New York: Libertarian Review Foundation, 1984. – 169 p.

the state and government in regulation of economic processes still keep rather strong and reasoned positions⁷.

The analysis of the honorable men of science gives reasons to propose some views as to successful functioning of the hypothetical system of global market economy regulation. To our mind, an essential variant of solution is connected with the usage of network approach and formation of the network model of global regulation worked out by V. V. Lukashevych and S. F. Sutyryn⁸. Within the frames of this model national states actively cooperate with various international, national and subnational institutions, which represent business-community and non-governmental organizations. Modern leading international organizations (the World Bank, WTO, IMF etc.) must do their best to conform to the new difficult realia. Besides, constructive cooperation with scientists, experts, mass media, trade unions and other interested groups is of fundamental importance. The model presupposes the absence of the beforehand-created hierarchy. These or other variants of the network configuration and distribution of responsibility among its participants in every separate case must be predetermined by a specific task which is on the agenda⁹. Such approach can contribute to the better coordination of activity carried out by various subjects of regulation. At the same time due to the fact that potential opponents of various pre-arranged regulating measures are involved into discussions, the model ensures the so-called “exhaust valve”, which allows lowering political and social tension. To the researches’ point of view, the proposed network approach adequately contributes to the preservation of national states, as they maintain their unique niche, which in future cannot be occupied by any other institution; they work out national strategy of development, namely economic strategy.

Detailed characteristic of the crisis presupposes analysis of the changes that have taken place under the influence of the crisis in the global economic situation. It should be admitted that modern the capitalism as a system of economy, in spite of its clear acuity, dramatic effect and scales of the suffered moment is far from exhaustion of its historical potential development. Contemporaries are the witnesses of a continuous row of cycle and structural dysfunctions of “normal” economic growth. Moreover, “classical” deviations of the process of economic cyclical development described in the 19th century, usually coincide with the models offered at that time, for instance by C. Juglar¹⁰ and i K. Marx, will be rarely met. But nowadays

⁷ E. Janeway *The Economics of Chaos. Revitalizing the American Economy*. New York: Truman Talley Books, 1989. – 402 p.

⁸ Lukashevych V.V., Sutyryn S.F. *Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Reasons and Consequences* // *Bulletin of Saint Petersburg University*. – 2009. – Series 5. Issues 3. – Pp. 3-11.

⁹ Tretiak O. A., Rumiantseva M. N. *Network Forms of Intercompany Cooperation: Approaches to the Explanation of the Phenomenon* // *Russian Journal of Management*. – 2003. – V. 1. – № 2. – Pp. 25–50; Sutyryn S. F. *Global Governance in Search of Sustainability: National State Perspective* // *Economic Globalization and the Choice of Asia: Transition, Growth and Welfare*. Shanghai Forum, 2008. Sub-Forum *Economic Transformation for Asia: The International Environment and Institutional Restructuring*. Shanghai Forum Organizing Committee, Fudan University, 2008.

¹⁰ Juglar C. *Des crises commerciales et de leur retour periodique en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis*. – Paris, 1889. – 286 p.

there is no unity in thoughts even concerning the fact, whether the experienced crisis is solely cyclic or has systematic or structural character.

We suppose the reason to be simple and hidden in comparative accessibility and maybe due to this in some historical exhaustiveness of the standard counter-cyclical macroeconomic tools: regulation of the macroeconomic balance in the terms of the model AS – AD by means of influence on the interest rate, norms of emergency funds and conducting open-market operations with government securities. Global knowledge economy is on the initial stage of its formation and will provide future analysts with new unsolved micro and macro recessionary processes.

The question of the damage level of the concrete crises in each case has historically predetermined character. The current crisis is not an exception. It is now evident that it can be compared to the Great Depression of 1929-1933 on the basis of its qualitative characteristics and scale. Comparison of these crises is rather interesting as they started after the prolonged decennial period of stable flourishing (at least in the postwar America (1919-1929) and in the area of the notorious “Golden billion” nowadays), moreover this increase took place under the conditions of stable and sustainable (as it was thought at that time) economic growth, price increase of basic industrial and (during the last 20 years) raw materials, generally favorable world conjecture, longstanding progressive promotion of national and world financial systems and non-stoppable flow of liquidity to the national and world markets.

Usually for a variety of reasons, conclusions and assessments as to the current crisis still have preliminary character. First of all, it is impossible to assert with confidence that the “bottom” of basic indexes of world dynamics has been already achieved. Secondly, under the conditions of the global postindustrial economy, which is usually defined as an informational society, the level of indetermination is increasing (comparing to the “former”, industrial stage of the world economy), and this appears as a result of the substantial deviation of the basic economic indicators from the conventional ones. And it is not enough to limit oneself with the simple assertion of the notorious “complication of social life phenomena”.

Now when there is an effort to interpret the flow and rapidity of numerous recessionary processes, the researches inevitably face the feature, which must be taken into account since without this feature it is impossible to estimate the scales and tendencies of the current crisis. In particular, we implicate the role of information in the modern economic processes application. Creation of an informational society (“knowledge society”) generated a number of new phenomena. On the one hand its economic existence becomes more and more dependent on the volumes and quality of the economically meaningful information which is available to all subjects who take decisions. And in its turn this produces more modern technical means of generating, generalizing and immediate information transmission in the global scale. On the other hand, usage of information, intended for decision making, not necessarily leads to economically adequate decisions. The problem of their adequacy concerns comprehension of rationality in economic theory and has direct connection to the current crisis.

This contradiction is absent in the theory of the “classical” market proposed by A. Smith, who created information about price as an indicator of resources restriction and fundamental result of the “opening procedure”, the mechanism of which was represented by competitiveness¹¹. The uniqueness of competitiveness as a specific process which produces information concerning the restriction of available economic resources and which acquires form of the price system was described by F. von Hayek¹². He used the idea of catallactics (the term introduced by Aristotle and which means “market economy that uses money as a mediator in the process of exchange”, “transformation of enemies into friends”, “transformation of a stranger into a member of a society”), which got the subsequent development in the works of his followers¹³.

Available data affirm that the global market of the 21st century does not completely cope with “Hayek’s” task in the frames of the “opening procedure”. Crises as the cycle forms of development have been known since 1825, but the crisis which at least partially blocked the production of reliable information as to the dynamics of limitedness, i.e. needs, is rather new phenomenon in economics. The usage of one and the same mass of information by various market participants in the process of taking specific economic decisions is mediated not by some common abstract views as to rationality (according to them an abstract entrepreneur maximizes profits, and the similar abstract buyer maximizes usefulness), but by a wider spectrum of values: it means an objective place in the split-level system of relations of possession among agents of business practices, their economic expectations, their conceptions of spiritual and material values etc¹⁴.

Taking into consideration the increase of the role of information in the modern world, let’s point out the brightest peculiarities of the current world crisis. Among them, one may mention the rapidity of expansion of the recessionary processes, confirming the idea of increasing importance of market participants’ awareness as to the state of the market situation.

The current crisis began at the US real estate market firstly as the sectoral crisis of the mortgage debt and it immediately spread to the financial and credit markets, endangered the stability of the whole banking system in the developed countries. Some mass media described the crisis as a forthcoming catastrophe. The peculiarity lay in the fact that the crisis of the US mortgage system at first was traditionally conceived as a deep, but merely “American” commotion, considering its scale and consequences, but which turned into the world financial crisis

¹¹ Smith A. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Londres, Paris: Garnier-Fiammarion, 1991.

¹² Hayek F. von. *Competition as a Discovery Procedure // World Economy and International Relations*. 1989. – № 12; Hayek F. von. *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*. – M.: Novosti, 1992. – 286 p.; Hayek F. A. *La Constitution de la liberte / Trad. R. Audouin & J. Garello*. Paris: Litec («Liberalia»), 1994. – P. 406.

¹³ Kirzner I. *Discovery and the Capitalist Process*. – Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985. – 183 p.

¹⁴ Vizirenko S.V. *Genesis of the Notion “Knowledge Economy” // S.V. Vizirenko / Stable Development of the Economy*. – 2012. – №2. – Pp. 44-48.

and later just within several weeks into the general economic crisis and this was an unprecedented phenomenon in recent history.

Analyzing this phenomenon Niall Ferguson draws a historical analogy with the former, as to its “origin”, American crisis of 1987, which unlike the current one, was “the crisis of Wall Street, but not the crisis of the whole country”. At that time the Federal Reserve System (FRS) rather quickly managed to set off a loss, caused by the relapse on the stock market, by lowering interest rates and ensuring liquidity. The current crisis has not undergone such countercyclical measures of influence. From October 2008 till February 2009 the Federal Reserve System took post-Keynesian and neo-monetarism countercyclical measures aimed at constraining recessionary processes (approaching to the critically low interest rates of the FRS, aggressive and not always justified securities services, usage of the United States government’s reserves aimed at money infusion into the national economy and support of the dollar’s exchange rate) and started the unprecedented procedures, which had never been taken before.

Similar measures, regarding the specific nature of the European community’s history, were taken in Europe. In the USA private persons started refusing from the increasing expenses, connected with repayment of mortgage, and this caused the wave of sales on the real estate market. Herewith, the existence of a great number of derivative securities, which were based on the mortgage bonds, worsened the situation. Besides, many securities were bounded with various foreign markets and other financial tools. That is the reason why the crisis became an international one.

It should be mentioned, that taking into consideration the recession, the USA and EU for the first time tried to coordinate their antirecessionary financial policy. But the biggest commercial structures (banking groups, insurance companies, automobile multicorporate enterprise), which seemed to the whole world to be the specimen of effectiveness and symbols of competitiveness, which had been endurable for the decades, one by one started to apply for financial help to the governments of their countries.

Table 1. The Characteristic of the Knowledge Economy

| Main characteristics | Description |
|--------------------------|--|
| Peculiar characteristics | Globality |
| Raw materials | Information (does not disappear, cannot be expropriated) |
| Infrastructure | Internet |
| Financial institutions | Venture capital funds, securities market of the high-tech companies (NASDAQ, Wesday, Nouvean Marche) |
| Credit sources | Pension fund, corporations, investors, private households |
| Institutions | Intellectual property, dynamic competitiveness, low barriers to market entry |

Source: Dinkin A.A. Discussion of V.L. Makarov’s Report, *Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences* 2003. V. 73. № 5.P. 456.

The current crisis became the first one, which was formed by the global knowledge economy¹⁵. Precedently, mankind had never faced any similar phenomena. As far as it is known, one of the main specific peculiarities of this economy, its basis is the mechanism of rational decisions taking, which is grounded on the flow of economically relevant and most likely reliable information, which is constantly refreshed. This flow is almost perpetual. The constant refreshing of information, which is carried out by the world stock exchanges can be a simple and sufficient example.

The stock exchanges' influence on the course of the current crisis cannot be compared even with the recessionary period of 1997, as it is for the first time in recent economic history that they created a united world network. It initiated new practice of decision making. It is rather important that the quality requirements to the informational flow are extremely high and continually growing. Besides, the information from the analyzed flow not always and not necessarily is economically reliable for taking rational decisions, which can have global consequences. Finally, if this happens, then the long-term decisions (including investment ones) are to be taken, and they often create unexpectedly deep disbalance in economy. And their adjustment requires exerting all efforts which have not been known in recent history and which, respectively, are not based on the appropriate theoretical approaches or are conducted with the help of destructive actions, as they are seen from the point of view of economy¹⁶.

The specific feature of the knowledge economy is represented by the unprecedented share of labour pool, which is employed in various spheres of economic activity and which is directly or indirectly connected with production and processing of economically reliable information. It is known that only in the EU countries – 27, more than 27.5% of labour pool are employed in the sphere of provision of financial services¹⁷. From the point of view of employment similar situation can be seen in other developed countries and regions.

¹⁵ Bell D. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting* / Translation from English. 2nd Ed. – M.: Academia, 2004. – 788 p.; Teece D. J. *Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The New Economy, Markets for Know-how and Intangible Assets* // *Russian Journal of Management*. 2004. – V. 2. – № 1. – Pp. 95–120.

¹⁶ Kharlamova O.V. *The Role of a Person in "New Economy"* // *Bulletin ZhDTU. Economic Sciences*. – 2010. – № 3 (53). – Pp. 311–313.

¹⁷ Eurostat (2008) *European Business — Facts and Figures — Data 1995–2007*.

Table 2. Dynamics of the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) in Terms of Components in Ukraine, its Neighboring Countries and Leading Countries

| Country | KEI | | | Economic stimulation | | | Innovations | | | Education | | | ICT | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1995 | 2008 | 2012 | 1995 | 2008 | 2012 | 1995 | 2008 | 2012 | 1995 | 2008 | 2012 | 1995 | 2008 | 2012 |
| Denmark | 9,54 | 9,58 | 9,16 | 9,30 | 9,66 | 9,63 | 9,55 | 9,57 | 9,49 | 9,78 | 9,8 | 8,63 | 9,69 | 9,28 | 8,88 |
| Sweden | 9,49 | 9,52 | 9,43 | 8,84 | 9,18 | 9,58 | 9,78 | 9,79 | 9,74 | 9,29 | 9,4 | 8,92 | 9,73 | 9,69 | 9,49 |
| Finland | 9,51 | 9,37 | 9,33 | 9,23 | 9,47 | 9,65 | 9,33 | 9,66 | 9,66 | 9,77 | 9,78 | 8,77 | 9,75 | 8,56 | 9,22 |
| The Netherlands | 9,46 | 9,32 | 9,11 | 9,35 | 9,18 | 8,79 | 9,52 | 9,48 | 9,46 | 9,21 | 9,26 | 8,75 | 9,27 | 9,36 | 9,45 |
| Norway | 9,29 | 9,27 | 9,11 | 8,53 | 9,25 | 9,47 | 9,09 | 9,06 | 9,01 | 9,60 | 9,6 | 9,43 | 9,80 | 9,16 | 8,53 |
| Hungary | 7,39 | 7,85 | 8,02 | 6,76 | 8,39 | 8,28 | 7,71 | 8,14 | 8,15 | 7,73 | 7,62 | 8,42 | 7,55 | 7,25 | 7,23 |
| The Czech Republic | 7,64 | 7,83 | 8,14 | 8,07 | 8,23 | 8,53 | 7,15 | 7,60 | 7,90 | 8,23 | 8,11 | 8,15 | 7,73 | 7,39 | 7,96 |
| Slovakia | 7,08 | 7,33 | 7,64 | 6,52 | 7,99 | 8,17 | 7,09 | 6,86 | 7,30 | 7,26 | 6,98 | 7,42 | 7,45 | 7,51 | 7,68 |
| Poland | 6,90 | 7,38 | 7,41 | 6,18 | 7,39 | 8,01 | 6,22 | 6,92 | 7,16 | 8,02 | 7,94 | 7,76 | 7,10 | 7,25 | 6,70 |
| Bulgaria | 6,84 | 6,80 | 6,80 | 5,84 | 7,01 | 7,35 | 7,17 | 6,43 | 6,94 | 7,65 | 7,42 | 6,25 | 7,04 | 6,33 | 6,66 |
| Ukraine | 5,97 | 5,80 | 5,73 | 3,18 | 4,06 | 3,95 | 6,10 | 5,77 | 5,76 | 8,15 | 7,91 | 8,26 | 6,32 | 5,45 | 4,96 |
| The Russian Federation | 5,73 | 5,4 | 5,78 | 2,55 | 1,55 | 2,23 | 5,64 | 6,89 | 6,93 | 7,19 | 7,09 | 6,79 | 6,60 | 6,08 | 7,16 |
| Turkey | 5,63 | 5,61 | 5,16 | 6,44 | 7,02 | 6,19 | 5,04 | 5,67 | 5,83 | 4,46 | 4,38 | 4,11 | 6,55 | 5,38 | 4,50 |
| Moldova | 5,11 | 5,04 | 4,92 | 3,47 | 4,19 | 4,44 | 4,43 | 4,39 | 4,16 | 6,05 | 6,40 | 5,79 | 5,55 | 5,17 | 5,28 |
| Europe and Central Asia | 6,25 | 6,35 | 7,47 | 4,35 | 5,44 | 6,95 | 6,90 | 6,88 | 8,28 | 6,62 | 6,74 | 7,13 | 7,02 | 6,33 | 7,50 |

Source: Knowledge Assessment Methodology, 2012 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp

Notes: The top position, according to the KEI methodology, in 2012 was held by Sweden with the index weight 9,43, next position belonged to Finland (9,33), Denmark (9,16). Ukraine occupied the 56th place with the index weight 5,73 (among 146 states).

These very personnel deal with professional processing of business information. Though, the economic role of these almost 30% of economic active population as to their potential influence on Hayek's mechanism of creation the information about limitedness of resources, which has already been functioning about a century, as well as their role in the world economy (first of all in the informational system) has not been practically researched yet. From the position of the bearers of archaic ideology of industrial and agricultural civilizations it is represented rather vague in society.

On the one hand, these professionals do not take direct part in material benefits' production, and on the other hand, not being bearers of technological information, they make production reasonable. One can suppose, that information produced by these personnel, can be

of great significance for millions of people, who independently take economic decisions, not less significance than economic information, created by the traditional mechanism, described by F. von Hayek.

Thereby, to our mind, the crisis recovery stipulates formation of some new model of development and global regulation, and this can be affirmed by the decisions of the April 2009 Summit G – 2018. This is a long and difficult path, as it has already been shown by the results of the economic activity in the countries which have overcome and got out of the crisis. In every country this path is characterized by its own peculiarities and specific features. We just express an assumption that in a long-term prospect the current situation can give Ukraine a real chance to move to a new model of economic development, which will be based on the innovation activity and this will improve its position in the system of world economic relations.

¹⁸ The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform. 2009. 2 April.

Діяльність Народних Зборів щодо демократизації болгарського суспільства

Автор досліджує парламентську демократію Республіки Болгарія і вважає її важливим фактором розвитку суспільства. У парламентській системі Болгарії відображена ідея раціоналізації парламентаризму, коли конституційна система має юридичні техніки, спрямовані на збереження стабільності і влади уряду при відсутності постійної парламентської більшості. Взаємини уряду і парламенту виражаються у співробітництві по здійсненню функцій кожної зі сторін і в контролі за роботою один одного. Болгарський парламент здійснює контроль за діяльністю уряду шляхом класичних технік депутатських запитів і питань.

Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, демократизація, парламент, опозиція, президент, політичні владні інститути, гілки влади, законотворчість, право законодавчої ініціативи.

Activities of the National Assembly for democratization of the Bulgarian society

The author analyzes the parliamentary democracy in the Republic of Bulgaria and considers it to be the important factor of community development. The parliamentary system of Bulgaria depicts the idea of rational parliamentarianism, when the constitutional system has judicial techniques to keep stability and power of the government when there is no parliamentary majority. The relationship between the government and parliament is revealed in their cooperation in carrying out the functions of each other and controlling each other's work. The Bulgarian parliament controls the government's activity by means of classical techniques of requests and inquiries.

Keywords: The republic of Bulgaria, democratization, parliament, opposition, president, political authoritative institutions, bodies of powers, lawmaking, right of legislative initiative

Since the 19th c. Bulgarians, immediately after the country's liberation from Turkish oppression, have created an important institution of community's political system, the body of legislative power, namely the parliament and started implementation and accumulation of their

own experience in parliamentary democracy. But it was little, as the practice of parliamentary democracy in the country soon was broken off. The observation of parliamentary activity in Bulgaria has been carrying out since 1879, when the adoption of the Tarnovo Constitution laid the foundation of the statehood: Bulgaria was announced the constitutional monarchy with the representation of people. This type of political system had been preserved up to 1946.

It must be admitted, that in the political history of Bulgaria in the 19th – 20th c. the traditions of non-democratic governing prevailed. Though, the democratic ideas were typical of the society since the national liberation movement of the 2nd part of the 19th century, but the mass consciousness of Bulgarians did not single out republican or monarchical ideas. The fact of the state creation was more important for them¹. The last democratic parliamentary elections were held on June 21, 1931. The military takeover of May 19, 1934 canceled all democratic institutions: the constitution was abolished, political parties were forbidden, and the National Assembly or Bulgarian parliament was dissolved. New parliamentary elections were held in 1938.

It should be underlined that the first Constitution of Bulgaria established not parliamentary, but constitutional and monarchical form of government. The institution of monarch was in the centre of the political system and kept this position till the beginning of the WWII. The establishment of parliamentarianism was prevented by such factors as the constitutional instability (the working of the constitution was interrupted), the political instability (state takeovers), the lack of legal competence among the community and bureaucracy².

In the interwar period authoritarianism as a form of governing was embodied in “personal regimes” of Bulgarian rulers. The constitutional principles were often violated. The opposition between the authorities’ branches led to the negative consequences. Permanent conflicts between legal and executive power, which were backed by various political and party interests, caused parliamentary crisis. As a rule, parliamentary governing is based on the political parties’ interaction, and weakness of the political parties stipulates weakness of the parliament as an institution. This statement can be subsumed under the political history of Bulgaria during the interwar period. Weakness of parliament intensified the role of government executive bodies, contributed to the enlargement and strengthening of the monocratic power of the head of the state. The lack of the powerful parties with huge social support in the interwar period led to the frequent change of the cabinets. Strengthening or weakening of the parliament in the political life of Bulgaria depended on how the relations in the parliament corresponded to the relations in the Bulgarian society³.

The absence of stable parties with the clear programs, factionalism, and groups’ feuds complicated the work of the parliament up to 1940. The society needed powerful government cabinets created on the basis of well-established parties, which would ensure stable

¹ M. Semov, *Dobrodeteli na bolharina*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1999, s. 121.

² T. Encheva, *Kabinet i siniata nomenklatura pritiskat chervenata vlast*, Seha (Sofia), 1997, H.2, Br.47, 4-10 dekemvry, s. 16-17.

³ T. Encheva, *Kabinet i siniata nomenklatura pritiskat chervenata vlast*, Seha (Sofia), 1997, H.2, Br.47, 4-10 dekemvry, s. 17.

parliamentary government. But, in political life, the parties, which pursued their own interests at a loss to the social interests, prevailed.

Weak parliamentary opposition, unstable parliamentary majority, small parties coalitions were interested in the way how to strengthen their own position in the parliament. Since 1935 after the resignation of K. Georgiev's government, the monarchical dictatorship of the fascist type established in the country. Under the conditions of fascism escalation in Europe, Bulgarian leading circles declared neutrality, but in fact pursued a fascist policy. After the difficult and non-democratic elections of 1940 the pro-German majority came to power, and B. Filov's cabinet on March 1, 1941 signed the treaty of Bulgarian accession to the fascist "Tripartite Pact". So, Bulgaria became an ally of Germany in the WWII.

The defeat of the Wehrmacht and the entry of the Soviet army into Bulgaria in 1944 changed the course of the Bulgarian history. In October 1944 the Allied Commission (the USSR, the USA, and the UK) and Bulgaria concluded an armistice. The power in the country was passed on to the Fatherland Front. In November 1945 a new composition of parliament was elected and later it recognized all the decrees made by the Fatherland front government as lawful ones. After 1944 the regime of the Soviet type was established in Bulgaria and parliamentarianism achieved its formal façade form. On all levels, power was in the hands of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Everything positive, that was in the experience of the prewar parliamentarianism, became lost for a long time.

On September 15, 1946 as a result of the referendum on the form of the statehood (93% of Bulgarians voted for the monarchy abolishment), Bulgaria was declared a republic. In October 1946 new parliament was elected. The Fatherland Front, which gained 70% of votes and was a coalition of democratic parties under the aegis of the Bulgarian Labour Party, dominated in it.

The process of civil society formation in Bulgaria began in the 20th c. But the civil society here was rather weak during the 20th c. In the 1st part of the century it revealed itself in the backwardness of democratic political culture and poor democratic traditions. In the 1st part of the 20th c. Bulgaria and other SEE countries were characterized by the repeated "alteration of democratic and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes and the existence of great power in the state's hands for account of widening and deepening of certain civil society's autonomy"⁴. As the development of the civil society and individual self-consciousness are deeply interrelated, it is important to discover the way this interconnection revealed itself in Bulgaria and this will contribute to understanding of modern democratic processes.

Bulgaria, as well as the other SEE countries, since the 14th c. and during the next 4-5 centuries had been developing under other conditions in comparison with the west European Christian world. Everyday vicinity with Muslims changed the communities' traditions, which

⁴ H. Fotev, *Smysl na politikata*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1999, s. 72.

had already been laid in the Orthodox World, and which became vital for Bulgarians survival under the conditions of Turkish enslavement. These circumstances prevented the appearance and strengthening of the individualism principle among the Bulgarians. H. Fotev mentions, that “civil society could not appear without the turn of the deep-rooted conservative life paradigm of the stable traditionalism”⁵.

The problem of Bulgaria modernization is also interrelated with the traditionalism overcoming and formation of civil society. The scholar believes that the socio-cultural phenomenon of modernization appears when traditionalism is removed as a barrier for the subsequent development of society, and historical memory becomes an instrument, which contributes to the development of society, but does not hamper it. The attempts of the first modernization of Bulgaria are referred to the interwar period; the second wave of modernization took place in the frames of the Soviet type system after the WWII and failed.

The peculiarities of Bulgaria democratization are stipulated by the differences of the historical processes in this Balkan country in comparison with western countries. European modernism is closely connected with the appearance of national states that became an absolutely new stage in the statehood development. For the Bulgarians the process of statehood creation was a national idea, which united the society during the struggle against the Turks. Belated formation of the statehood that took place in the late 19th c. left its mark on the Bulgarians’ social consciousness, which reveals itself even in the 21st century in the feeling of incompleteness of the national unification of the Bulgarian lands (there are scientific discussions nowadays). The idea of nation-preservation is still dominant in the Bulgarians’ mass consciousness, it feeds statehood frame of mind, which have been deeply rooted in the Bulgarian society since the time of socialistic country. Nationalism as a unified ideology was used by T. Zhykov’s regime in the late 80s (the campaign concerning the alteration of Muslim and Bulgarian names, which drew a wide negative response in the world).

New leading elite in the 90s refused from the tactic of searching for legitimacy in the national ideology. They realized that civil society formation requires the necessity for people to feel themselves citizens. It in essence changes their role in society, as a citizen acquires autonomy, which is impossible in the frames of the family, traditional society, totalitarian and paternalistic country. The process of democracy and parliamentarianism formation in Bulgaria is correlated with strangling the principle of individualism over the last two centuries. To the Bulgarians point of view, individualism is “the main constructive element of the civil society”⁶. Thus, the complicated processes in the political life of Bulgaria are stipulated by the insufficient level of the society development and citizens’ self-consciousness.

⁵ Ibidem, 74.

⁶ H. Fotev, *Smysl na politikata*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1999, s. 72.

After the WWII the development of Bulgaria according to the Soviet model did not contribute to the civil society formation. In the parliament as well as in the socialistic Bulgarian society, multi-party system was only declared. Nominally the political life of the country was characterized by the existence of such parties as – Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BAPU), which was the ally of the communists and the Fatherland Front, as the social movement. But the multi-party system was relative, as the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) held the power. Since the 50s of the 20th century the political opposition in Bulgaria was absent. So, the return to this political institution revealed many problems in the 90s of the 20th c. The multi-party system which was invented, fictitious and just kept up appearances of the BAPU and the Fatherland Front significance, led to the fact that the BCP was at the head of the parliament, politics and all other social structures. The unification of the state and the communist party precluded the autonomy of the individual.

It was vital to help out the country of the social and economic crisis. If till 1989 pre-reform social order was based on the absence of civism and political democracy and was carried out in the frames of central planned economy, then democratization at the beginning of reconstructing was understood as formation of civism, political democracy, new institutional norms and markets⁷. But expectations for rapid changes were illusive; they did not take into consideration their previous experience.

For several times since the late 19th c. Bulgaria has started implementation of radical reforms, which were to have led the country to the cardinal accelerated development. But all the attempts failed. In accordance with a number of Bulgarian researchers' observations, the attempts to overcome the antagonism between the strengthening of social and economic interests, which characterized the early stages of modernization, and the necessity for various social strata representation in the authorities, which is vital for democracy, failed⁸.

The mission of modern parliamentarianism is to soften social confrontation and to widen civilized forms of various social strata. To some extent it is embodied in the work of the Bulgarian parliament. Only at the end of the 20th c. for the first time in the Bulgarian history, rights of a personality, his/her dignity and safety were proclaimed the highest state value in the new Constitution (July 12, 1991). But there is a long gap between the declaration of aims and tasks, and their practical realization. And even after a quarter of a century many researches still skeptically appraise the approaching to the solution of these tasks. It is necessary to highlight that at the beginning of transformation (1989) civil society in Bulgaria was just reviving. The society was socially homogenous, as the social differentiation had just begun, and the group identification was absent. Many Bulgarian researchers state that revolutionary changes took place in the country where there were no revolutionary conditions, but where the crisis

⁷ D. Minev, *Prekhod – iluzii i realnost, v: Prekhodyt v Bylhariia prez pohleda na sotsialnite nauki*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1997, s. 66.

⁸ G. Dimitrov, P. Cabakchieva, G. Keosev, *Russia and Bulgaria: Farewell Democracy*, Sofia, 1996, s. 27.

of legitimacy began and which overgrew into the political crisis that formed new rules of the game.

Till the end of the 80s the Bulgarian society was dissatisfied with some members of BCP's political-bureau and government, but not with the regime in general. The Bulgarians quite understood the growth of the economic crisis and inefficiency of the "cosmetic reforms" carried out by T. Zhivkov's regime and inability of the leading class to sustain the crisis⁹. Social and economic transformation as "the revolution from the top" was implemented by the supreme party elite in their own interests. This elite was the only group who had clearly defined group-consciousness, based on the safeguarding their privileged status¹⁰. Social breakdown took place when the former Bulgarian communist elite exchanged their political power for leading economic positions and privileges that could happen only in a weak society, which hadn't had time to form its group interests. The wave of the meetings in Bulgaria during the first years of transformation showed the desire to change the political system. The establishment of the democratic parliament institution helped to change the unconstructive street confrontation for the struggle of political and social interests in the institutional frames of representative authority.

At first the tasks of transformation were to weaken the absolute control of the BCP, which was in power, and to create the balanced authority made of various social groups¹¹. The Constitution (1991), which legalized social and economic changes in the country, had been preceded by the talks between the opposition and the BCP during the round table conferences (first part of 1990). 26 oppositional political groups and movements took part in creation of the new rules of political cooperation. During the talks between the BCP's elite (later renamed into the BSP) and the opposition, represented by the Union of Democratic Forces (the UDF), which had got stronger in various discussions, the agreements as to the principles of the subsequent democratic system and security assurance for the BCP's elite were achieved. Many UDF's representatives later on became leading politicians in the country. The draft of the law on the recognition of the multi-party system was made up in spring 1990 at the round table conferences. Political pluralism was consolidated in the Constitution in 1991 and later the laws on political parties and regress of the BCP's property into the state's ownership were approved.

The role of the round table, which was in the origins of the country's democratization, more and more draws the attention of the Bulgarian researchers. Its work was stipulated not only by the BCP's position but also by the increasing social tension and the process of young

⁹ R. Peeva, Roliata na Bylharskata Kryhla masa v protsesa na perekhod kym demokratsia, *Sotsiolohicheskie problemy*, Sofia, 1999, Br. 1, s. 135.

¹⁰ G.Vladimirov, T. Todorov, J. Catcarsky, Bulgaria in the circle of anomie, *Comparative anomie research*, Brookfield, 1999, s. 48.

¹¹ D. Minev, M. Zheliazkova, Bylharia: razhdaneto na kapitalisma i na ikonomicheska ratsionalnost, *Sotsiolohicheskie problemy*, Sofia, 2000. – Br. 3-4, s. 118.

democratic power formation, which, for a long time, hadn't had an opportunity to be in opposition.

From its beginning the process of transformation in Bulgaria was moving towards democratization and parliamentarianism, as the system of governing that presupposed the existence of the multi-party system in the society and the opposition to the ruling majority in the legislative body, which creates the foundations of the talks as a subsequent governing tool. Even before the legislating formation of the new regime with the help of the constitution, the round table conference helped to work out the principles of the future democratic system.

Its meeting was presupposed by the political crisis, which occurred after the resignation of A. Lukanov's socialist government in the late 1990. The practice of holding round table conferences as a mechanism of political crisis solving was fixed in the Bulgarian constitution: the Advisory National Security Council, headed by the president of the country, was created. The experience achieved during the negotiations between the political elites was further used in the parliamentary practice¹². The subsequent development of the democratic processes is stipulated by the so-called "agreement" between the supreme party elite and politicians-democrats. There was a differentiation of labor between them: political language was developed by the intellectuals and structural reforms were carried out by the old political elite, which did not forget about their own interests in the new social and economic conditions. P. Cabakchieva states that the success as to the fundamental ideological issues was achieved during the round table conferences, but the mechanisms of their maintenance were not worked out and this slowed down the pace of the reforms, especially in the economy of Bulgaria¹³.

The broadened composition of the parliament – the Great National Assembly established the parliamentary republic in Bulgaria and according to the constitution of 1991 the parliament is a legislative body, the government is the executive body and the president is the mediator between these political institutions. H. Bliznashki states that the problem of achieving the balance between the separated authorities is a key issue not only for Bulgaria but also for any normal parliamentary system, and the history of parliamentarianism is a search for the magical formula of maintenance of the stable balance between the parliament and the government. The search for this formula is complicated as in practice, the centre of balance in the state politics constantly changes and the close cooperation between all spheres of authority in ensuring the legal regulation of social processes is necessary¹⁴.

Revealing the thesis given in the subtitle, it is necessary to mention that ideally the national representatives' activity should be aimed at achieving social benefit. But the Bulgarian reality differs from the ideal model. Parliamentary democracy, which revived in the late 20th

¹² R. Peeva, *Roliata na Bylharskata Kryhla masa v protsesa na perekhod kym demokratsia, Sotsiolohicheskie problemy*, Sofia, 1999, Br. 1, s. 142-143.

¹³ G. Dimitrov, P. Cabakchieva, G. Keosev, *Russia and Bulgaria: Farewell Democracy*, Sofia, 1996, s.55.

¹⁴ H. Bliznashki, *Parlamentanoto upravlenie v Bylharii*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1995, s. 37.

c., now is in the process of formation, when party structures have not stabilized yet, and the inner-party splits are real both for the historical parties and the leading parties of the transitional period – the UDF and the BSP. It influences the parliamentary activity as the parties do not represent the interests of the wide strata, but “serve mainly the interests of the elite and a part of middle class, assuring the stability of a new more democratic system for the others”¹⁵.

The Bulgarian parliament, or the National Assembly, is a single-chamber system, which is elected once in 4 years among 240 deputies, who represent various political parties, which surmount 4% barrier during the elections. The control over the activity of the parliament as a legislative body is taken by the president with the help of veto and the Constitutional Court, which can abolish any adopted law. The parliament plays a key role in formation, structuring and changing of governments, decision making processes as to national referendums, approving state loans, ratification and termination of the most important international agreements, declaring military situation. While forming the government, the parliament chooses the prime minister. The parliamentary majority offers its candidate for the position, and then the head of the government forms the cabinet. As the government must have the vote of confidence from the parliament, it is elected by the parliamentary voting. This circumstance limits the capabilities of the cabinet’s head to change the composition of the government.

The parliamentary system of Bulgaria depicts the idea of rational parliamentarianism, when the constitutional system has judicial techniques to keep stability and power of the government when there is no parliamentary majority. The relationship between the government and parliament is revealed in their cooperation in carrying out the functions of each other and controlling each other’s work. The Bulgarian parliament controls the government’s activity by means of classical techniques of requests and inquiries. But if the time for the deputies’ requests and inquiries is limited and the deputies’ speeches are restricted to the short statements concerning the certain problem, then there is nothing of that sort as to the ministers’ answers. This circumstance let the latter have the advantage in the course of discussion. Such type of parliament’s work presupposes transition to the general consideration of a case after the concrete inquiry, including 1/5 of deputies. The parliamentary opposition has a right of discussion the problems concerning the governmental activities, but it is extremely limited by the majority’s will, and the position of parliamentary groups is not taken into consideration.

The parliamentary opposition has a right to cause the dissolution of the government by raising the issue of no-confidence to the government. The right to raise the issue of no-confidence can be achieved with the help of 1/5 of deputies, i.e. 48 persons. Qualified majority is necessary for the government to be resigned. In case, when the parliament expresses no-confidence to the prime minister and the cabinet of ministers, the cabinet loses its powers. If the parliament does not support the issue of no-confidence, then voting as to this matter can be

¹⁵ L. Miteva, *Razvitie partiinykh sistem v stranakh Tsentralno-Vostochnoi Evropy v perekhodnoi period*, Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriya 12: Politicheskie nauki, Moscow, 2000, nr. 6, s.49.

held only in 6 months. This norm allows defending the government from constant parliamentary attacks. The national assembly can raise the issue of both overall governmental policy and just a concrete case. While voting it is enough for the government to get simple majority, for the decision to be taken for its benefit. Though, according to the Constitution the parliament is the highest power in the country, the executive branch, represented by the government, from time to time becomes the centre of all powers in the country and this, to the point of view of many political scientists, diminishes parliament's responsibilities, but does not change the model of the authorities¹⁶.

The main function of the parliament is a legislative one. Every deputy has a right of legislative initiative. The same right has the ministers' council as a collective body and the president. The activity of every composition of a parliament since 1989 has its own peculiarities, but among them we can single out the work of the 36th National Assembly (1992-1994). Reinforcement of the right powers, liberal politicians from the oppositional UDF activated parliament's work in the sphere of adoption laws, which contributed to the cardinal changes in the life of the Bulgarian society. The results of the elections did not guarantee majority for any political power. The confrontation that took place between the BSP and the UDF during the pre-election battles went on inside the parliament and as a result of this 220 laws and 272 decisions were adopted. Among them one can single out a number of laws which accelerated the changes in the political and economic systems of the country. This composition of the parliament adopted the Law on transformation and privatization of the state and communal enterprises, and a number of restitution laws: the laws on renewal the ownership right in the sphere of trade (shops, workshops, storehouses, tailoring shops), the law, according to which the movable and immovable property of the BCP, the BAPU, the Fatherland Front, the YCL, trade unions etc., which had been received by them after September 9, 1944, was returned to the state ownership.

In the parliamentary republic of Bulgaria the president's prerogatives are strictly limited. The relations between the Bulgarian parliament and president are based just to guarantee the independence of the legislative body. The date of convocation of the parliament is fixed in the Constitution. The Bulgarian president cannot dissolve the parliament ahead of time. He can use his right of dissolving the National Assembly, which is backed up by the parliament, only in the case when all constitutional opportunities as to the government formation are confined. At the same time according to the constitution, he is obliged to specify the date of the new parliamentary elections. In order to avoid the development of the parliamentary crisis into the general political crisis, the parliament cannot be dissolved during the last 3 months of the presidential powers. Such immunity of the parliament has its negative side, it can cause a situation

¹⁶ L. Miteva, *Razvitie partiinykh sistem v stranakh Tsentralno-Vostochnoi Evropy v perekhodnoi period*, Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriya 12: Politicheskie nauki, Moscow, 2000, nr. 6, s. 49.

when the composition and work of the parliament do not satisfy the society, and the effective government cannot be created¹⁷.

The institution of the president is a subject of controversy and doubtful interpretations. The constitutional status of the head of the country presupposes his active role in the political life of the country. Being the highest official, he plays the role of a person who unites everyone, the role of a peculiar republican monarch¹⁸. Researchers, in their theoretical investigations, sharply criticize this presidential function of a referee due to its ambiguity and indeterminacy. Arbitration function of the president is interpreted in the following ways: 1) the head of the country – the highest instance, who takes final decisions; 2) the head of the country, who maintains neutrality, does not interfere with the political game while its rules are not violated. The last interpretation is close to the idea, which is mentioned in the Constitution of Bulgaria. According to it, there is no way to create the presidential authoritarian regime. On the whole, the efficiency of the president's interference with the politics depends on his authority and action pattern more, than on his constitutional powers.

The institution of the president is assessed by the Bulgarian researchers in different ways: some believe it to be a weak and powerless one, other appraise the president's powers as temperate, which correspond to the president's place in the parliamentary republic. In most cases the president's interference with these or those issues is judicially based, but in general its powers has moral character, which allows the president to give recommendations and make demands on other authoritative bodies, namely to address to the Constitutional court. Active role of the president in the process of politics formation is ensured by the political acts, such as address to the nation and to the parliament.

The relations between the president and the parliament in the Bulgarian parliamentary republic are built just to guarantee the independence of the parliament. The date of convocation of the parliament is fixed in the Constitution. Newly elected parliament is convened by the president not later than in a month after the elections. If it does not happen, then 1/5 of deputies is enough to convene the parliament. According to the Constitution, in case when, the agreement as to the government formation is not reached, the president appoints acting government and dissolves the parliament, fixing the date of the new parliamentary elections¹⁹. This is the only case which allows the president to dissolve the parliament. Such immunity of the parliament is believed to slow down the recovery from political recession and that is why, it is necessary to mention in the amendments to the Constitution, the procedures, which will give an opportunity to renew the parliament quickly²⁰.

¹⁷ H. Bliznashki, *Parlamentanoto upravlenie v Bylharii*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1995, s. 76.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, s. 71.

¹⁹ *Konstitutsiia na Republika Bylharii*. Prieta ot Velikoto narodno sbranie 12 yuli 1991., Sofia, Nova Zvezda, 2002, s. 40.

²⁰ H. Bliznashki, *Parlamentanoto upravlenie v Bylharii*, Sofia, UI Stopanstvo, 1995, s. 76.

The relations between the president and the government escalated when the odds in the National Assembly were in favor of left or right forces. In 1992 president Zh. Zhelev criticized F. Dimitrov's government. Both political leaders belonged to the Union of Democratic Forces; Zh. Zhelev was the first UDF's head, and F. Dimitrov took up this position later. Being the head of the country, Zh. Zhelev pursued a policy, aimed at maintaining the balance between various social groups and achieving the national harmony. The cabinet of right forces due to its extremism created some tension in the country, and therefore caused sharp criticism on the part of extra-parliamentary opposition of trade unions.

In 1995 the confrontation between two authority institutions was extremely escalated, when the socialistic government tried to limit the president's power. Zh. Zhelev offered to amend the Constitution by broadening the power of the president. But he was accused of attempts to create dictatorship, interfere with the work of the parliament and government, and control the work of the Constitutional Court. The struggle in the parliament affected the legislative activity. The president used his right to return laws as requiring improvement. The presidential amendments concerned those laws, which were aimed at establishing a non-communistic country. The parliamentary majority, consisted of the socialists, ignored all Zh. Zhelev's amendments.

After a decade of the right politicians' presidency (Zh. Zhelev, P. Stoianov) since 2001 the socialist H. Pirvanov twice has been elected as president of the country. He came out for stoppage of the struggle between the authoritative institutions and believed that it was possible to achieve stability, if the power was divided between the authoritative bodies, but not in case of their separation or confrontation. In 2011 Rosen Asenov Plevneliev was elected as president. The fifth president of Bulgaria is a politician and entrepreneur. He was a minister of regional development in the centre-right government CEBD (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria). In economic policy the president stands for the tax lowering, business maintenance and budget gap reduction. Someone believed Plevneliev's victory as a step towards strict economic reforms but it did not happen. The president carries out his responsibilities and does not interfere with the work of the parliament.

Thus, it should be mentioned that stabilization of the state institutions includes statehood strengthening guarantees. The relationship between the government and parliament is revealed in their cooperation in carrying out the functions of each other and controlling each other's work. Mutual threat of losing their power by all authoritative bodies is aimed at maintenance of balance between them and at creation of preconditions for constructive cooperation. The Bulgarian parliament controls the government's activity by means of classical techniques of requests and inquiries.

Правовий статус арбітражного керуючого у справі про банкрутство в Україні

Проаналізовано існуючі погляди щодо природи правового статусу арбітражного керуючого в Україні. Охарактеризовано загальний, спеціальний та індивідуальний правовий статус арбітражного керуючого у справі про банкрутство. Встановлено, що арбітражний керуючий є специфічним учасником справи про банкрутство, що володіє особливим публічно-правовим статусом, зумовленим особливостями справ про банкрутство.

Ключові слова: арбітражний керуючий, банкрутство, неплатоспроможність, справа про банкрутство.

The legal status of the arbitration manager in bankruptcy case in Ukraine

The existing views on the nature of the legal status of the arbitration manager in Ukraine are analyzed. The characteristic of the general, special and individual legal status of the arbitration manager in bankruptcy case is made. It is established that the trustee in bankruptcy is a specific participant of the bankruptcy case that has a specific public law status, due to the peculiarities of bankruptcy cases.

Keywords: arbitration manager, bankruptcy, insolvency, bankruptcy case.

Implementation of insolvency proceedings in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Restoring Debtor Solvency or Declaring a Debtor Bankrupt” (hereinafter – the Bankruptcy Law) assigned to a particular participant of a bankruptcy case – arbitration manager. This notion can be used in two ways: as a representative of the profession – that person who, in accordance with the law, received a certificate to act as the arbitration administrator, and as a general name of property managers, rehabilitation managers and liquidators. However, despite a number of legal norms to regulate the activity of arbitration manager, the question of the legal status of him remains to be controversial.

In legal theory the concept of “legal status of person” is commonly understood as a system of enshrined in legal instruments and state-guaranteed rights, freedoms, duties, responsibilities, according to which the individual as a legal subject (i.e. having a personality) coordinate his behavior in society¹. Common is the separation of legal person statuses into three categories:

1. general, which refers to the status of a person as a citizen of the state, enshrined in the Constitution and other legislation;
2. special, which arises from the special features of certain groups of citizens, separated by a certain legal and important principle (occupation, age, etc.). The status of such categories of persons includes special additional rights and obligations pursuant to special legislation;
3. individual, which is a whole set of personalized rights and duties of the individual.

The Russian scholar N. Zahorolnyh considers it appropriate to distribute presented above theoretical construction gradation legal status into three main types (general, generic and individual) with respect to the arbitration manager². The general legal status of the arbitration manager means the sum of the basic rights and obligations of the arbitration manager, a set of legal requirements to this subject, the system of responsibility measures of this subject. The special status of the arbitration manager should be understood as the features of his legal status at various stages of proceedings in bankruptcy case – a legal status of property manager, rehabilitation manager and liquidator. Individual status of the arbitration manager is a personalized set of rights and obligations of this subject in a particular bankruptcy case.

The general legal status of the arbitration manager reveals through his set of common rights and obligations, the requirements raised to him, the order of appointment and removal of the arbitration administrator in bankruptcy case, fees and responsibilities. Arbitration manager – the key person in a case of insolvency, during legal proceedings has influence on the efficiency of legal proceedings of bankruptcy and, ultimately, the efficiency of satisfaction of creditor's claims³.

To obtain the License for the activity of arbitration manager, a person must meet certain requirements. In particular, the arbitration administrator must be a citizen of Ukraine who has completed higher legal or economic education and professional experience for not less than three years or one year in senior positions after receiving a complete higher education, trained for six months in the manner prescribed by state authority on bankruptcy, owns national language and has passed the qualifying examination. In the enterprises that are engaged in activities related to state secrets, trustee in bankruptcy must have an access to state secrets,

¹ Скакун О. Ф. Теория держави і права: Підручник / О. Ф. Скакун / Пер. з рос. – Харків: Консум, 2006. – р. 377.

² Захорольных Н. В. Особенности административно-правового статуса арбитражного управляющего / Наталья Вадимовна Захорольных // Юридическая наука. – 2012. – № 4. – р. 70.

³ Pokotilo A. Legal regulation of Insolvency (Bankruptcy) in Ukrainian Legislation // Ukrainian Law Firms 2005: A Handbook for Foreign Clients – Uridicheskaya prakticka publishing, 2005. – р. 23.

and in his absence – to get this admission by procedure established by law (Art. 97 of the Bankruptcy Law).

In the event of damage to the debtor or creditors activities, the arbitration manager's activity is subject to compulsory insurance. The procedure of compulsory insurance of the arbitration manager's activity is determined by the law.

The candidature of the arbitration manager (property manager, rehabilitation manager and liquidator) to fulfill the duties of a property manager is determined by the court using the automated system from among the persons listed in the Unified Register of arbitration managers (property managers, rehabilitation managers and liquidators) of Ukraine.

Automated procedure for selection of candidates for the appointment of court-appointed trustees in bankruptcy cases thoroughly covered by the Provision of an automated system for the selection of candidates for the appointment of the arbitration administrator in bankruptcy cases, approved by the Plenum of the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine on the 16th of January, 2013⁴.

By a decision of acceptance of the application for bankruptcy proceedings Commercial Court defines an arbitration manager, required by automated system, to apply for participation in the relevant case within the prescribed term of this definition. Arbitration manager appointed by the automated system within three days of receipt of the decision on approval of the application for bankruptcy proceedings is obliged to provide to the commercial court his involvement in the case with the message that he does not belong to any of the categories of persons referred to in ch. 2, Art. 114 of the Bankruptcy Law, in hard copy and/or to provide his consent electronically to the email address from which he received the appropriate decision. If the arbitration manager didn't give the consent to the Commercial Court to become the property manager in this case, the property manager is appointed by the court without using the automated system from a number of persons listed in the Unified Register of arbitration managers of Ukraine.

Property manager is appointed for the entire period of the management of debtor's property procedure, i.e. for one hundred and fifteen days and this period may be extended by the Commercial Court in the case of extension procedures disposition of property of the debtor for not more than two months.

The candidature of the arbitration manager to fulfill the duties of the rehabilitation manager or liquidator is determined by the court at the request of the creditors' committee, and in the absence of such a request – on the initiative of the court, except as provided by law on bankruptcy. However, during the appointment of the arbitration manager (rehabilitation managers

⁴ Положення про автоматизовану систему з відбору кандидатів на призначення арбітражного керуючого у справах про банкрутство, затверджене Постановою Пленуму Вищого господарського суду України від 16 січня 2013 р. № 1 // Вісник господарського судочинства. – 2013. – № 1. – Ст. 7.

and liquidators) Commercial Court is not associated with court-appointed trustees candidates proposed by the creditors committee and may appoint arbitration manager by himself.

Payment for the services of a property manager is done by advancing the remuneration of property manager by the applicant (creditor or debtor). The amount of the down payment is paid to the escrow account of the notary and the bankruptcy administrator shall be paid for each month of the performance of the powers of a property manager. Monetary compensation for the arbitration manager for the performance of the powers of managers and liquidators consists of primary and additional gratuities. Basic remuneration for the performance of the arbitration administrator powers managers and liquidators determined in the amount of two average monthly salaries of managers of the debtor in the last twelve months of his work for the introduction of commercial court procedures for readjustment of the debtor or the opening of the liquidation procedure of bankrupt each month implementation arbitration administrator powers rehabilitation manager or liquidator . Additional remuneration for the performance of the arbitration administrator powers rehabilitation manager is determined in the amount of 5 percent of the amount collected for the benefit of the debtor's assets (cash refund, property, property rights) that on the day of commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy were from third parties, and 3 percent on the amount of canceled claims bankruptcy creditors.

Commercial Court in bankruptcy has the wide range of powers that allow him to control and coordinate the activities of all participants in bankruptcy proceedings, particularly arbitration manager. The new version of the Bankruptcy Law further expanded court opportunities to influence the activity of the arbitration manager. In particular, now the court may exempt the arbitration administrator from executing the duties of property manager, rehabilitation manager and liquidator even on court's own initiative, without waiting for the receipt of complaints about his actions.

The special legal status of the arbitration manager appears in separation of the profession arbitration manager for three distinct types – property managers, rehabilitation managers and liquidators. This division is of practical importance because allows to consider the features of the arbitration manager's activity at corresponding stage of the proceedings in the bankruptcy case.

Property manager – an individual acting under the ruling of the commercial court or by the appointment of the government authority on bankruptcy, who according to this Law has authority for supervision and control over the management and disposal of debtor's property during the proceedings in the bankruptcy case in the manner prescribed by this Law.

Rehabilitation manager – an individual who, under the decision of the commercial court or by the appointment of the government authority on bankruptcy, organizes readjustment of the debtor.

Liquidator – a person who, under the decision of the commercial court or by the appointment of the government authority on bankruptcy organizes the liquidation procedure for the

debtor, declared bankrupt, and provides for fulfillment of creditors' claims, confirmed by the court in the manner established by the Bankruptcy Law.

Individual legal status of arbitration manager is caused by the merits of the case, especially the kind of judicial procedures applicable to the insolvent debtor and the general focus of the proceedings in the bankruptcy case.

In certain aspects, the arbitration manager in bankruptcy case can be considered as a subject of employment relationships. This is most clearly manifested in the process of readjustment when rehabilitation manager replaces the head of the debtor. In this case, in relation to the employees of the debtor arbitration manager in bankruptcy case acts as employer, entering into or breaking labor contracts. These actions of the arbitration manager are governed by labor law. In addition, the relationships between the arbitration administrator and the debtor at first glance may seem to be labor because rehabilitation manager actually performs the functions of the head of labor and receives money for thus activity, which essentially are the wages. On the other hand, there are no employment relationships between rehabilitation manager and the debtor, because firstly, the company doesn't represent the will to conclude the contract with the arbitration administrator, and secondly, the arbitration administrator is appointed by the Commercial Court.

However, in any case, the arbitration manager in bankruptcy case remains to be the subject of independent professional activity who works primarily for himself, hoping to receive appropriate remuneration for his activity. The assignment of arbitration managers to subjects of independent professional activity is a novel in Ukrainian law. Before the arbitration administrator could only be a natural person – a business entity, but now the requirement of registration as entrepreneur is canceled. This change in the legal status of arbitration managers to some extent equates them to judges, lawyers and notaries, which certainly enhances the credibility and value of this profession in society.

The arbitration manager can't be attributed to the bodies of a legal entity – debtor because his activities are not provided by statutory documents and the arbitration manager is appointed by Commercial Court, but not by the general meeting of the participants of a legal entity – debtor.

Russian scientist V. Salata, exploring the legal status of the arbitration manager in the process of external control, correctly notes that the external manager is neither a body of the debt nor the head of the company-debt. Combining the elements of legal statuses of each of them, the external manager is the subject of competitive relationships, has a special labor-law status, defined by aims and objectives of external control procedures⁵.

Quite common in the literature is the view that the arbitration manager is regarded as a public authority. G. Shershenevich considered bankruptcy trustee (bankruptcy

⁵ Салата Н. В. Трудовой статус арбитражного управляющего / Н. В. Салата // Вестник Томского государственного университета. – 2007. – № 296. – с. 224.

administration) as a public authority, designed to perform a public function, the aim of which is to protect the public interest (the State). In this regard, the pre-revolutionary scientist said: "Indeed, bankruptcy administration is obliged to fulfill his task of possible complete satisfaction of creditors, trying if it is possible to keep the interests of the debtor. But this phenomenon is not entirely consistent with the concept at a particular party. Obviously, competitive trustee may not be the representative of the debtor or its creditors. This by itself conclude that competition trustee or bankruptcy management is a public authority – authority acting under the direct supervision of the court, like the bailiffs"⁶. Modern Russian scientist V. Popondopulo has similar views on the nature of the legal status of the arbitration manager, and indicates that the trustee in bankruptcy substantially participates in enforcement proceedings – body arbitration and enforcement of judicial decisions in the relevant enforcement procedures (procedures, supervision, external management, bankruptcy proceedings)⁷.

Another Russian scientist A. Larin, exploring the legal nature of the action arbitration administrator in the bankruptcy case, said: "If you do agree that arbitration manager as part of the insolvency representative functions are missing, it can be concluded that it is in bankruptcy pursue their own interests, especially since the law itself encourages such an interpretation"⁸.

The arbitration manager in bankruptcy case must act in the interests of the debtor, creditors and society simultaneously. But it doesn't mean that he is a representative of anyone of these subjects because representative can act only in the interests of the parties in the case. Given this, it must be noted that the arbitration manager is the bearer of his own rights, duties and interests, and has a special public status.

Arbitration manager is one of the key figures in bankruptcy case, which significantly affects the fate of the debtor and his property. In bankruptcy case, according to court procedure applicable to the debtor, arbitration manager may act as property manager, rehabilitation manager or liquidator. Arbitration manager has a specific legal status which depends on specific features of the proceedings applicable to the debtor in bankruptcy case.

Thus, the arbitration manager is a special entity, appointed under the Bankruptcy Law. Trustee in bankruptcy has specific tasks for which he granted specific powers due to the nature and direction of the bankruptcy proceedings. Arbitration manager is neither a a body of the debt nor the head of the company-debt. Arbitration manager is a specific member of the bankruptcy case, which has a special public law status, due to the peculiarities of the bankruptcy cases.

⁶ Шершеневич Г. Ф. Конкурсный процесс / Г. Ф. Шершеневич. – М. : «Статут», 2000. – р. 324.

⁷ Попондопуло В. Ф. Конкурсное право / В. Ф. Попондопуло. – С. : Юристь, 2001. – р. 143.

⁸ Ларин А. М. Юридическая природа действий арбитражного управляющего в деле о банкротстве de lege lata / А. М. Ларин // Известия Юго-Западного государственного университета. Серия История и право. – 2012. – № 2. – Ч. 2. – р. 36.

Взаємодія держави, соціального партнерства та відповідального бізнесу при реалізації соціальної політики в країнах ЄС

У статті досліджено взаємодію держави при реалізації соціальної політики, з соціальним партнерством та соціально-відповідальним бізнесом у країнах ЄС. Бізнесові кола починають реалізовувати у своїх внутрішніх корпоративних відносинах принципи соціальної відповідальності і партнерства, закладені в європейській соціальній моделі, демонструють розуміння, що сучасна політика й економіка значно залежить від якості людських ресурсів, інтелектуального капіталу, здатного забезпечити розвиток сучасних суспільств. Певну роль тут відіграє громадянське суспільство, частиною якого є соціально-відповідальний бізнес, демонструючи активність у розвитку держав.

Ключові слова: соціальна держава, соціальна політика, соціальне партнерство, соціально-відповідальний бізнес, Європейський Союз, Європейська Комісія, транснаціональні корпорації.

The Interaction of a State, Social Partnership and Responsible Business in Realization of Social Policy in EU Countries

In this article the author analyzes the interaction of a state during implementation of social policy with social partnership and social-responsible business in countries of EU. Business circles start realizing principles of social responsibility and partnership in their corporate relations, laid in the basis of the European social model, demonstrating their comprehension of the fact that modern economy more and more depends on the quality of human resources, intellectual capital, which is able to ensure development of modern societies. Civil society, and socially-responsible business, which is a part of it, plays an important role, displaying activity in the states' development.

Keywords: Social state, social policy, social partnership, socially responsible business, European Union, European Committee, transnational corporations.

In developed countries of the world modern systems of social policy and social partnership were formed in the early 40s of the 20th c. The European Social Charter (1961) became the main document regulating social policy, and it proclaimed human right for social progress. Over the time of its functioning the EU has accumulated great experience of social policy development and usage of social partnership in various forms and at various levels. Social policy and social partnership are being developed at enterprises, branches of industry, states, and within the EU community. Social policy covers all spheres of people's vital activity, viz. political, industrial, social, spiritual, and regulates relations between society, groups, communities and an individual in every of these spheres and in zones of their interaction. To wide extent the notion of "social policy" means leading role of a state, which is based on the system of rules (norms), normative structures, which make decisions and organize activity contributing to drawing in various subjects to the political processes. The aim of such influence is to assist in forming the community of interests of the general public and consolidating the society, to obtain the state's support. While interpreting the notion of "social partnership" it is necessary to accentuate that this is a testing instrument of social policy, which is directly connected with the social structure of any society. In every state all spheres and groups of population in the course of community's improvement try to ensure their own interests and prosperity and that is why they are to cooperate with each other.

The European Union has rich experience in developing social policy and using social partnership in various forms and at various levels: at enterprises, various spheres of economy, countries and in the EU. Social partnership is an experimental instrument of social policy, directly connected with the social structure of any society. All segments of people in every country during the process of community improvement tend to meet their own needs and welfare, and that is why they must correlate with each other.

The policy of social partnership was initiated by entrepreneurs, and trade unions, being their opponents, had to accept this innovation. Gradually, the social dialogue grew, solved and leveled those sharp social conflicts in labor relationship, which had existed previously, and partners positively evaluated the advantages and preferences of a dialogue. The representatives of capital and management made it quicker than trade unions. All in all, the latter learned to benefit it. With time the appropriate scale of values and balance of mutual concessions appeared. Despite the obvious success of European policy of social partnership, it must be admitted that confrontation between social partners has not disappeared, though it has transformed into other forms and revealed itself in other ways. Entrepreneurs and trade unions are equally interested in applying generally accepted forms of conflict settlement and social stress relieving without any detriment to production development.

In this context corporate social policy is of exceptional interest. Against this background the previously determined interests of social opponents merge into a single unity. In Europe as on other continents, social shocks and misfortune are caused by the incompatibility of many

modern situations and old social orders. The processes that determine the development of the modern world, and first of all globalization, have led to appearance of innovations and new technologies in many spheres, in particular in the social one.

To great extent they touched the problem of social partnership. The fair-sized activity of the enterprises, which have exceeded the national limits, is of special significance in economy development. The need to coordinate social and labor relationship on the international market level has appeared. The transnational corporations (TNC) better than other could grasp the point of innovations, including social ones, and therefore evaluate the potential of social partnership. And no wonder, as they act in global scale, and hence they have global vision of problems.

Recently in the EU and the EU member countries a number of documents, conventions and agreements in the EU social and labor rights have been adopted, many union contracts and other documents have been signed, social codes of enterprises¹, which are of great interest for the study, have appeared. During the last years the study of social problems is in the focus of many researchers, in particular Russian² and Ukrainian³ ones. They wish to represent the new conceptual understanding of these problems from the position of various social sciences⁴. In the frames of political science literature the social problems are rarely appealed

¹ The Treaty of Amsterdam // European Union: the Past, Present, Future. – M.: Pravo, 1999. – 192 p.; The Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty) // The Collection of the International Legal Documents, Regulating Migration Problems / The International Organization for Migration. – M.: MOM, 1994. – Pp. 147-151; The EU Constitutional Acts (as Revised by the Treaty of Lisbon) / transl. by Hennadii Druzenko and Svitlana Druzenko, ed. by Hennadii Druzenko. – K.: K.I.S., 2010. – 536 p.; Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union: Document Drawn up on the Basis of COM (97) 2000 Final / EU, EC. – Luxembourg: EUR-OP, 1997. – 149 p.; The Treaty on European Union (in the Original Version d/d February 7, 1992) / T.K. Hartley // Fundamentals of European Union Laws / T.K. Hartley. – M.: Zakon i pravo: YUNITI, 1998. – Pp. 623-633; The Report on the Progress of the Countries of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010 – Ukraine (26/05/2011) [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://ceas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/2011_05_26_01_uk.htm; Kopiika V.V. European Union: the History and Principles of Functioning: workbook / V.V. Kopiika, T.I. Shynkarenko; ed. by L.V. Huberskyi. – K.: Znannia, 2009. – 751 p.

² M.K. Horshkov, Social Situation in Russia in Focus of Public Opinion, Sotsis, 2006, nr. 12, s. 3-8; N.E. Tikhonova, The Optimal of Social Policy in Mass Vision, Sotsis, 2006, nr. 12, s. 9-10; V. Rimskii, Social Policy as a Method of Social Problem Solution, ONIS, 2006, nr. 5, s. 92-96; Social Responsibility of Business: Actual Totice, ed. by Lytovchenko S.E., Korsakov M. I., - M., Assotsiatsiia Menedzherov, 2006.

³ A. Karvatskyi, Underclass and Culture of Poverty in the Hearth of Former State Agricultural Enterprises in the Context of Theoretical and Interpretational Discussions, Social Science: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 2005, nr. 1, s. 36-65; N.V. Kovalisko Stratificational Orders of Society: Conceptual Visions and Experience of Study, K.: Institute of Social Sciences NAS of Ukraine, 2008, s. 240; N.P. Kolhanova, Yu.H. Hnatenko, Poverty in Ukraine as Social Phenomenon, The Reform of Social and Credit System of Transitional Economy of Ukraine. The Collection of Scholarly Works, K., 2000, s. 139 -151.

⁴ I.H. Yasaveev, Construction of Social Problems by the Means of Mass Media, Kazan: Kazan University Publishing House, 2004, s. 199; Conceptualization of the Social Problem, Social Policy and Social Work in the Changeable Russia / ed. by E.I. Yarska-Smirnova, P.V. Romanova, M., 2002, s. 28-37.

to, in particular these questions are analyzed by A. Silenko⁵, O. Skrypnyk⁶, N. Khoma⁷. But there is some uncertainty in interpreting social problems, which requires political analysis and solution.

In the sphere of social partnership of the new type in the EU there are quite active TNC, which use it to improve the work of their enterprises. They strive for acquiring the status of so-called European companies and take certain commitments in the sphere of social partnership, which are fixed in the legal documents. The EU legitimates formulary social innovations. Namely, in TNC, where administrations successfully cooperate with powerful trade unions, appear new forms and new levels of social partnership, which are connected with control functions.

It should be mentioned that the new phenomenon does not get accustomed to any place and any time. It must overcome business resistance, which is not always ready to admit the organizations of working population to get information as to enterprises' activity, management and planning. The deterrent role is often played by a state and its national traditions, which come into conflict with the all-European goals.

Transforming to meet the needs of time, the EU passed to the strategic planning of economic development and social sphere. Nowadays it positions itself as a "network country", implying the idea of the network principle in management and building the organizations, which are called to solve global problems with the assistance of all social partners. It is made possible by modern technical and informational means, and the development of the economy, based on knowledge, presupposes the availability of regular personnel, which can implement the ideas into life. That is the way how local networks, which ensured the connection between the local authorities and trade unions and their mutual activity, have been created. Having none of their own resources trade unions receive great access to municipal facilities and gain control over their expenses for the benefit of local communities.

On the other side there are international networks, which are formed outside the traditional system of the national states. They are based on cooperation between TNCs, scientific communities, non-governmental organizations, many of which are transnational. Such networks are widely developed due to the Internet. The non-official world system, created by

⁵ A. Silenko, *Some Tendencies in Social State Development*, *Pravo Ukrainy*, 2005, nr. 8, s. 106-110; A. Silenko, *Social State: Territory of Changes*, Odesa: VTS UDAZ, 2000, s. 278.

⁶ O.V. Skrypnyk, *Social, Legal State in Ukraine: Problems of Theory and Practice: Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Independence of Ukraine*, K.: V. M. Koretskii Institute of State and Law of the NASU; IMV Knutsh, 2000, s. 600; O.V. Skrypnyk *Social Functions of the Constitution and Its Realization in Ukraine*, 2005, nr. 4, s. 68-79; O.V. Skrypnyk, *The Problem of Human Rights Realization while Conducting the State Governing of Social and Economic Spheres of Ukraine*, 2006, nr. 4, s. 34.

⁷ N.M. Khoma, *Social Problems of Globalization (in the Context of Social State Reformation)*, *Comparative Law Researches*, 2012, nx. 1-2, s. 303-309; N.M. Khoma, *Social Process in the Countries of the 5th Wave of Integration in the Context of Social State Development and Correspondence to the EU Social Standards (on the Example of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia)*, *Derzhava i Pravo*, 2011, Issue, 52, s. 588-594; N.M. Khoma, *Models of Social State: World and Ukrainian Experience: Monograph*, K.: Publishing House «Yurydychna Dumka», 2012, s.592.

them, contributes to the ordered and universal partnership. Many western experts appreciate that social partners adjust their organizations to the requirements of the new economy⁸.

Under the modern conditions social partnership should be treated not only as a means of protection and security of group interests, but also as a possibility to consolidate social partners' efforts, concentrate them on the tasks, which are vital for any society. The allotment of work and the part of everyone's social responsibility, not only to those whom they represent, but also to the society in general, must be clearly outlined.

Social partners have different political and financial resources. And with the help of legislation all wish to strengthen their position and achieved results. But it is not so easy to get the access to it. To achieve this aim it is important to bear relationship to political power. That is why nearly all active civilian power strives for receiving support form society and state structures, especially executive bodies. This creates tendency towards strengthening of political and psychological aspects of corporate, state social policy and its active instrument's potential, namely social partnership.

The new model of social partnership is far from an ideal one. Social groups want to defend their own interests. But, many participants of this process, keeping in mind their interests, agree, that it is necessary to combine efforts and concentrate them on the tasks that are vital to overcome challenges, which are brought forth to society. Partners' readiness to achieve compromises, their ability to contribute to creation of stable social climate is highly appreciated under these circumstances⁹.

Among the trends that reveal themselves nowadays, there is a tendency towards the increase of the state's role in the system of social partnership and its influence on the development of the latter. It can be explained by the fact that a state owns huge administrative resource, budget, relevant legislation, various structures of executive authority and can effectively use them to achieve social compromises, support or, on the contrary, to deter some social partners' activity.

Most EU member countries are defined as modern social states. It should be stressed, that since the 2nd part of the 20th century they have implemented the practice of a social contract, which presupposes cooperation between main social partners. The social contract is a historically approved act, which demonstrates its potential at difficult stages of social development. Under the conditions of the world financial and economic crisis, the society inevitably faces its negative social consequences¹⁰. In the very moments the role of a state as a leading social partner, who is intended to make a crucial contribution to the way forward not only over the crisis, but also its painful social effects, must come into sight. In this respect, the forms of

⁸ M. Crepaz, R. Damron, *Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes about Immigrants*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 2008, Vol. 40, nr. 3, s. 67.

⁹ M. Crepaz, R. Damron, *Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes about Immigrants*, *Comparative Political Studies*, 2008, Vol. 40, nr. 3, s. 66.

¹⁰ A.F. Khramtsov *Outlooks of the Social State: Europe and Russia*, *Sotsialno-humanitarnye znania*, 2007, nr. 3, s. 133.

the state activity and its relation with its social partners change. The necessity for state functions strengthening concerning management, regulation and control over the market element increases.

The great extent has got the idea of the social state as a benefactor, who is able to support socially vulnerable strata of society. Thus, social policy is exclusively viewed as defense reaction of society towards the negative processes' consequences in politics and economics in general. However, this approach is one-sided as to the evaluation of social realia.

The challenges of the 21st century, reinforced by the financial and economic crisis, changing the determinants of social dimensions, induce to extension of social policy sphere of activity. The main task of the social state is to ensure stability in the state development and social protection of the citizens under the new conditions. At the same time the state must conduct its policy taking into account interests of all social strata and professional groups which form any modern society. The state must regulate social and labor relations in the way to achieve the necessary compromise between social and professional groups; demonstrate the ability to balance rights and duties of various social strata; state's care must be felt not only by poor but also by more wealthy people, but naturally it is rather difficult.

The activity of the social state is based on the social justice, social responsibility and social partnership. Implementation of the above-mentioned directions of activity and their realization usually depends on the extent of business social responsibility, and on the presence of civil society and the level of its organization.

Globalization, which reveals itself in intensification of competitiveness, makes entrepreneurs search for the ways of retrenchment. One of the ways is saving of expense on labor force. But this causes recession in solvent demand and upsets social stability. So, the state faces a difficult task to ensure the effective cooperation with private entrepreneurship, which is necessary for priming of economy, not allowing the fall of workers' social protection.

In the EU countries many believe that in the period of crisis the state must reduce its financial expenses, including the expenses in the social sphere, sometimes shifting it onto its entrepreneurs. In comparatively small countries like Sweden, Denmark, with their specific development model, this method helped to achieve positive results and lighten a load that was on the state¹¹. It's far more difficult to conduct such changes in countries with old statehood traditions and branched systems of social welfare (France, Germany). In these countries social protests break out rather regularly, and despite all the attempts of the states to simplify bureaucratic procedures, reporting and a number of tax remissions, the position of business representatives is practically the same. Those companies do not want to undertake any additional responsibilities¹².

¹¹ A.P. Safronov, Inner Contradictions of the Sweden Model of "Welfare", *Nauchnyi Ekspert*, 2008, Issue, nr. 11, Pp. 73-74.

¹² V.A. Namchuk, Development of Social State in the EU countries: Actual Problems of State Management: The Collection of Scholarly Works, Kharkiv., Publishing House of KharRI NADU «Mahistr», 2011, nr. 2 (40), s. 445.

Under the new conditions the EU, building up its activity in the sphere of social integration, pays special attention to social partnership development and business social responsibility. Besides, it must be admitted, that in all documents the EU accentuates on the maintenance of subsidiarity principle and social unification in society¹³. Therefore, the participant of the Lisbon meeting (2000) appealed at the highest level for business social responsibility. Within the framework of the Lisbon strategy the agreement on making the economic growth and job creation the highest priority of the EU policy was reached. The strategy includes the regulations as to the necessity of exchange of experience and practice in coordination of actions with organizations, their equal participation in production development and social integration, which was not only addressed to the huge companies, but also was taken into consideration by them¹⁴. Principles of business social responsibility are implemented in various enterprises, including small and medium ones. But nevertheless big business is in the centre of this process. It is connected with the growth of the role of TNCs, which have got the status of European companies.

In 2001 appeared a special “Green Book”, the main regulations of which later were adduced in the “White Book” (2003), which was devoted to the problem of social responsibility of corporations in the EU¹⁵. In the United Kingdom in 2001 the Ministry of social responsibility in corporate sector was created. The Ministry for Social Affairs of Denmark worked out a special index of evaluation the level of social responsibility of the companies. Special articles in the legislative documents of France regulate requirements to the companies considering ecological and social consequences of their activity.

In the “Social Agenda 2001-2006”, adopted in 2000 in Nice the role of corporate social responsibility was accentuated¹⁶. This policy was carried on in the “Social Agenda 2006-2010”, approved in 2005 in Lisbon. The European Commission, which deals with putting forward the proposals of improving social standards and technical rules for establishing criteria of social responsibility of integrated management in the context of globalization into the European parliament and the European Council, has recently intensified its activity in this direction, as the main area of its work.

The aim of the corporate social responsibility strategy is to establish cooperation with those, who work with you: hired workers, consumers, non-governmental organizations etc. Interacting with various groups of society, companies “invest into future”, calculating the extent

¹³ TV. Panchenko, The Idea of Overall Welfare as a Valuable Basis for Subsidiary Doctrine, Bulletin SevNTU, 2010, Issue, nr. 112, s. 139.

¹⁴ European Regional Policy: Inspiration for Countries non-members of the EU? Application of Principles and Exchange of Experience [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/presenta/international/external_uk.pdf

¹⁵ Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (presented by the Commission), Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2001, s. 8.

¹⁶ M. Ferrera Open Coordination Against Poverty : the New EU «Social Inclusion Process», Journal of European Social Policy, 2002, Vol. 12, nr. 3, s. 4.

of possible concessions and taking into account the necessity of solving not only their own problems, but also their partners' problems. Social investments are considered not as additional and social expenses, but as an earnest for the following success. In the frames of the corporate social responsibility strategy the inclusion of labor's representatives in production management is activated, their access to information concerning the enterprises' activities is widened, i.e. industrial democracy is intensified.

Comprehension of necessity and appropriateness of such actions was formed in 1989 in the 17th Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in the Union and were detailed in the corresponding directive¹⁷. The decision of the European Commission (d/d 2006) to launch the project of creation the European Alliance in the sphere of business social responsibility achieved great recognition. The main principle of the Alliance's activity is partnership. This initiative took its definite shape in discussions with social partners, and the EU leaders suppose the fact that business social responsibility was put in the forefront (the name of the Alliance indicates that) was not accidental. It hugely consolidates the European way of life, influences the economic growth, its competitiveness and effectiveness, employment, working conditions and content, education development, prospects of the society.

The initiators of the project called all the enterprises for supporting it. The project presupposes its voluntary insertion into commercial and industrial activity of the enterprises, their relations with partners, offers social and economic measures, worked out together with civil society.

Following the regulations of the Lisbon strategy "The Green Book" about corporate social responsibility 2001, Special Report of the European Commission 2002, the decision of the European Council 2005, concerning the espousal of enterprises in developing their social responsibility, the multilateral Forum of the EU civil society representatives, backed up the idea of the Alliance creation, having appraised it as a new form of social partnership. It was foreseen that the Alliance would function on the basis of publicity and that social dialogue as an effective means of cooperation would help to exchange practical experience. The results of the Alliance's functioning must be felt by those who work at the enterprises and who live on the territories of their activity, consumers, local authorities, investors and young people.

It must be mentioned that the Alliance's functioning (since 2006) has been evaluated as one of the instruments of the European social model realization. The initiators of the project did not stop on this; they decided to carry on and planned to expand their activity on the international level, relying on the Global agreement on business corporate social responsibility, proposed by the UNO, in cooperation with the ILO, OSCE and other international organizations.

¹⁷ Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990, s. 2.

In 2006 the European Commission, European Parliament, European Council and Economic and Social Committee published the Appeal “to put partnership on service for the economic growth and resolution of employment problems, to make Europe an example in the sphere of enterprises social responsibility”, in which they accentuated that “the Alliance intends to search for and support novel methods of exchange of experience and spreading successful practice, taking into account interests of professionals, politicians, general public on all levels in Europe and beyond its borders”. So, the EU institutions declare the necessity of basing on the complex state scientific researches, usage of the latest achievements in technologies and sciences, education development. In these frames it is highlighted that for successful functioning of the Alliance mutual confidence and social dialogue are vital.

The EU plans and hopes as to European business can be estimated from different angles, but apparently, the problems of social partnership and positions of socially responsible business are mutually related. Without their interaction, modern society and its economy will face numerous problems.

So there is a lot of work in this sphere. It is evident that trade unions will stay the defenders of workers’ interests, will struggle for job places and employment, adequate payment and normal working conditions, worthy quality of life. Till there is economic and social inequality their defense function will be in demand. At the same time there is an objective need in active participation of trade unions in affairs concerning the increase in production effectiveness, planning and management improvement at all levels. Thus, social partnership must come up to a higher level and must be represented in new forms. However, it is necessary to break up outdated stereotypes.

We believe that certain role in this situation can be played by the European Labor Advice (ELA), created on the initiative of trade unions with the support of leading EU institutions on the European-wide enterprises. They were introduced in 1994¹⁸ and repeatedly were supplemented, widening and specifying accessibility of members of workers’ association to information concerning the enterprises activity and their participation in production management.

On December 17, 2008 the new European Commission Directive on increasing the role of the ELA appeared. It described the change in the legislation concerning the ELA, as to maximum adoption of their activity to changes in situation. Besides, the Directive foresaw the arrangement of education for workers’ representatives and ensuring the conditions which would contribute to their activity¹⁹. In 2008 the number of companies, where the ELA were implemented equaled 820. They employed 14.5 million workers. The special directive concerning the “status of the European company” determined the criteria, which the applicants

¹⁸ Commission Regulation (EC) No 2332/94 of 29 September 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1994, s. 254-255.

¹⁹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions : A Digital Agenda for Europe [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF>

had to accord in order to get this status, including the level of business social responsibility. In 1999 35% of the TNC, which acted in Europe, published the reports on social policy and social responsibilities. Later, their number reached 45%.

Throughout the years under the aegis of the European Commission the spring Forums of social policy, with the assistance of interested social partners, have been carried out and their positive effects on ratifying strategies of corporate social responsibility raise no doubts. A part of entrepreneurs and their organizations oppose to this movement. Thus, the Paris Chamber of Commerce absolutely negatively appraised the policy of informing and consulting workers in the frames of the social dialogue, initiated by the European Commission. French entrepreneurs called it an encroachment on the principle of subsidiarity and stated that they could evaluate the need and the extent of workers' inclusion into production management by themselves. They were supported by the "Euro commerce" association, who claimed that it was the prerogative of entrepreneurs, who, on the basis of the developed practice and tradition, could decide what kind and extent of documentation must be disclosed. The association stood against the EU efforts, aimed at harmonization of norms and rules of workers' information on the EU level. Entrepreneurs from Business Europe and representatives of the Public-Enterprises Workers' Centre (PEWC) in April 2008 even addressed to the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities V. Spidla for help and assistance in organizing the negotiation table with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). The ETUC refused to conduct negotiations concerning revision of rights, appointed to the European Councils for Labor by the special directive, and in its turn appealed to the European Commission to follow the already adopted documents and to resist encroachments of entrepreneurs on the workers' rights, and this was supported by the EU governing bodies.

So a great number of companies and associations start realizing principles of social responsibility and partnership in their corporate relations, laid in the basis of the European social model, demonstrating their comprehension of the fact that modern economy more and more depends on the quality of human resources, intellectual capital, which is able to ensure high-tech production, innovations, competitiveness of enterprises, that such labor force needs special treatment, and economies on social expenditures do not lead to entrepreneurs' additional profits, but to the increase in social tension and the decrease in companies' competitiveness.

Thus, the importance of business in political, social and economic development of any country is out of the question. Socially responsible business is a part of civil society, which demonstrates its activity in the states' development. It is clear that trade unions and other non-governmental organizations intend not only to defend the interests of the groups, which they represent, but also to control their partners' activity. The answer to the question whether (and how quickly) the European Union will be able to form a well-organized "European Citizens" requires long time and much carefulness.

Моделі вирішення господарських спорів у Країнах Східної Європи

Досліджено зміст категорії «моделі вирішення господарських спорів». Проаналізовано історію формування судових систем східноєвропейських країн. Запропоновано класифікацію моделей вирішення господарських спорів у країнах Східної Європи з метою визначення оптимальної моделі для України.

Ключові слова: господарський спір, господарський суд, судова система, арбітраж.

Models of economic disputes resolution in Eastern Europe Countries

The content of the category “models of economic disputes resolving” is investigated. The history of the formation of the judicial system in Eastern Europe countries is analyzed. The classification of models of economic disputes resolution in Eastern Europe countries is proposed in order to determine the optimal model for Ukraine.

Key words: economic dispute, the Commercial Court, the judiciary, arbitration.

Economic disputes as an essential element of economic life arise in each country. The procedure for resolving of such disputes is caused by many factors, including: membership in a particular legal family, historical traditions, economic conditions, administrative and territorial structure of the country and so on. A. Saidov divides Europe into two groups: the law in the first group of countries – Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, Slovenia – has been developing almost the same as in Germany, Austria and France; in these countries there was much rooted legal tradition (law considered as one of the fundamental principles of society); in the second group of countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia – the law historically developed differently; as well as Russia, these countries for a long time have been feeling the influence of Byzantium, not Western Europe¹.

¹ Саидов А.Х. Сравнительное правоведение (основные правовые системы современности): Учебник / Под ред. В.А. Туманова. – М.: Юристъ, 2004. – р. 225-226.

Mechanism for resolving commercial disputes should be called models (legal structure), which determine the main features of the system and procedure of such resolving. “Models of commercial dispute resolution” is a very broad concept, which includes not only the mechanism for resolving commercial disputes, but also the content of the judicial system of a country. Speaking about judicial system, M. Yarova notices that it is the system of courts and quasi-judicial bodies in the state, it is essentially nothing more than a hierarchically organized set of state institutions designed to deal with the administration of justice, their common, consistent and based on a special, procedural law activity².

The building of model for commercial dispute resolution has practical importance because it allows you to see the features of this solution in different countries, to identify dependencies and patterns that will adopt the useful experience of other countries for Ukraine. The model must be simple and clear, have a holistic nature and consistent with other models. The model indicates what elements consist of an object, as a result facilitates the understanding of the phenomenon. In turn, the typology of models for solving commercial disputes facilitates the identification of optimal forms to resolve such disputes.

I. Nazarov rightly emphasizes that historical analysis of the formation of the judicial systems of European countries indicates the absence of any single model of the judicial system for all states. Attempts to introduce such a model have been always. For a sample was taken the judiciary of state, which had overwhelming military political and economic situation in the region³. This thesis applies fully and models to solve commercial disputes. For countries that weren't the part of the Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), the existence of separate courts to resolve commercial disputes is not typical. It is seen from the fact that state arbitration (prototype of commercial courts) was formed in these countries in the late 40's – early 50's under the pressure of the Soviet Union, and after the weakening of position of the last state arbitrations began to be eliminated. R. David and K. Joffre-Spinozi indicate that the example of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have created special authority for dealing with disputes in the socialized sector which is not associated with the general judicial system, such as State arbitration, the title of which varies in different countries. Also there are some differences from the Soviet system. Evolution of the State Arbitration Institute took place in Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary. In these countries, respectively, in 1955, 1969 and 1972 State arbitration was eliminated⁴.

In Yugoslavia instead of State arbitration were established commercial courts which were considered to be specialized. The competence of commercial courts in this country was quite

² Яровая М. В. Судебные системы современных европейских государств: сравнительно-правовой анализ [Текст] : дис. ... канд. юрид. наук : 12.00.01 – М. , 2006. – р. 31.

³ Назаров І. В. Судові системи європейських країн: історичні аспекти формування // Держава і право : Збірник наукових праць. – № 47. – р. 559.

⁴ Давид Р., Жоффре-Спинози К. Основные правовые системы современности: Пер. с фр. В.А. Туманова. – М.: Междунар. Отношения, 1997. – р. 186.

broad. In particular, in addition to the traditional for commercial courts considering of economic disputes, these courts in Yugoslavia prescribed penalties and other sanctions for perpetrators of economic crimes. Higher economic courts of the republics as the first instance court decided the administrative and financial disputes. In this case, the status of judges of commercial courts was the same with the status of general courts⁵.

It should be noticed that the judicial system in Eastern Europe in the period of socialism contained specialized courts. For example, in Bulgaria till 1960 there was a transport court that decided the cases on actions that violate the proper functioning and safety of different modes of transport. In the Hungarian People's Republic also there were transport courts which dealt with cases of crimes against the normal operation of all transport modes. In the Poland also there were specialized courts – courts of Social Insurance, which decided complaints against decisions of department pensions and social deductions.

Instead of State arbitration, understanding the need in special order for resolving commercial disputes, in Eastern Europe countries was introduced a special procedure for settling commercial disputes in courts. But such special orders also were eventually canceled (except Bulgaria).

Thus, in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, there is a tendency to unify procedural principles for resolution of all disputes, regardless of specialization.

Jurisdiction of commercial dispute resolution is inextricably linked with the judicial system, court system and litigation. These institutions determine the procedure for settling commercial disputes and determine its characteristics.

First of all, a model of resolving commercial disputes is affected by the availability of a specialized court to resolve such disputes.

Settlement of commercial disputes in Europe takes place in quite different ways, ranging from the existence of commercial courts that specialize in resolving commercial disputes (France, Belgium), and ending with the general procedure to resolve such disputes without regard to any characteristics (Slovakia).

A special place among the European countries occupied by the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus), where the resolution of these disputes is carried out by special courts (commercial or arbitration) which fully included in the judicial systems of their countries. It should be noted that the RF and RB system of economic (arbitration) courts exist in parallel with the general court system, and besides the said courts decide administrative cases, replacing the same administrative court.

The variety of models for solving commercial disputes necessitates their classification to determine the optimal model for Ukraine. There is no single classification of models for solving commercial disputes in Eastern Europe. Speaking about models for solving commercial

⁵ Судебные системы социалистических стран. Под ред. И.С. Власова. – М.: ВНИИ советского права, 1973. – р. 40.

disputes, A. Osetyns'kiy proposed the classification of models for resolving commercial disputes. However, this author proposed a classification of the above models in national legal systems of European countries in general, namely: according to historical tradition and modern economic and legal environment it is proposed to apply three basic models of mechanisms for resolving trade (commercial) disputes: the functioning of specialized bodies, the activity of specialized departments in appropriate territorial level general courts and mixed model where, for some categories or based on a territorial basis, disputes relating to commerce, shall be settled either in special departments of general courts, or in a separate specialized body⁶.

Given that in Eastern Europe there are a variety of models for resolving commercial disputes, classification of them should be done according to various criteria. Making the classification of models for solving commercial disputes we have to consider many factors, including: the composition of the judiciary, the existence of a codified act regulating commercial dispute resolution, the possibility to use simplified procedures for resolving commercial disputes, the existence of the arbitration court (arbitration) and nonjurisdictional bodies to resolve commercial disputes.

For example, in Ukraine the system of courts of general jurisdiction includes: local courts; courts of appeal; high specialized courts; The Supreme Court of Ukraine. Courts of general jurisdiction specialize in civil, criminal, commercial, administrative matters and cases in administrative offenses (ch. 1, Art. 18 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and Status of Judges"). Commercial courts are specialized courts. The local commercial courts are commercial courts of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regions, cities Kyiv and Sevastopol. The system of courts of general jurisdiction form three separate subsystems of specialized courts, and the highest judicial body is the Supreme Court of Ukraine. Economic disputes in the courts are decided in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Code of Ukraine.

Also commercial disputes in Ukraine may be resolved by agreement of the parties by the arbitration.

Arbitration courts in Russia are the part of the judiciary with special status. Arbitration courts in Russia are four-instance system (Supreme Court of Russia, Federal arbitration courts of districts, arbitration courts of appeal, arbitration courts of the republics, territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous regions and autonomous districts). Economic disputes are resolved on the basis of the Arbitration Procedure Code of Russia, and for certain categories of cases a simplified procedure is used.

By the agreement of the parties the economic disputes can be resolved by arbitration courts, or in the process of mediation.

The judicial system of Belarus includes:

⁶ Осетинський А. Й. Перспективи запровадження комерційних судів в аспекті судового реформування в Україні // Вісник господарського судочинства. – 2006. – № 6. – р. 168.

- The Constitutional Court of Belarus – a body of judicial control over the constitutionality of legal acts in the country, which implements the judiciary through constitutional justice;
- General courts which administers justice in the form of civil, criminal and administrative proceedings;
- Commercial courts which administer justice in the form of economic and administrative proceedings.

Commercial disputes are resolved in accordance with the rules of the Commercial Procedure Code of Belarus, including: using the imperative institute proceedings.

Justice in Moldova is carried out by the Supreme Judicial Chamber, the Appeal Chambers and courts, and for certain categories of cases there are specialized courts, including the District Commercial Court. The order of dispute resolution by District Commercial Court is regulated by commercial Civil Procedure Code of Moldova, according to which such disputes are considered in a general way, without any features. The above code provides the clerks (simplified) proceedings.

Commercial disputes can be resolved in Moldova by means of mediation and resolved by arbitration.

In Bulgaria there are courts of general and administrative jurisdiction. In Bulgaria the jurisdiction system is organized under three-phase plan: the first instance – a district court, the appeal instance – the district court, courts of cassation – Supreme Court of Cassation. If the case in the first instance is considered by the district court, the appeal instance is the Court of Appeal and cassation instance is The Supreme Court of Cassation.

In Bulgaria there are no specialized courts to resolve only trade disputes. Such disputes are resolving by district courts under the Code of Civil Procedure of Bulgaria, which contains some provisions to resolve trade disputes.

One of the most common ways to resolve trade disputes out of courts is an arbitration and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms includes mediation procedure.

Romania's judicial system is organized under four-phase plan, which includes: courts, tribunals, courts of appeal, the Supreme Court of Cassation and Justice (in the first instance the case is considered by the courts and tribunals, the appeal instance are tribunals and courts of appeal, the cassation instance is Supreme Court of Cassation and Justice).

The mediation procedure in Romania is a mandatory prerequisite to submit a claim to the court. Commercial disputes are resolved in Romania also by the arbitration court (arbitration).

The judiciary in Poland consist of three instances of internal (civil and criminal divisions as required and family, juvenile, labor, economic as optional) and external specialization (administrative and military courts). A special place is occupied by the Constitutional Tribunal,

which is not a court in the conventional sense, but refers to the bodies of the judiciary, administering justice.

Commercial disputes in Poland are regulated in the process of mediation and resolved by arbitration courts.

Slovakia has three-instance judiciary (region court, district court, Supreme court), which includes the Specialized criminal court. The judicial system in Slovakia contains elements of both foreign and domestic specialization. All civil cases are resolved by the Civil Procedure Code of the Slovak Republic adopted in 1963, which does not provide special procedure for the consideration of economic disputes.

By agreement of the parties, the dispute in Slovakia may be referred to the Arbitration Court. Also in Slovakia the mediation procedure to resolve commercial disputes is used.

After analyzing the content of the judicial systems in Eastern Europe and procedural law, which regulates the procedure for resolving commercial disputes, we propose the following classification of models of economic disputes resolution.

1. On the basis of the presence of the court, which specializes exclusively in commercial dispute resolution, models are divided into:
 - a) models in which there are economic, arbitration and commercial courts (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova);
 - b) models in which there are no special courts to resolve commercial disputes (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovakia).
2. On the basis of the presence of a special procedure for resolving commercial disputes, models are divided into:
 - a) models in which there are separate codes for commercial dispute resolution (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus);
 - b) models in which there are specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure to resolve commercial disputes (Bulgaria);
 - c) models in which there are no specific provisions on commercial dispute resolution (Romania, Poland and Slovakia).
3. On the basis of the presence of vertical special courts to resolve commercial disputes, models are divided into:
 - a) models in which there is complete vertical of courts to resolve commercial disputes (Belarus);
 - b) models in which are is cut vertical of courts to resolve commercial disputes (Ukraine, Moldova and Russia);
 - c) models in which there is no vertical of courts to resolve commercial disputes (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovakia).
4. On the basis of the availability of mediation, models are divided into:

- a) models which apply voluntary mediation (Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia);
 - b) models in which mediation is a mandatory prerequisite to submit a claim to the Court (Romania);
 - c) models in which there is no procedure for mediation (Ukraine).
5. On the basis of the presence of nonjurisdiction agencies authorized by law to resolve commercial disputes, models are divided into:
- a) models in which there are nonjurisdiction bodies authorized by law to resolve commercial disputes (Belarus);
 - b) models in which there is no nonjurisdiction body authorized by law, resolve commercial disputes (all Eastern European countries except Belarus).

Thus, one of the primary factors determining the formation of commercial dispute resolution system in Eastern Europe and its elements are: belonging to one of Eastern European law families, historical and legal traditions, economic conditions, administrative and territorial division. Features of modern legal regulation procedures for resolving commercial disputes in Eastern Europe due to commonality and differences in typological characteristics of the judicial systems of countries that are considered, in particular, to the unity or plurality of elements of the system, models of administrative justice and control, jurisdictional powers of general and specialized courts.

Analysis of models of economic disputes resolution in Eastern Europe countries showed certain characteristics in dealing with such disputes. A special place among the European countries occupied by the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus), where commercial dispute resolution is carried out by special courts (commercial or arbitration) which fully are included to the judicial systems of their countries. It should be noted that in Russia and Belarus the system of economic (arbitration) courts exist in parallel with the general court system, and these courts resolve administrative cases, replacing in this way administrative courts. In Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria, there is a tendency to unify procedural principles of resolution of all disputes, regardless of specialization.

Classification of models of economic disputes resolution, in our opinion, should be made by taking into account the structure of the judicial system, the presence or absence of a codified act regulating this sphere of relationships, the using of simplified procedures for dealing with commercial cases, the activity of arbitration courts and international arbitration.

Jurij Szweda, Witalij Djakiw

Euromajdan: jako fenomen socjopolityczny

W artykule analizują się wydarzenia, które miały miejsce w życiu politycznym Ukrainy jesienią - zimą 2013 r. znane jako Rewolucja Godności. Oddzielnie jest analizowany Euromajdan jako fenomen socjopolityczny, podana jest periodyzacja etapów jego istnienia, czynników jakościowych, które określały jego tożsamość na każdym z wyróżnionych etapów.

Słowa kluczowe: Rewolucja Godności, Euromajdan, Euromajdan studencki, Majdan - tabor, Majdan - Sicz.

Юрій Шведа, Віталій Дяків

Євромайдан: як соціо-політичний феномен

У статті аналізуються події, що відбувалися в політичному житті України осінню-зимою 2013 р. відомі як Революція гідності. Окремо аналізується Євромайдан як соціо-політичний феномен, дається періодизація етапів його існування, якісних чинників, що визначали його самотність на кожному з виділених етапів.

Ключові слова: Революція гідності, Євромайдан, студентський Євромайдан, Майдан-табір, Майдан-Січ.

Biorąc pod uwagę Euromajdan (później - Rewolucję Godności), za rok od jego początku, możemy wyróżnić następujące etapy jego istnienia:

1. етап - Euromajdan studencki;
2. етап - Majdan - tabor;
3. етап - Majdan - Sicz;
4. етап - «Січ» Majdanu.

Największą trudnością podziału na etapy jest ich dokładna chronologia. Tak więc, jeśli punkt początku pewnych etapów wyznaczyć wystarczająco lekko, w tym że czasie zakresy niektórych etapów zderzają się i nakładają się jeden za drugim, co nie pozwala otrzymać dokładnej daty początku tego czy innego etapu.

Euromajdan studencki

Listopad, 2013 rok. Ukraina, z Prezydentem Wiktorem Janukowyczem na czele oraz premierem Mykołą Azarowym, powoli podąża do szczytu wileńskiego (25-27 listopada), gdzie, jak wszyscy spodziewali się, będzie podpisano Umowę stowarzyszeniową między Ukrainą i Unią Europejską.

Jednak w dniu 21 listopada, o godzinie 16.00, na stronie internetowej Gabinetu Ministrów Ukrainy pojawiło się rozporządzenie «... odłożenie procesu przygotowania do podpisania Umowy o stowarzyszeniu z UE.»¹

Na reakcję społeczeństwa nie trzeba było długo czekać. Około godziny 22.00 na Placu Niepodległości zebrało się kilka setek aktywistów. W socjalnych sieciach po raz pierwszy pojawia się słowo «Euromajdan». W ciągu nocy ilość ludzi stale rosła, do ich dołączyli się społecznicy, opozycyjni politycy, znane społeczni aktywiści. «... nie ludzie przyszli do polityków, a politycy do ludzi»² - wspominał znany społecznik Jurij Łucenko. Naprawdę, na Placu nie było żadnej flagi partyjnej.

Jednocześnie z rosnącą ilością uczestników, sąd zakazuje przeprowadzenie jakichkolwiek akcji na Placu Niepodległości, Sofijiwskim i Europejskim placach i na Kreszczatyku, jednak to nie powstrzymuje ludzi, oni decydują zostać na całą noc.

Tej samej nocy, dziesiątki ludzi wychodzą na place swoich miast we Lwowie, Iwano-Frankowsku, Charkowie i w innych miastach Ukrainy.

Rano dnia 22 listopada w centrum Kijowa zaczynają przygotowywać jarmark bożonarodzeniowy, poprzednio odsunawszy demonstrantów i zniósłszy ich namioty.

W tym samym czasie, studenci Lwowa ogłaszają strajk. Studencki pochód rozrastał się jak lawina, i ponad 10 tysięcy osób wyszły na demonstrację i pochód, potem uczestnicy pochodu postanawiają spotkać się na Alei Wolności wieczorem tego samego dnia.

Właśnie studenci zostali silnikiem występów protestowych podczas pierwszego etapu Euromajdanu. Pod pierwszym etapem Euromajdanu rozumiemy go jako demonstracja, strajk, protest. Pokojowy protest z wymaganiami politycznymi, które były skierowane na zmianę (czyli raczej powrót) kursu polityki zagranicznej państwa. Cechą tego etapu jest nieobecność symboli partyjnych na akcjach protestu i określająca rola studentów w rozprzestrzenianiu protestów.

W nocy z dnia 23 na 24 listopada do Kijowa zaczynają przybywać grupy obywateli, zwłaszcza studentów, z różnych miast Ukrainy, przecież na 24 listopada był zaplanowany pochód pod hasłem “Za Ukrainę Europejską!”. Właśnie wtedy odbywa się początek transformacji Euromajdanu. Początkowo w Kijowie istnieją dwa «Majdany» pierwszy, na Placu

¹ Урядовий портал. Уряд прийняв розпорядження про призупинення процесу підготовки до укладання Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=246868715&cat_id=244274160

² Білозерська О. ЄвроМайдан. 21.11.2013.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://www.bilozerska.info/?p=17429>

Niepodległości, zostaje społecznym, a drugi, na Europejskim placu, «polityczny» na którym jasna rzecz pojawiają się flagi partyjne. Między uczestnikami obu placów istnieje pewna nieufność i uprzedzenie. W dniu 26 listopada komendanci obu Euromajdanów decydują połączyć wysiłki, jednak pod warunkiem, że politycy nie będą agitowali za ich siły polityczne. W Mediach szerzą informację o tym, że do zjednoczenia majdanów powoływała J. Tymoszenko.³

Partie polityczne po wlewie do struktury jednego Euromajdanu rozpoczęły wprowadzać swoje zasoby i napelniać jego działalność nową treścią.

Unia z trzech politycznych sił: BJUT, UDAR i WO Swobody wyglądał nietrwałym i sytuacyjnym. Potwierdzeniem nieuzgodnienia działań między siłami politycznymi był 24 grudnia, kiedy WO Swoboda prowadziła filar ze swoimi zwolennikami do siedziby rządu, a przedstawiciele BJUTu w tym czasie przemawiali ze sceny.

Mimo to, na demonstracji było przyjęto szereg wymagań (w szczególności dymisja rządu Azarowa, przyjęcia niezbędnych ustaw eurointegracyjnych, podpisania Umowy o stowarzyszeniu, itd.) do prezydenta, które władza zignorowała. Dlatego, nie wykonawszy wymagań demonstrantów, reżim W. Janukowycza zerwał podpisanie Umowy, tym samym postawiwszy euromajdanowców przed wyborem: zaakceptować i odejść czy nadal być na Placu i domagać się akceptacji wysuniętych wymagań. Więc, pierwszy etap istnienia Euromajdanu skończył się, a drugi jeszcze nie rozpoczął się. Ustaliła się delikatna równowaga między protestującymi stronami - opozycji brakowało środków, a władzy - stanowczości byle rozpocząć następny etap walki.

Uogólniony «portret» euromajdanowca tego okresu wyglądał następująco: to student Uczelni na Ukrainie, przyjechał na Plac dobrowolnie sam czy z grupą przyjaciół, pełen stanowczości stać dotychczas jak władza nie spełni wymagania Euromajdanu. Głównymi hasłami tego okresu były takie:

- Ukraina to Europa!
- Przestępcę do więzienia – wtedy pójdziemy na lekcje!
- Studenci za UE!
- Kijów (Lwów, Charków itd.) wstawaj!

Majdan - tabor

W nocy z dnia 29 na 30 listopada, kiedy na Placu pozostało mniej niż pół tysiąca aktywistów (zdecydowana większość z ich to studenci) władza wysłała około dwóch tysięcy sił bezpieczeństwa, które w okrutny sposób rozpędzają młodzież. Dowiedziawszy się o rozbiegu swoich pobratymców, część aktywistów, które wyjechały z Kijowa tej samej nocy, starają się wrócić do stolicy, jednak na stanowiskach Wydziału kontroli ruchu drogowego ich zatrzymują.

³ Тимошенко закликала прибрати з євромайдана партійну символіку // Європейська правда. 19.11.2014.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/11/26/7003155/>

Właśnie pobicie studentów stało początkiem nowego, drugiego etapu Euromajdanu. Dlatego, władza sama stała katalizatorem nowego etapu konfrontacji. Właśnie ona spowodowała socjalną eksplozję, która wstrząsnęła całą Ukrainę. Od rana nie tylko Ukrainę, ale i cały świat obiegły nagrania pobicia studentów, grad krytyki posypał się wtedy na głowy władzy ze strony UE, krajów NATO, ONZ, międzynarodowych organizacji pozarządowych. Negatywnie wyrażali się przedstawiciele ukraińskich Cerkwi przeciw okrutnemu pobiciu studentów.

W szczególności przewodniczący UGCC Patriarcha Światosław powiedział następnie: «W imieniu naszej Cerkwi chcę wyrazić swój żal z powodu wydarzeń, które tej nocy miały miejsce na Placu Niepodległości w Kijowie. Potępiamy te przejawy przemocy, które funkcjonariusze organów ścigania zastosowały do pokojowych cywilów...», «Prosimy nie dopuścić jeszcze większej eskalacji przemocy, która może doprowadzić do jeszcze bardziej tragicznych konsekwencji. Nie powinniśmy reagować przemocą na przemoc i złem na zło»⁴

Inny przywódca duchowy, Patriarcha UOC KP Filaret oświadczył, że :

«Jako Cerkiew, moralnie potępiamy okrutne stosowanie siły wobec obywateli pokojowych, które odbyło się dziś na stołecznym Placu Niepodległości. Również powołujemy wszystkich - zwłaszcza milicję, ale również uczestników działań publicznych, nie dopuścić późniejszego zwiększania przemocy. Bo może właśnie tego - rozwijania dużego konfliktu wewnętrznego i podziału kraju, zniszczenia naszej państwowości - domagają się te siły, które za wszelką cenę pragną nie dopuścić integracji Ukrainy z Europą zjednoczoną. Przyszłość nam jest niewiadoma. Ale chcemy, żeby wszyscy wiedzieli: Kijowski Patriarchat - z ukraińskim ludem. Nie zależnie od tego, jakie wypróbowania czekają na nas »⁵

Takie brutalne zachowanie władzy ukraińskiej potępił ministrowie spraw zagranicznych Szwecji, Polski, Litwy, USA, Wielkiej Brytanii i innych państw.

1 grudnia w Kijowie swoją reakcję na pobicie studentów wypowiedział lud. W centrum stolicy znów powracają setki tysięcy demonstrantów, jednak teraz z wymaganiami bardziej radykalnymi. Zebrawszy się na placu Mychajliwskim, aktywiści rozpoczęli pochód, który zjednoczył ponad pół miliona obywateli i powrócili do Placu Niepodległości. Tego samego dnia grupą aktywistów została zdobyta KMAP (Kijowska Miejska Administracja Państwowa), odbyły się starcia w pobliżu Administracji Prezydenta przy ulicy Bankowej.

Drugi etap zmienia nie tylko wymagania Euromajdanu lecz również "portret" społeczny jego uczestników. Tak więc, studenci są nadal aktywnymi uczestnikami wydarzeń, ale główną

⁴ "Ми засуджуємо ті прояви насильства, які застосували... до мирних громадян", - Блаженніший Святослав. Інформаційний Ресурс Української Греко-Католицької Церкви. 30.11.2014.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: http://news.ugcc.ua/news/mi_zasudzhuemo_ti_proyavi_nasilstva_yaki_zastosuvali_do_mirnih_gromadyan_blahhennishiy_svyatoslav_68357.html

⁵ Заява Патріарха Київського і всієї Руси-України Філарета щодо подій 30 листопада 2013 р. у Києві // Українська Православна Церква Київський Патріархат. Офіційний веб-сайт "Церква info".- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://cerkva.info/uk/news/patriarkh/4211-zajava-30-11.html>

siłą demonstrantów stają ludzie z wyższym wykształceniem, wiek których jest w średnim 35-40 lat, z których około 13 % mieszkają w Kijowie, a pozostałe 87 % przyjechały z regionów.⁶

Ciekawym jest również to, że na Placu były przedstawione ludzie protestujące ze wszystkich obwodów Ukrainy. Jeśli większość euromajdanowców z Ukrainy Zachodniej przyjeżdżali na kilka dni (do tygodnia), to ponad połowa aktywistów ze wschodu była na Placu więcej niż 20 dni i planowali zostawać tam i nadal. Każdy drugi aktywista z przedsięwzięcia odwiedził Euromajdan więcej niż 2 razy, i zamierzał wrócić za kilka dni.

Jeśli główną przyczyną wyjścia ludzi na Euromajdan na pierwszym etapie jest odmowa od podpisania Umowy o stowarzyszeniu i wymaganie : powrót do kursu eurointegracyjnego państwa, to na drugim etapie te hasła stają się mniej ważnymi. Na pierwszym miejscu jest pragnienie zmienić władzę. Przejawia się to w nowych hasłach Majdanu, które czy nie najlepiej odzwierciedlają nastroje masy :

- Precz z bandą!
- Chwała Ukrainie! – Chwała bohaterom!
- Ukraina - to UE!
- Ukraina - nie Azja!
- Boże Narodzenie bez Jałynkowycza (Janukowycza)!

Dlatego, w porównaniu z hasłami, które były usłyszane kilka dni przed dniem 1 grudnia, te hasła stały bardziej radykalne, przeważają wezwania do powrotu do kursu europejskiego państwa, ale już z nowym rządem, ukarawszy poprzedni.

Zmienia się również sam Euromajdan, pojawiają się barykady, a po próbie szturm 11 grudnia Plac raczej przypomina umocniony wojskowy tabor. Ale brakuje mu dyscypliny i zorganizowania, które dopiero zaczyna się formować.

Majdan-Sicz

Trzeci etap nazywa się Majdanem - Siczem. Bierze początek po podpisaniu ustaw dyktatorskich⁷ 16 stycznia 2014 r., i trwa do 22 lutego.

Spróbować za jeden dzień zrobić z państwa - analog Białorusi, do tego jeszcze w kraju objętego masowymi protestami, można oceniać jako rozpaczliwą próbę utrzymania władzy.

Wynik - wydarzenia na ulice Gruszewskiego, i w dniu 22 stycznia, w «Krwistym dniu Jedności Ukrainy» - pierwsze śmierci uczestników Euromajdanu. Konfrontacja między dwoma stronami osiągnęła swojego apogeum. Władza udaje się do zastosowania broni przeciw demonstrantom pokojowych.

⁶ Обличчя Євромайдану (соціальний портрет учасників протестів) // Info-Light.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://infoflight.org.ua/content/oblichchya-ievromaydanu-socialniy-portret-uchasnikiv-protestiv>; Статистика: "Соціальна структура Євромайдану" // ЖЖ.lvivil.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://lvivil.livejournal.com/351132.html>

⁷ Рада ухвалила закони, що відкривають шлях до масових репресій".- фонда "Відродження" // Українська правда. 19.11.2013.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/16/7009773/>

Oprócz wydarzeń w Kijowie w szeregu obwodów były próby, a nawet zachwyt narządów władzy wykonawczej. To stało się we wszystkich obwodach zachodnich (oprócz obwodu Zakarpackiego), a także w niektórych obwodach centralnej Ukrainy. W rezultacie, w ciągu stycznia i lutego odbywały się kilka spotkań przez przedstawicieli opozycji z W. Janukowiczem, za pośrednictwem polityków europejskich, w szczególności ministrów spraw zagranicznych Polski, Francji i Niemiec. Rozmowy nie przyniosły pożądanego wyniku, w szczególności umowa (zapropozowana 21 lutego) powtórnych wyborów prezydenta w grudniu 2014 r. była odrzucona Majdanem, tak jak cierpieć Janukowycza jeszcze rok nikt nie chciał.

18-21 lutego miały miejsce najbardziej krwawe wydarzenia Euromajdanu, kiedy zginęli 88 uczestników Euromajdanu. Wszystkich, kto zginął podczas Rewolucji Godności, albo później od otrzymanych zranień, nazwano Nebesnoju Sotneju (Setką Niebieską). Dzisiaj posiada już 113 osób. Geografia poległych po raz kolejny udowadnia, że na Euromajdanu była cała Ukraina. Tak więc, wśród poległych były mieszkańcy Ukrainy Zachodniej, Kijowa, Krymu, obwodu Dniepropetrowskiego i innych obwodów, i nawet innych krajów (Białoruś, Gruzja, itp.).

W tych burzliwych dniach portret «euromajdanowca» zepchnął portret rewolucjonisty. Tak więc, rewolucjonista i nadal to jest mężczyzna w wieku około 35 lat, z wyższym albo średnim wykształceniem, gotów być do końca i pójść pod kuli, jeśli to jest niezbędne.

Oprócz haseł tradycyjnych, takich jak Chwała Ukrainie! - Bohaterom chwała!, można było usłyszeć :

- Razem do końca!
- Bohaterzy nie umierają!
- Nikt nie jest zapomniany!

22 lutego Rada Najwyższa podjęła uchwałę o odsunięciu od władzy prezydenta W. Janukowycza. Prezydent w panice ucieka z kraju.

Tę datę można uważać za zakończenie trzeciego etapu, a niektórzy badacze uważają ją logicznym zakończeniem Rewolucji Godności. Jednak szereg najbardziej zaciętych zwolenników Euromajdanu jako formy walki z Systemem uważali, że usunięcie W. Janukowycza od władzy jest tylko częściowym zwycięstwem i koniecznie trzeba ją rozwijać metodami rewolucyjnymi do końca zwycięskiego. Dlatego Majdan nadal był w centrum stolicy.

Jednak kiedy w marcu, a nawet w kwietniu i maju, Majdan jeszcze przedstawiał sobą formę walki z reżimem, to już latem, po wyborach prezydenckich, na Majdanie pozostały się tak zwane «długo żyjące ludzi», a sam Plac był tylko cieniem tego, jakim on był w czasie wszystkich trzech etapów.

„Cień” Majdanu

Czwarty etap w ewolucji Majdanu możemy nazwać majakiem Majdanu, albo jego cieniem, a początkiem chronologicznym będzie czerwiec 2014 r.

Powodem jest przede wszystkim nieobecnością dyscypliny: oprócz kilkuset namiotów w reszcie panował bałagan, który zaczął denerwować najpierw mieszkańców stolicy.

W ciągu całego lata na Majdanie raz po raz powstają starcia, strzelania. W kamizelkach kuloodpornych błędą placem byli rewolucjoniści, w ten czas kiedy na Wschodzie katastroficznie brakowało sprzętu, zwłaszcza kamizelek kuloodpornych, dla bojowców SZU (Siły Zbrojne Ukrainy) i Gwardie Narodowej.

Wyraźnie zmienił się również portret byłego rewolucjonisty. Teraz to jest mężczyzna 35-40 lat, o średnim wykształceniu, który tymczasowo nie pracuje i nie ma własnej rodziny.

Wreszcie w dniu 7 sierpnia aktywistów, którzy pozostali na Placu było rozgoniono, a pozostałości barykad i namiotów były rozebrane na części. Lecz «długo żyjące ludzi» zaczęli podpałać obrony⁸, i opierać się milicji i bojowcom batalionów dobrowolnych (które byli byłymi setkami Majdanu). Wreszcie udało się przywrócić porządek w centrum miasta, a do sprzątnięcia Placu wyszli nie tylko urzędnicy wydziału gospodarki lokalowej, ale również setki mieszkańców stolicy.

Jednak z demontowaniem pozostałości Placu nie możemy mówić o jego śmierci. Treść fenomenu Euromajdanu w tym, że on stał nieodłącznym elementem współczesnego życia politycznego, głęboko zakorzenił się w świadomości społecznej jako symbol niezmierności i waleczności, a ofiary, które pokładły się na jego ołtarz, na długo wpisały się w pamięci narodowej.

Euromajdan stał się tym ośrodkiem, wokół idei którego zaczęło łączyć się zdekompletowane społeczeństwo ukraińskie. Pierwsza krew na Majdanie (krew studentów w nocy 1 grudnia) umocniła ideę jedyne państwa, ze Wschodu na Zachód. Wbrew mitom rozszerzanym, Majdan pokazał, że rosyjskojęzyczna ludność jest nie mniej patriotyczna niż ukraińskojęzyczna ludność, i że w walce o wspólne wartości ludność Ukrainy jest jedyna. Stał on potężnym czynnikiem kształtowania ukraińskiego narodu politycznego.

Euromajdan również jest najbardziej masową i najbardziej ofiarowaną akcją do podtrzymania idei europejskich i wartości europejskich.

Euromajdan był potężną demonstracją oporu obywatelskiego wobec tyranii władzy, zarodkiem kształtowania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego na Ukrainie, które jak wierzymy, będzie w stanie godnie odpowiedzieć na wiele wezwania, które stoją przed nim.

⁸ Міліція почала затримувати "довгожителів" Майдану.- [Електронний ресурс].- Режим доступу: http://espreso.tv/news/2014/08/07/miliciya_pochala_zatrymuvaty_dovhozhyteliv_maydanu

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Warianty rumuńskiego nacjonalizmu

Nacjonalizm był jedną z najbardziej nośnych ideologii końca XIX i XX wieku, był także sprężyną nakręcającą główne przemiany polityczne, społeczne i ekonomiczne, także i na obszarze Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz Bałkanów. Warto zwrócić uwagę na to iż sam termin „nacjonalizm” jest wieloznaczny pod względem treściowym dzięki temu jest możliwy do odczytania i interpretacji często w diametralnie rozbieżny sposób.

Warto wspomnieć o wielu definicjach nacjonalizmu, niektórzy badacze tematu wręcz wspominają, że jest on po prostu „przeciążony” wielością interpretacji i w związku z tym trudno jest przedstawić właściwą definicję zjawiska. Także należy pamiętać, że często definicja istoty nacjonalizmu jest bezpośrednio zależna od języka w jakim jest sformułowana. Na taką zależność zwracano już uwagę w I połowie XX wieku¹. Nacjonalizmy miały swe cechy narodowe, jednak w istocie były do siebie bardzo podobne, co więcej występowały pomiędzy nimi elementy wspólnego porozumienia, ponieważ nacjonalizm sensu *stricte* nie dąży do zniszczenia innych nacjonalizmów, natomiast w przypadku *nacjonalitaryzmu* widoczna jest ich konkurencyjność wobec siebie oraz dążenie do wzajemnej destrukcji pomimo zawieranych doraźnie sojuszy pomiędzy poszczególnymi ugrupowaniami działającymi według tego wzorca².

Nacjonalizm jako struktura skomplikowana zawiera związane ze sobą substraty dające się wydzielić na mocy różnych kryteriów. Można go więc postrzegać: genetycznie, funkcjonalnie i ustrojowo. W tym ostatnim podejściu można według Hansa Kohna wyodrębnić: nacjonalizm liberalny, demokratyczny, integralny i totalitarny³, ewentualnie według Carltona J. H. Hayesa możemy wyodrębnić nacjonalizm humanitarny, jakobiński, tradycyjny, liberalny i integralny⁴. Według innej klasyfikacji nacjonalizm możemy rozpatrywać też w wersji historycznej i jako taki podzielić na: kulturalny, polityczny oraz gospodarczy. Ta właśnie klasyfikacja jest stosowana dość rzadko, z uwagi na częste pomijanie nacjonalizmu gospodarczego w klasyfikacji, podczas gdy w Europie Środkowo Wschodniej i na Bałkanach to właśnie ten model był dominujący, a wręcz można go uznać za katalizator pojawienia się tego typu nastrojów, zwłaszcza w początkach istnienia tej ideologii, należy przytoczyć tu przykład Rumunii z początku lat 20-tych i fenomen LANC⁵ w Besarabii i Mołdawii). Według badaczy zachodnioeuropejskich nacjonalizm gospodarczy stanowi często jedynie przedłużenie nacjonalizmu

¹ I. R. Pascal, *Idea de națiune în istoria doctrinelor politice și sociale*, București 1936, s. 9.

² J. Bartyzel, *Na antypodach idei narodowej: nacjonalizm i nacjonalitaryzm*, [w:] *Ideologie, doktryny i ruchy narodowe. Wybrane problemy*, [red.] S. Stępień, Lublin 2006, s. 15-28.

³ H. Kohn, *Nationalism. It's meaning and history*, Princeton 1955, s. 16-90.

⁴ C. J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism a religion*, New York 1960.

⁵ LANC – Liga Apărării Naționale Creștine – Liga Obrony Narodowo Chrześcijańskiej.

politycznego, uznawanego za najdoskonalszą formę tegoż⁶. Występuje także klasyfikacja prof. J. Bartyzela, wyróżniająca nacjonalizm i nacjonalitaryzm⁷.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest wskazanie specyfiki rumuńskiego nacjonalizmu. Teorią narodu zajmowali się tam tak wybitni myśliciele polityczni jak: Nicolae Iorga⁸, Alexandru C. Cuza⁹ czy Constantin Rădulescu-Motru¹⁰, a współcześnie przede wszystkim Catalin Mureșanu¹¹ czy Lucian Boia¹².

W rozumieniu rumuńskim nacjonalizm jest utożsamiany z wyrażaniem przywiązania do konkretnego narodu, w związku z czym należy uznać je za węższe znaczeniowo niż w przypadku języka angielskiego. W znaczeniu rumuńskim, można go definiować jako: ideologię o charakterze integracyjnym pewnej dużej grupy, które są realizowane w ramach własnego państwa, suwerennego i niezależnego, posiadającego własną kulturę i historię¹³.

W świetle klasyfikacji prezentowanej przez prof. Bartyzela wyróżniającej nacjonalizm i nacjonalitaryzm¹⁴, w przypadku Rumunii jako ideologię nacjonalistyczną można zakwalifikować tę, prezentowaną przez PND N. Iorgi, natomiast pozostałe, reprezentowane przez A. C. Cuze, C. Z. Codreanu i współcześnie przez C. V. Tudora można klasyfikować jako nacjonalitarystyczne ponieważ definiowały naród jako wspólnotę o charakterze rasowym, nie zaś kulturalnym, czy historycznym. W związku z tym odmawiały one wszelkich praw mniejszościom, dążąc w mniejszym, bądź większym stopniu do ich asymilacji (z wyjątkiem Żydów). Także głoszona przez Codreanu i jego popleczników koncepcja „nowego człowieka” *omul nou*, nie tylko w sensie obywatelskim, ale także i fizycznym oraz duchowym zakładała element wspólnej formacji, więc raczej wykluczający poszanowanie ewentualnych odrębności. Z drugiej strony warto nadmienić, że w Rumunii różnice lokalne nie były tak widoczne jak np. we Francji czy w Niemczech bowiem różnice pomiędzy Mołdawią a Wołoszczyzną raczej zanikły już do początku XX wieku. Świadomość ewentualnych różnic językowych zniknęła zapewne przy okazji XIX wiecznej, długoterminowej reformy języka rumuńskiego, w której wyrazy pochodzenia słowiańskiego w języku rumuńskim zastępowano słownictwem pochodzenia romańskiego¹⁵. Także i fakt, iż trwanie zjednoczonej Rumunii było raczej zagrożone „z zewnątrz” niż wewnątrz może świadczyć o braku dostatecznych podstaw pod tezę o walce z patriotyzmem wołoskim lub mołdawskim. Poświadczone natomiast jest nieco snobistyczne

⁶ J. Kofman, *Nacjonalizm gospodarczy – szansa czy bariera rozwoju*, Warszawa 1992, s. 14.

⁷ J. Bartyzel, op. cit., s. 16.

⁸ Por. np. N. Iorga, *Doctrina naționalistă*, [w:] *Doctrinile partidelor politice*, București [b.r.w.], s. 31-47.

⁹ A. C. Cuza, *Doctrina Naționalist Creștina*, 1924.

¹⁰ C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Psihologia Populului roman*, București 1999, s. 33-48.

¹¹ C. Mureșanu, *Națiune, naționalism. Evoluția naționalităților*, Cluj-Napoca 1996.

¹² L. Boia, *Rumuni. Świadomość, mity, historia*, Kraków 2003.

¹³ C. Mureșanu, op. cit., s. 20.

¹⁴ J. Bartyzel, *Na antypodach idei narodowej: nacjonalizm i nacjonalitaryzm*, [w:] *Ideologie, doktryny i ruchy narodowe. Wybrane problemy*, [red.] S. Stępień, Lublin 2006, s. 15-28

¹⁵ L. Boia, *Rumuni świadomość ...*, s. 138.

odżegnywanie się od używania samookreślenia *Rumun* przez część wyższych warstw społecznych, jeszcze w okresie międzywojennym¹⁶. Zastępowano je czasem bardziej arystokratycznie brzmiącym określeniem *Moldowoloch* (*Moldovalach*)¹⁷.

W okresie międzywojennym w Rumunii najgłośniejszym rzecznikiem „czystego” nacjonalizmu gospodarczego był Mihai Manoilescu. Własną doktrynę ogłosił on w wydanej w 1929 roku książce „Teoria protekcjonizmu gospodarczego”¹⁸. W swym sztandarowym dziele Manoilescu zwrócił uwagę na fakt, iż utrzymywanie przez kraje rolnicze swej dotychczasowej struktury gospodarczej właściwie wyklucza możliwość zmiany ich struktury przemysłowej w przyszłości, niejako zmuszając je do utrzymania statusu klienteli państw rozwiniętych. Odnosząc się do teorii i relacji pomiędzy peryferiami a centrum, to należy stwierdzić, że petryfikowałyby to taką zależność. Koncepcja Manoilescu sprowadzała się do stwierdzenia, że remedium na wyrwanie się z zacofania i zależności ekonomicznej jest uprzemysłowienie konkretnego obszaru, umożliwiające wyrwanie się z zakłętego kręgu zależności i budowę samodzielności gospodarczej. Kraje uprzemysłowione nie powinny postrzegać dążenia do samodzielności gospodarczej jako zagrożenia dla własnych interesów, ponieważ w przypadku sukcesu doszłoby do rozszerzenia rynku zbytu na wyspecjalizowane towary przemysłowe. Dopiero po osiągnięciu odpowiedniego poziomu gospodarczego krajów zacofanych byłoby możliwe usamodzielnienie poszczególnych wytwórczości krajowej i próba jej pełnej konkurencyjności.

Idee nacjonalistyczne – narodowe pojawiły się w Rumunii jeszcze w XIX wieku. Było to związane epoką przebudzenia narodowego, wskazuje się tu rok 1821, który rozpoczyna epokę patriotyzmu ogólnorumuńskiego, nie zaś słabo dotąd wykształconego i mało widocznego moldawskiego i wołoskiego¹⁹. Wówczas pojawiły się po raz pierwszy pomysły zjednoczenia w jednym organizmie państwowym dawnej rzymskiej Dacji. Później pod wpływem wykształconej w wyniku Wiosny Ludów generacji '48 (*pașoptistów*) idee zjednoczeniowe zaczęły się rozprzestrzeniać i generacja ta zdominowała życie polityczne i narodowe ziem rumuńskich przez następne 40 lat. (bracia Brătianu, M. Kogălniceanu, P. P. Carp). Pierwsze elementy wspomnianej myśli można odnaleźć już w głoszonych w latach osiemdziesiątych XIX wieku poglądach PNL zakładających uprzemysłowienie Rumunii własnymi siłami – zgodnie z hasłem *prin noi înșine*²⁰. Co rozumiałe było to odwołanie do nacjonalizmu ekonomicznego. Wspomniane hasło było promowane „na wyrost”, bowiem ówczesna Rumunia nie dysponowała kapitałem pozwalającym na prowadzenie prób uprzemysłowienia dzięki własnym środkom. Plan – bardzo zresztą ambitny, przedstawiany przez liderów partii liberalnej (PNL) powstał jako reakcja na występujące dotąd nieprawidłowości w procesie industrializacji kraju przejawiające

¹⁶ M. Samozwaniec, Maria i Magdalena, cz. 2, Szczecin 1989, s. 47.

¹⁷ Ta tytulatura była o wiele starsza od określenia Rumun, Rumunia i była używana raczej w stosunkach wewnętrzkościelnych. Np. zwierzchnik cerkwi rumuńskiej nosił tytuł metropolity *Moldowolochy* (*Moldovalchiei*).

¹⁸ M. Manoilescu, *Théorie de protectionisme et de l'échange international*, Paris 1929.

¹⁹ D. Berindei, *Epoca Unirii*, București 1979, s. 11.

²⁰ T. Lungu, *Viata politică în România la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea (1888-1899)*, București 1967, s. 39.

się licznymi aferami gospodarczymi – warto wspomnieć tu chociaż o „aferze Stroussberga” związanej z budową sieci kolejowej w Rumunii, a która zakończyła się skandalem na skale międzynarodowej, z racji uwikłania w nią także i rumuńskiej rodziny panującej²¹. Wspomniane nieprawidłowości ukazywały dobitnie Rumunom potrzebę uniezależnienia się gospodarczego od Europy Zachodniej. Można przyjąć, że pozytywnym szokiem dla nacjonalizmu ekonomicznego Rumunów były następujące wydarzenia: wojna francusko-pruska, która pogrzebała pomysły liberalnej części rumuńskiej klasy politycznej na bardzo bliską współpracę z Francją, również i na niwie gospodarczej, nie tylko kulturalnej²². Kolejnym ważnym elementem konstytuującym rumuńską świadomość narodową była wojna z Turcją, dzięki której Rumunia uzyskała pełną niepodległość, co oczywiście należy uznać za sukces. Pozostałe rezultaty konfliktu z Turcją już nie były oceniane w Rumunii tak jednoznacznie, chodzi tu zwłaszcza o kwestie przyłączenia północnej Dobrudży. Sam fakt inkorporacji właściwie nie budził oporów, lecz duży sprzeciw rodził sposób jego dokonania. Turcja w myśl ustaleń z Berlina przekazała to terytorium Rosji, ta z kolei dopiero przekazała je Rumunii, co część polityków rumuńskich odebrało jako upokorzenie²³. Spowodowało to wzrost nastrojów antyrosyjskich w Rumunii, które utrzymywały się do wybuchu wojen bałkańskich, w wyniku których antyrosyjskie nastroje zostały nieco stonowane z uwagi na nastawienie Austro-Węgier do Rumunii w czasie zawirowań politycznych na Bałkanach w latach 1912-1913.

Nacjonalizm ekonomiczny, będący formą przejawiania się nacjonalizmu i zarazem jego częścią składową, był co zrozumiałe dobrym hasłem wyborczym, jednak w rzeczywistości nie można było na nim bazować ponieważ gospodarka rumuńska nie dysponowała wystarczającym zapasem kapitału by samodzielnie rozwijać własny przemysł z tego też powodu dopuszczano do rynku rumuńskiego obcy kapitał, choć, przynajmniej formalnie starano się tworzyć ograniczenia starając się nie dopuszczać na rynek rumuński firm nie dysponujących odpowiednim wkładem ze strony kapitału rumuńskiego. Początkowo z uwagi na ograniczony wolumen konkurencyjności rumuńskiej gospodarki kwestia ta nie wywoływała większego odzewu w społeczeństwie, natomiast nabrała ona na znaczeniu na przełomie XIX i XX wieku z kilku powodów. Pierwszym z nich było rozpoczęcie eksploatacji bogatych złóż ropy naftowej i gazu, a do rozwoju tych potencjalnie dochodowych gałęzi przemysłu potrzebny był kapitał zagraniczny potrzebny zwłaszcza do budowy infrastruktury wydobywczej i przesyłowej. Drugim powodem eksplozji nastrojów nacjonalistycznych była szeroko rozumiana kwestia rolna i nie

²¹ Patrz szerzej: A. Dubicki, Wpływ kapitału niemieckiego i austro-węgierskiego na budowę pierwszych rumuńskich linii kolejowych, [w:] *Między historią a literaturą. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Prof. Krzysztofowi Antoniemu Kuczyńskiemu*, J. Ciesielska-Klikowska, A. Kisztełińska-Węgrzyńska (red.), Łódź 2013, s. 414.

²² Symptomatycznie nadzieje zbiorowe liberalów profrancuskich wyrażał pod koniec lat 60-tych XIX wieku sugerując Napoleonowi III nawet możliwość przyłączenia Rumunii do Francji, ewentualnie objęcia przez Paryż protektoratu. A. Dubicki, *System partyjny Królestwa Rumunii. Uwarunkowania i funkcjonowanie*, Łódź 2013, s. 111.

²³ Należy przypomnieć, że była to praktyka w ówczesnym czasie często stosowana, choćby po wojnie austriacko-francusko-piemontkiej w 1859 roku, na mocy rozejmu w Villafranca i pokoju w Zurychu (1860), kiedy to Austria przekazała Lombardię najpierw Francji, ta zaś dopiero potem przekazała ten obszar Piemontowi. M. Żywczyński, *Historia powszechna 1789-1870*, Warszawa 2002, s. 451.

przystająca do realiów początku XX wieku struktura własności ziemi rolnej na wsi²⁴. Istotą problemu było nie przeprowadzenie w Rumunii pełnej reformy rolnej, dotychczasowe próby w tym względzie z lat: 1864 i 1891 należy uznać za doraźne i niewystarczające. Podstawowym problemem była koncentracja ziemi uprawnej w rękach wielkich właścicieli ziemskich, którzy wydzierżawiali ją rolnikom. Dodatkowym elementem komplikującym sprawę i *de facto* wprowadzającym tu wątek nacjonalistyczny był akt, iż w większości dzierżawę obsługiwali Żydzi, którzy dodatkowo tworzyli trusty dzierżawne obsługujące niemal hurtowo właścicieli ziemskich z danego obszaru²⁵. Sytuacja taka była bardzo niebezpieczna ponieważ kładła podwaliny zarówno pod nacjonalizm o charakterze ekonomicznym jak i pod nacjonalizm *sensu stricto* skierowany przeciw konkretnej grupie narodowościowej. Po raz pierwszy niezadowolenie społeczne skierowane przeciwko Żydom jeszcze właściwie w formie nie skoordynowanej znalazło swoje ujście właśnie w trakcie powstania chłopskiego w 1907 roku, którego epicentrum znajdowało się na terenie Mołdawii w której wspomniany problem był szczególnie widoczny. W późniejszym czasie znajdowało się tam centrum poparcia dla nacjonalistycznego ruchu firmowanego przez Alexandru C. Cuzę, który bardzo silnie eksponował konieczność rozprawy z Żydami zwłaszcza na niwie ekonomicznej.

Początki nowoczesnego ruchu narodowego (w sensie XX wiecznym) na niwie rumuńskiej były związane z postacią Nicolae Iorgi, który rozpoczął działania na rzecz umocnienia świadomości narodowej Rumunów w roku 1906, wywołując zamieszki w Bukareszcie skierowane przeciwko wystawianym w teatrze w stolicy Rumunii sztukom teatralnym w języku francuskim²⁶. Było to „mocne wejście” w świat polityki rumuńskiego naukowca, który dzięki swej akcji zdobył szeroki rozgłos, co z kolei umożliwiło mu zdobycie odpowiedniego poparcia politycznego by założyć własną partię i nawiązać współpracę polityczną z profesorem A. C. Cuzą z Jassów, co umożliwiło mu rozwinięcie działalności na całą Rumunię²⁷. Współpracę nawiązaną pomiędzy Iorgą a Cuzą można określić z dzisiejszego punktu widzenia określić jako „egzotyczną” ponieważ obydwaj reprezentowali odmienny typ nacjonalizmu. O ile Iordze chodziło bardziej o promowanie „rumuńkości” we wszelkich jej odmianach, w tym przede wszystkim kulturalnej, o tyle Cuza stał się nośnikiem idei dominacji żywiołu rumuńskiego także pod względem narodowym i ekonomicznym. Wspomniana różnica poglądów doprowadziła w końcu obydwóch myślicieli-polityków do rozłamu, którego przyczyną było poszukiwanie poparcia wśród różnych warstw społecznych oraz stosunek do kwestii kolaboracji z władzami okupacyjnymi. Iorga swych zwolenników poszukiwał przede wszystkim na terenach Wołoszczyzny, natomiast Cuza w Mołdawii. Na krótką metę rzeczywiście mogli oni

²⁴ Patrz szerzej, A. Dubicki, Zarzys „problematyki chłopskiej” w Rumunii przed 1914 rokiem, *Zeszyty Wiejskie. Uniwersytet Łódzki*, Nr XVI/2011, s. 60 – 79.

²⁵ A. Dița, N. Iorga și *Neamul Românesc*, „Arhivele Totalitarismului”, 1-2/2007, s. 139.

²⁶ N. Iorga, *O viața de om, așa cum a fost*, vol. II, Chișinău 1991, s. 155.

²⁷ P. Țurlea, Nicolae Iorga în viața politică a României, București 1991, s. 55

utrzymywać współpracę potrzebną do rozwoju ruchu narodowego, natomiast na dłuższą metę nie była ona możliwa ze względu na wspomniane różnice pomiędzy obydwoma myślicielami. Rzeczą, która w dużym stopniu różnicowała obu polityków było widoczna u obu chęć dominacji we własnym, początkowo wspólnym, ugrupowaniu politycznym co było zarzewiem późniejszego konfliktu pomiędzy nimi.

W działalności politycznej Iorgi można wyróżnić trzy kanały dystrybucji jego poglądów politycznych. Po pierwsze była to trybuna parlamentarna. Iorga wszedł do parlamentu po raz pierwszy w roku 1907, na fali wspomnianego „sukcesu” związanego z wywołaniem zamieszek w obronie kultury rumuńskiej²⁸. Widać w tym wyraźnie przejaw nacjonalizmu kulturalnego, który będzie później dominantą w działalności Iorgi. Od razu można zaznaczyć, że wiąże się to z pewnym paradoksem, ponieważ Iorga sam był poliglotą i osobiście posługiwał się wieloma językami. Z tego też powodu należy uznać, że jego zapatrywania na konieczność obrony kultury rumuńskiej nie wynikały ze źle pojmowanej zaściankowości, bądź wąskich horyzontów, ale wręcz przeciwnie były przejawem jego troski o formę kulturalną narodu. W opinii Iorgi w głównym teatrze kraju, jakim niewątpliwie jest Teatr Narodowy powinno się promować przede wszystkim kulturę rumuńską i język rumuński, w związku z tym nie powinny tam być grane spektakle w innych językach. Koronnym argumentem Iorgi była chęć ochrony własnego języka, który należy kultywować, zwłaszcza w głównych instytucjach kulturalnych kraju²⁹. W swych poglądach w owym czasie Iorga zbliżył się do grupy skupionej wokół czasopisma „Semănătorul” (Siewca). Przez pewien czas sprawował on funkcję redaktora naczelnego czasopisma o tym samym tytule. Formy wpływu Iorgi za pomocą tego czasopisma były jednak w pewnej mierze ograniczone poprzez jego formułę literacką. W związku z tym profesor poszukiwał formy szerszej, umożliwiającej mu dostęp do szerszego audytorium. Okazja taka nadarzyła się przy wyborach w roku 1907, kiedy to Iorga zdecydował się zdyskontować swą popularność kandydując do Izby Deputowanych rumuńskiego parlamentu. Niejako przy tej okazji profesor zainaugurował jedno ze swych najważniejszych dzieł, będące odtąd najważniejszym nośnikiem jego poglądów naukowych, literackich, ale przede wszystkim politycznych. Chodzi tu o czasopismo *Neamul românesc*, które ukazywało się do roku 1940³⁰. Co najistotniejsze było to własne pismo Iorgi, w związku z tym nie musiał dopasowywać swych poglądów do aktualnej linii politycznej pisma. Początkowo głównym tematem poruszonym przez Iorgę była kwestia agrarna, związana z powstaniem chłopskim z 1907 roku. Wzięcie pod szczególną opiekę chłopu rumuńskiego było związane z poglądami Iorgi dotyczącymi także pochodzenia narodu rumuńskiego. To chłopów uznawał on za najzdrowszą warstwę społeczeństwa i w związku z tym uznawał, że należy się im specjalna ochrona. Poza kwestią chłopską w aktywności politycznej Iorgi w okresie poprzedzającym Wielką Wojnę zauważalne jest także

²⁸ P. Țurlea, op. cit., s. 42.

²⁹ N. Iorga, *Discursuri parlamentare*, București 1981, s. 19.

³⁰ A. Dița, op. cit., s. 135.

powolne przesuwanie akcentów na konieczność walki o zjednoczenie wszystkich Rumunów w jednym państwie. Po raz kolejny w sukurs poglądom Iorgi przyszła jego względna niezależność polityczna i paradoksalnie przynależność polityczna do partii nie dysponującej dużą reprezentacją parlamentarną. Jako, że „dzięki” temu nie był on „zagrożony” utrzymaniem władzy mógł w miarę swobodnie głosić hasła, które były nieobecne w propagandzie politycznej najważniejszych stronnictw przed 1914 r. Walka o język rumuński i instytucje kulturalne doprowadziła nawet do uznania jego oraz jego dzieł za elementy niepożądane w Austro-Węgrzech³¹. Aktywność Iorgi w kwestiach narodowych skupiała się także na właściwym upamiętnieniu 50 rocznicy zjednoczenia Rumunii, która przypadała w 1909 roku. W programie rządowym sugerowano skupienie się jedynie na obchodach na poziomie szkolnym, raczej nie organizując obchodów na poziomie centralnym, Iorga przez swe interpelacje wywalczył przeznaczenie odpowiedniej sumy pieniędzy na wzniesienie pomników ku czci zjednoczenia, który postawiono np. w Jassach³². Powodem takiego działania ze strony rządu była niejednoznaczna ocena ówczesnego księcia rumuńskiego Aleksandra Jana Cuzy. W odczuciu rządu bezpieczniejsze politycznie było świętowanie np. kolejnej rocznicy wstąpienia na tron króla Karola. Generalnie rzecz biorąc nacjonalizm Iorgi z okresu poprzedzającego Wielką Wojnę można określić jako kulturalny, właściwie nie odnoszący się do kwestii rasowych, w rozumieniu ekskluzywnym, z wyjątkiem piętnowania zjawiska „rozpijania” chłopów na wsiach. Ten element przy złej woli można potraktować jako najbardziej zbliżony do negatywnej kampanii skierowanej przeciwko Żydom. Jednak w tym momencie powodem wystąpienia nie była kwestia rasowa a prosta zależność ekonomiczna – do Żydów należały przede wszystkim karczmy na wsi rumuńskiej, w związku z czym skierowane przeciw nim wystąpienia Iorgi należy traktować w sensie ekonomicznym.

Nacjonalizm w wersji Iorgi przyjmował optykę opartą na wspólnocie cywilizacyjnej, nie zaś narodowej, z naczelnym zadaniem wytworzenia odpowiedniej *cywilizacji narodowej*, która jednak nie powinna być ekskluzywna, powinna być inkluzyjna, oraz otwarta na kontakty z innymi podobnymi cywilizacjami, był to wręcz podstawowy warunek jej rozwoju i trwania³³.

Można właściwie uznać, że najlepiej poglądy narodowe Iorgi są opisane w tytule jego autobiografii – *Supt trei Regi – Istoria unei lupte pentru ideal national și moral*.³⁴ Widać, że Iorga określa swoje życie, swoją karierę polityczną jako walkę o pewien ideał – ideał narodowy i moralny. Iorga był uważany za swego rodzaju ikonę takiej walki, zwłaszcza w okresie wielkiej Wojny, gdy uznawano go za swoisty katalizator energii narodowej dzięki artykułom publikowanym w *Neamul Românesc*. Takie jego postrzeganie jako symbolu trwało mniej więcej do roku 1931, kiedy to Iorga przyjął stanowisko premiera. Niestety tym razem jego idealistyczne nastawienie

³¹ C. Bodea, R. Ș., Vergatti, Nicolae Iorga in arhivele vieceze și ale Siguranței regale, București 2012, dok. 47.

³² N. Isar, Mari români in viziunea lui Nicolae Iorga, București 2010, s. 143.

³³ I. R. Pascal, op. cit., s. 170.

³⁴ N. Iorga, Supt trei Regi. Istoria lupte pentru ideal national și moral, București 1999, ss. 606.

nie wytrzymało zderzenia z twardą polityką i ostatecznie okres premierostwa Iorgi podkopał w pewnym sensie jego idealny wizerunek, natomiast jego popularność nadal utrzymywała się na stosunkowo wysokim poziomie. Wydarzenia z okresu premierostwa Iorgi nieco nadwyrężyły jego wizerunek, ponieważ profesor nie sprawdził się jako polityk w praktyce, należy uczciwie przyznać, że prawdopodobnie nie miał do tego odpowiednich zdolności, także i oczekiwania opinii publicznej w jego przypadku były zapewne zbyt wygórowane. Do tego należy dodać także i specyficzny okres w którym przyszło mu rządzić, był to czas wielkiego kryzysu, kiedy to *establishment* rumuński rozpaczliwie poszukiwał możliwości załagodzenia kryzysu, w związku z czym powołanie na stanowisko premiera osoby nie związanej bezpośrednio z najważniejszymi partiami wydawało się optymalnym rozwiązaniem, niestety tym razem Iorga, zresztą jak i wcześniej nie wykazał się ręką do znalezienia właściwych współpracowników. Można wręcz postawić tezę, że desygnując Iorgę na premiera wyrządzono mu krzywdę. Polski poseł (Jan Szembek) zwracał uwagę na to, że Iorga jako premier właściwie nie zajmuje się sprawami państwowymi, traktuje przewodniczenie Radzie Ministrów podobnie jak zajęcia na uczelni, w pełni korzystając z okresu wakacyjnego, w Bukareszcie pojawiając się bardzo rzadko, jedynie w celu podpisania najniezbędniejszych dokumentów³⁵.

O ile wizję nacjonalizmu Nicolae Iorgi można uważać za w pewnej mierze ograniczoną, ponieważ nie prezentował on kompletnej doktryny, ograniczając się raczej do naukowego pojmowania istoty narodu, i podnoszenia w sposób ograniczony postulatów o charakterze ekonomicznym, o tyle doktryna prezentowana przez jego czasowego współpracownika – A. C. Cuzę była o wiele bardziej komplementarna z punktu widzenia teorii polityki, zawierając wszelkie niezbędne pierwiastki – odnosząc się zarówno do ekonomii, jak i do religii, a również co oczywiste do polityki.

Trudno jest w sposób zdecydowany wskazać definitywnie początek *kubizmu*, ogólnie określa się go na koniec XIX wieku, można za H. Bozdoghina przyjąć, że pierwsze artykuły, w których A. C. Cuza zaczął propagować swą wizję nacjonalizmu pojawiły się już w 1889 roku, i rozwój tego ruchu trwał do roku 1938, czyli do momentu, w którym król Karol II zabronił działalności wszystkich partii politycznych na terenie Rumunii.

Czym jest *kuzizm*? Według samego Alexandru C. Cuzy, jest tożsamy z antysemityzmem, co bardzo często podkreślał Cuza w swych publikacjach³⁶. Co istotne ruch A. C. Cuzy był w dużej mierze identyfikowany z nim samym, co było zresztą praktyką dość często stosowaną w Rumunii w odniesieniu do partii o charakterze wodzowskim. W podobny sposób określano np. zwolenników Partii Ludu gen. Alexandru Averescu – *averesceni*), czy nawet zwolenników Nicolae Iorgi – *iorghisti*. Podkreślało to w sposób widoczny skalę wpływu szefa partii na jego

³⁵ A. Dubicki, Dzieje polskiej placówki dyplomatycznej w Bukareszcie. 1919-1940, Łódź 2014, s. 59.

³⁶ H. Bozdoghina, Doctrina naționalist-crăștina „Cuzismul”, „Holocaust. Studii și cercetari”, 2./2009, s. 110.

ruch polityczny, który właściwie bez jego przywództwa się rozpadł, gdyż nie było w ogóle mowy o ewentualnej sukcesji władzy w partii. Zgodnie z tymi obserwacjami zwolenników Cuzy określano jako *kuzistów*, co miało także swoje zalety, bowiem umożliwiało sprawniejsze prowadzenie propagandy politycznej na terenach wiejskich, gdyż w łatwiejszy sposób umożliwiało to chłopom identyfikację partyjną, bez potrzeby rozumienia spraw związanych np. ze zmianą nazwy partii, ewentualnie jej fuzjami.

Sam A. C. Cuza utożsamienie swego ruchu z antysemityzmem rozumiał jako ułatwienie dla zwykłego wyborcy, który niekoniecznie musiał zdawać sobie sprawę z istoty tego zagadnienia. Ważne było identyfikowanie go z Cuzą i *kuzizmem*, było to nawet bardziej nośne niż „zwykły” antysemityzm. Celem ostatecznym miała być eliminacja Żydów z Rumunii, zarówno w sensie jednostkowym, jak i wspólnotowym³⁷.

W okresie międzywojennym *kuzizm* był przedstawiany jako doktryna polityczna kompletna, zawierając elementy odwołujące się do: biologii, teologii, ekonomii oraz socjologii i historii³⁸.

Jako receptę na rozwiązanie problemu żydowskiego w Rumunii zakładano całkowite wykluczenie Żydów ze społeczeństwa rumuńskiego. Miało to nastąpić w przypadku realizacji dobrze opracowanego programu politycznego. W tym kontekście Cuza uznawał antysemityzm i *kuzizm* za dwa zupełnie różne pojęcia. *Kuzizm* miał być rozumiany jako antysemityzm radykalny. Według samego Cuzy jego ideologia, oraz antysemityzm były w sensie ogólnym zbieżne, jednak miały różnić się doraźnie osiągniętymi skutkami. *Kuzim* był antysemityzmem natychmiastowym, miał przynieść efekt właściwie natychmiast po jego deklaracji wprowadzenia w życie. Jego efektem miała być deportacja Żydów z Rumunii, względnie pozbawienie ich praw obywatelskich.

Sam antysemityzm Cuza postrzegał jako chorobę przewlekłą, ograniczającą się jedynie do teoretyzowania, w swojej ideologii starał się on przenieść jej ciężar w sferę czynów. W własnych słowach A. C. Cuza zdefiniował *kuzizm* jako: *doktrynę aktywną, która nie ograniczającą się jedynie do teoretyzowania. Zawierającą w sobie elementy polityczne, kulturalne i ekonomiczne i przez to stającą się programem naukowym. Kuzizm miał też być programem działania natychmiastowego, wprowadzającego w czyn opracowaną już wcześniej teorię. Miał być postrzegany jako system kompletny, pozwalający rozwiązać kwestię żydowską w sposób całkowity, zarówno teoretycznie jak i praktycznie*³⁹.

Synteza doktryny narodowo-chrześcijańskiej zostawała zawarta w tezach *kuzizmu* opracowanych przez założyciela i głównego teoretyka ruchu – A. C. Cuzę. Narodowość była tu postrzegana jako element naturalny, organiczny i duchowy, była co zrozumiałe czynnikiem pozytywnym, który jednak uległ poważnemu zagrożeniu w wyniku stałego kontaktu z Żydami.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ Ibidem, s. 109.

Jednym z elementów rozwiązania tej kwestii miało być wprowadzenie w Rumunii, a także w innych zainteresowanych krajach, specjalnych *ustaw narodowych*, czegoś w przybliżeniu odpowiadającego Ustawom Norymberskim, choć należy pamiętać, że Cuza zręby swego programu tworzył w latach dwudziestych XX wieku, czyli poprzedzał ideologię reprezentowaną przez Hitlera i jego popleczników. Wspomniane *prawo narodowe* powinno być wyrazem *mocy sprawczej* każdego narodu, zwłaszcza w kontekście jego potencjalnego wkładu w kulturę światową. Naród w tym układzie reprezentowany jest przez wszystkich osobników tej samej krwi, rozumianych jako organizmy produkcyjne, skonkretyzowane w trzech klasach:

- *klasie robotniczej i chłopskiej (produkcyjnej);*
- *klasie średniej;*
- *klasie rządzącej;*⁴⁰

Podział na wspomniane klasy był również istotny w kontekście antysemityzmu Cuzy. W jego opinii naród stawał się bytem wspólnym ustanowionym poprzez naturalne połączenie jednostek legitymujących się tym samym pochodzeniem, zamieszkujących konkretny obszar, mający zadanie dalszego kreatywnego rozwoju swej narodowości i w sposób aktywny wpływającego na rozwój kultury ogólnoswiatowej. Miała być to zasada uniwersalna formująca naród⁴¹. Należy także zwrócić uwagę na fakt iż wszystkie trzy klasy winne być emanacją tego samego narodu, gdyż w przeciwnym razie organiczność tego układu zostałaby zaburzona.

Naród w myśli Cuzy był określany jako: ogół jednostek, których zadaniem jest własny rozwój w określonych warunkach: geograficznych, politycznych, etnicznych i ekonomicznych. Tworzą one grupy, narody i rasy, z których składa się populacja światowa. W ramach tak rozumianego narodu funkcjonują wspomniane już uprzednio klasy społeczne, tworząc jedną organiczną i niepodzielną jedność. Co więcej stwierdzał on, że w jednym miejscu na ziemi może funkcjonować tylko jeden naród, gdyż w innym wypadku dochodziłoby do ich mieszania, ewentualnie dochodziłoby do ciągłych konfliktów narodów o przeciwnych interesach⁴². Z tego też powodu polityka nacjonalistyczna, wspierająca rozwój własnego narodu jest jedyną uprawnioną i właściwą dla kraju chcącego zachować swą niezależność.

Co zrozumiale Cuza nie przewidywał w tej definicji miejsca dla Żydów, postrzegał on ten naród jako zdegenerowany, mieszany i pozbawiony własnego obszaru zamieszkania. Z tego też powodu uznawał ich za warstwę nieużyteczną, bezpłodną z punktu widzenia kultury światowej oraz ogólnie rozumianego życia narodowego. Bezpośrednim powodem takiego stanu był brak u Żydów podstawowej w mniemaniu Cuzy warstwy ludności – mianowicie chłopów i robotników. Z tego też powodu Cuza określał Żydów jako prowadzących pasożytnicze życie nomadów. Swoją możliwość działania w kwestiach narodowych według lidera LANC Żydzi utracili częściowo w wyniku chowu wsobnego, będącego wynikiem ich izolacji od świata

⁴⁰ H. Bozdoghina, op. cit., s. 111.

⁴¹ Ibidem, s. 112.

⁴² I. R. Pascal, op. cit., s. 163.

zewnątrznego. Był to jeden z najwcześniej promowanych przez Cuzę poglądów zauważalny już w jego pierwszych wystąpieniach w 1893 roku. Już w początkach swej działalności Cuza uzasadniał swą wizję elementami rasizmu, co miało wynikać bezpośrednio z jego badań naukowych. Wykazywał w nich, że pomiędzy rasą semicką a aryjską istnieje olbrzymia przepaść, której w żadnym razie nie da się zasypać. Później, t.j. w latach trzydziestych Cuza przypominał o wspomnianym aspekcie twierdząc, że był swego rodzaju prorokiem w tym względzie. Swoje enuncjacje rasowe Cuza podbudowywał przekonaniem, że wynikają one z wielkiego zróżnicowania rasowego (wielość typów ludzkich) widocznych wśród Żydów. W jego mniemaniu świadczyła o tym także ich pochyla postawa, chwiejne ruchy i specyficzny sposób chodzenia z palców.

W *kuzizmie*, jak już wspomniano dużą rolę odgrywały oprócz komponentu naukowego także i kwestie religijne. Jeżeli chodzi o współczesny judaizm, to Cuza uważał go za parodię oryginalnego mozaizmu (judaizmu świątynnego) oraz chrześcijaństwa⁴³.

Judaizm współczesny (rabiniczny) Cuza postrzegał jako wynik przewagi wśród Żydów elementu koczowniczego, więc absolutnie degenerującego uprzednie zalety judaizmu świątynnego. Cuza twierdził, że wszelkie uzasadnienia statusu Narodu Wybranego Żydzi już utracili, bowiem przestali uprawiać ziemię, kosztem życia o charakterze nomadycznym. W kwestiach religijnych Cuza poszedł nawet dalej odmawiając judaizmowi współczesnemu nawet miana monoteizmu, postrzegając go raczej jako henoteizm. Cuza odbierał to w sposób przeciwstawiający Jahwe henoteistycznego jako walczącego z innymi bogami. Jahwe monoteistyczny nie byłby Bogiem zazdrosnym – gdyż innych bogów po prostu by nie było. Dalsze oczekiwanie przez Żydów na Mesjasza w świetle objawienia Ewangelii uznawał Cuza za pasożytnicze. Judaizm rabiniczny był uznawany za trąd, który może doprowadzić do zniszczenia narodu rumuńskiego. Cuza nie wahał się głosić takich poglądów na najwyższym szczeblu, nawet w rumuńskim parlamencie. Polityk negocjował także przesłanie świętych ksiąg judaizmu – Tory i Talmudu – uznawał je za skierowane przeciwko reszcie rodzaju ludzkiego. Stąd też w jego mniemaniu antysemityzm stawał się reakcją obronną na nauczanie Talmudu i Tory. Negując w dużej mierze Judaizm, Cuza musiał się wypowiedzieć także o chrześcijaństwie, zwłaszcza w kraju tak związanym, niemi organicznie z Cerkwią prawosławną jak Rumunia. W tej mierze Cuza postulował głęboką reformę chrześcijaństwa, odrzucenie zasad ustalonych przez Ojców Kościoła i Sobory. Cuza negocjował wartość Starego Testamentu *en bloc* oraz żydowskie pochodzenie Chrystusa. Reforma chrześcijaństwa miała polegać na oczyszczeniu go z naleciałości żydowskich. Wspomniany element w sposób widoczny stawał pod znakiem zapytania narodow-chrześcijańską identyfikację ruchu, co jego krytycy skrzętnie Cuzie wypominali (narodowe chrześcijaństwo było obecne choćby w samej nazwie ruchu LANC – Liga Obrony Narodowo Chrześcijańskiej). W dalszej mierze doprowadził to do obłożenia *kuzizmu* klątwą

⁴³ A. C. Cuza, Știința antisemitismului, "Apararea Națională", 15 XI 1922.

przez duchownych prawosławnych, jako sekty odrzucającej podstawy chrześcijaństwa. Jak już wspomniano Cuza nie uważał Chrystusa za Żyda, natomiast samo chrześcijaństwo, zwłaszcza we własnej wersji, widział jako antytezę judaizmu. Sam proces zbawienia według Cuzy miał być gwarantowany poprzez odrzucenie dziedzictwa Starego Przymierza, tak jak to miał zalecać Chrystus, który według Cuzy miał dążyć wręcz do odrzucenia zasad religii mojżeszowej i jej likwidacji. Swoje dalekie odejście od zasad chrześcijaństwa Cuza tłumaczył wypaczeniem pierwotnych zasad ewangelicznych przez św. Pawła i jego następców. Cuza postulował oddzielenie obu części Pisma Świętego od siebie, co powinno umożliwić właściwe odczytanie nauki Chrystusa. Sam Stary Testament Cuza uznawał za religię diabelską przekłętą narodu, zbliżając się w swych interpretacjach do pewnych odłamów chrześcijańskiego gnostycyzmu, które również wybiórczo podchodziły do dziedzictwa biblijnego w sposób wyraźny odróżniając Boga Starego Testamentu od Boga Nowego Przymierza⁴⁴. Zgodnie z oczekiwaniami Cerkiew prawosławna potępiła tezy Cuzy, jednak pomimo klątwy polityk podtrzymywał swe poglądy widząc w nich nadzieję dla Rumunii, poprzez dość radykalne zerwanie z przeszłością miały one definiować nowe przeznaczenie, określane wyraźną parabolą „kraj, prawo, lud, król”. Te elementy miały symbolicznie układać się w cztery ramiona swastyki symbolu (także wyborczego) LANC⁴⁵.

Eliminacja Żydów z Europy, jako konkretnego zagrożenia była dla Cuzy jedynym konkretnym wyjściem, nie dopuszczał on możliwości asymilacji Żydów, wręcz uważał ją jako poważne zagrożenie, zarówno dla narodów jak i kultury europejskiej. Wspomniana eliminacja Żydów powinna być wykonana jak najkrótszym czasie, bez oglądu na możliwe konsekwencje gospodarcze, polityczne i kulturalne.

W kwestiach ekonomicznych *kuzim* podobnie jak i w pozostałych sprawach opierał się na myśli Cuzy. Było to o tyle naturalne, że w dziedzinie ekonomii Cuza rzeczywiście był osobą zorientowaną, jako profesor ekonomii politycznej na Uniwersytecie w Jassach (od 1901 r.).

W tej mierze postulował znaczne rozszerzenie zasad protekcjonizmu gospodarczego i równocześnie praw upośledzających Żydów, ich aktywny udział w ekonomii rumuńskiej Cuza uznawał za największą bolączkę rumuńskiej gospodarki i za element wręcz ją psujący⁴⁶.

W celu eliminacji Żydów Cuza przewidywał konieczność interwencji państwa poprzez odpowiednią działalność legislacyjną, która miała odpowiednio wpływać na rumuński rynek pracy. Miało to doprowadzić do odzyskania przez elity rumuńskie utraconych pozycji na rynku ekonomicznym i rynku pracy. Szczególną opieką miano otoczyć klasę średnią, bowiem to właśnie ona miała być najbardziej poszkodowana przez Żydów. Sam Cuza określał swą ideologię, jako element samoobrony rumuńskiego narodu przeciw zagrożeniom żydowskim wynikającym wręcz z instynktu samozachowawczego narodu. Swoją propozycję przedstawiał

⁴⁴ P. A. Shapiro, *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*, Bloomington 2007, s. 140.

⁴⁵ A.C. Cuza, *Invatatura lui Isus. Iudaismul si teologia crestina*, Iasi, 1925, s. 33-34.

⁴⁶ idem, *Știința antisemitismului*, „Apararea Națională”, 15 XI 1922.

jako rozwiązanie kompleksowe dla narodu. W konkluzji nadawał swym propozycjom sankcję najwyższą – boską jako wynikającą z nauczania ewangelicznego oraz naturalną, jako emanację prawa naturalnego⁴⁷.

Kuzizm był jedną z radykalniejszych form antysemityzmu, zwłaszcza z tych obecnych w Rumunii w okresie międzywojennym. Niezależnie od przesłania aspirował do stania się ideologią kompletną zawierającą wszystkie niezbędne składniki i zajmując stanowisko we wszystkich najważniejszych kwestiach: od ekonomii, przez politykę po sprawy duchowe. *Kuzizm* zakładał współpracę wszelkich elementów życia i nauki w jednym celu eliminacji Żydów z życia kulturalnego i gospodarczego Rumunii, niemniej jednak pomimo szumnych zapowiedzi pozostał kolejną doktryną teoretyczną, nie mając okazji do sprawdzenia się w warunkach sprawowania władzy. Epizod rządów Gogi-Cuzy w grudniu 1937 – lutym 1938, co prawda zapowiadał pewne działania antysemityczne, jednak w ówczesnej sytuacji geopolitycznej oraz wewnętrznej nie były one realne i ich implementacja była możliwa jedynie w takim zakresie, jaki był zgodny z interesem realnego suwerena – króla Karola II. Był także wstępem do likwidacji ruchu i pretekstem do przejścia władzy przez Króla⁴⁸.

Codreanu i ruch Żelaznej Gwardii

Mimo ograniczenia się właściwe warstwy teoretycznej – Cuza i jego ideologia w dużej mierze byli powiązani także z ruchem żelaznogwardyjskim, dla którego idee te początkowo stanowiły punkt wyjścia w działalności politycznej. Obaj liderzy czyli A. C. Cuza i Coneliu Zelea Codreanu propagowali radykalny nacjonalizm i antysemityzm, niemniej różnice dotyczyły zasięgu ich ruchu oraz metod walki, nie tylko politycznej. Organizacją macierzystą była LANC, jednak po początkowym okresie w miarę zgodnej i korzystnej dla obu stron współpracy doszło do zerwania z uwagi na: *primo: spór co do metod walki politycznej (Dubicki, Nagy-Talavera, Heinen), oraz docelowego elektoratu partii. LANC choć oczywiście kierował swą doktryną także i do chłopów, to jednak przez swój program ekonomiczny, mówiący o eliminacji Żydów z handlu największy posłuch uzyskał w Mołdawii, swym mateczniku, wśród drobnomieszczanstwa. Codreanu ze swej strony chciał poszerzyć swą bazę społeczną, dlatego dążył do odejścia od drobnomieszczkańskiego konserwatyzmu i chciał poszerzenia ruchu na pozostałe warstwy społeczne, co jednak wymagałoby od Cuzy zmian doktrynalnych w jego ideologii*⁴⁹.

*W typologii nacjonalizmów Stanleya G. Payne'ego oba ruchy sytuowały się jako prawica radykalna, której działanie było o tyle ułatwione, że faktycznie nieobecna była w Rumunii w owym czasie prawica konserwatywna*⁵⁰. *W późniejszym okresie lat 30-tych, zwłaszcza dzięki poszerzeniu*

⁴⁷ R. Ioanid, *The Sacralised Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard*, [w:] *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion*, [ed.] R. Griffin, Routledge 2013, s. 131.

⁴⁸ A. Chistol, *Cronica unui eșec așteptat. Guvernarea Goga-Cuza*, Craiova 2011, s. 500.

⁴⁹ T. Dubicki, K. Dach, *Żelazny Legion Michała Archanioła*, Warszawa 1996, s. 48; N. M. Nagy Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others*, Iași ... 2001, s. 370.

⁵⁰ S. Payne, *The history of fascism 1914- 1945*, Madison 1996, s. 14-19.

swej bazy społecznej ruch Codreanu zaczął przechodzić na stanowiska obecnie klasyfikowane jako faszystowskie – zwłaszcza gdy zaczęto akcentować potrzebę ukształtowania „nowego człowieka”-*omul nou*.

Secundo: Kolejnym elementem, na który zwraca się powszechnie uwagę był konflikt generacji, jaki miał miejsce w LANC i który poskutkował w końcu odejściem grupy Codreanu⁵¹.

Tertio: ważnym, aczkolwiek dziś raczej pomijanym aspektem rozpadu pierwotnego LANC, i elementem niezgody pomiędzy Codreanu a Cuzą były wspomniane już uprzednio poglądy religijne Cuzy. Były one zupełnie nie do przyjęcia dla Codreanu, któremu zależało na zdobyciu szerokiego poparcia także i na wsi, co nie było absolutnie możliwe w warunkach otwartego konfliktu z Cerkwią.

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu dystansowanie od LANC rozpoczął już w roku 1925, jest to udokumentowane w zachowanej korespondencji pomiędzy nim a Cuzą⁵². Jak sam wspominał wolał swobodę akcji, niż pozostawanie związanym partyjnymi obligacjami. Do widocznego dla wszystkich zerwania relacji doszło w 1927 roku, po założeniu konkurencyjnego dla LANC – *Ruchu Legionowego*. Niemniej jednak atmosfera wzajemnej tolerancji trwała do 1933 r., gdy obie partie zaczęły przejawiać wobec siebie wzajemną i otwartą wrogość.

W początkowych dokumentach programowych Żelaznej Gwardii wpływ Cuzy jest co zrozumiałe bardzo widoczny, jednak z czasem a także wraz z kolejnymi programami politycznymi LANC potrzeba wyraźnego odcięcia się od Cuzy stawała się dla Codreanu coraz bardziej istotna⁵³.

W 1928 r. Ion Moța, jako jeden z ideologów ruchu legionowego rozpoczął proces uniezależniania się gwardzistów, pozwalając sobie na początkowo zawołowaną krytykę *kuzizmu*, wskazując, że prezentuje ona koncepcję naturalistyczną w kulturze, oraz mocne powiązanie tegoż z zagadnieniami natury ekonomicznej, legionieści zaczęli krytykować brak podkreślenia walorów moralnych w walce politycznej w doktrynie Cuzy. W całości nadal afirmowano antyżydowską część programu LANC⁵⁴.

Do dalszych nieporozumień dochodziło przy okazji wyborów w 1931 i 1933 r.. Wówczas krytyka LANC przybierała na sile. Legionieści akcentowali *systemowość* ruchu Cuzy i jego chęć działania w ramach demokracji. Do tego dochodził element wzajemnych nieporozumień, czyli zgłaszanie kandydatur w tych samych okręgach wyborczych, co prowadziło do walki politycznej pomiędzy obydwojema partiami narodowymi. Według Codreanu i jego popleczników Cuza stał z czasem antytezą tego co uprzednio zwalczał, przechodząc w latach 30-tych na pozycje teoretyzowania, a nie działania politycznego. Do ostatecznego zerwania doszło w grudniu 1933 r. Od tego momentu legionieści zaczęli prezentować LANC jako ruch nie przystający

⁵¹ T. Dubicki, K. Dach, op. cit., s. 48.

⁵² Totalitarismul de dreapta în România. Origini, manifestări, evoluție. 1919-1927, București 1996, s. 537.

⁵³ Ibidem, s. 617, 618.

⁵⁴ V. Săndulescu, Note privind extremismul de dreapta în România Mare: clarificări doctrinare și practici politice, „Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană”, 1/2013, s. 189.

do nowych czasów, oraz do nowych okoliczności walki politycznej, jako ruch wtłoczony w tryby maszyny demokratycznej, z którą w nowych czasach miał walczyć ruch legionowy⁵⁵.

W kolejnych artykułach myśliciele związani z Codreanu (M. Polihroniade) poddawali *kuzizm* coraz silniejszej krytyce wskazując na brak jego sukcesów w polityce wewnętrznej. Oskarżano Cuzę, że zajął się w swej działalności paranauką – dowodząc że Jezus nie był Żydem itp., natomiast brak było realnych efektów jego działalności, podczas gdy Żydzi zajmowali coraz większą rolę w ekonomii rumuńskiej⁵⁶. Rok 1933 był w narodowym ruchu rumuńskim o tyle istotny, że był czasem wyborczym, co sprzyjało radykalizacji nastrojów i wzajemnych stosunków. Zwolennicy Codreanu oskarżali kuzistów o konformizm i jedynie pokazowy antysemityzm i antymasonizm, podczas gdy w rzeczywistości mieli oni wspierać te grupy. Podobnie jak Cuza określał współczesny judaizm o imitację dawnej wersji świątynnej i chrześcijaństwa, tak twórcy ruchu legionowego oskarżali LANC o tworzenie nieudolnych kopii ich własnego ruchu żelazno gwardyjskiego. Miało to w sposób oczywisty dowodzić przewagi ruchu Codreanu. Symbolicznym momentem zerwania mostów pomiędzy obiema gałęziami były wspomniane wybory z grudnia 1933 r. Gwardziści zostali z nich wykluczeni, jednak nie wsparli w konsekwencji z polecenia samego Codreanu kandydatów LANC w wyborach. Codreanu swój wyraźny zakaz takiego działania motywował dwoma przyczynami:

- *kuziści to inne oblicze rządu*
- *kuziści byli z rządem w zмовie, bowiem ich partii nie rozwiązano.*

Było to ostateczne zerwanie pomiędzy obiema partiami, rozłam pogłębiał się do roku 1937, gdy w przededniu kolejnych wyborów parlamentarnych bojówki obu partii zaciekle ze sobą walczyły. Późniejsze wsparcie Codreanu dla rządu Gogi-Cuzy, było raczej taktyczne i w końcu niosło za sobą znamiona „niedźwiedziej przysługi” prowadzącej ostatecznie do rozwiązania tego gabinetu⁵⁷. Dochodziła do tego urażona duma Codreanu, który nie otrzymał misji utworzenia rządu pomimo znacznie lepszego wyniku wyborczego⁵⁸.

Nacjonalizm prezentowany przez Codreanu miał w sobie wiele wspólnego z tym co prezentował we Włoszech Mussolini, natomiast w kwestiach relacji ruchu gwardyjskiego z Hitlerem, tutaj sprawa jest o wiele bardziej skomplikowana, ponieważ „Kapitan” z reguły dość krytycznie wypowiadał się na temat niemieckiego wodza. Jednym z elementów odstręczających go od Hitlera była areligijność jego ruchu, w żadnej mierze nie będąca do pogodzenia z mocnym zaangażowaniem religijnym samego Codreanu. Ważnym elementem była też działalność społeczna Żelaznej Gwardii będąca także umiejętnym pokazem propagandy pro legionowej, np. budowa *Zielonego Domu* (Siedziby Legionu, czy sezonowe akcje pomocy rolnikom w trakcie żniw⁵⁹.

⁵⁵ N. M. Nagy-Talavera, op. cit., s. 404.

⁵⁶ V. Săndulescu, op. cit., s. 191.

⁵⁷ A. Chistol, op. cit., s. 482.

⁵⁸ H. Ch. Maner, *Parlamentarismul în România 1930-1940*, București 2004, s. 188.

⁵⁹ Por. T. Dubicki, K. Dach, op. cit., s. 88.

Wszystko to powodowało pozytywny odbiór społeczny ruchu i dawało mu przewagę w porównaniu z LANC. Jednak coraz większa popularność ruchu niosła za sobą także poważne zagrożenie, jakim była niechęć króla Karola I, która w końcu w połączeniu z niechęcią Codreanu do współpracy z królem doprowadziła do likwidacji jego działalności, oraz likwidacji fizycznej jego kierownictwa. Warto nadmienić, że LANC nie miał kłopotu z akceptacją przynajmniej nominalnego kierownictwa Karola II, co i tak nie uchroniło go przed rozwiązaniem wraz z innymi partiami w marcu 1938 roku⁶⁰.

W porównaniu wszystkich narodowych sił politycznych funkcjonujących przed II wojną światową na terenie Rumunii warto także zwrócić uwagę na zagadnienie przywództwa. Analizując to można pokusić się o postawienie nieco przewrotnego wniosku, mianowicie partia, która była oceniana jako akceptująca w największym stopniu wzorce faszystowskie – czyli Żelazna Gwardia w istocie swoje kierownictwo miała rozbudowane w największym stopniu, choć oczywiście pryncypium hierarchiczne było tu bardzo ważne, osoby wykazujące zbyt wybujałe ambicje niezgodne z zapatrywaniami „kapitana” były usuwane z ruchu a czasem nawet likwidowane fizycznie. Umożliwiło to jednak przetrwanie ruchu po okresie represji w latach 1938-1940 i jego chwilową odbudowę w latach 1940-1941. Pozostałe partie były typowymi partiami wodzowskimi, identyfikowanymi z liderem i właściwie niezdolnymi do działania po utracie przezeń znaczenia politycznego. Jednak dzięki temu zarówno partia Iorgi, jak i partia Cuzy były w oczach suwerena – Karola II w pewnym stopniu relewantne politycznie, co umożliwiło im w określonych momentach na dojście do władzy. Żelazna Gwardia jako siła odporna na sugestie królewskie nie była relewantna, także z uwagi na zły dobór koalicjantów przez Codreanu – taktyczne zbliżenie z Maniu i Gh. Brătianu w przededniu wyborów z 1937 roku z pewnością nie wzmocniło jego potencjału politycznego, zwłaszcza w oczach króla⁶¹.

Kolejnym typem nacjonalizmu obecnym w Rumunii, tym razem już w okresie po II wojnie światowej były elementy nacjonalistyczne obecne w propagandzie z czasów Nicolae Ceaușescu

Epoka rządów partii totalitarnej w Rumunii pozostawiła po sobie istotne dziedzictwo polityczne, poza „jawnymi” postkomunistami zrzeszonymi w FSN [Frontul Salvării Naționale – Front Ocalenia Narodowego] a później w PSD [Partidul Social Democratic] itp. część osób związanych w pewnym stopniu ze starym reżimem zaczęła poszukiwać własnej drogi politycznej, próbując także swych sił w ruchu skrajnie prawicowym. Jedną z takich osób był Corneliu Vadim Tudor, lider rumuńskiej partii Partidul România Mare (PRM) [Partia Wielkiej Rumunii]⁶². Program polityczny wspomnianego ugrupowania jest widoczny już w jego nazwie,

⁶⁰ Okoliczności rozwiązania patrz: A. Dubicki, System partyjny Królestwa Rumunii ..., s. ; S. Arhire, Guvernarea Goga – Cuza și „problema evreiască”. Percepții britanice, „Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica”, 15/1/2011, s. 318.

⁶¹ R. A. Haynes, Reluctant allies? Iuliu Maniu, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu against King Carol II of Romania, „The Slavonic and East European Review”, 2007, vol. 85, no. 1, s. 110.

⁶² T. Gallagher, Romania after Ceaușescu, . The politics of intolerance, Edinburgh 1995, s. 205.,

nawiązywała ona do Rumunii międzywojennej, co oznaczało otwarcie szeregów partii także na osoby pochodzące z terenów należących do Rumunii w okresie międzywojennym, w tym zwłaszcza Besarabii⁶³.

PRM zaistniała na rumuńskim firmamencie politycznym w 1991 roku. Przez niektórych komentatorów rumuńskiej sceny politycznej na początku działalności była klasyfikowana jako partia neokomunistyczna, z niejasną do dnia dzisiejszego klasyfikacją jako partia lewicowa bądź prawicowa. Większość jej programu wskazuje jednak na możliwość umiejscowienia jej po prawej stronie sceny politycznej. O pierwotnej klasyfikacji jako partii neokomunistycznej decydowały aspekty takie jak: przede wszystkim bliskie powiązania Tudora z poprzednim reżimem, także wewnątrzpartyjny kult przywódcy oraz nostalgia za pronarodowymi rozwiązaniami wprowadzanymi przez poprzedni reżim, było to zresztą charakterystyczne dla tej części sceny politycznej⁶⁴.

Sam Corneliu Vadim Tudor przywódca tej partii od roku 1991 do 2013 r. w czasach starego reżimu był nadwornym poetą Nicolae Ceaușescu i piewą nacjonalizmu w wydaniu rumuńskim, rozwijanego od lat 70-tych, co także w pewnym stopniu doprowadziło do odrodzenia antysemityzmu, choć kojarzonego raczej z drugą falą „de judaizacji” KC RPK⁶⁵. Partia Tudora korzystała ze wsparcia tygodnika o podobnej nazwie *România Mare*. Była to jego główna trybuna z której piętnował i wskazywał głównych wrogów narodu rumuńskiego.

Ze skrajną prawicą identyfikuje PRM antysemityzm, oraz ogólny sprzeciw przeciw szeroko rozumianym wrogom narodu, ta kategoria została w okresie powojennym bardzo rozszerzona, bowiem o ile przed wojną byli to głównie Żydzi, o tyle teraz kategoria ta została poszerzona o Cyganów i Węgrów. Stałym elementem negacji jest niezgoda na korupcję, z którą powszechnie jest kojarzona prawie cała rumuńska klasa polityczna. W działalności PRM można wyróżnić trzy okresy:

- 1991-1999 – kiedy partia ta była partią o zasięgu właściwie regionalnym, ograniczonym do południowej Rumunii,
- 1999-2004 – gdy była partią ogólnorumuńską o znacznym poparciu elektoratu,
- po 2004 r. – gdy rozpoczął się proces rozpadu partii.

W trakcie funkcjonowania PRM przechodziła proces ewolucji programowej absorbując elementy zachodniej myśli prawicowej, tworząc z własnego programu mieszkankę negacji zastanych stosunków politycznych i wszechobecnej korupcji. Początkowym konkurentem PRM na skrajnej prawicy była PUNR (Partia Rumuńskiej Unii Narodowej), która jednak w ciągu

⁶³ N. Răgaru, A. Capelle-Pogăcean, *România Mare and Araka: National Populism and Political Protest in Romania and Bulgaria*, „Critique and Humanism Journal”, 23_EN/2007, s. 136.

⁶⁴ F. Hartleb, „Europe” and the Extreme Right: Comparing Partidul Romania Mare and Vlaams Belang, „Romanian Journal of Political Sciences”, 1/2009, s. 60.

⁶⁵ Na ten temat patrz szerzej np. A. Burakowski, *Gedniusz Karpat, Dyktatura Nicolae Ceaușescu 1965-1989*, Warszawa 2008; P. Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu. Lata odliczane wstecz*, Warszawa 2004.

ostatniej dekady XX wieku traciła znaczenie⁶⁶. Była to partia określana przez swych krytyków również jako nacjonal-komunistyczna, z uwagi na to iż bazowała ona na kadrach należących dawniej do PCR. Reprezentowała ona nurt nacjonalizmu o wiele bardziej agresywnego wobec mniejszości węgierskiej, niż w późniejszym okresie PRM, jej liderem był Gheorghe Funar – burmistrz Klużu, znany ze swej antywęgierskiej retoryki. Była ona obecna na każdym szczeblu, nie tylko werbalnym – programowym. Także np. wszelkie urządzenia użyteczności publicznej w Klużu, rządzone przez wspomnianego Gh. Funara były np. malowane w rumuńskie kolory narodowe, co dawało wrażenie groteskowości. Również była to partia nacjonalistyczna, jednak w odróżnieniu do PRM, wcześniej osiągnęła ona relewantność i co można uznać za pewien paradoks dysponowała już w połowie lat 90-tych potencjałem koalicyjnym, zresztą w wyborach z 1992 roku otrzymała ona około 8% głosów w wyborach parlamentarnych w związku z tym brała ona udział w rządzie w latach 1994-1995⁶⁷. Było to apogeum jej możliwości. Dysponując największym poparciem w Siedmiogrodzie, była ona pożądanym partnerem koalicyjnym, niemniej jednak poparcie dla niej mocne na terenie jednej prowincji, sprawiało, że stawiała się ona niejako „zakładnikiem” danego obszaru. W tych też kategoriach należy postrzegać jej upadek, po roku 1995, kiedy to opuściła ona koalicję rządową w wyniku braku zgody na zawarcie traktatu dobrosąsiedzkiego z Węgrami, sytuacji nie poprawiło także uwikłanie liderów tej partii w aferę piramidy finansowej „Caritas”.

Klasyfikacja PRM jako partii skrajnej prawicy jest uzasadniona także i tym, że spełnia ona wymogi klasyfikacyjne wyznaczone przez C. Muddego. Są to: widoczna w programie rasowa i etniczna definicja narodu uznanego za źródło wspólnoty politycznej. Po drugie silne podkreślanie elementu *antystabilizacyjnego* w retoryce partyjnej. Początkowo negacja elit była prowadzona głównie przez pryzmat oskarżeń o korupcję, jednak wraz ze zbliżeniem się Rumunii do UE, dużą rolę zaczęła także odgrywać retoryka antyunijna, z szeroko rozumianą *eurokracją* i eurokratami na czele. Trzecim elementem identyfikacyjnym partii skrajnie prawicowej jest skupienie się także na kwestie imigracyjnych w UE. Rumunia jako kraj graniczny tej organizacji jest żywotnie zainteresowana rozwiązaniami europejskimi, w związku z czym temat ten był obecny także w retoryce PRM⁶⁸.

Ideologia PRM zajmowała się w sposób oczywisty szeroko rozumianymi kwestiami narodowymi. Zresztą można uznać, że ta właśnie kwestia jest centralną w retoryce właściwie każdej partii narodowej na całym świecie. Każda partia skrajna ma także własną wizję demokracji, wolności porządku, prawa, bezpieczeństwa i niezależności. Z reguły są one przedstawiane w bliskim znaczeniu kontekstowym ze słowem naród. Wraz z tym pojawia się także kluczowa klasyfikacja inkluzyjna i ekskluzywna wskazująca kto jest członkiem narodu, a kto nie.

⁶⁶ A. Burakowski, M. Stan, Kraj smutny pełen humoru. Dzieje Rumunii po 1989 roku, Warszawa 2012, s. 110.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, s. 92.

⁶⁸ F. Hartleb, op. cit., s. 61.

PRM jako partia skrajnie prawicowa również definiowała podstawowe kwestie w ten właśnie sposób. Ekskluzywnie wskazywano Węgrów, zwłaszcza tych zamieszkujących w Siedmiogrodzie jako głównych wrogów narodu rumuńskiego⁶⁹. Była to istotna zmiana w nacjonalizmie rumuńskim, w którym dotąd Żydzi byli głównym zagrożeniem. Było to odzwierciedlenie przemian narodowościowych, jakie miały miejsce po II wojnie światowej w Rumunii oraz przemian ideologicznych, ukazujących Węgrów, choć nie zawsze wprost, jako głównych wrogów narodu rumuńskiego⁷⁰. W jednym z ostatnich dokumentów programowych PRM z 2005 r. odwoływano się do argumentów historycznych by uzasadnić niechęć do narodu węgierskiego. Przypomniano tu argumenty polityki historycznej, obecnej w dyskursie politycznym i naukowym, od końca XVIII wieku, skupiając się na zagadnieniu *autochtonizmu* bądź *allochtonizmu* Rumunów w Transylwanii⁷¹. Oprócz wykazania praw do Siedmiogrodu, w dyskusji tej chodzi także o wskazanie korzeni narodu rumuńskiego i jego mniej lub bardziej bezpośrednie powiązanie z Dakami i Rzymianami zamieszkującymi w starożytności te ziemie, wraz z całym bagażem dziejowym i kulturalnym. Zgodnie z programem z 2005 roku, ten element programu jest mocno eksponowany, jako niosący w sobie stosunkowo duży ładunek antymadziarski – jako że według niego Węgrzy są narodem koczowniczym, który przybył na tereny obecnie przez nich zamieszkiwane stosunkowo niedawno (oczywiście w porównaniu z „odwiecznym” zamieszkiwaniem tam przez Rumunów). Podkreślano przy tym trwanie rumuńskości jako elementu niezależnego od aktualnej formy politycznej obecnej na tym obszarze, podległości Rzymianom, Węgom, czy w ramach niepodległego państwa rumuńskiego. W kwestii granic – PRM uznawała, że naturalnymi dla Rumunów są te w których zamieszkują wschodnie ludy romańskie, czyli było to inkluzyjne wobec terenu Mołdawii⁷².

W kategorii wrogów narodu rumuńskiego umieszczono przede wszystkim Węgrów i Cyganów postrzeganych jako istotne zagrożenie dla rumuńskiego narodu i w związku z tym przedstawianych w sposób kontrastowy. W większym stopniu koncentrowano się na Węgrach, jako jedynej mniejszości z zauważalnym potencjałem politycznym na terenie Rumunii. Kwestie rasowe zostały zepchnięte w programie PRM na plan dalszy, choć oczywiście akcenty te są widoczne zwłaszcza w retoryce antyimigracyjnej – o wiele bardziej istotny jest tu wzajemny stosunek „narodu” i Europy. Pojawienie się zjednoczonej Europy wymusiło na partiach narodowych pewne zmiany w ich retoryce – odrzucono dawny „parafialny” nacjonalizm działający na zasadzie „my ↔ oni” lub „naród kontra reszta świata”. Warto nadmienić, że w dyskursie zaczyna się pojawiać eksponowanie oprócz oczywistej walki o prawa Rumunów, także i walki o prawa Europejczyków w ich walce z imigrantami – dla osób spoza UE program przewiduje poważne upośledzenie, lub wręcz brak praw socjalnych. Pojawiło się także rozumowanie

⁶⁹ N. Răgaru, A. Capelle-Pogăcean, op. cit., s. 141.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, s. 143.

⁷¹ Na ten temat patrz szerzej: m.in. L. Boia, Rumuni. Świadomość, mity, historia, Kraków 2003, s. 64-73.

⁷² F. Hartleb, op. cit., s. 66.

w kategoriach walki o dobro cywilizacji i kultury chrześcijańskiej. W kwestiach integracji europejskiej doktryna PRM zamykała się od początku w braku akceptacji dla jakiegokolwiek uszczuplenia zakresu suwerenności kraju czy to na arenie wewnętrznej czy międzynarodowej⁷³. Pewnym elementem odwołującym się do dumy narodowej było uznanie wojny 1878 r. za wojnę o niepodległość Rumunii a także wojnę o zjednoczenie Europy.

W początkowych programach politycznych kwestia ta właściwie była nieobecna z uwagi na dość odległą wówczas możliwość przystąpienia Rumunii do UE. Później, wraz z przybliżeniem się momentu akcesji kwestie europejskie, co zresztą zrozumiale zaczęły się znajdować w większym stopniu w centrum uwagi. W doktrynie PRM widoczne jest dążenie do podporządkowania celów UE celom nadrzędnym Rumunii. Przykładem tego był np. postulat stworzenie Euroregionu jedynie terenów zamieszkiwanych przez Rumunów, co byłoby oczywistym zaprzeczeniem ponadnarodowości UE. W myśl doktryny narodowej interes konkretnego narodu zawsze powinien mieć priorytet przed interesem zbiorowości europejskiej. W takim układzie PRM uzależniał swoje poparcie dla idei europejskiej od przyszłego jej poparcia dla interesów państwa rumuńskiego. Generalnie można to skongregować w niechęci wobec poszerzania kompetencji UE, w kierunku przekształcania jej w „superpaństwo”⁷⁴.

Szczyt popularności PRM przypadł na wybory z 2000 roku, zarówno prezydenckie jak i parlamentarne, w których PRM zdobyła około 20 % głosów, sam Tudor w głosowaniu prezydenckim otrzymał w II turze 28 % głosów, co było realnym maksimum poparcia, osiągniętego w bardzo sprzyjających warunkach politycznych, dekompozycji rządzącego wcześniej obozu prawicowego. Tudor generował zbyt wielki elektorat negatywny, by myśleć o zwycięstwie w wyborach prezydenckich. Poparcie na dość wysokim poziomie wynikało z dużego niezadowolenia społecznego z poprzednich rządów prawicy i zebrał wokół siebie osoby nie akceptujące także możliwości oddania głosu na siły lewicowe. W okresie późniejszym PRM cieszyła się poparciem osób, które niewątpliwie straciły na przemianach po 1990 r.⁷⁵

Do relewantności tej partii doprowadziła niewątpliwie kadencja rządów prawicy, która wykazał kompletną indolencję tego obozu w sprawowaniu władzy. Ludzie wiedzieli, czego można się było spodziewać po obozie Iliescu, natomiast kompletna porażka polityczna ludzi Constantinescu była szokiem dla antylewicowego elektoratu, który w 2000 roku pozostał bez widocznej alternatywy. Ułatwiło to działanie Tudorowi, którego antyestablishmentowa retoryka znajdowała oparcie w faktach. Po roku 2000 poparcie dla PRM ciągle spada, co jest pochodną braku zapotrzebowania na retorykę nacjonalistyczną w Rumunii. Niemniej ona sama czasami odżywa, jak choćby podczas referendum na temat odsunięcia prezydenta Traiana Băsescu w 2012 roku. Wówczas Węgrzy z UDMR zdecydowali się na nie wzięcie udziału

⁷³ Ibidem, s. 67.

⁷⁴ Ibidem.

⁷⁵ A. Burakowski, M. Stan, op. cit., s. 170.

w głosowaniu, co ostatecznie przesądziło o fasku głosowania z uwagi na niewystarczającą frekwencję⁷⁶.

W pewnym sensie można próbować poszukiwać przyczyn gorszego wyniku wyborczego PRM w innym systemie przeliczania, głosów jaki od 2008 roku obowiązuje na terenie Rumunii, jednak jak się wydaje większą rolę odgrywa tu brak zainteresowania ze strony chwiejnego elektoratu. Dowodziły tego choćby wybory do Europarlamentu z 2009 r., kiedy to PRM udało się obsadzić 3 mandaty, jednak sam akt wyborczy odbywał się przy niskiej frekwencji (28%), więc posiadanie „żelaznego” i zdyscyplinowanego elektoratu było w tym wypadku poważnym bonusem. W wyborach z 2014 r. partia startowała już bez C. V. Tudora, usuniętego z przywództwa i partii w roku 2013, i nie przekroczyła progu wyborczego, przy nieco wyższej frekwencji – 32 %

Wspomniana klęska partii prawicowych wydatnie wspomogła Tudora, który we wcześniejszych wyborach nie był w stanie osiągnąć wyniku lepszego niż 4,5% co oznaczało balansowanie niemal na skraju progu wyborczego (3%)⁷⁷ W kolejnych wyborach Tudor i jego partia nie byli w stanie powtórzyć najlepszego wyniku z 2000 r. ze względu na zmianę politycznych konstelacji na prawicy, a także z uwagi na próby kompromitowania samego lidera poprzez różne procesy sądowe i nawiązania do jego przeszłości.

Pod wpływem nieudanych przemian w latach 90-tych w doktrynie PRM zaczęło być wyraźnie widoczne nastawienie antyzachodnie, aczkolwiek należy pamiętać o tym, że Tudor odżegnywał się od totalnego potępienia Zachodu i zajmował konformistyczną postawę wobec negocjacji z UW i NATO, jednak postrzegając te organizacje jako służebne wobec interesów Rumunii, czyli właściwe bez szans na realne ich wykonanie. W kwestiach walki o cele założone w programie i opiekę na całym narodem – PRM zakładała zarówno działania irredentystyczne (zwłaszcza w stosunku do Mołdawii), jak i obronne wobec własnego narodu. Irredentyzm – domaganie się powrotu do granic Wielkiej Rumunii, a zwłaszcza inkorporacji Bukowiny północnej i Besarabii. Tudor zachęcał także część Mołdawian do emigracji do Rumunii i tam aktywnego działania w polityce⁷⁸. Głównym wrogiem w kwestiach narodowych byli Węgrzy transylwańscy, jako korzystający z czynnego wsparcia Budapesztu, o wiele mniej groźnym wrogiem byli Cyganie, których postrzegano raczej jako zagrożenie dla porządku publicznego, co postulowano zwalczyć poprzez wprowadzenie bardziej restrykcyjnego ustawodawstwa w sprawach karnych i porządkowych. Co ujmowano niego górnolotnie jako tzw. dyktaturę prawa. Zauważalny w dokumentach programowych jest także antysemityzm, ówczynie jednak Żydzi są postrzegani jako zagrożenie raczej ze względu na ich pozycję międzynarodową,

⁷⁶ W okręgach zamieszkiwanych przez liczną mniejszość węgierską frekwencja wyniosła od: 13,59% (Harghita) do 35% w Aradzie co wyraźnie kontrastowało z frekwencją na pozostałym obszarze kraju – w okręgu Olz zanotowano nawet 70% frekwencję. <http://www.becreferendum2012.ro/DOCUMENTE%20BEC/Rezultate/judete.pdf>

⁷⁷ Obowiązywał w 1992 i 1996 r., A. Dubicki, Ewolucja rumuńskiej ordynacji wyborczej w latach 1866-2012, [w:] Mechanizmy obywatelnic. Kampanie i systemy wyborcze na świecie, [red:] M. Rączkiewicz, Łódź 2014, s. 302.

⁷⁸ N. Ragaru, A. Capelle-Pogacean, s. 141.

niż wewnętrzną, można to uznać za pewien wyjątek w rumuńskim nacjonalizmie, jednak odzwierciedla to przemiany, także i narodowościowe, jakie dokonały się w Rumunii po II wojnie światowej.

Reasumując w przypadku Rumunii wystąpiły właściwie wszystkie rodzaje nacjonalizmu, można wręcz postawić tezę, że w różnych wcieleniach była to ideologia wywierająca duży wpływ na sytuację w kraju od XIX wieku (nacjonalizm, w rozumieniu XIX wiecznym, czyli właściwie tożsamy z patriotyzmem), poprzez I połowę XX wieku, gdy podobnie jak w pozostałych krajach europejskich także i pod wpływem traumy Wielkiej Wojny doszło do eskalacji nacjonalizmu szowinistycznego, czyli w terminologii propagowanej przez prof. Bartyzela – *nacjonalitarymu*, po II połowę XX wieku, gdy pewne jego przejawy były obecne także w działaniach władz partii komunistycznej i w pewnym sensie powiązanych z nimi partii o charakterze narodowym, których apogeum popularności przypadło na przełom tysiącleci. Obecnie ruch narodowy nie jest w Rumunii popularny na tyle by liczyć się w walce o miejsca w parlamencie. Jest to wynikiem sytuacji w której Rumunia została wyraźnym beneficjentem akcesji do UE, sytuacja jednak może się zmienić wtedy, gdy przestanie być widoczny efekt przyspieszenia cywilizacyjnego, a Rumunia zacznie się borykać z podobnymi problemami jak kraje zachodnie, jak np. imigracja czy rozbudowa systemu fiskalnego.

Демократична трансформація у нових Державах ЦСЄ

Автор даної статті досліджує консолідацію демократії в країнах ЦСЄ в контексті аналізу перехідних посткомуністичних суспільств і зосереджує увагу саме на цій фазі демократизації. Виділено три інституціональних аспекти, які відіграли важливе значення для перехідних суспільств. Це – зміцнення кордонів національних держав, вибір форми правління та вибір виборчої системи. У сукупності, на думку автора, ці інституціональні зміни стали визначальними факторами розвитку демократизації посткомуністичних суспільств.

Ключові слова: консолідація, демократизація, країни ЦСЄ, три фази третьої хвилі демократизації, перехідні посткомуністичні суспільства, модернізація

Democratic transformation in new CEE Countries

the author of the paper studies consolidation of democracy in the CEE countries in the context of analysis of the transitional post-communist societies and focuses on the very phase of democratization. Three institutional aspects, which played an important role in transitional societies, have been described. These are strengthening of the national borders, choosing the form of the government and electoral system. The author presupposes that as a whole these institutional changes became the crucial factors in the development of democratization in the post-communist societies.

Keywords: Consolidation, democratization, Central and Eastern European countries, three phases of the third wave of democratization, transitional post-communist societies, modernization

In modern theories of society democratization researchers clearly single out two conflicting concepts. The radical concept perceives aim in democracy; the essential concept considers existing democracies as the way which will lead the countries to democracy only when they create the minimal criteria for a legal state. In the radical concept the reality is believed to be only “democratization”, thus the authors insist on the subsequent development of consolidated democracy¹. The

¹ W. Schmalz-Bruns, Reflexive Demokratie, Baden-Baden, 1995, s. 41.

moderate approach to the democratic theory considers consolidation of democracy as a sufficient precondition for the following stable development.

The development of democratic process in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) introduced new elements in the theoretical researches. The elements of the civil “non-state” or even “anti-state” democratization took the leading places in the political elites’ authoritative functionaries’ and researchers’ discussions during the system change. Though, the theory of the civil society, as K. von Beyme believes, appears to be rather ideology-driven and remote from life², but it had great influence on the people’s attitude towards the mediate institutions, such as interest groups and parties, and contributed to the fact that during the transformational process in the CEE countries after 1989 they played another role than during the previous waves of democratization, which ended with the system change.

Three phases of the third democratization wave (liberalization, democratization itself and consolidation) mentioned by S. Huntington in 1991³ are difficult to be applied to the CEE countries. Therefore, in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, where the collapse of the real socialism took place, the liberalization phase was missed. The same could be seen in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia, i.e. in those countries where the heredity of the partly changed communist ruling party was kept. In those two types of transformation the powerful opposition was absent. Besides, the ruling parties in the CEE countries weakened it by manipulating the elections results, introducing a low barrier for new party registration and adhering to the “divide and rule” policy.

The retrospective analysis shows that the democratization phase looks rather compressed. Implicitly, it is believed to be ended with the creation of the most important institutions (multi-party system, free and democratic elections, parliament, president, division of branches of government), and especially with the adoption of the Constitution. But after the establishment of the basic institutions in CEE, the electoral systems were often viewed as auxiliary and disposed to the necessary changes for achieving the goals of the leading groups⁴.

Having defined the aim of the paper as the study of democracy consolidation in CEE by the analysis of the transitional post-communist societies, let’s focus our attention on the phase of democratization. It should be mentioned, that even a short phase of democratization (before the adoption of the constitution) allows marking out three institutional aspects, which played an important role for transitional societies. These are strengthening of the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral system. In general, these institutional changes became crucial factors in democratization development of the post-communist societies, so let’s examine each of them.

² K. von Beyme, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Transformation der ex-sozialistischen Länder Osteuropas*, in: W. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen*, Opladen, 1996, s. 142.

³ S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, s. 46-51.

⁴ M. Kasapovic, D. Nohlen, *Wahlssysteme und Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*, in: W. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen*, Opladen, 1996, s. 47.

Analyzing the first institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely strengthening of the national borders, it should be mentioned that another wave of democratization started in 1989 and differed from the previous ones by escalation of the nationalistic problems and tendencies to irredentism. In the 1990s only 5 out of 19 CEE countries had the same borders as the previous national states (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Hungary). Other countries are unconsolidated products of disintegration of three federations (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). At first among three federations only Czechoslovakia the least resembled the country, which could be disintegrated. The scenario of its disintegration was discussed involuntarily. During the conflict period of disintegration Czechoslovakia could have used the Belgian example of federation formation. The subcultural isolation of two national groups in Czechoslovakia was considerably less, than it was in Belgium between Flemings and Walloons. But the readiness to divide the rich parts of the country was implemented too. The maintenance of federation in Czechoslovakia failed due to the lack of cooperation between the elites at level of general institutions and inability to create the general Czechoslovakian party system⁵. Unlike poorer Montenegro in former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, being less socially and economically developed, did not demonstrate “federal devotion,” which could have ensured state and territorial integration of Czechoslovakia.

The intellectual community of all CEE federations condemned “imperialism” of the centre, but “social imperialism,” which presupposed the sacrifice of the centre in favor of regions, was not ignored by the community. The desires and hopes of European integration, contributed to the fact that Slovakia became more focused on secession, than earlier. K. von Beyme states, that the unification of “hereditary statehood and ethnical consciousness” is a crucial factor of the organizing force of nationalism⁶. In some countries from Poland to Croatia, the ethnical minorities in the period of democratization had at least minimal parliamentary representation. And in other countries, as it is highlighted by V. I. Burdiak, the minorities are concentrated in some territories, in particular the Hungarians in Romania, have distanced themselves from politics, not to excite Romanian nationalism. The scholar mentions the same about the Hungarians in Slovakia, who mainly take a critical view of the political system of the Slovak Republic. Only in Bulgaria the ethnical Turks’ party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, managed to attain the position of an indispensable partner in coalition formation, as the small amount of parties is elected to the parliament and the choice of possible coalition alternatives is limited⁷.

National construction in former federations (the CSSR, the USSR, Yugoslavia) is carrying on, and that is why it is worth approaching the implementation of borrowed forms of democracy rather carefully, as its institutions cannot be adapted in every country. It is necessary to consider

⁵ W. Merkel, *Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa*, in: W. Merkel, E. Sandschneider, D. Segert (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 2. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie*, Opladen, 1996, s. 100.

⁶ K. von Beyme, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Transformation der ex-sozialistischen Länder Osteuropas*, in: W. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen*, Opladen, 1996, s. 144.

⁷ V. I. Burdiak, *The Republic of Bulgaria at the Turn of the Epochs: Political Transformation of Society*, Chernivtsi, Ruta, 2004, s. 244-245.

such factor of the theory of transformation as the possibility of war between democracies. Countries in other regions of the world demonstrate greater inclination to war, than “mature democracies” or stable autocracies⁸. In places, where governments are “partly liberal” and delegate’s democracies of charismatic presidents have not implemented the norms of the “world union”, it is not enough for consolidation of democracy just to ascertain that in the political system there is no alternative of democratic rules of the game.

Studying the second institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely the choice of government system (presidential, parliamentary or mixed) conducted by the CEE countries, it should be mentioned that the direct spreading of western institutions played the secondary role. Its choice chiefly depended upon the course of transformation. Thus, taking into consideration the pact variant in Hungary, where the balance allowed some minor steps in the constitutional process, it led neither to the presidential and parliamentary system, nor to the weaker variant of the premier and presidential system, where Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and even Romania can be referred, taking into account that the division of branches of government was rather formal here⁹.

In the countries where the old collective government was gradually supplanted by the sole head of the country, the presidential systems have been formed, especially in case of charismatic leader. In Poland it was revealed through numerous conflicts even under the pact variant of changes. The peculiarity of Poland showed itself through the leading role of the President, during the rule of V. Yaruselskii. In some countries after the transitional non-presidential period, as in Belarus, a poorly masked form of presidential dictatorship has been formed. In countries with a mixed form of the presidential and parliamentary systems, the division of branches of government according to the constitutions is nearly absent. For instance, in Russia the form of government was rather parliamentary, than it had been seen under president B. Yeltsyn. To our mind, any president can shift the balance in his/her favour, due to the fact that parties do not play any important role in the country. Charismatic leaders actively use the mixed system of government to strengthen their power. Thus, in Romania and Bulgaria (till 1991), when the transformation was started by the communist high-ranking functionaries, and the representatives of the old regime cadre became presidents, there was no need in the charismatic leader.

The best way out for the CSSR, where, as a result of the former regime failure, a new group of civilian forces came to power, was the parliamentary system, as it lowers the concentration of the previous authority, who acted during the preceding regime. The researchers who study the consolidation of democracy diverge as to the question whether it was the parliamentary system in Czech and Hungary that brought them success and due to which they became the most consolidated democracies in CEE, or these countries chose the parliamentary system because of the

⁸ E. Mansfield, J. Snyder, *Democratization and the Danger of War*, *International Security*, 1995, Vol. 20, 1, s. 5-6; S.P. Huntington, *Democracy for the Long Haul*, *Journal of Democracy*, 1996, Vol. 7, s. 2, 6.

⁹ W. Merkel, *Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa*, in: W. Merkel, E. Sandschneider, D. Segert (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 2. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie*, Opladen, 1996, s. 79.

powerful positions occupied by the democratic elites. Though there are some contradictions as to the first postulate. The example of Slovakia, which, being without Czechoslovakia, would have chosen the presidential system, shows that the parliamentary system does not protect from the president's ambitions as it was in the case of V. Meciar¹⁰.

T. Baylis believes, that during the first years of the system change, the crucial negative role in nearly all eastern European countries was played by the conflicts between the president and the prime minister¹¹. Even in purely parliamentary systems one could observe such phenomena and the destructive potential of these conflicts was not always lower than in semi-presidential systems. The conflict between president A. Goncz and prime-minister P. Antall could have damaged Hungarian democracy even more, but for the death of the latter at the end of 1993. In Slovakia the conflict between V. Meciar and M. Kovac to the less degree was determined by the formal powers, than by simple authoritative resources, and this rather negatively influenced the development of democratic institutions. Apparently, because of this P. Shaki, deputy minister for civil rights and ethnic minorities' rights, who in 1998 replaced V. Meciar's government, stated after the elections that "today we deal with the government formation, and tomorrow we will start changing the regime"¹².

The choice of the form of the government has influence on the structure of the party system. The more presidential traits had the constitutional order in the country, the highest level of polarity it had. At the same time only the combination of some institutions had strong influence upon the party system. In particular, the general direct presidential elections with the majority electoral system (or with the system that leads to majority creation) had structured influence on the party system. As a rule it is influenced by other institutional factors like: the division of branches of government between federal and regional bodies or the constitutional court's prerogative as a guarantor for the established order in the system of government.

M. Duverger, G. Sartori and A. Lijphart consider the electoral system to be the most powerful factor that determines the party system. In this respect the experience of the old regimes was crucial for the choice of the electoral system institutions. At the constituent assembly in 1990 in all CEE countries, the system of absolute majority dominated (this did not use to be the case during the 2nd (1945) and the 3rd (1947) waves of democratization in Europe). Up to 1995 the system of absolute majority functioned in three countries (Belarus, Macedonia, Ukraine), where the change of authority did not take place. In four countries (Albania, Lithuania, Russia, Croatia) mixed and uncoordinated electoral system was used as a transitional variant on the way towards the system of proportional representation. Partly new elites (Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Croatia), and partly old elites (Albania, Yugoslavia) abolished the system of majority, immediately as it

¹⁰ N. Lazar, Dilemmas of Post-communist Transformations: Slovakia's Experience, in: Political Science and Sociological Sciences' Workshop, Collection of Scientific Works, Vol. II, Chernivtsi, Prut, 2002, s. 226-227.

¹¹ T. Baylis, Presidents, Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, in: World Politics, 1997, Vol. 48, nr. 3, s. 302.

¹² Volby i stat. Pal šaki, Pravda, 1998, 21 October.

stopped serving their strategic plans of winning the elections. The strategies of saving the electoral systems of majority sometimes led old elites to loss of power instead of its retention.

Western Europe gained this experience during Gaullism period in France, and in Eastern Europe it was convincingly confirmed – the system of absolute majority, as showed the example of Ukraine, Belarus and Macedonia, did not contribute to the modern party systems. At the constituent assembly in the CSSR dominated the proportional system, as the old communist elite was to capitulate and new leaders of transformation had already achieved the victory at the previous elections¹³. The differentiated threshold as an electoral barrier against the fragmentation of the party system was established both in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. In the Czech Republic remained the same rules as in the CSSR (national barrier equaled 5%), and they were modified for the electoral blocks (block of two parties equaled 7%, block of three parties equaled 9%). In 1990 in Hungary the national barrier was 4%, and in 1994 it was raised up to 5% (for electoral blocks of two parties it was 10 %, for blocks of three parties it was 15 %).

On the whole the creation of institutions is considered to be a part of the democracy consolidation phase. But a number of researchers and W. Merkel in particular determine the institutionalization of democracy as an element of the second transitional phase¹⁴. The postulate offered by S. Huntington which is vital for democracy consolidation says that holding of two free elections or carrying out the double change of power in accordance with the constitution cannot be considered as a satisfactory result nowadays¹⁵. The examples from the political history of Europe refute it. Thus, the change of the government in the FRG took place only in two decades. So, it means, that up to that time, according to Huntington, German postwar democracy cannot be considered as a consolidated one. Another example is consolidated democracy in Italy, where there was no change of actual power until 1994. Apparently, that after the successful consolidation of democracy, the researchers of the transformational process can discover a new sphere of analysis, which at first sight sounds a bit strange, but correct, namely the change from “democracy to democracy”.

The post-communist societies of CEE worked out a great number of mixed forms of the legal state and various types of anomalies. Thus, the change of the government took place in Albania, but the elections, next after the constituent ones, were considered by the opposition as unfair. A unique event happened in Slovakia, when the government of the former communists fell from power at the elections, but came to it at the next elections. So, there was a change of the governments in the countries, but no one considers these states to be consolidated democracies. Albania is not in the focus of European politics yet due to its peripheral

¹³ S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, s. 28.

¹⁴ W. Merkel, *Theorien der Transformation: Die demokratische Konsolidierung postautoritärer Gesellschaften*, in: K. von Beyme, C. Offe (Hrsg.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Opladen, 1996, s. 41.

¹⁵ S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, s. 267.

location. And Slovakia took great efforts and together with the Czech Republic became the member of the EU. The economic indices were of crucial importance in this process, as the EU, despite the political rhetoric put economic cooperation in the first place.

Analyzing consolidation, minimalists usually use formal criteria consisting of seven indicators of polyarchy proposed by R. Dahl, which are determined by the rules of law and institutions; and G. O'Donnell's approaches¹⁶. Maximalists, in their turn, believe democracy to be more than a political regime and to combine several spheres, namely free and life-giving society, the availability of civil society, bureaucracy which would be loyal to democracy and institutionalized economic society¹⁷. Sticking to this theory, it should be mentioned that most of eastern European political transformational regimes do not correspond to the consolidation criteria. At the same time, in scientific publications concerning modernization there is a fixed threshold for successful democratization due to the execution of a number of vital preconditions, which are necessary for democratization attempts to succeed. Most of them can be used for analysis, a phase of democratization and a phase of consolidation.

The first quite spread precondition is the effectively functioning market economy with minimal prosperity. It (the precondition) was introduced in 1990 by J. Linz and A. Stepan as a notion of "economic society"¹⁸. In this respect the post-communist societies look even more injured than the post-fascist ones. Fascism created economy under the aegis of the state, but it did not make encroachments on private property. Spain, with its powerful authoritarian tendencies in the time of fascism, at the end of Franco's governing came to an open economy. But other forms of state property and interference are known. They coexisted with democracy until the state interference led to the economic stagnation and democracy oppression.

At the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, researches were seized by the east European changes. F. Schmitter and others refuted economically determined "teaching about the preconditions". Cause and effect relationship acquired reversed character: democracy appeared to be stylized to the precondition of the successful market economy, and as the assumption was not absolutely convincing, it was strengthened by the structures of the international support: only democratic regimes have an outlook for receiving western help and joining the EU and NATO. But it was quickly clarified that there was no Marshall plan for CEE and actual aid was rather modest. K. von Beyme believes that perceptual pattern of international help within CEE is just catastrophic¹⁹.

The CEE citizens rapidly understood that they should not rely on the West's help. The Hungarian ambassador to Romania declared that any country could remain democratic if its GDP

¹⁶ R.A.Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971. – 257 p.; G. O'Donnell, *Illusions about "Consolidation"*, *Journal of Democracy*, 1996, Vol. 7, nr. 2, s. 35.

¹⁷ J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Towards Consolidated Democracies*, *Journal of Democracy*, 1996, Vol. 7, nr. 2, s. 17.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, s.21.

¹⁹ K. von Beyme, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Transformation der ex-sozialistischen Länder Osteuropas*, in: W. Merkel (Hrsg.), *Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen*, Opladen, 1996, s. 153.

is more than \$6000 per capita. He highlighted that Hungary could rapidly become democratic, whereas Romania would stay in its transitional period for a long time. Those words were confirmed by A. Przeworski, who concluded that the democratic system “with more than \$6000 per capita must stay alive”²⁰. His evidence is allayed by H. Linz’s thesis, who mentions that the parliamentary systems even in poor nations are more probably to survive, than the presidential systems.

At the same time the changes of transitional character, which depict the context of the political system, are possible here. Taking into an account the indicator of the GDP per capita at the beginning of transformation, we can see that only the Czech Republic (\$7424), Slovenia (\$6540) and Hungary (\$5330) had prospects of quick consolidation. Bulgaria (\$5113) and Poland (4086) were in tolerance limits. The GDP of other countries was less than \$3000. But if one compares these indices with analogic ones of the consolidated democracies of the third wave, then it can be seen that the GDP per capita in Spain was \$4159, in Greece it was \$3224, in Portugal it was \$2397²¹. The calculations were made by A. Przeworski, who had previously been against the generalization of modernization theories and dependence of democracy on economics, as they had not been corroborated in Spain²². This approach can be correct, but only because it was applied to “all countries without exceptions”. S. Huntington’s thesis that democracy can exist only in the place where there is the USA’s influence or legacy of European colonialism, appears to be no less than problematic, though the political factors of international influence are taken into consideration.

Let’s consider another condition for democracy consolidation, namely “bureaucracy’s loyalty”²³. This factor has wide tendencies. The post-fascist countries “cleared” their bureaucracy just a little. Their loyalty was not checked, except for the Spanish attempt of coup in 1981. In Italy from time to time there was a great deal of talk about exposing the pro-fascist conspiracies among the high elite circles, but though there were no loyalty checks in the country. Only in Hungary 80% of elite was changed.

Student movements in many countries in the 60s of the 20th century stood up for disclosure of former elites’ suppression. In literature these questions are rarely raised, with the exception of S. Huntington, who implored not to persecute the adherents of dictatorship when the system was changed, as in this case “political losses exceed moral benefits”²⁴.

²⁰ A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge, 1991, s. 49.

²¹ M.G. Schmidt, *Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies*, *European Journal of Political Research*, 2002, nr. 41, s. 153.

²² A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge, 1991, s. 96.

²³ M.G. Schmidt, *Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies*, *European Journal of Political Research*, 2002, nr. 41, s. 152.

²⁴ S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, s. 231.

Despite the numerous crimes and human rights limitations, real socialism should not be referred to criminal regime. Only in the Czech Republic the legislative act of prosecution of regime criminals was adopted. However, the Law on Lustration in 1991 led to dismissal of many functionaries, even such figure as A. Dubcek had to be dismissed. Later, while heading the parliament he refused to sign the law. This cruel law was classified as the alibi law. It specified the criteria of incompatibility with the positions under authoritarian and democratic regimes, not to investigate every separate case. Thus, after 1990 in the FRG the responsibility was placed on bureaucracy of Hauk's department, regardless of high political losses, as it did not concern the ruling elite of the country. The results of democracy consolidation hugely depend on the way the functional bureaucracy implement the newly created parliaments' and governments' decisions. As a rule no one can demand more diligence from bureaucracy, which have not been dismissed up to the middle level and have been reconstructing clans and high-ranking functionaries' traditions up to this time, and as a result slowing down consolidation of democracy due to their passive resistance. Only the state, where the multi-party system exists and functions, can contribute to the gradual change of the administrative elites and this minimalizes the threat of destabilization. An amount of old functionaries who quit from the organs of government is less than the number of new members of administrative staff from the party which wins the elections. At the same time a normal alternation of generations happens. That is why we believe that consolidation of new democracies is a question of time.

So, the processes of new democracies formation and consolidation in the CEE countries, which have started after the revolutions of 1989, are complicated and disputable. The post-communist period shows the differences in economic, political and social structures, despite the similar influence of the communist system. In all countries party systems differ from the West analogic democratic structures, they just being of slight resemblance. They also differ from the systems where democratic principles have not been formed yet. Progressive economic reforms of the government have caused decline in living standards. All this influenced the processes of democracy consolidation, which have not taken place in many countries.

To our mind, the study of the preconditions for democracy consolidation in the context of analysis of the transitional post-communist societies in CEE, proves that the countries, which managed to pass the democratization phase rather quickly (till the adoption of the constitution), and during the consolidation phase partly resolved three institutional preconditions, have achieved greater success in their development. These institutional preconditions, namely strengthening of the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral system, played an important role in stabilization of countries and societies. In general, these institutional changes became the crucial factors of consolidation, which, in its turn, became the guarantor of the CEE countries' success recognition in the world.

Інтерпретація понять «Трансформація», «Соціальна трансформація», «Політична трансформація» у сучасному науковому дискурсі

Проаналізовано зміст використання поняття «трансформація» у сучасній суспільствознавчій літературі. Подана інтерпретація термінів «трансформація», «соціальна трансформація», «політична трансформація», запропонованих науковцями різних політологічних шкіл. Виокремлено найважливіші ознаки політичної трансформації, як складової процесу змін, що відбуваються у суспільстві. Встановлено, що політична трансформація є сутнісною ознакою розвитку будь-якої політичної системи.

Ключові слова: трансформація, соціальна, політична трансформація, політичний режим, політична система, пострадянські країни.

Interpretation of the concepts of “Transformation”, “Social transformation”, “Political transformation” in modern scientific discourse

The content of the concept of “transformation” in modern social science literature has been analyzed. The interpretation of the terms “transformation”, “social transformation”, “political transformation” proposed by the scientists from various political science schools has been presented. The most important features of political transformation as a part of the process of changes that take part in the society have been singled out. Political transformation has been defined as an essential characteristic of evolution of any political system.

Key words: transformation, social transformation, political transformation, political regime, political system, post-Soviet countries.

One of the main methodological problems of the current political science is the absence of the clearly defined term “transformation” (from Latin “modification”, “change of the form”). Usually, one can encounter its synonyms, namely such terms as “metamorphosis”, “conversion”, “modernization” etc. Correspondingly, the essence of this synonymic row is reduced to any kinds of changes (social, political, economic, authoritative etc.). At the same time, to carry

out a valuable and an objective research it is necessary to possess clear categorical definitions of notions, which describe the processes of changes and transformations that occur.

Afterwards, before defining the concept of “transformation” in the sense of political science, it is necessary to define the essence of this term and analyze main approaches to its interpretation that exist in other branches of sciences, especially in the social sciences.

The concept of “transformation” has become widely used in the social sciences in the 2nd half of the 20th century. The transformation was interpreted as the process of overcoming the essential elements of the previous order and achieving new quality of a certain system. The notion of social transformation has been particularly actively investigated in the scientific community in recent years. Among the scientists who have investigated the concept of “transformation”, it is necessary to draw attention to the works by V. Shamrai, V. Stepin, V. Tolstykh, M. Lapin, L. Beliaeva¹. Moreover, these scientific problems have been rather actively researched by Ukrainian scientists, especially V. Volovyk and V. Kremen².

The analysis shows that among scientists there is no unity as to the essence of the process of the social systems’ transformation. In the most general interpretation this process is defined as a change, transformation of a type, form and vital characteristics of one or another object, modification of social institutions and structures, which can be accompanied by their fundamental renewal³. Philosophical dictionary defines transformation as mutually stimulating changes of models of social action on the one hand, and functioning of social institutions, related to the deliberate, intentional influence of nominal directions (formal norms, procedures or rules) on the other hand⁴.

An important methodological problem is the identification of the concepts of “social transformation” and “modernization”. Many scientists do not see any difference between these concepts and use them as synonyms. Modernization paradigm, which is now very popular in the West, closely connects these concepts. From the point of view of this paradigm the transformation is understood as the development of the conventional society into the modern one. For instance, the well-known adherent of modernization paradigm W. Zapf⁵ believes transformation to be one of the modernization types, i.e. diversified overtaking processes in the undeveloped societies.

In sociological sense modernization is understood as a process, in which social structure gets the elements which have not been inherent to it before and loses those items which

¹ Shamrai V.V. Transformation of a Society: the Limits of the Possible / V.V. Shamrai. – K.: Nauk. Dumka, 1994. – 176 p.; Lapin N.I., Beliaeva L.A. Crisis Society: Our Community in Three Dimensions. – M.: Philosophical Institute of RAS, 1994; Stepin V.S., Tolstykh V.I. Democracy and Society’s Destiny // Philosophic matters. – 1996. – № 10. – Pp. 3-18.

² Volovyk V.I. Ideological Activity: Dialectics of Traditions and Innovativeness. – M., 1990; Kremen V. Political Strategy of Ukraine. Comparative Prospects // Viche. – 1994. – № 6.

³ Sociological Encyclopaedic Dictionary. – M.: Publishing House INFRA. – 1998. – P. 374.

⁴ The Newest Philosophic Dictionary. – Mn.: Publishing House V. M. Skakun. – 1998. – P. 726.

⁵ Zapf, W. Modernisierung, Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Transformation: soziologische Aufsätze 1987 bis 1994 // Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1994. – 212 S.

previously characterized this social structure. Thereby, one can assume that the reason for the identification of the concepts of "modernization" and "social transformation" is that they are both interpreted as changes which take place in the society.

Ukrainian sociologist S. Kataev⁶ tried to differentiate these concepts logically. The scientist states that both terms are universal, but the term "transformation of society" on the contrary to modernization does not describe the direction vector of changes and is convenient only in those cases, when the content of changes is not clearly defined. In situations when it is difficult to determine the nature of changes, whether they are progressive or regressive, they are evidence of a crisis or overcoming great difficulties.

If social transformation is defined as the purposeful changes carried out from "above" and which have their supervisor or social technologist, in this case the content of the very changes theoretically must be clearly defined, have its aims and a worked out model of the future society. The terms "social transformation" and "modernization" in spite of their content likeness should not be treated as synonyms. Social transformation is the total reorganization of the whole society, whereas modernization is in charge of introduction of new social institutions, which are copied from the western countries and are adapted to the conditions of certain societies.

In the world political science a great number of scientific researches concerning the interpretation of the notion "transformation" have been worked out. The heuristic potential of the term began to be developed in the frames of transitional paradigm in the 70s of the previous century, especially in the form of "states of transition period" and "transformation from capitalism to socialism" theories. Western scientists were more active in the first case. Marxists, who tried not only to justify the regularity of the general world transformation from capitalism to socialism, but also to represent it as a new model of social development, the transition from tribal and feudal (in Asia and Africa) systems to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism were more active in the second case.

In particular, one of the founders of transitology D. Rustow analyzes phenomenon of political transformation as the process of transition from dictatorship to democracy. In the paper "Transits to Democracy – Toward a Dynamic Model"⁷ on the basis of comparative analysis of Sweden (1890-1920) and Turkey (1940-1960) the researcher singles out three main phases of the transitional dynamics, namely: 1) the preparatory phase, characterized by a conflict between main social powers, which is becoming imminent; 2) decision phase, when the political

⁶ Kataev S.L. Sociocultural Transformation of Modern Ukrainian Society. Kyiv. – 1998. – 380 p.; Kataev S.L. Valuable Foundations of the Theory Crisis Society Transformation // Problems of Sociological Theory Development. Transformation of Social Institutions and Institutional Structure of a Society: Scientific Reports and Messages of the III All-Ukrainian Sociological Conference / Sociological Association of the Country, Sociological Institute NAS of Ukraine // Ed. M.O. Shulha, V.M. Vorona. – K., 2003. – Pp. 90-93.; Kataev S.L. Transitional Society as a Challenge of Modern Times // Methodology, Theory and Practice of the Sociological Analysis of the Modern Society: Collected Scientific Papers. – Kharkiv: Publishing House of V. N. Karasin Kharkiv, 2001. – Pp. 75-81.

⁷ Rustow D.A. Transits to Democracy – Toward a Dynamic Model // Polis. – 1996. – № 5. – Pp. 5-15.

formula of “great compromise between main political actors” is being worked out and the main political rules of the democratic game are being determined; 3) habituation phase, when new forms of people communication and new democratic institutions are being established”⁸.

According to Rustow, the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy is launched with the help of continuous and ineffective struggle, the participants of which represent interests of various social groups, and controversial issues are of top priority for all. During the second phase, some of the country’s political leaders adopt an intentional decision to accept the diversity in unity and with this aim institutionalize some of the fundamental mechanisms of democracy (general electoral rights, free elections etc.). This is the achievement of some consensus as to the rules of the game. Rustow observes that the first fundamental compromise, which is achieved at this phase of transition, becomes a key aspect of democratization, as it is the proof for the effectiveness of reconciliation and agreement principle, opening the prospect of solving current and future challenges with the help of democratic methods. Finally, during the habituation phase there is an assimilation of new democratic rules, procedures and values by various political forces and society.

Modern theories of political transitology focus main attention on social transformations that take place in the post-Soviet countries. It is stipulated by the peculiarities of the course of transformational processes in the post-Soviet region, and here belongs the fact that they are aimed at the change of the whole political system, accompanied by intensive structural transformations, which include reorganization of political power, main mechanisms of its formation and principles of its functioning, and the appearance of various models of intermediate and short-term agreements concerning the principles of competitiveness between political elites and ways, which would help to include people in the political processes.

Despite the specificity of the post-Soviet transformations, theoreticians of political transitology acknowledge the existence of mutual algorithms and similarity of its dynamics even in the countries with different levels of social development. Thus, D. Easton considers new political system to be established as a result of cumulative changes, which occur at the hierarchical levels of decision making (including political organization of a society, political relations, political processes, political actors etc.). Decisions regarding fundamental values (“who are we?”) are taken at the first level, i.e. civilizational, cultural, national and territorial identities which draw the boundaries of the national state are defined here. Decisions regarding political rules, procedures, constitutional and institutional formation of the system are taken at the second level. D. Easton believes that only at the third (the highest) level, which is based on the results of the decisions taken at the former levels, the current policy is realized: “Who gets, when and how much”⁹. At the very level occurs reproduction of the former ones – the current

⁸ Ibid. – P. 5.

⁹ Easton D. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. – Excess mode: <http://blog.lib.umn.edu/burn0277/pa5012/readings/Easton%201965%20An%20Approach%20to%20the%20Analysis%20of%20Political%20Systems.pdf>

distribution of economic, social and political resources and all the things which constitute the strategic potential of any society, allow it to develop dynamically and ensure the legitimacy of the current political regime. This legitimacy is a sign of consolidation and stability of the society and a result of its political transformation.

According to the assertion made by American scientist A. Przeworski, in his work "Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America"¹⁰, the compulsory stipulation for transformation is a struggle between various political forces. The scientist analyzes the problem of political transformation, using the theory of games. Phases of a process of democratization are represented as a game between four political groups: die-hard conservatives, reformers, moderate groups, radical opposition. In the analysis provided by A. Przeworski it is necessary to single out the moment of weak predictability of the final result of the transformation; it can be either "authoritarian restoration" or "guaranteed democracy"¹¹.

In his fundamental work "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century"¹² American political analyst S. Huntington explains the fact of transitional processes, including political transformation, by the general tendency of the global political changes, the so-called "waves of democratization". He understands these waves as the group of transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones, which occur in a specified period of time, and the number of which exceeds the number of transitions in the opposite direction during the given period¹³.

In his paper "Transformation of the Institution of Federalism under the Conditions of Political and Administrative Reforms in Modern Russia"¹⁴ Russian political analyst V. Haiduk "defines political transformation as a qualitative and complex change of a structure and functioning of the political system in the society". Its dynamics and effectiveness depends upon the ability of the political institutions, political actors to respond to various internal and external impacts. At the same time political transformation can be considered as a phasic process, but not a perpetual one. It incorporates three interrelated directions: innovational (associated with the creation of more effective elements of the system), inertial (stabilizing, which limits radical changes) and dysfunctional (resulting in the destruction of the old system's elements, and as a result, in disorganization of vital activities in the society). The scientist concludes that political transformation represents the ability of the political system to adapt to absolutely

¹⁰ Przeworski A. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. – M., 2000. – P. 28.

¹¹ Przeworski A. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America / A. Przeworski. – M., 1999. – Pp. 295 -297.

¹² Huntington S. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century / S. Huntington [Text] / Translation from English. – M.: «Russian Political Encyclopaedia» (ROSSPEN), 2003. – 368 p.

¹³ Ibid. – P. 26.

¹⁴ Haiduk V.V. Transformation of the Institution of Federalism under the Conditions of Political and Administrative Reforms in Modern Russia // Authority and Politics. – 2011. – Issue. № 3 (16). – P. 7-12.

new social requirements, maintain rational conventional structures, and create new institutions, which will ensure optimization of the “feedback” mechanisms between the statutory authority and society.

Famous Russian scientist and political analyst A. Duhin considers, that “within the study of political institutions and political processes, the term “transformation” may have different interpretations, since it is used in the consideration of various types of significant changes in the basic structures and systems, which constitute the political foundation of any society”¹⁵.

A number of scientific approaches to understanding the meaning of the concept of “political transformation” have been proposed in the Ukrainian political science. Such national scientists as O. Dolzhenkov, S. Krymskyi, M. Mykhalchenko, Yu. Shaihorodskyyi and others have paid much attention in their works to investigate the specificity of this phenomenon. Particularly, M. Mykhalchenko in his paper “Search for Leaders: Honest, Talented, Fair ...”¹⁶, defines political transformation as “changes in: political institutions and structures (political system); political consciousness and political actions of various strata, elites, an individual (personality and their activity in social structures); political culture of the society (are there any valuable signs of combination between the modern Ukrainian society and traditional and new national political culture)”. He remarks that the problem lies not only in the transformational processes of the political system of the society, but also in the fact whether these processes are interrelated, if there is complementarity between them and to what extent they are multidirectional and why their development occurs without any aims and mechanisms predetermined by the society. The researcher also singles out “external” (parliamentary elections on the multi-party basis, referendums, constitution) and “internal” (individual freedom, freedom of political parties, public institutions, democracy, a lawful state) markers of political transformation of the society. Parliamentary elections on the multi-party basis, referendums, constitution can be “external” markers of political transformation of the society, where one totalitarian system succeeds another one. “Internal” marker of political transformation is an individual freedom, freedom of political parties and public institutions, democracy and a lawful state and cannot always conform to the external markers.

Ukrainian political analyst O. Dolzhenkov on the basis of comparative analysis of political systems of Ukraine and Belarus comes to the conclusion that transformational processes in the society occur at the moment when the current political system loses its stability and consistency, enters a period of uneven interactions, starts feeling the internal and external changes, pressure and when the extent of tension can exceed its allowable maximum¹⁷. The researcher considers the very content of the concept of “political transformation” from two perspectives:

¹⁵ Duhin A.H. Transformation of Political Institutions and Structures in the Process of Conventional Societies' Modernization // Author's abstract of dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Political Sciences. – Rostov-na-Donu, 2004. – 34 p.

¹⁶ Mykhalchenko M. Search for Leaders: Honest, Talented, Fair ... / M. Mykhalchenko [Electronic resource]. – Excess mode: <http://www.politik.org.ua/vid/magcontent.php3?m=1&n=61&c=1329>

¹⁷ Dolzhenkov O. Ukraine – Belarus: Political Transformation Experience: Monography / O. Dolzhenkov. – Odesa, 2003. – P. 228.

firstly as a symptom of successful course of transformational processes in other spheres of people's life (social, economic, cultural and spiritual); secondly as an effective instrument to ensure transformations in these spheres¹⁸. Analyzing modern political transformations, the scientist supposes that due to their inorganic nature, they do not always end with the transition to the modern society, but on the contrary, in most cases they are doomed to fail. According to the researcher it is predetermined by the fact that just a mechanical borrowing of external markers of the modern society and dismantling of traditional values, norms and institutions results in a state of permanent anomie. The latter is associated with inadequate ensuring of the functioning of main subsystems, which can be found in the structure of the political system of any society, including: institutional, regulating, communicative, political and ideological.

Analyzing the phenomenon of system transformation, Ukrainian political analyst S. Krymskii determines the combination of various old and new elements of the system in the processes that take place right now. In his interpretation, transformation is a development of social and political processes, which do not exclude the possibility of reverse movement. However, the opposite movement should not be necessarily negative. Transformations can be progressive or reversed, systematic or unsystematic. And the concept of "ordered transformation", which means "reformation of the post-Soviet society towards the Western European paradigm of development"¹⁹, is very close to the notion of modernization.

Treatment of political transformation by focusing on the leading role of legal principles in the process of modern politics implementation and the necessity for democratization of social and political life has been proposed by famous Ukrainian political analyst Yu. Shaihorodskyy in the paper "The Concept of "Transformation" as an Instrument for the Analysis of Social Changes"²⁰. The scientist reckons that transformational processes in the political sphere are carried out in the directions of forming the system of government on legal basis; ensuring legislative and constitutional development of the country; improving the electoral system; creating the institution of parliamentarism; reforming the judicial system; creating the institution of local self-government; forming party system and establishing political pluralism; functioning the independent mass media; establishing new political elite etc. These transformations represent modern political strategy of the society and its desire for democracy. In spite of the multidimensional processes of democratic transformations, they must be considered, according to the researcher, as the links of a single global process of democratization, since they are combined with the help of efforts of transition from non-democratic forms of government to democratic ones and by some other general factors. Democratic transformation,

¹⁸ Ibid. – P. 20.

¹⁹ Krymskyi S. The Prospect of the New Millennium and the Change of Social Intelligence Strategies // *Mahisterium. Historical and Philosophical Studies / National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy"*. – Kyiv: Stylos, 2008. – Issue. 1. – P. 66.

²⁰ Shaihorodskyy Yu. The Concept of "Transformation" as an Instrument for the Analysis of Social Changes / Yu. Shaihorodskyy // *Ukrainian academic periodical «Education of a Region: Political Science and Psychology of Communication»*. – 2010. – № 4. – Pp. 51-53.

in its essence, is the process towards an open society with its inherent pluralism in political life, economics, culture, developed structures of the civil society and a lawful state.

Therefore, having summarized various scientific approaches towards the understanding of the meaning of “transformation” in modern political science, philosophical, and social science literature, one can make a conclusion that this term represents the process of transition from the accumulation of new features to the destruction of the old foundation and establishing of a relatively new state of the object. Transformation is not always characterized by straightforwardness, its development can be carried out in any direction, as towards the progress, so the regress. It should be mentioned, that in the modern social science there is no definite theory of transformation. Transformation is very often identified with modernization, though there is a significant difference between them. Modernization can be probably compared with the gradual evolution, whereas transformation includes both the elements of evolution, and revolution and reform. The thesis that the process of transformation is inherent to every society is more or less certain and defined.

In social sciences, transformation is considered to be the process of inner changes of the society, as a result of which it is possible to overcome the loss of balance, to achieve new and more differentiated and higher level of order and organization within all main spheres of life. Social transformation is stipulated by social commotion, revolutions, reformative actions carried out by some historical figures and activity level of various societies. Political transformation is a constituent of social processes of transformation and includes their main features. It can be defined as a transformation of political institutions and political structures which calls forth changes (in some cases fundamental ones) of the whole political system of a specific society and is accompanied by the process of acquiring new characteristics. Political transformation is an essential feature of any political system development. And the direction of changes, their effectiveness and structural and substantial content of the system completely depend on the factors which stipulate this process of development.

Політичний флешмоб: Специфіка періоду революції гідності та Україно-Російського Збройного Протистояння

Досліджено політичний флешмоб як нову форму політичної участі. Розкриті мобілізаційні можливості цієї форми політичного протесту на прикладі флешмобів періоду Революції гідності та україно-російського збройного протистояння (2013–2014). Вивчаються переваги флешмобу в сучасному політичному процесі. Політичний флешмоб аналізується як неконвенціональна форма політичної участі громадян за мережовим принципом формування.

Ключові слова: флешмоб, політичний флешмоб (полімоб), політична участь.

Political flashmob: Specifics of the period of dignity revolution and Ukrainian-Russian Armed Conflict

There is investigated political flashmob as a new form of political participation. There are determined mobilization capabilities of this form of political protest at the example of flashmobs of the period of Dignity Revolution and Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict (2013–2014). There are studied advantages of flashmob in modern political process. Political flashmob is analyzed as non-convetional form of political participation of citizens by network formation principle.

Keywords: flashmob, political flashmob (polimob), political participation.

Polityczny flash mob: Specyfika okresu rewolucji godności i Ukraińsko-Rosyjskiej Konfrontacji Militarnej

Tradycyjne formy uczestnictwa politycznego dzisiaj nie są jedyną drogą zaangażowania obywateli w procesy polityczne. Powstał szereg nowych, twórczych form uczestnictwa obywatelskiego w procesach politycznych. Jedną z form takiego uczestnictwa jest flash mob. H. Rheingold

w pracy pt. “Mądry tłum: następna rewolucja społeczna”¹ jeszcze przed powstaniem politycznych flash mobów przewidział zastosowanie nowoczesnych środków komunikacji do samoorganizacji masy. Badacz użył terminu “smart mob” (bystry tłum) – “mądry tłum”, czyli nowe społeczeństwo, które potrafi osiągnąć wysoki poziom wewnętrznej organizacji w specyficznych warunkach (anonimowości, braku ośrodka rządzącego); autor zapowiadał zastosowanie nowoczesnych technologii komunikacyjnych (Internetu, telefonów komórkowych) w celu samoorganizacji.

H. Rheingold zapoczątkował badania problematyki flash mobów, która później uległa naukowej konkretyzacji. Ten rodzaj działania badają m. in. ukraińscy badacze: T. Kremeń, T. Kuprij, W. Torianyk, O. Szerman, którzy badają fenomen politycznego flash mobu z zastosowaniem różnych metodologicznych podejść. Ale właśnie specyfika flash mobów przeprowadzonych na Ukrainie w okresie Rewolucji godności i ukraińsko-rosyjskiej konfrontacji militarnej jest jeszcze niezbadanym kierunkiem badań politologicznych. Moim zadaniem badawczym jest ukazanie pewnych tendencji w zastosowaniu politycznego flash mobu jako formy uczestnictwa politycznego w Ukrainie.

Pierwotnie flash mob, przestrzegając dewizy “Flash mob poza religią, poza polityką, poza gospodarką”, nie był przeznaczony do akcji politycznych. Flash moby mające cele polityczne były zakazane przepisami, ponieważ zakładano, że będzie to forma swobodnego samowrażania, akcja artystyczna, środek protestu społecznego poprzez absurduzycję, lecz nie sposób osiągnięcia pewnych celów politycznych. Jednak tak atrakcyjna forma wyrażania idei nie mogła umknąć uwadze siłom politycznym. Flash mob szybko pozycjonował swój ekwiwalent polityczny jako polityczny flash mob. Dzisiaj flash mob zakorzenił się w polityce, mając główny cel – wywołać zainteresowanie przypadkowych widzów, chęć dowiedzieć się, co się dzieje. Przekształcił się w nową formę zaangażowania demokratycznego obywateli wg sieciowej zasady kształtowania (podstawa – to więzi poziome, nie pionowe). Flash mob to niekonwencjonalna forma uczestnictwa politycznego i członkostwa w organizacjach społeczno-politycznych.

Podstawowe cechy politycznego flash mobu są sprzeczne z logiką protestu politycznego, którego właściwościami są następujące aspekty:

- protest polityczny prowadzony jest zazwyczaj przez aktywistów konkretnego ruchu politycznego lub przez zwolenników pewnych idei politycznych;
- akcje protestu politycznego dążą do całkiem konkretnych celów politycznych i prowadzone są przede wszystkim dla osiągnięcia tych celów;
- akcje protestu politycznego nastawione są na maksymalne audytorium (czyli ludzi, którzy dowiedzą się o tym, że dana akcja została przeprowadzona), dlatego liczą przede wszystkim nie na świadków akcji, lecz na przedstawicieli prasy;

¹ Г. Рейнгольд, Умная толпа: новая социальная революция, Москва 2006, s. 415

- akcje protestu planowane są z góry i w odróżnieniu od flash mobu, pozbawione są efektu spontaniczności (dotyczy to nawet akcji “przedzierających się”), ponieważ na miejsce wydarzeń koniecznie zapraszani są z góry dziennikarze².

Ukraińska badaczka politycznego flash mobu O. Szerman wskazuje na znaczenie osobistego doświadczenia, jako tego, który ma silniejszy wpływ na świadomość człowieka niż hasła usłyszane lub przeczytane³. Dlatego w takich sytuacjach kształtowanie odpowiednich nastawień moralno-etycznych, krzewienie pewnych idei odbywa się szybko i skutecznie.

Na pierwszy rzut oka, flash moby podobne są do zwykłych akcji masowych, ale tak naprawdę wykazują absolutnie nową zasadę organizacji. Nie ma jednego centrum, które miałoby wysyłać zaproszenia do szczebli poziomych lub pionowych: inicjatorem flash mobu może być jeden człowiek, flash mob (samo)organizuje się poprzez łańcuchowe rozpowszechnienie informacji nieformalnymi kanałami komunikacji⁴.

Flash mob ma szereg wyraźnych zalet potęgujących jego znaczenie dla procesu politycznego: naoczność i wyrazistość; „pojemność” formy wyrażenia, potencjał do zaangażowania znacznej ilości przedstawicieli społeczności. Organizacja przy pomocy środków masowego przekazu, dobrowolne uczestnictwo, anonimowość, szybkość zebrania, pokojowy charakter, brak organizatorów i osób odpowiedzialnych, możliwość zaproponowania każdemu potencjalnemu uczestnikowi scenariuszu pewnego przedsięwzięcia i samodzielnego odnalezienia zwolenników, krótkotrwałość, gwałtowność, tak społeczno-polityczny, jak również rekreacyjny charakter; brak regulaminu prawnego (trudno bowiem pociągnąć do odpowiedzialności któregoś z uczestników) – są to niezaprzeczalne cechy flash mobu. Istotną właściwością flash mobu jest to, że stanowi słabo sformalizowaną, niehierarchizowaną, sporadyczną pod względem sposobu mobilizacją działań zespołowych, co jest skutecznym instrumentem konsumeryzmu politycznego.

Flash mob produkuje nowe spektrum technologii politycznych – moberowych. Polityczny flash mob – to nie jest zwykła rozrywka intelektualna, tak jak w tradycyjnym flash mobie: często on ma na celu modyfikację ustroju politycznego i daje impuls “kolorowej rewolucji”. Polityczne flash moby są prostszym, bardziej operatywnym i bezpieczniejszym sposobem wyrażenia opinii społecznej lub przyciągania uwagi na problemy, niż inne akcje protestu. Ich zadaniem jest poruszyć konserwatywizm (absenteizm) społeczeństwa, w niestandardowy sposób pokazać jego problemy. Najważniejsze, żeby władze nie ignorowały zgłoszonych problemów, w innym przypadku można spodziewać się potężniejszych politycznych flash mobów, np. w 2001 roku na Filipinach, gdzie zwolennicy opozycji obalili ówczesnego prezydenta Johna

² В. Торьяник, Флеш-моб як інструмент політичного консумеризму, “Вісник Севастопольського національного технічного університету”, 2011, nr. 123, s. 229.

³ О. Шерман, Флешмоб як засіб патріотичного виховання, w: Патріотичне виховання громадян в умовах інтеграційних процесів, Запоріжжя 2014, s. 320.

⁴ О. Шерман, Флешмоб як соціальне явище, w: Особистість в екстремальних умовах, Львів, 2013, s. 82.

Estradę, zgromadziwszy na placu centralnym za pomocą rozsyłania smsów ponad milion protestujących, ubranych w ciemne ubrania.

Sieci społeczne i flash moby przeprowadzane za ich pomocą przez ostatnie kilka lat mają ważne znaczenie w wielkiej polityce, na przykład, podczas wyborów we Włoszech, w Iranie w 2009 roku, w ramach ruchu “Podbij Wall Street”, wydarzeń Arabskiej wiosny. Termin “Twitter Revolution” odnosi się różnych rewolucji i protestów, koordynowanych przez sieci społeczne: protesty w Kiszyniowie (2009), akcje protestu w Iranie (2009), rewolucje w Tunisie (2010-2011), Egipcie (2011), Rewolucja godności na Ukrainie (listopad 2013 – luty 2014).

Pierwszy flash mob na Ukrainie odbył się 16 sierpnia 2003 r. o godzinie 17:00 w Kijowie, w centrum handlowym “Globus” na Placu Niepodległości (Majdan Nezależnosti)⁵ [, s. 73]. Wezwanie do wykorzystania pomarańczowej wstążki i koloru na znak pozycji politycznej, rozesłane Ukraincom pocztą elektroniczną w październiku 2004 r., niektórzy badacze uważają za flash mob⁶. Powstawszy jako formy spontanicznej kreatywności masy, pozostaje zjawiskiem, w którym inicjatorzy i wykonawcy niczym się nie różnią: oni należą do tych samych grup wiekowych i społecznych, mają wspólne ideały i mentalność⁷ [, s. 318].

Zaslugują na szczególną uwagę liczne patriotyczne flash moby: “Ukraina – jedna, bez wojny” (z okazji Dnia Konstytucji Ukrainy, 28.06.2014), “Uściśnij Ukrainę” (odbywał się w koszulach o kolorach państwowej flagi Ukrainy), “Młodzież za jedną Ukrainę” (w Kijowie koło Arki Drużby Narodów, z okazji Dnia młodzieży, 29.06.2014), flash moby absolwentów z okazji Dnia ostatniego dzwonka (zakończenia roku szkolnego) w wyszywankach oraz z błękitnymi i żółtymi balonami (30.06.2014), flash mob “Za jedność Ukrainy” trafił do Księgi rekordów Ukrainy (02.07.2014 r.; 1200 uczestników utworzyli mapę Ukrainy o wymiarach 25 x 35 metrów).

W okresie Euromajdanu odbyły się liczne flash moby: we Lwowie na znak poparcia dla studentów zatrzymanych w noc na 30 grudnia w Kijowie (uczestnicy z zaklejonymi czerwioną wstążką ustami, 10.12.2013); w Chmielnickim: flash mob matek z dziećmi “Aniołowie Ukrainy” na znak poparcia dla Euromajdanu (28.12.2013); w Kijowie flash mob poświęcony poszkodowanym na Euromajdanie (uczestnicy trzymali plakaty z liczbą 1739, która symbolizowała ogólną liczbę zaginionych, pobitych, zaaresztowanych i zabitych aktywistów (03.02.2014).

Aktywistki “Żeńskiej sotni” z Zaporozża w formie flash mobu protestowały przeciw referendum na Donbasie: w centrum Zaporozża narysowały kontur mapy Ukrainy, a każdy obwód personifikowała dziewczyna w wyszywance, która trzymała w ręku godło miasta – centrum

⁵ Т. Купрій, Ю. Головка, Флешмоб як соціальне явище і технологія інформаційної комунікації, “Грані”, 2012 nr 7 (87), s. 73.

⁶ С. Романенко, О толпе, флешмобе и задачах социологии, “Вестник Одесского национального университета”, 2005 nr. 11. – s. 80-87.

⁷ О. Шерман, Флешмоб як засіб патріотичного виховання, в: Патріотичне виховання громадян в умовах інтеграційних процесів, Запоріжжя 2014, s. 318.

obwodu. Natomiast flash mob z przeciwnymi hasłami – wzywającymi do uczestnictwa politycznego – przeprowadzili tarnopolscy studenci przed nadzwyczajnymi wyborami prezydenckimi (23.05.2014): pod hasłem “Nie śpij, nie leń się, idź na wybory” studenci leżeli na ulicy, co symbolizowało leń i apolityczność, które są niewłaściwe w okresie na tyle odpowiedzialnym dla kraju. We flash moby ukierunkowane politycznie angażują się również dzieci, m. in. w ogólnoukraińską akcję “Jeśli dzieci błagają – armaty milczą” (08.03.2014).

Ukraińcy przeprowadzają flash moby nie tylko na terenie kraju, a również poza granicami. Np. w Wiedniu odbył się flash mob “skazanie krwawego dyktatora” na znak poparcia Euro-majdanu (09.02.2014). Uczestnicy trzymali w rękach plakaty “Nie – przemocy w Ukrainie” i “Powstrzymajcie przemoc w Ukrainie”; w improwizowanej inscenizacji pokazali dyktatora Janukowicza siedzącego na “tronie” i jego “niewolników na kolanach, którym związano ręce i nakryto głowy prześcieradłami ze śladami krwi”.

Często polityczne flash moby nabierają nie tylko lokalnego brzmienia, lecz również ogarnia obywateli różnych państw jednocześnie: flash mob za jedność Ukrainy “Głos za pokój. Wsparcie Ukrainę” (Warszawa, 17.03.2014); flash mob zezłożeniem wieńców koło ambasad Federacji Rosyjskiej w szeregu miast (Wilno, Warszawa, Bruksela, Vancouver, Haga, Nowy Jork, Toronto) (21.06.2014). Z okazji Dnia Niepodległości w czterech amerykańskich miastach jednocześnie (Waszyngtonie, Filadelfii, Detroit i Nowym Jorku) odbył się flash mob pod hasłem “Zapał iskierkę jedności” (24.08.2014).

Popularną współczesną formą flash mobu jest wysłanie elektronicznych wiadomości o jednakowej treści na oficjalne strony polityków, np: Ukraińcy byli szczególnie aktywni co do A. Merkel (12-14.07.2014), starając się wpłynąć na jej stanowisko odnośnie relacji ukraińsko-rosyjskich. W okresie przygotowywania i przeprowadzenia referendum w Autonomicznej Republice Krymu (16.03.2014), a później – we wschodnich obwodach Ukrainy (11.05.2014) odbyły się setki różnych flash mobów na znak poparcia jedności Ukrainy, na przykład, rowerowy flash mob (Dnipropetrowsk, 03.05.2014), flash mob, na którym tworzone i rozmieszczano swój patriotyczny awatar (01.04.2014), flash mob pracowników Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych Ukrainy, którzy “określili” kontur kraju i zaśpiewali Hymn narodowy na placu koło resortu (Kijów, 19.04.2014), flash mob “Ukraina jedna w czasie wojny” (Lwów, 28.06.2014) itp.

W Dniu Flagi Państwowej (23.08.2014) masowo odbywały się flash moby z rozwinięciem ukraińskiej flagi; mieszkańcy miasta niby współzawodniczyli o wymiary niebiesko-żółtej płachty. Przykład zaskakującego flash mobu przedstawiony został z okazji Dnia Miasta w Miłkołajowie (13.09.2014), ukierunkowany przeciw wojnom informacyjnym w postaci zniszczenia prasy, która rozpowszechnia materiały separatystyczne.

W czasie ukraińsko-rosyjskiej konfrontacji zbrojnej aktywizowały się protesty przeciw rosyjskim towarom, sklepom, zakładom żywienia zbiorowego. Myśl przewodnia – “Rosyjskie zabija”: podczas flash mobu aktywiści w supermarkecie wybierają towary z rosyjskim kodem kreskowym, zbierają w jednym miejscu sali handlowej i padają na podłogę. Tematyka flash

mobów protestowych rozpowszechniła się z dziedziny handlu i obsługi na kulturę “Idzie rosyjski serial? Przełącz kanał”.

Mieszkańcy Krymu, którzy w przestrzeni Internetu wyrażają chęć życia pod ukraińską flagą, ale w warunkach aneksji publicznie protestować, przeszli z realnej przestrzeni w wirtualną. W warunkach autorytarnych prześladowań Internet pozostaje “oknem na wolność”, jednak putinski “Antyterrorystyczny zbiór ustaw” (przyjęty w kwietniu 2014 r., wprowadzony od dnia 01.08.2014 roku), zobowiązuje sieci i serwisy społeczne przekazujące szybkie wiadomości do przechowywania korespondencji użytkowników wciągu sześciu miesięcy, dlatego flash moby internetowe będą dla mieszkańców Krymu niedostępne.

Szczególne znaczenie ma mobilizacja ludzi, którzy zostali wewnętrznymi przesiedleńcami z obwodów Ługańskiego i Donieckiego Ukrainy. Na przykład, na Dzień miasta Ługańska (13.09.2014) ługańczanie przez Facebook umieszczali swoje zdjęcia pod ukraińską flagą i z plakatami o swoim mieście, publikowali na swojej stronie w sieci, dodając hashtag #LuhanskUkraine.

Jednym z najbardziej oryginalnych flash mobów, które przyszły z Zachodu, ale zostały przekształcone na Ukrainie, jest Ice Bucket Challenge, ale w odróżnieniu od działalności uświadamiającej i zachęcającej do zbierania środków na badania nad ALS (choroba stwardnienia zanikowego bocznego), Ukraińcy zaczęli stosować lodowate oblewania, żeby zebrać pieniądze na potrzeby wojska i fundacji charytatywnej pomagającej dzieciom chorym na raka krwi. Ten flash mob (mimo niepoważnej – dla ludzi poważnych – formy) objął nie tylko młodzież: lodowatą sztafetę jako pierwsi promowali właśnie rektorzy uczelni, przywódcy miast, top-menadżerowie, politycy, twórcze osobowości, duchowni. Za pomocą tej formy mobilizacji zebrane zostały miliony hrywien i uratowano życie wielu ludziom. Dlatego, moim zdaniem, flash mob, mimo braku akceptacji przez część społeczeństwa – jest jedną z najbardziej dynamicznych metod zjednoczenia społeczeństwa – zementowania, sklejenia dla rozwiązania wspólnego problemu. Po zdobyciu popularności przez ten flash mob, zostały zorganizowane jego formy zespołowe, na przykład: administracja Parku Kultury we Lwowie wsparła Ice Bucket Challenge (07.09.2014), organizując pawilony do przebierania uczestników, wydania suszarek, wiader, wody, a przede wszystkim (bo na tym polega treść akcji) – skrzynek na ofiary na potrzeby armii. Sztafetę podchwyciły i przekazywały przedsiębiorstwa, uczelnie.

Do politycznych flash mobów można zaliczyć promowanie przez użytkowników sieci społecznych, przede wszystkim Facebook i Twitter hashtagów do oznaczania interesujących tematów poruszanych w sieci. We wrześniu 2014 roku Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Ukrainy wezwało użytkowników Internetu do aktywnego promowania w Facebook i Twitter hashtagów #StopRussianAggression, a użytkownicy Twittera promowali hashtag #RussiaViolatedCeasefire, #NATOforUkraine. Jedna z pierwszych prób zwiększenia zainteresowania zagranicy Ukrainą tą metodą, została zapoczątkowana przez aktywistów Euromajdanu (27.01.2014 roku od godz. 17:00 do 18:00) akcja #DigitalMaidanTwitterStorm;

półgodziny po starcie flash mobu udało się osiągnąć postawionego celu – hashtag #digitalmaidan zajął pierwsze miejsce w światowych trendach sieci społecznej; w ramach flash mobu uczestnicy wysyłali wcześniej przygotowane tweety w języku angielskim, adresowane wpływowym politykom, dziennikarzom i działaczom społecznym całego świata.

Moim zdaniem, zdezaktualizowały się co najmniej dwie cechy charakterystyczne politycznego flash mobu:

1. flash mobu – to działanie młodzieży. Uważam, że znaczenie ma nie wiek, a status społeczny i tym samym aktywność komunikacji internetowej jako przejaw pewnego stylu życia. Mimo, że rzeczywiście liczba użytkowników Internetu jest największa wśród młodzieży, jednak wiele flash mobów dotyczących problematyki socjalnie rażącej jednoczą ludzi różnego wieku, na przykład: Ice Bucket Challenge, który na Ukrainie zaangażował, mówiąc obrazowo, “od starego do małego”;
2. flash mob – to akcja uliczna. Wiele z nich przeprowadzonych jest wirtualnie, w sieciach społecznych, poprzez rozpowszechnianie pewnych hasel, zdjęć, zmian avatarów itp.

Nowa rzeczywistość internetowa zmienia życie społeczne ludzi, stymuluje do działania, w tym również w formie flash mobu. Dzisiaj mobilizacja polityczna nie jest na tyle skuteczna, jak przy dodaniu jej zabarwienia emocjonalnego; dyskusje racjonalne nie doprowadzają do takiego poziomu mobilizacji politycznej, który osiągają akcje, ukierunkowane na wybuch emocji ich uczestników⁸. Mobilizacja polityczna następująca w mediach społecznych, czy to w formie flash mobów, czy teatralizowanych performansów, dociera do apolitycznych warstw ludności, angażuje ich w działalność polityczną poprzez włączenie do uczestnictwa politycznego elementów gry. Flash moby robią efekt doładowania emocjonalnego i poczucia wspólnej sprawy, a jednocześnie umożliwiają uczestnikom oderwanie się od codzienności.

Za zewnętrznymi przyczynami powstania i popularności flash mobów ukryła się głębsza idea: flash mob jako rodzaj działalności idealnie wpisuje się w kulturową matrycę Postmodernizmu. Ukraiński politolog O. Szerman charakteryzuje flash mob jako czynność, która nie pociąga żadnych skutków oraz jest jednocześnie i uczynkiem, i imitacją uczynku; jest to rozrywka nie wymagająca kosztów; porozumiewanie się, które nie potrzebuje zasobów psychicznych lub emocjonalnych, a jednocześnie jest to możliwość żeby dać się poznać, „zostać wiecznym” chociaż by w charakterze uczestnika wideo na Youtube; a więc, jest to szansa na zrobienie czegoś, tak na prawdę nic nie robiąc⁹. Zresztą, my uważamy, iż ukraińskie flash moby w 2014, uwarunkowane wydarzeniami rewolucyjnymi i wojennymi, przekształciły się w konkretny wynik, skuteczny wkład, na przykład, wspomniany już Ice Bucket Challenge z ofiarą pieniężną dla wsparcia armii.

⁸ Т. Кремень, Емоційна складова політичної мобілізації через соціальні медіа, “Наукові праці”, 2012, nr. 192, s. 72.

⁹ О. Шерман, Флешмоб як соціальне явище, w: Особистість в екстремальних умовах, Львів, 2013, s. 83.

The idea of the “Escape from freedom” of Erich Fromm in light of post-industrial and globalization changes of modern societies: a theoretical analysis

The article analyzes the idea of the “escape from freedom” of Erich Fromm in the context of globalization and post-industrial transformations of modern Western societies. It determines the destructive character of socioeconomic and psychological tendencies, which follow these transformations and establishes their connection with the idea of the escape from freedom”. It is argued that this idea preserves its topicality and heuristic potential for the analysis of contemporary political and social challenges in the conditions of post-industrial, consumerist democracy.

Keywords: “Escape from Freedom”, globalization, post-industrial society, authoritarianism, democracy.

Konceptcja „Ucieczki od wolności” E. Fromma w świetle przemian globalizacyjnych i postindustrialnych współczesnego społeczeństwa: analiza teoretyczna

W artykule przeanalizowano koncepcję „ucieczki od wolności” Ericha Fromma w kontekście przemian globalizacyjnych i postindustrialnych współczesnych, zachodnich społeczeństw. Dokonano deskrypcji destruktywnego charakteru społeczno-ekonomicznych i psychologicznych tendencji towarzyszących tym przemianom, a także określono ich związek z analizowaną koncepcją. Postawiono uargumentowaną tezę, iż w warunkach postindustrialnej „demokracji konsumpcyjnej”, „ucieczka od wolności” zachowuje aktualność i potencjał heurystyczny dla analizy politycznych i społecznych wyzwań współczesności.

Słowa kluczowe: „Ucieczka od wolności”, globalizacja, społeczeństwo postindustrialne, autorytaryzm, demokracja.

Концепція "Втечі від свободи" Е. Фромма у світлі глобалізаційних і постіндустріальних трансформацій сучасного суспільства: теоретичний аналіз

у статті проаналізовано концепцію «втечі від свободи» Е. Фромма у контексті глобалізаційних і постіндустріальних трансформації сучасних західних суспільств. Обґрунтовано деструктивний характер соціально-економічних і психологічних тенденцій, які супроводжують дані трансформації, й визначено їх зв'язок з концепцією «втечі від свободи». Аргументовано, що в умовах постіндустріальної, «споживацької» демократії ця концепція зберігає свою актуальність і евристичний потенціал для аналізу політичних та соціальних викликів сучасності.

Ключові слова: «Втеча від свободи», глобалізація, постіндустріальне суспільство, авторитаризм, демократія.

Erich Fromm's work *The Escape from Freedom* postulates two fundamental issues. First of all, it reveals on the basis of psychoanalysis the most deep-laid psychological determinants of human behavior, and on this ground maintains the close relationship between psychology and political activity. Secondly, it outlines the ways of establishment of human freedom in the past and on this basis tries to foresee the future of the Western civilization. Despite the book has been written before World War II, it is as relevant in our time as it was half a century ago, since the development of European and American society during this time confirmed the majority of Fromm's surmises and monitions, and the threat of the re-establishment of totalitarian regimes in the XXI century, in light of the acts of terrorism in September 2001, does not seem so vague as it was presumed by the philosopher-liberal in the beginning of 1990s. Furthermore, the progress of technology and means of communication, globalization and worldwide modernization have caused the most tremendous and rapidly ongoing destruction of those traditional ties and cultural patterns that had formerly determined the lifestyle of most societies on our planet. Under such conditions as the feelings of estrangement and loneliness of a person and the sense of losing oneself in the pitiless world of inhumane market mechanisms, is perhaps stronger and more palpable than ever before. It concerns not only economically undeveloped countries of the Third World, but successful countries in the West as well. The success and growing popularity of different nationalistic, extremist and fundamentalist religious slogans, that are nowadays observed in almost all regions of the planet (Ukraine is no exception), have at least related origins, if not a common source. The idea of "the escape from freedom" can therefore be viewed as a key to understand those threats and challenges

to democracy that emerged before mankind on the threshold of the XXI century. But first of all we should briefly outline the contents of this fundamental work.

Erich Fromm, analyzing the phenomenon of totalitarianism, explains it as a joint effect of psychological and historical factors. According to Fromm, the traditional type of society, which had been dominant from ancient times until the Renaissance, could be characterized, first of all, by close ties between an individual and the community to which he belonged. The community – either a kin or a city state – via solidarity between its members, vouched for the feeling of safety and security in the day-to-come. At the same time it regulated the activity of each of its members and it deprived them of their ability to act and to live the way they wanted. The New Time, according to Erich Fromm, marked an overturn of the world of values. The focus of an individual's world view was no longer a community with its traditional ties, but an individual with inalienable value of his freedom¹. The crucial moment of transition to the modern thinking and public organization was marked by the Reformation, which displaced the church as a mediator between man and God and put the former face to face with the Latter. The ideals of the Reformation which emphasize an individual as the sole subject of responsibility before God have found their embodiment in the idea of Calvinism and its doctrine of salvation through permanent labor. This was the exact ideology that underpinned the market mechanisms of the modern societies. Taking this into account, there can be drawn a certain parallel between the views of Fromm and those of Max Weber who also viewed the capitalist relations through the prism of Protestant ethics. However, Erich Fromm argues that having given an individual freedom and the possibility to live of his own free will, the market economy and the ethic system attached to it, simultaneously deprived him of his affiliation with a community and the feeling of safety and certainty in the future. Freedom under such circumstances has become a burden for a man, and this calls forth a natural desire to exchange it for the primeval ties of group sameness. The psychological background of this desire is also constituted by sadomasochistic impulses which are regarded by Fromm as an instinctive need to rule or to obey power. These very factors are primary cause of totalitarian regimes, the formation of which is first of all the result of human longing to cast down the burden of freedom, or as Fromm had stated, to escape from it.

The focus of Fromm's analysis thus appears the problem of man and his interaction with the outer world, and this implies a whole number of problems of political theory. Let us outline some of them. Aren't the political values and institutes of modernity, which are, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the subject of the global cultural consensus, in reality threatened by the psychological alienation of man which they indirectly call forth?¹ If yes, do democracy and political freedom that underlies it at all correspond with the anthropological nature of

¹ З. Бжезінський, Демократія перед лицем глобалізації, «І» (незалежний культурологічний часопис), 2000 nr. 19, s. 42

man? Or maybe traditional, or "closed" as Karl Popper called them², societies provide a more natural environment for human life and work than democracy, which lays on the wearisome burden of freedom?

"The Escape from Freedom" makes us once more return to those questions, which have seemingly been answered long ago. However, it should be noticed, that Fromm's theoretical conclusions on the nature of man have also found their empirical corroboration. The controversial socio-psychological experiment, realized under the guidance of Stanley Milgram in 1960s, discovered the unexpected propensity of a man to manifest cruelty and sadism. Reflecting upon the results of the experiment, Milgram asserted that if concentration camps, similar to those of the Nazi, had been opened in the United States, their personnel could have been recruited out of the inhabitants of any average town³. If the impulses from the "dark part" of the human mind are so strong, the stability of our political regimes is in fact illusory. The psychology of the masses can thus be likened to a sleeping volcano that is about to explode at any moment with the fire of dictatorship and totalitarianism³. The tendencies of globalization constitute a good ground for such an explosion. Let us discuss some of them.

The estrangement of man from the community, with which he is connected by traditional ties, is according to Fromm, the starting point to of the rise of totalitarian forms of power. In modern time it is the civil society that forms the above mentioned "traditional ties". According to the sociological research data, the civil society of western countries came to a period of progressive decline in the second half of the XX century. The article of Robert Putnam "Playing skittles alone: the decline of American social capital" presents convincing evidence, how the number of civil institutes in the USA has rapidly shortened: the number of members of the civil organizations has shrunk by more than half over past four decades – from 32,5% in 1953 to 15,2% in 1992; the regular church attendance rating fell from 48% in the 1950s to 41% in the end of the 1970s; the number of members of Parent-Teacher Associations decreased from more than 12 million in 1964 to less than 5 million in 1982 etc⁴. The decrease of participation according to Putnam has more or less affected virtually all independent civil organizations in the USA. Among the reasons which had caused the mentioned metamorphosis Putnam named the switch of women from the domestic sphere to the professional, the growing preference toward technical forms of spending one's leisure time, the growing social mobility of the population and different social factors (for example, the increase of the number of divorces with the concomitant decrease of the number of marriages). All these factors were determined by economic, cultural and technological reasons, which follow the post-industrial transformations of society. Thus, it can be stated, that the sole alternative for the declining civil society

² К. Поппер, *Закрите суспільство і його вороги*, Київ 1994, s. 444.

³ Conscience and authority," <http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/conscience.html> (ogładane 6.10.2014).

⁴ Р. Патнем, *Гра в кеглі наодинці: занепад соціального капіталу Америки*, «І» (незалежний культурологічний часопис), 2001 nr. 20, s. 34-35.

seems to be an atomized society of aloof, socially indifferent individuals that can be re-integrated into some wholeness only by a totalitarian political myth.

The next factor which intensifies the feeling of estrangement and urges a man “to escape from his freedom” is presented by the way in which post-industrial economics is organized. Alvin Toffler in his famous books suggested that in the second half of the XX century took place the transition from the society of “smoking pipes” to the society of “the third wave”. The post-industrial “super-symbolic” economics, which is grounded on the high intellectual abilities of its agents, creates, its own kind of class antagonism. If the industrial era, according to Marx, was characterized by rivalry between classes that had been brought about by unequal possession of property, the post-industrial era in turn, makes a sharp distinction between people with high and low intellectual abilities.⁵ Following the massive implementation of technologies in industry, labor becomes more and more highly intelligent. In our opinion, there are two issues of concern about this. Firstly, it threatens to produce groups of “redundant” people, who are unable to realize themselves in the sharp every-day vying. Secondly, it raises too high demands for a man himself. Besides this, according to Herbert Marcuse’s suggestion⁵, the post-industrial economics exploits not only the physical powers of man, but his mental and emotional powers as well, and from this point of view is even more oppressive than any former class formation had ever been.

Freedom thus becomes a burden for the majority of people, since it demands from them very high intellectual capabilities, a certain set of distinctive features, necessary for an individual to succeed, and strong will power to develop those features. The popularity of diverse youth extremist movements (anarchist, Neonazis etc.) in our opinion can be viewed in the light of the estrangement of person in particular under the post-industrial economic conditions.

Above we tried to examine conditions of “the escape from freedom” idea within framework of a certain society. It should be noticed, however, that one of the major features of the social process of our time is represented by globalization, i. e. by the destruction of national borders and the formation of the unified global community. Without exaggeration it can be stated, that globalization is the exact factor that to a great extent begets the above mentioned feeling of estrangement and the desire to “escape from freedom”. These feelings swell in proportion to the level of involvement of a society in the global economic and cultural discourse. Robert Dal in his article “The Shift of Borders of the Democratic Governments”⁶ stressed the historical regularity of enlargement of the social environment toward broader spatial structures. If such structure in the Ancient times could be compared to a city-state, in the New time it became identical with a national state. It would be natural therefore to foresee that this tendency would last as far as to create the unified world community under the common

⁵ Г. Маркузе, *Одновимірна людина*, Москва 2006, 526 с.

⁶ Р. Даль, *Зміна меж демократичного правління*, «І» (незалежний культурологічний часопис), 2001, пг. 20, с. 34-48

political rule. However, the processes, observable nowadays in world politics, not only bear no constructive potential for this but nurture tendencies almost contrary. It takes place most of all due to the lack at the level of global cultural interchange of that traditional, archetypal legitimization that characterizes both a city-state and a national state of the modern time. In this context we should pay attention to Jurgen Habermas's theory of the formation of democratic forms of government in the New time and the formation of the concept of the ethnic nation at the same time, which he regarded as two sides of the single process. "The idea of the ethnic nation presumes, Habermas argues, that the demos of citizens must be rooted in the ethos of compatriots in order for it to stabilize as a political association of free and equal bearers of civil rights. The pale "workshop" opinion about constitutional patriotism cannot replace the "healthy national consciousness." This concept of constitutional patriotism is thus suspended. The appeal to the nation, to the "we-consciousness" that is included within it and can bind emotionally, therefore cannot be omitted"⁷. The ethnic nation as an "imaginary society", according to Benedict Anderson's definition⁸, exists within democratic states of the New Time and, providing their integrity, actually can be regarded as an archetypal idea of kin enlarged to the scope of a nation-state. The ethnic nation provides an emotional solidarity in society, and in this aspect its socializing function is identical to Fromm's "traditional ties", that endow a man with the feelings of safety and affiliation with a community. The processes of globalization in their turn do not constitute such irrational legitimization in the world-wide scope; at the same time the directions of their development do destroy the traditional national environment, dissolving it in the global cultural discourse. Thus, following the extent of openness of society to the global influences, the low-grade ersatzes of mass culture supplant the traditional national values and, cultivating the crisis of identity, intensify the social atomization. The spiritual void that in such a way inevitably appears will try to heal itself by radical nationalist or religious fundamentalist slogans which are potent enough to ruin individual freedom and human rights. In fact, under such conditions the society would rather sacrifice its liberty than lose its national identity.

Except the atomization of civil society, the class polarization on the basis of intellectual factor, and the erosion of ethnic culture, there is one more weighty factor of the transition to the society of secondary (ideological) kind of integrity which the globalization entails and we should pay attention to. We mean the growing ideologization and propagation of political myths and radical political sentiments in majority of the poor societies of the World. As Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests, "The spread of literacy and especially the effect of the means of communications have caused the unprecedented growth of political consciousness of the masses that have become more susceptible to the emotional attraction of nationalism, social

⁷ Ю. Габермас, Залучення іншого, Львів 2005, с.190

⁸ Б. Андерсон, Уявна спільнота, Київ 2001, с. 272

radicalism and religious fundamentalism. The attraction of these ideas is also raised by better information about the differences in welfare status of different countries that provokes the comprehensible feelings of envy, enmity and indignation toward what may be called a hedonism of the privileged. Thus with each day it becomes easier to mobilize the poor and the oppressed”⁹. This process calls to live the revolutionary situation, about which the Marxist theorists wrote, when the masses become conscious of their oppressed state and spurn the existing status quo. The ruination of the traditional social ties is thus accompanied by the process of understanding of an ethnos of its status in the World and of the inequality in material well-being. This in its turn creates a good ground for susceptibility of an ideology – a revolutionary self-consciousness of masses. The nature of these processes is different but their result is common – the formation of the totalitarian society of the secondary social ties.

But is it appropriate to speak in this context about the escape from freedom? Is this thesis applicable to the traditional societies, whose life had been for ages suppressed by patrimonial customs and despotic rules and which now believed in nationalist and religious fundamentalist soteriological formulas? In our opinion, we should speak here about the escape from potential freedom – the freedom that has not already come to being, but has the potential to do so, due to common actions that should be taken by the developed and the developing countries. The dilemma which now appears before the latter consists in their choice between democracy which bears its fruits only in the long historical perspective and totalitarianism which forms the illusion of instantaneous solving of all the problems of society and demands this illusion be paid for in blood.

Regarding the aforesaid, we approached the crucial moment in this paper. Are there any alternatives to the society of freedom, such as the society of total equality, the society of pure blood or many other resembling “societies” that have been for ages postulated by the theorists of different utopian teachings starting with Ancient Greece? The answer is clear: there is no other alternative for the society of human rights. History serves as a confirmation to this thesis and it demands no metaphysical arguments for its favor. In this case why could freedom be a burden, and is there a possibility to cast down the burden and preserve freedom at the same time? Erich Fromm answers the following: “Submission is not the single way to avoid loneliness and anxiety. The other way – the only fruitful one, which leads to no insoluble conflicts – is the way of spontaneous connections between people and Nature. I mean such connections that unites a man with Nature without harming his individuality. Love and creative work are the most noble manifestations of such connections, which are rooted in the plenitude of an integral personality. That’s why they not only unbind human personality but encourage its development to its supreme level”¹⁰.

⁹ З. Бжезінський, Вибір: світове панування чи світове лідерство, Київ 2006, с. 48

¹⁰ Э. Фромм, Бегство от свободы, Москва 2009, с. 33

Freedom is neither the Hobbesian war of all against all, nor even a softened kind of this war in the form of market competition. Such freedom, with the motto of "each man for himself" perhaps truly is an unbearable burden. True freedom is in our opinion, a dialog between You and Me in which You as well as I, are not purely independent entities only (for example, as bearers of abstract rights), but are bound by those spiritual chains which, according to Vladimir Solovyov, make Me see in You the same absolute quality which it due to its egoism is prone to see only in itself. In other words, only that society may be considered to be really free, in which the concept of "thou shalt not kill" is followed by the concept "thou shalt love thy neighbor". Applying this thesis to our time, we will not be mistaken to suggest that only in the case of a dialog between countries, nations and cultures, in which along with preservation of each of its identities, their unification around values common to all mankind will have taken place, any appeal to "escape from freedom", any sermon of violence or dictatorship will be condemned and thrown off like myth. Globalization has for the first time in history created conditions to make such dialog possible and, according to the Pope's John Paul II conviction, "is *a priori* neither good, nor bad but will be such as people will make it"¹¹.

¹¹ Przemówienie Jana Pawła II w Papieskiej Akademii Nauk Społecznych 27 kwietnia 2001 roku. Cytowane według З. Бжежинський, Вибір: світове панування чи світове лідерство, s.136

Напівпрезидентська система правління у контексті республіканської форми правління: типологізація, конституційно-правові і політичні виклики та перспективи реформування в Україні

У статті теоретико-методологічно й емпірично окреслено сутність, різновиди, наслідки республіканських систем правління. Типологізовано напівпрезидентську систему правління. Окреслено конституційно-правові та політичні виклики й перспективи реформування системи напівпрезидентського правління в Україні.

Ключові слова: форма державного правління, система правління, напівпрезиденталізм, президенталізм, парламентаризм, системи уніфікованої та розділеної більшості й розділеної меншості, президент-парламентаризм, прем'єр-президенталізм, Україна.

Semi-presidential system of government in the context of republican form of government: typology, constitutional and political challenges and prospects for reforming in Ukraine

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of nature, types and consequences of republican systems of government. The author singled out varieties of semi-presidential systems of government, outlined the constitutional, legal and political challenges and prospects for reforming the system of semi-presidential government in Ukraine.

Keywords: form of government, system of government, semi-presidentialism, presidentialism, parliamentarism, unified majority system, divided majority system, divided minority system, president-parliamentarism, premier-presidentialism, Ukraine.

У ході і в результаті масових народних виступів в Україні у листопаді 2013 – лютому 2014 рр. (спочатку з приводу призупинення президентом і урядом України євроінтеграційних процесів України, внаслідок системного спротиву суспільства існуючому політичному укладу) повалено диктаторський (у формі змагального чи електорального авторитаризму) режим президента України В. Януковича. Після цього система правління України змінилася із президентсько-парламентської на

прем'єрсько-президентську (парламентсько-президентську) (схожий маневр система України здійснила у 2004–2006 рр.). Відповідно суттєво обмежено повноваження глави держави, принаймні із приводу його участі у формуванні та достроковому припиненні повноважень уряду та інших центральних органів виконавчої влади. Разом з цим, а також у контексті результатів позачергових виборів президента (які проведено 25 травня 2014 р.) і нестабільної внутрішньополітичної та зовнішньополітичної ситуації в Україні було взято курс на прискорене прийняття поправок до конституції та відповідно окреслення нового місця політичних інститутів у системі правління в Україні. У цьому контексті актуальним виявилось питання адекватного окреслення викликів та перспектив системи правління в Україні. Це складна та комплексна проблема, а її вирішення фактично неможливе без знання особливостей та наслідків еволюції системи правління в Україні упродовж 1991–2014 рр.

В Україні після розпаду СРСР і отримання незалежності формально з 1996 р., а фактично з 1991 р. застосовано й апробовано здебільшого різні варіанти змішаної чи в політологічному сенсі напівпрезидентської системи правління. Те ж стосується (або стосувалося) більшості країн Європи та Азії (в тому числі тих, що припинили своє існування), які виникли/відновили незалежність після краху Варшавського блоку, Радянського Союзу і СФРЮ¹, приміром, Азербайджану (з 1995 р., коли було прийнято напівпрезидентську конституцію), Боснії та Герцеговини (із 1995 р.), Вірменії (із 1995 р.), Білорусі (із 1996 р.), Болгарії (із 1991 р.), Грузії (із 2004 р.), Казахстану (із 1993 р.), Киргизстану (із 1993 р.), Литви (із 1992 р.), Македонії (із 1991 р.), Молдови (у 1994–2001 рр.), Польщі (із 1990 р.), Росії (із 1993 р.), Румунії (з 1990 р.), Сербії (із 2006 р.), Словаччини (із 1999 р.), Словенії (із 1992 р.), Хорватії (із 1991 р.), Чехії (із 2012 р.), Чорногорії (із 2006 р.), Югославії (у 2000–2003 рр.). Натомість, до класичного парламентаризму звернулись такі постсоціалістичні країни, як Албанія, Естонія, Латвія, Молдова (із 2001 р.), Угорщина та Чехія (до 2012 р.), а до класичного президенталізму – тільки Таджикистан, Туркменістан і Узбекистан. Роблячи такий висновок, опираємось на широко вживану і популярну в західній політичній науці таксономію конституційних систем правління Р. Елгі, яка запропонована наприкінці 90–х років ХХ – початку 10–х років ХХІ ст. Дослідник оперуючи поняттям форми правління – монархічної або ж республіканської, – виокремлює три різновиди конституційних систем правління: президенталізм, напівпрезиденталізм та парламентаризм². Ми звуємо предмет наукового інтересу і звернемося до трьох видів республіканської форми правління, які треба іменувати республіканськими

¹ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, s. 623.

² R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, s. 219–238.; R. Elgie, *Variations on a theme: a fresh look at semi-presidentialism*, "Journal of Democracy" 2005, vol 16, nr 3, s. 1–21.

системами правління, – президенталізму, парламентаризму та напівпрезиденталізму³. Їх вирізняють на підставі двох індикаторів: способу обрання президента та способу й суб'єкта відповідальності уряду.

Президенталізм – це конституційна система правління, в якій існує посада всенародно та безпосередньо (прямо) обраного на фіксований термін президента (зазвичай як глави держави та глави виконавчої влади), а члени урядового кабінету (адміністрації президента) колективно не відповідальні перед парламентом («чисті», класичні кейси – США, більшість країн Латинської Америки). Парламентаризм – конституційна система правління, в якій глава держави (у випадку республіканської форми правління – це президент, що не є главою виконавчої влади) отримує фіксовані повноваження на підставі непрямих/небезпосередніх виборів (у парламенті), а прем'єр-міністр і урядовий кабінет є колективно відповідальними винятково перед парламентом («чисті» класичні кейси – Німеччина, Італія, Греція, Мальта, Ізраїль). Напівпрезиденталізм – конституційна система правління, в якій існує посада всенародно і безпосередньо (прямо) обраного на фіксований термін президента (зазвичай як глави держави, хоча інколи як глави держави та глави виконавчої влади), а також прем'єр-міністра та урядового кабінету, які обов'язково колективно відповідальні перед парламентом (класичні кейси – Франція, Португалія, Тайвань, Фінляндія, Ірландія, Ісландія, Шрі-Ланка) (більш детально див. табл. 1). Перевага такого трактування конституційних систем правління у тому, що ми не маємо робити посилань на різні реляційні властивості політичного процесу, а лише повинні зважати на конституційно-правові атрибути феномену системи правління. У такий спосіб намагаємось уникнути суб'єктивізму в класифікації⁴. Це означає, що виокремлення різних республіканських конституційних систем правління варто проводити поза трактуванням сили повноважень президентів, прем'єр-міністрів і парламентів, оскільки повноваження останніх змінюються залежно як від конституційних, так і від політичних передумов. Особливо актуально це у зрізі напівпрезидентських систем правління, колосальний вплив на фактичне функціонування яких мають результати виборів, причому президентських і парламентських, оскільки саме від інститутів президента (здебільшого) та парламенту (обов'язково) залежить процес формування, діяльності і ймовірно дострокового припинення повноважень урядів. Також позитивним моментом запропонованої класифікації систем правління є те, що

³ Між поняттями «форма державного правління» та «система правління» є теоретико-методологічна відмінність. Форма державного правління піддається оцінці на підставі способу формування і заміщення посади глави держави, а система правління – на підставі формальних (конституційних) і фактичних (політичних) передумов міжінституційних відносин з приводу здійснення влади. Оскільки глава держави буває виборним та спадковим, то серед форм правління виділяють республіки і монархії, а також їхні комбінації та різновиди. Натомість, серед систем правління виділяють президентські, напівпрезидентські і парламентські, які унаслідують республіканські та монархічні форми державного правління.

⁴ V. Lytvyn, *Podviina vykonavcha vlada: teoriia ta praktyka yevropeiskoho pivprezidentalizmu*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii" 2009, vol 3, s. 25–33.

«конституційно» система правління не залежить від того, чи є країна демократичною або авторитарною/тоталітарною. Запропонована схема класифікації систем правління заснована винятково на конституційній теорії, а тому дозволяє враховувати інші підходи та тумачення стосовно емпіричного оцінювання президенталізму, парламентаризму та напівпрезиденталізму.

Розгляд емпіричних прикладів президенталізму, напівпрезиденталізму та парламентаризму у світі (станом на 2013–2014 рр.) свідчить, що найбільш вільними за показниками політичних прав та громадянських свобод у світі (згідно проекту «Свобода у світі» організації «Freedom House») є парламентські системи, менш вільними – напівпрезидентські, а найменш вільними – президентські системи. Найбільшу ефективність урядування (згідно проекту «The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)» Світового банку) реалізують парламентські, меншу – напівпрезидентські, а найменшу – президентські республіканські системи правління. Майже сумірними виявляються особливості кореляції республіканських систем правління та показників індексу людського розвитку згідно «Програми розвитку ООН»: найбільш ефективними у цьому зрізі виявляються парламентські системи, дещо менш ефективними – президентські та напівпрезидентські системи. Примітно, що зазначені висновки спрацьовують як на універсальному (чи глобальному) рівні аналізу, так і на конкретному (регіональному) рівні аналізу, зокрема на прикладі постсоціалістичних країн Європи та Азії. З однієї сторони, це імпліцитно свідчить про те, що вибір оптимальної та перспективної республіканської системи правління (зокрема в контексті творення конституційних проектів) з огляду на світовий досвід треба робити на користь парламентаризму (детально див. табл.1). З іншої сторони, потрібно враховувати теоретико-методологічні виклики чи ризики та перспективи кожної республіканської системи правління.

Традиція визначення кращої чи оптимальної конституційної системи правління є доволі давньою. Наприкінці XIX ст. В. Баджхот (1867 р.⁵) та В. Вільсон (1885 р.⁶) обґрунтовували позитивні інституційні переваги парламентської республіки, в ході Другої світової війни Д. Прайс був захисником ідей парламентаризму⁷, а Г. Ласкі стверджував, що не можна з точністю визначити кращу форму республіканського правління⁸. Після краху соціалістичної моделі розвитку, а також формування цілої низки нових республік проблема визначення найкращого типу республіканської форми правління (принаймні в контексті становлення та консолідації демократії) з

⁵ W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, Wyd. C. A. Watts and Co. Ltd. 1964.

⁶ W. Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics*, Wyd. Library of Alexandria 1956.

⁷ D. Price, *The parliamentary and presidential systems*, "Public Administration Review" 1943, vol 3, nr 4, s. 317–334.

⁸ H. Laski, *The parliamentary and presidential systems*, "Public Administration Review" 1944, vol 4, nr 4, s. 347–359.

новою силою була відображена у напрацюваннях Х. Лінца⁹, Х. Лінцата А. Валенсуели¹⁰, А. Степана та С. Скач¹¹, Т. Павера та М. Гасіоровські¹² тощо, в яких здебільшого було постульовано думку про гіпотетичні небезпеки президентського та позитивні моменти парламентського республіканізму на шляху інсталяції і консолідації демократії. При цьому паралельно було зазначено, що напівпрезидентська система правління інституційно більш сприятлива демократизації та політичному розвитку, ніж президентська система правління.

⁹ J. Linz, *The perils of presidentialism*, "Journal of Democracy" 1990, vol 1, nr 1, s. 51–69.; J. Linz, *The virtues of Parliamentarism*, "Journal of Democracy" 1990, vol 1, nr 4, s. 84–91.

¹⁰ J. Linz, A. Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.

¹¹ A. Stepan, C. Schach, *Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation. Parliamentarism versus presidentialism*, "World Politics" 1993, vol 46, s. 1–22.

¹² T. Power, M. Gasiorowski, Institutional design and democratic consolidation in the third world, "Comparative Political Studies" 1997, vol 30, nr 2, s. 123–155.

Таблиця 1. Республіканські конституційні системи правління (за методологією Р. Елгі) у країнах світу та їхні наслідки (2014 р.)

| Президенталізм * | Парламентаризм | Напівпрезиденталізм ** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Президент-парламентаризм | Прем'єр-президенталізм (Парламент-президенталізм) |
| Афганістан, Ангола, Аргентина Бенін, Болівія, Бразилія, Бурунді Венесуела, Гайана, Гана, Гватемала, Гвінея, Гондурас Джибуті, Домініканська Республіка Еквадор, Екваторіальна Гвінея, Індонезія Кенія, Кіпр, Колумбія, Коморські острови, Коста-Рика, Кот-д'Івуар Ліберія, Малаві, Мальдіви, Мексика Нігерія, Нікарагуа, Палау, Панама, Парагвай, Республіка Конго, Республіка Корея, Сальвадор, Сейшельські острови, Сінгапур, Судан, США, Сьєрра-Леоне Таджикистан, Туркменістан Уганда, Узбекистан, Уругвай Філіппіни, Чилі | Албанія Бангладеш Греція Домініка Естонія, Ефіопія Ізраїль, Індія, Ірак, Італія Лаос, Латвія, Ліван Маврикій, Мальта, Молдова Німеччина Пакистан Самоа Тринідад і Тобаго Угорщина | Австрія, Азербайджан Білорусь, Буркіна-Фасо Габон Єгипет Ісландія Казахстан, Камерун, Киргизстан Мавританія, Мадагаскар, Мозамбік Намбія Перу Росія, Руанда Сенегал, Сирія Тайвань, Танзанія, Того, Туніс Шрі-Ланка | Алжир, Вірменія Болгарія, Боснія та Герцеговина Гаїті, Грузія ДР Конго Ірландія Кабо-Верде, Литва Македонія, Малі, Монголія, Нігер Польща, Португалія, Румунія Сан-Томе і Принсіпі, Сербія, Словаччина, Словенія, Східний Тимор Туреччина Україна Фінляндія, Франція Хорватія Чад, Чехія, Чорногорія |
| Кількість країн у групі | | | |
| 48 | 21 | 24 | 30 |
| Середній рівень політичних прав/громадянських свобод у групі згідно проекту «Свобода у світі» організації «Freedom House»: 1 – max, 7 – min, 2014 р. | | | |
| 3,52/3,63 | 2,57/2,81 | 3,39/3,20 | |
| | | 4,38/3,96 | 2,60/2,60 |
| Середній рівень ефективності урядування у групі згідно проекту «The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)» Світового банку: +2,50 – max, –2,50 – min, 2013 р. | | | |
| –0,41 | +0,19 | –0,14 | |
| | | –0,37 | +0,04 |
| Середній рівень показників індексу людського розвитку у групі згідно «Програми розвитку ООН»: 0 – min, 1 – max, 2012 р. | | | |
| 0,624 | 0,720 | 0,663 | |
| | | 0,618 | 0,698 |

* Виняткові випадки (систему правління яких визначити складно, а також перехідні держави, військові диктатури/хунти тощо): Ботсвана, В'єтнам, Гамбія, Еритрея, Замбія, Зімбабве, Іран, Кірибаті, КНДР, КНР, Куба, Лівія, Маршалові острови, Мікронезія, М'янма, Науру, Непал, ПАР, Південний Судан, Сан-Марино, Сомалі, Суринам, Фіджі, Швейцарія.

** Перелік європейських напівпрезидентських республік, які колись були президент-парламентськими, а сьогодні є прем'єр-президентськими: Вірменія (1995–2005 рр.), Хорватія (1991–2000 рр.), Грузія (2004–2013 рр.), Португалія (1976–1982 рр.), Україна (1996–2006, 2010–2014 рр.). Перелік європейських республік, які колись були напівпрезидентськими (президент-парламентськими або прем'єр-президентськими), а сьогодні є парламентськими: Веймарська республіка (Німеччина), Молдова (1994–2001 рр.). Перелік європейських напівпрезидентських республік, які спочатку були прем'єр-президентськими, а згодом стали президент-парламентськими: Україна (2010–2014 рр.).

Першорядними інституційними викликами чи ризиками президенталізму визначено такі: розділений тип легітимності виконавчої та законодавчої гілок влади, похідних від всенародного волевиявлення/обирання на фіксований термін; конфлікт виконавчої і законодавчої гілок влади з судовою; використання фіксованих термінів діяльності органів державної влади, що робить президенталізм менше гнучким за парламентаризм; схильність генерувати кризу управління без вбудованих методів її розв'язання; використання мажоритарної виборчої систем відносної більшості; несприйняття главою держави політичної опозиції; сприяння розвитку популізму (внаслідок участі кандидатів-популістів у президентських виборах)¹³. Це змусило Ф. Рігса констатувати, що ймовірний крах президенталізму традиційно зумовлений «недосконалістю та дефективністю політичної формули» президентських країн¹⁴. А. Степан та С. Скач уточнили, що проблема президенталізму полягає у взаємній незалежності гілок влади, що спричиняє формування розділеної системи, де виконавча влада (президент) і законодавча влада (парламент) знаходяться у ситуації політичної безвиході, коли нема жодних конституційно й інституційно зумовлених засобів її подолання¹⁵. Разом із цим, актуальні висновки запропонував Д. Горовіц, який зазначив, що: сильний президент в умовах президенталізму часто може бути вагомим медіатором розвитку розділених суспільств; якість президенталізму зростає у випадку застосування пропорційних виборчих систем¹⁶. Подібну позицію зайняли С. Майнверінг та М. Шугарт¹⁷, які аргументували, що президенталізм може бути найефективнішою системою правління за умови його правильного та логічного конструювання й інженерії. Натомість, президенталізм для якого властива посада всесильного президента, повноваження (особливо законодавчі) якого перманентно зростають, призведе до проблем становлення та консолідації демократії¹⁸.

Найпростішим (або інституційно «найближчим») формально-конституційним засобом подолання викликів та ризиків президенталізму вважають запровадження напівпрезидентської системи правління. Проте й остання наділена проблемами. Так, першорядні інституційні виклики напівпрезидентської системи правління: ймовірність

¹³ S. Mainwaring, M. Shugart, *Juan Linz, presidentialism and democracy. A critical appraisal*, "Comparative Politics" 1997, vol 29, nr 4, s. 449–471.

¹⁴ F. Riggs, The survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional practices, "International Political Science Review" 1988, vol 9, nr 4, s. 247–278.

¹⁵ A. Stepan, C. Schach, *Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation. Parliamentarism versus presidentialism*, "World Politics" 1993, vol 46, s. 1–22.

¹⁶ D. Horowitz, *Comparing democratic systems*, "Journal of Democracy" 1990, vol 1, nr 4, s. 73–79.

¹⁷ S. Mainwaring, M. Shugart, *Conclusion: presidentialism and the party system*, [w:] S. Mainwaring, M. Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 394–439; S. Mainwaring, *Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy. The difficult combination*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1993, vol 26, nr 2, s. 198–228; M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

¹⁸ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 156.

виникнення/розповсюдження напруженості між інститутами у системі виконавчої влади (насамперед між президентом та прем'єр-міністром, які наділені підтримкою різних партійно-політичних сил у парламенті); як наслідок, зменшення рівня демократичності політичного процесу та легітимності політичної влади у країнах, які трансформуються¹⁹; складність усунення від влади президента, який втратив легітимність та порушує принципи демократії (А. Лейпхарт вважає, що в деяких напівпрезидентських системах правління президенти фактично можуть бути впливовішими, ніж у більшості «чистих» класичних президентських систем правління, навіть коли це не регламентовано конституційно²⁰); ймовірність розвитку інституційних ситуацій, за яких «ні президент, ні прем'єр-міністр, ні будь-яка партія чи коаліція не мають незалежної більшості у законодавчій владі»²¹, внаслідок чого змінюються коаліції і уряди, а президент постійно нерегламентовано втручається у діяльність уряду, а також використовує «резервні» повноваження (на думку В. Ю-Шена, це означає, що напівпрезиденталізм легко вибрати й інституціоналізувати, проте складно операціоналізувати й апробувати²²).

Більшість вчених вважають, що напівпрезиденталізм (як збірний різновид республіканських систем правління) результує незначне інституційне покращення порівняно з «чистим»/класичним президенталізмом. Натомість, єдиною директивною конституцій перехідних суспільств вважають парламентську систему правління. Проте й парламентаризм дестермінований деякими викликами та ризиками, зокрема: ця республіканська система правління здебільше властива для вже розвинених та територіально невеликих країн; гіпотетичне переростання урядової (політичної) кризи в умовах парламентаризму в кризу політичного режиму; ефективність за умов здебільшого консолідованого національного політичного лідерства чи міцної національної партійної системи із продукуванням законодавчої більшості; відсутність вбудованих механізмів стабілізації урядів (окрім термінів повноважень парламентів), що уможлиблює використання неконституційних засобів вирішення урядових (політичних) криз (зокрема військового перевороту чи утисків політичних опонентів). У цьому контексті спрацьовує висновок Х. Лінца й А. Лейпхарта: парламентаризм – не обов'язкова найкраща республіканська система у контексті демократизації, але більше пристосована до умов демократичної стабільності, ніж президенталізм та напівпрезиденталізм²³.

¹⁹ A. Stepan, E. Suleiman, *The French Fifth Public: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil*, [w:] H. Chehabi, A. Stepan, J. Linz, *Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies*, Wyd. Boulder 1995, s. 394–414.; J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, s. 286.

²⁰ A. Lijphart, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*, "Journal of Democracy" 2004, vol 15, nr 2, s. 102.

²¹ C. Skach, *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005, s. 17–18.

²² W. Yu-Shan, *Semi-presidentialism Easy to Choose, Difficult to Operate: The Case of Taiwan*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 201–218.

²³ J. Linz, *The virtues of Parliamentarism*, "Journal of Democracy" 1990, vol 1, nr 4, s. 84–91.; A. Lijphart, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*, "Journal of Democracy" 2004, vol 15, nr 2, s. 96–109.; A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance*

Наприклад, стабільний парламентаризм менше ризикує зазнати краху, ніж стабільні президенталізм і напівпрезиденталізм. Проте у країнах, для яких історично властивий крах демократії, більше ризикують зазнати краху саме парламентські республіки²⁴. Це спричинено тим, що у такому випадку політичні еліти схильні не відрізнати кризу уряду (політичну кризу) від кризи демократії.

Проте це не завжди означає, що прямий вибір між президенталізмом, парламентаризмом і напівпрезиденталізмом як республіканськими системами правління є самодостатньою проблемою порівняльного аналізу та конституційного вибору. Вказані системи правління бувають різними (особливо це стосується напівпрезиденталізму) і це проявляється у специфічності розуміння демократії та демократизації, особливостях партійної та виборчої систем, системи інституційних стримувань та противаг, політичної структуризації, стабільності й ефективності органів державної влади (особливо уряду та парламенту), детермінант державного устрою²⁵. Відповідно є чимало прикладів демократизації у межах президенталізму чи авторитаризації в умовах парламентаризму. Окрім того, до демократизації чи авторитаризації може призводити і напівпрезиденталізм.

Проте постулюючи такий теоретичний висновок про напівпрезиденталізм, не враховано, що напівпрезиденталізм, на відміну від класичного парламентаризму та президенталізму, – це дуже гетерогенна республіканська система правління, яка здатна диференціюватись на окремі типи з огляду на формальний і фактичний вплив різних інституційних/політичних акторів. На цій підставі доцільно запропонувати цілісну та різносторонню типологізацію напівпрезиденталізму, розглянути його ймовірні наслідки й апробувати отримані результати до України (у періоди, коли у нашій державі була притаманна зазначена республіканська система правління).

Проблема типологізації республіканських систем правління, зокрема напівпрезиденталізму, і їх застосування у світі, зокрема в постсоціалістичних країнах Європи (в тому числі Україні), в зрізі перспектив демократизаційних трансформацій

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отримала відображення у доробках О. Аморіма Нето та К. Строма²⁶, Е. Арато²⁷, Х. Бехро, Е. Везера та Б. Бейерлейна²⁸, Д. Грінберга²⁹, Д. Бобана³⁰, Ж. Блонделя³¹, М. Дюверже³², Р. Елгі³³, Т. Л. Карл та Ф. Шміттєра³⁴, Т. Колтона та С. Скач³⁵, А. Лейпхарта³⁶, О. Процика³⁷,

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³² M. Duverger, *A New Political System Model. Semi-Presidential Government*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1980, vol 8, s. 165–187.; M. Duverger, *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Paris 1986.

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³⁴ T. L. Karl, P. Schmitter, *Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe*, "International Social Science Journal" 1991, vol 128, nr 2, s. 267–282.

³⁵ T. Colton, C. Skach, *A Fresh Look at Semi-presidentialism: The Russian Predicament*, "Journal of Democracy" 2005, vol 16, nr 3, s. 113–126.; T. Colton, C. Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, Paper has been produced to assist working sessions at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 21 s.; T. Colton, *Superpresidentialism and Russia's Backward State*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 1995, vol 11, nr 2, s. 144–148.

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- ⁵⁵ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, Princeton 1995.

та Дж. Кері⁵⁶, Х. А. Чейбуба, З. Елкінса, Т. Гінзбурга та Ф. Лімонгі⁵⁷, Дж. Хеллмана⁵⁸, П. Шлейтер і Е. Морган-Джонса⁵⁹, В. Литвина⁶⁰, Л. Хелмса⁶¹, Г. Шварца⁶², а також цілої низки інших дослідників.

Головна особливість напівпрезиденталізму зводиться до способу формування, діяльності й відповідальності уряду і в цілому системи виконавчої влади. Річ у тому, що в напівпрезиденталізмі як системі правління важлива роль у формуванні уряду належить одночасно як президенту, так і парламенту. Це проявляється у тому, що президент може володіти свободою у визначенні складу уряду, проте не може не враховувати співвідношення партійно-політичних сил у парламенті, оскільки, призначаючи прем'єр-міністра або деяких ключових міністрів (формуючи уряд), президенту потрібна згода парламенту. Крім того, у напівпрезидентських системах правління компетенція президента завжди включає окремі (значні або незначні) повноваження у сфері виконавчої влади, які він може реалізувати самостійно або через уряд. Це, на думку Ж. Блонделя⁶³ та В. Богданора⁶⁴, означає, що в умовах напівпрезиденталізму президент – глава держави, що не відчуває нестачі політичної влади, проте й не є одноосібним керівником держави внаслідок наявності посади впливового прем'єр-міністра, який не є «строго» підлеглим тільки президентові, оскільки відповідальний перед президентом та парламентом чи лише парламентом. Відповідно взаємовідносини глави держави та

⁵⁶ M. Shugart, *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] A. W. Rhodes, S. Binder, B. Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; M. Shugart, *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, edited by R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman 2005, 31 s.; M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; M. Shugart, *Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns*, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr 3, s. 323–351.

⁵⁷ J. A. Cheibub, Z. Elkins, T. Ginsburg, *Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Forms*, Presented at the International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, January 14–15 2010, 44 s.; J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, *Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered*, "Annual Review of Political Sciences" 2002, vol 5, s. 151–179.; J. A. Cheibub, *Divided Government, Deadlock and the Survival of Presidents and Presidential Regimes*, Presented at the conference "Constitutional Design 2000", December 9–11 1999, 38 s.; J. A. Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Cambridge 2007.; J. A. Cheibub, *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2009.

⁵⁸ J. Hellman, *Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions*, "World Politics" 1998, vol 50, nr 2, s. 203–234.

⁵⁹ P. Schleiter, *Mixed Constitutions and Political Instability: Russia 1991–1993*, "Democratization" 2003, vol 10, nr 1, s. 1–26.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2009, vol 48, nr 5, s. 665–693.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems?*, Centre for the Study of Democratic Government 2005, WP № 01.

⁶⁰ V. Lytvyn, *Podvima vykonavcha vlada: teoriia ta praktyka yevropeiskoho pivprezidentalizmu*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii" 2009, vol 3, s. 25–33.; V. Lytvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kohabitatsii v napivprezidentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii" 2011, vol 4, s. 140–149.

⁶¹ L. Helms, *The Democratic State or State Democracy: Problems of Post-Communist Transition*, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre 1998.

⁶² H. Schwartz, *The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe*, Chicago 2002.

⁶³ J. Blondel, *Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, S. E. Finer, G. Peele, *Comparative Government and Politics*, Wyd. Boulder 1984.

⁶⁴ V. Bogdanor, *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] V. Bogdanor, *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.

уряду у напівпрезиденталізмі визначають як модель «дуалізму виконавчої влади» – і це характерна ознака саме цієї системи правління⁶⁵.

Але саме спосіб колективної відповідальності уряду (перед главою держави та парламентом або лише парламентом) є причиною першої/формальної класифікації напівпрезидентських систем правління на президент-парламентські (президент-парламентаризм) і прем'єрсько-президентські (прем'єр-президенталізм). Останні в пострадянській науці традиційно іменують парламентсько-президентськими, натомість у західній політичній науці їх означають як прем'єрсько-президентські напівпрезидентські системи правління. М. Шугарт і Дж. Кері (вперше обґрунтували сутність президент-парламентаризму та прем'єр-президенталізму) зазначають, що ці системи правління та конструкції напівпрезиденталізму треба означати як незалежні змінні⁶⁶. У прем'єр-президенталізмі прем'єр-міністр та його кабінет колективно відповідальні винятково перед парламентом. Якщо парламент призначає прем'єр-міністра, який ідеологічно і партійно протилежний президентові, останньому доводиться прийняти призначення. Результатом є формування уряду, який має парламентську підтримку, а тому взаємовідносини між президентом та кабінетом є діловими. Президент має повноваження у питаннях зовнішньої та оборонної політики і національної безпеки, але його рішення вимагають контрасигнації з боку уряду. Натомість, у президент-парламентаризмі прем'єр-міністр і його кабінет колективно відповідальні і перед президентом, і перед парламентом. Президент може звільнити прем'єр-міністра і відправити у відставку уряду, а тому взаємовідносини між президентом та прем'єр-міністром є ієрархічними. Якщо парламент намагається призначити супротивника президента прем'єр-міністром, то останній ризикує бути відправленим у відставку президентом. Якщо президент намагається призначити прем'єр-міністром союзника, коли опонує парламенту, тоді парламент може звільнити прем'єр-міністра. Проте буває і так, що парламент за незгоду з президентом можуть відправити у відставку⁶⁷. Із постсоціалістичних країн Європи та Азії прикладами прем'єр-президенталізму (в 2014 р.) були Вірменія, Болгарія, Боснія та Герцеговина, Грузія, Ірландія, Литва, Македонія, Польща, Румунія, Сербія, Словаччина, Словенія, Україна, Хорватія, Чехія і Чорногорія. Приклади ж президент-парламентаризму – це Азербайджан, Білорусь, Казахстан, Киргизстан та Росія⁶⁸. Очевидно, що прем'єр-президентські напівпрезидентські системи

⁶⁵ P. O'Neil, *Presidential power in post-communist Europe: the Hungarian case in comparative perspective*, "Journal of Communist Studies" 1993, vol 9, nr 3, s. 177–201.

⁶⁶ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; M. Shugart, *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] A. W. Rhodes, S. Binder, B. Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; M. Shugart, *Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns*, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr 3, s. 323–351.

⁶⁷ A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. New Haven 1999, s. 90–115.

⁶⁸ М. Шугарт доповнив запропоновану ним класифікацію напівпрезиденталізму перевіркою того, чи президент може розпускати парламент. У результаті отримано чотири підтипи напівпрезиденталізму: 1) президент-подібний («чистий»)

більш вільні/демократичні, ефективні в урядуванні й людському розвитку (більш детально див. табл. 1)

Причиною другої/фактичної класифікації напівпрезиденталізму (розробленої С. Скач⁶⁹) є метод розподілу повноважень у виконавчій гілці влади між президентом і прем'єр-міністром у контексті забезпечення їхньої легітимності і відповідальності. Прем'єр-міністр (уряд) залежить від делегування повноважень з боку президента та/чи парламенту і відповідальний перед ними (або тільки перед парламентом), а президент автономний від парламенту та може діяти за відсутності його підтримки. Із огляду на це, в умовах напівпрезиденталізму глава держави може формувати та пропонувати свій порядок дій, навіть коли він передбачає втручання у сферу повноважень прем'єр-міністра. Натомість, взаємно прихильні відносини президента, прем'єр-міністра та парламенту (парламентської більшості) зменшують вірогідність переростання напружених взаємин зазначених інститутів у складні міжінституційні конфлікти. Внаслідок цього С. Скач виділяє три варіанти співіснування головних політичних інститутів і центрів влади у напівпрезиденталізмі або три різновиди напівпрезиденталізму – системи уніфікованої та розділеної більшості й розділеної меншості⁷⁰.

У системі уніфікованої більшості глава держави є прибічником курсу і навіть членом партії прем'єр-міністра або навпаки за умови, що президента та прем'єр-міністра підтримує аналогічна парламентська більшість. Відповідно у цих умовах глава держави або прем'єр-міністр залежно від формально передбачених за ними ролей і повноважень (реалізації президентсько-парламентського чи прем'єрсько-президентського напівпрезиденталізму), а також історичного досвіду превалювання когось із них у політичному (зокрема владно-виконавчому) процесі є беззаперечним лідером нації. Значно впливають на динаміку напівпрезиденталізму в умовах системи уніфікованої більшості позиції президента та прем'єр-міністра у системі партійної ієрархії. Зазвичай коли лідер партії стає главою держави, то він домінує у системі виконавчої влади. Якщо ж глава держави не є лідером політичної партії, а її очолює глава уряду, то тоді формат їхніх взаємовідносин залежить від внутрішньопартійних параметрів політичної сили. Часто буває і так, що у зазначеній конструкції напівпрезиденталізму домінує не глава держави, а глава урядового кабінету (наприклад, у Польщі часів президентства Б. Коморовського та прем'єрства Д. Туска). Саме тому у системах уніфікованої більшості

президент-парламентаризм, коли президент може звільнити прем'єра й уряд, проте не може розпустити парламент; 2) президент-парламентаризм, коли президент може звільнити прем'єр-міністра та кабінет і розпустити парламент; 3) прем'єр-президенталізм, коли президент не може звільнити прем'єр-міністра і уряд, але може розпустити парламент; 4) парламент-подібний прем'єр-президенталізм, коли президент не може звільнити прем'єр-міністра і уряд та не може розпустити парламент.

⁶⁹ С. Skach, *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.

⁷⁰ V. Lytvyn, *Podviina vykonavcha vlada: teoriia ta praktyka yevropeiskoho pinyezydentalizmu*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykhologhiia, komunikatsii" 2009, vol 3, s. 25–33.; V. Lytvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kobabitatsii v napyuprezydentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykhologhiia, komunikatsii" 2011, vol 4, s. 140–149.

фактично спрацьовує логіка президенталізму або парламентаризму, а системи правління формально є напівпрезидентськими⁷¹.

На відміну від систем уніфікованої більшості, у системі розділеної більшості глава держави не є членом і навіть прибічником курсу політичної партії прем'єр-міністра та на відміну від останнього не має підтримки парламентської більшості. Тому зазвичай прем'єр-міністр приймає найбільш вагомі владно-виконавчі рішення, унаслідок чого політична система тією чи іншою мірою зміщується в напрямі до парламентаризму. Разом з цим, можливий і випадок, коли у системі розділеної більшості зростають фактичні повноваження глави держави: найчастіше це стається у періоди, коли в парламенті не вдається створити урядовий кабінет на партійній основі, тому задля уникнення політичної кризи глава держави (який не має підтримки парламентської більшості) пропонує кандидатуру субординованого собі непартійного прем'єр-міністра, який отримує вотум довіри у парламенті. Традиційно сценарії системи розділеної більшості позначають терміном «когабітація»⁷².

У системі розділеної меншості ані президент, ані прем'єр-міністр не мають підтримки парламентської більшості. Випадок поєднує риси найбільш проблемного варіанту президентської системи (розділена система) та найбільш проблемного варіанту парламентської системи (система меншості) та часто веде до авторитаризму, персоналізації влади (здебільше президентами). Головні причини цього: дистанційованість президента від парламенту і прем'єр-міністра; фрагментованість парламенту та часті зміни коаліцій і складу урядів; безперервне втручання президента в діяльність уряду і використання ним резервних повноважень; бажання президента з результатів «всенародної легітимності» встановити персональний контроль над системою⁷³. Специфіка виокремлення систем уніфікованої і розділеної більшості та розділеної меншості у тому, що напівпрезидентська система правління може переходити з одного різновиду до іншого залежно від результатів президентських і парламентських виборів, а також партійно-політичного складу парламенту.

Третя формально-фактична класифікація напівпрезиденталізму на підставі врахування особливостей дуалізму виконавчої влади ґрунтується на особливостях та силі

⁷¹ T. Gschwend, D. Leuffen, *When Voters Choose Regimes: The Issue of Cohabitation in the French Elections of 2002*, „Mannheim: Arbeitspapiere – Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung” 2003, nr 63.

⁷² Всі напівпрезидентські системи доцільно розподіляти на три групи залежно від того, як їхні конституції окреслюють процедуру когабітації. Перша група конституцій зобов'язує президента консультуватись із парламентською більшістю чи найбільшою партією, коли він висуває кандидата у прем'єр-міністра. Тому автоматично має місце когабітація, коли партія (або коаліція) протиставлена президентові та домінуюча (провідна) у парламенті. Друга група конституцій не передбачає умови про вирішення/рішати/ відмінностей між президентом та парламентом щодо/відносно/ кандидатури прем'єр-міністра (когабітація може бути, а може і не бути). У третій групі конституцій інституційно неможлива когабітація: президент може розпустити парламент, коли останній відхиляє/відхиляє/ президентську кандидатуру прем'єр-міністра (та все ж формально когабітації уникнути не можливо, якщо президент погодиться на її сценарій).

⁷³ R. Elgie, I. McMenamin, *Divided executives and democratization*, „Working Papers in International Studies Series” 2006, nr 2, 39 s.; R. Elgie, *The perils of semi-presidentialism. Are they exaggerated?*, „Democratization” 2008, vol 15, nr 1, s. 49–66.; C. Skach, *The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism*, „International Journal of Constitutional Law” 2007, vol 5, nr 1, s. 93–121.

президентів й прем'єр-міністрів. Серед напівпрезидентських систем правління існують такі, в яких глави держав є слабкими/номінальними (відповідно, значно сильнішими є прем'єр-міністри і урядові кабінети), а також такі, де весь політичний процес відбувається навколо президентів, тобто останні є дуже сильними чи навіть всесильними (відповідно слабкими є повноваження прем'єр-міністрів та урядових кабінетів)⁷⁴. Можливий також варіант, коли повноваження президентів та прем'єр-міністрів (урядових кабінетів) є майже ідентичними/сумірними. Першу групу напівпрезидентських систем правління становлять, приміром, Австрія, Болгарія, Ірландія, Ісландія, Словенія, Чехія, Словаччина, Фінляндія; другу групу – Азербайджан, Білорусь, Росія, Казахстан; третю групу – Грузія, Литва, Польща, Румунія, Україна, Хорватія тощо (станом на 2014 р.). Висновок зроблено на підставі застосування найпоширеніших методик оцінювання сили президентів – А. Сіароффа⁷⁵, Т. Фрая⁷⁶, М. Шугарта та Дж. Кері⁷⁷. Детально розглянемо конституційно-правові та політичні виклики та перспективи, які проводять ці три групи напівпрезидентських республіканських систем правління.

Напівпрезидентські системи, в яких глави держав є слабкими/номінальними, іменують напівпрезиденталізмом із номінальними президентами. Для них властиві такі політико-правові особливості: вони діють за логікою парламентаризму, хоча їх ініціальна природа (та природа головних інститутів) є напівпрезидентською; у них звично (крім періоду інституційних криз) президента трактують як «символічного лідера нації», який практично не має конституційних і політичних повноважень та вважається номінальним главою держави, а не активним творцем політичних рішень; у них реальна (виконавча та державна) влада належить прем'єр-міністру, який відповідальний за всі аспекти політичного курсу країни перед парламентом. Дуже зрідка факт «всенародності виборів глави держави» (у силу його номінальних повноважень) означає, що легітимність влади президента буде спрямована проти легітимності прем'єр-міністра. Проте це не означає, що інституційно та політично президент не може бути прямим конкурентом прем'єр-міністра (зокрема в періоди інституційних криз)⁷⁸. Це зокрема відбувається у періоди когабітацій – сценаріїв інституційного розвитку напівпрезидентської системи правління, за яких президент та прем'єр-міністр репрезентують протилежні парламентські партії (або президент не репрезентує парламентської партії взагалі та не позиціонується з партією прем'єр-міністра в парламенті), а президентська (пов'язана

⁷⁴ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, s. 619–643.

⁷⁵ A. Siaroff, *Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, s. 287–312.

⁷⁶ T. Frye, *A politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies*, "Comparative political studies" 1997, vol 30, nr 5, s. 523–552.

⁷⁷ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

⁷⁸ R. Elgie, *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 1–13.

з президентом) партія не входить у склад уряду⁷⁹. В умовах когабітації президентські повноваження у таких системах правління можуть політично зростати. Причина у тому, що конституційна влада президента – це дуже важливий індикатор аналізу, однак для його більш чіткого здійснення потрібне врахування взаємовідношення між формальними та реальними політичними повноваженнями президента і інших політичних інститутів. Президент зі слабкими формальними/конституційними повноваженнями може мати значно сильніші політичні/фактичні повноваження, якщо він у діяльності опирається на більшість у парламенті. У такому разі глава держави легше втручається у законотворчість – в нього є можливість змусити прем'єра ініціювати та проводити законопроекти, які відображають курс саме президента. З огляду на це очевидно, що напівпрезиденталізм з номінальним президентом може функціонувати за логікою парламентаризму чи напівпрезиденталізму. Проте означені системи правління не варто трактувати як незвичайні парламентські республіки із виборними, але слабкими президентами, що дуже часто відбувається у політичній та правовій науці⁸⁰. Доказом є періоди фактичного посилення повноважень президентів у деяких напівпрезидентських системах Європи з номінальними президентами, наприклад, в Австрії, Болгарії, Ірландії, Ісландії, Словенії, Фінляндії, Чехії тощо, у періоди когабітацій.

Напівпрезидентські системи, в яких глави держав є сильними/всесильними, іменують президентіалізованим напівпрезиденталізмом чи напівпрезиденталізмом з сильними президентами. Такі системи правління досить часто формуються у неконсолідованих демократіях/автократіях та гібридних політичних режимах або призводять до їх становлення⁸¹. Прикладом були чи є більшість постсоціалістичних країн Європи й Азії під час апробації систем правління президентіалізованого напівпрезиденталізму, зокрема свого часу – Вірменія, Грузія, Хорватія та Україна, а сьогодні – Азербайджан, Білорусь, Казахстан, Киргизстан, Росія (жодна зі сучасних президентіалізованих напівпрезидентських постсоціалістичних країн не вважається демократичною). На відміну від напівпрезиденталізму з номінальними президентами, у системах із сильними президентами когабітація (якщо вона інституційно можлива) є причиною фактичного зростання повноважень прем'єр-міністрів (раніше в Франції, Грузії). Досить специфічним різновидом президентіалізованих напівпрезидентських систем правління є напівпрезидентські республіки з суперпрезидентами, тобто дуже сильними/

⁷⁹ V. Lytvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kohabitatsii v napivprezydentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykhologhiia, komunikatsii" 2011, vol 4, s. 140–149.

⁸⁰ S. Ozsoy, *An Unusual Parliamentary Model with Elected but Weak Presidents. And Its Virtues and Vices*, Presented at Conference of International Political Science Association "Political Regimes, Democratic Consolidation and the Quality of Democracy". – São Paulo, February 18th 2011.

⁸¹ A. Croissant, *From transition to defective democracy: Mapping Asian democratization*, "Democratization" 2004, vol 11, nr 5, s. 156–178.

всесильними президентами⁸² (супернапівпрезидентські системи правління⁸³). У цьому контексті вагомо, що такі системи формально залишаються напівпрезидентськими (а не президентськими), бо в них уряд принаймні формально перебуває в ієрархічній залежності від парламенту, адже останній може брати участь у формуванні складу уряду, затвердженні програми уряду, надає уряду вотум довіри, а також може відправити кабінет у відставку на підставі вотуму недовіри. З іншої сторони, в таких системах республіканського правління гіпотетично обмежено участь парламенту в формуванні та забезпеченні підтримки уряду. Наприклад, в Азербайджані, Білорусі чи Росії, де передбачено посаду сильного президента («суперпрезидента»), регламентовано участь парламенту у забезпеченні вотуму довіри урядові, кандидатуру прем'єр-міністра якого пропонує президент. Але якщо тричі підряд кандидатуру глави уряду не затверджено у парламенті, президент може розпустити парламент та самостійно сформувати урядовий кабінет. Ще одна ознака напівпрезидентських систем із суперпрезидентами, зокрема в Білорусі, Росії, Казахстані, Киргизстані, полягає у тому, що парламент має право висунути вотум або осуд недовіри урядові, проте останній набуває чинності тільки тоді, коли його підтримає президент. Такі самоочевидні «аномалії» напівпрезиденталізму часто на практиці призводять до означення систем, у яких практикують напівпрезиденталізм, як президентських. Більше того, тому такі напівпрезидентські системи у якийсь момент можуть почати функціонувати як президентські. Та між президентськими й напівпрезидентськими системами правління з суперпрезидентами існує суттєва відмінність. Президенталізм із посадою суперпрезидента – це президентська система правління з посадою всесильного глави держави, який будучи безпосереднім главою уряду/виконавчої влади/вертикалі, може мати (проте не обов'язково має) поряд із собою посаду субординованого прем'єр-міністра, котрий у жодному випадку не відповідальний перед парламентом. Натомість, напівпрезиденталізм із посадою суперпрезидента – напівпрезидентська система правління (насамперед президент-парламентського типу) з посадою всесильного глави держави, який будучи або не будучи (частіше будучи) безпосереднім главою уряду (виконавчої влади/вертикалі), неминуче має поряд із собою субординованого або несубординованого прем'єр-міністра, що формально відповідальний перед парламентом. Головна відмінність системи напівпрезиденталізму (від президенталізму) з посадою суперпрезидента у тому, що для неї властива різної міри (низька/значна) залежність виконавчої вертикалі в особі прем'єр-міністра або прем'єр-міністра та глави держави від розстановки партійно-політичних сил у парламенті. Це означає, що конституційно всесильний президент/суперпрезидент фактично може

⁸² S. Fish, *Democracy derailed in Russia: the failure of open politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.; S. Holmes, *Superpresidentialism and its problems*, "East European Constitutional Review" 1993, vol 2, nr 4, s. 123–126.

⁸³ A. Arato, *The new democracies and the American constitutional design*, "Constellations" 2000, vol 7, nr 3, s. 316–340.; T. Colton, C. Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, Paper has been produced to assist working sessions at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 21 s.

посилити свої повноваження у випадку розпуску парламенту, що може слідувати за (зазвичай потрібною) незгодою парламенту з приводу кандидатури прем'єр-міністра (у випадку відмови парламенту забезпечити вотум довіри уряду), запропонованої главою держави, чи за небажанням президента виконувати рішення парламенту про вотум недовіри урядові⁸⁴.

Напівпрезидентські системи, де повноваження президентів та прем'єр-міністрів (урядових кабінетів) є майже ідентичними або співмірними, іменують збалансованим напівпрезиденталізмом чи напівпрезиденталізмом збалансованої влади. На прикладі таких країн, як Грузія, Литва, Польща, Румунія або Україна (станом на 2014 р.) можна виявити, що збалансованому напівпрезиденталізму не властиве вирішальне домінування владних повноважень президента чи прем'єр-міністра, зокрема з приводу здійснення виконавчої влади. Внаслідок цього властиве зміщення домінування президентів та прем'єр-міністрів (до більшої персоналізації систем правління повноваженнями президентів чи прем'єр-міністрів) і відповідно – ускладнення дуалізму виконавчої влади в умовах напівпрезиденталізму. Саме тому серед трьох типів напівпрезиденталізму, в основі виокремлення яких є врахування особливостей дуалізму виконавчої влади, західні вчені найчастіше критикують збалансовану (повноваженнями президента та прем'єр-міністра) напівпрезидентську систему правління, в умовах якої можуть реалізовуватись різні сценарії блокованого конституційного та міжінституційного конфліктів, особливо коли виборці не дають (не забезпечують) парламентської більшості жодному з центрів виконавчої влади (найбільшою мірою це відчувається в періоди когабітацій, коли на думку Х. Лінца й А. Степана⁸⁵, втрачається керованість процесом і знижується рівень легітимності державної влади)⁸⁶.

Схожу типологію фаз/сценаріїв напівпрезиденталізму на підставі врахування повноважень президента та парламенту з приводу провадження законодавства і партійного складу парламенту запропонував Т. Чжун-Хсієн⁸⁷. Вчений виокремив збалансований, когабітаційний, президент-домінуючий, прем'єр-домінуючий та парламент-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм. Ці фази сценаріїв напівпрезиденталізму

⁸⁴ Тому в напівпрезидентських системах правління із посадами суперпрезидентів прем'єр-міністри є дуже слабкими незалежно від того, чи прем'єр-міністр політично та/або партійно субординований або несубординований президентові у контексті розстановки політичних сил у парламенті. Тому в таких системах правління часте застосування отримують мажоритарні чи змішані виборчі системи, які забезпечують представництво неафільних кандидатів у депутати. Фактичне посилення повноважень суперпрезидентів ймовірно у разі значної фракціоналізованості/фрагментованості парламентів, які в силу своєї слабкої структурованості не завжди повноцінно можуть і намагаються виконувати функції політичного інституту, який повинен стабілізувати повноваження президента з приводу здійснення виконавчої влади.

⁸⁵ J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, s. 286.

⁸⁶ V. Lytvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kohabitatsii v naviuprezidentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, „Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykhologhiia, komunikatsii” 2011, vol 4, s. 140–149; A. Romaniuk, V. Melnyk, *Instytut kohabitatsii ta politychni naslidky yoho realizatsii v Ukraini*, „Suchasna ukrainska polityka: Polityky i politolohy pro nei” 2009, vol 17, s. 69–73; V. Lytvyn, *Teoretyko-metodolohichni „kbyvli” doslidzhennia respublikanskykh system derzhavnogo pravlinnia: vid V. Badzhekbota do R. Elbi*, „Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu: „Seriiia filosofo-politolohichni studii” 2013, vol 3, s. 146–155.

⁸⁷ T. Jung-Hsiang, *Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock*, “French Politics” 2008, vol 6, s. 63–84.

позначають ситуації, коли той чи інший політичний інститут (президент, уряд або парламент) має ключову роль та завершальну думку щодо змісту законодавства⁸⁸. Річ у тому, що попри формальну норму, що парламент – найвищий законодавчий орган, на практиці він не завжди є інститутом, який проводить законодавчу владу: у напівпрезидентських системах правління законодавча влада може залежати від парламенту, президента, уряду⁸⁹ і т.д.

Президент-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм – напівпрезидентська система правління, в якій президент має значні унілатеральні повноваженнями видавати укази з силою законів та право вето, а також контролює парламентську більшість, тому здатний проводити законодавство.

Прем'єр-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм – напівпрезидентська система правління, в якій президент не має істотних повноважень та є символічним лідером, а прем'єр-міністр керує парламентською більшістю та має владу «вести» законодавство.

Парламент-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм – напівпрезидентська система, де президент не має істотних повноважень, кабінетом є уряд меншості, опозиція керує законодавчою більшістю супроти президента й уряду, внаслідок чого винятково парламент може проводити законодавство.

Когабітаційний напівпрезиденталізм – це напівпрезидентська система правління, в якій президент наділений «резервними» повноваженнями, глава уряду керує законодавчою більшістю та виходить із опозиційної до президента партії, саме тому президент та прем'єр-міністр ділять владу проводити законодавство.

Збалансований напівпрезиденталізм – напівпрезидентська система правління, де опозиційні президент і парламент мають однакові фактичні політичні повноваження, тому змагаються за владу проводити законодавство. Емпіричний аналіз засвідчує, що збалансований напівпрезиденталізм частіше зумовлює політичні та міжінституційні конфлікти у системах дуалізму виконавчої влади, ніж інші фази/сценарії напівпрезиденталізму. Загалом типологізація напівпрезидентських систем правління демонструє, що про напівпрезиденталізм треба говорити з «прикметниками»: вони відсилають нас до певних його формальних і фактичних різновидів та фаз/сценаріїв, які означають систему правління в контексті взаємовідносин між конституційними нормами та політичною практикою⁹⁰.

Звертаючись до досвіду конституційних систем правління в Україні у 1991–2014 рр., особливе місце між яких зайняв гетерогенний напівпрезиденталізм, пропонуємо таку їх поетапну структурування: у 1991–1995 рр. – президентсько-парламентський

⁸⁸ H. Bahro, *Virtues and vices of semi-presidential government*, „Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy” 1999, vol 11, nr 1, s. 1–37.

⁸⁹ C. Skach, *Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy*, “Constitutional Political Economy” 2005, vol 16, s. 347–368.

⁹⁰ V. Lytvyn, *Klasyfikatsiia yevropeiskoho pivprezidentalizmu*, “Demokratychnе vriaduvannia: Elektronne naukove fakhove vydannia” 2009, vol 3.

напівпрезиденталізм; у 1995–1996 рр. – президенталізм; у 1996–2006 рр. – президентсько-парламентський напівпрезиденталізм; 2006–2010 рр. – прем'єрсько-президентський напівпрезиденталізм; 2010–2014 рр. – президентсько-парламентський напівпрезиденталізм; з 2014 р. – прем'єрсько-президентський напівпрезиденталізм. Запропонована структуризація умовно/не повністю стосується конституційних систем правління в Україні, бо конституцію України було прийнято в 1996 р., а в 1991–1996 рр. в Україні діяла стара радянська Конституція 1978 р., послідовно доповнена п'ятнадцятьма законами та чисельними поправками, яка вважалась правовою підставою розвитку і функціонування політичних інститутів. Специфіка українського напівпрезиденталізму полягає у циклічній зміні моделей президент-парламентаризму та прем'єр-президенталізму: перший більше сприяє авторитаризації (у період 1996–2004 рр. за часів президентства Л. Кучми і 2010–2014 рр. за часів президентства В. Януковича політичний режим в Україні тяжів до електорального авторитаризму), а другий – демократизації (у період 2006–2009 рр. за часів президентства В. Ющенка, а також починаючи з 2014 р. після колапсу президент-парламентаризму політичний режим в Україні тяжів до електоральної демократії). Примітно, що досвід когабітації (розділеної більшості) у перехідних/гібридних режимах не завжди має негативні тенденції та наслідки. Це підкреслює пріоритетність системи правління, де домінує законодавча влада.

Таблиця 2. Еволюція напівпрезидентської системи правління у контексті розвитку республіканської форми правління в Україні (1991–2014 рр.)

| Період | Система правління | Формальний тип | Фактичний тип | Формально-фактичний тип | | Фаза/сценарій | Президент | Прем'єр-міністри | Конфлікт дуалізму виконавчої влади |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|--|---|---|--|------------------------------------|
| | | | | Формальний тип | Фактичний тип | | | | |
| Серпень 1991– червень 1995 | Напівпрезиденталізм ⁹¹ | Президент-подібний президент-парламентаризм | Розділена більшість | Збалансований напівпрезиденталізм | Парламент-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм | Л. Кравчук (1991–1994) | В. Фокін Л. Кучма Ю. Звєгльський В. Масол | незначний значний проміжний незначний | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Червень 1995 – червень 1996 | Президенталізм | – | – | – | – | Л. Кучма (1994–1999, 1999–2004) | Є. Моруш П. Лазаренко 1 П. Лазаренко 2 В. Пустошійченко В. Ющенко А. Кишч В. Янукович 1 Ю. Тимошенко 1 | проміжний проміжний значний незначний незначний незначний | |
| Червень 1996 – січень 2006 | Напівпрезиденталізм | Президент-подібний президент-парламентаризм | Уніфікована більшість | Президентиалізований напівпрезиденталізм | Президент-домінуючий президенталізм | В. Ющенко (2005–2010) | Ю. Єхануров В. Янукович 1 В. Янукович 2 Ю. Тимошенко 2 | незначний проміжний значний значний | |
| Січень 2006 – жовтень 2010 | Напівпрезиденталізм | Прем'єр-президенталізм | Уніфікована більшість Розділена більшість Уніфікована більшість | Збалансований напівпрезиденталізм | Когабітайний напівпрезиденталізм | В. Янукович (2010–2014) | М. Азаров 1 М. Азаров 2 М. Азаров 3 А. Яценюк | незначний незначний незначний незначний проміжний | |
| Жовтень 2010 – Лютий 2014 | Напівпрезиденталізм | Президент-подібний президент-парламентаризм | Уніфікована більшість | Президентиалізований напівпрезиденталізм | Президент-домінуючий напівпрезиденталізм | О. Турчинов (в.о.) (2014) П. Порошенко (2014 – чинний) | | незначний незначний незначний | |
| Лютий 2014 – і досі | Напівпрезиденталізм | Прем'єр-президенталізм ⁹² | Уніфікована більшість Розділена більшість | Збалансований напівпрезиденталізм | Когабітайний напівпрезиденталізм | | | незначний проміжний | |

⁹¹ Розподіл повноважень між політичними інститутами свідчив про «розмитий» президентсько-парламентський напівпрезиденталізм без права президента розпускати парламент.
⁹² Президент (як і в 2006–2010 рр.) не може звільнити прем'єр-міністра й уряд, але може розпустити парламент.

Вважаємо, що сьогодні вибір конституційної системи правління в Україні має падати на прем'єрсько-президентський (в жодному випадку незбалансований та непрезидентіалізований, а з номінальними президентами) напівпрезиденталізм або парламентаризм. Ці системи максимально (по-різному) мінімізують міжінституційні конфлікти між гілками влади (зокрема з приводу виконавчої влади та провадження законодавства). Навіть якщо такі конфлікти виникають, то їх здебільшого усувають через процедури парламентського вотуму недовіри уряду. Окрім того, зазначені системи республіканського правління окреслюють випереджувальні інституційні механізми розв'язання урядових (політичних) криз до того, як вони переростуть у кризи політичної системи (політичного режиму та системи правління). Тому такі системи правління більш гнучкі та краще адаптуються до мінливих інституційних і політичних/електоральних обставин. Особливо це актуально для парламентських систем правління, де уряд уповноважений оголошувати дострокові парламентські вибори для вирішення проблем «заблокованого законодавства» («законодавчого глухого кута»). Так уряд змушує себе (у контексті тих депутатів, які забезпечують йому підтримку) і всіх членів парламенту приймати популярні й необхідні рішення. Що стосується особливостей і перспектив систем прем'єр-президентського напівпрезиденталізму з номінальними президентами (порівняно з іншими моделями напівпрезиденталізму), варто виокремити такі з них: обмеженість можливостей міжінституційних конфліктів у системі дуалізму виконавчої влади лише періодами когабітацій і тільки окремими сферами сумісної компетенції президентів та прем'єр-міністрів (переважно це питання оборонної і зовнішньої політики, закордонних справ); односпрямованість (чи унідирикторальність) міжінституційних конфліктів у системі дуалізму виконавчої влади, яка проявляється у тому, що президент тільки обмежено може протистояти уряду; нерозвиненість дифузної відповідальності між президентом і прем'єр-міністром, внаслідок чого політико-владний процес майже немає двоїстого і контраверсійного значення (навіть у періоди когабітацій); реальна та постійна усвідомленість того, що домінуючим актором виконавчої влади (та й політичного процесу загалом) є прем'єр-міністр/уряд. На користь парламентських та прем'єр-президентських (проте незбалансованих та непрезидентіалізованих) систем правління свідчить той факт, що вони з усіх наявних республіканських систем правління є найдемократичнішими, втілюють найбільшу ефективність урядування і найбільшу якість людського розвитку. Ці системи окреслені порівняно невисоким ризиком військових переворотів. Проте для якісного втілення на практиці будь-якої з зазначених систем правління в Україні потрібна ефективна виборча система (яка пропорційно переводить голоси виборців у мандати), міцна (а не фракціалізована та недисциплінована) партійна система з продукуванням законодавчої більшості, а також реформа парламентаризму (як процесуального виміру діяльності/структури органу законодавчої влади). В іншому разі проблемою залишатиметься формування стабільних

парламентських коаліцій та вузькопрофільність інтересів політичної еліти. Проте в умовах кризових явищ, які починаючи з кінця 2013 – початку 2014 рр., розгортаються в Україні, у разі запровадження будь-якої із зазначених систем правління треба передбачити перехідні/тимчасові положення конституції для регламентації резервних повноважень глави держави (у випадку прем'єрсько-президентського напівпрезиденталізму з номінальним президентом) або прем'єр-міністра (у разі парламентаризму), що мають виявлятися у можливості видавати укази або постанови із силою законів в окремих сферах господарства і соціального життя, які критично потребують реформування та вдосконалення.

У разі пролонгованої апробації чинної системи прем'єр-президентського (парламентсько-президентського) збалансованого (впливовий президент та прем'єр-міністр) напівпрезиденталізму доцільно (як у випадку Франції і Румунії⁹³) звернутися до процедури проведення синхронних (двох упродовж одного року) президентських і парламентських виборів⁹⁴. Так відповідальність за визначення ключового актора у системі дуалізму виконавчої влади – президента чи прем'єр-міністра, – буде перекладено

⁹³ Відмінність України (а також Румунії) від Франції додатково проявляється у тому, що перша є прикладом системи позитивного парламентаризму, а друга – прикладом системи негативного парламентаризму. В системах позитивного парламентаризму формування уряду безпосередньо залежить від позитивного (такого, що підтриманий абсолютною чи відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту) вотуму довіри уряду з боку парламенту. Урядовий кабінет розпочинає свою діяльність лише після того, як йому (його прем'єр-міністру, персональному складу чи програмі) абсолютною або відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту (залежно від конкретного випадку) буде надано вотум довіри/інвестиції. Урядовий кабінет вважається чинним до тих пір, поки він користується довірою парламенту або поки йому не буде висловлено позитивного (тобто такого, що підтриманий абсолютною чи відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту) вотуму довіри або залежить від негативного вотуму довіри парламенту довіра/інвестиція урядові постійна та забезпечується як на етапі його ініціювання/формування, так і в процесі його функціонування. У системах негативного парламентаризму формування уряду безпосередньо не залежить від позитивного (підтриманого абсолютною або відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту) вотуму довіри або залежить від негативного вотуму довіри уряду з боку парламенту. Негативний вотум довіри урядові означає, що для того, щоб уряд почав функціонувати, він має отримати вотум довіри/інвестиції, суть якої полягає у тому, що проти прем'єр-міністра, складу чи програми уряду не повинна проголосувати абсолютна більшість депутатів парламенту. Це означає, що урядовий кабінет розпочинає діяльність після того, як його чи його прем'єр-міністра номіновано главою держави або ж парламентом без наявності підтримки (вотуму довіри/інвестиції) прем'єр-міністра, персонального складу та програми уряду абсолютною або відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту або за умови, що проти прем'єр-міністра, складу чи програми уряду не голосує абсолютна більшість депутатів парламенту. Урядовий кабінет отримує довіру парламенту самим фактом номінування його прем'єр-міністра чи складу уряду або незапереченням кандидатури прем'єр-міністра чи складу уряду абсолютною більшістю депутатів у парламенті. Урядовий кабінет є чинним доти, поки йому не буде висловлено позитивного (такого, що підтриманий абсолютною або відносною більшістю депутатів парламенту – залежно від конкретного випадку) вотуму довіри або поки йому не буде відмовлено у мовчазній або негативній довірі. В умовах систем негативного парламентаризму довіра/інвестиція уряду не завжди ґрунтується на парламентській більшості, бо може не забезпечуватись або забезпечуватись негативно у процесі формування уряду. Натомість, відмова у позитивній довірі уряду або ж незадоволення вимог негативної довіри уряду в процесі функціонування уряду є причиною дострокового припинення повноважень уряду. Тому система негативного парламентаризму – інституційно-конституційний сценарій, що ґрунтується на постійній мовчазній довірі урядовому кабінету, підтриманій більшістю депутатів парламенту (коли парламент не відмовляє уряду в довірі чи не висловлює уряду вотуму довіри), чи на постійній негативній довірі урядовому кабінету, проти чого не виступає абсолютна більшість депутатів парламенту. Детально див.: F. Russo, L. Verzichelli, *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 2014; M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences"; T. Louwse, *Unpacking positive and negative parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences" of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

⁹⁴ V. Lytvyn, *Teoriia ta praktyka kohabitatsii v napiuprezidentskykh systemakh Yevropy*, „Osvita rehionu: politolohiia, psykholohiia, komunikatsii” 2011, vol 4, s. 140–149.

на виборця, який зможе детермінувати, хто конкретно у той чи інший проміжок часу буде домінувати. Синхронність виборів президента і парламенту у збалансованому напівпрезиденталізмі, як свідчить теорія і практика, здебільшого позитивно впливають на фактичне посилення повноважень президента, оскільки партія переможця президентських виборів зазвичай стає переможцем і парламентських виборів. Одночасно із запровадженням процедури синхронних виборів буде максимально унеможливлено когабітацію, яка раніше дуже негативно впливала на політичний (зокрема владно-виконавчий) процес в Україні. Разом із цим, специфікою системи залишиться той момент, що політично/фактично сильний президент не матиме легалізованої чи формальної змоги унілатерально відправляти у відставку урядовий кабінет, оскільки у прем'єр-президентських напівпрезидентських системах правління право дострокової відставки уряду зарезервовано винятково за парламентом. Відповідно, бажаючи зміни складу чи керівництва уряду, президент буде зобов'язаним домовлятися про це із парламентом, що не завжди політично легко та безперешкодно, бо президентська/пропрезидентська партія не обов'язково самостійно або в коаліції з іншими партіями повинна мати підтримку абсолютної більшості депутатів парламенту. Це особливо актуально для України, в якій у 1991–2014 рр. жодний уряд не опирався на підтримку однопартійної парламентської більшості. Загалом за допомогою синхронних виборів формально збалансовану прем'єрсько-президентську напівпрезидентську систему можна трансформувати у фактично президенціалізовану прем'єрсько-президентську систему.

У випадку, коли синхронні вибори президента і парламенту не забезпечують президентові підтримки парламентською більшістю його кандидатури прем'єр-міністра (системи уніфікованої більшості), формально збалансована прем'єрсько-президентська напівпрезидентська система фактично спрацьовує через когабітацію (систему розділеної більшості), але цілком інституційно окреслену – таким чином проявляється збалансований дуалізм виконавчої влади. Особливість у тому, що так можна суттєво обмежити конфліктність дуалізму виконавчої влади та зменшити гіпотетичну кількість випадків когабітації.

Із погляду виборців, у такому випадку буде цілком очевидно, що в державі формально є дві вагомні політичні посади – президента та прем'єр-міністра. Президент фактично буде сильнішим у тому випадку, коли представник його ж політичної партії буде прем'єр-міністром, навіть якщо таку конструкцію підтримає не тільки президентська/пропрезидентська партія (самостійно), а й кілька партій, які формують коаліцію у парламенті. Натомість, прем'єр-міністр буде сильнішим тоді, коли належатиме до опозиційної щодо президента політичної партії, яка самостійно чи в коаліції входить у склад парламентської більшості, що формально формує уряд.

Все очевидно у цьому разі буде й у середовищі політичної/партійної еліти, що конкуруватиме на президентських та парламентських виборах. Очевидно й те, що кожний кандидат у президенти розраховуватиме стати фактично найвпливовішою особою в державі. Це можливо лише тоді, коли президентові субординований через підтримку парламентської більшості (або систему уніфікованої більшості) прем'єр-міністр. Для цього треба, щоби кандидат у президенти в контексті синхронних президентських та парламентських виборів розраховував на конкретну кандидатуру прем'єр-міністра. Це найпростіше зробити тоді, коли обидва належать до однієї політичної партії. Тому в партійній ієрархії кандидатом у президенти традиційно буде лідер партії, а кандидатом у прем'єр-міністри – друга особа в партії. Якщо ж президент не матиме підтримки парламентської більшості, тоді він очевидно та фактично не позиціонуватиметься як найвпливовіша особа в державі (навіть якщо існуватиме значний історичний досвід домінування президента у системі державної влади). Натомість, провідну роль відіграватиме опозиційний стосовно президента прем'єр-міністр (який традиційно також був би кандидатом у президенти).

Але навіть у цьому випадку в Україні залишається суттєва проблема – це неструктурованість електорату. Тому навіть попри синхронність президентських та парламентських виборів все ж таки можуть бути сценарії когабітації, бо не завжди президенти матимуть підтримку парламентської більшості. Ефективний спосіб подолання цього недоліку – запровадження виборчої системи, яка сприятиме великим партіям. Із-поміж таких традиційно виокремлюють мажоритарні системи абсолютної або відносної більшості, але вони дискредитували себе в Україні. Тому результатом може бути запровадження пропорційної системи відкритих списків (за формулою, яка сприяє великим партіям) або ж непаралельної/залежної змішаної виборчої системи (пропорційної системи додаткового членства або мажоритарної системи додаткового членства – на зразок Німеччини, Угорщини або Румунії).

Дваракурсні перспективних республіканських систем правління в Україні демонструють, що маємо справу не просто з системою правління як такою (у її чистому вигляді), а з конституційною інженерією системи правління, оскільки остання залежить не тільки від формальних/правових повноважень ключових політичних інститутів і їхніх відносин між собою, а фактичних/політичних причин та наслідків цих повноважень і взаємовідносин, які проявляються у зрізі виборчих систем і формул, партійних систем та конкуренції, соціополітичних поділів тощо. Цікаво й інше: обидва варіанти реформування системи правління в Україні, незалежно від сили президентів, прем'єр-міністрів та парламентів, скеровуватимуть політичний/владний процес в Україні до принципів парламентської демократії – такого формату демократичного політичного режиму, у якому уряд є виконавчою гілкою влади, проте лише при умові, що прем'єр-міністр та урядовий кабінет завжди відповідальні перед парламентом, обраним всенародно. Натомість, у 1991–2014 рр. уряд в Україні завжди виступав в ролі об'єкта, вплив на який був міжінституційним конфліктом парламенту та президента на різних стадіях конституційного процесу.

Чинник глобалізму як головна перешкода на шляху до формування демократичної моделі світового політичного порядку

Означено труднощі на шляху до побудови глобального демократичного політичного порядку. Охарактеризовано і обґрунтовано глобалізм як одне з найбільш проблемних явищ сучасного світового розвитку. Подано розгорнутий огляд негативних практик/деструктивних впливів, обумовлених глобалізованою політичною кон'юнктурою. Наведено ключові положення стратегії системного реформування.

Ключові слова: глобалізм, демократія, система світового порядку, міжсуб'єктні відносини.

Globalism phenomenon as the main obstacle toward settlement of the democratic model of world political order

The author defines difficulties on the way toward formation of the global democratic political order; characterizes and treats globalism as the main problematic phenomenon of world's modern development; gives a wide prospect of negative practices/destructive influences, which are considered to be the consequences of globalized political climate; offers the key elements of systemic reformation's strategy.

Keywords: globalism, democracy, system of the world order, inter-subjects' relations.

In the XX century democracy in its various forms managed to approve her vitality, found the way out from plenty of crisis situations. The reality of the XXI century – revealed in deep social, economic, political, cultural, spiritual transformations – actualizes the imperatives of renewal of democratic system. The dynamics of these transformations put them in one boat with the dominant tendency of world modern development – globalization, which causes the foundation of new world political system and unfolds the perspectives of global society establishing. Fully pledged organization of the two formations demands the network of global administration which would be able to articulate common interests, to rise and to protect the system of universal values, to supply the common needs and to encounter the challenges. The features of global structures are obvious already; their contours could be seen on the basis of

space enlargement of international and supranational regulation, rising of global supranational institutions' authorities.

At the same time ability of the real-active shifts, which are being made first of all in the institutional sphere of inter-subjects' relations according to the motto of democratic model of world political order formation, is complicated by numerous challenges, which put the adoptive source of democracy to careful trial. They are the system challenges: specific problems of democratic system settlement, related to the absence of social-psychological and cultural premises, which would be able to assist the effective functioning of democracy in terms of new environment; as well as the challenges of internal, qualitative nature of democracy itself that rely on the strong cultural-historical fundament. Estimating the consequences of globalization processes in this spectrum we can claim that present reorganization of the world space, regulation of the interrelations, management of the world development are accomplished mostly in the interests of subjects of global governing. So, spreading of the global democratization processes, intensification of the world interconnects encourage theoretically constructing of the global social reality due to the democratic ideal. However, usage of manipulative technologies within the global processes, broad arsenal of various tools for political pressure displays a sharp problem with establishment of the democratic order of decision making on the global level. Globalization, from one point, becomes a promoter of global democracy construct, stimulates searching and unfolding of the democratic forms of global interrelations. Globalism, from the other point, supports the reverse forces, causing as the result emergence of the peculiar paradox, when "the democratic rhetoric hides antidemocratic content of political process"¹.

Consequently, the aim of this article is to outline the perspectives of final emergence of the democratic model of world political order through overwhelming of negative practices/destructive influences caused by injunctions of the globalism system; as well as to suggest the way of solving the actual problems in accordance with reorganization of world's political process due to the democratic ideal.

Let's note that most of the remarks dedicated to the analysis of versatile aspects of global democracy's mechanism constructing are predominantly critical on modern system of globalism, those practices and phenomena, which are produced by it. At the same time researchers do not usually put the full-stop after sharing with the critics, which logically follows from the comprehension of the diffusive processes of modern global reality and from realizing the essence of its political expression. After the description and the precise explanation of numerous problems, as a rule, they give deep and well elaborated recommendations, leading afterwards to the fine strategy of systemic reformation. Before articulating of its program theses we shall clarify the obstacles standing against the fully completeness of this process.

¹ Шепелев М.А. Проблемы і перспективи глобальної демократії / М. А. Шепелев // Матер. IV Міжнар. наук.-практ. конф. „Розвиток демократії та демократична освіта в Україні” (Львів, 20-22 трав. 2005 р.). – Львів, 2005. – С.35

Among the main problems, which threaten democracy on both international and internal-political levels, are: narrowing of the sphere of sovereign power of state democratic institutions, contradictions between the system of international law, national interests and human rights, and also the “growing autonomy of politics”. As D. Korobka argues appropriately, in the third millennium all the main parameters of global intersubjects’ relations are being changed dramatically, as well as the settings of international security: “previously they were defined by the military balances, the level of conflict potential, the threat of the world war; today on the fore ground steps the fight against untraditional dangers – international terrorism, transnational criminality, illegal migration, informational diversions”². In terms of individualization that is getting strengthened postmodern society faces the problem of disagreement between the system of international law, based on the state concept of national interests, and the human rights, which became the symbolic capital of the democratic theatre of world politics (the first fiddle in its orchestra belongs to the USA and to a number of Western democracies). The specificity of this situation is characterized by the fact that the right of a state on sovereignty contradicts the right of the citizens on freedom. This contradiction appears clearly when using of international military forces or economic sanctions is necessary for defense of citizens of the state, their rights and freedoms from authoritative (undemocratic) government. Military campaigns in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Syria – are the examples of parallel asserting of human rights and of limitation of state’s right on sovereignty.

Until quite recently it was considered that only West predominantly, if not exclusively, abused of appealing to its traditional symbolic capital – declaration of human rights, democratic rules and freedoms – for putting of itself on the first place in geopolitical structure of mastership. Therefore many experts emphasized too exaggerated that the democratic rhetoric, international law’s priorities, holding of humanitarian interventions – regardless of any ideological or ideal excuses – are merely West’s intentions to inculcate in other countries his values and models of social-political conduct. However, today we can observe some other external-political subjects to pass the same rout in trying to confirm their influence on global political arena; they just mask their tricks and methods under the other conceptual prerogative. The prominent example of this is protection of the “life’s space” of “Russian world”: defense of national minorities’ rights, representatives of ethnic (and not only) Russian speaking communities, residing out of the territory of Russian Federation. Comparing of the two polar concepts – of global democracy and of the “great Russia” – gives no favor to the last one.

Nevertheless, in each case, the level of legitimacy of the supranational governing structures, which represent world modern political order, remains too low; applying of their force potentialities is quite uneven – they are too eager to intervene into the internal affairs of some national states and to the contrary fail to mention the refractory activity of the others. Thus,

² Коробка Д.С. Символизация международных отношений. Бренд США на мировой арене: Pro et Contra / Д.С. Коробка // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. – Серия: Политология. – 2008. – №5. – С. – С.74

the crisis of sovereignty is coming – because of the external dependence governments aren't able to deal with the internal problems effectively. In the end the factual system of global democracy meets serious hurdles.

Concerning the internal national level many researchers argue frankly that climate of globalization creates the conditions when the governing groups become unable to implement the principles of democratic policy; under these conditions the leading elite must behave according to the strict models of conduct; it has to accept decisions due to the “narrow corridor of choices”. Sometimes a part of elite tends voluntarily to appreciate such limitations. It occurs then that elite's traditional estrangement from the interests of common citizens, accompanied by the desire to restrict their participation in political process and to cut the area of public politics, is being revised in the globalized world: an elite loses integrity of its mentality, gets divided into nationally oriented part and the cosmopolitan part; is not guided any more only by its certain egoistic corporative interests, but becomes responsible for the new national interests. Cosmopolitan sector under these circumstances pursues the policy appropriate to the injunctions of globalization – treats it as the only possible way of providing the social progress and supplying of the public needs, as well as denies the importance of existence of a national state in the modern world. Opposition to this policy is considered as a sign of narrow-mindedness or of provincial manner to be behind the times.

According to S. Huntington, S. Bauman, K. Lash, the emergence of this new global elite was provoked by arising of the highly integrated global economics. It consists from the upper functionaries of numerous international organizations, managers of transnational corporations and of high technologies enterprises' controllers. Besides it includes a large number of the establishment of the developed countries. “Those who bear transnationalism' identity, – S. Huntington argues, – are quite careless to the national loyalty; they look at the national borders as at the obstacles which are disappearing luckily. The national governments are treated by them as the relics of past; the only efficient function of theirs is assisting to the successful global activity of elites”³. As the result the positive correlation between the citizens' expectations for changes in the internal and the external policies and the manner of government's conduct is getting reduced rapidly.

These tendencies which are present in social-political life of many democratic countries obviously give the strong reason to ascertain the progressive loss by the modern democracy of its representative origin. Despite the remaining practice of the rotation of political leaders due to the democratic procedure of free elections, the “representativeness” of these democracies is simplified to formalism – concerning a lot of issues political leaders take the decisions which go against the wishes of a big part of public. In the other words, a deep cleavage appears between the public requirements and the real policy's implementation. Such situation is outlined

³ Хантингтон С. Кто мы?: Вызовы американской национальной идентичности / Самюэль Хантингтон; Пер. с англ. А. Башкирова. — М.: ООО «Издательство АСТ»: ООО «Транзиткнига», 2004. — С.507

by the notion of “growing autonomy of politics” (or “deficit of democracy”). It reveals in the gradual reducing of the trust in official power, its institutions, in particular in political parties; the last point of it is the parliamentary crisis. In the consequence citizens’ participation in the political process is getting lower and lower; their political alienation could get converted into alternative, radical, even extremist forms of public-political activity. Undoubtedly, it pushes the changes of qualitative significance within the functioning of democratic systems, as well as testifies against the possibility of F. Fukuyama’s thesis about the “final triumph of western model of liberal democracy over the other forms of political organization” to come into true. Consequently, the split in the society appears; a struggle or a concurrence between the liberal democracy and the alternative ideology, which is called also the “transnational progressivism”, is getting more and more sharpen⁴. Representatives of this ideology adhere to an idea that liberal-democratic model of a national state’s governing is not relevant any more to the needs of the modern world; that globalization demands the updated form of transnational “global governing”.

Thus, the *raison d’être* of democracy itself, as well as its reorganization, is still indefinite. R. Darendorf supposes that today searching of the new institutional forms of the conflict of interests’ reveal is occurring, so long as representative democracy is not any more such an evident idea as it used to be. However forming of the new model is a matter of the future perspective. Some other researchers assume this tendency as the one which is being fulfilled at the moment. They offer using of term “leader’s democracy” instead of term “representative democracy”, as far as the distinction lies in a fact that character of the political process is defined not so much by the electoral preferences, as by “striving and ambitions of the politicians”⁵.

The British sociologist C. Crouch, who devised the concept of “post-democracy”, obtained many followers. For instance, American researcher R. Rorty examines the main features of passing of the western societies’ political systems to the post-democratic stage. Among them is growing weakness of the organized social forces, what makes it impossible to counteract the risen concentration of power in hands of political elites and of transnational corporations’ representatives, which become more and more professional. One could find here the hint of “growing autonomy of politics”, from one hand, and realize the problematic perspective of treating of the representative democracy, from the other. The issue of “growing autonomy of politics” makes a large amount of citizens feel no anxiety over the decisions taking process, which is provided absolutely freely by elites; nevertheless those decisions are still decisive for broad social daily life. Somehow it means the formation of the new type of political culture in democratic societies, which leans upon the silent agreement of the most of population with

⁴ Fonte J. Liberal Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism: The Future of the Ideological War within the West / John Fonte. [Electronic source] – Access regime: file:///C:/Users/Svyatoslav/Pictures/Fonte%20J.%20Liberal%20democracy%20vs%20...pdf

⁵ Мак-Грю Е. Транснаціональна демократія: теорія і перспективи / Ентоні Мак-Грю // Демократія: Антологія. Упорядник О. Проценко / Інститут європейських досліджень. «Смолоскит». – К. – 2005. – С. 1025-1050

covering of the decisions taking process, with its becoming private, and upon the readiness to refuse voluntarily from one's rights and freedoms.

Globalization's negative influence upon the democracy's general position is recognized by researchers in many countries. Ukrainian political scientist M. Shepieliev stands that global technologies serve the interests of subjects of the global rule. The problem of correlation between democracy and this new reality runs into difficulties, on his mind, with unfolding of the democratic model of decision making within the global scale; it is highly problematic to guarantee legitimacy of the supranational mechanism of force application and of intervention into the internal affairs of sovereign states, which become usual under globalization's conditions⁶. As the researcher suggests, sovereignty's crisis shortens state's ability to form and to provide on its territory those policy which is effective for social rule and for solving of the internal problems.

By acknowledgement of incompatibility of the globalized economics' tendencies with liberal-democratic principal of "self-government" in the national state M. Plattner shares the idea: "with intention to vanish all the borders and to transfer the center of decision making from national to transnational level globalization threatens not only to the authoritarian regimes, but to the democratic as well". Moreover "globalization at its final stage is hostile to every self-government per se; thus the world without borders can hardly become democratic"⁷.

Therefore, we can conclude that it has been approved and proven by international academic community that the reality of contemporary global democracy consists in the growing dependance of democratic governments upon undemocratic international systems. Over the past two decades academic studies have corroborated the statement that in the conditions of globalization the existing capacities of influence upon the realpolitik and the decision making process determine the citizens' estrangement from traditional institutes of global democracy. The objective decrease of national political systems' capacity to act in accordance with their citizens' demands intensifies their long-growing dissatisfactions about the "closeness" of political power and the lack of feedback. Therefore, it becomes an additional source of their dissatisfaction about modern democracy. That's why we deal with a certain paradox: social transformations in many countries of the world cause, on one hand, the unprecedented expansion of political democracy, along with the establishment of its values in social consciousness worldwide. Thus they change the world, inspired by "the democratic aura". On the other hand, more and more apparent becomes the lack of efficiency of contemporary democratic institutes, and more and more people feel distrustful about them. It has been determined by problems of both exogenous and endogenous

⁶ Шепелєв М.А. Проблеми і перспективи глобальної демократії / Максиміліан Шепелєв // Матер. ІV Міжнар. наук.-практ. конф. „Розвиток демократії та демократична освіта в Україні” (Львів, 20-22 трав. 2005 р.). – Л. – 2005. – С.37

⁷ Платтнер М. Ф. Глобалізація і самоврядування / Марк Ф. Платтнер // *Демократія: Антологія. Упорядник О. Проценко / Інститут європейських досліджень. «Смолоскип».* – К. – 2005. – С. 1051-1063

nature. These tendencies are reflected in the works of foreign and Ukrainian scholars, as well as in various analytical reports of international organizations and rating agencies. In his endeavor to trace out the roots of this paradox M. Shepelev develops the following statement: the main symptom of the crisis nature of contemporary democracy consists in the total estrangement of society from conceptual power. The problem of the true democratic government consists not so much in the manners of voting or other attributes of formal democracy, but, in the first place, in the construction of such social order, which would allow its every member to access the complete systematic knowledge, or the summit of conceptual power, which is the starting and final point of the contours of government in every society. It is specifically necessary to implement it at global level.⁸

Nevertheless, despite its apparent destructive influence, brought into focus by a term “globalism”, the globalization remains an important tool in the establishment of global democracy, since in its political and administrative dimensions it belongs to key tendencies of the development of modern world. The aforesaid prompts us to make the following conclusion: the process of global transformations along with recent world-wide challenges stimulate the active process of reflection upon the essence of global democracy and the ways of its dissemination through the channels of intersubjective communication among subjects of global space, with regard to their cultural and evaluative specificity. This, in turn, makes of urgent necessity the study of the ways of reflection of global democracy and the mechanisms of its institutional transformation in the dimension of contemporary global changes on the basis of methodological principles of post-nonclassical science, which reflect the new sociocultural reality of postmodernity.

Despite the obstacles, connected to the mentioned issues, we are sure that the strategy of political reformation can be successfully implemented. The route lies across the introduction of democratic legitimacy to global political life. The authors of cosmopolitical models of global democracy elaborated powerful normative resources, which elevated the democratic construction to the heights of ideal theory. Besides this, a number of scholars offer practical institutional models, by means of which they supplement the general construction of global democracy with a package of recommendations that are ready at hand for immediate implementation. While not being obsessed by revolutionary ambitions to change the pluralistic power structure and, instead, being aware of the impossibility to quickly reach the restructuring of the global machinery of public power, they keep their faith in the effectiveness of reformatory initiatives, which approximate step by step the realization of the project of global democracy.

The perspectives of global democracy are linked, in the first place, to the transition from the system of world order, in which the more or less decisive influence is exerted by democratic

⁸ Шепелев М.А. Проблеми і перспективи глобальної демократії / Максиміліан Шепелев // Матер. IV Міжнар. наук.-практ. конф. „Розвиток демократії та демократична освіта в Україні” (Львів, 20-22 трав. 2005 р.). – Л. – 2005. – С.37-39

countries, to the fully pledged democratic model of global political order. Large amount of work has already been done in this direction; however this work still has to be extended. It includes the three phases:

1. Reconsidering of their foreign policy by some subjects.
2. Reformation of the institutional structure, including the network of current international organization.
3. Improvement of the effectivity of international judicial system.

The fundamental point of the first phase, according to D. Archibuti, is the reappraisal of their foreign policy priorities by democratic countries. First and foremost they must learn to build dialogical interactions with other countries, especially those which are developing, and those, who just try to take the path of active development, even if they would have to sacrifice some of their short-term interests. The consolidation of the developed democracy around this issue is the crucial condition of consolidated international community⁹. The establishment of a dialog with non-democratic political regimes is the other extremely important aspect. In the internal matrix of authoritarian states lies the fundamental inability for the reproduction of the principle of dialogical interaction in their foreign and domestic policy, since their very nature inclines them to coerce, to subdue, and erase the otherness, i. e. to realize the dialectics, embodied in the relationships “Me-It.” That’s why, the only solution to this problem is democratization of these regimes. The non-violent, democratic, purposeful and beneficially tuned pressure on the part of democratic countries would facilitate the qualitative transformation in such political regimes. The situation becomes further complicated, when non-democratic political regimes are mixed with democracies in the framework of cooperation and they become economically interdependent that precludes the possibility of direct pressure. Nevertheless, the unanimity of democracies in fundamental issues, the realization of common informational line against the aggressor, its forcing out beyond the scope of communications can put an end to the imperialistic expansion.

At the second stage, it seems necessary to set out the more efficient institutes of global regulation, which would expand the direct representation of citizens and would not serve as platform for discussions between authorized representatives of the national governments. The long-term program of global democracy anticipates a gradual reformation of the UN along with other international organizations, as well as the deployment of a network of new such organizations and their empowerment with a wider spectrum of executable functions in order to enhance their political independence and endow them with real political subjectivity.

At the third state it is very important to change the core of the international principle of the supremacy of law, further complete the mechanism of accountability and responsibility, in order to make the countries feel losses if they fail to comply with international law.

⁹ Archibugi D. The Hope for a Global Democracy / Daniele Archibugi et al. // *Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New Political Hope*. – *New Political Science*, Volume 32, Number 1, 2010. – P. 87

Especially it is important to concentrate at the improvement of the system of criminal justice and encourage as many countries as possible to accept the jurisdiction of, for instance, the international criminal court. It is necessary to fully systematize its activity in order to make it an effective tool of protection of the weak against the strong and the strongest. The latest events at the international stage, including Russian aggression against Ukraine, actualize the necessity of radical transformation of mechanism of solution of international controversies. The current system is under stagnation and demonstrates virtually zero efficacy. The decisive role belongs to the advantage in the ad hoc relationship "law-force". All attempts to solve major international conflicts, which involved military confrontation, in legal framework failed due to the subjects' reluctance to recognize the competence of international court and legitimacy of its legal acts. The extension of the principle of supremacy of law, which becomes a creative core of global democracy, depends on the assignment of coercive force to the system of international legal proceedings, which will make the courts function literally as tribunals.

In the context of construction of global democracy the space of subjectivity essentially expands, since the channels of communication change. Also grows the role of democratic deliberation. It isn't necessary for deliberative communities to be situated in the same territory. Instead, the unifying democratic mechanisms are needed in order to make diverse groups feel as one. The territorial and national identity is changed for global. The effectivity of deliberative communication has been proven by transnational social movements. Such communities, as well as organization that represent them, become the full bearers of legitimate subjectivity. The states are still key representatives of their societies' beliefs, as well as they continue to be the creators of the constructs of internal identification, however in these activities they become increasingly supplemented by other subjects. The need in alternative perpetrators of foreign-policy commissions, which would wield the sufficient amount of competence, becomes more and more pressing.

The key to the global democracy lies in creation of the alternative to national structures of political representation. Following this direction, D. Archibugi, for instance, suggests the idea of World Parliamentary Council as the perfect institutional model that could integrate politically people from all over the world, give them deliberative authorities to solve the problems of global significance¹⁰. Certainly it will be difficult to enrich such an institute with factual power and to set the logistics of implementation of its decisions. However, this institute will ideally serve as a forum for public opinion's articulation and as a constructor of common global identity. It can also take care of asocial groups – minorities, refugees, immigrants, those who have no citizenship – to represent their interests, as far as no one does it appropriately today.

So, creating of the global democracy opens the infinite horizon for creative thinking. Intellectual expertise usually supports the innovative fulfillment of the concept. Let's emphasize

¹⁰ Archibugi D. The Hope for a Global Democracy / Daniele Archibugi et al. // *Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New Political Hope*. – *New Political Science*, Volume 32, Number 1, 2010. – P. 88-90

that foundation of global democracy is not just a work of certain subjects. The progress in the intention to materialize the idea calls for the largest company to put together their efforts in forming the harmonic polyphonic ensemble. Conditions are up to it as never before.

Електоральні успіхи та соціальна складова діяльності ліберальних парламентських партій у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи (1990–2014)

Розглянуто феномен ліберальних партій у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз електоральних успіхів ліберальних парламентських партій у Центрально-Східній Європі у період 1990–2014 рр. Визначену соціальну складову (соціальну базу та соціальні питання) ліберальних парламентських партій у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, а також її вплив на електоральні/урядові успіхи ліберальних партій.

Ключові слова: політична партія, лібералізм, ліберальна партія, соціальна складова діяльності партій, електоральні успіхи партій, ідеологічне позиціонування партій, соціальна база, соціальні питання, соціальна відповідальність, соціально-виборчий профіль, «Manifesto Project», Центрально-Східна Європа.

Electoral success and social dimensions of liberal parliamentary parties in Central-Eastern Europe (1990–2014)

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of liberal parties in Central-Eastern Europe. The author carried out the comparative analysis of the electoral success of liberal parliamentary parties in Central-Eastern Europe in 1990–2014; determined social dimensions (social base and social issues) of liberal parliamentary parties in Central-Eastern Europe, as well as its impact on electoral/cabinet success of liberal parties.

Keywords: political party, liberalism, liberal party, social dimensions of political parties, electoral success of parties, ideological positioning of parties, social base, social issues, social responsibility, social and electoral profile, “Manifesto Project”, Central-Eastern Europe.

Before and after collapse of the Soviet Union and regimes of the so-called «*real socialism*» in the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (which at those times were called East-European Countries) there appeared quite a wide palette of new political parties criticizing the socialist system of social relations, which actually stayed on a path of economic liberalism. In this respect the practice of formation, functioning, social grounding or filling (social component of activity)

and electoral success of liberal political parties is of special interest. They faced quite a paradoxical situation, as the liberalism ideology (at least in economic respect – economic liberalism) was taken by most of anti-communist and even post-communist parties as basic. Therefore, in this situation liberal parties needed to somehow emphasize their ideological belonging to liberalism against the implementation of liberal/anti-communist principles of other political parties of the region. With regard to this, the special attention should be paid to the evaluation of electoral success and social pattern/component of political activity of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Before analyzing this issue, one should understand some theoretical and methodological peculiarities. Principal peculiarity is that *political party* is normally regarded as a voluntary organizationally-ordered union of citizens representing the interests of certain social groups of population, has the social development program and acts on the basis of certain ideology for obtainment/realization of political power. Accordingly, the *social component of political party activity* which can be successfully evaluated through electoral success of the party, is the social base, social issues, and social responsibility of political party. These are the spheres of political party activity, which, on the basis of ideology directly connect the voter (party social environment) and the electoral result (party institutional environment). They may be outlined in the form of the following interrelations: between society in general and political party acting for certain social sphere (ascension to the social base of the party activity); between rank and file (electorate) and party apparatus (ascension to the social issues reflected in whether the party fulfills social demands of its electorate); between the party apparatus and the part of the party which, in case of election victory, occupies governmental positions (ascension to the social responsibility of the party in front of the rank and file and party apparatus). These components are summarized into the *social component/social infrastructure* of political party activity assessment of which responds to the question of how successfully political party and party system accumulated and realized existing social interests. In this respect it is obvious that: *the party social basis* is the reason for transforming the party into the governmental structures (first of all into governmental and parliamentary parties); *social issues* are the social challenges to settle which political parties take part in the political process, namely, in program and creative activity, electoral participation and probably party management; *the party social responsibility* is the party readiness to take the blame for non-fulfillment of social and other obligations in front of their electorate (first of all in the above case we should appeal to the governmental party category which bears the political responsibility in front of its electorate and in front of the whole country) on the basis of which the party ideological position in the system is changed, and upon which the party's future political success depends. Synthesizing of the political party activity components is followed by the allocation of the political party *social functions*. This is acting for the interests of different social groups; their satisfaction; expansion of the party social base; social integration and dealing with the social contradictions; political socialization of individual; realization of social initiatives and work with youngsters; interaction between the

governmental institutions and civil society institutes; insurance of population relation with the state institutions and increase of control over their activity and activity of parties, etc. Electoral success, social component of activity, and social functions of the parties are interrelated categories the assessment of which may be deemed full only in case it is both consistent and paralleled. With this in mind, in the *first part of the research* we suggest considering the liberal parties and their electoral/governmental success in the Central and East European countries which in the *second part of the research* will be compared and complemented with regard to the peculiarities of the social program dimensions of the parties ideological positioning in the region. The analysis is methodologically suggested in the form of case study synthesis methods (separately for each country of the region) and regional comparison (simultaneously for all countries in Central and Eastern Europe) (see tables 1 and 2).

In *Bulgaria* during 1990–2014 the following liberal parties operated: Bulgarian Business Block (BBB), National Rescue Union (ONS), Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), National movement Simeona II (later National movement for stability and progress) (NDSV). In *Estonia* during 1992–2014 the following liberal parties existed: Estonian party of Entrepreneurs (EEE), Estonian Coalition Party (EKK), Estonian Party of Reforms (ERe). Among Latvian liberal parties during 1993–2014 the following may be singled out – Democratic Centrist Party, (DCP) which was later renamed into Latvian Democratic Party (LDP), Democratic party «The Host» (DPS), National Unity Party (TSP) (until 1994 was called “Harmony for Latvia – national economics recovery») and Latvian way (LC). More liberal political parties during 1992–2014 existed in *Lithuania*, among which the following: Lithuanian democratic party (LDP), Lithuania liberal union (LLiS), Lithuanian Centrist Union (LCS), «New union (Social-Liberals)» (NS), Liberal and Centrist Union (LiCS), Workers’ Party (DP) and Liberal movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS). In *Poland* liberal parties (first of all as anti-communist) were successful right after the Soviet Union collapse, but later they became less represented on the political arena (up till 2011). Among them in 1990–2014 the following were singled out: Democratic union (UD), Liberal and democratic congress (KLD), «Freedom Union – Democratic party» (UW-PD), «Palikot’s Movement» (RP) and «Your movement» (TR). In *Romania* during 1990–2014 the following powerful (frequently governmental) liberal parties were represented: «Civil alliance» (PAC), Democratic party (PD), Liberal party/Democratic convention (PL/DC), Liberal democratic party (PLD), National Liberal Party (PNL), Democratic liberal party (PD-L). Less electorally successful parties in *Slovakia* during 1990–2014 were represented by Society against violence (VPN), parties Civil democratic alliance (ODÚ), Hungarian democratic party (MOS), «Democratic union» (DUS), «New citizens’ Alliance» (ANO) (since 2011 – Party of Speech liberty (SSS), and since 2014 – party «The Citizens» (OBČANIA)), «Freedom and Solidarity» (SaS).

Table 1. Liberal parliamentary parties, their ideological positioning and electoral success in the Central and East European countries (1990–2014)¹

| Part ² | Year of Party formation | Party ideological positioning | Positioning in the left-right ideological sector (0= max left, 10= max right) | Party representation in the parliament; years of election (number of mandates) | Party governmental membership; Starting from |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Bulgaria | | | | | |
| BBB | 1990 | Classical liberalism, right-centrism | 6.7 | 2. 1994 (13), 1997 (12) | – |
| ONS | 1997 | Liberalism, right-centrism | 5.9 | 1. 1997 (19) | – |
| DPS | 1990 | Liberalism, centrist, social-liberalizm, interesi musulmanskoj lenčini | 4.6 | 7. 1991 (24), 1994 (15), 1997 (8), 2001 (21), 2005 (40), 2009 (30), 2013 (36) | 3. 2001, 2005, 2013 |
| NDSV | 2001 | Liberalizm, centrizam | 5.8 | 2. 2001 (120), 2005 (53) | 2. 2001, 2005 |
| Estonia | | | | | |
| EEE | 1988 | Liberalism, left-centrism | 8.3 | 1. 1992 (1) | – |
| EKK | 1991 | Liberalism, right-centrism | 7.2 | 3. 1992 (17), 1995 (41), 1999 (7) | 4. 1995, 1995, 1996, 1997 |
| Ere | 1994 | Classical liberalism, right-centrism | 7.9 | 5. 1995 (19), 1999 (18), 2003 (19), 2007 (31), 2011 (33) | 9. 1995, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014 |

¹ Conventional signs: k – in electoral coalition; BBB – Bulgarian Business block (Български бизнес блок); ONS – National Salvation Union; DPS – Movement for Rights and Freedoms; NDSV – National Movement Simeona II (later National movement for stability and progress (National movement Simeona Vroty); EEE – Estonian Party of Entrepreneurs (Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond); EKK – Estonian Coalition Party (Eesti Koorderakond); Ere – Estonian Party of reforms (Eesti Reformierakond); DCP – Democratic Centre Party (Demokraatlik Centra Partija); DPS – Democratic party „Hosť“ (Demokraatiska partija „Saimnieks“); TSP – Party of National Unity (Tautas Saskaņas Partija); LC – The Latvian way (Latvijas Cēš); LDP – Lithuanian Democratic Party (Lietuvos demokrati partija); LLS – Liberal Union of Lithuania (Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga); LCS – Lithuanian Centrist Union (Lietuvos centro sąjunga); NS – „New union (Social-Liberals“ (Naujoji sąjunga (socialliberalai)); LLS – Liberal and Centrist Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga); DP – Workers Party (Darbo Partija); LRLS – Movement of Liberals of the Republic of Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalų sąjūdis); UD – Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna); KILD – Liberal and Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny); UW/PD – Freedom Union – Democratic Party „Unia Wolności – Partia Demokratyczna“; PR – Palikors Movement (Ruch Palikota); PNL – National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal); PAC – Party „Civil alliance „ (Partidul Alianța Civică); PL/DC – Liberal party / Democratic convention (Partidul Liberal/Convenția Democrată); PD – Democratic party (Partidul Democrat); PLD – Liberal Democratic Party (Partidul Liberal Democrat); PD-L – Democratic Liberal Party (Democratic Liberal Party); MOS – Hungarian civil party (Magarskă občianska strana); VPN – Society against violence, (Vereinigt proti násiliju); DUS – Democratic union (Demokraatiska ūnija); ANO – „The New citizens Alliance „ („Aliancia nového občana“); SaS – Freedom and Solidarity „ (Sloboda a Solidarita); SZDZ – Slovenian Democratic Union (Slovenska demokratična zveza); SOS – Slovenian Liberal Party (Slovenska libertarijska strana); LDS – „Liberal Democracy of Slovenia“ („Liberalna demokracija Slovenija“); DL – „Civil Register „ (Državljanstva lista“); SdZs – Union of free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége); VP – Party of Entrepreneurs (Vállalkozók Pártja); OF – „Civil forum „ (Občanské fórum“); ODA – Civil Democratic alliance (Občanska demokraatiska alianca); LSU – Liberal Social Union (Liberalné sociálne ůnity); US – „Union of Freedom „ (Unie Svobody“); VV – „Public Relations“ („Veći vetejn“); ANO – „Action of dissatisfied citizens“ („Akec nespokojených občian“).

² Other (never were parliamentary) liberal parties in the Central and East-European countries: Bulgaria – Union „New choice“ („Нова избор“) (SNI), Democratic forces Union – liberals (Съюз на демократичните сили – либералите) (SDS-I), party „The Leader“ (LR); Estonia – Estonian blue Party (Eesti Sinine Erakond) (ESE); Latvia – Latvian democratic worker’s party (Latvijas Demokratiškă darba partija) (LDDP), „Society of other politics „ (Sabiedriba citai politikai) (SCP), „Political union of economists „ (Tautsaimnieku politiškă apvieniba“) (TPA); Lithuania – „Motherland renewal and perspective „ (Tevynės atgimimas ir perspektyva“) (TAIP), Civil Democratic party (Pilietinis demokratijs partija) (PDP); Poland – „Your movement“ („Twój Ruch“) (TR), Polish economic program (Polski Program Gospodarczy) (PPG); Slovakia – Alliance of Democrats (Aliancia demokratoj Slovenska) (ANO), „Free forum“ („Slobodné fórum“) (SF), Party of Liberty (Strana slobody) (SSL), „Changes from Below“ – Slovakia Democratic Union („Zmena zdola“ – Demokratiškă ūnia Slovenska) (ZZ-ZS); Slovenia – Liberal Democratic Party of Slovenia (Liberalno demokratiška stranka Slovenije) (LDSS), „Active Slovenia“ („Aktivna Slovenija“) (AS); Czech Republic – European Democratic Party (Evropskă demokratiškă strana) (EDS); Civil movement (Občanské hnutí) (OH); Czechoslovakian party of businessmen, traders, and farmers (Strana československých podnikateli, živnostníků a rolníků) (SCPZR), SNK European democrats (SNK Evropskůi demokrati) (SNK-ED), LIDEM – Liberal Democrats (LIBERALNĚ demokrati) (LIDEM).

| Latvia | | | | | | |
|-----------|---------------|--|----|--|-----------------------|--|
| DCP | 1992 | Liberalism, centism | 59 | 1: 1993 (5) | - | - |
| DPS | 1993 | Liberalism, centism | 59 | 1: 1995 (18) | - | 3: 1995, 1997, 1997 |
| TSP | 1993 | Liberalism, Social-democracy, leftism | 19 | 3: 1993 (13), 1995 (6), 1998 (16) | - | - |
| LC | 1993 | Conservative liberalism, right-centism | 61 | 3: 1993 (36), 1995 (17), 1998 (21) | 1: 2004 (1) | 10: 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1997, 1998, 1998, 1999, 1999, 2000 |
| Lithuania | | | | | | |
| LDP | 1989 | Liberalism, centism | 58 | 3: 1990 (3), 1992 (6), 1996 (3) | - | - |
| LLS | 1990 | Classic liberalism, conservatism | 68 | 2: 1996 (1), 2000 (34) | - | 1: 2000 |
| LCS | 1992 | Liberalism, centism | 49 | 3: 1992 (2), 1996 (13), 2000 (2) | - | 3: 1996, 1999, 1999 |
| NS | 1998 | Social-liberalism, left-centism | 43 | 3: 2000 (29), 2004 (11), 2008 (1) | - | 3: 2000, 2001, 2004 |
| LICS | 2003 | Liberalism, conservative liberalism, right-centism | 78 | 2: 2004 (18), 2008 (8) | 1: 2004 (2) | 2: 2006, 2008 |
| DP | 2003 | liberalism, social-liberalism, populism, left-centism | 39 | 3: 2004 (39), 2008 (10), 2012 (29) | 2: 2004 (5), 2009 (1) | 3: 2004, 2006, 2012 |
| LRLS | 2006 | Conservative liberalism, right-centism | 78 | 2: 2008 (11), 2012 (10) | 1: 2009 (1) | 2: 2008, 2010 |
| Poland | | | | | | |
| UD | 1990 | liberalism, social-liberalism, Christian democracy, centism | 44 | 2: 1991 (62), 1993 (74) | - | 2: 1992, 1993 |
| KLD | 1991 | Pragmatic liberalism, liberal-Catholicism, centism | 53 | 1: 1991 (37) | - | 3: 1991, 1992, 1993 |
| UW-PD | 1994 | liberalism, social-liberalism, centism | 52 | 1: 1997 (60) | 1: 2004 (4) | 1: 1997 |
| PR | 2011 | liberalism, liberal-socialism, libertarianism, anti-clericalism, populism, centism | 59 | 1: 2011 (40) | - | - |
| Romania | | | | | | |
| PNL | 1875/ 1989 | Liberalism, liberal conservatism, centism | 61 | 6: 1990 (29), 1996 (25), 2000 (30), 2004 (64), 2008 (65), 2012 (100) | 2: 2007 (6), 2009 (5) | 9: 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2012 |
| PAC | 1992 | Liberalism, centism | 44 | 1: 1992 (14) | - | - |
| PL/DC | 1992 | Liberalism, centism | 59 | 1: 1992 (13) | - | - |
| PD | 1993 | Liberalism, social-liberalism, centism | 54 | 3: 1996 (43), 2000 (31), 2004 (48) | 1: 2007 (13) | 5: 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2006 |
| PLD | 2006 | Liberalism, conservative right-centism | 61 | 1: 2007 (3) | - | - |
| PD-L | 2007 | Conservative liberalism, Christian democracy, right-centism | 54 | 2: 2008 (115), 2012 (52) | 1: 2009 (10) | 4: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 |
| Slovakia | | | | | | |
| VPN | 1989 | Liberalism, centism | 59 | 1: 1990 (48) | - | 2: 1990, 1991 |
| MGOS | 1992 | Liberalism, centism | 59 | 1: 1992 (1) | - | - |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|------|--|-----|--|-----------------------|--|
| DUS | 1994 | Liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 1994 (15) | – | 1: 1994 |
| AMO | 2001 | Liberalism, right-centrist | 7,2 | 1: 2002 (15) | – | 1: 2002 |
| SaŠ | 2009 | Liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 2: 2010 (18), 2012 (11) | – | 2: 2010, 2011 |
| Slovenia | | | | | | |
| SDZ | 1989 | Liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 1990 (8) | – | 1: 1990 |
| SOS | 1989 | Liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 1990 (3) | – | – |
| LDS | 1990 | Liberalism, social-liberalism, left-centrist | 3,7 | 6: 1990 (12), 1992 (23), 1996 (25), 2000 (34), 2004 (24), 2008 (5) | 2: 2004 (2), 2009 (1) | 10: 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2011 |
| DL | 2011 | Classic liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 2011 (8) | – | 2: 2012, 2013 |
| Hungary | | | | | | |
| SzDSz | 1988 | Liberalism, social-liberalism, left-centrist | 4,0 | 5: 1990 (93), 1994 (69), 1998 (24), 2002 (20), 2006 (20) | 1: 2004 (2) | 4: 1994, 2002, 2004, 2006 |
| VP | 1989 | Classic liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 1994 (1) | – | – |
| Czech Republic | | | | | | |
| OF | 1989 | Classic liberalism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 1990 (127) | – | 1: 1990 |
| ODA | 1989 | Conservative liberalism, right-centrist | 7,1 | 2: 1992 (14), 1996 (13) | – | 4: 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998 |
| LSU | 1992 | Social-liberalism, ecological liberalism, left-centrist | 3,0 | 1: 1992 (16) | – | – |
| US | 1998 | Conservative liberalism, right-centrist | 7,2 | 2: 1998 (19), 2002 (9) | – | 4: 1998, 2002, 2004, 2005 |
| VV | 2001 | Conservative liberalism, populism, participatory democracy, right-centrist | 5,9 | 1: 2010 (4) | – | 1: 2010 |
| ANO | 2011 | Liberalism, populism, centrist | 5,9 | 1: 2013 (47) | – | 1: 2014 |

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Unequal electoral influence during 1990–2014 was given to the liberal parties in *Slovenia*, among which: Slovenian Democratic Alliance (SDZ), Slovenian liberal party (SOS), «Civil register» (DL) and «Liberal democracy of Slovenia» (LDS). In Hungary liberal parties are quite weak. The matter is that as of 2014 they were not politically represented or stopped their functioning. In 1990–2014 they included the Party of entrepreneurs (VP) and Union of free democrats (SzDSz). Liberal parties in *Czech Republic* were much more powerful and included (mostly like parliamentary, at different times) the following: movement «Civil forum» (OF), «Civil movement» (OH), Civil democratic alliance (ODA), Liberal social union (LSU), «Unity of liberty» (US) (since 2002 –»Liberty Union – Democratic Union» (US-DU)), «Public Relations» (VV) and «Action of dissatisfied citizens» (ANO) (for details see table 1).

Comparative analysis of *electoral success* of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 1) in 1990 they were represented in the parliaments of Latvia and Poland; 2) in 1990–2000 they were represented in the parliaments of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and Czech Republic; 3) they were insufficiently represented in European Parliament, except for the liberal parties of Czech Republic and Slovakia; 4) they participated in the formation of governments in all countries of the region but they were almost never positioned as dominating governmental parties; 5) more frequently the governments with the participation of liberal parties functioned in Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia, less frequently – in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovakia, Hungary, and Czech Republic³. Generally, the representation of liberal parties in the region is insufficient (as compared to the parties of social-democratic or conservative orientation).

The specificity of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is that they follow *similar development models*. In most countries of the region liberal parties and movements first of all participated in the formation of national anti-communist «umbrella» organizations. Later they separated from them and tried to participate independently in the political process, which very frequently determined their *electoral failures*. After this the efforts were made to reform most liberal parties in the Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, the second period of their development is marked by numerous interparty/intraparty breakups and associations. This has become the reason of the following: *first of all*, liberal political parties do not frequently participate in the formation of governmental cabinets (especially this concerns Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary); *secondly*, liberal parties in the governmental cabinets are considered as secondary partners who do not have the positions of principal ministers (actually, liberal parties can not form the governments themselves); *thirdly*, very often after their participation in coalitional governmental cabinets electoral success of liberal parties (at regular parliamentary elections) essentially decreased. Quite usual is the conclusion that due to the *weakness of the liberal parties social base* they can not form the stable/consolidated party

³ Some liberal parties are/were the members of Liberal international. This, for example, is National movement Simeona II and Rights and Liberties Movement in Bulgaria, Estonian party of reforms, The Latvian way, «new union (Social-Liberals)» and Liberal and centrist union in Lithuania, National liberal party in Romania, «Liberal Democracy of Slovenia».

organization able to “survive” more than two election rounds. Only Several liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe make an exception: Rights and Liberties movement in Bulgaria, Estonian party of reforms, Worker’s Party in Lithuania, National liberal party in Romania, in its time “Liberal democracy of Slovenia” and Union of free democrats in Hungary, who managed to overcome the intra-party breakups and maintain the electorate support increase during a long period of time. In the other countries liberal parties are very weak and face the rivalry of stronger conservative and social-democratic parties⁴. Strange as it may seem, the reason of the liberal parties social base weakness is *ideological centrist position*, which causes their inability to consolidate certain electorate and provide for its stable loyalty. Exception is the rights and Liberties Movement in Bulgaria and National liberal party in Romania. Instead, liberal parties which are “as far as possible” from the conventional ideological center are usually much electorally successful.

Besides, the program challenges of liberal parties in the region is that they do not always have clearly defined *social base* and *identity*, as there is no sociopolitical division which causes the reason of liberal parties strengthening (almost all parties in the Central and Eastern Europe advocate the principles of free market, supremacy of law and individual rights and liberties of human and citizen, which at the same time are the main principles of liberal parties)⁵. Accordingly, sometimes liberal parties do not have stable ideology which complicates searching for their electorate. Consequently, quite often liberal parties can not withstand the decentralized tendencies which leads to their disappearance from political arena. Besides, the electorate not always has a clear understanding of the essence of liberal ideology, and therefore singly supports liberal parties. The problem is aggravated by the perception of liberal parties perspectives by their management. Very often the liberal party leaders in case of failure search for the ways of new parties formation. This increases the liberal parties diversity in the region, as well as electoral inequality, because the voters at some elections may vote for some liberal parties, and at the other – for the other parties.

The Socio-electoral profile of liberal parties in most countries of the region is similar. The liberal parties electorate is usually more *educated*, than the electorate of the other parties; the percentage of voters with the higher education among liberal parties is bigger as compared to the other parties. This is related to the fact that liberal ideas are especially popular among the intellectuals, where the liberty and free business activity, free circulation of goods and manpower are rather considered as advantage than as disadvantage. The social basis of liberal parties in the Central and Eastern Europe has much more possibilities to obtain the profit from liberalized system where its competence and abilities constitute an asset, and therefore it is less concerned about the warranties of preserving working positions or social requirements. Nevertheless, J.-M. De Waele i B. Cholova state that such electorate of liberal parties is more unstable, because well-educated person, is usually more interested in

⁴ J.-M. De Waele, B. Cholova, *The Liberal Parties in Central and Eastern Europe : Weakness and Potential: Final Report*, Wyd. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party, 2013, s. 43.

⁵ Alongside, in late 1980–s – early 1990–s liberal parties relied upon the social division of «communism – anti-communism». Consequently, the social basis of the first liberal parties in the region was constituted by the dissidents. For more details see: J. Malíš, P. Marek, *Politické strany – vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861–2004*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005.

the policy than the average citizen, and, correspondingly, is much more criticized in mass-media or aggressive campaign of political rivals⁶. Besides, the educated voter is more critical as to the policy and suggestions of the political parties, as he is able to make up his own view on any issue, and that is why he is less «loyal», as compared to less educated voter. One more attribute of the social image of liberal voter is the age: the voter supporting liberal party is normally *younger* than the voter supporting other political parties. Young voters are less dependent on the phenomenon of the «social security of communist country» or idea of Welfare State, and therefore views the liberalization as an advantage. Besides, young voters are less nostalgic for the past and «old regime», than, for instance, their parents. But this, at the same time, is the reason for the liberal parties social base weakness, as young voters are socialized in constantly changing development conditions, therefore, they do not position themselves with the «traditional» parties and may easily give their vote to any new party reflecting their actual interests and values. One more peculiarity of liberal electorate is that they are mostly constituted by the *urban population*, moreover, the population of big cities. It is less sensitive in the conditions of liberal market economy, because it does not depend upon the state allowances (the state-dependent population normally votes for the socialist or conservative parties, as liberal position may threaten its interests). One of the reasons is that urban population is much more open to the cultural changes than the population of remote territories. Therefore, liberal voter is more worldly and easily accepts modern values, as compared, for example, to the conservative voter, who is more religious and defends traditional values. The exception is ethnically-oriented electorate of Rights and Liberties Movement in Bulgaria, whose voter is less educated than the electorate of the other parties, and is traditionally employed in agro-industrial complex. This fact once more proves the specificity of this liberally-ethnic party, which does not fit in the general model of liberal parties development in the region, but is rather similar to the parties of ethnical regionalism. Generally, as to the electoral geography of liberal parties, the following two conclusions are applicable: 1) in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe liberal voter lives in big cities and regional centers; 2) in most cases liberal voter lives in the western countries of the regions which traditionally embrace the richest regions. Nevertheless, it causes frequent desire of liberal voter to vote for new political forces which he is likely to view as more liberal.

In the political process the *party liberalism* in the Central and East-European countries gravitates towards the principles of the law supremacy and individual right protection, especially the rights to traditional liberties, such as the freedom to worship, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of conscience. Alongside, still there are heated discussions as to the «liberty equality», which constituted the reason for constructing at least three types of practical (reflected in the programs of

⁶ J.-M. De Waele, B. Cholova, *The Liberal Parties in Central and Eastern Europe : Weakness and Potential: Final Report*, Wyd. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party, 2013, s. 44.

political parties) liberalism – classical, social, and conservative⁷. Classical liberalism prevails in the programs and actions of liberal parties in Bulgaria (except for the rights and liberties movement, which gravitates to the social liberalism), Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (except for «Liberal democracy of Slovenia», which gravitates more to the social liberalism); social liberalism – in the programs and actions of liberal parties in Poland (except for liberal-democratic congress, which gravitates more to pragmatic liberalism), Hungary (except for the Party of entrepreneurs existing in the early 1990–s, which gravitated more to the classic liberalism). In Latvia in 1990s, when liberal parties were popular, the elements of classical, social, and conservative liberalism were combined. In Lithuania in 1990–s classic liberalism prevailed, and in 2000–s the confrontation between social and liberal liberalism takes place. In Romania in 1990–s classic liberalism prevailed, since 2000–s – conservative liberalism was prevailing (except for the Democratic party gravitating to the social liberalism). In Czech Republic it is impossible to mark the domination of certain type of liberalism.

⁷ Generally, *common principles of ideological positioning of liberal political parties* in the Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2014 are/were the following: organization and maximization of free market and private entrepreneurship; integration into the free European market; government decentralization; support of pluralistic society, parliamentary democracy, republican form of government, market economy, privatization, freedom of agricultural associations, different property forms and new tax policy (namely, introduction of system of the so-called «flat taxation»); liberalization of citizenship; achievement of legal equality of citizens and middle class expansion; development of profitable sectors of economy and national business; attraction of social investments; departure from the socialist system of social insurance; fighting corruption, gradual increase of minimal salary; development of social policy due to successful economic policy; creation of contractual army; provision of state loyalty as to the moral and religious issues. Some liberal political parties, particularly in Bulgaria and Latvia, at the same time are positioned as the parties defending the interests of national minorities. Alongside, they do not perceive ethnic model as a static product or as accomplished act, but rather as a process requiring inter-ethnic patience at every level – in the interpersonal and social relations, as well as in the political life. Principal values of liberal parties in the region are as follows: personal freedom and dignity; social solidarity; people's welfare; social justice and decentralization; maintenance of the social dialogue and sympathy; law supremacy, moral and open policy. This, due to the combination of rule of thumb and functioning of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe allows stating that most frequently the ideological specificity of liberal parties in the region is that their programs synthesize liberalism and socialism. Alongside, quite often classic liberal and liberally-conservative political parties are represented in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as liberal parties ideologically complemented by the principles of Christian democracy. Nevertheless, as it is demonstrated by the practices of Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, principles of liberalism (namely, libertarianism) in the activity of certain political parties are complemented by anti-clericalism (canceling of religious education in national schools, cutting of state aid to the churches, legalization of abortions, euthanasia, and marihuana, homosexual marriages, etc.). Therefore, the scientists believe that generally, liberalism in the region is «pragmatic», oriented towards European Union and quite rarely Euro-skeptical. See also: D. Almeida, *The Impact of European Integration on Political Parties: Beyond the Permissive Consensus*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2012, s. 102.; E. 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Nevertheless, today liberalism is often viewed as community-oriented ideology, because quite a lot of liberalism theoreticians state that its significant characteristics is the community respect: therefore, the individual choice is meaningful only in the context of community, reflecting such social value of social liberalism as solidarity, harmony, and unity⁸. Consequently, the following forms of liberal orientation of the parties are singled out: individualism (mainly focused on individual rights protection) and pluralism (gravitating to particularistic cultural representation and solidarity, along with the individual rights protection)⁹. In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe liberal parties constitute the individualism phenomenon. Conventionally, the exception were such liberal parties as National Salvation Union in Bulgaria, Estonian coalitional party, Estonian party of reforms, Democratic centrist party, Democratic party «The Host» and the Party of National Unity in Latvia, Liberal and centrist Union of Lithuania, «Society against violence», Democratic Union in Slovakia, «Liberal democracy of Slovenia», Union of free democrats in Hungary, «Union of freedom» and «Public relations» in Czech Republic (for details, see table 2). It means that the liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by a small attention given to the issues of social development. Instead, party liberalism in the region is mostly economical (connected with the free market and national control reduction), civil (related with the human rights and individual liberties) and cultural (related with protection of minorities and tolerance, as well as some ethnic issues, namely abortions, homosexual marriages, euthanasia, etc.). Quite often this is the reason of electoral failures of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, at least with regard to the electoral success of social-democratic and conservative parties more focused on the social development problems¹⁰. In order to demonstrate the lack of attention concentration by the liberal parties on the social development issues (social components of party activity) we suggest addressing to the results of evaluation of the social program dimensions of liberal parties ideological positioning in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe according to «Manifesto Project» as of 1990–2012. (For more details see table 2).

In 1990–2012 *the liberal parties social positioning* in the Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by the following trends: 1) enough attention paid to the human rights and liberties, to the democracy development; 2) salary stimulation, subsidies, and tax policy, private enterprise

⁸ C. Taylor, Atomism, [w:] S. Avineri, A. De-Shalit (eds.), *Communitarianism and Individualism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.; W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995.; C. Taylor, A. Gutmann, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1994.; J. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1988.; C. Young, Ethnic diversity and public policy: an overview, [w:] C. Young (ed.), *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry*, Wyd. Macmillan Press and St Martin's Press 1998.; C. Wellman, *A Theory of Secession. The Case for Political Self-determination*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

⁹ S. Deets, *Liberal pluralism: does the West have any to export?*, "Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe" 2002, vol 4, s. 1–12.; E. Charney, *Identity and liberal nationalism*, "American Political Science Review" 2003, vol 97, nr 2, s. 295–310.; W. Kymlicka, *Multiculturalism and minority rights: East and West*, "Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe" 2002, vol 4, s. 1–26.; A. Patten, *Liberal neutrality and language policy*, "Philosophy and Public Affairs" 2003, vol 31, nr 4, s. 356–386.; W. Norman, *Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.; Z. Csergo, K. Deegan-Krause, *Liberalism and cultural claims in Central and Eastern Europe: toward a pluralist balance*, "Nations and Nationalism" 2011, vol 17, nr 1, s. 85–107.

¹⁰ M. Tupy, *The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe: Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat to Liberalism*, "Development Policy Analysis" 2006, nr 1.

development; 3) provision of cultural and entertainment activities, development of sports and mass-media; 4) development of equality, fair relations between people, special protection of the deprived, fair resource distribution, eliminating of class barriers and racial or sexual discrimination; 5) development of the Welfare State, social insurance, social services support (healthcare service, system of municipal housing provision); 6) education development at all levels. Though, liberal parties in their programs (and in their actions) do not pay much attention to the following *social development issues*: 1) fighting with corruption; 2) introduction of direct state control over economy, prices, salary, rent payment, and national intervention into economy; 3) development of traditional moral values, fighting with immorality, indecent behavior, development of family and religion; 4) development of social solidarity and unity, disapproval of anti-social positions; 5) development of cultural diversity, maintenance of autonomy of religious and linguistic heritage; 6) development of workers' associations, worker's class and unemployed people, support of trade unions, appropriate medical care to workers; 7) development of «old» and «new» middle class, professional groups, etc. Generally, social dimension in the liberal parties activity is *most reflected* in Latvia, Estonia, and Hungary, and *less* – in Romania, Slovenia, and Poland. *The most socially-oriented liberal parties* in 1990–2012 are Estonian party or reforms, Democratic centrist party, Democratic party «the Host», National unity party in Latvia, «Society against violence» and Democratic Union in Slovakia; and *the least socially-oriented liberal parties* are Bulgarian business-block and National movement Simeona II in Bulgaria, «Latvian way», Democratic union in Poland, Democratic party, Liberal democratic party and Democratic and liberal party in Romania, «New citizens' alliance» and Freedom and solidarity» in Slovakia, «Civil Register» in Slovenia, liberal social union and «Public relations» in Czech republic.

Table 2. Evaluation of social program dimensions of ideological positioning of liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (at most successful or last elections with the participation of each analyzed liberal party in the region), according to «Manifesto Project» (1990–2012)¹¹

| Party/year of elections | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | Average data | Party position in left-right sector | Party ideological family |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|----------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Bulgaria | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| BB8/1994 | 0.54 | 3.76 | 6.45 | 0.00 | 0.81 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 3.23 | 2.42 | 1.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.38 | Right-centrism | Liberal | |
| ONS/1997 | 3.60 | 0.90 | 1.80 | 0.90 | 1.80 | 0.00 | 8.11 | 3.60 | 4.50 | 5.41 | 4.50 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 2.83 | Right-centrism | Liberal | |
| NDSV/2001 | 0.38 | 0.95 | 0.57 | 4.16 | 0.19 | 3.02 | 0.76 | 8.88 | 7.18 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.19 | 0.38 | 1.93 | Centrism | Liberal | |
| DP5/2005 | 1.63 | 3.52 | 0.45 | 6.41 | 0.00 | 5.24 | 2.80 | 9.94 | 5.33 | 0.18 | 0.36 | 0.45 | 3.61 | 0.00 | 2.85 | Centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| Average data of the whole country | 1.54 | 1.48 | 1.65 | 4.48 | 0.05 | 2.52 | 1.09 | 6.73 | 4.09 | 1.01 | 2.12 | 2.12 | 2.39 | 0.23 | 2.25 | — | — |
| Estonia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EKK/1995 | 0.96 | 0.72 | 0.24 | 7.66 | 0.00 | 4.55 | 0.48 | 13.16 | 4.55 | 1.44 | 1.20 | 0.00 | 2.63 | 0.00 | 2.69 | Right-centrism | Liberal |
| ERe/2011 | 1.53 | 1.94 | 0.10 | 1.53 | 0.20 | 10.81 | 1.02 | 8.66 | 9.99 | 0.61 | 2.24 | 2.34 | 1.33 | 0.10 | 3.03 | Right-centrism | Liberal |
| Average data of the whole country | 1.25 | 1.33 | 0.17 | 4.60 | 0.10 | 7.68 | 0.75 | 10.91 | 7.27 | 1.03 | 1.72 | 1.17 | 1.98 | 0.05 | 2.86 | — | — |
| Latvia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DPV/1993 | 4.32 | 5.56 | 4.32 | 8.02 | 0.00 | 6.79 | 3.70 | 4.32 | 10.49 | 0.62 | 1.23 | 1.85 | 0.62 | 0.00 | 3.70 | Centrism | Liberal |
| LC/1993 | 0.45 | 0.90 | 0.45 | 7.62 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.45 | 1.79 | 6.73 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.35 | Right-centrism | Con. Liberal |
| DP5/1995 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.77 | 0.00 | 1.75 | 3.51 | 40.35 | 3.51 | 5.26 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.76 | Centrism | Liberal |
| TS9/1998 | 4.20 | 3.78 | 3.78 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 3.36 | 5.04 | 11.34 | 7.14 | 0.00 | 6.30 | 1.68 | 1.68 | 0.00 | 3.48 | Leftism | Soc. liberal |
| Average data of the whole country | 2.24 | 2.56 | 2.14 | 6.21 | 0.00 | 2.98 | 3.18 | 14.45 | 6.97 | 1.15 | 3.20 | 0.88 | 0.58 | 0.00 | 3.32 | — | — |
| Lithuania | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LCS/1996 | 2.11 | 2.11 | 0.60 | 2.86 | 1.36 | 4.07 | 1.36 | 4.97 | 3.77 | 0.60 | 1.05 | 0.90 | 1.96 | 0.30 | 2.00 | Liberalism | Liberal |
| LIS/2000 | 5.85 | 4.09 | 1.77 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.97 | 0.58 | 4.53 | 7.60 | 0.29 | 2.78 | 0.15 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 2.41 | Right-centrism | Liberal |
| NS/2000 | 4.39 | 2.41 | 0.22 | 1.98 | 0.00 | 3.18 | 1.65 | 5.38 | 7.03 | 0.77 | 0.55 | 0.44 | 3.29 | 0.55 | 2.27 | Left-centrism | Soc. liberal |
| LCS/2004 | 4.11 | 5.40 | 2.31 | 1.29 | 0.00 | 4.63 | 2.57 | 6.17 | 4.88 | 0.00 | 2.06 | 0.26 | 1.54 | 1.03 | 2.59 | Right-centrism | Con. liberal |
| DP/2004 | 2.11 | 8.42 | 2.11 | 6.32 | 0.00 | 3.16 | 0.00 | 8.42 | 4.12 | 0.00 | 4.21 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.78 | Left-centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| LRLS/2012 | 1.10 | 3.48 | 2.20 | 3.11 | 0.00 | 6.23 | 3.48 | 0.55 | 10.62 | 0.00 | 2.93 | 0.37 | 2.75 | 1.83 | 2.76 | Right-centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| Average data of the whole country | 3.28 | 4.32 | 1.44 | 2.81 | 0.23 | 4.37 | 1.61 | 5.00 | 6.34 | 0.28 | 2.26 | 0.35 | 1.66 | 0.62 | 2.47 | — | — |

¹¹ Conventional signs: A – human rights and liberties; creation of the program of personal freedom and civil rights importance; freedom from bureaucratic control, speech freedom, freedom from the coercion in political and economic spheres; B – democracy; creation of the program of democracy importance as a method or objective in national and other organizations, as well as involvement of citizens into the decision-making process; C – political corruption; determining of the programs by the parties aimed at corruption elimination in political and civil life; D – motivation of private enterprise development by salary, subsidies, and tax policy; E – controlled economy; within party programs – introduction of direct state control over economy, prices, salary, rent payment, as well as state intrusion into the economy; F – culture; within party programs – provision of cultural and entertainment activities, development of sport and mass-media etc.; G – social justice; within party programs – development of justice, equality, fair relations between the people, special protection of the deprived, fair distribution of the resources, elimination of class barriers, racial or sexual discrimination; H – Welfare State; within party programs – development of the Welfare State; social services support, namely, healthcare service, or municipal housing system; I – education; education development at all levels; J – traditional morale; within party programs – development of traditional moral values, suppression of immorality and indecent behavior; development of family and religion; K – social harmony; within party programs – development of social solidarity and unity, civil movement, disapproval of anti-social positions; L – multiculturalism; within party programs – development of cultural diversity, communalism, pillarization, preservation of autonomy of religious and linguistic heritage inside the country; M – labor societies and groups; within party programs – development of workers' associations, class of workers and unemployed people, support of trade unions, appropriate medical care to workers; N – middle class and professional groups; within party programs – development of «old» and «new» middle class, professional groups. Conventional designations of the names of parties, see in the table 1.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|----------------|----------------|
| Poland | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KL/D/1991 | 16.41 | 12.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.23 | centrism | Liberal |
| UD/1993 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.85 | 0.00 | 1.85 | 0.00 | 9.26 | 5.56 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.85 | 0.00 | 1.46 | centrism | Liberal |
| UW-PD/1997 | 1.66 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 9.29 | 0.00 | 4.64 | 0.17 | 19.73 | 4.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 2.93 | centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| Average data of the whole country | 6.02 | 4.22 | 0.00 | 3.71 | 0.00 | 2.16 | 0.06 | 9.92 | 3.51 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 2.20 | — | — |
| Romania | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PD/2000 | 1.59 | 6.17 | 3.00 | 1.94 | 0.00 | 0.18 | 0.71 | 4.23 | 3.88 | 0.00 | 1.23 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.12 | centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| PNL/2008 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 3.09 | 5.15 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.00 | 4.64 | 3.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.03 | 1.33 | centrism | Con. liberal. |
| PD-L/2008 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 1.35 | 2.47 | 0.00 | 4.49 | 1.12 | 4.72 | 1.35 | 0.90 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.22 | Right centrism | Con. liberal. |
| Average data of the whole country | 0.70 | 2.45 | 2.48 | 3.19 | 0.00 | 1.73 | 0.61 | 4.53 | 2.77 | 0.30 | 0.56 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 1.12 | — | — |
| Slovakia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| VPW/1990 | 10.00 | 9.73 | 0.00 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 5.68 | 2.43 | 4.32 | 4.05 | 0.00 | 1.89 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.01 | centrism | Liberal |
| DUS/1994 | 3.12 | 2.40 | 0.48 | 4.56 | 0.00 | 5.28 | 2.88 | 10.31 | 8.39 | 3.12 | 2.16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.05 | centrism | Liberal |
| ANO/2002 | 4.01 | 1.11 | 3.12 | 1.34 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | 1.56 | 2.00 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.00 | 1.08 | Right centrism | Liberal |
| SaS/2010 | 1.45 | 1.99 | 5.35 | 0.91 | 0.00 | 4.35 | 7.26 | 1.99 | 1.99 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.80 | centrism | Liberal |
| Average data of the whole country | 4.65 | 3.81 | 2.24 | 1.97 | 0.27 | 3.83 | 3.31 | 4.52 | 4.11 | 1.25 | 0.65 | 0.47 | 0.22 | 2.24 | — | — |
| Slovenia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LDS/2000 | 1.06 | 0.46 | 0.23 | 1.67 | 0.08 | 6.87 | 4.94 | 12.65 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 2.16 | 0.34 | 0.04 | 0.00 | Left centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| DU/2011 | 1.89 | 6.82 | 0.00 | 1.52 | 5.68 | 1.52 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 3.79 | 1.52 | centrism | Liberal. |
| Срепни јани по крајини | 1.48 | 3.64 | 0.12 | 1.60 | 2.88 | 4.20 | 2.66 | 6.52 | 0.63 | 0.44 | 1.46 | 0.17 | 1.92 | 0.76 | — | — |
| SaDSz/2006 | 3.94 | 2.13 | 0.16 | 2.13 | 0.00 | 5.36 | 9.14 | 3.70 | 6.93 | 0.24 | 1.65 | 1.65 | 1.34 | 0.08 | Left centrism | Soc. liberal.. |
| Average data of the whole country | 3.94 | 2.13 | 0.16 | 2.13 | 0.00 | 5.36 | 9.14 | 3.70 | 6.93 | 0.24 | 1.65 | 1.65 | 1.34 | 0.08 | — | — |
| Hungary | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OF/1990 | 5.39 | 5.39 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 1.20 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 4.19 | 0.00 | 13.77 | 1.80 | 0.60 | 0.00 | centrism | Liberal. |
| ODM/1992 | 2.30 | 2.56 | 0.51 | 5.88 | 0.77 | 3.32 | 1.79 | 7.42 | 4.35 | 0.51 | 1.02 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 1.02 | Right centrism | Con. liberal. |
| LSU/1992 | 1.33 | 3.33 | 2.00 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 1.33 | 3.33 | 2.00 | 8.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.00 | 0.00 | Left centrism | Soc. liberal. |
| US/1998 | 2.09 | 11.36 | 0.30 | 5.98 | 0.00 | 1.94 | 0.90 | 4.78 | 3.44 | 3.74 | 0.30 | 1.94 | 0.00 | 2.80 | Right centrism | Con. liberal. |
| WP/2010 | 2.37 | 5.81 | 6.29 | 0.71 | 0.00 | 2.49 | 1.19 | 4.86 | 1.78 | 1.42 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.36 | Right centrism | Con. liberal. |
| Average data of the whole country | 2.70 | 5.69 | 1.82 | 2.77 | 0.29 | 2.06 | 1.56 | 3.93 | 4.35 | 1.13 | 3.02 | 0.80 | 0.97 | 0.75 | — | — |
| Average data of sampling | 2.78 | 3.16 | 1.22 | 3.34 | 0.38 | 3.69 | 2.40 | 7.02 | 4.70 | 0.68 | 1.66 | 0.77 | 1.18 | 0.41 | — | — |
| Czech Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Žródło: A. Volkers, N. Merz, S. Regel, A. Werner, O. P. Laczewell, H. Schultze, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MPG/MP/MAPPOR). Version 2013b*, Wyd. WZB Berlin Social Science Center 2013.; J. Budge, H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkers, J. Bara, E. Janenbaum, R. Fording, D. Hearl, H.-M. Kim, M. McDonald, S. Mendez, *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Eectors, and Governments 1945–1998*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.; H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkers, J. Bara, I. Budge, M. McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Eectors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990–2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

Such type of liberal parties social positioning and *human rights and liberties*, are best of all replicated by Poland and Slovakia, and worst of all – by Romania, Estonia, and Slovenia, and in party respect – best of all by Liberally-democratic Congress of Poland and «Society against violence» in Slovakia, and worst – by Bulgarian business-block and National movement Simeona II in Bulgaria, Latvian way and Democratic party «the Host» in Latvia, Democratic union in Poland, National liberal party and Democratic liberal party in Romania. *Democracy* as a method or objective in the national and other organizations and involvement of citizens into the decision-making process is viewed as important by the Liberal parties of Lithuania, Poland and Czech Republic, and less important – by the liberal parties of Estonia, Bulgaria, Hungary. In the party respect the dimension is best represented by the Worker's party in Lithuania, Liberal-democratic congress in Poland, «Society against violence» in Slovakia and «Unity of freedom» in Czech Republic, and worst – Bulgarian business-block and National movement Simeona II in Bulgaria, Latvian way and Democratic party «The Host» in Latvia, Democratic Union and «Union of liberty – Democratic party» in Poland, National liberal party, and Democratic liberal party in Romania, «Liberal democracy of Slovenia» in Slovenia.

The attempts to *overcome the corruption* poorly correspond to the social dimensions of liberal parties in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect the parties in Romania and Latvia are positioned somewhat better and worse the parties in Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary. One of the most successful parties, socially aimed at corruption elimination is the Bulgarian business block, Democratic centrist party and Party of national unity in Latvia, Democratic party and National Liberal party in Romania, «New citizens' alliance» and «Freedom and Solidarity» in Slovakia, «Public relations» in Czech Republic. The dimension of *motivation with salary*, subsidies, and tax policy of private enterprise development is quite developed in the social points of the programs of liberal parties majority in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but most of all in Latvia, Bulgaria, and Estonia (the following parties are most noticeable: Bulgarian business-block and Movement for human rights and liberties in Bulgaria, Estonian coalitional party, Democratic centrist party, Latvian way and Democratic party «the Host» in Latvia, Worker's Party in Lithuania, «Freedom Union – Democratic party» in Poland). Instead, the controlled *economy phenomenon* is underdeveloped as a social dimension of programs of almost all liberal parties of the countries of region, except for the parties «Civil register» in Slovenia, «Society against violence» in Slovakia, Latvian centrist union (for details see table 2).

In social respect of liberal parties program activity in Central and Eastern Europe much attention was paid to the *cultural* issues. This is most characteristic of liberal parties in Estonia and Hungary. However, the least attention to this respect of social policy is paid by such political parties as Bulgarian business-block, Latvian way, Liberal and democratic congress in Poland, Democratic party and National liberal party in Romania, as well as «the New Citizens' Alliance» in Slovakia. The *social justice* dimension was especially developed in the programs of the following parties «Union of free democrats» in Hungary, «Freedom and solidarity» in Slovakia, «Liberal democracy of Slovenia»

and National Unity party in Latvia. In most cases other liberal parties do not pay enough attention to the issues of the development of equality, fair relations between the people, special protection of the deprived, fair distribution of the resources and elimination of class barriers and racial or sexual discrimination. However, the dimension of *Welfare State* development is quite popular in all countries and for all liberal parties of the region together with the social security system, social services support, namely, healthcare service or municipal housing system. This is expressly demonstrated by the example of liberal parties of Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Though, even in these (and other) countries some liberal parties do not pay (at least at the program level) much attention to the development of Welfare State. Among them in 1990–2012 the following should be singled out: Bulgarian business-block, Latvian way, Movement of liberals of the Republic of Lithuania, Liberal and democratic congress in Poland, «The New citizens' Alliance» and «Freedom and solidarity» in Slovakia, «The Civil register» in Slovenia, and «Civil forum» in Czech Republic. Except for Romania and Slovenia such social dimension of liberal parties' program as *education* (at all levels) is quite developed. Undisputed leaders in this context are liberal parties of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary. However, some liberal parties pay or have paid quite a little attention to the education. Among them: Bulgarian business-block, Liberally-democratic congress in Poland, Democratic liberal party in Romania, «Liberal democracy in Slovenia» and «The Civil Register» in Slovenia, «Public Relations» in Czech Republic (for details see table 2).

Traditionally undeveloped is such attribute of social dimension of the liberal parties program activity as *development of traditional moral values, family, and religion*. Exception are such liberal parties as Democratic party «The Host» in Latvia, Democratic Union in Slovakia, and «Freedom Union» in Czech Republic, where the issue of traditions despite liberal orientation of the parties was always quite substantial. Also generally underdeveloped are such social dimensions of liberal parties' programs in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as multiculturalism (or development of cultural diversity, communalism, pillarization, maintenance of the autonomy of religious and linguistic heritage inside the country), development of the workers' associations, worker's class and unemployed people, support of trade unions, appropriate medical care to workers, development of «old» and «new» middle class and professional groups. Exception in the context of importance of *multiculturalism* are or were the following parties: National Salvation Union in Bulgaria, Estonian party of reforms and «Freedom Union» in Czech Republic; in the context of *labor associations and groups protection* – National Salvation Union and Rights and Liberties Movement in Bulgaria, Estonian Coalition Party, «New Union (Social-liberals)» in Lithuania, Liberal movement of the Republic of Lithuania, «The civil register» in Slovenia, as well as Liberal social Union in Czech Republic; in the context of *middle class and professional groups protection* – Liberal movement of the Republic of Lithuania, Democratic party of Romania, «Freedom Union» in Czech Republic. The situation in the region was somewhat better with such dimension of liberal parties programs as *social harmony*. But the development of social solidarity/unity, or the civil movement, disapproval of anti-social positions is not characteristic of the programs of such parties as the Latvian way, Liberally-democratic

Congress, Democratic Union and «Freedom Union – Democratic party» in Poland, National liberal party in Romania, «Society against violence» and «Freedom and Solidarity» in Slovakia, Liberal social Union and «Public relations» in Czech Republic (for more details see table 2).

According to the comparative analysis, left liberal parties are more socially-oriented in the region, and less socially-oriented are left-centrist and centrist liberal parties, the least socially-oriented are right-centrist liberal parties. The most socially-oriented type of liberalism is the social-liberalism, less socially-oriented is classical liberalism, and the least is conservative liberalism. At the same time, according to G. McElroy and K. Benoit¹², interesting fact about modern liberal parties, including in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is that they are two-dimensional from ideological point of view, as from economic point of view they gravitate more to the right specter, and socially – to the left. This is often the reason of electoral failures of the liberal parties in the countries of the region. Noteworthy is also the fact that the institutionalization of liberal parties, and, accordingly, their social basis and orientation towards the Central and Eastern Europe passed at least two stages of development. At first stage liberal parties were positioned as anti-communist in the narrow understanding of anti-communism phenomenon (as a complex of liberal ideas acting against communist principles, ideology and certain political trends and government methods). Therefore, social base of the first liberal parties was mostly formed by dissidents and oppositionists of the times of «people's democracy» regime, and liberal parties program orientation itself was based on socio-political division «communism– anti-communism». Later (usually in the process of economic and political liberalization that was a direct objective of liberal parties of the so-called «first» or «anti-communist» wave», and after conceptual determination of Euro-integration perspectives of the countries of region) liberal parties started being viewed as liberal in wide understanding (including as socio-liberal, liberally-conservative or libertarian). Accordingly, the social base for these parties was constituted by the image of educated and young city voter which caused the «dilution» of socio-political conditioning of liberal political forces. Accordingly, it is believed that modern liberal parties in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not based on the expressive socio-political division, which causes the weakness of their electoral positions.

¹² G. McElroy, K. Benoit, *Policy positioning in the European Parliament*, "European Union Politics" 2011, vol 13, nr 1, s. 150–167.

До питання про політичні технології у політиці: теоретико-методологічний аспект їх аналізу

У статті зроблено спробу всестороннього аналізу понять «технологія» «техніка», «політична технологія». Висвітлено змістовне наповнення цих категорій. Розглянуто політологічні підходи до поняття «політична технологія», а також чинники та методи якими можна визначити «політичну технологію».

Ключові слова: технологія, техніка, політичні технології, політичний PR

Kwestia polityki technologii politycznej: Teoretyczne i metodologiczne aspekty analizy

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę kompleksowej analizy pojęć «technologii» «technologia», «technologii politycznej». Wskazuje czynniki i metody, które charakteryzują „technologię polityczną” w kontekście politologicznym.

Słowa kluczowe: technologii, technologia, polityka w zakresie technologii, PR polityczny

To the issue about political technologies in politics: Theoretical and methodological aspects of their analysis

The article deals with comprehensive analysis of such concepts as “technology” “technics”, “political technology”. The article contains information about meaningful content of these categories. Analyzed political science approaches to the concept of “political technology”, as well as factors and methods that can define “political technology”.

Keywords: technology, technics, political technologies, political PR

The transition from post-industrial society to the informative one allows us to investigate the political processes out of technological positions. At present, people use technologies in

all spheres of human activity. Politics, being one of the components of human activity, is an industry in which the process of technologizing is widely used. Reasons for technologizing of political process are in human needs, rational use of informational and time resources.

In principle, technologies are used to optimize any kind of human activity, as well as for the study of socio-political processes and their management. Unlike the production, in the social sphere technologies have their specific feature – dependence on human factors. Political technologies as a special type of social technologies determine the content and the form of political processes, their structure, the functioning of political system, and affect the participants' behavior of political relations.

The term “technology” originated from the Greek words “techno” – the art, mastery and “logos” – science, knowledge, law. In dictionaries technology is defined as follows:

1. as a complex of knowledge, information about the sequence of certain manufacturing operations in the production of something;
2. as a set of methods of handling or processing materials, manufacturing products, leading of manufacturing operations, etc.;
3. as «the science about recycling and processing materials, ways of goods production and the set of methods used in different activities»;
4. as «any means of converting raw materials, whether they are people, information or physical materials in order to obtain the desired product or services». ¹

In a broad sense, „technology” means a series of techniques, methods, ways and means of organizing and managing the practical activity according to the purpose, specifics and even the logics of transformational process and the transformation of this or that object. Most soviet and foreign scholars believe that the widespread use of technology is an axiom of society. Among these social technologies there elective ones.

Technology embedded in a variety of processes, ensuring the formation and the use of political power on different levels of the state and society, thus contributing to the formation of not only universal, but also typical properties of political technologies.

Some experts differ the concept of „technology” and „technichs”, as technology is a set of defined techniques which are united around a common purpose and strategy in the light of the situation. Technics is – a particular method or technique, the sequence of steps that always lead to a certain result. Thus, under the concept of political technologies fall not all known methods. For example, organizing of the social event or political upheaval – this is technology and the conducted demonstration or rally – is a technique. Technicians can work in any country without significant changes, while the technologies are more specific and require adaptation. ²

¹ Кочубей Л. Виборчі технології: Навч. посібн. / Л. Кочубей. – К.: Український центр політичного менеджменту, 2008. – С. 10

² Шелестов О. Теоретичні засади дослідження виборчих технологій в електоральному процесі України та проблеми їх ефективності [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http://www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/soc_gum/dip/2010_50/10_24.pdf

Thus, the solution of a particular problem means not the understanding of human goals and means of their achievement, but the producing specific versions of their implementation in practice, that is the use of certain technology for solving the problem. In general, technological solution of the problem means not the understanding of what form it is, but rather how „to defuse” the specific situation. Therefore, by using the technology appears a new meaning and essence of power. Technology in a new dimension raises a concern of political events, put the base for specialized activities to resolve or control political phenomena. Creating a special perspective of understanding the political processes, political technologies show that used methods of problem solution can dramatically affect the essence of this phenomenon.

The term „political technology” is relatively young. Under a technological solution is generally understood how the planned result is achieved in the context of a particular situation. In its turn, under the political technologies mean a system of consistent actions and tools, techniques, methods, procedures that are used by politicians (individuals, political and social groups, political parties, associations, pressure groups, etc) in order to achieve the desired political result, and the implementation of political values and interests.³

Nowadays there is no clear definition of political technologies. Using this expression, political consultants often mean very different categories – starting with the specific techniques and methods of forming public opinion till strategic approaches and principles. As for ordinary voters, this expression is often associated with „black PR” used by political technologists in order to achieve victory by any means.

The concept of „political technologies” are used to describe methods of achieving the required results in policy. Ukrainian scholar M. Holovaty suggests that „political technologies” – are set of methods and systems of consistent actions directed on achieving the desired political result. In political practice, they appear as a set of methods of using the objective laws of politics, materialization of political science abstractions into concrete decisions, documents, regulations, orders. The features of political technologies conditioned by the nature of the political process, which includes a variety of political activity within a specific political system.⁴

Soviet analysts M. Obushnyy, A. Kovalenko, A. Tkach distinguish the concept of „the technology of power”. Under this category scientists understand a combination, a system of various techniques of power activity, designed to achieve (given, conceived) result. Different power technologies include power techniques such as achieving local, short-term effect (here usually talk about tactics of power), as well as obtaining a decisive, large-scaled, fundamental, strategic, long-term result.⁵

³ Кочубей Л. Виборчі технології: Навч. посібн. / Л. Кочубей. – К.: Український центр політичного менеджменту, 2008. – С. 11

⁴ Головатий М. Мистецтво політичної діяльності: навч. посіб. для студ вищ. навч. закл. / М. Головатий. – К.: Міжрегіон. акад. упр. персоналом, 2002. – С. 20

⁵ Обушний М. Політологія: довід. / М.Обушний, А.Коваленко, О.Ткач. – К.: Довіра, 2004. – С. 123

Russian expert Mikhail Koshelyuk isolates the concept – „political PR”, which defines the sphere of political activity related to the organization and management of political campaigns. This scholar also notes that „the most striking their prototypes are pre-elective campaigns, so today between political PR and the so-called elective technologies usually put an equal sign”.⁶

Some types of political technologies are closely related to this notion, among them there are: „technologies of political management” (running the political process), „informational technologies” (the formation and direction of informative flows of government-affiliated media corporations), „technology of lobbyist activity” (functioning of political individuals of business groups to protect their economic interests in the current policy), „parliamentarism technology” (creation of proper agenda and direction of the representative body of state power in the programmed direction), „technology of political power legitimation” (formation of political perceptions into power).

If we start with an understanding of political technologies as an instrument of political control, the list of types of political technologies formed in accordance with the directions of political governance should include the following technologies: political analysis; political consultation; decision-making; conflict management; management of the negotiations; lobbying; elective; „public relations” political advertising; informative; informative network.

In this context it can be affirmed that political technologies are a combination of consistently used procedures, techniques and methods of activities directed on the most optimal and effective implementation of the goals and tasks of a particular individual at a particular time and in a particular place. In general, as a set of specific knowledge and skills that provide a solution of specific tasks by the individual in the sphere of governing, political technologies sometimes are also called political marketing that we believe to be somehow irrelevant.

Political activity as any other activity, has not only its own features, tools and techniques, but also patterns. It is nothing like the corresponding technologies of political activity.

The literature sometimes served the formulation such as polling «techniques» or «methods of election campaign.» When applied to the electoral process, in our opinion, it is still advisable to use the term «technologies», not «methods». The technology – is a system ... The main element that distinguishes the «technology» from the «methods» – is a description of the final result. Political technology provides the result in the election (the success of a particular politician or a party), and methods which are used can be in other sciences (psychology, sociology, etc.).⁷

Thus, to talk about political technologies, analyze and classify them, at first you must define the terminology and try to bring the entire range of views to a common denominator.

⁶ Кошелюк М. Технологии политических выборов / М. Кошелюк. – СПб.: Питер, 2004. – С.11

⁷ Кочубей Л. Виборчі технології: Навч. посібн. / Л. Кочубей. – К.: Український центр політичного менеджменту, 2008. – С. 9

There are several complementary approaches to the definition of political technologies that were stated by a number of experts.

Approach 1. Conditionally call it «instrumental» (M. Holovaty, M. Koshelyuk), defines the concept of «political technology» in the most general terms – a set of technics (techniques, steps) with the result of transforming the source material into a certain product. The material can be public (elite) opinion, and the product – voting for a candidate (support).

Approach 2. In the focus of «communicative» approach (V. Bebyk, T. Greenberg) there is a communication, and technology is defined as a sequence of actions for building channels of communication between the candidate for elective office and the electorate.

Approach 3. The Followers of «psychological» approach (D. Olshansky, L. Kochubej, G. Potsepchov) put to the fore the study and the impact on public opinion, because technology here is a double combination, which comprises a study of electoral preferences at first (using universal research methods), and then the impact (delivery of the expected information by using different techniques).

Approach 4. The Followers of «strategic» approach (Y. Surmi, D. Narizhnyi) divide the concept of «political technologies» into its component parts. For them, technology – is primarily a set of strategic principles and approaches to the holding of elective campaign. These strategic concepts are universal. First of all, they are the principles of positioning and promoting the political message. Secondly – this is the work of «message». Besides, the experts separate technological approaches (promotion, forecasting), which are universal, from technological methods and channels of communication.

Approach 5. Through the prism of «leadership» approach (V. Fisano, G. Fesun) the technology is a sequence of actions to transform the informal leaders (politicians) into formal ones or maintenance in the leaders' hands the levers of power.

Approach 6. In the concept of «model» (S. Kara-Murza, E. Malkin, E. Suchkov) technology looks like not the activity, but rather like a business model. This is the result of the analysis of already carried activity. Besides, it was carried out repeatedly – just an analytical testing of certain provisions of the general model allows you to be confident in its accuracy and, if it is necessary, universality.⁸

Approach 7. The authors of «interactive» approach (M. Grishin) interpret the substantive nature of political technologies as practices of their own interaction between public authorities and citizens who are aware of their interdependence from each other and permanently affect the development of joint action in order to control social and political processes, and not only during elections.⁹

⁸ Универсальные политические технологии и страновая специфика: опыт российских политических консультантов / Под рук. Е. Н. Минченко [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: <http://www.stratagama.org/issledovaniya.php?nws=10853949126458904522>

⁹ Кузь О. Виборчі технології в модерному електоральному процесі США та України: монографія / О. Кузь, І. Поліщук, Т. Моторнюк. – Харків: Інжеск, 2012. – С. 45

It should be noted that all the approaches mentioned above not so contradict as rather complement each other. In a combination all these allow to understand the nature and specific features of the complex phenomenon of political technologies.

Summarizing the different approaches, we can give the following definition of political technologies – these are intellectually managed complex algorithms of political actions (political events, actions, campaigns) that are aimed at systematical improving of the political individuals functioning in order to maintain the state power.

Consultants all agree that universal political technologies exist. Some even say that in general technologies are universal, at the same time there is no specific technologies.

Political technologies are a set of the most appropriate measures, methods, procedures, implementations of the political system functions, aimed at increasing the political process efficiency and achieving the desired results in the field of politics. Political technologies contain the means of achieving rapid local short-term results (tactics) as well as getting deep, global, long-term effect (strategy). Use of any political technologies determines the effectiveness of political control, regulation of political processes, the stability of the political system and the entire political space. Political technologies are largely determined by the type of social development (whether there dominates evolutionary or revolutionary process), the nature of the regime (democratic, totalitarian, etc.).

In practice, they are presented as a transformation of political science theory into concrete decisions, resolutions, orders.

Political technologies are heterogeneous as object-based criteria, and, as a rule, resolving of political problems requires the use of complex technologies. Therefore, in practice, there is a system of different political technologies .

Political technologies can be grouped into the following :

- analytical technologies (political analysis, political consulting);
- practical («field») technologies (decision-making, conflict management, negotiation management);
- communicative technologies (agitation, propaganda), political advertising.
- In addition, there are several types of political technologies distributed on the criterion of the politics nature :
- «Common» (relating to the maximum number of citizens, many individuals of the political process. Most common among them there is the technology of «conquering» and holding the power. To the Common political technologies include the technologies of elective campaign;
- Individual (peculiar to individual politicians) that are used by some political, civic and state leaders. Public appearances, participating in conversations, discussions, conflict resolution belong to the most common individual political technologies. Each technology has its own characteristics, due to which certain image of politician cre-

ates, as well as his influence and popularity, also shapes and enriches the experience of political activity.

Each of these technologies has certain specific of use, so that creates a corresponding politician image, his authority and popularity. Individual political technologies must bear the imprint of the person's personality who uses them. General technologies are technologies of making political decisions relating to the maximum number of people (national, state decisions) and technologies of elective campaigns. But without knowledge of the specifics, political technology peculiarities and the ability to use them, it is almost impossible to achieve success in politics.

Also political technologies are divided into:

- democratic and non-democratic;
- basic (reflects opinions or actions of large groups or entire populations in general, such as opinion polls, elections, referenda);
- secondary (technologies of certain political decisions adoption, holding of individual political actions, meetings, rallies, pickets, marches, supporting or protesting demonstrations);
- general (mostly related to the interests of many individuals of political process);
- individual (peculiar to some politicians). Individual technologies are used by individual politicians, civil, government officials (public speaking, participation in conversation, discussion, conflict resolution, performance on radio, television, press, etc.).¹⁰

The use of political technologies has always driven by specific social, political roles that are constantly performed by political individuals, as each individual (personality) always has a corresponding social status associated with specific social problems which affect their solution. That is what caused the peculiarities, uniqueness, originality sometimes seems to be the same political technologies.

Political technologies exist in several forms, namely the development and adoption of certain political projects and solutions; implementation of policy decisions; technologies of political power formation; election technologies; technologies of political parties, organizations and associations; technologies of public opinion formation; technologies of public interests coordination; technologies of resolving political conflicts and more. The majority of political technologies are used in the struggle for the power and its maintenance, expansion and strengthening.¹¹

Summarizing all the mentioned above as for political technologies, we note that their arsenal is quite large and diverse. You can not talk about the applicability or inapplicability

¹⁰ . Головатий М. Мистецтво політичної діяльності: навч. посіб. для студ вищ. навч. закл. / М. Головатий. – К.: Міжрегіон. акад. упр. персоналом, 2002. – С.14

¹¹ Кочубей Л. Виборчі технології: Навч. посібн. / Л. Кочубей. – К.: Український центр політичного менеджменту, 2008. – С.14

of one hundred percent of certain technologies in specific countries, as within any country there are significant differences between regions and groups of voters. Moreover, the situation is dynamic, and technologies that were effective year ago, may cease to be so today. Each time a particular process chain is built with individual blocks as a designer does. Therefore, it is crucial to create individual strategies for specific client in these unique circumstances and receive constant feedback during its implementation.

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Profesjonalizacja polskiej służby więziennej w kontekście szkolenia – teraźniejszość i przyszłość

Realizacja zadań stawianych przez społeczeństwo Służbie Więziennej wymaga profesjonalnego przygotowania do wypełniania penitencjarnej misji więziennictwa. Polski system penitencjarny posiada własną organizację szkolenia personelu, podlegającą ewolucji i reorganizacji, tak aby sprostać wymogom profesjonalizacji. W pracy przedstawiono charakterystykę polskiej Służby Więziennej oraz aktualny stan edukacji personelu więziennego i zmiany, które będą miały miejsce w najbliższej przyszłości w systemie kształcenia zawodowego funkcjonariuszy.

Słowa kluczowe: Służba Więzienna, szkolenie funkcjonariuszy, personel więzienny

Professionalization polish prison service in the aspect of training – present and future

Completing the tasks posed by the Prison Service society requires professional preparation of penitentiary to perform the mission of the prison. Polish prison system has its own system of personnel training, subject to the evolution and reorganization so as to meet the demands of professionalization. The paper presents the characteristics of Polish Prison Service and the current state of education of prison staff and the changes that take place in the near future in the system of vocational education officers.

Keywords: Prison Service, education officers, prison staff

Professionalization is described as a process of qualitative and quantitative transformation of human resources and hardware security institutions of the state. The aim is to gradually increase the professionalization level in three functional areas: personnel, technical modernization and training². These activities are distributed over time and are introduced gradually,

¹ PhD. Robert Poklek senior lecturer. Training Centre of the Prison Service in Kalisz, Address: 62-800 Kalisz. ul. Wrocławska 193-195, Poland.

² S. Ruman, *Model osobowy profesjonalnych Sił Zbrojnych*, [w:] *Edukacja w Siłach Zbrojnych RP w dobie profesjonalizacji*, W. Horyń, K. Klupa, L. Welyczko, Wrocław 2010.

so that the institution could continue to assume its constitutional task³. Important place in the era of professionalization is the reorganization, improvement and creation of appropriate conditions for the training and further training. Success will depend on the achievement of planned goals, because the personnel in each which is directly related to the proper functioning of the system of recruitment and training of staff⁴.

Systemic change has forced the need to reform the prison system, hitherto associated with the camera security system of oppression and communist state. It carries out the tasks in which priority was to isolate and general prevention and disgraceful episodes of repression independence activists in the years 40 and 50, the use of seclusion democratic opposition activists in 1981-1983. Therefore, after 1989, the Prison Service has undergone a number of transformations towards the professionalization of the profession prison officers initiated by its first Director-General of the Third Republic, Paul Moczydłowski and continued to the present day⁵. According to P. Moczydłowski new and inexperienced officer, but morally pure, more contribute to peace in the prison and law-abiding pursue the objectives of imprisonment rather than specialist with long experience, but demoralized and dubious reputation⁶. The transitional period – the most dangerous to the operation of units – ended around 1994, when stabilized wave of resignations, and new officers took relevant experience. Since 2000, gradually increasing number of staff, recruited more women and people with higher education⁷.

It should be emphasized that the current form of the Polish prison system is not a completely new creation of post-communist era, despite the considerable likeness to the construction of a European study of prison. Some of the legal and organizational solutions have been introduced in its original form, the other in a modified version of the previous period, and some were taken from the concept of Western countries. This indicates a certain continuity of thought Polish penitentiary, including correctional, pursued by modern Prison Service⁸. Re-organized the system of vocational education staff⁹. Changes included the ideological content of the curriculum and meeting international standards, focused on interdisciplinary training,

³ E. Trojanowska, *Wstęp*, [w:] *Edukacja w Siłach Zbrojnych RP w dobie profesjonalizacji*, W. Horyń, K. Klupa, L. Welyczko, Wrocław 2010.

⁴ W. Michniewicz, *Kierunki zmian w systemie kształcenia i doskonalenia zawodowego podoficerów w warunkach profesjonalizacji SZ RP*, [w:] *Edukacja w Siłach Zbrojnych RP w dobie profesjonalizacji*, W. Horyń, K. Klupa, L. Welyczko, Wrocław 2010.

⁵ W. Głowiak, I. Ossowska, *Kadra więzienna*, [w:] *Księga jubileuszowa więziennictwa polskiego 1989–2009*, Warszawa 2009.

⁶ P. Moczydłowski, *Więziennictwo – od systemu totalitarnego do demokratycznego*, „Przegląd Więziennictwa Polskiego”, nr 8.

⁷ W. Głowiak, I. Ossowska, *Kadra więzienna...*

⁸ H. Machel, *Współczesne problemy polskiego więziennictwa*, [w:] *W dziewięćdziesiątce polskiego więziennictwa. Księga jubileuszowa*, (red.) Z. Jasiński, A. Kurek, D. Widelak, Opole 2008.

⁹ Por. Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 26 lipca 2010 roku *w sprawie szkolenia oraz doskonalenia zawodowego funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej* [Dz.U. z 2010 r. Nr 144, poz. 970]; Zarządzenie Dyrektora Generalnego SW Nr 89 z dnia 21 grudnia 2010 roku *w sprawie programów szkolenia wstępnego, zawodowego oraz specjalistycznego w Służbie Więziennej oraz czasu trwania szkoleń*, (niepublikowane).

referring to activating teaching methods and modern practical training¹⁰. It should be emphasized that Poland was the only country with “the former Eastern bloc”, performs its own system of training of prison staff¹¹.

Characteristics of Polish Prison Service

The Prison Service creates a separate subsystem of the government institution responsible for the internal security of the state, subordinate to the minister of justice¹². Performs criminal policy of the State to which the objectives are as retribution (retribution), social rehabilitation, deterrence, positive general prevention, reparation and protection of society by isolating offenders¹³. The role of the prison system begins at the moment of transition justice to the execution phase, which relates directly to an individual person – the suspect or offender and indirect victims of crime and society¹⁴. The fundamental rules governing the activities of the Prison Act on the prison service¹⁵ and the Executive Penal Code Act¹⁶ and other provisions relating to the penitentiary law, having the character of acts under statutory¹⁷.

The Prison Service is the formation of uniformed, armed and apolitical, with its own organizational structure¹⁸. The organizational units are: Central Board of Prison Service, Regional Inspectorates of Prison Service prisons and detention centres, as well as offering training and staff development¹⁹. It is so well-known a three level organizational model (Central Board – Regional Inspectorate – Prison or Detention Centre) supplemented with training centres²⁰. The institutional structure of a particular penitentiary unit, there are three organizational levels: top management, middle management and a basic level of contractors²¹. The staff of a prison or detention centre officers and create civilian employees, acting out their

¹⁰ K. Jędrzejak, *Ewolucja treści szkolenia funkcjonariuszy służby więziennej*, [w:] *Ustawiczna edukacja obronna dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i narodowego*, (red.) R.M. Kalina, P. Łapiński, R. Poklek, K. Jędrzejak, Kalisz 2009; Idem, *Czynniki determinujące interdyscyplinarny charakter przygotowania funkcjonariuszy służby więziennej* [w:] *Więziennictwo. Nowe wyzwania*, (red.) B. Hołyst, W. Ambrozik, P. Stępnik, Warszawa – Poznań – Kalisz 2001.

¹¹ W. Głowiak, I. Ossowska, *Kadra więzienna...*

¹² Por. M. Lisiecki, *Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w ujęciu systemowym*, [w:] *Bezpieczny obywatel – bezpieczne państwo*, (red.) J. Widacki, J. Czapska, Lublin 1998; A. Misiuk, *Administracja porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Zagadnienia prawno-ustrojowe*, Warszawa 2008; S. Walczak, *Prawo penitencjarne. Zarys systemu*, PWN, Warszawa 1972; J. Sliwowski, *Prawo i polityka penitencjarna*, Warszawa 1982.

¹³ B. Stańdo-Kawecka, *Prawne podstawy resocjalizacji*, Kraków 2000.

¹⁴ M. Kuć, *Rola służb penitencjarnych w polityce kryminalnej*, [w:] *Autorytet i godność służb penitencjarnych a skuteczność metod resocjalizacji*, (red.) J. Świtka, M. Kuć, I. Niewiadomska, Lublin 2004.

¹⁵ Ustawa z dnia 9 kwietnia 2010 roku o Służbie Więziennej [Dz.U. z 2010 r. Nr 79, poz. 523 z późn. zm.]

¹⁶ Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 roku Kodeks karny wykonawczy [Dz.U. z 1997 r. Nr 90, poz. 557 z późn. zm.]

¹⁷ W. Śledzik, *Wprowadzenie*, [w:] *Prawo penitencjarne. Kodeks karny wykonawczy z przepisami związkowymi*, Kraków 2006.

¹⁸ Por. art. 1. ustawy o Służbie Więziennej.

¹⁹ M. Zoń, *Ustrój i zasady funkcjonowania służby więziennej*, [w:] *Księga jubileuszowa więziennictwa polskiego 1989–2009*, Warszawa 2009.

²⁰ T. Wierchowski, *Zakład karny w strukturze organizacyjnej więziennictwa – teraźniejszość i przyszłość*, [w:] *Więziennictwo. Nowe wyzwania*, (red.) B. Hołyst, W. Ambrozik, P. Stępnik, Warszawa – Poznań – Kalisz 2001.

²¹ K. Jędrzejak, *Przygotowanie funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej do wykonywania zadań ochronno-obronnych*, [w:] *Współczesne kierunki rozwoju kultury fizycznej w formacjach obronnych. Tom 5*, (red.) R.M. Kalina, K. Klukowski, K. Jędrzejak, A. Kaczmarek, Warszawa 2000.

duties in the prevention, rehabilitation, operation and administration²². The reform of the prison system meant that the penitentiary was established units penitentiary²³. The composition of the squad is a team consisting of the permanent staff of the unit (psychologist, teacher, ward and ward aides, supply, quartermaster) and the officers and employees of ad hoc working for a branch (health, workers accounting, finance, employment). Directs the Division of penitentiary department manager, who has to support a coordinator for the penitentiary-protective²⁴.

Paramilitary nature of the Prison Service gives it a formal, similar to the military organizational structure²⁵. Because of the many factors that influence the image of today's prisons and detention centers (the number of prisoners, aggressiveness, organized crime, etc.), do not expect a radical departure from the paramilitary operation of the Prison Service²⁶. The realization of the tasks is strictly defined by the rules and instructions relating to individual service stations²⁷. Subordination to the military model the effect of removing from the influence of the Prison Service of the Labour Code, and draws into the orbit depending on business, regulated professional pragmatists on the model of the police and army²⁸. Thus, in the hierarchy determines the officers belonging to the appropriate body (non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers) and the degree of service and position held²⁹.

The Prison Service is one of the disposing and uniformed groups, or social classes distinguished in sociology because of two criteria: the remaining members of the group in a specific, defined by law, the social relation and the particular role they fulfil in society. At the dispositional layer composed so all entities whose existence is a source of belonging to organized groups of a special nature, in the military, police and other uniformed services and paramilitary³⁰. Members of the group dispositional gain their livelihood, placing at the disposal of the

²² H. Machel, *Psychospołeczne uwarunkowania...*

²³ K. Keller, J. Kopczyk (red.), *Oddziały penitencjarne. Nowa struktura organizacyjna jednostek penitencjarnych*, Białystok 2007. Więcej na temat tworzenia oddziałów penitencjarnych w wybranych artykułach zamieszczonych na łamach czasopisma branżowego „Forum Penitencjarne”: A. Lupińska, *Zapomnijmy o działach*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2010, nr 6(145), s. 8-9; G. Wągiel-Linder, *Pod znakiem racjonalizacji*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2010, nr 9(148), s. 3; G. Wągiel-Linder, *Jak to się robi w Barczewie*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2010, nr 7(146), s. 20-21.

²⁴ Por. Instrukcja Dyrektora Generalnego SW nr 27 z dnia 19 listopada 2010 roku w sprawie tworzenia i organizacji oddziałów penitencjarnych w zakładach karnych i aresztach śledczych (niepublikowana); Zarządzenie Dyrektora Generalnego SW nr 30 z dnia 13 sierpnia 2010 roku w sprawie szczegółowego zakresu działania dyrektorów oraz struktury organizacyjnej zakładów karnych i aresztów śledczych (niepublikowane).

²⁵ J. Pyrcak, *Organizacja i zadania więziennictwa w nowej ustawie o służbie więziennej*, „Przegląd Więziennictwa Polskiego”, 1996, nr 12-13.

²⁶ B. Stasiaczyk, *Funkcjonariusze służby więziennej – wybrane aspekty funkcjonowania w zawodzie*, [w:] *Rekrutacja do grup dyspozycyjnych – socjologiczna analiza problemu*, (red.) J. Maciejewski, M. Liberacki, Wrocław 2011.

²⁷ A. Misiuk, *Administracja porządku...*

²⁸ P. Szczepaniak, *Wybrane problemy personelu więziennego w Polsce – wzorce a rzeczywistość*, [w:] *Służba więzienna wobec problemów resocjalizacji penitencjarnej*, (red.) W. Ambrozik, P. Stępnik, Poznań – Warszawa – Kalisz 2004.

²⁹ R. Poklek, *Motywacja osiągnięć a poziom dyrektywności funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej zajmujących różne stanowiska służbowe*, [w:] *Bezpieczeństwo a bezpieczeństwo wada*, (red.) L. Hofreiter, Liptovský Mikuláš – Liptovský Ján 2009.

³⁰ Z. Morawski, *Prawne determinanty pozycji, roli i statusu warstw dyspozycyjnych społeczeństwa Polski na przykładzie trzech organizacji formalnych*, Wrocław 2005.

master disposers³¹. Availability means submission to orders, hierarchy, discipline, drill, placed in the barracks, uniforms and significantly reduced personal life, for the fulfilment of segmentation (inside-group and out-group) social roles³².

The penitentiary system creates general rules of law and institutions of the penitentiary and prison equipment, aimed by a particular method, and methods and means – to achieve the fundamental goal of imprisonment³³, and prison staff, as the executor of that order, is a very important part of this system³⁴. The realization of the tasks assigned to staff the prison is one of the most significant factors affecting the efficiency of the mission of the prison³⁵.

The mission of the Prison Service includes aspects related to the protection of social and rehabilitation society of justice, as well as aspects of individual persons undergoing social isolation. This mission sets the appropriate security policies of both citizens and the functioning of the penitentiary unit, and therefore the aims of the prison in the presented model are two-fold nature: social (isolation and rehabilitation of criminal offenders, cooperation with other security organs) and institutional dimension (security prisoners, security personnel and material protection unit). Methods for isolating offenders relate to place them in the appropriate type of correctional facility (closed, semi-open, open) or the use of electronic surveillance system. Impact of the detainees relies on the use of individual and group interactions and therapeutic rehabilitation.

In contrast, the exercise of pre-trial detention focuses on securing the proper course of criminal proceedings by isolating partners and preventing uncontrolled external contacts, and thus the obstruction of judicial investigations. Implementation of conservation objectives within the prison includes steps to prevent the occurrence of individual or collective extraordinary events (disturbances, aggression, self-harm and suicide, destruction of property, rebellions) by identifying the atmosphere and appropriate deployment of prisoners, and in an emergency situation threatening the use of appropriate coercive measures (physical strength, service batons, handcuffs, incapacitating chemical agents, rubber bullets fired stun guns and other) or firearms.

Moreover, in the case of particularly dangerous prisoners isolates them in adequately secured separate prison cells or residential units. All activities of the Prison Service are documented in the respective reports through which it is possible to collate the statistics and

³¹ Z. Zagórski, *Grupy dyspozycyjno-mundurowe w toku transformacji. Struktura segmentacyjna a kondycja społeczeństwa Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej*. [w:] *Wojsko i inne grupy dyspozycyjne, w perspektywie socjologicznej*, „Zeszyty Naukowe WSO we Wrocławiu. Poglądy i Doświadczenia”, (red.) T. Leczykiewicz, Z. Zagórski, Wrocław 2000.

³² Z. Zagórski, *Spółczesność transformacyjna. Klasy i warstwy Polski postkomunistycznej*, Wrocław 1997, s. 25.

³³ Patrz: Wólczyński, *Prawo penitencjarne. Zarys systemu*, PWN, Warszawa 1972; J. Śliwowski, *Prawo i polityka penitencjarna*, Warszawa 1982.

³⁴ J. Górny, *Elementy indywidualizacji i humanizacji karnania w rozwoju penitencjarystyki*, Warszawa 1996.

³⁵ H. Machel, J. Zagórski, *Kadry więzienna – stan obecny, potrzeby, pozycja zawodowa i społeczna*, [w:] *Wina – Kara – Nadzieja – Przemiana*, (red.) J. Szalański, Łódź – Warszawa – Kalisz, 1998.; R. Musiłowki, *Kadry więzienna*, [w:] *Stan i węzłowe problemy polskiego więziennictwa. Część I*, „Biuletyn RPO”, 1995, nr 28.

analysis, enabling the creation of adequate security policies and possible amendment. Achieving the goals of the institution requires the integration of multiple sub-goals pursuing activities that contribute to the final effect³⁶.

Officer of the prison may be the only person unpunished, of good repute, who has Polish citizenship, at least secondary education, relevant qualifications and – most important – mental and physical ability to serve in the uniformed armed formations³⁷. Selection of candidates for the service is done strictly according to legal procedures³⁸. Selection of candidates for the service is done strictly according to legal procedures and is carried out by a cell staffing organizational unit of the prison³⁹. In addition to the formal prerequisites in the selection are also important ethical officer qualifications that are protected against moral dishonest and abuse in the criminal executive, especially in extreme situations in which undoubtedly abounds prison environment⁴⁰. The Professional Responsibilities of prison staff focuses not only on ensuring each and embedded security, but also to restore public bodies respect the law, the rules and norms that govern it⁴¹.

Training for prison guard officers in Poland

A very important part of preparing man for the professional performance of official duties is vocational education. The organization should take into account the interaction of cognitive and motivational states of participants and, if possible influence on the psyche of those states. An important component of the curriculum developed career goals are concretized and effects that influence their content and final evaluation. However, designing vocational education should, in addition to determine the content, methods and training strategies, take into consideration the characteristics of participants, including their attitudes and motivation, and the type of tasks that after completion of professional education shall implement⁴².

The basis of the educational process and the educational curriculum is the consequent range of material for individual faculties. Course contents are subject to regular updating,

³⁶ R. Poklek, *Służba Więzienna w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa*, „Securitologia”, 2013, nr 13.

³⁷ Por. A. Kaczmarek, *Etyczne i sprawnościowe kryteria przydatności zawodowej funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej*, [w:] *Więziennictwo. Nowe wyzwania*, (red.) B. Hołyst, W. Ambroziak, P. Stępnia, Warszawa – Poznań – Kalisz 2001; Z. Morawski, *Pozycja szeregowców w niektórych grupach dyspozycyjnych społeczeństwa. Uwarunkowania prawne*, [w:] *Szeregowcy w grupach dyspozycyjnych. Socjologiczna analiza zawodu i jego roli w społeczeństwie*, (red.) J. Maciejewski, A. Krasowska-Markut, A. Rusak, Wrocław 2009.

³⁸ Por. Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 20 września 2010 roku w sprawie postępowania kwalifikacyjnego do Służby Więziennej [Dz.U. z 2010 r. Nr 186, poz. 1247] oraz Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 29 lipca 2010 roku w sprawie określenia trybu przeprowadzania procedury określającej predyspozycje funkcjonariuszy do służby na określonych stanowiskach lub w określonych komórkach organizacyjnych w Służbie Więziennej [Dz.U. z 2010 r. Nr 143, poz. 966].

³⁹ J. Dzieńdziora, *Rozwój kariery zawodowej szeregowych służby więziennej*, [w:] *Szeregowcy w grupach dyspozycyjnych. Socjologiczna analiza zawodu i jego roli w społeczeństwie*, (red.) J. Maciejewski, A. Krasowska-Markut, A. Rusak, Wrocław 2009.

⁴⁰ J. Rejman, *Źródła etyki zawodowej wychowawcy penitencjarnego. Wybrane propozycje*, [w:] *Autorytet i godność służb penitencjarnych a skuteczność metod resocjalizacji*, (red.) J. Świtka, M. Kuć, I. Niewiadomska, Lublin 2004.

⁴¹ H. Karaszewska, *Personel więzienny jako realizator idei resocjalizacji*, [w:] *Służba więzienna wobec problemów resocjalizacji penitencjarnych*, (red.) W. Ambroziak, P. Stępnia, Poznań – Warszawa – Kalisz 2004.

⁴² J. Patrick *Szkolenia*, [w:] *Psychologia pracy i organizacji*, (red.) N. Chmiel, Gdańsk 2003

dependent on the development of science, changing procedures and current legislation. The education of prison officers the principle of selection methods and means adequate to the characteristics of the audience, and in particular the type and level of education, skills and abilities, as well as the specifics of the tasks that will be performed by them at different positions service⁴³.

Vocational training is aimed at equipping the officer with specialist knowledge and professional skills, conditioning the effective implementation of official tasks and work effectively. As for the transfer of acquired during training for his professional competence and improve the quality of jobs so far⁴⁴. Education officers and prison guards are three stages initial training, vocational and further training in the form of specialized courses. The main objectives of the training include: learning proper execution of official duties, independence in performing services for occupied positions, the formation of professional discipline and self-discipline, and expanding the production of knowledge and skills, development of humanistic attitudes, promote the comprehensive development of personal and professional development, the creation of an integrated system of knowledge shaping analysis and synthesis, and evaluation of phenomena at work, and others.

Currently, the *initial training* include: training course, conducted in the Prison Service Training Centre, which lasted two weeks and professional practice, implemented in an organizational unit, a period of about 11 months. During the preparatory course students are familiarized with the rules governing the functioning of the prison system and the implementation of deprivation of liberty, acquire skills in ethics and rules of official conduct and handle basic units of firearms. Part of the course is a self-directed method of e-learning. Further training takes place in its own entity penitentiary and includes learning the rules governing the execution of imprisonment and operation of the different departments of the service and improves practical skills for the post. The initial training ends with an examination, which enables further education at the stage of training in the first degree, non-commissioned officer, warrant, or an officer.

Main professional training, depending on the body (non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers), it takes about two months and covers up in several areas: legal issues and pragmatics official, penitentiary issues and international standards for the treatment of prisoners especially European, shooting and self-defense training, safety issues units penitentiary and action and intervention stocks, science and technology prison, rescue premedical. Complementing the main thematic areas of specialization subjects are: safety, penitentiary,

⁴³ M. Kalaman, M. Strzelec, *Nowoczesne formy nauczania w Służbie Więziennej*, [w:] *20 lat Polskiego Towarzystwa Penitencjarnego. Refleksje i impresje jubileuszowe*, K. Jędrzejak, M. Kalaman, R. Poklek, Kalisz 2013.

⁴⁴ S.I. Tannenbaum, G. Yukl, *Training and development in work organizations*, „Annual Review of Psychology”, 1992, nr 43.

logistical, financial, registration, organizational and legal, associated with prison health care and quartermaster issues⁴⁵.

Further forms of training are *specialist courses* dedicated to strictly defined categories of customers in service or intended for her performance on specific positions in the various departments of the service. They prepare officers to carry out the tasks related to the maintenance of security, keeping correctional labour, finance, logistics, recording of prisoners and other areas of operation of the penitentiary unit⁴⁶. An important component of the training officers are workshops and psychological training, aimed at improving the social skills include: interpersonal communication, teamwork, solving difficult situations and conflict⁴⁷.

The teaching programmes and the didactic process of prison staff is subordinate the specifics of armed paramilitary taking into account the statutory tasks of the service, which can be subject to criticism. The allegations concern, among others, the lack of connections realized the contents of the current scientific and cultural achievements, and too much emphasis on the need for a pragmatic and a safeguard items at the expense of psychological, pedagogical and social⁴⁸.

Conclusions

According to the dictionary definition professionalization means the conversion team skills and activities in the profession and designation requirements in terms of knowledge and competence of the profession⁴⁹. It is also the acquisition by employees experience, expert knowledge and expertise in a particular area. Therefore, a professional is a person professionally engaged in something and knows well on particular area⁵⁰. In other words, it is professional, expert, specialist, practices and professional performing their duties competently, expertly, reliably, and fairly neatly⁵¹. In order to an officer of the Prison Service was professional in the course of his education should seek to achieve the following learning outcomes in terms of knowledge and skills:

1. After the training officer should know and be able to apply certain provisions governing the functioning of the prison system.

⁴⁵ Por. Zarządzenie Dyrektora Generalnego z dnia 21 grudnia 2010 r. w sprawie programów szkolenia wstępnego, zawodowego oraz specjalistycznego w Służbie Więziennej oraz czasu trwania szkoleń (niepublikowane).

⁴⁶ K. Jędrzejak, *Ewolucja treści...*

⁴⁷ R. Poklek, *Skuteczność psychologicznego warsztatu antystresowego w profilaktyce stresu i wypalenia zawodowego funkcjonariuszy Służby Więziennej*, Kalisz 2006.

⁴⁸ P. Szczepaniak, *Wzory szkolenia personelu więziennego – refleksje związane z 90 rocznicą polskiego więziennictwa*, [w:] *Ustawiczna edukacja obronna dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i narodowego*, (red.) R.M. Kalina, P. Łapiński, R. Poklek, K. Jędrzejak, Kalisz 2009; W. Ambrozik, *Kształcenie i doskonalenie kadr penitencjarnych a współczesne koncepcje resocjalizacji skazanych*, [w:] *Ustawiczna edukacja obronna dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego i narodowego*, (red.) R.M. Kalina, P. Łapiński, R. Poklek, K. Jędrzejak, Kalisz 2009.

⁴⁹ K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki (red.), *Słownik socjologiczny*, Toruń 1997.

⁵⁰ A. Latusek (red.) *Wielki słownik wyrazów obcych*, Kraków 2008.

⁵¹ M. Tomczyk (red.), *Wielki słownik wyrazów bliskoznacznych*, Kraków 2008.

2. Have the ability to apply coercive measures and the use of firearms.
3. Adhere to safety procedures and be knowledgeable about the preventive measures to prevent the occurrence of hazards and apply it in practice.
4. Adequately react in different work situations both in normal service, as well as in emergency situations.
5. Have a general knowledge of the Polish penitentiary system in relation to the international standards of prison and the European Prison Rules.
6. Have a general knowledge of penitentiary institutions and their influence on inmates and staff.
7. Be able to explain the mechanisms of psychosocial behaviour of people exposed insulation and include them in their activities.
8. Use technical devices and systems used in the prison service.
9. Know the rules targeting a dedicated team of subordinates and practically apply them.
10. Know and implement the principles of conduct of official documentation.

In addition, each functionary should have adequate personal and social competence in terms of:

1. Communication skills to enable appropriate interpersonal relationships.
2. Conduct in accordance with the rules of professional ethics prison officer and compliance with official principles of behaviour.
3. Skills appropriate to organize own work and cooperate with other officers and employees in the implementation of duties.
4. Beliefs about the necessity of continuing professional development and maintenance of an adequate level of mental and physical ability.

Efficiency is a priority of the modern educational system of education and professionalization of the determinant. This efficiency is an attribute of any organized action, and therefore one in which goals set, the band methods, forms and means to achieve these tasks. Each of these elements needs to be managed, and the measure of its effectiveness is the degree of their perfection. Management is defined as the effective impact on the resources (human, material, financial and informational), including planning, decision making, organizing, directing and controlling, to ensure implementation of system functions⁵².

Currently we are working on a project ordinance governing the education of prison staff. The new programs will be based on well-defined learning outcomes to be achieved through modern forms of education (interdisciplinary, a departure from the methods of transmitting complete information in favour of activation, the use of an online e-learning platform). They will have to take into account, in addition to the requirements of the Prison Service

⁵² R. Sala, *Profesjonalizacja, uwarunkowania doboru kadry dowódczej, kandydatów na żołnierzy zawodowych oraz efektywność kształcenia*, [w:] *Edukacja w Siłach Zbrojnych RP w dobie profesjonalizacji*, W. Horyń, K. Klupa, L. Węliczko, Wrocław 2010.

for a specific profile of the graduate, the state of scientific knowledge in the field of modern thought penitentiary and current trends in andragogics.




Figure 1. Model initial training of prison officers

Source: G. G. Wągiel-Linder, *Kandydaci na profesjonalistów*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2013, nr 3(178), s. 16

High emphasis will be on the initial training, which will be longer and will be divided into three stages: a general practice under the guidance of a designated mentor (4 weeks) allowing participation in a stationary preparatory course (3 weeks). After a preparatory course of professional practice will be directional (taking into account the specialization of the officer), lasting from 2 to 4 months. After a period of initial training exam will be qualifying for vocational training.




Figure 1. Model vocational training of prison officers

Source: G. G. Wągiel-Linder, *Kandydaci na profesjonalistów*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2013, nr 3(178), s. 17

Professional training will also be divided into three parts. Prior to regimented training functionary will use the web-based platform and realized part of e-learning. Then will be involved in training the desktop in your body (non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers), which will have a unitary character (same content of education for all officers) and ends with an exam. Following the submission of the exam functionary will be able to join specialized training, after which he will be assigned an appropriate grade (corporal, younger ensign, second lieutenant)⁵³.

⁵³ G. Wągiel-Linder, *Kandydaci na profesjonalistów*, „Forum Penitencjarne”, 2013, nr 3(178).

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Оцінка повноважень президентів у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи з допомогою формалізованих показників

Розглянуто сукупність повноважень глав держав країн Центрально-Східної Європи залежно від форми правління. Зроблено наголос на питаннях: формування уряду, зовнішньополітичної діяльності та участі у питаннях оборони країни. Здійснено формалізовані заміри рівня повноважень президентів за методиками А.Сіароффа та К. Арлігеона і Р.Карейї. Проаналізовано практику застосування вето главами держав.

Ключові слова: глава держави, президент, форма правління, повноваження президента, принцип вето, індикатори.

Presidents' authorities measurement in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe with the help of the formalized exponents

The authors considered the complex of authorities of the presidents of Central and Eastern Europe countries irrespective of the form of government. The following issues were emphasized: formation of government, foreign economic activity and participation in the country defense issues. The presidents' authorities were measured according to the methods suggested by A. Siaroff and K. Arligeon, and R. Kareya. The practice of veto implementation by the presidents was analyzed.

Keywords: head of state, president, form of government, president's authorities, veto principle, exponents.

The Dignity Revolution in Ukraine of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 demonstrated the importance of not only the legal control of position and role of the head of state, but also the formalized measurement of his real authorities. The following early elections and elaboration of the ways of the Ukrainian society overcoming a long-lasting political crisis have additionally actualized the importance of understanding the practice of Central and East-European Countries which succeeded in overcoming the threats and challenges of transition period and built the consolidated democracy along with the efficient economic model. The analysis of place and role of the head

of state in the political life presupposes the simultaneous appeal to the issue of constitutional regulations and actual powers. In national scientific idea the issue of constitutional powers is proven and reflected in a wide range of publications. However, the analysis of actual powers through the formalized exponents has not yet become a wide-spread practice¹.

The president's powers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe depend upon many factors among which the form of government is the most important. The heads of states with the half-presidential form of government have more powers, and the heads of states with the parliamentary form of government have less. The functions characteristic of the presidents of the countries of region include three functions traditionally important for the heads of all states: government formation, foreign political activity, participation in the defense issues.

The system-formation function of presidents in half-presidential form of government is the participation in appointment of the *Prime-Minister and formation of government*. According to the Constitution of Poland (art. 154), the president nominates the candidate of the Head of the Board of Ministers who suggests the government composition. President appoints the prime-minister together with the other members of government within 14 days from the day of the first session of Seim or after acceptance of the former government resignation and the oath of new government composition. Afterwards the Prime-Minister within 14 days addresses the Seim for the vote of confidence. In the event the vote of confidence was not received the right of the government formation is transferred to the parliament. The presidents of Slovakia (p. 102, g) and Czech Republic (art. 62) have similar format of participation in the appointment of the prime-ministers and members of government. However, the Constitution of Romania (art. 85, p. 1) states that the head of state nominates the candidate for the prime-minister of the parliament of state. In Bulgaria, according to the art. 99 p.1 of the Constitution, the president after the consultations with the parliamentary groups entrusts the candidate to the position of the prime-minister, nominated by the greatest parliamentary group, to form the government. In Lithuania on the basis of the art. 84 p.4 of Constitution the president, under the Seim's agreement appoints the prime-minister, entrusts him to form the government and approves the government composition. The similar procedure is stated in the Constitution of Slovenia (art. 111), where the president may appoint the candidate to the prime-minister's position only after the consultations with the heads of the parliamentary fractions. In all countries mentioned the president and parliament jointly participate in the appointment of the prime-minister and governmental cabinet formation. In Bulgaria the Constitution regulates the following actions of president in case of unsuccessful government formation. If the candidate to the head of government approved by the parliamentary groups and president can not form the government within the determined period, the head of state shall grant this right to the leader of the second numerous parliamentary group. In case of failure the right to form the government is transferred by the president to the leader of the second numerous parliamentary fraction. The third

¹ Romaniuk A. Comparative analysis of the presidency institute in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe // Osvita Regionu, 2012, № 3. – P.60-66.

failure gives the right to the state to form technical government and conduct early parliamentary elections.

In the countries with the parliamentary form of government the president has the following right: in Estonia he is authorized to nominate a candidate for the position of the prime-minister who is entrusted to form the new government and who has to receive the vote of confidence in the parliament (art. 89 of the Constitution); in Latvia – he can appoint a person who will form the government (art. 56 of the Constitution), and, accordingly, the government has to gain the support in Seim. President of Hungary nominates a candidate for the position of the prime-minister (art. 9.3, j) and appoints certain ministers.

Comparing the level of the presidents' competence as to the prime-minister appointment, it is worthy to outline the higher powers of the presidents of Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, with regard to whom the national constitutions of states provide for the appointment norm with the following parliament address about the support demand. These countries are classified as half-presidential. In the other countries of the Central and Eastern Europe the presidents in their selection of candidates to the position of the head of governments mostly depend upon the correlation between the political forces in the parliament.

Traditionally, the head of state has enough powers also in the sphere of *foreign policy*. In the Constitution of Poland all powers of the head of state in the foreign relations are stated in the art. 133. For instance, the president ratifies/ denounces international agreements of which he notifies the Seim and Senate; appoints and revokes authorized representatives of state in the other countries and international organizations; accepts credentials and revoking documents of accredited diplomatic representatives of other countries and international organizations. The President has the right to address the Constitutional Tribunal as to the concordance of the international agreement with the Constitution of Poland. In the sphere of foreign policy the president cooperates with the prime-minister and minister of foreign affairs. Common thing for the presidents of all countries of the region in the sphere is the country representation in the international relations, appointment of the national diplomatic representatives and acceptance of credentials or revoking documents of the diplomatic representatives of the other states. Major laws of countries with the half-presidential form of government emphasize that the head of state makes international agreements in cases provided for by the law (Bulgaria); deals with the important issues of foreign policy, together with the government realizes foreign policy, signs international agreements and transfers them to the Seim for ratification (Lithuania); makes international agreements as to which the governments conducts its negotiations (Romania); makes and ratifies the international agreements (Slovakia); conducts negotiations and ratifies international agreements (Czech Republic).

If in the republican countries of Western Europe, except for Germany, the presidents are supreme commanders of *armed forces*, in Central and Eastern Europe they head the armed forces in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. This norm is not provided for by the constitutions of Lithuania, Slovenia, and Hungary. For instance, the

Constitution of Hungary (art. 44, 2) states that only the parliament, President of the Republic, National Defense Council, Government, and competent minister shall have the right to govern the Hungarian defense forces". All presidents, except Slovenian, appoint the senior executives of the armed forces/generals, and grant the highest military ranks. President of Bulgaria, for instance, heads the Consultative Board in national defense, and the president of Poland chairs the National Defense Council which is the consultative body at the office of the president of the state.

Presidents of the countries of region within their powers provided for by the constitutions, have the right to pass the decrees/acts. Accordingly, with regard to the part of these authorities there is a countersignature demand on the part of the prime-minister or the government minister. In all countries where the countersignature norm is provided for, it is stated that it means that the head of government or the member of government assumes the obligations for the content and consequences of the decision made. For instance, according to the article 102 of the Constitution of Bulgaria, essential part of the president's competence, except for the right to the parliament dismissal, veto, etc. providing for the possibility of making the rulings, have to be countersigned. Similar constitutional norm was noticed in Latvia (art. 53), except for the right of parliament dismissal, as well as introducing the candidacy of the prime-minister as the future head of government. The countersignature demand shall be considered within the complex of all powers of the head of state and within the system of his relations with the government, although, it inevitably leads to certain restriction of the president's powers.

Alongside, in the political science there singled out an independent direction of formalized measurements of the level of president's powers in the countries of the region with the help of certain exponents. Nowadays there are a lot of methods which allow measuring the president's powers on the basis of formal exponents. The first complex methodology was suggested by M. Shugart and J. Carey in 1992.² It provided for the valuation of the official powers of presidents according to the ten positions which may be subdivided into the powers in the legislative and non-legislative/executive power. T. Frye³ valued presidents' powers on the basis of 27 exponents. Very popular methodology of valuation of the powers of presidents was suggested by A. Siaroff (9 exponents). On the basis of exponents singled out by T. Frye, K. Armigeron and R. Kareya elaborated the methodology of the valuation of presidents' positions according to 29 exponents. This methodology was tested by the scholars with regard to the presidents of 28 post-communist countries in 1989–2007.⁴

² *Shugart M.* Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics / Matthew Soberg Shugart, John M. Carey. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. – P. 148–166.

³ *Frye T.* A politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies / Timothy Frye // Comparative political studies. – 1997. – Vol. 30. – No. 5. – P. 523–552.

⁴ *Fortin J.* Measuring Presidential Powers: Some Pitfalls of Aggregate Measurement [Електронний ресурс] / Jessica Fortin // International Political Science Review. – 2012 (online). – Режим доступу до запропонованої інформації: http://jessica-fortin.weebly.com/uploads/9/0/4/1/9041356/jfortin_measuring_presidential_powers.pdf

In the book the last two methods were taken as a basis for analysis of the powers of presidents in the region.

A. *Siaroff* singled out nine exponents embracing the most important issues of exercising of the president's powers. The first criterion is president election at the national elections. If he is elected this way, the country is given 1 point, if no – 0 points. Second criterion is competitive presidential and parliamentary elections. The third exponent is whether the president plays a leading role in the prime-minister appointment and in the government formation. The fourth exponent is the president's right to chair the government sessions and influence the formation of the government session agenda. The fifth exponent is the president's right to veto the parliament's decision. Sixth exponent is the president's powers in the emergency situations, under the force-majeure circumstances or national security threat. The seventh exponent is whether the president plays a leading role in the foreign policy including the control over the National Security Council, critical role in the election of ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and country representation at the international arena. An eighth exponent is the right of president to early termination of the parliament's authorities and announcement of the parliamentary elections. Ninth exponent is whether the term of the powers of president and parliament coincide. Longer term of president's powers than the term of the parliament powers provides for the power stability, especially in conditions when after the parliamentary elections the government formation is getting protracted. If the term of president's power is longer than the term of the parliament powers, according to some scholars, this is one of the components of stability of political system functioning. This strengthens political significance of presidents⁵. Out of the exponents suggested by A. *Siaroff* the second one somewhat loses its functional intensity in case of democratic countries. As all countries of the region are democratic, the elections of president and parliaments are competitive. Therefore, this exponent will not help to range the president's powers.

However, it would be worthy to take into account the president's right to announce referendum. Such power essentially increases the president's political significance, as he will be able to suggest some tough issues for the citizens' consideration, regardless of the parliamentary majority position. In case of controversies between the president and parliamentary majority the president may search for the support among the citizens. To our point of view, important factor is also the right to legislative initiative. Surely, on condition of parliamentary majority opposition to the president, the draft law is unlikely to pass the parliament. However, even the very fact of the draft law introduction by the president, its discussing, public argumentation as to the approval or disapproval will be a powerful informational cause and may significantly influence the levels of the people's support of the higher power institutes and main political actors in the country. The second A. *Siaroff*'s exponent, to our point of view, may not be taken into account. Under number 9 the exponent is added – the president has the right to announce referendum, and under number 10 – president has the right to legislative initiative. As it was stated above, according to A. *Siaroff*, in case of the

⁵ *Siaroff A.* Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction / Alan *Siaroff* // European Journal of Political Research. – 2003. – Vol. 42. – P. 287–312.

exponent relevance the country is given 1 point, and in case of irrelevance – 0 points. Noteworthy, it is not always possible to determine expressly the relevance level. In cases of partial relevance it is suggested to give 0,5 point.

Table 1. Measurement of the presidents' powers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe according to the modified methodology by A. Siaroff (as of 2013)⁶⁷⁸⁹¹⁰¹¹

| Nº | Country | I ⁶ | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | Cyba |
|----|----------------|----------------|-----|-------------------|----|-----|-----|------------------|------|-----------------|---|------|
| 1 | Bulgaria | 1 | 0,5 | – | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 6,5 |
| 2 | Estonia | – | 0,5 | – | – | 0,5 | 0,5 | – | 1 | – | – | 2,5 |
| 3 | Latvia | – | 0,5 | – | – | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 ⁷ | – | – | 1 | 3,5 |
| 4 | Lithuania | 1 | 0,5 | – | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 ⁸ | 1 | – | 1 | 6,0 |
| 5 | Poland | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8,0 |
| 6 | Romania | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 ⁹ | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 ¹⁰ | – | 7,0 |
| 7 | Slovakia | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 7,0 |
| 8 | Slovenia | 1 | 0,5 | – | – | 0,5 | 0,5 | – | – | – | – | 2,5 |
| 9 | Hungary | – | 0,5 | – | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,5 |
| 10 | Czech Republic | – | 1 | 0,5 ¹¹ | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 5,5 |

The following methodology is the president's power exponent by K. Armgeon and R. Kareya, which is calculated with regard to the president's powers stated in the constitutions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see. tables. 2).

The following 29 president's authorities are taken into account: 1) right to dismiss the parliament; 2) right to announce the referendum; 3) right to announce the elections; 4) right

⁶ Exponents: I) president election at the national elections – 1, election in the parliament – 0; II) whether the president plays a critical role in the appointment of prime-minister of government formation; III) the right of president to chair the government sessions or to influence formation of the agenda; IV) has the right to veto the parliamentary decision; V) president's powers in emergency situations; VI) whether the president plays a critical role in exercising the foreign policy; VII) the right to early termination of the parliament's authorities and announcement of new elections; VIII) whether the term of president's tenure and the term of the parliament's work coincide, if yes – 0, if no – 1; IX) president has the right to announce referendums; X) president has the legislative initiative right.

⁷ According to the art. 48 of the Constitution of Latvia, president has the right to initiate the parliament dismissal. On the basis of this initiative the referendum should be conducted and in case more than half of voters support this initiative, the parliament ceases its activity and new elections are announced.

⁸ According to the art. 58 of the Constitution of Lithuania, the president may prematurely dismiss the parliament in case the Seim within thirty days from the moment it was provided the program of the new government activity has not approved it, or in case within 60 days from the first submitting of program by the government the Seim has not approved it two times in a row. The President may announce early elections – on the initiative of the government whom the Seim has granted the vote of non-confidence. Thus, the presidents' ability to dismiss the parliament prematurely is very strictly regulated and does not provide for the decisions made at his sole discretion under conditions of strong political struggle.

⁹ On the basis of art. 87 of the Constitution of Romania, the president takes part in the government sessions when the issues of national interest are discussed, or if they are related to the foreign policy issues, provision of civil order and at the prime-minister's request. In case the president is present at the government session, he chairs the session. This article does not provide that the president takes part in all government sessions.

¹⁰ According to the art. 90 of the Constitution of Romania, president has the right, upon consultations with the parliament, to rise the issues of national interest at the referendum. As in this case the president is the initiator of consultations with the parliament and not retransmits somebody's will or decision, we believe this norm may be treated as the president's right to referendum.

¹¹ According to the art. 64 (2) of Czech Republic, the president may take part in the government sessions.

to appoint the prime-minister; 5) right to appoint the ministers; 6) right of constitutional court formation; 7) right of supreme court formation; 8) right to appoint the judges; 9) right to appoint the Prosecutor General; 10) right to appoint the head of the central bank; 11) formation of Security council; 12) appointment of the executive officers; 13) right to appoint the executive commanders; 14) armed forces commanding; 15) chairing the Security Council; 16) right to return the law for revision (2/3 pass a veto = 1); 17) right to direct the laws to the constitutional court; 18) legislative initiative; 19) issue of the decrees in the emergency situations; 20) initiation of the constitutional amendments; 21) convocation of the special sessions of the parliament; 22) right to the special powers, unless the parliament can gather; 23) special powers in the other cases; 24) right to participation in the parliamentary sessions; 25) address the questions to the parliament; 26) right to convene the government sessions; 27) right to participation in the government meetings; 28) right to cancel the acts of the other regulatory bodies; 29) preparation and approval of budget. The calculation formalization provides for the president's powers marking system: 1 – if the president has an exclusive power in the said issue; 0,5 – if the president shares his powers with the other regulating institutes; 0 – if the president does not influence /does not possess the powers as to certain issues.

Table 2. Measurement of the president's powers in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe according to the ratified methodology of K. Armigeon and R. Kareya (as of 2008)

| Nº | Bulgaria | Estonia | Latvia | Lithuania | Poland | Romania | Slovenia | Slovakia | Hungary | Czech Republic |
|----|----------|---------|--------|-----------|--------|---------|----------|----------|---------|----------------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0,5 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 0,5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 4 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 1 | 0,5 | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 |
| 6 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 |
| 7 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0,5 |
| 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 |
| 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 1 |
| 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 12 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 1 | 0,5 | 0,5 |
| 14 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0,5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 16 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0,5 | 0,5 |
| 17 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 18 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 19 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 |
| 20 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 21 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

| Nº | Bulgaria | Estonia | Latvia | Lithuania | Poland | Romania | Slovenia | Slovakia | Hungary | Czech Republic |
|--------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| 22 | 1 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 |
| 23 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0,5 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 25 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 26 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0,5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 12,0 | 8,5 | 7,5 | 13,0 | 13,5 | 13,0 | 4,5 | 12,0 | 13,0 | 11,0 |

Thus, all presidents take part in the government formation. Presidents nominate the candidates for the prime-minister's position. Though, the candidate's choice depends upon the election results and distribution of political forces in the parliament. Surely, under the conditions of essential party segmentation, when several majority combinations are possible, or under conditions of impossibility to form a majority this role of president may grow, as he will decide who will form the government. But in no country of Central and Eastern Europe the president forms the government at his sole discretion. The second common feature of the presidents is influence on the foreign policy. Normally the president's activity in this sphere is limited or aimed at cooperation with the governments. For instance, the art. 133, p. 3 of the Constitution of Poland states that „In the issues of foreign policy the President cooperates with the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers and the minister”.

The results of implementation of both methods are similar, despite different numbers of exponents according to which they are valuated. The highest level of powers is characteristic of the presidents of Poland and Romania, close position is occupied by the presidents of Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Hungary. Except for Hungary, all other countries of the region are the countries with half-presidential form of government. Accordingly, medium exponent of the president's powers in the countries with the half-presidential form of government is essentially higher than in the countries with the parliamentary form. Noteworthy, the situation in Hungary and Slovenia should be treated as a “separate case” or exception. However, we believe the results obtained confirm the statement that formal characteristics of the country belonging to certain form of government, in this case the main characteristics are national elections of the head of states, – should be additionally confirmed by other exponents. According to the results of comparison of the two methods, we may state certain divergence in the measurement of the president's powers with regard to Lithuania. This may be explained by different treatment of the exponent „The right to early termination of powers and dismissal of parliament”. According to amendments to the constitution of Czech Republic made in 2012, starting from 2013 president of country is elected at the direct and national elections, which strengthens his powers.

Table 3. Practice of veto implementation by the presidents of countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2010)

| № | Country | Analyzed period | General amount of analyzed months | General amount of veto |
|---|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Direct (national) presidential elections | | | | |
| 1 | Bulgaria | 01.2002 – 12.2010 | 107 | 24 |
| 2 | Lithuania | 10.1992 – 12.2010 | 214 | 175 |
| 3 | Poland | 01.1991 – 12.2010 | 240 | 76 |
| 4 | Romania | 10.2004 – 12.2010 | 75 | 25 |
| 5 | Slovakia | 06.1999 – 12.2010 | 139 | 166 |
| Indirect (parliamentary) elections of president | | | | |
| 1 | Estonia | 10.1992 – 12.2010 | 219 | 59 |
| 2 | Latvia | 07.1993 – 12.2010 | 209 | 35 |
| 3 | Slovakia | 02.1993 – 05.1999 | 139 | 36 |
| 4 | Hungary | 08.1990 – 12.2010 | 245 | 39 |
| 5 | Czech Republic | 01.1993 – 12.2010 | 215 | 75 |

Difference of the president's positions is well-reflected during the implementation of the right to veto by the heads of state. President elected at the national elections may hold his ground more decisively, if there are different approaches of parliament and president to the political process, as compared to the president elected in the parliament. This may be testified by the research of P. Köker¹². The presidents elected at the national elections, more frequently use veto in the absolute exponents and according to the number of implementations within the period of parliament activity with regard to the laws passed in the parliament.

Thus, monitoring of the formalized exponents and practice of veto implementation prove that medium exponent of president's power in the countries with the half-presidential form of government is much higher than in the countries with the parliamentary form of government.

¹² Köker P. Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) : A statistical analysis of the use of presidential vetoes in the CEE EU member states, 1990–2010 / Philipp Köker // Paper prepared for presentation at the 63rd Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, 25–27 March 2013, Cardiff. – 22 p.

Мовне питання у передвиборчих програмах політичних партій країн Західної Європи

У статті обґрунтовується нагальність мовного питання для країн Західної Європи. Актуальність проблеми у конкретних державах виявляється за допомогою застосування контент-аналізу передвиборчих програм політичних партій. Дослідження базується на ствердженні, що якщо яка-небудь з політичних партій, що пройшли до національного парламенту певної країни, у своїй передвиборчій програмі торкається проблеми використання тієї чи іншої мови, мовне питання є важливим для населення відповідної країни. Робиться висновок, що нечасте згадування мов у програмах політичних партій Західної Європи, що було виявлено, свідчить про непершочерговість мовного питання, що може бути пов'язано з успішною імплементацією Європейської хартії регіональних мов або мов меншин, ратифікованою більшістю країн Західної Європи.

Ключові слова: Західна Європа, контент-аналіз, передвиборчі програми політичних партій, мова, мовне питання.

The Language Issue in the Electoral Programmes of the Political Parties of Western European Countries

The article provides proofs of the language issue urgency for Western Europe. The relevance of the language issue for particular countries is revealed with a content analysis of the electoral programmes of the political parties. The research is based on a statement that if none of the political parties that made it into the national parliament of a particular country deal with the issue of language use in their electoral programmes, the language problem is not urgent for the population of that country. It is concluded that not frequent mention of languages in Western European political parties' programmes evidences that the language issue is not a priority. That may be due to the successful implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by the majority of Western European countries.

Keywords: Western Europe, content analysis, electoral programs of political parties, language, language issue.

In modern Western Europe, national frontiers often do not coincide with linguistic boundaries. The mismatch of state and ethnic (linguistic) boundaries is inevitable because there are more ethnic groups than states. A situation where a state territory and distribution of a particular ethnic group match is a rarity. This is due to the fact that throughout its history Europe has undergone significant changes of state borders as a result of wars, dynastic combinations, interstate and international agreements. The French-speaking area extends for France, Belgium and Switzerland, German-speaking – for Germany, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Basque-speaking – for Spain and France¹. Ethnic and linguistic boundaries also exist within countries. For example, the Breton and the Basque minorities in France, the Sorbs and the Frisians in Germany.

The ethnolinguistic problematics continues to be of relevance for Europe. Such scholars as Monica Heller², Robert F. Weber³, Durk Gorter and Jasone Cenoz⁴ occupy themselves with the study of linguistic minorities in Europe. Today even states referred to as monoethnic, that is, those where the bulk of citizens are members of one ethnic group (according to different classifications from 2/3 to 4/5 of total population), can potentially face the challenge of ethnic and, as a consequence, linguistic regionalism, since even the remaining 1/5 of population who reside locally and belong to a different cultural and linguistic paradigm may be a conflict causing factor.

The purpose of the research was to reveal the relevance of the language issue in the countries of Western Europe.

A political party as a socio-political institution represents the interests of a certain social (including linguistic) group, i.e. if the language issue is urgent, there must be a party that will raise this issue. Therefore decision was made to find out whether (minority) languages are mentioned in the party programmes and, if so, in what context. For this purpose, a content analysis was conducted of the electoral programmes of the political parties which qualified for the national parliaments of Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Switzerland, Sweden. It should be noted that a content analysis is an independent quantitative and qualitative research method consisting in the study of documents; socio-political problems, inter alia, can be the subject of a content analysis.

The following hypothesis was put forward: if none of the political parties that made it into the national parliament of a particular country deal with the issue of language use in their

¹ Raasch, A. *Europe, Frontiers and Languages. Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe. From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002. p. 9.

² Heller, M. *Linguistic Minorities and Modernity: a Sociolinguistic Ethnography* (2nd ed.). London: Continuum, 2006.

³ Weber, Robert F. *Individual Rights and Group Rights in the European Community's Approach to Minority Languages.* *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, 17 (361), 2007.

⁴ Gorter D., Cenoz J. *Legal Rights of Linguistic Minorities in the European Union.* Peter M. Tiersma, Lawrence M. Solan (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law* (pp.261-271). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

electoral programmes, the language problem is not urgent for the population of that country. If the party does not have enough support and therefore has not qualified for the parliament, its ideas, including that concerning the language, are not very popular, indicating the absence of the language problem. That is why the sample included only electoral programmes of the parties that made it into the parliaments as all the parties having even the lowest level of electorate support a priori qualify for the representative bodies of the respective countries, because the countries under the study were that ones with developed pluralistic democracy.

The conducted content analysis was qualitative by type. The official sites of the parties were an information source for the content analysis; analysed messages were electoral programmes of the parties; the time of appearance of the messages was 2011-2014 (parliamentary elections in the respective countries of Western Europe). The word “language” and cognate words in the language corresponding to the language of a message were used as the unit of analysis (keyword).

After an analysis of some 152 programmes of political parties, it was found out that the unit of analysis was mentioned in the programmes of the following parties.

1. “Siumut” (“Forward”) is a social-democratic political party in Greenland (Denmark), advocating independence and sovereignty of Greenland. In the 2011 Folketing elections “Siumut” got 37.1% of votes and secured 1 of 2 seats allotted to the representatives of Greenland. In the 2013 elections it got 14 of 31 seats in the regional parliament of Greenland. The unit of analysis appears in the electoral programme of the party in the following context: the languages of the autonomous Greenland should be Greenlandic and Danish⁵.
2. «Convergència i Unió» (CiU; “Convergence and Union”) is a nationalist secessionist party in Catalonia (Spain), speaking for the independence of Catalonia in the European Union. In 2012, it got 4.17% of the vote and obtained 16 of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies. Since 2011 CiU has 13 (9 selected and 4 appointed) of 264 seats in the Senate of Spain. In 2010 elections to the regional Parliament of Catalonia CiU got 38.5% and got 14 seats of 62. The CiU programme says that the language and culture are the tools to ensure and protect collective future of the Catalonia population⁶; Catalan is the language of social cohesion; Catalan must be accessible to everybody, and not to be discriminated against; immigration to Catalonia should be made conditional on the knowledge of the Catalan language⁷. CiU supports the existing language regime of the Catalonia education system in accordance with the Catalonia

⁵ Electoral programme of the political party “Siumut”, 2011. p. 17. Retrieved from http://www.siumut.gl/Portals/0/Pdf/ka/Sumup_anguniagai_2011-2014.pdf

⁶ Electoral programme of the political party “Convergència i Unió”, 2012. p. 62. Retrieved from <http://www.ciu.cat/media/76990.pdf>

⁷ Ibid, p. 136.

education act⁸; ensuring the administration of justice in Catalan in all judicial areas⁹; guaranteeing the respect for the right of citizens' linguistic choice in the judiciary¹⁰; augmentation of the number of books published in Catalan. CiU recognises Spanish as the language of part of the population of Catalonia, therefore it maintains Spanish should have an official status¹¹.

3. "Izquierda Unida" (IU; "United Left") is a left-green coalition of political parties in Spain. IU has 11 of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies, 2 of 264 seats in the Senate, 1 of Spain's 54 seats in the European Parliament. In its electoral programme IU emphasises respect for cultural and linguistic diversity of Spain; the study of both official languages in the Basque Country¹²; the guarantee of the right for free education in Basque; promoting the use of the Basque language and achieving true bilingualism of the society¹³.
4. "Chunta Aragonesista" (CHA; "Aragonese Union") is a nationalist and eco-socialist party in Aragon (Spain). In 2011 elections CHA got 1 seat in the Congress of Deputies as a part of the electoral alliance with "Izquierda Unida". CHA claims that the linguistic policy of Spain offering Castilian language as the only option is disrespectful towards linguistic diversity of Aragon¹⁴, and advocates preservation of cultural and linguistic variety of Aragon¹⁵, compulsory teaching of the relevant regional languages at all the stages of educational process in all the regions of Spain¹⁶ and the protection of languages of Aragon, especially of Aragonese¹⁷.
5. "Bloque Nacionalista Galego" (BNG; "Galician Nationalist Bloc") is a political coalition of nationalist socialist parties in Galicia (Spain). In 2011 BNG got 2 of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies with 11.25% of the votes. In 2012 elections to the parliament of Galicia BNG gained 10% of votes – 7 seats of 75. BNG considers that public authorities are to protect the Galician language, and their aim should be to use Galician in all the areas of life. For this purpose it is necessary to publish official documents related to Galicia in the Galician language; to use official toponyms;

⁸ Ibid, p. 62.

⁹ Ibid, p. 99.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 100.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 137.

¹² Electoral programme of the coalition of political parties "Izquierda Unida", 2012. pp. 5-6. Retrieved from <http://www.izquierda-unida.es/node/11244>

¹³ Ibid, p. 10.

¹⁴ Electoral programme of the political party "Chunta Aragonesista", 2014. p. 16. Retrieved from <http://www.chunta.org/workspace/uploads/programmemea-europeas-2014.pdf>

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 16.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 18.

to use Galician in scientific researches¹⁸; to promote use of the Galician language in industry; to legally oblige financial institutions (including online and customer services) and the mass media to use the Galician language (including advertisement); to expand use of Galician to labour relations, trade and business; to prevent discrimination of the Galician language in legal proceedings; to establish minimum levels of use of the Galician language in private life¹⁹. In addition BNG speaks for ensuring of presence of Galicia representatives in all the institutions of the European Union and acknowledgement of Galician as one of the official languages of the European Union²⁰. BNG claims to guarantee new attitude to cultural and linguistic diversity and identity of Galicia²¹ which will provide for encouragement of study of the Portuguese language at schools²².

6. “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya” (ERC, “Republican Left of Catalonia”) is a nationalist separatist political party in Catalonia (Spain). In 2011 ERC got 3 of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies of Spain. In 2012 ERC gained 13.7% of the vote (second best result) and got 21 of 135 seats in the Parliament of Catalonia. ERC argues that Catalonia is experiencing a situation of systematic attacks by public authorities on their language²³ and speaks for the establishment of the Republic of Catalonia and granting Catalan the status of the state language²⁴. ERC believes that the state should undertake necessary measures to make the Catalan language one of the official languages of the European Union²⁵ and for Catalan to be used in international organisations²⁶. In its programme, ERC argues that the linguistic reality in many areas is still far from normal, that globalisation is encouraging the use of the most common languages of the world, Castilian being more widely presented in social life than Catalan²⁷. According to ERC’s electoral programme the language of Catalonia shall be Catalan, which means its primary use in public institutions, public media²⁸ and at all educational stages²⁹; public authorities of Catalonia shall establish the necessary

¹⁸ Electoral programme of the coalition of political parties “Bloque Nacionalista Galego”, 2012. p. 45. Retrieved from http://www.bng-galiza.org/wp-content/uploads/Programmemea_BNG_Eleccions_Galegas_2012.pdf

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 46.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 50.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 8, 45.

²² Ibid, p. 37.

²³ Electoral programme of the political party “Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya”, 2012. p. 153. Retrieved from http://www.esquerra.cat/partit/programmemees/c2012_programmemea.pdf

²⁴ Ibid, p. 28.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 29.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 153.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 153.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 153.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 66.

measures to prevent any discrimination in use of any of these two languages: Catalan – the official language of Catalonia, and Castile – the official language of Spain³⁰.

7. “Amaiur” is a left-wing nationalist and separatist political coalition in the Basque Country and Navarre (Spain). In 2011 got 7 seats of 350 in the Congress of Deputies of Spain and 3 of 264 in the Senate. “Amaiur” think Basque is the national language and the main feature of the Basque ethnic identity, so there is a necessity to grant the Basque language the appropriate status and to make it preferable in all areas of everyday life. The Basque language should obtain such status that the Basques can become equal to the Spaniards and the French in the Basque Country in political, legal and socio-linguistic sphere. Other linguistic communities will also benefit from the comprehensive development of the Basque language³¹.
8. “Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea” (EAJ; “Basque Nationalist Party”) is a regionalist nationalist party in the Basque Country (Spain). EAJ is the largest and oldest Basque nationalist party, the largest political party in the Basque Autonomous Community, and a marginal one in the French Basque Country. EAJ has 6 of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies, 4 of 264 seats in the Senate and 1 of 50 in the European Parliament. Main ideas of its Declaración del Centenario concerning language issue come to a statement that the language of the Basque people is Basque and its support and promotion should be a priority for every Basque³².
9. “Unione per il Trentino” (UpT; “Union for Trentino”) is a regional Christian-democratic political party in Trentino (Italy). It has 1 of 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 1 of 319 in the Senate, 5 of 35 in the local council. In 2013 general elections UpT gained 19.6% of the vote, in the local elections – 13.3%, in 2014 European elections – 12.2%. In the programme UpT suggests appointing three representatives of the linguistic minorities to local parliament³³.
10. “Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei” (ADR, “Alternative Democratic Reform Party”) is a national-conservative political party in Luxembourg. It has 3 seats in the sixty-seat Chamber of Deputies, making it the fifth-largest party. ADR advocates making knowledge of the Luxembourgish language one of mandatory criteria for naturalisation, and supports protection and promotion of use of Luxembourgish which they claim to be something more than just a symbol of cultural identity³⁴.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 153.

³¹ Electoral programme of the coalition of political parties “Amaiur”, 2012. p. 97. Retrieved from <http://ehbildu.net/program-memca/NL.pdf>

³² Electoral programme of the political party “Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea”. Retrieved from http://eaj-pnv.eu/adjuntos/docs_estaticos/declaracion_centenario.pdf

³³ Electoral programme of the political party “Unione per il Trentino”, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.unioneperiltrentino.it/sites/default/files/images/statuto_upt_-_approvato_01_03_14_0.pdf

³⁴ Electoral programme of the political party “Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei”, 2006-2014. Retrieved from <http://www.adr.lu/unsere-themen/immigratioun-an-integratioun/>

11. “Fryske Nasjonale Partij” (FNP, “Frisian National Party”) is a nationalist autonomist party in Friesland (the Netherlands). FNP has 1 of 75 seats in the Senate and 4 of 43 in the regional parliament. FNP advocates that decisions relating to the Frisian language and culture should be made at the provincial level and it is necessary to strengthen the Frisian identity and, in this regard, to promote the Frisian language and culture, but other languages and cultures should also be practiced and respected. The programme also refers to the substantial increase of the number of trilingual primary schools and to support of Frisian post-secondary educational institutions. FNP promises to implement the measures, implementation of which the Dutch government has undertaken regarding the Frisian language, having adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages³⁵.
12. “Plaid Cymru” (“Party of Wales”) is a nationalist separatist party in Wales (the United Kingdom), speaking for the independence of Wales in the European Union. Since 2012 “Plaid Cymru” has 3 of 40 Welsh seats in the House of Commons, 2 of 775 seats in the House of Lords, 1 of 4 Welsh seats in the European Parliament, 11 of 60 seats in the National Assembly of Wales, 171 of 1264 seats in the Welsh local government. One of the main aims of the party is to create a bilingual society by promoting the revival of the Welsh language³⁶.

As a result of the content analysis there was made a list of countries where the language issue is actual:

1. Denmark (Greenlandic);
2. Spain (Aragonese, Basque, Galician, Catalan);
3. Italy (German, French and Franco-Provencal);
4. Luxembourg (Luxembourgish);
5. The Netherlands (Frisian);
6. The United Kingdom (Welsh).

In all the six countries, where the political parties touch upon the language issue in their programmes, it is about the languages of regional linguistic minorities. The exception is the Luxembourgish language in Luxembourg, where the number of Luxembourgish language speakers is 266,000 citizens, while there are 82,000 and 10,200 French and German speakers respectively³⁷.

As for Denmark the language of Greenland Eskimos mentioned in the programme of the local political party is the most common (out of 57,000 inhabitants 50,000 speak Greenlandic,

³⁵ Electoral programme of the political party “Fryske Nasjonale Partij”, 2011. Retrieved from [http://www.fnp.nl/?english/provincial_council/programmeme/](http://www.fnp.nl/?english/provincial_council/programmeme)

³⁶ Electoral programme of the political party “Plaid Cymru”, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.plaidcymru.org/uploads/Cyfansoddiad_Nov_2012.pdf

³⁷ Ethnologue: Languages of the world, 2014. Luxembourg – Languages - Luxembourgish. Retrieved from <http://www.ethnologue.com/country/LU/languages>

3,000 speak the Eastern Greenlandic dialect, 44,000 speak the Western Greenlandic and 800 use the Northern dialect) and has an official status³⁸: the Act No. 577 of 29 November 1978 (“The Greenland Home Rule Act”) in the Section 9 establishes that “Greenlandic shall be the principal language”³⁹.

The Frisian language according to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (01 March 1998 entered into force in the Netherlands) is recognised as the regional language within the territory of Friesland (as a regional language European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages considers a language traditionally used within a given territory of a state by nationals of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the state’s population; and different from the official language(s) of that state)⁴⁰, and thereby enjoys a high degree of protection: in the educational sphere the Netherlands undertook obligations to make available studying in Frisian from pre-school to secondary education and to provide facilities for the study of the Frisian language as university and higher education subject. Frisian is also protected in the economic and social life, judicial and administrative spheres, media and culture⁴¹.

Some of the analysed programmes, where a regional language was mentioned, speak to the need of autonomisation of the respective region, accretion of power of regional authorities or even federalisation. Nevertheless the language in such cases cannot be considered a major factor. Thus «Fryske Nasjonale Partij» stands for federalism with Friesland not only enjoying self-rule, protection and recognition of the Frisian language, but also creating the provincial fiscal system⁴². The majority of the political parties simply offers to use language in some sphere where it is not used yet.

None of the political parties that made it into the Senate and the National Assembly of France mention Corsican, despite the evident existence of the Corsican language problem. After the French Revolution, state policies aimed at smoothing regional differences and culture standardisation through the elimination of linguistic diversity, in particular. French was considered the epitome of civilisation and progress and recognised as the sole national language to represent interests of the new revolutionary order. The maintenance of other languages countered the Revolution objectives. The French politician Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac in 1794 asserted that “federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hate of the Republic

³⁸ Ethnologue: Languages of the world, 2014. Greenland – Status. Retrieved from <http://www.ethnologue.com/country/GL/status>

³⁹ The Greenland Home Rule Act. Act No. 577 of 29 November 1978. Retrieved from http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html

⁴⁰ European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages CETS No.: 148, 2014. Retrieved from <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=148&CM=8&DF=06/10/2014&CL=ENG>

⁴¹ List of declarations made with respect to treaty No. 148, 2014. Retrieved from <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=148&CM=8&DF=06/10/2014&CL=ENG&VL=1>

⁴² Electoral programme of the political party “Fryske Nasjonale Partij”, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.fnp.nl/?english/provincial_council/programmeme

speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque” and suggested to “smash these faulty and harmful instruments”⁴³.

Today, Corsican speakers number 160,000⁴⁴, so UNESCO’s annual “Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger” considers the Corsican language endangered⁴⁵. In Corsica there functions “Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu” (“The National Liberation Front of Corsica”), a militarised group advocating creation on the island of Corsica of an independent state separated from France.

The French government signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages on 07 May 1999, but on 15 June 1999 the Constitutional Council claimed that the preamble of the Charter contradicted the French Constitution, since the Constitution declares that the right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life inalienable. Some provisions of the second part of the Charter – in regard to the use of specific rights of linguistic groups within the boundaries of the territories where these languages are used – are also in conflict with the French Constitution.

As a result of the research it may be claimed that the electoral programmes of political parties of Western European countries qualified for the national parliaments mainly deal with the regional ethnic minorities’ and linguistic minorities’ languages. The language issue despite being relevant is not a priority, as languages are only mentioned in 12 of 152 political parties’ programmes analysed. It is possible to presume that this is due to the successful implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the adoption of which has become one of the common approaches to language problems solving in Europe. In Denmark it is not the language mentioned in the programme of the party qualified for the parliament (Greenlandic) that gets under the protection of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, but German. Italy signed the Charter in 2000, but never ratified. Luxembourg has ratified the Charter, but did not specify which languages will be considered regional or minority ones. In Spain, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the Charter applies to all the languages mentioned by the parties in the electoral programmes.

Taking into account the traditions inherent to Western European politics the very fact of touching upon the language issue in the electoral programmes of political parties that made it into the respective parliaments means they are going to undertake the actions aimed at implementation of the declared language policies and in that way to solve the language problem gradually.

⁴³ May, S. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Language*. Harlow, Essex, UK/New York: Pearson Education (Longman), 2001. p. 168.

⁴⁴ UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages. *Language Vitality and Endangerment: Document submitted to the International Expert Meeting on UNESCO Programme Safeguarding of Endangered Languages*, 10-12 March 2003, Paris, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/00120-EN.pdf>

⁴⁵ UNESCO Interactive Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php>

Теорії модернізації: проблеми типологізації

Стаття присвячена аналізу формування теоретичного загалу модернізаційній теорії та виокремлення теорій суспільно-політичної модернізації. Центральним фокусом статті виступає проблема типологізації модернізаційних теорій, потреба побудови ефективної типології даних теорій. Продукуються висновки щодо можливості ефективної типологізації теорій суспільно-політичної модернізації.

Ключові слова: сучасність, модернізація, теорії модернізації, типологізація, теорії конвергенції, пост модернізація, соціалізація.

Modernization theory: problems typology

this article analyzes the theoretical masses of modernization theory and separation theories of social and political modernization. The central focus of the article speaks problem typology of modernization theories, the need for building an effective typology of these theories. Produced findings on the possibility of an effective typology of theories of social and political modernization.

Keywords: modernity, modernization, modernization theory, typology, convergence theory, post modernization, socialization.

Modernization theory is to describe and explain the processes of transformation from traditional or underdeveloped societies in modern societies. According to one of the main supporters: "Historically, modernization is a process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and then spread to other European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in South America, Asia and the African continent. Modernization theory has been one of the major perspectives in the sociology of national development and underdevelopment since the 1950. Primary attention has focused on ways

in which past and present premodern societies become modern (i.e., Westernized) through processes of economic growth and change in social, political, and cultural structures¹.

The subject of this study is to analyze the process of formation of modernization theory as typology and prospect specific theories of modernization. The aim is to study the intellectual context of the modernization discourse. The main objective of research supports the need to implement an effective model typology of modernization theories of modernization and some conceptual considerations. The working hypothesis of research is the authors assumption of the existence of separate discursive history of modernization metatheory. Theoretical and epistemological history of modernization is actually a central theme of modern social science and can not be viewed without dipping into the conceptual context of discussion (and approaches they formed) definition content around the idea of modernization. The very definition of the idea of modernization is often the criterion verification, through which it is possible a conceptual scheme of modernization analysis separate from the other, while in the other case, its application allows you to affirm the continuity of theoretical or conceptual distance. According to the eminent sociologist P. Stompka contemporary research reflection around upgrading is available in three key dimensions of understanding this phenomenon. First, in the most general sense, modernization is synonymous with all progressive social change, in cases where society is moving forward in accordance with the scale of indicators to improve life. This understanding is true when applied to any historical time period. After the invention of the wheel, sail or use case space flight are good examples of modernization, but it should be noted that this understanding of modernization is not promising because of the lack of it a specific (in addition to the historical description of these processes sometimes involved in other similar terms)².

The second meaning, which finds its embodiment of the idea of modernization is identical to modernity», that means the whole complex of social, political, economic, cultural and intellectual transformations that took place in the West from the XVI century and culminated in the XIX-XX centuries. These include the processes of industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, bureaucratization and democratization, the dominant influence of capitalism, individualism distribution, motivation for success, upholding reason and science and many others. Modernization in this sense is understood as the achievement of our time, the process of converting traditional to industrial, technological society to society under a typical machine technology, rational and secular relations, as well as a high degree of differentiation of social structures (for example, power is not only divided into separate its independent branches, but there are separated from the business and public sector). According to this trend include classical modernization theory (early modernization theory) owned

¹ Deviatko I. Sociological theory of activity and practical rationality / I. Deviatko – M.: "Avanti Plus", 2003. P. 117.

² Sztompka P. modernization theory, old and new. Last "incarnation" of evolution / Peter Sztompka; [Lane, from English. ; ed. V.A.Yadova] / Sociology social change. – M.: Aspect Press, 1996. P. 170-172.

by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber, E. Durkheim, F. Tonnisu et al. researchers, authors theories of social change. Finally, the third meaning, which embodies the idea of modernization – refers to the existence of an ontology backward and underdeveloped societies (non-Western societies) and formed around their efforts, directed to catch up with the most developed countries (modern country) that coexist with them in a historical time within a single global (global) society. In other words, in this case the «modernization» is demonstrated by examples of movement from the periphery to the center of modern society. Several theoretical approaches that have emerged on the grounds of classical theories of social change that developed in the previous step modernization theorizing, they are known as modernization theory and convergence, use the term “modernization” in that narrow sense³.

Modern theories of modernization and convergence in its epistemological sense echoes of the postwar era, actually being the concepts, the authors have set themselves the aim to explain the distribution of contemporary world into three separate political realities “first world” to which belonged the advanced industrial countries of the West and its semi, “second world” personified the Soviet Union and the socialist community, which only began to be built at that time and the “third world”, which was a post-colonial reality of the South and East, or to actually poorly industrialized socio-political and economic system. The desire to explain the difference between “first” and “third” worlds, led the emergence and institutionalization of research, which then formed under the name of modernization (In this case, the special role played by research T. Parsons and N. Smelser, D. Apter, S. Eisenstadt, etc.). While the desire to focus on the issue of differences / differences between “first” and “second” worlds led to the institutionalization of the theory of convergence (especially prominent in this case the direction is the conceptualization of “democratic transition” and related primarily to researchers such as R. Aaron S. Huntington, W. Rostow, Dahl et al.)

In general, modernization theorists are concerned with economic growth within societies as indicated, for example, by measures of gross national product. Mechanization or industrialization are ingredients in the process of economic growth. Modernization theorists study the social, political, and cultural consequences of economic growth and the conditions that are important for industrialization and economic growth to occur. Indeed, a degree of circularity often characterizes discussions of social and economic change involved in modernization processes because of the notion, embedded in most modernization theories, of the functional compatibility of component parts. The theoretical assumptions of modernization theories will be elaborated later.

It should be noted at the outset that the sociological concept of modernization does not refer simply to becoming current or “up to date” but rather specifies particular contents and

³ Kapustin B. Modernity as a matter of political theory [electronic resource] / B. Kapustin. – Access mode. – [Http://www.shulenina.narod.ru/Polit/kapustin/sovremennost/04.html](http://www.shulenina.narod.ru/Polit/kapustin/sovremennost/04.html)

processes of societal changes in the course of national development. Also, modernization theories of development do not necessarily bear any relationship to more recent philosophical concepts of “modernity” and “postmodernity.” Modernity in philosophical and epistemological discussions refers to the perspective that there is one true descriptive and explanatory model that reflects the actual world. Postmodernity is the stance that no single true description and explanation of reality exists but rather that knowledge, ideology, and science itself are based on subjective understandings of an entirely relational nature. While their philosophical underpinnings place most modernization theories of development into the “modern” rather than the “postmodern” context, these separate uses of the term modernity should not be confused⁴.

Also, modernization, industrialization, and development are often used interchangeably but in fact refer to distinguishable phenomena. Industrialization is a narrower term than modernization, while development is more general. Industrialization involves the use of inanimate sources of power to mechanize production, and it involves increases in manufacturing, wage labor, income levels, and occupational diversification. It may or may not be present where there is political, social, or cultural modernization, and, conversely, it may exist in the absence of other aspects of modernization. Development (like industrialization) implies economic growth, but not necessarily through transformation from the predominance of primary production to manufacturing, and not necessarily as characterized by modernization theory. For example, while modernization theorists may define development mainly in terms of economic output per capita, other theorists may be more concerned about development of autonomous productive capacity, equitable distribution of wealth, or meeting basic human needs. Also, while modernization theories generally envision democratic and capitalist institutions or secularization of belief systems as components of modern society, other development perspectives may not. Indeed, dependency theorists even talk about the “development of underdevelopment”⁵.

Each of the social science disciplines pays particular attention to the determinants of modern structures within its realm (social, political, economic) and gives greater importance to structures or institutions within its realm for explaining other developments in society. Emphasis here is given to sociological modernization theory.

Although there are many versions of modernization theory, major implicit or explicit tenets are that (1) societies develop through a series of evolutionary stages; (2) these stages are based on different degrees and patterns of social differentiation and reintegration of structural and cultural components that are functionally compatible for the maintenance of society; (3) contemporary developing societies are at a premodern stage of evolution and

⁴ Ivanov D. Virtualization society / D. Ivanov. – St. Petersburg.: “Petersburg Oriental”, 2002. 24 p.

⁵ Ermahanova S. Modernization Theory: Past and Present [electronic resource] / S. Ermahanova. – Access mode. – [Http://www.econom.nsc.ru/icie/SMU/conference/articles/Ermahanova.doc](http://www.econom.nsc.ru/icie/SMU/conference/articles/Ermahanova.doc)

they eventually will achieve economic growth and will take on the social, political, and economic features of western European and North American societies which have progressed to the highest stage of social evolutionary development; (4) this modernization will result as complex Western technology is imported and traditional structural and cultural features incompatible with such development are overcome⁶.

At its core modernization theory suggests that advanced industrial technology produces not only economic growth in developing societies but also other structural and cultural changes. The common characteristics that societies tend to develop as they become modern may differ from one version of modernization theory to another, but, in general, all assume that institutional structures and individual activities become more highly specialized, differentiated, and integrated into social, political, and economic forms characteristic of advanced Western societies.

For example, in the political realm, modern societies are characterized by high levels of urbanization, literacy, research, health care, secularization, bureaucracy, mass media, and transportation facilities. Kinship ties are weaker, and nuclear conjugal family systems prevail. Birth-rates and death rates are lower, and life expectancy is relatively longer. In the political realm, the society becomes more participatory in decision-making processes, and typical institutions include universal suffrage, political parties, a civil service bureaucracy, and parliaments. Traditional sources of authority are weaker as bureaucratic institutions assume responsibility and power. In the economic realm, there is more industrialization, technical upgrading of production, replacement of exchange economies with extensive money markets, increased division of labor, growth of infrastructure and commercial facilities, and the development of large-scale markets. Associated with these structural changes are cultural changes in role relations and personality variables. Social relations are more bureaucratic, social mobility increases, and status relations are based less on such criteria as age, gender, or ethnicity and more on meritocratic criteria. There is a shift from relations based on tradition and loyalty to those based on rational exchange, competence, and other universally applied criteria. People are more receptive to change, more interested in the future, more achievement-oriented, more concerned with the rights of individuals, and less fatalistic⁷.

Underlying the description of political features and changes that are thought to characterize modern urban industrial societies are theoretical assumptions and mechanisms to explain the shift from traditional to modern societal types. These explanatory systems draw upon the dominant theoretical perspectives in the 1950s and 1960s, growing out of classical evolutionary, diffusion, and structural-functionalist theories.

⁶ Fisun A. *Democracy, neopatrimonialism and global transformation: [monograph]* / A. Fisun. – H.: Constant, 2006. P. 34-35

⁷ Sztompka P. *Robert K. Merton: An Intellectual Profile* / Piotr Sztompka. Basingstone; London: Macmillan, 1986. 24 p.

The evolutionary perspective, stemming from Spencer, Durkheim, and other nineteenth-century theorists, contributed the notion that societies evolve from lower to higher forms and progress from simple and undifferentiated to more complex types. Western industrial society is seen as superior to preindustrial society to the extent that it has progressed through specialization to more effective ways of performing societal functions. Diffusionists added the ideas that cultural patterns associated with modern society could be transferred via social interaction (trade, war, travelers, media, etc.) and that there may be several paths to development rather than linear evolution. Structural functionalists emphasized the idea that societies are integrated wholes composed of functionally compatible institutions and roles, and that society's progress from one increasingly complex and efficient social system to another. This contributed to the notion that internal social and cultural factors are important determinants or obstacles of economic change.

Research by Smelser (1969) draws on all three traditions in describing modernization of society through processes of social differentiation, disturbances, and reintegration. In a manner similar to other conceptions of modernization, Smelser emphasizes four major changes: from simple to complex technology, from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture, from rural to urban populations, and, most important, from animal and human power to inanimate power and industrialization⁸.

Parsons later theoretical work (1964) also combines these perspectives in a neo-evolutionist modernization theory that treats societies as self-regulated structural functional wholes in which the main processes of change are social differentiation and the discovery (or acquisition through diffusion) of certain "evolutionary universals" such as bureaucratic organizations and money markets. These, in turn, increase the adaptive capacity of the society by providing more efficient social arrangements and often lead to a system of universalistic norms, "which, more than the industrial revolution itself, ushered in the modern era of social evolution" (Parsons 1964, p. 361). A similar neoevolutionist social differentiation theory of modernization is provided by Eisenstadt (1970)⁹.

Another early influence on modernization theory was Weber's work on the Protestant ethic. This work stressed the influence of cultural values on the entrepreneurial behavior of individuals and the rise of capitalism. Contemporary theorists in the Weberian tradition include Lerner, McClelland, Inkeles, and Rostow. Lerner's (1958) empirical studies in several Middle Eastern societies identified empathy, the capacity to take the perspective of others, as a product of media, literacy, and urbanization and as a vital ingredient in producing rational individual behavior conducive to societal development. McClelland (1961) felt that

⁸ Merton RK Some Preliminaries to a Sociology of Medical Education // The Student-Physician Ed By Robert K Merton, George G Reader, Patricia L Kendall – Cambridge.1957. P. 71-78 <http://cheloveknauka.com/kontseptsiya-strukturnogo-funktsionalizma-roberta-k-mertona#ixzz3GOg5G5uK>

⁹ Merton R. Sotsyalnaya Theory and sotsyalnaya structure. Sotsyalnaya structure and anomya. Sotsyolohycheskye study. 2008. №2-4. P. 89-90.

prevalence of individuals with the psychological trait of high “need for achievement” was the key to entrepreneurial activity and modernization of society. In a similar vein Smith (1974) used interview data from six societies to generate a set of personality traits by which they defined “modern man.” They felt that the prevalence of individual modernity in society was determined by such factors as education and factory experience and that individual modernity contributed to the modernization of society. Finally, Rostows (1960) well-known theory of the stages of economic growth, which he derived from studying Western economic development, emphasized the importance of new values and ideas favoring economic progress along with education, entrepreneurship, and certain other institutions as conditions for societies to “take off” into self-sustained economic growth.

All of these versions of modernization theory depict a gradual and more or less natural transition from “traditional” social structures to “modern” social structures characteristic of Western European and North American societies. More specifically, these theories tend to share to one degree or another the views that (1) modern people, values, institutions, and societies are similar to those found in the industrialized West, that is, the direction of change tends to replicate that which had already occurred in Western industrial societies; (2) tradition is opposite to and incompatible with modernity; (3) the causes of delayed economic and social development (i.e., underdevelopment) are to be found within the traditional society; (4) the mechanisms of economic development also come primarily from within societies rather than from factors outside of the society; and (5) these internal factors (in addition to industrial development) tend to involve social structures, cultural institutions, or personality types.

In keeping with this orientation, empirical studies of sociological modernization tend to deal with the internal effects of industrialization or other economic developments on traditional social institutions or with the social, political, and cultural conditions that facilitate or impede economic growth within traditional or less-developed societies. Examples might include research on the impact of factory production and employment on traditional family relations or the effects of an indigenous land tenure system on the introduction of cash crop farming in political.

Even though modernization theory since the 1960s has been dominated by and sometimes equated with Parsons neo-evolutionary theory, it is clear that there is no single modernization theory but rather an assortment of related theories and perspectives. In addition to those mentioned, other important contributors of theoretical variants include Hagan (1962), Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973), Bendix (1964), Moore (1967), Tiryakian (1985), and Nolan and Lenski (1999). Useful reviews include Harrison (1988), Harper (1993), and Jaffee (1998).

Since the 1960s, many critiques of modernization theory and the emergence of competing theories of development have eroded support for modernization theory. Foremost among

these are dependency, world systems, and neo-Marxist theories, all of which criticize the ethnocentricity of the modernization concept and the bias in favor of dominant capitalist interests. The focus of these theories is on explaining the contemporary underdevelopment of Third World countries or regions of the world in terms of colonization, imperialist interference, and neocolonial exploitation of developing countries since their gaining of independence. In these counter perspectives, both development and underdevelopment are viewed as part of the same process by which certain “center” countries or regions become economically advanced and powerful at the expense of other “periphery” areas. Rather than explaining development and underdevelopment by the presence or absence of certain internal institutions or personalities, these alternative theories argue that both result from unequal exchange relations and coalitions of interests associated with the structural position of societies in the global economy. Rather than interpreting underdeveloped societies as traditional or archaic, both underdeveloped and developed societies are contemporary but asymmetrically linked parts of capitalist expansion. Both are relatively “modern” phenomena¹⁰.

Attention to modernization theory in political science has declined as a result of the theoretical and empirical weaknesses raised especially during the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is still the dominant perspective among government officials and international agencies concerned with third world development. Hoogvelt has noted its influence on development policies as follows:

Because modernization theories have viewed the total transformation, that is westernization, of developing countries to be an inescapable outcome of successful diffusion of the Western economic/technological complex, by methodological reversal it is argued that a reorganization of existing social and cultural as well as political patterns in anticipation of their compatibility with the diffused Western economic/technological complex may in fact facilitate the very process of this diffusion itself. This monumental theoretical error – which to be fair was not always committed by the theorists themselves – has in fact been made and continues to be made by modernization policy-makers such as those employed by Western government, U.N. organizations, the World Bank, and so forth.

Thus, various indicators of social, political, and cultural development (such as degree of urbanization, high literacy rates, political democracy, free enterprise, secularization, birth control, etc.) have frequently been promoted as “conditions” for development. Interestingly, as modern structures and institutions have spread around the world and created economic, political, social, and cultural linkages, an awareness of global interdependence and of the ecological consequences of industrial development and modern lifestyles has grown. It is now clear that finite natural resources and the nature of the global ecosystem could not sustain worldwide modern conditions and practices of European and North American societies

¹⁰ W. Zapf modernization theory and the difference ways of social development / W. Zapf // Sociological studies. 2008. № 8. P. 14-26.

even if modernization theory assumptions of evolutionary national development were correct. Thus, new visions and interpretations of national and global development have already begun to replace classical modernization theory.

Zasady przygotowywania tekstów

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 - praca zbiorowa: *Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza porównawcza*, red. A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Wrocław 2008, s. 22.
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