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## Contents

*Anatoliy Romanyuk*

PECULIARITIES OF STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING OF THE ALL-UKRAINIAN UNION “SVOBODA” ..... 6

*Zbigniew Białobłocki*

THE STATE OF RESEARCH OF THE PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT AND ITS IMPOSITION ON THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE ..... 20

*Andrii Butyrskyi*

INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY ..... 40

*Sławomira Białobłocka*

MODELING COALITION GOVERNMENTS’ MANAGEMENT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CUT ON THE EXAMPLE OF EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES ..... 48

*Burdiak Vira*

SPECIFICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE BALCAN STATES ..... 60

*Oleh Burdyak*

USAGE OF INTERNET SERVICES IN STRATEGIC MARKETING ..... 69

*Tomasz Białobłocki*

THE RESEARCH ON THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS AS THE INDICATOR OF POLITICIZATION OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN UKRAINE ..... 81

*Tetiana Fedorchak*

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SCIENTISTS’ RESEARCHES ..... 96

*Krzysztof Białobłocki*

POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF IMMIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP ..... 112

*Hryhoriev Oleksandr*

ДЕФЕКТНА ДЕМОКРАТІЯ: ПОРІВНЯННЯ НЕЛІБЕРАЛЬНИХ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЙ УГОРЩИНИ ТА ПОЛЬЩІ ..... 127

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*Panczak-Białobłocka Nadja*

EFFECTIVENESS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF MINORITY  
GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTEXT..... 140

*Vitaliy Lytvyn*

CATEGORIZATION AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF INSTITUTIONALLY-PROCEDURAL AND POLITICALLY-  
BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT 158

*Magdalena Białobłocka*

THE FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT SYSTEM, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE  
COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP: FROM «REAL SOCIALISM» REGIMES TO POST-COMMUNISM..... 180

*Konet Andrii*

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE STUDY ON PUBLIC OPINION MANIPULATION  
TECHNOLOGIES..... 195

*Aneta Moszczyńska*

THE FEATURES OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP: A  
DESCRIPTIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ..... 208

*Myroslav Leshanych*

MODEL OF THE MODERN POLITICAL PARTY IN TERMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ..... 229

*Ewa Gruzziel*

SOCIAL SECURITY OF ELDERLY PEOPLE IN THE SELECTED EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRY ON THE  
EXAMPLE OF POLAND..... 237

NOTA O AUTORACH..... 248

ZASADY PRZYGOTOWYWANIA TEKSTÓW..... 250

## **Peculiarities of structural construction and ideological positioning of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”**

Evolution of the Vse-Ukrainske Obiednannia (hereinafter VO) “Svoboda” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom”) has been traced back; special attention has been paid to the issues of the leader in the organizational structure and the state of inner-party democracy. A high level of centralization and leadership format in the structure of the party has been justified. On the basis of the analysis of the party documents the ideological positioning of the party in the context of such variables as: radicalism, left-right positioning has been determined. It has been proved that the AU “Svoboda” most fully correspond to the parameters of radical and national ideology, combining left and right approaches with populism as an integral element.

*Key words: political party, organizational structure, democratic centralism, party’s statute, party’s program, ideology*

## **Особливості структурної побудови та ідеологічного позиціонування ВО «Свобода»**

Проаналізовано еволюцію ВО «Свобода», особлива увага приділена питанням ролі лідера в організаційній структурі, стану внутрішньопартійної демократії. Доведено високий рівень централізації та лідерський формат побудови партії. На підставі аналізу партійних документів окреслено ідеологічне позиціонування партії в контексті змінних: радикальність, ліво-праве позиціонування. Стверджено, що ВО «Свобода» найбільш повно відповідає параметрам радикальної та націоналістичної ідеології, поєднує ліві і праві підходи та інтегруючим елементом виступає популізм.

*Ключові слова: політична партія, організаційна структура, демократичний централізм, статут партії, програма партії, ідеологія.*

Since Ukraine proclaimed independence in 1991 a permanent feature of its political arena were and still remain nationalistic political parties among which it is usually possible

to qualify right and radical parties<sup>1</sup>. To them also belong the AU "Derzhavna Samostiinist Ukrainy" (DSU – the State Independence of Ukraine), Ukrainska Natsionalna Asambleia – Ukrainska Natsionalistychna Samo-Oborona (UNA-UNSO – the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-Defense), Sotsial-Natsionalistychna Partiiia Ukrainy (SNPU – the Social-National Party of Ukraine), Kongres Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv (KUN – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) and a number of other formations. Nowadays, to these parties belongs the VO "Svoboda", Natsionalno-Vyzvolnyi Rukh "Pravyi Sektor" (the National-liberation struggle "Right Sector"), Natsionalnyi Korpus (the National Corps). Among the abovementioned parties a special place is occupied by the AU "Svoboda", which derives origin from 1991, though in February 2004 the party's name was changed from SNPU into the VO "Svoboda. During 2012-2014 the party was represented in the parliament and nowadays according to the parameters of its activity must be qualified as a national/all-national political party, what allows to treat it as the biggest one among national political forces. The aim of the paper is to analyze the evolution of the organizational structure of the party and its ideology. We strive for investigating the extent to which the VO "Svoboda" is characterized by the foundations of the inner-party democracy and how the level of democracy/centralism is correlated with dominant ideological parameters of the party.

In the course of the research we have studied the program and statute of the party in all its versions (when some changes or amendments took place), conducted a number of interviews with the party members and experts, and analyzed the results of the sociological studies as to people who support or vote for the VO "Svoboda".

In the course of the SNPU/VO "Svoboda" it is possible to single out three stages, which predetermined the change of qualitative characteristics:

1. from foundation of the SNPU in 1991 to February 2004, when at the 9<sup>th</sup> congress the name was changed in to the VO "Svoboda";
2. from 2004 to 2014, when the process of enlargement took place and the level of electorate support grew. But this stage the party entered the parliament;
3. since summer 2014 when the level of support started dramatically decreasing as a result of which the party could not overcome an electoral threshold at the early parliamentary elections in 2014. This stage is currently characterized by a partial loss of members; decrease of activity in a number of regions throughout the country and consistently low level of support among potential voters what does not allow the party to enter the parliament independently.

<sup>1</sup> Bokalechuk V.O. Modern tendencies of right radicalism development in the Ukrainian society // Strategic priorities, 2011. № 3 (20). – C.39-44; Tanchin I., Lutsyshyn H. Ukrainian right radical parties after the Revolution Dignity // Political sciences, 2016, № 2. – C.43-48; Likhachov V. Ultra-right extremism as a threat to Ukrainian democracy [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://ccl.org.ua/position/ultrapravyy-ekstremizm-yak-zahroza-ukrajinskij-demokratiji>

### **Evolution of the organizational structure of the VO “Svoboda”**

Unfortunately, we do not have documents, which would provide us with a possibility to conduct a substantial study of the organizational structure of the party at the stage of its functioning as the SNPU. That is why we will focus our attention on the transformations of the grounds of the organizational structure of the VO “Svoboda”, put an emphasis on the issues of inner-party democracy and in particular the position of the party’s leader. The statute of the VO “Svoboda” was adopted by the 9<sup>th</sup> congress of the SNPU in February 2004; later on it was changed and amended at: the 13<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO “Svoboda” on June 17, 2006; the 20<sup>th</sup> congress on May 24, 2009; the 30<sup>th</sup> congress on February 7, 2015 and 37<sup>th</sup> congress on October 14, 2016.

The Statute of 2004 presupposed the formation of the leadership-type party with an absolute domination of the Head of the Party. According to the Statute the structure of the party presupposed central bodies and local party organizations. Correspondingly to the central bodies belong the Political Council and Control and Auditing Commission, whereas to the local bodies belong party organizations at the primary, district, town, Kyiv city and Sevastopol city, regional, the Crimea Autonomous Republic levels<sup>2</sup>. The position of the leader in the structure of the party authority was guaranteed on the basis of the following statutory provisions: paragraph 4.5 “During the periods between the congresses of the party operating control over the party’s activity is conducted by the Head of the VO “Svoboda” and the Political Council of the VO “Svoboda”; paragraph 4.6 “The Political Council of the VO “Svoboda” is formed at the congress upon the recommendation of the Head of the VO “Svoboda”. The Political Council of the VO “Svoboda” is managed by the Head of the VO “Svoboda”. Each member of the Political Council of the VO “Svoboda” is subordinate and accountable to the Head of the VO “Svoboda”. The construction of the absolute power of the party’s leader is supplemented by paragraph 4.10 “Upon the recommendation of the Head of the VO “Svoboda” the Political Council of the VO “Svoboda” appoints the heads of the state organizations” and paragraph 4.11, which presupposes the right of the Political Council of the VO “Svoboda” to dismiss district, town and primary party organizations. The Statute quite strictly determines the position of each member of the party. According to paragraph 2.7 the member of the party is prohibited to speak out, sign documents and come out with public announcements on behalf of the party, if they are not authorized in written form. The Statute as well presupposed suspension of the party membership due to the decision taken by the Political Council, if the latter assumes that the party member violated the statutory norms.

In the Statute, adopted at the 13<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO “Svoboda” on June 17, 2006 were introduced new regulations, concerning new leading bodies of the party – the Political Executive Committee and the Party Court. Some provisions concerning the competence of the party’s leading bodies were broadened. In particular, paragraph 4.5 formalized that “in the period between the party congresses the party is operated by the Head of the VO “Svoboda”, the Political

<sup>2</sup> The Statute of the VO “Svoboda” approved by the 9<sup>th</sup> congress of the SNPU on February 14, 2004 // Current archive of the VO “Svoboda”



Executive Committee "Svoboda" and the Political Council of the VO "Svoboda"<sup>3</sup>. However, paragraph 4.2 confirmed the right of the Head of the Party to introduce recommendations as to the whole composition of the Political Executive Committee and the Political Council for a two-year term. Besides, on the grounds of paragraph 4.13 the Head of the Party conducts human resources management, approves and removes heads of regional organizations and party organizations of the AR of the Crimea, Kyiv and Sevastopol cities.

In the Statute adopted at the 20<sup>th</sup> congress on May 24 1999, it is possible to trace a further attempt to "broaden parameters of the inner-party democracy" by means of a more specified documentation of powers of all structural departments. However, additionally the leadership role was assigned to the Head of the Party: paragraph 4.6 formalized that in fact the Head runs the Political Council, only the Head is entitled to convene it and that every member of the Political Council "is submitted and accountable to the Head of the VO "Svoboda"<sup>4</sup>. Paragraph 4.7 determining competence of the Political Council documented that only upon the recommendation of the Head of the Party the heads of central departments of the party, heads of structural bodies and departments of the central body, heads of local party organizations (apart from the heads of regional organizations), members of the ruling bodies of these organizations are appointed and dismissed. As to the heads of the regional party organizations, then in accordance with paragraph 4.13 the Head of the Party "offers candidates for the position of the regional organizations at the meeting (conference)". In paragraph 4.12 in particular it goes that the Head of the Party "... is the highest position in the party and conducts overall control over the VO "Svoboda" ... at the same time is the Head of the Political Council and the Head of the Political Executive Committee". Paragraph 4.13 states "that the Head issues orders and instructions".

In the Statute adopted at the 30<sup>th</sup> congress on February 7, 2015, which was approved with changes and amendments by the 37<sup>th</sup> congress on October 14, 2016 the vertical construction of the party organization was acknowledge, which, according to paragraph 3.1 presupposed: central bodies and local party organizations to which belong: regional, city (of regional significance), district in the town, town (of district significance), country district and village organizations<sup>5</sup>. The party preserved a high level of centralization and strict parameters of a predominant position of the party leader – the Head of the Party. However, it is possible to trace an attempt of formal representation of collegial format of the party management. In particular, in accordance with 4.5 in between the party's congresses the party is run by the Head, the Political Executive Committee and Political Council and according to paragraph 4.6 only the Political Council is declared to be the highest managing body in between the congresses. On the other hand, the real role of the Head of the Political Council is described in paragraph 4.6, where it goes that the Head manages the activity of the Political Council and that each member is submitted and accountable to the

<sup>3</sup> The Statute of the VO "Svoboda" approved by the 13<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO "Svoboda" on June 17, 2006 // Current archive of the VO "Svoboda"

<sup>4</sup> The Statute of the VO "Svoboda" approved by the 20<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO "Svoboda" on May 24, 2009 // Current archive of the VO "Svoboda"

<sup>5</sup> The Statute of the VO "Svoboda" [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://svoboda.org.ua/party/charter>

Head of the VO “Svoboda”. In similar way the relations between the Head of the Party and the Political Executive Committee are determined. According to paragraph 4.9 “each member of the Political Executive Committee of the VO “Svoboda” is submitted and accountable to the Head of the VO “Svoboda”. Such interpretation of the Head of the Party as the highest position has not been changed and was confirmed by paragraph 4.12. in the same way paragraph 4.13 regularized that namely the Head conducts human resources policy in the party, hat is specified by the norms concerning recommendations to the positions of heads of regional organizations and appointment and dismissal of the heads of local organizations and their bodies, acting heads of the regional, city (of regional significance), district in the town, town (of district significance), country district and village organizations. The right to issues orders and instructions has been justified. The focus of the party statute is put on a party member, who in accordance with paragraph 2.5 “is obliged to execute orders of the party leaders”.

The issue concerning the compliment of political parties in Ukraine only seems to be an easy one. All parties in their structures comprise organizational departments, which are aimed at keeping record of all party members, and correspondingly it is justified to expect information as to the real state and changes in numbers of party members, reported at the party congresses. However, in fact it is very difficult to find such information. Parties’ representatives prefer to report on general information and not specific data, concerning the number of parties’ members. Herewith, it is possible to observe demonstration of positive tendencies instable increase in party membership. Despite public demonstration of openness, parties do not provide researchers with information as to party members, explaining it in different ways. Predominantly they refer to the necessity to secure personal information and desire to avoid negative consequences for party members, especially in a case when a party is in opposition. Nowadays, on a non-confidential basis, such information may be found in Wikipedia articles, devoted to political parties, where the quantitative composition of a party at a certain period of time is stated (according to such information on September 19, 2018 the VO “Svoboda” comprises 15 000 members)<sup>6</sup>. There are also formal requirements of the legislation from the Ministry of Justice concerning registration of a political party, where there are criteria of the presence of party organizations in two-thirds of regions and two-thirds of districts and at least 10 000 signatures what allows to have a hypothetical view as to the minimal number of party members. However, we do not have verified data both at present moment and in the retrospective of development/evolution from the moment of its foundation. Among available publications it is necessary to mention data, provided by A. Shekhovtsov. He presents the following dynamics: 1991-92: 30-40 members; 1995 – 1000 members; 2003 – 10 000 members; 2009 – 15 000 members; 2010 – 15 000 members; 2012 – 20 000 members<sup>7</sup>. It is difficult to check these numbers and correspondingly

<sup>6</sup> The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Всеукраїнське\\_об'єднання\\_«Свобода»](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Всеукраїнське_об'єднання_«Свобода»)

<sup>7</sup> Shekhovtsov A. VO “Svoboda”: the problem of legitimacy in fight for power. – P. 206 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf](http://uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf)

to confirm or refute this information. The only available source is information provided by the party members and those who were in the party earlier<sup>8</sup>. The most doubtful is the number of 10 000 in 2003. In 2005 the Center for political studies in Ivan Franko Lviv National University conducted a research concerning party organizations on the eve of the parliamentary elections in 2006. Within the scope of the research we interview the heads of regional party organizations as to the situation in party organizations, and among the questions were those concerning general-party characteristics. The representatives of the VO "Svoboda" provided an approximate number of members – 4 000<sup>9</sup>. However, on the basis of the statements of the former members of the SNPU, at that time the party was in a deep crisis, concerning the membership and the given figures caused some doubts. The abovementioned number they believed to be significantly exaggerated, arguing that the events organized by the party at that time, it was incredibly hard to find a required number of participants among the party members and "one person had to carry two flags at one time". The interviewed representatives of the party (both former and actual) testify that the biggest number of party members was observed in 2012 and was about 20 000, and that the approximate number of members in September 2018 must be about 8 000 – 9 000 members. Correspondingly, the number given in the Wikipedia causes justified doubts.

As it is seen the centralized model with an absolute domination of the Head of the Party adopted at the party congress in 2004 has been preserved in all versions of its Statute. The role of party members is described exclusively as subordinate participants, who are obliged to execute orders of the party management, first of all the Head of the Party. A high level of centralization as well as discipline is contributed to by the statutory party court, as one of the highest leading bodies and the presence of internal security service, as to the statements made by former party members. Under such conditions it is theoretically possible to speak of a certain level of the inner-party democracy. Among these norms we may name a provision concerning formal choice of the heads at all level, including the Head of the party and presence of the institute of the party congresses and meetings. In fact, the party absolutely represents the provisions/foundations of democratic centralism<sup>10</sup>, inherent to communist parties and which do not deny the cult of the party leader both within the party and the country in general.

<sup>8</sup> In case when party members do not operate data on the basis of the party members record cards, they can be mistaken either deliberately to show power of the party structure which they belong to or not intentionally do that. In the latter case the evaluation on the basis of indirect factors like participation in the party's actions of different kind, will not always be verified. This is because at the party activities quite often participated representatives of affiliated nationalistic organizations, whose members not always were the representatives of the party or among whom only some part could be members indeed.

<sup>9</sup> Political parties in Lviv region on the eve of the 2006 elections: Textbook-reference book/ Compilers: Romaniuk A. S., Stochyliak L.S. – Lviv: TsPD LNU im. I. Franka, 2005. – P. 46.

<sup>10</sup> The principle of democratic centralism lied in the basis of establishing and functioning of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It presupposed: appointment for all party positions and bodies from the bottom upwards by election; accountability of higher bodies to lower ones; party discipline, when minority is submitted to the decisions of majority. Functionally this principle served for the fight for power and contributed to it.

### **Peculiarities of ideological positioning of the VO “Svoboda”**

The issues concerning ideological positioning have been partially studied in the publication by A. Shekhovtsov<sup>11</sup> and a conjoint publication by S. Kononchuk and Ya. Yarosh<sup>12</sup>. The latter focused on the program of the SNPU (1991) and the VO “Svoboda” in 2004 and 2011 in the formats: “left” - “right” and “liberal” - “conservative”, according to the formerly determined system of indices. The authors came to the conclusion that “the predominant ideological characteristic in the party programs of the SNPU – VO “Svoboda” is a strongly articulated nationalistic component, which we interpret as a variant of conservative ideology”<sup>13</sup>.

To evaluate the ideology of the party we must analyze the program of the SNPU and several versions of the VO “Svoboda” program: 2005 (adopted at the 12 congress); 2009 (adopted at the 20<sup>th</sup> congress) and current version of the program as of 2018.

A. Shekhovtsov states in the process of registration of the SNPU program the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine required to eliminate provisions: 1, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 29<sup>14</sup> (enumeration of provisions is determined on the basis of comparison of the contents of these provisions, according to the information provided by A. Shekhovtsov and the contents of the program, published in the collected volume by the I. F. Kuras of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine<sup>15</sup>). The determined nuance in the program causes some questions: first of all, the program was published by the board of authors of the collected volume and the program which is kept in the archive of the party, to which we got an access, are identical and include 31 provisions/paragraphs; secondly, the program used in the collected volume, as to the statements of those who compiled it, was received in the Ministry of Justice and the abovementioned provisions were not excluded. We may assume that the Ministry of Ukraine required excluding those provisions, but technically they were not eliminated from the text of the program. Correspondingly, if we follow A. Shekhovtsov’s version that there was such a requirement and the SNPU had to comply with it, it could have been done just technically “for the sake of appearance”, but within the party as a working document they left the program with 31 provisions/paragraphs.

The program of the SNPU is characterized by the following features: 1) the program of the party, which is aimed at “taking political power in Ukraine to create a new state and new society” (p.1), in general the notion “struggle” is constantly used in the program; 2) nationalistic, though it does not formalize the format of ethnic nation, but it is latently registered in the document: “to give an Ukrainian a chance to see the world from the Ukrainian point of

<sup>11</sup> Shekhovtsov A. VO “Svoboda”: the problem of legitimacy in fight for power. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf.

<sup>12</sup> Ideological positioning of political parties in Ukraine / Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Studies: S.H.Kononchuk, O.A.Yarosh. – K.: Agency «Ukraine», 2013. – 52 p.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. – P. 42.

<sup>14</sup> Shekhovtsov A. Ibid. – Pp.180-181.

<sup>15</sup> The program of the Socialist-National party of Ukraine // State, power and civil society in the documents of political parties of Ukraine (late 1980s – first part of 2011). – K.: IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy, 2011. – P. 181-183.

view, return them national character" (p.12), "consider Ukraine as a state of the Ukrainian nation" (p.17); 3) Ukraine-centrism: "Ukraine is a geopolitical center of Eurasia... We transform an out-of-date slogan "Independent Ukraine" into a slogan "Great Ukraine" (p.15), "new world, new society, which are so expected by the humanity at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium will descend from Ukraine" (p.31); 4) anti-Russian position: "the SNPU considers Russia to be the first cause for all misfortunes in Ukraine" (p.6), "struggle against pro-Moscow community spirit and Moscow influence over Ukraine – is one of the primary tasks of the SNPU" (p.11); 5) anticommunism: "the SNPU is an uncompromising opponent to the communist ideology and political parties as well as social movements, which propagandize and implement it into life. The SNPU believes that due to the communist ideology a person and the society degenerate intentionally by means of substituting moral and ethical values" (p.13). formally declaring the desire to build political life on the basis of a multi-party system (p.18) and do not "fight with oppositional parties and movements" by means of their prohibition (p.19), in the program the stress is made on the wish of the SNPU to become a "ruling party" (p.19) and declaration that "The SNPU interprets all other political forces as national-collaborators-betrayers of the Ukrainian revolution or to national-romantics – unfertile flowers of the national revolution, who are capable of nothing except some "revolutionary" phrases" (p.14). Correspondingly all other parties except the SNPU easily fall to those which can be prohibited: "Only those political parties and social movements will be prohibited, which in their programs or their actions bear a wish not to change the political system but to destroy the Ukrainian State" (p.18). Besides, the program does not include any notes concerning legislation and rule-of-law state (except the right for private property – p.25), but on the contrary states that "the SNPU to achieve its tactical tasks does not chain itself by dogmas, but takes advantage of the moment, constantly remember its strategic goals (p.29).

Therefore, the SNPU's program can be qualified as nationalistic, anticommunist, anti-Russian and non-democratic. It includes such requirements, which are characteristic of right-wing parties, concerning the nation as a value, religion. From the text of the program, despite the usage of the notion of national-socialism, it is difficult to draw a conclusion as to correspondence of the program to the ideas of classic national-socialism of the Third Reich.

The program in the version of 2005<sup>16</sup> preserved key characteristics from the SNPU's program: 1) Ukrainian nationalism: determined as a program aimed at protecting Ukrainians in Ukraine, i.e. the emphasis is consciously made on the ethnic component. Besides, it is presupposed: to adopt the legislation on Citizenship, according to which citizenship will be granted only to those people born in Ukraine or ethnic Ukrainians upon the requirement to deprive naturalized foreigners rights for Ukrainian citizenship if any crimes committed; a number of provisions concerning the Ukrainian language; "to offer preferential conditions for returning to

<sup>16</sup> The Statute of the VO "Svoboda" approved by the 12<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO "Svoboda" on December 23, 2005 // Current archive of the VO "Svoboda"

the Motherland, for those ethnic Ukrainians who were forcedly deported or made to emigrate”; “return in to passports and birth certificates information concerning “nationality”; guarantee proportional representativeness of Ukrainians in all bodies of authority – not less than 78 %; 2) anti-communism: “to initiate public legal procedures against communism. To prohibit communist ideology as misanthropic, which caused incorrigible damage to the Ukrainian nation”; 3) anti-Russian: demand from Moscow an official apology and compensation for genocide of the Ukrainian nation, demand from Russia to return all people’s savings, withdraw troops out of the Crimea. Thus, in the new version were eliminated the provisions concerning the leading role of Ukraine in the region, Europe and world (Ukraine-centrism). On the contrary, in the program appeared the following characteristics: 1) appeal to historical memory with the aim to give positive narrative to some historical events, in particular Holodomor (what corresponded the line, chosen by President Yushchenko) and OUN-UPA; 2) anti-immigrant provisions, concerning shut off all channels of illegal immigration, conditions for deportation of illegal immigrants (what can be qualified as the result of cooperation with a number of anti-emigrant parties from Eastern European countries); 3) support to Ukrainian immigrants. On the other hand, the program omitted the issues of democracy, human rights and social protection. Herewith, we observe in it some left requirements: “check validity of privatization of all big enterprises and initiate re-privatization”, “provide constitutional right for housing to all Ukrainian families. To oblige construction monopolists to build social housing at reasonable prices”, to provide deportee status with all social guarantees to Ukrainians, who were expelled from the native land, provide people in regions, who suffered from any technology-related contaminations, a status, equal to that of Chernobyl fighters, provide OUN-UPA veterans with corresponding preferences and compensate everything lost over 15 years of independence. Final requirements have much in common with populist promises/requirements, though they are addressed to Ukrainians not all citizens. Besides, in the program there are anticorruption slogans: to eradicate corruption schemes of providing citizenship of Ukraine”, “to exterminate corruption schemes and stop appointing non-professionals on the leading positions”, “to bring to responsibility the organizers ... of corruption activity”.

Thus, the program of the party in the 2005 version is characterized by the foundations of nationalism, anti-communism and anti-Russian rhetoric. It comprises elements of emigrant requirements. At the same time it acquires the nature of left ideology, with significant elements of populism: social promises without economic grounding, appeal to justice, anti-corruption phraseology. It is difficult to position the program as to the issues of democracy and human rights as they are not represented in it at all.

The version of the program adopted by the 20<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO "Svoboda" on May 24, 2009<sup>17</sup> is characterized by a significant growth in number of provisions/paragraphs in comparison with the previous version. It preserved and developed a number of crucial characteristics from the previous program: Ukrainian nationalism, anti-communism, anti-Russian nature, anti-emigrant ideas, support to Ukrainian migrants. Especially significant it was worked out and thus developed in the provisions concerning the restoration of historical justice while treating/interpreting historical events. If the previous version concentrated focus on the role and importance of the OUN-UPA, then the new version of the program appealed to the historical events in the Kyivska Rus. While assessing the events connected with the Soviet regime, the notion of "the genocide of the Ukrainian nation" was introduced and was formulated the appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the UNO, Euro parliament, parliaments of other countries of the world to acknowledge the fact of the genocide of Ukrainians in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a crime against humanity. Moreover a new requirement was articulated: "To develop and introduce state education programs "The truth about genocide of Ukrainians" and introduce a new education subject "The History of the Genocide of Ukrainians in the 20<sup>th</sup> century" in all education establishments". Significant attention is paid to the issues of European Ukraine-centrism and powerful state. In the program it is stated that European Ukraine-centrism must become a strategic course of the state, according to which Ukraine wishes to become not only a geographical, but also geopolitical center of Europe<sup>18</sup>. Together with the requirements to withdraw membership from the CIS, CES, EurAsEC, the GUAM organization is determined as an important geopolitical project. Besides, they define the scope of natural allies – countries of the Baltic-Black Sea geopolitical axis. For the first time ever, the idea of joining the NATO is contemplating on the conditions favorable for Ukraine and upon conditions of strict guarantees and precise terms<sup>19</sup>. Significant attention is paid to the issues of reformation and development of the Armed Force of Ukraine and Navy forces of Ukraine, withdrawal of Russian military bases from the Ukrainian territory. Another characteristic feature became a great block of requirement towards authority and society. In particular they regularized a demand/requirement: to transform Ukraine into a presidential republic, increase the significance of local self-administrations, abolishment of deputy immunity, introduction of a proportional electoral system with open lists, to reduce the term for the President's position, terms of the parliament and local councils, introduce new three-level system of administrative-territorial formation of Ukraine and so on. In the political bloc attention is drawn to the requirements to introduce practice of direct people-power in territorial communities – referendums, plebiscites, general meetings. In this context we may observe the requirements to introduce the mechanism of people's veto

<sup>17</sup> The Statute of the VO "Svoboda" approved by the 20<sup>th</sup> congress of the VO "Svoboda" on May 24, 2009 // State, power and civil society in the documents of political parties of Ukraine (late 1980s – first part of 2011). – K.: IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy, 2011. – P. 183-191.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. – P.188.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. – P.189.

as to the decisions taken by local self-administrations and providing the right for territorial communities to recall deputies of local councils, judges, local, judges and introduce the right to vote of no confidence in the head of the executive committee, land surveyors and the head of the department of internal affairs by means of plebiscite. The social context of the previous program was a bit developed by some requirements concerning an increase or provision of high living standards which must be guaranteed by the state.

Therefore, the party's program in the version of 2009 preserved previous characteristics of Ukrainian nationalism, anti-communism, anti-Russian rhetoric, elements of emigrant requirements as well as profound elements of populism: social promises without economic grounding, appeal to justice, requirements for direct democracy, which are characteristics of left political forces. Right-wing requirements are more clearly outlined in the program: strong army, nation, order. It is still difficult to position the program as to the issues of democracy and human rights as they are not represented in it at all.

The current program of the VO "Svoboda", published on the party site<sup>20</sup>, was adopted with changes and amendments at the 38<sup>th</sup> congress on September 2017. It presupposes party's assessment of tasks, taking into account annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the war on the territory of some districts in Donets and Luhansk regions. The program mainly specifies or develops all already mentioned provisions from the analyzed programs. Among new points attention is attracted by paragraph 1.10 concerning prohibition of activity of anti-Ukrainian political parties and public organizations and creation in the Criminal Code of Ukraine an individual chapter "Crimes against the Ukrainian Nation". The abovementioned norm, on conditions that there are no strict indicators how to define "anti-Ukrainian activity", may become a powerful instrument in the hands of authority in struggle with critics/opponents to the official national paradigm, both among political parties and in the civil society. Among the number of new more tough requirements it is necessary to mention paragraph 1.27 concerning the requirement to preserve unitary character of the state, render impossible any claims for autonomy, "special status" or "special order of self-administration". Though, these norms can be explained by formalization of the party's position as to implementation of Minsk agreements as to the special status of currently occupied territories of Donbas, their interpretation in future may put into question the policy of decentralization. With further development of the ideas of Ukraine-centrism there is certain correction concerning omitting the importance of the GUAM construction and additional emphasis on the advantages of the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance, construction of which becomes predominant in the foreign policy vision of the party. As the current version of the program comprises the most complete understanding of the party construction of economic nationalism and social justice, let's study them more precisely. In the sphere of economic policy the state is obliged to: perform deoligarchisation of the national

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<sup>20</sup> The program of defense of Ukrainians (current version). – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [https://svoboda.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PZU\\_actual\\_text\\_1-44.pdf](https://svoboda.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PZU_actual_text_1-44.pdf)



economy and liquidate private monopolies and cartels; adopt a complex of measures concerning return of capitals from offshores; prohibit privatization of strategic enterprises and return to the state those previously privatized; check validity of privatization of great enterprises, up to returning into the state ownership those enterprises whose owners did not perform their social, investment and other obligations; take control over natural monopolies; provide control over the bank sphere; legislatively restrict extortionate interests on bank credits; do not permit privatization of land and so on. In the sphere of social justice: to liquidate social gap between rich and poor; provide small and medium business with available and reasonable credits; to bring the cost of living into compliance with the real needs; abolish unfair pension reform and so on. A general conclusion of the current program in the last version will justify the assessment of the previous as populist.

Evaluation of the party on the basis of its program always evoke a question as to the extent the publicly declared provisions characterize the whole party in general. Are there in the party any groups with distinctive positions/approaches? According to the evaluation of former SNPU members in the party at the end of its continuation rather sensitive were relations between the group of the party members around A. Parubii and around O. Tiahnybok. The first group was characterized as more ideological and less aimed at "earning money for the party". Distinctive approaches as to evaluation of the party activity were vividly represented in the reaction as to O. Tiahnybok's speech in the party "Svoboda" on July 17, 2004 at Yavoryna mountain<sup>21</sup>. The so-called group of A. Parubii treated the speech and the outcomes rather negatively. On the other hand, O. Tiahnybok justified viability of his own formulations for further growth of the party. It should be mentioned that in January 2005 A. Parubii left the party. The same was done by 6 out of 18 members of the Political Council. In further activity of the party at the public level we practically do not have evidence as to the existence in the party any other distinctive approaches. To some extent, from this generally homogeneous information, fall out the examples of 2012-2013. At that time in public speeches of the VO "Svoboda" representatives we can find different messages. In the article published by I. Farion in the internet it goes that "an organic hyperbolic anti-thesis friend-or-foe, i.e. Ukrainian-Jew, German, moskal becomes a means of assertion of a corresponding ideologeme, what is a successful and influential keen-public device. Such anti-thesis has not only political, ethically-upright, but existential character, as an oppositional structure ""friend-or-foe" (motherland-foreign country) is one of the deepest archetypes, inherent to kin consciousness"<sup>22</sup>. In September 2013 people's deputy

<sup>21</sup> In his speech O. Tiahnybok stated: "The enemy came and took Ukraine. But they were not scared and now we should not be scared as well, they took up arms and went into woods they got prepared and fought against moskals, fought against Germans, fought with Jews and other evil, which wanted to take Ukrainian State from us". The prosecutor's office in Ivano-Frankivsk region opened an occurrence against Tiahnybok charging him with ethnic agitation. But on March 31, 2005 he was finally freed from accusations after several trials. However, that speech cost O. Tiahnybok a place in the parliamentary faction "Our Ukraine". See: Shekhovtsov A. VO "Svoboda": the problem of legitimacy in fight for power. – P. 186-187. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf](http://uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Farion I. Words as witnesses of truth. Linguistic expertise of ethnonyms "Jews" and "moskal" in the context of a meeting speech. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [www.freewebs.com/propovid/dopysy/farion.htm](http://www.freewebs.com/propovid/dopysy/farion.htm)

from VO “Svoboda” A. Illienko stated “We always repeated that Ukraine is a part of Europe and European civilization. We have never been against Europe. We are a pro-European party. First of all, we are a pro-Ukrainian party. But our key thesis in foreign relation policy is European Ukraine-centrism”<sup>23</sup>. Though, the article by I. Farion under such title was first published in 2004 in the magazine “Universum”, the version we cited is proclaimed by I. Farion being a people’s deputy and refers to 2012-2014. Thus, both messages refer to almost the same period. However, a bit distinctive cited assessments do not give us grounds to state that the VO “Svoboda” in the ideological scope allows/allowed relatively wide range of assessments and interpretations or that is possible to speak of distinctive groups inside the party, which could be roughly qualified as moderate and radical. The majority of party members we talked to, state, that there have not been any significant differences in interpreting the declared provisions of the program. Different interpretations predominantly appear due to peculiar features of the political moment and bear tactical character. The stress on a more radical evaluation or less tough was determined by specific circumstances and did not represent an inner-party discussion.

On the other hand, party representatives remark that since 2006 in the party has appeared a division into “pragmatists/businessmen” and “ideological people”. The first group justified the necessity to correct the behavior of party organizations, different levels of departure from program goals or value-based provisions by need to get funding from business. Payment for sponsors’ funding had to be: inclusion of businessmen into the party, voting for “ambiguous issues” in local bodies of authority, absence of public party reaction to questionable actions of the government and so on. As a rule, within the party such “compulsory pragmatism” in exchange for money was explained by necessity to provide financial support to the party members in other regions. Another group predominantly consisted of ordinary members and middle-ranking leaders as in particular they had to agree on such requirements, supporting them by their votes or silence and in this way legitimize “pragmatic” activity of the party leaders, i.e. they had to “make a deal with a devil”. The authority of pragmatists in the life of the party, especially in the questions of personnel and party decisions all the time was predominant. At the same time functioning of these two groups was no evidence for a competition for power in the party, as the representatives of both groups acknowledge the leading position of O. Tiahnybok and do not cast doubt on it.

Determination of the party leaders of the VO “Svoboda” on “pragmatic” behavior in exchange for money/services with silent agreement, in fact consent of the party members, calls into doubts a widespread statement concerning the ideological character of the party. Ideological nature is really can be found in the program document, public speeches of the party representatives, however constant “cooperation” with sponsors puts on the agenda a number

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<sup>23</sup> Illienko Andrii: The Party of Regions is now similar to the “Our Ukraine” in the days of V. Yushchenko // Hlavkom. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://glavkom.ua/interviews/122132-andrij-illienko-partia-regioniv-zaraz-nagaduje-“nashu-ukrainu”-chasiv-jushchenka.html>

of questions: 1) is there an edge and where is it when the foundations/values of Ukrainian nationalism come into contradiction with a chance to get profit? 2) whether the desire to get financial and other support and a possibility of personal gain of individual representatives of the party allows us state that ideological values remain the characteristic feature of the party and its members, but do not serve as a kind of disguise?

Validity/reasonableness of the abovementioned questions is justified by the results of deputies' from the VO "Svoboda" activity in regional, city councils in a number of regions and activity of the party representatives at the highest state positions after the Revolution of Dignity. A high level of expectations that the party representatives could radically change the situation, establish such expected order, that they personally would become a model of morality in politics have not withstood the test of power. The practice showed that a high level of patriotism does not always correspond with professionalism and struggle against corruption, moreover as to a number of the party representatives there were multiple charges of unlawful enrichment<sup>24</sup>. By all means, this topic is of great significance for all Ukrainian politics and it requires special research and studies which could form foundations for specific conclusions as to the ideological level of the VO "Svoboda". But "unpleasant after-taste" remained and was represented not only in a considerable lowering of the party and its candidates rating in September 2014 in comparison with January of the same year, but also in doubts as to the ideological level of the party.

Therefore, we may conclude that the program of the VO "Svoboda" is nationalistic, combining characteristic inherent to left-wing parties in economy and right-wing parties in the questions of army, nation. In this context, we assume that it not correct to position the VO "Svoboda" as a right-wing party. It is populist and does not presuppose any provisions concerning defense for rights of citizens and democracy, tending to authoritarian techniques of state governing.

<sup>24</sup> Fesenko: There are many accusations against the Prosecutor General's Office headed by Makhnitskyi. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://for-ua.com/article/1038236>; From radicalism to moderateness: what is the secret of the "Svoboda" failure. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://www.dw.com/uk/від-радикалізму-до-поміркованості-у-чому-секрет-провалу-свободи/a-18027849>; What will 15 former Prosecutor Generals be remembered for. – [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <https://ua.112.ua/mnenie/chym-zapamiatalsia-15-poperednich-kerivnykiv-hpu-311005.html>

## **THE STATE OF RESEARCH OF THE PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT AND ITS IMPOSITION ON THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE**

The historiographical article is devoted to examining the state of research of the problems of government stability and efficiency in comparative political studies. The emphasis was placed on the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study of the proposed problem and on its empirical content in the case of its overlapping on the countries of Eastern Europe. It was revealed that the problems of stability and efficiency of governments in the countries of Eastern Europe are multi-component and multivariate ones. On this occasion, it was motivated that today there are no complex works that are able to systematically open the identified issues. Instead, the author proposed various directions and blocks of research that are tangent to the analyzed issues and can contribute to its disclosure.

*Keywords:* government, government cabinet, government stability, government efficiency, historiography, Eastern Europe.

## **СТАН ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ПРОБЛЕМАТИКИ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ Й ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ УРЯДІВ У ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ КОМПАРАТИВІСТИЦІ: ІСТОРІОГРАФІЧНИЙ І ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ РОЗРІЗ ТА ЙОГО НАКЛАДАННЯ НА КРАЇНИ СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ**

В історіографічній статті розглянуто стан дослідження проблематики стабільності й ефективності урядів у політичній компаративістиці. Наголос зроблено на теоретико-методологічному розрізі дослідження запропонованої проблематики і його емпіричному наповненні у випадку накладання на країни Східної Європи. Виявлено, що проблематика стабільності й ефективності урядів у країнах Східної Європи є багатоскладовою і мультिवаріативною. З цього приводу вмотивовано, що сьогодні немає комплексних праць, які спроможні системно розкрити означену проблематику. Натомість науковцям запропоновано напрями і блоки досліджень, які є дотичними до аналізованої проблематики і можуть сприяти у її розкритті.

**Ключові слова:** уряд, урядовий кабінет, стабільність урядів, ефективність урядів, історіографія, Східна Європа.

In modern Polish and foreign comparative political studies the problem of government stability and efficiency is far from being new, but it actualizes, for example, in case of Eastern European countries – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, political systems of which, especially from the perspective of government stability and efficiency, have not undergone a thorough study. Thus, the current research is actualized by the necessity to answer the question what the state of research of the problems of government stability and efficiency is now in the countries of Eastern Europe, which became independent and sovereign only in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and whether this range of problems can be operated within the frames of actual scientific research concerning the problem of government stability and efficiency. Besides, the topicality of the given research is supplemented by the fact that in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the countries of Eastern Europe had already established new political institutes, including governments, and the need to investigate them is absolutely regularized by the neo-institutional approach within modern comparative studies.

It is quite obvious, especially taking into account the fact that the political transit of Eastern European countries, and therefore, their political systems, from the Soviet formal single-party system to the system of formal multi-polar competitiveness played a basic role in comparative studies of all political institutes, which were formed or/and are forming and are still functioning in the region after 1991. For instance, it is revealed in the classical and newest works by J. Linz and A. Stepan «Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe»<sup>1</sup> and «Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?»<sup>2</sup>, E. Arato «Constitution and Continuity in the East European Transitions»<sup>3</sup>, K. Collins «Clan politics and regime transition» in Central Asia<sup>4</sup>, N. Biryukov and V. Sergeyev «Russian Politics in Transition: Institutional Conflict in a Nascent Democracy»<sup>5</sup>, T. Colton «Transitional citizens: voters and what influences them in the new Russia»<sup>6</sup>, G. Di Palma «To Craft Democracies: an essay on democratic transitions»<sup>7</sup>, S. Haggard and R. Kaufman «The Political economy of democratic transitions»<sup>8</sup>, J. Hell-

<sup>1</sup> Linz J., Stepan A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996.

<sup>2</sup> Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3-87.

<sup>3</sup> Arato A., Constitution and Continuity in the East European Transitions, «*Constellations*» 1994, vol 1, s. 92-112.

<sup>4</sup> Collins K., *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.

<sup>5</sup> Biryukov N., Sergeyev V., *Russian Politics in Transition: Institutional Conflict in a Nascent Democracy*, Wyd. Ashgate 1997.

<sup>6</sup> Colton T., *Transitional citizens: voters and what influences them in the new Russia*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 2000.

<sup>7</sup> Di Palma G., *To Craft Democracies: an essay on democratic transitions*, Wyd. University of California Press 1990.

<sup>8</sup> Haggard S., Kaufman R., *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

man «Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions»<sup>9</sup>, D. Greenberg «Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World»<sup>10</sup>, T. L. Karl and P. Schmitter «Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe»<sup>11</sup>, L. Helms «The Democratic State or State Democracy: Problems of Post-Communist Transition»<sup>12</sup>, M. McFaul «The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship»<sup>13</sup>, M. Simai «Poverty and inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS transition economies»<sup>14</sup>, J. Wedel «Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking „Transition“ in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union»<sup>15</sup>, S. White, G. Gill, D. Slider «The politics of transition: shaping a post-Soviet future»<sup>16</sup> and many others.

However, the special emphasis in this context was laid on the governments. They are peaks of executive power, which are formed and function for its direct actualization. They are considered to be the most influential arena of political processes in any country, as just around their formation and functioning, different types of modern political systems are initialized. Moreover, governments are such political institutes, whose direct functions are providing well-being and interests of these or those countries in general. Thus, it is clear that activity of governments circulates over such categories as stability and efficiency. For a long time they have been forming the subject of comparative studies in western political science, as well as they have come in sight of Polish researchers. But even despite this and the fact that comparative studies of political institutes in the countries of Eastern Europe are of great popularity, currently in Polish political comparative studies the problem of government stability on the one hand, and government efficiency on the other, is not sufficiently represented, especially when one speaks of the region of Eastern Europe. However, in fact, some basic works concerning this range of problems exist (for instance works by A. Antoszewski<sup>17</sup>), but they are rather fragmentary or fundamentally have nothing to do with the region of Eastern Europe. And quite the contrary, they are predominantly universalistic, suggest complex theoretical-methodological and conceptual determination of the essence, principles, indicators and markers of government stability and efficiency on the example of Western European countries (where in fact appeared this strand of research) and Central-Eastern Europe. Therefore, in most cases one can remark episodic character of research concerning government stability and efficiency which are conducted

<sup>9</sup> Hellman J., *Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions*, „*World Politics*” 1998, vol 50, nr. 2, s. 203-234.

<sup>10</sup> Greenberg D., *Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>11</sup> Karl T. L., Schmitter P., *Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe*, „*International Social Science Journal*” 1991, vol 128, nr. 2, s. 267-282.

<sup>12</sup> Helms L., *The Democratic State or State Democracy: Problems of Post-Communist Transition*, Wyd. European University Institute 1998.

<sup>13</sup> McFaul M., *The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in the Post-communist World*, „*World Politics*” 2002, vol 52, nr. 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>14</sup> Simai M., *Poverty and inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS transition economies*, „*DESA Working Paper*” 2006, vol 12.

<sup>15</sup> Wedel J., *Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking „Transition“ in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, „*Journal of International Development*” 2003, vol 15, s. 427-440.

<sup>16</sup> White S., Gill G., Slider D., *The politics of transition: shaping a post-Soviet future*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

<sup>17</sup> Antoszewski A., *Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: perspektywa porównawcza*, Wrocław 2006.

within the Polish political science, especially in the context of Eastern European countries. To our mind, this is stipulated by several factors. First of all, it is a specific character of political development in the countries of Eastern Europe which is distinct from a specific nature of development in the countries of Western and Central-Eastern Europe. Secondly, to define stability and efficiency of governments in the region it is necessary to apply limited empirical data, what is not peculiar of the regions, speaking of which this problem has already been solved in Polish political science. And this, in its turn, means that the range of problems under investigation in the current paper, even despite the fact that it is more historiographical, is of high relevance, though requires a complex study of scientific works of western and post-Soviet schools of political comparative studies.

However, in this context it is necessary to remark that in foreign political science there are no specific research, devoted to the problems of the correspondence between stability and efficiency of governments in Eastern European countries (as well as isolated studies of stability of governments and efficiency of governments in the region). Nevertheless, there are a number of works, which in this or that way are relevant to the theoretical-methodological grounding of the problem of stability and efficiency of governments (and systems of governing) within modern political systems (including those of Eastern Europe). In particular the stress is made on theoretical-methodological and empirical studies by: S. Berglund, J. Ekman and F. Aarebrot («The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe»<sup>18</sup>), J. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel («Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets»<sup>19</sup>), I. Budge and H. Keman («Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States»<sup>20</sup>), Cheibub J. A. («Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy»<sup>21</sup>), L. Dodd («Coalitions in Parliamentary Government»<sup>22</sup>), R. Elgie («Semi-presidentialism in Europe»<sup>23</sup>, «Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study»<sup>24</sup>), M. Gallaher, M. Laver and P. Mair («Representative Government in Western Europe»<sup>25</sup>), W. Ismayr («Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas»<sup>26</sup>), R. Katz («Party Government: European and American Experiences»<sup>27</sup>), H. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert and I. Budge («Parties, Policies and Democracy»<sup>28</sup>), M. Laver and K. Shepsle («Making and

<sup>18</sup> Berglund S., Ekman J., Aarebrot F., *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Edward Elgar Publishing 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Blondel J., Muller-Rommel F., *Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>20</sup> Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Cheibub J. A., *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

<sup>22</sup> Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>23</sup> Elgie R., *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.

<sup>24</sup> Elgie R., Moestrup S., *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007.

<sup>25</sup> Gallaher M., Laver M., Mair P., *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992.

<sup>26</sup> Ismayr W., Soldner M., Richter S., *Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010.

<sup>27</sup> Katz R., Wildenmann R., *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987.

<sup>28</sup> Klingemann H., Hofferbert R., Budge I., *Parties, Policies and Democracy*, Wyd. Westview Press 1994.

breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies»<sup>29</sup>), M. Laver and N. Schofield («Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe»<sup>30</sup>), M. Laver and I. Budge («Party Policy and the Government Coalitions»<sup>31</sup>), A. Lijphart («Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government»<sup>32</sup>), D. Olson and P. Norton («The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe»<sup>33</sup>), T. Poguntke («The Presidentialisation of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies»<sup>34</sup>), G. Pridham («Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice»<sup>35</sup>), P. Roosendaal («Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability»<sup>36</sup>), K. Strom («Minority Governments and Majority Rule»<sup>37</sup>), K. Strom, W. Müller and T. Bergan («Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe»<sup>38</sup>), R. Taras («Post-communist presidents»<sup>39</sup>), J. Zielonka («Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe»<sup>40</sup>), P. Warwick («Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>41</sup>), I. Bell («Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia»<sup>42</sup>), D. Howard («Constitution making in Eastern Europe»<sup>43</sup>), G. Luebbert («Comparative Democracy: policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel»<sup>44</sup>) and some others. However, the problem of government stability and efficiency is not homogeneous; it requires distinguishing and solving a range of problems. It is proved by diversified scientific positions, which can be seen in political science. Taking this into account, we offer several blocks, referring to which in political comparative studies allows conducting scientific research of stability and efficiency of governments within political systems of Eastern European countries.

The first block comprises general scientific theoretical-methodological problems, concerning conceptualization of the notions “government stability” and “government efficiency”.

<sup>29</sup> Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>30</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>31</sup> Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Lijphart A., *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.

<sup>33</sup> Olson D., Norton P., *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1996.

<sup>34</sup> Poguntke T., Webb P., *The Presidentialisation of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Pridham G., *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986.

<sup>36</sup> Roosendaal P., *Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability*, Wyd. Thesis Publishers 1992.

<sup>37</sup> Strom K., *Minority Governments and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>38</sup> Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T., *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Taras R., *Post-communist presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

<sup>40</sup> Zielonka J., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

<sup>41</sup> Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>42</sup> Bell L., *Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2002.

<sup>43</sup> Howard D., *Constitution making in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. The Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1993.

<sup>44</sup> Luebbert G., *Comparative Democracy: policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.



In this context, it is necessary to appeal to the whole number of leading researchers, who from different perspectives have defined and studied the abovementioned categories.

First of all, conceptualization and modeling of government stability, interpretation of its indicators, markers and units of measurements in the institutional and contextual forms have been in the focus of such scholars (in parentheses we presented, to our mind, their most significant works) as: M. Laver and K. Shepsle («Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies»<sup>45</sup>), M. Laver and N. Schofield («Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe»<sup>46</sup>), M. Laver and I. Budge («Party Policy and the Government Coalitions»<sup>47</sup>), M. Gallaher, M. Laver and P. Mair («Representative Government in Western Europe»<sup>48</sup>), E. Zimmerman («Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s»<sup>49</sup>), L. Dodd («Coalitions in Parliamentary Government»<sup>50</sup>), J. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel («Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets»<sup>51</sup>), D. Sanders and V. Hermann («The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe»<sup>52</sup>), M. Taylor and V. Hermann («Party Systems and Government Stability»<sup>53</sup>), M. Taylor and P. Mair («Government Coalitions in Western Europe»<sup>54</sup>), P. Warwick («Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>55</sup>, «Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government»<sup>56</sup>), W. Riker («The Theory of Political Coalitions»<sup>57</sup>), A. Swaan («Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations»<sup>58</sup>), B. Grofman and P. Roosendaal («Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination»<sup>59</sup>), P. Roosendaal («Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability»<sup>60</sup>), C. Nikolenyi («Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe»<sup>61</sup>), K. Strom («Minority

<sup>45</sup> Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>46</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>47</sup> Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

<sup>48</sup> Gallaher M., Laver M., Mair P., *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992.

<sup>49</sup> Zimmerman E., Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

<sup>50</sup> Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>51</sup> Blondel J., Muller-Rommel F., *Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>52</sup> Sanders D., Herman V., The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe, „*Acta Politica*” 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.

<sup>53</sup> Taylor M., Hermann V., Party Systems and Government Stability, „*American Political Science Review*” 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28-37.

<sup>54</sup> Taylor M., Laver M., Government Coalitions in Western Europe, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1973, vol 1, s. 205-248.

<sup>55</sup> Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>56</sup> Warwick P., *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

<sup>57</sup> Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

<sup>58</sup> Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>59</sup> Grofman B., van Roosendaal P., Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.

<sup>60</sup> Roosendaal P., *Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability*, Wyd. Thesis Publishers 1992.

<sup>61</sup> Nikolenyi C., Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe, „*Party Politics*” 2004, vol 10, s. 123-150.

Governments and Majority Rule»<sup>62</sup>), K. Strom, W. Muller and T. Bergman («Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe»<sup>63</sup>, «Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>64</sup>), J. Toole («Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe»<sup>65</sup>), G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver («A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>66</sup>), I. Budge and H. Keman («Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States»<sup>67</sup>), A. Lijphart («A Note on the Meaning of Cabinet Durability»<sup>68</sup>, «Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation»<sup>69</sup>), J. Woodendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge («Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998)»<sup>70</sup>), J. Huber and C. Martinez-Gallardo («Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>71</sup>), E. Browne, J. Frendreis, D. Gleiber («The Process of Cabinet Dissolution»<sup>72</sup>, «The Study of Cabinet Dissolutions in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>73</sup>), D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson («Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events»<sup>74</sup>) and many others.

Secondly, theoretical-methodological grounding of government efficiency and systems of governing has been in the focus of such scientists (in parentheses we presented, to our mind, their most significant works) as: J. Huber («How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?»<sup>75</sup>), I. Indridason and C. Kam («Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift»<sup>76</sup>, «The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>77</sup>), T. Dewan and D. Myatt («Selection, Performance, and Government Longevity: the Good, the Bad, and the Unique»<sup>78</sup>,

<sup>62</sup> Strom K., *Minority Governments and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>63</sup> Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T., *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.

<sup>64</sup> Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Toole J., Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe, „*Party Politics*” 2000, vol 6, s. 441-461.

<sup>66</sup> King G., Alt J., Burns N., Laver M., A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.

<sup>67</sup> Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>68</sup> Lijphart A., A Note on the Meaning of Cabinet Durability, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 163-166.

<sup>69</sup> Lijphart A., Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.

<sup>70</sup> Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge J., *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): composition, duration, personnel*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000.

<sup>71</sup> Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared at 2003 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia, 2003.

<sup>72</sup> Browne E., Frendreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 1986, vol 30, s. 628-650.

<sup>73</sup> Frendreis J., Gleiber D., Browne E., The Study of Cabinet Dissolutions in Parliamentary Democracies, „*Legislative Studies Quarterly*” 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 619-628.

<sup>74</sup> Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, „*American Political Science Review*” 2000, vol 94, s. 627-640.

<sup>75</sup> Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, „*American Political Science Review*” 1998, vol 92, s. 577-591.

<sup>76</sup> Indridason I., Kam K., Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2008, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 621-656.

<sup>77</sup> Kam C., Indridason I., *The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Parliamentary Democracies: A Repeated Events Approach*, Paper presented at annual meeting of The Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, 2009.

<sup>78</sup> Dewan T., Myatt D., *Selection, Performance, and Government Longevity: the Good, the Bad, and the Unique*, LSE-NYU Conference 2011, Chicago.

«Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet»<sup>79</sup>, «The Declining Talent Pool of Government»<sup>80</sup>), G. Cox («The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England»<sup>81</sup>), L. Martin and G. Vanberg («Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny»<sup>82</sup>), D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran («Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking Under Separate Powers»<sup>83</sup>), T. Borzel and Y. Pamuk («Good Governance in the European Union»<sup>84</sup>, «The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its Near Abroad»<sup>85</sup>, «Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood»<sup>86</sup>), S. Haggard and R. Kaufman («The Political economy of democratic transitions»<sup>87</sup>), G. Brewer, Y. Choi and R. Walker («Accountability, Corruption and Government Effectiveness in Asia»<sup>88</sup>, «Does Administrative Reform Improve Bureaucratic Performance?»<sup>89</sup>) and others. At the same time, special attention should be paid to the works by D. Kaufman, A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi («The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues»<sup>90</sup>), T. Curristine («Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges»<sup>91</sup>), R. Putnam and R. Leonardi («Making Democracy Work»<sup>92</sup>).

Thirdly, an institutional range of problems, concerning all those processes which describe and determine stability and efficiency of governments has been outlined in the works by W. Merkel and A. Croissant («Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien»<sup>93</sup>, «From transition to defective democracy: Mapping Asian democratization»<sup>94</sup>), G. Lanza («Self-Destructive Processes in Institution Building and Some Modest Countervailing

<sup>79</sup> Dewan T., Myatt D., Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet, „*American Political Science Review*“ 2007, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 63-77.

<sup>80</sup> Dewan T., Myatt D., The Declining Talent Pool of Government, „*American Journal of Political Science*“ 2010, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 267-286.

<sup>81</sup> Cox G., *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

<sup>82</sup> Martin L., Vanberg G., Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny, „*American Journal of Political Science*“ 2004, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 13-27.

<sup>83</sup> Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking Under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

<sup>84</sup> Börzel T., Pamuk Y., Stahn A., *Good Governance in the European Union*, Wyd. Freie Universität Berlin 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Börzel T., Pamuk Y., Stahn A., The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its Near Abroad: One Size Fits All, „*SFB-Governance Working Paper Series*“ 2008, vol 18.

<sup>86</sup> Börzel T., *Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood*, Paper prepared for the ERD Workshop „Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms“, Florence, April 16-17, 2009.

<sup>87</sup> Haggard S., Kaufman R., *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

<sup>88</sup> Brewer G., Choi Y., Walker R., Accountability, Corruption and Government Effectiveness in Asia: an Exploration of World Bank Governance Indicators, „*International Public Management Review*“ 2007, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 200-219.

<sup>89</sup> Brewer G., Does Administrative Reform Improve Bureaucratic Performance? A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis, „*Public Finance and Management*“ 2004, vol 4, nr. 3, s. 399-428.

<sup>90</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, „*Policy Research Working Paper*“, vol 5430.

<sup>91</sup> Curristine T., Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges, „*OECD Journal On Budgeting*“ 2005, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 127-151.

<sup>92</sup> Putnam R., Leonardi R., *Making Democracy Work*, Wyd. Greenwood Publishing Group 2002.

<sup>93</sup> Merkel W., Croissant A., Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien, „*Politische Vierteljahresschrift*“ 2000, vol 41, nr. 1, s. 3-30.

<sup>94</sup> Croissant A., From transition to defective democracy: Mapping Asian democratization, „*Democratization*“ 2004, vol 11, nr. 5, s. 156-178.

Mechanisms»<sup>95</sup>), F. Bealey («Stability and Crisis: Fears about Threats to Democracy»<sup>96</sup>), J. Linz («Democracy's Time Constraint»<sup>97</sup>, «The Perils of Presidentialism»<sup>98</sup>).

However, institutional problems of government stability and efficiency have even been deeper described from the perspective of theoretical-methodological approaches towards evaluation of modern political systems. Despite a great number of studies conducted in this direction, we outline those, which to our mind, are the most qualitatively and temporarily significant. First of all, among them we appeal to the ideas of the following scholars (in parentheses we presented, as we believe, their most significant works, especially of monographic character): K. von Beyme («Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa»<sup>99</sup>), G. Sartori («Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes»<sup>100</sup>), M. Shugart and J. Carey («Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design»<sup>101</sup>, «Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics»<sup>102</sup>), Cheibub J. A., Z. Elkins and T. Ginsburg («Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Forms»<sup>103</sup>, «Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy»<sup>104</sup>, «Divided Government, Deadlock and the Survival of Presidents and Presidential Regimes»<sup>105</sup>), R. Elgie («Divided executives and democratization»<sup>106</sup>, «Semi-presidentialism in Europe»<sup>107</sup>, «Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study»<sup>108</sup>), M. Kasapovic («Parliamentarism and Presidentialism in Eastern Europe»<sup>109</sup>), M. Duverger («Les Régimes semi-présidentiels»<sup>110</sup>), J. Blondel («Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability»<sup>111</sup>), A. Stepan and C. Skach («Borrowing Constitutional Designs»<sup>112</sup>,

<sup>95</sup> Lanzara G., Self-Destructive Processes in Institution Building and Some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1998, vol 33, nr. 1, s. 1-39.

<sup>96</sup> Bealey F., Stability and Crisis: Fears about Threats to Democracy, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1987, vol 15, nr. 6, s. 687-715.

<sup>97</sup> Linz J., Democracy's Time Constraint, „*International Political Science Review*” 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 19-37.

<sup>98</sup> Linz J., The Perils of Presidentialism, „*Journal of Democracy*” 1990, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 51-69.

<sup>99</sup> Beyme K., *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa*, München 1973.

<sup>100</sup> Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

<sup>101</sup> Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, 2005.

<sup>102</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

<sup>103</sup> Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., *Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Forms*, Presented at the International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, January 14-15 2010, Oslo.

<sup>104</sup> Cheibub J. A., *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

<sup>105</sup> Cheibub J. A., *Divided Government, Deadlock and the Survival of Presidents and Presidential Regimes*, Presented at the conference „Constitutional Design 2000”, December 9-11, 1999, University of Notre Dame.

<sup>106</sup> Elgie R., McMenamin I., Divided executives and democratization, „*Working Papers in International Studies Series*” 2006, vol 2.

<sup>107</sup> Elgie R., *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.

<sup>108</sup> Elgie R., Moestrup S., *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007.

<sup>109</sup> Kasapovic M., Parliamentarism and Presidentialism in Eastern Europe, „*Politička misao*” 1996, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 120-135.

<sup>110</sup> Duverger M., *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Paris 1986.

<sup>111</sup> Blondel J., *Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability*, [w:] Kavanagh D., Finer S., Peele G. (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1984.

<sup>112</sup> Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.

«Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy»<sup>113</sup>, «The „newest“ separation of powers: semi-presidentialism»<sup>114</sup>), A. Krouwel («Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European countries»<sup>115</sup>), Bahro H. («Virtues and vices of semi-presidential government»<sup>116</sup>), O. Protsyk («Politics of Intra-executive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe»<sup>117</sup>, «Semi-Presidentialism: The Logic of Institutional Conflict and Implications for Public Administration Design»<sup>118</sup>), P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones («Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems?»<sup>119</sup>), O. Amorim Neto and K. Strom («Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies»<sup>120</sup>), O. Amorim Neto and D. Samuels («Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective»<sup>121</sup>), D. Samuels and M. Shugart («Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior»<sup>122</sup>) and others.

Finally, a special place in the scientific analysis of political systems in the context of government stability and efficiency, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe, belongs to political regimes, as they determine peculiarities of horizontal and executive accountability of the central power. Concerning this, we believe it necessary to appeal to a number of scientific studies done in this direction, but the emphasis we put on the categories of democratization, hybrid and autocratic political regimes and their stability etc. These problems and questions, with complete or partial connection to the countries of Eastern Europe were represented in the works by such scholars (in parentheses we presented, to our mind, their most significant works, especially of monographic character) as: Chehabi H. and J. Linz («Sultanistic Regimes»<sup>123</sup>), Cheibub J. A. and F. Limongi («Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered»<sup>124</sup>), L. Diamond («Thinking About Hybrid

<sup>113</sup> Skach C., Constitutional origins of dictatorship and democracy, *“Constitutional Political Economy”* 2005, vol 16, s. 347-368.

<sup>114</sup> Skach C., The „newest“ separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, *“International Journal of Constitutional Law”* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

<sup>115</sup> Krouwel A., Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European countries, *„Working Papers Political Science”* 2003, vol 2.

<sup>116</sup> Bahro H., Virtues and vices of semi-presidential government, *„Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy”* 1999, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 1-37.

<sup>117</sup> Protsyk O., Politics of Intra-executive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe, *„East European Politics and Societies”* 2005, vol 19, nr. 2, s. 135-160.

<sup>118</sup> Protsyk O., *Semi-Presidentialism: The Logic of Institutional Conflict and Implications for Public Administration Design*, Wyd. Rutgers University 2000.

<sup>119</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or Generating Representation and Governance Problems?*, Wyd. Centre for the Study of Democratic Government 2005.

<sup>120</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *„British Journal of Political Science”* 2006, vol 36, s. 619-643.

<sup>121</sup> Amorim Neto O., Samuels D., Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective, *„Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2010, vol 1, nr. 1.

<sup>122</sup> Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

<sup>123</sup> Chehabi H., Linz J., *Sultanistic Regimes*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1998.

<sup>124</sup> Cheibub J. A., Limongi F., Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered, *„Annual Review of Political Sciences”* 2002, vol 5, s. 151-179.

Regimes»<sup>125</sup>), K. Collins («Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia»<sup>126</sup>), S. Levitsky and L. Way («Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War»<sup>127</sup>), T. Pempel («Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes»<sup>128</sup>), V. Bunce and S. Wolchik («Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries»<sup>129</sup>), K. Dawisha and B. Parrott («Russia and the new states of Eurasia: the politics of upheaval»<sup>130</sup>), E. Korosteleva («Democratic authoritarianism: public preferences in Belarus and its neighbors»<sup>131</sup>), M. Ottaway («Democracy challenged: the rise of semi-authoritarianism»<sup>132</sup>), L. Way («Pluralism by Default and the Challenges of Authoritarian State Building in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine»<sup>133</sup>), K. Rossiter («Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies»<sup>134</sup>), D. Beachain («The color revolutions in the former Soviet republics: successes and failures»<sup>135</sup>), D. Greenberg («Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World»<sup>136</sup>), J. Hellman («Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Post-Communist Transitions»<sup>137</sup>), T.L. Karl and P. Schmitter («Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe»<sup>138</sup>), T. Lancaster («The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data»<sup>139</sup>), S. White, G. Gill and D. Slider («The politics of transition: shaping a post-Soviet future»<sup>140</sup>) and others.

In general, on this basis it was studied that the problem of theoretical-methodological interpretation of the phenomenon of government stability and efficiency has not been directly applied and solved on the example of Eastern European countries, as it mainly touches the peculiarities of political systems in the countries of the region and patterns of the processes of government formation and resignation. Taking this into account it is possible to single out the second block of research, which refers namely to the constitutional (formal), as well as political (factual) attributes of executive-legislative relations and the place of government cabinets in them, in particularly in the countries of Eastern Europe. As in the region (at the time of

<sup>125</sup> Diamond L., Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, „*Journal of Democracy*” 2002, vol 13, nr. 2, s. 21-35.

<sup>126</sup> Collins K., *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.

<sup>127</sup> Levitsky S., Way L., *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

<sup>128</sup> Pempel T., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1990.

<sup>129</sup> Bunce V., Wolchik S., *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.

<sup>130</sup> Dawisha K., Parrott B., *Russia and the new states of Eurasia: the politics of upheaval*, Wyd. University of Cambridge 1994.

<sup>131</sup> Korosteleva E., Democratic authoritarianism: public preferences in Belarus and its neighbors, „*Northwestern Journal of International Affairs*” 2003, vol 5, s. 31-39.

<sup>132</sup> Ottaway M., *Democracy challenged: the rise of semi-authoritarianism*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment 2003.

<sup>133</sup> Way L., *Pluralism by Default and the Challenges of Authoritarian State Building in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine*, Paper presented at workshop on „Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective”, Stanford University, 2002.

<sup>134</sup> Rossiter C., *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Princeton 1948.

<sup>135</sup> Beacháin D., *The color revolutions in the former Soviet republics: successes and failures*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2010.

<sup>136</sup> Greenberg D., *Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>137</sup> Hellman J., Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Post-Communist Transitions, „*East European Constitutional Review*” 1996, vol 1, nr. 5, s. 46-53.

<sup>138</sup> Karl T. L., Schmitter P., Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, „*International Social Science Journal*” 1991, vol 128, nr. 2, s. 267-282.

<sup>139</sup> Lancaster T., *The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>140</sup> White S., Gill G., Slider D., *The politics of transition: shaping a post-Soviet future*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

research) function both more democratic (hybrid) and more autocratic political regimes, we propose to study them individually, in a separate format – concerning each country in particular (but first of all appealing to the main monographic works in this field).

Specifically, speaking of Azerbaijan it makes sense to refer to the ideas of such scientists as: V. Babak, D. Vaisman and A. Wasserman («Political organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: sources and documents»<sup>141</sup>), B. Sidikov («New or Traditional? „Clans“, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan»<sup>142</sup>), I. Kupeli («Stabilisierung autoritärer Herrschaft: Das Fallbeispiel Aserbaidschan»<sup>143</sup>), F. Guliyev («Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semi-authoritarianism?»<sup>144</sup>), T. Swietochowski («Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition»<sup>145</sup>), M. Croissant («The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications»<sup>146</sup>), R. Badalov and R. Mehdi («The Political Institutions of Azerbaijan: a dichotomy between text and reality»<sup>147</sup>), G. Curtis («Azerbaijan: Government and Politics: The Presidential Election of 1992»<sup>148</sup>), K. Dawisha and B. Parrott («Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus»<sup>149</sup>), D. Mastro and K. Christensen («Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan»<sup>150</sup>), L. Alieva («Azerbaijan's frustrating elections»<sup>151</sup>), S. Cornell («Azerbaijan Since Independence»<sup>152</sup>) and others.

The issues of executive-legislative relations and the place of government cabinets in them in Belarus have been scientifically described in the works by E. Korosteleva («Changing Belarus? The Limits of EU Governance in Eastern Europe»<sup>153</sup>, «Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship»<sup>154</sup>, «Democratic authoritarianism: public preferences in Belarus and its neighbors»<sup>155</sup>, «Patterns of participation in post-communist politics: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine since 1989»<sup>156</sup>, «Was it a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006

<sup>141</sup> Babak V., Vaisman D., Wasserman A., *Political organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: sources and documents*, Wyd. Frank Cass 2004.

<sup>142</sup> Sidikov B., New or Traditional? „Clans“, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, „*Berliner Osteuropa*” 2004, vol 21, s. 68-74.

<sup>143</sup> Küpeli I., *Stabilisierung autoritärer Herrschaft: Das Fallbeispiel Aserbaidschan*, Wyd. Universität Duisburg-Essen 2010.

<sup>144</sup> Guliyev F., Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semi-authoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization, „*Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*” 2005, vol 13, nr. 3, s. 393-435.

<sup>145</sup> Swietochowski T., *Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1995.

<sup>146</sup> Croissant M., *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications*, Wyd. Greenwood Group 1998.

<sup>147</sup> Badalov R., Mehdi R., *The Political Institutions of Azerbaijan: a dichotomy between text and reality*, Tbilisi 2013.

<sup>148</sup> Curtis G., *Azerbaijan: Government and Politics: The Presidential Election of 1992*, Wyd. Library of Congress 1995.

<sup>149</sup> Dawisha K., Parrott B., *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

<sup>150</sup> Mastro D., Christensen K., *Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan*, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, June 1-3, 2006.

<sup>151</sup> Alieva L., Azerbaijan's frustrating elections, „*Journal of Democracy*” 2006, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 147-160.

<sup>152</sup> Cornell S., *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2010.

<sup>153</sup> Korosteleva E., Bosse G., Changing Belarus? The Limits of EU Governance in Eastern Europe, „*Conflict and Cooperation*” 2009, vol 44, nr. 2, s. 143-165.

<sup>154</sup> Korosteleva E., Lawson C., Marsh R., *Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship*, Wyd. Routledge-Curzon 2003.

<sup>155</sup> Korosteleva E., Democratic authoritarianism: public preferences in Belarus and its neighbors, „*Northwestern Journal of International Affairs*” 2003, vol 5, s. 31-39.

<sup>156</sup> Korosteleva E., Hutcheson D., Patterns of participation in post-communist politics: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine since 1989, „*Journal of Comparative European Politics*” 2006, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 23-46.

Presidential Election»<sup>157</sup>), S. Parker («The Last Soviet Republic: Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus»<sup>158</sup>), A. Kulik and S. Pshizova («Political Parties in Post-Soviet Space: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics»<sup>159</sup>), D. Marples («Belarus: A Denationalized Nation»<sup>160</sup>), H. Schwartz («The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe»<sup>161</sup>) and others.

In case of evaluating the procedures of government cabinets formation and resignation in the context of constitutionalism in Armenia it is feasible to focus on the works by the following scholars: J. Elster and P. Preuss («Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea»<sup>162</sup>, «Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea»<sup>163</sup>), J. Kis («Between Reform and Revolution»<sup>164</sup>), A. Markarov («Armenian Constitutional Changes: Slight Amendments or Heavy Reform?»<sup>165</sup>), «The Institutional Arrangements within Armenian Transition»<sup>166</sup>), I. Jefferies («The Caucasus and Central Asian Republics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century»<sup>167</sup>), S. Mkhitarianm M. Anushyan and A. Hayrapetyan («Political Parties of The Republic of Armenia: Directory»<sup>168</sup>) and others.

Georgia and its political system and executive-legislative relations around governments also form the subject of scientific studies, conducted by a number of scholars, among whom we may single out: A. Kapanadze («The Constitution-making Politics in Georgia»<sup>169</sup>), D. Howard («Constitution making in Eastern Europe»<sup>170</sup>), J. Wheatley («Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution»<sup>171</sup>), I. Bell («Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia»<sup>172</sup>), S. Cornell («Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Case in Georgia»<sup>173</sup>), G. Manjavidze («Comparison of Appointment and Dismissal Powers of the Executive Branch in Germany, France and Georgia»<sup>174</sup>), G. Nodia («The Political

<sup>157</sup> Korosteleva E., Was it a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 Presidential Election, „*Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*” 2009, vol 25, nr. 2-3, s. 324-346.

<sup>158</sup> Parker S., *The Last Soviet Republic: Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus*, Wyd. Trafford Books 2007.

<sup>159</sup> Kulik A., Pshizova S., *Political Parties in Post-Soviet Space: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics*, Wyd. Praeger Publishers 2005.

<sup>160</sup> Marples D., *Belarus: A Denationalized Nation*, Wyd. Harwood Academic Publishers 1999.

<sup>161</sup> Schwartz H., *The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. The University of Chicago Press 2002.

<sup>162</sup> Elster J., Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, „*Public Administration*” 1993, vol 71, nr. 1, s. 169-217.

<sup>163</sup> Elster J., Offe C., Preuss P., *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.

<sup>164</sup> Kis J., Between Reform and Revolution, „*East European Politics and Societies*” 1998, vol 2, s. 300-383.

<sup>165</sup> Markarov A., Armenian Constitutional Changes: Slight Amendments or Heavy Reform?, „*Sprawy Polityczne*” 2002.

<sup>166</sup> Markarov A., *The Institutional Arrangements within Armenian Transition*, Unpublished 2000.

<sup>167</sup> Jefferies I., *The Caucasus and Central Asian Republics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

<sup>168</sup> Mkhitarian S., Anushyan M., Hayrapetyan A., *Political Parties of The Republic of Armenia: Directory*, Wyd. Gasprint 2005.

<sup>169</sup> Kapanadze A., *The Constitution-making Politics in Georgia*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

<sup>170</sup> Howard D., *Constitution making in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. The Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1993.

<sup>171</sup> Wheatley J., *Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union*, Ashgate 2005.

<sup>172</sup> Bell L., *Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2002.

<sup>173</sup> Cornell S., *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Case in Georgia*, Wyd. Uppsala, 2002.

<sup>174</sup> Manjavidze G., *Comparison of Appointment and Dismissal Powers of the Executive Branch in Germany, France and Georgia*, Wyd. Central European University 2009.



Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects»<sup>175</sup>), L. Mitchell («Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution»<sup>176</sup>) and others.

To determine institutional peculiarities of Moldova in the context of government cabinets formation and resignation it is proposed to make use of works by such scientists as: L. Way («Pluralism by Default in Moldova»<sup>177</sup>), H. Alker, T. Gurr and K. Rupesinghe («Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons»<sup>178</sup>), M. Beissinger («Beyond state crisis? Post-colonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective»<sup>179</sup>), R. Fawn («Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies»<sup>180</sup>), C. King («The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture»<sup>181</sup>), E. Mazo and A. Kounov («Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States»<sup>182</sup>), P. Quinlan («Moldova under Lucinschi»<sup>183</sup>), J. Zielonka («Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe»<sup>184</sup>), O. Protsyk and I. Osoian («Moldova: Party Institutionalization in a Resource-Scarce Environment»<sup>185</sup>) and others.

A huge number of studies refer to evaluation of the political system and the place of government cabinets in Russia. The main of them are represented by the following scholars (crucial and monographic works are offered): T. Colton, C. Skach and M. McFaul («Popular choice and managed democracy: the Russian elections of 1999 and 2000»<sup>186</sup>, «A Fresh Look at Semi-presidentialism: The Russian Predicament»<sup>187</sup>, «Transitional citizens: voters and what influences them in the new Russia»<sup>188</sup>), L. Shevtsova («Putin's Russia»<sup>189</sup>, «Russia – lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies»<sup>190</sup>, «Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality»<sup>191</sup>), P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones («Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime»<sup>192</sup>),

<sup>175</sup> Nodia G., Scholtbach A., *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects*, Wyd. Delft 2006.

<sup>176</sup> Mitchell L., *Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania Press 2009.

<sup>177</sup> Way L., Pluralism by Default in Moldova, „*Journal of Democracy*” 2002, vol 13, nr. 4, s. 127-141.

<sup>178</sup> Alker H., Gurr T., Rupesinghe K., *Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 2001.

<sup>179</sup> Beissinger M., Young C., *Beyond state crisis?: postcolonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia in comparative perspective*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2002.

<sup>180</sup> Fawn R., *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

<sup>181</sup> King C., *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture*, Wyd. Hoover Institution Press 2000.

<sup>182</sup> Kounov A., Mazo E., *Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States*, Stanford University 2004.

<sup>183</sup> Quinlan P., Moldova under Lucinschi, „*Democratization*” 2002, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 83-102.

<sup>184</sup> Zielonka J., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

<sup>185</sup> Protsyk O., Osoian I., *Moldova: Party Institutionalization in a Resource-Scarce Environment*, [w:] Roper S., Ikstens J. (eds.), *Public finance and post-communist party development*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing 2008, s. 95-112.

<sup>186</sup> Colton T., McFaul M., *Popular choice and managed democracy: the Russian elections of 1999 and 2000*, Wyd. Brookings Institution Press 2003.

<sup>187</sup> Colton T., Skach C., A Fresh Look at Semi-presidentialism: The Russian Predicament, „*Journal of Democracy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 3, s. 113-126.

<sup>188</sup> Colton T., *Transitional citizens: voters and what influences them in the new Russia*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 2000.

<sup>189</sup> Shevtsova L., *Putin's Russia*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment 2005.

<sup>190</sup> Shevtsova L., *Russia – lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment 2007.

<sup>191</sup> Shevtsova L., *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1999.

<sup>192</sup> Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132-163.

E. Huskey («Presidential Power in Russia»<sup>193</sup>), S. Fish («Democracy Derailed in Russia: the failure of open politics»<sup>194</sup>, «The Perils of Russian Superpresidentialism»<sup>195</sup>), S. White («After Gorbachev»<sup>196</sup>, «How Russia votes»<sup>197</sup>, «Russia's new politics: the management of a post-communist society»<sup>198</sup>), D. Hoffman («The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia»<sup>199</sup>), V. Hesli and W. Reisinger («The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy»<sup>200</sup>), T. Remington and S. Smith («The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma»<sup>201</sup>), M. Mommsen («Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Kreml und die Schatten der Macht»<sup>202</sup>), R. Sakwa («Putin: Russia's choice»<sup>203</sup>, «Russian politics and society»<sup>204</sup>, «The Crisis of Russian Democracy: Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession»<sup>205</sup>), V. Gelman («From „Feckless Pluralism“ to „Dominant Power Politics“?»<sup>206</sup>, «Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy»<sup>207</sup>, «Political Opposition in Russia. Is It Becoming Extinct?»<sup>208</sup>) and others.

Finally, the problems of political system, executive-legislative relations and government cabinets in Ukraine have been studied (the focus is made on monographs) by the following scientists: K. Matsuzato («Differing Dynamics of Semi-presidentialism across Euro/Eurasian Borders»<sup>209</sup>, «Semipresidentialism in Ukraine: Institutional Centristism in Rampant Clan Politics»<sup>210</sup>), O. Protsyk («Constitutional Politics and Presidential Power in Kuchma's Ukraine»<sup>211</sup>, «Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement»<sup>212</sup>, «Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russia and

<sup>193</sup> Huskey E., *Presidential Power in Russia*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1999.

<sup>194</sup> Fish S., *Democracy Derailed in Russia: the failure of open politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

<sup>195</sup> Fish S., The Perils of Russian Superpresidentialism, „*Current History*” 1997, vol 96, s. 326-330.

<sup>196</sup> White S., *After Gorbachev*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

<sup>197</sup> White S., Rose R., McAllister I., *How Russia votes*, Wyd. Chatham House Publishers 1997.

<sup>198</sup> White S., *Russia's new politics: the management of a post-communist society*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2000.

<sup>199</sup> Hoffman D., *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, Wyd. Public Affairs 2003.

<sup>200</sup> Hesli V., Reisinger W., *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

<sup>201</sup> Smith S., Remington T., *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2001.

<sup>202</sup> Mommsen M., *Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Kreml und die Schatten der Macht*, Wyd. Verlag C. H. Beck 2004.

<sup>203</sup> Sakwa R., *Putin: Russia's choice*, Wyd. Routledge 2008.

<sup>204</sup> Sakwa R., *Russian politics and society*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2008.

<sup>205</sup> Sakwa R., *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.

<sup>206</sup> Gel'man V., *From „Feckless Pluralism“ to „Dominant Power Politics“? The Transformation of Russia's Party System*, Paper prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2006.

<sup>207</sup> Gel'man V., Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy, „*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2008, vol 60, nr. 6, s. 913-930.

<sup>208</sup> Gel'man V., Political Opposition in Russia. Is It Becoming Extinct?, „*Russian Politics and Law*” 2005, vol 43, nr. 3, s. 25-50.

<sup>209</sup> Matsuzato K., Differing Dynamics of Semi-presidentialism across Euro/Eurasian Borders: Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, and Armenia, „*Democratization*” 2006, vol 14, nr. 3, s. 317-345.

<sup>210</sup> Matsuzato K., Semipresidentialism in Ukraine: Institutional Centristism in Rampant Clan Politics, „*Demokratyzatsiya*” 2005, vol 1, s. 453-474.

<sup>211</sup> Protsyk O., Constitutional Politics and Presidential Power in Kuchma's Ukraine, „*Problems of Post-Communism*” 2005, vol 52, nr. 5, s. 23-31.

<sup>212</sup> Protsyk O., Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement, „*Communist and Post-Communist Studies*” 2003, vol 25, nr. 4, s. 427-442.

Ukraine»<sup>213</sup>, «Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine»<sup>214</sup>), K. Wolczuk («The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation»<sup>215</sup>), M. Bader («Against All Odds: Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine»<sup>216</sup>), A. Wilson («Ukraine: two presidents and their powers»<sup>217</sup>), S. Birch («Elections and Democratization in Ukraine»<sup>218</sup>), «Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-communist Europe»<sup>219</sup>), P. D'Anieri, R. Kravchu and T. Kuzio («Politics and society in Ukraine»<sup>220</sup>), «Understanding Ukrainian politics: power, politics, and institutional design»<sup>221</sup>, «Dilemmas of state-led nation building in Ukraine»<sup>222</sup>, «State and institution building in Ukraine»<sup>223</sup>), as well as L. Way («Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism»<sup>224</sup>) and others.

The third block of studies directly refers to the problems of government types and their stability in the countries of Eastern Europe. It is singled out on the basis of the works by such scholars as: C. Conrad and S. Golder («Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies»<sup>225</sup>), F. Müller-Rommel («Party Government in Central European Democracies»<sup>226</sup>), «Types of Cabinet Durability in Central Eastern Europe»<sup>227</sup>), P. Harfst («Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties»<sup>228</sup>), M. Ireland and S. Gartner («Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems»<sup>229</sup>), E. Zimmerman («Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s»<sup>230</sup>), V. Lytvyn («Com-

<sup>213</sup> Protsyk O., Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russia and Ukraine, „*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2004, vol 56, nr. 5, s. 637-660.

<sup>214</sup> Protsyk O. Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, „*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077-1095.

<sup>215</sup> Wolczuk K., *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2002.

<sup>216</sup> Bader M., *Against All Odds: Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine*, Wyd. Vossiuspers UvA 2010.

<sup>217</sup> Wilson A., *Ukraine: two presidents and their powers*, [w:] Taras R. (ed.), *Post-communist presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 67-105.

<sup>218</sup> Birch S., *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*, Wyd. MacMillan Press 2000.

<sup>219</sup> Birch S., *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-communist Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan Press 2003.

<sup>220</sup> D'Anieri P., Kravchuk R., Kuzio T., *Politics and society in Ukraine*, Wyd. Westview Press 1999.

<sup>221</sup> D'Anieri P., *Understanding Ukrainian politics: power, politics, and institutional design*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2007.

<sup>222</sup> Kuzio T., D'Anieri P., *Dilemmas of state-led nation building in Ukraine*, Wyd. Greenwood Publishing Group 2002.

<sup>223</sup> Kuzio T., Kravchuk R., D'Anieri P., *State and institution building in Ukraine*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1999.

<sup>224</sup> Way L., Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism, „*Journal of Democracy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 2, s. 131-145.

<sup>225</sup> Conrad C., Golder S., Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2010, vol 49, nr. 1, s. 119-150.

<sup>226</sup> Müller-Rommel F., Fettelschoss K., Harfst P., Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003), „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2004, vol 43, s. 869-893.

<sup>227</sup> Müller-Rommel F., *Types of Cabinet Durability in Central Eastern Europe*, Paper posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California Irvine, 2005.

<sup>228</sup> Harfst P., *Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties*, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000.

<sup>229</sup> Ireland M., Gartner S., Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems, „*Journal of Conflict Resolution*” 2001, vol 45, s. 547-568.

<sup>230</sup> Zimmerman E., Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

parative analysis of government stability in the countries of Central Europe and Ukraine»<sup>231</sup>). Besides, in the abovementioned perspective it is sensible to appeal to a number of studies, which have been referred to above in the context of theoretical-methodological grounding for government stability.

However, an individual place (as a result of specific nature of the analyzed countries in Eastern Europe) must belong to the studies concerning stability of non-party governments. The works referring to their interpretation and stability have been published by the following scholars: A. Lijphart («Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation»<sup>232</sup>), J. Staun («Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy»<sup>233</sup>), I. Bremmer («The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want»<sup>234</sup>, «Who's in Charge in the Kremlin?»<sup>235</sup>), U. Akcay («Technocrats in Power?»<sup>236</sup>), M. Centeno («The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy»<sup>237</sup>), S. Piattoni («Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation»<sup>238</sup>), K. Collins («Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia»<sup>239</sup>), J. Kechichian and T. Karasik («The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic»<sup>240</sup>), B. Sidikov («New or Traditional? „Clans“, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan»<sup>241</sup>), J. Wedel («Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking „Transition“ in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union»<sup>242</sup>), O. Amorim Neto and K. Strom («Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies»<sup>243</sup>, «Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies»<sup>244</sup>) and others.

The fourth block of the scientific research also has some connection to the problem of government stability, but from the perspective of analysis of the institutional attributes of the

<sup>231</sup> Lytvyn V., *Comparative analysis of governments' stability in the countries of Central Europe and Ukraine*, Львів 2010.

<sup>232</sup> Lijphart A., Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.

<sup>233</sup> Staun J., Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy, „*DIIS Report*” 2007, vol 9.

<sup>234</sup> Bremmer I., Charap S., The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want, „*The Washington Quarterly*” 2006-2007, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 83-92.

<sup>235</sup> Bremmer I., Who's in Charge in the Kremlin?, „*World Policy Journal*” 2005-2006, vol 22., nr. 4, s. 1-6.

<sup>236</sup> Akcay U., *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On” conference, Leeds Metropolitan University, 22 May 2009.

<sup>237</sup> Centeno M., The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy, „*Theory and Society*” 1993, vol 22, nr. 3, s. 307-335.

<sup>238</sup> Piattoni S., *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2001.

<sup>239</sup> Collins K., *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.

<sup>240</sup> Kechichian J., Karasik T., The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic, „*Middle East Policy*” 1995, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 57-77.

<sup>241</sup> Sidikov B., New or Traditional? „Clans“, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan, „*Berliner Osteuropa*” 2004, vol 21, s. 68-74.

<sup>242</sup> Wedel J., Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking „Transition“ in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, „*Journal of International Development*” 2003, vol 15, s. 427-440.

<sup>243</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion”, Aalborg, August 15-17, 2002.

<sup>244</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol 36, s. 619-643.

processes of government formation and resignation at the level of party-electoral systems and from the perspective of parliamentary support, party power and ideology. It has been represented, especially when it refers to the countries of Eastern Europe in the works by such scholars as (in parentheses we presented, as we believe, their most significant works): H. Klingemann and B. Wessels («Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems»<sup>245</sup>), R. Wildemann and R. Katz («Party Government: European and American Experiences»<sup>246</sup>), M. Taylor and V. Hermann («Party Systems and Government Stability»<sup>247</sup>), M. Taylor and M. Laver («Government Coalitions in Western Europe»<sup>248</sup>), S. Rokkan and A. Campbell («Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of Political Development»<sup>249</sup>), M. Laakso and R. Taagepera («The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe»<sup>250</sup>), R. Taagepera («Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems»<sup>251</sup>), A. Lijphart («Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas»<sup>252</sup>), M. Gallagher («Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities»<sup>253</sup>, «Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems»<sup>254</sup>), M. Pedersen («Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977»<sup>255</sup>) and others.

Herewith, rather significant are studies, devoted namely to stability of governments from the perspective of parliamentary support, party power and ideology, in particular in the countries of Eastern Europe. Among them we single out such scientists as: H. Giliomee and C. Simkins («The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy»<sup>256</sup>), A. Arian and S. Barnes («The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability»<sup>257</sup>), P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts («Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform»<sup>258</sup>),

<sup>245</sup> Klingemann H., Wessels B., *Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems*, Berlin 2002.

<sup>246</sup> Katz R., Wildemann R., *Party Government: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1987.

<sup>247</sup> Taylor M., Hermann V., Party Systems and Government Stability, „*American Political Science Review*” 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 28-37.

<sup>248</sup> Taylor M., Laver M., Government Coalitions in Western Europe, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1973, vol 1, s. 205-248.

<sup>249</sup> Rokkan S., Campbell A., *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of Political Development*, Wyd. Universitetsforlaget 1970.

<sup>250</sup> Laakso M., Taagepera R., The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 1979. Vol 12, nr. 1, s. 3-27.

<sup>251</sup> Taagepera R., Shugart M., *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1989.

<sup>252</sup> Lijphart A., *Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas*, [w:] Grofman B., Lijphart A. (eds.), *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, Wyd. Agathon Press 1986, s. 170-182.

<sup>253</sup> Gallagher M., Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 1992, vol 22, nr. 4, s. 469-496.

<sup>254</sup> Gallagher M., Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, „*Electoral Studies*” 1991, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 33-51.

<sup>255</sup> Pedersen M., *Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation*, [w:] Daalder H., Mair P. (eds.), *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, Wyd. Beverly Hills 1983, s. 29-66.

<sup>256</sup> Giliomee H., Simkins C., *The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy*, Wyd. Harwood Academic Publishers 1999.

<sup>257</sup> Arian A., Barnes S., The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability, „*The Journal of Politics*” 1974, vol 36, s. 592-614.

<sup>258</sup> Dunleavy P., Margetts H., Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform, „*International Political Science Review*” 1995, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 9-30.

Z. Maoz («Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems»<sup>259</sup>), A. Alesina and A. Drazen («Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?»<sup>260</sup>), B. Nyblade («Reconsidering Ideological Diversity and Government Survival»<sup>261</sup>), P. Converse and R. Pierce («Measuring Partisanship»<sup>262</sup>), S. Mainwaring and L. Torkal («Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies»<sup>263</sup>), M. Schmidt («Regierungen: Parteipolitische Zusammensetzung»<sup>264</sup>), Deemen A. van («Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games»<sup>265</sup>), B. Peleg («Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players»<sup>266</sup>), as well as others (the majority of them has already been mentioned in the previous blocks).

Finally, the fifth block of scientific research refers to the problems of government efficiency and systems of governing, their correlation with stability of governments, especially in Eastern European countries. Partially, it has been described in the works by such scholars as: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi («The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues»<sup>267</sup>, «Governance Indicators: Where Are We and Where Should We Be Going?»<sup>268</sup>, «Growth and Governance: A Reply/ Rejoinder»<sup>269</sup>, «The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics»<sup>270</sup>), D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoidlo-Lobaton («Aggregating Governance Indicators»<sup>271</sup>), T. Currstine («Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges»<sup>272</sup>), J. Boonstra and N. Shapovalova («The EU's Eastern Partnership: One Year Backwards»<sup>273</sup>), A. Gani and R. Duncan («Measuring good governance using time series data»<sup>274</sup>), R. Manchin («Exploring relations between Governance, Trust and Well-being: Exploring relations between Governance, Trust

<sup>259</sup> Maoz Z., Somer-Topcu Z., *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945-98*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2009.

<sup>260</sup> Alesina A., Drazen A., *Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?*, *American Economic Review* 1991, vol 81, s. 1170-1185.

<sup>261</sup> Nyblade B., *Reconsidering Ideological Diversity and Government Survival*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004.

<sup>262</sup> Converse P., Pierce R., *Measuring Partisanship*, *Political Methodology* 1985, vol 11, s. 143-166.

<sup>263</sup> Mainwaring S., *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of Brazil*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1999.

<sup>264</sup> Schmidt M., *Regierungen: Parteipolitische Zusammensetzung*, [w:] Schmidt M (ed.), *Lexikon der Politik*, Wyd. C. H. Beck 1992, s. 393-400.

<sup>265</sup> Deemen A., *Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1991, vol 3, s. 139-162.

<sup>266</sup> Peleg B., *Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players*, *International Journal of Game Theory* 1982, vol 10, s. 11-33.

<sup>267</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M., *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*, *Policy Research Working Paper*, vol 5430.

<sup>268</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., *Governance Indicators: Where Are We and Where Should We Be Going?*, *World Bank Research Observer* 2008, vol 23, s. 1-30.

<sup>269</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M., *Growth and Governance: A Reply/ Rejoinder*, *Journal of Politics* 2007, vol 69, nr. 2, s. 555-562.

<sup>270</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M., *The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics*, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2007, vol 4149.

<sup>271</sup> Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Zoido-Lobaton P., *Aggregating Governance Indicators*, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 1999, vol 2195.

<sup>272</sup> Currstine T., *Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges*, *OECD Journal On Budgeting* 2005, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 127-151.

<sup>273</sup> Boonstra J., Shapovalova N., *The EU's Eastern Partnership: One Year Backwards*, *FRIDE Working Paper* 2010, vol 99, s. 1-14.

<sup>274</sup> Gani A., Duncan R., *Measuring good governance using time series data: Fiji Islands*, *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 2007, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 367-385.

and Well-being»<sup>275</sup>), N. Meisel («Is „Good Governance“ a Good Development Strategy?»<sup>276</sup>), D. Jarvis («Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk»<sup>277</sup>) and others.

In general, the analysis of the scientific studies concerning the problem of government stability and efficiency in the countries of Eastern Europe showed that in this context there is very little research; however there are a lot of adjacent studies. On the contrary, in modern political comparative study there are a number of theoretical-methodological ideas concerning stipulation of the attributes of studying government stability and efficiency and their comparison within the political systems of today. They are extremely significant, as empirical data referring to the countries of Eastern Europe are also highly represented nowadays. Consequently, elaboration of a complex image of the parameters of government stability and efficiency and about the systems of governing in the countries of Eastern Europe necessarily requires overlapping of theoretical-methodological knowledge on the available literature and factual information from the perspective of the countries in the region.

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<sup>275</sup> Manchin R., *Exploring relations between Governance, Trust and Well-being: Exploring relations between Governance, Trust and Well-being*, Prepared for Asia-Pacific Conference on Measuring Well-Being and Fostering the Progress of Societies, 5-6 December 2011, Tokyo.

<sup>276</sup> Meisel N., Is „Good Governance“ a Good Development Strategy?, *AFD Working Paper* 2008, vol 58.

<sup>277</sup> Jarvis D., *Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method*, Wyd. National University of Singapore 2010.

## **INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY**

The article analyzes the influence of the state on the development of the Ukrainian economy. It is stressed that the existence of the Commercial Code of Ukraine is necessary, since it provides the basis for the implementation of economic activity, which cannot be defined in separate normative legal acts (the integrity of legal regulation will be lost). It is emphasized that the influence of the state on the economy exists in each country. The magnitude of this influence may be different, however, it is not possible to abandon the participation of the state in the development of the economy. It is determined that the role of the state in the economic life of the country is manifested in two directions: 1) as the sole regulator of economic life; 2) as the owner of state-owned enterprises.

*Keywords: state, economy, state regulation, economic law, state sector of economy.*

## **ВПЛИВ ДЕРЖАВИ НА РОЗВИТОК ЕКОНОМІКИ УКРАЇНИ**

У статті проаналізовано вплив держави на розвиток економіки України. Наголошено, що існування Господарського кодексу України є необхідним, оскільки саме в ньому закладено основи здійснення господарської діяльності, які неможливо визначити в окремих нормативно-правових актах (буде втрачена цілісність правового регулювання). Наголошено, що вплив держави на економіку існує у кожній країні. Величина цього впливу може бути різною, проте відмовитись від участі держави в розвитку економіки неможливо. Визначено, що роль держави в економічному житті країни проявляється у двох напрямках: 1) як єдиного регулятора економічного життя; 2) як власника державних підприємств.

*Ключові слова: держава, економіка, державне регулювання, господарське право, державний сектор економіки.*

The state's influence on the economy exists in each country. The magnitude of this influence may be different but it is not possible to abandon the participation of the state in the development of the economy. In the Soviet Union the state's influence on the economy was total, the state controlled all spheres of life, dominated the state form of ownership, and so on.



However, as history has shown, this path of development turned out to be false, as a result of which broad discussions are continuing in Ukraine on the appropriate level of state influence on the economy.

The Commercial Code Ukraine, which came into force on January 1, 2004, is the normative legal act defining the basic principles of business in Ukraine and regulating economic relations that arise in the process of organization and implementation of economic activity between economic entities, as well as between these entities and other parties in the field of economic relations.

At present discussions on the expediency of the existence of the Commercial Code of Ukraine are ongoing in Ukraine. Thus, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine P. Petrenko believes that the system of Ukrainian law does not need a Commercial Code, since it largely duplicates the Civil Code and leads to legal conflicts<sup>1</sup>. P. Pylypenko adheres to this point of view, which notes that in the world there are two models of regulation of private relations – monistic and dualistic. The first implies only the existence of a civil code, and the second – even corporate. Our model is a typical soviet one, which was introduced by “Donetsk” and imposed by the legislator in addition to the Civil Code<sup>2</sup>. Contrary to these judgments, V. Shcherbyna notes that the only way to create the proper legal conditions for conducting business in Ukraine, both Ukrainian and foreign business entities, is to modernize the economic legislation with the preservation of its codified form<sup>3</sup>. In her turn, V. Reznikova points out that the first days of active discussions on thematic subgroups proved that it is impossible without exception of the norm of the Civil Code of Ukraine without any problem to be excluded from its content or transferred to other normative legal acts<sup>4</sup>.

In our opinion, the existence of the Commercial Code of Ukraine is necessary, since it provides the basis for the implementation of economic activities, which cannot be defined in separate normative legal acts (the integrity of legal regulation will be lost). In addition, it is equally important that in the Commercial Code of Ukraine, institutions that are inherent in commercial law (bankruptcy, antimonopoly regulation, etc.) have found their expression.

<sup>1</sup> Petrenko P. Systemi ukrainskoho prava ne potriben Hospodarskyi kodeks [The Ukrainian law system does not require a Commercial Code]. URL: <http://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1418631-sistemi-ukrayinskogo-prava-ne-potriben-gospodarskiy-kodeks-p-petrenko> (accessed: 15.10.2018) (in Ukrainian).

<sup>2</sup> Pylypenko P. Hospodarskyi kodeks u takomu varianti nam ne potriben [The economic code in this version we do not need]. URL: <https://blogs.korrespondent.net/blog/events/3597409/> (accessed: 15.10.2018) (in Ukrainian).

<sup>3</sup> Shcherbyna V.S. Kodyfikatsiia chy dekodefikatsiia hospodarskoho zakonodavstva Ukrainy: yakyi shliakh obraty? [Codification or Decodification of Ukrainian Commercial Legislation: Which Way to Choose?] *Reformuvannia hospodarskoho zakonodavstva Ukrainy. Zbirnyk tez i materialiv uchasyukiv kruhlobo stolu, provedenoho za uchastiu Vysshchoho hospodarskoho sudu Ukrainy, Kyivskoho natsionalnogo universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, Instytutu ekonomiko-pravovykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy*, 31 bereznia 2016 roku, m. Kyiv K.: Vyd-vo Lira-K, 2016. S. 136 (in Ukrainian).

<sup>4</sup> Rieznikova V. Skasuvannia Hospodarskoho kodeksu Ukrainy: sposib efektyvnoi modernizatsii pravovoho rehulivannia hospodarskoi diialnosti chy destabilizuiuchy faktor dlia sfery hospodariuvannia? [Cancellation of the Commercial Code of Ukraine: the way of effective modernization of legal regulation of economic activity or destabilizing factor for the sphere of management?] *Reformuvannia hospodarskoho zakonodavstva Ukrainy. Zbirnyk tez i materialiv uchasyukiv kruhlobo stolu, provedenoho za uchastiu Vysshchoho hospodarskoho sudu Ukrainy, Kyivskoho natsionalnogo universytetu imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, Instytutu ekonomiko-pravovykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy*, 31 bereznia 2016 roku, m. Kyiv K.: Vyd-vo Lira-K, 2016. 144 s., S. 103 (in Ukrainian).

It is stated in the Commercial Code of Ukraine (article 12) that the state uses various means and mechanisms of regulation of economic activity for the implementation of economic policy, the implementation of targeted economic and other programs and programs of economic and social development. The main means of regulating the state's influence on the activities of economic entities are:

- government order;
- licensing, patenting and quota;
- technical regulation;
- application of norms and limits;
- regulation of prices and tariffs;
- granting of investment, tax and other privileges;
- granting subsidies, compensation, targeted innovations and subsidies<sup>5</sup>.

The role of the state in the economic life of the country is manifested in two directions: 1) as the sole regulator of economic life; 2) as the owner of state-owned enterprises. If in the first case the state defines the basic rules of conduct in the field of economics, then in the second one it must itself play according to these rules. And here there is a certain imbalance, since formally all forms of ownership in Ukraine are equal, but the state form of ownership differs from among others and is under the special supervision of the state, while they are learning certain preferences. These are state contracts that provide state-owned enterprises and the legal prohibition of bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises and much more.

Let's consider in more detail each direction of the state's role in the Ukrainian economy.

First of all, the state determines how the country's economy will go, for which there is a state economic policy. The latter should be understood as the objectives and tasks set by the state in the economic and legal documents set by the state, providing a comprehensive solution to a dual task: the combination in economic life of market principles of economic management and social orientation of the economy, based on optimal coordination of the interests of business entities, consumers, society as a whole and its different layers.

As a carrier of political power and as the owner of a certain part of the means of production, the state implements economic and social policies in the field of economic activity in two forms – in the form of long-term (strategic) policy and in the form of current (tactical) policies aimed at realization and optimal coordination of the interests of the subjects of state-building and consumers, various social strata and population in general.

The economic strategy is defined as the state-selected economic policy, designed for a long-term perspective and aimed at solving large-scale economic and social tasks, tasks of cultural development, ensuring economic security of the state, preserving and increasing its economic

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<sup>5</sup> Hospodarskyi kodeks Ukrainy [Economic Code of Ukraine]: Zakon vid 16.01.2003 № 436-IV. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/436-15> (accessed: 18.10.2018) (in Ukrainian).

potential and national wealth, improving people's welfare. The economic strategy includes identifying the priority objectives of the national economy, ways and means of their implementation, based on the content of objective processes and trends taking place in the national and world economy, and taking into account the legitimate interests of economic entities.

Economic tactics is a set of closest goals, tasks, means and means of their achievement for the implementation of the strategic course of economic policy in the specific conditions that are formed in the immediate period of development of the national economy.

The legal consolidation of economic policy is carried out by defining the principles of internal and external politics, in the forecasts and programs of economic and social development of Ukraine and its individual regions, programs of activity of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, targeted programs of economic, scientific, technical and social development, as well as relevant legislative acts.

In addition, the state manages the economy. Legal forms of state management by economics are regulated by the norms of law the types of activities of state bodies in the field of economics, which are distinct goals and mechanism of implementation. There are four legal forms of state management of the economy:

1. programming;
2. normative regulation;
3. control;
4. management.

Programming is the definition by the competent governmental authorities of the main goals, directions, priorities and indicators of economic and social development of the state in the whole, its regions, branches of the economy, and in cases provided for by law, of separate economic entities, in the manner established by law.

Normative regulation is the establishment by the competent authorities of the rules governing business activities. With the help of normative regulation, the legal status of all economic entities is determined; establishes the procedure for conducting business operations and procedures; the procedure for resolving business disputes (jurisdictional regulation) is determined; the formation of a mechanism for the protection of rights and legitimate interests of economic entities (security regulation).

Normative-legal regulation is a universal form of state regulation of the economy.

Control is the implementation by the competent governmental authorities of the verification of the degree of compliance with the direction and results of the business entities with the requirements of the legislation and other mandatory requirements for the implementation of economic activities (observance of the statutes, regulations, norms, minima, etc.).

Control as a form of economic management implies:

1. identification of violations in economic activity;

2. taking measures to eliminate these violations, including through the application of economic sanctions in the manner prescribed by law.

Management – as a legal form of state regulation of the economy – means the adoption by the competent authority of legally significant decisions for business entities on operational issues of economic life (state registration of economic entities, licensing of certain types of economic activity, establishment of limits on the use of natural resources, etc.). As G. Pronska correctly notes, the management is strictly limited to normative acts<sup>6</sup>.

From the forms of state governance to the economy, it is necessary to distinguish between methods of state management of economics – these are the methods prescribed by the current legislation for the state to influence the behavior of economic entities in order to obtain the result necessary to the state.

There are two main methods of state management of the economy:

1. administrative;
2. economic.

Administrative methods are ways to influence the behavior of business entities, when the result, which is necessary for the state, is achieved by direct order of the competent state body, which is subject to mandatory unambiguous execution.

Economic methods are the ways of influencing the behavior of state-building actors provided by the current legislation, when the result required is achieved through the economic interest of the executor (tax benefits to those economic entities engaged in activities in which the state is interested; state lending of certain types of activities).

Regarding the above, R. Dzhabrailov notes that the above methods and means of state regulation of economic activity form the economic and legal mechanism of such regulation<sup>7</sup>.

Entrepreneurs have the right to carry out state-commissioned activities independently without restrictions, which does not contradict the legislation. Illegal interference with, and obstruction of, the business activities of business entities on the part of state authorities and their officials in the course of their implementation of state control and supervision is prohibited.

At the same time, the state exercises control over economic entities that have different manifestations. Thus, all business entities are subject to state registration in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individuals-Entrepreneurs and Public Associations”. By registering, the state keeps records of subjects of entrepreneurship, regulates the issue of establishment of economic entities and determines the peculiarities of the beginning of their activity. According to this Law, state registration consists in certifying the fact of creation

<sup>6</sup> Pronska H.V. Vybrane [Selected]. K.: Osvita Ukrainy, 2013. S. 493 (in Ukrainian).

<sup>7</sup> Dzhabrailov R. Poniattia ta zmist derzhavnogo rehuliuвання hospodarskoi diialnosti [Concept and content of state regulation of economic activity]. *Problemy rozvytku nauky hospodarskoho prava i vdoskonalennia hospodarskoho zakonodavstva*. Materialy kruhloho stolu (m. Kyiv, 4 hrudnia 2015 r.) K.: Vyd-vo Lira K., 2015. S. 83. (in Ukrainian).

or termination of a legal entity, certifying the fact of acquiring or depriving an entrepreneur of an individual's identity by entering the corresponding records in the Uniform State Register.

Also, the state controls and oversees the economic activities of business entities in the following areas:

- sphere of saving and spending of funds and property values by subjects of economic relations – that is control over the status and reliability of accounting and reporting;
- the sphere of financial, credit relations, currency regulation and tax relations – that is control over the compliance of economic entities with credit obligations to the state and accounting discipline, compliance with the requirements of currency legislation, tax discipline;
- the sphere of prices and pricing – control over compliance with the subjects of management of state prices for products and services;
- sphere of monopoly and competition – control over observance of antimonopoly-competitive legislation;
- sphere of land relations – that is control over the use and protection of land;
- sphere of water relations and forestry – control over the use and protection of water and forests, reproduction of water resources and forests.
- sphere of production and labor – control over: safety of production and labor, observance of labor legislation; for fire, ecological, sanitary-hygienic safety; in accordance with the standards, norms and rules, which established the mandatory requirements for the conditions of economic activity.
- sphere of consumption – control over the quality and safety of products and services.
- sphere of foreign economic activity – control over technological, economic, ecological and social security.

With regard to the participation of the state as the owner of state-owned enterprises, the following should be noted. The state carries out the management of the state sector of the economy in accordance with the principles of domestic and foreign policy.

The peculiarity of the state sector of the economy lies in the fact that the subjects of management in it are:

- subjects acting on the basis of state ownership only
- subjects, the state share in the statutory fund of which exceeds fifty percent,
- subjects, the state share in the authorized capital of which amounts to the amount that provides the state with the right of decisive influence on the economic activity of these entities.

The subjects of governance in the public sector of the economy are the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, ministries, other bodies of government and organizations. their powers regarding the subjects of economic activity (economic competence) are determined by law.

The state realizes the right of state property in the state sector of the economy through the system of state and government authorities of the relevant governing bodies in respect of economic entities belonging to this sector and exercising their activities on the basis of the right of economic management or the right of operational control.

The legal status of a separate entity in the public sector of the economy is determined by the authorities in accordance with the requirements of the Economic Code and other laws. The relations of management bodies with the named economic entities in cases stipulated by law may be exercised on a contractual basis.

The state applies to economic entities in the state economic sector all means of state regulation of economic activity, provided by the Economic Code, taking into account the peculiarities of the legal status of these entities.

Management bodies that carry out organizational and economic powers regarding economic entities of the state sector of the economy shall not be allowed to delegate to other entities the powers regarding the disposal of state property and the authority to manage the activities of economic entities, with the exception of deleting mentioned authorities in accordance with the law to local self-government bodies and other cases, foreseen by the Economic Code and other laws.

Summarizing the above, we arrive at the following conclusions. The state's influence on the economy exists in each country. The magnitude of this influence may be different, however, it is not possible to abandon the participation of the state in the development of the economy. The role of the state in the economic life of the country is manifested in two directions: 1) as the sole regulator of economic life; 2) as the owner of state-owned enterprises.

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## **MODELING COALITION GOVERNMENTS' MANAGEMENT: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CUT ON THE EXAMPLE OF EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES**

The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical and empirical cuts in the modeling coalition governments' management on the example of European representative democracies. This was done due to the fact that representative democracies in Europe still face fundamental challenges, i.e. delegation and combination of powers, but are characterized by a permanent formation of government coalitions. It was revealed that European democracies are synthesized with a peculiar affirmative influence on the parameters of implementation, efficiency and quality of governance. Although they are always determined by the institutional, rational and contextual attributes of the formation and functioning of governmental coalitions, which can be described as a coherent structure that is a subject to comparative analysis.

*Keywords: coalition, governmental cabinet, governmental coalition, delegation and combination of powers, representative democracy, Europe.*

## **МОДЕЛЮВАННЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ УРЯДОВИМИ КОАЛІЦІЯМИ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНИЙ ТА ЕМПІРИЧНИЙ РОЗРІЗ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ**

Проаналізовано теоретичний та емпіричний розрізи моделювання управління урядовими коаліціями на прикладі європейських представницьких демократій. Це здійснено з огляду на той факт, що представницькі демократії у Європі як і раніше стоять перед фундаментальними викликами – делегуванням і комбінуванням повноважень, – але характеризуються перманентним формуванням урядових коаліцій. Виявлено, що європейські демократії синтезуються своєрідним ухвалювальним впливом на параметри реалізації та ефективність і якість урядування, хоча завжди детермінуються інституційними, раціональними й контекстуальними атрибутами формування та функціонування урядових коаліцій, які можна окреслити як певну цілісну структуру, котра піддається порівняльному аналізу.

*Ключові слова: коаліція, урядовий кабінет, урядова коаліція, делегування й комбінування повноважень, представницька демократія, Європа.*



Modern representative democracies in Europe still face fundamental challenges, i.e. delegation and combination of powers. Delegation of powers is necessary because the majority of citizens do not have both abilities and time to take important political decisions by themselves. Thus, to make the process of state managing, the practice of delegation has been introduced, in the course of which people have to find and choose representatives, to whom they can entrust political process according to their specific principles and beliefs. These chosen representatives (first of all at the level of parliament), in their turn, delegate powers to the party leaders or heads of bureaucratic departments further pursuing of voters/people's goals in politics. Finally, the heads of departments of the executive branch and government in general delegate their responsibilities to their subordinates. On the analogy, the process takes place or at least is to take place in the reversed order – when responsibility is pushed down. Namely in this way the process of delegating powers and responsibility makes representative democracy possible in Europe. However, the problem becomes more complicated by the fact that Europe is traditionally (in the predominant majority of cases) characterized by formation of governmental coalitions. Thus, from this perspective it is quite sensible to combine powers and responsibility, as representative democracies function within the frames of countless political actors, and the very democratic rules determine that decisions should be taken by simple (relative) majority or by competent (absolute or qualified) majority of deputies. This crystallizes the principle of democratic representativeness and governing, according to which, theoretically and practically people directly cannot adopt legislations or exercise power without others' support. Correspondingly, to make the process of managing easier within the frames of delegated structures, it is necessary to form and maintain governmental (and parliamentary, and sometimes electoral) coalitions. And to adopt laws and implement them in practice and provide public order, at least some of the agents, who are authorized to act on behalf of people, always must search the ways of cooperation with other authorized agents. This theoretically and empirically actualizes articulation of a scientific problem, concerning modeling of managing governmental coalitions in European democracies.

Such range of problems has already been revealed in a number of scientific works, among which the most notable are authored by E. Browne, J. Frendreis and D. Gleiber<sup>1</sup>, G. Cox and M. McCubbins<sup>2</sup>, A. De Swaan<sup>3</sup>, W. Downs<sup>4</sup>, D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran<sup>5</sup>, B. Grofman and P.

<sup>1</sup> Browne E., Frendreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 1986, vol 30, s. 628-650.

<sup>2</sup> Cox G., McCubbins M., *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

<sup>3</sup> De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>4</sup> Downs W., *Coalition Government, Subnational Style: multiparty politics in Europe's regional parliaments*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 1998.

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van Roosendaal<sup>6</sup>, J. Huber, A. Lupia and K. Strom<sup>7</sup>, M. Laver and N. Schofield<sup>8</sup>, W. Muller and K. Strom<sup>9</sup>, W. Riker<sup>10</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>11</sup>, O. Williamson<sup>12</sup> and others. On their grounds it has been motivated, that despite the fact that European representative democracies face the challenges of delegation and combination of powers and responsibility, ways and models, applied to deal with the challenges are rather distinctive. However, all of them have “approving” influence on parameters of actualization and efficiency as well as quality of managing. Because, if the problem of delegating powers (and responsibility) is not solved, we may observe “deficiency of democracy”, as a result of which political representatives do not get credibility with the voters. Consequently, political order could be regarded by many as unlawful and thus fragile. If there is no such combination of powers (and responsibility), then the representatives themselves cannot take authoritative and managing decisions. It may result in “political congestion” and “immobilism”, due to which the very prospects of democratic governing could be cheerless. At the same time, it is notable, that challenges of delegation and formation of governmental coalitions are not absolutely distinctive. In fact they overlap in the cycle of government coalitions functioning and unite being regulated by means of elections.

It becomes clear due to the fact that coalition is a team of people and groups who unite in order to conduct mutual actions and achieve a common aim. On the analogy, in many European countries teams of political parties unite for the purpose of government formation and governing. Thus, in case of government coalitions their participants transform a wide range of social requirements into a managed set of actions authorized by the state/government. However, working for a common end, members of government coalitions may not agree on some significant transformations. For example, there can be a lot of divergences when some government coalition members try to score some points with others’ voting districts and groups of voters. Conflicts may also emerge as a result of personal interests, when members of government coalition strive for a specific place in power<sup>13</sup>.

All in all, it requires certain theorized structure by means of which it is possible to generalize behavior of government coalitions in various political contexts. However, taking into account

<sup>6</sup> Grofman B., van Roosendaal P., Toward a Theoretical Explanation of Premature Cabinet Termination with Application to Post-War Cabinets in the Netherlands, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1994, vol 26, s. 155-170.

<sup>7</sup> Huber J., Lupia A., Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 2001, vol 45, s. 18-32; Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005; Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, „*American Political Science Review*” 1995, vol 89, s. 648-665.

<sup>8</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Muller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, s. 309-333; Muller W., Strom K., *Conclusion*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

<sup>11</sup> Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Williamson O., Contested Exchange versus the Governance of Contested Relations, „*The Journal of Economic Perspectives*” 1993, vol 7, s. 103-108.

<sup>13</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

a fact that each country is unique, being the result or combination of historical precedents, democratic principles, political institutions, as well as social agreements and requirements. Let's consider the example of government coalition formation and functioning in Italy, where since 1945 an average duration of government cabinets is just a little more than a year. On this account W. Muller emphasizes that such frequency of changes among government cabinets (first of all government coalitions) is the highest in Western Europe<sup>14</sup>. At the same time, Italian policy was and still remains uniquely stable. In particular, it refers to the period of 1945-1981, when the party of Christian democrats was dominating in almost each government cabinet and was characterizing each political action. Similar situation has arisen in Latvia, for example, where average duration of governments is rather short, but the structure of government coalitions is typically constructed without the parties, representing the interests of Russian national minority. Thus, if theoretical structure of government coalitions can explain important aspects of managing them under unusual circumstances, we may use it to get better understanding of peculiarities of managing coalitions in other representative democracies.

We judge from the fact that parliaments in representative democracies in Europe are deliberately organized in a way to strengthen the role of political parties<sup>15</sup>. That is why studying the process of managing government coalitions we focus on the way how political parties manipulate voters' and coalition partners' interests, taking crucial decisions (in particular those concerning formation of government coalitions, elaboration of tactics and strategy of government coalitions, inter-ministerial shifts, choose of time for possible elections). It is obvious that changes, which happen within parties, are important for comprehending policy of government cabinets, as intra-party policy may systematically overlap inter-party bargaining<sup>16</sup>. Herewith, we take into account A. Lupia's remarks, according to which theoretical structure of elaborating models of managing government coalitions includes six methodological components. Five of them depend on the institutionalized approaches towards studying how to manage government coalitions, which are often used independently, but can be united into a consolidated structure. The sixth component is the basics of the structure, which provides means for its integration.

From this perspective, it is notable, that scientific studies usually appeal to the unique nature of contexts, in which collective decisions are made – they have a tendency to bring to the foreground the factors, which are connected with a specific society, where the events take place, take to account causal connections within the frames of culture and history of a certain country. That is why E. Banfield remarks that political and managerial decisions reflect specific peculiarities of national and system context, which are not included in the form of discrete

<sup>14</sup> Muller W., Strom K., *Conclusion*, [w:] Muller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Oxford 2000, s. 561.

<sup>15</sup> Muller W., Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, s. 309-333.

<sup>16</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

and determined variables<sup>17</sup>. At the same time, the research typically underlines historical precedents of social and political events. An argument that every society is under the influence of its own past, is an approach which cannot be ignored. Moreover, each new historical case adds uniqueness and restricts all future decisions. It determines that political decisions are predominantly presupposed by past elections and that there is no significant comparison of political parameters of the environment<sup>18</sup>. In their turn, contextual arguments emphasize importance of divided but not separate events. According to this logic, political events are determined by simultaneous changes, even if they take place in concurrently remote states. It presupposes that political actors in different countries live in an interdependent process, where they can be subordinate to time or be under the influence of divided experience of hard times. If general events are really crucial, then formation of government coalitions can be interpreted only in a specific historical context<sup>19</sup>. Therefore, all calculations, which underline the unique character of time and place, cannot be used for the same phenomena.

The abovementioned logics can be supplemented by the positions of the scientists, who believe political life to be a competition between great political forces<sup>20</sup>, where resources determine winners. On this account S. Rokkan acknowledges that “votes are counted, but resources elect”<sup>21</sup>. However, such an outlook should not be a simple construct of political competitiveness, as from the perspective of parliamentary policy, especially in representative democracies – “the more the better”. Therefore, the most important assets which can be offered by a party during the process of negotiations – is the size of its parliamentary delegation. It means that there are at least two theoretical prospects, which are used while analyzing the models of managing government coalitions. The first one is predetermined by peculiarities and historical factors in the course of some polities, and the second is presupposed by resources and strategic interrelations of political actors, predominantly parties<sup>22</sup>. This means that one should take into account rational, institutional, contextual factors, however each of them separately is not sufficient to interpret politics and models of managing coalitions<sup>23</sup>. It fits into the idea proposed by A. de Swan<sup>24</sup> and P. Warwick<sup>25</sup>, according to which, if parties divide their political agenda, then they have more powerful, effective and long-term government coalition, rather than in case when

<sup>17</sup> Banfield E., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Wyd. The Free Press 1958.

<sup>18</sup> Thelen K., Steinmo S., *Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics*, [w:] Steinmo S., Thelen K., Longstreth F. (eds.), *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 1-32.

<sup>19</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

<sup>20</sup> Miliband R., *Divided Societies: Class Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1991.

<sup>21</sup> Rokkan S., *Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism*, [w:] Dahl R. (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1966, s. 105.

<sup>22</sup> Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

<sup>23</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

<sup>24</sup> De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>25</sup> Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

government coalitions have less common political agenda. A striking example could be the process of forming the so-called “rainbow coalitions”, which united ideologically different parties in Finland and the Netherlands at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as they were characterized by a permanent challenge to current political institutions at the national level<sup>26</sup>.

Quite important is the fact that specific and special institutional parameters, in particular political institutes (for instance, proportional election system, constructive vote of no-confidence in government cabinet, system of powerful parliamentary committees, peculiar nature of votes of investiture for governments etc.), generate their consequences on the policy of managing government coalitions, moreover despite national parameters of resolving the question and resource sharing<sup>27</sup>. It means that “institutes are important” and touch on the policy of government coalitions and thus it is important to understand their influences. It is important especially from the point of view that privileges of institutions are certain standards of behavior, which may form expectations and advantages of some political actors. Another valuable thing is that in scientific literature one often emphasizes significance of critical events while forming and implementing current government policy. For example, the oil crisis in the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, financial-economic and migration crisis in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century led to serious losses among ruling parties all around Europe. By the same token, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its European Empire in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century confused and substantially weakened communistic parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, policy of government coalitions must be overwhelmed by national events, in particular political scandals, bankruptcies, natural disasters, crimes, scams of political actors and so on<sup>28</sup>. The point is that quite often namely unpredictable factors bring to naught all attempts to form coalition policy by determined means<sup>29</sup>. Nevertheless, it does not mean that formation and management of governmental coalitions should not take place due to systematic (institutional and rational) factors.

It is necessary to realize that at every stage of a “life cycle” of any government coalition, its decisions are the result of a bargain, where each outcome gained on the basis of political agreement or consent is the sum not only of previous operations, which touch on the history, institutes and resources, but a fact that the bargain takes place “in the shadow of people’s thoughts”, under the threat, preconditioned by political competitors, who typically try to substitute their forerunners. Consequently, decisions taken by any coalition is a result of agreement or consent between the members of coalitions, when they want to stay in a team in power and meet the needs of the coalition members. At the same time a bargain is traditionally a means,

<sup>26</sup> Downs W., *Coalition Government, Subnational Style: multiparty politics in Europe’s regional parliaments*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 1998.

<sup>27</sup> Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: participation, stability, and violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>28</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Browne E., Frendreis J., Gleiber D., *The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies*, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 1986, vol 30, s. 628-650.

by which this agreement or consent is achieved; a means, by which parties try to satisfy the main requirement of participation in coalition – to form and maintain consent between the members of coalition. In its turn, voters' support is the second requirement for participation in coalition and it depends on the quality of signed agreements or the nature of such agreements<sup>30</sup>. Herewith, at any stage of government coalition functioning, the "bargain price" is governed by both past and present. The past predetermines resources, available for players. The past deals with the institutes, which support such bargains.

In addition, a bargain over government coalition is a process by means of which, political actors participate in communication in order to determine mutually profitable agreement or consent. Therefore, a bargain must result in an agreement or consent, if there are individual benefits, which can be achieved only due to collective actions; there are multiple ways of sharing benefits, which are connected with such actions; none of the actors can make a collective agreement as to other participants<sup>31</sup>. In this context, political contract (an agreement or consent) is simple "currency" in coalition bargain; oral or written agreement and consent, by which participants transfer some actions in exchange for discussed benefits. The aim of the contract is to define the notions of agreement and consent, outline penalties for their non-compliance and benefits for abidance and thus to cut down on coalition and government risks. Correspondingly, to draft a contract which could meet all goals is rather difficult, especially when the agreement or consent aims at seizing a wide range of further actions and events, in particular when they are partially expectable. Expenses on such agreements are known as operating expenses, which D. Kreps define as follows: «Conducting an operation, parties must undergo several types of expenses: if an operation is maintained in accordance with a written contract, the latter must be projected; other expenses are incurred while performing an agreement, which was "constituted" at the beginning»<sup>32</sup>.

The most complicated thing in this process is that it is questionable whether parties must go for formal and stable patterns of cooperation. Liabilities predetermined by a coalition agreement can make parties act differently. Thus, parties should not consider it better to form an unstable majority, but must be free from the coalition partners' requirements and can change partners to leave the coalition. Predominance of such freedom is the main problem of inefficiency while managing coalitions<sup>33</sup>, among the most serious dimensions can be singled out the following:

1. escalation of operational expenses: a free (unstable or non-formalized) majority makes participants search agreement on each decision. Time and energy can exhaust party's

<sup>30</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for "Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe", 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for "Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe", 2005.

<sup>32</sup> Kreps D., *A Course in Microeconomic Theory*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1990, s. 743.

<sup>33</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for "Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe", 2005.

- resources and diminish their ability to achieve wide and multiple goals. As a result, government coalitions scrimp on operational expenses;
2. Continuity of policy: imbalance diminishes value of all coalition decisions. With a free (unstable or non-formalized) majority, especially with minority governments the effectiveness of any government's decisions may reduce dramatically, as a result of which collective and individual benefits from managing government cabinet of ministers can disappear or significantly reduce;
  3. Less expectable policy and support for non-government programmes. The state governed by a free (unstable or non-formalized) majority can become a political dimension where public order does not have long-term stability and confidence. It can adversely affect people, as a result of what expenses made on long-term interest will be great<sup>34</sup>.
  4. Unreliable support of voters. Within democratic systems parties have a possibility to use their appointments in government cabinets only when people by means of elections delegate them power to elaborate political tactics and strategy. Connection with voters is a threat, by means of which voters can "condemn" members of government coalitions and manage behavior of their members. It means that parties cannot just perform an operation, which they like, as voters provide parties with power and can take it back easily. That is why if voters prefer the government, whose actions can be at least predictable, and then political actors, who can fairly devote themselves to another government coalition, get a chance for benefits. Stable coalitions may unite parties with certain policy, which provide voters with more plausible explanation for their orientation in politics, in particular to differentiate between candidates to a government cabinet<sup>35</sup>.

That is why it is traditionally believed that formalized and stable coalition (conventionally in a form of majority governments) is a strategy of government survival: it gives parties a chance to influence government's decisions, "earn" confidence of non-government/non-political actors, maintain good and long-term relations with voters. However, decisions of government coalitions depend on how parties appraise each other. Comprehension of this fact explains many aspects in government coalitions' behavior, including mistakes generated by mutual hope for resources. Now, lots of voters assume the bigger party is, the more powerful it positions itself in negotiating over government coalition formation. However, such idea is accurate only in cases, when there is a correlation between party's values and size. In such cases we expect loyalty to "parity standards", i.e. agreement and consent, concerning which percent

<sup>34</sup> Huber J., Lupia A., Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, „*American Journal of Political Science*” 2001, vol 45, s. 18-32.

<sup>35</sup> Cox G., McCubbins M., *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

of coalition appointments corresponds with other members of government coalition. Therefore, understanding the role of coalition bargain and its political value, positions the actions of a government coalition. According to the majority principle, the size should not dominate in power while managing government coalitions. If a party does not get a half of seats in the parliament, then its market price depends on its value. The same logics determine that every factor on the basis of advantages and resources concerns coalition agreement, only when it touches on a potential partner in government coalition<sup>36</sup>.

Further general preconception comes down to the expectation, according to which if political parties share general advantages, they hypothetically must unite in a government coalition. However, concentrations on the necessity of a coalition bargain show that such speculations are false, what, for example, can be proved by experience in coalition formation in Ukraine over 2006-2010. When operational expenses from a political consent with a specific partner are very high, other parties may reject agreements with such partner and on the contrary choose an agreement, which causes lower operational expenses with a partner, whose advantage is lower. Even for parties with mutual interests, if there are many points to agree on or unpredictable circumstances, one cannot expect simplicity while uniting. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole explain it the following way: «a situation of making an agreement involves a player, who must achieve consent, to see the benefits of a coalition bargain. A classic example is the problem of “sharing a pie”. None of players can get a “pie”, until they agree on the “piece” for each player. Thus, negotiations over “pieces” may reach a deadlock and be cut off, if they take too much time «<sup>37</sup>.

Besides, of great importance is the fact that political uncertainty significantly affects formation and policy of government coalitions, being focused on its operational expenses. Basic principle to determine operational expenses of coalition activity is that participants of a coalition bargain describe opportunism on the basis of coalition acts: opportunism is formed when members of government coalition make use of uncertainty to get benefits on the expenses of other members of government coalition. Attention to opportunism is especially important in agreements and consent, when one party gets benefits at the expense of another. In this case, the party, which gets its “payment” too early, can have a desire not to support it at the end of formation process or functioning of a government coalition. If the members of government coalition expect such reaction and can do nothing to prevent it, the agreements usually are not achieved. If political uncertainty and opportunism are combined in an abovementioned way, then it is quite plausible that operational expenses grow. On this account O. Williamson<sup>38</sup> says if a coalition bargain may keep potential benefit, the negotiations will be performed.

<sup>36</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., *Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance*, Prepared for “Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe”, 2005.

<sup>37</sup> Fudenberg D., Tirole J., *Game Theory*, Wyd. MIT Press 1991, s. 397.

<sup>38</sup> Williamson O., *Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: a Study in the Economics of Internal Organization*, Wyd. Free Press 1975.



However, political uncertainty and opportunism can become a hurdle for such results<sup>39</sup>. Thus, O. Williamson goes on “logics of operational coalition value is applied as to a wide range of phenomena, adding vertical integration and limitations of a political market, regulations of an economic market, work activity management, corporate finances and management”<sup>40</sup>. Therefore, operational value of a coalition bargain and government coalition in general leads to an unusual role of specialization of government coalition in politics. As a result, nowadays parties which have stimulus for specialization become more and more significant.

A. Lupia and K. Strom<sup>41</sup> suppose that this determines the fact that an important place in constructing and modeling management of government coalitions belongs to a hypothetical decision concerning transformation of government or dissolution of parliament, as in any representative democracy these decisions may be adopted at any time. The point is that in European democracies dates of elections do not correspond with the constitutions, even quite the contrary they directly depend on the decision of parliaments' members. Moreover, in the countries where coalition governments are standard decisions, election dates are often outcome of a dynamic consent. That is why it is important to understand why, when and how coalition governments may want themselves to terminate their powers<sup>42</sup>. Especially, on the background of the fact that in almost all European democracies parliamentary majority (or a majority in the parliament) has a right to “remove government from the office”, i.e. at any time to dismiss government cabinet, and sometimes even has a right to dissolve the parliament itself. In this context, it is specified that the end of a government coalition quite often reflects unintentional reactions to the external events. However, causes and consequences of government coalition termination are anticipated agreed answers to political consequences. Everything hinges on the fact that the aim of each party is to maximize the value, which it gets from its role in the parliament. At first parties concern with managing mandates in the parliament: each party prefers to get more seats. After this parties assess authority within a government coalition: every party believes that it is better to get any government appointment, than not to do it.

From this perspective the outcome of any and all decisions taken by a government coalition as a result of a coalition bargain is compensation, implemented in the idea concerning dates of elections. B. Grofman and P. van Roozendaal assert that “expectations of further electoral benefits may make a party or a group of parties become desirous of “dismissing a cabinet at the moment”, when their predictable electoral success will be the greatest”<sup>43</sup>, and hypothesize that

<sup>39</sup> Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

<sup>40</sup> Williamson O., Contested Exchange versus the Governance of Contested Relations, „*The Journal of Economic Perspectives*” 1993, vol 7, s. 103-108.

<sup>41</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, „*American Political Science Review*” 1995, vol 89, s. 648.

<sup>42</sup> Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, „*American Political Science Review*” 1995, vol 89, s. 648.

<sup>43</sup> Grofman B., van Roozendaal P., Toward a Theoretical Explanation of Premature Cabinet Termination with Application to Post-War Cabinets in the Netherlands, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1994, vol 26, s. 158.

“parties put an end to cabinets when they are expecting electoral success”. However, in practice it is just partially true, as the party with anticipated electoral outcomes contemplates a possibility of getting advantages by using non-electoral means (in particular signing agreements and achieving consent with parties, which have lower electoral prospects). That is why a change of a government cabinet, and not new elections, is much probable, if key members of the existing government coalition strive for avoiding elections – great prospects of any party are not enough to trigger dismissal of the parliament. Such way of thinking shows that dismissal of parliament is most likely when a government coalition comprises parties which: expect great benefits from the elections; face low operational expenses; face great operation expenses to negotiate over non-elective transition of power; get low value from the seats they are managing at the moment; get low value from other government coalitions, whom they could join<sup>44</sup>.

This brings us to the conclusion that the process of formation and performing government policy (in the context of government coalitions) always requires comparative evaluation, which may be performed at least in two forms. First of all, the process may be caused by a government coalition in general: the more time such government coalition is in power, the more experienced it probably becomes. It means that relations between partners happen along the line of institutionalized behavior and therefore within the frames of a governmental coalition there should not be frequent conflicts. Secondly, personal “expert evaluation”, performed by the prime minister and parliament, is probably of some importance, especially under conditions when the process of studying and adjusting coalition requirements (agreement and consent) must be implemented.

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## **SPECIFICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE BALCAN STATES**

### **Abstract**

The author proves that 12 states located in the Balkans have quite different, specific development of political culture and political processes. Basically, these processes are historically preconditioned. Among them, Bulgaria, which has a stable democratic regime (except for problems) and peaceful coexistence of minorities and ethnic communities, can be an attractive model of political status. The political tool of this process can be the focus on common initiatives of the region, on deepening the political cooperation and accelerating the action of integration mechanisms.

*Keywords: the Balkan States, political culture, Bulgaria, integration.*

## **СПЕЦИФІКА РОЗВИТКУ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ В БАЛКАНСЬКИХ ДЕРЖАВАХ**

### **Анотація**

Автор доводить, що розміщені на Балканах 12 держав, мають цілком відмінний, специфічний розвиток політичної культури та політичних процесів. Здебільшого ці процеси історично зумовлені. Серед них привабливим зразком політичного статусу може бути Болгарія, яка має стабільний демократичний режим (крім проблем) та мирне співіснування меншин і етнічних спільнот. Політичним інструментом цього процесу може стати концентрація уваги на спільних ініціативах регіону, на поглибленні політичної співпраці та прискоренні дії інтеграційних механізмів.

*Ключові слова: Держави Балкан, політична культура, Болгарія, інтеграція.*

Social relations and, in particular, political relations have become very complicated under the influence of globalization and specific factors that are developing in different regions of Europe. It can be assumed, by analyzing the course of the political process, that up to a certain stage of development of the global world in international relations the elements that served as a certain benchmark for the states (bloc confrontation, balance of

power, etc.) were dominant, and today, obviously, it is necessary to consider new elements that have extremely diversified these relations. In support of this thesis about the complexity of public relations and how they affect political relations, we can cite an argument related to two seemingly different processes, but those that are intensively developing in the Euro-Atlantic region. We are talking about the trend of returning to a strong national state within the EU, with the development of the attributes of such a policy, and the strengthening of communitarianism<sup>1</sup> in the postmodern states of the West, as a reaction to globalization and as an attempt of finding the identity within the community.

The first process, in our opinion, was clearly demonstrated by the refusal of a number of states to support the draft Constitution of the European Union (later, under the aegis of Germany, this initiative was replaced by the Lisbon strategy), which clearly indicates the desire to distinguish, divide, preserve the national factor in the corporate policy. At the same time, different data show that in Western and Central Europe and in the United States, there has been an increase in the process of uniting citizens, who have registered as different legal entities, for example, in interest clubs. Their actions clearly show the desire of society for more intensive social cooperation, unification and personal identification as a part of the community. However, the picture is becoming more complicated if we look at the developments in South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Balkans.

The development of political culture and political processes in the SEE and the Balkans is quite different. Basically, these processes are historically preconditioned. Even within the Ottoman Empire, the policy of these regions was aimed at “separation” from the Ottoman political culture, reducing its influence on the subjects that were a part of the Empire. Later, in the process of building a nation state, this style of policy was repeated cyclically. Although the Balkans are seen as a whole, time has had a different impact on different actors in the political process. Thus, some modern states are experiencing a crisis characteristic of the period of development of national states (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina), others are in the process of creating a modern democratic state, and the others are trying to “understand” the integration processes.

One of the most characteristic features of the Balkan political culture is the desire to form a positive “image” among the Western States. This has an explanation, because for a long time political elite of the EU-15 considered the Balkans as a subject inhabited by “bad Europeans” between the best countries in the world, and the imaginary border with South-Eastern Europe served as a division. However, the analysis of the Balkans can only be adequate if we consider the concept of Europe in discourse. Recently, “old” Europeans have come together to agree on a statement that the Balkans are a micro-model of a particularized

<sup>1</sup> Манчев Кр. (2007), История на националния въпрос на Балканите, Трето преработено и допълнено издание. София: Парадигма, С. 112-113.

Europe<sup>2</sup> that emerged from a political vacuum after the Second world war, and this has affected the Western European countries' foreign policy combination on the integration of the Balkans. With the enlargement of the European Union to 28 member-states and with the political problems of administrative reform within the EU itself, the idea of the Balkans as a politically stable whole is becoming increasingly more relevant and should be on the agenda of the parties concerned.

There are now two lines of development in the evolution of the Balkan States: the politically formal and the informal levels of communication. And if the Western part of the European continent has achieved the synchronization of the two lines, the Balkans are still far from it. It also explains the concept which sees Balkan political elite as something that is far from the masses<sup>3</sup>. The actions of the participants in the decision-making process do not seem to have anything to do with the voters, and therefore comes the understanding of Balkan politics as something "bad", "dirty", accessible only to the chosen ones. This understanding of political processes further complicates the thesis of integration in the region, because the implementation of political will usually occurs in two ways: when there is public support for a certain policy, or, in case of its absence, the will of the political elite is proclaimed as mutual. The current problem for the Balkan States is that there are no indicators for both of the ways<sup>4</sup>.

It should be noted that the political identification of the Balkan national states is dominated by the emphasis on competition and confrontation. With a strong and traditional political culture, individual ethnic groups have long sought to articulate their differences in order to preserve their identity and survive. In this case, the emphasis on diversity was vital. Continuation of the usual policy is present in the offensive nationalism in Macedonia, both at the level of political elites and at the level of mass culture. This combination of cultural differences, activated by the process of islamization, is cultivated in the Western Balkans, significantly reducing the opportunity for self-identification of residents of the region (which comes from the within and is not "brought" from the outside). Indeed, contradictions and problems with the islamization exist, which is explained by the backwardness of evolutionary development, the revival of the antagonisms that have already been overcome. Thus, although in Europe painful discussions about the "occupied" territories had stopped over two decades ago, this issue is still not resolved in the Balkans and the territory (in the geographical sense), as the essence of the phenomenon, is associated with the political identification of various Balkan communities and entire societies.

The political awareness of the Balkans is perceiving them as an object, not a subject, as "victims" and sufferers, which causes the formation of reverse complexes, supranational

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<sup>2</sup> Delhey J. (2012), Generalizing Trust: How Outgroup-Trust Grows Beyond Ingroup-Trust, *World Values Research*. Vol.5. №3. P. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Славев Т. (2009), Политическа култура на Балканите и политически перспективи // България в Европа и света. София: Център за европейски и международни изследвания Фондация «Фридрих Еберт», С.121.

<sup>4</sup> Конфликты на пространстве бывшей Югославии. Справка. URL: <https://ria.ru/spravka/20110720/404635550.html> (дата зърнення 20 жовтня 2017).

ambitions and a distorted interpretation of historical objectivity (as far as it is possible at all). Hence the main difference between European and Balkan traditions: if the former are characterized by continuity, the Balkan political culture has always followed the lines of fractures. The custom of interrupting the traditions laid down by the previous rulers is extremely dynamic, revolutionary, and not evolutionary (like the rapid liberation from the Ottoman Empire and the rapid replacement of the Communist political system with new democratic institutions). This causes difficulty and complexity of perception of the Balkans by the people themselves – the balkanians and identification of political subjectivity.

However, this is a rather controversial thesis, but the conclusions are in fact that the Balkan political culture is extremely complex, heterogeneous, expressed in the coexistence of many “others” in one region. In addition, the Balkans have indeed been perceived as an atomized reality for a long time, as evidenced by the presence of the Balkan Orthodox and Balkan Romano-Germanic types of religious and legal systems etc<sup>5</sup>.

American sociologist, representative of the structural functional school T. Parsons considered society as a system consisting of separate, integrated elements in his work “Social System”. As such elements in the structure of each society he defined: social goals, norms, values, roles. Society consists of institutions, which are subsystems of a large social system. Each social system (subsystem) has four main functions that ensure its preservation and survival: adaptation, that is, a specific type of interaction of social actors with the environment, as a result of which there is an adjustment of its requirements to the environment; achievement of goals (provided by political subsystem, policy); integration, achievement of the state of connectivity of differentiated elements, the presence of order, conflict-free relations between social actors-individuals, communities, organizations (legal institutions, power structures, rules of law, customs); the maintenance of the systems (of beliefs, morals, agencies of socialization – family, school, arts, etc.)<sup>6</sup>.

These cultural layers are also reflected in the structural complexity of the Balkans, which are quite clearly manifested through the conflicts existing in the region: first, internal conflicts in countries; second, conflicts between countries; third, conflicts at the cultural and geopolitical, global level (in the context of globalization)<sup>7</sup>. The weakness of the political structure lies in the lack of unity for cooperation and mutual search for progress in policy at the state level and locally. There is a characteristic tendency, the nature of which is that all the political successes of states are quite similar, because everyone tries to win “at the expense of the other”. This creates the feeling that every political action of one of the Balkan States forces others to act the same.

Structural complexity is also evident at the cultural level. Problems in the development of national states in the Balkans have created certain conditions for the perception of their societies as a whole, because the emphasis is on common national and internal similarities

<sup>5</sup> Интереси и възможности за сътрудничество между държавите от Югоизточна Европа, (2012), т. 1, София, Издателски комплекс – УНСС, С. 29.

<sup>6</sup> Parsons T. (1991), *The Social System*, New York : Routledge, P.24-35.

<sup>7</sup> Чавдарова М. (2008), Пет причини за дезинтеграция на балканския етнодържавен ред, *Международни отношения*, №2, С. 37.

opposed to the other countries. The main problem is that the Balkan political model lacks the pure anthropocentrism, which is characteristic for the Western European unification. It is in the essence of common, classical and recognized cultural and political models that the answers to the integration of the Balkans can be found, and the prerequisites for this exist. If we follow the opinions of J.J. Rousseau, who argued that in order to build a modern state it is necessary to destroy all the traditional communities<sup>8</sup>, the Balkan States are trying to restrain the development of political culture as a characteristic element of nationality. However, when it comes to the crisis of national identity, these attempts (including political elites) are doomed to failure, which can lead to underdevelopment.

The attempts of the Balkan States to “close themselves up” and dissociate themselves, to a certain extent, are modern<sup>9</sup>. Globalization has once again sparked a debate on the search for identification. At the structural level, the Balkans have advantages, but being an object of observation and wishing to be “included” in the criteria of democracy, they seem to be torn between the two tests of the same course. At a time when all national political cultures are returning to ethnic origins and so trying to find their place, the region is expected to look more global. This complicates greatly the problems of identification, and perhaps the best solution is to use all the common Balkan elements of political culture, following the example of the EU – 15, which will contribute to the deepening of integration, cooperation, and will also strengthen the national factor.

The risk factor for this type of political development is the transformation of the political course to explicit or disguised nationalism. Nationalism as a policy is present in all Balkan States without exception, but in different forms. Balkan nationalism is so strong that for five centuries the Ottoman Empire had been failing to unify or assimilate individual national communities. In modern conditions, it is in a latent state, but in moments of concern in the political environment, it creates significant tension.

Nationalism can also be defined as a “convenient” form of collective identity. It shows the most clearly when political change is needed. It is no accident that in a situation where a stable future development of the Balkans is associated with membership in the European Union, nationalist challenges are sounding more and more strongly. This process is also characteristic of the EU itself. The Balkanians traditionally prefer to define themselves through collective identity, because for a long time there were no conditions for this. Now identity is connected with choice. Existing identities in the world are accessible to all, but at the level of the citizens of the Balkans, it is again difficult, because political elites have not assimilated enough the difference between political identity and natural, cultural identity. History shows that political identity is not that stable and is difficult to maintain, which provokes

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<sup>8</sup> Руссо Ж.-Ж. (2001), Про суспільну угоду, або принципи політичного права, Пер. з фр. та ком. О. Хома. Київ: Port-Royal. С. 53-54.

<sup>9</sup> Чавдарова М. (2008), Политически системи и външна политика на балканските държави, София: УИ Стопанство, С. 235.



attempts to combine traditional political culture with a new form of political development. The paradox in the Balkans is that identity is perceived as political (but this understanding is complex, even impossible), or as ordinary, natural (but such a regional type can be dangerous).

The key point in the political orientation of the Balkans happened in the early 1990s<sup>10</sup>, South-Eastern Europe, as a part of the former socialist bloc, was a rather interrelated political integrity. Western Europe has long been afraid to view this part of the world as such a subject that has already reached a degree of cultural and political identity. An approach to the hierarchy of the states according to the degree of readiness to meet the EU criteria was developed. This created internal tension and set the states against one another. Now another approach is being practiced – the region, which is consciously perceived as renewed, is ready to create a homogeneous structure. In this case, the Bulgarian model can be considered successful.

The ability of Bulgarian society to turn over the page of ethnic confrontation, despite the historical moments of excessive escalation, can be realized at the regional level. The political elite of Bulgaria at some point realized that the integration of ethnic groups occurs by providing channels for communication, both between communities and between communities and the political elite. However, the lack of political will and the ability to sacrifice someone from the political leadership among the parts of the Balkan subjects (states) for the common Balkan fate, makes the regional cooperation and stability of the region impossible.

The main feature of the Balkan political subculture is multiculturalism, which is understood as the presence of many cultures. There are some features that distinguish Balkan multiculturalism from the American one. Thus, on the one hand, the understanding of the culture of individual communities mainly as ethnic, and not as those based on global or other initial positions (the Balkanians will be determined in culture according to their ethnicity, and not in connection with their belonging to a certain political force or environmental movement). In addition, if the American communities have a clear time of occurrence, then in the Balkans all cultural communities claim to be primordial and primacy, because their main goal is not a policy of compromise and understanding, but their own positioning as a dominant entity. Here the difficulties arise when it is argued that multiculturalism, understood as the mutual penetration of cultures, as cultural exchange and the like, could become an adequate recipe for relieving political tension.

Purely political obstacles for mutual respect create many physical constraints in the Balkans. If we talk about multiculturalism, then, of course, it is necessary that the free movement of goods, people and capital could operate, that is, that there is complete freedom of movement. In the context of political culture, this is impossible. Circulation in this sense will mean a dynamic, a process that is highly respected in the EU. But in the first period, when various ethnic, religious or other defining elements of political culture begin to emerge, tensions will arise in the Balkans, because the political space is not ready for this. The vacuum

<sup>10</sup> Чавдарова М. (2008), Политически системи и външна политика на балканските държави, София: УИ Стопанство, С. 193.

that will appear in the political space will easily be occupied by populism or nationalism of the Balkan model, and these are undesirable phenomena.

How these cultural and political layers will emerge in the current political process of the Balkan States is a matter of utmost importance, as it outlines the possibilities for political cooperation. All examples of common Balkan initiatives do not indicate the existence of political will or the desire for political cooperation and integration, but are rather caused by the objective needs of interests of forces outside the Balkans. Thus, multilateral military cooperation in the black sea region is represented by the regional organization BLACKSEAFOR<sup>11</sup>, which includes six black Sea coastal states – Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Greece and Turkey. In 2000, they established a working group on black sea military cooperation, which activities include rescue operations in case of a disaster, mine clearance; humanitarian assistance, environmental protection and operations to support peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN or OSCE.

Despite the existence of this organization, it had no real mechanisms (the Russia – Georgia conflict over South Ossetia) for security, although it relied on military cooperation. A specific example of “building a model of cooperation” is the multinational model SEEBRIG (South-Eastern European brigade), founded in 1988, according to one of the variants of the NATO multinational force – “NATO-Plus”, which is a coalition of member-states and states with partner status<sup>12</sup>. The purpose of the brigade is the joint operations of NATO and member-states of the “Partnership for peace” initiative. Although the brigade has several peacekeeping missions (including in Afghanistan), there is no such mission in the Balkans. There arises and understandable question: if this type of institution is established why does not it participate in monitoring and missions in Kosovo? It is difficult to answer this question, given the lack of available information.

Thus, the examples given are only some of the complex problems that should be noted in the political communication in the region. The fact is that when a Balkan state has a partnership priority in its relations with one of the major actors in international relations, its relations with the other states of the Peninsula acquire a rather chaotic character or, at best, become ineffective. The only possible solution is the emergence of an attractive center that would be able to streamline relations through mutual cooperation and the introduction of common models and tasks.

The role of Bulgaria in the Balkans is often defined as a stabilizing factor, but apparently this is not enough. Of course, the position of Bulgaria, analyzing which we can draw positive conclusions (in addition to political and economic), and it is an active, regional factor. However, there are several problems, despite the existing objective conditions for the state to

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<sup>11</sup> Aydin M. Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions // Perceptions. 2005. Autumn. P. 82

<sup>12</sup> South-Eastern Europe Brigade 'SEEBRIG'. URL: <http://www.scebrig.org/mpfsee/south-eastern-europe-brigade-scebrig-2.html> (дата звернення 20 жовтня 2017).

become the voice and an exponent of all Balkan interests. Bulgaria could become an attractive model of political status for other Balkan States, in terms of having a stable democratic regime (despite problems) and peaceful coexistence of minorities and ethnic communities. In addition, the Bulgarian society, though hard to accept the policy of reforms, managed to adequately pass this difficult period of development of society, when the other Balkan states have yet to do it. In such a difficult situation, the Bulgarian political elite (in the broad sense of the term) should not only be ready to help, but also seek to determine the priorities of the agenda. The lever for this should be the focus on common initiatives in the region, on deepening political cooperation and accelerating the action of integration mechanisms.

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## USAGE OF INTERNET SERVICES IN STRATEGIC MARKETING

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century information technologies have a decisive influence on business development. The most important changes are already taking place in the development of marketing activities on the Internet and will be increasingly linked to the emergence of a global information system in the future. According to some estimates, by 2014 – the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, most small, medium and large enterprises have been using online marketing. The Internet is used not only by computer information technology professionals, but also by a growing number of sectors of society. Commercial users of the Network – are the fastest growing part of the users of the “world wide web” (World Wide Web – WWW). The number of companies developing Internet strategies to support business is constantly increasing and this has a significant positive impact on business development.

*Keywords: marketing, online marketing, business, computer information systems and information technologies, Internet.*

## ВИКОРИСТАННЯ ІНТЕРНЕТ-ПОСЛУГ У СТРАТЕГІЧНОМУ МАРКЕТИНГУ

У ХХІ столітті інформаційні технології мають визначальний вплив на розвиток бізнесу. Найбільш важливі зміни вже відбуваються в розвитку маркетингової діяльності в Інтернеті і в майбутньому все тісніше будуть пов'язані з появою глобальної інформаційної системи. За деякими оцінками, до 2014 р. – початку воєнних дій, в Україні більшість малих, середніх та великих підприємств використовували онлайн маркетинг. В Інтернеті працюють не лише фахівці у сфері комп'ютерних інформаційних технологій, але і все ширші верстви суспільства. Комерційні користувачі Мережі – це найшвидше зростаюча частина користувачів «всесвітньої павутини» (World Wide Web – WWW). Постійно збільшується кількість компаній, що розробляють Інтернет-стратегії для підтримки бізнесу і це суттєво позитивно впливає на розвиток бізнесу.

*Ключові слова: маркетинг, онлайн маркетинг, бізнес, комп'ютерні інформаційні системи та інформаційні технології, Інтернет*

A characteristic feature of the modern economy is the acceleration of business processes caused by the increase in the volume of knowledge and innovations in all sectors of production, increase in the intensity of information flows, formation of an alternative communication environment and the fragmentation of communication channels. The use of computer equipment, programs, databases, telecommunications and networks allows the integration of all available information sources and the transition from a set of disparate data to information systems for marketing activities designed to support marketing management decisions.

At the same time, the modern stage of business development can be called the information era. The use of information systems and information technologies in the conditions of intensive development of market relations is becoming one of the most important elements of effective management and marketing. Companies are increasingly using modern information systems and technologies to monitor the increasing external and internal flows of information, implement it for the analysis, forecasting, management decision-making. Widely known «recipe for making a good decision: 90% of information and 10% of inspiration»<sup>1</sup>. However information systems and technologies alone cannot be the main tool in achieving corporate goals. Only those companies that have clearly defined corporate and competitive strategy and have an idea of their own information needs can succeed.

The purpose of the article is to determine the role of the global system of Internet in marketing activities and to find the main directions of using Internet services in the marketing strategy of the enterprises.

The use of Internet services in marketing has many areas, in particular: the maintenance of business relations; market research; online shopping; selling via the Internet; advertising of goods on the Internet; service and after-sale service. In this article we will focus on the first two directions. First, we should consider some of the advantages of using the Internet in marketing activities and peculiarities of restrictions in case of its absence:

– sustainable competitive advantage cannot be solely derived from the access to the Internet or from developing a website. As the number of companies is constantly increasing, acquiring the necessary knowledge, skills and technology to connect to the WWW, a competitive advantage cannot be achieved only through the use of standard ways where this technology is evolving. The simple use of a business tool that everyone owns does not imply any clear competitive advantage for the company. It seems surprising if the company does not have a phone and Fax. However, the appearance of these, now familiar to us tools in business also occurred gradually. Today, the same situation is with the Internet. At first, it was believed that the Internet was destroying certain advantages available to individual companies by disseminating additional information about them and disclosing this information to competitors. However, it is now clear that as the number of enterprises that develop websites

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<sup>1</sup> Алёшкин С.А.. Методы повышения эффективности внедрения корпоративных информационных систем, компания «Ламинфо». URL: [http://www.iteam.ru/publications/it/section\\_53/article\\_1869/](http://www.iteam.ru/publications/it/section_53/article_1869/)

increases, the lack of access to the Internet creates a competing disadvantage (inconvenience) for those enterprises that do not use it;

- the demand for the company's products does not arise from the development of the website, not from the use of the Internet. Sometimes it is impossible to influence the level of consumer spending. This means that even with the long-term use of WWW or other Internet-related applications, you cannot expect an increase in annual revenue for all companies, although some of them do make some additional profit;
- marketing problems of the company can not be solved by means of Internet access. Thus, companies not engaged in export, can not become exporters all of a sudden, by developing and maintaining websites. The development of export-specific infrastructure within the company is quite expensive. In addition, export marketing includes a variety of macro and micro- restrictions related to planning and management, including standards for specific products (programs, products), target market pricing and competition factors, export currency and payment problems, customer support and service requirements, legal and regulatory restrictions etc. None of these problems can be solved only because of the availability of a web page or access to the Internet;
- the Internet can not «do the same thing that used to be done without the Internet, but much cheaper»<sup>2</sup>;
- of great importance is the problem of protecting the security of communication over the Internet. This restriction becomes even more important in cases where the Internet should become a serious stimulus to business development. Although scientists have suggested some solutions to this problem<sup>3</sup>, data protection (security) will remain a major issue for any company that wants to integrate the Internet into the business. As soon as there is a solution to the security problem, new ways of penetration and decoding of the transmitted data and protection of the latter are immediately developed – it is an unsolved problem for the enterprise.

Having analyzed the existing concepts of identification of strategic directions of Internet use in marketing, it is possible to distinguish six principal directions of its application: network communication; market information; purchase and sale through the Internet, advertising of goods on the Internet, service and after-sale service. To carry out the study, the possibilities of using Internet services by enterprises to improve the efficiency of marketing management were studied. The tools are available for practical application of Internet marketing include e-mail

<sup>2</sup> *Levin, Joy (2006)*. How Marketing Research Can Benefit A Small Business. URL: <https://smallbiztrends.com/2006/01/how-marketing-research-can-benefit-a-small-business.html>

<sup>3</sup> *John A. Schibrowsky, James W. Peltier, Alexander Nill, (2007)*. The state of internet marketing research: A review of the literature and future research directions. *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 41 Issue: 7/8, P.722-733. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1108/03090560710752366>

and other forms of interactive communication; information search and search software; development of the website by the company.

Let's consider the main directions of Internet services that enterprises can use in their marketing activities in the following sequence.

Business communication support. In modern conditions of development of marketing relationships and production needs for timely delivery for successful marketing activities it is extremely important to have effective communication with customers (actual and potential), suppliers, agents and distributors. The Internet provides various tools to improve or provide communication with partners in the companies' network, including e-mail; electronic bulletin boards organized by network newsgroups (usenet); and mail registries in e-mail (listserv groups); relaying the conversation to the Internet (IRC – Internet Relay Chat); dialogue for multiple users (MUDDS – multi-user dialog service); video conferencing; voice mail corresponding to the e-mail<sup>4</sup>.

The following Internet services can be used for business communication:

- mailing lists («opt-in» e-mail marketing). There are many mailing lists on the Internet that cover a variety of topics. As a rule, people who are knowledgeable in this matter lead them, sending regular issues of mailing. Recipients of such e-mails have the right to cancel their subscription at any time. There are (for everyone) open mailings, closed (for a certain circle), free (existing due to the enthusiasm of the creators, sponsors, advertisers), paid mailings;
- discussion e-mails. They are created for the exchange of information, discussion of issues on certain topics. Marketer of the company can subscribe to and monitor all of the discussion e-mails that (do not) directly affect their business. By analyzing the published messages, you can find your potential partners and customers, contact them. In addition to promoting their own company, specialized discussion e-mails provide marketers with useful practical information and news;
- services for the acquisition of press materials, and the search for articles of interest to the client is also conducted online. The client indicates what he needs, and the results of daily searches are sent to his e-mail. It can be materials of clients, possible consumers, competitors, as well as general information;
- server newsletters. Interested site visitors are invited to subscribe to a special newsletter informing about the updates and placement of new material on it;
- advertising services on bulletin boards, which are grouped by topic and work by the principle of free newspaper ads;

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<sup>4</sup> Cave, Julie (2016). Digital Marketing Vs. Traditional Marketing: Which One Is Better? URL: <https://www.digitaldoughnut.com/articles/2016/july/digital-marketing-vs-traditional-marketing>



- – services for the creation of group transactions and communities. Such services are quite common abroad. There are four types of organizational relationships on the Internet <sup>5</sup>:
  - a. confederations in which firms continue to compete with each other, but have some horizontal contractual cooperation such as joint advertising, transport sharing, joint purchases, joint ventures etc. The joint management provides resources for members of the Network to trade products and services on the Internet;
  - b. consolidation of teams (i.e. closed group agreements between supplier and buyer), where vertical cooperation is organized through a chain of added values, including joint research and formal networks of sellers and buyers;
  - c. agglomerative unions (i.e. trade associations), which imply mutually beneficial cooperation between members of the association, including industry pricing, agreements on industrial standards etc. Trade associations provide market information on their web pages for the members of the Union to use;
  - d. organic unions (community service groups) that represent «traditional» Network-type participation in the joint management. Product advertising by the members of the community on the Internet is carried out at reduced prices or free of charge (LinkNet).

Market research. Buying research reports on the work of the market can be quite expensive. To reduce costs, and in many cases to get it for free, much of the same information can be obtained from the WWW. The use of the Internet to collect market information is one of the most important ways in which enterprises can develop international and domestic markets<sup>6</sup>. Information search on the Internet is provided by software products of the world's largest manufacturers:

- software products of Netscape and Microsoft: e-mail (Microsoft Outlook); Internet Explorer (WWW viewer); Microsoft Internet Information Server – Web server integrated into Windows NT Server supports FTP, HTTP, Gopher, etc;
- Gopher – interrogative-search system that provides access to the hierarchical information stores on the Internet via Gopher the server through the direct protocol;
- Archie – a special Internet service to search for files on FTP servers;
- WAIS (Wide Area Information Server) – a system of quick contextual information search in 400 databases located on the Internet;

<sup>5</sup> Poon, S. and Jovons, C. (1997). Internet-enabled international marketing: a small business perspective. *Journal of Marketing Management: Special Edition on Internationalization*. Vol. 13. No 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> Washington, Richard (2013). 5 Ways Technology Has Changed Market Research. URL: <https://blog.marketresearch.com/blog-homepage/bid/339928/5-ways-technology-has-changed-market-research>

- Veronica (Very Easy Rodent-Oriented Net-wide Index to Computerized Archives) a network index of computerized archives, a database of names of almost all menu item on thousands of Gopher servers.

The amount of important marketing information available on the Web is too large to describe in detail in one article – it includes numerous interactive newspapers and magazines; an extensive list of countries and industries, market research reports; lists of suppliers, agents, distributors and government contacts in a large number of countries; agency agreements, joint ventures etc.

Usually there are two main ways to call and find the necessary information<sup>7</sup>:

- printing the keywords using one of the WWW search engines like InfoSeek ([www.infoseek.com/](http://www.infoseek.com/)), AltaVista ([www.altavista.com/](http://www.altavista.com/)) or Magellan ([www.magellan.com/](http://www.magellan.com/)). This can take a long time, because you will often need to review a lot of unnecessary information. It may be best to use search engines to find very specific information, or you need to be an experienced Internet user;
- an easier method is to contact one of the international business directories already available online, like Yahoo Business Directory ([www.yahoo.com/](http://www.yahoo.com/)), Excite ([www.excite.com/](http://www.excite.com/)) etc. In addition, you can use the well-known addresses of web pages containing information about the countries, their economic policies, reports on market analysis, industries, well-known companies and other useful information for the marketer.

International marketing resources in the Network can be grouped into the following areas:

a. Information on countries:

CIA World Fact Book (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>). On this website you can find the following information about the countries: country history; geography (location, area, climate, seas, mountains, land resources and their use, natural resources); population (population, sex structure, birth rate, mortality rate, life expectancy, nationalities and ethnic groups that live in it, population education); mechanism of governance of the countries; economy (overview, GNP, GDP growth rates, including by industry, standard of living, inflation, employment, unemployment, budget, export, import), etc;

Country Libraries (<http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/>). In addition to a General overview of the countries, you can order reports on market research, analysis of industries, trade information, information about the investment climate and other marketing information.

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<sup>7</sup> Kierlanczyk, Kuba (2016). A Brief History of Market Research. URL: <https://www.keltonglobal.com/perspectives/a-brief-history-of-market-research/>

International Monetary Fund (<http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm>). This website highlights a series of economic issues, government reports, analysis of the political situation in various countries, and the publication of countries, including statistical ones.

World Bank (the name of the bank given in the English and American media – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)). The world Bank publishes information on the most important economic, social and natural resources of over 200 countries and territories. World development indicators, published annually, contain about 600 indicators covering population, GDP, purchasing power parities, rate of growth for economic statistics, including the growth of production in the context of individual sectors, consumption, trade, investment, and also social and demographic statistics, for example, education of the population.

World Economic Indicators (World Bank publications) – (<http://www.worldbank.org/html/ieydd/wdipdf.htm>). Information is provided in English, German, French, Russian, including the annual report of the World Bank, including topics in the following areas:

- lending by regions (Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean);
- lending by sectors (agriculture, education, energy, environment, finance, industry, mining, health, social protection, telecommunications, transport, water and sanitation);
- activities of the International Development Association (IDA);
- initiatives to address the excessive debt of poor countries;
- financial and operational indicators.

Tables issued annually provide the most detailed collection of economic data and socio-economic indicators calculated by the World Bank. Standardized data presented for use by many countries makes it ideal for international comparisons. The tables provide estimates of the countries that the World Bank uses to analyze economic and social trends in the countries that are developing, in which the Bank's borrowers are interested. Income data from the Organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD) is based on reports from OECD and IMF.

b. Industry resources:

Information about the industry in which the company competes is very useful in assessing the performance of the company. Thus, in the study of the competitive position of Nike, it is necessary to collect data on the size of the market for sports shoes, the largest manufacturers and their respective market shares, trends and prospects for

the development of this specific industry. In addition to the general short summary of the industry in individual countries presented in the previous section, it is necessary to allocate marketing industry resources in the Network by the following addresses:

Company Research Instructional Web Site (<http://iws.ohiolink.edu/companies/indexindustryresearch>).

Center for Industrial Research and Service (<http://www.ciras.iastate.edu/>).

Industry Data and Market Research (<http://www.ipc.org/html/navbar.htm/>).

Information in Science, Industry and Business (<http://www.nypl.org/research/sibl/index.html/>).

Most of the information related to industry analysis is paid. However, brief reviews of specific industries and some data on trends and prospects are available on the Internet.

c. Trade data:

World trade organization (<http://www.wto.org>). The site provides information on the countries of origin of individual goods, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, warranty periods and services, subsidies and compensation, anti-dumping agreements, trade facilitation offers, as well as information on the agreement on trade in services and intellectual property;

Imex Exchange (<http://www.imex.com/>). Information on trade associations, market leaders, goods sold, services, global markets is presented in the context of individual countries<sup>8</sup>;

Dolphin Marketing International Trade Links Page (<http://www.ahhh!merkury.saic.com/dolphin/tradelink.html/>);

Market Access Sector and Trade Barriers Database (<http://mkaccdb.eu.int/>).

Information on the general characteristics of trade policy can be searched by country, sector and economic indicators. Information on tariff barriers (customs tariffs, customs duties, quotas) and non-tariff barriers (registration, documentation, taxes and fees, import licenses, import bans, standards and other technical requirements) is highlighted separately.

d. Information on the companies:

Strategic Partners of Annual Report Gallery (<http://www.reportgallery.com/>). On this site you can find the annual reports of well-known companies in Japan, Korea, Great Britain, South Africa;

Company research guide <http://iws.ohiolink.edu/companies/indexcompanyresearch.htm>). Company search is possible if the following information is known: the full name of the company; the address of the headquarters of the company/corporation; the form of ownership of the company.

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<sup>8</sup> The Internet and International Marketing. URL: <https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-internet-and-international-marketing/>

e. International marketing:

International Business Resources on the WWW (<http://ciber.bus.Msu.edu/bus-res.htm/>). The site is maintained by Michigan State University. All information is classified by type of information and region, in particular general and specific information on countries in Europe, North America, Central and South America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. Another useful feature of the site is the search for the necessary information by keywords;

The Global Export Marketing Information System (Internet Resources for Exporters) [www.exportusa.com/resources.html/](http://www.exportusa.com/resources.html/)).

The two sites offer an opportunity for companies that have not previously exported to take the first steps in the internationalization process to select the most appropriate markets for specific products. Most likely these sites can be attributed to educational<sup>9</sup>;

Euromonitor ([www.euromonitor.com/](http://www.euromonitor.com/)). The Euro monitor, which is headquartered in London, is an important source of data on international markets, focusing mainly on consumer markets. All information on consumption, total and per capita, is published in two dimensions: for the European market and for other countries of the world.

f. Marketing companies: here are the websites of some of the leading market research firms that offer useful paid and free information from their market surveys; you can also order a market survey that is of interest to marketers:

Gather group (<http://www.gather.com/>). The site provides information about the company, its products and services, search system in the context of marketing research conducted by the company earlier;

Global Business Advisory Services (<http://www.findsvp.com/>). Here you can receive orders for special research, search for the necessary information (information catalog contains more than 200 publications), there is a list of clients of the company, a brief overview of the markets of individual countries and an overview (with the possibility of buying) of analytical data on industry markets;

Nielsen company (<http://www.nielsen.com/>). All marketing research on this website is divided into two groups: global research and media research. The first group lists the countries in which the company has been operating, as well as the main areas of research, which it has conducted previously: retail and wholesale trade evaluation, consumer panels, consumer behavior research, management decision support, modeling and analysis. The second group lists some of the major media, the examination

<sup>9</sup> Godin, Seth (2018). This Is Marketing: You Can't Be Seen Until You Learn to See. URL: [https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0525540830/ref=as\\_li\\_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=technotesting-20&camp=1789&creative=9325&linkCode=as2&creativeASIN=0525540830&linkId=7459f366ce93cd58a6f5dd35f6a8b832](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0525540830/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=technotesting-20&camp=1789&creative=9325&linkCode=as2&creativeASIN=0525540830&linkId=7459f366ce93cd58a6f5dd35f6a8b832)

of which, you can order: television, an independent radio station, cable system and advertising agencies.

All sites provide access to a fairly large number of reports on research work on the foreign market and other services useful to the enterprise – you just need to know the addresses of web pages that are of interest to the marketer. However, without knowledge of the addresses of the necessary sites, there may be some problems, because modern search engines are far from perfect. Now there are companies that provide online services for collecting materials and search for articles that interest the client is also conducted online. The clients indicate what they needs, and the results of daily searches are sent to their e-mails. These may be materials about the company, its customers, potential consumers, competitors, as well as general information. Of course, the Internet can not find all the interesting information for you but the amount of information that can be found is extensive. The main advantage of collecting secondary information online is the convenience and efficiency of accessing it, due to the very essence of the Internet.

It is also necessary to focus on Internet research based on primary information. At present there are two main types of such studies on the Internet: implicit and explicit.

The first approach, also called observation filtering, is based on neural network technology. «For some time, we study which pages of the server a particular visitor views, which buttons are most often chosen (for example, the user chooses a certain genre of music or literature at each visit, most often buys a certain type of goods, etc.), and based on this conclusions are made about the interests of users. This observation is made implicitly, consumers may or may not know that research is being conducted.<sup>10</sup>» An example of the use of the implicit approach is a bookstore «Ozone» ([www.o3.ru](http://www.o3.ru)), where a special program tracks all the actions of visitors. Therefore, when ordering a book, you can see links to those books that are most often bought by visitors of the site when buying the book you are interested in.

Filtering through collaboration is the essence of the second approach. Users of the research task indicate their advantages, make ratings of various parts of the content of the site, products or services. Subsequently, a special program compares the interests of respondents and other users and identifies common advantages. All matches are recorded so that they can be used with other products.

Thus, the main directions of the use of Internet services indicate that the individual functional marketing systems of enterprises should take into account changes in information technology and personal relationships. On the other hand, Internet service providers should also offer projects which destinies would be formed not only within the Network, but also would be related to the main strategies that companies use in their activities. That is, all participants

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<sup>10</sup> Райбман М. Измерения аудитории Интернет: Доклад на конференции «Интернет-маркетинг'99». URL: [www.citforum.ru](http://www.citforum.ru)

in the market of Internet services should consider the activities on the Internet as part of the marketing strategy of the enterprise.

In general, we can say that the use of the Internet today concerns almost all aspects of marketing activities of many enterprises, and its role is constantly increasing. The basis of this use are both traditional marketing tools that are becoming more effective on the Network, and new opportunities provided by the Internet.

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## **THE RESEARCH ON THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS AS THE INDICATOR OF POLITICIZATION OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN UKRAINE**

The article is devoted to analyzing the problem of the researches on the origin of Russians and Ukrainians as the indicator of politicization of Russian national minority in Ukraine. There are four basic schools of understanding of the proposed issues, i.e. Russophile, Sovietophile, Ukrainophile, as well as East-Slavonophile. The author motivated that scholars at each historical stage of development interpreted the problems studied in different ways, but always depending on the size of actual material, ideological positions of researchers, as well as on the prevailing political conditions at one time or another. It was confirmed that the formation of a real ethnos is impossible without the creation of a myth in the national context, although it was discovered that colonial attempt to erase historical memory is a process that leads to the loss of national identity and its assimilation in the center of imperial aspirations.

*Keywords: Ukrainians, Russians, Russian national minority, Kievan Rus, Ukraine.*

## **ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ПОХОДЖЕННЯ РОСІЯН ТА УКРАЇНЦІВ ЯК ІНДИКАТОР ПОЛІТИЗАЦІЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ МЕНШИНИ В УКРАЇНІ**

Проаналізовано проблематику дослідження походження росіян та українців як індикатора політизації російської національної меншини в Україні. Виокремлено чотири базові школи розуміння запропонованої проблематики – русофільська, радянофільська, українофільська, а також східно-слов'янофільська. Вмотивовано, що на кожному історичному етапі розвитку вчені тлумачили досліджувані проблеми по-різному, але завжди залежно від обсягу існуючого в них фактичного матеріалу, ідеологічних позицій дослідників, а також панівної у той або інший час політичної кон'юнктури тощо. Підтверджено, що без міфотворення на національну проблематику неможливе формування реального етносу, хоч натомість виявлено, що колонізаторські спроби стерти історичну пам'ять – це процес, який веде до втрати національної ідентичності та спричиняє її асиміляцію в центрі імперських прагнень.

*Ключові слова: українці, росіяни, російська національна меншина, Київська Русь, Україна.*

The origin of East Slavic peoples and their languages (Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian languages) has always been in the focus of many researchers. However, at each historical stage of development scientists interpreted these problems differently, in particular depending on the volume of available factual information, ideological positions of scholars, as well as predominant political conjuncture during any of the periods etc. Nevertheless, the problem of origin of Russians and Ukrainians as the indicator of politicization of Russian national minority in Ukraine, to a large extent has been unsolved and thus it is positioned as rather actual, especially against the background of warfare between Russia and Ukraine, started in 2014.

Correspondingly, the aim and tasks of the current research is to study out and systematize the problem of origin of Russians and Ukrainians as the indicator of politicization of Russian national minority in Ukraine. This range of problems has been described in a number of works by the following authors D. Arel<sup>1</sup>, M. Braichevskiy<sup>2</sup>, I. Burkovskiy<sup>3</sup>, A. Chernenko<sup>4</sup>, M. Hrushevskiy<sup>5</sup>, Y. Isaievych<sup>6</sup>, N. Karamzin<sup>7</sup>, V. Klyuchevskij<sup>8</sup>, P. Kolstoe<sup>9</sup>, V. Kremin i V. Tkachenko<sup>10</sup>, S. Kulchytskyi<sup>11</sup>, T. Kuzio<sup>12</sup>, P. Magocsi<sup>13</sup>, M. Maksimovich<sup>14</sup>, V. Mavrodin<sup>15</sup>, J. Pelenski<sup>16</sup>, H. Pivtorak<sup>17</sup>, M. Pogodin<sup>18</sup>, M. Pokrovskij<sup>19</sup>, S. Solovjov<sup>20</sup>, O. Subtelny<sup>21</sup>, R. Szporluk<sup>22</sup>,

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O. Tolochko and P. Tolochko<sup>23</sup>, V. Tolz<sup>24</sup>, N. Trubeckoj<sup>25</sup>, S. Velychenko<sup>26</sup>, A. Wilson<sup>27</sup>, L. Zaluzniak<sup>28</sup> and many others.

Having familiarized with them, it is possible to argue that scientific research on ethnogenesis of eastern Slavs in fact has a bicentennial tradition, as a result of which there have been made up two main conceptions. Thus, in tsarist and imperial Russia, ideologists who were supported by that time historians, interpreted all eastern Slavs as a single Rus nation and descended its history from the Kyivska Rus, assuming it the oldest Rus (very often ideology-driven and mistakenly – Russian) state. In its turn, the Soviet historiography acknowledged not only the right of Russian, but also Ukrainian and Belarus people on their language and history, however, party ideologists could not get rid of imperial claims for historical heritage of the Kyivska Rus. Therefore, having declared it a common-Slavic state, the USSR ideologists promulgated a doctrine, approved by the highest institutions of the communist party, according to which the origins of Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples and correspondingly their languages had to be descended to the Late Middle Ages (14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries). The point is that official authorities turned a blind eye to all attempts made by Russian historians and philologists to start the history of Russia and its language from the 9<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> centuries, whereas the same aspirations in Ukraine and Belarus were considered as hostile and were roughly prosecuted. As a result of this, during a long course of time only being a part of expatriate community Ukrainian (and Belarusian) researchers could freely articulate their views and develop conceptions of ethnogenesis of Ukrainians on the bases of historical facts. Eventually, during the period of reconstruction of Ukrainian sovereignty and revival of Ukrainian nation's spirituality (late 20<sup>th</sup> century) there was a considerable increase of interest among the public in the origin of the Ukrainian nation and its language, as well as similar data concerning Russians, which are quite useful from the point of view of the problems of Russian minority in Ukraine.

It is proved by numerous publications, written not only by researchers-historians, philologists and ethnologists, but journalists-amateurs, writers etc. But the absence of necessary knowledge in Slavonic studies, lack of research experience, incomprehension of the necessity to ground on verified sources of information and operate accurate historical facts and inability (or unwillingness) to take into account acknowledged scientific postulates have often led to the fact that amateurs' intentions turned into unrestrainable fantasies, a kind of wishful thinking.

<sup>23</sup> Tolochko O., Tolochko P., *Kyivska Rus*, Wyd. Alternatyvy 1998.; Tolochko P., *Vid Rusi do Ukrainy*, Wyd. Abrys 1997.

<sup>24</sup> Tolz V., Rethinking Russian-Ukrainian relations: a New Trend in Nation-Building in Post-Communist Russia, „*Nations and Nationalism*“ 2002, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 235–253.

<sup>25</sup> Trubeckoj N., *K probleme russkogo samopoznaniya*, Parizh 1927.

<sup>26</sup> Velychenko S., *National History as Cultural Process: a Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914*, Wyd. University of Alberta 1992.; Velychenko S., *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>27</sup> Wilson A., *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2009.; Wilson A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

<sup>28</sup> Zaluzniak L., *Vid sklavyvnyv do ukraïnskoi natsii*, Wyd. Biblioteka ukraïntsia 1997.; Zaluzniak L., *Etnohenez ukraïntsv, „Geneza”* 1995, vol 1, nr. 3.; Zaluzniak L., *Kyivska Rus – proukraïnska derzhava, „Istorychnyi kalendar”* 1997, vol 98, s. 180–183.

That is why together with scientific conclusions, supported by documents and facts, earlier and today there are a lot of mythological visions of the history of Ukrainian and Russian peoples and their languages. On the other hand, authors, following out-of-date foundations and views, intentionally “broaden” the history of Russians and their language, “shifting away” the origins of Ukrainians’ independent history and formation of the Ukrainian language, in particular up to the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, and connect the previous periods only with the existence of Russian sovereignty. That is the way why many researchers and amateurs mistakenly believe that Ukrainians have no connection to the Kyivska Rus.

Correspondingly, a “fight for the heritage” of the Kyivska Rus evidently has a “great impact” on various aspects of cultural comprehension, historical perception, modern national consciousness and national mythology of Ukraine and Russia. From this perspective, it is notable, in particular, that there are at least four basic schools of understanding of the proposed issues, i.e. Russophile, Sovietophile, Ukrainophile and East-Slavonophile. The first three, as an American scientist J. Pelenski believes, testify that the Kyivska Rus was a single state: though, in fact it was “weakly connected, ill-determined and heterogeneous union, in the basis of which was loyalty of tribes to their local territories”<sup>29</sup>. Nevertheless, it in no way prevented from mythologization of the history of the Kyivska Rus by each of the three schools. On the other hand, the fourth East-Slavonophile school was a representation of eclectic reactions to supposedly “nationalistic” and “anti-Russian” trends of the Ukrainophile School and unwillingness of Russophiles and Sovietophiles to recognize Ukrainians as an independent ethnic group<sup>30</sup>. From this perspective, it is rather important to analyze genesis of research concerning origins of Russians and Ukrainians as the indicator of politicization of Russian national minority in Ukraine, including the period over last years and decades.

A starting point of current research is the fact that the conclusion of a multi-dimensional historical influence on formation of the Ukrainian nation is justified and substantiated. In this process during different periods of time participated different tribes, which inhabited the territory of modern Ukraine, in particular: non-autochthonous Trypillia tribes; autochthonous tribes of Dnipro-Donetsk and Srednistog culture; non-autochthonous Yamnaia culture, autochthonous and multiethnic Zarubentsi, Cherniakhivtsi, Volyntsiivska and Romenska cultures, cultures of Penkiv type and Luka Raikiv type etc. Namely due to them we can start trace ethnic inheritance of population in the territory of modern Ukraine, as a result of a succession of inter-tribal events started their formation of new territorial ethno-political unities on the basis of mutual language i.e. white Croats, Poliany, Drevliany, Duliby, Buzhany, Tyvertsi, Ulychi and others. In the process of further economic, cultural and language consolidation we observe transformation of separate ethno-political unities (the so-called “tribal confederations”) into feudal dukedoms, as a result of their unification at the edge of the 7<sup>th</sup> – 9<sup>th</sup> century appeared

<sup>29</sup> Pelenski J., *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus*, Wyd. East European Monographs 1998, s. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Kuzio T., National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine, „*Nationalities Papers*” 2006, vol 34, nr. 4, s. 407–427.

the Kyivska Rus. At first (before the 10<sup>th</sup> century) it did not go beyond the proto-Ukrainian ethnic and language territory, however later (over the 10<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> centuries) it spread its influence over all lands of eastern Slavs and many non-Slavic tribes. That is why, at the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> century the Kyivska Rus was an unstable confederation of tribal dukedoms, representing entwining of centripetal and centrifugal ethnic-language and political tendencies<sup>31</sup>.

Namely due to this the question of ethnic arrangement and heterogeneity of the Kyivska Rus has been causing heated arguments, which are not only a scientific, but also a political problem. In particular, historians at the times of tsarist and imperial Russia and a great number of their followers stated and still argue that the Kyivska Rus as a state was founded by ethnic Russians. Allegedly, they were the oldest Slavic ethnoses, whereas Ukrainians and Belarusians, according to their logic, derived from them later. Thus, in the “Synopsis” by I. Gizel (published in 1674) and which till the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the main historical textbook in the Russian Empire, the Kyivska Rus (it was often insisted on naming it just “Rus”) was declared the first stage of Russian sovereignty. The Kyivska Rus was also called the first “Russian state” by a Russian historian M. Karamzin (1776–1826), who in his book “The History of the Russian State” called Kyiv the mother of all cities, interpreting this phrase as the mother of all “Russian cities”<sup>32</sup>. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the concept was continued by M. Pogodin (1800–1875), who stated that in Kyiv since the times of establishing Russian sovereignty and up to the Mongol-Tatar invasion in 1240 lived Russians and their ancestors, but when the Rus was conquered by Mongol-Tatars, Russians presumably left for Serednia Oka and Verkhnia Volga<sup>33</sup>. This anti-scientific conception was refuted by Ukrainian philologists, historians and folklorists M. Maksymovych (1804–1873)<sup>34</sup> and A. Krymskyi (1871–1942)<sup>35</sup>. However, nowadays, especially since 1991, but predominantly after 2014 some political circles in Russia and Ukraine, as well as chauvinistic representatives of Russian minority in Ukraine have been trying to revive it. Nevertheless, against the background of up-to-date achievements in the sphere of linguistics, archeology, anthropology and history such attempts are more and more interpreted as scientific ignorance or political fraud.

The result of the influence made by the Russophile approach towards the answer concerning the origin of peoples in the Russian Empire and the USSR was that in English speaking/western translations of Russian historiography the medieval state the Kyivska Rus was traditionally (though not always) defined as “Kyiv Russia”, which is a part of historical past of Russia. According to this idea after the collapse of the Kyivska Rus in the 8<sup>th</sup> century its heritage came to Volodymyro-Suzdal dukedom and from there to Moskoviia and only in the 18<sup>th</sup> century to

<sup>31</sup> Braichevskiy M., *Konspekt istorii Ukrainy*, Kyiv 1993.

<sup>32</sup> Karamzin N., *Istoriya gosudarstva Rossijskogo: v 12 t.*, Moskva 1816–1829.

<sup>33</sup> Pogodin M., K voprosu o slavyanofilah, „*Grazhdanin*” 1873, vol 11.

<sup>34</sup> Maksimovich M., *Otkuda idet russkaya zemlya, po skazaniyu Nestorovoj povesti i po drugim starinnyim pisanijam russkim: Sochinenie Mihaila Maksimovicha*, Kiev 1837.

<sup>35</sup> *Abatanel Krymskyi – uchenyi, pysmennyk, ukrainets*, Wyd. Volynska knyha 2007.

the Russian Empire. On the contrary, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples supposedly appeared already after the collapse of the Kyivska Rus or when eastern Slavs lost their unity. For example, in traditional Russophile history of Russia Ukrainians as ethnos appeared only in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, when their task was to search ways for integration with Russia<sup>36</sup>. Of great danger in this context is the fact that the Russophile-imperial vector in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was used by the majority of western historians, due to what such interpretation of “Russia” became standardized in western historiography. Though, in fact applying this paradigm rejects any claims concerning the Ukrainian nature of the Kyivska Rus, ignores real origin of Russians and suggests studying east-Slavonic history as an organic unity.

During the USSR times, in particular within the scope of the Sovietophile range of problems, great-power and chauvinistic feeling was smoothed by Soviet ideologists, making up a concept of “an individual Old Russian ethnos” i.e. a peculiar Old Russian nationality, which supposedly became an ethnic base for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. In opposition to this since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, starting with the “History of the Rus People”<sup>37</sup>, Ukrainian scientists started unscrupulously stated that the state Kyivska Rus was established by Ukrainians and Kyiv from everlasting was a proto-Ukrainian city. On the other hand, according to the statements made by Soviet historians, which until quite recently were an irreversible postulate, over the period of the Kyivska Rus, namely in the course of the 9<sup>th</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> century, in particular as a result of rapprochements and merging of many east-Slavic tribes, was formed an ethnic and language unity – an Old Rus nationality. It as well as any other nationality, in accordance with Stalinist definition, had a common territory, language, economic life and psychological composition, which revealed in cultural entity. Namely this Old Rus nationality probably existed some time after the collapse of the Kyivska Rus and only later after the Mongol-Tatar invasion, started its division into three related parts, which in the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> century transformed into east-Slavic nationalities – Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian. Correspondingly, as Sovietophile assume, a common old Rus language split into three east-Slavic languages. Thus, according to the official USSR doctrine the history of Ukrainians and their language started not earlier than 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> century, and any attempts to search for deeper roots were harshly prosecuted. However, especially after the collapse of the USSR and development of science, it appeared that teachings about an Old Russian nationality are nothing more than an ideological myth.

It is notable, that the peculiarity of the Sovietophile approach in opposition to the Russophile approach is the fact that it is based on a supposedly more objective approach to studying the Kyivska Rus. In fact Russophile imperial scopes were still dominating in the history of the USSR due to a mixture of Russian imperial nationalism with communism. Herewith, merging of Russian nationalism and Soviet communism irreversibly marked formation of the Soviet

<sup>36</sup> Velnychenko S., *National History as Cultural Process: a Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914*, Wyd. University of Alberta 1992.; Velnychenko S., *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>37</sup> *Istoriia rusiv*, Wyd. Rad. pismennyk 1991.

policy concerning nationalities, as well as historiography. That is why, in the USSR times only Russian historians<sup>38</sup> wrote about the Kyivska Rus and any other distinctive approach was treated as “nationalistic” and such which could be criminalized for the use of the terms “Ukrainian” and “Ukrainians” as referring to the period of the Kyivska Rus. On the contrary, the official USSR position was narrowed down to a simple use of the notion “Rus” synonymously for the term “old Russia”, on the grounds of which was postulated ancient identification with Russia<sup>39</sup>.

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that not all Russian historians and not always followed such unscientific position. Thus, a historian V. Kliuchevkyi (1841-1911) assumed that Russians appeared on the historical arena after the collapse of the Kyivska Rus i.e. not earlier than the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. Besides, taking into account the position of M. Hrushevskyi, described in the work “An ordinary scheme of Rus history and the state of rational patterns of history of eastern Slavs” (1904)<sup>40</sup>, M. Pokrovskij<sup>41</sup> interpreted ethnic processes in Rus as a part of official Soviet historical science. However, it was only before his school was bashed in 1936, after what Russian history stopped being connected with the Volodymyr-Suzdal dukedom and it stopped being appealed to the history of the Kyivska Rus. The situation dramatically changed in 1946 when in Leningrad was published the work by V. Mavrodin “Old Russia”<sup>42</sup>. In it without any scientific grounding was stated that the Kyivska Rus is an initial stage in the history of three fraternal Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, “which have one ancestor – Russian people of Kyiv times”. Such statements caught fancy of Soviet ideologists and were supported on behalf of the Soviet authorities, though at first were not understood by historians and philologists. The point is that in the concept offered by V. Mavrodin ideologists found artificial grounding for national policy of the Soviet leaders, which was disguised by demagogical phraseology and in fact continued the great-power vision of the tsarist and imperial Russia. Direct explanation was found in the fact that recognition of a real process of Russian nationality formation since the 12<sup>th</sup> century (in particular within the boundaries of the Volodymyr-Suzdal dukedom) made rather problematic all those claims Russia and the USSR had not only for territorial, but also cultural heritage of the Kyivska Rus, whereas return of Ukraine into the empire looked like not a fair readmission of old “Russian lands” by Moscow, but as a seizure of lands which belonged to a neighboring nation. All this means that the conception of an old Rus community started serving the political interests aimed at restoring the Russian empire at least within the frames of east-Slavic territories, as a result of which it was approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and officially stated in the “CPSU Central Committee’s thesis dated to 300<sup>th</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Tolz V., Rethinking Russian-Ukrainian relations: a New Trend in Nation-Building in Post-Communist Russia, „*Nations and Nationalism*” 2002, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 235–253.

<sup>39</sup> Isaevych Y., Problema pokhodzhennia ukrainskoho narodu: istoriohrafichnyi i politychnyi aspekt, „*Ukraina: Kulturna spadshchyna, natsionalna svidomist, derzhavnist*” 1995, vol 2, s. 7.

<sup>40</sup> Hrushevskyi M., *Zvychnaia skbema „russkoi” istorii y sprava ratsionalnogo ukladu istorii skbidnogo sloviaanstva*, [w:] Kravtsiv B. (ed.), *Vyvid prav Ukrainy: Dokumenty i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi politychnoi dumky*, N-Y 1964, s. 11–24.

<sup>41</sup> Pokrovskij M., *Russkaya istoriya v samom szhatom ocherke*, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo CK VKP(b) Partizdat 1933.

<sup>42</sup> Mavrodin V., *Drevnyaya Rus: Proiskhozhdienie russkogo naroda i obrazovanie Kievskogo gosudarstva*, Wyd. Gospolitizdat 1946.

anniversary of reunification of Ukraine and Russia”<sup>43</sup>. In fact they stopped all scientific discussions concerning old Rus nationality and non-recognition of the proposed doctrine was treated as political immaturity and a crime against the state. Taking this into account, criticism of the hypothesis were provided only by historians from abroad and dissidents<sup>44</sup>, what was not enough to refute such mean historical myth of the national unification of the Russian Empire, which included Ukrainians as a branch of the Russian nation, in the eyes of leading politicians and researchers in the West. A direct representation of that was the fact that even after collapse of the USSR and rationalization of historical science numerous researchers (including western) continued ascribing Russians the historical past they have no connection to<sup>45</sup>.

Only when the period of openness and restructuring started in the USSR, but mainly after the proclamation of independence of Ukraine, the Ukrainophile approach to explanation and conceptualization of the history of Ukraine as a direct successor of the Kyivska Rus<sup>46</sup> was revived, as well as the idea of Ukrainians as a nation, which can exist “beyond the boundaries of the Russian state”<sup>47</sup>. The initial task that was solved by Ukrainophiles was a successful rejection of the Sovietophile conception, in particular validation of the out-of-date nature of the “old Russian nationality” concept, refutation of monolith nature of the old language, culture and social-economic life in the Kyivska Rus as the idea required by Russia and its ideology<sup>48</sup> etc. Therefore, in the frames of the Ukrainophile approach it was proved that there was not any Old Russian nationality, even despite the fact that various tribal unions and proto-states at different times used the very name “Rus”. The point is that it is still unknown what sense was intended by using this name by people in different regions of the state Kyivska Rus, i.e. ethnic essence or territorial affiliation to the state and so on. Confirmation for this is represented in the concept offered by H. Pivtorak<sup>49</sup>, according to which one should not confuse the notion of old Rus sovereignty, which actualized in the form of the Kyivska Rus and the corresponding nationality, which should inevitably have been formed in the country, though in fact could not have a chance to be formed and even could not be formed a priori. This, in its turn, led to acknowledgement of the fake ideology-driven concept of the Kyivska Rus as a “cradle for the three fraternal peoples – Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. It is supplemented by the fact that the representatives of the Ukrainophile approach (O. Subtelny<sup>50</sup>, M. Braichevsky<sup>51</sup>, Y.

<sup>43</sup> *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej: Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tt.: T. 3*, Moskva 1954.

<sup>44</sup> Zaluzniak L., *Vid sklavyntiv do ukrainskoi natsii*, Wyd. Biblioteka ukrainsia 1997.; Badzio Y., An Open Letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU „*Journal of Ukrainian Studies*” 1984, vol 9, nr. 1, s. 74–94.

<sup>45</sup> Krypiakevych I., Tsolnytskyi M., *Istoriia Ukrainy*, Niu-York 1990, s. 223.

<sup>46</sup> Chernenko A., *Ukrainska natsionalna ideia*, Wyd. DDU 1994, s. 4.

<sup>47</sup> Badzio Y., An Open Letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU „*Journal of Ukrainian Studies*” 1984, vol 9, nr. 1, s. 74–94.

<sup>48</sup> Pivtorak H., *Pokhodzbennia ukrainsiv, rosiian, bilorusiv ta yikbnikh mov*, Wyd. Akademiia 2001.

<sup>49</sup> Pivtorak H., *Pokhodzbennia ukrainsiv, rosiian, bilorusiv ta yikbnikh mov*, Wyd. Akademiia 2001.

<sup>50</sup> Subtelny O., *Ukraine: A History*, Wyd. University of Toronto Press 2000.

<sup>51</sup> Braichevsky M., *Prytydnannia chy vozvziednannia? Krytychni z'auvaby z pryvodu odnii kontseptii*, Wyd. Novi Dni 1972.



Kanyhin, Z. Tkachuk<sup>52</sup> and other<sup>53</sup>) state that the Kyivska Rus was the first Ukrainian state, which in the course of a long period of time spread its power over neighboring Slavic peoples (by own history, language, culture etc.). Herewith, as the scientists assume the Kyivska Rus was the first Ukrainian kingdom, whereas Danylo Halytskyi state and Halytsko-Volynsk dukedom were the second.

However, even despite this the Sovietophile approach in Russian and Ukrainian historiography is still preserved and was not completely “refuted and disproved”, whereas became the source for politicization of Russian minority in independent Ukraine (over different period of its existence, but especially at dawn of its sovereignty and since 2014) and became a question on the agenda concerning the ideas of reviving the USSR. To a great extent this approach was preserved as individual, but simultaneously it was parallelized within the scope of the approach focused on eastern Slavs (the East-Slavonophile approach), as it is a mixture of pan-Slavism and Soviet internationalism. This approach refutes the Kyivska Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state (such idea came into the focus of western scholars, for example A. Wilson<sup>54</sup> and P. Magocsi<sup>55</sup>), but, at the same time, it rejects the Russophile approach as well (in particular in the questions of the primary origin of Russian people) as a product of antagonism in the regional scope of western and eastern Ukraine. In the context of such ideas at different times appeared concepts, according to which Ukraine is a “buffer” (L. Kravchuk) or a “bridge” (L. Kuchma) between Europe and Russia. The main representatives of this approach are O. Tolochko and P. Tolochko<sup>56</sup>, V. Kremin, D. Tabachnyk, V. Tkachenko<sup>57</sup> and other. Similar views are expressed by S. Kulchytskyi, who states that the Kyivska Rus is the idea of three nationalities, but initially it had the impact on formation of the Ukrainian nation<sup>58</sup>. Herewith, the explanation is focused on the remark, according to which the Slavs in Eastern Europe first of all inhabited the territory within the boundaries of modern Polissia and Lisostep. And this is an eastern part of the ancient ancestral Slavic territory, within the boundaries of which since the mid of the 1<sup>st</sup> century started its formation Ukrainian ethnos. As this territory after the disintegration of the proto-Slavic ethnic and language unity was inhabited by relatively close, but different groups of Slavic tribes, the proto-Ukrainian territory was not homogeneous, but on the contrary was distinctively divided into different ethnographic and probably variable groups – northern and southern. The former became the basis for the northern dialect of the Ukrainian and other languages; the latter was the ground for the majority of phonetic features, indicative only of

<sup>52</sup> Kanyhin Y., Tkachuk Z., *Ukrainska mritia*, Wyd. Leksykon 1996.

<sup>53</sup> Zalizniak L., Kyivska Rus – proukrajinska derzhava, „Istorychnyi kalendar” 1997, vol 98, s. 180–183.; Zalizniak L., Etnohenez ukraintsiiv, „Geneza» 1995, vol 1, nr. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Wilson A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.; Wilson A., *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2009.

<sup>55</sup> Magocsi P., *A History of Ukraine*, Wyd. University of Toronto 1996.

<sup>56</sup> Tolochko O., Tolochko P., *Kyivska Rus*, Wyd. Alternatyvy 1998.; Tolochko P., *Vid Rusi do Ukrainy*, Wyd. Abrys 1997.

<sup>57</sup> Kremin V., Tabachnyk D., Tkachenko V., *Ukraina: Alternatyvy postupu, krytyka istorychnoho dosvidu*, Wyd. ARC-Ukraine 1996.; Kremin V., Tkachenko V., *Ukraina: Shliakh do sebe. Problemy suspilnoi transformatsii*, Wyd. Druk 1998.

<sup>58</sup> Kulchytskyi S., Davnokyivska spadshchyna u vysvitleni Mykhaila Hrushevskoho, „Polityka i chas” 1996, vol 9, s. 71–80.

the Ukrainian language. It means, as the representatives of the approach state, that origin of some east-Slavic nationalities, in particular Ukrainian, took place not as a result of the division of the so-called Old Russian nationality into parts, but by means of consolidation of several adjacent and closely related groups of east-Slavic territorial tribes into certain compact cultural and ethnographic unities, which in the course of further consolidation gradually, but not synchronously developed into Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian nationalities.

To protect their ideas the representatives of the Ukrainophile approach assume that ethnic and linguistic processes in the south or in the “core” of the Kyivska Rus, i.e. closer to the Byzantium centers of civilization, developed more rapidly than in the north. Due to this, formation of Ukrainian ethnos, to the point of view of L. Zalizniak, happened earlier than in Russian and Belarusian nationalities<sup>59</sup>. As a result, at the moment of collapse of the Kyivska Rus over the territories, which are nowadays described as Ukraine, the Ukrainian nationality was mainly formed and divided into two branches: Halytsko-Volynskiy (which preserved the traditional name “Rus”) and Naddniprianskiy (which since the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century has been called Ukraine, for the first time this name was used in 1185). In parallel with that, as the scholars suppose, quite complicated and very controversial was formation of the youngest, but the most numerous east-Slavic ethnos – Russian, which is advisable to be divided into several ethnic groups.

On this account in the work “The History of Ukraine Rus” M. Hrushevskiy stated a position according to which the origin of Russian ethnos started by Novhorodsko-Kryvetska and Kryvetsko-Viatska settlements, which assimilating Finns nationality and being modified by its influence, disguised in it its Slavic national type<sup>60</sup>. Mentioned by M. Hrushevskiy historical process of origin of Russians as a nation in due time was supported by Russian historians S. Solovjov<sup>61</sup> and V. Klyuchevskij<sup>62</sup>, and later by a Soviet historian M. Pokrovskij<sup>63</sup>, in particular in his thesis as to a great percentage of Finno-Ugric element in the origin of Russian nationality. However, in the mid-1<sup>st</sup> century the territory of the would-be Russians (in particular Novgorod territories) was inhabited namely by Finno-Ugrian and partially Baltic tribes<sup>64</sup>, which, before these territories were conquered by the Kyivska Rus, were assimilated by eastern Slavs, and after the collapse of the Kyivska Rus started positioning themselves as the Novgorod feudal republic. It witnessed ethnogenetic processes towards formation of an individual ethnos, but in the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century they were artificially ceased, as Novgorod was an obstacle for unification of “Russian territories” around Moscow, due to which it was conquered and by force was integrated to the Moscow state. The very Moscow state, and thus Russian nationality, was forming in the course of the 12<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, but already in the region between Srednia Oka and Verkhnia

<sup>59</sup> Zalizniak L., *Vid sklavyriv do ukrainskoi natsii*, Wyd. Biblioteka ukrainsia 1997, s. 101.

<sup>60</sup> Hrushevskiy M., *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 1992.

<sup>61</sup> Solovjov S., *Istoriya Rossii s drevnejsih vremen*, Moskva 1959.

<sup>62</sup> Klyuchevskij V., *Sochineniya: v 9 t.*, Moskva 1956.

<sup>63</sup> Pokrovskij M., *Russkaya istoriya v samom szhatom ocherke*, Wyd. Izdatel'stvo CK VKP(b) Partizdat 1933.

<sup>64</sup> Pivtorak H., *Pokhodzhenia ukrainsiv, rostian, bilorusiv ta yikbnikh mov*, Wyd. Akademia 2001.

Volga, which in the mid-1<sup>st</sup> century was inhabited by native Finno-Ugrian and Baltic tribes. Similar processes took place in case with Rostov-Suzdal, Ryazan and Murom lands. Till that time (in particular over the 10<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries) the territory of modern central European Russia was a far province of the state Kyivska Rus, though it was characterized by integration and disintegration political processes, as well as the process of ethnogenesis<sup>65</sup>. To the greatest extent it was observed during the rule of duke A. Boholyubsky from Volodymyr-Suzdal land, who performed an open and demonstrative breach of relations with the Kyivska Rus, gave a start to individual policy of the would-be Moscowii and Russian nationality and even wanted to break relations at the church level and establish new metropole<sup>66</sup>, what testified not an internecine but inter-ethnic nature of political struggle at that time. Thus, in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, in particular due to the abovementioned political processes appeared the Grand Duchy of Moscow the first Russian state<sup>67</sup>, what significantly distance “Russian element” from the proto-Ukrainian state Kyivska Rus. Even despite the fact that the Moscow state played an important role in further strengthening among Russian and Ukrainian dukedoms and their unification/centralization within the frames of an “artificial” single nationality.

The analysis is supplemented by the fact that on the contrary to proto-Ukrainian/Ukrainian nationality, Russian nationality was mentally constructed as “Christianized Tatar tsarstvo”, as with disintegration of the Golden Horde, whose north-east settlement (ulus) was former Kyivska Rus and Moscowii, namely Moscow tsar was perceived as a legitimate successor of the Mongol-Tatar state<sup>68</sup>. It corresponds with the remarks made by N. Trubeckoj, according to which “Moscow state appeared due to the Tatar yoke, as the Russian tsar was the successor of the Mongol Khan. The overthrow of the Tatar yoke led to the change of the Tatar khan for the orthodox tsar and move of the capital to Moscow. Even a great percent of boyars (nobility) and other people of Moscow tsar were representatives of Tatar nobility. Russian nationality derived from the Tatar and it is unlikely that those historians, who close their eyes on this circumstance or try to diminish its significance, are right<sup>69</sup>. Especially in the context of the fact that other east-Slavic lands under the rule of the Golden Horde had been Christianized long before the Tatar-Mongol influence. All in all, it allows arguing that development of Russian nationality predominantly took place far from Kyiv and whole proto-Ukrainian state of the Kyivska Rus, due to what this ethnos was initially very specific in comparison with the worldview of proto-Ukrainians.

All this in general and in particular as a result of applying factual and historiographical material let us determine that “the Russian brother” as to its age in fact is not “older”, but is the

<sup>65</sup> Zalizniak L., *Vid sklavyvnyv do ukrainskoi natsii*, Wyd. Biblioteka ukrainsia 1997, s. 114.

<sup>66</sup> Klyuchevskij V., *Sochineniya: v 9 t.*, Moskva 1956, s. 324–325.

<sup>67</sup> Pivtorak H., *Pokhodzhennia ukrainsiv, rosiian, bilorusiv ta yikbnikh mov*, Wyd. Akademiia 2001.

<sup>68</sup> Berdyacv N., *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunitizma*, Wyd. Nauka 1990.; Berdyacv N., Hristianstvo i antisemitizm, „*Druzhbba narodov*“ 1989, vol 10, s. 205–213.

<sup>69</sup> Trubeckoj N., *K probleme russkogo samopoznaniya*, Parizh 1927, s. 49.

youngest. Besides, it had never been in the common cradle, because when “it was born” the cradle had already disintegrated. On the contrary, Russians bear little connection to the Kyivska Rus only because for some time their lands half-formally were a part of the state and would-be Russians adopted Christian culture of the Kyivka Rus together with many Ukrainian features, in particular taking the initial name Rus. In due time it made L. Zalizniak states that “the rights of Moscow for the historical and cultural heritage of princely Kyiv are not more justified than the rights of Madrid, Lisbon, Paris and Bucharest for the history and cultural heritage of Latin Rome... However, how latter were not direct creators of the Latin culture of Rome, the former has just mediated connection to formation of the culture of the Kyivska Rus”<sup>70</sup>. That is why scientists in their objective research must clearly comprehend that the state Kyivska Rus is not Russia and the Rus (from Kyivska Rus) language is not the Russian language.

It is especially evident in the context of the fact that all researchers in the frames of Ukrainophile and Slavonophile approaches came to certain common conclusions: 1) according to the western history of territorial divisions the history of the Kyivska Rus and other early settlements is the history of Ukraine, due to which Ukrainian people are the main successor of the Kyivska Rus (though on different bases: according to the Ukrainophile approach – on the grounds of ethnic and territorial features; according to the Slavonophile approach – only on the territorial grounds); 2) objective absence of the hierarchy among all east-Slavic peoples (at the academic level, as at the political one there are some manipulations); 3) the predominant successor of the language of the Kyivska Rus is the Ukrainian language and Ukraine. It had significant impact on both Ukrainian but mainly western historiography<sup>71</sup>. However, at the same time it is necessary to pay attention to the ideas of J. Friedman, who proves the fact of “mistaken intellectual objectivism”, as the history (especially political history) in no way can be objective<sup>72</sup>. The reason is hidden in a rather simple fact, according to which the identity policy is always based on the ideas of nowadays through the perspective of the past. As a result the past is frequently formed according to the wishes and visions of those who are authors of historical textbooks and monographs. Therefore, the whole history, including modern historiography, is mythologized, as history is just a print of nowadays as to the past<sup>73</sup>. This point of view is supported by D. Miller, who remarks that formation of new national identity, which would unite people, is impossible without turning attention to mythologization<sup>74</sup>. The point is that myths call to comprehend the common faith in the group, determining individual solidarity and opposition

<sup>70</sup> Zalizniak L., *Vid sklavyntiv do ukrainskoi natsii*, Wyd. Biblioteka ukrainsia 1997, s. 123.

<sup>71</sup> Szporluk R., Kiev as the Ukraine's Primate City, „*Harvard Ukrainian Studies*” 1979–1980, vol 3, nr. 4, s. 843–849.; Pritsak O., Za kulisy proholoshennia 1500-littia Kyieva, „*Suchasnist*” 1981, vol 9, s. 46–54.; Pyrohov S., Do pytannia pro „ukrainizatsiiu”, „*Suchasnist*” 1980, vol 6, s. 61–64.; Arel D., A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 1996, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 73–90.; Kuzio T., Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future, „*Washington Quarterly*” 2006, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 89–108.; Burkovskiy I., Chy mala mova Kyivskoi Rusi davnomoskovsku osnovu, „*Rozbudova derzhavy*» 1996, vol 12, s. 15–18.

<sup>72</sup> Friedman J., Myth, History and Political Identity, „*Cultural Anthropology*” 1992, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 207.

<sup>73</sup> Friedman J., The Past in the Future: History and the Politics of Identity, „*American Anthropologist*” 1992, vol 94, nr. 4, s. 837.

<sup>74</sup> Miller D., *On Nationality*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1995.

to alien forces, i.e. by means of increasing peculiar features of boundaries of perception<sup>75</sup>. It is generalized by E. Smith who believes that “without myths, recollections and symbols, on the basis of which it is possible to differentiate between the members of the group and “foreigners””, without the ability of cultural elite to interpret and develop them, there cannot be any real ethnos<sup>76</sup>. And on the contrary, all colonialist attempts to wipe historical memory are the processes, which lead to the loss of national identity and causes its assimilation in the center of imperial strivings. Correspondingly, revival of memory and national historiography are closely connected with revival of identity as to the notion of former imperial “others”. That is the way how is formed the position of those who “take credit for” the issues of the past and are able to identify oneself and others at any moment of time and place<sup>77</sup>. That is why it is not surprising that such interpretation of the past in the attempts to satisfy the needs of the state of postcolonial type (in our case – Ukraine) are welcomed by the majority, but can generate a feeling of betrayal among national minorities (in our case, first of all, Russian minority in Ukraine)<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>75</sup> Armstrong J., *Nations Before Nationalism*, [w:] Hutchinson J., Smith A. (eds.), *Nationalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 145.

<sup>76</sup> Smith A., Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals, *„Journal of European Sociology”* 1984, vol 25, nr. 2, s. 288.

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## **THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SCIENTISTS' RESEARCHES**

### **Abstract**

The scientific researches of theoretical aspects of formation of political transformation and democratization in CEE carried out by scientists of the Russian Federation are analyzed. It is proved that they are quite productive in conducting targeted studies of systemic political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their conceptual constructs, methodological approaches and generalizations are a certain contribution to the development of modern political science.

*Key words: Central-Eastern Europe, transformation, democratization, revolutions.*

## **ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ АСПЕКТИ РОЗВИТКУ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ І ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ В ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯХ ВЧЕНИХ**

Проаналізовано наукові дослідження теоретичних аспектів формування політичної трансформації та демократизації в ЦСЄ, здійснені вченими Російської Федерації. Доведено, що вони досить плідно ведуть цілеспрямовані дослідження системних політичних змін у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Їх концептуальні конструкти, методологічні підходи й узагальнення є певним внеском у розвиток сучасної політичної науки.

*Ключові слова: Центрально-Східна Європа, трансформація, демократизація, революції.*

Qualitatively new internal and external dimensions of the political process that have emerged on the continent in recent decades in the context of radical geopolitical changes shows the trend of searching for theoretical models and innovative modifications of well-known theories of international relations to explain the modern transformation processes in Europe and the problems of development and cooperation of the CEE countries. The people of the region have long cherished the hopes for the establishment/restoration of democracy in the states by the criterion of the political system, mentally preparing for the changes in the states



and were only expecting a specific time for the promises to be fulfilled. In the 1990s CEE has significantly changed the political and ideological image – the system of power which had reigned here for more than forty years collapsed; the ruling Communist parties either ceased to exist, or, having undergone changes, moved to a secondary position in the policy of societies. Democratization, abandonment of the old ones and recognition of new social values has changed the current system and foreign policy priorities, and the objective process of their development has led to increased scientific interest in the political problems of international systems and global development in the country dimension of political life and the issues have not lost importance among scientists. This is an urgent task of political science, because the analysis of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the CEE States is of scientific, theoretical and practical importance.

The article is based on the analysis of scientific works of scientists of the Russian Federation, who cover theoretical approaches to the problems of transformation and democratization in the CEE countries.

The purpose of the article is to understand the importance and scale of the formation of a new Europe, the consequences of systemic changes in CEE since 1989.

The analysis of the problems of the study is important at three levels: international, interregional in the context of deepening and spreading the European integration process and directly at the level of the individual country. In the 2000s, the key to the further development of the research problem was its significant expansion, which takes place in the context of formation of new conceptual approaches to the coverage of certain areas of the modern process of transformation and democratization.

The works of Russian scientists arouse a certain interest among the scientific schools that were formed in the new countries on the territory of the former USSR. Leading scientific centers of the Russian Federation, which conduct a comprehensive study of the problems of political transformation in post-communist countries are – Department of contemporary history and socio-political problems of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe of the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISS RAS), Department of international economic and political studies of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), the Division of Eastern Europe Center of scientific information studies on global and regional issues of Russian Academy of Sciences, Department of East European studies and the Center “Seredzemnomorie – Chornomorie” of the Institute of Europe of RAS. Scientists of these departments have been studying the problems of systemic transformation in CEE in late 20th century for more than two decades: reforms of political systems of post-communist countries, prerequisites, specific historical reasons, the nature of the “velvet” revolutions, the direction of political changes caused by them, the formation of new institutions of power, the phenomenon of multi-party, especially the formation of political pluralism, the results of political transformation, and the like.

First of all, we should mention that the list of works of the scientists of the mentioned RAS institutes is quite lengthy. We believe that it is almost impossible to analyze the works on all CEE states in one article, so it is necessary to choose one certain state. Russian scientists often examine the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its successors Czech Republic (CR) and Slovak Republic (SR). These states occupy a significant place among the CEE countries that have taken the path of transformation. Therefore, the subject of our study is the works of Russian scientists, which analyzed the theoretical aspects of the development of political transformation and democratization in the Czech Republic.

Modern CR was a part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic up to 1993, so the main phases of political transformation, which occurred in the late 1980s – early 1990s were carried out in a shared state with the Slovaks. Russian scientists consider the processes of change on the scale of the entire Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, interpreting the question of the stages of political transformation, its completeness, in different ways. The authors of the three-volume (in fact – 4-volume, since the 3rd volume was published in 2 books) study, which was prepared in the Bulletin of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and devoted to the half-century history of the CEE countries<sup>1</sup>, consider the political transformation as the first stage of the revolutionary process, which includes “large or smaller elements of the political revolution”, which entailed radical, profound consequences. According to scientists, this stage was completed when the formation of the foundations of a multi-party system began and the first free parliamentary elections were held in the spring and summer of 1990, which contributed to the formation of the legal foundations of the new political system<sup>2</sup>. The editor-in-chief of the monograph academician A. D. Nekipelov believes that there are few such publications among the scientific literature. Chronologically close to the subject of the study are the 2nd and the 3rd volumes. The second part of the third volume analyzes the changes of the 1990s – the search for new economic and political allies in the world by the post-communist CEE countries in the context of sharp changes in the geopolitical situation and globalization challenges. Scientists S. Glinkina, R. Greenberg, R. Evstigneev, E. Sheynin, B. Shmelev, M. Bukharin, I. Yazhborovskaya, N. Kulikova, M. Deryabin, G. Shmelev, P. Kuligin, A. Nekipelov, I. Orlik, A. Yazkova analyzed the causes, course and ambiguous consequences of changes in the CEE countries, pointed out that their results are not too impressive, though they still attributed the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia to successful “democratizers”.

Later, M. Bukharin at a “round table” of the Department of international economic and political studies of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the editorial board of the journal “New and contemporary history”<sup>3</sup>, pointed to a few phases of change.

<sup>1</sup> Центрально-Восточная Европа во второй половине XX века. В 3 т. Т. 3. Трансформация 90-х годов. Ч. 1. М.: Наука, 2002. 461 с.; Центрально-Восточная Европа во второй половине XX века. В 3 т. Т. 3. Трансформация 90-х годов. Ч. 2. М.: Наука, 2002. 463 с.

<sup>2</sup> Центрально-Восточная Европа во второй половине XX века. В 3 т. Т. 3. Трансформация 90-х годов. Ч. 2. М.: Наука, 2002. С. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Восточная Европа: Двадцать лет спустя. *Новая и новейшая история*. 2009. № 6. С. 3.

The first one (late 1980s - early 1990s) – the dismantling of the former regime; registration of the legal basis of the new system of democracy, the first democratic parliamentary elections; the formation of new political structures and institutions. At the heart of political change is a consensus between the new and old elites. The Western standards of the political structure of society were a model. The second stage (1990s) – political changes aimed at the formation of a democratic state based on the rule of law, strengthening the principles of separation of power and civil society, the development of political pluralism. The third stage, in his opinion, began for these states after joining the European Union. “The era of pro-European and pro-reformatory consensus after the accession to the EU and the completion of the systemic transformation was over and nationalist, populist, and most importantly anti-liberal trends began to grow. They are generated by the first ethnic tension in Slovakia and Hungary, the strengthening of conservative Catholicism in Poland. And now they are amplified by the global crisis”<sup>4</sup>.

Scientists who actively explore the theoretical and methodological approaches and the realities of the political changes in CEE are S. Glinkina, I. Orlik<sup>5</sup>, E. Zadorozhnyuk<sup>6</sup>, S. Eliseev<sup>7</sup>, B. Kapustin<sup>8</sup>, A. Kovler<sup>9</sup>, A. Melville<sup>10</sup>. The tradition of studies on the transition to democracy in CEE is being developed by I. Yazhborovska (theoretical framework for the analysis of changes)<sup>11</sup>, Y. Novopashin (preconditions and driving forces of the revolutions of 1989)<sup>12</sup>, V. Mokshin (forms of transformation of political regimes)<sup>13</sup>, M. Bukharin (civil society)<sup>14</sup>, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Там само. С. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Россия и Центрально-Восточная Европа: трансформации в конце XX-начале XXI век: [Монография]: в 2 т. Т. 1: Преобразования / [отв. ред. С.П. Глинкина, И.И. Орлик]. М.: Наука, 2005. 360 с.; Россия и Центрально-Восточная Европа: трансформации в конце XX-начале XXI век: [Монография]: в 2 т. Т. 2: Взаимоотношения / [отв. ред. С.П. Глинкина, И.И. Орлик]. М.: Наука, 2005. 412 с.; Становление многопартийности в Восточной Европе в 1990-е годы (на материалах Болгарии, Венгрии, Восточной Германии, Польши, России, Словакии и Чехии): Монография [Ю.И. Игрицкий, С.П. Глинкина, Л.С. Лыкошина и др.]. М.: ИНИОН, 1996. 217 с.

<sup>6</sup> Власть – общество – реформы: Центральная и Юго-Восточная Европа. Вторая половина XX века / отв. ред. Э.Г. Задорожнюк; Ин-т славяноведения РАН. М.: Наука, 2006. 442 с.; Задорожнюк Э.Г. «Бархатная революция» в Чехословакии: Настоятельность новых интерпретаций // История антикоммунистических революций конца XX в.: Центральная и Юго-Восточная Европа. М.: Наука, 2007. С. 193-279; Задорожнюк Э.Г. От крушения Пражской весны к триумфу «бархатной революции». Из истории оппозиционного движения в Чехословакии (август 1968-ноябрь 1989 гг.). М.: ИНИОН, 2008. 439 с.

<sup>7</sup> Елисеев С.М. Выйти из «Бермудского треугольника»: О методологии исследования посткоммунистических трансформаций. *Политические исследования*, 2002. № 6. С. 71-82.

<sup>8</sup> Капустин А.Я. Европейский Союз: интеграция и право. М.: Изд-во Рос. Ун-та дружбы народов, 2000. 434 с.; Капустин Б. Концепция «транзитологии»? (О теоретическом осмыслении первого посткоммунистического десятилетия) *Политические исследования*, 2001. № 4. С. 6-26.

<sup>9</sup> Ковлер А. И. Кризис демократии? Демократия на рубеже XXI века / Отв. ред. Б.Н. Топорнин. М.: ИГП РАН, 1997. 102 с.

<sup>10</sup> Мельвил А.Ю. Демократические транзиты (теоретико-методологические и прикладные аспекты). М.: МОНФ, 1999. 106 с.; Мельвил А.Ю. Опыт теоретико-методологического синтеза структурного и процедурного подходов к демократическим транзитам. *Политические исследования*, 1998. № 2. С. 6-39.

<sup>11</sup> Яжборовская И. Политологические подходы к проблематике трансформации общественного устройства в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы. *Международный исторический журнал*, 2000. № 7; Яжборовская И.С. Глобализация и опыт трансформации в странах Центрально- и Юго-Восточной Европы. М.: «Academia», 2008. 378 с.

<sup>12</sup> Новопашин Ю. Революции 1989 года в странах Центральной (Восточной) Европы: взгляд через десятилетие. *Международный исторический журнал*, 2000. № 7; Новопашин Ю.С. Антикоммунистические революции конца XX века. *Вопросы истории*, 2006. № 9. С. 87-98.

<sup>13</sup> Мокшин В.К. Трансформация политических режимов восточно-европейских стран во второй половине XX века. Архангельск, 1997. 271 с.

<sup>14</sup> Бухарин Н.И. Строительство гражданского общества в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы: 90-е годы XX века – начало XXI века. *Новая и новейшая история*. 2005. № 1. С. 26-49.

Despite significant differences in views and assessments of the events of 1989-1990, it is common in the works of scientists to define these events as the most radical turn in the political systems of post-communist countries, world politics and history as a whole. At the same time, in comparison with the works of European scientists, Russian researchers, analyzing the problems of the CEE countries, highlighted their unwillingness to conduct forced democratization, because, with the exception of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, those states did not have such traditions. G. Vainshtein, V. Vasovic, V. Gelman, B. Kapustin, A. Kovler, N. Korovitsyna, L. Lykoshina, B. Makarenko stress that in the conditions of undemocratic political culture, without the change of elites, political institutions of the Western model can not act effectively and that political evolution in the post-communist space can not be subjected to analysis by the tools of transitology.

A significant role in scientific studies on changes in CEE countries plays the monograph by the scientists of the sector in CEE and SEE countries of the Institute of Economics of RAS, Institute for economic and political studies RAS, performed under the supervision of leading scientists (N. Bukharin, G. Weinstein, S. Glinkina, Y. Igritskiy, V. Kuznechevski, N. Kulikova, K. Maidannik, G. Mirskiy, A. Nekipelov, I. Orlyk, L. Shanshieva, B. Shmelev, I. Yazhborovskaya, A. Yazkova<sup>15</sup>). Using various theoretical constructions scientists proved that after the overthrow of the totalitarian-authoritarian regime, states can choose different ways of the future, we can expect different models of democracy, different from its liberal type: unsuccessful copying of Western models; imitation of democratic norms; curtailment of controlled democracy in the conditions of apathy of the masses, etc.

It is necessary to highlight the detailed collective work of scientists of the Institute of Sociology of RAS "History of anti-communist revolutions of the late 20th century: Central and South-Eastern Europe", which was published in 2007 under the editorship of Y. Novopashin<sup>16</sup>. The authors of the monograph are leading scientists – B. Zhelitski, E. Zadorozhnyuk, N. Korovitsyna V. Maryina, K. Nikiforov and others focused their attention on the turning point in the history of the CEE states in the late 1980s-early 1990s, associated with the collapse of the

<sup>15</sup> Демократизация и парламентаризм в Восточной Европе: Монография / Центр науч.-информ. исслед. глобальных и регион. проблем. Отд. ВЕ; Отв. ред. Игрицкий Ю.И. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 2003. 265 с.; Демократическое правовое государство и гражданское общество в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы / [Н. И. Бухарин, Н. И. Довженко, З. Н. Кузнецова и др.]; РАН, Ин-т междунар. экон. и полит. исслед. М.: Наука, 2005. 184 с.; Национализм и популизм в Восточной Европе: Сб. науч. трудов / РАН. ИНИОН. Центр науч.-информ. исслед. глобал. и регионал. проблем. Редакол.: Игрицкий Ю.И. (отв. ред.) и др. М., 2007. 176 с.; Национальные меньшинства в странах Центрально-Восточной Европы: Сб. обзоров и реф. / РАН. ИНИОН. Центр науч.-информ. исслед. глоб. и регион. проблем: Редакол. Биткова Т.Г. (отв. ред.) и др. М., 2007. 140 с.; Общественные трансформации в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы (90-е годы XX века – начало XXI столетия) / Отв. ред. Ю.С. Новопашин. М.: Институт славяноведения РАН, 2008. 352 с.; Политический процесс: основные аспекты и способы анализа / Под ред. Мелешкиной Е.Ю. М.: ИНФРА-М, Весь мир, 2001. 304 с.; Процессы демократизации в Восточной Европе: ожидания и реальность: Сб. обзоров, реф. / РАН. ИНИОН. Центр науч.-инф. иссаса. глобал. и регион. проблем. Отдел ВЕ; Отв. ред.: Игрицкий Ю.И. М., 2002. 152 с.; Публичное пространство, гражданское общество и власть: Опыт развития и взаимодействия / Редакол.: А.Ю. Сунгуров (отв. ред.) и др. М.: Российская ассоциация политической науки (РАПН); Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2008. 422 с.; Юго-Восточная Европа в эпоху кардинальных перемен [А.А. Язькова, С. Бьянкини, Ю.П. Давыдов и др.]; под ред. А.А. Язьковой; Рос. акад. наук, Ин-т Европы. М.: Весь мир, 2007. 352 с.

<sup>16</sup> История антикоммунистических революций конца XX века: Центральная и Юго-Восточная Европа [отв. ред. Ю.С. Новопашин]: ИС РАН. М.: Наука, 2007. 397 с.

socialist system and the formation of new structures of political development. The work covers an array of sources, published documents, analysis of the international situation and internal causes of the revolutions in CEE, problems that remain debatable among Russian and foreign scientists in the modern period.

Scientists of the Russian Association of political science have made a certain contribution to the study of transformation processes in CEE. Thus, the team under the leadership of A. Sungurov explored the public space, civil society and power in the process of their development and interaction. A. Soloviev (scientific editor)<sup>17</sup>, V. Achkasov, S. Aivazov and M. Arakelov prepared a powerful political science dictionary "Political Science. Lexicon"<sup>18</sup>. P. Panov studied political institutions, identities and practices from the perspective of the theoretical model of political order<sup>19</sup>; scientists under the leadership of K. Nikiforov analyzed the impact of revolutions and reforms in the countries of CEE and SEE in twenty years past<sup>20</sup>.

We should also highlight the works of Russian scientists dedicated to the "velvet" revolutions and transformation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and then in the Czech Republic, the consolidation of democracy and European integration processes. In our opinion, the process of changes in the political system of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ended up with the division of the country into two states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which by 1993 managed to transform the foundations of the past political system and develop the principles on which they further relied in their development. An important condition for the development of the concept of political transformation is the understanding of the prerequisites and specific historical causes of the collapse of the socialistic system that reigned in the CEE countries, particularly in the CSR. Y. Novopashin notes that "the events of that late autumn (1989 – *T.F.*) were the result of a long-term crisis". Scientists point out that in the CSR economic crisis was not as deep as in other countries of the region<sup>21</sup>. And although, unfortunately, there are still no works with a comprehensive analysis of the state of the Czechoslovak society in the 1980s., in the period of the so-called "normalization", some articles considered the negative trends in economic development, noted that the CPC has significantly lost public trust<sup>22</sup>.

Y. Novopashin believes that the revolutions of 1989 had a class character. Despite their inherent desire for class cooperation rather than class struggle, "yet the core of all these negotiation

<sup>17</sup> Публичное пространство, гражданское общество и власть: Опыт развития и взаимодействия / Редкол.: А.Ю. Сунгуров (отв. ред.) и др. М.: Российская ассоциация политической науки (РАПН); Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2008. 422 с.

<sup>18</sup> Политология: Лексикон / В.А. Ачкасов, С.Г. Айвазова, М.П. Аракелова / под ред. Соловьёва А.И. М.: РОССПЭН, 2007. 800 с.

<sup>19</sup> Панов П.В. Институты, идентичности, практики: теоретическая модель политического порядка. М.: РОССПЭН, 2011. 230 с.

<sup>20</sup> Революции и реформы в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы: 20 лет спустя / Отв. ред. К.В. Никифоров. М.: РОССПЭН, 2011. 775 с.

<sup>21</sup> Центральноевропейские страны на рубеже XX-XXI вв. Аспекты общественно-политического развития. Историко-политологический справочник / Отв. сост. Ю.С. Новопашин. М.: Новый хронограф, 2003. С.16.

<sup>22</sup> Общественные трансформации в странах Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы (90-е годы XX века – начало XXI столетия) / Отв. ред. Ю.С. Новопашин. М.: ИС РАН, 2008. 352 с.

efforts was nothing more than a class confrontation, but not in Lenin's understanding of it, but in the interpretation of M. Gilas, which divided the socialist society into a "new class" of the governing "commune-bureaucracy" and the class of all the other governed (white-collar workers, workers, peasants, intellectuals)<sup>23</sup>. He writes that these revolutions are anti-communist in nature, not anti-totalitarian<sup>24</sup>. However, supporters of a different assessment of the nature of the events of 1989-1990 point to the evidence of their general authoritarian and antitotalitarian orientation, which led primarily to the collapse, agony, collapse of the political system<sup>25</sup>. Despite the peaceful, non-violent nature of the revolutions, the events of the 1980s in a number of Eastern European countries, Y. Novopashin defines them as revolutions, not reforms. Such revolutions, in his opinion, represent a new word in the theory of change of social systems and in the practical implementation of such a change<sup>26</sup>.

Scientists usually indicate that the political changes in CEE and SEE in the end the 20th century were organized and mostly peaceful in nature. They characterize revolutions as "velvet" and "negotiated". The events of the autumn of 1989 in the CSR are defined as a "velvet" revolution (in Slovak version – "gentle"). This name was not an accident. Analyzing the correlation between the role of negotiations between the authorities-opposition and pressure from the "street" (hundreds of thousands of demonstrators), scientists point out that citizens – "street" had outweighed.

A prominent place in the study of the prerequisites of the "velvet" revolution in the CSR occupy the works of Russian scientist E. Zadorozhnyuk, in particular the monograph "From the collapse of the Prague spring to the triumph of the "velvet revolution". From the history of the opposition movement in Czechoslovakia (August 1968 – November 1989)"<sup>27</sup>. The scientist used a significant number of documents and was the first among the bohemists of the Russian Federation to describe in detail the history of the opposition in the Czechoslovakia, was able to refute the view that the "velvet" revolution "appeared as if from nothing", highlighted the stages of the opposition movement that preceded the "velvet" revolution, the scale, role and place of organizations that were part of it, their programs, ideological platforms, specific forms of opposition in the CSR; revealed the internal evolution of the opposition; the importance of external factors, which sometimes were crucial; the phenomenon of "non-political politics," analyzed why Charter 77 had not become the second "Solidarity", and in the ranks of the CPC in the late 1980s there were no communists-reformers (as in Hungary). She is supported by other scientists who point out the importance of the external factor among the prerequisites of the revolution in the CSR – the course of the USSR to perestroika and democratization.

<sup>23</sup> История антикоммунистических революций конца XX века: Центральная и Юго-Восточная Европа / [отв. ред. Ю.С. Новопашин]: ИС РАН. М.: Наука, 2007. С. 17.

<sup>24</sup> Там само. С. 21, 25.

<sup>25</sup> Там само. С. 63.

<sup>26</sup> Новопашин Ю.С. Антикоммунистические революции конца XX века. *Вопросы истории*, 2006. № 9. С. 88.

<sup>27</sup> Задорожнюк Э.Г. От крушения Пражской весны к триумфу «бархатной революции». Из истории оппозиционного движения в Чехословакии (август 1968-ноябрь 1989 гг.). М.: ИНИОН, 2008. 439 с.

Scientific interests of E. Zadorozhnyuk cover the analysis of multi-party in the CSR and the formation of the party system of the Czech Republic. In the article "Parties and movements in the Czech Republic: Structural evolution and the problem of priorities" the scientist notes that "the party mosaic resembles the structures of the Czech Republic when it was a part of Austria-Hungary, in the interwar period and in 1945-1948"<sup>28</sup>. "The continuity is reflected", the scientist believes and it allows us to speak about the relative order of the political life of the country until the mid-1990s, and the role of the external situation in the internal political life of the Czech Republic, the focus on the West is considered as a negative factor that weakens internal political stability<sup>29</sup>.

Although some monographs on the phenomenon of the Czechoslovak "velvet" revolution are still missing, a significant number of articles and sections in the works devoted to the events of the autumn of 1989 were published. A collective monograph "Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 20th century" highlights them in great detail continuing the series of publications on "20th century in documents and research" that was started by the Institute of Sociology of RAS. The monograph was published in two books. The second part of the monograph is devoted to the modern events<sup>30</sup>.

Many scientists distinguish a striking feature of the political transformation in the CSR – the shattering of the old state machine and the formation of new legislative and executive bodies of power at first had the character of "reconstruction". By the agreement between CPC, CF and SAV, part of the deputies of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia handed over their mandates, and their seats were taken (without elections, by "appointment") by the representatives of the opposition. The composition of the government of the CSR had been changed several times to meet the demands of the opposition on the personal composition of the government. During 1990-1992 political changes in the country occurred in preservation of the Constitution of the Czechoslovak socialist Republic, existing from the time of socialism<sup>31</sup>.

Scientists study the formation of multi-party, formation and change of political movements and parties, identify the processes of polarization, fragmentation and pluralization, institutions and mechanisms of democracy, the new political elite of the country. In the collective monograph "Formation of multi-party system in Eastern Europe in the 1990s" the phenomenon of "explosion of multi-party system" is considered, it is stated that it is as much obvious as

<sup>28</sup> Задорожнюк Э.Г. Партии и движения в Чехии: Структурная эволюция и проблема приоритетов / Политический ландшафт стран Восточной Европы середины 90-х годов. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 1997. С. 241.

<sup>29</sup> Задорожнюк Э.Г. Партии и движения в Чехии: Структурная эволюция и проблема приоритетов / Политический ландшафт стран Восточной Европы середины 90-х годов. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 1997. С. 241-242.

<sup>30</sup> Чехия и Словакия в XX веке: очерки истории : в 2 кн. / [отв. ред. В.В. Марыина]; ИС РАН. М.: Наука, 2005. (XX век в документах и исследованиях). Кн. 2. 585 с.

<sup>31</sup> Власть и общество: непростые взаимоотношения. Страны Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы. Сб. ст. М.: ИС РАН, 2008. С. 236; Патрушев С.В. Институционализм в политической науке: Этапы, течения, идеи, проблемы / Институциональная политология: Современный институционализм и политическая трансформация России / Под ред. С.В. Патрушева. М.: ИС РАН, 2006. С. 39.

conditional<sup>32</sup>. The conventionality is that “the basis of the modern Eastern European multi-party system is, as a rule, not the rivalry of two or more large parties with their stable social base, but the simple desire of various social movements and groups to realize the possibilities of self-expression, which suddenly opened up, and gain political weight”<sup>33</sup>.

A large array of articles are devoted to this problem and were published in well-known magazines of Russia (“Polis”, “Socis”, “International journal on social sciences”, “Free Thought-XXI”, “International Life”, “World economy and international relations”, “New and contemporary history”, “East (Oriens)”, “The World of Russia”, “Eastern European studies”, “Social Sciences and Modernity”, “Constitutional law”, “Logos”, “Slavonic Studies”, “Russian economic journal” etc.) and collections of scientific papers.

The articles devoted to the problems of political transformation and democratization have conceptual and informational character. For example, L. Leonova analyzes the formation of coalitions of various political forces of the Czechoslovakia, considers it a reflection of pluralism at the stages of change in the state, rightly notes that the Czech Republic has its own positive experience of democratic development, explores the problems of transformation of the CPC<sup>34</sup>. A. Nosova explores the problems of the internal history of the Civic Forum (CF), a unique phenomenon of the beginning of political transformation in the USSR. Czech CF and similar movements were part of the political democratization in the CEE countries at the turn of the 1990s<sup>35</sup>. She highlights the “internal” and “external” activities of the CF and concludes that its uniqueness was determined by the horizontal rather than vertical structure; conducts a detailed analysis, monitors the evolution of the CF almost on a daily basis, discovers contradictions between the organizational concept of the CF as a broad free association without membership and hierarchy, and the specific objectives of effective political participation in the elections of 1990<sup>36</sup>. The history of CF, according to the scientist, testifies to the fallacy of the concept of “non-political policy” in specific historical conditions. Many works of scholars also reflect the first years of democratic changes in the Czech Republic<sup>37</sup>.

In order to deepen the socio-political studies of the CEE countries, the international journal “Eastern European studies” was created on the initiative of the RAS. The new scientific almanac contributes to the development of the scientific direction of Eastern European studies freed

<sup>32</sup> Ковлер А. И. Кризис демократии? Демократия на рубеже XXI века / Отв. ред. Б.Н. Топорнин. М.: ИГП РАН, 1997. С. 92.

<sup>33</sup> Там само. С. 93.

<sup>34</sup> Леонова Л.А. Становление плюралистической политической системы в Чехословакии, (1990-1992) / Восточная Европа на новом пути (Хроника событий, документы, комментарии). М.: ИНИОН РАН, 1994. С. 153-158.

<sup>35</sup> Носова А.В. Эволюция и смена элит в рамках Гражданского Форума в «революционный» период его истории / Профессор МГУ И.М. Белявская. Материалы конференции, посвященной 90-летию со дня рождения проф. МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова И. М. Белявской. М.: Изд-во МГУ, 2005. С. 303-333.

<sup>36</sup> Носова А.В. Проблема формирования посткоммунистических элит в Чешской Республике (на материале Гражданского Форума) / Национально-территориальный фактор в истории Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы в XX веке и России (СССР). Материалы международной научной конференции. Минск: Изд-во БГУ, 2003. С. 225-228.

<sup>37</sup> Новопашин Ю. Революции 1989 года в странах Центральной (Восточной) Европы: взгляд через десятилетие. *Международный исторический журнал*, 2000. №7; Щербакова Ю.А. Начало «нежной революции» в ЧСФР (осень 1989 г.) / Восточная Европа на историческом переломе. М. ИНИОН РАН, 1991. С. 237-240.



from the theoretical layers of so-called “communist and democratic myths”. The CEE countries are considered as permanently transitioning: first there was a period of socialism, and the next stage was the stage of democratic changes in the 1990s and 2000s. At the initiative of an international team of scientists from the former socialist states in December 2005 Public Center of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic in Prague with the broad participation of the scientific community from Bulgaria, Hungary and Russia, a presentation of its first issues was held. N. Korovitsyna, chief editor of the journal, delivered a speech about the main directions of work of the magazine, its concept, academic, and social challenges<sup>38</sup>. In 2003, she prepared a fundamental work on the development of CEE societies in the 20th century in the context of their relations with Russia. She has a lot of works, where she carried out a comparative analysis of transformational changes in the region, studied the “velvet” revolution, political culture<sup>39</sup>.

Thus, it can be concluded that Russian scientists are very productively conducting targeted studies on systemic political transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, in particular, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, its division into two state entities – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the further democratization of the CEE countries, the consolidation of democracy in them, the preparation of the countries for membership in the NATO and the EU, the characteristics of the CEE countries’ activities in these international organizations, as well as their participation in the regional organization Visegrad-4. Their conceptual constructions, methodological approaches and generalizations are a certain contribution to the development of modern political science.

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## **POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF IMMIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP**

The article is dedicated to analyzing and systematization of political perception of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group. It is argued that the positions of parties and voters regarding immigration in the countries of the Visegrad group are essentially ideologically structured. The author found that the region enjoys different approaches to understanding national issues and immigration processes, but traditionally revolves around the nationalist, liberal, exceptional, national-conservative approaches and rhetoric of the “greater nation” approach. It is motivated that the immigration problem in the countries of the region depends on the conceptualization of party approaches to nationalism and related/contextual issues. In general, it is noted that the political perception of the problems of immigration processes in the countries of the region is nationally (i.e. in each country) and regionally (i.e. in the region in general) determined and oriented, and the political process is much radicalized and activated, in particular by anti-immigrant and (as an accommodation) mainstream parties.

*Keywords: immigration, party, political perception, nationalism, Visegrad group.*

## **ПОЛІТИЧНЕ СПРИЙНЯТТЯ ІМІГРАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ У КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ**

Проаналізовано та систематизовано специфіку політичного сприйняття імміграційних процесів у країнах Вишеградської групи. Аргументовано, що позиції партій і виборців щодо імміграції у країнах Вишеградської групи істотно ідеологічно структуровані. Відтак виявлено, що регіон користується різними підходами до розуміння національної проблематики й імміграційних процесів, а усереднено обертається довкола націоналістичного, ліберального, виняткового і націонал-консервативного підходів та риторики підходу «великої нації». Вмотивовано, що імміграційна проблематика в країнах регіону залежить від концептуалізації підходів партій до націоналізму і суміжних/контекстних з ним питань. Загалом помічено, що політичне сприйняття проблематики імміграційних процесів у країнах регіону національно (тобто у кожній державі) та регіонально (тобто в регіоні загалом) детерміноване й орієнтоване, а політичний процес значно радикалізований та активізований, зокрема антиіммігрантськими і (як акомодатійна реакція) основними партіями.



**Ключові слова:** імміграція, партія, політичне сприйняття, націоналізм, Вишеградська група.

Immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group, especially over the last decade, are quite differently perceived politically and against this background have different consequences. Thus, their comparison and systematization make an effective instrument for comparing immigration process in the region, in particular aiming at working out certain recommendations. It is of great topicality in the context that some countries of the Visegrad group currently and traditionally are positioned as emigrant, some as immigrant and others as constantly changing, what automatically marks the way political forces, political elites and public articulate their position as to immigration process, as well as referring to elaboration of immigration policy in each individual country of the Visegrad group.

The abovementioned range of problems has been specifically and indirectly studied in the works by the following researchers: S. Allievi<sup>1</sup>, J. Androvilov<sup>2</sup>, L. Billy<sup>3</sup>, H. Bojar<sup>4</sup>, A. Buonfino<sup>5</sup>, J. Filadelfiova<sup>6</sup>, Á. Hárs<sup>7</sup>, K. Hodor and A. Kosinska<sup>8</sup>, R. Hokovsky and J. Janda<sup>9</sup>, J. Husák, O. Schütz and M. Vit<sup>10</sup>, T. Kolar<sup>11</sup>, T. Kusnirakova and P. Cizinsky<sup>12</sup>, M. Meciar<sup>13</sup>, J. Rovny<sup>14</sup>, S. Schneider<sup>15</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Allievi S., How The Immigrant Has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe, „*Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*“ 2005, vol 21, nr. 2, s. 135–163.

<sup>2</sup> Androvilov J., Immigration in Current Political Discourse – The Case of Slovakia within the European Union, „*Annual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity*“ 2013, vol 7, s. 5–22.

<sup>3</sup> Billy L., *Immigration issues in Slovak politics*, Wyd. Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Bojar H., To Be an Immigrant in Poland An Analysis of the Experiences of Immigrants from Non-EU Countries, „*Polish Social Review*“ 2007, vol 160, s. 401–403.

<sup>5</sup> Buonfino A., Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe, „*New Political Science*“ 2004, vol 26, nr. 1, s. 23–48.

<sup>6</sup> Filadelfiova J., *Sondy do kultúrnej diverzity na Slovensku*, Wyd. IVO 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Hárs Á., Balogi A., Bernát A., Feischmidt M., Kováts A., Nyíri P., Péteri G., Zakariás I., Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary, „*IDEA Working Paper*“ 2009, vol 12, źródło: [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12\\_Hungary.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12_Hungary.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Hodor K., Kosinska A., Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: a Critical Analysis, „*University of Bologna Law Review*“ 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>9</sup> Hokovsky R., Janda J., *Immigration and Integration of Minorities in View of Czech Political Parties*, [w:] Hokovsky R., Kopal J. (eds.), *Politics and Policies of Integration in Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Denmark and at the EU Level*, Wyd. League of Human Rights & European Values Think-Tank 2013.

<sup>10</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vit M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, „*L'Europe en Formation*“ 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

<sup>11</sup> Kolar T., *The Migration Crisis and the Rise of Right-wing Extremism and Euroscepticism*, Paper on the occasion of the international conference „Migration's Influence on Euroscepticism and Political Radicalism“, May 27, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Kusnirakova T., Cizinsky P., Dvacet let ceske migracni politiky: liberalni, restriktivni, anebo jeste jina?, „*Geografie*“ 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 497–517.

<sup>13</sup> Meciar M., *Immigrant Identity, Social Adaptation and Post-Secular Society in Europe*, [w:] Leman J., Sczegin I., Toguslu E. (eds.), *New Multicultural Identities in Europe: Religion and Ethnicity in Secular Societies*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2014, s. 73–93.; Meciar M., Immigration Discourses in the Czech Republic from the Perspective of the Current Refugee Crisis, „*Beykent Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*“ 2016., vol 9, nr. 1, s. 148–161.

<sup>14</sup> Rovny J., Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe, „*World Politics*“ 2014, vol 66, nr. 4, s. 669–708.; Rovny J., The Other “other”: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe, „*Comparative European Politics*“ 2014, vol 12, nr. 6, s. 637–662.

<sup>15</sup> Schneider S., Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Outgroup Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat, „*European Sociological Review*“ 2008, vol 24, nr. 1, s. 53–67.

U. Sjöberg and I. Rydin<sup>16</sup>, I. Sletaune<sup>17</sup>, J. Weis<sup>18</sup> and many others. However, they have not worked out a systematic and synthesized understanding of peculiarities in political perception of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group, what in fact makes the aim and the task of the current research.

To achieve the abovementioned goal we mainly appeal to the remark made by J. Rovny, who states that political perception of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group must be interpreted in the context of the ternary interrelation of such factors as communist heritage, federalism and dichotomy “nation – ethnic minorities”, which are denoted on the left-right ideological positioning of political aspects of party competitiveness, in particular with special emphasis on the issues of immigration<sup>19</sup>. This, in its turn, has an impact on the way how parties, political elites and public articulate their positions concerning perception of immigration processes and elaboration and correction of immigration policy in the each country of the Visegrad group.

Instrumentally it follows certain logics: 1) position of a political force, concerning the nation and rights of ethnic minorities, is connected with its position towards immigration processes and vice versa; 2) communist heritage, in particular social-political division “center – periphery” caused by it, generates party competitiveness referring to the problems of immigration processes. From the perspective of the countries of the Visegrad group it is represented in the fact that comprehension of immigration processes is diversified: first of all, in due time in peripheral Slovakia, where ethnic minority and titular nation of the Slovaks derive not from the center (which was represented by the Czechs) of the former federation, left political forces do not support multiculturalism, ethnic rights and immigration, whereas right forces are inclined to do this; secondly, in due time in non-peripheral Czech Republic, where an ethnic majority, and nowadays titular nation of the Czechs derives from the center of the former federation, left forces usually support multiculturalism, rights of national minorities and immigration, whereas right forces do not do that; thirdly, in unitary/ethnic centrist (non-federative from the beginning) Hungary and Poland transformation of former left political forces presupposed systematic positioning of left and right parties as to multiculturalism, rights of ethnic minorities and immigration policy, and moreover it was done in the way that reformed left political forces appear to bear a relation to perception of migration issues, whereas non-reformed ones do not. Such logics is supplemented (in particular in Poland) by the role and place of church referring to immigration issues, because religion is opposed to the tendency of ethnic minorities and immigrants

<sup>16</sup> Sjöberg U., Rydin I., *Discourses on media portrayals of immigrants and the homeland*, Presented at ECREA's 2nd European Communication Conference, November 25–28, 2008, Barcelona.

<sup>17</sup> Sletaune I., *Anti-immigration parties in the European Parliament*, Wyd. University of Oslo 2013.

<sup>18</sup> Weis J., *Migration Policy in the Slovak Republic: Argumentation Analysis of Political Party Positions*, Wyd. Department of Government Uppsala University 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Rovny J., The Other “other”: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe, *„Comparative European Politics”* 2014, vol 12, nr. 6, s. 637–662.; Rovny J., Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe, *„World Politics”* 2014, vol 66, nr. 4, s. 669–708.

to adhere to liberal position and tolerance<sup>20</sup>, and thus significantly influences behavior, rhetoric and activity of political forces.

In general it argues that the position of political parties and voters as to immigration in the countries of the Visegrad group is “significantly ideologically structured”, initially due to the experience of positioning of ethnical minorities during the period of socialism; in addition due to the consequences of interpretation and perception of European immigration crisis. Correspondingly, it is represented in the fact that in addition to parties’ positions in the countries of the Visegrad group, different patterns concerning perception of immigration issues, have predominantly become a precondition for “distorted” and “inversed” (on the contrary to Western European countries) focus of interparty competitiveness. As a result, we get the effect, according to which homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population of the country over the period of socialism forms post-communist country in the way that it determines the structure of political system by means of ideology. Consequently, parties’ views on the rights of ethnic minorities are determined advantages over the questions of immigration and integration of immigrants.

Additional significance, in determining political comprehension of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group, is attached in the way to what extent politics and political parties are interested in the national issues, especially against the background of the last European immigration crisis. It is especially actual taking into account the fact that nowadays countries of the region more often come under criticism due to their Euro-skeptic, nationalistic, Euro-populist, anti-immigrant anti-European and even non-European position, rhetoric and activity<sup>21</sup>. It is quite important at least due to growing importance of the region after its deeper integration into the EU. Correspondingly, an outline as to their attitude to the questions of national character (including those of nation, nationalism and nationalistic ideology) given by different countries and parties in the Visegrad group is an indicator of how they perceive and interpret current immigration processes. The point is that namely parties are one of the main participants in social discussion concerning civil issues, and in the political system they usually are representatives of people’s thoughts and form public discourses referring to different issues, in particular immigration problems.

In this context, in particular on the basis of comparative content-analysis of electoral manifests of political parties (less often electoral manifests represented by candidates for presidency and programs of governments) in the countries of the Visegrad group (first of all from the perspective of parliamentary elections as the elections of the “first line” and not European and regional elections as the elections of the “second order”), it has been discovered that the region makes use of different approaches applied by political forces referring to the national range of problems and immigration processes<sup>22</sup>. In particular,

<sup>20</sup> Rovny J., The Other “other”: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe, *„Comparative European Politics“* 2014, vol 12, nr. 6, s. 637–662.; Hodor K., Kosinska A., Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: A Critical Analysis, *„University of Bologna Law Review“* 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>21</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vít M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, *„L’Europe en Formation“* 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

<sup>22</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vít M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, *„L’Europe en Formation“* 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

it has been ascertained that in Hungary traditionally prevails protectionist, isolation, anti-national, but aimed at “great” (“greater”) nation approach. Poland is characterized by a combination of liberal, liberal-national, conservative-national and religious-national approaches as to understanding national issues and immigration processes<sup>23</sup>. Slovakia conventionally is determined by liberal-conservative, cultural-nationalistic, nationalistic and right-liberal approaches as well as an approach towards the Slovak minority. Finally, Hungary is defined by post-modernistic, European, homogeneous, populist, nationalist and communist approaches. In the context of the region it is synthesized by the fact that the Visegrad four is traditionally focused on nationalistic, liberal, exclusive and national-conservative approaches and rhetoric of the “great nation” approach in the process of interpreting national issues and immigration processes. In general, we may conclude that immigration problems in the countries of the Visegrad group much depend on conceptualization of parties’ approaches to nationalism.

Herewith, it was observed that the nationalistic approach to interpretation of immigration processes concentrates on supremacy of the nation and national collectiveness, Christian values (thus civilized-Christian nation) and patriotism, as well as divine logics (especially in the cases of Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) and national pride (in education, training and science), and therefore is based on hostile and questionable perception of immigration as an unnecessary and even dangerous threat (at least when it is not Christian), of immigrants as people, who can be deprived of rights, freedoms and liberties.

Thus nationalists (in particular such political forces as “Hungarian Justice and Life Party” in Hungary, “The League of Polish Families” and the Polish National Party in Poland, the Slovak National Party, the Slovak People’s Party and the People’s Party “Our Slovakia” in Slovakia and the National Party and the Workers’ Party in the Czech Republic) stand for tough laws on immigration and construction (as an ideal model) of a homogeneous society. In its turn, national-conservative approach is less radical and is determined by formation of a national state and providing security and safety to its nation and thus is determined by a non-hostile attitude to other peoples, national minorities and immigration processes, however, if they do not threaten the titular nation. It is represented in the ideological positions of political forces, first of all in Poland and Slovakia, such as the “Law and Justice” and the “Self-Defense” (in Poland) and the “Direction – Social Democracy” and the “Movement for a Democratic Slovakia” (in Slovakia), as well as partially in rhetoric and activity of the Czech parties the “Sovereignty” and the “Public Affairs”. Rather similar is the Hungarian-centric approach to a “great nation”, which as described by the following political forces the “Hungarian Civic Alliance – Fidesz”, “The Hungarian Democratic Forum – MDF” and “The Movement for a Better Hungary” strives for both comprehension of the national state and restoration of its former (historical) greatness and the essence of the nation not as a unity of Hungarians with the same values, history and culture, but as a supertemporal group, which composes the state and people of Hungary, who identify themselves with the country<sup>24</sup>. What concerns a liberal approach, it acts beyond the ideas of the

<sup>23</sup> Hodor K., Kosinska A., Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: a Critical Analysis, „*University of Bologna Law Review*” 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>24</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vit M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, „*L’Europe en Formation*” 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

nation but appeals to the supremacy of the society as a unity of citizens in a country, and thus supports Euro-integration component of immigration policy. First of all, it is represented in manifests of such Slovak and Czech political forces as the “Tradition Responsibility Prosperity” (the Czech Republic) and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, “The Alliance of New Citizens” and the “Most-Hid” (Slovakia). In its turn, a unique or exclusive approach is based on the ideas and principles of liberalism and democracy, however it is careful as to external influences, as every culture and society in totality of their citizens, and not nations have their own specific values, which must be protected in a pluralistic competition. Therefore, political forces which represent this approach, for example “The Hungarian Democratic Forum” (partially) and the Hungarian Socialist Party in Hungary, “The Civil Platform” and “The Polish People’s Party” in Poland, The Christian Democratic Movement, the “Freedom and Solidarity”, the “Direction – Social Democracy” (partially) in Slovakia, the Civic Democratic Party, the Czech Social-Democratic Party and the Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party, appeal to the ideas of equality and rights for all people, though insist on tough rules, concerning immigration policy and rely on disguised xenophobia. Finally, such approach is an anti-nationalistic appeal to an obvious refusal from nationalistic ideology and policy, rejection of the notion of nation, opposition to cultural-educational policy, revision of history, but on the contrary stands for international, including migration, solidarity between countries and continents and constructing an open society and state. It is traditionally characteristic of such parties as “The Alliance of Free Democrats”, the “Politics Can Be Different”, the Hungarian Socialist Party in Hungary, the “Democratic Left Alliance” and “the Left and Democrats” in Poland and the “Alliance of Freedom” and “The Green Party” in the Czech Republic<sup>25</sup>. From the perspective of the countries of the Visegrad group these approaches are supplemented by a specific position of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, which insists on deep integration in social and immigration policies, however on the basis of appealing to the ideas of internationalism and not European identity, as well as the approach towards the Slovak minority, which is represented by the Slovak Party of the Hungarian coalition, stands for extending rights of minorities and immigrants, underlines importance of cooperation and tolerance, though with an inclination to the national interests of the Hungarian minority<sup>26</sup>. In this context it is notable that political comprehension of the issues of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group are both nationally (i.e. in each country) and regionally (i.e. in the region in general) determined and oriented. To represent the specific nature of national party-political and social-political perception of immigration processes we appeal to the experience of ideological positioning of parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic and determination of social-political processes around the immigration discourse in Hungary and Poland, and to reveal regional patterns of social-political view of immigration processes we appeal to the peculiarities of political process both in the Visegrad four and some of its members.

<sup>25</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vít M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, „*L’Europe en Formation*” 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

<sup>26</sup> Husák J., Schütz O., Vít M., National Identity of the Political Parties in the Visegrad Region, „*L’Europe en Formation*” 2012, vol 2, nr. 365, s. 265–287.

Approaching Slovakia it is necessary to admit that this is the country where immigration can be treated as a relatively new phenomenon, because till 1989/1990 its borders were under such strict control that only certain groups of immigrants could cross them, in particular those, appointed by the ruling elites<sup>27</sup>. These groups of people were concentrated in certain social-economic spheres and thus as immigrants were considered only those foreigners who moved into their direction. Correspondingly, what refers to them any political discussion was excluded. But in the course of time and nowadays, especially after finalization of Euro-integration processes and even to a bigger extent after the beginning of the European immigration crisis and taking into account that Slovakia is a heterogeneous country<sup>28</sup>, immigration situation in Slovakia diversified and predetermines its variable social-political perception. Therefore, there is comprehension that Slovak parties initially did not pay special attention (and did it only contextually on the background of other problems) to the issues of immigration in their political programs, but started appealing to it since 2013-2015, and especially before the parliamentary elections in 2016.

For example, it is represented in the manifests of the political force "Direction – Social Democracy", which initially traditionally named "immigration and unfavorable demographic development" among other problems, namely demographic ones, as well as "global transformations in economy" or "climate changes"<sup>29</sup>, but intentionally started appealing to immigration problems after 2012-2016, in particular in the context of arguing the "security needs". As a result, the political force focused on the problem of accepting only those immigrants, who are Christians and refugees from zones of military conflicts, but was against the EU principle of solidarity and quota-share division of refugees as a result of the European immigration crisis<sup>30</sup>. In a similar way the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party initially considered the issues of immigration among other problems in electoral manifests, namely work places<sup>31</sup>, terrorism, state failures, regional conflicts, organized crimes, corruption etc<sup>32</sup>, but later, in particular on the background of humanitarian problems and security issues as well as before the 2016 parliamentary elections, started to appeal to it more expressively, because it began opposing the European policy of migration solidarity<sup>33</sup>. But even despite this, the party does not have a strict immigration policy and program, but is characterized by a number of intra-party variants of comprehending the problem. Therefore, the political force often positions itself as neutral in question of immigration issues and European refugee crisis. In its turn the party "Most-Hid", which in its discourse actively appeal to migration problems, is doing this on the background of national minorities protection<sup>34</sup>, however, and this is quite surprisingly, it stands against the quota-share division of refugees in order to solve immigration crisis in

<sup>27</sup> Androvilov J., Immigration in Current Political Discourse – The Case of Slovakia within the European Union, „*Annual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity*” 2013, vol 7, s. 5–22.

<sup>28</sup> Billy L., *Immigration issues in Slovak politics*, Wyd. Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci 2012.

<sup>29</sup> *Programové zameranie strany SMER–SD pre volebné obdobie 2012–2016*, Wyd. SMER-SD 2012, s. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Weis J., *Migration Policy in the Slovak Republic: Argumentation Analysis of Political Party Positions*, Wyd. Department of Government Uppsala University 2016.

<sup>31</sup> *Programové zameranie strany SMER–SD pre volebné obdobie 2012–2016*, Wyd. SMER-SD 2012, s. 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Volebný program SDKU pre voľby 2012*, Wyd. SDKU-DS 2012.

<sup>33</sup> *Transcript Parliamentary Debate n. 54: Date: 16/9/2015 – 7/10/2015*, Wyd. Narodna Rada Slovenskej Republiky 2015, s. 97, 99.

<sup>34</sup> Rovny J., „The Other “other”: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe, „*Comparative European Politics*” 2014, vol 12, nr. 6, s. 652.

the countries EU-members<sup>35</sup>; the “Freedom and Solidarity” is the party, which on the bases of security factors, EU sovereignty prefer using anti-immigration discourse taking into account economic factors<sup>36</sup>; the “Ordinary People and Independent Personalities” is a party close to immigration issues only in questions concerning security/integration stability of Slovakia and the European Union, though it speaks against obligatory refugee quotas<sup>37</sup>. A bit more to the immigrant issues appeal conservative and nationalistic forces in Slovakia, in particular the Christian Democratic Movement and the Slovak National Party. The former, for example, addresses immigrant question from the perspective of such articulations as security, integration, economy, labor market, welfare and humanitarian dimensions, as well as Christian values and Christian democracy and interprets immigration as a way to solve a predicted demographic crisis in Slovakia<sup>38</sup>. At the same it insists on attracting into the country only “cultural immigrants” and their cultural integration<sup>39</sup>, and therefore traditionally appeals to the need to introduce strict admission control, however, it not so often describes immigration as a possible social and cultural security threat to the national and traditional culture of Slovakia (in particular protesting to the policy of multiculturalism), and at the same time denies obligatory refugee quotas<sup>40</sup>. The latter, in its turn, is on the whole characterized by appealing to the problem of autochthonous minorities, focusing its rhetoric on anti-immigrant rhetoric.

In general, it is observed that the “Direction – Social Democracy”, the “Ordinary People and Independent Personalities” and the “Freedom and Solidarity” make a strict stand against immigration, the Christian-Democratic Movement generally speaks against immigration, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party takes a neutral stance as to immigration, while the “Most-Hid” is not against, but on occasion is even for immigration. The significance of the conclusion is that both left and right parties in Slovakia (what is not observed in other countries of the region) can make a stand against immigration. It was also found that the problem of immigration processes in Slovakia was at first neutral (secondary), but later, especially after joining the EU and the economic crisis of 2008-2009, this issue became “economized”<sup>41</sup> (or economically oriented), and more later, in particular after a new turn of the European immigration crisis of 2014/2015 it became securitized (or security oriented). However, the discourse of economization is predominantly more typical for social-democratic and liberal parties and politicians, as it is usually based on the idea of immigration as a “flexible mobility”, while securitized discourse is peculiar of conservative and nationalistic parties and politicians, as it is grounded on perception of immigration as a threat to national security and interests. Thus, at the beginning immigrants in Slovakia were perceived as “friendly”, but later transformed into “others” or “foreigners”, as they became

<sup>35</sup> *Transcript Parliamentary Debate n. 54: Date: 16/9/2015 – 7/10/2015*, Wyd. Narodna Rada Slovenskej Republiky 2015, s. 37

<sup>36</sup> *Volebný program SaS pre budúce generácie*, Wyd. Sloboda a solidarita 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Weis J., *Migration Policy in the Slovak Republic: Argumentation Analysis of Political Party Positions*, Wyd. Department of Government Uppsala University 2016.

<sup>38</sup> Weis J., *Migration Policy in the Slovak Republic: Argumentation Analysis of Political Party Positions*, Wyd. Department of Government Uppsala University 2016.

<sup>39</sup> *Silnejšie Slovensko – začína to pracou*, Wyd. KDH 2012.

<sup>40</sup> *Transcript Parliamentary Debate n. 54: Date: 16/9/2015 – 7/10/2015*, Wyd. Narodna Rada Slovenskej Republiky 2015, s. 8

<sup>41</sup> Buonfino A., *Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe*, „*New Political Science*” 2004, vol 26, nr. 1, s. 38.

interpreted as objects, which could be managed<sup>42</sup>. And even despite the fact that Slovakia is probably the least “immigrant” country of the EU and its public is probably the least informed, but at the same time is the most categorical towards immigration issues<sup>43</sup>.

It opens a field to form migration policy “behind closed doors” and contributes to blur of boundaries between political and administrative components of managing immigration<sup>44</sup>. Thus, a meaningful conclusion is that in Slovak immigration policy and political discourse, predominates an emphasis on national interests and security<sup>45</sup>. However, it refers to perceiving new topics and discourse elements of the “common” vision of solidarity policy in the EU. It is supplemented by the fact that Slovak public is characterized by the “fear of unknown”, as a result of which immigrants quite often (and after 2015 even more often) are treated as members of “foreign culture”, as they disturb Slovak “major society”<sup>46</sup>. Even despite the fact that the main mass of immigrants in Slovakia are from the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Romania, less from Vietnam and China, all they quite well integrate into the Slovak society and are vital for the structure of the Slovak labor market. In addition to this it is concluded by the fact that irrelevance in migration issues within the Slovak political life is a result of unawareness of voters as to the topic a little number of foreigners in the Slovakia, whose presence (at least until 2015) did not cause any serious problems and consequently reaction of Slovak politicians.

With reference to the Czech Republic, this country as well as Slovakia, does not have a long political history of immigration and refugees, especially taking into account the political situation till 1989, which is known for the fact that former Czechoslovakia generated more refugees than it received<sup>47</sup>. It is largely presupposed by a relative homogeneity of the Czech society, as a result of which immigration processes in the country are traditionally interpreted as economic oriented. This is testified by the public poll data, which show that a very large part of Czechs agree on admission labor migrants<sup>48</sup>. At least up to 2015, when the statistics became much worse and thus, on the contrary to the situation which was formed in 2010, immigration became the subject of political-electoral discourse. It is represented in the diversified comprehension of immigration processes by various political parties.

For example, the Civic Democratic Party treats immigration issues from a generally social point of view and does not appeal to rapid naturalization of immigrants. It is predetermined by the fact that ideologically the political force stands on the principles of nationality and that is why is focused on peaceful coexistence of the majority of the nation with ethnic minorities. As a matter of fact the latter are

<sup>42</sup> Filadelfiova J., *Sondy do kulturnej diverzity na Slovensku*, Wyd. IVO 2010, s. 114.

<sup>43</sup> Billy L., *Immigration issues in Slovak politics*, Wyd. Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci 2012.

<sup>44</sup> Androvilov J., Immigration in Current Political Discourse – The Case of Slovakia within the European Union, „*Annual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity*“ 2013, vol 7, s. 5–22.

<sup>45</sup> Bigo D., *To Reassure and Protect after September 11th*, „Social Science Research Council After September 11 Archive“ 2002, źródło: <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/biggo.htm>

<sup>46</sup> Billy L., *Immigration issues in Slovak politics*, Wyd. Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci 2012.

<sup>47</sup> Hokovsky R., Janda J., *Immigration and Integration of Minorities in View of Czech Political Parties*, [w:] Hokovsky R., Kopal J. (eds.), *Politics and Policies of Integration in Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Denmark and at the EU Level*, Wyd. League of Human Rights & European Values Think-Tank 2013.

<sup>48</sup> Kusnirakova T., Cizinsky P., Dvacet let ceske migracni politiky: liberalni, restriktivni, anebo jeste jina?, „*Geografie*“ 2011, vol 116, nr. 4, s. 497–517.



conceived as potential benefit for the Czech Republic, as a result of what the country must be open not to all immigrants, but only to those who are ready to work and conduct mutually profitable life. Taking into account that the political force is moderately Euro-skeptical, it is officially neutral as to European immigration policy of solidarity, nevertheless in practice it is based on pragmatic ideas and overall values of respect and equality. What concerns the Czech Social-Democratic Party, this political force, first of all, stands for integration of immigrants into the society and its everyday life. From this perspective, the position that the Czech Republic must welcome immigrants, who are willing to work, and not just “enjoy” generous social system, is at the same time combined with the systems of control over immigration, in particular to prevent illegal immigration and organized crime. In its turn, the party “Tradition Responsibility Prosperity” takes a stand for immigration processes, constructed on the grounds of the knowledge of the Czech language, respect towards values and ideas and openness to the culture of majority, but it emphasizes that the titular majority must be ready to receive immigrants and their values. In this context immigration processes must be controlled by the state and aimed at providing people’s security. The party “Sovereignty” on the grounds of its manifestation concerning citizenship, nationality and sovereignty remarks that the priority in the Czech Republic must be protection of national interests, Christian values, cultural and historical heritage and legal system, but not promotion of immigration processes. Therefore, the political force rejects principles of multiculturalism and openness, stands for filtration of immigrants on the basis of religious criteria. Similar position is shared by the Labor Party, which calls to conduct public and not obligatory politically correct discussions, concerning the problems of immigration and integration. The point is that immigration is interpreted by the political force as an undesirable phenomenon and political asylum must be provided only to those refugees, who are willing to respect national traditions of the Czech Republic and conduct decent life together with other citizens of the country. It is also articulated, that there is sense to welcome immigrants with a high level of education, work experience and respect towards Christian values and not cover immigration with birthrate problems. Finally, Czech communists support flexible integration in the social and immigration policy, however on the grounds of the ideas of internationalism, but not European identity.

All this argues that immigration issues are traditionally quite developed in the Czech Republic, but special activity is observed after another turn of the European immigration crisis, which started flaring in 2014/2015<sup>49</sup>. As a result, not only Czech politicum appeared to be divided, but also mass media and the Czech society was, as there emerged at least two camps, which differently perceive European and Czech immigration policy adopted to overcome immigration crisis. Correspondingly, it became new for the Czech Republic that since 2015 in the country extremely widespread was anti-immigrant social propaganda, accompanied by a vivid wave of Islamophobia. On the contrary, pro-immigration discourse can be interpreted as a response to the predominant populist anti-immigrant discourse. This inadequate representation of pro-immigration discourse leads to the fact that some scholars consider the

<sup>49</sup> Meciar M., Immigration Discourses in the Czech Republic from the Perspective of the Current Refugee Crisis, *“Beykent Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi”* 2016., vol 9, nr. 1, s. 148–161.

existence of two radical camps within political debates, concerning refugees, to be a “myth”<sup>50</sup>. For example, P. Pospesch states that at the time when anti-immigrant discourse is represented by radical nationalism and in public debates the camp of radical multiculturalism prevails, Czech mass media still carry on reproducing the above mentioned myth. The point is that pro-immigrant position lies in the fact that it is represented by intellectual elite and mainly by scholars, who are treated suspiciously in the Czech society and not by activists from non-governmental organizations and professionals in the sphere of immigration<sup>51</sup>. On the other hand, of great importance is the remark made by U. Sjöberg and I. Rydin<sup>52</sup> that mass media significantly influence the way immigrants are perceived. As they traditionally represent immigrants as an “indiscrete mass”, which leads to social (social-political) interpretation that “all immigrants are the same”, “unethical”<sup>53</sup> and “are homogeneously represented by Muslims”<sup>54</sup>.

If we focus our attention in general on regional patterns of political perception of the issues of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group, we appeal the experience of Hungary, which to the biggest extent faced the problem of illegal immigrants and whose political position, both officially and unofficially, is the most strict, and thus it largely determines political processes in the other countries of the region<sup>55</sup>. Quite important is the fact that Hungary, as well as other countries of the region, did not face the problem of refugees before 2014/2015, and therefore had to act hastily and often even blindly. As a result, it appeared that policy performed by the Hungarian government and immigrant policy of Hungary in general (as well as in other countries in the Visegrad group) was not either unanimous or mature, but was rather “protective” (even in the economic context<sup>56</sup>), because in fact it corresponded with and “embryonic” state of immigration<sup>57</sup>.

When it comes to Poland, in this country perception of immigration processes is preconditioned by all abovementioned attributes and other factors, in particular by the position of the Polish Roman Catholic Church<sup>58</sup>. Besides, Polish people are rather versatile in their perception of immigration. It is known that Poles with higher education not so often express their hostile attitude towards immigrants; Poles positively conceive people from the territories close to them (geographically – especially from eastern countries, but treat immigrants from foreign or historically hostile countries with disrespect<sup>59</sup>); Poles

<sup>50</sup> Pospesch P., UprchKci a mytus o dvou radikalmch taborech, “*Hospodarske noviny*” February 9, 2016.

<sup>51</sup> Pospesch P., UprchKci a mytus o dvou radikalmch taborech, “*Hospodarske noviny*” February 9, 2016.

<sup>52</sup> Sjöberg U., Rydin I., *Discourses on media portrayals of immigrants and the homeland*, Presented at ECREA’s 2nd European Communication Conference, November 25–28, 2008, Barcelona.

<sup>53</sup> Allievi S., How The Immigrant Has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe, “*Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*” 2005, vol 21, nr. 2, s. 135–163.

<sup>54</sup> Meciar M., *Immigrant Identity, Social Adaptation and Post-Secular Society in Europe*, [w:] Leman J., Sezgin I., Toguslu E. (eds.), *New Multicultural Identities in Europe: Religion and Ethnicity in Secular Societies*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2014, s. 73–93.

<sup>55</sup> Hárs Á., Balogi A., Bernát A., Feischmidt M., Kováts A., Nyíri P., Péteri G., Zakariás I., *Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary*, “*IDEA Working Paper*” 2009, vol 12, źródło: [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12\\_Hungary.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12_Hungary.pdf)

<sup>56</sup> Skrentny J., Chan S., Fox J., Kim D., *Defining Nations in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Return Migration Policy*, “*IMR*” 2007, vol 41, nr. 4, s. 793–825.

<sup>57</sup> Hárs Á., Balogi A., Bernát A., Feischmidt M., Kováts A., Nyíri P., Péteri G., Zakariás I., *Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary*, “*IDEA Working Paper*” 2009, vol 12, źródło: [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12\\_Hungary.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12_Hungary.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> Hodor K., Kosinska A., *Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: a Critical Analysis*, “*University of Bologna Law Review*” 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>59</sup> Bojar H., *To Be an Immigrant in Poland An Analysis of the Experiences of Immigrants from Non-EU Countries*, “*Polish Social Review*” 2007, vol 160, s. 401–403.

with lower incomes have a tendency to treat immigrants negatively, especially those who are satisfied with their earnings; the higher social-economic evaluation of personal situation is, the more favorable is attitude towards immigrants and refugees; rural people and people from small towns more rarely show their positive attitude towards other nations (in particular immigrants), in comparison with other population<sup>60</sup>. It results in the fact that Poles-anti-immigrants are united under anti-immigrant slogans, like “Poland is for Poles”, “Great Catholic Poland”, “Stop Islamisation”, “Yesterday Moscow, Today Brussels takes away our freedom” and so on. Doing this, regular citizens try to show their social-political position to the government and influence its decisions concerning immigrants in Poland.

In fact more and more vivid becomes the point that “the spirit of mutual concern among Poles” is in the process of strengthening, and national and xenophobia attitudes come to the real and virtual political arena. This situation is supplemented by the fact that Poles are absolutely open, expressing their extremist views on the immigrant problem, without any disguise<sup>61</sup>. On the other hand, those who support an influx of immigrants to Poland assume that this contributes to cultural enrichment of the country, opens new possibilities, promotes openness of Polish society towards other nations and enhance demographic situation. In addition they accentuate benefits for the Polish labor market, because presence of qualified experts with their specific knowledge and unqualified laborers getting lower wages, than Polish workers do, contribute to the economic development of Poland. But even in this context, Poles less welcome Islamic immigrants and refugees, mainly because of the preconceptions that their presence may cause conflicts based on cultural or religious features and constitutes a threat to the national security of Poland. It is important that Poles gradually get accustomed to the presence of immigrants in their country and this even finds its representation in political discourse. However, in general it is obvious that integration of immigrants into the Polish society is the source of many challenges for modern and future of the country and its citizens.

Concluding, we may argue that political perception of immigration issues in the countries of the Visegrad group comprises two stages: before and after a new turn of the immigration crisis in Europe. Correspondingly, neither right extremism nor Euro-skepticism could become new terms in the political dictionary and discourse of the countries in the region, however with the beginning of the refugee crisis, which started in 2014/2015 these phenomena have increased their ominous and destructive power and become extremely actual, for the first time ever, in the countries of the Visegrad group<sup>62</sup>. As a reaction to them and to social-political processes in individual countries, extremist rhetoric gained its popularity among mainstream political forces. The main goal of such actions was preservation of their electoral popularity and some weakening of radicalism in the society. At the same time, general political process in the Visegrad countries became significantly radicalized and

<sup>60</sup> Hodor K., Kosinska A., Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: a Critical Analysis, *„University of Bologna Law Review“* 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>61</sup> Hodor K., Kosinska A., Polish Perceptions on the Immigration Influx: a Critical Analysis, *„University of Bologna Law Review“* 2016, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 242–270.

<sup>62</sup> Kolar T., *The Migration Crisis and the Rise of Right-wing Extremism and Eurocepticism*, Paper on the occasion of the international conference „Migration's Influence on Eurocepticism and Political Radicalism“, May 27, 2016.

actualized, though it has not become homogeneous as to its parameters: the most powerful with elements of authoritarianism it has become in Hungary, powerful with elements of authoritarianism it is in Poland (where the society is very informed as to immigration issues, and the political process is turning around two predominant parties); much diminished it was in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (where population is not well informed as to immigration issues and the political process is not focused on just dominating parties).

However, even despite this and the fact that political process in the countries of the region is predominantly turning around mainstream and institutionalized political parties and movements, the so-called anti-immigrant political forces became specially widespread (in particular in the course of the European immigration crisis development). The key reason for their development was the fact that the issues of immigration processes and immigration policy in the countries of the Visegrad group are represented in the construction of one division of a “new” policy, which comprises the questions of protection of rights and liberties of ethnical population in some countries, solution of immigrant problems (in particular refugee crisis) and preservation of the national heritage. It was incorporated in the fact that since the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but more over 2003-2018 some new political parties in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic started positioning themselves as explicitly anti-immigrant, due to which their phenomenon was described as specific<sup>63</sup>. The main attribute and marker of distinction between anti-immigrant parties traditionally is their mainly populist and even xenophobia slant against immigrants. Herewith, it is analytically and on average observed that: political-ideological principles of anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries, especially in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, less in the Czech Republic, became Euro-skepticism, anti-globalism, mono-nationalism and its predominance over ethnic and religious diversity (in Poland towards Jewish minority, in Slovakia towards Hungarians, Roma and representatives of sexual minorities; in Hungary towards people of Jewish origin, Roma and representatives of sexual minorities; in the Czech Republic towards Roma), radicalism, extremism, xenophobia, neo-Nazism and populism. It is notable that rhetoric of such parties in the Visegrad group was given publicity after 2010 and 2014/2015, when the problems of the EU immigration policy developed to the maximum extent; in particular the European immigration crisis reached its peak. All this allowed us argue that anti-immigrant parties politicize the issues of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group, as on the background of increase in their electoral successfulness (especially during the migration crisis) it is naturally (as an accommodation reaction) that there is a growth in anti-immigrant rhetoric of the mainstream (leading) political forces and public in general in any of the countries of the region or the region itself.

<sup>63</sup> Art D., *Inside the Radical Right. The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.; Fennema M., Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe, „*Party Politics*” 1997, vol 3, nr 4, s. 473–492.; McLaren L., Anti-Immigrant Threat in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants, „*Social Forces*” 2003, vol 81, nr. 3, s. 909–936.; Rovny J., The Other “other”: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe, „*Comparative European Politics*” 2014, vol 12, nr. 6, s. 637–662.; Schneider S., Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Outgroup Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat, „*European Sociological Review*” 2008, vol 24, nr. 1, s. 53–67.; Slettaune L., *Anti-immigration parties in the European Parliament*, Wyd. University of Oslo 2013.

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## **Defective Democracy a comparison of the illiberal transformations in Hungary and Poland**

The processes of transformation of liberal democracy in Hungary and Poland are studied. The problem of constructing a democratic institutional landscape is researched. It focuses on the radicalism of the ruling parties, the growth of populism. The main manifestations of the pressure of power on the institutions of liberal democracy are revealed. Particular attention is paid to the study of the forms of pressure regimes constructed by the parties „Fidesz” in Hungary and „PiS” in Poland on non-governmental organizations, the media, judicial bodies.

*Keywords: defective democracy, illiberal democracy, Hungary, Poland.*

## **Дефектна демократія: порівняння неліберальних трансформації Угорщини та Польщі**

Вивчаються процеси трансформації ліберальної демократії в Угорщині та Польщі. Досліджено проблеми побудови демократичного інституційного ландшафту. Акцентовано на радикалізмі правлячих партій, рості популізму. Розкрито основні прояви тиску влади на інститути ліберальної демократії. Особливу увагу приділено вивченню форм тиску режимів, сконструйованих партіями «Fidesz» в Угорщині та «PiS» у Польщі на неурядові організації, медіа, судові органи.

*Ключові слова: дефектна демократія, неліберальна демократія, Угорщина, Польща.*

Актуальність теми зумовлена формуванням в останнє десятиліття в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи (ЦСЄ) режимів неліберальної демократії, які є загрозливими в контексті цінностей правової, демократичної держави. Сучасний політичний процес у цьому регіоні Європи доводить: позиціонування країною себе як демократичної не засвідчує її безумовної характеристики як такої. За демократичним фасадом можуть маскуватися різноманітні деформації: обмеження свободи слова, права на асоціації, тиск на судочинство тощо. В останнє десятиліття у світі спостерігається значне погіршення якості демократії. Значно більше країн останніми роками зазнають невдач у демократизації, аніж тих, які досягли поступу. При цьому такі процеси характерні не лише для слабко розвинених держав, а й для держав-учасниць ЄС, таких як Польща, Угорщина, Словаччина, Хорватія

та ін. Аналіз таких дефектів демократії на прикладі Угорщини періоду 2010-2018 рр. та Польщі періоду 2015-2018 рр. становить мету дослідження, яке підготовлене на основі методології неінституціоналізму.

Більшість посткомуністичних країн ЦСЄ упродовж останніх трьох десятиліть переймають від Заходу зовнішні атрибути ліберальної демократії (вибори, формально демократична конституція, багатопартійність тощо). При цьому є істотні труднощі в реалізації на практиці таких засадничих принципів демократії як верховенство права, поділ влади та ін. Таке відхилення зумовило образну оцінку нових режимів як «демократій зі зламаним хребтом» (broken back democracy)<sup>1</sup>. Увиразненість в сучасному політичному процесі більшості країн ЦСЄ таких деформацій започаткувало в політологічному дискурсі дослідницький напрям вивчення «якості демократії».

У 2008 р., напередодні міжнародної фінансової кризи, Світовий банк опублікував доповідь<sup>2</sup>, де відзначено: ера демократичного переходу в ЦСЄ закінчилася, бо усі країни, що вступили до ЄС у 2004 та 2007 рр. діють як ліберальні демократії. Було оптимістично констатовано, що тут створено стабільні інституції, котрі гарантують демократію. Але з позицій сьогодення ці твердження оцінюються критично. Навіть ставиться питання про те, чи не була прихильність окремих країн до ліберальної демократії вимушеною та тимчасовою задля приєднання до ЄС, адже завершивши євроінтеграційний процес окремі країни почали нехтувати базовими принципами ліберальної демократії<sup>3</sup>.

Ф. Закарія<sup>4</sup> ще в 1997 р. першим зацентрував на перспективах ліберальної демократії. Ця тематика піднімалася найперше у межах транзитологічних досліджень. Але саме динамічні зміни в Угорщині починаючи від 2010 р. стали поворотним моментом у формуванні наукового інтересу до проблематики еволюції неліберальної демократії у посткомуністичних країнах ЦСЄ. Вони спричинили питання: чи ці зміни унікальні як віддзеркалення історичного спадку Угорщини, а згодом - і Польщі, або ж це тенденція у світі? Процеси, які відбуваються в низці країн, дозволяють сформулювати робочу гіпотезу про зростання ареалу неліберальної демократії в останнє десятиліття. Нині ці процеси потребують аналізу, що актуалізує тематику, порушену в статті.

**Кейс Угорщини.** Специфіка Угорщини полягає в тому, що на відміну від багатьох країн ЦСЄ, процес демократизації тут був порівняно простим. Країна послідовно реформувалася та першою з-поміж посткомуністичних держав подала заявку на вступ до ЄС (березень 1994 р.). Та, попри друге десятиліття членства в ЄС, нині Угорщина

<sup>1</sup> R. Rose, W. Mishler, C. W. Haerpfer. *Democracy and its alternatives. Understanding post-communist societies*. Baltimore 1998.

<sup>2</sup> A. Alam, P. Anós, F. Casero Khan, C. Udomsaph, *Unleashing prosperity: productivity growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*. Washington, The World Bank 2008. 275 s.

<sup>3</sup> A. Shekhovtsov, *Is Transition Reversible? The Case of Central Europe*. Legatum Foundation. URL: <https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/publications/is-transiting-reversible-the-case-of-central-europe-january-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=8> [odczyt: 21.11.2018].

<sup>4</sup> F. Zakaria, *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy*, „Foreign Affairs”, 1997 nr 76 (6), s. 22-43.



має великі проблеми побудови демократичного інституційного ландшафту; політика держави радикалізується, зростає вплив популістів<sup>5</sup>.

Серед причин піднесення популярності партії «Fidesz» є наслідки кризи 2008 р., яка зробила електорат уразливим. Високі рейтинги партії «Fidesz», а також разюча, як для праворадикального партійного сегмента, популярність партії «Йоббік» можуть бути пояснені крізь призму наслідків цієї кризи та висхідного невдоволення населення соціально-економічними показниками, наявним на той момент політичним порядком. Напередодні 2010 р. (й упродовж наступних років) зріс попит саме на авторитарну політику за одночасного ослаблення угорського громадянського суспільства, падіння довіри до ринкової економіки. Отже, «Fidesz» прийшла до влади на хвилі сильного соціального невдоволення. Виборча програма партії підживлювала ці настрої аргументами про те, що у 1989-1990 рр. реального переходу не було, бо попередня номенклатура зуміла трансформувати свою втрачену політичну силу на економічний вплив; тепер же (2010 р.) настав час для нового політичного порядку, який буде встановлений завдяки «революції виборчих скриньок». Відтак від 2010 р. Угорщина переживає відхід від ліберальної демократії.

Найперше ці процеси відобразилися в новій Конституції Угорщини (вступила в дію у 2012 р.), яку неформально характеризують як «європейську неслухняність». Вона розроблялася без цивілізованих дебатів. Усі обговорення проходили за участю лише представників правлячих партій. Невдовзі (березень 2013 р.) до неї внесено зміни, що свідчить про конституційно-правову турбулентність країни.

Серед суперечливих норм Конституції Угорщини відзначимо: скасування права Конституційного суду Угорщини посилалися на власні рішення, прийняті до вступу в дію нового Основного Закону; обмеження низки прав цього судового органу; визначення сімейних зв'язків виключно як заснованих на шлюбі та зв'язків між батьками та дітьми, а шлюбу – як добровільного союзу чоловіка та жінки (заперечення одностатевих шлюбів); наділення парламенту правом через прийняття органічних законів визначати критерії віднесення частини релігійних організацій до «церков», що зумовить нерівність правового статусу релігійних організацій у залежності від наявності статусу «церкви»; заборона в періоді виборчих кампаній до угорського парламенту та Європарламенту розмішувати агітаційні матеріали в приватних медіа; наділення Голови Національного бюро юстиції широкими повноваженнями передавати справи з одного суду в інший та ін. Загалом нова конституція стала початком широкомасштабної атаки на ліберальну демократичну політику та практику в країні. Водночас В. Орбаном була обрана тактика, за якою Угорщина зберігає членство в ЄС, продовжує отримувати субсидії та пільги.

<sup>5</sup> I. Kabantseva, *Przeciwdziałanie korupcji przez społeczeństwo obywatelskie: analiza porównawcza doświadczenia Rumunii, Węgier i Polski*, „Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej”, 2018 nr 9, s. 193-204.

Після зміни Основного Закону Угорщини парламентська більшість вирішує питання порядку денного фактично без будь-яких механізмів контролю, а незалежність як загальних судів, так і Конституційного суду фактично скасована. Скорочення повноважень Конституційного суду є важливою «перемогою» В. Орбана, позаяк цей судовий орган був чи не єдиною протиположною неліберально налаштованій парламентській більшості. За оцінками Угорського Гельсінського комітету, «уряду „Fidesz” вдалося сформувати Конституційний суд як лояльне тіло»<sup>6</sup>, відтак 11 із 15 суддів були призначені парламентською більшістю без консультацій з опозицією. Після 2010 р. члени та прихильники «Fidesz» фактично підпорядкували собі судову вертикаль. Саме члени цієї партії зайняли провідні позиції в аполітичних незалежних установах. Були ініційовані кампанії проти представників попередніх урядів та окремих частин інтелігенції<sup>7</sup>. Уряд В. Орбана та парламент, контрольований партією «Fidesz», розпочав наступ на опозицію, особливо соціалістів.

Від початку 2012 р. Європейська комісія відкрила низку проваджень щодо Угорщини; натомість В. Орбан почав застосовувати тактику «стратегічного відступу», аби ввести в оману демократичні інституції світу щодо справжнього стратегічного курсу. Фактично ж В. Орбан створив систему, в якій глава уряду необмежено впливає через централізацію влади та неформальні відносини на основі особистої залежності. На переконання угорської влади, європейські політичні системи не потребують системи стримувань і протиположних; натомість доречно посилювати співпрацю державних установ. Видається, що відбулася «приватизація» або ж ослаблення державою незалежних інституцій Угорщини, які традиційно є частиною системи стримувань і протиположних, відіграють ключову роль у забезпеченні верховенства права через поділ влади. В. Орбан, припускаємо, має за мету ліквідувати механізми стримувань і протиположних і навіть парламентську ротацію партій, позаяк центром політичного життя Угорщини визначає партію «Fidesz». Загалом неліберальна демократія спрямована на розбудову сильної виконавчої влади, що й успішно впроваджується в Угорщині.

Після внесення змін до Конституції був видозмінений виборчий закон: вибори проходять в один тур замість двох; скасовані обмеження щодо явки на голосування; за існуючої змішаної виборчої системи у ній збільшено частку депутатів, обраних за мажоритарною системою тощо. Виборчі округи почали створюватися так, щоб забезпечити додаткові преференції саме для «Fidesz»; надано права голосу угорцям-нерезидентам (це переважно лояльний до «Fidesz» електорат) тощо. Загалом ці зміни спрямовані на зміцнення позицій партії «Fidesz», забезпечення їй парламентської більшості.

Про намір побудови власне неліберальної демократії В. Орбан заявив у промові 2014 р., а після початку міграційної кризи у 2015 р. політик оголосив кінець епохи «ліберального

<sup>6</sup> Hungary's Government Has Taken Control of the Constitutional Court. URL: [helsinki.hu/en/hungarys-government-has-taken-control-of-the-constitutional-court](https://helsinki.hu/en/hungarys-government-has-taken-control-of-the-constitutional-court) [одczyт: 05.12.2018].

<sup>7</sup> A. Shekhovtsov, Is Transition Reversible? The Case of Central Europe. Legatum Foundation. URL: <https://lifblob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/publications/is-transiting-reversible-the-case-of-central-europe-january-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=8> [одczyт: 21.11.2018].

бла-бла» (“liberal blah blah”), і передбачив, що Європа йде до свого «християнського та національного» уявлення про політику<sup>8</sup>.

Нині склалася ситуація, за якої в країні залишилося лише кілька незалежних газет і новинарних веб-сайтів. Було створено нові державні органи для регулювання медіа-контенту з домінуванням в їх персональному складі саме представників партії «Fidesz». Показово, що нині близько 80 % населення мають доступ лише до медіа, підконтрольних «Fidesz»<sup>9</sup>. Суспільному мовленню відмовляють у праві випускати свої власні новини, зобов'язуючи їх, натомість, використовувати новини, випущені Національною агенцією новин, яка підконтрольна «Fidesz». Раніше конституційно заборонений інформаційний монополізм, є легалізований. У 2013 р. парламент прийняв поправку, яка заборонила політичну рекламу в комерційних медіа під час виборчих кампаній. Це створило ситуацію, коли кандидати вимушені звертатися до державних медіа, на які сильно впливає «Fidesz».

Окрім цього зростає рівень корупції – не лише побутової, а, найперше, топ-корупції. Наприклад, родина (фактично клан) В. Орбана систематично збагачується шляхом вигравання тендерів на великі соціальні проекти, фінансовані ЄС та іншими міжнародними інституціями. Видається, що Угорщина стає прикладом «захопленої держави», бо саме неформальна інституціалізація (непотизм, клановість, корупція) визначає розвиток країни<sup>10</sup>.

Угорщина є особливим випадком, коли в державі-учасниці ЄС уряд стратегічно застосував обмежувальні заходи проти громадянського суспільства, фактично виключив його з процесу прийняття рішень, обмежив сферу його дії та фінансування. В. Орбан запозичив від Росії стратегію контролю над НУО, контролюючи їх фінанси. Попри громадські протести, угорський парламент прийняв, а глава держав Я. Адер влітку 2017 р. підписав закон, за яким організації, які отримують з іноземних джерел (т. зв. «підтримувані з-за кордону організації») підтримку понад 7,2 млн форинтів на рік мають бути перереєстровані як такі, що мають іноземне фінансування, зі суворим режимом фінансового контролю. Це різко ускладнило діяльність низки організацій, найперше – правозахисних, антикорупційних.

Для виправдання своєї політики В. Орбан активно використовує національну риторику: Угорщині потрібна внутрішньополітична згуртованість, позаяк загрожують зовнішні та внутрішні вороги, зокрема іноземні НУО, різноманітні «національні зрадники» (найперше мається на увазі Дж. Сорос). Перед кожними новими виборами «Fidesz» радикалізує риторику, шукає нових «ворогів». Однією з таких тем є міграційна політика, спричинена загальноєвропейською міграційною кризою 2015 р. Угорщина послідовно протистоїть прийняттю мігрантів, зокрема тих, кого має прийняти за квотами

<sup>8</sup> J.-W. Mueller, The problem with «illiberal democracy». URL: <https://jordantimes.com/opinion/jan-werner-mueller/problem-illiberal-democracy%E2%80%9999> [odczyt: 03.12.2018].

<sup>9</sup> A. Shekhovtsov, Is Transition Reversible? The Case of Central Europe. Legatum Foundation. URL: <https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/publications/is-transiting-reversible-the-case-of-central-europe-january-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=8> [odczyt: 21.11.2018].

<sup>10</sup> I. Kabantseva, *Przeciwdziałanie korupcji przez społeczeństwo obywatelskie: analiza porównawcza doświadczenia Rumunii, Węgier i Polski*, „Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej”, 2018 nr 9, s. 199.

перерозподілу біженців. Офіційна позиція угорського уряду – міграція не відповідає національним інтересам. Влітку 2018 р. Угорщина озвучила намір вийти з глобального договору ООН про міграцію. 20.06.2018 р. угорський парламент всупереч міжнародному законодавству ухвалив пакет законів «Зупинити Сороса» з метою ніби-то захисту країни від напливу нелегальних мігрантів.

Попри серію протестів, наприкінці 2018 р. прийняте рішення перенести Центральноєвропейський університет з Будапешта до Відня. Саме тиск угорської влади став причиною завершення дворічної суперечки про свободу науки в Угорщині. Після 25-річної діяльності заклад є витіснений урядом В. Орбана через прозахідну позицію та функціонування коштом США. Задля витіснення навчального закладу, підтримуваного особистим ворогом В. Орбана Дж. Соросом, угорський парламент прийняв спеціальний закон, за яким закордонні заклади вищої освіти в Угорщині, повинні також мати функціонуючий кампус і за місцем юридичної прописки (у цьому випадку це мав би бути штат Нью-Йорк). Фактично освіта в Угорщині нині стала заручницею політики.

Угорщина підтримує політиків зі сумнівною репутацією, зокрема тих, кого на батьківщині звинуватили в корупції. Прикладом є колишній глава уряду Македонії, приятель В. Орбана Н. Груєвський. Після озвучення вироку, Н. Груєвського було нелегально доставлено до Будапешта за допомогою угорської влади (автомобілем угорського посольства), де він отримав політичний притулок як особа, переслідувана на батьківщині.

Зближуючись із Росією, Угорщина натомість загострює зовнішньополітичні стосунки з низкою країн, зокрема країнами-сусідами. Наприклад, у випадку з Україною, Угорщина підтримує видачу паспортів своєї держави українцям, які проживають у Закарпатській області (такі випадки фіксуються упродовж останніх десяти років). Також Угорщина протестує проти українського законодавства про освіту, що нібито порушує права угорців, які живуть на Закарпатті і, на знак протесту, блокує рух України в НАТО і ЄС.

На позначення режиму сучасної Угорщини (а також Польщі) дослідниці А. Пету та В. Гжебальська<sup>11</sup> пропонують неологізм «поліпорна держава» (polypore state – мовний новотвір, в основі якого назва паразитарного грибка, який уражає уже ослаблені дерева, живлячись ними). У такій державі уряд «живиться» ресурсами своїх ліберальних попередників (інституції, джерела фінансування), але на заміну створює цілковито новий тип держави. Наприклад, держава-поліпор перерозподіляє ресурси зі світського, модерністського сектора громадянського суспільства до неліберальних НУО, які підтримують її політику (тобто квазі-НУО) або ж організацій, які більш відповідні ідеології саме правлячої партії. В Угорщині підтримка держави найперше стосується структур, лояльних до партії «Fidesz». Наприклад, двома основними жіночими організаціями є давно існуюча

<sup>11</sup> A. Petó, W. Grzebalska, How Hungary and Poland have silenced women and stifled human rights. URL: <http://visegradrevue.eu/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights/> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

ліберальна НУО «JÓL-LÉT Alapítvány» та новостворена консервативна НУО «Narom Kiralyfi», але останніми роками тільки остання отримувала значні державні субсидії для своїх проєктів. Помітно, що угорський «третій сектор» штучно модифікується шляхом перерозподілу різноманітного фінансування тим НУО, які поділяють ідеологію уряду В. Орбана. Натомість прогресивні організації через штучно звужені можливості фінансування все більш неспроможні впливати на внутрішню політику держави.

Подібно до того, як поліпоровий гриб зазвичай атакує вже хворі дерева, неліберальні режими приходять до влади в контексті демократичних стандартів, але на тілі фінансової, міграційної чи іншої кризи. Для виправдання своїх рішень уряди неліберальних демократій часто вдаються до аргументів безпекового характеру, близьких пересічним громадянам. Зокрема, іноземні організації позиціюються як загроза для національного суверенітету (це особливо виражене саме в Угорщині). Звучать міркування, що гендерна рівність, відкрите суспільство та права меншин є екзистенційними загрозами виживання угорської нації. Наприклад, у 2013 р. В. Орбан розпорядився провести розслідування щодо фінансованих урядом Норвегії кількох угорських НУО зі захисту прав ромів та жінок, котрі зазнали насильства. Ці організації звинувачені в тому, що були проплаченими політичними активістами, які намагаються просувати інтереси іноземних акторів на території Угорщини.

Угорські високопосадовці ставлять під сумнів оцінки їх країн незалежними рейтингами, зокрема щорічні дані «Freedom House». Наприклад, очільник зовнішньополітичного відомства Угорщини П. Сіярто, виражаючи позицію партії «Fidesz», називає «нісенітницею» висновки «Freedom House» про те, що демократія в Угорщині погіршується<sup>12</sup>. Водночас практично усі індекси фіксують погіршення демократичних параметрів Угорщини, її відхід від ліберальної демократії. Американське видання «Foreign Policy» називає Угорщину уже не просто неліберальною демократією, а авторитарною державою, яка демонструє «відкат свободи»<sup>13</sup>.

**Кейс Польщі.** Чвертьстолітній (від початку 1990-х років) міцний консенсус щодо основних елементів ліберального демократичного порядку у Польщі був порушений наприкінці 2015 р. Стрімко змінюється політична траєкторія Польщі; донедавна сектор правих партій не був помітним актором. Вигравши президентські, парламентські та місцеві вибори, зосередивши практично всю владу, партія «PiS» спрямувала діяльність на побудову в Польщі системи «керованої демократії». Образно кажучи, у Варшаві «будують Будапешт», тобто впроваджують модель за взірцем, сконструйованим В. Орбаном в Угорщині. Подекуди звучать оцінки Польщі вже навіть не як неліберальної демократії, а авторитарної держави, яка демонструє «відкат свободи».

<sup>12</sup> C. Keszthelyi, Szijjártó: Freedom House criticism of Hungary is «nonsense». URL: [https://bbj.hu/politics/szijarto-freedom-house-criticism-of-hungary-is-nonsense\\_114599](https://bbj.hu/politics/szijarto-freedom-house-criticism-of-hungary-is-nonsense_114599) [odczyt: 12.12.2018].

<sup>13</sup> D. Rohac, *Hungary and Poland Aren't Democratic. They're Authoritarian*, „Foreign Policy”, 2018, 5 Feb.

Вже три роки поспіль «PiS» розширює контроль над життєдіяльністю країни, що погіршує демократичний клімат. Це попри те, що лідер «PiS» Я. Качинський у минулому співпрацював зі «Солідарністю», президентом Л. Валенсою, а очолювана ним партія донедавна не мала радикальної платформи.

Виділимо кілька з-поміж низки суперечливих законодавчих ініціатив, які можна розглядати в контексті неліберальної демократизації сучасної Польщі: 1) новий медіа-закон передбачає державний контроль над суспільними ЗМІ. Хоч на приватні медіа нововведення не поширюються, але вони зазнають інших форм утисків; 2) поправки до закону про державну службу, які фактично уможливають «політизацію» державної служби; 3) ініційована «PiS» реформа судової влади фактично спрямовувалася на встановлення контролю над судовою вертикаллю Польщі.

Безумовно, партія «PiS» не могла б впроваджувати свій курс без належної соціальної бази. На нашу думку, така база сформувалася як результат невдоволення політикою попередників – партії «Громадянська платформа» Д. Туска та Б. Коморовського у 2007-2015 рр. Попри певне економічне зростання, ріст доходів та інвестиції в країну значний відсоток поляків не зуміли знайти себе в умовах ринкової економіки. Тому гасла на візерінь «справедливого розподілу доходів» були схвалені значною частиною електорату на виборах 2015 р. (37,6 % голосів (235 місць) на виборах 2015 р. до Сейму, 61 місце у Сенаті). Окремі соціально очікувані реформи були впроваджені (зниження пенсійного віку, ріст виплат на дітей). Водночас ці реформи мають не лише схвальні оцінки, адже хоч народжуваність і зростає, але найперше в найбідніших і не завжди благополучних сім'ях; пенсійна реформа негативно змінила структуру зайнятості населення, збільшила навантаження на бюджет; результатом став ріст податків і бюджетний дефіцит; економічне зростання сповільнилося, національна валюта ослабла. Тому ці реформи можна розцінювати і як свого роду соціальний популізм, підсилений націонал-консервативною риторикою.

Наш аналіз засвідчує, що від кінця 2015 р. партія «PiS» поступово встановлює контроль над дедалі більшою кількістю сфер життєдіяльності країни. Змінилися критерії до державних службовців: звільнення нелояльних та їх заміна ідеологічно близькими до «PiS» кадрами. Посилився тиск на медіа; «PiS» фактично взяла на себе політичний контроль за фінансами державних радіо та телебачення. У період від липня 2016 р. 163 журналісти, редактори звільнилися<sup>14</sup> або були звільнені<sup>15</sup>. Найперше це стосується «Польського радіо» і телеканалу TVP; звільнених замінили медійники з інтернет-порталів правого спрямування. Тиск на вільні медіа вбачається не лише у звільненнях, але й у рекомендаціях, що саме доцільно оприлюднювати. Наприклад, коли державний телеканал Польщі мав показати репортаж про вселюдний антиурядовий протест, керівництво каналу отримало

<sup>14</sup> A. Smale, J. Berendt, *Poland's Conservative Government Puts Curbs on State TV News*, „The New York Times”, 2016, 3 Jul.

<sup>15</sup> S. I. Pogany, *Europe's illiberal states: why Hungary and Poland are turning away from constitutional democracy*, „The Independent” 2018, 9 Jan.

урядову «вказівку» натомість висвітлити прес-конференцію польського єпископату<sup>16</sup>. Такі форми тиску на свободу слова можна оцінити як «авторитарний дрейф».

На наше переконання, партія «PiS» та фактично підконтрольні їм державні установи намагаються тиснути на критичні до влади медіа. Наприклад, ліберальною газетою «Gazeta Wyborcza» наприкінці 2018 р. було викрито корупцію голови Комісії фінансового нагляду М. Хшановського. Це посилює тиск на газету, а щодо журналіста-викривача В. Чухновського лише за 2018 р. подано низку судових позовів. Відомими є й інші факти тиску на представників медіа: їх примушування озвучити свої джерела інформації, допити слідчими органами без конкретних звинувачень тощо. Мета таких дій держави - спонукати медійників відмовитися від критичного висвітлення подій, а також похитнути довіру суспільства до них. Тільки за перший рік активного просування ідей неліберальної демократії (2016 р.) Польща опустилася з 18-го на 58-е місце в Індексі свободи ЗМІ, який визначає організація «Репортери без кордонів»; така ж позиція збережена й в Індексі за 2018 р. Видається, що у Польщі розвивається «медіа-фобія» - насторожене, вороже ставлення політиків до вільних медіа. Чимало колись вільних ЗМІ нині перетворені на пропагандистські рупори партії «PiS».

Польський уряд знаходить щораз нові способи тиску на НУО, критичні до уряду та партії «PiS». Наприклад, було скорочено час на проведення громадських консультацій щодо законопроектів; це ускладнило надання НУО своїх відгуків. В період з листопада 2017 р. по травень 2018 р. уряд Польщі виділяв у середньому лише тринадцять днів для консультацій щодо законопроектів. Для невеликих організацій цього часу недостатньо для вивчення законопроекту та його коментування. Є випадки скорочення фінансування НУО; найперше це стосується тих НУО, які реалізують проекти інтеграції мігрантів і біженців, підтримують дискримінованих за ознаками статі, сексуальної орієнтації, расової та етнічної приналежності. Зокрема, у 2016 р. Міністерство юстиції Польщі відмовило в субсидіях кільком прогресивним НУО, переспрямувавши кошти на підтримку католицьких організацій, позаяк це відповідне ідеології «PiS». Відтак польський «третьій сектор» штучно модифікується шляхом перерозподілу фінансування держав та ЄС тим НУО, які поділяють ідеологію уряду; натомість прогресивні організації через штучно звужені можливості фінансування менш спроможні впливати на внутрішню політику своїх держав.

У 2017 р. «PiS» централізувала управління державними (і потенційно ЄС) фондами в руках новоствореного Національного інституту свободи - Центру розвитку громадянського суспільства, який фактично контролюється польським віце-прем'єр-міністром. Сам факт створення такої інституції супроводжувався протестами польського «третього сектора» з огляду на те, що бажане для «PiS» громадянське суспільство – це національне, католицьке і, насамперед, слухняне. У демократично налаштованого сегмента громадянського суспільства Польщі сформувалося розуміння, що новостворений

<sup>16</sup> A. Smale, J. Berendt, *Poland's Conservative Government Puts Curbs on State TV News*, „The New York Times”, 2016, 3 Jul.

Інститут створений задля легітимації політики «PiS» щодо перерозподілу фінансування в «свої» організації, тобто національні, католицькі. Припускаємо, що створення такої установи може призвести до поступової втрати незалежності громадським сектором, поглибленням розбіжностей між НУО за політичним критерієм. Фактично такий Інститут порушуватиме свободу об'єднання громадян. Досвід інших країн свідчить: наслідком централізації та націоналізації «третього сектора» є зростання контролю над громадянським суспільством. Політика «PiS» щодо розвитку громадянського суспільства обмежує його незалежність, підриває довіру до «незручних» владі організацій. Щорічно згаданий Інститут матиме в розпорядженні орієнтовно 160-200 млн злотих, які мають спрямовуватися на нові державні програми підтримки НУО.

Примітно, що закон про Національний інститут свободи - Центр розвитку громадянського суспільства було прийнято Сеймом без відкритого слухання, попередніх консультацій із громадськими організаціями. У ставленні до критично налаштованих НУО Л. Качинський фактично слідує ініціативам В. Орбана, адже у Польщі, як і в Угорщині, тиск на громадянське суспільства почався саме з організацій, які займаються правами людини.

«PiS» намагається встановити контроль над судовою владою, що порушує договори ЄС, підриває верховенство права. Ініційована реформа судової влади фактично мала за мету встановити контроль над судовою вертикаллю Польщі завдяки новим законам: «Про Національну раду судочинства», «Про загальні суди» та «Про Верховний суд». Пропоновані зміни мали забезпечити зміцнення впливу правлячої партії на суди та уможливити відсторонення «проблемних» суддів. Зокрема, Національну раду судочинства пропонувалось призначати спільно главі держави, Сейму та Сенату. Це вкрай небезпечно за ситуації, якщо всі три названі інституції контролює одна партія (нині такою є партія «PiS»), адже саме цей орган призначає суддів, має функції їх кар'єрного просування. Закон «Про загальні суди» був спрямований на надання міністру юстиції (який за сумісництвом ставав би генеральним прокурором) можливість змінювати голів апеляційних та окружних судів, а прокурорам – впливати на вибір суддів для розгляду справи. Закон «Про Верховний суд» передбачав повне перезавантаження цього органу, а призначення мали б відбуватися за поданням міністра юстиції.

Примітно, що згадані закони були ухвалені вночі без належного обговорення та урахування поправок від опозиції. Такі ініціативи зумовили низку акцій протесту поляків впродовж 2017-2018 рр., на яких лідера «PiS» Я. Качинського позиціювали як недемократичного лідера. Натомість підконтрольний владі телеканал TVP ці протести схарактеризує як спроби організації перевороту проти демократично обраної влади. Відзначимо, що під тиском громадськості два з трьох законів («Про Національну раду судочинства» та «Про Верховний суд») не були підписані главою держави А. Дудою.



Натомість третій акт («Про загальні суди»), який, зокрема, й розширює повноваження уряду щодо Конституційного трибуналу Польщі, набув чинності.

Наприкінці 2018 р. під тиском ЄС деякі пункти законодавства про судову владу були скасовані, зокрема щодо примусового відправлення на пенсію верховних суддів, позаяк це порушувало основоположні принципи про довічний статус судді та суддівську незалежність. Певні поступки польського уряду є цілком очікувані, адже нині Польща є найбільшим отримувачем фінансування в ЄС і скорочення його обсягів ослабить польську економіку, відповідно, знизиться рівень довіри населення до уряду, в чому «PiS» не є зацікавлена.

Хоч «PiS» і здійснює свою політику під гаслом «Dobra zmiana», але ці зміни стосуються підриву конституційної системи, знищення балансу політичних сил і підриву системи правосуддя, звуження можливостей громадянського суспільства, обмеження прав людини (наприклад, репродуктивні права жінок). Загалом неліберальна демократія спрямована на розбудову сильної виконавчої влади.

Причини такого антидемократичного реверсу Польщі можна вбачати як у комуністичному, так і в докомуністичному минулому. Після розпаду комуністичних урядів у 1989 р. ейфорія від демократичних змін відтіснила прогнози про можливий вплив на демократизацію саме історичного чинника, з яким їм доведеться боротися задля успішного переходу до ліберальної демократії. Тоді, як видається, існувало сподівання, що самого факту відходу від комуністичної ідеології достатньо для впровадження ліберальної демократії.

На переконання польської опозиції, уряд дбає про внутрішньопартійні, а не загальнопольські інтереси, підриває авторитет країни на міжнародній арені. Втім Я. Качинський, як неформальний лідер Польщі, не згоден з антидемократичними звинуваченнями: «Ми не хочемо знищити демократію. Ми хочемо зробити її реальною»<sup>17</sup>.

Безумовно, Польща нині залишається демократією, адже є незалежні медіа, опозиційні політичні партії тощо. З конституційного аспекту Польща зберігає стабільність найперше завдяки пропорційній виборчій системі та багаторівневій структурі органів місцевого самоврядування, які забезпечують певний баланс центральної адміністрації. Водночас швидко змінюються інституційні стандарти, запровадження антидемократичних процедур – основна причина підриву польської демократії та її означення як «неліберальної». Правляча партія «PiS» дедалі більше схиляється до авторитаризму, бо не вірить у незалежні інститути, фактично зневажає незалежні медіа та суд. Польський уряд загалом критичний в оцінках досягнень демократичного переходу, вважаючи їх провальними. Тому, видається, відхід від взятого курсу на побудову неліберальної демократії можливий за двох сценаріїв: або згортання (зменшення) неліберальних урядових ініціатив під тиском санкцій ЄС, або завдяки сильному протестному руху «знизу».

<sup>17</sup> A. Smale, J. Berendt, *Poland's Conservative Government Puts Curbs on State TV News*, „The New York Times”, 2016, 3 Jul.

Можна погодитися з критичними оцінками тих дослідників, які вважають, що нині як Польща, так і Угорщина відкинули «ідеологію, засновану на індивідуалізмі, правах людини, економічній прозорості та мультикультуралізмі. Замість цього впроваджується альтернативна соціально-політична модель, в якій збереження „традиційних цінностей”, чітких національних ідентичностей має першорядне ідеологічне значення»<sup>18</sup>. При цьому ця нова модель також «часто характеризується широкомасштабною, часто системною корупцією та все більш авторитарною політичною культурою»<sup>19</sup>. Водночас порівняння різних неліберальних демократій у Європі підводить до думки, що саме Польща дає надію на відхід від такого типу режиму, тому це питання потребує моніторингу.

**Висновки.** Отже, глобальний характер сучасної демократизації не виключає в окремих країнах зворотного руху до авторитаризму. Чи не найбільша небезпека неліберальної демократії полягає у в тому, що вона дискредитує саму ліберальну демократію, кидаючи тінь на демократичне правління. Польща та Угорщина є прикладами того, що неліберальна демократія схильна виникнути саме в умовах копіювання демократичних порядків у країнах, які не мали довготривалої демократичної традиції. У цих країнах конструюються режими, які відтворюють інституційний дизайн західних демократій, але наповнюють його відмінним змістом; формальні демократичні процедури подекуди стають тим фасадом, за яким знаходяться авторитарні механізми.

Якщо порівняти угорську модель неліберальної демократії з польською, то, вважаємо, що політичні методи та інституційна структура режиму В. Орбана увиразнює значно вираженіші авторитарні риси, що найперше проявляється у наростаючому тиску на громадянське суспільство. Якщо польський неформальний лідер Я. Качинський є ідеологом, який увиразнює позицію католицької церкви, то В. Орбан зорієнтований найперше на олігархів. В цілому демократичне відхилення Угорщини та Польщі демонструє: успішна демократизація не може базуватися лише на інституційній основі; політична та правова культура є такими ж важливими як й інститути.

Нині в країнах ЦСЄ загалом ліберальні демократичні цінності знаходяться під серйозним ризиком звуження. Видається, що збереження цінностей ліберальної демократії узалежене від рівня активності ліберально-демократичного сегмента громадянського суспільства та рівня його тиску на державні інститути. Розвиток сценаріїв узалежнених від того, чи зможуть національні організації громадянського суспільства повернутися до процесу розробки політики, служити каналами між урядом та громадянами, чи вони перетворяться в паралельні до держави структури.

<sup>18</sup> S. I. Pogany, *Europe's illiberal states: why Hungary and Poland are turning away from constitutional democracy*, „The Independent” 2018, 9 Jan.

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## **EFFECTIVENESS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTEXT**

The article is dedicated to analyzing negative and positive aspects and disclosures of socio-economic and political effectiveness and consequences of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. The researcher also identified the parameters of perceptions of minority governments by the public and electorate. As a result, it was argued that: the voters who support small parties or the voters who support large parties, but hope that they will not win elections, consistently favor minority governments; the voters who are more concerned about socio-economic policies are less inclined to support minority governments; the voters who are not inclined to concentrate power support the idea of minority governments.

*Keywords: government, minority government, governmental cabinet, socio-economic and political implications, perceptions of minority governments, parliamentary democracy, Europe.*

## **ЕФЕКТИВНІСТЬ, СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНІ ТА ПОЛІТИЧНІ НАСЛІДКИ І СПРИЙНЯТТЯ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНИЙ І ПРАКТИЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ**

Проаналізовано негативні та позитивні сторони і вияви соціально-економічної та політичної ефективності й наслідків урядів меншості у європейських парламентських демократіях. Виявлено параметри сприйняття урядів меншості громадськістю і електоратом. Аргументовано, що: виборці, які підтримують малі партії, або виборці, які підтримують великі партії, але сподіваються, що вони не переможуть на виборах, послідовно віддають перевагу урядам меншості; виборці, які більше стурбовані соціально-економічною політикою, менше схильні підтримувати уряди меншості; виборці, які не схильні до концентрації влади, підтримують ідею урядів меншості.

*Ключові слова: уряд, уряд меншості, урядовий кабінет, соціально-економічні та політичні наслідки, сприйняття урядів меншості, парламентська демократія, Європа.*

Despite the fact that minority governments are the norm for the majority of European parliamentary democracies and it is known almost everything or a lot about their attributes, preconditions, reasons and models of their formation, functioning and accountability, the problems of the parameters of their effectiveness, social-economic and political consequences and perception have not been solved and synthesized yet. And this issue is of great topicality, as their effectiveness, social-economic and political consequences/results and features of public perception of minority governments is a crucial factor of viability or non-viability while choosing them and quality of functioning of those political systems, where minority governments operate and thus political institutions and processes evaluated in them, as the latter are a predictor of the system stability, democratic representativeness and accountability and prospects of democratic strengthening. Nevertheless, the issue of effectiveness, social-economic and political consequences and perception of minority governments (as distinguished from the problem of minority government effectiveness) nowadays is predominantly solved only partially (in the form of “tangential issues” within the frames of more comprehensive scientific research<sup>1</sup>), primarily descriptively and intuitively and not absolutely analytically and therefore it requires undiverted and systematic attention, what has been done in the current scientific paper.

However, while constructing systematized and synthesized conclusions concerning parameters of effectiveness, social-economic and political consequences and perception of minority governments the majority of already existing research, referring to this and adjacent range of problems, have been applied. Among of them, for instance, there are works by such scientists as A. Alesina, N. Roubini and G. Cohen<sup>2</sup>, A. Blais, J. Kim and M. Foucault<sup>3</sup>, L. Dodd<sup>4</sup>, P.-A. Edin and H. Ohlsson<sup>5</sup>, M. Laver and N. Schofield<sup>6</sup>, J. Linz and A. Stepan<sup>7</sup>, G. Pech<sup>8</sup>, A. Robert<sup>9</sup>, R. Franzese<sup>10</sup>, L. Helland<sup>11</sup> and many others. As a matter of fact they are united by a scientific position, according to which “minority rules” determine time-limited, ineffective and weak (in comparison with “majority rules”) governments, in particular when referring to the issues of their economic results, fiscal (budget) discipline, currency and monetary policy, budget deficit, social-economic forward-thinking, responsibility for their own actions and reaction to exogenous shocks.

<sup>1</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G., *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*, Wyd. MIT Press 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Blais A., Kim J., Foucault M., Public Spending, Public Deficits and Government Coalitions, *“Political Studies”* 2010, vol 58, nr. 5, s. 844.

<sup>4</sup> Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>5</sup> Edin P.-A., Ohlsson H., Political determinants of budget deficits: coalition effects versus minority effects, *“European Economic Review”* 1991, vol 35, nr. 8, s. 1597–1603.

<sup>6</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Linz J., Stepan A., *The breakdown of democratic Regimes*, Wyd. John Hopkins University Press 1978, s. 66.

<sup>8</sup> Pech G., Coalition Governments versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes, *“Public Choice”* 2004, vol 121, nr. 1–2, s. 1–24.

<sup>9</sup> Robert A., Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement, *“Europe-Asia Studies”* 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1273–1303.

<sup>10</sup> Franzese R., *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Helland L., Minority-Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence: A Cure for the Norwegian Illness?, *“Scandinavian Political Studies”* 2004, vol 27, nr. 4, s. 391–401.

This stated position and a fact of relative social-economic ineffectiveness of minority governments are supported by P. Warwick<sup>12</sup>, S. Borrelli and T. Royed<sup>13</sup>, who argue that minority government cabinets are reliable on support of “hostile parties, which even do not get benefits from their control over ministries”. As a result, on average minority governments are obliged constantly or contextually, in particular appealing to expediency of aspects of governing and retaining their seats, to “shift” from a desirable political-ideological position or constantly or contextually take into account distinctive/controversial political preferences of non-government parties<sup>14</sup>. And this postulates an intermediate, though an artificial conclusion that those minority government cabinets either are or can be, “the weakest” and the least effective in comparison with other types of governments<sup>15</sup>, even under conditions when some of them perform substantially effective and significant social-economic actions. First of all, it is revealed in the fact that minority governments contribute to reduction in efficiency of taxation policy and fiscal (budget) discipline and growth in expenses, debt crisis and budget deficit. K. Strom<sup>16</sup> states that historically it is presupposed by an “impressionist” negative perception of minority governments and the fact that lots of minority governments, being legislatively inefficient and within the frames of their stability, predominantly became predictors of social-economic and political crises, determining themselves by “political illness”, irrationality and weak level of governing<sup>17</sup>.

Herewith, A. Blais, D. Blake and S. Dion<sup>18</sup>, S. Borrelli and T. Royed<sup>19</sup>, B. Volkerink and J. De Haan<sup>20</sup>, J. De Haan, J.-E. Sturm and G. Beekhuis<sup>21</sup>, D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson<sup>22</sup>, P.-A. Edin and H. Ohlsson G. Pech<sup>23</sup>, L. Helland<sup>24</sup> and many other scholars believe that the reason for this may be hidden in the fact that ineffectiveness of taxation policy, reduction in fiscal (budget) discipline and growth in expenses, debt crisis and budget deficit are caused by

<sup>12</sup> Warwick P., Coalition Policy in Parliamentary Democracies, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 2001, vol 34, nr. 10, s. 1212–1236.

<sup>13</sup> Borrelli S., Royed T., Government “Strength” and Budget Deficits in Advanced Democracies, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1995, vol 28, nr. 2, s. 235.

<sup>14</sup> Robert A., Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement, *“Europe-Asia Studies”* 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1280.

<sup>15</sup> Roubini N., Sachs J., Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Democracies, *“European Economic Review”* 1989, vol 33, s. 903–938.

<sup>16</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 17.

<sup>17</sup> Lijphart A., Measures of cabinet durability: a conceptual and empirical evaluation, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 265–279.

<sup>18</sup> Blais A., Blake D., Dion S., Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 1993, vol 37, nr. 1, s. 56.

<sup>19</sup> Borrelli S., Royed T., Government “Strength” and Budget Deficits in Advanced Democracies, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1995, vol 28, nr. 2, s. 225–260.

<sup>20</sup> Volkerink B., De Haan J., Fragmented government effects on fiscal policy: New evidence, *“Public Choice”* 2001, vol 109, nr. 3–4, s. 221–242.

<sup>21</sup> De Haan J., Sturm J.-E., Beekhuis G., The weak government thesis: some new evidence, *“Public Choice”* 1999, vol 11, nr. 3–4, s. 163–176.

<sup>22</sup> Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, *“American Political Science Review”* 2000, vol 94, nr. 3, s. 627–640.

<sup>23</sup> Pech G., Coalition Governments versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes, *“Public Choice”* 2004, vol 121, nr. 1–2, s. 1–24.

<sup>24</sup> Helland L., Minority-Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence: A Cure for the Norwegian Illness?, *“Scandinavian Political Studies”* 2004, vol 27, nr. 4, s. 391–401.

scenarios (especially in the periods of economic crises<sup>25</sup>) of conflict-ridden relationship between the government and legislative majority in legislature, political factionalization and excessive number of parties (in the parliament and government cabinet<sup>26</sup>) and political instability. They, in their turn, if are not then can be attributes of minority governments, at least in comparison with majority governments and on the background of party government in general. Besides, to incoordination within the policy of minority governments contributes the fact that such cabinets must or can adjust to one party/some parties while dealing with some issues and to another/other parties while dealing with other questions. As a result, parties which provide parliamentary support to minority governments, demand “their part in the budget”, are influencing on increase in expenditures, growth of the budget deficit and decrease in economic effectiveness of cabinets<sup>27</sup>. It is notable, that political/party factionalization of legislatures is traditionally higher over the periods of economic crises, and this is the reason why minority governments exert negative influence on income and expenditure<sup>28</sup>.

It should be mentioned as well, that in case with minority governments key decisions are taken not directly in government cabinets, but in legislatures and their committees. Such situation, in particular on the basis of not preserving, but overcoming a status quo, fragments and complicates social-economic policy, reducing effectiveness and resulting quality of minority governments. A. Falco-Gimen and I. Jurado<sup>29</sup> supplement such described logics stating that social-economic ineffectiveness of minority governments is influenced by parameters of parliamentary opposition structuring, in particular expectations and probability that it may become a part of a hypothetical/future government cabinet. As consent of opposition is required to form and approve of political programs of minority governments and thus unwillingness or procrastination of the process on the part of opposition may become a precondition for minority government ineffectiveness. Therefore, it is obvious that the problem of minority government inefficiency lies in the fact that government parties and coalitions, which compose them, do not coincide with parliamentary parties/coalitions, which support them. Thus, of great importance in the process of reducing minority governments ineffectiveness are rational preferences of political parties, which are in opposition to them.

In general, it is revealed in the fact that oppositional parties in their relations with minority governments concentrate on two major issues or interests: a) avoid supporting budgets, which do not improve their chances to bring down current governments; b) avoid excessed complication

<sup>25</sup> Bortelli S., Royed T., Government “Strength” and Budget Deficits in Advanced Democracies, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1995, vol 28, nr. 2, s. 225–260.; Kontopoulos Y., Perotti R., *Government fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries*, [w:] Poterba J. (ed.), *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*, Wyd. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999, s. 81–102.

<sup>26</sup> Kontopoulos Y., Perotti R., *Government fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries*, [w:] Poterba J. (ed.), *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*, Wyd. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999, s. 81–102.

<sup>27</sup> Edin P.-A., Ohlsson H., Political determinants of budget deficits: coalition effects versus minority effects, *“European Economic Review”* 1991, vol 35, nr. 8, s. 1597–1603.

<sup>28</sup> Towliat V., *Minority government and fiscal policy outcomes: New evidence*, Wyd. Lund university 2014.

<sup>29</sup> Falcó-Gimeno A., Jurado I., Minority governments and budget deficits: The role of the opposition, *“European Journal of Political Economy”* 2011, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 554–565.

of a social-economic situation, which they can hypothetical face, when coming into cabinet, composing further government cabinets. In this context, of great significance is the point, the more opposition is concentrated in one party, the more probably it will be a part of further government cabinet, in fact one party cabinet. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned expenses and benefits of minority governments depend not only a composition of parliamentary opposition. The point is that social-economic effectiveness or ineffectiveness of minority governments is influenced by their type, which is directly evaluated with respect to own advantages over parliamentary opposition. In this way, apart from the composition of parliamentary opposition, minority governments effectiveness is influenced by the level of party factionalization within government cabinets. It can be traced from the perspective of assessing by oppositional/non-government and government parties their prospects, concerning conducting early parliamentary elections, in particular when functioning of minority governments deteriorates or at least does not improve social-economic situation in the country. On this account K. Strom<sup>30</sup> remarks that the higher factionalization of the government is, the less probable it will be that such government continues functioning under complicated social-economic dramatic circumstances. That is why it is more difficult for a factionalized minority government to overcome budget deficit and symptoms of economic crisis, in comparison with a non-factionalized minority government or a majority government. It is presupposed by the fact that in this case factionalization of minority government is overlapped with the wish of parliamentary opposition to gain benefits from situational support or non-support, provided to the cabinet. Consequently, parliamentary oppositions are not obligatory willing to provide support to minority governments in the issues of overcoming budget deficit and symptoms of economic crisis. On the contrary, less factionalized minority government, at least hypothetically, can solve social-economic problems easier, because it can significantly influence parliamentary opposition, especially when the latter is composed of several parties. And this regulates, that ineffectiveness of minority governments is variable and depends on the type and composition of minority governments and parliamentary opposition. Such situation is predetermined by the fact that oppositional and ad-hoc (in general non-government) parties, in particular depending on their chances to become a part of future cabinets and weakness of current cabinets, leave their mark on the results of social-economic effectiveness of minority governments<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>31</sup> Falcó-Gimeno A., Jurado I., Minority governments and budget deficits: The role of the opposition, "European Journal of Political Economy" 2011, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 554–565.



Quite similar but at the same time different point of view is offered by P.-A. Edin<sup>32</sup>, C. Green-Pedersen<sup>33</sup>, E. Damgaard<sup>34</sup>, G. Pech<sup>35</sup>, A. Robert<sup>36</sup>, T. Sakamoto<sup>37</sup>, K. Strom<sup>38</sup>, M. Hallerberg and J. Von Hagen<sup>39</sup> and other scholars, who argue that not all minority governments, in particular, not all the types and scenarios of minority governments are ineffective. As a number of constructions of minority government cabinets achieve positive (especially in Denmark, Sweden, Spain and Croatia) and negative (including Italy and Romania) social-economic outcomes, which are determined by a general state of development of political and social-economic systems. B. Mukherjee and D. Leblang<sup>40</sup> assume that minority governments after all are capable of taking complicated and significant economic (in particular budget, currency and financial) and social decisions. Besides, different types of minority government cabinets (first of all those created on the basis of agreements and support on the part of non-government parties in legislature) are potentially different as to the indices of social-economic effectiveness and weakness or power<sup>41</sup>. For example, it is quite obvious that coalitional minority governments possibly face a bigger number of obstacles while promoting their own initiatives and political courses (and thus are less effective), than single-party minority governments, as they are determined by a double-fold field of veto-players, from the perspective of essence and problematical character of minority governments, and in the context of essence and problematic character of coalition. In addition, as K. Strom<sup>42</sup>, T. Bale and T. Bergmann<sup>43</sup> believe, that operating efficiency of minority governments is under influence of types of agreements between government and non-government political parties in legislature. As a result, some minority governments (which enjoy reliable support in parliaments or the so-called “externally supported” minority governments or governments within the frames of “contract parliamentarianism”) become more powerful (overall), while others (which are not characterized by these attributes) become weaker (less comprehensive).

<sup>32</sup> Edin P.-A., Ohlsson H., Political determinants of budget deficits: coalition effects versus minority effects, *“European Economic Review”* 1991, vol 35, nr. 8, s. 1599.

<sup>33</sup> Green-Pedersen C., Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the ‘Danish Miracle’, *“Journal of Public Policy”* 2002, vol 21, nr. 1, s. 53–70.

<sup>34</sup> Damgaard E., *Minority Governments*, [w:] Karvonen L., Ståhlberg K. (eds.), *Festschrift for Dag Ancker on His 60th Birthday on February 12, 2000*, Wyd. Åbo Akademi University Press 2000, s. 353–369.

<sup>35</sup> Pech G., *Government Formation, Budget Negotiations and Re-election Uncertainty: The Cases of Minority and Majority Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm 2001.

<sup>36</sup> Robert A., Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement, *“Europe-Asia Studies”* 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1280.

<sup>37</sup> Sakamoto T., Economic Performance of “Weak” Governments and Their Interaction with Central Banks and Labour: Deficits, Economic Growth, Unemployment and Inflation, 1961–1998, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 2005, vol 44, nr. 6, s. 801–836.

<sup>38</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 1–22, 129, 238.

<sup>39</sup> Hallerberg M., von Hagen J., *Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union*, [w:] Poterba J., von Hagen J. (eds.), *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1999, s. 209–232.

<sup>40</sup> Mukherjee B., Leblang D., Minority Governments and Exchange Rate Regimes: Examining Evidence from 21 OECD Countries, 1975–1999, *“European Union Politics”* 2006, vol 7, nr. 4, s. 450–476.

<sup>41</sup> Robert A., Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement, *“Europe-Asia Studies”* 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1280.

<sup>42</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 61.

<sup>43</sup> Bale T., Bergman T., Captives No Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand, *“Government and Opposition”* 2006, vol 41, nr. 3, s. 422–449.

That is why minority governments may be conventionally divided on the grounds of their own theoretically probable power and social-economic effectiveness.

From this perspective, rather notable is a remark by D. Alexiadou<sup>44</sup> who states that minority governments are more socially-economically effective, concerning problems of capital gains and income taxation, in particular in the countries, where they are formed more often and are accompanied by the results of more proportional election systems. As in such cases the systems of governing, which are capable of increasing labor taxes and decreasing employees' taxes, can make use of additional income from bigger capital markets to finance constructions of universalistic states of welfare. Correspondingly, countries where minority governments are often formed and proportional election system are applied are usually characterized by more inclusive political systems and mechanisms of political negotiations and therefore tend to spread and divide tax burden between, employers, employees and capital. As a result minority governments in such cases are or may be the outcome of general rules of achieving consensus, according to which opposition parliamentary parties have too less political stimuli to be desirous of becoming a part of alternative government cabinets, because much less their "political value" is if they stay beyond the government<sup>45</sup>. To K. Strøm's<sup>46</sup> point of view it is especially correct and actual in case when not entering the composition of the government cabinet (minority cabinet in particular) is estimated by opposition parties as an instrument to get and multiply the number of benefits/votes of electorate in future. Taking this into consideration, the scientist remarks that "if political influence is the main aim of political parties, participation in the government composition is not an indispensable condition to get a reward"<sup>47</sup>. However, it testifies that opposition parties in legislature (at least some European parliamentary democracies) can be interested in promoting social-economic policy of minority governments for so long as it does not interfere with their basic political values and interests. Therefore, not only government, but also non-government (situational or opposition) parties under conditions of minority governments may take responsibility for social-economic life in the country. In general, it demonstrates that minority governments are more socially and economically effective when they possess potential for "broad cooperation" with non-government parties and are incorporated in the frames of more inclusive political systems<sup>48</sup>. Thus, effectiveness of minority governments may both increase and decrease in case when party systems, within which they operationalize, become more factionalized.

<sup>44</sup> Alexiadou D., *Financing the welfare state: Employers' contributions and unemployment in minority and majority governments*, Paper prepared for the 5th ESPAnet Conference 2007, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, September 20–22, 2007.

<sup>45</sup> Luebbert G., A Theory of Government Formation, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 229–264.

<sup>46</sup> Strøm K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-Winning Cabinet Solutions, *"Comparative political Studies"* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–226.

<sup>47</sup> Strøm K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-Winning Cabinet Solutions, *"Comparative political Studies"* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 211.

<sup>48</sup> Alexiadou D., *Financing the welfare state: Employers' contributions and unemployment in minority and majority governments*, Paper prepared for the 5th ESPAnet Conference 2007, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, September 20–22, 2007.

It should be mentioned that to the point of view of B. Mukherjee and D. Leblang<sup>49</sup>, as well as M. Hallerberg<sup>50</sup>, leaders (prime-minister and heads of parties) in minority governments have strong stimuli not only to influence, but also to choose between fixed or floating exchange rates (in fact in favor of the latter). As a result, prime-ministers in minority governments and the very minority governments themselves are determined by lower discount coefficient, in comparison with majority governments, due to their relative government instability, "shorter horizon period". However, it determines that prime-ministers in minority governments are less interested in and concerned about final expenditures and expectedly higher levels of inflation, caused by such changes of currency rates, appealing to the control over inflation by means of fixed balance<sup>51</sup>.

In addition, minority governments may position themselves as effective at least because they are relatively fluent in their ability to construct majority in legislatures with political parties, which are non-governmental and thus can more rationally effectively and politically promote significant, in particular controversial reforms<sup>52</sup>. An indicator of successfulness in conducting reforms in such case is a systematic possibility to stabilize agreements between government and non-government parties<sup>53</sup>. It can be especially observed due to remarks made by M. Laver and N. Schofield<sup>54</sup>, that ideologically centrist or mediate minority governments can even play a role of "policy dictators". This is the basis for checking and supporting the hypothesis that minority governments in fiscal or budget terms are the most responsible types of party government cabinets. Against this background J. Alt and R. Lowry<sup>55</sup> disprove the position, according to which unified government cabinets are less inclined to face budget deficit, while diversified government cabinets are more inclined to do that. G. Pech<sup>56</sup> notes that minority governments are not obligatory formed or must be formed in the situation of political and social-economic crises, because they can be a sign of a stable political environment. It substantiates the position, according to which minority governments, which are formed under the political crisis, are in fact determined by relatively high expenditures, while minority governments which appear under the stable situation (especially when they are the result of a powerful position of the initiator) are characterized by rather low expenses. All this means that minority governments are more socially and economically effective and show high-performance (or generally more successful), when they are constructed by more powerful political parties. Or minority governments

<sup>49</sup> Mukherjee B., Leblang D., *Minority Governments and Exchange Rate Regimes: Examining Evidence from 21 OECD Countries, 1975–1999*, "European Union Politics" 2006, vol 7, nr. 4, s. 450–476.

<sup>50</sup> Hallerberg M., *Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions*, "International Organization" 2002, vol 56, nr. 4, s. 796–797.

<sup>51</sup> Mukherjee B., Leblang D., *Minority Governments and Exchange Rate Regimes: Examining Evidence from 21 OECD Countries, 1975–1999*, "European Union Politics" 2006, vol 7, nr. 4, s. 450–476.

<sup>52</sup> Robert A., *Demythologizing the Czech opposition agreement*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2003, vol 55, nr. 8, s. 1280.

<sup>53</sup> Helland L., *Adequate fiscal responses under minority rule? Evidence from advanced democracies*, Wyd. Norwegian School of Management.

<sup>54</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998, s. 111.

<sup>55</sup> Alt J., Lowry R., *Divided government, fiscal institutions, and budget deficits: evidence from the states*, "American Political Science Review" 1994, vol 88, nr. 4, s. 811–828.

<sup>56</sup> Pech G., *Government Formation, Budget Negotiations and Re-election Uncertainty: The Cases of Minority and Majority Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm 2001.

effectiveness depends on how much “external expenditures of a government cabinet” coincide with “expenditures within a government cabinet”.

Taking into account studies conducted by R. Perotti and I. Kontopoulos<sup>57</sup> and our own observations we may state that effectiveness of minority governments depends on a percentage ratio in a parliamentary composition of parties, which make up governments in correlation with a nominal composition of legislature. The point is that such correlation, in addition to single-party or coalitional character of minority governments, exerts influence on capability of the analyzed governments to preserve positional and institutional status quo. Taking it into account, for example, it is obvious that the most effective among minority governments, at least theoretically, are single-party cabinets, with the number of party seats approaching to 50% of a nominal composition in legislatures. It is especially observed in those cases, when such parties in single-party minority governments are ideologically non-centrist/medial, resembling single-party majority governments. A bit less effectiveness of such governments is shown when they are operationalized in the systems of bicameral legislatures, but on the condition that personal composition of parliament chambers is ideologically different. And eventually, as V. Towliat<sup>58</sup> remarks that effectiveness of minority governments depends on combination of the number of government parties and the percent of their parliamentary seats together with the character of support provided to these parties and governments formed by them in legislatures: when the described conditions lead to the growth of party factionalization, then minority government become less politically and socially-economically effective and vice versa.

From the political perspective, consequences and effects of minority governments are also very variable. Thus, among the key negative political consequences and effects of minority governments it is possible to single out: a) relative instability of the very government cabinets, and therefore political process and political system; b) crisis of legitimacy of governing, presupposed by the lack of “strong/formalized power of minority governments and their relatively high level of stability”; c) inability to fully implement all planned programs and measures (social-economic and foreign policy) of minority governments, what caused the tendencies for such governments to be not very long-standing<sup>59</sup>; d) spending too much time on formation and spread/provision support to minority government cabinets; e) constantly low level of parliamentary discourse and cooperation between parties, what is determined by the fact that parties are in permanent conflict and in expectation of early parliamentary elections<sup>60</sup>, as a result of which elections

<sup>57</sup> Kontopoulos Y., Perotti R., *Government fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries*, [w:] Poterba J. (ed.), *Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance*, Wyd. National Bureau of Economic Research 1999, s. 81–102.

<sup>58</sup> Towliat V., *Minority government and fiscal policy outcomes: New evidence*, Wyd. Lund university 2014.

<sup>59</sup> Oktay S., *United We Act, Divided We Halt? The Effects of Government Structure on the Foreign Policy Behavior of European Governments, 1994–2004*, Prepared to be presented at the Biennial Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Baltimore, May 9–11, 2013.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas P., *A glimpse of the future? What the minority governments of the 38th and 39th Parliaments can teach about proposals for electoral reform*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, May 29 – June 1, 2007.

lose their expediency and accountability; f) relative slowness and operational inefficiency of administrating and governing<sup>61</sup>.

Explanations and effects of the described political consequences of minority governments are supplemented by the fact that determined institutional designs considerably lose to majority governments as to succession and resulting quality of their activity (especially in case of situational and not formalized minority governments). Therefore, minority governments are less predictable and less reliable while solving social-economic and systematic problems of state development, as traditionally they embrace smaller range of problems, than majority governments. Especially, it is difficult for minority governments to take budget and reformist decisions. This, as their experience in European parliamentary democracies proves, is predetermined by the need for constant negotiations as to parliamentary support of minority governments provided by non-government parties. Consequently, it cannot be excluded that instead of taking urgent measures of state policy, minority governments will have to take part in long and complicated negotiations over their support and further functioning. It causes and generates much smaller system responsibility and accountability than in case of majority governments. That is why we may assume that key and at the same time “cycle” drawbacks of minority governments are their relative instability, inconstancy and ineffectiveness, misbalancing character of which can especially dangerous reveal first of all in the systems of semi-presidential type (in particular under conditions of the diversified minority system). To C. Skach’s<sup>62</sup> point of view such situation is predominantly caused by the fact that minority governments in the context of semi-presidentialism (especially when they confront opposed presidents, who do not enjoy support of the majority in legislature) can lead to the problem of controllability over political process, maximization of conflicts in the system of dual executive power, political instability, decrease in effectiveness of governing and backsliding/retreat from democracy.

On the other hand, as Z. Maoz and B. Russett state that minority governments are not always characterized by relative instability (against the background of majority governments) and thus are capable of functioning successfully and effectively. The point is that “minority governments are not more restricted than majority governments”<sup>63</sup>, as the former can even be less conflictive than the latter. B. Prins and C. Sprecher<sup>64</sup>, as well as M. Ireland and S. Gartner<sup>65</sup> state that it is determined by the fact that majority governments (in particular coalitional, which are among the majority of governments in Europe) face a bigger number of variants of political/

<sup>61</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of “Minority” Government in Canada, *“Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science”* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 1–11.

<sup>62</sup> Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005, s. 15, 17–18.

<sup>63</sup> Maoz Z., Russett B., Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946–1986, *“American Political Science Review”* 1993, vol 87, nr. 3, s. 626.

<sup>64</sup> Prins B., Sprecher C., Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946–1989, *“Journal of Peace Research”* 1999, vol 36, nr. 3, s. 271–287.

<sup>65</sup> Ireland M., Gartner S., Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems, *“Journal of Conflict Resolution”* 2001, vol 45, nr. 5, s. 547–568.

party resistance than minority governments. Therefore, namely minority governments and not majority ones are less dangerous in questions referring to escalation of institutional conflicts.

In addition, among the advantages of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies scientists name institutional sensitivity, accountability, transparency and responsibility. Thus, theoretically it is clear and not occasionally observed that minority government cabinets are very sensitive to the views of individual deputies of legislature. As policy in minority cabinets is outlined, carried out and determined not independently or directly by prime-ministers and members of their cabinets (as in cases with majority governments), but by prime-ministers, members of cabinet and government, situational and oppositional parties of legislature<sup>66</sup>. Besides, in particular situational and opposition parties, which formally comprise majority in legislature can effectively check or introduce issues of votes of no-confidence in minority governments making them work more responsibly<sup>67</sup>. In its turn, accountability of minority governments before parliamentary parties reveals in the fact that government legislations must be obligatory and in time presented to all oppositional and situational parties, because namely on them it depends whether laws and regulations would be adopted or not. Finally, public disclosure and transparency of minority governments' policy are based on constant communication between governments, oppositional and situational parties of legislature. On average as P. Thomas<sup>68</sup> states it means that namely minority governments and not majority governments implement practice of more democratic and effective legislatures. Because government parties do not really possess potential to personalize power, but always look for a consensus and compromise while contacting oppositional and situational (I total non-government) political forces<sup>69</sup>. First of all it reveals in the fact that within the frames of minority governments much used and effective are procedures of parliamentary debates. Besides, from the perspective of minority governments legislatures are more open and democratic in the light of non-government parties and individual deputies of legislature, as the latter are not only authorized, but are also interested in introducing own legislative initiatives<sup>70</sup>. It contributes to the growth in efficiency of minority governments, as the search for support helps not only implement "good and clever things", but also prevent "bad and ill-considered things"<sup>71</sup>.

On average, it means that types of government are not an obligatory predictor of their social-economic and political effectiveness. Thus, minority governments can be effective or ineffective, and the key question is what exerts influence on this and on what depends social-economic

<sup>66</sup> Dobell P., What could Canadians expect from a minority government?, *"Policy Matters"* 2000, vol 1, nr. 6, s. 1–20.

<sup>67</sup> McCandless H., Public Accountability in a Minority Government, *"Canadian Parliamentary Review"* 2004, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 31–39.

<sup>68</sup> Thomas P., *A Working Minority?*, Wyd. Institute On Governance 2006; Thomas P., Measuring the effectiveness of a minority parliament, *"Canadian Parliamentary Review"* 2007, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 22–31.

<sup>69</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of "Minority" Government in Canada, *"Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science"* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 4.

<sup>70</sup> Strahl C., Politics and Procedure in a Minority Government, *"Canadian Parliamentary Review"* 2004, vol 27, nr. 4, s. 7–9.

<sup>71</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of "Minority" Government in Canada, *"Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science"* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 4.

and political effectiveness of minority governments. On this account K. Strom<sup>72</sup> states that minority governments are socially and economically and politically effective only in case, when legislatures, within which they are formed and function, and their individual party actors are united and characterized by stimuli for cooperation. That is when the problems referring to coordination of inter-institutional executive-legislative relations could be overcome. Additional, but ambiguous importance in this context has stability of minority governments, as it predictably influences or at least can exert influence on minority government effectiveness. The same opinion is shared by M. Benner and T. Vad<sup>73</sup>. They state that only institutionally and behaviourally flexible minority governments, which can “maneuver” in the process of searching support for their own political (legislative) initiatives in legislatures, can be effective. In other words as C. Green-Pedersen<sup>74</sup> puts it, effective are those minority governments, which operate different variants of formal or situational support of legislature. On the analogy, more effective are those minority governments which in their parliamentary support and legislative activity (or governing in general) rely on and make agreements (conduct negotiations) not with one party, but with several parties in legislatures. The point is that when a minority government has only one variant of constructing the majority support, then non-government party or parties, which provide support only to governments’ initiatives, have too significant influence on the political course and functioning of the government cabinet. That is why, effectiveness of taking government’s initiatives in legislature, and consequently effectiveness of a government cabinet largely depends on closeness of such initiative to an ideal position of a non-government party or parties, which support minority governments.

As a result it is obvious that political and social-economic effectiveness of minority governments is the bases for consideration, referring the question how minority governments are interpreted by public and electorate. In this context, it is obvious that in political science there is no unified theory, devoted to explanation why public may support or protest against minority government phenomenon and activity. However, there are some theoretical assumptions, in this or that way concerning it, which could disclose how electorate perceives minority governments. It is notable that such reflections are rather numerous, referring to the countries, where minority governments are formed more often<sup>75</sup>. However, distinctive studies are too few or they are prejudiced in some cases, which are not characterized by minority governments (which are not regularized or even prohibited) or are formed rather seldom.

<sup>72</sup> Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 129.

<sup>73</sup> Benner M., Vad T., *Sweden and Denmark: Defending the Welfare State*, [w:] Scharpf F., Schmidt V. (eds.), *Welfare Work in the Open Economy: Vol. II. Diverse Responses to Common Challenges in Twelve Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 399–466.

<sup>74</sup> Green-Pedersen C., *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the ‘Danish Miracle’*, *Journal of Public Policy* 2002, vol 21, nr. 1, s. 53–70.

<sup>75</sup> Artés J., Bustos A., *Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study*, *European Journal of Political Research* 2008, vol 47, nr. 3, s. 307–333; Russell P., *Two Cheers for Minority Government: The Evolution of Canadian Parliamentary Democracy*, Wyd. Emond Montgomery Publications 2008.; Godbout J.-F., Hoyland B., *Voting Coalitions and Minority Governments in Canada*, Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting Toronto, September 5, 2009.

The majority of early scientific studies concerning the problem of perceiving minority governments by public and electorate follow the scenario, according to which such cases of institutional design are instable and ineffective and thus their perception must be negative. For example, E. Forsey states that perception of minority governments is predominantly negative, as the phenomena described by this notion are traditionally “incompetent, weak, indecisive, if not worse”<sup>76</sup>. Similar opinion is shared by L. Leduc, who assumes that voters are traditionally inclined to support majority governments in accordance with “the British tradition of parliamentary policy”<sup>77</sup>. Finally, H. Cody argues that parties, public and mass media perceive minority government cabinets and expect their operationalization as “fragile structures”, which, on the one hand, are able to build a short bridge to the majority, and, on the other hand, act as “unreliable instruments of governing”<sup>78</sup>.

On average, critical perception of minority governments by public and electorate is presupposed by the following: a) these constructions of institutional design predictably limit direct accountability of government cabinets before people, and thus are “less democratic” (at least in terms of people’s influence on composition of minority governments); b) these scenarios of inter-institutional relations are interpreted as the least transparent among other party governments<sup>79</sup>, as they often function on the basis of informal and situational agreements, which are not always known to the public; c) such government cabinets, being dependent on support provided by non-government (situational and oppositional) parties, are less capable of performing their obligations; d) these executive structures are restricted in their ability to find and implement innovation political and managerial decisions, as they, on the one hand, are less responsible and, on the other hand, are less accountable. However, distinctively it is clear that minority governments are much popular in “old” and consolidated democracies than in “young” democracies, which are in the process of consolidation. Moreover, minority governments are more positively perceived in the countries, which test proportional and not majority election systems and formulas.

On the contrary, positive perception of minority governments by public and electorate is presupposed, in particular on the bases of including party expectations, stipulated by the fact that these institutions serve as peculiar “information labels”, which assist society to neglect absence of necessary political knowledge. The point is that electoral results of minority governments give a possibility to introduce a row of complex challenges, which require certain level of political

<sup>76</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of “Minority” Government in Canada, *“Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science”* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 3.

<sup>77</sup> Leduc L., Political Behaviour and the Issue of Majority Government in Two Federal Elections, *“Canadian Journal of Political Science”* 1977, vol 10, s. 311.

<sup>78</sup> Cody H., Minority Government in Canada: The Stephen Harper Experience, *“American Review of Canadian Studies”* 2008, vol 38, nr. 1, s. 27.

<sup>79</sup> Gallagher K., Laver K., Mair P., *Representative Government in Modern Europe: Institutions, Parties, and Governments*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 2005, s. 383.



competence to operate party-oriented problems, incorporated in them<sup>80</sup>. It is important that comprehension of minority governments is determined on the basis of voters' corrections of their own attitude towards these institutional scenarios, at least on the basis of strategic voting, as a result of which the electorate's choice can be motivated by expecting the results of voting. It is especially traced when are formed minority governments, which lack just a bit to achieve the status of minimally victorious coalitions or single-party majority governments. As in such cases voters feel that they are represented by electorally successful parties<sup>81</sup>.

To positive perception of minority governments contributes the fact that being less democratic accountable and responsible they are characterized by a more "opened style" of procedural democracy. The point is that under conditions of minority governments much more influential become uncharacteristic for the bigger part of majority governments veto-authority in executive-legislative relations, as non-government parties do not just have a right but are also interested in limiting resources of government parties, restricting hypothetical (but permanent for most parliamentary democracies) growth in concentrating power by government cabinets<sup>82</sup>. And this, though being contradictory, enhances legislative-negotiating "power" of non-government parties, on the basis of which there is a non-institutional increase in minority governments accountability<sup>83</sup>. Thus, people understand that minority governments, being dispersive representations of executive power, are or at least can be more "sensitive" to voters' preferences. As they, in particular to engage support on the part of legislature, may offer more variable scenarios of solving different legislative/managerial coalitions<sup>84</sup>. Especially, it can be observed due to the fact that minority governments, in comparison with majority governments, pay excessive attention to small parties, what causes such drawback of minority governments as blurring of the locus of responsibility for government's actions, as a result of which minority governments are more able, in contrast with majority governments, to solve "short-term" problems of state management and achieve short-term electoral successes.

To conclude, we state that support of minority government cabinets can be led by electoral preferences and expectations of more dispersed authority and more flexible reaction to public requests; reaction to minority governments can be predetermined by more pragmatic economic expectations, reflections and calculations; party expectations of minority governments may be motivated by voters' desire to serve and have a liking for the interests of the parties they support. In other words, it means that voters, who support small parties or voters, who support big parties, but hope they do not win the elections, consistently prefer minority governments;

<sup>80</sup> Dufresne Y., Nevitte N., Why do Publics Support Minority Governments? Three Tests, *Parliamentary Affairs* 2014, vol 67, s. 825–840.

<sup>81</sup> Artés J., Bustos A., Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study, *European Journal of Political Research* 2008, vol 47, nr. 3, s. 307–333.

<sup>82</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of "Minority" Government in Canada, *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 1–11.

<sup>83</sup> McCandless H., Public Accountability in a Minority Government, *Canadian Parliamentary Review* 2004, vol 27, nr. 3, s. 31–39.

<sup>84</sup> Forsey E., The Problem of "Minority" Government in Canada, *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1964, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 1–11.

voters who are concerned with social-economic policy, are less inclined to support minority governments; and voters who do not tend to concentration of power, support the idea of minority governments.

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## **CATEGORIZATION AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF INSTITUTIONALLY-PROCEDURAL AND POLITICALLY-BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT**

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. The author identified at least two groups of causes and factors, i.e. exogenous and endogenous, that define and categorize semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (exogenous causes and factors), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of a president in relation to parliamentary majority (endogenous causes and factors). It was motivated that, within the same constitutional delimitation, a specific semi-presidential country can be classified in practice, first of all in the cut of varying institutional rules and formal/actual powers of presidents, governmental cabinets/prime ministers and parliaments. The researcher found out that taking into account the place and role of political institutions in inter-party competition and party hierarchy has a significant influence on this process. That is why semi-presidentialism was generalized as a system of government, which is comprehensively updated and taxonomied formally and actually. At the same time, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism uses specific hierarchical and transactional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. Their combination affects the formal and actual positioning and taxonomy of different types of heterogeneous semi-presidentialism. It was generalized that semi-presidentialism is definitively and permanently characterized with: a restrained and moderate model of separation of powers and appropriate system of checks and balances; popular election of a president for a fixed term; the collective responsibility of a prime minister and a cabinet to a legislature; the actual “securitization” of a president from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive between a president (the head of state) and a prime minister (the head of governmental cabinet); double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive.

*Keywords: semi-presidentialism, president, prime minister, governmental cabinet, legislature, inter-institutional relations.*

## **КАТЕГОРИЗАЦІЯ ТА СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЯ ІНСТИТУЦІЙНО-ПРОЦЕСУАЛЬНИХ І ПОЛІТИЧНО-ПОВЕДІНКОВИХ АТРИБУТІВ Й ОЗНАК НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ**

У статті запропоновано теоретичну та методологічну категоризацію та систематизацію інституційно-процесуальних і політично-поведінкових атрибутів й ознак напівпрезиденталізму. Виокремлено щонайменше дві групи причин і чинників – екзогенні й ендогенні, – які визначають і категоризують напівпрезиденталізм: фактичний зміст конституції, поєднання традицій і обставин (екзогенні причини), склад парламентської більшості і позиція президента стосовно парламентської більшості (ендогенні причини). Вмотивовано, що в рамках одного і того ж конституційного окреслення конкретна напівпрезидентська країна може дихотомувати і класифікуватись на практиці, передусім у зрізі варіативних інституційних правил та формальних і фактичних повноважень президентів, урядів/прем'єр-міністрів та парламентів. З'ясовано, що значний вплив на цей процес має врахування місця і ролі політичних інститутів у міжпартійній конкуренції та партійній ієрархії. Саме тому напівпрезиденталізм узагальнено як систему правління, яка всесторонньо актуалізується і таксономується формально та фактично. Водночас зафіксовано, що напівпрезиденталізм застосовує властиві лише йому ієрархічні і транзакційні відносини у трикутнику «глава держави–уряд–парламент». Їх суміщення впливає на формальне і фактичне позиціонування й таксономію типів гетерогенного напівпрезиденталізму. Узагальнено, що напівпрезиденталізм дефінітивно і перманентно характеризується: стриманою та поміркованою моделлю поділу влади і відповідною їй системою стримувань і противаг; всенародним обранням президента на фіксований термін; колективною відповідальністю прем'єр-міністра й урядового кабінету перед легіслатурою; фактичним «убезпеченням» президента від втручання у його діяльність з боку інших інститутів та гілок влади; фактичною (або хоча би формальною), але різноступеневою та різною дуалізацією або дєконцентрацією виконавчої влади між президентом (главою держави) і прем'єр-міністром (главою уряду); подвійною/дуальною природою походження та здійснення виконавчої влади, а не відповідальності виконавчої влади.

***Ключові слова:** напівпрезиденталізм, президент, прем'єр-міністр, урядовий кабінет, легіслатура, міжінституційні відносини.*

As a whole number of scientific researches on the problems of semi-presidential system of government proves, semi-presidentialism being an independent type of systems of government's typology (alongside and in contrast mainly to presidentialism and parliamentarism) is endowed

with exceptional or overwhelming institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features, which allow scholars to distinctively systematize it against the background of other systems of government. However, the systematization of semi-presidentialism can be both political and legal (constitutional) that confirms both political (actual or behavioral) and institutional (formal or constitutional) nature of this system of government. To a large extent, it is understandable given the variability of approaches to defining and conceptualization of semi-presidentialism, as well as taking into account the fact that it is necessary to understand institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral non-equivalence of the examples and cases of semi-presidentialism and consequently of its institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features. Since responding to the definitive essence of semi-presidentialism, they are extremely diverse and therefore cannot be reduced to a single model and common denominator, but instead need to be elaborated. This theoretically and methodologically actualizes the formulation of the problems of categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism.

The stated issues were considered in an extremely large number of studies, in particular by the authorship of such scholars as Albert, Almeida, Amorim Neto, Bahro, Baylis, Braga da Cruz, Carey, Cheibub, Cho, Choudhry, Constantinesco, Costa Lobo, Duverger, Elgie, Elkins, Frison-Roche, Ginsburg, Huber, Jyranki, Kirschke, Krysenko, Lijphart, Lin, Ludwikowski, Martins, McPherson, Metcalf, Moestrup, Morgan-Jones, Pasquino, Pierre-Caps, Protsyk, Protsyuk, Radchenko, Roper, Samuels, Sartori, Schleiter, Serochina, Shen, Shugart, Siaroff, Skach, Stacey, Strøm, Thiebault, Tsebelis, Varnavskiy, Verney, Vesper, Weber, etc. Instead, our task is to systematize and correct them and based on this to develop a coherent idea of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. At the same time, it is proposed to do in the constant attachment to the variations in definitions of semi-presidentialism, in particular from its origins to present day.

For example, Duverger, in the framework of the maximalist (classical) approach to the definition of semi-presidentialism, notes that the construction of analytical models, which are initially constitutionally determined, is atypical for scientists. However, on the other hand, it is inappropriate to consider inter-institutional relations without knowing the “rules of the game”, since they constitute the fundamental aspects of the strategy and tactics of the behavior of political actors<sup>1</sup> and thus determine why relatively homogeneous constitutions are tested and applied in absolutely different ways<sup>2</sup>. Most often, under the conditions of semi-presidentialism, this is manifested in the fact that similar constitutional norms and prerogatives can be implemented in practice both by influential and nominal political institutions/actors, first of all by presidents. This, according to the scholar, is determined by at least two groups of causes,

<sup>1</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 166.

<sup>2</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 177.



i.e. exogenous and endogenous ones, which define and categorize four parameters/attributes of semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (as exogenous causes), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of president regarding parliamentary majority (as endogenous causes). At the same time, the only one of them (that is the actual content of a constitution) defines the concept of semi-presidential system of government in the maximalist (classical or “Duvergerian”) approach<sup>3</sup>. The fact is that since constitutions establish the “rules of the game”, which should be respected by political actors and institutions, their content affects the practical application of systems of government, in particular a semi-presidentialism one. However, constitutions are not and cannot be absolutely identical in determining the roles of political institutions (for example, the powers of presidents<sup>4</sup>) and, therefore, may predetermine the differentiation of systems of government, including semi-presidentialism. Moreover, the heads of state and prime ministers themselves do not always (behaviorally) adhere to constitutions and laws, thereby they informally strengthen or weaken their constitutional powers. The most important point in this cut is the understanding that the head of state or the head of government in the case of semi-presidentialism does not fully or excessively fulfill the powers conferred upon them by a constitution only because they expect some personal/behavioral benefit or interest in view of the political situation/practice and inter-institutional relations<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, it is often the case that constitutions do not play a primary role in categorizing and systematizing the attributes of semi-presidentialism, yielding to other parameters of typology/taxonomy of systems of government. This means that a specific semi-presidential state can radically differentiate and be classified in practice even within the same formal constitutional delineation.

In sum, such a categorization of the attributes of semi-presidentialism means that the material power of a president and any other political institution in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament” is a combination of authority possibilities actually exercised by such institutions, which are based on formal (constitutional) and/or empirical (especially in view of relations within parliamentary majority) actions-resources. According to Samuels<sup>6</sup> and Shugart<sup>7</sup>, the fact that president/the head of state is a priori “separated” from the other political institutions is a supplementary factor in the importance of political institutions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Since presidential mandate is clearly established and fixed (or, in other words, “protected”), as a result of which it is able to “use profits” from the separation

<sup>3</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 166–176.

<sup>4</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 176.; Duverger M., *Xéque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 22–23.

<sup>5</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 178–179.

<sup>6</sup> Samuels D., Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2002, vol 35, nr. 4, s. 461–483.

<sup>7</sup> Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

of its term of office and the nature of its institutional origin, while politically limiting the role of prime minister. On the other hand, unlike presidentialism, both president and prime minister de facto have the right to veto appointments in governmental cabinet, which a priori weakens the institution of the head of state. The analysis is complemented by the fact that the symmetry/asymmetry of the powers of president and prime minister is variable. Therefore, as Almeida and Cho<sup>8</sup>, as well as Amorim Neto and Strom<sup>9</sup> note, it depends on the specific institutional rules, in particular on the specific assigning powers of each of them. In addition, there are some misunderstandings in the attribution of semi-presidentialism according to its maximalist (classical) definition and given that Duverger, for example, does not mention anything about the origin of prime minister and governmental cabinet. Especially in view of the fact that in some semi-presidential states president has either a purely nominal constitutional (formal) powers or informally has the opportunity to appoint a prime minister and a governmental cabinet. This, according to Duverger's idea<sup>10</sup>, means that in conditions of semi-presidentialism prime minister must definitely owe his or her origin to the results of popular election of the head of state, even if he or she holds position due to the confidence of the majority in legislature. This is complemented by the fact that president is authorized not only to appoint/nominate a prime minister and/or a governmental cabinet, but formally or informally (through presidential and/or pro-presidential parties in legislature) to resign a prime minister and a governmental cabinet and sometimes to dissolve parliament in some semi-presidential states. At the same time, it is interesting the idea of Cheibub<sup>11</sup>, Choudhry and Stacey<sup>12</sup>, according to which the focus exclusively on the powers of one political institution (most often on the president), in particular in the conditions of executive dualism/dualization, causes the neglect of other political institutions and, in general, the institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral nature and conditions of semi-presidentialism, and therefore is unacceptable. The fact is that the distribution and appointment of political powers among all the branches of government (all political institutions) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism affects the integral system of relations among them and, therefore, determines the structure and framework of their political power and influence. This, according to Moestrup<sup>13</sup>, Sartori<sup>14</sup>, Elgie and Schleiter<sup>15</sup>,

<sup>8</sup> Almeida A., Cho S.-J., *Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 3–6, 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strom K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“ at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, August 15–17, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*“ 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.

<sup>11</sup> Cheibub J. A., Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work, „*Texas Law Review*“ 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.

<sup>12</sup> Choudhry S., Stacey R., *Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia // “NYU Law Working Papers: Consolidating the Arab Spring – Constitutional Transition in Egypt and Tunisia”* 2013; Stacey R., Choudhry S., *Semi-presidential government in the post-authoritarian context*, Wyd. The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Moestrup S., *Semi-presidentialism and Power Sharing Does it Work? Examples from Anglophone Africa*, Wyd. IPSA Paper Room.

<sup>14</sup> Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, London 1997, s. 121.

<sup>15</sup> Elgie R., Schleiter P., *Variation in the Durability of Semi-Presidential Democracies*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave, 2011, s. 42–60.

means that semi-presidentialism is a system of government, in which it is constitutionally embedded (in contrast to presidentialism and parliamentarism), although in different ways, the possibilities of separation of powers, in particular between a popularly elected president and prime minister, who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature (that is between two parts of the dualized executive, each of which has a separate electoral mandate<sup>16</sup>). The problem is that the constitutional regulation of the separation of powers in the inter-institutional relations is often modified or refined politically that significantly devalues Lijphart's remarks on "the prevalence of the zero sum nature of presidential election" under semi-presidentialism<sup>17</sup>, and instead, according to Roeder<sup>18</sup>, it testifies a long-term stability of the system of checks and balances in semi-presidentialism.

Accordingly, traditions and circumstances are very important in this context, since the normative (legal or formal) delineation of systems of government takes place on the basis of consensus through the perspective of taking into account the course of history. Moreover, the practice of implementing systems of government generates unambiguous factual traditions, which quite often complicate and substitute legal manifestations of inter-institutional relations. This means that the powers of political institutions within the framework of semi-presidentialism can be distinctive in legal (formal) and political (actual) cuts. The endogenous factors that synthesize them are the composition of parliamentary majority (or even its presence or absence) and the position of political institutions (primarily of president and prime minister/government) regarding parliamentary majority. Thus, in semi-presidential countries, where parliamentary majority is not the norm, it can be seen, according to Duverger, the greatest coincidence and correlation between the norms of law and political practice, as a result of which the head of state is neither ceremonial (nominal) nor omnipotent in powers. Instead, in semi-presidential countries with a coherent and stable parliamentary majority, there is a significant inconsistency between constitution and practice, as a result of which the head of state is actually positioned either as the dominant political actor or as the only symbolic "leader" of the nation<sup>19</sup>. Taking into account the place and role of political institutions (in particular, president and prime minister) in party hierarchy also has a significant influence on this process. Consequently, according to Bahro<sup>20</sup>, Weser<sup>21</sup> and Braga de Cruz<sup>22</sup>, the idea of a presidential or a prime-ministerial phase of semi-presidentialism is justified by the type of configuration of parliamentary majority (or its possible absence) and by the affiliation

<sup>16</sup> Stacey R., Choudhry S., *Semi-presidential government in the post-authoritarian context*, Wyd. The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Lijphart A., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, *Journal of Democracy* 2004, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 102.

<sup>18</sup> Roeder P., *Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing*, [w:] Roeder P., Rothchild D. (eds.), *Sustainable Peace, Power and Democracy after Civil War*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2005, s. 52.

<sup>19</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 182–183.

<sup>20</sup> Bahro H., Weser E., Das semipresidentielle System "Bastard" oder Regierungsform sui generis?, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 1995, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 471.

<sup>21</sup> Weser E., Semi-Presidentialism – Duverger's Concept: A New Political System Model, *Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences* 1997, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 39–60.

<sup>22</sup> Braga da Cruz M., O Presidente da República na génese e evolução do sistema do governo português, *Análise Social* 1994, vol 29, s. 243.

or non-affiliation with parties of major political institutions. As a result, the head of state in different configurations may actually be positioned as a “hyper-president” who has considerably more powers than a president in presidential system of government or as a “powerless” president who has fewer powers than the head of state in parliamentary system of government. Instead, the main attribute of the powers of various political institutions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is the consideration of both the personal power of these institutions (in accordance with constitutions) and their influence on party politics and inter-party relations in legislature. Although semi-presidentialism (according to its classical interpretation, but in historical empirical practice) was not initially defined as party-dependent and regulated<sup>23</sup>. Since, for example, in the researches of Weber, Preuss and Redlob<sup>24</sup>, there was expressed a distrust in political parties, but instead there was a belief that the “plebiscituous” popular election of president must force parties “to more or less definitely obey the leaders who use a trust of masses”<sup>25</sup>. In other words, due to the fact that the head of state is elected popularly and is characterized by personal charisma, he or she can resist bureaucracy and conservative social groups, including within the framework of parliament, as the guarantor of legality, stability, order and support of the continuity of power and its legitimacy<sup>26</sup>. Accordingly, semi-presidentialism in this cut is generalized as a system of government, which is being comprehensively (in relation to all institutions of power) updated and constitutionally (formally) and politically (actually) taxonomied (in particular, in party and electoral cut).

In turn, Elgie<sup>27</sup> and Skach<sup>28</sup> (within the framework of the minimalist (post-classical) approach to the definition of semi-presidentialism) state that the most important attributive characteristic of this system of government is an “additional” division of power (that is the division of executive within the institutions of popularly elected president and prime minister/governmental cabinet, the last of which is collectively responsible at least to legislature), as well as distinctive legitimacy of the head of state and parliament. However, even this minimal set of attributes of semi-presidentialism does not mean that all the systems of this constitutional type function as identical in political practice. The fact is that the constitutional power of presidents, prime ministers and governmental cabinets varies as often as the political power of presidents,

<sup>23</sup> Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Mommsen W., *Max Weber and German politics, 1890–1920*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1984; Meyerson R., *Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster*, Wyd. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper 1999; Stirk P., Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution, „*History of Political Thought*” 2002, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 497–516; Redlob R., *Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und unechten Form: Eine vergleichende Studie über die Verfassungen von England, Belgien, Ungarn, Schweden und Frankreich*, Wyd. J.C.B. Mohr 1918.

<sup>25</sup> Weber M., *Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany*, [w:] Guenther R., Wittich C. (eds.), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Wyd. California University Press 1978, vol 3, s. 1452–1453.

<sup>26</sup> Veber M., *Parlament i Pravitelstvo v rekonstruirovannoy Germanii*, [w:] *Antologiya mirovoy pravovoy mysli: v 5 t.*, Moskva 1999, vol 3, s. 634–635.; Varnavskiy A., Smeshannaya (poluprezidentskaya) forma gosudarstvennogo pravleniya: prichiny i usloviya stanovleniya. faktory transformatsii v sovremennykh usloviyakh, „*Sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye yavleniya i protsessy*” 2010, vol 4, s. 297–300.; Medushevskiy A., *Teoriya konstitutsionnykh tsiklov*, Wyd. GU VShE 2005, s. 157–158. 202–203.; Demishel A., Demishel F., Pikernal M., *Instituty i vlast vo Frantsii*, Moskva 1977, s. 56–59.

<sup>27</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

<sup>28</sup> Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, „*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 96.

prime ministers and governmental cabinets alters. That is why constitutionally strong presidents are sometimes politically weak and constitutionally weak presidents are sometimes politically strong: presidents sometimes dominate prime ministers/governmental cabinets, prime ministers/governmental cabinets sometimes dominate presidents and sometimes none of them dominates each other (that is inherited from the attribution of semi-presidentialism in its maximalist (classical) interpretation). Accordingly, the concept of semi-presidentialism is so heuristic, how heuristic is the description of a specific set of constitutional levers of inter-institutional relations<sup>29</sup>. It enables to generate/construct an analytical model that promotes in-depth and comprehensive description, categorization and systematization of the attributes of this system of government. Moreover, such an analytical model helps not only to trace and explain the historical and modern manifestations of semi-presidentialism, but also to predict them in future<sup>30</sup>. It also defines a peculiar set of variables that determine why semi-presidentialism can be operationalized in different ways<sup>31</sup>. Among these variables there are the constitutional powers of the main political actors/institutions, the events surrounding the formation of a system of government, the nature of parliamentary majority and the relationship between it and president. In other words and according to Elgie<sup>32</sup>, semi-presidentialism is determined by constitutional (or power), historical, situational, regime (or contextual), political (party or inter-institutional) attributes. However, such a logic of its definition and attribution, in parallel, contributes to its typology and taxonomy.

The essence of constitutional or power attributes of semi-presidentialism is that (in the opinion of Duverger<sup>33</sup>) at least three types of scenarios of its inter-institutional manifestation can be regulated by a constitution: a) when a president is only a “controlling force”, that is he or she simply appears as a guarantor of constitution and may have, for example, the right to refer laws to the constitutional court and propose constitutional referendums; b) when a president enjoys the above-mentioned control powers and is entitled to unilaterally dismiss a prime minister and dismiss a governmental cabinet; c) when a president is a “governing or ruling” force, that is he or she takes part in state governance, though in cooperation with a prime minister and governmental cabinet. At the same time, constitutional norms and political practices in the above-listed types of situations do not always coincide, since presidents who seemingly can act only as “controlling forces” actually act as “guides” and “governing forces” in some cases. The consequence is an understanding that constitutional (or power) attributes directly relate to the practice of semi-presidentialism, but are sometimes secondary compared with other parameters of this system of government. Taken together, these attributes de jure demonstrate the balance

<sup>29</sup> Duverger M., *Bréviaire de la cohabitation*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 349.

<sup>30</sup> Duverger M., *Xeque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 89–90.

<sup>31</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

<sup>32</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

<sup>33</sup> Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 177–178.

of powers of various political actors and institutions and at least minimally de facto hint at the relationship among them.

The nature of historical, situational and regime (or contextual) attributes of semi-presidentialism lies in the fact that its operationalization is influenced by historical, political and cultural factors, within which a system of government is incorporated. Therefore, as Elgie<sup>34</sup> remarks, given that the context of each country is nationally unique and preserves for a certain period of time, and, accordingly, it can “distort” the implementation of the set of de jure constitutional norms in practice, then contextual attributes are mainstream in explaining different types of semi-presidential system of government. This is reasoned and important, because each specific semi-presidential country operationalizes this constitutional system of government in a certain geographical area, against the background of specific historical situations and within the framework of the dynamics of changes of a concrete constitutional/institutional “foundation and design”. Although, on the other hand, it is possible and appropriate to highlight some common features, which fit into the framework of the main types and scenarios of a “contextual design”: a) when semi-presidentialism is theorized and implemented purely for symbolic reasons (for example, during the process of national self-determination, when the introduction of the institute of a popularly elected, though weak president is considered as an instrument of democratization); b) when semi-presidentialism is introduced for the reasons of manageability and governance (for example, after the collapse of a parliamentary system of government, when creating the position of a strong popularly elected president is considered as an instrument to prevent political crises in future); c) when semi-presidentialism is perceived as the stage of transition of political system and political regime to democracy (for example, when the institution of a stronger popularly elected president plays the role of reforming parliamentarism or the introduction of the institution of a weaker popularly elected president plays the role of reforming presidentialism, etc.) or to autocracy (for example, when the institution of a popularly elected president strengthens or weakens the position of a prime minister on the way of diversifying the personalization of political power). In general, this proves that, whatever are the historical, political and cultural factors of the introduction of semi-presidentialism, the contextual component that determines a way of choice and development of this system of government generates rather diverse and varied political practices of semi-presidentialism. In other words, the events around the choice and formation of a semi-presidential system of government are crucial to understanding politics within its framework. The point is that the main or very important role is played by the norms, rules and practices that (for the first time since the implementation of semi-presidentialism) determine the positioning of the various political actors/institutions and the relationship among them. In addition, an important role is played by the expectations of political elite from the fact of introduction of a semi-presidential system of government or its type’s change, in particular in contrast to another constitutional model.

<sup>34</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

Finally, the specificity of political or party (inter-institutional) attributes of semi-presidentialism is that this system of government is always determined by party and political factors, which, according to Duverger, are even “more important than constitutional powers” of various political actors/institutions, and therefore they influence the different typological positioning of the investigated type of inter-institutional relations<sup>35</sup>. First and foremost, the determining factor in this perspective is a presence or absence of a parliamentary majority (minority) in legislature, as well as the type of its relations with a president and prime minister (governmental cabinet). Based on this, Elgie<sup>36</sup> sets out several scenarios of political (party) attributes of semi-presidentialism: a) when there is an one-party absolute parliamentary majority with the dominant party; b) when there is a coalitional absolute parliamentary majority consisting of one large, but non-dominant party; c) when there is a balanced coalitional absolute parliamentary majority without any large party; d) when there is an one-party relative parliamentary majority (or an absolute parliamentary minority); e) when there is a coalitional relative parliamentary majority (or an absolute parliamentary minority); f) when there is no absolute or relative parliamentary majority, but instead it is determined situationally. The importance of these scenarios is that the nature of parliamentary majority or minority may acquire different inter-party forms and therefore can diversify influence inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament” and the relationship between president and majority or minority in legislature. For example, a president may be the leader of an absolute majority or minority in legislature or may be only its participant. Equivalently, a president may be the representative of the interests of a party from parliamentary opposition or even a completely neutral and apolitical (non-partisan) figure. Accordingly, such political and party attributes of inter-institutional relations are informative in the context of explaining the differences between various scenarios and types of semi-presidentialism.

Correcting the maximalist (classical) attribution and updating the minimalist (post-classical) attribution of semi-presidentialism, Shugart<sup>37</sup> (unlike his early ideas<sup>38</sup>) observes that this system of government (in comparison with presidentialism and parliamentarism) uses its inherent hierarchical and transactional relations (or, in other words, the sources of legitimacy in the form of origin and strength of power) in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament”. Thus, semi-presidentialism in hierarchical relations is determined by the fact that some political institutions are subordinated to others, and in transactional relations it is characterized by the fact that political institutions are or may be “identical” or equivalent. The difference between parliamentarism and presidentialism is that in the first case hierarchical relations extend between legislature and its “subordinates” (first of all, governmental cabinet) and in the second case, due

<sup>35</sup> Duverger M., *Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1971, s. 116.; Duverger M., *Xeque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 89–90.

<sup>36</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

<sup>37</sup> Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

<sup>38</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

to the divided legitimacy of president and legislature, inter-institutional relations are purely transactional, since they are determined by the achievement of distinctive goals. This means that semi-presidentialism is inter-institutionally multidirectional one, since it is defined by the “constellation” of both hierarchical and transactional patterns. Their combination affects the actual (politically-behavioral) positioning of semi-presidentialism and hence the allocation of various types of semi-presidentialism in different modes of its constitutional (power), historical, situational, regime (contextual), political (party or inter-institutional) attributes. Moreover, as a result of such a synthesis of inter-institutional relations, it is clear that semi-presidentialism is determined by: a) the comparison/superposition of institutions of a popularly elected president and governmental cabinet, which is responsible to legislature; b) the probability that one institution (“principal”), which forms another institution (“agent”), cannot be unilaterally authorized to terminate its functions. It shows the theoretical and methodological failure to attribute semi-presidentialism as a constitutional and inter-institutional type, which is reflected in the alternation of presidential and parliamentary phases of the political system in practice<sup>39</sup>. Providing this, Shugart delineates the institutional attributes of political system and its politically-behavioral results, and observes that even if president becomes more or less “influential” (depending on whether he or she is able to control government and parliamentary majority (or minority)) this completely does not affect the institutional design of political system (or system of government), although it creates various behavioral models for its testing and verification. The point is that each system of government, including a semi-presidential one, is characterized by its inherent characteristics that are extremely difficult or impossible to change. These characteristics and attributes are related to the institutional structure of system of government and therefore clearly determine whether it is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential. In contrast, only temporary or transitive characteristics of systems of government, including electoral results and the type of party system that define a model of politically-behavioral attribution of the institutional (or institutionally-procedural) type of systems of government, are subject to change<sup>40</sup>. In sum, this means that Shugart’s logic of attribution (and defining) of semi-presidentialism, unlike the “pure” minimalist approach, is determined by three indicators – a source of legitimacy of executive institutions, relations between legislative and executive institutions, the nature of responsibility of executive institutions. The consequence is the construction of the basis of the analytical model, which enables better and more versatile analysis of semi-presidentialism, its attributes and characteristics, organizational requirements and operational consequences.

They are conceptualized and verified in the framework of the theory of agent (“principal-agent”) relations, in particular, in the researches of such scholars as Shugart, Carey and

<sup>39</sup> Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

<sup>40</sup> Shugart M., Of Presidents and Parliaments, *East European Constitutional Review* 1993, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 30.



Samuels<sup>41</sup>, Lupia<sup>42</sup>, Amorim Neto, Strom, Mueller and Bergman<sup>43</sup>, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones<sup>44</sup>, Huber<sup>45</sup>, Constantinesco and Pierre-Caps<sup>46</sup>, Martins<sup>47</sup>, Jyranki<sup>48</sup> and others. The aforementioned researchers point out that the theory of agent relations focuses on the delegation of authority (powers) and responsibility (accountability) from voters (as the main “principal”) to elected officials, in particular to president and legislature (as “agents”), and from them (as “principals”) to governmental cabinet (as “agent”) and vice versa<sup>49</sup>. This means that political process, at least in democratic regimes, should be a priori, albeit in different ways (for example, in presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism)<sup>50</sup>, determined by electorate, since all “agents” of voters must be responsible and accountable to them<sup>51</sup>. The peculiarity of semi-presidentialism is that voters choose two “agents” whom they delegate the rights and opportunities to act on their behalf, i.e. the head of state and parliament. Therefore, semi-presidentialism (as well as presidentialism) is determined by the double legitimacy of the main “agents”. Another

<sup>41</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 2006.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Lupia A., *Delegation and Its Perils*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.

<sup>43</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion” at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, August 15–17, 2002.; Strom K., *Parliamentary democracy and delegation*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 55–108.; Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., Nyblade B., *Dimensions of citizen control*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 673–681.; Strøm K., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 309–333.; Strøm K., Müller W., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995, s. 51–82.

<sup>44</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

<sup>45</sup> Huber J., *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>46</sup> Constantinesco V., Pierré-Caps S., Presidential Elements of Government in France: The Quest for Political Responsibility of the President in the Fifth Republic, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2006, vol 2, s. 341–357.

<sup>47</sup> Martins A., Presidential Elements in Government. The Portuguese Semi-Presidential System, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2006, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 81–100.

<sup>48</sup> Jyranki A., Presidential Elements in Government. Finland, Foreign Affairs as the Last Stronghold of the President, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2007, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 285–306.

<sup>49</sup> Moe T., The New Economics of Organization, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 1984, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 739–777.; Lupia A., *Delegation and Its Perils*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

<sup>50</sup> Strøm K., Müller W., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995, s. 74.

<sup>51</sup> Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.

feature is that these “agents” at the same time are able to structurize and streamline the process of formation and functioning (and even responsibility) of governmental cabinets. Therefore, semi-presidentialism has the attribute of the executive dualism. At the same time, semi-presidentialism ambiguously subordinate governmental cabinet to president and parliament, since the “survival” of governmental cabinet depends, on the one hand, on the confidence or lack of no confidence of legislature and, on the other hand, on popular election of president as a channel for voters to influence the process of governance. Especially in view of the fact that presidents in semi-presidential countries are usually given at least one of the proposed powers, i.e. to form a governmental cabinet, to resign a governmental cabinet or to act in the legislative sphere. Accordingly, under the conditions of semi-presidentialism, at least according to its minimalist (modern) definition<sup>52</sup>, president does not necessarily contribute to functioning of governmental cabinet (as in the case of parliamentarism), and governmental cabinet, in turn, does not necessarily promote and popularize a legitimized set of presidential goals (as usually in the case of presidentialism)<sup>53</sup>.

At the same time, the problem lies in the fact that semi-presidentialism is wide-ranging according to the logic of delegation of authority/powers and responsibility, as well as through the amount of powers of various “principals” and “agents”<sup>54</sup>. For example, in the context of the process of government formation, semi-presidential systems should be divided into the groups where: a president may not agree with the candidacy of a prime minister or with the option of a governmental cabinet; a president may nominate a prime minister’s candidacy or a governmental cabinet’s option and expect the consent/investiture of a legislature; a president may nominate a prime minister and a governmental cabinet without the consent or investiture of a legislature. The differentiated logics is also evident in the case of governmental cabinets’ resignation in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, since they can be carried out: exclusively by legislatures, which may be early dissolved by presidents; exclusively by legislatures, which cannot be early dissolved by presidents; unlimitedly by presidents and legislatures; by presidents and legislatures, but with the limitation of powers of legislatures by the powers of presidents<sup>55</sup>. The difference is also observed in the case of regulating the legislative agenda, since these powers are exclusively directed by governmental cabinets or presidents and governmental cabinets in semi-presidential systems. Moreover, presidents in some semi-presidential states have the right

<sup>52</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 13.; Elgie R., *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 2–6.

<sup>53</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.

<sup>54</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, *British Journal of Political Science* 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.; Hellman J., Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transitions, *East European Constitutional Review* 1996, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 46–56.; Frye T., A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies, *Comparative Political Studies* 1997, vol 30, nr. 5, s. 523–552.; Metcalf L. K., Measuring Presidential Power, *Comparative Political Studies* 2000, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 657.; Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, *European Journal of Political Research* 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

<sup>55</sup> Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 336–337.

of the block/complete legislative veto, while in others systems they have only the right of the partial legislative veto. Finally, in other states, presidents are empowered to issue decrees with the force of law<sup>56</sup>, etc. This means that the balance of inter-institutional (“principal-agent”) relations in the conditions of semi-presidentialism can vary from the prevalence of legislatures to the prevalence of presidents or even to their equilibrium. However, even despite this, the “core” of the “chain” of delegation of powers and responsibility, which attributes semi-presidentialism, remains constant. Instead, the other inter-institutional attributes of semi-presidentialism determine exclusively the probability and ways, in which political actors and institutions achieve their desired goals, and the likelihood of conflicts among them, and therefore indefinitely testify the similarity among semi-presidentialism, presidentialism and parliamentarism<sup>57</sup>. Accordingly, semi-presidentialism can actually, politically and behaviorally (nevertheless, not formally, institutionally and procedurally) look like presidentialism or parliamentarism<sup>58</sup>. However, it is the formal (constitutional) structure of the delegation of powers and responsibility in the conditions of semi-presidentialism that forms and “crystallizes” the patterns of potential variability of the operationalization of this system of government in practice<sup>59</sup>.

In other words, the consequence of the attribution of semi-presidentialism in the theory of agent relations is the fact that semi-presidentialism is behaviorally diversified depending on the presence of two “basic agents”, i.e. a president and a parliament, through which voters can potentially influence governance and politics in general<sup>60</sup>. In institutional terms, this is finalized by the fact that semi-presidentialism is attributed to the incomplete separation of powers, since both president and parliament appear as common “principals” of a governmental cabinet, and therefore they should agree on it and control it<sup>61</sup>. This, in turn, predetermines a specific nature and composition of a governmental cabinet and a peculiar process of governance, since the “principals” of a governmental cabinet are electorally different in their origin and purposes (this is manifested in the fact that presidential electoral campaigns are much wider than electoral campaigns of parties

<sup>56</sup> Huber J., Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States, *American Political Science Review* 1992, vol 86, nr. 3, s. 675–687.; Huber J., *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>57</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Russia: The Benefits and Perils of Presidential Leadership*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2008, s. 159–179.

<sup>58</sup> Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 121–122.; Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 67–73.

<sup>59</sup> Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.

<sup>60</sup> Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.; Nousiainen J., From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 2001, vol 24, nr. 1, s. 101.

<sup>61</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s.358.

and individual parliamentary candidates; moreover, they even unite and combine them<sup>62</sup>). As a result, even a prime minister and ministers from the same party as a president, in particular, when they have or enjoy the support of majority in legislature, are not “absolutely reliable agents” of the head of state<sup>63</sup>. That is why governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are often and unreasonably formed on the basis of delegation of powers to both party and non-party ministers<sup>64</sup>. In other words, presidents in semi-presidential systems have much more incentives to include non-party, rather than party ministers in governmental cabinets, since the heads of state thus contribute to the realization of their political and electoral goals. Identical or similar situation is about solving the issues of foreign and defense policy in semi-presidentialism<sup>65</sup>, since the heads of state in this context try to dominate prime ministers and governmental cabinets in general. The conclusion is that semi-presidentialism a priori weakens party-government relations, resulting in greater variation in the relations between parties and governmental cabinets than any other system of government<sup>66</sup>. This is especially common in a situation where the balance of powers in inter-institutional relations is balanced or concentrated/displaced in favor of president’s institution<sup>67</sup>. Since a strong president, assigning or influencing the appointment of a prime minister, that is the main result and endogenous factor of government formation, formally or informally affects the composition of the entire governmental cabinet and, accordingly, various subject areas and functions of a governmental cabinet<sup>68</sup>. We observe a similar effect when the negotiating power of a parliament proves to be politically limited that, in turn, is the result of its excessive party fractionalization. Therefore, as Shugart<sup>69</sup> points out, party systems, characterized by a lack of a clear distinction between a governmental cabinet and opposition, are characterized by the presence of a president’s institute, which de facto has more freedom of action than other political actors.

<sup>62</sup> Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.

<sup>63</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.

<sup>64</sup> Thiebault J.-L., *France: Forming and maintaining government coalitions in the Fifth Republic*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 514.; Protsyk O., Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, „*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.; Costa Lobo M., *The Emergence of a Prime Ministerial Model: Portuguese Government Coordination, 1976–1995*, Wyd. University of Oxford 2001.

<sup>65</sup> Arter D., *Politics and policy-making in Finland*, Wyd. Wheatsheaf/St Martin’s Press 1987.; Hayward J., *From republican sovereign to partisan statesman*, [w:] Harrison M., Hayward J. (eds.), *De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential power in France*, Wyd. Hurst 1993, s. 1–35.

<sup>66</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.; Protsyk O., Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2005, vol 44, nr. 5, s. 721–748.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, „*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

<sup>67</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

<sup>68</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

<sup>69</sup> Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

Somewhat controversial logic is maintained by Roper, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter, who note that in some semi-presidential systems, which are characterized by less developed party systems, the confrontation between a president and a prime minister leads to institutional and political instability, and in other semi-presidential systems it increases the effectiveness of cooperation between a president and a legislature<sup>70</sup>. According to Protsyk<sup>71</sup>, the latest scenario is often due to the fact that “clientelist” parties (in the form of narrow agreements on a governmental cabinet) negotiate with a president and a parliament. In this case, a popularly elected and strong president largely compensates for the relative lack of well-organized parties that are needed in order to provide a well-functioning system of government. Accordingly, we conclude that constitutional (institutionally-procedural) and political (politically-behavioral) descriptors of the attribution of semi-presidentialism occur through the prism of the theory of agent (“principal-agent”) relations, which are manifested in the fact that party-governmental relations in semi-presidentialism, in contrast to other systems of government, are susceptible to constitutional and political changes.

The theory of “veto players”, which appeals to the analysis of the powers of political institutions, inter-institutional relations, their place through the prism of party and electoral systems and in the cut of different ideologies that are tangential to systems of government, also occupies an important place in the attribution of semi-presidentialism<sup>72</sup> (although, within its minimalist (post-classical) tradition of defining). As Shen and Tsebelis remark, the theory of “veto players” is an analytical tool that can be used to analyze the status quo change in the context of inter-institutional relations of individual “veto players”, which are individuals and collective political actors whose treaties and agreements are necessary to change the status quo<sup>73</sup>. This is important given the scientists’ assumption that the stability of inter-institutional relations (and the ability to make political decisions) in the context of different systems of government increases in the event of a decrease in the number of “players with veto powers”, reducing the ideological difference and distance between them, as well as in the event of reducing the internal unity and cohesion of collective “veto players”<sup>74</sup>. In this cut, it is noticeable that semi-presidentialism is much more difficult to operationalize than any other system of government, since institutional “players with the right of veto” within its framework are usually “vague” and difficultly differentiated, resulting in the increasing of the influence of various “agents of the

<sup>70</sup> Roper S., Are all semi-presidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes, *„Comparative Politics“* 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253–272.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, *„Post-Soviet Affairs“* 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

<sup>71</sup> Protsyk O., Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, *„Europe-Asia Studies“* 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

<sup>72</sup> Elgie R., From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?, *„Democratization“* 2005, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 115.

<sup>73</sup> Shen Y.-C., Using the Veto Players Theory to Explain the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes, *„International Journal of Humanities and Social Science“* 2011, vol 1, nr. 9, s. 87–102.; Shen Y.-C., *Veto Players Theory and the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes*, XXIIPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, July 12–16, 2009.

<sup>74</sup> Tsebelis G., Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism, *„British Journal of Political Science“* 1995, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 293.; Ganghof S., Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis, *„Swiss Political Science Review“* 2003, vol 9, nr. 1–2, s. 1–25.; Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Russell Sage Foundation 2002, s. 19–63.

agenda change” in inter-institutional relations. It is regulated by the fact that constitutions of semi-presidential states do not always clearly and unambiguously distinguish the roles, powers and responsibilities of various political actors, which, depending on the complementary factors of political process (in particular, the relation among political institutions and majority in legislature) and inter-institutional relations, modify the institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attribution of semi-presidentialism. So, if a parliamentary majority is under the control of a president or a party of a president, the head of state has a good chance to realize his or her electoral goals. However, on the other hand, the same can be said about the regulation of political process by a prime minister whose party controls a majority in a legislature. The controversial situation is typical in the case when a president and his/her party cannot control a majority in a legislature, as a result of which a prime minister cannot be strictly subordinated to a president. This means that the separation or unification of inter-institutional relations in the vector “president–governmental cabinet–parliamentary majority” is an explanatory variable of the attribution of semi-presidentialism<sup>75</sup>. Moreover, it regulates that the main thing is not the differences between systems of government (i.e. presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism), but the differences in inter-institutional relations within each of them, that is the differences between the types and scenarios of semi-presidentialism<sup>76</sup>. A vivid expression of the importance of such a comment is the fact that prime minister is quite often constitutionally positioned as the head of the executive, but in practice the direction of executive and governmental activity is determined by a president. Accordingly, the way how a constitution and political practice divide executive (administrative) powers and hierarchical and transactional relations among the institutions in the system of executive dualism is a determining factor in the attribution, stability and effectiveness of semi-presidentialism<sup>77</sup>.

Imposing such features of the attribution of semi-presidentialism on the theory of “veto players” and realizing that “veto players” under the conditions of semi-presidentialism are all those who can influence (approve, reject, revise) the implementation of political process or political decisions<sup>78</sup> (especially in the context of the executive dualism), it is obvious that “veto

<sup>75</sup> Elgie R., *Divided Government in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001, s. 10–12.; Lin J.-W., A Veto Player Theory of Policy Making in Semi-Presidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2011, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 407–435.; Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.; Elgie R., Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Regimes, *Political Studies* 1997, vol 45, nr. 2, s. 217–231.; Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.; Elgie R., Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations, *Political Studies Review* 2004, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 314–330.; Tavits M., *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

<sup>77</sup> Baylis T., Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, *World Politics* 1996, vol 48, nr. 3, s. 297–323.; Kirschke L., Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States, *Comparative Political Studies* 2007, vol 40, nr. 11, s. 1372–1394.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

<sup>78</sup> Lin J.-W., A Veto Player Theory of Policy Making in Semi-Presidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2011, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 407–435.;

players” themselves can be both formal and informal<sup>79</sup>, as well as both mandatory and optional for a particular scenario and type of inter-institutional relations within semi-presidentialism<sup>80</sup>. For example, the question of whether a president of any semi-presidential state is a “veto player” is rather unusual, since the answer to it depends on constitutional provisions, peculiarities of political practice and on the type of system of government itself. Instead, it is unequivocally clear that a legislature, to which a governmental cabinet is necessarily collectively responsible, is a collective “veto player” under the conditions of semi-presidential system of government. Although, on the other hand, it is not necessary, especially in a multiparty system, to be a “veto player” of any parliamentary party, but only of the political party, which is the main “player” in the formation, support or resignation of a governmental cabinet. In general, this means that party system in semi-presidentialism is too complex to be defined as a collective “veto player”<sup>81</sup>: on the one hand (in the conditions of one or two-party systems), it is a collective “veto player” and, on the other hand (in the conditions of different types of multiparty systems), it is or is not a “veto player”. In addition, the number of parties that are “veto players” depends on the quantitative and dimensional attributes and types of governmental cabinets. Accordingly, the outlining of parties as “veto players” in the conditions of semi-presidentialism depends on institutional rules, inter-institutional relations and type and structuring of party systems. At the same time, such “veto players” within the framework of semi-presidentialism as president and parties may to a large extent depend on some informal variables, in particular on constitutional agreements and traditions, as well as on the fact and results of elections (for example, in the processes of formation, support or resignation of governmental cabinets). Although in general, the listed informal variables are not independent “veto players”, since they do not always have the force of coercion and constraints.

Summing up these ideas, Protsyuk<sup>82</sup> and Radchenko<sup>83</sup> argue that semi-presidentialism (in their words, a “mixed republic” or a “mixed form of government”) is determined and conditioned by a restrained model of the division of power, which traces the features of “rigid” (in particular, as in presidentialism) and “soft” (in particular, as in parliamentarism) models, and, respectively, by the corresponding to it system of checks and balances. Bostan<sup>84</sup> notes that semi-presidentialism (in his words, a “mixed polyarchy”) is based on the “moderate” distribution of the system of supreme bodies of legislative, presidential and governmental powers, where the latter is doubly/

<sup>79</sup> Shen Y.-C., Using the Veto Players Theory to Explain the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2011, vol 1, nr. 9, s. 87–102.; Shen Y.-C., *Veto Players Theory and the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes*, XXI IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, July 12–16, 2009, s. 25.

<sup>80</sup> Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 24.

<sup>81</sup> Martin L., Stevenson R., Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 34.

<sup>82</sup> Protsyuk I., Zmishana respublika: poniattia ta oznaky, *„Aktualni problemy prava: teoriia i praktyka”* 2012, vol 25, s. 462–471.

<sup>83</sup> Radchenko O., Osoblyvosti zastosuvannya pryntsyphu rozpodilu derzhavnoi vlady u zmishanykh respublikakh, *„Viznyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav”* 2010, vol 1, s. 202–209.

<sup>84</sup> Bostan S., *Forma pravlinnia suchasnoi derzhavy: problemy istorii, teorii, praktyky*, Zaporizhzhia 2005, s. 290.

dually formed and/or responsible under the condition of joint participation of popularly elected president and legislature. As a result, the following attributes are obtained: the actual “securitization” of a president/the head of state (based on his or her representative mandate received popularly from the people) from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different in structural and functional terms (based on different distances among institutional relations in the triangle “head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”) deconcentration, distribution or dualization of the executive between a president/the head of state and a prime minister/the head of governmental cabinet; formal (but not always actual) complete non-membership (or partial membership) of a president/the head of state to any of the branches of state power, provided that he or she can play an active role in political life of a country and significantly influence the functioning of the state mechanism and apparatus. As a consequence, it is often believed the generation of not a triune, but a quadruple (the fourth branch of state power appears to be in a president/the head of state) model of state power, although it is not a mandatory and permanent attribute of semi-presidentialism. This, according to Radchenko<sup>85</sup>, on the one hand, helps to balance state power and establish an effective system of checks and balances, as well as to prevent a significant strengthening of any of the subjects of institutional, procedural, political and behavioral relations and its unrestricted domination in political life of a country, but, on the other hand, it causes conflicts within the state mechanism and apparatus, which do not contribute to political stability. Therefore, according to Serohina, the impression is that under the conditions of semi-presidentialism there is a stabilization of system of government “due to the combination of different equilibrium power principles that form their new unity”<sup>86</sup>. As a result, in this system of government, there almost always (apart from certain institutional, procedural, political and behavioral scenarios and cases) are such aspects of the division of state power as functional, institutional and subjective ones. In addition, a president (mostly as exceptionally the head of state) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism traditionally provides or can provide with its “arbitration” or “neutrality” the coordinated functioning of state authorities, and also must ensure compliance with constitution and laws, national independence and territorial integrity.

At the same time, semi-presidential system of government is determined by other categorical and systematizing factors, some of which are the indicators of this constitutional and political type. For example, regardless of the approach to the conceptualization of various systems of government, semi-presidentialism is traditionally determined by the fact that a governmental cabinet and its prime minister are necessarily collectively responsible (that is, they may be resigned beforehand) to a legislature (parliament, leading or two chambers of parliament) or both to a legislature and a president. In addition, a prime minister and/or a governmental cabinet

<sup>85</sup> Radchenko O., Osoblyvosti zastosuvannya pryntsyphu rozpodilu derzhavnoi vlady u zmishanykh respublikakh, *Visnyk Khar'kivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav* 2010, vol 1, s. 202–209.

<sup>86</sup> Serohina S., Vytoky kontseptsii „zmishane pravlinnia“ v antychnii polityko-pravovii teorii ta praktytsi, *Problemy zakonosti* 2006, vol 78, s. 35.



are generally formed on the basis of a presidential proposal with the only difference that such a proposal may be real (on his or her own accord, regardless of the support of a legislature) or conditional (through the implementation and consideration by the head of state of the will and distribution of political parties within the composition of a legislature and necessarily taking into account the support of a legislature). Moreover, it does not matter whether a governmental cabinet and its prime minister are positioned as pro-presidential (i.e., in the same team with a president) or anti-presidential (i.e., in opposition to the presidential team). Since, the main thing in the definition of semi-presidentialism are exclusively institutional and procedural attributes and the peculiarities of its categorization and systematization as if it has a double/dual nature of the executive, but not the presence or absence of dual executive, as well as the powers of president and parliament in formation and resignation of governmental cabinet and prime minister. This means that the systematic and permanent feature of semi-presidentialism is double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive. Since, as noted above, a governmental cabinet and prime minister in semi-presidentialism (in any of its definition) are collectively responsible (that is they may be resigned ahead of time) necessarily to a legislature or to a legislature and a president. Moreover, the political responsibility of a governmental cabinet and prime minister in semi-presidentialism is traditionally more prolonged in the direction of a parliament. The fact is that a legislature (if it participates in the formation of a governmental cabinet) must express its position/agreement (the so-called vote of investiture in governmental cabinet) regarding the formation of a governmental cabinet (i.e., regarding the appointment of a prime minister, the approval of a composition and/or a government program) and is authorized (regardless of the design of inter-institutional relations) to verify the results of the government's activity, embodied in the possibility of its early resignation (i.e., in the vote of no confidence in governmental cabinet).

In addition, semi-presidentialism is characterized or can be characterized by other temporary or transitive institutional and procedural attributes. All of them, by correcting the remarks of Albert<sup>87</sup>, Metcalf<sup>88</sup>, Ludwikowski<sup>89</sup>, McPherson<sup>90</sup>, Protsyuk<sup>91</sup> and Krysenko<sup>92</sup>, can be reduced to such, not always realizable, patterns as: replacement of the president's position with a non-parliamentary and popular way for a fixed term; obligatory collective responsibility of a governmental cabinet and prime minister to a legislature; the appointment of a prime minister

<sup>87</sup> Albert R., Presidential values in parliamentary democracies, „*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2010, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 207–236.

<sup>88</sup> Metcalf L. K., Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, „*Journal of Transnational Law & Policy*” 1996, vol 125, s. 125–142.

<sup>89</sup> Ludwikowski R., “Mixed” Constitutions – Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, „*Boston University International Law Journal*” 1998, vol 16, s. 1–34.

<sup>90</sup> McPherson C., Russia's 1993 Constitution: Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a Return to Autocracy?, „*Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly*” 1999, vol 27, s. 160–163.

<sup>91</sup> Protsyuk I., Zmishana respublika: poniattia ta oznaky, „*Aktualni problemy prava: teoriia i praktyka*” 2012, vol 25, s. 462–471.

<sup>92</sup> Krysenko O., Napivprezidentska forma pravlinnia: model instyutsionalnoi stabilizatsii vlady dlia Ukrainy, „*Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karavazina. Seriya: Pytannia politolohii*” 2008, vol 825, s. 114–122.

and the formation of a governmental cabinet under a real or conditional submission by a president; double or dual nature of the origin and implementation, but not the responsibility of the executive (governmental cabinet and prime minister); the constitutional determination of a president neither as the head of the executive, nor as the head of governmental cabinet, but only as the head of state and the “arbiter” or the guarantor in certain spheres of state activity (however, while conferring him or her with the powers in the executive, which leads to executive dualism); presidential dedication to the legislative initiative, legislative veto, promulgation of laws, announcement of referendums and its positioning as a supreme commander of the armed forces; the prerogative of the head of state to convene and chair a governmental cabinet; the authorization of a legislature to impeach a president for committing crimes; probable fixing of the principle of incompatibility of the position of a member of a governmental cabinet with the mandate of a deputy; along with the obligatory collective responsibility of a cabinet to legislature, its dual individual responsibility to a legislature and a president; the president’s prerogative to dissolve a legislature and appoint its early elections; presence of a constitutionally determined list of presidential acts subjected to counter-signature by a prime minister and (or) ministers; control by the highest judicial authority (which has a constitutional jurisdiction) of the correspondence of the acts of a parliament and a president with respect to constitution, etc. Among them, the categorical and systematic (mandatory) principles are the first four, and the complementary (optional) principles are all the rest. Supplemental principle is also (according to constitutional (institutional or formal) definition of semi-presidentialism) the actual set of powers of the main institutions of power in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. It is determined by party and electoral factors and by the ratio among the support of a president and a prime minister by parts (parties, groups and individual deputies) of a legislature, in particular by checking their support or non-support by parliamentary majority, as well as by the participation of each of them in the legislative process. As a result, semi-presidential system of government constitutionally and politically admits the opportunity for a kind of “drift” of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”, in particular in terms of changing the balance of power between them. Therefore, according to Tereshchuk<sup>93</sup>, the status of a president and a prime minister in the conditions of semi-presidentialism may vary depending on the social and political circumstances that arose at one time or another, and even on the authority of politicians who occupy the corresponding positions. This means that semi-presidentialism is categorized and systematized institutionally-procedurally (i.e. formally and constitutionally) and politically-behaviorally (i.e. subjectively and personally).

Synthesizing and systematizing the attributes and characteristics of semi-presidentialism, derived from its maximalist (classical) and minimalist (post-classical) definitions, in particular,

<sup>93</sup> Tereshchuk M., Riznovydy respublikanskoi formy pravlinnia: porivnialna kharakterystyka, „*Derzhava i pravo: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats. Seriya: Yurydychni ta politychni nauky*” 2006, vol 33, s. 76.

appealing to the scientific researches of Verney<sup>94</sup>, Lijphart<sup>95</sup>, Sartori<sup>96</sup>, Elgie<sup>97</sup>, Newton<sup>98</sup>, Gerring, Thacker and Moreno<sup>99</sup>, Cheibub, Elkins, Ginsburg, Gandhi and Vreeland<sup>100</sup>, etc., we reduce them to a common “uncontroversial” denominator, which covers both definitional (constant), complementary (typological) and temporary (transitive) attributes. The main definitional and constant attributes of semi-presidentialism are the following characteristics of this system of government: popular election of a president for a fixed term; obligatory collective responsibility of a prime minister and a governmental cabinet to a legislature; the combination/dualization of the executive by a president (necessarily as the head of state) and a prime minister (necessarily as the head of government) and governmental cabinet. They are stable and unambiguous and check the presence or absence of a formal (institutionally-procedural) semi-presidential nature of a particular system of government. Instead, the temporary (transitory) attributes of semi-presidentialism are complementary, variational and optional, and therefore their use contributes to identifying the actual (politically-behavioral) nature, as well as increasing the quality of the typology of semi-presidential system of government. They (based on various indicators) should be divided into such groups as: related to the formation and dismissal of governmental cabinets, related to the activities of parliaments, legislative, functional, prescriptive/terminal, etc. In sum, such a theoretical, methodological and operational logic of the attrition of semi-presidentialism satisfies the observations of Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg<sup>101</sup>, according to which there are two sets of characteristics of this system of government. The first (permanent or definitive) set determines whether a certain system of government is institutionally and procedurally semi-presidential one. Instead, the second (temporal or transitive) set complementary and typologically outlines the institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes of semi-presidentialism.

<sup>94</sup> Verney D., *Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government*, [w:] Lijphart A. (ed.), *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992, s. 31–47.

<sup>95</sup> Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

<sup>96</sup> Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, London 1997.

<sup>97</sup> Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

<sup>98</sup> Newton K., *Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

<sup>99</sup> Gerring J., Thacker S., Moreno C., Are Parliamentary Systems Better, „*Comparative Political Studies*“ 2009, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 327–359.

<sup>100</sup> Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, „*British Journal of Political Science*“ 2014, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 515–544; Cheibub J. A., Gandhi J., Vreeland J., Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, „*Public Choice*“ 2010, vol 143, s. 67–101.

<sup>101</sup> Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., *Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Forms*, Presented at the International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, January 14–15, 2010; Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, „*British Journal of Political Science*“ 2014, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 515–544.

## **THE FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT SYSTEM, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP: FROM «REAL SOCIALISM» REGIMES TO POST-COMMUNISM**

The article is devoted to analyzing historical trends and peculiarities of formation and reformation of transport system, infrastructure, logistics and transport in general in the countries of the Visegrad Group – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – in communist and post-communist periods. It is motivated that the solution of transport problems at the interface between the regimes of “real socialism” and post-communism was the initial stage of formation of the current transport system in the countries of the Visegrad Group. This was mainly due to the processes of diversified privatization and deregulation of transport system, infrastructure and logistics, which had a definite effect on the change in the ownership structure of transport, and hence on the further development of transport infrastructure and logistics both in post-communist and post-Eurointegration periods.

*Keywords: transport, transport infrastructure, transport logistics, motorization, privatization, countries of the Visegrad Group.*

## **ОСОБЛИВОСТІ РОЗВИТКУ ТРАНСПОРТНОЇ СИСТЕМИ, ЛОГІСТИКИ Й ІНФРАСТРУКТУРИ В КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: ВІД РЕЖИМІВ «РЕАЛЬНОГО СОЦІАЛІЗМУ» ДО ПОСТКОМУНІЗМУ**

Проаналізовано історичні тренди й особливості становлення та реформування транспортної системи, інфраструктури, логістики і загалом транспорту в країнах Вишеградської групи – Польщі, Угорщині, Словаччині і Чехії – у комуністичний та посткомуністичний періоди. Вмотивовано, що вирішення транспортної проблематики на стику режимів «реального соціалізму» і посткомунізму було ініціальною стадією становлення чинної транспортної системи в країнах Вишеградської групи. Причому відбувалось це головню за рахунок процесів диверсифікованої приватизації і дерегуляції транспортної системи, інфраструктури й логістики, які визначально позначились на зміні структури власності транспортом, а відтак й на подальшому розвитку транспортної інфраструктури і логістики – як у посткомуністичний, так і в постевроінтеграційний періоди.

**Ключові слова:** транспорт, транспортна інфраструктура, транспортна логістика, моторизація, приватизація, країни Вишеградської групи.

Modern state of transport system, infrastructure, logistics and transport in general in the countries of the Visegrad group – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – mainly relies on historical trends and features of their formation and reformation, in particular over the communist and post-communist periods. Thus, systematization and structuring of current transport infrastructure and logistics in the analyzed region are not possible without determining the patterns of their development and historical and transformational trends and features of formation in the past. Correspondingly, the topicality of the current research is mainly predetermined by the necessity to figure out peculiarities of the development of the transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the countries of the Visegrad group at the edge of their transit from the “real socialism” regime to post-communism as an initial stage of establishing current transport system in the region.

This range of problems was intentionally and briefly studied in the scientific works by the following scholars: R. Bauer<sup>1</sup>, W. Hook<sup>2</sup>, T. Komornicki<sup>3</sup>, S. Mitric and W. Suchorzewski<sup>4</sup>, D. Peters<sup>5</sup>, J. Pucher<sup>6</sup>, W. Rydzkowski and B. Spraggins<sup>7</sup>, W. Suchorzewski<sup>8</sup>, M. Turre<sup>9</sup> and many others. However, they do not deliver a complex and systematic position as to understanding peculiarities of transport logistics and infrastructure in the Visegrad countries at the edge of their transit from the “real socialism” regime to post-communism as a precondition for establishing current transport system in the region in future. This is the basic aim and tasks of the current research.

Proceeding to the task we appeal to J. Pucher and R. Buehler's<sup>10</sup> remark that the countries of the Visegrad group being in due time socialistic, but later becoming post-socialistic, have

<sup>1</sup> Bauer R., *Gospodarka Rynkowa w Transporcie*, „Przegląd Komunikacyjny” 1990, vol 11.

<sup>2</sup> Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, „Transport Policy” 1999, vol 6, s. 207–224.

<sup>3</sup> Komornicki T., Factors of development of car ownership in Poland, „Transport Reviews” 2003, vol 23, s. 413–431.

<sup>4</sup> Mitric S., Suchorzewski W., *Urban transport in Poland: the challenge of the ascending private car*, [w:] *Proceedings of the Conference Reconciling Transportation, Energy, and Environmental Issues, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, Paris 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Peters D., *Planning for a sustainable Europe: a case study of EU transport infrastructure policy in the context of eastern enlargement*. Ph.D. dissertation, Wyd. Rutgers University 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Pucher J., Capitalism, socialism, and urban transportation, „Journal of the American Planning Association” 1990, vol 56, s. 278–297.;

Pucher J., Road to ruin? Impacts of economic shocktherapy on urban transport in Poland, „Transport Policy” 1995, vol 2, s. 5–13.;

Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „Transport Policy” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.;

Pucher J., The transport revolution in Central Europe, „Transportation Quarterly” 1993, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 97–113.;

Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/>

PucherCentralEurope.pdf [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>7</sup> Rydzkowski W., Spraggins B., Privatization and Deregulation of Transport in Poland: New Transport Policy Implications, „International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management” 1994, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 23–29.

<sup>8</sup> Suchorzewski W., *The funding of public transport investment in Central Europe*. *Proceedings of Conference Financing Urban Public Transport*, Paper presented at Conference of European Ministers of Transport and Union Internationale des Transports Publics, Paris 1999.;

Suchorzewski W., *Urban public transport in Poland: main issues and perspectives*, Paper presented at UITP Conference „Changing European Market and Global Industry”, Lodz 2002.;

Suchorzewski W., *Urban transport in Poland*, Wyd. Ministry of Transport 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Turre M., *Going trans-European: planning and financing networks for Europe*, Wyd. Pergamon 1999.

<sup>10</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/>

undergone profound political and social-economic transformations since the collapse of the “real socialism” regimes in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But each country in the region due to specific time and circumstances of epochal changes has its own history of political, social-economic and systematic transformations into a democratic and market society. Therefore, even today between the countries of the Visegrad group there are certain distinctions as to which extent their political systems are democratic, and social-economic systems are market. On the one, hand it allows to unite the country of the analyzed region in a single analytical group, but on the other hand it is a precondition for their permanent clustering. At the same time it refers to the development of transport system, infrastructure and logistics, as in each country of the analyzed region political and social-economic development and reforms stipulated a corresponding “transport revolution”<sup>11</sup>. Eventually, it means that namely changes in politics and social-economic sphere became catalyst for almost all transformations in post-socialist Europe over the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, demonstrating how dramatically politics and economy influenced each aspect of that time and current transport, infrastructure and logistic systems<sup>12</sup>. In particular, taking into account the fact that as a result of trends and consequences of reforms (from authoritarianism, planned economy and absolutely state ownership to democracy, capitalism and private, state, municipal and shared ownership) transport systems stopped being predominantly an element of planning and forecasting activity, but naturally, though chaotically started falling under the processes of restructuration, privatization and deregulation<sup>13</sup>.

One of the most vivid factors of the “transport revolution” in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the countries of the Visegrad group was a dramatic growth of the number of car ownership and usage of private (first of all automobiles) vehicles and a corresponding reduction in the level of public transport using, however together with the processes of producing considerable social inequality<sup>14</sup> (see Table 1). Herewith, such modal shift in using public transport in the majority of the countries of the analyzed region corresponded with similar changes in the system of railway transport from the state sector to private transport companies<sup>15</sup>. At the same

[www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf](http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf) [odczyt: 01.11.2018].; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>11</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; Pucher J., The transport revolution in Central Europe, „*Transportation Quarterly*” 1993, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 97–113.

<sup>12</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>13</sup> Rydzkowski W., Spraggins B., Privatization and Deregulation of Transport in Poland: New Transport Policy Implications, „*International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*” 1994, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 23–29.; Bauer R., Gospodarka Rynkowa w Transporcie, „*Przegląd Komunikacyjny*” 1990, vol 11.

<sup>14</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; Rydzkowski W., Spraggins B., Privatization and Deregulation of Transport in Poland: New Transport Policy Implications, „*International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*” 1994, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 23–29.; Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 207–224.

<sup>15</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

time, of great interest is the fact that dependence of the road transport (first of all automobiles) started over the last years of the “real socialism” regimes, movement towards “market capitalism” significantly accelerated this trend and stipulated terrific transformations in the state transport policy, logistics and infrastructure.

Table 1. Private ownership of transport means (the number of automobiles per 1 000 people) in the countries of the Visegrad group over the “real socialism” regime and post-communism (1970–1996)

| Year | Poland, № | Hungary, № | Czechoslovakia, № | the Czech Rep., № | Slovakia, № |
|------|-----------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| 1970 | 15        | 22         | 64                | –                 | –           |
| 1980 | 67        | 95         | 152               | –                 | –           |
| 1985 | 98        | 135        | 180               | –                 | –           |
| 1988 | 119       | 163        | 196               | 216               | 158         |
| 1990 | 138       | 189        | 211               | 233               | –           |
| 1992 | 169       | 217        | 219               | 250               | 176         |
| 1996 | 195       | 220        | –                 | 325               | 191         |

Źródło: Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; Pucher J., Road to ruin? Impacts of economic shocktherapy on urban transport in Poland, „*Transport Policy*” 1995, vol 2, s. 5–13.

What refers to the historical period of the “real socialism” regime (see Tables 1 and 2), in due time, especially in the 70s-80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, domination of public transport over private was predetermined by several factors. First of all, according to the socialist ideology of “communist dictatorship” held a view and declared that owning and using private vehicles was expensive and hard, while public transport was widely spread and so much subsidized that it almost cost nothing. Thus, socialist governments of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia imposed very high expenses on owning and using cars and other vehicles by means of the system of regulated prices<sup>16</sup>. Besides, they restricted their own car production (first of all personal cars), organized long queues for new national means of transport and banned or limited import of “western” vehicles<sup>17</sup>. As a result, demand on private transport means significantly has overtaken their supply and thus purchase of cars was often accompanied by bribes and political ties. It was supplemented by the fact that fuel prices in the countries of the analyzed region were, at least in the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, standardized and this led to formation of the black market of ration cards and growth in price on fuel for those who wanted to travel more than it was possible due to the official sharing of fuel<sup>18</sup>. Secondly, quite obvious was rather low quality of national transport means and services, thus vehicles

vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>16</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>17</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>18</sup> Rydzkowski W., Spraggins B., Privatization and Deregulation of Transport in Poland: New Transport Policy Implications, „*International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*” 1994, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 23–29.

frequently got broken and it was hard to repair them (due to the lack of replacement parts). Besides, at that time road and transport network in general was rather primitive in comparison with the western standards and characterized by the deficit of fuel filling stations, vehicle service stations and other object of service infrastructure<sup>19</sup>. Thirdly, before the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century governments in the socialist countries of the analyzed region treated private vehicles as luxury and real sign of capitalism, materiality and consumerism, which contradicted that time regimes of “people’s democracy” and “real socialism”. Only in the course of the late 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century restrictions on private means of transport (in particular automobiles) were eased in response to growing demand of people on articles of popular consumption<sup>20</sup>.

As a result all this generated a stereotype, according to which an average citizen of that time socialist Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia perceived a private car as an elite and high-quality means of transport, which due to its restricted market admission was rather a status symbol. It was enhanced by the fact that socialist governments in the region allowed small supply of cars – first of all as a reward for faithful party members. And even after some liberalization of the transport market in the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, even at the end of the epoch of “real socialism” regimes owning a private car was limited to a small vehicle, though it was still accompanied by a negative and scornful social attitude. Correspondingly and on the contrary, public transport was the most relevant means for a planned social economy with its restrictions on consumption, mobility and selection of sites for living. It resulted in a limited motorization, which apparently helped “communist dictatorship” to keep control of their population, which was positioned as a “captivated horseman”<sup>21</sup>.

All in all, it led to the perception of public transport as a vital means of life, which was rendered to all at a low price. And thus, it resulted in lavish financial support and investment on the side of governments to all types of public transport activity. Though, even despite this fact, except for the subway in big cities, public transport services in the socialist countries of the analyzed region usually were of low quality in comparison with public transport in the West. The point is, that in almost all socialist cities buses, trolleybuses and trams were overcrowded, slow, ill-coordinated and were characterized by often breakage<sup>22</sup>. It was pre-determined by the fact that socialist public transport in fact had no competitors and thus was not concerned with comfort and safety of drivers and passengers. As in many spheres of socialist economy, staff overage, lack of working motivation, excessive bureaucracy and extreme inefficiency also characterized public transport. Thus, only stability, frequency and

<sup>19</sup> Pucher J., The transport revolution in Central Europe, „*Transportation Quarterly*” 1993, vol 47, nr 1, s. 97–113; Pucher J., Road to ruin? Impacts of economic shocktherapy on urban transport in Poland, „*Transport Policy*” 1995, vol 2, s. 5–13.

<sup>20</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>21</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>22</sup> Pucher J., Capitalism, socialism, and urban transportation, „*Journal of the American Planning Association*” 1990, vol 56, s. 278–297.



cheapness of public transport compensate all its disadvantages, especially on the background of other well-developed economies within the region of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. And against the backdrop of people's poverty it determined impossibility not only to own, but even to move by personal transport means. A vivid example became the fact that at the end of 1988 only 10% of the Czechs and Slovaks used cars to get to work<sup>23</sup>.

Situation in the countries, which later composed the Visegrad group, started changing only after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty at the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as during that period (especially over 1989-1992) the majority of principles and regulations of transport programs and policies in the region changed significantly. One of the crucial changes was a dramatic reduction of subsidies from the central government for support and development of public transport. On the contrary, the main part of the burden connected with financing capital investments and acting subsidies in the sector of public transport was shifted to municipal authorities. Therefore, not capitals, but individual towns and villages were obliged to pay operative and capital subsidies on public transport (except for the railway transport) in separate populated areas, while central authorities became enlisted to this only in the frames of little financing by means of special infrastructural funds. For example, in Czechoslovakia, the central government in this period offered to cover only 30% of expenses on means of transport and infrastructure for electric trams and trolleybuses and 10% of expenses on purchase and maintenance of buses<sup>24</sup>. In practice, local governments in Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) did not have possibilities to render support to all necessary funds, and the central government could not repay them promised assistance<sup>25</sup>. As a result, later subsidy programs of public transport (partially except for the subway and railway transport) on the part of central governments in the part of the countries from the region were fully cancelled, while the remained programs were reconsidered in the context of changing state budgets.

The results of reduction in financing appeared to be destructive for the sector of public transport, especially because the bodies of local authorities were in an awful financial state and could not compensate for the subsidies, reduced by central governments. That is why, along with reduction of state subsidies for the system of public transport in the countries of the Visegrad group it became necessary to raise fares both in an absolute representation and in line with inflation, salary and costs of using personal means of transport (first of all automobiles). Thus, in course of 1988-1994 price for a one-way ticket in trams in Warsaw rebound by over 400 times, and the percent of an average hour salary, necessary to pay for this ticket, only in 4 times, i.e. 26%. Moreover, a liter of petrol in 1988 cost 7 times more

<sup>23</sup> *Dato o Doprave v Praze*, Wyd. Institute of Transportation Engineering of Prague 1998.; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>24</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>25</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

than a tram ticket, while in 1994 the price was only twice of it<sup>26</sup>. On the analogy, in the Czech Republic over that time the price for public transport grew in 72%, including inflation adjustment, as a result of what the price of ticket was twice of that for petrol over 1989-1997. These dramatic changes of relative prices (which were peculiar of all countries in the Visegrad group) and deterioration of quality of services presupposed a considerable shift from passenger carriage to transit of goods – in the direction from public and industrial transport to private transport<sup>27</sup>. Besides, reduction in demand for public transport in post-communist period (first of all in Poland, Hungary, less in the Czech Republic and Slovakia<sup>28</sup>) was stipulated by a high level of unemployment<sup>29</sup>.

All this standardized the fact that if the state policy of the Visegrad countries in the sector of public transport became less advantageous, they became more adjusted to the processes of owning and using private means of transport, first of all automobiles. Especially on the background the point that almost all restrictions on owning cars were removed, it opened a market to foreign and national (in particular Poland and the Czech Republic<sup>30</sup>) manufacturers of motor vehicles, what resulted in growth of quality and number of cars, which became affordable for people from post-communist countries. It was also contributed by the fact that since the mid-90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century real salary in the countries of the Visegrad group grew, due to what growth of real income of people stimulated a bigger level in owning and using automobiles and corresponded to reduction in the level of using public transport and negative elasticity of its income. Almost immediately after the collapse of the system of the Warsaw Treaty it was supplemented by the fact that in the countries of the analyzed region started the processes of improvement and development of road networks, in particular with the focus on high-speed arterial roads, suburb lines around cities, narrow streets at the key intersections with main inter-city and international routes. It means that after the collapse of the USSR an increase in the level of motorization in the Visegrad countries was accompanied, though not absolutely relevant in terms of rates, by development of road infrastructure<sup>31</sup>, but at the same time by reduction in quality of public transport (on the background of socialist period in comparison with western countries).

<sup>26</sup> Mitric S., Suchorzewski W., *Urban transport in Poland: the challenge of the ascending private car*, [w:] *Proceedings of the Conference Reconciling Transportation, Energy, and Environmental Issues, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, Paris 1994.; Pucher J., Road to ruin? Impacts of economic shocktherapy on urban transport in Poland, „*Transport Policy*” 1995, vol 2, s. 5–13.

<sup>27</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>28</sup> *Transport Yearbook 2002*, Wyd. Czech Statistical Office 2003.

<sup>29</sup> Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 207–224.

<sup>30</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236. *Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region*, Wyd. World Bank 2002.

<sup>31</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

Therefore, a dramatic transition from mass public transport to mass private transport, on the one hand represented consumers' advantages as to convenience, comfort, speed, flexibility, independency, but, on the other hand, caused considerable problems concerning traffic congestions, demarcation of pathways for public and private transport, deterioration of infrastructure, lack of parking lots, air contamination, as well as noise and accidents, which were (and even are solved) very slowly and gradually<sup>32</sup>. However, on the contrary, after overcoming a "primary shock" caused by transition to capitalism in the early 90-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the systems of public transport in the countries of the Visegrad group, started gradually, but partially recovering, modernization, privatization and even corporatization. It was represented by stabilization of passenger traffic flow in public transport, growth in quality of service and monitoring, modernization and renovation of transport means and infrastructure in the sector, growth in operational efficiency, and rationalization of fare. At the same time, due to ill-financing, technical support, coordination, planning and other governments' actions, modesty of local budgets and ambitious policy of road engineering in the countries of the region still existed the policy of widespread use of private means of transport, and therefore the "policy of non-assistance" in renewing a customer database of public transport.

It became clear due to constantly growing competitiveness of private transport, its low density, polycentric nature and multi-mandate character of movement<sup>33</sup>, which for decades has been inherent to western countries and is becoming more and more co-opted in the analyzed region. The abovementioned fact, especially on the edge of epochs in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was enhanced by the factor of future membership in the European Union, which already had quite effective transport system and policy, which is obligatory to follow for all EU members. Correspondingly, transition from monopolized public transport to liberal private transport in the countries of the Visegrad group before and while joining the European Union was determined by the requirement to conform to the EU policy<sup>34</sup>. Moreover, taking into account the fact that the transport policy of the European Union had a significant influence and is still influencing intercity transportation, as it is aimed at (including the means of the European Investment Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund) reestablishing variable means of communication, which stopped over the period of "real socialism", in particular in the Visegrad countries<sup>35</sup>.

It is worth mentioning that before joining the EU, i.e. in the period of post-communism, these projects to be implemented were predominantly financed from the national budgets,

<sup>32</sup> Pucher J., The transport revolution in Central Europe, „*Transportation Quarterly*” 1993, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 97–113.; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>33</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>34</sup> *Urban transport in the Europe and Central Asia Region*, Wyd. World Bank 2002.; Peters D., *Planning for a sustainable Europe: a case study of EU transport infrastructure policy in the context of eastern enlargement: Ph.D. dissertation*, Wyd. Rutgers University 2003.

<sup>35</sup> Tuire M., *Going trans-European: planning and financing networks for Europe*, Wyd. Pergamon 1999.

and not supra-national funds and thus were characterized by slow progress<sup>36</sup>. And only since 2004, when the countries of the Visegrad group stopped being post-communist, funding of transport projects in them (in different periods the situation differs) became more forward-thinking and comprehensive<sup>37</sup>. Though in general it looked like central governments and bodies of local authorities of the countries in the Visegrad group started implementing transport projects being still post-communist candidates for joining the European Union and continued to enhance, develop and even complete them being already the EU members. All in all, it means that the EU transport system and policy played an exclusively mediate and directive, but not a conceptual role, as well as performed isolated and selective influence on the policy of transport, infrastructure and logistic orientation, development and maintenance within the frames of public and private transport in the countries of the Visegrad group<sup>38</sup>. Herewith, orientation of the countries under analysis on the European Union and the EU influence on the countries of the Visegrad group appeared to be crucial, as due to them all the requirements as to open competition in rendering transport services marked organizational structure and economic efficiency of the transport system, in particular public and private transport. As a result, namely due to this the countries of the Visegrad group, after the collapse of the Warsaw treaty system, naturally had to modify their legislations to conform to the EU standards, which contributed to transnational and transport competitiveness.

In general, it is determined that at the edge of political epochs the transport system and orientation of the countries of the Visegrad group were mainly characterized by a significant growth in the level of motorization (which is traditionally assessed by the number of private means of transport per 1 000 people). In particular, as the study in Table 2 shows, ownership of private automobiles was growing in the course of the whole period of 1976 – 2001 (which could be undoubtedly named absolutely post-communist). The point is that over that time and in the late 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the countries of the Visegrad group the number of owners of private means of transport per capita doubled. It was stipulated by the fact (which includes) that within the frames of partially liberated reforms, performed by socialist governments in the late 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially in Poland and Hungary, less in Czechoslovakia, started the processes of increase in demand for consumer goods, in particular for private cars<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> Peters D., *Planning for a sustainable Europe: a case study of EU transport infrastructure policy in the context of eastern enlargement: Ph.D. dissertation*, Wyd. Rutgers University 2003.

<sup>37</sup> Pucher J., Buchler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>38</sup> Peters D., *Planning for a sustainable Europe: a case study of EU transport infrastructure policy in the context of eastern enlargement: Ph.D. dissertation*, Wyd. Rutgers University 2003.; Suchorzewski W., *Urban public transport in Poland: main issues and perspectives*, Paper presented at UITP Conference „Changing European Market and Global Industry”, Lodz 2002.

<sup>39</sup> Pucher J., Buchler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtppi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

Table 2. Level of motorization and private ownership of transport means (in the number of transport means per 1 000 people) in the Visegrad countries and other post-communist countries in Europe (1976–2001)

| Country                    | Year |      |      |      |      | GDP per capita, in US\$ |        |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|--------|
|                            | 1976 | 1980 | 1990 | 1996 | 2001 | 1996                    | 2001   |
| Belarus                    | 12   | 31   | 59   | 101  | 142  | 2 150                   | 7 630  |
| Bulgaria                   | 51   | 56   | 146  | 204  | 262  | 1 140                   | 6 740  |
| Estonia                    | 12   | 31   | 154  | 277  | 347  | 3 390                   | 9 650  |
| Latvia                     | 12   | 31   | 106  | 153  | 250  | 2 063                   | 7 760  |
| Lithuania                  | 12   | 31   | 133  | 212  | 340  | 2 230                   | 8 350  |
| Macedonia                  | 80   | 108  | 121  | 139  | 151  | 1 090                   | 6 040  |
| German Democratic Republic | 122  | 151  | 296  | 440  | 486  | 15 498                  | 17 668 |
| Poland                     | 37   | 67   | 138  | 209  | 272  | 3 590                   | 9 370  |
| Russia                     | 12   | 31   | 65   | 92   | 140  | 2 740                   | 6 880  |
| Romania                    | 9    | 11   | 56   | 107  | 144  | 1 420                   | 5 780  |
| Slovakia                   | 112  | 148  | 163  | 198  | 240  | 3 700                   | 11 780 |
| Slovenia                   | 80   | 108  | 289  | 365  | 433  | 9 680                   | 17 060 |
| Hungary                    | 69   | 85   | 188  | 239  | 244  | 4 430                   | 11 990 |
| Ukraine                    | 12   | 31   | 63   | 93   | 106  | –                       | 4 270  |
| Croatia                    | 80   | 108  | 147  | 175  | 257  | 4 610                   | 8 930  |
| The Czech Republic         | 112  | 148  | 228  | 325  | 369  | 5 200                   | 14 320 |
| Average data               | 52   | 74   | 147  | 208  | 261  | 4 195                   | 9 639  |
| Countries of the region    | 83   | 112  | 179  | 243  | 281  | 4 230                   | 11 865 |

Źródło: Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; *World Road Statistics*, Wyd. International Road Federation 1997.; *World Development Indicators 1999*, Wyd. World Bank 1999.; *Motor vehicle facts and figures*, Wyd. American Automobile Manufacturers Association 1982.; *International Statistics*, Wyd. German Federal Statistical Office 2003.

It was supplemented by tendencies and correlation of increase in income per capita in post-communist European countries, as it is found that growth in private income has predominantly been in direct proportionality, however with some exceptions, with the level of motorization in the region<sup>40</sup>. There were and still are several reasons for such variability of income and a share of private ownership. First of all, statistical data may be unreliable and based on different methods, i.e. may take into account only quantity, but not quality of automobiles, and thus of great significance is the fact that means of transport in the countries of the Visegrad group were usually older, secondhand and of much lower quality than those in western Europe or Northern America, for example<sup>41</sup>. Besides, information about income of population in the countries of the analyzed region was (and still often is) inaccurate, as black markets and black economies played (and still play) a significant role, although this data was not reported on in the

<sup>40</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>41</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, Źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf>[odczyt: 01.11.2018].

official statistics and this diminished real income and purchasing power of population. Secondly, private ownership of an automobile is a very important symbol of social-economic status and personal liberty and therefore a great number of people in the region bought vehicles just to show that crucial symbol of prosperity and independence, and to do that they often overstepped the boundaries of their financial-economic resources and real transport needs<sup>42</sup>. Thirdly, even at that time private ownership of transport means in the countries of the Visegrad group (see Table 2) achieved a rather high level, played the so-called “saturation effect”, as the increase in income led mainly to purchasing more expensive cars and not just to growth in number of automobiles (including cheap cars). Controversial situation was inherent to a number of other post-communist countries in Europe, where an increase predominantly took place (and takes place even now) due to a number of transport means, as general levels of motorization remained rather low. Fourthly, personal (own) transport means became more and more necessary only in some post-communist countries of Europe, as it has been mentioned above, in the analyzed region the system of public transport declined, while fares were growing unevenly<sup>43</sup>.

Besides, difference in correlation between income of population and level of motorization in the countries of the Visegrad group was determined by distinctive features of the state policy in the transport sphere, in particular in the sphere of progressive private (first of all automobiles) and regressive public (country, town and inter-city) transport (especially in Poland and to a less extent in other countries of the region). That is why, the result of using private means of transport and reduction in using public transport became a rapid shift of modal shares of transporting<sup>44</sup>. Thus, over the mid-80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – 2000 the share of public transport in the overall motorized transportation in big cities in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic reduced from 75–85% to 50–60%. Even bigger share in the sphere of transportation public transport lost in small towns and villages, many of which just lost such type of transportation<sup>45</sup>. The same processes took place in the sphere of railway transportation, because its share in transportation of freight dramatically reduced, though in general all-freight railway operations rapidly grew (and are still growing). For instance, a share of railway transportation in tones per kilometers from all freight transportation in the Czech Republic in fact reduced almost in three times from 73% in 1990 to 25% in 2002. In Poland over the same period the reduction was from 67% to 39%. Herewith, among all countries of the Visegrad group such losses in railway transportation were covered first of all due to motorization of road freight

<sup>42</sup> Pucher J., Road to ruin? Impacts of economic shocktherapy on urban transport in Poland, *“Transport Policy”* 1995, vol 2, s. 5–13.; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, *“Transport Policy”* 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; Komornicki T., Factors of development of car ownership in Poland, *“Transport Reviews”* 2003, vol 23, s. 413–431.

<sup>43</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>44</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>45</sup> Suchorzewski W., *The funding of public transport investment in Central Europe. Proceedings of Conference Financing Urban Public Transport*, Paper presented at Conference of European Ministers of Transport and Union Internationale des Transports Publics, Paris 1999.; *Yearbook of Transportation 2002*, Wyd. Institute of Transportation Engineering 2003.

transport, as over the analogous period of time, in the Czech Republic, for example, tonnage of transportation by road means of transport grew almost tripled (from about 15 000 to more than 45 000 mln tons/km), and in Poland it almost doubled (from 40 000 to over 74 000 mln tons/km/km)<sup>46</sup>.

As a result, in combination with the growth of using private means of transport (first of all automobiles) a dramatic increase in their tonnage caused great pressure on the restricted capacities of transport/transit networks in the countries of the Visegrad group<sup>47</sup>. It was amplified by rather sharp changes of models of land-use and land-surveying in the countries of the analyzed regions. The point is that during the regimes of “people’s democracy” socialist cities in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were densely populated first of all along with main public transport arterial roads, as even in the late 80s – early 90s there almost did not exist suburban spread of low density. The main reason was that practically all new houses built by the state belonged to the state, and thus it concentrated in extremely densely populated block of flats on the periphery of cities, where still was some land, available for such large-scale projects. But even in such peripheral settlements there was practically no need in private means of transport, because they were well served by public transport services. Nevertheless, the situation started significantly changing in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the focus of attention was shifted to new industrial and residential buildings in suburbs<sup>48</sup>. As a result and with the aim to avoid congestions and because of high prices for land in central parts of cities, many companies, enterprises and trade centers were stationed on the periphery, along main traffic roads<sup>49</sup>. Similar construction was repeated in case of living dwellings, however on the contrary to the period of “real socialism” regimes they stopped being complexes of high density, but transformed into low-noise detached houses for one or several families<sup>50</sup>. Therefore, public transport services in new suburb areas of different (first of all big) cities in the countries of the Visegrad group appeared to be small in number quantity and thus were substituted by private transport sector. It happened especially as a result of the fact that statutory and regulatory base of land-using in suburb areas around big cities was much weaker than that in the central parts of cities, and due to this the so-called “suburb settlements” started practicing any accrued taxes and social-economic development, aimed at creating job opportunities, independent of the “center”.

All this means that despite control over land-using and tough policy in the sphere of housing facilities with high density of inhabitation in the countries of the Visegrad group after the

<sup>46</sup> *Transport Yearbook 2002*, Wyd. Czech Statistical Office 2003.; *Transport Statistics 2002*, Wyd. Polish Central Statistical Office 2003.

<sup>47</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

<sup>48</sup> Sykorova I., Sykora L., *Prague Metropolitan Area*, [w:] *Urban Land Institute Market Profiles 1998: Europe*, The Urban Land Institute 1999.; Sykora L., *Suburbanization: the social, economic, and ecological impacts*, Wyd. Institute of Ecopolitics 2002.; Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.; Suchorzewski W., *Urban transport in Poland*, Wyd. Ministry of Transport 2000.

<sup>49</sup> Suchorzewski W., *Urban transport in Poland*, Wyd. Ministry of Transport 2000.

<sup>50</sup> Pucher J., Buehler R., *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2005, źródło: <http://www.vtpi.org/PucherCentralEurope.pdf> [odczyt: 01.11.2018].

collapse of the system of Warsaw Treaty, sufficient stimulation of public transport did not take place, and on the contrary, in particular due to the tendency of commercial and residential building on the periphery, was initiated and later a tendency towards autonomous/private property and usage of private means of transport enhanced. As a result after several decades of using overcrowded public transport and living in monolithic multiple-dwelling complexes, over the first decade of post-communism, i.e. before the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, growth in motorization by means of private vehicles and population shifts to suburbs did not look at least strange<sup>51</sup>. It was supplemented by the fact that in the countries of the Visegrad group during this period started growth in number of private entrepreneurship and middle and high-class experts, who obviously became owners of not only new private automobiles, but also family houses in suburbs<sup>52</sup>.

Thus, a dramatic transition from public transport to private transport in the countries of the Visegrad group was conceived as a civilizational shock only in the course of the first/post-communist decade. Later, growth in the level of motorization in the countries of the analyzed region was stereotyped and predominantly aimed as the processes of “pursuing” development of the transport system. The point is, that the level of ownership and using private means of transport in the countries of the Visegrad group unconditionally (of course not at the rates as before) continues growing, but as in Europe in general. Similar processes also characterize public transport, as its number in Europe is gradually decreasing, however, in the countries of the Visegrad group it happens not as dramatically as it was in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In conclusion, it means that though the system of public transport in the region is making great efforts as to spreading and improving their services, they are in the situation of “losing competition” in comparison with an extremely popular sector of private transport. And even if in the end they can reach the western European standards of service quality, the best they can hope for is to conserve the usage of private transport at the current level. Even despite it, the majority of people in the region support the idea to provide transport and road priority to the very public transport, even in case it requires restrictions over using their private means of transport<sup>53</sup>. In conclusion, we may say that it works with the idea proposed by W. Rydzkowski and B. Spraggins<sup>54</sup>, according to which in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the countries of the Visegrad group started the processes of privatization and deregulation of the transport system, infrastructure and logistics. Namely these processes had a cardinal impact on the change of the structure of transport ownership and thus further development of transport infrastructure and logistics both in post-communist and in post-Euro-integration periods.

<sup>51</sup> Pucher J., The transformation of urban transport in the Czech Republic, 1988–1998, „*Transport Policy*” 1999, vol 6, s. 225–236.

<sup>52</sup> Sykorova L., Sykora L., *Prague Metropolitan Area*, [w:] *Urban Land Institute Market Profiles 1998: Europe*, The Urban Land Institute 1999.

<sup>53</sup> Suchorzewski W., *Urban public transport in Poland: main issues and perspectives*, Paper presented at UITP Conference „Changing European Market and Global Industry”, Lodz 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Rydzkowski W., Spraggins B., Privatization and Deregulation of Transport in Poland: New Transport Policy Implications, „*International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*” 1994, vol 24, nr. 2, s. 23–29.



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## **THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE STUDY ON PUBLIC OPINION MANIPULATION TECHNOLOGIES**

### **Abstract**

The author argues that electoral process is particularly indicative of studies on political manipulation, because during this period all manipulative resources are mobilized, which encourages people to actively support certain forces. The mechanisms of political manipulation are constantly working, improving, so that at the right time they can be activated at full capacity helping to achieve the desired outcome. Manipulation is not limited to electoral practices. It can be successful provided it's total or full coverage, continuous and leaves no alternative and there are no large-scale contradictory manipulative actions.

*Keywords: electoral process, electoral practices, manipulation, political manipulation*

## **ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ АСПЕКТИ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ МАНІПУЛЮВАННЯ ГРОМАДСЬКОЮ ДУМКОЮ**

### **Анотація**

Виборчий процес особливо показовий для досліджень політичного маніпулювання, адже в цей період мобілізуються всі маніпулятивні ресурси, які спонукають населення до активної підтримки певних сил. Механізми політичного маніпулювання постійно діють, удосконалюються, щоб у потрібний час їх можна було включити на повну силу і досягти бажаного. Маніпулювання не обмежується лише виборчою практикою. Воно успішне за умови тотальності чи загального охоплення, безперервності і безальтернативності, відсутності масштабних та протилежних за напрямками маніпулятивних акцій.

*Ключові слова: електоральний процес, електоральні практики, маніпулювання, політичне маніпулювання*

Scientists believe that the most suitable element for manipulation in the political system is the electoral system. Parliamentary electoral systems and institutions are the governing structure of the modern democratic process. It is important to create an optimal electoral system for democratic

institutions, a balance of justice and efficiency, representation and controllability. Thus, choosing one specific electoral system is quite a responsibility. Authors of the multifactorial model P. Sniderman, J. Glasser and R. Griffith write that perhaps the question of “Who will govern and sit in Parliament?” is less important than the electoral process itself<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, it indicates that even the details of electoral mechanisms can determine whether the elections are fair, whether the democracy will survive at all.

The electoral process is particularly indicative of studies on political manipulation, because during this period all manipulative resources are mobilized, which encourages people to actively support certain forces. The mechanisms of political manipulation are constantly working, improving, so that at the right time they can be activated at full capacity helping to achieve the desired outcome. Manipulation is not limited to electoral practices. It can be successful provided it's total or full coverage, continuous and leaves no alternative and there are no large-scale contradictory manipulative actions.

The concept of “influence”, “manipulation”, “political manipulation”, “social manipulation” – lies in a process achieved by the interaction of two or more disorderly systems, which results in changes in the structure or state of at least one of these systems. “Influence” in political practice is interpreted as a process of asymmetric interaction between political actors and the general public, acting as one of the main components of the relations of power. In political practice, there are rational and irrational methods of influence, which are usually destructive. The purpose of negative information and psychological manipulations – lies in the hidden influence on individual and social actors to act to the detriment of their own interests for the sake of the interests of the individuals, groups and organizations that implement them.

The study of the factors influencing the choice of citizens in the electoral process started in the United States along with the active development of commercial marketing. Political marketing was originally a “subsidiary” direction of its commercial counterpart. It arose during the formation of political communications in the United States in the 20th century as a modern system of election campaign management on the basis of broad media involvement, intensive study and publication of the results of public opinion polls and use of political advertising.

In 1940 political scientist from the USA P. Lazarsfeld carried out one of the first researches of the factors influencing electoral choice of citizens. His attention was focused on the problem of the media influence (radio, television) on electoral behavior of Americans and he detected interesting patterns of public's attitude to the media, discovered the law of selectivity of their perception. The core principle of the law is that an average voters pay attention only to those information materials that correspond to their primary political views; that people – members of one social group, almost always vote identically. P. Lazarsfeld discovered the law of “opinion leaders”. He pointed out that mass voters perceive political information better if it is distributed not just by the media, but also by a popular personality – so called “opinion leader” – attractive repeater of the needed

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<sup>1</sup> Information and Democratic Process. Chicago : University of Illinois Press, 1990. P. 120.

political propaganda – direct and indirect. Thus a concept of “two-stage communication” has been presented by P. Lazarsfeld and his associates B. Berelson, H. Godet and E. Katz.

In the 1950s marketing theory and practice, in the modern sense, had been quite widely included in American politics. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first one from the politicians to understand the importance of improving the effectiveness of election campaigns through involving marketing experts who would develop strategy and tactics for the electoral struggle. A commercial marketer Rosser Reeves was a pioneer in this process. He used a regional segmentation of the US electorate and developed an effective communication strategy based on the principle of differentiation for each state; created separate commercials for them, taking into account the characteristics of their political subcultures. For the first time the principle of positioning was used by analogy with the principle of a unique offer in commercial marketing.

In the 1960s another American, Joseph Klapper, described a system of intermediary factors that determine the effect of mass communication: the willingness of the voter to accept the necessary information, its interpersonal dissemination, a person's connection to a social group with its norms, the influence of opinion leaders on the dissemination and evaluation of the information. These factors conclude the full political information assimilation process of a particular individual<sup>2</sup>. Thus, the problem of the factors influencing electoral behavior and choice of citizens has always occupied a prominent place among the problems of political science. Various scientists have offered their explanations, concepts that elaborated upon the choice mechanism of people, referred to the action of natural (controllable) and random (uncontrollable) factors.

At the same time, political scientists at the University of Michigan developed a concept of multi-scale factors – the “funnel of causality” model<sup>3</sup>. In the classical version of the theory, the following factors were emphasized: socio-economic and cultural conditions that cause socio-political conflicts; economic structure, social stratification, historical traditions, etc.; the level of social and group loyalty (class, regional) and value orientations that arise due to socio-economic and cultural divisions; the narrower part of the “funnel” is occupied by the factors that directly affect the voting – guidance on three components of the political process: candidates, political courses and group interests, which are formed through value orientation and group loyalty.

Supporters of the classical version believed that the determining factor of electoral choice for the voter is party identification, which plays a role of a filter for political information about candidates for the elected office, political programs and group interests. Scientists also recognize the action of external factors: actions of the government, opinions of one's friends and environment, media, the election campaign influence, certain political and economic conditions.

Given the time factor, scientists from Michigan described five groups of electoral choice factors<sup>4</sup>: socio-demographic and psychological factors; party identification; the personality of the

<sup>2</sup> Klapper J.T. *The Effects of Mass Communication*. Glencoe (Illinois): The Free Press, 1960. 302 p.

<sup>3</sup> *The American Voter* / C. Angus, Ph.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, D.E. Stokes. N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1960. 576 p.

<sup>4</sup> Сартори Дж. Вертикальная демократия / Дж. Сартори // Полис. 1993. №2. С. 80-89.

candidate; the nature of the election campaign (the quality of political advertising, anti-advertising and “dirty” technologies); articulation of the troubles of the election campaign with friends and environment. Citizens vote rather out of habit, duty, ideological instructions than because of the detailed (economic) comparison and analysis of problem solving.

The political scientist from the US G. Sartori identified two main models: problem voting and party identification model. The first includes: problem advantage – problem perception – voice for the candidate/party standing closer to the problem. Weakly determined, “shaky” electorate with “floating votes” without a clear party preference usually gravitates toward this model. The model of party voting is based on stable ideological and political orientations that motivate citizens. It works in such a sequence: the self-inclusion to the left/right, progressive/conservative spectrum; certain party views; voting for the party with the voters identify themselves with<sup>5</sup>.

Recent studies by political scientists in a number of countries have shown a weakening in voters’ sense of party identification. Thus, in the study “Transformation of American voters” under the editorship of S. Verba, revealed a decrease in such traditional factors of voter behavior, such as status polarization, class consciousness and party inclination, mobilization ability of parties, the growth of party-independent mentality of the voters. For example, during the presidential elections in France in 1995, according to experts, there were fewer ideological and political models of voting and the influence of “Americanized” electoral technologies of TV democracy had increased.

In the 1980s, M. Shanks and V. Miller suggested their version of the factors influencing the electorate: established and acquired personal (demographic) traits (education, occupation, place of residence, communication); ideological advantages; party membership; evaluation of the actions of candidates; sympathy and antipathy to them. Scientists have proved that on these stages an electoral choice of a certain individual is born<sup>6</sup>.

In the multivariate model of P. Sniderman, J. Glasser and R. Griffith these factors are placed differently. The role of party identification is at the beginning of the causal sequence, the image of the candidate – at the end. There is also a new factor – assessment of the actions of the ruling person who was elected<sup>7</sup>. By the logic of influence, the factors of electoral behavior are placed as follows: ideological attitudes, partisanship, evaluation of the party’s actions, personal traits, evaluation of the ruling person, comparative assessment of the ruling person and the candidate, choice (decision during voting).

As a set of methods and systems of actions aimed at achieving a certain political result, using political technologies is a necessity in election campaigns. Quite often this situation is characterized by an aggressive form of influence. Therefore, scientists have long been investigating the role and importance of political technologies, political manipulation and the impact of political advertising.

<sup>5</sup> Sartori G. *The Theory of Democracy. Revisited.* Chatham (NY): Chatham House Publishers, 1987. P. 179.

<sup>6</sup> Shanks J.M. *Policy Direction and Performance Evaluations: Complementary Explanations of the Reagan Elections* / J.M. Shanks, W.E. Miller. *British Journal of Political Science.* 1990. Vol. 20. P. 143-235.

<sup>7</sup> *Information and Democratic Process.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990. P. 121.

Western researchers (E. Sampson, M. Spillman, R. Fisher) point out the methods of building a positive image of the candidate. T. J. Colton developed an interpretative model of electoral culture; emphasized the factors that strongly influence the psychology of voters during voting: social characteristics of the electorate; voters' assessment of the current economic and political situation; party identification; positions on certain issues; retrospective assessment of the activities of the officials; assessment of personal qualities of leaders; prospective expectations of voters from political parties, candidates and the degree of their accordance with the election programs<sup>8</sup>.

Nowadays foreign scientists pay considerable attention to the theoretical and practical aspects of the demythologization of the electoral process, the symbolic nature of the myth, which were previously analyzed by G. Vico, F. Schelling, E. Cassirer, O. Losev. Scientists C. Jung, J. Campbell, C. Levi-Strauss developed a provision on a myth as a part of a collective unconscious. Semiological essence of the specific nature of mythological thought was developed by M. Lotman and B. Uspensky. O. Potebnya and V. Propp approached the myth as a work of art while assessing it. B. Malinowski investigated it as a set of rules and a tool for solving critical issues. Analysis of a political myth, as a popular phenomenon in modern society, was carried out by G. Sorel, T. Mann, R. Niebuhr, R. Bart, M. Eliade.

Instead, scientists of the USSR (V. Zhitenev, I. Mashchenko) investigated the influence of political campaigning and criticized bourgeois information business. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study on technologies of manipulation of citizens' opinions by Ukrainian scientists.

After the emergence and institutionalization of electoral studies in modern political science, paradigms of electoral culture were formed: institutional, transitological and behavioral. In the last paradigm there are three main models of electoral behavior: sociological, socio-psychological and rational-instrumental. Each model has a highlighted key factor of influence on electoral choice: in the sociological model it is the social status of the individual, in socio-psychological – party identification, in rational-instrumental – rational choice of citizens.

The sociological theory of voting connects the choice of a citizen with macro-social variables and not with his individual features. This was justified by the American scientist S. M. Lipset and Norwegian researcher S. Rokkan. According to the authors, the differences between social groups provide a potential basis for political conflicts; create a problematic space of politics and a social base of parties at the same time. They identified several differences of this type (social divisions). The result of national revolutions is religious and separation between center and periphery. Divisions between owners and workers, between the city and the village appeared as a result of industrial revolution<sup>9</sup>. The variables here are the conflicts between different social groups (disputes between owners and employees, the tension between the city and the village, the center

<sup>8</sup> Colton T.J. *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia*. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard Univ. Press, 2000. XI. 324 p.

<sup>9</sup> Липсет С., Роккан С. Структуры размежеваний, партийные системы и предпочтения избирателей. Предварительные замечания. *Политическая наука*. 2004. № 4. С. 210.

and the periphery, the state and the Church.) There is a close connection between social status and electoral behaviour, especially participation in elections.

Sociological and socio-psychological models of voting are quite close. They see voting as an act of solidarity with small groups: family, the Church community or with a large group – class, social stratum (lowest social strata, middle class and rich elite). But in any case, the electorate's choice is expressive.

The socio-psychological model has its own logic of reasoning. Under the influence of political socialization (at an early age in the family, at school, later in the armed forces, university), individuals have certain preferences in relation to certain political parties. This identification is often passed down from generation to generation. In the US, it is a quite common model when a father, son, grandson vote for the Republicans/Democrats. Of course, sometimes there are generational changes in values and the picture is broken. Thus, in the 1970s-1980s in Western Europe there was recorded a change of mood of voters towards new parties (environmental). At that time the phenomenon of political parties of “movemental type” had emerged, which borrowed the principles of organization and action from social movements as an effective form of activity and political participation. The “green” party of Germany was formed in the environmental movement of the country and has specific features that bring it closer to public associations: full openness and transparency of its internal life, the minimum apparatus of the party bureaucracy, the lack of centralization, permanent leader and fixed membership. The innovative structure provided the party with a positive result in electoral campaigns<sup>10</sup>.

In general, the shift in the mass consciousness in the direction of the party ecologists was associated with the so called post-materialistic social turn. But the socio-psychological model is based on the idea that the voters defines their preferences based on the solidarity with certain communities they relate to (family, Church, social group). It is worth considering that the socio-psychological model describes the practice of Western democracies. But this model is not quite adequate to the realities of the electoral process in post-Soviet democracies. After all, the primary party identification of voters in the post-Soviet space is still being formed. Parties in Ukraine, as equal participants in the election campaigns, have been operating since the end of the 20th century, but those are non-permanent entities, and people cannot clearly indicate their preferences.

In 2014, 38 political parties were registered in Ukraine; in 2015, the number of parties had increased to a record 79. In general, more parties have been registered in the last two years than in the previous ten. This was reported by the Director of Committee of voters of Ukraine O. Koshel. Before that, the biggest number of political parties created (24) was in 2005. In total, 316 political parties were registered in Ukraine in 2016<sup>11</sup>. In 2017, Ukraine remained one of the lead-

<sup>10</sup> Чорногор Я.О. Утворення партії Зелених та її роль у суспільно-політичному житті ФРН (1966-1993 рр.): автореф. дис....канд. іст. наук: 07.00.02. К.: НАН України. Ін-т укр. археографії та джерелознавства ім. М.С. Грушевського, 2005. 18 с.

<sup>11</sup> У 2015 році в країні з'явилися 79 нових політичних організацій. URL: <http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3619897-v-ukraini-zareiestruvaly-rekordnu-kilkist-partii>



ers in Eastern Europe in the number of officially registered political parties. O. Koshel noted that today “344 political parties are registered”<sup>12</sup>.

Only eight of all the political parties of Ukraine got into the Parliament, including those which are a part of the blocks<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, the real party system, which is known and voted for by the electorate, does not include more than 300 parties “on paper”, but about ten real parties, which is almost 30 times less than the nominal number. All the other parties – is an unnecessary ballast that misleads the voters<sup>14</sup>.

We can assume that the identification of voters in the new democracies is based on certain ideological prerequisites, on how individuals see the world around them. The relationship between the worldview attitudes and political actions – voting in the elections – is provided by political ideology. Moreover, ideology may not necessarily be formalized in the name of the party. It is enough for the leader of a political force to use certain ideologically colored rhetoric when addressing the voters, sending necessary messages expected by this category of electorate. Those voters who make up the electoral core of the subject of the election campaign are guided by this message. Thus, within the framework of the use of socio-psychological approach in Ukraine, we can say that political identification is not characterized by the party, but by ideology.

At the end of the 20th century, substantial changes occurred in the political sphere of the Western societies. Political parties started to get rid of the traditional class orientation and began appealing to all groups of the population. Political scientist from the US J. Lapalombara called this type of political parties a “catch all party” and then – “voters’ party”. Later, they were called the “universal party”. They have a pragmatic approach to ideology, expanding it to the nationwide level, looking for a common language with many, sometimes opposing social groups to attract more votes<sup>15</sup>. Therefore, this is the rate of “monster parties” to expand the electoral field through the party identification of voters.

Rational choice theory, in contrast, assumes that a voter is selfish, has rational, conscious approach to politics, so that the voting is purely instrumental in nature. Voters in this model, which is also called egocentric or economic, always associate voting with assessments of their financial status and prospects of its change depending on the possible results of the election campaign. This position of the voter is called “Aesop model”. The simplest variant can be described by the so called retrospective voting – when a voter encourages or punishes a party/candidate who is in power with his or her vote, depending on how their rule affects his or her well-being. The logic of building this model comes from the fact that the voters do not have enough knowledge about party platforms and prospects of benefits from a certain political force for themselves or for the country’s economic course, but at the same time voters clearly feel how he lived under the current

<sup>12</sup> КВУ нарахувавв Україні 344 політичних партії / URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/2092432-kvu-narahuvav-v-ukraini-344-politichnih-partii.html>

<sup>13</sup> Депутатські фракції і групи VIII скликання. URL: [http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p\\_fractions](http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_fractions)

<sup>14</sup> Подішук І. О. Політичні партії як суб’єкти виборчого процесу. *Політичний менеджмент*. 2005. № 6. С. 48.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

government and vote “with their own wallet.” It is believed that the voter can assess not only their own economic condition, but also the welfare of the society as a whole. This is a “sociotropic” model. A perspective voting is also possible when the voter has an opportunity to estimate how his economic condition will be influenced by the success of this or that party or candidate on the elections.

The theory of “retrospective voting” contributed to the development of the concept of “economic voting”. Its authors found the dependence of electoral choice on the state of the economy. Proponents of this theory concluded that: 1) economic shifts explain about a third of changes in electoral behavior; 2) the voter reacts to a small number of macroeconomic indicators (unemployment level and inflation); 3) voters are “short-sighted”, which means their horizons are not wide, in terms of time measurement; 4) the voter reacts more to the past (retrospective voting) rather than expecting certain events in the future; 5) the sociotropy of voting is stronger than the egocentric one, although there are some national exceptions; 6) voters react more to the negative changes than to the positive ones<sup>16</sup>.

In a transitional society with an unsettled economy, the sociotropic model and the idea of prospective voting are not realistic, because they require too much effort from an average voter to collect and analytically process the necessary information about political forces and their representatives. Hardly a rational individual, who mainly thinks about surviving, will make an effort and spend time on political and economic analysis of election programs, history of political forces, biographies of their leaders and the effectiveness of their management. But the information about the state of one’s own wallet and the welfare of one’s family is known to every person. These theories have certain shortcomings, but in a complex they can explain features of technologies of psychological manipulation of consciousness of citizens in electoral process.

Since the mid-1980s political science has been leaning towards multi-paradigm approaches in explaining the political process. Scientists have been studying the electoral process as a multifactor phenomenon. P. Dunleavy developed a model of dominant ideology or radical model, which became an important contribution to the development of the theory of electoral culture<sup>17</sup>. The radicalism of this concept lies in its opposition to the model of party identification and in the assumption that, in fact, a citizen has no free choice in a secret ballot. Voting in elections reflects the position of the individual in the social hierarchy. But P. Dunleavy comes to the conclusion that the objective indicators of social position are of secondary importance, and subjective factors are more important. The social group subjectively assesses its position in the social hierarchy, being under a significant influence of mass media and pre-election party competition. Thus, representatives of the class of rich workers in England, the owners of their homes, can vote for both left and right. The media, which interpret their social interests in a particular situation, and political

<sup>16</sup> Мелешкина Е. Ю. Исследование электорального поведения: теоретические модели и проблемы их применения. *Политическая наука*. 2001. № 2. С. 207.

<sup>17</sup> Dunleavy P. *British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980-s*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1985. 252 p.

parties, which are desperately fighting for the right to defend and represent a group's social interests, have a certain influence on the choice.

The interpretation of group interests through the media forms a dominant ideology that may deviate from left-wing party orientation. Therefore, voters act instrumentally in defending group interests that seem real to them, although they have already been identified by the media parties. Such fine manipulative work leads to the fact that voters are certain that their position is not imposed, but arose from their own motivation. According to this model, electoral behavior and voting appear as an individual's reaction to the dominant ideological interpretation of the social division, which is the result of the individual's desire for self-realization, social control of power and social environment, ideological manipulation of the media, the situation of party competition.

The realities of the electoral process in post-communist societies are described by the modernized model of "social splits", which was developed by H. Kitschelt when analyzing the political systems of CEE democracies. He classified the splits in the space of these countries, which are crucial for their electoral process. Among the political splits, he identified the following: the conflict of redistribution as a manifestation of the classical economic split, which occurs in a form of the political division into left and right; the conflict of political principles as contraposition of instructions on the nature and control of public administration: the principles of collectivity and authoritarianism, individualism and liberalism; the conflict of the public, associated with the opposition of a universal understanding of citizenship based on ethnic, religious, linguistic and other factors<sup>18</sup>.

The model is quite important and allows us to trace the main lines of the splits in transforming societies, although it does not fully reveal the effect of subjective, irrational factors of behavior in new democracies.

Among the relatively new theoretical models, regulation of electoral choice should be mentioned. It is based on the idea of creating an equilibrium of electoral action. The latter postulates the state of balance between two factors that affect the electoral orientation: 1) the desire for material well-being, economic evaluation; 2) ideological identification as the basis of the party's image.

The determination of the first factor is carried out due to the special crisis state of modern Ukrainian society and generally reflects the interest of the vast majority of the world's population in improving their own well-being. Ideological identification takes place through communication channels. This is a real counterweight to the artificial formation of political activity, which is realized through the party's ability to implement economic policy and the ability to represent the ideology of society. As a means of their own actions political forces choose that resource which works in the specific conditions of choice. The richer the political subject, the more he or she focuses on the technologies of image creation. Ideally, it is advisable to combine both factors and thoroughly develop a targeted impact on different groups of voters. As the Nobel Prize laureates

<sup>18</sup> Kitschelt H. *European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*// *Developments in West European Politics*. London, 1997. P. 147.

F. Chris and J. Mono believe, 10% of the electorate is under purposeful influence from the outside, which should develop and direct 90% of the internal content.

In the late twentieth century a manipulative conception of political influence by V. Ricker became fairly widespread. The latest information technology offered to the actors of the political game to resort to attracting the votes in their favor, given that externally-oriented individuals in a mass society do not delve into the depths of their own soul, they enjoy things that surround them: cars, jewelry, clothing etc. And in politics: you should wrap the goods in a bright wrapper and profitably sell it to the consumer. The human psyche and consciousness act as a container in which you can put any content. The market determines the value of goods and the share of each in the social product. A political party is a product that should be turned into capital and placed profitably. The value of political actors is determined by demand and fashion design<sup>19</sup>. However, there are some difficulties.

First, there is an unstable share of the electorate among the active viewers of political programs on TV and the readership. Therefore, any recent model of influence can neutralize the effects of the previous one. Secondly, there is the effect of a “militant distancing” from the rich manipulative information. Psychologist O. Pavlov proves the opposite result of excessive repetition. But yet there is a possibility of improving the technology and getting a certain effect, as evidenced by the popularity and weight of the works on the topic, in particular W. Riker and his “Art of political manipulation”.

The “consumer model” of electoral behavior proposed by researcher H. Himmelweit is quite popular in the West. The main idea of her concept is that a citizen makes his or her political choice in almost the same way as he or she solves the problem of purchasing a particular product. Citizens who give their vote are looking for maximum compliance or minimum discrepancy between a number of their installations and party programs. “The habit of voting for a particular party is similar to a commitment to a particular store or firm, and the influence of reference groups is reminiscent of how the lifestyle of our friends and colleagues guides our preferences”<sup>20</sup>.

Western political scientists in many studies have found that in countries with a stable political system, in which voters really have a habit of voting for a certain party, the political consciousness of citizens is filled with certain “packages of ideas”. Thus, British attitudes on nuclear weapons correlated with their attitude to the nationalization of public transport and the health system, immigration and the death penalty.

Therefore, the nature of voting depends on a number of macro - and micro-issues. These include: the type of political regime and the political system of society, the degree of the electoral law and the electoral system development, the level of socio-economic development, the degree of stability of the social structure, the presence of a large middle class. In addition, socio-demographic parameters, such as age and gender, are very important. The social and professional affiliation of

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<sup>19</sup> Старовойтенко Р. Імідж політичної партії як чинник секторального вибору: дис. ... канд. політ. наук : 23.00.02. К., 2003. С. 58.

<sup>20</sup> Himmelweit H. *How Votes Decide?* L.: Academic Press, 1981. P. 131.

the electorate, the level of its education and political culture determine the nature of the political participation of the population and its political orientations.

Thus, the examined directions of technologies of the phenomenon of manipulation and political manipulation helped to find out and argue that manipulation is a complex and versatile phenomenon that requires detailed scientific research. There are different approaches to the explanation of this phenomenon with an emphasis on the purpose of the manipulative actions, the means used in them, the relationship between the manipulator and the one who is being manipulated. The understanding of manipulation basically boils down to a hidden influence that should not be seen by the object of manipulation. The essence of political manipulation is clarified, which refers to the process of psychological influence on the performance of political choice. This process is of a hidden nature and forms the “illusion of choice” for the citizens, when the object of influence is convinced of their own conscious management of their thoughts, behavior, and choice. Political manipulation creates the appearance of democracy, when people, who have a natural right to make decisions, is not only being deceived or directly forced to certain actions, but certain actions of hidden control are carried out which turns citizens from a subject into an object of politics.

Several basic hypotheses explain the motives of the electorate voting in the elections: “sociological”, when voters show solidarity with their social group (class, ethnic, religious, neighbour, etc.); “socio-psychological”, when voters are guided by the usual political sympathies that run in the family, psychological attraction to a certain party, leader; “political-communicative”, in which voting is influenced by the election campaign, the media image of the politician and the party; “rational choice”, in which people vote/do not vote not as members of the group, but as individuals, guided by their own interest, calculation, benefit<sup>21</sup>.

The use of models depends on the type of electoral system. We believe that a significant factor in this process is the type of political culture.

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<sup>21</sup> Морозова Е. Г. Политический рынок и политический маркетинг: концепции, модели, технологии. М.: Прогресс, 1999. С. 124.

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## **THE FEATURES OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP: A DESCRIPTIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

The article is dedicated to analyzing, comparison and synthesis of the features of legislative process in the countries of the Visegrad group. It was emphasized on a descriptive and comparative analysis of the proposed cases. The researcher motivated that the countries of the Visegrad group are nominally and practically characterized by variational procedures and patterns of legislative process. This is determined by the fact that there are unicameral (more legislatively stable) and bicameral (more legislatively volatile) legislatures in the region, which use different procedures of legislative process. Although it was recognized that in general (in the case of the unicameral and bicameral parliaments of the countries of the Visegrad Group) legislative process is largely implemented in the same way, but with some differences.

*Keywords: parliament, legislature, legislative process, unicameralism, bicameralism, the countries of the Visegrad group.*

## **ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЗАКОНОДАВЧОГО ПРОЦЕСУ В КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: ДЕСКРИПТИВНИЙ І ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ**

Проаналізовано, порівняно й синтезовано особливості законодавчого процесу в країнах Вишеградської групи. Наголошено на дескриптивному і порівняльному аналізі запропонованих кейсів. Вмотивовано, що країни Вишеградської групи номінально і на практиці характеризуються варіативними процедурами та патернами законодавчого процесу. Детерміновано це тим, що в регіоні діють унікамеральні (більш стабільні законодавчо) та бікамеральні (більш волатильні законодавчо) легіслатури, які послуговуються відмінними процедурами законодавчого процесу. Хоча встановлено, що загалом у випадку унікамеральних та бікамеральних парламентів країн Вишеградської групи законодавчий процес реалізовується в значній мірі однаковою чином, але за винятком деяких відмінностей.

*Ключові слова: парламент, легіслатура, законодавчий процес, унікамералізм, бікамералізм, країни Вишеградської групи.*



Legislative process is one of the most significant forms of state activity, aimed at creating/generating (or revising) legal and regulatory and subordinate acts. Herewith, namely adoption of laws is, without doubt, one of the most important functions of parliaments, what is mentioned in the bodies of national constitutions. Correspondingly, the task of parliaments is to adopt laws, which<sup>6</sup> first of all, are characterized by their binding nature for citizens and political institutions. In this context features of legislative process in the countries of the Visegrad group – Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary require descriptive consideration and comparative analysis, as these countries in fact simultaneously started reforming in order to join the European Union, but practically are characterized by variational procedures and patterns of legislative process, what actualizes the question as to different techniques, stages and consequences of the legislative process.

Current range of problems is much represented in scientific works by the following scholars S. Eng<sup>1</sup>, K. Goetz and R. Zubek<sup>2</sup>, R. Kimber<sup>3</sup>, N. Panchak-Bialoblotska<sup>4</sup>, A. Romaniuk and V. Lytvyn<sup>5</sup>, S. Wronkowska-Jaskiewicz<sup>6</sup>, M. Zander<sup>7</sup> and others, as well as directly on the sites of national legislative bodies in the countries of the Visegrad group. However, they mainly represent research on individual cases within the countries of the region under analysis, however little attention is paid to the Visegrad group as one analytical unit.

The analysis of the abovementioned works let us generally observe, that the countries of the Visegrad group are characterized by the so-called “British” model of legislation or a legislative process, which presupposes passing three stages of discussing the majority of draft laws<sup>8</sup>. However, these implementation arrangements for this principle and model radically differ in each of the analyzed states, what, by all means, is a methodological motive to consider this issue in the context of descriptive and comparative research. The point is that Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary are rather distinctive polities, notably institutionally, politically, party and electorally and so on. Therefore, it is possible to trace distinctive variations while interpreting the “British” model of legislation process. It is mainly represented and dependable on the fact that national legislative bodies in the countries of the Visegrad group are variable as to their structure and arrangement – unicameral and bicameral, and thus it marks certain

<sup>1</sup> Eng S., *Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law*, [w:] Wintgens L. (ed.), *Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation*, Wyd. Hart 2002, s. 65-79.

<sup>2</sup> Goetz K., Zubek R., Government, Parliament and Lawmaking in Poland, *„The Journal of Legislative Studies”* 2007, vol 13, nr. 4, s. 517-538.; Zubek R., *Legislative Time, Executive Rules and Government Lawmaking*, Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions Helsinki, 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>4</sup> Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Polityczna struktura zjazdów parlamentów krajów Środkowej Europy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv kraїн Vyshebrnads'koi hrupy ta inshykh kraїн Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Wronkowska-Jaskiewicz S., *Ustawodawstwo w państwie prawa. Siedem tez do dyskusji*, [w:] Lipińska M. (ed.), *Stanowienie prawa – kompetencje Senatu w procesie legislacyjnym*: Materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Komisję Ustawodawstwa i Praworządności pod patronatem Marszałka Senatu RP Longina Pastusiaka 22 października 2002 r., Wyd. Kancelaria Senatu 2002, s. 13-25.

<sup>7</sup> Zander M., *The law-making process*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Zander M., *The law-making process*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

features of legislative processes in them. In particular, it is known that unicameralism is permanently inherent to Hungary and Slovakia, while bicameralism is traditionally found in Poland and the Czech Republic. Consequently, determination of features of a legislative process in the countries of the Visegrad group must be descriptively and comparatively connected with the structure of national legislature bodies in the countries from the analyzed region. In fact, it is important to take into account the axiomatic remark that in unicameral legislatures namely the whole composition of parliaments is clearly responsible for adopting legislative acts of generally national significance, because legislative bodies are formed on the basis of national elections. At the same time we should bear in mind the remark that a legislative process in bicameral parliaments is characterized by a more time-consuming procedure than in unicameral parliaments, as in the former it is assembled and structured in two chambers of legislature (under condition that upper chambers of parliaments are not obligatory nation-wide elected), and not in one as it happens with the former.

A classic example of the “British” model of legislature for unicameralism to our mind is Slovakia. In this country constitutional and other laws, as well as amendments to them are considered and adopted by a single chamber of the National Council, which later has control over them. Its legal and regulatory acts (or legislations) regulate relations in all spheres of social, political and social-economic life etc. Herewith, draft laws may be introduced by committees and members of parliament and government cabinet, and a legislative process in the parliament consists of three readings. During the first reading, in particular, in the course of general debates, when none amendments can be introduced, a legislative body may: recommend a draft law for further development; close the debate concerning a draft law; submit a draft law for the second reading. In its turn, the National Council during the second reading initiates debates over the draft law in at least 48 hours from the date of receiving a report from committees or information from special reporters. Making amendments or supplements to the draft law is possible only after their approval by at least 15 deputies (with a nominal composition of legislative body of 150 deputies). Finally, at the third reading the form of amendment may have only those questions, which require checking legislative mistakes of technical nature, correction grammatical mistakes and mistakes of written character or typing errors. Other amendments and supplements to draft laws must be introduced by at least 30 deputies (or 1/5 from the complete composition of legislature). Correspondingly, at the third reading a draft law can be either adopted or annulled/rejected<sup>9</sup>. Of great interest is the fact that ordinary (non-fundamental/non-constitutional) laws are adopted by a relative majority of parliamentary deputies under condition that at the meeting of legislative body there are at least 76 deputies (i.e. 50% + 1 deputy of a nominal composition of legislature). Therefore, theoretically a draft law can be adopted by at least 39 deputies, but under condition that at the meeting there is a minimal quorum to consider such meeting to be open. In their turn, some legislations and decisions are passed by an absolute majority of a nominal composition of a legislative body (i.e. at least 76 deputies out of 150). In such case, for example, we speak of a decision concerning

<sup>9</sup> *Postavenie a právomoci*, zdrojlo: <https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=nrsr/poslanie> [odczyt: 29.11.2018].

a vote of no-confidence in government or its members, to confirm appointment of candidates on the posts of the speaker or deputy speakers etc. Finally, constitutional laws and decisions as to the internal format of legislature work are passed by the majority of 3/5 (at least 90 deputies) of the nominal composition of a parliament. In order a law to become operative it must be promulgated and published in the “Journal of laws”. At the same time all significant international agreements and acts, vetoed by the president (suspensory veto), are passed by an absolute majority of deputies of the full composition of parliament. However, even at that construction of unicameralism and combination of systems of relative and absolute majority for passing the laws Slovakia is characterized by a relatively small number of regulatory and legal acts, adopted by legislature. Thus, over 1994–1998 were adopted 313 laws, over 1998–2002 – 532 laws, over 2002–2006 – 550 laws, over 2006–2010 – 530 laws<sup>10</sup>, over 2010–2012 – 208 laws, over 2012–2016 – 455 laws (here we mentioned periods of legislature convocation between the parliamentary elections). In its turn, current, at the moment of analysis, convocation of the National Council 2016–2020 (as of June 2018) were introduced 748 draft laws (majority by the deputies from a legislative body), among which 222 have been passed, 446 have been rejected, 14 have been vetoed by the president etc<sup>11</sup>. It is rather notable that Slovakia does not adopt laws in a fast-track procedure and the president quite rarely refuses from promulgation the acts of national legislation.

A bit different and much more complicated are features of the “British” model under conditions of unicameralism in Hungary. The point is that before and after adoption of a new constitution in 2011 in Hungary (of course, after the collapse of the “real socialism” regime and introduction of amendments to the new constitution) its parliament has been positioning itself not only as a legislative institution, but also as a body, endowed with constitutional rights (because since 1990 the Hungarian legislative system has been formed on the provisions of law, due to which a formerly inherent practice of government directives predominance (or presidium orders) was changed or the principle laws priority ranking). And this determines that in Hungary there is no need to ratify the constitution and amendments to it by means of referendum, though the National Assembly (parliament) can fall back on this procedure to have a detailed view of people’s opinion concerning any mentioned problems. However, on the other hand, people and deputies do not have a right to initiate referendum by their own, concerning the questions, which directly concern the amendments to the constitution, as the only body which is directly delegated to do that is the National Assembly. This, as it was mentioned before, is stipulated by the fact that at a former stage of its functioning the Hungarian parliament was not the center of taking legal and regulatory decisions, as in the course of 1945–1990 it adopted only 472 laws, 100 of which were passed a year before the change of the “real socialism” regime towards liberalization and democratization. And on the contrary, over 1990–2018 have been passed almost 2 000 new laws and over 2 000 laws in the form of amendments, i.e. on average 140 laws a year (see Table 1). It is presupposed by the

<sup>10</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164–180.; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Politychna strukturyzatsiia parlamentiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.; *Historia legislativnej chinnosti NR SR*, źródło: [https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/historia\\_legislativnej\\_chinnosti\\_NR\\_SR.rtf](https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/historia_legislativnej_chinnosti_NR_SR.rtf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>11</sup> *Stručný prehľad o činnosti NR SR v VII. volebnom období k 30. 6. 2018*, źródło: [https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/strucny\\_prehľad\\_o\\_chinnosti\\_NR\\_SR\\_k\\_20180630.rtf](https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/NRSR/strucny_prehľad_o_chinnosti_NR_SR_k_20180630.rtf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

fact that laws in Hungary are passed only by the parliament, and the very phenomenon of a law is regulatory for a whole range of “ordinary” and “exclusive” spheres of legislation. Besides, the key principle of a legislative process in Hungary is the norm, according to which, an adopted law can be alternated or abolished only on the basis of a new legislation.

Table 1. Statistics on the legislative process in the parliament of Hungary (1990–2018)

| Period of parliament's mandate | Number of passed laws |                             |       | Number of adopted resolutions | Total |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
|                                | New laws              | Laws by means of amendments | Total |                               |       |
| 1990–1994                      | 219                   | 213                         | 432   | 354                           | 786   |
| 1994–1998                      | 264                   | 235                         | 499   | 455                           | 954   |
| 1998–2002                      | 273                   | 187                         | 460   | 394                           | 854   |
| 2002–2006                      | 262                   | 311                         | 573   | 488                           | 1061  |
| 2006–2010                      | 262                   | 325                         | 587   | 421                           | 1008  |
| 2010–2014                      | 321                   | 538                         | 859   | 419                           | 1278  |
| 2014–2018                      | 221                   | 509                         | 730   | 121                           | 851   |
| Total                          | 1822                  | 2318                        | 4140  | 2652                          | 6792  |

Źródło: Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164–180.; *Legislation activity of the Parliament*, źródło: <http://www.parlament.hu/web/house-of-the-national-assembly/legislation-activity-of-the-parliament> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

Therefore, now the National Assembly is by all means a legislative body in Hungary. But initially (in particular in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) there were serious difficulties while creating the system of resources, solving contributory problems and alleviating danger, concerning the point that the number of laws may affect their quality. To solve this contradiction several steps were implemented: there appeared the norm that the government is obliged to offer the program of its legislative activity for its term of office; a strict division of a legislative process, was based on a different order of committees and plenary meetings, as a result of which it became possible to introduce and discuss amendments to different draft laws; the role of law selection in committees was established and later institutionalized: they in advance take decisions whether a proposal will be put on the agenda, whether it is necessary to consider amendments, which do not enjoy great support; a system of designating committees in charge of draft laws was worked out according to an impartial scheme of legislative assignment among them; was adopted the principle in accordance with which, the subjects to justification are not only legislations but also draft amendments, which may have social-economic and political consequences, the latter must be obligatory mentioned; was minimized the influence of errors in the course of a legislation process due to the usage of a clear methodology of defining the term legislation, broadening the frames of final voting and preparation of “combined proposals” which unite the voting results for different draft amendments; the system of extraordinary

legislative process while dealing with the state budget was improved; a professional codification group, which is used as a resource of a judicial department, was created<sup>12</sup>.

Herewith, the constitution (both old and new) clearly enumerates the spheres, which can be regulated exclusively by laws<sup>13</sup>. As it was mentioned above, here belongs the so-called “exclusive spheres of legislation”, almost 30 in total. It is significant that exclusive legislative powers, delegated by the National Assembly, are rather great. Though the parliament can adopt laws in other spheres. However, most frequently it happens on the basis of government’s proposals: though it is possible to observe gradual broadening of legislative regulations of the National Assembly in new social and economic spheres. From this perspective special attention must be paid to a group of laws (sometimes they are called fundamental), which are adopted by a qualified majority – not less than 2/3 of all legislative deputies (earlier a full composition of parliament consisted of 386 deputies and nowadays there are only 199). For the first time these laws are proposed into the Hungarian system according to the amendments to the old constitution, which came in force on October 23 1989, but at that time a qualified majority of all deputies was required only to pass constitutional amendments. Nowadays, this qualified majority of all elected deputies is also required to pass the laws which possess higher/cardinal legal force, compared to constitutional: i.e. it is referred to the so-called constitutional laws<sup>14</sup>. To the spheres of their functional obligations belongs, for example, a range of problems concerning introducing amendments to the constitution, regulations of the National Assembly, declaration of international agreements, election of the president of Hungary (however, only during the first voting), election and dismissal of the members of the constitutional court and some other judicial authorities and services, voting for the prosecutor general, president of the public audit service, parliamentary commissioners for fundamental rights, imposing, resuming and terminating the state of emergency or martial law etc. At the same time, the law concerning deviations from current rules and procedures (regulations) of the National Assembly can in fact be passed exclusively by a qualified majority, not less than 4/5 of present deputies of legislature. However, less strict rules, in particular in the form of 2/3 of present deputies of legislature are used while adopting or introducing changes to the cardinal laws, laws concerning regulations of the National Assembly (some points), announcement of deputies and president elections or resignation of the prime-minister and government, who do not carry out their job, deployment of the army of Hungary abroad or within the country, termination of parliamentary deputies’, speaker’s and prosecutor general’s immunity, electing acting president etc<sup>15</sup>. Other laws and decisions of the Hungarian legislature, if nothing

<sup>12</sup> Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Polityczna struktura i zasktsia parlamentu krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>14</sup> *The legislative process*, źródło: <http://www.parlament.hu/web/house-of-the-national-assembly/the-legislative-process> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>15</sup> *Voting: Decisions requiring a qualified majority*, źródło: <http://www.parlament.hu/web/house-of-the-national-assembly/laws-requiring-a-two-thirds-qualified-majority> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

else is presupposed by the law are passed by an absolute majority of deputies from a nominal composition of the National Assembly. In this context it is observed that relying on principle of a qualified majority (in its different formats) aims at ensuring some political guarantees. In particular, this mechanism provides wide support of the parliament while developing key institutions of the legal state and while regulating and protecting main rights and freedoms of people and citizens. The necessity of the principle can be easily seen from the fact, that at first it was not clear which political forces could win the elections and thus there could appear the wish to strengthen positions of power on the basis of changing the national legislation, what in fact happened in the early 2010s.

The features of a legislative process in Hungary also revealed in the fact that in the state there are two procedures of adopting laws – ordinary and extraordinary. Herewith, the right for legislative initiative belongs to the president, government, each parliamentary committee and each deputy of the legislature. It can be seen that the draft of a law can be proposed by bodies and individuals that are delegated to introduce draft laws for consideration of the National Assembly and that perform it only in written form with the procedure of justification. At the same time the author of the draft law or legislation can at any time, but not just before the final voting, scrap it or recommend for further development (however, with the approval of the National Assembly). In fact it was discovered that the majority of draft laws are introduced by the government, a bit less – by deputies and committees. Along with that, the head of the state uses the right of legislative initiative very rarely (however, it was rather common over 1990-1994)<sup>16</sup>. Of great importance is the fact that in Hungarian parliamentary vocabulary there is a tendency towards unification of two different notions as synonyms, in particular terms “draft law” and “bill”, though in fact they do not mean the same. Because a draft law is a text of a law, which is introduced to the National Assembly for consideration. However, at the stage of introducing a draft law, for example, while achieving a consensus between the ministry/government and group of interests, the text of a draft law is called a bill. Therefore, the government is discussing a bill, while the parliament gets a draft law for consideration.

It is notable, that while introducing a draft law for consideration to the parliament, there must be its general and detailed justification, what makes parliamentary debates significantly easier. A necessary requirement is to ascertain the goals of the initiator of the project and ways of its future implementation. In general the main traditional elements of the legislative process in Hungary are the preparatory role of committees, method of plenary meetings with its division into general and detailed discussion, introduction of draft amendments by committees and deputies, as well as two-round voting – the first for draft amendments and the second for the law in general. Herewith, in the course of a legislative process plenary meetings and debates in committees follow each other in the order established in advance. Consideration of a legislation begins with a preparatory stage in the committee<sup>17</sup>. The head

<sup>16</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabryi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Vyshebradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164-180.

<sup>17</sup> *The legislative process*, źródło: <http://www.parlament.hu/web/house-of-the-national-assembly/the-legislative-process> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

of the parliament appoints a draft law for consideration in one or several committees. The National Assembly must discuss draft laws, introduced by the government, president and committees. Besides, in case if there are any proposals, introduced by deputies, the committees which are in charge of these draft laws decide, whether they will be discussed in the parliament in general. This is a crucial moment, according to which the agenda of the legislature is formed. If the committee does not do this, then any parliamentary faction can demand from the parliament itself to take a decision. Sometimes there can be a situation when the parliament denounce the committees' decisions. At the same time the committee expresses its attitude towards draft amendments, offered by deputies, and after their detailed discussion expresses its opinion towards any additional draft amendments. If the committee considers it necessary, then it can offer its own draft amendments. In this context a basic rule of voting for amendments is that the voting may be conducted only in case if a draft amendment gets support of at least 1/3 of members of a relevant committee (i.e. committee which is responsible for consideration of a draft law). Draft amendments, introduced by the government, committees and deputies which do not have legislative errors are considered by the Committee for constitutional issues. Only after it, the law (as a draft law) can be put to vote as a whole. Herewith, the speaker of the parliament must sign the law no more than in 5 days and direct it to the head of state/president for promulgation (the latter has 5 days as well). It is important that during plenary debates deputies are discussing the necessity of a law, the sphere and principles of its regulation. Correspondingly, draft amendments made by deputies may be introduced only till the end of a general discussion, however, in this process the initiator of the draft law cannot introduce any other draft amendments.

It is important that with changes to the regulations of the National Assembly, which were adopted in April 1991 (however, the law on regulations has been changed later, as well as was adopted in an updated revision), and the Institute of extraordinary procedure of passing laws was introduced<sup>18</sup>. To initiate it there must be consent of not less than a certain percent of deputies of a nominal composition of parliament (for example up to 2010 it required consent of not less than 4/5 of a nominal composition of a parliament (309 out of 386) and in general this procedure is a simpler and quicker variant of a legislative process. The point is that debates over draft amendments take place in a corresponding committee or committees, and not in the session hall. When a committee or committees take a decision on rejecting the amendments, which are introduced for their consideration, the National Assembly after a short discussion (in which only one deputy from each faction can take place) in fact take an immediate decision as to draft amendments. However, if the committee has nothing against the introduced amendments, the National Assembly does not even vote to support its position. It determines, that in the frames of an extraordinary procedure, time required for passing a law, is reduced even to 1/3, though the procedure itself has not become widely spread in factual legislative process in Hungary. In particular, over 1990–1994 according to the extraordinary procedure were adopted 58 laws (out of 77 which were introduced), over 1994–1998 – 48 (out

<sup>18</sup> *The legislative process*, źródło: <http://www.parlament.hu/web/house-of-the-national-assembly/the-legislative-process> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

of 54 introduced), over 1998–2002 – 10 (out of 16 introduced), over 2002–2006 – 3 (out of 6 introduced), over 2006–2010 – none (none was introduced), over 2010–2014 – 27 (out of 27 introduced), and over 2014–2018 – 41 (out of 41 introduced). All this is supplemented by the fact that all laws, which require the support of a qualified majority of deputies of legislature (despite their form) cannot be considered in accordance with an extraordinary or fast-track procedure. The same refers to the state budget.

Of great interest is the fact that a special role in initiating legislation in Hungary (as well as in other countries of the Visegrad group) is played by the government cabinet, what has already become a basic rule. It can be easily explained by technical and motivational reasons: the government enjoys, in most cases (except minority governments), constant support of legislature, what presupposes a conditionally simplified procedure of adopting laws. Besides, the program of the government, supported by the parliamentary majority (together with the prime-minister candidature) must include most of all goals to be realized in the course of the legislative process and political course. Correspondingly, deputies of the National Assembly have to work on government draft laws. It is significant that the government of Hungary proposes a semiannual agenda of the National Assembly, and thus initiates most of draft laws, 90% of which are usually adopted as laws. Besides, to satisfy its legislative goals the government can convene an extraordinary session of the parliament. As to the deputies, they also offer a great number (almost the same as the governments do) of draft laws, however much lower number of them finally become laws. Predominantly it is determined by the priority of the government draft laws over the draft laws, introduced by deputies and committees. Moreover, for deputies to get an opportunity to propose a draft law, at least one of the requirements must be satisfied: 1) each draft law must have a fixed number of signatures; 2) the right for legislative initiative on behalf of deputies has a faction in legislature<sup>19</sup>. Besides, the following rule is traditionally actualized in Hungary (and other members of the Visegrad group) – government parties more often introduce draft laws, than oppositional parties. Of great interest is the point that participation of committees in the legislative initiative is rather low, though the draft laws introduced by committees are characterized by a complementary nature (as the government cannot interfere in some spheres of parliamentary activity, i.e. its role is played by committees). The identical situation is in case of legislative initiative and using it by the president.

Peculiar features of the “British” model of legislation for bicameralism we will study mainly on the example of the Czech Republic, nevertheless Poland in this context is rather similar, as both countries are combined by the fact that it is possible to trace the priority of the lower house over the upper house in the course of the whole process of legislation. In case with the Czech Republic it is revealed in the fact that at first draft laws are sent for consideration to the Chamber of Deputies, where they are debated and then voted. If the lower house (the

<sup>19</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].



Chamber of Deputies) approves of the draft law, the latter (including amendments, approved by this chamber) is forwarded to the upper house (the Senate) for its subsequent approval. If the Senate approves of it, not introducing additional amendments, it can be adopted as a law and sent to the hand of state for signing (however, it does not refer to constitutional laws). In case the Senate completely rejects a draft law or approves of it partially, providing its amendments are taken into account, the draft law returns to the Chamber of Deputies to be voted once more. If the lower house approves of this project, then it forwards it to the president to be signed. As in the former case, except for constitutional laws, the president can refuse to sign the law, sent to him by the parliament. In this case the Chamber of Deputies must vote the issue concerning expediency of providing support to such law. At the end of the legislative process or if the president has signed the law, or if the Chamber of Deputies has overridden the veto of the president, the law is promulgated and published in the “Journal of laws”<sup>20</sup>.

Depending on the type of the law, which is to be passed, there can be several exceptions as to the general legislative procedures, described above. From this perspective, it is necessary to mention that there are three basic legislative principles and procedures, which can be applied only in the following cases: 1) approval of a draft of law by both houses of the parliament, according to which the Senate has 30 days to take a vote on the draft law (it refers to the so-called “regular” laws); 2) approval of a draft law by both houses of the parliament, when the Chamber of Deputies does not have a right to abrogate the decisions taken by the Senate (it refers to the so-called “constitutional” laws and laws, corresponding to article 40 of the constitution)<sup>21</sup>; 3) approval of a draft law exceptionally by the Chamber of Deputies (it refers only to the so-called “budget” laws). At the same time it is notable that if the Chamber of Deputies is dismissed, the Senate can take all necessary measures at the level of regular laws. Legislative acts can be adopted only when the case, which requires decision, is urgent or if a regular law is offered at the moment when the Chamber of Deputies was not dismissed. Besides, legislative acts can be adopted only in the spheres, specified by the constitution. In particular, it is prohibited to pass the laws in the constitutional, budget and election spheres. It should be pointed out “alternative” legislative nature of the Senate is always actualized at government’s suggestion. When the Chamber of Deputies is reelected, it must approve of all the legislative acts, which have already been adopted by the Senate, otherwise such acts become null and void.

It is of interest, that the right for legislative initiative in the Czech Republic belongs to deputies and groups of deputies, the Senate, the government and regional assemblies/legislature. However, predominantly deputies and government (as well as in other countries of the Visegrad group) make use of it. It is notable, that in the Czech Republic the notion of a “draft law” is interpreted not only as a text of a would-be law, but also an explanatory memorandum,

<sup>20</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164-180.

<sup>21</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

which is divided into general and special parts. Its general part characterizes a legislative context, explains a motivational component of necessity to pass a law and describes all budget costs, associated with passing and implementing a law. On the other hand a special part of the memorandum includes a description of a part of a proposed draft law. However, the term for implementing proposals in the form of a memorandum is 30 days. When a draft law gets into the Chamber of Deputies it has to undergo a procedure of several readings. First of all, it is directly debated in the lower house of the parliament (first reading), then it is forwarded to the specialized committees of the lower house of the parliament for a more comprehensive consideration. When the committees finish their job, the Chamber of Deputies considers a draft law at the second reading, and, finally, during the third reading, which is the end of a legislative process in this house, if a draft law would not be returned later to the lower house by the Senate or the head of the state<sup>22</sup>.

At the beginning of the first reading the party (represented by any initiator from the allowed list) which introduces or represents a draft law, describes it, appoints the reporter (a deputy, appointed by the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies). After general parliamentary debates (not limited in time) the lower house can return the draft law upon the recommendations of the party, reject the draft law or forward it to the committee or several committees for further debates. The task of the first reading is to introduce the essence and objects of a draft law to deputies. The aim of the Chamber of Deputies' decision as to returning or rejecting a draft law is to make sure that the draft law lacking support in the lower house should not get through all three readings before it will be rejected later. Another aim of the first reading is to specify parties' positions as to the draft law before it is debated in the committees or at the plenary session. If the Chamber of Deputies does not reject the draft law at the first reading, it is forwarded to the committee or several committees for further consideration. It is important that the draft law is obligatory forwarded to the committees, which specialize on the issues, which must be resolved in future by the law. In some cases the draft law can be sent to more than one committee. Besides, a committee can decide that it will discuss the draft law on its own initiative. It often happens in situations concerning the projects in the sphere of military defense policy, where draft laws are under consideration of the defense and security committee, foreign-relations and European-relations committee. In the process of consideration of the project there are numerous debates and discussions, when deputies have an opportunity to introduce amendments to the draft law. Finally, after the first reading, committees have 60 days for further consideration of the project, if they are in charge of it. This term can be reduced to 30 days or prolonged for 20. The term is reduced by more than 30 days, if at least 2 deputy factions or 50 or more deputies insist on it. The term is prolonged for more than 20 days by mutual consent of all parties, which are the authors of the project. At the end of discussions the committee adopts a resolution, in which it recommends to adopt

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<sup>22</sup> *The legislative process in Parliament*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative\\_ENG\\_05\\_2016.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative_ENG_05_2016.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

or reject the draft law at the plenary session of the Chamber of Deputies. The minority of the members of the committee may take another controversial position<sup>23</sup>.

At the second reading the initiator of the draft law again introduces it and addresses it to the appointed reporter. After general discussions there is a comprehensive discussion, including those deputies who want and can introduce amendments to the draft law. The debates are not limited in time. A deputy or several deputies can offer a resolution concerning each procedural matter or return the project to the committee. Besides, a deputy or a group of deputies can offer to reject the draft law, but such proposal may be put on vote only at the third reading. The third reading itself in the Chamber of Deputies must begin no later than 72 hours from the date of considering all amendments at the second reading. However, the lower house in the course of detailed discussion may take a decision to reduce this term to 48 hours<sup>24</sup>.

At the beginning of the third reading the party-initiator or a representative of a draft law again introduces it and addresses it to the appointed reporter. The latter must propose an order, in which the Chamber of Deputies will vote on any proposed amendments to the draft law and a legislation as a whole. In the course of parliamentary debates at the third reading deputies cannot introduce any other amendments to the project, except those concerning legislative, technical, grammatical, literal and typographical errors, which can be seen in the text and already proposed amendments. Besides, deputies can return the draft law for further development for the second reading. All ballots on the offered amendments and legislation as a whole are coordinated by the reporter on the project in accordance with the specified order. The latter and the party-initiator of the draft law express their position as to each proposed amendment and legislation as a whole (positive, negative, neutral). The Chamber of Deputies at first vote on any offered amendments (of non-conceptual nature) and only after that on the legislation as a whole. If the Chamber of Deputies does not approve of the project as a whole, the legislation is considered defeated and the legislative process terminates. If they express consent, then the legislative process comes to its end and the legislation is forwarded to the Senate (except the laws, which are adopted by the lower house only, in cases which have been mentioned above)<sup>25</sup>.

However, when the draft law is being sent for consideration to the Chamber of Deputies the party-initiator and representative of the legislation may ask the latter to approve of the project at the end of the first reading (the second and third readings will not take place in that case). In such instance the explanatory note must comprise the reasons for such request. The Chamber of Deputies can consider such request only if 2 deputy factions or at least 50 deputies are not against it. Proposals to the constitutional laws and the law on the state budget, as well as parliamentary ratification of international

<sup>23</sup> *The legislative process in Parliament*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative\\_ENG\\_05\\_2016.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative_ENG_05_2016.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].; *The legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies of the parliament of the Czech Republic*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni\\_proces\\_EN.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni_proces_EN.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>24</sup> Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Polityczna strukturyzatsiia parlamentiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> *The legislative process in Parliament*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative\\_ENG\\_05\\_2016.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative_ENG_05_2016.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].; *The legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies of the parliament of the Czech Republic*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni\\_proces\\_EN.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni_proces_EN.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

agreements in no way can be approved by the lower house at the first reading as a whole<sup>26</sup>. After general discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, the plenary session accepts the request. If the request is not admitted, then a traditional (full) legislative procedure is applied. If the request is accepted, detailed parliamentary debates take place at the first reading. In this case deputies cannot offer amendments to the project, except legislative, technical, grammatical, literal and typographical errors. Considering all proposals the Chamber of Deputies vote for approval of the draft law. If the legislation is not approved, then the lower house consider a draft law in accordance with a regular legislative procedure. It is notable, that in due time a special procedure of passing laws, which allows the lower house of the parliament to approve of the legislation during the first reading, was enacted when the Czech Republic was joining the EU. Of interest is the fact that apart from a general and fast-track procedure while passing laws in the lower house, there are other special features: a case, when the governmental cabinet forwards a draft law for consideration of to the Chamber of Deputies due to the request to express a vote of no-confidence in the government cabinet; a case, when the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies at the suggestion of the government declares a state of emergency; in case, when approval of a legislation is necessary to implement the resolution of the UN Security Council; in case, when the state is under the threat of martial law, the government demands from the parliament to consider projects in accordance with a fast-track legislative procedure<sup>27</sup>.

According to the regular procedure, in particular after adopting the law as a whole in the lower house, it is forwarded to the Senate, which must finish discussing the project during 30 days since it is received. At the plenary meeting the Senate consider a draft law only in one reading, however previously discussing it in the corresponding committees. In the course of 3 days since the draft law is received from the Chamber of Deputies the organizing committee of the Senate forwards it to one or several committees. The procedure according to which the project is sent to the committees is identical to one used in the Chamber of Deputies. If the Senate approve any amendments, they must be adopted by the chamber of Deputies as a whole. That is why senators often introduce only those amendments, which can be approved by the lower house. After discussions of the project in the committees of the Senate it goes for consideration to the plenary meeting of the upper house. The senate may take one of the following steps: 1) do not discuss the draft law: the latter is assumed to be adopted as a law, and thus the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies forwards it to the president to sign it; 2) approve of the draft law: the latter is assumed to be adopted as a law, and thus the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies forwards it to the president to sign it; 3) reject the draft law: the latter is returned to the Chamber of Deputies for a second ballot; 4) return the draft law to the Chamber of Deputies together with the amendments adopted by the Senate for a new ballot; 5) reject the resolution on a legislation: a draft

<sup>26</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

<sup>27</sup> *The legislative process in Parliament*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative\\_ENG\\_05\\_2016.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/Legislative_ENG_05_2016.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].; *The legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies of the parliament of the Czech Republic*, źródło: [http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni\\_proces\\_EN.pdf](http://www.psp.cz/eknih/cdrom/ic/pdf/en/legislativni_proces_EN.pdf) [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

law is assumed to be adopted as a law in 30 days after it is forwarded to the Senate by the lower house of the parliament, the speaker of which gives the law to the president for signature.

In its turn, the president of the Czech Republic can return the law (except constitutional legislations) in the course of 15 days after receiving it: that a procedure of putting a veto on it. In such case the Chamber of Deputies must hold a ballot on the law, returned by the president at the next plenary meeting, but not earlier than 10 days, since it is returned to the house. If the Chamber of Deputies approve of the law by an absolute majority of all deputies (of a nominal composition of the legislature), the law is published in the “Journal of laws” (without president’s signature). If the Chamber of Deputies do not approve of the law (do not override the veto of the president), it is considered to be rejected or not adopted. Therefore, it means that regular legislation in the Czech Republic are adopted by a relative majority of deputies, and veto is overridden by an absolute majority. Finally, it testifies that the procedure of passing laws in the bicameral Czech legislature is a bit more complicated than in case with unilateral legislature. Thus, it results in the reduction of both the number of draft laws and adopted laws, as well as stabilization of the party system. So in the case of the Czech Republic the number of the proposed legislations in due time, for instance, had the following correlation (according to the terms of the lower house of the parliament, as the upper house is elected partly and not synchronized): 1992–1996 – 2133; 1996–1998 – 663; 1998–2002 – 2082; 2002–2006 – 2176; 2006–2010 – 2166 and so on<sup>28</sup>.

Finally, the construction of the “British” model of legislation in the system of bicameralism is a bit distinctive in case of Poland. In our country the right for legislation initiative belongs to deputies, the Senate (upper house), the president, the Council of Ministers (the government), groups of people in the number of not less than 100 000, who are up for election to the Sejm (the lower house of the parliament). Draft laws from deputies may be introduced by means of committees of the Sejm or by deputy groups with a fixed number of members. However, the law on the state budget, amendments to it, regulations on the state debt, as well as the laws on the state guarantees can be initiated only the Council of Ministers (government). Any draft law must be accompanied with an explanatory note, where should be stated social, economic and financial consequences of the legislation, sources of funding (if the project is funded from the state budget), the declaration of the project conformance to the EU legislation. Draft laws, introduced by the Council of Ministers, must be accompanied with the projects of main subordinate acts<sup>29</sup>. To simplify the procedure of passing legislations it is required to mention their representatives, who will act on the behalf of the initiators during all stages of the legislative process. In case of a government legislation the head of the Council of Ministers (the prime-minister) appoints one of the ministers to represent the government while

<sup>28</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniálnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv kraïin Vyshebnadskoi hrupy ta ïnshykh kraïin Tsentralno-Skbidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164-180.; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Politychna strukturyzatsiia parlamentiv kraïin Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> *Legislative Procedure*, źródło: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/lp1.htm>; <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/diagram.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

considering the project. The initiators have a right to scrap a draft law, introduced by them, but not later than the agreement as to the second reading is achieved. The legislative process starts in the Seim, when a draft law is forwarded to Marshal/Speaker of the Seim.

Traditionally, the Seim considers a draft law in three readings. The first one takes place at the session of the house or a committee, and presupposes presentation of the project by the initiator, question-answer period between the initiator and deputies, discussion over peculiarities of the legislation. The first reading, which takes place at the meeting of the Seim, may result in rejecting a draft law as a whole, however, usually it is forwarded to a corresponding committee (or committees) or a specialized committee. Further work over a draft law is conducted in a committee (committees, sub-committee) involving deputies, experts and government representatives. This stage results either in approval of the draft law by a committee (committees), which may include some recommendations as to passing it with amendments or without them, or in a request to reject the legislation. Initiators of amendments, which are rejected by a committee (committees) may demand to include their proposals into the report as the minority's opinions. Committees are independent as to division of work between them, but deputies usually follow their political priorities. That is why draft laws often undergo significant changes at this stage.

Second reading in the Seim includes presentation of a complex report on the legislation, further discussions and introduction of probable amendments. Among those who have a right to introduce amendments are deputies, initiators of a legislation and members of the Council of Ministers. The Marshal/speaker of the Seim may reject the request to put to the vote any amendment, which has not been presented in the committee before. After this procedure a draft law, as a rule, is forwarded to a committee/committees in order the latter can set their position as to the introduced amendments and proposals<sup>30</sup>.

Finally, the third reading comprises a presentation of an additional report of the commission or if the draft law has not been sent back to a committee/committees there is a reporter's speech about the amendments and proposals, which are introduced during the second reading, as well as the process of voting, on the basis of which the decision is taken whether the legislation is finally adopted. An ordinary law can be passed by an absolute majority of votes with not less than a half of all deputies, if the constitution does not presuppose another type of majority as to certain laws (in fact it is a rule of a relative majority).

It is notable that ballots on a legislation as a whole may follow such procedures: 1) voting "for" or "against" the proposal to reject a project as a whole (if such variant is available); 2) voting "for" or "against" amendments to some articles on condition that a legislation has been rejected as a whole before that; 3) voting "for" or "against" a legislation as a whole in the text, proposed by the committee, including adopted amendments. When a draft law is adopted, it is named a "statute", but it is not binding yet. Thus the marshal/speaker of the Seim sends the act adopted by the Seim to the corresponding

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<sup>30</sup> *Legislative Procedure*, źródło: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/lp1.htm>; <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/prace/diagram.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

committee, which has 18 days to consider the statute. In general, in the course of 30 days since the statute is sent, the upper house may take the following steps: 1) take a decision to reject the statute as a whole (the statute is sent back to the Seim); 2) approve of the statute as it is as a whole (the statute is sent back to the Seim and the marshal/speaker forwards it to the president); 3) approve of the statute with amendments (the Seim considers all proposed amendments). If during the fixed period the Senate does not take any resolution, the statute is considered to be adopted as specified in the formulation, offered by the Seim. In case there are amendments from the Senate the lower house can: 1) override them, leaving the statute in its previous reading, this requires an absolute majority of the nominal composition of the lower house; 2) take into account amendments made by the Senate and vote for them by a relative majority (according to the rule of taking laws). If the Senate block the statute as a whole and the Seim do not have an absolute majority of votes to override the decision of the upper house, the legislative procedure stops and this legislation may be considered from the beginning only (and not at the second reading, for example)<sup>31</sup>.

Considering the decision of the Senate (or if the Senate do not take any decision during 30 days), the marshal/speaker of the Seim forwards the adopted statute to the president for promulgation. The president has 21-day term to take a decision. If the latter is positive, the statute becomes a law and is published in the “Journal of laws of the Republic of Poland”. However, before signing the statute the president can forward it to the Constitutional Court to consider its constitutionality. In cases, when the Constitutional Tribunal believes the statute to be in full concordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the president cannot refuse signing it. And on the contrary, the president has the right to refuse of signing the law, which is declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal. It should be mentioned that if a decision concerning its unconstitutional nature refers only the number of its provisions, which to the tribunal’s point of view, are inseparably connected with the statute, the president conducting preliminary consultations with the marshal/speaker of the Seim, has the right to sign the statute with cautions, defined by the tribunal. Besides, the head of the state can decide to return the statute to the Seim, in order the latter correct all non-conformities. The role of the Senate is complimentary. On the other hand, if the head of the state does not appeal to the court to ask the latter to make a decision as to the constitutional nature of the statute, he/she can forward it to the Seim for further development (the veto of the president)<sup>32</sup>. Such decision must be accompanied with an explanatory note. The marshal/speaker of the Seim forwards the president’s request to the corresponding committee, which took part in working out a draft law, before the latter was adopted by the Seim. Later, the committee presents a report, including the decision whether to pass the law as it has been sent to the president or with amendments. The Seim can override the veto of the president by the majority of 3/5 in the presence of at least half of the house. The regulatory act, which has been voted

<sup>31</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv kraïni Vyshebnadskoi hrupy ta ïnshykh kraïni Tsentralno-Skbidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164-180.; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Politychna strukturyzatsiia parlamentiv kraïni Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. PAIS, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Kimber R., *Constitutions, treaties, and official declarations*, Wyd. PS Resources, źródło: <http://www.politicsresources.net/const.htm> [odczyt: 28.11.2018].

on again in the house must be signed by the president during 7 days and come into force immediately. In such case, the head of the state does not have a right to send the law to the Constitutional Court or put a veto on it.

Quite specific is the fast-track procedure of considering draft laws in the Seim. The right to initiate a fast-track procedure belongs exclusively to the Council of Ministers (government) on the basis of classification of the draft laws prepared by it as urgent. However, according to the constitution the terms, when the lower house must pass laws in accordance with a fast-track procedure, are not specified. It should be mentioned as well that ordinary laws are passed by a majority of deputies among those who are present (but under the condition, that there is not less than a nominal composition of the parliament). Amendments to the constitution are adopted in the form of constitutional statutes, the projects of which are offered by the head of the state, the senate or not less than 1/5 of the nominal composition of the Seim. All constitutional statutes are adopted by at least 2/3 of deputies if at least half of the nominal composition of the lower house of the parliament are present. After this, during 60 days the same reading of the legislation must be adopted in the Senate by an absolute majority of votes with at least half of the composition of it present<sup>33</sup>. However, if the proposed amendment refers to Chapter I (Republic), Chapter II (Freedoms, rights and responsibilities of individuals and citizens) and Chapter XII (On the Amendments to the Constitution), then the subjects of the legislative initiative are authorized to hold a national referendum, during 45 days since the statute is adopted in the upper house of the parliament. A constitutional amendment is believed to be adopted, when the majority of voters support it. The head of the state signs it during 21 days since it is submitted by the marshal/speaker of the Seim, and then it is ordered to be published in the "Journal of laws". The head of the state cannot impose a veto on it. Besides, the constitution cannot be changed during the martial law or the state of emergency.

In practice, according to the study by K. Goetz and R. Zubek<sup>34</sup>, the leading (key) actor of the legislative initiative in Poland, as well as the other members of the Visegrad group, as it was mentioned above, was the government cabinet. However, this statistics differently correlates with the situation in Poland, as only 40% of all draft laws, which are introduced in the parliament, belong to the government. The situation may be justified only by the fact that the majority of draft laws, proposed by deputies, are nominally governmental, as they are initiated by deputies, who belong to government parties. Herewith, the role of the government cabinet in a legislative initiative is very decentralized (despite the fact that the prime minister controls the agenda of the cabinet, individual ministers possess a high level of influence over the agenda of the legislative initiative). At the beginning of each semester the Head of the president's office offers ministers to approve of the plan of government's legislative measures.

<sup>33</sup> Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164-180.

<sup>34</sup> Goetz K., Zubek R., Government, Parliament and Lawmaking in Poland, *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 2007, vol 13, nr. 4, s. 517-538.



Table 2. Statistics on legislative activity in the Polish parliament (1989–2018)<sup>35</sup>

| Convocation of parliament | Year/years       | Number of draft laws introduced to the Sejm | Number of the laws adopted | Number of the laws adopted with amendments from the Senate | Number of the adopted resolutions |
|---------------------------|------------------|---|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| 0                         | <b>1989–1919</b> | <b>н.д.</b>                                 | <b>247</b>                 | <b>н.д.</b>  | <b>164</b>                        |
| 1                         | <b>1991–1993</b> | <b>н.д.</b>                                 | <b>94</b>                  | <b>н.д.</b>  | <b>135</b>                        |
| 2                         | <b>1993–1997</b> | <b>826</b>                                  | <b>473</b>                 | <b>217</b>   | <b>296</b>                        |
| 3                         | 1997             | 59  | 21                         | 10   | 24                                |
|                           | 1998             | 276   | 97                         | 52   | 44                                |
|                           | 1999             | 322   | 126                        | 56   | 42                                |
|                           | 2000             | 257   | 174                        | 127  | 45                                |
|                           | 2001             | 237   | 222                        | 142  | 35                                |
|                           | <b>1997–2001</b> | <b>1151</b>                                 | <b>640</b>                 | <b>387</b>   | <b>190</b>                        |
| 4                         | 2001             | 79  | 36                         | 10   | 23                                |
|                           | 2002             | 349   | 213                        | 108  | 43                                |
|                           | 2003             | 302   | 226                        | 142  | 62                                |
|                           | 2004             | 342   | 241                        | 145  | 81                                |
|                           | 2005             | 193   | 178                        | 96   | 47                                |
|                           | <b>2001–2005</b> | <b>1265</b>                                 | <b>894</b>                 | <b>501</b>   | <b>256</b>                        |
| 5                         | 2005             | 92  | 21                         | 7  | 34                                |
|                           | 2006             | 363   | 193                        | 71   | 103                               |
|                           | 2007             | 253   | 170                        | 101  | 63                                |
|                           | <b>2005–2007</b> | <b>708</b>                                  | <b>384</b>                 | <b>179</b>   | <b>200</b>                        |
| 6                         | 2007             | 87  | 6                          | 1  | 26                                |
|                           | 2008             | 544   | 251                        | 118  | 57                                |
|                           | 2009             | 342   | 232                        | 116  | 67                                |
|                           | 2010             | 324   | 229                        | 132  | 81                                |
|                           | 2011             | 214   | 234                        | 109  | 58                                |
|                           | <b>2007–2011</b> | <b>1511</b>                                 | <b>952</b>                 | <b>476</b>   | <b>289</b>                        |
| 7                         | 2011             | 60  | 5                          | 1  | 24                                |
|                           | 2012             | 374   | 134                        | 39   | 59                                |
|                           | 2013             | 310   | 167                        | 62   | 69                                |
|                           | 2014             | 293   | 186                        | 87   | 81                                |
|                           | 2015             | 263   | 261                        | 98   | 49                                |
|                           | <b>2011–2015</b> | <b>1300</b>                                 | <b>753</b>                 | <b>287</b>   | <b>282</b>                        |
| 8                         | 2015             | 62  | 29                         | 4  | 35                                |
|                           | 2016             | 358   | 217                        | 60   | 89                                |
|                           | 2017             | 337   | 212                        | 55   | 74                                |
|                           | 2018             | 318   | 246                        | 48   | 43                                |
|                           | <b>2015–2018</b> | <b>1075</b>                                 | <b>704</b>                 | <b>167</b>   | <b>241</b>                        |

Źródło: Romaniuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 164–180.; *Archiwum*, źródło: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/page.xsp/archiwum> [odczyt: 28.11.2018]., Zubek R., *Legislative Time, Executive Rules and Government Lawmaking, Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions Helsinki, 2007.*

<sup>35</sup> As of November 26, 2018

Namely, in accordance with this requirement the consideration of the proposed plan of legislations is happening, as well as gathering all commentaries on this account. Though in general in the course of this process opinions of other heads of departments are taken into consideration. However, ministers keep some possibilities to actualize a sectorial legislative process (in their discretion). By and large, all unscheduled government legislations comprises 50%.

In general, Poland is characterized by quite a large number of laws, adopted by the legislature and sent to president for promulgation. On average, annually their number is bigger than in Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic (see Table 2). Nevertheless, on this account one should not make clear-cut solutions, though some results must be highlighted. Growth in the number of laws does not prove their over-production<sup>36</sup>. The majority of laws may, for instance, indicate the necessity to solve social and economic problems and to bring current legislation into compliance with the European standards. However, there is consensus among the researchers, that legislative measures are performed even they are not necessary, and result in expenses which are bigger than the benefit for the society in general. Thus, regulatory inflation, which can be observed in Poland, lie in the fact that there are an excessive number of laws in comparison with those required to regulate the society to be provided with efficient resources of its functioning <<<sup>37</sup>.

In general, having analyzed the situation of legislature in the countries of the Visegrad group, we single out three pathways of developing the number of laws, passed in the region: 1) unstable number of acts (the Czech Republic and Poland); 2) stable number of adopted regulatory acts (Hungary); 3) gradual growth in the number of legislations (Slovakia). It is determined by the fact that in the region there are unicameral (more stable from the legislative point of view) and bicameral (of higher legislative volatility character), which make use of different procedures of a legislative process. Though, in conclusion it is determined that in general in case of unicameral and bicameral parliaments in the countries of the Visegrad group a legislative process is implemented predominantly in the same way, however there are some distinctive features, synthesized in Table 3:

<sup>36</sup> Eng S., *Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law*, [w:] Wintgens L. (ed.), *Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation*, Wyd. Hart 2002, s. 65-79.

<sup>37</sup> Wronkowska-Jaskiewicz S., *Ustawodawstwo w państwie prawa. Siedem tez do dyskusji*, [w:] Lipińska M. (ed.), *Stanowienie prawa – kompetencje Senatu w procesie legislacyjnym*. Materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Komisję Ustawodawstwa i Praworzadnoooci pod patronatem Marszałka Senatu RP Longina Pastusiaka 22 października 2002 r., Wyd. Kancelaria Senatu 2002, s. 16.

Table 3. Features of a legislative function in unicameral and bicameral parliaments in the countries of the Visegrad group<sup>38</sup>

| Marker  | Poland  | Slovakia | Hungary | Czech Rep. |
|---|---------|----------|---------|------------|
| Number of houses in the parliament  | 2       | 1        | 1       | 2          |
| House (leading house), where consideration of a draft law starts  | Lower   | Single   | Single  | Lower      |
| Need for approval on behalf of the alternative house, bicameralism only   | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Possibility to pass laws when there is no approval on behalf of the alternative house of the parliament, bicameralism only                                      | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Number of readings in one house   | 3       | 3        | 3       | 3          |
| Number of readings in the alternative house, bicameralism only  | 1       | N/A      | N/A     | 1          |
| Possibility to hold an associated meeting of houses in the parliament to pass controversial legislation, bicameralism only                                      | -       | N/A      | N/A     | -          |
| Time limit for additional consideration of legislation in the alternative house, bicameralism only  | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Time limit for consideration of the amendments to the constitution in the alternative house, bicameralism only  | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Possibility of the leading house to put a veto on a negative decision, taken by the alternative house, concerning constitutional legislation, bicameralism only | +       | N/A      | N/A     | -          |
| Possibility of the leading house to pass some laws individually, bicameralism only  | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Possibility of the alternative house to pass some laws individually, bicameralism only  | +       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Necessity to approve the decisions of the alternative house by resolutions of the leading house of the parliament, bicameralism only                            | -       | N/A      | N/A     | +          |
| Necessity of a motivational report  | +       | +        | +       | +          |
| Time limit for consideration in a committee before the first reading  | -       | -        | -       | -          |
| Time limit for consideration in a committee before the second reading   | 60 days | N/A      | N/A     | 60 days    |
| Possibility to terminate consideration of the draft law after the second reading  | +       | +        | +       | -          |
| Possibility to introduce conceptual amendments during the third reading   | -       | -        | -       | -          |
| Possibility to return a draft law from the third reading to the second one  | -       | -        | -       | +          |
| Possibility to consider legislation in accordance with a fast-track procedure   | +       | +        | +       | +          |
| Possibility to transfer a draft law from a fast-track procedure to a regular procedure  | -       | -        | -       | +          |
| Possibility to unite draft laws   | +       | -        | +       | -          |
| The right of the president to impose a veto   | +       | +        | +       | +          |

<sup>38</sup> N/A – such procedure or features of a legislative function of the parliament is not available (usually it refers unicameralism in comparison to bicameralism).

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## **Model of the modern political party in terms of democratic transition**

There were analyzed specifics of the evolution and function of political parties in the transforming societies. Reasons and aftermaths of “political parties’ crisis” in 70-x and 80-x years of XX century were envisaged.

It was characterized correlation of the phases of the transition to democracy and political parties’ types. Influence on the establishing of the political parties, socio-political distinctions, forms of government, electoral system was described.

There were made conclusions about the main characteristics of political parties in transitional societies.

*Keywords: political party, transitional societies, countries of Central-East Europe, socio-political distinctions, form of government, electoral system.*

## **Модель сучасної політичної партії в конструкції демократичного транзиту**

Проаналізовано специфіку еволюції функцій політичних партій в суспільствах, які трансформуються. Розглянуто підстави та чинники «кризи політичних партій» у 70-х та 80-х роках двадцятого сторіччя. Дано характеристику етапів транзиту до демократії та типів політичних партій. Простежено взаємовплив політичних партій та соціополітичних поділів, форм правління та виборчих систем. Отримано висновки щодо головних характеристик політичних партій в транзитних суспільствах.

*Ключові слова: політичні партії, транзитне суспільство, країни Центрально-Східної Європи, соціополітичний поділ, форми правління, виборчі системи.*

**Articulation of issue:** Characteristics of any phenomenon requests an understanding of its nature (essence) and sense of functioning. So we examine phenomena in context of structural-functional paradigm.

Examining political parties as institutes, there should be kept in mind: a) basic tools that are reflections of their institutional features: program, organizational structure, social base etc; b) specifics of social-cultural environment, wherein parties operate (present social-political

distinctions, transit society/entrenched democracy etc.); c) specifics of institutional environment (form of government, electoral system).

Analyzing the political party's main parameters of political party in transit society, first of all, need to describe a classic model of political party, which has been formed during XX century. The paradigm setup of the researchers of political parties was the belief, that party, as a political organization, should be examined in the relationship system «civil society – party – state», namely as transmitter between society and the state. Second, party has been considered as political institute, whose main goal of activity is power struggle, taking part in the power relationships realization. Third, party has been considered as organization that has a program (ideological profile), organizational structure (set up by a statute) and social base (fixed membership, as a rule) [10; 14; 15; 16].

In years 1970–1980 in political life of the Western countries are being conducted political processes, can be called as a crisis of parliament democracy. First of all it's about the social changes, within which the middle-class rising, women activity in political life, migration of population and some other should be emphasized. It is also important to note the crisis of traditional ideologies and formation of the post-material values system (concerned with career, cultural requests, prestige etc).

At the same time a number of researchers consider that crisis has taken over the old type of parties – mass parties – and given an impulse to the appearance of the new forms of party life – panoptic and cartel parties.

A transition to a democracy in countries of Central and East Europe also fostered appearance of the new party formations in terms of transformation of social and political structures. New political parties had been organizationally built according to the principle of panoptic parties, as a rule, and their special functioning feature was determined by the specifics of democratic transition.

**Objective** of this article is characteristics of the modern political party's model in the terms of democratic transition. For the achievement of set objective it's necessary to solve the following goals: a) to research the reason of “party crisis” in 70-x years of XX century; b) to characterize essential features of political parties in transit societies.

Problem of the institutional features of political parties in “new democracies” is being actively evolved as foreign (V. Helman [2], H. Golosov [3], G. Ishiyama [7], T. Carosers, R. Katz [17], R. Kitchelt [18], S. Lipset [8; 9], P. Mayer [17], A. Ryommele [12], G. Sartory) so the domestic specialists (V. Bun' [1], M. Karmazina, A. Kolodiy, A. Klyuckkovich, V. Lebedyuk, Y. Ostapets' [10], A. Romanyuk [11], M. Prymush).

Evolvement and activity of political parties in societies that transforming, in some measure, are determined by the process of democratic transition. It is researched special branch of comparative political science “theory of transition”, or transitology. Analyzing the transition to the democracy, the majority of transitologists places an emphasis on the number of phases. There

was popular a model of democratic transition that was proposed by American politologist D. Rustow for a long time. Comparing the transitions to democracy in Sweden (from 1890 till 1920) and Turkey (from 1940 till 1960), he has marked three phases out: preparing phase, where the conflicts between main social groups get sharpened; phase of decision's making, when the compromise on the new democratic political game's rules get reached between the political actors; phase of acclimatization, during which democratic institutes gain their role. As the main requirement of the democratic transitions he considered the national unity.

Some similar model of transition to the democracy is proposed by the American politologists F. Schmitter and G. O'Donnel. They marked such phases of the transition out: of liberalization, of democratization, resocialization. Phase of liberalization begins at the crisis of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes and crisis of elite's identity that ends with their divide. Phase of democratization differs itself by the institutional changes in the political system. On this phase there are appearing such political institutes as political parties, electoral system, that give a possibility to form authorities in a democratic way. During the resocialization acquirement and adoption of the democratic values and game rules by citizens and step-to-step inclusion of them to the new political system takes place – there forms a democratic society.

Other authors call this phase a phase of consolidation. So, the logic of party systems establishing is subordinated to the already mentioned logic of political transition. Such an evolution ends with a consolidation of party system. On the every of these phases party system has their configuration and corresponding factors make an influence on its establishing. On the phase of liberalization takes place a political split on the leftists and rightists, governing and opposing parties. Then splitting takes place within the governing party and opposition [13].

An essential influence on the evolution of political parties in the terms of transformation, on thought of Y. Ostapet's makes an objective process of the development of party structures in the modern world. Such regularity exists and has been described by the scientists. The question is historical phases of institutionalization of political parties. In political science next phases are marked out: 1) aristocratic groups; 2) political clubs; 3) mass political parties; 4) panoptic political parties; 5) cartel political parties. Therefore, political parties that establish in new democracies shall act and are acting on the panoptic and cartel parties' functioning principles [10, p. 8].

Universal parties (electoral-professional parties or "get-them-all"-parties) don't claim the intellectual and moral domination anymore, aiming at the success on the elections. These «interclass» organizations consider their widening but trying to consolidate the maximal number of electors of different social, ethnic and other belonging for the solving of the main questions of the moment. Such parties are forming around the pragmatic leader (or leaders) of a common-national scale, as a rule, that offers to society the ideas of harmony, compromise, balance of interests.

Process of transforming of ideological parties in universal is being conducted in the direction of strengthening their direct connection with state and also connections between the

parties. It appears a type of “cartel parties” on this ground. This kind of parties becomes a mechanism of state offices’ sharing between professional groups of politicians. Such a mechanism is based, first of all, on the unmediated ties of politician and elector without any help of party organization. Moreover, it is based on the wide coalition basis and shortening the distance between electors and political leaders [17].

Sure, one can speak on the specific way of party system establishing in the post-communist countries. First of all, there should be emphasized that in difference with Western Europe countries, whose party building process has begun from below are distinguished in Central-Europe countries, where all was conversely – from above to below. That means the institutional forming of the elites (groups and interests) taken place first and then terms for appearance and institutionalization of political parties being created. Hereout comes the affirmation of the low-level political participation in the «third wave» democracies by the researchers.

V. Merkel marks 5 factors out that make an influence on the party system configuration in the post-communist countries: 1) character of transformational conflict; 2) presence of «historical» parties; 3) influence of political institutes; 4) presence of the clientalist traditions; 5) influence of social-political division [10, p. 9].

Lviv scientist A. Romanyuk considers that evolvement of modern party systems in Central-Eastern Europe is determined by the turning points of post-authoritarian and democratic history of parties. The first is forced by collapses of authoritarian regimes in the region (party pluralism has appeared as a consequence), the second – by the consequences of the first/constituent elections in the certain countries of the region (inasmuch the ideological parties have begun to appear or restore), the third – by the specifics and consequences of the eurointegrative processes in the region (political parties became more structured). Every single turning point in the political parties’ evolvement has been added by a qualitative change of the social-group structuring of the different countries and transformation of their party systems [11, c. 285–288].

Other researcher of the party systems’ evolution in the CEE countries G. Kitchelt has constructed three (perfect) types of parties in the period of the transition to the consolidated democracy:

1. Program parties – the parties which are bounded with existing conflict lines and which have ideological or worldview basis. As a rule, they represent the interests of the certain population swath. The mobilize groups of electors on the basis of their program documents.
2. Charismatic parties are the parties, whose identity is determined by a charismatic leader and isn’t tied with contensive constituent of their policy.
3. Clientalist parties also impede the consolidation of democracy. Through such parties promise general goods but in fact, they care first of all about supplying of their clientele in a way of different resources sharing: subventions, tax reliefs, social goods [18, p. 76].



K. Janda marked next type of parties in CEE countries out:

1. Parties of mass democratic movements («Solidarity» in Poland, «Civil Forum» in Czechia, «Sajūdis» in Lithuania, «Union of Democratic Forces» in Bulgaria, «National Salvation Front» in Romania etc.).
2. Parties – rudiments of communist parties.
3. Restored pre-war parties (liberal, conservative, rural).
4. Ethnic parties (hungarian parties in Romania, Slovakia).
5. Religious parties.
6. Parties of western political values (feminist, environment protection etc.).
7. “Exotic” parties (parties of beer fans) [6, p. 132].

So, party development of the new democracy countries is characterized by tendency of forming of parties with an unstable electoral base, wherein party leadership performs the main role, inasmuch the party system isn't established yet.

This process is concerned with several circumstances. First, parties have to appeal to the wide circle of electors foremost, because they cannot rely on the support of the electorate with established political vocation, because there was any under the authoritarianism. Second, parties don't seek to widen their members' number, because their financial resources don't depend from the number of members, and with lower number of members, the chance of the potential challenge within party reduces. Third, depoliticized citizens of post-communist countries don't expose an inclination to the ideological and party symbols identification – they prefer powerful personalities. Therefore the highest chances in post-communist politics has universal parties, where party leadership plays the dominate role and the party structure – secondary.

The essential influence on the party system evolution makes social-political stratification. Founders of the social-political stratification theory S. Lipset and S. Roccan have considered the establishment and evolvement of Western party systems in close ties with revolutionary transformations and contradictions that have been appeared between center and periphery, between state and the Church, between city and countryside, between owners and workers [8, p. 204–235].

This approach presents party systems as reflection of societal conflicts or political competition's structure that has been forged between different groups of population.

The structure of social-political division in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has its own specifics. Divisions that come from the socialist past and reflex, first of all, in the mental characteristics of the electors – authoritarian values of the powerful state and powerful leader, although they losing significance, they still determine the existence of the “divide” between those, who gained benefits from the “old” regime and those, who won in a result of “transitional” period.

A high mobilization level of population in a communist regime, negative take of communist past by electors explain in a great measure the fact that individuals in Central and Eastern Europe don't qualify themselves with political parties, are unstable in their party-political preferences, passive, inclined to the positive reaction of populist and nationalist parties.

It must be noted that according to the O. Donova, the characteristic of the post-communist electorate as unstructured and «atomized» had a momentum in the beginning period of transformation. The situation has changed with the lapse of time – definition of the main ideological blocks and structuring of the party of the party-political space reduces the level of the disorientation of electors. Electors that had won are inclined to the support of liberal-free market programs and parties. And, vice versa, the disaffection for the economic situation can enforce to vote for the parties that stay on antidemocratic and anti-market positions. It points onto the presence of social-political division on the social-political ground in post-communist countries [4].

In general, it's noteworthy that specifics of social-political divisions in Central and Eastern Europe countries are determined by the regional historical development specifics, authoritarian regime experience, specifics of the democratic transition first of all. On the other hand, communist regime has weakened the historical structure of the division to the point, where they stopped to be the ground of electoral proclivity and party competition. So, social-political divisions of societies that transforming bearing the imprint of the social conflicts' structure, that has been existed even before the entrenchment of the authoritarian regimes.

A. Ryommele has defined such four mandatory distinctions in political divisions in Central and Eastern Europe, different from the Western Europe.

First, it's a path and difficulty of the transition. Post-communist Europe really experiences “triple” transition that foresees not just a democratization but also massive transition to the market economy and state building.

Second stays the difference of the electorates. In party systems that had been formed in the West is being preserved the incline to the inheritance and inertance. In Eastern and Central Europe electorate is much more opened and responsive to the influence.

Third, there are differences in the type of the party. New parties in countries of Central-Eastern Europe are more charismatic and clientalist than program. Fourth – the role of media. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe media were to be strictly censored and controlled under the communist regimes. They played a role of an ruling elite's tool, with the help of which state policy and ruling ideology has been popularized [12, p. 30–45].

Summarizing different original approaches it could be laid an emphasis onto seven problematic dimensions that correlate with conflict lines of S. Lipset and S. Roccan and which are typical for the post-communist societies. These are next dimensions: cultural-ethnic, religious, social-economic, of foreign policy, post-material, dimension “city-countryside” and dimension of the “regime support”.

**Conclusions.** In societies that are being in the state of transformation a lot of parties are registering. It's sure that only a part of them takes a part In the political life of the society, so not any of them could be considered as a party system. According to our point of view as a part of party system should be considered the parties that: a) express the essential interests of society and being supported by the citizens; b) bidding political and law principles that are regulating party competition; c) reaching a representation in the state authorities.

The main factors that are making influence on the forming of political parties and political systems in transitional societies are the next: a) objective terms that are defining the specifics of functioning of the party systems in the modern world; b) logic of the transformational process in one or another country; c) choice of the government form; d) election system; e) social-political divisions.

After characterized the specifics of functioning of political parties in transitional societies, such a «perfect types» of parties can be marked out: a) charismatic parties; b) clientist parties; c) program parties; d) quasipolitical parties.

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## **SOCIAL SECURITY OF ELDERLY PEOPLE IN THE SELECTED EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRY ON THE EXAMPLE OF POLAND**

*Keywords: social policy, social security, social security, old age, aging process, social insurance, pension system, health care, public institutions, health problems, economic problems, social problems, digital exclusion, forms of care, family, activation activities*

### **Summary**

The main purpose of this publication is to characterize the problems of effective social security for the elderly. The public debate on changes in the social security system has been going on in our country for years. In particular, problems related to the right to a full insurance system, in particular the pension system, but also the right to social assistance and health care are important challenges for the legislator. Older people come and increase their share in the general population of our country's population. At the same time, a very similar tendency is also observed in all European countries. Therefore, it is necessary to remodel social consciousness, but also material infrastructure, education as well as culture, health protection or social assistance, and finally the broadly understood sphere of services and many other areas of collective life in order to meet the requirements and needs of the elderly.

The work consists of several parts. The considerations began with the characterization of the concept and the role of the social security system in the social policy of the country. Next, the focus was on describing the social situation of older people in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century. Later, in turn, methods of social support and social security for the elderly as well as factors determining them were presented. The work ends with a summary and a list of quoted literature.

### **Introduction**

For many years there has been a public debate in our country about changes in the social security system. In particular, problems related to the right to a full insurance system, in particular the pension system, but also the right to social assistance and health care are important challenges for the legislator.

At the same time, the faster and faster process of demographic aging contributes to many challenges that the state, as well as local government administration or social organizations, must meet. These tasks cover mainly areas of social policy and health protection, but also refer to many other competences of the state.

The main purpose of this publication is to characterize the problems of effective social security for older people.

Older people come and increase their share in the general population of our country's population. At the same time, a very similar tendency is also observed in all European countries. Therefore, it is necessary to remodel social consciousness, but also material infrastructure, education as well as culture, health protection or social assistance, and finally the broadly understood sphere of services and many other areas of collective life in order to meet the requirements and needs of the elderly.

### **1. The concept and meaning of the social security system**

The definition of social security can be summarized as a whole, as well as the activities of public institutions, with the help of which the society tries to protect its citizens against a lack of culpability, but also against the threat of not being able to satisfy basic and socially recognized as important needs.<sup>1</sup>

It should be stated that the social security system is a law that has an established constitutional position in our country. This issue is also found in a number of appeals in the acts of international law.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of human rights, above all the so-called right of the second generation, had a very large impact on the creation of the current social security system. At present, social security is considered as an inalienable right resulting from the need to maintain human dignity, which is guaranteed as a law of universal importance and is part of the global constitution of human rights.

Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that "every human being has the right to social security as a member of society". In turn, according to Convention No. 102 of the International Labor Organization from 1952<sup>3</sup>, every person has the right to medical care (Articles 7-12 of the Convention), as well as sickness benefits (Articles 13-18), and many other benefits: unemployment (Articles 19-24), old age (Articles 25-30), or in the case of accidents at work and occupational diseases (Articles 31-38) and many others.

The right to social security is also included in Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, which provides for the right of "everyone to social security, including social insurance"<sup>4</sup>.

The social security system is therefore one of the main human rights. At the same time, it is a very important tool for the implementation of socio-economic policy. Therefore, this system can be presented as a guarantee of every state to provide citizens with a minimum subsistence

<sup>1</sup> J. Piotrowski [za:] T. Szumlicz, *Zabezpieczenie społeczne*, Warszawa 2017, s. 7-8

<sup>2</sup> K. Lechowicz, M. Łuszczuk, *Kierunki zmian systemu zabezpieczenia społecznego w Polsce – wybrane aspekty*, Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Rzeszów 2015, s. 186

<sup>3</sup> Konwencja Nr 102 Międzynarodowej Organizacji Pracy dotycząca minimalnych norm zabezpieczenia społecznego (Dz.U. 2005, nr 93, poz. 775)

<sup>4</sup> Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Gospodarczych, Społecznych i Kulturalnych otwarty do podpisu w Nowym Jorku dnia 19 grudnia 1966 r. (Dz.U. 1977, nr 38, poz. 169)

level. However, social security can not be equated with social insurance, which in turn must be understood as a whole of tools to ensure the adopted standard of social security<sup>5</sup>. This means in turn all actions to protect citizens from not meeting the main needs, socially recognized as important<sup>6</sup>. It can also be said that social security being a law at the same time is part of the global constitution of human rights, but it is also universal and is guaranteed to everyone. It is also a concept superior to the social security system. In turn, the social security system functioning in our country is one of the most important trends in the social policy of the state and is a response to the need to provide social security for everybody<sup>7</sup>. The social security system in our country consists mainly of the insurance and social security systems, but also the health insurance system, unemployment benefits and family benefits<sup>8</sup>.

The social security system in question covers mainly a whole team of activities in the field of social security, but also benefits of supply, or care and health care, as well as supporting the rehabilitation of disabled people and some social benefits, for example: scholarships and benefits. These services, in turn, are implemented through public administration or the scope of activities results from the constitutional guarantees of social security<sup>9</sup>. However, the social security system currently in operation in our country does not always meet the social needs of society at an appropriate level. At the same time, it requires permanent subsidies from the central budget. On the other hand, in conditions of weakening public finances, these circumstances constitute the most serious grounds for undertaking the necessary reforms<sup>10</sup>.

## 2. The social situation of older people in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century

The old age is a period which people who experience very individually experience. According to the World Health Organization, old age starts from the age of 60. In our country, for example, according to the Central Statistical Office, the beginning of old age is the same as the end of the so-called working age, i.e. with retirement or pension<sup>11</sup>. The aging process is a natural developmental process, being at the same time one of the life stages of every human being. Aging is very important in the individual sense, but also in social and economic terms. Until recently, old age was perceived very often as a period of almost complete degradation in terms of health, but also in terms of experiencing somatic complaints, infirmity or progressive addiction to the environment. However, the social activity of older people, but also increasing

<sup>5</sup> T. Szumlicz, *Metoda ubezpieczenia w systemie zabezpieczenia społecznego*. [w:] T. Szumlicz (red.), *Spoleczne aspekty rozwoju rynku ubezpieczeniowego*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2010, s. 35

<sup>6</sup> K. Lechowicz, M. Luszczuk, *Kierunki zmian systemu zabezpieczenia społecznego w Polsce – wybrane aspekty*, Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Rzeszów 2015, s. 186-187

<sup>7</sup> R. Grabiec, *Zabezpieczenie społeczne. Istota i elementy systemu*. Wydawnictwo Politechniki Częstochowskiej, Częstochowa 2008, s. 13

<sup>8</sup> A. Pątek, *Zabezpieczenia społeczne w Polsce*, Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, Warszawa 2016, s. 11

<sup>9</sup> R. Grabiec, *Zabezpieczenie społeczne. Istota i elementy systemu*, Wydawnictwo Politechniki Częstochowskiej, Częstochowa 2008, s. 13-14

<sup>10</sup> K. Lechowicz, M. Luszczuk, *Kierunki...*, op. cit., s. 190

<sup>11</sup> M. Zawartka-Czekaj, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne osób starszych w aspekcie systemu wsparcia społecznego na przykładzie Siemianowic Śląskich*, *Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, 2016, Vol. XXIX, s. 140

the demands of those people, shows that old age does not necessarily mean complete reconciliation with the laws of nature<sup>12</sup>. The prolongation of the lifespan of the human population is associated primarily with social progress, but also with the achievements of many different scientific disciplines, primarily medical, enabling a better understanding of factors and determinants of human aging and indicating ways to extend the lives of older people<sup>13</sup>. According to the forecasts of the Central Statistical Office in 2030, there will be as many as 2 persons of working age per post-working age population<sup>14</sup>. An important basis for the shape of this indicator is still the decreasing number of births. At the same time, according to GUS forecasts, by 2030, the number of post-working age people will increase from nearly 7 million to over 10 million, with a virtually unchanged group of people aged 50-59 and with a falling number of people at the age of highest professional activity<sup>15</sup>. Nearly half of this population will be people over 75 years of age, characterized by the chronicity of multi-morality, which is also characteristic for this age group, but also physical disability and cognitive impairment, which in turn results in many health, rehabilitation and caring needs<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect on the current social situation of older people, but also on the ways to counteract socio-cultural exclusion, which in turn will improve their well-being and increase their membership in a given social group, resulting in improved health as a consequence<sup>17</sup>.

The characteristic groups of factors should be mentioned, which in turn make up the social situation of older people. These include, among others, family relationships, but also health, their financial situation and housing situation, as well as the activities of institutions and social organizations<sup>18</sup>.

In particular, health problems are for the elderly the main and inalienable basis for their existence. The level of well-being and proper physical and mental condition are determined by everyday relations or an appropriate level of activity of people belonging to this category<sup>19</sup>.

At the same time, health problems of elderly people are often accompanied by economic problems but also due to social difficulties. Also, the marginalization and growing sense of

<sup>12</sup> M. Dudek, M. Murat, *Wsparcie osób starszych w Polsce – wybrane problemy*, Uniwersytet Przyrodniczy w Lublinie, Lublin 2014, s. 230

<sup>13</sup> S. Kowalik, *Pedagogiczne problemy funkcjonowania i opieki w starszym wieku*, [w:] W. Dykik (red.), *Pedagogika specjalna*, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2002, s. 311

<sup>14</sup> P. Błędowski, *Demograficzne starzenie się społeczeństwa jako wyzwanie dla polityki społecznej*, [w:] W. Koczur, A. Rączaszek (red.), *Współczesne obrazy polityki społecznej i gospodarczej. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesor Lucynie Frąckiewicz*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach* nr 87, Katowice 2012, s. 66

<sup>15</sup> *Raport na temat sytuacji osób starszych w społeczeństwie*, Instytut Pracy i Spraw Socjalnych, Warszawa 2016, s. 18

<sup>16</sup> J. Derejczyk, B. Bień, K. Szczerbińska, T. Grodzki, *Ochrona zdrowia osób starszych*, [w:] *Strategie działania w starzejącym się społeczeństwie. Tezy i rekomendacje*, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, Warszawa 2012, s. 44

<sup>17</sup> A. Libertowska, *Ludzie starsi we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, Politechnika Poznańska, Katedra Nauk Ekonomicznych, Poznań 2015, s. 66

<sup>18</sup> D. Kalita, K. Rawska, G. Staniszewska, *Uczestnictwo osób starszych w życiu społecznym*, [w:] *Strategie działania w starzejącym się społeczeństwie. Tezy i rekomendacje*, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, Warszawa 2012, s. 17

<sup>19</sup> *Sytuacja i potrzeby osób starszych w województwie świętokrzyskim. Raport z badania przeprowadzonego w 2013r.*, Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Świętokrzyskiego, Kielce 2014, s. 9-10



loneliness, as well as intergenerational dialogue disturbances or passivity and social disintegration - is also a determinant of the description of the life situation of older people.

At the same time, social assistance is often not able to reach all those in need - however, on the other hand, there are many formal requirements that should be met in order for aid services to be applied. Also the problem is the state of knowledge of the respondents in the area of social activation and the level of their use of various forms of this activation.

In this case, a specific offer of social assistance system services or activation measures should be confronted with real needs and expectations of elderly people. That is why the broad recognition of the needs of this social category is so important. Satisfying the multiple needs of older people who are unable to earn their own money because of their age is a multi-faceted problem. This problem concerns not only older people who are currently receiving retirement benefits, but also those currently employed who, during their professional activity, should accumulate appropriate pension capital in old age, that is, transform income in time<sup>20</sup>. Currently, it is increasingly difficult to reconcile the main functions of the pension system, i.e. providing adequate benefits, allowing retirement to maintain a proper standard of living, as well as protection against poverty in old age with long-term stability of pension systems. Pensions are currently a very large, and at the same time growing, part of public spending: currently on average more than 10% of GDP, and in May 2060 it can even 12.5% for the entire European Union.<sup>21</sup> It also creates a very big economic and financial challenge for social security systems - especially the pension system. One of the responses to these challenges was the pension reforms carried out in most EU countries, including Poland. At the same time, many post-socialist countries - including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - introduced pension reforms of a parametric nature - i.e. for example, extension of contribution and non-contributory periods required to obtain full pension benefits, or conversion of insurance periods into specially calculated points, and the basis for financing the pension system has remained unchanged and based on a generational contract, i.e. a repartition<sup>22</sup>. Currently, it can be assumed that people with low earnings, but also some people with average income, who for some reason will have interruptions in payment of pension contributions, will receive very low benefits from the pension system. These people are particularly at risk of poverty in old age. At the same time, people with higher incomes who do not accumulate additional retirement savings will also experience a significant drop in their current standard of living after retirement.

Unfortunately, in our country the minimum income from social assistance is too low and, therefore, the needs of older people are not met or are not fulfilled to a small extent. In the case of a minimum pension, in most cases only physical needs are met, while fulfilling many important social needs is practically impossible. The national pension system lacks a so-called

<sup>20</sup> M. Szczepański, *Systemy zabezpieczenia emerytalnego wobec ryzyka ubóstwa osób starszych*, Politechnika Poznańska, Katedra Nauk Ekonomicznych, Poznań 2015, s. 200-201

<sup>21</sup> Komisja Europejska, *Biała Księga. Plan na rzecz adekwatnych, bezpiecznych i stabilnych emerytur*, Bruksela 2012, s. 4

<sup>22</sup> M. Szczepański, *Systemy...*, op. cit., s. 202

zero pillar, which would guarantee minimum income in old age protecting against poverty. In turn, international experience indicates that such a base pillar - understood here as zero, is needed primarily where the contributive part of the pension system is constructed on the basis of defined contributions<sup>23</sup>.

### **3. Support and social security for the elderly and factors determining them**

Social support is one of the most important terms in the field of contemporary social pedagogy, but also social psychology, therapeutic activity, promotion and health protection, as well as social work. In the opinion of S. Kawula, social support is any help for an individual or group, in difficult, stressful, but also groundbreaking situations, which an individual or group could not overcome<sup>24</sup>.

In turn, H. Sęk and R. Cieślak define social support in a structural and functional approach. Social support in the first of these approaches is understood as objective existing and accessible social networks, which stand out from other networks in that through the fact of the existence of ties, or social contacts, belonging, they have a helpful function towards people<sup>25</sup>. In turn, social support in functional terms means a kind of social integration that is taken up by one or both participants in a problematic, difficult, stressful or critical situation<sup>26</sup>. One of the most important sources of social support for an elderly person is the family, where through a positive emotional bond it is possible to meet practically all needs, first of all the need for certainty and security, belonging, but also the need for solidarity and communication with loved ones, as well as the need for acceptance and recognition. The individual nature of old age brings with it the need for a multi-faceted approach in the area of social policy and social work conducted towards older people. At the same time, the actions taken should focus on the active inclusion of older people in social life, but also on the use of the resources of experience, knowledge and wisdom at their disposal. In social policy towards old people, emphasis is placed on satisfying the needs of this population. Social policy towards old people can be defined as a policy whose main goal is to create - both currently and in the future - appropriate conditions for satisfying the needs of old people and shaping the right relations between the older generation and younger generations primarily by reducing the addiction of the older and younger, but also preventing the marginalization of old people and shaping the relations of the so-called intergenerational solidarity<sup>27</sup>.

Taking into account the quoted definition, it is possible to indicate such areas of tasks that can be considered extremely important. These are mainly the creation of such living conditions

<sup>23</sup> M. Szczepański, *Systemy...*, op. cit., s. 205

<sup>24</sup> S. Kawula, *Wsparcie społeczne* [w:] D. Lalak, T. Pilch (red), *Elementarne pojęcia pedagogiki społecznej i pracy socjalnej*, Wyd. Akademickie „Żak”, Warszawa 1999, s. 338

<sup>25</sup> H. Sęk, R. Cieślak, *Wsparcie społeczne – sposoby definiowania, rodzaje i źródła wsparcia, wybrane koncepcje teoretyczne*, [w:] *Wsparcie społeczne, stres i zdrowie*, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2005, s. 14-15

<sup>26</sup> H. Sęk, R. Cieślak, *Wsparcie...*, op. cit., s. 15

<sup>27</sup> P. Błądowski, *Polityka wobec osób starych – cele i zasady*, „*Studia BAS*”, 2012, nr 2, s. 204

for older people, in which they will be able to meet their needs only with their own means, but in if necessary to use state aid. An appropriate system of services and services supporting the independence of these people should reduce the level of their dependence on the environment, which in turn may lead to the marginalization of older groups. At the same time, the expression of acceptance for the needs of older people as well as understanding social processes taking place in old age is to be the so-called intergenerational solidarity. The described approach to social policy towards older people assumes focusing mainly on prevention and solving the social issue of old people<sup>28</sup>.

At present, only the negative effects of the aging process of the society are underlined, above all the increase in the costs of insurance and social benefits, at the same time avoiding the contribution of this age group to society, including their economic development. According to E. Bojanowska, it is not only the legislators who should understand that the process of population aging requires very many changes in the fields of social policy, but at the same time it is important to understand old age by elderly people themselves<sup>29</sup>. When taking appropriate actions involving the elderly in the mainstream of social and economic life, the following aspects should be taken into account<sup>30</sup>:

1. increasing the level and quality of life of older people, especially health care. Social security allows you to freely incorporate these people into social life;
2. organization of the process of gradual inclusion of older people into social activity;
3. diversifying the forms of employment of older people by allowing them to perform advisory, consultative, educational or research functions;
4. undertaking appropriate activities that will eliminate the isolation of older people (social and political activation), but also their discrimination (for example, legal, media or educational activities, etc.)
5. creating an integrated system of environmental assistance for the elderly;
6. support system for families who care for older people;
7. modernization and unification of the pension system.

Action should also be taken to prevent discrimination on the basis of age, but also to promote productive aging and, finally, to strengthen the position of older people in society. Among others, it is necessary to create a positive image of the aging process as well as older people in society, but also to promote active aging, strengthen older people's involvement in social life and intergenerational solidarity, and finally provide the elderly with appropriate living conditions,

<sup>28</sup> P. Błędowski, *Lokalna polityka społeczna wobec ludzi starych*, Szkoła Główna Handlowa, Warszawa 2002, s. 175

<sup>29</sup> E. Bojanowska, *Ludzie starsi w rodzinie i społeczeństwie*, [w:] J. Hryniewicz (red.), *O sytuacji ludzi starszych*, Rządowa Rada Ludnościowa, Warszawa 2012, s. 32

<sup>30</sup> A. Libertowska, *Ludzie starsi we współczesnym społeczeństwie*, Politechnika Poznańska, Katedra Nauk Ekonomicznych, Poznań 2015, s. 68

as well as health and care<sup>31</sup>. When examining the social welfare law<sup>32</sup>, it can be stated that the social support system provides specific instruments of work, and at the same time the possibility of satisfying the needs of older people. Such instruments may include financial benefits, mainly intended for the purchase of fuel, food or medicine. The purpose of these benefits is first of all to supplement economic shortcomings that very often result from low pension or retirement benefits. It should also be recognized that the financial instruments at the disposal of the social support system can build a sense of social security, but also social security of the elderly. However, apart from financial instruments, the social support system supports the elderly also with other forms of assistance. You can include care services, as well as a benefit in the form of a stay at the Daytime Social Assistance Home or in Social Welfare Homes<sup>33</sup>.

Organizing a support system and care for the elderly is not possible without the involvement of the whole society and local government units. However, it is in the well-understood public interest, because as many demographic and economic analyzes prove - nothing adversely affects the development of local communities as a demographic collapse.

The forms of care and support presented in the table below were divided into the following four groups: they can be realized within the framework of social self-organization, carried out in the place of residence, but also the so-called stationary (institutional) forms and forms available as part of collaborative health care.

Table 1. Forms of the care and support system for the elderly

|                        | IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL SELF-ORGANIZATION             | IN THE LIVING PLACE                         | STATIONARY (INSTITUTIONAL)       | CO-OPERATING HEALTH CARE       |
|------------------------|--|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| EXISTING FORMS         | SENIOR CLUBS   | MONTAGE AND MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE             | DAY STAY                         | GERIATRIC DEPARTMENTS          |
|                        | SUPPORT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND ENVIRONMENT (VOLUNTEER) | CARE SERVICES AND SPECIALIZED FOOT SERVICES | DAILY HOMES OF HELP              | BRANCHES OF PILIATIVE MEDICINE |
|                        | UNIVERSITIES OF THE III CENTURY                          |   | ENVIRONMENTAL SELF-HEALTH HOUSES | CARING AND HEALING DEVICES     |
|                        | WYPOŻYCZALNIE SPRZĘDU REHABILITACYJNEGO                  | ŚWIADCZENIA ZDROWOTNE                       | ENTIRELY STAY                    | SANATORIUMS                    |
| DOMY POMOCY SPOŁECZNEJ |  |   | TURNUSY REHABILITACYJNE          |                                |

<sup>31</sup> A. Libertowska, *Ludzie...*, op. cit., s. 68-69

<sup>32</sup> Ustawa o pomocy społecznej z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. (Dz.U. 2004 Nr 64, poz. 593)

<sup>33</sup> M. Zawartka-Czekaj, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne osób starszych w aspekcie systemu wsparcia społecznego na przykładzie Siemianowic Śląskich*, *Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, 2016, Vol. XXIX, s. 140

|   |                                       |   |   |                                     |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| FORMAS – sporadically existing – to start | SUPPORT OF SELF-ORGANIZATION          | TELEPHONE AND TELEMEDICINE                        | FAMILY HOMES OF HELP  | CENTER FOR GERIATRICS               |
|   | ANIMATOR OF OLDER PEOPLE              | GUARDIAN CARE                                     | HOUSE OF SOCIAL WELFARE OR HOSTELS WITH THE PERIODIC RESIDENCE PLACES | MOBILE HEALTH CARE                  |
|   | COMMUNE (URBAN) SENIOR SERVICE OFFICE | SERVICE OF BUSINESS SERVICES AND HEALTHY SERVICES | FLATS FOR SENIORS   | HEALTHCARE MEMBERS FOR OLDER PEOPLE |
|   | BANK OF VOLUNTEERING                  |   | HOUSING SENIORS   |                                     |

In each of the presented groups of activities, proposals of existing and implemented forms were presented, as well as those that were presented for launch under this model.

The above presented forms of care and support for the elderly are mainly aimed at creating a comprehensive package of senior services, which, of course, would strengthen the sense of security of the elderly and relieve their relatives and carers. At the same time, the introduction of these forms will allow for the creation of new jobs, but it will also give an opportunity for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, for example providing care services.

### Summary

The aging of society leads to specific social and economic problems, it also requires many important changes in the social policy of the country. It is necessary to take many effective actions that will guarantee seniors the right place in society, but also the opportunity to meet their needs, improve the quality of life and provide appropriate care. At the same time, it can be stated that older people, regardless of their health problems or social problems, try to be active people as long as possible, improve their quality of life and health, and at the same time care for their development and their social capital.

Summarizing this discussion, it can be stated that despite the still improving social situation of older people, one can still see such phenomena as, inter alia, their digital exclusion, deprecating knowledge and experience, as well as marginalization of socio-cultural life. Therefore, all undertaken programs supporting the activation of the discussed age group bring tangible benefits not only to the interested parties, but also to the whole society. At the same time, maintaining the social and social security described in this study is a very important problem for cities and municipalities. It should be noted that the aging of the society requires a high involvement of state and non-governmental institutions in the development of various services or services for the social category indicated here. At the same time, in the future this situation will require even greater level of involvement. However, the main difficulty lies in properly balancing relations and maintaining them between the guarantees that the state should give and the so-called precautionary principle, understood as the individual resourcefulness of the individual or family. Otherwise, an excessive increase in the tasks of the state may lead to a deepening crisis in the welfare state.

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12. Przypisy należy umieszczać na dole strony.
13. Opisy bibliograficzne w przypisach należy sporządzać wg poniższych zasad:
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