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Redakcja techniczna:

Łukasz Różyński

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Łukasz Różyński

Adres Wydawcy:

99-300 Kutno, ul. Lelewela 7,
tel. 24 355 83 40, e-mail: wydawnictwo@wsgk.com.pl

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Contents

Anatoliy Romanyuk
MEMBERSHIP IN UKRAINE’S POLITICAL PARTIES: MEMBERSHIP CRISIS OR CRISIS OF THE PARTY MODEL? 6

Zbigniew Białobłocki
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND DELIMITATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF TURNOVER, STABILITY, VARIABILITY
AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURES 22

Pavlo Artymyshyn, Taras Polovyi
THE CONCEPT OF THE «RUSSIAN WORLD» IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF BELARUSIAN RESEARCHERS 41

Krzysztof Białobłocki
FACTORS, STAGES AND VARIETIES OF MIGRATION AND MIGRATION PROCESSES: THEORETIZATION IN
UKRAINIAN SCIENCE 56

Vitaliy Lytvyn
TO THE DEFINITION, STRUCTURING AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE ESSENCE, TYPES AND
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RELEVANCE OF “SMALL” PARTIES: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXTS 73

Nadija Panczak-Białobłocka
THE ESSENCE, FEATURES AND COMPONENTS OF STRUCTURING PARLIAMENTS: WORLDVIEW AND
POLITICAL THEORIZATION FOR DIFFERENT CASES AND TYPES OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES
AND DEMOCRATIZATION 92

Stepan Rishko
FORMATION, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR
STUDYING LOCAL POLITICAL REGIMES IN UKRAINE: A MAXIMALIST APPROACH 111

Magdalena Białobłocka
TRENDS, DETERMINANTS AND PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS 134

Adam Rogala-Lewicki
POLAND IN RANKINGS – THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRY IN A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION ON THE
BASIS OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS 151

Tomasz Białobłocki

FEATURES OF THEORIZING, VERIFICATION AND STRUCTURING OF REGIONALISM AS A POSSIBLE
BASIS FOR THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN UKRAINE IN 1991-2013 AND BEFORE THE RUSSIAN-
UKRAINIAN WAR 194

Moszczyńska Aneta

ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES: POLITICAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEFINITION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELATIONS..... 208

Ślawomira Białobłocka

BASIC PARAMETERS, MANIFESTATIONS AND OPTIONS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRACTICE OF
POPULISM IN THE WORLD AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY..... 224

Jan Szatański

ZACHOWANIA AGRESYWNE, ICH UWARUNKOWANIA I NASTĘPSTWA
W PERCEPCJI UCZNIÓW TRZECIEJ SZKOŁY 239

NOTA O AUTORACH 287

ZASADY PRZYGOTOWYWANIA 288

Membership in Ukraine's political parties: membership crisis or crisis of the party model?

The characteristics of political parties of Ukraine and democratic countries in relation to the level of membership have been considered; its low level has been stated. In Ukraine, the formation of political parties was carried out in accordance with the model of "mass political party", formulated by M. Duverger. Accordingly, regulations on political parties clearly define the requirements for formal membership. The main versions of the information on the number of members of political parties in Ukraine have been analyzed; its secrecy and impossibility of verification have been emphasized. On the basis of interviews with party activists of Lviv region, the parameters of membership in regional party branches have been determined. The influence of a number of factors on the involvement of non-party employees in party organizations has been clarified and their role in the work of party structures has been outlined. It has been proved that the low level of membership in regional centers is evidence of the crisis of the mass party model. It has been also proposed to consider as an indicator of this crisis the attempts to form a network party model by a number of newly created parties in Ukraine.

Keywords: political party, crisis of political parties, mass party, member of a political party, non-partisan, intra-party democracy, election management, employees of party campaigns.

Członkostwo w partiach politycznych Ukrainy: kryzys członkostwa czy kryzys modelu partyjnego?

Uwzględniono charakterystykę partii politycznych Ukrainy i krajów demokratycznych pod względem poziomu członkostwa i stwierdzono jego niski poziom. Na Ukrainie formowanie partii politycznych odbywało się według modelu „masowej partii politycznej” sformułowanej przez M. Duverge. W związku z tym akty normatywne przeznaczone partiom politycznym jasno określają wymogi formalnego członkostwa. Analizowane są główne warianty informacji o liczbie członków partii politycznych na Ukrainie, podkreśla się ich tajność i niemożność weryfikacji. Na podstawie wywiadów z działaczami partyjnymi obwodu Lwowskiego określono parametry członkostwa w regionalnych oddziałach partii. Wyjaśniono wpływ szeregu czynników na zaangażowanie pracowników pozapartyjnych w pracę organizacji partyjnych oraz nakreślono ich rolę w pracach struktur partyjnych. Udowodniono, że niski poziom członkostwa w oddziałach regionalnych świadczy o kryzysie modelu partii masowych. Proponuje się również rozważenie prób stworzenia modelu partii sieciowej przez szereg nowo powstałych partii na Ukrainie jako wskaźnika tego kryzysu.

Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, kryzys partii politycznych, partia masowa, członek partii politycznej, bezpartyjny, demokracja wewnątrzpartyjna, kierownictwo wyborcze, wynajęci pracownicy kampanii partyjnych.

Членство в політичних партіях України: криза членства чи криза моделі партії?

Розглянуто характеристики політичних партій України і демократичних країн стосовно рівня членства, констатовано його низький рівень. В Україні формування політичних партій здійснювалося відповідно до моделі «масової політичної партії», сформульованої М. Дюверже. Відповідно нормативні акти присвячені політичним партіям досить чітко окреслюють вимоги до формального членства. Проаналізовано основні варіанти інформації про кількість членів політичних партій в Україні, наголошено на її закритості і неможливості перевірки. На основі інтерв'ю з партійними активістами Львівської області визначено параметри членства в обласних партійних осередках. З'ясовано вплив низки чинників на залучення до роботи партійних організацій найманих працівників, які не є членами партії та окреслено їх роль в роботі партійних структур. Доведено, що низький рівень членства в обласних осередках є свідченням кризи моделі масової партії. Запропоновано також розглядати індикатором цієї кризи спроби формування моделі мережевої партії низкою новостворених в Україні партій.

Ключові слова: політична партія, криза політичних партій, масова партія, член політичної партії, безпартійний, внутрішньопартійна демократія, виборчий менеджмент, наймані працівники партійних кампаній.

Numerous studies by world partologists often analyze the current state of party membership and state the crisis, which is manifested not only in the reduction of the share of party citizens among the voters of a particular country and all democracies together, it also extends to the ability of political parties to carry out their functions and leads to the emergence of new characteristics in party activities and the very institution of political parties. Ukrainian researchers in the analysis of political parties often talk about the weakness of the institution of parties in the country and the small base of party members, both in relation to those represented in parliament and active on the political scene, and those who periodically participate in parliamentary, presidential and local elections. The formal similarity / closeness of the numerical characteristics of party members in Ukraine and democracies has led some researchers to talk about the similarity of the situation¹,

¹ Symonchuk O. Socio-class structure of Ukraine since independence // Ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes. 30 years of independence. Issue. 8 (22). Kyiv, 2021. P.249.

which implicitly foresees the assertion of conformity of processes that led to this state of affairs and delineation of directions and tools for action.

The purpose of our publication is to verify the above statement and clarify the current state and factors and consequences of the presence of a small number of party members in the political parties of Ukraine. Our hypothesis is that the formal similarity of low party membership rates is due to different processes in political parties in Ukraine and democracies and that the low number of party members indicates a crisis in the mass party model chosen in Ukraine.

The problem of studying the state of affairs with membership in Ukrainian parties has not received much attention from Ukrainian researchers. The vast majority of publications are devoted to the legal basis for the acquisition and loss of membership in a political party. Among these publications is the article by S. Osaulenko, who analyzed changes in the legislation of Ukraine on membership in political parties and came to the following conclusions: 1) on the instability of the relevant legislation, as the relevant articles of the Law "On Political Parties" have undergone 8 changes since its adoption and 2) on the existence of gaps in domestic legislation regarding the regulation of party membership, in particular, the lack of a register of party members, as a result of which it is impossible to check whether a particular citizen is a member of a particular party, or whether he may be a member of two or more parties². It is also worth noting a number of publications of Doctor of Sociology O. Vyshnyak, who based on the analysis of research conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine considered the dynamics of changes in the membership of Ukrainian political parties since 1994³. Peculiarities of the membership base of political parties at the level of Lviv region have been analyzed in the article by A. Romaniuk⁴. To some extent, the issue of membership in political parties of Ukraine at the regional level was considered in the materials of a number of years of the international scientific conference entitled "Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices" (in memory of Yuri Romanovych Shved), which takes place annually since 2016⁵.

² Osaulenko S.V. Membership in political parties of Ukraine: current status and problems of regulatory regulation / S.V. Osaulenko // Scientific papers of the National University "Odesa Law Academy". Vol. 21 / editor in chief. M.V. Afanasyeva; MES of Ukraine, NU "OYUA" - Odesa: Helvetica, 2018, P. 89.

³ Vyshnyak O. The political system of Ukraine in the sociological dimension: the dynamics of membership in political parties and party identifications of citizens. Ukrainian society. Twenty years of independence: sociological monitoring: in 2 volumes Vol.1. Analytical materials / ed. V. Voroni, M. Shulgi. K.: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2011. P. 160-178; Vyshnyak O. Tendencies of changes in membership in political parties and party identification of citizens of Ukraine // Sociology: theory, methods, marketing. 2018. №1. Pp. 103–117

⁴ Romanyuk A. The particularities of membership in political parties of Ukraine through the focus of regional party organization of Lviv region // Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. – Półrocznik, 2021, #16. – P. 6-20.

⁵ Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices: a collection of articles and abstracts based on the results of the scientific conference "Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices" (in memory of Yuri Romanovych Shved) from October 8, 2016 / Edited by A. Romanyuk. – Lviv: Prostir-M, 2017; Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices: Coll. Articles and abstracts based on the results of science. conf. "Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices" (in memory of Yuri Romanovych Shved) from November 3, 2018 / resp. for the issue A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, I. Osadchuk. – Lviv: I. Franko LNU 2019. – Issue 3; Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices: coll. Art. and abstracts on the results of the Fourth International Scientific Conference "Political Parties and Elections: Ukrainian and World Practices" (in memory of Yuri Romanovych Shved) from November 9, 2019 / ed. Anatoly Romanyuk and Vitaliy Lytvyn. Lviv: Ivan Franko Lviv National University, 2020. Issue. 4; Political parties and elections: Ukrainian and world practices: coll. art. and abstracts based on the results of the Fifth International Scientific Conference "Political Parties and Elections: Ukrainian and World Practices" (in memory of Yuri Romanovych Shved) of November 28, 2020 / ed. Anatoly Romanyuk and Vitaly Lytvyn. Lviv: Ivan Franko National University, 2021. Issue. 5.

In Western political science, the issue of membership in political parties is given considerable attention. A number of articles consider the changes in the membership base in European countries during the 1960s and 1980s⁶, at the next stage in the 1980s and 2000s⁷, and the factors that determine the analyzed level. A separate area should be considered the study of the functioning of political parties and the role of party members in party activities, in particular in intra-party democracy⁸. The study of the organizational structure and functioning of political parties' peculiarities at the present stage is mainly with the definition of the context of quantitative and qualitative changes in party members, or the selection of defining variables that determine the emergence of new characteristics⁹. Also worth noting are publications on the crisis of party membership and new forms of party participation, the number of which has increased significantly in recent years¹⁰.

Among the publications of Polish researchers is the monograph by Beata Kosowska-Gonstol, which contains a section on party members and structures of European political parties¹¹. At the same time, there are a number of studies on political parties that analyze membership issues¹².

Today, we can get information about the number of the political parties' members in Ukraine only on the basis of opinion polls. Unfortunately, the current political parties do not publish these data either on their own resources or in public publications. As a result, we are not able to verify the data obtained through opinion polls. Among a number of sociological agencies in Ukraine, a systematic study of the membership of Ukrainian parties was conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which in fact throughout the period of independence annually includes the question of estimating the number of party members in its research.

⁶ Richard S. Katz, P. Mair and L. Bardi and other/ The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960-1990// *European Journal of Political Research*. 1992, # 22. P.329-345.

⁷ Mair P., Van Biezen I. Party membership in twenty European democracies. 1980-2000// *Party Politics*. 2001. #7. Issue 1. P. 5-21.

⁸ Katz R.S. & P.Mair: How parties organize: Change and adaptation in party organizations in Western democracies. London: SAGE. 1994; Lawson K. How parties work: Perspectives from within. Westport: Praeger. 1994.

⁹ Husted E. Party organization in the digital age// *Ephemera*. 2019, # 19 (3). P. 651-662; Husted E., Moufahim M. & Fredriksson M. Welcome to the party// *Ephemera. Theory & Politics in organization*. Volume 21 (2). 2021. P.1-17; Husted E., Moufahim M. & Fredriksson M. Political parties and organization studies: The party as a critical case of organizing// *Organization Studies*. Doi: 10.1177/01708406211010979.

¹⁰ Van Biezen I., Mair P., Poguntke T. Going, going...gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe// *European Journal of Political Research*. 2012. Vol. 51. Issue 1. P.24-56; Fisher J., Fieldhouse E., Curtis D. Members are Not the Only Fruit: Volunteer Activity in British Political Parties at the 2010 General Election// *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. Vol. 16. Issue 1. 2014. P.75-95; Parker M., Cheney G., Fournier V. and Land C. The question of organization: A manifesto for alternatives// *Ephemera*. 2014. Vol. 14 (4). P. 623-638; Foycher F. New forms of political participation. Changing demands or changing opportunities to participate in political parties?// *Comparative European Politics*. 2015. Vol. 13. P. 405-429; Mazzolini O. & Voerman G. Members parties: Beyond the business firm model?// *Party Politics*. 2017. Vol. 23 (6). P. 783-792; Scarrow S.E., Webb P.D. and Poguntke T. Organizing political parties: Representation, participation and power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017. 384 p.; Gauja A. Moving beyond the membership? The transformation of party organisations, policy outsourcing and the creation of supporters networks. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association. Toronto. 2019.

¹¹ Kosowska-Gonstol B. Członkostwo i struktury europejskich partii politycznych [w:] Kosowska-Gonstol B. Europejskie partie polityczne jako organizacje wielopoziomowe. Rozwój, struktury, funkcje. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. 2014. 340 s.

¹² Antoszewski A. Partie i systemy partyjne państw Unii Europejskiej na przełomie wieków. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Toruń 2009; Herbut R. Teoria i praktyka funkcjonowania partii politycznych. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2002; Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej. Pod red. A. Antoszeskiego, P. Fiali, R. Herbuta i J. Sroki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Wrocław 2003; Sobolewska-Myslik K. Partie i systemy partyjne na świecie. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Warszawa 2010; Wojtaszczyk K.A. Partie polityczne w państwie demokratycznym. Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. Warszawa 1998; Współczesne systemy partyjne wybranych państw Europejskich. Pod red. M. Grzybowski i A. Zięby. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Kraków 1996.

Table 1. Dynamics of the level of membership in political parties of Ukraine according to the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 1994 – 2020, %¹³.

1994	95	96	97	98	99	2000	01	02	03	04	05	06	08	10	12	14	16	18	20
0,7	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,9	1,5	0,8	1,7	2,2	2,0	1,9	2,5	4,6	2,8	3,0	1,2	1,4	1,4	1,1	1,7

The importance of the results of the Institute of Sociology is that the surveys were conducted according to a single method, as well as the calculation of results.

As a result, it is correct to compare the indicators given by years. The materials in the table show that the situation with the number of members is relatively dynamic. In particular, the interval of one or two years, in a number of cases, shows significant differences in the number of party members. This figure for 2020 is also confirmed in the publication of O. Symonchuk, which estimates the total share at 2.0%¹⁴. The slight difference between the two indications does not provide further clarification as to which indicator is a more plausible. Accordingly, the figure for 2020 we should take in the range of 1.7 – 2.0 %. At the same time, another perspective on the perception of this indicator will be the assessment of its compliance with the number of citizens. According to the State Register of Voters, during the 2020 local elections, the number of citizens of election age was approximately 28 million. Accordingly, the percentage obtained by sociologists this year should be equal to 476 – 560 thousand voters.

As an additional source of information about members of political parties in Ukraine, we consider the materials contained in Wikipedia. It should be noted that there is a noticeable discrepancy between the Ukrainian and English versions. As a rule, Ukrainian-language versions often do not provide specific figures on membership or give a larger number than English-language ones. Regarding the indicators of the number of members of parliamentary parties: the “Servant of the People” party does not provide information on the Ukrainian-language page, and the English-speaking one estimates the number of party members from 500 to 1,000 members¹⁵; the “European Solidarity” Party similarly does not provide information on the number of members of the party in the Ukrainian-language edition, instead the English-language page records about 30,000 members as of October 2017¹⁶; the “Opposition Platform – For Life” party¹⁷ has no information on the number of its members on Wikipedia; the Ukrainian-language website of the “Motherland” provides the figure of 600,000 party members for 2012, and the English-language website records about 10,000¹⁸ for 2020; The “Voice” party has traditionally not posted data on

¹³ Ukrainian society: monitoring of social change. Issue. 7 (21). Kyiv, 2020. - P.449.

¹⁴ Symonchuk O. Socio-class structure of Ukraine since independence // Ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes. 30 years of independence. Vip. 8 (22). Kyiv, 2021. P.249.

¹⁵ Servant of the People [Електронний ресурс] - URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Servant_of_the_People

¹⁶ European Solidarity [Електронний ресурс] - URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Solidarity

¹⁷ By the decision of the National Security and Defense Council on March 20, 2022, the party's activities for the pro-Russian position were suspended, and on April 14, 2022, the party was dissolved in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

¹⁸ Batkivshyna [Електронний ресурс] - URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batkivshyna>

the number of its members on the Ukrainian-language resource, and the English-language version is estimated at about 500 people¹⁹. The situation is similar for other political parties. It should also be noted that of the 365 officially registered political parties (as of January 1, 2021), a significant number do not have their own pages and overview information on Wikipedia.

Attempts to summarize the information available on Wikipedia on the members of Ukrainian parties, taking into account the incompleteness of information on each officially registered party and the predominantly expert nature of the information posted in this resource, raise questions about the inconsistency of estimates of membership in Ukrainian political parties. At the same time, the question arises how to assess the current level of membership in political parties in Ukraine?

The first Ukrainian political parties began to form at the end of perestroika²⁰. The process of creating Ukrainian parties received a powerful impetus after the declaration of independence in 1991. From the very beginning of the party-building process, the “mass party” in the format of M. Duverger was chosen as the basic model. According to this model, the main indicators were a significant number of party members who expected a strong “culture of participation”, parties had a strong organizational structure with a permanent party apparatus, were hierarchical, had a program in a format close to ideology²¹. This choice was due to the limited experience of Ukrainian society in observing the institutions of a democratic society, including a political party. This experience for the vast majority was reduced to the CPSU, even with a negative attitude towards this party and its members. An additional factor at the time of independence was the assessment that the cadre party format was predominant in European democracies. In accordance with the requirements of the mass party model, there were prescribed normative documents regulating the formation, registration and functioning of political parties in Ukraine.

Analysis of membership in Ukrainian political parties will primarily require a conceptual definition of the very concept of “party member” in accordance with Ukrainian law. According to the Law “On Political Parties in Ukraine” (Article 6.8), “membership in a party is fixed, which means that there is a certain relationship between the person and the political organization to which he or she belongs and is regulated by such a document as the statute. A prerequisite for registration of membership in a political party is the presence of a statement of a citizen of Ukraine, about the desire to become a member of this party submitted to the statutory body of the political party.

The procedure for joining a political party, suspending and terminating its membership is determined by the statute of the political party.²² Thus, the law clearly sets out the main parameters for the status of a political party member in Ukraine: membership is exclusively individual, to obtain the status of a particular citizen must personally apply and other documents

¹⁹ Holos [Електронний ресурс] - URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holos> (political party)

²⁰ In 1988, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front party was registered. See: State, government and civil society in the documents of political parties of Ukraine (late 1980s - first half of 2011). - K.: I.Kuras IPandENR. NAS of Ukraine, 2011. - p.15.

²¹ Shveda Yu. Mass parties (parties of mass mobilization) // Shveda Yu. R. Parties and elections: European experience and Ukrainian realities: Encyclopedic dictionary. - Lviv: Taras Soroka Publishing House, 2009. - P.205-206.

²² Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties in Ukraine” URL: zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#Text

provided by the statute of the elected party and go through a certain procedure as a result of which the citizen will receive formal confirmation of acquiring the status of a party member.

An analysis of the statutes of the main political parties shows the approximate / relative similarity of the requirements – a personally written statement and one or two recommendations. Also, by additional requirements, some political parties put forward a lustration check or monitoring of open sources of information on the nature of messages (positive and negative) about a potential candidate. Thus, we state that in the presence of these requirements, each party must clearly record who its member is and take into account all changes in its own number. Therefore, the lack of not only clear, but generally correct and not evaluative information about members of political parties, especially those involved in political life is a conscious position of political parties. Most experts agree that party representatives are leaving the installation, so far we do not estimate what it is, that a political party should have a large number of members. By this logic, the presence of a significant number of party members may indicate a number of properties: that the party is popular, that party members are represented in major social groups, that a political party should have a developed membership base in accordance with the vertical and horizontal structure of the party and in total be an indicator of public support and political power of a particular party. In this context, the starting point regarding the number of party members is the information of O. Symonchuk that in the Ukrainian Socialist Republic in 1980, 11.7% of citizens were party members²³. Compared to this indicator, the share calculated by sociologists can be interpreted as small one. At the same time, such a comparison would be incorrect, since the USSR was not a democracy and the Communist Party was a conditionally political party because it was the leading and guiding party when its status was guaranteed by the constitution / laws. That is, evaluation / comparison should be made in relation to democracies, the immanent elements of which are political parties.

Based on comprehensive estimates by a number of authoritative Western political scientists, the share of members of political parties in Western Europe in the 1960s was 14.6% of the total electorate, and in the late 1980s it was 10.5%²⁴. As for twenty European countries in the late 1990s, the average membership of political parties fell to 4.99%²⁵. Research on the assessment of the share of party citizens in European countries today shows a further decrease in their quota. In this context, P. Mayer, van Bizen and T. Poguntke state that the level of party membership may have fallen to such a low level that membership cannot be a significant indicator of the party's organizational potential, or indeed the reduction of party members may be such that the party organization itself can no longer function²⁶. That is, these and a number of subsequent studies of political parties in European countries show a trend of steady decline in the number of members of political parties

²³ Symonchuk O. Socio-class structure of Ukraine since independence // Ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes. 30 years of independence. Issue. 8 (22). Kyiv, 2021. P.249.

²⁴ Richard S.Katz, P.Mair and L.Bardi and other/The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960-1990// European Journal of Political Research. 1992, # 22. P.334.

²⁵ Mair P., Van Biezen I. Party membership in twenty European democracies. 1980-2000// Party Politics. 2001. #7. Issue 1. P. 9.

²⁶ Van Biezen I., Mair P., Poguntke T. Going, going...gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe// European Journal of Political Research. 2012. Vol.51. Issue 1. P. 40.

and their small share among citizens of election age. Can we talk about the conformity of the situation in the party system of Ukraine to the universal tendencies of democratic countries? In our opinion, the indicators of Ukrainian political parties can only be partially explained by the action / relevance of the situation in European political parties. According to the results in Table 1, the coverage of Ukrainian citizens with party membership since independence, which coincides with the beginning of the formation of political parties in the country, has always been at a very low level. The situation recorded in 2006, when the share was 4.6%, should be considered as a special case caused by the events of the Orange Revolution, the next parliamentary elections under the new electoral system and the transition from semi-presidential to parliamentary-presidential form. In other words, the tendency inherent in democratic countries, which consists in a gradual, long-term and significant reduction in the share of party citizens, is not observed in Ukraine.

In order to clarify the situation with members of political parties, we held a series of meetings with experts and representatives of the main political parties of Ukraine in Lviv region. We assume that the situation in the political parties of one region, in general, reflects the trends of change in other regions and gives us the opportunity to see the existing processes in political parties at the level of Ukraine.

If we do not take into account the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began on February 24, 2022 and requires special research, among the determinant factors that determine changes in political parties, we can name: the evolution of the decentralization process, adoption of a new Electoral Code and its testing in practice and taking into account the specifics / features of the electoral processes of the President, Parliament and local elections.

By the summer of 2020, when within the framework of the program of decentralization and administrative-territorial reform there were formed 7 large districts, 20 districts functioned in the region and there were 9 cities of regional subordination where there were city councils (Boryslav, Drohobych, Lviv, Morshyn, Novy Rozdil, Sambir, Stryi, Truskavets and Chervonohrad). Thus, the structure of the regional party organization should ideally include 20 district and 9 city party branches. Any additional expansion to other cities, towns and even villages depended solely on the organizational capacity of the political party. As part of the decentralization process launched in Ukraine in 2014, United Territorial Communities (UTCs) have been established in each oblast. There are 73 of them in the Lviv region. Accordingly, the main political parties since 2020, when the process of creating UTC in each region was completed and the process of forming new 7 instead of the previous 20 districts began, began to restructure their organizations to ensure the presence of party organization in each district and each UTC. Regional party branches, represented by their own groups / factions in the Lviv Regional Council²⁷, have formally all started the process of changing the organizational

²⁷ Political parties such as "European Solidarity", "Servant of the People", "Self-Help", "Batkivshchyna", "Golos", AUU "Svoboda", "People's Movement of Ukraine", "Ukrainian Galician Party" and "For the future" are presented in the Lviv Regional Council of the VIII Democratic Convocation.

structure in accordance with the new format of administrative-territorial division of the region. The results of interviews with party representatives show that specific purposeful work on the formation of party cells in all UTCs, which should end in full coverage, is unique to regional party organizations: “European Solidarity”, “Servant of the People”, “Batkivshchyna”, AUU “Svoboda”, “Ukrainian Galician Party” and “For the Future”. However, there is a peculiarity: the recently established “Servant of the People” and “For the Future” parties do not create party cells in the UTC, but rather points of influence and preparation for elections (there may be one or more people able to comply with the regional center’s requirements and recommendations). As for the first group, they declared the same goal as the representatives of the second, but unlike the latter have the potential to achieve it. We are aware that all this is not a guarantee that the mentioned construction / reconstruction will take place quickly, the process may take a long time and will not lead to the registration of party cells in all UTCs.

The Electoral Code of Ukraine was finally adopted on December 19, 2019 and it incorporated the main legislative acts: “On Elections of the President of Ukraine”, “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” and “Local Elections”²⁸. A feature of the parliamentary and local elections of 1919 and 2020, during which it was tested, was the introduction of relatively “open” party lists, which led to a number of serious changes in the electoral behavior of Ukrainian parties. The Code at the level of parliamentary elections and, in most cases, local elections, effectively introduced a party monopoly on the nomination of candidates. According to the legislator’s logic, this should have stimulated the strengthening of political parties at all levels, including the UTC. However, inter-party competition and high-quality requirements for party lists, especially the introduction of a quota of women from the top ten on the party list, in practice encouraged the involvement of a significant number of non-party candidates on party lists. Their share, especially in the 2020 local elections, was significant for all regional party organizations (62.4%), and in the case of the “Servant of the People” party it was absolute – 100%²⁹. A significant number of non-partisans in the party lists was due, in our opinion: first, the lack of party candidates who had a sufficient level of public authority, what could make them competitive with other candidates and give them a chance to get a high result for themselves and for the party list; legislative restrictions on the ability of non-partisan citizens to participate in elections outside the lists of political parties, as a result of which persons with a high level of recognition and / or authority, who had a good chance to count on public attention and support, were forced to look for options to get on party lists; the desire of citizens who had significant financial or other important resources to exchange a share of this resource acceptable to both parties for a place on the party list. Thus, the high share of non-partisans in party lists is to some extent an indicator of the small number of members of the party

²⁸ Electoral Code of Ukraine URL: zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text

²⁹ Romanyuk A. The particularities of membership in political parties of Ukraine through the focus of regional party organization of Lviv region // *Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*. – Półrocznik, 2021, #16. – P. 12.

organization, especially recognizable individuals and those who can work in public. It is interesting to note that in most party groups in the Lviv Regional Council, a significant share of non-party members remained. As a rule, all deputies - members of a party group act as a kind of "face" of the party structure, are publicly identifying themselves with it.

Analysis of the activity of regional party branches shows that it is the largest one during elections (we mean parties that participate in elections, those that do not participate in elections, are actually in a state of lethargy during elections and in inter-election times).

In the inter-election period, the main activity falls on the work of party groups of deputies / factions present in elected representative institutions, and the political activity of party organizations can be marked by significant growth in political or crisis situations at both regional and national levels.

Let's consider the involvement of party members during elections and in the inter-election period. The peculiarity of modern elections in Ukraine (we take into account mostly parliamentary and local) is the permanent growth of the use of electoral technologies, increasing the use of media and social networks, the involvement of lawyers. Another important feature is the limited time of the election campaign, even when party organizations and individual candidates begin to prepare for the election in advance and take various actions to increase voter recognition and commitment, the period from the official start of the election campaign to election day is hyper-active. In these conditions, political parties that have a wide range of resources and expect a positive result, formally at a certain stage of their operation have experienced / are experiencing a dilemma – to make elections on the basis of existing party members or to involve specialists and employees, the option of combining these two components is always present. The peculiarity of this dilemma was / is that party members have a strong connection with the party, are naturally fans of the party and its candidates. However, they see party work as a hobby, as an interest in addition to their main job and family affairs, as a result of which the vast majority of them cannot leave their jobs or all affairs during the election and focus exclusively on the election campaign, i.e. they do not have unlimited spare time limit. They also have different ages, education; do not always have modern gadgets and communication techniques. The second alternative was specialists in political management and marketing, PR technology and digitalization, lawyers, who often had the appropriate education and experience of such campaigns. Their disadvantage was the need to pay for their services and not belonging to a particular party. The experience of analyzing a number of election campaigns to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and at the local level shows that all regional branches that expect a positive result (admission to a representative institute) attract a wide range of specialists to conduct the election campaign. In addition, holding a rather popular "door-to-door campaign", setting up tents, and distributing campaign materials is mostly done by employees. Work in social networks, Internet monitoring, legal and communication departments, as a rule, are also formed by specialists or carried out by university students. That is, the bulk of the actions required during the election

campaign are implemented by employees. Moreover, functionally, party members, who can also be involved in the election campaign, are forced to be executors if employees are involved (the assessment does not always apply to elected / appointed leaders). Formally, some of the professionals and employees involved are invited to join the party, but these requirements are not mandatory. The facts of accession are mostly isolated and concern those who are moving to a contractual form of cooperation. In addition, we observe that in the inter-election period, especially those party organizations that have their own parliamentary groups in representative institutes are forced to hire lawyers, specialists in PR and political management and marketing, and even organizational department workers, who are not members of the party.

The action of these three groups of factors leads to a situation where party organizations at the regional and lower levels consist of party members and employees, who are mostly experts in an important area for the functioning of the party organization. The share of these non-party workers and their functional load is variable, increasing during election campaigns and in the functioning of parliamentary groups / factions, and decreases when the party is unable to bring its representatives to councils of various levels. The transition from the temporary involvement of employees to a permanent presence is a sign of a number of regional organizations that have their own parliamentary groups in representative institutes. This feature of modern Ukrainian party structures also differs from the situation in political parties in democracies where the trend of reducing party members is accompanied by increasing involvement in various types of party work of volunteers and party sympathetics. In this context, volunteers are also identified as sympathetics of the party, only the emphasis is on the fact that they are not paid for their work³⁰. We are aware that all current political parties in Ukraine are constantly trying to attract volunteers to their work, but if there are not enough of them, then they are forced to involve hired specialists. In this context, we can also talk about the effect of imitation, when the practice of hiring employees by one party organization will encourage other party structures to test this experience. Also, the positive results will contribute to its expansion, comparing it with the practice of working in reliance on party members. We are also aware that in democracies, political parties hire political management and marketing specialists, PR specialists and lawyers, however, this is mainly at the national level.

We deliberately did not outline the current state of members of party organizations as the fourth factor because it is the subject of our analysis. However, paradoxically, the qualitative parameters of members of party organizations are also a variable / determinant of further development of the membership base of party organizations and the attitude to this component of the whole party.

In the process of interviewing representatives of Lviv politicians, we received mainly estimates of the number of members of party organizations: "Batkivshchyna", "European Solidarity", AUU

³⁰ Van Biezen I., Mair P., Poguntke T. Going, going...gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2012. Vol. 51. Issue 1. P. 40.

“Svoboda” and the People’s Movement of Ukraine outlined within several thousand; Ukrainian Galician Party – 450-500 members; AUU “Samopomich” (Self Help) – 180 members; “Voice”(Golos) – about 150 members; “Servant of the People” and “For the Future” – less than 50 members. The rest of the political parties that did not run for the regional council, but participated in the elections to the councils of various levels, are also quite modest in estimating the number of available members. Thus, the newly formed party “Warta” (Guard), which passed to the Lviv City Council and relied in the process of creating on the representatives of several small parties previously represented in the political life of the region has an estimated less than 100 party members. And the Dukhovna Ukraina (Spiritual Ukraine) party, as it participated only in the elections to the Lviv City Council, declares the presence of about 10 members of the party. These figures mainly confirm the quantitative parameters presented in the English version of Wikipedia and confirm skepticism about the hypothetical number of members of political parties in the range of 450-500 thousand. Interviewed representatives of regional party branches identified the following main categories of party members (we do not take into account employees):

1. colleagues and acquaintances of the leader / leaders of the party cell (they come to the organization at the same time as a certain leader, he relies on them in the conduct of party work, they are his reliable support in conflict situations, and mostly they leave the party organization together with this leader, or when he loses his leadership position;
2. individuals who count on the political success of the organization and the opportunity to receive certain dividends through this success: getting into deputies or administrative / managerial positions if a party organization comes to power, the opportunity to lobby for projects through a regional party organization within the region or at the national level if the party is represented in different branches of government through specific individuals or deputies of different levels;
3. ideologically determined or supporters of assessments / provisions of the party program, even more of the party’s position represented through public statements by party representatives. This forms a kind of attitude in this group of people that the party representatives will adhere to, express, discuss / broadcast this position / positions in the public space in the future;
4. perception of the party organization as a club where you can communicate on a wide range of topics, under certain conditions to get the opportunity for additional or main work.

We must also realize that many party members perceive their presence in the party organization as a patriotic act. There is a peculiar tendency when a party organization has a small number of members, then first of all the group of party members who share ideological closeness and are focused on the format of the party club is reduced. Interviews with party representatives also show that party organizations are very wary of groups 2, 3 and 4, especially of the latter

one, as its representatives mostly have enough spare time and try to direct the work of party organizations in the format of a discussion club or to solve sensitive problems, which in the opinion of party leaders distracts time and resources from current problems or areas of work. In fact, they mainly explain the regulation of membership and the small number of their own party organizations by the fear of representatives of these groups joining party organizations.

Thus, our analysis allows us to draw conclusions:

- political parties of Ukraine are characterized by a small number of members, at the same time low numbers are characteristic of parties throughout the time since the formation of the national party system;
- the small number of party members is due to the weakness of the party structures themselves, the dominant leadership format of the parties, their close relationship with sponsors and the correspondingly low level of trust in the institution of political parties;
- the need for party organizations to perform functions related to the election and operation of representative institutions of various levels, leads to the involvement of employees in the work of the party and inclusion in party lists of non-party candidates, involving them in public representation of the party and the whole process of party functioning;
- there is a trend that requires further analysis, when the parties that emerged and continue to function for a long time (PMU, Motherland (Batkivshchyna), Freedom (Svoboda), European Solidarity) have more party members, respectively, greater similarity in the requirements of the mass party, and newly formed political parties (Servant of the People, For the Future, Voice, etc.), which have a minimum or conditional number of members and at the same time are characterized by strong management, show signs of the network format parties.

Our analysis gives grounds to state that the model of a mass party adopted in Ukraine shows a number of features, first of all a low number of formal members and a weak “culture of participation”, which indicate its crisis. The attempt of newly formed political parties to build a new party format similar to that of networked parties is also a kind of indicator of the crisis. Thus, low rates of membership in political parties in Ukraine and democracies are mainly due to various factors.

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CONCEPTUALIZATION AND DELIMITATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF TURNOVER, STABILITY, VARIABILITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURES

The article attempts to solve one of the problems of institutional Political Science, which is that modern research seldom appeals to the institution of parliament in the categories of its stability and efficiency, even though some scholars analyze different parameters of defining the institutional attributes of parliaments, including their variability and institutionalization. On this basis, the author put on the agenda of the study the issues of clarifying, filling in with the content and delimitation of some of the institutional attributes – stability, variability, dynamics and institutionalization – of parliaments. As a result, some tendencies in the definition and significance of parliamentary dynamics and parliamentary variability were singled out and confirmed at the background of their separation from the stability and institutionalization of legislatures. The researcher proved that parliamentary dynamics in democratic countries is determined by both internal and external factors, including electoral volatility, type of electoral systems, and type of party systems and etc. It is also shown that parliamentary variability directly depends on the institutional and political changes that take place in relation to the nature of electoral institutions – types of electoral systems, frequency of elections, ability to run on different electoral lists, size of constituencies.

Keywords: parliament, legislature, parliamentary dynamics, variability, stability, institutionalization.

Konceptualizacja i definicja pojęć obiegu, stabilności, zmiany i instytucjonalizacji ustawodawstwa

Artykuł jest próbą rozwiązania jednego z problemów politologii instytucjonalnej, który polega na tym, że współczesne badania odwołują się do instytucji parlamentu w kategoriach stabilności i efektywności, mimo że niektórzy naukowcy analizują różne parametry wyznaczania instytucjonalnych atrybutów parlamentów, w szczególności ich zmienność i instytucjonalizację. Na tej podstawie autor umieścił na agendzie badawczej właśnie problem doprecyzowania, wypełnienia treści i wyodrębnienia niektórych atrybutów instytucjonalnych – stabilności, zmienności, obiegu i instytucjonalizacji parlamentów. W rezultacie zidentyfikowano i potwierdzono pewne tendencje w zakresie definicji i znaczenia obiegu parlamentarnego oraz zmienności parlamentarnej na tle jego oddzielenia od stabilności i instytucjonalizacji legislatury. Udowodniono, że rotację parlamentarną

w krajach demokratycznych determinują zarówno czynniki wewnątrzparlamentarne, jak i zewnętrzne, w szczególności zmienność elektoratu, rodzaj systemu wyborczego, rodzaj systemu partyjnego itp. Wykazano również, że zmienność parlamentarna bezpośrednio zależy od zmian instytucjonalnych i politycznych zachodzących w związku z charakterem instytucji wyborczych – rodzaje systemów wyborczych, częstotliwość wyborów, możliwość startowania na różnych listach wyborczych, wielkość okręgów wyborczych.

Słowa kluczowe: parlament, ustawodawca, obieg parlamentarny, zmienność, stabilność, instytucjonalizacja.

КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЯ І РОЗМЕЖУВАННЯ ПОНЯТЬ ОБІГУ, СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ, МІНЛИВОСТІ Й ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ ЛЕГІСЛАТУР

У статті здійснено спробу розв'язати одну з проблем інституційної політології, яка полягає у тому, що сучасні дослідження зрідка апелюють до інституту парламенту в категоріях стабільності й ефективності, навіть попри те, що деякі науковці аналізують різні параметри окреслення інституційної атрибутики парламентів, зокрема їхньої мінливості й інституціоналізації. На цій підставі автор поставив на порядок денний дослідження саме проблематику з'ясування, наповнення змістом і розмежування деяких інституційних атрибутів – стабільності, мінливості, обігу й інституціоналізації, – парламентів. У підсумку було виокремлено і підтверджено деякі тенденції означення та значення парламентського обігу й парламентської мінливості на тлі її відокремлення від стабільності й інституціоналізації легіслатур. Доведено, що парламентський обіг у демократичних країнах визначається як внутрішньопарламентськими, так і зовнішніми чинниками, зокрема електоральною мінливістю, типом виборчих систем, типом партійних систем тощо. Також показано, що парламентська мінливість прямо залежить від інституційних та політичних змін, які відбуваються у прив'язці до характеру виборчих інститутів – типів виборчих систем, частоти виборів, здатності балотуватись за різними виборчими списками, розміру виборчих округів.

Ключові слова: парламент, легіслатура, парламентський обіг, мінливість, стабільність, інституціоналізація.

In modern institutional political science, the subject of interest and optional research of political institutions is becoming more and more diverse, as a result of which, for example, a number of scholars are often interested in stability, efficiency, variability, strength of various formal and informal political institutions, etc. On the one hand, it is the subject of a huge number

of scientific works of researchers from all countries and regions of the world, thanks to which the institution of parliament is studied and compared primarily for its multi-factorial (party, personal, committee, management, etc.) structuring and ordering. On the other hand, the institution of parliament is seldom considered in terms of stability and efficiency, even though some researchers still appeal to different parameters for defining the institutional attributes of parliaments, including their variability, dynamics, institutionalization, etc. Accordingly, it puts on the agenda the issue of clarifying, filling in the content and delimitation of some institutional attributes – stability, variability, dynamics and institutionalization – of parliament.

In trying to solve this scientific problem, we appeal to a fairly large array of scientific works authored by such, especially Western European and American, scientists as K. Anderson and S. Thorson¹, H. Best and M. Cotta², J. Gibbing³, J. Graham⁴, R. Darcy and J. Choike⁵, D. Judge⁶, K. Jackson⁷, K. Eliassen⁸, T. Castevens and W. Denham⁹, R. Matland and D. Studlar¹⁰, D. Matthews¹¹, P. Norris¹², R. Putnam¹³, W. Petzelt¹⁴, M. Petrakka¹⁵, N. Polsby¹⁶, J. Swain, S. Borrelli and B. Reed¹⁷, R. Sisson¹⁸, P. Squire¹⁹, A. Somit²⁰, M. Fiorina, D. Rode and P. Wessel²¹, J. Fund²²,

¹ Anderson K., Thorson S., Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women, *Western Political Quarterly* 1984, vol 37, s. 143-156.

² Best H., Cotta M., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.; Hibbing J., Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons, *American Journal of Political Science* 1988, vol 32, s. 681-712.

⁴ Graham J., Legislative Careers in the French Chamber and U.S. House 1871-1940, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1982, vol 7, s. 37-56

⁵ Darcy R., Choike J., A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 237-255.

⁶ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 498-516.

⁷ Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 251-277.

⁸ Eliassen K., Pedersen M., Professionalization of Legislatures: Long-Term Changes in Political Recruitment in Denmark and Norway, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1978, vol 20, s. 123-132.

⁹ Casstevens T., Denham W., Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1970, vol 3, s. 655-661.

¹⁰ Matland R., Studlar D., Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis, *British Political Science Journal* 2004, vol 34, s. 87-108.

¹¹ Matthews D., *Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers*, [w:] Loewenberg G., Patterson S., Jewell M (eds.), *Handbook of Legislative Research*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1985, s. 17-56.

¹² Norris P., Lovenduski J., *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995.

¹³ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976.

¹⁴ Patzelt W., Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 239-279.

¹⁵ Petraccia M., *Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (eds.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 19-52.

¹⁶ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

¹⁷ Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998, *American Politics Quarterly* 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

¹⁸ Sisson R., *Comparative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation*, [w:] Kornberg A. (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. David McKay Company 1973.

¹⁹ Squire P., Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1988, vol 13, s. 65-82.

²⁰ Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994.

²¹ Fiorina M., Rohde D., Wessel P., *Historical Change in House Turnover*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *Congress in Change*, Wyd. Praeger 1975, s. 24-57.

²² Fund J., *Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (ed.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 225-240.

A. Khayama²³ and many others, in which these issues are considered mostly on the example of different developed Western states.

However, despite the rather wide range of works and ideas of these scholars, they still do not provide a holistic mechanism for conceptualizing and delimiting the concepts of dynamics, stability, variability and institutionalization of parliaments, a gap which, at least in part, we will continue to fill by our research.

From the works of the above mentioned scholars we can conclude that it is extremely rare in political science, but different attributive symbols of the institution of parliament, such as dynamics, stability, variability and institutionalization, are still used but they are denoted as both different or related, and distinctive, but complementary clarifying developments and phenomena. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that in Western political science there is no single consolidated and holistic categorical definition and designation of the temporal and forceful / authoritative context of the parliament functioning institution, in particular its stability, variability or strength, since to name them separately or in different ways there are used such concepts as “parliamentary variability”, “parliamentary stability”, “parliamentary fluidity”, “parliamentary dynamics”, “parliamentary change”, “institutionalization of parliament”, etc., and variability, stability or force of parliaments are coded on the basis of accurate or at least approximate indicators of reshuffling / both the removal of deputies, parties and committees, and the functions and role of the parliamentary institution in different time periods, but first of all in different parliamentary convocations.

We believe that in order for these or at least some of these categories to be well understood and distinguished, they need to be outlined, detailed and filled with certain content.

Thus, the category of “parliamentary turnover” or “turnover of the legislature” should be rationally used, given that in the case of the institution of parliament as a cyclically operating and functioning institution, it is necessarily a question of personnel replacements and reshuffles within successive legislatures, as well as with reference to the fact that the description of personnel changes, especially in economics, is described using the term “staff turnover”. However, along with this definition, the term “parliamentary variability” should be considered in a somewhat narrower sense, in particular as a process of functioning of parliament and the process of institutional and contextual changes in the legislature at each stage of its development, i.e. in each successive convocation. In this sense, the comparative analysis of change and representation of deputies of national parliaments is a rather fundamental topic in Western comparative political science, especially given that such change and parliamentary dynamics in general are characterized differently by various political systems in the world changes) among deputies of national parliaments.

Hypothetically and conceptually, we note that the possibility and expediency of making changes and changes in parliamentary or legislative staff (i.e. among deputies of successive

²³ Hayama A., Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections, *“Electoral Studies”* 1992, vol 11, s. 46-57.

legislatures) are important from the point of view of the theory of the elites' dynamics²⁴, especially in order to create a structure of career motives and reserves for promising political leaders²⁵ and to accelerate changes in public policy²⁶. After all, without the dynamics of elites, there would be far less new ideas, and therefore legality / legitimacy and legislation would suffer. Therefore, it is in this regard that K. Jackson notes that the insufficient volume / level of parliamentary dynamics or changes among members of the legislature inevitably cause the danger of such three socio-individual phenomena as arrogance, apathy and atrophy²⁷. After all, when the rapid dynamics of elites is inherent in periods of political and socio-economic crises, a moderate dynamics of deputies is needed, according to R. Putnam, also in periods of relative socio-political calm and balance, in particular to maintain social and political stability²⁸ addressed to the dissatisfied groups.

With this in mind, the category of "parliamentary dynamics" begins its scientific history as an integral part of the theories of the dynamics of elites²⁹, in particular as a framework between the two boundaries of the paradox. At the same time, its lowest limit implies that insignificant parliamentary turnover is equal to or inherent in autocratic and limited political leadership, a situation that will sooner or later lead to a lack of legitimacy of power. On the other hand, the upper limit is also destructive, as it affects the quality of parliamentary work and endangers the process of developing tactics in the legislature. That is why parliamentary leadership can cut costs (including information) and create (or at least try) new models of cooperation. And this at a time when the constant influx of new people / MPs in parliaments will be associated with low party discipline and clientelistic problems of novice MPs in front of their constituencies, etc³⁰. This is even more evident in the context of representation, one of the most important normative criteria for evaluating legislatures, on the basis of which accountability, representation and accountability can be indicators of comparison of dynamics in parliaments³¹.

Other explanations that appeal to parliamentary dynamics in the context of the dynamics of modern elites or elites in representative democracies include compilations of the following nature: ideas about the benefits of the theory of "dynamics of government administrations" by M. Petrakka³², the thesis about the "elimination of fraudsters" by S. Rothenberg³³. Moreover,

²⁴ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976

²⁵ Norris P., Lovenduski J., *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995.; Schlesinger J., *Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States*, Wyd. Rand McNally 1966.

²⁶ Brady D., *Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1991.; Bunce M., *Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1981

²⁷ Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds.), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 270.

²⁸ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976, s. 65-68.

²⁹ Putnam R. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. – Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976. – 246p. (P.68).

³⁰ Schepsle K., *The giant jigsaw puzzle: Democratic committee assignments in the modern House*, Wyd. Chicago University Press 1978.

³¹ Rieselbach L., *Congressional Reform: The changing modern Congress*, Wyd. CQ Press 1994.

³² Petrakka M., *Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (eds.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 19-52

³³ Rothenberg S., How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon, "State Legislatures" 1992, vol 18, s. 35-39.

K. Chi and D. Lizerbay emphasize that changing the powers of deputies of national legislatures promotes democracy or democratization, guaranteeing alternative elections, as it leads to "more open mandates"³⁴. D. Fund claims that the term of office of the legislature members increases the quality of legislation, because they reduce the importance of the phenomenon of seigniorage, as the legislator, who remains in office for 1-20 years, becomes more influential³⁵. After all, the term of office of legislators, according to J. Weil, is a complement to any proposal to improve the efficiency and capacity of the political system³⁶. Accordingly, in this regard, it is obvious that parliamentary dynamics, parliamentary turnover or turnover of the legislature is an important component of the democratic idea in the first place. In addition, the modern theory of democratic sovereignty defines any government (in a broad sense these are power or governance) as a projection of the desires and will of the people, because they exercise direct and indirect control of the system, which is their "creation".

This means that the ability to "remove" their elected representatives, who are unable to adhere to the will of the national character, is important for people, because it helps them determine the parameters and framework of the effectiveness of reproduction / reproduction of the political system. After all, when this ability is limited (reduced), there is a weakening of the ability of the government to be an instrument of influence of individuals.

In addition, it should be noted that the modern theory of liberal and representative democracy considers parliamentary variability or parliamentary dynamics primarily as an effective way to prevent tyranny³⁷. After all, the task of democracy is to protect the possibility of government and to ensure the rights of the majority and the minority. However, representative democracy assigns a rather limited role to the public, which distinguishes it from the theory of democratic sovereignty. However, even so, the ability of citizens to remove the current leadership from power is important in order to avoid the dangers of tyranny and autocracy. The threat of a change of leadership is an effective obstacle to tempting some parliamentarians to use their powers for their own benefit. The fact is that when the share of reshuffles of parliamentarians and officials decreases, there may be a "temptation" to pursue politics primarily in their own interests and the interests of their political environment, rather than to increase public goods, which shows other dysfunctional results of the political process. In contrast, according to the proponents of the theory of representative democracy, valuable in terms of representation is the legislature, which embodies the representation of citizens of different socio-economic strata and groups³⁸. After all, when groups excluded

³⁴ Chi K., Leatherby D., State Legislative Term Limits, "Solutions: Policy Options For State Decision-Makers" 1998, vol 6, s. 1-39.

³⁵ Fund J., *Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (ed.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 235-236.

³⁶ Vile J., *Rewriting the United States Constitution: An Examination of Proposals from Reconstruction to the Present*, Wyd. Praeger 1991, s. 160-161.

³⁷ Katz R., *Democracy and Elections*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

³⁸ Phillips A., *The Politics of Presence*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995.; Pitkin H., *The Concept of Representation*, Wyd. University of California Press 1972.

from the struggle demand fair political representation, low parliamentary turnover can be a burden that prevents the state from moving towards a more representative, in particular at the expense of women, leadership and government format³⁹.

In addition, it should be noted that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability also affects public policy. As different types of individuals, socially, economically and ideologically, try to gain positions in power – in legislatures, etc. – their strategic political prerogatives differ significantly. Therefore, any innovations in terms of the staff of parliaments can determine the common position of parliaments as public authorities. Various scholars⁴⁰ have argued, for example, that increasing women's representation in government in general and in legislatures in particular is changing strategic priorities in many countries.

Thus, it was found that the change of staff in parliaments, even though the party's control over the legislatures may not change, can lead to dramatic changes in the strategic political principles of the existing legislatures⁴¹. As a result, the perception of the fact that the low turnover of parliamentarians and government officials in general is or may be a problem that motivates the public to initiate a movement to establish a compulsory term for government officials is theorized. Especially considering that deputies become a priori at least partially distant from the public from the moment they receive their positions in the legislature⁴². Accordingly, low movement or turnover in parliaments is a reason for isolating the law from the public, as electoral ties and influence are not enough to prevent abuse of office by certain parliamentarians. However, at the same time as much of the theory and practice of democracy in real political systems focuses on the need to guarantee sufficient change of government, it is clear that too much parliamentary dynamics should also be considered problematic for theories of democracy and democratic sovereignty. The fact is that theory and practice indicate the "centricity" nature of citizens' representatives in their legislative activity. Therefore, if there are too many reshuffles among members of parliament, any legislature with open public relations may find itself in an awkward situation with regard to the government and the head of state, etc.

In this context, it is important that one of the defining mechanisms of parliamentary dynamics is political parties in representative democracies, especially those with mechanisms of parliamentary influence on the formation and / or accountability of governments, i.e. the so-called parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. The fact is that changes in the parliamentary majority in the legislature and the perturbation of parties in governments ensure the

³⁹ Anderson K., Thorson S., Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women, *Western Political Quarterly* 1984, vol 37, s. 143-156.; Darcy R., Choike J., A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 237-255.

⁴⁰ Bratton K., Ray L., Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway, *American Journal of Political Science* 2002, vol 46, s. 428-437.; Rosenthal C., *When Women Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.; Thomas S., *How Women Legislate*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994.

⁴¹ Wolbrecht C., *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2000

⁴² Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

dynamics of elites create opportunities for the influence of opposition groups and ultimately lead to changes in state policy. Thus, as J. Gibbing points out⁴³, it is the parties, not parliaments in general, that are the main promoters of the stabilization and institutionalization of legislatures. However, the analysis of parliamentary dynamics from the point of view of parties bypasses the subject of controversy about quantitative changes in the composition and staff of parliamentary parties, and regardless of changes in the composition of parliaments and governments. Therefore, this means that the consequences and indicators of parliamentary variability are regulated both at the non-partisan (individual among deputies) and at the party level, i.e. through intra-party dynamics in legislatures⁴⁴, although this is quite different in various countries with diverse types of electoral and party systems in general.

In particular, as noted in a number of comparative political studies, parties are not as influential in this regard in presidential democracies (as, for example, in the United States), as in parliamentary democracies (particularly in almost all European countries). The fact is that in the first group of cases, individual parliamentarians and officials can strengthen their positions in the performance of their duties by serving the constituencies, and above all by directly ensuring the interests of the groups and individuals to whom they are electorally attached⁴⁵. One of the reasons is that in these cases the advantages of various public positions and the consistent reduction of their dynamics, including in parliaments, have been historically documented⁴⁶. Instead, in the second group of cases, both the processes inherent in the previous group (in the format of serving constituencies of individual deputies⁴⁷) and the processes determined by greater structuring of party systems are important, as the format of interparty relations often determines parliamentary dynamics and the behavior of deputies of legislatures. This means that parliamentary dynamics is regulated both personally and electorally, and collectively and party-wise, in particular by various indicators of the significant number of competing parties and the relative strength of parties, the role of competition for appointments within parties, type of electoral systems, peculiarities of distribution of powers between representatives of different parties, career opportunities within the legislature and other authorities, legislative professionalism, etc⁴⁸. It clearly follows from all this that parliamentary dynamics is regulated by both internal parliamentary factors and external (institutional, electoral, party, etc.)

⁴³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *"Legislative Studies Quarterly"* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁴⁴ Brady D., *Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1991.

⁴⁵ Cain B., Ferejohn J., Fiorina M., *The Personal Vote*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1987.

⁴⁶ Fiorina M., Rohde D., Wessel P., *Historical Change in House Turnover*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *Congress in Change*, Wyd. Praeger 1975, s. 24-57.; Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *"American Political Science Review"* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.; Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998, *"American Politics Quarterly"* 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

⁴⁷ Lancaster T., Patterson D., Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1990, vol 22, s. 458-477.; Norton P., Wood D., *Back from Westminster: British members of Parliament and their constituents*, Wyd. University of Kentucky Press 1993.

⁴⁸ Matthews D., *Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers*, [w:] Loewenberg G., Patterson S., Jewell M (eds.), *Handbook of Legislative Research*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1985, s. 17-56.; Squire P., Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, *"Legislative Studies Quarterly"* 1988, vol 13, s. 65-82.

factors⁴⁹. That is why in Western political science it has become commonplace to use two sets of data and factors solving the problem of parliamentary dynamics. The first factor involves the analysis of parliamentary dynamics based on the results of identifying parties and political leaders as politically responsible for their stay in power. Instead, the second factor outlines the restructuring of election legislation and the linking of parliamentarians and candidates to their constituencies (if it is possible).

This sometimes raises the issue of the so-called “normal” or democratic parliamentary dynamics and the orderly dynamics of political elites, which are sometimes even seen as one of the dimensions of the institutionalization of parliaments ((which will be discussed in more detail below). In this regard, one of the theorists of parliamentary dynamics N. Polsby believes that the long career of a deputy and, conversely, low rates of parliamentary dynamics are decisive factors in the institutionalization of legislatures. Therefore, stable and high indicators of stability of officials or low indicators of their variability in legislatures are needed in order to create a field of legislative knowledge that allows deputies to standardize their activities and make decisions in a predictable way⁵⁰. In addition, the continuity of the careers of parliamentarians is important because the architecture of internal differentiation in legislatures is based on arguments about tenure, the most important of which is the so-called “seniority” or “seigniorage”. Accordingly, proponents of this theoretical approach view low parliamentary turnover as a sign of high institutionalization of parliaments, even in consolidated democracies⁵¹. In contrast, another theorist of parliamentary dynamics, J. Gibbing, takes a different view, arguing or trying to predict that the institutionalization of parliaments is compatible with high rates of change or reshuffling⁵². The scholar emphasizes that the institutionalization of parliaments should not reduce the absolute indicators of parliamentary turnover, but can minimize them, so new deputies should be quickly hired and socialized in their new roles to successfully and in a short time to replace deputies who lost seats. And this certainly negates the tradition of research, which suggests that positions are an indicator of strong institutionalization of parliaments, ie the previous approach. At the same time, A. Somit makes a synthetic conclusion that there is no single systemic feature that consistently correlates with high or low parliamentary turnover, because each state is unique, and data on political, electoral and party practices and processes can be very different⁵³. However, even so, it can be generalized that the parliamentary turnover or turnover of legislatures, ie the aggregate level of “exits from parliament”, can correlate continuously from the previous parliamentary elections to the next ones, from the election of

⁴⁹ Hall R., Van Houweling R., Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House, *“American Political Science Review”* 1995, vol 89, s. 121-136.; Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *“American Political Science Review”* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁵⁰ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *“American Political Science Review”* 1968, vol 62, s. 148.

⁵¹ Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 1973.

⁵² Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁵³ Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 14.

candidates to the lower house of parliament in conditions of bicameralism to the election to a single house of parliament in a unicameral legislature.

In this sense, it is certainly important to state that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, if not, it can most likely be tangent to the signs and parameters of stability of party systems in certain states or entire regions, in particular in Western Europe or Central and Eastern Europe, etc. This is especially true given that party systems and organizations are not equally stable, and election results can be characterized by varying volatility⁵⁴. It is more important taking into account the fact that the stability of party systems is based on the fact of their verification with the focus on the relationship between political parties and blocs / coalitions⁵⁵. The fact is that the stability of party systems is the product of two factors: 1) parties as organizations that seek to promote their candidates to parliaments and cabinets in order to achieve specific political goals; 2) models of party interaction, in particular in the framework of their entry or non-membership in the governmental and opposition components / groups of inter-party competition⁵⁶. In other words, this means that the functioning of the party system is through the prism of at least two parameters: changes in the actual party organization within a party system and changes in the competition structure of party electoral blocs in a party system. Accordingly, a stable party system presupposes not only the existence of stable parties, but also the existence of stable patterns of their interaction. By this logic, the degree of stability of parties in the party system can be combined with indicators of electoral volatility / variability and changes in the party organization⁵⁷. All mentioned above mean that the central test in this context is to verify the theoretical and practical alignment of the stability of party systems with indicators of parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, or in other words, the extent to which they are interconnected and interdependent. Moreover, the starting point of the analysis is the comparison of changes among the participants in the election process with an emphasis on parliamentary dynamics and indicators of electoral variability (as a possible consequence of stability or instability of party systems), the basis of which is the modern theory of the dynamics of elites.

Theoretically and partially empirically, political science has developed an understanding that the correlation between electoral variability and parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability in successive parliaments confirms the expectations of elite dynamics theory based on party structure and stability and changes in party systems. The fact is that it is clearly stated that higher party stability and lower electoral variability mean or hypothetically cause

⁵⁴ Innes A., Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery, *"Comparative Politics"* 2002, vol 35, s. 85-104.; Kitschelt H., Mansfeldova Z., Markowski R., Toká G., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; Mair P., *Party system change. Approaches and interpretations*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1997.

⁵⁵ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.; Smith G., What is a Party System?, *"Parliamentary Affairs"* 1966, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 351-362.

⁵⁶ Mair P., *Party system change. Approaches and interpretations*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1997.; Smith G., A Systems Perspective on Party System Change, *"Journal of Theoretical Politics"* 1989, vol 1, s. 349-363.

⁵⁷ Bartolini S., Mair P., *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates: 1885-1985*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

a decrease in parliamentary variability. In other words, it has been established that the decline in parliamentary dynamics corresponds to the trend of stabilization of party systems.

Empirically, this is interesting given the assumption of scholars that the optimal indicator of parliamentary turnover is a 30 percent component of parliamentary rotation among the staff of two consecutive legislatures⁵⁸.

At the same time, the analysis of the stability of party systems in the context of parliamentary variability in the above format is only one side of the coin. Instead, the other side is the logic of taking into account the stability of party systems by determining the number of party parliamentary groups (factions), which are defined by consistent and stable representation in successive legislatures (in the categories of party entrances and exits to the legislature, both as a result of elections and as a result of other political processes in already elected parliaments) on the basis of their relationship with parliamentary turnover indicators. Such a mechanism of correlation or interrelation of parliamentary variability / parliamentary dynamics and stability of party systems is often considered as the basis for calculating the influence of the former on the institutionalization of legislatures as a separate attribute of this political institution. In addition, this mechanism is an option to test one of the political science hypotheses, in particular, that the institutionalization of the legislature is compatible with high rates of parliamentary turnover or rotation among the deputies of two successive legislatures⁵⁹. After all, the institutionalization of parliaments, according to this hypothesis, should not reduce the absolute rate of parliamentary variability, but can still minimize them⁶⁰. Although, in contrast and as mentioned above, this hypothesis challenges the tradition of parliamentary research, which suggests that positions are an indicator of strong institutionalization of legislatures⁶¹.

The theoretical relevance of verifying the correlation of parliamentary variability and institutionalization of legislatures is due to several factors: a) a small number of scholars deal with the problem of the impact of parliamentary dynamics on the institutionalization of legislatures in a comparative perspective⁶²; b) there are virtually no empirical attempts to identify highly institutionalized parliaments that demonstrate low stability / turnover among members of the legislature; c) interest in verifying that if the institutionalization of parliaments could be inherent even in conditions of high parliamentary variability, the professionalization of deputies, the system of parliamentary committees, internal parliamentary norms and procedures will then need additional attention.

⁵⁸ Best H., Cotta M., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.; Crowther W., Matonyte I., Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova compared, "East European Politics and Societies" 2007, vol 40, s. 281-299.; Narud H., Pedersen M., Valen H., *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, Wyd. University Press of Southern Denmark 2002.

⁵⁹ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶⁰ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶¹ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, "American Political Science Review" 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁶² Matland R., Studlar D., Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis, "British Political Science Journal" 2004, vol 34, s. 87-108.; Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994.

But in this context, the problem of determining parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, as discussed above, is manifested, in particular, as changes between new members of the same parliament (in the same state) between (as a result of) its two consecutive elections. The fact is that in this case there is inaccuracy, because it is not clear how to take into account a member of parliament who returns to the legislature after one or more election cycles when he was not a member of parliament. On the one hand, he is a new MP, and on the other – not at all MP⁶³.

It is to overcome this shortcoming in political science that parliamentary variability can be analyzed and compared not only in person (in deputies) but also collectively (in parties and party groups). At the same time, the main indicator of personalized measurement of turnover among deputies and parliamentary variability in general, mainly in the context of institutionalization of legislatures, is the percentage of deputies, former members of parliament, who are considered re-elected. Of additional importance may be the preservation of the roles of the so-called “core group” of parliamentarians, which includes committee leaders, heads of parliaments, i.e. speakers and deputy speakers, i.e. the so-called “parliamentary elite” in general. Combining personalized and collective (party-group) logic of understanding and assessing parliamentary variability is important in the context of the phenomenon of institutionalization of parliament.

However, the problem is that there is no unity of researchers on how to understand or appropriate the institutionalization of legislatures, in particular in the sense that it belongs to the list of its attributes. Thus, N. Polsby⁶⁴ believes that the signs of institutionalization of parliaments are their “limitations”, “internal complexity” and the attribute of “automatic decision-making.” Moreover, the limited number of legislatures mainly refers to the fact of “division”, i.e. obtaining the autonomy of parliaments from external factors, and therefore in this case it is primarily about indicators of stability of members of parliament, their professionalism and stability of leadership roles⁶⁵. In turn, the internal complexity of legislatures is defined by the theory of specialization, in particular as a result of increasing the autonomy of parliaments, and hence the importance of committees and resources and the influence of individual members of parliament⁶⁶. Finally, automatic decision-making by legislatures stems from the application of universal principles of organization and hierarchy, including the development of seigniorage in committees and the “settlement of choices when competing for merit⁶⁷.”

In contrast, other researchers understand the institutionalization of parliaments as institutionalized autonomy and organizational complexity of legislatures⁶⁸ or internal organization-

⁶³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶⁴ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁶⁵ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 503.

⁶⁶ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 153.

⁶⁷ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 503.

⁶⁸ Sisson R., *Comparative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation*, [w:] Kornberg A. (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. David McKay Company 1973, s. 18.

al development and external differentiation of legislatures⁶⁹. Other scholars point out that the institutionalization of parliaments is evidenced by the leadership (formal internal structures and organization) of legislatures and their ability to reproduce and resist social interference⁷⁰. It follows that, speaking of the institutionalization of parliaments, check such indicators of this phenomenon as: level or degree of institutionalization of committees (their structure (permanent or changing), composition and autonomy, including the right of legislative initiative, the right of legislative amendments, the right to professional advice)⁷¹; indicator of stability of parliamentary factions and groups in parliaments; indicator of parliamentary turnover (percentage of deputies returning to previous parliamentary positions, strengthening the personal structure of parliaments).

It is in this context that it has been established that parliamentary dynamics has a different structure, because of what it can be defined in differently and it affects the institutionalization, strength and stability of legislatures in quite different ways. In particular, it was found that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability is composed of two structural components, such as unintentional withdrawal and voluntary withdrawal of deputies or party groups / factions from the legislature. In this context, the term "withdrawal" in this context is typically understood as the termination of a deputy in parliament, and the concept is associated with the theory of systems.

Unintentional withdrawal of a deputy from the parliament may take place when: a candidate who was given a deputy mandate in the previous convocation of the legislature is defeated by the results of the counting of votes on the basis of ballots as a result of new elections; when a candidate for deputy cannot be re-appointed or nominated by his party; when a candidate is forced to resign due to a scandal; when it is caused by the death or illness of a deputy at the time of his or her performance of official duties or a candidate for deputy during the election campaign. Interestingly, the scandal can lead to the resignation of only some, but not all members of parliament, and therefore it does not affect a very significant percentage of total parliamentary variability. This is even more the case in the event of death or illness as a deputy or candidate, as they are unlikely to be a determining factor in parliamentary dynamics in terms of aggregate parliamentary dynamics.

In addition, the limited number of deaths among MPs in the line of duty indicates that they are not a significant factor. Statistically, some researches say⁷² that on average, less than one percent of MPs die in the line of duty. In contrast, two other cases of unintentional termination of deputies' powers as factors of parliamentary variability are more relevant and significant. It

⁶⁹ Judge D., *Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?*, "Government and Opposition".

⁷⁰ 70Kopecky P., *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization*, Wyd. Ashgate 2001, s. 14.

⁷¹ Olson D., Crowther W., *Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 2002, s. 33.

⁷² Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 251-277.; Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., *A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998*, "American Politics Quarterly" 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

should be noted that the most common form of unintentional withdrawal of deputies from parliament is their defeat in the parliamentary elections. The probability of defeat must be explained by several basic factors, including the structural features of the electoral systems of certain states. One of the most obvious factors regarding parliamentary dynamics is an indicator and the fact of how often an official can be re-elected. After all, there are significant differences in how often parliamentary elections are held, including depending on the term of office of deputies, and the ability of no-confidence votes and other factors to cause the dissolution of parliament and its early elections. In view of this, scholars often note that increasing the frequency of the deputies' re-election increases the frequentness and probability of losing their parliamentary powers, primarily due to defeat before candidates from other parties or groups, etc., especially in electorally changing party systems. After all, in this context, significant are remarks of political theorists that in the event of an increase in electoral volatility, MPs' feelings about the possible loss of their seats in the new parliamentary elections significantly increase⁷³. The same is true when the electorate, for various reasons, is characterized by volatility, as it is also theoretically and intuitively the basis for increasing parliamentary dynamics, albeit to varying degrees within different types of electoral systems for electing legislatures⁷⁴. Finally, this is influenced by certain mechanical effects of different types of electoral systems, in particular in their connection to the types of party systems in certain countries, but primarily due to the proportionality of the election results⁷⁵.

It is for this reason that political science argues that parliamentary variability increases with the size of constituencies and the proportionality of electoral systems, although it may be the reason for a candidate's defeat due to the influence or desire of his own party. At the same time, it is interesting that the rates of internal party defeats of candidates are also higher in proportional or more proportional electoral systems. However, in contrast, proportional systems that use closed lists provide candidates with the greatest degree of protection against intra-party reshuffles, since voters are unable to change the order because it is established by the parties themselves. Instead, proportional systems with open or preferential voting correlate depending on the assessment of candidates for the possibility of their intra-party reshuffle. Some electoral systems have very high electoral barriers, so voters are virtually unable to make changes to the ballot paper submitted by parties, the second electoral system simply sets relatively high electoral barriers, the third one ensures that voters determine which of the candidates will be elected to parliament, etc. However, it is absolutely clear that electoral systems that tend to lose seats

⁷³ Bartolini S., Mair P., *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates: 1885-1985*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Crewe I., Denver D., *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1985.; Pedersen V., The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility, "European Journal of Political Research" 1979, vol 7, s. 1-26.

⁷⁴ Tufte E., The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, s. 540-547.

⁷⁵ Gallagher M., Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, "Electoral Studies" 1991, vol 10, s. 33-51.; Taagepera R., Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections, "American Political Science Review" 1986, vol 80, s. 489-504.

and are threatened with intra-party reshuffle lead to higher parliamentary turnover or higher parliamentary variability, and thus do not contribute to the institutionalization of legislatures.

It is also noteworthy that in addition to electoral reshuffle – the main form of unintentional withdrawal of a deputy from parliament – the latter may also be caused by the cancellation of the election. However, the abolition of the election is different from the intra-party electoral change, as it describes a situation where a certain deputy cannot be re-appointed by the party to this position. This is a relatively rare phenomenon, as normally officials wishing to be re-elected are re-appointed without any problems. However, one reason why revoking elections is considered rare may be the fact that officials who run the risk of being eliminated may opt for voluntary resignation instead. At the same time, the abolition of the election by the party leadership is especially characteristic of systems where there is no mechanism through which intra-party change can be described. It is also important that the probability of canceling the election depends on the type of electoral system, as different electoral systems stimulate parties differently. However, one way or another, the candidates of parties in which there are formal levers of selection can be eliminated in the first place. To clarify the situation, it should be noted that the parties have at least two main incentives through which the process of considering the elimination of officials, including deputies before or during the election. First, parties must also have some internal dynamics so that they can encourage their candidates at lower levels of the party hierarchy / organization and force them to continue working for the party. Second, the party must understand whether the retention of an official improves the party's chances of retaining its seats in parliament as a whole. An official's ability to improve the party's capabilities depends on the extent to which he can attract votes based on electoral popularity. This assumption is based on the patronage of party representatives in a particular constituency, as well as on the visibility of the work of members of parliament on the ground and their ability to pursue government priorities. In general, this means that the more acceptable the size of the deputies' contribution, the more reluctant the parties will be to eliminate officials from their membership. After all, perhaps the last reason why a party can rotate its candidates and eliminate officials is that party ideology places special emphasis on the need to ensure that its deputies do not become distant from the people they represent.

In contrast, the decision to leave parliament voluntarily is the point when a deputy weighs the benefits and costs / losses in the process of his re-election against the benefits and costs / losses of other options for continuing his political career or ending his political career. One of the variables in the decision to resign a member of parliament is the impact of pension benefits. In this regard, scholars have shown that the decision to resign individual parliamentarians in most democracies is due to changes in the rules on pensions⁷⁶; after all, some deputies postpone their consent to voluntary resignation in order to take advantage of a more attractive financial benefit and prospect. In general, the political science literature on parliamentary

⁷⁶ Hall R., Van Houweling R., *Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House*, "American Political Science Review" 1995, vol 89, s. 121-136.

dynamics assesses the possibility of more attractive political positions outside the legislature rather sparingly. However, the focus of the research is on the progressive ambitions of deputies, among which the most important is the source of voluntary withdrawal from parliament. Some deputies suspend their activities in order to obtain higher political privileges. Other deputies are resigning to hold positions in other bodies and institutions of power, which is often more prestigious⁷⁷. However, it should be equally emphasized that parliamentary dynamics, under the influence of progressive aspirations and ambitions of individuals, is largely atypical for representative democracies. For example, in most European countries, the parliament is considered the pinnacle of political power: so, apart from it, there are actually few opportunities for a vertical movement of a deputy in terms of political career. After all, another body in which significant political powers are concentrated and on which deputies focus is the government / cabinet. However, in many cases (especially in parliamentary republics and parliamentary monarchies), ministers retain their seats in parliament or at least their seats on party lists in the next elections, provided they do not retain their positions in parliament. Therefore, in fact, the ministers know that they will be able to return to their previous (deputy) position and leave voluntarily again.

In general, taking into account the costs / losses and benefits of holding office, the degree to which parliamentary activity is attractive will depend on the amount and capacity of the individual MP and the quality of work within parliament. These variables directly depend on the level of institutionalization of legislatures. In this context, the research position is that since working conditions in parliaments today are more or less orderly, and strategic influence is significant, the service in the legislature is becoming more attractive, leading to a gradual reduction in parliamentary dynamics⁷⁸, and thus (as one of the factors) to the institutionalization of legislatures.

In general, on this basis, the study identified and confirmed some trends in the definition and importance of parliamentary dynamics / parliamentary variability in the context of its separation from the stability and institutionalization of legislatures, even though they are not always consolidated and inherent in all representative democracies. In particular, it was found that in democratic states (consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies) parliamentary dynamics is determined by both internal and external factors, including electoral variability, type of electoral systems, type of party systems, etc., after all, for example, the growth of electoral volatility leads to an increase in parliamentary dynamics among members of parliament. It is also reasoned that parliamentary variability directly depends on institutional and political changes related to the nature of electoral institutions – types of electoral systems, frequency of elections, ability to run on different voter lists, size of constituencies. Therefore, parliamentary dynamics may depend on electoral and political engineering. Finally, it has been established that parliamentary turnover or parliamentary variability increases in the event of an increased threat of intra-party electoral defeats of deputies and candidates, a decrease in the professionalization of legislatures and the institutionalization of parliamentary committees and parliaments in general.

⁷⁷ Schlesinger J., *Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States*, Wyd. Rand McNally 1966.

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The concept of the «Russian world» in the assessments of Belarusian researchers

A characteristic trend of the contemporary information space of Belarus is the promotion of narratives of the «Russian world». In parallel with the penetration and dissemination of relevant ideas in the Belarusian media, studies devoted to the study of the concept of the «Russian world» are beginning to appear in Belarusian historiography. Some Belarusian researchers try to adapt the ideas of the Russian world to the contemporary political realities of Belarus. This is manifested in the use of theses about a common history, the imposition of beliefs that Belarusians and Russians are one people, and Russian is the native language for Belarusians. Such theses take place in the context of the Belarusian academic humanities, which often, following the Soviet tradition, ideologically serves the political slogans of contemporary pro-Russian (including pro-government) circles in Belarus through a peculiar interpretation of historical facts and their adaptation to nowadays socio-political processes. At the same time, it is also worth noting the presence of different, more academic views, interpretations and approaches that take place when Belarusian researchers try to study and comprehend this phenomenon.

Keywords: «Russian world», Belarus, Russia, pro-Russian narratives, scientific discourse.

Koncepcja «Ruskiego miru» w ocenach badaczy białoruskich

Charakterystycznym nurtem współczesnej przestrzeni informacyjnej Białorusi jest propaganda narracji «Ruskiego miru». Równoległe z przenikaniem i rozpowszechnianiem odpowiednich idei w białoruskich mediach, w białoruskiej historiografii zaczynają pojawiać się badania nad badaniem pojęcia «Ruskiego miru». Niektórzy białoruscy badacze próbują dostosować idee rosyjskiego świata do współczesnych realiów politycznych Białorusi. Przejawia się to w posługiwaniu się tezami o wspólnej historii, narzucaniu przekonań, że Białorusini i Rosjanie to jeden naród, a język rosyjski jest językiem ojczystym Białorusinów. Takie tezy pojawiają się w kontekście białoruskiej humanistyki akademickiej, która często podąża za tradycją sowiecką i ideologicznie służy politycznym hasłom nowoczesnych środowisk prorosyjskich (w tym prorządowych) na Białorusi poprzez unikalną interpretację faktów historycznych i ich adaptację do współczesnych procesów społeczno-politycznych. Jednocześnie warto zauważyć, że pojawiają się różne, bardziej akademickie poglądy, interpretacje i podejścia, które mają miejsce, gdy białoruscy badacze próbują badać i zrozumieć to zjawisko.

Słowa kluczowe: «Ruski mir», Białoruś, Rosja, narracje prorosyjskie, dyskurs naukowy.

Концепт «русского мира» в оцінках білоруських дослідників

Характерною тенденцією сучасного інформаційного простору Білорусі є пропаганда наративів «русского мира». Паралельно з проникненням і поширенням відповідних ідей у білоруських медіа в білоруській історіографії починають з'являтися дослідження, присвячені вивченню концепції «русского мира». Деякі білоруські дослідники намагаються адаптувати ідеї російського світу до сучасних політичних реалій Білорусі. Це проявляється у використанні тез про спільну історію, нав'язуванні переконань, що білоруси і росіяни – один народ, а російська мова – рідна для білорусів. Такі тези з'являються в контексті білоруської академічної гуманітарної науки, яка часто, дотримуючись радянської традиції, ідеологічно обслуговує політичні гасла сучасних проросійських (у тому числі провладних) кіл Білорусі через своєрідну інтерпретацію історичних фактів та їх адаптацію до сучасних суспільно-політичних процесів. Водночас варто також відзначити наявність різних, більш академічних поглядів, інтерпретацій та підходів, які мають місце, коли білоруські дослідники намагаються вивчити та осмислити цей феномен.

Ключові слова: «русский мир», Білорусь, Росія, проросійські наративи, науковий дискурс.

Introduction

Over the past few years, the promotion of the idea of the «Russian world» has become the main activity of Russian propaganda both in Russia itself and abroad.

«Russian world» today is partly interpreted in Russian and pro-Russian circles as a «cultural and historical idea of the international, interstate and intercontinental community, aimed at uniting disparate Russian-speaking compatriots»¹. Being ideologically formed among Russian intellectuals-contributors to the collection «Other. A Reader of the New Russian Self-Consciousness», published in 1992–1995, the concept of «Russian World» came directly into Russian scientific discourse after the publication in 1999 of Peter Shchedrovitsky's work «Russian World and Transnational Russian». In it, the author noted that «Russian world» should be understood as «the network structure of large and small communities that think and speak in Russian». At the same time, P. Shchedrovitsky clearly emphasized that in the territory delineated by the administrative borders of the Russian Federation lived only half of the population that belonged to the «Russian world». Therefore, Russia's primary task in this direction, according to the analyst, was to be comprehensive support (including information) of Russian «human capital» living outside Russia².

¹ S. Alejnikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *belorusskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, s.6.

² P. Shchedrovitskij, *Russkij mir i transnacional'noe russkoe*, URL: <https://shchedrovitskij.com/russkij-mir/> [4.04.2022]

The concept of «Russian world» entered the official political field in the mid-2000s. This marked the beginning of the Russian government's implementation of a new global project, which would be a «Russian alternative» to Western geopolitical projects. At that time, Russian President Vladimir Putin was particularly active in promoting it. The latter increasingly began to address issues related to Russian compatriots living abroad in terms of their linguistic, cultural, and civilizational unity. Finally, in the same year, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation established the Russian World Foundation, which aimed to promote the study and use of Russian language and culture both in Russia and abroad (including in Belarus and Ukraine)³.

At the same time, the same rhetoric appeared in the religious community of Russia. Thus, when Kirill Gundayev became the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in 2009, he became one of the most active promoters of the idea of «Russian world», claiming in his speeches that in addition to Russia its «core» is at least Belarus and Ukraine⁴.

In general, in the 2000s, the concept of the «Russian world» became the ideological basis of the Putin regime and the general line of Russia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space and in the context of restoring spheres of influence actual for the Soviet era. Relevant messages with the help of Russian and local pro-Russian media were actively rebroadcast in the Republic of Belarus – an important, from the Russian point of view, part of the «Russian world» and in general a strategic partner of Russia on the contemporary geopolitical chessboard⁵.

However, the dissemination of theses about the «Russian world» is not limited to the media sphere only. Similar messages gradually began to appear on the pages of scientific publications of Belarusian authors – researchers in the humanitarian sphere. The latter, imitating the Soviet tradition, with the help of scientific tools often created an ideological basis, and at the same time, exculpation of the pro-Russian vector of foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus, which has remained a stable priority during the last 28 years of Alexander Lukashenko's presidency.

The purpose of this publication is to analyze the scientific publications available in Belarusian historiography regarding the concept of the «Russian world». As of today, in contrast to Russian historiography, where the concept has already been the subject of numerous studies, including dissertations⁶, there is no significant interest in this issue in the Belarusian scientific

³ P. Artymyshyn, «My vse russkie, a ne rossijane»: snovni svitohliadni vizii rosijskoi hromady zakhidnoukrainskoho regionu (za materialamy hazety «Russkyi vestnyk»). *Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zbirnyk* 2017, nr. 19, s. 306-307.

⁴ Vystuplenie Svjatejshego Patriarha Kirilla na torzhestvennom otkrytii III Assamblei Russkogo mira. 2009. 3 nojabrja. URL: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html> [1.04.2022]

⁵ P. Artymyshyn, T. Polovy, Koncept «russkogo mira» v informacionnom prostranstve Belarusi. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 2021, nr. 74(2), s. 181–201. <https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2021.74.2.01>

⁶ A. Andreev, Russkij mir kak faktor rossijskoj politiki. *Mir i politika* 2011, 10 janvarja, s. 94-102; O. Batanova, Russkij mir i problemy ego formirovanija: avtoref. diss. ... kand. polit. nauk: 23.00.04, Rossijskaja akad. gos. sluzhby pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federacii, Moskva 2009, 24 s.; D. Garaev, The Methodology of the «Russian World» and «Russian Islam»: New Ideologies of the Post-Socialist Context. *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 2021, nr. 48(3). URL: https://brill.com/view/journals/spst/48/3/article-p367_7.xml?ebody=abstract%2Fexcerpt [20.04.2022]; N. Narochnickaja, *Russkij mir*: SPb, Alereja 2007, 320 s.; M. Nejmark, Russkij mir i geopolitika. *Problemy postsovetetskogo prostranstva* 2015, nr. 2(4), s. 78-100; E. Pen'kova, Russkij mir kak faktor social'noj identifikacii rossijskoj molodezhi: avtoref. diss. ... kand. soc. nauk: 22.00.04, FGBOU VPO «Rossijskij gos. social'nyj un-t, Moskva 2012, 25 s.; V. Petuhov, Russkie i «Russkij mir»: istoričeskij kontekst i sovremennoe prochtenie. *Polis. Politicheskie issledovanija* 2014, nr. 6, s. 83-101; V. Rastorguev, «Russkij mir» i civilizacionnaja identičnost'. *Vestnik Pravoslavnoho Sejato-Tihonovskogo gumanitarnogo uni-ta. Serija 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofija* 2015, nr. 59, s. 152-158.

community. Despite this, several different kinds of publications can be distinguished, in which this phenomenon is considered and evaluated from different angles. In particular, the Belarusian scientific discourse contains several articles by Belarusian researchers: Vsevolod Shimov, Lev Krishtapovich, Fiodor Prikhodko and Vasily Ivchik, as well as a scientific monograph by Svetlana Aleinikova dedicated to the topic of the «Russian world».

These authors are key representatives of the discourse of «Russian world» in the context of Belarusian science. Vsevolod Shimov – Candidate of Political Science, Associate Professor of Political Science at the Belarusian State University – one of the most influential institutions of higher education in the Republic of Belarus. Lev Kryshtapovich is a Doctor of Philosophy who has worked for many years at the Academy of Management under the President of the Republic of Belarus and the Operational and Analytical Center under the President of the Republic of Belarus. Fiodor Prikhodko and Vasily Ivchik are lecturers of the humanities at the Belarusian State Agrarian Academy. Finally, Svetlana Aleinikova – Candidate of Sociological Sciences, analyst of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, founded by the President of the Republic of Belarus in 2019 to «provide information and analytical support to government agencies and officials in strategic areas of domestic and foreign policy»⁷.

The humanities, especially those related to contemporary socio-political processes, in the authoritarian conditions of contemporary Belarus are mostly extremely conjunctural, and from the point of view of the academic level – partly marginal. Scholars with opposition views in recent years, especially after August 2020, have mostly left the territory of the Republic of Belarus, or at least were «removed» from public space within the country. Instead, the researchers considered in the article took an almost monopoly position in the niche of analysis of the «Russian world», at the same time forming «ideological canons» and approaches to the concept for their successors, which, however, in modern Belarus, is almost non-existent. And, in fact, the full list of Belarusian researchers of the «Russian world» consists of the mentioned authors.

Given the above, the purpose of our article is to highlight and analyze the work of Belarusian scientists who in their research raised the issue of manifestations of the «Russian world» in Belarus. In the course of the research we used, in particular, methods of comparison, discourse analysis, content analysis, etc., which allowed us to identify key postulates formulated by individual authors and reflect the approaches and general interest of Belarusian researchers to this problem.

From the views of Vsevolod Shimov

Vsevolod Shimov devoted his scientific intelligence to «Russia and Russians as a factor of Belarusian identity»⁸. He argued that in Belarusian society, regarding the influence of the Russian side on Belarus, both in historical retrospect and at the present stage, thoughts varied between «radical followers of nationalism», who focused on the presence of an irreconcilable

⁷ O BISI, URL: <https://bisi.gov.by/o-bisi> [30.03.2022]

⁸ V. Shimov, *Rossija i russkie kak faktor belorusskoj identichnosti. Sociologija*, nr. 4, s.76-84.

national-cultural antagonism between Belarus and Russia throughout history their relations, and supporters of «Western Russianism», who considered Belarusians «an integral part of the triune Russian people on a level with the Great and Little Russians (Ukrainians)»⁹. And although at the beginning of the article the researcher tries to stay away from two extremes, especially since V. Shimov himself was convinced that in both cases we are talking about «ideal types» that do not exist in a real context, however, revealing more and more the origins and transformations of both directions, the author «succumbed to temptation», and became rather on the side of «Western Russianism» than remained a neutral observer of these processes.

Consequently, Belarus for a scientist is to a large extent a common cultural, linguistic and informational space with Russia, both in the historical dimension and today. Accordingly, assuming that the separation of Belarusians (and other Eastern Slavs) into independent ethnopolitical groups took place already in the 14th–15th centuries, the researcher claims that a complete ethnopolitical separation could not be achieved even in the 19th century, when in the future the idea of the Eastern Slavs as a single «Russian people» remained stable, based on the cultural, linguistic, religious and state heritage of Kyivan Rus (for the researcher, according to the Soviet-Russian tradition, it is «Ancient»), the «center of gravity» of which at first became Tsardom of Muscovy, and then – the Russian Empire¹⁰.

Moreover, according to V. Shimov, in the event that Rus would develop steadily according to the same scenario as the Holy Roman Empire, then gradually the «Russian» ethno-political community, as in the case of Germany and Italy, would be transformed into a single nation. Thus, the Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians would never have formed as separate peoples, although under the existing circumstances, according to the researcher, it was impossible to talk about the final national demarcation between them even in the 2000s. Moreover, as the scientist convinced, between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus there is still a cultural and informational space based on the literary «all-Russian» language that developed in the 18th–19th centuries from the «Great Russian dialect basis of the noble intellectual elite of Moscow and St. Petersburg». In this configuration, the Belarusian and «Little Russian» (Ukrainian) languages were only dialects with certain regional folklore and ethnographic specifics, which only organically complemented the «high all-Russian culture»¹¹.

At the same time, the political scientist admitted that in the 19th century, oppositional views appeared among Belarusians and Ukrainians to this approach - the Ukrainian national movement «grew» from the «Little Russian» regional patriotism, and a significant part of the «personnel reserve» of the movement in Belarus was small the Catholic gentry and the Uniates (Greek Catholics), who, being under Polish cultural influence, retained close ties with the peasantry and gradually became supporters of the idea of national economic liberation of

⁹ V. Shimov, *Rossija i russkie kak faktor belorusskoj identichnosti. Sociologija*, nr. 4, s.76.

¹⁰ V. Shimov, *Rossija i russkie kak faktor belorusskoj identichnosti. Sociologija*, nr. 4, s.76-79.

¹¹ V. Shimov, *Rossija i russkie kak faktor belorusskoj identichnosti. Sociologija*, nr. 4, s.79-80.

the Belarusians. And although the last, national direction at the decline of the Russian Empire was embodied in the creation of the Belarusian and Ukrainian People's Republics, and throughout the 1920s. it was adopted by the Bolsheviks, introducing a policy of «indigenization» («korenizatsiya»), from the 1930s. the policy of stimulating national identities was replaced by measures aimed at the formation of a supranational community – the Soviet people, and in the context of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, the doctrine of «three fraternal peoples» was also added, which showed the introduction of the tools of «Western Russianism» into the Soviet discourse, and such a situation cases was relevant until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

At the same time, speaking about Belarus in 1991–1994, V. Shilov noted that at that time the country was dominated by the political and ideological «national» forces, which aimed to spread their political, ideological and national cultural views to the entire Belarusian society. But after 1994 and up to the present time – with the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko – the «pro-Russian» trend again took over, associated with an orientation towards a political and economic union with Russia and the reproduction of the cultural and linguistic balance characteristic of the BSSR, which was characterized by the dominance of the Russian language in most spheres of society, since the Belarusian-speaking tradition allegedly «could not develop forms of high culture capable of competing with Russian culture». At the same time, in the late 2000s the scientist stated that in the «nationally oriented» environment, «revanchist» moods were brewing, due to dissatisfaction with the political, cultural and linguistic situation in Belarus, and this at some point could lead to a new round of political and ideological confrontation in the state¹².

V. Shimov considered the language issue as a factor of potential political instability in Belarus and 10 years later - in 2020 – an article appeared specifically dedicated to this problem¹³. It is symptomatic that the researcher V. Shimov was alarmed by the fact that the Russian language, which, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, had an equal status with Belarusian, did not receive even in the country headed by A. Lukashenko, at the state level, that symbolic priority of the title and national language, like Belarusian. In particular, in his opinion, this was manifested in the absolute predominance of the Belarusian language on street signs and road signs, the Latin transliteration of names and surnames in passports by default from Belarusian and the absence of the Russian language on the national currency. At the same time, he was not embarrassed that if during the national census in Belarus in 1999 only 41.3% of the Belarusians surveyed said that they speak Belarusian at home (Russian - 58.6%), and in 2009 there were even fewer such - 26% (against 69.7% of Russian speakers)¹⁴.

However, this state of affairs seems unsurprising, given that for V. Shimov, the Belarusian (like Ukrainian) language is only a derivative of local dialects isolated from the «all-Russian»

¹² V. Shimov, Rossiya i russkie kak faktor belorusskoj identichnosti. *Sociologija*, nr. 4, s.76-83.

¹³ V. Shimov, Jazykovoj vopros kak faktor potencial'noj politicheskoy nestabil'nosti v Belarusi. *Zhurnal Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Sociologija* 2020, nr.1, s. 67-70.

¹⁴ V. Shimov, Jazykovoj vopros kak faktor potencial'noj politicheskoy nestabil'nosti v Belarusi. *Zhurnal Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Sociologija* 2020, nr.1, s. 68-70.

context, which, along with the Russian literary language, came out of the common cultural tradition of Rus. Under such circumstances, the opposition of the Russian language with Belarusian and Ukrainian, which, according to the researcher, was done by the «nationalists» in Ukraine and Belarus, contradicted any logic of historical processes, and was ineffective: if even in Ukraine the Russian language and identity were almost completely replaced by Ukrainian, mainly in the western and central regions, then in Belarus the Belarusian language «did not go beyond the narrow layer of the humanitarian intelligentsia, and the population, migrating to the cities, spontaneously rebuilt from rural dialects into Russian literary language»¹⁵. However, the contemporary national policy of the Republic of Belarus, which did not take into account such specifics, and continued to use the Soviet ethno-linguistic scheme, could, according to the scientist's forecasts, threaten with a serious aggravation and politicization of the national-language issue up to the complete destabilization of the socio-political situation in the country¹⁶.

Lev Krishtapovich: between science and politics

In 2014, against the backdrop of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, an article by Lev Krishtapovich appeared in the scientific journal «Problems of National Strategy» of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, with title «Our Russian Faith»¹⁷.

It is noteworthy that the author begins his exploration with the assertion that the Baptism of Rus, the 1025th anniversary of which in 2013 was just celebrated by «the peoples of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine», was not only an important religious and church event, but also became the «final a stage in the formation of a «common Russian» ethnic identity, which was expressed in a single «all-Russian» literacy, a single art and architecture, a single way of life, a «all-Russian» people and a «all-Russian» state, the borders of which stretched from the Black and Azov Seas in the south to the White Sea in the north, from Red Rus in the west to the banks of the Volga in the east. As a result, as L. Krishtapovich assured, a single «all-Russian» civilization of the «Rusichi» was formed with its own spatial, temporal and mental parameters. And in a religious context, the scientist emphasizes that since that time in Rus, not just the Orthodox, but the Russian Orthodox Church began to exist, where the concept of Rus was decisive. Therefore, in the historical and scientific dimension, there is neither a Belarusian nor a Ukrainian Orthodox Church, but only a common Russian Church, where «all-Russianness is a mental characteristic», a civilizational code of the Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian, which determined all further processes - national, religious, political, cultural - on the territory of the entire «Russian land» until today¹⁸.

¹⁵ V. Shimov, Jazykovej vopros kak faktor potencial'noj politicheskoy nestabil'nosti v Belarusi. *Zhurnal Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Sociologija* 2020, nr.1, s. 70.

¹⁶ V. Shimov, Jazykovej vopros kak faktor potencial'noj politicheskoy nestabil'nosti v Belarusi. *Zhurnal Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Sociologija* 2020, nr.1, s. 69-70.

¹⁷ L. Krishtapovich, Nasha russkaja vera. *Problemy nacional'noj strategii* 2014, nr. 5, s. 104-120.

¹⁸ L. Krishtapovich, Nasha russkaja vera. *Problemy nacional'noj strategii* 2014, nr. 5, s. 104-120.

From this point of view, L. Krishtapovich also considered the historical path of Belarus as a component of the «all-Russian» civilization and its people – Belarusians, for whom Russians and Ukrainians are fraternal peoples with the same «all-Russian» identity. Consequently, the scientist rejects as such that they have nothing to do with reality, the approaches of some Belarusian colleagues on the withdrawal of the Belarusian identity from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL). The latter, according to L. Krishtapovich, was actually an antithesis to the «all-Russian» character of the Belarusian nationality, which began its formation just in the 14th–15th centuries. Moreover, the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, according to the philosopher, was alien to Belarus, and which, as the scientist stated, began to be «created in Polish-gentry» circles after the lands of White Ruthenia were first part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and later – the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, allegedly, the process of denationalization began through the Polonization of the Belarusian «all-Russian» elite. Under such conditions, only Belarusian peasants and philistines remained «Russians» in their mentality. However, according to L. Krishtapovich, this did not prevent the formation of the Belarusian national revival during the 18th–19th centuries – and not least in this context, the scientist credits the assistance of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Geographical Society, which from the middle of the 19th century began a detailed study and publication of ancient written monuments and «all-Russian» literature in Belarus, and then they returned to life in the Belarusian expanses the traditions and values of historical Russia, to which the Belarusians, according to the philosopher, are devoted to this day. Any attempts by colleagues to «impose» a view of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as determining factors for the formation of Belarus and Belarusians, and then to justify the exclusively European character of the latter, L. Krishtapovich calls «pushing through the Polish culture, whose apologists do this in order to emphasize the incorrectness of the path of development chosen by Belarusians, to try to impose values alien to the Belarusian people, which means radically reconsider the policy of the Belarusian state». The ultimate goal of such efforts, according to the researcher, was to be «the rejection of Belarusian self-consciousness from ancient Ruthenian roots, and with it from an alliance with fraternal Russia, and more broadly from participation in any integration processes in the post-Soviet space, which could lead to a change geopolitical orientation of Belarus»¹⁹. The scientist emphasized that such a scenario would be disastrous, since, in his opinion, Belarus itself as a state was formed exclusively in the conditions of the «East Slavic civilizational time and space» and would not fully exist without an alliance with the Russian people, then in the context of the Russian Empire, or the USSR or contemporary Russian Federation.

He also perceives the issue of the status of the Russian language in Belarus – claims that for Belarusians Russian is the same native language as Belarusian. From this, the scientist concludes that in fact there has never been any (sic!) Russification of Belarusians either in the past or at the present stage. The attempts of the «Belarusianizers» (as L. Krishtapovich calls the supporters of the preservation of the Belarusian language in society) to dispute this fact, the doctor of sciences considers nothing

¹⁹ L. Krishtapovich, *Nasha russkaja vera. Problemy nacional'noj strategii* 2014, nr. 5, s. 104–111.

more than their desire «under the pretext of reviving the native language, to oppose the Belarusian language to Russian, to include the latter in the list of foreign ones like English or German, and thus oppose Belarusians and Russians to each other as completely different peoples that have nothing in common with each other». Hence the conclusion of the scientist that the Russian language is the main guarantor of the preservation and strengthening of the Belarusian identity, and its opposition to the Belarusian language will only lead to the loss of the ethnic identity of the Belarusians²⁰.

Finally, the «all-Russian» factor, according to the scientist, should also play a key role in contemporary integration processes in the post-Soviet space, the most complete embodiment of which took place in the form of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and the creation of the Eurasian Union as an antithesis to the European integration of Belarusian neighbors in the region. An alternative, according to L. Krishtapovich's forecasts, for the post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine, could only be their non-realization as states, or transfer to the status of «puppets» of the West²¹.

In his other publication «All-Russian history is our everything», L. Krishtapovich noted that the mentioned «Eurasian» integration was guaranteed success only when it was based on the principle of «all-Russian», that is, the Russian language, Russian history and Russian culture as a condition realization of political sovereignty and unity of the people. At the same time, such integration should concern not only the economy or politics, but also the «civilizational unity», destroyed with the collapse of the USSR²². And at the same time, as the scientist notes in another scientific article devoted to the historiosophical foundations of the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, if the unification with the EU in line with globalization was supposedly focused on consolidating the privileged position of Western states in the system of international relations and creating a unipolar world in led by the USA, then the pro-Russian integration projects were based on the strategy of multipolar integration and the establishment of fair relations between all its participants, and in the case of the East Slavic peoples, also on the same social and moral system of values and worldview and political beliefs, a common history, starting from the time of Kyivan Rus²³.

In the end, in 2017, another scientific work by L. Krishtapovich appeared, in which the author directly set the goal of «revealing the historical significance of the «Russian world» in the preservation and development of the Belarusian and Ukrainian identity»²⁴. According to him, despite the fact that after the collapse of Kyivan Rus, its territories ended up in different state formations, from the national-religious point of view, the population of these lands remained part of the «all-Russian civilization». However, it is characteristic that the researcher interpreted the formation of the Belarusian (and Ukrainian) people as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania not as an evolutionary

²⁰ L. Krishtapovich, *Nasha russkaja vera. Problemy nacional'noj strategii* 2014, nr. 5, s. 111-114.

²¹ L. Krishtapovich, *Nasha russkaja vera. Problemy nacional'noj strategii* 2014, nr. 5, s. 114-120.

²² L. Krishtapovich, *Obshherusskaja istorija – nashe vse. Belaruskaja dumka* 2014, nr. 2, s. 66-67.

²³ L. Krishtapovich, *Istoriosofskoe edinstvo belorusov i russkikh kak osnova stroitel'stva Sojuznogo gosudarstva. «NOMOTHETIKA: Filosofija. Sociologija. Pravo»* 2011, nr. 8(16). URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriosofskoe-edinstvo-belorusov-i-russkikh-kak-osnova-stroitel'stva-soyuznogo-gosudarstva> [8.04.2022]

²⁴ L. Krishtapovich, *Russkij mir kak osnova belorusskogo i ukrainskogo samosoznaniya. «Kul'tura v evrazijskom prostranstve: tradicii i novacii»* 2017, nr. 1, s. 66-74.

process, but, on the contrary, as a regression – they appeared as a result of «stagnation of the ancient Rus' people on the territory of present-day Belarus and Ukraine and harmful influences from the Polish-Latin and Jesuit factors». Therefore, both Belarusian and Ukrainian languages for L. Krishtapovich are nothing more than «Old Rus' language spoiled by Polonisms and Latinisms». At the same time, favorable conditions arose in the Moscow state for the transformation of the Old Rus' (passed into the status of Great Russian) language into the «great and mighty». From this logic, it followed that there could be no «Russification» of Ukrainians and Belarusians, and it was only about their liberation from the «Polish yoke» and «return» to the linguistic and generally cultural «all-Russian» bosom with the development of the Russian language²⁵.

It is noteworthy that L. Krishtapovich also projects the events of the past on contemporary geopolitics – support for the «Russian world» in the Republic of Belarus, that is, maintaining the country's course towards a geopolitical and generally «civilizational» union with Russia, for a scientist is the fuse that even today protects against «Polish-gentry campaign», the goal of which is to turn Belarus (and Ukraine) into the eastern «kresy» of Poland. Allegedly, according to the researcher, this is the ultimate goal of the EU Eastern Partnership program, which consists in «orienting Belarus and other post-Soviet members of this project to the so-called European values, and, accordingly, to the rejection of their identity, their national history and replacing it with the «Euro-NATO» one». For example, he was convinced that a policy was being pursued with regard to Belarus and Ukraine that was supposed to encourage Belarusians and Ukrainians to discard their «all-Russian history» and replace it with «the history of the Polish-gentry and Bandera-fascist», and most importantly, to take an anti-Russian geopolitical position. The researcher claims that «under the guise of hypocritical verbiage about democracy, European security, existential European values, the Western military and plutocracy is trying to carry out invasions of Russia in their geopolitical interests, which have nothing common with the interests of the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples». Hence the conclusion of the author - Belarus needs to stand next to the Russian Federation against such projects of a hostile environment, and Ukraine needs to reject the attempts of «the United States and the European Union to create a pro-fascist state here – a NATO foothold against Russia» and return to the «native all-Russian family»²⁶.

Therefore, only in the «Russian world» – the cultural-historical and spiritual-mental community of ethnic groups, nations, people who recognize their belonging to the «Russian» civilization and consider Russian as their native language – L. Krishtapovich sees a guarantee for the further existence of the Belarusian statehood and nation²⁷.

²⁵ L. Krishtapovich, *Russkij mir kak osnova belorusskogo i ukrainskogo samosoznaniya*. «Kul'tura v evrazijskom prostranstve: tradicii i novacii» 2017, nr. 1, s. 66-68.

²⁶ L. Krishtapovich, *Russkij mir kak osnova belorusskogo i ukrainskogo samosoznaniya*. «Kul'tura v evrazijskom prostranstve: tradicii i novacii» 2017, nr. 1, s. 69-71.

²⁷ L. Krishtapovich, *Russkij mir kak osnova belorusskogo i ukrainskogo samosoznaniya*. «Kul'tura v evrazijskom prostranstve: tradicii i novacii» 2017, nr. 1, s. 71-72.

«Russian world» and Belarus: interpretation of Fyodor Prihodko and Vasily Ivchik

In 2018, an article by two Belarusian researchers-philosophers F. Prihodko and V. Ivchik was published on the pages of the scientific publication of the Ural Federal University, which also substantiates the close historical, socio-cultural, and mental connection of Belarus with the «Russian world»²⁸.

According to researchers, the «all-Russian idea», having formed in the «Old Rus' period», did not disappear with the political decline of Rus, but continued to fulfill a unifying mission for the Eastern Slavs at the spiritual, ideological and cultural levels. This, in particular, was manifested in the appearance in the 19th – early 20th centuries of the concept of «Western Russianism», the supporters of which substantiated the opinion that historically and culturally Belarus is alien to the heritage of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, but constitutes the western part of Russia, and Belarusians are an organic element of «Russian people»²⁹.

At the present stage, the «Russian world» is considered by researchers as a «special cultural and civilizational community», united by the Russian language, culture, awareness of a common origin, norms and values, which cannot be reduced to one thing at a time - to the territory (it shrinks, then expands), to the state or cultural-genetic code, mentality, language, although these are its most important components. The real physical and spiritual center of this cultural and civilizational community, which does not fit within the boundaries of one country, scientists define contemporary Russia. Given this, Belarus is not seen as a separate entity, but only in close relationship with Russian state³⁰. At the same time, the authors do not pay attention to the fact that the «Russian world», as a more applied phenomenon, is a tool for promoting Russian interests, which often call into question the sovereignty and national interests of Belarus outside of Russian influence. On the contrary, any criticism of the concept in the article is perceived solely as a manifestation of «Russophobia», «American intrigues», the negative impacts of «Maidan Ukraine», etc. - those forces that were afraid of Russia turning into a self-sufficient, independent from the West, center of world development and influence, but wishing to once again weaken and break the «Russian world» (in particular, as it was at the time of the collapse of the USSR), first of all, by «quarreling» between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – the «heart» of the heritage of Holy Rus. According to the same perspective, F. Prihodko and V. Ivchik also assessed the events in Ukraine after 2014 in the Crimea and Donbas, which, in their opinion, were not the result of Russian aggression against the Ukrainian state, but the intervention of Western countries in the «internal Russian» context, allegedly in order to prevent the strengthening of Russian influence in the region³¹.

²⁸ F. Prihod'ko, V. Ivchik, *Russkij mir i Belarus': obshhee i osobennoe*. URL: <https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/58947> [15.04.2022]

²⁹ F. Prihod'ko, V. Ivchik, *Russkij mir i Belarus': obshhee i osobennoe*. URL: <https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/58947> [15.04.2022]

³⁰ F. Prihod'ko, V. Ivchik, *Russkij mir i Belarus': obshhee i osobennoe*. URL: <https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/58947> [15.04.2022]

³¹ F. Prihod'ko, V. Ivchik, *Russkij mir i Belarus': obshhee i osobennoe*. URL: <https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/58947> [15.04.2022]

Belarusian view of the «Russian world»: the case of Svetlana Aleinikova

A higher level of academicism is noted in the monograph by Svetlana Aleinikova «The Russian World»: a Belarusian view», which, having appeared in 2017, became one of the first attempts to comprehensively study the concept of the «Russian world» in Belarusian political science³². At the same time, the author tried to conduct research without expressed ideological obsession. In the work, the ideologeme of the «Russian world» is considered in three aspects: in scientific discourse, as a model of political development and as a factor in integration processes.

According to the definition of S. Aleinikova, the «Russian world» is a global Russian cultural, civilizational and geopolitical project, the purpose of which is the «gathering of lands and peoples», that is, the reintegration of the post-Soviet countries and the Russian-speaking diaspora of the far abroad on the basis of common traditions and values: the Russian language and culture, historical past, Orthodox faith. According to the scientist, the key features of belonging to the «Russian world» are: from a cultural and civilizational point of view, the concept of «community» - the unity of peoples and ethnic groups based on common civilizational traditions and spiritual values, the Russian language and culture, ideas about the historical past; in a religious context - Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church as basic values and factors in the formation and development of Russian civilization; in the geopolitical approach - linguistic affiliation and identification with a common historical homeland (Russian Empire, USSR, Russia)³³.

According to the researcher, attempts to implement the ideas of the «Russian world» at the present stage are carried out mainly through the tools of «soft power» - non-political institutions (religion, culture, education, etc.). A special role in this context is played by the ROC, which quite consciously distinguishes between the concepts of the «Russian world» and Russia, interpreting the latter as only one of the components of «Holy Rus» next to Belarus and Ukraine.

In general, the implementation of the functional potential of the concept with the help of «soft power» tools, as noted by S. Aleinikova, provides for such objective functions as the basis: the formation of a new identity, primarily in the countries of the former USSR, firstly, to maintain the status of the Russian language and Russian cultural influence, and, secondly, to legitimize political decisions aimed at reintegrating the countries of the post-Soviet space (cultural, humanitarian component); strengthening foreign economic, trade, financial and other intersubject ties aimed at maximizing the development of integration processes (economic component)³⁴.

Speaking about the actual Belarusian context of the perception of the concept of the «Russian world», S. Aleinikova noted that although in the works on the ideology of the Belarusian state there is no direct appeal to the «Russian world» ideologeme, however, the place and role

³² S. Aleinikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *belorusskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, 240 s.

³³ S. Aleinikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *belorusskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, s.164-165.

³⁴ S. Aleinikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *belorusskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, s. 165-166.

of such its main features as attitude to the common historical past, common traditions and values, as well as the priorities of geopolitical development, were characterized as follows (not always identical with similar processes in the same Russia): a compromise position regarding joint ideas about the historical past - in particular, the synthesis of the provisions of the tribal and «Ancient Rus» concepts that connected the genesis of the formation of the Belarusian ethnos with the settlement of tribes, and the Belarusian statehood – with the fact of the baptism of Kyivan Rus; influence on the formation of traditional Belarusian culture, both Orthodox and Catholic branches of Christianity, determined its synthetic and eclectic character; the absence of messianism traditional for the «Russian idea», the cult of civilizational confrontation «West-East», a tolerant attitude towards various axiological systems, religious and cultural traditions, states and political entities; choosing the development of the Union State of Russia and Belarus as the main foreign policy priority, while at the same time trying to establish effective and multilateral cooperation with all countries and regions.

In general, S. Aleinikova attributed to the specific features of the perception of the ideas and foundations of the «Russian world» in Belarus: the high importance of the Soviet period and the period of independence in comparison with other, earlier stages of the historical development of the Belarusian statehood; awareness, on the one hand, of the consolidating role of the common traditions and values of the Slavic peoples, on the other hand, of their own identity and independence of the development path; positive perception of both Western European liberal (constitutional-legal) and traditional values: the integrity of the axiological foundation, the absence of internal inconsistency of the national mentality, as well as tendencies of opposition of cultures and religions; goal-oriented pragmatic approach to building a system of inter-subject interaction based on the priority of the socio-economic interests of the Belarusian state and the principle of equal partnership in foreign policy integration processes³⁵.

However, so far, the seemingly scientific publication has ended with a political message - a call for Belarus to use the situation when Russia was interested in implementing the ideas of the «Russian world» in order to obtain strategic advantages in choosing the conditions for potential participation in possible promising integration projects and strengthening Belarusian positions in the world political arena. However, S. Aleinikova allowed the participation of the Republic of Belarus in the project of the «Russian world» only if the latter retained its independence, sovereignty, the right to its own development and foreign policy multi-vector. At the same time, the researcher's conclusion is interesting that in the collective consciousness of the Belarusian society itself, the idea of the «Russian world» as of 2017 was largely fragmentary, because the concept itself was not sufficiently developed in Belarus, in particular, its main target functions and strategic objectives³⁶.

³⁵ S. Aleinikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *beloruskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, s. 166-169.

³⁶ S. Aleinikova, «*Russkij mir*»: *beloruskij vzgljad*. Minsk, RIVSh 2017, s. 168-170.

Conclusions

The concept of the «Russian world» is an influential basis for the Russian ideological influence on the Belarusian society not only in the media sphere. An important information reinforcement for the promotion of the ideas of the «Russian world» among the Belarusian society became the sphere of scientific humanitarian research. Some Belarusian scientists interpret historical facts and events from the past in line with the interpretation of Belarus' belonging to the «Russian world». Within this framework, the theses of scientists are reduced to beliefs about:

- common origin of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians;
- kinship between the Russian and Belarusian languages, which are equally native to the average Belarusian;
- a unified «all-Russian» history of the Eastern Slavs, the beginnings of which go back to the time of Kyivan Rus, and its historical-legal-state tradition supposedly «flowed» first to the Muscovite state, and then to the Russian Empire, the USSR, and, finally, the Russian Federation;
- challenging the role of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as determining factors in the civilizational, ethnogenetic and cultural development of Belarusians.

This kind of scientific intelligence of the Belarusian past and present carries very specific political and propaganda messages: to convince the Belarusian public that the pro-Western path of development of Belarus is a scenario «artificially imposed» by external forces that contradicts the logic of the historical process, and most importantly, the «natural» and almost historically undefined «pro-Russian vector» in the bosom of the «Russian world».

It is important, however, to note that in the presence of very ideologically biased interpretations of the concept of the «Russian world», the Belarusian scientific discourse also contains large academic works in which the scientific approach to the study of this phenomenon prevails.

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FACTORS, STAGES AND VARIETIES OF MIGRATION AND MIGRATION PROCESSES: THEORETIZATION IN UKRAINIAN SCIENCE

The article structures the theorizations available in Ukrainian Political Science on the factors, stages and varieties of migration and migration processes, in particular at the background of a number of political and socio-economic events of the past decades of the early 21st century. This period was chosen taking into account the fact that at this time different and divergent migration processes were gradually expressed both within Ukraine and from Ukraine to other countries in Europe and the world. It was shown that the migration process necessarily includes four stages – initial or preparatory, basic, residence stage and return stage. The author revealed that these stages are inherent in different types of migration, although due to quite different factors, including economic, social, political/political-legal, environmental, cultural/ethno cultural, demographic and so on. In general, it was found that the topics of factors, stages and varieties of migration processes are well developed and structured in Ukrainian science.

Keywords: migration, migration processes, migration factors, stages of migration, varieties of migration, Ukrainian science.

Czynniki, etapy i odmiany migracji i procesów migracji: teoretyzacja w nauce ukraińskiej

W artykule uporządkowano dostępne w politologii ukraińskiej teorie dotyczące czynników, etapów i rodzajów migracji i procesów migracyjnych, w szczególności na tle szeregu wydarzeń politycznych i społeczno-gospodarczych ostatnich dziesięcioleci początku XXI wieku. Okres ten został wybrany ze względu na fakt, że w tym czasie uwidoczniły się różnie uwarunkowane i różnie ukierunkowane procesy migracyjne zarówno na Ukrainie, jak i z Ukrainy do innych krajów Europy i świata. Wykazano, że proces migracji z konieczności obejmuje cztery etapy – etap początkowy lub przygotowawczy, etap główny, etap pobytu i etap powrotu. Stwierdzono, że etapy te są charakterystyczne dla różnych typów migracji, chociaż determinują je dość różne czynniki, w tym ekonomiczne, społeczne, polityczno-prawne, środowiskowe, kulturowe/etnokulturowe, demograficzne i tp. Ogólnie ustalono, że temat czynników, etapów i rodzajów procesów migracyjnych jest w nauce ukraińskiej dobrze rozwinięty i uporządkowany.

Słowa kluczowe: migracje, procesy migracyjne, czynniki migracji, etapy migracji, rodzaje migracji, nauka ukraińska.

ФАКТОРИ, СТАДІЇ ТА РІЗНОВИДИ МІГРАЦІЇ І МІГРАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ: ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЯ В УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ НАУЦІ

У статті структуровано наявні в українській політичній науці теоретизації з приводу факторів, стадій і різновидів міграції та міграційних процесів, зокрема на тлі цілої низки політичних і соціально-економічних подій минулих десятиліть початку ХХІ століття. Цей період вибрано з огляду на те, що в цей час поетапно увиразнились різнозумовлені і різноспрямовані міграційні процеси як у рамках України, так і з України в інші країни Європи і світу. Продемонстровано, що процес міграції неодмінно включає у себе чотири стадії – вихідну або підготовчу, основну, стадію проживання та стадію повернення. Виявлено, що ці стадії притаманні для різних типів міграції, хоч і зумовлюються доволі різними факторами, зокрема економічними, соціальними, політичними / політико-правовими, екологічними, культурними/етнокультурними, демографічними тощо. Загалом встановлено, що тематика факторів, стадій та різновидів міграційних процесів добре розвинена й структурована в українській науці.

Ключові слова: міграція, міграційні процеси, фактори міграції, стадії міграції, різновиди міграції, українська наука.

The presented scientific article is aimed at revealing the set topics in theoretical and historiographical contexts.

A number of Ukrainian scientists have dealt with these and previous issues. In particular, the issue of factors and indicators of migration, including within Ukraine and from Ukraine and in general, has been and still remains the field of interest of such Ukrainian scientists as D. Balanyuk¹, A. Nadtochiy², M. Palinchak and J. Drozdovsky³, O. Rovenchak⁴, O. Savitska and V. Tsonyo⁵ and many others. In turn, theorizing the stages of migration and migration processes are engaged in such Ukrainian researchers as O. Pasichnyk⁶ and P. Shushpanov⁷. Finally, the options and types of migration processes are considered by the following Ukrainian scholars:

¹ Balaniuk D., Problemy doslidzhennia mihratsii yak obiekta derzhavnogo rehulivannia, "Visnyk SevDTU" 2008, vol 91, s. 214–218.

² Nadtochiy A., Prychyny zovnishnoi trudovoi mihratsii ta otsinka yii naslidkiv dlia ekonomiky Ukrainy, "Teoriia ta praktyka derzhavnogo upravlinnia" 2015, vol 1, s. 106–113.

³ Palinchak M., Drozdovskyi Y., Svitovi mihratsiini protsesy (zahalna kharakterystyka), "Naukovyi visnyk Khersonskoho derzhavnoho universytetu" 2015, vol 1, nr. 12, s. 38–44.

⁴ Rovenchak O., Vyznachennia ta klasyfikatsii migratsii: nablyzhennia do operatsiinykh poniat. "Politychnyi menedzhment" 2006, vol 2, nr. 17, s. 127–139.

⁵ Savitska O., Tsono V., Osoblyvosti mihratsiinykh protsesiv naselennia v umovakh hlobalizatsii, "Naukovyi visnyk NLTU Ukrainy" 2013, vol 23, nr. 17, s. 296.

⁶ Pasichnyk O., Stadii mihratsiynoho protsesu za ukrainskykh sotsialno-ekonomichnykh realii, "Visnyk Khmelnytskoho natsionalnoho universytetu" 2014, vol 1, s. 109–114.

⁷ Shushpanov P., Zovnishnia trudova mihratsiia naselelnia rehionu: sotsialno-demografichniy aspekt (na materialakh Ternopilskoi oblasti), Kyiv 2009.

I. Lapshyna⁸, N. Mykhailenko and K. Petryanina⁹, O. Rovenchak¹⁰, I. Roy¹¹, S. W. Sichko¹², P. Shupshyanov¹³ and others.

Based on the appeal to their works, we can state that Ukrainian science has developed a fairly thorough and comprehensive approach to understanding population migration and migration processes in general. In particular, many scholars support the view that the definition of migration should be divided into three main groups. The first group includes common in the late twentieth century definitions that mix different types of population movements, including migration and social ones. They refer to migration as sectoral, territorial, professional and social movements, and therefore this approach to understanding migration is often called broad. Accordingly, migration is perceived as a territorial movement of the population associated with a change of residence¹⁴. In other words, it means that the result of this approach is the idea that migration is defined as any form of social movement or as any movement, regardless of the change of place in the geographical area. In contrast, the second group of definitions, which is considered the most common, includes those definitions of migration, which are the main component of this process of territorial movement of the population. However, in the context of territorial movements of the population, migration can also be considered in a broad sense of the word, in particular, as a set of various movements of people in space, or, instead, in a narrower or special sense of the word – as a set of relocations of people associated with their change of residence for a relatively long period of time. Within this approach, a broad understanding of migration involves all the diversity of spatial movement of the population, regardless of its nature, goals, causes and consequences. That is, migration in this sense includes both business trips, vacations and other regular or occasional short-term movements, as well as relocations that result in a change of region or country of permanent or temporary residence. However, most researchers exclude from migration the spatial movements that occur within the same locality. Although in contrast, there are examples definitions, in which the migration includes any movement that occurs within settlements. The reverse side of the definitions in the second group is a narrow approach to the interpretation of migration as a process of spatial movement of the population, which ultimately leads to its territorial redistribution. In this case, the attribution of spatial displacement to migration is determined by the actual relocation from one area to another, and the formal sign of such relocation is, in particular,

⁸ Lapshyna I., *Mizhnarodna mibratsiia robochoi syly: ukraïnskyi aspekt (za materialamy zakhidnykh oblastei Ukraïny)*, Lviv 2002.

⁹ Mykhailenko N., Petryanina K., *Suchasni aspekty mizhnarodnoi trudovoi mibratsii*, „Sbornyk nauchnykh trudov Sworld” 2012, vol 23, nr. 2, s. 61–68.

¹⁰ Rovenchak O., Vyznachennia ta klasyfikatsii migratsii: nablyzhennia do operatsiinykh poniat. „Politychnyi menedzhment” 2006, vol 2, nr. 17, s. 127–139.

¹¹ Roi I., Mibratsiini protsesy v systemi derzhavnoho rehuliuвання demografichnoi bezpeky Ukraïny, „Visnyk Natsionalnoi akademii derzhavnogo upravlinnia pry Prezidentovi Ukraïny” 2010, vol 3, s. 231–238.

¹² Sichko S., Mizhnarodna trudova mibratsiia yak forma mizhnarodnykh ekonomichnykh vidnosyn, „Hlobalni ta natsionalni problemy ekonomiky” 2016, vol 10, s. 112–116.

¹³ Shushpanov P., *Zoznishnia trudova mibratsiia naselennia rebionu: sotsialno-demografichnyi aspekt (na materialakh Ternopilskoi oblasti)*, Kyiv 2009.

¹⁴ Khomra A., *Mibratsiia naselennia: voprosy teorii, metodiki issledovaniia*, Wyd. Naukova dumka 1979, s. 7.

the registration of the population in a new place of residence. Finally, the third group of scholars includes definitions of migration that do not distinguish between “movement” and “mobility”, although they – etymologically and theoretically and methodologically are not identical or synonymous, because it is not a move at all, but a readiness for it.

Structuring the existing historiography of the research problem, in general, various definitions of migration can be divided into three main approaches. In the first approach, migration should be interpreted as a spatial movement of persons, regardless of its nature and ultimate goals.

These can be both temporary and short-term trips of individuals to a foreign country for seasonal work, business trips, vacations, and long-term stays abroad in connection with work or study. At the same time, a separate category in this context is considered to be the transfer of a person to another state for permanent residence. In the second approach, migration is understood as the movement of a person from one state to another in order to change his place of residence for a certain period or forever. Finally, the third approach calls migration the process of spatial movement of a person, which ultimately always leads to territorial redistribution of the population both in the country of origin and in the country of arrival (relocation or resettlement)¹⁵. In view of this, the position agreed upon in various Ukrainian studies is that the main features of migration as a type of human movement should be considered: the process of crossing both the administrative borders of their own state (during internal migration) and the official borders of states (during external migration); the process of permanent or temporary change of residence of persons; the process of improving the socio-economic status of an individual or group of persons as a fundamental goal of migration. In this context, migration is certainly positioned as a phenomenon that is or theoretically may be quite different, so different scholars identify different factors of migration, including economic, social, political / political-legal, environmental, cultural / ethno cultural, demographic, etc. (see Table 1).

According to Ukrainian researchers, all the movements of people are based on the desire of these people to improve their living conditions, so the main factor in migration is traditionally economic¹⁶. Among the economic factors of migration processes are typically distinguished such as the presence or absence of jobs, employment conditions, income level, prospects or problems of solving housing problems, benefits in meeting social needs, etc. The isolation of this factor as a basic one is quite obvious in view of such a theoretical generalization that the cyclical nature of economic development in the 20-21st centuries coincides with the cyclical fluctuations of population, which depends on the diversified development of production and property, labor markets and the use of capital, the polarization of states in terms of wealth, the globalization of information technology processes, etc.

The nature of the political factors of migration is quite different, and if not always, it is predominantly related to legal factors. In addition, migrations that arise as a result of political

¹⁵ Romaniuk M., *Mihratsii naselennia Ukrainy za umov perekhidnoi ekonomiky: Metodolohiia i praktyka rehuliuвання*, Wyd. Svit 1999.

¹⁶ Balaniuk D., Problemy doslidzhennia mihratsii yak obiekta derzhavnoho rehuliuвання, „*Visnyk SevDTU*” 2008, vol 91, s. 215–216.

processes inevitably require a special approach to legal regulation. At the same time, migration processes, either autonomously or independently, can change the political situation in a country, region or even the world, necessitating the adjustment of the entire legal system of the host state or the entire supranational entity. This is happening in many countries around the world, including Europe and the United States, where immigrant groups are pushing for their rights and demanding changes in current legislation. The case of intensive immigration of Ukrainians to most European countries after the direct and large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the beginning of the interstate war in 2022 is also a direct example of the manifestation of political and legal factors of migration, after all, this case inevitably affects the change in the legal regulation of displacement processes, not only in each European country, but also in the European Union as a whole.

In contrast, environmental factors of migration processes are considered to be separate or distinct, which, intensifying migration, typically or most often become a direct or indirect consequence of the industrial development of certain countries and / or regions. The intensification of migration under the influence of environmental conditions leads to the fact that in many cases the migrants themselves create an excessive burden on the natural environment of the space in which they are. In this context, the example of megacities, which attract many migrants, is quite striking, and therefore migration processes in this context are both internal (within the same country) and external (from other countries). It is also important that natural processes of urbanization, production of various toxic wastes, soil depletion and other forms of ecological imbalance in the world are derivative factors that determine internal and external migration.

As for the cultural or ethno cultural factors of migration, it is appropriate to refer them to a subjective group of factors that are determined by the existence of living standards, which depends on assessments of living conditions in a potential region or potential country of settlement. However, in contrast, these factors of migration are very often politicized and acquire political and legal connotations or character. It is also important that the ethno cultural factor in the migration sphere also determines the results of the migration process, the quality of interaction of migrants with the new society. Once in the new society, migrants of other ethnic backgrounds and cultures interact with the local population, taking into account their ethnic, linguistic or general cultural and host and state characteristics. This is complemented by the fact that migrations, which are intensified under the influence of cultural / ethno cultural factors, in themselves affect the ethno cultural environment of the host society. Therefore, considering all these points complicates the requirements for streamlining and regulating modern public policy in this area.

Finally, the importance of demographic factors in migration processes is due to the fact that the divergence of stages of demographic transition in different countries and parts of the world leads to redistribution of population within countries and between countries. The process of demographic transition is accompanied by the growth of productive forces and the movement of large masses of the population to cities and other states. That is why immigration flows in developed countries reduce the share of titular nations, as immigrants have a higher birth rate.

As a result, processes such as the “Arabization” of France, the “Turkification” of Germany and the Netherlands, the partial “Ukrainization” of Poland, and so on are taking place in the world. After all, the demographic resource is characterized not so much quantitatively, at least currently, as qualitatively, as it is a factor that determines the social stability of society¹⁷.

Table 1. Dichotomy of factors influencing migration processes among the population

“Ejection” factors	Factors of “attraction”
<i>Economic</i>	
Low wages	High wages
Low quality of life	High quality of life
High unemployment level	Availability of vacancies
Economic instability	Stable economic development
Burdensome tax system	Liberal tax system
<i>Social</i>	
Low quality of education	High quality of education
Harmful working conditions	Optimal working conditions
The health care system is invalid	An affordable and high-quality health care system
Impossibility of professional self-realization	Possibility of professional self-realization
<i>Cultural</i>	
Religious persecution	Freedom of religion
Ethnic discrimination	Absence of ethnic discrimination
Racism	Absence of racism
<i>Political</i>	
Lack / underdevelopment of democracy	Development of democracy
Political instability	Stability of the political system
Corruption of power structures	Absence or low level of corruption
<i>Ecological</i>	
Polluted environment	Better environmental situation
Poor quality of drinking water and food	Clean drinking water and environmentally friendly food

Zródło: Savitska O., Tsono V., Osoblyvosti mihratsiinykh protsesiv naselennia v umovakh hlobalizatsii, „Naukovyi visnyk NLTU Ukrainy” 2013, vol 23, nr. 17, s. 296.

In general, it should be noted that all factors of migration processes – economic, social, political / political-legal, environmental, cultural / ethno cultural, demographic, etc. should be dichotomized into factors of “ejection” and factors of “attraction” (see Table 1). That is, each of the factors may have a dual nature and dual significance in the context of real migration processes. It should also be noted that in addition to all the above structured factors of migration, a special place belongs to the issue of clarifying or supporting factors, including security, search for skilled workers, repatriation etc. The essence of the security factor is to provide protection to a foreigner (and members of his family) in another state, in particular from persecution for political, racial,

¹⁷ Balaniuk D., Problemy doslidzhennia mihratsii yak obiekta derzhavnoho rehuliuвання, „Visnyk SevDTU” 2008, vol 91, s. 215–216.

religious, national and other reasons, belonging to a certain social, political, linguistic or ethno linguistic group and generally political beliefs. In addition, this factor is generally important when there is a threat to life and health due to war and military conflict on certain grounds in international and national regulations, because in this case migration is related to refugee status, additional protection, tolerance, etc. The factor of migration in attracting skilled workers is important for filling jobs in the labor market of a particular country and it is carried out in this context through the tools such as legislation, issuance of employment cards for seasonal / permanent work and special government incentive programs, etc. After all, repatriation is also a factor in migration, as it concerns the return of emigrants to their country of origin, including through the introduction of appropriate programs and the issuance of appropriate cards, and so on.

In conclusion, we consider it appropriate to state that migration is a voluntary or forced spatial movement of a person or groups of persons both within the administrative boundaries of their own state (during internal migration) and when crossing state borders of other countries (external or international migration) with the presence or absence of legal / regulatory grounds for relocation for a certain period of time or forever, which may cause a change in the permanent residence of this person or group of persons. In this case, a person migrating is called a migrant¹⁸, although according to international law, a migrant is typically a person of foreign origin who has lived outside his or her own country of birth or citizenship for at least one year.

At the same time, it is known that the change of location / residence of an individual can be analyzed both in relation to the place of the beginning of his movement / movement, and in relation to the place of completion of this movement. This is the basis for the division of all migrations or migration processes into emigration and immigration as a result of the formation of nation-states, the principles of citizenship and the principle of personal freedom were established, the borders of states were determined, and as a result, three main components of migration have been identified – the country of origin, the country of destination and the migrant himself – and the proper concepts of “emigration” and “immigration” have emerged. Emigration in the relevant Ukrainian scientific literature is often called: 1) resettlement (voluntary or forced) of a person or groups of persons to another country for permanent or temporary (long-term) residence, which has economic, political, religious and other reasons; 2) place or time of stay outside the homeland of a person or group of persons after such resettlement; 3) a set of emigrants living in a particular country. Interestingly, Ukrainian scholars sometimes view emigration mostly as a social process. However, emigration is the crossing of an administrative border, voluntary or forced departure of a person or group of persons from the place (country) of their residence on legal or illegal grounds for a certain period or forever, which involves further immigration, that is, the crossing of an administrative border, the voluntary or forced entry of a person or group of persons into the place (or country) of destination (or new place of residence) on legal or illegal grounds, for

¹⁸ Rovenchak O., Vyznachennia ta klasyfikatsii migratsii: nablyzhenia do operatsiinykh poniat. „*Politychnyi menedzhment*” 2006, vol 2, nr. 17, s. 129.

a specified period or forever. Accordingly, an emigrant is a person who emigrates, and an immigrant is a person who immigrates¹⁹. In the process of migration, there is always a point where an emigrant becomes an immigrant and emigration becomes immigration, and this point is the crossing of the administrative border. This is complemented by the fact that this logic in both Ukrainian and European migration theory applies not only to movements related to crossing the state border, but also to inter-district or various internal (within one country) resettlement²⁰.

However, emigration most often includes: people who move to other countries for permanent residence; a certain number of workers who go to work to the countries with relatively higher levels of economic development, which cannot meet the existing demand for labor solely from their own labor resources; a number of illegal immigrants moving to neighboring countries; a certain number of asylum seekers; a number of refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries²¹. An immigrant can become an active internal migrant, moving within one country in connection with work or in search of better working conditions. It is also worth appealing for re-emigration and re-immigration, as re-emigration is the return of emigrants to their country of origin (or country of last residence), and re-immigration is the return of persons or groups of immigrants who arrived there as a result of immigration.

Given all this, Ukrainian scientists note that it is necessary to distinguish three stages of migration processes: 1) initial or preparatory stage – the process of formation of territorial mobility of the population; 2) the main stage or the actual act of resettlement and migration flow; 3) the final stage is the settlement of migrants in their new place²². The basis of the first stage of migration is traditionally the formation of territorial mobility of the population, i.e. its certain socio-psychological state. A potential migrant is a person who has achieved psychological readiness to migrate and has made such a decision. The impact on migratory behavior in the first stage of migration processes can be realized by changing the territorial difference in living standards, which will meet basic human needs. Another area could be influencing the needs and values of potential migrants. The second stage of migration processes reflects the level of implementation of migration mobility. This stage is the main one mostly from the economic and demographic point of view, because it provides a balanced distribution of productive forces in a given area. The totality of resettlement within certain territories at a certain time is a migratory flow, the volume of which is difficult to determine. This can be explained by the imperfection of collecting and providing information about migration statistics, as well as the inability to determine the volume of illegal migration, during which registration evasion occurs. Finally, the third stage of migration processes involves the survival of a migrant or migrants in a new place and in new

¹⁹ Rovenchak O., Vyznachennia ta klasyfikatsii migratsii: nablyzhennia do operatsiinykh poniat. „*Politychnyi menedzhment*” 2006, vol 2, nr. 17, s. 129.

²⁰ Palinchak M., Drozdovskiy Y., *Svitovi mihratsiini protsesy (zahalna kharakterystyka)*, „*Naukovyi visnyk Khersonskoho derzhavnoho universytetu*” 2015, vol 1, nr. 12, s. 39.

²¹ Kuzenko V., Poniattia ta sutnisni kharakterystyky kateorii „mihrant”, *Naukovyi visnyk „Demokratychnie vriadiuvannia”* 2008, vol 1.

²² Shushpanov P., *Zovnishnia trudova mihratsiia naseleння rehionu: sotsialno-demografichniy aspekt (na materialakh Ternopilskoi oblasti)*, Kyiv 2009.

conditions. The migrant moves into a new space, meets demographic, social, political, economic and other changes, and also participates in socio-economic activities, etc. In general, migrants need to establish new connections. Therefore, during survival, the migrant goes through the process of adaptation – adaptation to new living conditions, and in general, the socio-economic and psycho physiological process of adaptation of an individual or social group to new conditions of the social environment in the places of settlement and new life²³.

At the same time, the Ukrainian researcher P. Shushpanov additionally identifies the fourth stage of migration processes, which is called Return. This stage is characterized by the fact that people who plan temporary labor movements abroad, at the same time plan to return home after a certain period of time. The same may apply to migrants who are displaced for other reasons, including military and political ones. However, not all external migrants seek to return from their temporary jobs or, in general, their current places of residence. That is why it is not advisable to fully apply the migration stage of return to such external migrants who are: 1) young persons aged 16-29 years old who are not married and want to start their own family abroad; 2) persons aged 30-49 years old who are divorced or widowed; 3) single persons. This is due to the fact that the migration behavior of these groups of external migrants cannot be predicted, because the return from immigration abroad is mainly facilitated by close family ties, the presence of children and persons in need of guardianship, national beliefs, and so on²⁴. A migrant can make a decision on return or non-return after arriving at his destination. Some, planning to settle in a new place, do not receive the necessary and expected conditions and immediately decide to return. Others, on the other hand, go on a temporary (at least as they see fit) period, on the contrary, get better conditions than they expected. This encourages them to continue staying in a new place, and eventually to possible permanent residence in this or another place, but not in their homeland.

In addition, another Ukrainian scientist O. Pasichnyk proposes to identify another stage of migration processes – the post-migration period. It is one of the possible options for the development of the situation after the second stage of migration (as discussed above)²⁵. In particular, the return of migrants after employment abroad is considered a stage of the post-migration period. During this period, the return of a migrant is associated not only with psychological adaptation in society, in relationships with family, but also with economic problems – the targeted use of financial resources obtained abroad, employment at home, etc. The fact is that the migrant, depending on the conditions he received and the satisfaction of their own needs and goals, there may be several options for continuing life: 1) the migrant will have a desire to change his place of residence again, but it will not concern the return to the previous place, but the continuation

²³ Lapshyna L., *Mizhnarodna mibratsiia robochoi syly: ukrainskyi aspekt (za materialamy zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy)*, Lviv 2002.

²⁴ Shushpanov P., *Zoznishnia trudova mibratsiia naselemnia rehionu: sotsialno-demohrafichnyi aspekt (na materialakh Ternopilskoi oblasti)*, Kyiv 2009.

²⁵ Pasichnyk O., *Stadii mibratsiinoho protsesu za ukrainskykh sotsialno-ekonomichnykh realii*, „Visnyk Khmelnytskoho natsionalnoho universytetu” 2014, vol 1, s. 112.

of migration. This is the case of continued migration (i.e. the second stage is repeated); 2) the migrant will have a desire to stay in a certain place for a certain time.

In this case, the issue of long-term migration is considered (the third stage, which includes both survival and return); 3) the migrant will have a desire to remain in a permanent place of residence in the place where he has already migrated. This case will be the end of migration and its consequence will be the transition to the stage of survival (the third stage is only survival); 4) the migrant will have a desire to return to his / her previous place of residence (when the third stage turns out to be a return immediately)²⁶. In the end, this means that there are several stages of migration, but they are not necessarily consistent. The first stage is characterized mainly by labor and other migrations of young people who send their earnings to their homeland and plan to return to it. In the second stage, the length of stay abroad increases and the basis for this is the cohabitation, kinship or homeland association of migrants. The third stage is related to the reunification of the family territory of the country that receives migrants, which is mainly related to increasing the length of stay abroad and the creation of ethnic / linguistic communities. At the last stage, immigrants receive a secure legal status and protection in the host country, and sometimes their associations may even receive the rights and status of ethnic minorities²⁷.

In this case, according to Ukrainian researchers, it all depends on what kind and what factors of migration are in question in a particular / specific case. All this usually puts on the agenda the issue of options or types of migration, which are also considered by Ukrainian scholars. Territorial and international migrations are distinguished on the basis of territory, which is generally understood as the crossing of the border of a political or administrative unit. In this sense, internal migration in this sense should mean movement from one area (region, province, county, municipality, town, etc.) to another within one country, and international migration means crossing the borders separating one state from another. Thus, internal migrants are a category of people who for various reasons cross the internal administrative borders (cities, districts, regions, etc.) of their country and settle permanently or temporarily in new places of residence. As a rule, this category of persons is legal migrants, although in some autocratic countries they are considered illegal. Their relocation to another region or locality in general, especially to a city from a village, can be considered by the authorities of such states to be *de facto* illegal migration or to be *de jure* illegal migration. The status of internal migrants is determined by the domestic law of a particular country. In contrast, external or international migrants are the people who cross international / interstate borders, regardless of their place of residence.

This category of people includes not only migrants, but also refugees, tourists, migrant workers, students, etc. Their status is typically determined by the law of the host country and

²⁶ Pasichnyk O., *Stadii mibratsiinoho protsesu za ukrainskykh sotsialno-ekonomichnykh realii*, „Visnyk Khmelnytskoho natsionalnoho universytetu” 2014, vol 1, s. 112.

²⁷ Zapadniuk S., *Mibratsii naseleennia Ukrainy: peredumovy, dynamika ta naslidky rozvytku*, Kyiv 2011, s. 34.

the relevant rules of international law²⁸. However, as in the case of internal migration, external migration is also illegal.

Interestingly, a significant place in the development of modern society in the context of growing globalization and expansion of world economic relations is occupied by international migration²⁹. The fact is that due to growing demographic disparities, the consequences of environmental change, due to the new dynamics of global politics and economics, technological revolution and social networks, international migration is gradually intensifying and changing its scale, reach and complexity. This is due to the fact that international migration is now perceived as a potential for empowerment – from economic development and poverty reduction to social and cultural innovation. However, international migration can exacerbate existing problems and cause new problems, in particular from illegal migration to the protection of the migrants' rights, etc. Theoretically and in general, international migration as a form of displacement tends to be combined with five main conceptual components, such as place of birth, citizenship, place of residence, purpose and length of stay in another country. In practice, however, international migration typically occurs during social, economic, and political transformation, accompanied by the spread of market relations to pre-market and non-market societies. Therefore, in the context of globalization of the economy and social life, the transition to the market and intensive production methods in command or underdeveloped economies destroys the existing social and economic ties and leads to large-scale displacement of people from the usual way of life, creating mobile groups who are actively looking for new ways to achieve their economic well-being. On the other hand, international migrants do not always come from poor, isolated places that are cut off from world markets, but from those regions and countries that are undergoing rapid change due to their inclusion in the global trade, information and production network. It follows that the nature of international migration is quite variable, and therefore it has not yet exhausted itself, but is actively continuing and only gaining momentum.

What synthesizes its various stages is the direction of such migration from one (less developed) region / country to another (more developed). And this despite the fact that international migration as such is not a unified phenomenon, as it can be described as economic voluntary migration (with the participation of labor migrants), political voluntary migration, political forced migration (mainly through the flow of "refugees"), economic forced migration (due to refugees from places of environmental and other disasters).

In turn, Ukrainian researchers believe that the duration of migration should often be divided into permanent and temporary. Permanent migration is a situation when migrants stay in their new place of residence forever, i.e. change their permanent place of residence, and temporary migration is a situation when migrants leave for a certain period and intend to return to their

²⁸ Kuzenko V., Poniattia ta sutnisni kharakterystyky katehorii „migrant”, *Naukovyi visnyk „Demokratychni vriaduvannia”* 2008, vol 1.

²⁹ Palahniuk O., Migrantsiia yak sotsialno-ekonomichnyi fenomen ta heopolitychnyi vyklyk rozvytku suchasnoho suspilstva, „*Naukovi pratsi Chornomorskoho derzhavnogo universytetu imeni Petra Mohyly (Politolohiia)*” 2014, vol 230, nr. 218, s. 40.

homeland or previous place of residence. The criterion for the temporary nature of migration is often considered to be that members of the same family association live in different places. Therefore, temporary migration is divided into long-term, short-term, seasonal (migration mainly to the place of work and residence, which usually lasts several months, after which there is a return to permanent residence or homeland) and pendulum (meaning crossing the border per day or week, etc., in most cases for work). To these four types of temporary migration, researchers add another one – transit migration. It is the migration of people who cross the borders of one or more countries, staying in their territory for some time, but intend to later migrate to the country of their final destination³⁰. Some scholars also distinguish the types of migration by duration, such as: episodic are business, recreational and other trips that take place not only irregularly in time, but not necessarily in the same directions; pendulums are daily or weekly trips from places of residence to places of work (and back) located in different settlements or even countries; seasonal – is the movement of mostly able-bodied population to a place of temporary work and residence for a certain period with the possibility of returning to a place of permanent residence; irreversible (resettlement) are migrations that involve a change of permanent residence. On the other hand, all migrations can be divided into short-term (less than two years), medium-term (two to ten years), long-term (more than ten years) and permanent (more than twenty years).

In contrast, according to the legal status, all migrations are divided into legal, illegal and semi-legal. Legal migration is the crossing of international borders legally, i.e. with an entry visa or other appropriate document for a certain period of time³¹.

Illegal migration is carried out by migrants who, leaving their country of residence, enter the territory of another state without official permission, i.e. without a visa to enter it or without other appropriate documents³². Semi-legal migration is carried out, after all, by migrants who entered a country legally, i.e. with a visa or other necessary document, but due to various circumstances refused to leave the country and remained there after the expiration of the period due to the document. It is also migration, which concerns people who came to a country legally, having only a tourist visa, and illegally got a job³³. Illegal and semi-illegal migrants create many additional problems for both individual countries and the world community, and these problems are growing exponentially every year³⁴.

In nature of decision-making (according to the extent to which migration is voluntary), Ukrainian researchers distinguish such types of migration as: voluntary – when the migration decision is made by the migrant himself, forced – it is an eviction or expulsion, i.e. a situation

³⁰ Makoznak E., *Mezhdunarodnaia klassifikatsiya katehoryi mihrantov*, „*Sotsialni vymiry suspilstva. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats*“ 2002, vol 5, s.329.

³¹ *Mihratsiini protsesy v suchasnomu sviti: svitovyi, rehionalnyi ta natsionalnyi vymiry*(*Poniatynnyi aparat, kontseptualni pidkhody, teoriia ta praktyka*): *Entsyklopediia* / red. Y. Rymarenko, Wyd. Dovira 1998, s. 130.

³² Romaniuk A., *Mihratsiini protsesy u Lvivskii oblasti*, „*Ukrainski varianty*“ 1997, vol 2, s. 22.

³³ *Mihratsiini protsesy v suchasnomu sviti: svitovyi, rehionalnyi ta natsionalnyi vymiry*(*Poniatynnyi aparat, kontseptualni pidkhody, teoriia ta praktyka*): *Entsyklopediia* / red. Y. Rymarenko, Wyd. Dovira 1998, s. 130–131.

³⁴ Kuzenko V., *Poniatia ta sutnisni kharakterystyky katehori „mihrant“*, *Naukovyi visnyk „Demokratychni vriaduvannia“* 2008, vol 1.

where the migrant is deprived of the right to choose, and the authorities force him to move. It is also expedient to single out forced migration as a separate type, i.e. a change of place of residence for a certain period of time or forever against the wishes of people, which is motivated by persecution, natural disasters, wars, famines, etc. In such cases, the migrant still has the right to make a minimum choice, such as the time or direction of migration. Forced migrants are often called refugees, but not every forced migrant becomes a refugee after arriving in the country of resettlement. There are three types of forced migrants: asylum seekers – applicants for refugee status, i.e. citizens of other countries or stateless persons who, being forced to move from their place of residence, have applied for refugee status in the country of immigration, but have not yet received it; persons with temporary refugee status – citizens of other states or stateless persons who have been granted temporary protection and rights for a certain period identical to the rights of refugees by the state authorities of the country of immigration; refugees are citizens of other countries or stateless persons who have been forced to migrate for reasons of sufficient importance to the public authorities of the country of entry to provide them with the necessary protection and right to reside and work indefinitely, including refugee status³⁵.

In this context, it is appropriate to analyze the phenomenon of “political migrants”. “Political migrants” are a type of migrants who leave their country for political reasons. Such migration can be coercive, forced or voluntary.

In the first case, such people are declared dissidents, deprived of citizenship (as was the practice in the former USSR) and forcibly deported from their country of residence. In the second case, people are forced to leave their country due to repression and persecution for political activities, discrimination for political beliefs, as well as civil wars and armed conflicts. In the third case, individuals can voluntarily (if possible) leave their own country, in particular due to political instability in it, the coming to power of forces that do not cause political sympathy, and so on³⁶.

According to many Ukrainian scholars, due to objective reasons related to migrants from Ukraine to other countries in Europe and the world, such a type of migration as labor migration deserves special attention. The peculiarity of this type of migration is that it can accompany almost any other type of migration – regardless of its isolation. Interestingly, international labor migration is a process of organized or spontaneous movement of able-bodied people between countries, which is permanent or temporary, caused by economic, social and sometimes political reasons³⁷. It is on this basis that Ukrainian researcher M. Romanyuk defines labor migration as “the movement, resettlement and relocation on a permanent or temporary basis of labor and labor potential in the regional, national and interstate migration space to ensure

³⁵ Makoznak E., Mezhdunarodnaia klassifikatsiya katehoryi mihrantov, „*Sotsialni vymiry suspilstva. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats*“ 2002, vol 5, s.325–331.

³⁶ Kuzenko V., Poniattia ta sutnisni kharakterystyky katehorii „mihrant“, *Naukovyi visnyk „Demokratychnye vriaduvannia*“ 2008, vol1.

³⁷ Palinchak M., Drozdovskyi Y., *Svitovi mibratsiini protsesy (zahalna kharakterystyka)*, „*Naukovyi visnyk Khersonskoho derzhavnogo universytetu*“ 2015, vol 1, nr. 12, s. 39.

the appropriate economic cycle of reproduction and own needs of labor migrants”³⁸. Thus, labor migration is a kind of separate migration flow, which is formed under the influence of various social and demographic factors, as well as the mentality of labor migrants themselves. In addition, according to the scientist, the essence of labor migration is the right of an individual to pursue his professional activity in order to obtain mainly material remuneration for his work, which is directly proportional to the quality of work performed and professional qualifications of the performer. It should be noted that this right is considered not only at the intraregional and interregional levels (i.e. within one country), but also from the point of view of a person’s employment in a foreign enterprise, firm or institution (i.e. already at the interstate level) in view of the generally accepted norms of international cooperation, which provide for the creation of favorable conditions for the free movement of labor³⁹.

Migrant workers are a type of migrants who cross internal and interstate borders in search of work or to buy or sell certain consignments of goods. The main reasons that most often motivate people to such migration can be: unemployment, delays in the payment of wages, its meager size, impoverishment, etc. As a rule, migrant workers are unskilled or low-skilled workers who have a low social status in society. However (due to the certain reasons or circumstances) the professionals, who have a scarce profession, higher education and even academic degrees and academic titles become migrant workers, although in this case such labor migration is not always due to purely economic reasons. Migrant workers are divided into three major groups: a) those that have left the country of residence forever; b) those who work in another country for a long time; c) so-called labor tourists who cross interstate borders for a short time (for several days or months). Most migrant workers go to more developed or, less frequently, safer countries. At the same time, the growing number of migrant workers raises many political, legal, socio-economic, linguistic, cultural and other problems and often leads to increased anti-immigrant sentiment among a large part of the local population of the host countries. That is why the governments of many countries and leading international organizations are in favor of creating a system of orderly, controlled and planned labor immigration.

This is especially important against the background that the current trends in international labor migration are: the spread of labor migration to almost all countries, the main direction of labor migration – from developing countries and countries with economies in transition to developed countries; intensification of migration processes from one developed country to another; strengthening interstate resettlement within developing countries; re-viving pendulum migration between countries with economies in transition; migration of scientific and technical personnel; strengthening the trend of outflow of intelligence from

³⁸ Romaniuk M., *Mihratsii naselennia Ukrainy za umov perekhidnoi ekonomiky: Metodolohiia i praktyka rehuliuvannia*, Wyd. Svit 1999, s. 30.

³⁹ Romaniuk M., *Mihratsii naselennia Ukrainy za umov perekhidnoi ekonomiky: Metodolohiia i praktyka rehuliuvannia*, Wyd. Svit 1999, s. 30.

countries with economies in transition and developing countries to developed countries; increasing the share of “young migration”, expanding the volume of illegal migration⁴⁰.

This puts on the agenda the ideas of Ukrainian scientists construction, according to which in the basic structure of labor migration by the degree of legality can be divided into four levels: 1) official labor migration – the movement of persons who, going abroad, declare their participation in employment as the purpose of departure and are legal labor migrants in the host countries; 2) unofficial legal migration – trips abroad with the declared purpose of tourism, visiting relatives, etc., but with further employment and registration in the recipient country (participants in such trips cannot be tracked by statistics, but become completely legal labor migrants in recipient countries); 3) successful illegal migration – trips abroad related to unregistered employment activities that are permitted by the legislation of the respective countries; 4) migration of victims of criminal groups – trafficking in persons and other cases of stay of residents of the donor country in inhumane conditions or employment in illegal activities abroad against their will⁴¹.

It is also noteworthy, in particular, the fact that the problems of external labor migration in the context of general socio-economic development are differentiated depending on which side they are considered – from the position of the donor country or recipient country. The consequence of external migration is, as a rule, an increase in the total working population in the recipient country and, accordingly, its reduction in the donor country. At the same time, the negative migration balance is mainly characteristic of countries and regions where the aggregate supply of labor exceeds the need for those who for some reason are unable to participate in foreign travel or in other circumstances. On the other hand, labor emigration in general contributes to the reduction of labor supply, if it is considered in terms of irreversible outflow of population abroad, and, accordingly, immigration helps to increase the total number of labor potential⁴². At the same time, according to Ukrainian scholars, in addition to obstacles and the creation of socio-economic problems, labor migration provides undeniable benefits to both host countries and supplying countries. Countries that accept labor receive the following benefits: due to the reduction of production costs, the competitiveness of goods produced by the country increases, which is due to the lower price of foreign labor; foreign workers, creating additional demand for goods and services, stimulate production growth and additional employment in the host country; when importing skilled labor, the host country saves on education and training costs; foreign workers are often seen as a shock absorber in the event of a crisis and unemployment⁴³. As for the shortcomings, the main negative consequences of labor migration are the following:

⁴⁰ Sichko S., *Mizhnarodna trudova mihratsiia yak forma mizhnarodnykh ekonomichnykh vidnosyn*, „*Hlobalni ta natsionalni problemy ekonomiky*” 2016, vol 10, s. 113.

⁴¹ Kychak O., *Trudova mihratsiia ukrainstiv Zakarpattia na pochatku XXI stolittia ta yii kulturno-pobutovi naslidky: monohrafiia*, Wyd. Grahdia 2012, s. 67.

⁴² Roi I., *Mihratsiini protsesy v systemi derzhavnogo rehuliuвання demohrafichnoi bezpeky Ukrainy*, „*Visnyk Natsionalnoi akademii derzhavnogo upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukrainy*” 2010, vol 3, s. 233–234.

⁴³ Mykhailenko N., Petriana K., *Suchasni aspekty mizhnarodnoi trudovoi mihratsii*, „*Sbornyky nauchnykh trudov Sworld*” 2012, vol 23, nr. 2, s. 61–68.

depopulation of the country's population; deteriorating quality of upbringing of children in the families of migrant workers (social orphanage or the problem of another lost generation), family breakdown; outflow of better labor potential; crime and corruption; political aspect; migrant workers are mainly employed in jobs that do little to improve their skills and acquire the skills needed for future productive activities in the homeland⁴⁴.

Imports of labor also have a "reverse side" since additional competition in the labor market leads to rising unemployment. In addition, mass immigration is always accompanied by growing social tensions in society, conflicts on racial, national and regional grounds, rising crime and other negative phenomena. It should also be noted that foreigners tend to face various forms of discrimination in the labor-importing country, from employment, pay and health care and insurance. In general, we can state that the issue of factors, stages and types of migration and migration processes is quite developed and theorized in Ukrainian science, and at different stages of its development – both before the events that began to cause intensive migration in the Ukrainian population in the 21st century both during and after. In general, Ukrainian science has taken the position that migration is a voluntary or forced spatial movement of a person or group of persons both within the administrative boundaries of their own state (during internal migration) and when crossing state borders between countries (external or international migration), the presence or absence of legal grounds for relocation for a certain period of time or forever, what may cause a change of permanent residence. Within the framework of this understanding of migration, it is stated that it necessarily includes four stages: initial or preparatory stage – the process of forming the territorial mobility of the population; the main stage or the actual act of resettlement and migration flows; stage of migration of migrants in a new place; return stage. These stages are inherent in different types of migration, although they are determined by quite different factors, including economic, social, political / political-legal, environmental, cultural / ethno cultural, demographic, etc.

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⁴⁴ Mykhailenko N., Petrianina K., *Suchasni aspekty mizhnarodnoi trudovoi mihratsii*, „Sbornyk nauchnykh trudov Sworld” 2012, vol 23, nr. 2, s. 61–68.; Nadtochii A., *Prychyny zovnishnoi trudovoi mihratsii ta otsinka yii naslidkiv dlia ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Teoriia ta praktyka derzhavnogo upravlinnia” 2015, vol 1, s. 106–113.

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TO THE DEFINITION, STRUCTURING AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE ESSENCE, TYPES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RELEVANCE OF "SMALL" PARTIES: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXTS

The study is dedicated to analyzing, structuring and systematizing different approaches to understanding the essence of the phenomenon and types of "small" parties and based on this to theorizing and characterizing the meaning and manifestations of their relevance or irrelevance. Thus, the article is actualized by a theoretical and methodological attempt to answer the question of whether "small" parties can be interpreted as relevant ones or, conversely, should be defined and understood exclusively as marginal ones, in particular as unable to regulate various forms of inter-party competition. It is argued that Political Science has not yet developed a holistic position on the definition, structuring and systematization of the essence, types, manifestations and framework of the relevance of "small" parties. On one hand, some "small" parties are able to structure party systems and inter-party competition, and some are not. On the other hand, the characteristic of relevance is the basis for the separation or non-separation of "small" parties as such. At the same time, the article as a whole demonstrates that the relevance or irrelevance of "small" parties is not only an attribute of party system and inter-party competition, but also a characteristic of separate parties at different stages of their operation. Therefore, it was proven that "small" parties can be both relevant or irrelevant, although the latter ones, in addition, may be endowed with a unique potential for relevance, even though the manifestations of this potential are also quite different.

Keywords: political party, "small" party, party system, inter-party competition, elections, relevance, irrelevance.

Do definicji, strukturyzacji i systematyzacji istoty, typów i ustalenia właściwości „małych” partii: kontekst teoretyczny i metodologiczny

W badaniach przeanalizowano, uporządkowano i usystematyzowano podejścia do rozumienia istoty zjawiska i rodzajów „małych” partii i już na tej podstawie teoretyzowano i scharakteryzowano znaczenie i przejawy ich właściwości lub nieistotności. W związku z tym artykuł jest aktualizowany teoretyczno-metodologiczną próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy „małe” partie mogą być interpretowane jako istotne, czy też przeciwnie, powinny być oznaczane i rozumiane

включно як маргінальні, в szczególності як неzdолне до ureгулованя рózных форм конкуренції міжпартийної. Твєрди сє, же політологія вчїаž не wypracowała спóјного stanowiska в zakresie definicji, strukturyzacji i systematyzacji istoty, rodzajów, przejawów i ram relewancji „małych” partii. Z jednej strony, niektóre „małe” partie są в stanie ustrukturyzować systemy partyjne i konkurencję міжпартийną, а inne nie. Z drugiej strony oznaka relewancji jest podstawą do wyróžnienia lub niewyróžnienia „małych” partii jako takich. Jednocześnie artykuł jako całość pokazuje, że istotność lub nieistotność „małych” partii jest nie tylko atrybutem systemu partyjnego i конкуренційності міжпартийної, а также cechą poszczególnych partii на róznych etapach ich funkcjonowania. Udowodniono, że „małe” partie mogą być zarówno istotne, jak i nieistotne, chociaż te ostatnie dodatkowo mogą być obdarzone szczególnym potencjałem trafności, chociaż przejawy tego potencjału są również zupełnie inne.

Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, „mała partia”. System partyjny, rywalizacja міжпартийна, wybory, właściwość, nieistotność.

ДО ОЗНАЧЕННЯ, СТРУКТУРИЗАЦІЇ ТА СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЇ СУТНОСТІ, ТИПІВ І ВИЯВІВ РЕЛЕВАНТНОСТІ “МАЛИХ” ПАРТІЙ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ

У дослідженні проаналізовано, структуризовано і систематизовано підходи з приводу розуміння сутності феномена і типів “малих” партій, а вже на цій підставі теоретизовано та схарактеризовано значення та вияви їхньої релевантності або нерелевантності. Відтак стаття актуалізована теоретико-методологічною спробою відповісти на питання про те, чи “малі” партії можуть бути потрактовані як релевантні або ж, на противагу, повинні означуватись і розумітись винятково як маргінальні, зокрема як нездатні впорядковувати різноманітні форми міжпартійної змагальності. Аргументовано, що політична наука й досі не виробила цілісної позиції стосовно означення, структуризації та систематизації сутності, типів, виявів і рамок релевантності “малих” партій. З одного боку, деякі “малі” партії спроможні структуризувати партійні системи і міжпартійну змагальність, а деякі – ні. З іншого ж боку, ознака релевантності є підставою для виділення або невиділення “малих” партій як таких. Водночас у статті в цілому продемонстровано, що релевантність чи нерелевантність “малих” партій – це не тільки атрибут партійної системи і міжпартійної змагальності, а й характеристика окремих партій на різних етапах їхнього функціонування. Тому доведено, що “малі” партії можуть бути і релевантними, і нерелевантними, хоча останні, у доповнення, можуть бути наділені своєрідним потенціалом релевантності, навіть попри те, що вияви цього потенціалу теж є доволі різними.

Ключові слова: політична партія, “мала” партія, партійна система, міжпартійна змагальність, вибори, релевантність, нерелевантність.

Since the 70s of the twentieth century, but with further intensification and enlargement, political scientists began to put on the agenda and articulate their interest in the so-called “small” parties, their essence, types, grounds for separation from other parties and within particular party systems in general, and so on. However, no holistic view has yet been developed on how to understand the so-called “small” parties over the half a century of political science researches. Since there is still no answer to the question of whether “small” parties can be relevant or significant ones (in terms of party systems) and in general of how important they are in various forms of inter-party competition and different designs of party systems at both national and subnational (local, regional, etc.) levels of elections, politics and governance. Accordingly, it still or further raises the question of how the phenomenon and possible varieties of “small” parties can be and should be understood, as well as whether they have the ability to position themselves as relevant ones or, instead, as those being forced to be perceived exclusively as marginal and irrelevant ones. The posed question and the task of answering it are complex, because the issues of relevance or irrelevance of “small” parties are at least ambiguous in the theoretical and methodological contexts. On one hand, these issues concern the substantive and essential content of the phenomenon and possible varieties of “small” parties as such, including at different levels of politics and governance. On the other hand, these questions address the notion and conceptual definition of the attribute of relevance of both parties in general and “small” parties in particular. Therefore, it is necessary to answer the questions and to solve the tasks that determine them consistently.

In this context, it should be noted that “small” parties on the example of different countries, but especially in Europe, somehow force entire cohorts and groups of scientists to rethink and transform the theory of parties and party systems as well as the outlines of real party systems in some of these countries. In particular, scholars often review the subject and matter of the relevance of parties as well as fragmentation/fractionalization, polarization, electoral volatility, nationalization/denationalization and structuring of party systems in general, and so on¹. It is noteworthy that what has happened and is still happening in the progress of Political Science is demonstrated in several stages or “waves”, which reveal the relative heterogeneity and non-consolidation of the topic of “small” parties at different stages of its development. Thus, the first “wave” of researches (from the moment of their initiation to the beginning of the XXI century) on the phenomenon of “small” parties is represented by such scholars as (not in chronological order) P. Abramson, J. Aldrich, P. Paolino and D. Rohde², T. Baskaran and M.

¹ Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, *Irish Political Studies* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.

² Abramson P., Aldrich J., Paolino P., Rohde D., Third-party and independent candidates in American politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot, *Political Science Quarterly* 1995, vol. 110, nr 3, s. 349-367.

L. da Fonseca³, A. Blais⁴, J. Coakley⁵, K. Deschouwer⁶, M. Duverger⁷, S. Fisher⁸, H. Gold⁹, W. Grant¹⁰, J. Hammond¹¹, H. Herzog¹², R. Katz and P. Mair¹³, V. Key¹⁴, K. Lawson and P. Merkel¹⁵, P. Lucardi¹⁶, H. Mayer¹⁷, F. Müller-Rommel and G. Pridham¹⁸, M. Novak and R. Cassling¹⁹, M. Pedersen²⁰, M. Pinard²¹, P. Reynolds²², K. Richmond²³, G. Sartori²⁴, G. Smith²⁵, S. Wolinetz²⁶ and many others. They mostly began to think about the phenomenon and synonymizing regarding the separation, denotation and positioning of the so-called “small” parties and even their diverse or multidirectional types, but almost did not structure them and did not reduce them to systematic or comprehensive comparisons²⁷.

³ Baskaran T., da Fonseca M. L., Electoral thresholds and the success of minor parties, “Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers” 2013, nr 177.

⁴ Blais A., Third parties in Canadian provincial politics, “Canadian Journal of Political Science” 1973, vol. 6, nr 3, s. 422-438.

⁵ Coakley J., Minor parties in Irish political life, 1922-1989, “Economic and Social Review” 1990, vol. 21, nr 3, s. 269-297.

⁶ Deschouwer K., Small parties in a small country: The Belgian case, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 135-151.

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⁸ Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, ss. 232.; Fisher S., *The “Decline of Parties” Thesis*, [w:] Merkel P. (ed.), *Western European Party Systems*, Wyd. The Free Press, New York 1980, s. 609-610.

⁹ Gold H., Third party voting in presidential elections: A study of Perot, Anderson, and Wallace, “Political Research Quarterly” 1995, vol. 48, nr 4, s. 751-773.

¹⁰ Grant W., Local Parties in British Local Politics: A Framework for Empirical Analysis, “Political Studies” 1971, vol. 19, nr 2, s. 201-212.

¹¹ Hammond J., Minor Parties and Electoral Realignment, “American Politics Quarterly” 1976, vol. 4, s. 63-85.

¹² Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, “Comparative Politics” 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

¹³ Katz R., Mair P., Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, “Party Politics” 1995, vol. 1, nr 1, s. 5-28.; Mair P., *The West European Party System*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990, ss. 376.; Mair P., *The electoral universe of small parties in postwar Western Europe*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 41-70.

¹⁴ Key V., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Thomas Crowell, New York 1964, ss. 738.

¹⁵ Lawson K., Merkel P., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organisations*, Wyd. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1988, ss. 606.

¹⁶ Lucardi P., *Fragments from the pillars: small parties in the Netherlands*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 115-134.

¹⁷ Mayer H., *Big party chauvinism and minor party romanticism*, [w:] Mayer H., Nelson H. (eds.), *Australian politics: A fifth reader*, Wyd. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1980, s. 345-360.

¹⁸ Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.

¹⁹ Novak M., Cassling R., The relevance of small parties: From a general framework to the Czech “opposition agreement”, “Czech Sociological Review” 2000, vol. 8, s. 27-47.

²⁰ Pedersen M., Towards a new typology of party lifespans and minor parties, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1982, vol. 5, nr 1, s. 1-16.

²¹ Pinard M., One-party dominance and third parties: The Pinard theory reconsidered, “Canadian Journal of Political Science” 1973, vol. 6, nr 3, s. 399-421.

²² Reynolds P., *The Role of the Minor Parties*, [w:] Penniman H. (ed.), *Australia at the Polls*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute, Washington 1975, s. 159-169.

²³ Richmond K., *Minor parties in Australia*, [w:] Starr G., Richmond K., Maddox G. (eds.), *Political parties in Australia*, Wyd. Heinemann Educational, Richmond 1978.

²⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, London: 1976, ss. 383.

²⁵ Smith G., *In search of small parties: Problems of definition, classification and significance*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 23-40.

²⁶ Wolinetz S., *The Transformation of West European Party Systems*, [w:] Mair P. (ed.), *The West European Party System*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990, s. 218-231.

²⁷ Müller-Rommel F., *Small parties in comparative perspective: The state of the art*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London 1991, s. 1.

Instead, the second “wave” of researches on “small” parties (from the beginning of the XXI century until now) is represented by such scholars as (also not in chronological order) J. Adams, M. Clark, L. Ezrow, G. Glasgow and D. Leiter²⁸, J.-E. Bartels and M. L. Remke²⁹, E. Bélanger³⁰, C. Boix³¹, N. Bolleyer³², H. Bochel and D. Denver³³, J. Coakley³⁴, C. Copus, A. Clark, K. Bottom, H. Reynaert and K. Steyvers³⁵, K. Deschouwer³⁶, L. Diamond and R. Gunther³⁷, J. Font³⁸, J. Gerring³⁹, S. Gherghina, G. Jiglaui and A. Fagan⁴⁰, S. Hug⁴¹, G. Kefford⁴², S. McDaid and K. Rekaewek⁴³, E. O'Malley⁴⁴, L. Sloan⁴⁵, J.-J. Spoon⁴⁶, B. Tamas⁴⁷, M. Tavits⁴⁸,

²⁸ Adams J., Clark M., Ezrow L., Glasgow G., Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 2006, vol. 50, nr 3, s. 513-529.; Adams J., Ezrow L., Leiter D., Partisan Sorting and Niche Parties in Europe, *"West European Politics"* 2012, vol. 35, nr 6, s. 1272-1294.

²⁹ Bartels J.-E., Remke M. L., Parties in the Shadows – Do Small and Marginal Parties Cater to a Niche?, *"German Politics"* 2021, Online First.

³⁰ Bélanger É., Antipartyism and third-party vote choice: A comparison of Canada, Britain, and Australia, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 2004, vol. 37, nr 9, s. 1054-1078.

³¹ Boix C., *The emergence of parties and party systems*, [w:] Boix C., Stokes S. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, s. 499-521.

³² Bolleyer N., *New Parties in old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, ss. 250.; Bolleyer N., Small parties: From party pledges to government policy, *"West European Politics"* 2007, vol. 30, nr 1, s. 121-147.

³³ Bochel H., Denver D., Minor parties and independents in times of change: Scottish local elections 1974 to 2007, *"Local Government Studies"* 2008, vol. 34, nr 5, s. 577-593.

³⁴ Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.

³⁵ Copus C., Clark A., Bottom K., *Multi-party politics in England? Small parties, independents and political associations in English local politics*, [w:] Reiser M., Holtmann E. (eds.), *Farewell to the Party Model? Independent Local Lists in Eastern and Western European Countries*, Wyd. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, s. 253-276.; Clark A., Breaking the mould or fiddling at the edges? Ireland's minor parties in comparative and systemic perspective, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 661-680.; Copus C., Clark A., Reynaert H., Steyvers K., Minor party and independent politics beyond the mainstream: Fluctuating fortunes but a permanent presence, *"Parliamentary Affairs"* 2009, vol. 62, nr 1, s. 4-18.

³⁶ Deschouwer K., *New Parties in Government: In Power for the First Time*, Wyd. Routledge/ECPR, London 2008, ss. 224.

³⁷ Diamond L., Gunther R., *Types and functions of parties*, [w:] Diamond L., Gunther R. (eds.), *Political parties and democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2001, s. 3-39.

³⁸ Font J., Dangerous Coalitions for Small Parties: The Electoral Consequences of Government in Spanish Regions and Municipalities, *"South European Society and Politics"* 2001, vol. 6, nr 2, s. 71-96.

³⁹ Gerring J., Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems, *"Party Politics"* 2005, vol. 11, nr 1, s. 79-107.

⁴⁰ Gherghina S., *Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe: Enhancing Voter Loyalty*, Wyd. Routledge, London 2014, ss. 214.; Gherghina S., Fagan A., Fringe political parties or political parties at the fringes? The dynamics of political competition in post-communist Europe, *"Party Politics"* 2021, vol. 27, nr 1, s. 3-8.; Gherghina S., Jiglaui G., Playing their cards right: Ethnic parties and government coalitions in postcommunist Europe, *"Nationalism and Ethnic Politics"* 2016, vol. 22, nr 2, s. 220-240.

⁴¹ Hug S., *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behaviour and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2001, ss. 215.; Hug S., Studying the Electoral Success of New Political Parties: A Methodological Note, *"Party Politics"* 2000, vol. 6, nr 2, s. 187-197.

⁴² Kefford G., Rethinking small political parties: from micro to peripheral, *"Australian Journal of Political Science"* 2016, vol. 52, nr 1, s. 1-15.

⁴³ McDaid S., Rekaewek K., From mainstream to minor and back: the Irish Labour Party, 1987-1992, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 625-642.

⁴⁴ O'Malley E., Punch bags for heavyweights? Minor parties in Irish government, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 539-561.

⁴⁵ Sloan L., *Measuring Minor Parties in English Local Government: Presence vs. Vote Share*, Wyd. Local Politics Specialist Group 2011, ss. 19.

⁴⁶ Spoon J.-J., *Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2011, ss. 203.

⁴⁷ Tamas B., *The self-destructive tendencies of minor parties: the implosion of the Reform Party*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston (August 29 – September 1, 2002).

⁴⁸ Tavits M., Party systems in the making: the emergence and success of new parties in new democracies, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 2008, vol. 38, nr 1, s. 113-133.

W. Van der Brug, M. Fennema and J. Tillie⁴⁹, L. Weeks⁵⁰ and many others. They develop the achievements of the previous “wave” of scholars and even relatively systematize them, but do not resolve all the identified problems of structuring the phenomenon and varieties of “small” parties by consensus⁵¹, and often even deny the appropriateness and validity of their separation as such.

Despite such a wide range of available scientific researches, the topic of “small” parties is not unified, unilateral and fully organized and systematized, but rather dispersed and heterogeneous in theoretical and practical contexts. This can be well understood from at least a partial list of general and basic tasks/problems of the researches of “small” parties in Political Science, among which, in particular, there are such questions as: the essence and reasons for defining and parameters/effects of positioning parties as “small” ones at different (both national and subnational) levels of politics, governance and electoral process; organizational structure, strategy, tactics, ideology and membership in “small” parties; the ability of “small” parties to perform alternative functions and tasks and to solve problems that are inherent in other parties at national and subnational levels of politics, governance and electoral process; relevance or irrelevance (significance or insignificance) of “small” parties within different types of party systems; the possibility of “small” parties’ transforming into strong, large, major or mainstream parties or, conversely, their possibility to decline, marginalization and collapse. Moreover, all this is at the background of the lack of regional (not to mention universal) comparisons in Political Science, but instead within the focus on the study of separate cases, which is why there is currently no consolidated theory of “small” parties⁵².

The difficulty of defining “small” parties is due to the fact that they are distinguished on the basis of various factors and criteria, including not only electoral and national, but also functional, geographical, territorial, subnational, etc., that is as parties at both national and subnational levels of politics and governance and parties with different goals of formation and functioning. We are convinced that this can serve as a basis for distinguishing several theoretical and methodological approaches to defining and outlining the phenomenon of “small” parties, including power-electoral (based on differences of success of parties in elections, governance and political process in general, in particular concerning the status in power and relevance), territorial (on the basis of taking into account different levels of politics and governance and different roles

⁴⁹ Van der Brug W., Fennema M., What causes people to vote for a radical-right party? A review of recent work, *“International Journal of Public Opinion Research”* 2007, vol. 49, nr 19, s. 474-487.; Van der Brug W., Fennema M., Tillie J., Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support, *“Comparative Political Studies”* 2005, vol. 38, nr 5, s. 537-573.

⁵⁰ Weeks L., Minor parties: a schema for analysis, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 481-501.; Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.

⁵¹ Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.

⁵² Weeks L., Minor parties: a schema for analysis, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 481-501.; Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.; Bolleyer N., The Irish Green Party: From protest to mainstream party?, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 603-623.; O’Malley E., Punch bags for heavyweights? Minor parties in Irish government, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 539-561.; Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.

of parties within them, in particular and mainly at levels below the national one (subnational, regional, local, etc.)), functional (on the basis of taking into account the fact that parties perform or fail to perform their main functions and tasks), historical-organizational (on the basis of taking into account the origin, causes and methods of formation, organizational structure and features of financing of parties), ideological (due to the diversity of ideas, doctrines, policies and activities of parties), strategic (based on an assessment of the styles and formats of party behavior within electoral market, in the course of and in connection with governance and in political system in general) and so on. In addition, the problem is intensified by the fact that these theoretical and methodological approaches can be applied both separately or alternatively as well as being paired or combined, but they certainly and unconditionally blur the nature and scope of "small" parties as such⁵³. Even the fact that different approaches have their most common definitions and understandings of "small" parties does not help in this context.

As a result, different scholars understand "small" parties in very diverse ways, including as: all "extra" parties within certain types of party systems (i.e., "third" parties in two-party systems, "fourth" parties in two-and-a-half-party systems, "fifth" parties in four-party systems, etc.)⁵⁴; all or new parties that are not represented in the legislatures and/or do not structure inter-party competition and party systems⁵⁵; parties without political influence that do not form cabinets and their policies, but also do not form a political/parliamentary opposition⁵⁶; ideologically diverse parties with very low national electoral support, small number of members and weak organizational structure, support and/or funding⁵⁷; parties functioning and active exclusively at subnational (regional, local, etc.), but not at national levels of politics and governance⁵⁸; opportunistic, marginal or pariah/peripheral parties that "play" outside the framework and rules of the

⁵³ Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.

⁵⁴ Bélanger É., Antipartyism and third-party vote choice: A comparison of Canada, Britain, and Australia, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 2004, vol. 37, nr 9, s. 1055.; Bochel H., Denver D., Minor parties and independents in times of change: Scottish local elections 1974 to 2007, *"Local Government Studies"* 2008, vol. 34, nr 5, s. 579.; Charlot J., Faut-il interdire les petits candidats?, *"Projet"* 1974, vol. 87, s. 837-841.; Coakley J., Minor parties in Irish political life, 1922-1989, *"Economic and Social Review"* 1990, vol. 21, nr 3, s. 270.; Gerrig J., Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems, *"Party Politics"* 2005, vol. 11, nr 1, s. 83.

⁵⁵ Emanuele V., Chiaramonte A., Explaining the impact of new parties in the Western European party systems, *"Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties"* 2019, vol. 29, nr 4, s. 490-510.; Kefford G., Rethinking small political parties: from micro to peripheral, *"Australian Journal of Political Science"* 2016, vol. 52, nr 1, s. 1-15.; Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.

⁵⁶ Abramson P., Aldrich J., Paolino P., Rohde D., Third-party and independent candidates in American politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot, *"Political Science Quarterly"* 1995, vol. 110, nr 3, s. 349-367.; Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, ss. 232.; Maghraoui D., On the relevance or irrelevance of political parties in Morocco, *"The Journal of North African Studies"* 2019, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 939-959.; Völkel J., The "chicken and egg" problem of relevance: Political parties and parliaments in North Africa, *"The Journal of North African Studies"* 2020, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 865-880.

⁵⁷ Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *"Irish Political Studies"* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.; Mair P., *The electoral universe of small parties in postwar Western Europe*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 41-70.

⁵⁸ Copus C., Clark A., Bottom K., *Multi-party politics in England? Small parties, independents and political associations in English local politics*, [w:] Reiser M., Holtmann E. (eds.), *Farewell to the Party Model? Independent Local Lists in Eastern and Western European Countries*, Wyd. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, s. 253-276.; Kefford G., Rethinking small political parties: from micro to peripheral, *"Australian Journal of Political Science"* 2016, vol. 52, nr 1, s. 1-15.; Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.

political and party systems and governance⁵⁹; parties that represent an extreme/radical or “niche” ideological position⁶⁰; parties that are positioned exclusively as representatives of different types of minorities⁶¹. Even more, because modern Political Science uses many “adjectives” and synonyms to denote the essence, types and functionality of “small” parties at different levels of politics, governance and electoral process, including in different contexts, frameworks and countries⁶², in particular “small” parties themselves, “minor” parties, “micro-parties”, “third” parties, “independent” parties, “peripheral” parties, “pariah” parties, “protest” parties, “niche” parties, “local” parties, “alternative” parties or organizations, “personal” parties, “electoralist” parties, etc.

However, such diversity in the definition of “small” parties is internally contradictory in terms of their likely effects on inter-party interaction and structuring of party systems, since it leads to mixed and ambiguous conclusions. The reason is that some “small” parties (within one group of approaches) may be able to structure party systems of entire countries (i.e., at different levels of governance and politics), while other “small” parties (within the same or different approaches) may not do this⁶³, since they are not permanently represented in the legislatures⁶⁴ or remain on the margins, initially forming, but soon disappearing under the influence of strong, large, major, mainstream or systemic parties⁶⁵. This, in turn, raises the question of the relevance or irrelevance of “small” parties and, in general, of their ability to transform the theory of parties and party systems and the shape of real party systems at different levels of politics and governance⁶⁶. Especially given that different theoretical and methodological approaches to explaining the essence of “small” parties outline the phenomenon of relevance of such parties very differently and depending on the context of understanding “small” parties. It follows that the relevance or irrelevance of “small” parties should be interpreted and verified both in general and within the theory of party systems, as well as on the basis of various theoretical and methodological approaches to the definition of “small” parties discussed above. This is the logical sequence we would like to further follow in our study.

⁵⁹ Kefford G., Rethinking small political parties: from micro to peripheral, *“Australian Journal of Political Science”* 2016, vol. 52, nr 1, s. 1-15.

⁶⁰ Adams J., Clark M., Ezrow L., Glasgow G., Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 2006, vol. 50, nr 3, s. 513.; Adams J., Ezrow L., Leiter D., Partisan Sorting and Niche Parties in Europe, *“West European Politics”* 2012, vol. 35, nr 6, s. 1272-1294.

⁶¹ Chandra K., What is an ethnic party?, *“Party Politics”* 2011, vol. 17, nr 2, s. 151-169.; Ishiyama J., Breuning M., What’s in a name? Ethnic party identity and democratic development in post-communist politics, *“Party Politics”* 2011, vol. 17, nr 2, s. 223-241.

⁶² Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.; Sloan L., *Measuring Minor Parties in English Local Government: Presence vs. Vote Share*, Wyd. Local Politics Specialist Group 2011, ss. 19.

⁶³ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.; Kefford G., Rethinking small political parties: from micro to peripheral, *“Australian Journal of Political Science”* 2016, vol. 52, nr 1, s. 1-15.; Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.; Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, London: 1976, ss. 383.

⁶⁴ Orr G., Ballot order: Donkey voting in Australia, *“Election Law Journal”* 2002, vol. 1, nr 4, s. 576.

⁶⁵ Mayer H., *Big party chauvinism and minor party romanticism*, [w:] Mayer H., Nelson H. (eds), *Australian politics: A fifth reader*, Wyd. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1980, s. 345.

⁶⁶ Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.

It is generally known that the relevance of parties can be considered both functionally as well as quantitatively and dimensionally (i.e., given the number and size of parties). An example of a functional understanding of the relevance of parties when they have to be taken into account is a scientific position by G. Sartori⁶⁷, according to which the relevance is determined by coalition potential and/or blackmail potential of parties in legislatures (no party can be identified as relevant one if it is not represented in the legislature), in particular on the formation and/or support or non-support of the executives at various levels of governance. The coalition potential depends on whether a party has enough seats in the legislature to become governmental/executive (even within coalition) one, i.e. whether a party (which is therefore relevant one) is directly involved in coalition cabinet formation or at least provides it support. In turn, the blackmail potential outlines a party's ability (only if it is relevant one) to block the formation of cabinet/executive at a particular level of politics and governance (in particular, by changing the essence of political competition from centrifugal to centrifugal one, etc.). It follows that a party (regardless of its size) is considered relevant if it is able to change the direction of party competition and the essence of the party system, endowed with the coalition and/or blackmail potential⁶⁸. In contrast, the quantitative and dimensional (i.e., given the number and size of parties) interpretation of party relevance is based on the success or failure of parties in the election or on the overcoming or failure to overcome by parties the barrier of representation in the legislature at a particular level of politics and governance. Thus, some scholars consider relevant those parties that receive at least 2.5–5 (but most often 3) percent of seats in the legislature⁶⁹, while other scholars – those parties that receive at least 1 percent of the vote, but also any representation in the legislature⁷⁰.

Various scholars often use one or the other approaches to understanding the relevance of parties, including for their classification and even delimitation of the so-called “small” parties (as well as independent/non-party politicians)⁷¹. This is complemented by the fact that researchers sometimes use the concepts of party relevance to distinguish divergent upper limits of the size of representation of “small” parties in the legislatures, including from 1.5 to 15 percent depending

⁶⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, London: 1976, s. 122-123.

⁶⁸ Wolinetz S., *Classifying Party Systems: Where Have All the Typologies Gone?*, The Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg (Manitoba) 2004; Wolinetz S., *Party Systems and Party System Types*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds), *Handbook of Party Politics*, Wyd. Sage, London 2006, s. 51-62.

⁶⁹ De Swaan A., *Coalition theories and cabinet formations: A study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier, New York 1973, ss. 347.; Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press, New York 1980, ss. 7.; Janda K., *Retrieving information for a comparative study of political parties*, [w:] Crotty W. (ed.), *Approaches to the study of party organization*, Wyd. Allyn & Bacon, Boston 1967, s. 159-215.; Rose R., Urwin D., *Persistence and change in Western party systems since 1945*, “*Political Studies*” 1970, vol. 18, nr 3, s. 287-319.; Sioroff A., *Comparative European Party systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, Wyd. Garland Publishing 2000, ss. 484.; Ware A., *Political Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, s. 148-149.

⁷⁰ Doring H., Mapping established democracies: integrated data on parties, elections and cabinets, “*Electoral Studies*” 2016, vol. 44, s. 538; Doring H., Regel S., Party Facts: A database of political parties worldwide, “*Party Politics*” 2019, vol. 25, nr 2, s. 97-109.

⁷¹ Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, “*Irish Political Studies*” 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.; Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, “*Irish Political Studies*” 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.

on national specifics and types of party and electoral systems⁷². This provides an attempt to define, grade or classify “small” parties and separate them from mainstream and systemic parties in the legislatures at different levels of politics and governance, and so on⁷³. However, the basic understanding is traditionally that “small” parties are political parties that are not positioned and perceived as governmental or executive ones at one or another – national or subnational – levels of politics, even though they may aspire to it and may or may not be electorally successful or represented in the legislatures⁷⁴. In other words, this means that “small” parties (at any level of politics and governance) may or may not be relevant electorally and in their representation in the legislatures, but they may not be relevant at the governmental level or at the level of obtaining and exercising the executive.

However, researchers ambiguously interpret the essence and hypotheses of the relevance of “small” parties given that there are different theoretical and methodological approaches to their understanding. For example, “small” (necessarily subnational) parties are traditionally marginalized at the national level of politics and governance within a territorial approach, and therefore they are certainly not relevant ones in the context of national party systems⁷⁵. Instead, such parties are or may be influential, relevant and even dominant ones at any subnational level of politics, thus displacing and sometimes rendering national-level parties to be irrelevant, in particular because of their inability to recognize and respond to subnational circumstances and their incapacity to function on the line of “center-periphery” conflict⁷⁶. Similarly, “small” parties cannot be interpreted as relevant ones when they are understood as parties representing exclusively different types of minorities. However, with the exception of subnational entities, where such parties are basic ones and provided for by the relevant electoral legislation or are or may be popular, etc.

The situation is more difficult if “small” parties are understood as having no real influence on the political agenda, political process and governance (at any level), even if they are relatively electorally successful and represented in the legislatures. The fact is that such “small” parties are only provisionally relevant ones, in particular electorally, but not functionally, because they do not meet or support the established and customary political/institutional design⁷⁷. In addition, it is

⁷² Clark A., Breaking the mould or fiddling at the edges? Ireland's minor parties in comparative and systemic perspective, *Irish Political Studies* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 661-680.; Mair P., *The electoral universe of small parties in postwar Western Europe*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 41-70.; Weeks L., Minor Parties in Irish Political Life: An Introduction, *Irish Political Studies* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 473-479.

⁷³ Clark A., Breaking the mould or fiddling at the edges? Ireland's minor parties in comparative and systemic perspective, *Irish Political Studies* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 661-680.; McDaid S., Rekawek K., From mainstream to minor and back: the Irish Labour Party, 1987-1992, *Irish Political Studies* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 625-642.

⁷⁴ Fisher S., *The “Decline of Parties” Thesis*, [w:] Merkl P. (ed.), *Western European Party Systems*, Wyd. The Free Press, New York 1980, s. 609-610.; Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *Comparative Politics* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁷⁵ Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, s. 6-8.; Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, ss. 240.

⁷⁶ Coakley J., Centres, peripheries, and party systems: nested secession processes in Great Britain and Ireland, *Political Geography* 2008, vol. 27, nr 7, s. 740-760.

⁷⁷ Maghraoui D., On the relevance or irrelevance of political parties in Morocco, *The Journal of North African Studies* 2019, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 939-959.; Völkel J., The “chicken and egg” problem of relevance: Political parties and parliaments in North Africa, *The Journal of North African Studies* 2020, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 865-880.

quite common for parties, especially in autocratic political regimes, to be positioned as “small” and irrelevant ones when they are the symptoms or consequences of the complete or almost complete insignificance or absence of party systems as a whole. Since nominally or formally such parties do exist and even structure party systems, at least partially, but they are “under control” and are not independent functionally. Accordingly, this means that those “small” parties that are unable to determine the voting agenda in the political process and are subordinated to political regimes are systemically irrelevant a priori and gradually lose their functionality and significance⁷⁸.

Instead, the situation is much simpler when “small” parties are those parties that are new and have no representation according to the election results. Since both functionally and quantitatively such “small” parties are not relevant ones, because they are not able to change and structure inter-party competition and party systems in general at a particular level of politics and governance, including or especially by participating in the possible formation of cabinets/executives and setting the political agenda⁷⁹. Accordingly, the main indication of the irrelevance of such “small” parties is that they are an “ephemeral” minority and are incapable of gaining electoral success and representation, not only wanting it, but also having relatively developed membership bases, organizational structures and funding⁸⁰. Although, in contrast, it sometimes happens that the potential relevance of such “small” parties is used “for rent” or is automatically acquired by mainstream or systemic parties, which further mobilize, strengthen or at least test new forms and models of political behavior, responding to the risks of modifying political competition and the existing party systems⁸¹.

Nevertheless, the preliminary (following the theorizations proposed above) conclusion about the complete or almost complete irrelevance of “small” parties is not universal and absolute one. Since the analyzed parties are often interpreted as new or established political actors, which may be insignificantly and at a low level represented in the legislatures according to the elections results both at national and/or subnational levels of politics and governance. Accordingly, it is obvious that “small” parties can be both relevant or irrelevant electorally and by their representation in the legislatures (but necessarily with a low level of representation in the legislatures and other elected institutions), i.e. functionally and/or quantitatively, although these parties may not be relevant at the level of involvement and status in the executive. This is evident mainly in the framework of the power-electoral approach to the understanding of “small” parties,

⁷⁸ Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, s. 6-8; Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329; Reynolds P., *The Role of the Minor Parties*, [w:] Penniman H. (ed.), *Australia at the Polls*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute, Washington 1975, s. 159-169.

⁷⁹ Emanuele V., Chiamonte A., Explaining the impact of new parties in the Western European party systems, *“Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties”* 2019, vol. 29, nr 4, s. 490-510.

⁸⁰ Coakley J., Minor parties in Irish political life, 1922-1989, *“Economic and Social Review”* 1990, vol. 21, nr 3, s. 269-297.

⁸¹ Clark A., Breaking the mould or fiddling at the edges? Ireland's minor parties in comparative and systemic perspective, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 661-680; Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329; Maghraoui D., On the relevance or irrelevance of political parties in Morocco, *“The Journal of North African Studies”* 2019, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 939-959; Völkel J., The “chicken and egg” problem of relevance: Political parties and parliaments in North Africa, *“The Journal of North African Studies”* 2020, vol. 26, nr 6, s. 865-880.

which takes into account the differences in the level of success of parties in elections, in governance and in the political process in general.

In addition, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the phenomenon and the attribute of relevance can serve as a barrier and a probable basis for the separation or non-separation of “small” parties as such. The reason is that the barrier or problem of relevance of “small” parties traditionally concerns the acquisition and demonstration of a certain influence of such parties on the political process, in particular on political and governmental decisions, as well as in general for defining and conducting policy at various levels of governance, in particular at national or subnational (local or regional) levels. Therefore, it is in this context that the answer to the question of whether “small” parties can have a role and status of relevant ones in certain party systems at different levels of politics and governance or whether they should be treated exclusively as irrelevant ones is of paramount importance⁸².

This problem is also developing due to the fact that “small” parties do not fully and not always fit into the theory of party systems, in particular due to the lack of a unified definition of “small” parties. Therefore, different scholars give the phenomenon of relevance of “small” parties quite different and even specific options. Clear evidence of this is the fact that “small” parties usually or often appear as irrelevant ones at one or another level of politics and governance within the classical theories and typologies of party systems. In contrast, “small” parties are often tried to be positioned and presented as relevant ones in the categories of the so-called “mobilization potential”. The latter is based on the ability of “small” parties to attract attention and challenge the party status quo in a given case, as well as to act within new socio-political cleavages and express new political identities in certain conditions⁸³. It follows that many scholars shift the emphasis on the essence and content of the relevance of parties, because they explain the relevance of “small” parties not only functionally and quantitatively, but also ideologically, behaviorally and so on⁸⁴. There are good and sufficient reasons for this, since the relevance of parties can be outlined in relation to different dimensions of political and party systems and at each stage of the life-cycle of parties⁸⁵. Although, in contrast, if a party fails to achieve its relevance or becomes irrelevant one, then its chances of “survival” are greatly reduced⁸⁶. This is reflected in the fact that a “small” party should be considered irrelevant one in its life-cycle when it eventually remains or is considered as “superfluous” one in the sense that this party is

⁸² Sloan L., *Measuring Minor Parties in English Local Government: Presence vs. Vote Share*, Wyd. Local Politics Specialist Group 2011, ss. 19.

⁸³ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.; Lucardi P., *Fragments from the pillars: small parties in the Netherlands*, [w:] Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Newbury Park, London + Sage, New Delhi 1991, s. 123.

⁸⁴ Müller-Rommel F., Pridham G., *Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives*, Wyd. Sage, London 1991, s. 7-13.

⁸⁵ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁸⁶ Bianco W., Kam C., Sened I., Smyth R., Party relevance and party survival in new democracies, *“International Area Studies Review”* 2014, vol. 17, nr 3, s. 251-261.; Coakley J., The rise and fall of minor parties in Ireland, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 503-538.; O'Malley E., Punch bags for heavyweights? Minor parties in Irish government, *“Irish Political Studies”* 2010, vol. 25, nr 4, s. 539-561.; Pedersen M., Towards a new typology of party lifespans and minor parties, *“Scandinavian Political Studies”* 1982, vol. 5, nr 1, s. 1-16.

not needed and will not be used for any possible coalition majority. But on the contrary, even a “small” party is or may be relevant one when its existence or appearance affect the tactics and direction of inter-party competition and the party system in general⁸⁷.

This is often due to the fact that “small” parties, at least indicate the emerging drifts, processes and factors on the “boundaries” of certain party systems in certain periods of their development, if the formers do not structure the party systems themselves thus automatically being relevant ones. This, in turn, means that “small” parties may not be directly positioned as relevant ones – neither functionally nor quantitatively, – but may have an indirect potential for relevance. Even when such parties do not overcome the barrier of representation in the legislatures and other elected institutions, but determine, shape and manifest certain political, ideological, mobilizing, but generally deviant alternatives for inter-party competition and party systems, and so on. It is sometimes even believed that the potential for relevance of “small” parties is due to the very fact of their announcement or emergence, since this fact may force established/mainstream parties to change their behavior, tactics and strategy⁸⁸.

In addition, the potential for relevance is inherent in “small” parties even when they affect the forced preservation of the status quo in party systems, in particular about certain ideological boundaries and rules of the “game” in the latter⁸⁹. Since it is “small” parties, even if they are not represented in the legislatures, that sometimes appear as “benchmarks” of the content and framework of political culture, which are taken into account or not taken into account in the programmatic and ideological positioning of parties structuring party systems. Accordingly, “small” parties may have the potential for relevance due to the fact that they already exist or may become a kind of initiators, interpreters or promoters of political norms and rules of the “game”, which are do not fully generated and adopted by systemic, major and mainstream parties in party systems. This is due to the fact that “small” parties often operate as a “testing grounds” or “halfway” for testing new ideas, which are eventually picked up, adopted or transformed by major, mainstream and systemic parties⁹⁰, which again confirms the potential for relevance of the former⁹¹.

Another specific manifestation of the potential for relevance of “small” parties is that they are seen as “safety valves” for dissatisfied voters⁹², thus significantly regulating the external needs and frameworks of party systems. Since it is thanks to “small” parties that it is possible to expand the electoral framework of inter-party and political competition in general. The reason is that party systems are not always and not fully formed by involving all voters who vote for

⁸⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, London: 1976, s. 22-23.

⁸⁸ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁸⁹ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁹⁰ Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, s. 31-32.; Hammond J., Minor Parties and Electoral Realignment, *“American Politics Quarterly”* 1976, vol. 4, s. 63-85.; Key V., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Thomas Crowell, New York 1964, s. 286.

⁹¹ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁹² Fisher S., *The minor parties of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Wyd. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, s. 32.

certain parties. Accordingly, “small” parties often appeal to voters who are not involved in the formation of the existing party systems or to political ideas and slogans, which are largely ignored by mainstream and major parties⁹³. Thus, the potential for relevance of “small” parties is manifested in the fact that such political actors expand and update the electoral arenas and ideological/programmatic framework of party systems. However, this means that the relevance of parties varies depending on whose point of view is taken into account as the basis one both at the “center” (at national level of politics) and at the “periphery” (at subnational level of politics) of the political system. As a result, the size and functionality of parties are not always directly proportional to their strength (although the ideal option is when differences in party size also express differences in substance⁹⁴). Since “small” parties can play a disproportionately large role⁹⁵ even without being functionally and/or quantitatively relevant ones, but instead having only ideological, political, electoral or mobilizing potential for relevance. However, by contrast, the status of a relevant party does not automatically mean that it is a “big” party, and the status of a “small” party does not automatically mean that it cannot be relevant one, and so on⁹⁶.

As a result, we can conclude that the phenomenon of “small” parties and the parameters, features and scope of their relevance or irrelevance are still not consistently structured in Political Science, since there is no consolidated position on this issue. On one hand, scholars point out that some “small” parties may be able to structure party systems of entire countries or party systems at individual levels of their politics and governance, while other “small” parties may not. It all depends on the context and approach used to define and identify “small” parties (power-electoral, territorial, functional, ideological, historical-organizational, strategic one) and to understand the relevance of parties in general and the relevance of “small” parties in particular (functional, quantitative, ideological, behavioral, etc.), as well as on the electoral success of such parties. On the other hand, scholars argue that the attribute of relevance may be a barrier and a probable basis for the separation or non-separation of “small” parties as such, although “small” parties do not fully and not always fit into party systems theory. That is why we are inclined to state that in case of the so-called “small” parties (regardless of the approach to their definition) their relevance or irrelevance should be defined not just as an attribute of a party system type, but as a characteristic of party or even political system and individual parties at different levels and stages of their life-cycle. Accordingly, “small” parties can be both relevant or irrelevant, but irrelevant “small” parties may still be endowed (though not necessarily) with the potential for relevance. Especially when the latter are able to mobilize the electorate for new socio-political cleavages and political identities, etc., and thus to adjust the behavior and ideological/political positioning

⁹³ Herzog H., Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective, *“Comparative Politics”* 1987, vol. 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

⁹⁴ Duverger M., *Les partis politiques*, Wyd. A. Colin, Paris 1951, s. 383.

⁹⁵ Novak M., Cassling R., The relevance of small parties: From a general framework to the Czech “opposition agreement”, *“Czech Sociological Review”* 2000, vol. 8, s. 27-47.

⁹⁶ Bolleyer N., Small parties: From party pledges to government policy, *“West European Politics”* 2007, vol. 30, nr 1, s. 121-147; Laurent A., Villalba B., *Les petits partis. De la petitesse en politique*, Wyd. L'Harmattan, Paris 1998, s. 25; Siaroff A., Two-And-A-Half-Party Systems and the Comparative Role of the “Half”, *“Party Politics”* 2003, vol. 9, nr 3, s. 267-290.

of all other parties, especially systemic and mainstream ones, i.e. the tactics and direction of inter-party competition in party system.

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THE ESSENCE, FEATURES AND COMPONENTS OF STRUCTURING PARLIAMENTS: WORLDVIEW AND POLITICAL THEORIZATION FOR DIFFERENT CASES AND TYPES OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION

The study focuses on worldview and political theorization of the essence, features and components of structure and structuring of parliaments for different cases and types of representative democracies and democratization, including for presidential and parliamentary democracies, and among the latter ones for the Westminster and consensus models of democracy. It is argued that the relatively greater importance of structuring legislatures, even in the case of similarity or identity of all other conditions, is inherent in the case of parliamentary rather than presidential democracies, as well as consensual rather than Westminster models of democracy. The author finds that the political and institutional structuring of parliaments should be implemented on the basis of such indicators and markers as the number of chambers of parliaments, party-factional features of legislatures, determinants of the influence of parliamentary committees on the parameters of structuring parliaments, determining characteristics and positions of individual membership of deputies at the level of legislatures. These properties constitute the immanent internal component of parliaments and describe the stability and institutionalization of legislatures.

Keywords: parliament, legislature, structure, structuring.

Istota, charakterystyka i struktury komponentowe parlamentów: światopoglądowa i politologiczna teoretyzują dla różnych przypadków i typów demokracji przedstawicielskich i demokratyzacji

W opracowaniu skupiono na światopoglądzie i politycznym teoretyzowaniu istoty, cech i komponentów struktury i strukturyzacji parlamentów dla różnych przypadków i typów demokracji przedstawicielskich i demokratyzacji, w szczególności dla demokracji prezydenckich i parlamentarnych, a wśród tych ostatnich – dla modelu westminsterskiego ta demokracji konsensualną. Argumentuje się że relatywnie większe znaczenie strukturyzacji ciał ustawodawczych, nawet w przypadku podobieństwa lub tożsamości wszystkich innych warunków, jest nieodłącznie w przypadku demokracji parlamentarnych, a nie prezydenckich, a także konsensualnych, a nie westminsterskich modeli demokracji. Autor uznał, że polityczna i instytucjonalna struktura parlamentów powinna być realizowana w oparciu o takie wskaźniki i wyznaczniki jak:

liczba izb parlamentów, determinanty wpływu komisji sejmowych na parametry strukturyzacji parlamentów, określające cechy i stanowiska poszczególnych posłów na poziomie legislatyw. Właściwości te stanowią immanentny wewnętrzny składnik parlamentów i opisują stopień, w jakim legislatury są stabilne i instytucjonalizowane.

Słowa kluczowe: parlament, legislatura, struktura, strukturyzacja.

СУТНІСТЬ, ОСОБЛИВОСТІ І СКЛАДОВІ СТРУКТУРИЗАЦІЇ ПАРЛАМЕНТІВ: СВІТОГЛЯДНА ТА ПОЛІТОЛОГІЧНА ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЯ ДЛЯ РІЗНИХ ВИПАДКІВ І ТИПІВ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ ТА ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦІЇ

У дослідженні увагу зосереджено на світоглядній і політологічній теоретизації сутності, особливостей і складових структури й структуризації парламентів для різних випадків і типів представницьких демократій і демократизації, зокрема для президентських і парламентських демократій, а серед останніх – для вестмінстерської та консенсусної моделей демократії. Аргументовано, що відносно більше значення структуризації легіслатур, навіть у випадку подібності чи ідентичності всіх інших умов, притаманне для випадків парламентських, а не президентських демократій, а також консенсусної, а не вестмінстерської моделей демократії. Автор виявив, що політична й інституційна структуризація парламентів повинна реалізовуватись на підставі таких індикаторів і маркерів, як: кількість палат парламентів, партійно-фракційні особливості складу легіслатур, детермінанти впливу парламентських комітетів на параметри структуризації парламентів, визначення особливостей та позицій індивідуального членства депутатів на рівні легіслатур. Ці властивості становлять іманентну внутрішню складову парламентів і описують те, наскільки легіслатури стабільні й інституціоналізовані.

Ключові слова: парламент, легіслатура, структура, структуризація.

The third¹, and sometimes, according to some theorists and practitioners, the fourth² or even subsequent³ “waves” of democratization, which in the late 20th century – early 21st century, swept through different countries and regions of the world (even despite the decline of some countries to autocracy), previously had, and still have, the increased scientific and empirical interest in constitutional, institutional and political theory, philosophical and worldview literature⁴. They are most often related to the fact that they are necessarily characterized by the interest, need and real process of development and implementation of new / updated democratic constitutions and institutions in pre-existing or new states of certain parts of the world. At the same time, the main theoretical and practical emphasis is placed on the creation, promotion and dissemination of the authority and effects of people’s / democratically governing societies and communities, which, however, have never been positioned in a unified way, but instead provided many options for institutional theorizing and political implementation. What they have in common is and still is that among the various manifestations of institutional and political design, only the institution of parliament or legislature (at the national level of politics) is positioned as a nationally elected and representative body, even though its structuring leads to different options and alternatives. Accordingly, it is in view of this that our scientific article focuses on the ideological and political theorizing of the essence, features and components of the structuring of parliaments for different cases and types of representative democracies and democratization.

Therefore, in general, it is obvious that even in the conditions of identical structure and structuring of popularly elected parliaments, the latter are institutionally and politically more important and even decisive in the context of executive-legislative relations in the case of parliamentary democracies and parliamentary options for democratization. This is perhaps the main reason why parliamentary democracy has received (and continues to do so) the greatest support in the current scientific and practical debate, regardless of the constitutionalized systems of government – parliamentary monarchy, parliamentary republic or semi-presidential republic, but provided that both formally and in fact they have structurally capable national legislatures.

¹ Huntington S., Democracy’s third wave, *“Journal of democracy”* 1991, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 12-34.; Huntington S., *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*, Wyd. University of Oklahoma Press 1993.; Huntington S., After twenty years: the future of the third wave, *“Journal of democracy”* 1997, vol 8, nr. 4, s. 3-12.; Mainwaring S., Bizzarro F., The Fates of Third-Wave Democracies, *“Journal of Democracy”* 2019, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 99-113.; Schenoni L., Mainwaring S., Hegemonic Effects and Regime Change in Latin America, *“Democratization”* 2019, vol 36, nr. 2, s. 269-287.

² Abushouk A., The Arab Spring: A Fourth Wave of Democratization?, *“Domes”* 2016, vol 25, s. 52-69.; Diamond L., A Fourth Wave or False Start?, *“Foreign Affairs”* May 22, 2011. źródło: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-05-22/fourth-wave-or-false-start> [odczyt: 20.04.2022]; McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, *“World Politics”* 2002, vol 54, nr. 2, s. 212-244.; Howard P., Hussain M., *Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2013.; Hussain M., Howard P., *Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Information Technologies and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring*, Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association, San Diego (April 1-4, 2012) źródło: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029711> [odczyt: 20.04.2022].

³ Gunitsky S., Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective, *“Perspectives on Politics”* 2018, vol 16, nr. 3, s. 634-651.; Gunitsky S., From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century, *“International Organization”* 2014, vol 68, nr. 3, s. 561-597.

⁴ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.

This perception is exacerbated by the fact that theorists and practitioners often draw attention to the inefficiency and propensity for coups in a presidential system of government, even in a democratic one, which, paradoxically, is much less common in the case of the parliaments “merger” and government cabinets in parliamentary democracies. In addition, critics of presidentialism and even presidential democracy often cite the rigidity, inefficiency, and wastefulness of these systems of the powers’ separation, which are embodied in the presidential constitutions of countries with such a format of interinstitutional relations⁵. In particular, due to the fact that their national parliaments, regardless of internal structuring, are not able to control the presidents and the executive branch in general. As a result, purely ideologically and theoretically, many practitioners of the presidential format of interinstitutional relations are in favor of the parliamentary logic of democracy and democratization, but are unable to put this logic into practice, especially when it comes to the prospects of obtaining presidential positions and positions in the executive branch in general.

This dichotomy of representative democracy and democratization shows, as noted above, that despite the same structure and similar function of parliaments, at least in the field of law-making, etc., the potential for influence and importance of their structuring is still very different. One of the immediate effects of this state of affairs is that the structuring of parliaments, at least in theory, can be better understood through the example of parliamentary democracies. Perhaps because they are able to demonstrate a wide range of options for “merger” of different branches of government and executive-legislative relations, which are derived from the diversity and range of the internal structure of national legislatures.

On the other hand, it is clear that parliaments, their functions, organization and structure / structuring can shed enough light on the implementation of a mechanism for democracy and democratization, both in parliamentary and presidential formats. Thus says, at least, neo-institutional political theory and its individual spokesmen⁶. And this despite the fact that in comparative political science at different times there were many miscalculations and disappointments due to differences between “visibility” and “reality” in the assessment of legislatures and legislative policy, as scientists return to these issues with varying intensity and interest, but each time with newer with newer and more promising review tools. Thus, for the last few decades, the analysis of parliaments, parliamentarism and legislative policy has been revolutionary with the application of theories and models of rational choice, including neo-institutional paradigms of complex importance and knowledge of the structure of parliaments. As a consequence, the first “neo-institutional revolution” that in general in relation to formal theory has opened and

⁵ Moe T., Caldwell M., The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 1994, vol 150, nr. 1, s. 171-195.; Weaver K., Rockman B., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, Wyd. Brookings Institution 1993.

⁶ Moe T., The New Economics of Organization, *American Journal of Political Science* 1984, vol 28, s. 739-777.; Shepsle S., *Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions*, [w:] Weisberg H. (ed.), *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, Wyd. Agathon 1986, s. 51-81.; Shepsle S., Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1989, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 131-147.

applied different perspectives of quite realistic theories of legislative behavior, parliamentary-government coalitions, presidential, but first of all parliamentary models of democracy in the context of structuring legislatures.

However, even in this context, there are some varieties in the positioning of the institution of parliament in parliamentary democracies as such, especially given that they are different, in particular with popularly elected (as in semi-presidential republics) and non-popularly elected (as in parliamentary republics) or non-elected (as in parliamentary monarchies) heads of state. And this, in turn, is one of the reasons for distinguishing parliamentary democracies from institutional / constitutional parliamentary as one of the formats of inter-institutional relations and systems of government, even though they are sometimes (albeit erroneously) treated as synonyms. Accordingly, it raises the question of understanding the nature and parameters of the structuring of legislatures both in parliamentary democracies and in political / institutional design with a parliamentary system of government, as these two political and institutional entities are an example of the distinction, respectively, between a broad and a narrow assessment of the dependence of the executive branch on the legislative branch. Thus, in political science, the theoretical and empirical position that parliamentary democracy is determined mainly by the parliamentary way of forming and, above all, the responsibility of governments is becoming more and more common. Instead, or in addition, parliamentarism as a system or construction of the system of government and inter-institutional relations is further filled with the indicator that, along with the parliamentary responsibility of governments, heads of state are positioned as non-elected or non-popularly elected, and therefore not endowed with the rational and national legitimacy of their power.

In other words, it means that parliamentary democracy in general (regardless of the system of government – parliamentary or semi-presidential) is a democratic political system in which the attribute is mandatory that the majority of the people or citizens effectively govern and manage public policy at least through elections representatives in the legislative branch, i.e. through the legislature.

Moreover, this is institutionally characteristic for both democratic cases of parliamentarism and democratic cases of semi-presidentialism, which means that parliamentary democracy as people's sovereignty exercised by elected representatives, especially in parliaments, is broader than its institutional mechanisms in the format of parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, after all, it is not regulated by the origin of the heads of state. It is in this context that the phenomenon of parliament and its structuring acquires perhaps the decisive and most comprehensive meaning in the case of parliamentary democracies as such (as a whole) and in many of their options.

However, as noted above, parliamentary democracy, including in terms of the institution of parliament is not a monolithic and unified phenomenon, and therefore it is able to organize the legislature quite differently and depending on other components of democratization and

democracy as such. Thus, it is historiographically and empirically known that in its original form, parliamentary democracy and the logic of parliamentary-order governance are majoritarian, in particular in the format of the so-called Westminster model⁷. It was in this model that the belief in the relatively unlimited powers of the popularly elected majority in parliament was once built as the basis for postulating the tradition of parliamentary government. Therefore, the details and peculiarities of the Westminster paradigm of parliamentary governance have fallen into the “heart” of the tradition of a kind of “parliamentary supremacy”, according to which legislators are accountable exclusively to the people and therefore the executive power is accountable to the legislature one. Therefore, this is how the early theorists of the idea of parliamentary representation or representation of the people / sovereign, primarily through parliaments, argued that political activity of parliamentary-type systems and structures is endowed with its own focal point in parliaments, as heads of state, governments, other electoral representatives, political parties, interest groups and voters unequivocally recognize the superiority of parliaments⁸. Over time, this idea has been significantly transformed, in particular given that political and institutional scenarios that complicate the principles of majoritarianism and bipartisanship (as the basic and simplest condition of majoritarianism) have been tested.

The fact is that many structures of parliamentary government over time began to shift in the direction of replacing the principle of majority or majoritarian with the idea of plurality or dominance. In other words, the understanding that the majority in the legislature can be both absolute and relative was on the agenda, due to the shift in the formats of inter-party relations and political competition from pure bipartisanship to different options for multi-party system. Initially, this called into question the risk of continuing to apply the logic of parliamentary governance, particularly in the form in which the Westminster tradition proved to be. However, with the expansion of innovative ideas, theorists and practitioners have later agreed that parliamentary democracy can be related not only in a bipartisan or Westminster model, but also in a model called continental or consensus. This model is characterized primarily by the fact that it denies or at least does not regulate as the only possible option the logic of one-party domination in legislatures, instead, it is inclined to approach, if not unanimity, then consensus and coalition procedures (including on the composition of governments). Thus, the emphasis is on maintaining the “primacy” of legislatures both in the legislature and in the formation and responsibility of the executive, but not as pronounced as in the Westminster model, since in this case is characterized by a kind of diffuse or combined rather than unified logic of government, which does not necessarily follow the principles of majoritarianism and one-party domination. However, the parliament remains a streamlining institution characterized by institutional and political supremacy.

⁷ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.

⁸ Verney D., *Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government*, [w:] Lijphart A. (ed.), *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992, s. 46.

One way or another, it is the institution of parliament that has gained prominence in constructing the phenomenon of parliamentary democracy and in streamlining the executive branch, both in Westminster and continental formats. This means that, having received high ambitions and significant power potential, it was the national legislatures that began to be intensively and universally treated as institutions that should perform significant political functions. Almost paramount or a priori of them was, of course, the function of drafting and adopting laws and various budget allocations. But perhaps the most important among them, and not always provided by the constitution, was the function of the decisive role of national parliaments in the election / formation and control / responsibility of the composition, program and functionality of the executive branch – the government⁹. That is why the legislatures today (regardless of the system of government, parliamentary or semi-presidential) are the main institutions of parliamentary democracies, which play a crucial role in streamlining and structuring the executive branch. This is despite the facts that in its purest form it takes place or can take place within the “chain” of the powers delegation and responsibilities, when members of the executive (or at least the government) must or may also be deputies / legislators or members of the legislature.

Although, in practice, this is not always the case, and if it is, it varies with different degrees of intensity, as some systems define simultaneous membership in two branches of government as constitutionally and politically incompatible. However, this is not essential and not fundamental, because the definition of restrictions today is mainly considered a modifying principle of parliamentary governance and parliamentary democracy¹⁰. Instead, the principle that national parliaments in parliamentary democracies are now considered to be the arenas for decision-making by the executive branch is becoming valid and increasingly developed (in this case, of course, we are not talking about routine government procedures, but instead we mean that parliaments organize and agree on the program vectors of government activities, etc.).

However, the most important is the combined logic of parliamentary democracies, according to which the basic role of parliaments as legislative bodies is that they limit the executive branch¹¹. This demonstrates the potential of parliaments to remain the main guarantors of national sovereignty, because in this case the legislatures are conceived as institutions capable of executing and organizing the will of the people. And this is so since parliaments in parliamentary democracies can not only directly make consistent political decisions, but also directly and indirectly implement the decisions made. In a simplified way, this is interpreted in such a way that, above all, parliaments in parliamentary democracies have the task and power to express the voice of the people¹². However, as a rule, people do not have the opportunity to speak in

⁹ Bagehot W., *The House of Commons*, [w:] Norton P. (ed.), *Legislatures*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990, s. 36–46, s. 36.

¹⁰ Hernes G., Nergaard K., *Oss i mellom: konstitusjonelle former og uformelle kontakter Storting – Regjering*, Wyd. FAFO 1989.

¹¹ Beer S., *The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent*, [w:] Norton P. (ed.), *Legislatures*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990, s. 71.

¹² Riker W., *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Wyd. Freeman 1982, s. 11–12.

one voice or even tone. Therefore, even if people can agree, their representatives cannot or not always cannot. And this is perhaps the biggest problem of parliamentary democracies through the prism of structuring national parliaments, because deputies and legislatures in general are often unable to express popular ideas that will meet the preferences of the majority. The fact is that parliaments can be internally divided, and this division will not only promote the principle of dominance (which is needed primarily in the Westminster model), but even the principle of consensus (which is the basic continental model). The situation is complicated by the fact that different legislatures have different internal structures of their organization (for example, different chambers, parties, groups of deputies, committees, etc.), and therefore they form or may form different privileged groups that differently initiate different benefits and prospects¹³. This, in turn, complicates not only the organizational logic of parliaments, but also their functionality, including the structuring of the legislative process and control over the executive branch¹⁴.

It is in this context that the structure and structuring of parliaments are on the agenda as a primary factor, especially in parliamentary ones, but also in presidential forms of democracy and democratization. In particular, on the subject of ideological and political theorizing of the studied phenomenon, including theoretical and methodological assessment of the institutional and political structure and structuring of parliaments. The fact is that today there are many problems and differences on these issues and they start from the most generalized level of "steps of abstraction" and logical ordering. Thus, the problems and differences of opinion regarding the very concept of "structure", which are conducted in modern science, in particular in the framework of various sociological and political theories, should be considered primary. Similarly, the traditional notion of structure in the political or institutional sphere is associated with the idea of orderliness of all relations that connect the elements of the political system. Therefore, the structure as such is traditionally considered as a framework, model or scheme of a particular analyzed subject (in this case, the institution of parliament as part of the political system). It is defined as a strong and relatively stable fixation of relationships between elements of a political system or elements of a particular political institution within the system, as the logic of the relationship of these elements, as a way of organizing and functioning institution or system or as the sum of invariant attributes projects within a particular political institution or political system as a whole. This is important since lasting or stable relationships between the elements of the system guarantee the structure (systemic or institutional) integrity and identity, maintaining the basic properties of various internal and external changes and factors. In addition, in a purely functional sense, structure is understood as a kind of modeling of political relations and political phenomena, in a consequence of which it is external to the object of comparative evaluation (in this context the institution of parliament in parliamentary or

¹³ Tsebelis G., *The Core, the Uncovered Set and Conference Committees in Bicameral 14* Strom K., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Doering H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 51-82.

¹⁴ Strom K., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Doering H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 51-82.

presidential democracy or political system in general), even though it outlines the internal attributes of that object. It follows that the structure of the parliament is a model of organizational components on the basis of which the legislature operates, but always in relation to a particular type, format and structure of the political system in which the institution of parliament takes place. That is why, according to this logic, the structuring of parliaments is a mechanism and way of organizing parliaments in certain systemic, institutional and political circumstances, as well as mechanisms and ways of distributing powers and functions of parliaments themselves and their constituent and structural components. It follows that the structuring of parliaments is a logically ordered way of separating the structural parts of parliament that determine the structural logic of the political systems in which the legislatures operate.

Given this ideological and even philosophical logic, it is clear that the structure of any parliament (both institutional and political structure) must be assessed in two ways – both static and dynamic. Thus, the static structure of parliament (like any other political institution) assumes that its elements and the links between these elements do not change, and therefore such a structure of parliament should be called the “foundation level” or the normal structure of the legislature. Among other things, it is endowed with the following attributes: it is in static equilibrium, assumes constant constancy of interaction of various elements of parliaments (first of all macro division of parliaments into chambers, party factions, composition of committees and / or subcommittees, political systems), relations of parliaments with other centers and institutions of power in political systems), as well as the immutability of the system as a whole under certain conditions in a given period of time; is characterized by stationarity (or invariance of essential system attributes) of parliaments or is in non-stationary equilibrium (i.e. in the form of invariance of parameters of parliaments in time); is defined by the stability of parliaments in the broadest sense, i.e. their ability to perform their functions and responsibilities. However, it should be understood that it is impossible to speak in its purest form about the invariability of the parliamentary structure, because within the legislatures, especially consistent ones, there are constant divisions and associations of groups and factions, changes in political preferences of deputies, replacement of members of parliaments and committees, etc. It follows that the static structure of parliaments has to be discussed rather in a descriptive manner or for descriptive purposes or exclusively formalized. In addition, it is quite convenient to try to understand or present the structure of parliaments as a cross-section, image or snapshot, even on the basis of certain temporal characteristics, because in this case the scheme of static structure of legislatures is purely methodologically most convenient. However, in the formation of long-term perspective conclusions on the structuring of legislatures, such logic is not relevant and methodologically considered. After all, it is not always and not fully able to interpret certain fixed moments in the development of the parliamentary structure, especially if it changes the whole set of internal relations in parliaments (which should be described using the term “state of parliament”).

This is especially true in the context that the structuring of parliaments has as one of its effects the question of how stable national legislatures are or, according to the methodology of neo-institutionalism, institutionalized, especially in the context of various forms of democratization and democracy. The fact is that the static structure of the parliament is characterized by equilibrium stationary stability (when the parliament is unchanged in its parameters over time, as well as in its essential systemic characteristics and is able to perform its functions) and equilibrium periodic (non-stationary) stability (when changing some significant systemic characteristics of the parliament). Accordingly, such an interpretation of the stability of the parliaments structure provides the status quo of the regulatory system in the organization of parliament, and therefore is an essential feature of the institutionalization of legislatures at the level of parties, groups and committees. Although in the narrow sense, the stability of parliaments in the form of institutionalization means the absence of institutional and contextual changes in successive stages of development of the structure of parliaments.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in order to deepen the scientific analysis of the structuring of parliaments, both institutional and political, it is also advisable to operate with the concept of dynamic structure of legislatures. It is unique to open and democratic political systems (parliamentary and presidential democracies), where the parliament exchanges with the environment – the whole political system, especially in the framework of executive-legislative relations – and, therefore, is able to change functionally. Therefore, it is obvious that legislatures are structures that develop and adapt, as changes in the dynamic structure of parliaments may be subject to any of their structural elements (party-factional and individual composition, composition of committees, rules of conduct with other authorities), as well as ties between them. But the degree of internal and external changes in the functioning of parliaments can vary, although in general minor changes traditionally do not lead to the collapse of the structural model and the emergence of a new parliamentary structure, and therefore in general the system preserves the organization, does not undergo qualitative restructuring and develops in the direction of institutionalization. Instead, in more severe forms of instability of legislatures, when systemic variables “suppress” system-forming factors, there is a “rebirth of systems” of parliaments, as well as their transition to new formats. In this context, it should be noted that virtually any parliament is characterized by minor changes in its structure, which is in dynamic equilibrium. At the same time, it is obvious that such a property is characterized by the invariance of relative changes in the interaction of elements of parliamentary organization. Thus, an example of stable balanced dynamic structures within parliaments is the formation of standing committees (which are sociologically called attractors). The fact is that the standing parliamentary committees are relatively stable states, to which the process of evolution of linear functions and specializations within the legislatures is directed. In other words, parliamentary committees very often ensure the stable functioning and positioning of one or another parliamentary model and the structure of legislatures in one or another model of representative democracy.

It is also noteworthy that in the context of the dynamic structure of parliaments, assessing their stability and institutionalization is a more complex task, as it involves taking into account the problems of individual membership (mandates) and the structure of parliaments. In this regard, we believe that for a comparative understanding of the phenomenon of parliamentary institutions in democracies, it is not enough to just point out the procedural and dynamic nature of the parliamentary structure. It is also necessary to identify and demonstrate the connection between the micro and macro levels, individual deputies and parties, and the structure of parliaments in general. And this despite the fact that deputies, parties and groups in parliaments are also by all means structural elements of legislatures. The fact is that deputies are represented both as figures and as elements rigidly determined by the static and dynamic structure of legislatures. Therefore, according to the principles of neo-institutionalism and, in particular, the theory of rational choice, each Member of Parliament is not a static but an active element of its structure. It follows that all elements of the structure of parliaments should be perceived as interdependent. This means that the methodological principle of structuring parliaments should be considered a paradigm shift at the level of “dual structure” of different parliaments, as the structure of parliament as such should not be equated with coercion, since it not only forces but also provides functionality. As a result, it permits to form several generalizations, according to which: the structure of the parliament does not exist outside the various types of deputy activities; the structure of the parliament does not exist outside the ideas and concepts of its elements about the essence of its activities and functionality; parliament is a product of the activities of individuals at the level of structure; a special way of communication between the structure of the parliament and the deputies within it is the reproduction and transformation of the former one. Thus, the parliament in relation to the deputies acts as a structure that exists only through their activities.

In this sense, it is noteworthy that in most modern legislatures their deputies are elected through similar procedures and electoral systems that can be structured into certain types. That is, all members of parliament, regardless of, say, the plurality in which they received their seats, are endowed with similar rights and privileges as legislators. With rare exceptions, voting rules in legislatures are typically egalitarian and undifferentiated, and the vote of each parliamentarian is worth as much as any other vote of any other deputy, and this is typically reflected on a “one deputy – one vote” basis. Moreover, such egalitarian principles usually go beyond a simple act of voting, and are often enshrined even in constitutions. However, from the point of view of political structuring of legislatures, the most important thing is to take into account the votes of deputies who influence the most important political decisions or decisions on which the distribution of worldviews of deputies in legislatures is considered critical. However, in essence, the legislature is collegial rather than hierarchical one in its organizational structure, at least in contrast to bureaucratic structures. However, in reality there are still some options for differences between members of parliament. They are able to acquire two main forms – hierarchy

(vertical differentiation) and specialization (functional or horizontal differentiation). At the same time, various forms of differentiation are seldom detailed or even specified in constitutions, but they can be traced with astonishing regularity in the smallest detail in practice. Therefore, they can be thought of as a form of organization of legislatures. In this sense, the organizations of legislatures are the distribution of resources and the allocation of parliamentary rights to deputies and their groups¹⁵.

At the same time, it is clear that the structuring of legislatures determines the set of privileged groups, i.e. subgroups of deputies with special powers, and the set of procedures that determine the powers of these groups in relation to the functions of parliaments. In general, this leads to the fact that, although deputies are elected with equal and undifferentiated voting rights, any structural and organizational rules that violate this equality essentially determine one or more options of privileged groups of deputies in the legislature. However, the magnitude of the priorities of such groups varies considerably, and is not unified in content and functionality. In this regard, let us first consider the most common forms of privileged groups in legislatures, including "dictators", decision-making groups and veto groups. And also we shall note that almost all more complex forms of privileges can be obtained by combining pure types of privileged groups. Thus, "dictators" are the groups that can unilaterally impose their will on the legislature, can pursue legislative policy / lawmaking at will, and can prevent changes in any status quo. In other words, the consent of "dictators" is a necessary and sufficient condition for the decision of the legislature. Instead, decision-making groups have the voice and authority to legislate, but they do not necessarily oppose other groups in actions they do not like. Therefore, their consent is sufficient, but not required. Finally, veto groups can block any decision from parliament that they do not approve of, but do not have the power to impose their own advantages and preferences. That is why their approval is necessary, but insufficient, which is why they are the most common type of privileged groups in legislatures. However, in general, it should be understood that most privileged groups in parliaments have weaker rights than parliaments as a whole. For example, decisions of standing parliamentary committees can be overturned by a majority in plenary sessions of parliaments, and leaders of parliamentary factions can be "defeated" by ordinary party members etc.

One way or another, in general, the options of organizational structure and structuring of legislatures, including within various forms of democracy and democratization, inevitably put on the agenda issues related to the causes and consequences of this organizational structure in the context of different types of privileged groups in parliaments. The categories of different researchers¹⁶ are questions of the balance of institutions or institutional balance, which are related to the definition of the influence and importance of legislatures and privileged groups in

¹⁵ Krehbiel K., *Information and Legislative Organization*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1991, s.2.

¹⁶ Shepsle S., *Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions*, [w:] Weisberg H. (ed.), *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, Wyd. Agathon 1986, s. 51-81.

them in different types of political systems. In this context, we note that neo-institutionalism provides two important lessons for the study of privileged groups in legislatures. The first lesson is a direct analysis of the institutional balance and involves a study of the rules under which the legislative process unfolds.

In other words, if privileged groups have dictatorial or veto rights, it is necessary to determine the rules that allow such influence to these groups, not only nominally but also in reality. Thus, if it is argued that the threat of dissolving parliament gives the prime minister's party certain dictatorial powers within the parliamentary majority, it must be demonstrated that the prime minister will in fact exercise this power rationally. If, however, the Prime Minister avoids, instead, such threats, due to unfavorable and any other circumstances, he cannot be attributed dictatorial powers at all. In turn, the second lesson is that the neo-institutional teaches to seek the balance of institutions. In this sense, it is necessary to strive to understand the rationale for the rules under which privileged groups receive their privileged powers. And here it is extremely important to point out that in the system of parliamentary governance and structuring of legislatures, rules and structures are endogenous. However, this does not mean that the situation cannot change under the influence of the majority in the legislature. After all, the rules adopted by the majority to fulfill some obligations in parliaments are only collective in nature, but they are not predetermined. And this fits in very well with the remark that most forms of parliamentary organization are not provided for in the constitutions. Some of them are provided by ordinary laws, but, as a rule, most of the functions of the parliamentary structure and organization are simple rules, which any legislature assumes and which it can terminate at will, etc.

It is also important that scientists¹⁷ have long identified two basic classes of theories of organization of legislatures – distributive and informational perspectives. The distributive explanation of the organization and structure of parliaments focuses on the “income” that MPs can have from bargaining with each other. In other words, deputies usually find themselves in situations that are neither purely conflictive nor purely victorious. In addition, MPs often have personal interests and reach an agreement that is generally ineffective: especially when it comes to populist projects and issues¹⁸. In contrast, the informational perspective of considering the structuring of parliaments emphasizes the limited knowledge with which deputies approach the tasks set before them or facing them. In addition, many external factors affect the relationship between parliamentary decisions and political outcomes, and legislative initiatives often lead to unintended and undesirable consequences. However, deputies can also prevent some consequences through the policy of specialization. If they coordinate their efforts to obtain information, then it is obvious that they can implement better solutions. Accordingly, the information perspective emphasizes the possibility of mutual strengthening in the parliamentary process.

¹⁷ Krehbiel K., *Information and Legislative Organization*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1991.

¹⁸ Baron D., Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 1991, vol 35, nr. 1, s. 57-90.

It is noteworthy that even though the distributive and informational perspectives generate contradictory hypotheses, they are by no means mutually exclusive and completely contradictory.

In our research context, this is extremely important, since according to the results of defining and distinguishing the essence of presidential and parliamentary democracy and parliamentarism, as well as thanks to the allocation of distributive and informational perspectives on the study of the structure of legislatures, it is possible to approach in detail the assessment of basic organizational elements in the structure of parliaments. Functionally, parliaments are structured on the basis of various forms of political privileges, which are provided in the format of parliamentary procedures. That is why almost all procedures and debates in parliaments are highly institutionalized and distributed. At the same time, the most important internal structures generated by privileged groups of deputies include the separation of individual chambers, standing and specialized committees, party and inter-party entities (factions and groups), governing bodies (presidents and speakers of parliaments or parliaments in general), individual deputies legislatures, etc. It is these internal structural elements that are potential mechanisms for the division of labor in legislatures, although this is not their only task. We will try to consider them in more detail, but not so much in empirical terms, but mainly in filling at their expense the content of distributive and informational prospects for the structuring of legislatures in the framework of neo-institutional theory.

We must start with the fact that modern parliaments are usually a one-chamber (unicameral) or two-chamber (bicameral), although before the introduction of universal suffrage, constitutionalists and politicians used the practice of three- and even four-chamber legislatures. In particular, three-chamber parliaments operated at various times in South Africa (until 1983), Bolivia (under S. Bolivar), France (during the Consulate), Iceland, the SFRY, China and others. Instead, four-chamber legislatures operated at different times in Finland and Sweden (inherited from medieval Scandinavian advisory meetings), as well as in the SFRY after the restructuring of the pentacameralism. As they have become a mere tribute to time today, the structuring of legislatures in this context takes place only in relation to bicameral parliaments, which can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical (in other words, equivalent or non-equivalent or non-subordinated or subordinated), in particular, depending on whether the powers of the upper / first (and usually smaller) chamber are equal to those of the lower / second (and typically larger and "younger") chamber¹⁹. Moreover, in this context, the rule that bicameral parliaments are asymmetric works in this context, because the powers of the upper chambers are insignificant and do not constitute a worthy obstacle to the adoption of legislative decisions in the lower chambers.

Instead, the first chambers are strong in that they can fulfill the practical goals of "dictators", at least in the field of finance. As for symmetrical bicameralism, each chamber of parliament

¹⁹ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.

plays the role of an effective veto group. Although, in contrast, the features of the veto powers of each chamber are quite significantly correlated in different cases of bicameralism.

There is much more theoretical and empirical maneuver in the framework of structuring parliaments in the case of taking into account the internal features of the standing committees of legislatures. At the same time, it should be emphasized that in the parliaments of the Westminster tradition of parliamentary democracy, the committees of the legislatures are a kind of “microcosm” in the organization of large parliaments. The party (parties) of the majority in the legislatures as a whole also constitutes the committees of the majority, and therefore often subordinates all leading positions in the committees. Committee members are more likely to make a random sample of parliamentarians who may not have personal experience or interests in the policy area in which they are appointed. In contrast, in the continental or consensus model of parliamentary democracies, the leadership of committees is often proportionally distributed among the parties, and the committees themselves may deviate significantly from the activities at the level of legislatures, including party affiliation, experience, preferences, etc. Structurally, the difference between parliamentary committees is manifested in their term of office, composition and functions. For example, some committees have permanent membership and specialization for the duration of the entire parliamentary term or even longer, while other committees are appointed on a special basis and cease to exist after fulfilling their tasks. Moreover, the specialization of certain committees closely reflects the functional areas of different executive structures, while other parliaments structure their committees along different lines. In addition, some committees have only legislative tasks, and some have budgetary, oversight, investigative, administrative, etc.

In addition, it should be noted that legislature committees can perform a number of valuable functions for parliamentarians. There is general agreement that they provide a division of labor, as policymakers, “tired” of policy requirements, form “agreements” with each other to divide parliamentary work, which describes the various legislative functions. In neo-institutionalism regarding parliaments, there is usually a growing demand for committees’ research²⁰, especially given the very nature of structuring parliaments through committees. In this sense, they take into account, for example, the fact that parliamentarians make their appointments in committees that reflect their heterogeneous political preferences, which in turn are previously obtained on the basis of election results in individual constituencies. In this way, each parliamentary committee receives “ownership” of the specialization assigned to it.

With this in mind, committees as internal structures of national parliaments effectively divide the political space into separate and almost exhaustive and mutually exclusive jurisdictions. However, such a distributive perspective is often challenged by the authors in the study of information aspects of the legislative process²¹. In particular, they recall that the majority

²⁰ Shepsle K., Weingast B., Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, *“Legislative Studies Quarterly”* 1994, vol 19, nr. 2, s. 148-179.

²¹ Gilligan T., Krehbiel K., Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, *“American Journal of Political Science”* 1989, vol 33, nr. 2, s. 459-490.

in the legislature usually receives all the powers of all or most parliamentary committees, in particular on the principle of proportionality of the formation of committees. However, if the powers and tasks of the committees are systematically disrupted under the influence of the majority in parliament, other members of the committees (from the opposition) are not able to oppose this, although they may oppose it for information. Thus, even the “best intentions” of the legislation sometimes lead to results that no one expected, and even worse, which they do not want at all. However, parliamentarians can mitigate some of the side effects of structuring parliamentary committees through their specialization policies.

At the same time, committees are usually only one of the locus of power in the legislature, and political parties, in contrast, implement a slightly different locus. Simultaneously, from the point of view of party structuring of parliaments, two scenarios of party participation in the legislative process are probable – at the level of parties and at the level of deputies. The basic principle for representative democracies is that parties play a dominant role in the legislative process. However, the formal basis of party authority is often rather weak. Political parties tend to have several direct functions in the legislature, unless they constitute a majority in parliament. They do not enjoy the same rights of veto power and control as committees. They do not have ingrained specialization, and they have only a few informational advantages. However, the rules of procedure of parliaments usually give their leaders considerable control in shaping a certain legislative calendar and agenda, as well as in discussions in plenary sessions of parliaments. In addition, in some countries, members of parties (or factions) enjoy greater advantages over non-party deputies when passing legislation. Also in many countries, party members receive benefits in the form of state funding schemes, but above all or mostly parliamentary parties.

In this sense, it is quite obvious that parties are the most studied function of the organization and structuring of legislatures. According to various researchers²², parties emerge to address various “collective dilemmas” of a legislative nature, including such as coordination, public good, and foreign policy. Accordingly, the re-election of parties to parliament is a very important collective dilemma for legislators. Because voters often rely on party identities, parliamentarians can benefit from their party’s collective reputation²³.

At the same time, each deputy seeks to improve his or her prospects by spreading the party’s line of local interests and by providing particular benefits that are multifaceted. That is why “political entrepreneurs”, especially party leaders, are endowed with several basic attributes: they incur direct costs in monitoring the compliance of deputies with their parties’ cooperative behavior; they control selective incentives (individual targeted punishments and rewards), through which they can give preference to members of the party collective, as well as punish “defectors”; they are rewarded for their services by claiming the residual benefits and privileges

²² Cox G., McCubbins M., *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

²³ Mayhew D., *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2004.

that the party can receive as a result of elections and decisions regarding the formation of the government and the division of the “domineering pie”.

After all, as with all other hierarchical bodies, the structuring of parliaments must have leaders at its logical top. Such persons usually act as heads of legislatures and may enjoy many significant or honorable responsibilities. At the same time, the chairmen of parliaments or individual chambers of parliaments are often known as speakers or presidents, and the offices of the heads of legislatures can be both individual and collective ones. The latter are usually determined by constitutions or other relevant legislation, and then in this case they play a certain ordinal role in the hierarchy of positions according to their social significance. However, constitutional attributes seldom fully describe the functions of parliamentary chairmen in full. Nevertheless, it is clear that the most pressing day-to-day responsibility of parliamentary leaders is to oversee the parliamentary agenda. That is, speakers or presidents are responsible for planning draft laws for discussion during plenary sessions of legislatures, as well as for organizing the parliamentary calendar. Speakers of parliaments can participate in important coordinating functions of legislatures, such as appointing committee members, allocating bills to committees, receiving bills from committees, choosing rules for plenary sessions, administering parliamentary staff and personnel, communicating with the executive, etc. During the debate in the plenary session of the parliaments, the speakers are responsible for determining the members who wish to speak and for conducting speeches within the time limits and parliamentary decency. At the same time, the basic principle is the division of parliamentary chairmen into party and non-party ones, although the functions of the latter in this case are usually more limited than the roles of party leaders of legislatures²⁴.

In general, the study argued that the political and institutional structuring of parliaments should be based on such indicators and markers as the number of chambers of parliaments, party-factional features of the legislature, determinants of parliamentary committees' influence on the structuring of parliaments, and individual membership of deputies at the level of legislatures.

It is these characteristics that constitute the immanent internal component of national parliaments and ultimately describe to what extent legislatures are stable, institutionalized and competitive, etc. In contrast, however, there are additional factors of structuring and resource content of legislatures. These are, for example, the various procedural attributes of parliaments that do not require special consideration but are related to the internal aspects of structuring. The most focused among them are the legislative schedule, agenda and calendar, plenary decisions, debates, amendments, staff selection, monitoring of parliaments, reporting, and institutional verification.

²⁴ Cox G., McCubbins M., *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

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FORMATION, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING LOCAL POLITICAL REGIMES IN UKRAINE: A MAXIMALIST APPROACH

The relevance of the study of local political regimes in Ukraine has been growing since the 2010s. This is due to the need to predict the behavior of the local political actors after the transfer of a large number of authorities to them due to the reform of decentralization of power. In addition, practical studies of local political regimes make it possible to highlight the main features of formal and informal relationships between local political actors and with the central government, covering the essence and effects of the process of decentralization of power in Ukraine. In this sense, the purpose of the article is to determine the key parameters of local political regimes; analysis of the methods used by Ukrainian scientists when studying local political regimes in Ukraine; defining parameters for comparing local political regimes in the Ukrainian context based on a maximalist approach. Based on the results of the study, a periodization of existing studies of local political regimes in Ukraine is proposed, in particular, taking into account existing studies in the format of case studies and regional comparisons. Based on them, the key parameters for the formation of a methodology for comparing local political regimes are identified, which should include indices and indicators for analyzing democracy and the level of decentralization of power within the local regime, as well as identifying the influence of local authorities, business and civil society on the process of forming the agenda and determining strategic directions of socio-economic growth.

Keywords: local political regime, regional elite, local authorities, local self-government bodies, local business, civil society, agenda.

Ustalenie, problemy i perspektywy rozwoju metod badania lokalnych reżimów politycznych na Ukrainie: podejście maksymalne

Znaczenie badania lokalnych reżimów politycznych na Ukrainie rośnie od lat 2010-h. Wynika to z konieczności przewidywania zachowań lokalnych aktorów politycznych po przekazaniu znacznej części ich uprawnień w wyniku reformy decentralizacyjnej. Ponadto praktyczne badania lokalnych reżimów politycznych pozwalają uwypuklić główne cechy formalnych i nieformalnych relacji lokalnych aktorów politycznych między sobą oraz z władzą centralną, obejmując istotę procesu decentralizacji władzy na Ukrainie. W tym sensie celem

artyкулу jest: określenie kluczowych parametrów lokalnych reżimów politycznych; analiza metod stosowanych przez ukraińskich naukowców badających lokalne reżimy polityczne na Ukrainie; zdefiniowanie parametrów dla porównania lokalnych reżimów politycznych w kontekście ukraińskim w oparciu o podejście maksymalistyczne. Na podstawie wyników badań proponuje się periodyzację istniejącego wywiadu na temat lokalnych reżimów politycznych na Ukrainie, w szczególności uwzględniając istniejące opracowania w formie studium przypadku i porównań regionalnych. Na ich podstawie określa się kluczowe parametry kształtowania metodologii porównań regionalnych. Na ich podstawie określa się kluczowe parametry kształtowania metodologii porównań lokalnych ustrojów politycznych, które powinny obejmować indeksy i wskaźniki do analizy demokracji i poziomu decentralizacji władzy w ramach ustroju lokalnego, jak również określenie wpływu samorządu, biznesu i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego na proces kształtowania agendy i określania strategicznych kierunków rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego.

Słowa kluczowe: lokalny reżim polityczny, elita regionalna, samorząd terytorialny, organy samorządu terytorialnego, lokalny biznes, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, agenda.

СТАНОВЛЕННЯ, ПРОБЛЕМИ ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ РОЗВИТКУ МЕТОДИКИ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ ЛОКАЛЬНИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕЖИМІВ В УКРАЇНІ: МАКСИМАЛІСТСЬКИЙ ПІДХІД

Актуальність дослідження локальних політичних режимів в Україні зростає з 2010-х рр. Це пов'язано з потребою прогнозувати поведінку локальних політичних акторів після передачі їм значної частини повноважень завдяки реформі децентралізації влади. Крім того, практичні дослідження локальних політичних режимів дають можливість виділяти основні особливості формальних та неформальних взаємовідносин локальних політичних акторів між собою та з центральною владою, охоплюючи сутність й ефекти процесу децентралізації влади в Україні. В цьому сенсі мета статті полягає у: визначенні ключових параметрів локальних політичних режимів; аналізі методик, які використовували українські вчені, вивчаючи локальні політичні режими в Україні; означенні параметрів задля порівняння локальних політичних режимів в українському контексті на підставі максималістського підходу. За результатами дослідження запропоновано періодизацію наявних розвідок локальних політичних режимів в Україні, зокрема з урахуванням наявних досліджень у форматі кейс-стаді та регіональних порівнянь. На їхній основі означено ключові параметри формування методики порівняння локальних політичних режимів, яка має включати індекси й індикатори задля аналізу демократичності та рівня децентралізації влади в рамках локального режиму, а також означити вплив локально

влади, бізнесу та громадянського суспільства на процес формування порядку денного і визначення стратегічних напрямів соціально-економічного зростання.

Ключові слова: *локальний політичний режим, регіональна еліта, локальна влада, органи місцевого самоврядування, локальний бізнес, громадянське суспільство, порядок денний.*

In the last decade, the number of studies of local political regimes has been growing in Ukrainian political science. In the Ukrainian context, this is primarily due to the process of decentralization of power, which began in 2014. However world/Western political science, active study of local political regimes began in the 1980s. 20th century and was due to three factors: 1) internationalization – a decrease in the influence of the government “from above” due to the growing role of international organizations and transnational corporations; 2) regionalization – an increase in local and regional demands, especially large agglomerations, in relation to the center, the growth of their influence on the policy of the government as a whole; 3) development of market and civil society.¹

At the same time, the main prerequisites for the growth of the concept meaning of “local political regime” are the development of a new methodological direction of political science – neo-institutionalism – as well as an increase in the number of theoretical developments related to the allocation of local politics as an important area of political research. The expediency of identifying local political regimes lies in the spread of processes of decentralization of power, the ability to analyze in more detail the vertical relations in the government (along the center–periphery line) and the motives of the political actors involved in these interactions. Also, this concept makes it possible to analyze differences in the economic development of cities and their agglomerations, to study in more detail the features of hybrid political regimes and creates opportunities for developing an effective regional policy etc.

It is noteworthy that the conceptual foundations for the study of local political regimes began to be laid in the first empirical investigations of power in urban communities (since the 20s of the XX century), which were subsequently developed in a comparative analysis of power, as well as in Marxist and multidimensional concepts of power in urban communities. The foundations of these studies were laid by F. Hunter (elitist school, reputational method), R. Dahl (pluralistic school, decision analysis method) and R. Presthus (method synthesis). In addition, the current stage of research on local political regimes became possible due to the emergence of the concepts of “growth machines” (H. Molotch) and “urban regimes” (K. Stone), also the concept of “subnational political regime”. Given the significant number of approaches to the definition of the term “local political regime”, almost all of them come down to understanding this phenomenon as specific features of the formation of the agenda, in which the “rules of the

¹ М. Кутялн, *Новий реґіоналізм в Западній Європі*, Лохос 2003, nr. 6, s. 67–116.

game” are formed, interested actors from different fields interact and in order to develop, adopt and implement decisions in a specific city or urban agglomeration, etc.

We, in turn, and taking into account the existing scientific developments, conceptualize the local political regime as a set of stable institutional and behavioral features that determine the “rules of the game” and the strategy of a territory compactly limited in area with a significant population density (city, city with suburban areas, urban agglomeration) in the process of interaction between the political actors and institutions of this space in the triangle “authority – business – civil society” and along the line “local self-government bodies – government power at the central level with its derivatives”.² In addition, we proceed from the fact that the functioning of local political regimes is influenced by stable (unchanging in the short term) and dynamic characteristics. Among the stable indicators are geographical location, natural and climatic features, democratic and other resources and prerequisites, historical and cultural prerequisites, the socio-economic context of the city, region and government as a whole. Meanwhile dynamic indicators are changing (in the short and medium term) features under the influence of national, regional or local aspects. First of all, this is a change in the established “rules of the game”, strategic goals and, consequently, the agenda in the city. However, local political regimes are not stable, but dynamic and can change in the medium term under the influence of national factors or even with changes in regional and local characteristics.³

It is also important that local political regimes depend on the political and institutional external features that are emerging around them, namely: “rules of the game”, which are determined and established by federal (in federal governments), national and regional laws and regulations; informal management mechanisms between the local and central levels of policy and management, municipalities from the center and regions; existing relationships between key political actors, their resources and strategies of behavior at the federal/national and regional levels of government. These features determine the political possibilities of local regimes (the totality of resources that determine the likelihood of the emergence of certain institutions and practices, the forms of their activity and the results of functioning). At the same time, political opportunities, in contrast to structural characteristics, are more changing and dynamic in the short-term perspective.

Accordingly, it is quite obvious that the functioning of a local political regime is necessarily carried out under the influence of several factors that are hierarchically interconnected: 1) structural characteristics external to the regime; 2) political opportunities that define the political and institutional sphere of the regime and set incentives for political actors; 3) the

² S. Rishko, Indeksy y indykatory dlia analizu lokalnykh rezhymiv ta yikhnoi koreliatsii z natsionalnymy rezhymamy: teoretyko-metodolohichniy kontekst, [w:] Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky: zb. st. i tez za rezultamy mizhnar. nauk. konf. «Mali politychni partii ta aktory u politychnomu protsesi na rehionalnomu ta lokalnomu (subnatsionalnomu) rivniakh: Ukraina i svit» – shostoï u ramkakh serii mizhnar. konf. kafedry politolohii «Politychni partii i vybory: ukrainski ta svitovi praktyky», Lviv 2022, nr. 6, s. 257.

³ V. Helman, Vlast, upravleniye y lokalnyye rezhimy v Rossii: ramky analiza, Nepriykosnennyyi zapas 2010, nr. 2. URL: <https://magazines.gorky.media/nz/2010/2/vlast-upravleniye-i-lokalnye-rezhimy-v-rossii-ramki-analiza.html> [10.05.2022].

mechanisms of political and economic management carried out at the highest levels of power through the political course. The result of their activity is the formation of established interactions of political actors within the framework defined by certain institutions that emerge on three interconnected arenas of the local level: political power, political course, and political and economic management.⁴ That is why the local political regime should be analyzed as a spatially limited level of the national regime, which has the following basic features: 1) institutional features of local institutions with established formal and informal “rules of the game”, as well as norms and sanctions for their violation; 2) the presence of local political actors (local authorities, business, civil society) with their own specific resources and behavioral strategies, methods for achieving power and realizing their own interests; 3) the existence of formal and informal “rules of conduct” between political actors at the local level (horizontal relations) and types of connections with the center (vertical relations along the “up” line) and the local community (vertical relations along the “down” line).

Compared to the government, local political regimes are more limited in space.⁵ This makes it possible to involve a greater number of analytical indices and indicators in their study. In addition, the number of comparative analysis parameters is affected by the administrative-territorial structure of a government and the type of national political regime. The more powers and democratic features/resources the administrative-territorial units have, the more favorable the conditions for the formation of their territorial, specific local and regional political regimes. It is also necessary to distinguish between the concepts of “local” and “regional” political regimes. The former are characterized by location in a compact area with a high population density (city or urban agglomeration), while the latter cover a much larger territory (regions, provinces, subjects of the federation, etc.).

Considering all this, as well as the peculiarities of the formation, problems and prospects for the development of existing methods and our intention to correct them in order to determine a new methodology for studying local political regimes, mainly in the Ukrainian context, in the article we: first, briefly and historiographically define how the process of studying this phenomenon in Ukraine develops; and after that we will attempt to correct the existing methods and develop our own tools for studying local political regimes in Ukraine.

In a historiographical context, it is advisable to note that in the first decade of the 21st century there were practically no studies, the purpose of which was a purposeful study of local, regional or subnational levels of the political regime in Ukraine. The exception is the dissertation by V. Romanova (2009; the expediency of identifying and studying political regimes at

⁴ V. Helman, *Vlast, upravleniye y lokalnyye rezhimy v Rossii: ramky analiza*, Nepriykosnennyy zapas 2010, nr. 2. URL: <https://magazines.gorky.media/nz/2010/2/vlast-upravlenie-i-lokalnye-rezhimy-v-rossii-ramki-analiza.html> [10.05.2022].

⁵ V. Lediacev, *Horodskyye politycheskiye rezhimy: teoriya y opyt empiryicheskogo issledovaniya*, Polytycheskaia nauka 2008, nr. 3, s. 32–60.

the regional level, the features of their transformation in Ukraine),⁶ as well as scientific articles by Y. Balanovskyi (2009; analysis of the concepts of urban political coalitions)⁷ and M. Lendel (2009); the factors of growth in the number of studies of local regimes are analyzed and the concept of urban regimes is considered).⁸ In contrast, Ukrainian researchers have actively explored political regimes in a national context, regional, cultural and ethno-political manifestations of Ukrainian identity (mainly at the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), features of regional elites and regional studies in general. All this laid the foundation for the intensification of studies of the political regime at the local, regional or subnational levels.

However, in the early 2010s also not marked by the intensification of research on local political regimes. So, in the collection of articles published in 2012 "Scientific Notes" (No. 62) of the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine⁹ devoted exclusively to the subject of political regimes, there was not a single material on the study of local or regional regimes. Practical studies of regional identity were continued at the level of specific cities and regions, in particular through the prism of electoral preferences, and this concerned Odesa (T. Bevz), Dnipropetrovsk region (O. Vysotskyi), Bukovina (N. Rotar), Chernihiv (V. Yaremchuk), Poltava (O. Zorych), Luhansk (A. Zykivska), Donbass (T. Bevz), Chernivtsi region (A. Kruhlashov, O. Shcherbatyuk, N. Rotar). In parallel with this, the process of studying the concepts of local and regional political regimes and their methodology continued on the basis of foreign developments, noticed in the works of such Ukrainian researchers as: M. Lengyel (2011; review of formal and factual approaches to research)¹⁰, O. Mazur (2011; the concept of local political regimes), P. Levchuk (2013; theoretical analysis of the type of local regime "growth coalition")¹¹, S. Rybalka (2014, 2015; definition of the concept of "regional political regime" and the model of interaction between regional regimes and elites, methods of studying local political regimes)¹², V. Pashchenko (2015; analysis of approaches to the study of power in local communities)¹³, M. Shabanov (2015; analysis of the features of local regimes, the allocation of municipal government, urban business and active civil society institutions, which, in interaction with each other, form the agenda, as well as the definition

⁶ V. Romanova, Politychnyi rezhym u natsionalnomu ta rehionalnomu formati, IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2008, nr. 38, s. 257–265.

⁷ Ya. Balanovskyi, Teoretyko-metodolohichniy potentsial kontseptsii mislykhyk politychnykh koalitsii, Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho universytetu. Ser.: Filosofiia. Sotsiologiia. Politologiia 2009, nr. 19, s. 268–274.

⁸ M. Lendel, Lokalni politychni studii yak komplementarnyi pidkhid do doslidzhennia polityky, Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA 2009, s. 27–32.

⁹ Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2012, nr. 6(62), s. 391.

¹⁰ M. Lendel, Suchasni metodolohichni pidkhody do doslidzhennia lokalnykh politychnykh protsesiv (na prykladi Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy), Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriiia filosofsko-politolohichni studii 2011, nr. 1, s. 168–176.

¹¹ P. Levchuk, Sotsiialnyi sensy harmonizatsii lokalnoho prostoru, Filosofiia i politologiia v konteksti suchasnoi kultury 2013, nr. 6(4), s. 126–129.

¹² S. Rybalka, Rehionalnyi politychnyi rezhym ta rehionalna politychna elita: sposoby vzaiemodii u tranzhytnykh suspilstvakh, Hileia: naukovi visnyk 2014, nr. 83, s. 374–377.

¹³ Rybalka, Osoblyvosti doslidzhennia struktury vlady v mislykhyk spilnotakh v Ukraini, Aktualni problemy polityky 2015, nr. 55, s. 106–115.

¹⁴ V. Pashchenko, Osoblyvosti doslidzhennia struktury vlady v mislykhyk spilnotakh v Ukraini, Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2015, nr. 2, s. 241–252.

of external and internal factors of local regimes)¹⁴. In the end, in 2014, V. Lytvyn's textbook "Political Regimes of Modernity: Institutional and Procedural Dimensions of Analysis"¹⁵, and in 2015, A. Mazur's dissertation on the topic "Conceptualization of the Political Regime in Conditions of Democratic Transformation in Ukraine" were published¹⁶. In these works, studies of political regimes are actually summed up, the terminology, typology and methodology of their study are clearly indicated. In addition, V. Lytvyn's research analyzed the methodological features of the study of subnational political regimes, which became an important component of subsequent studies of both regional/subnational and local political regimes.

In contrast, active applied research of local and regional political regimes in Ukraine begins only in 2016, in particular, the authorship of such scientists as: T. Bevz (the local regime of the Dnipro in 2010-2015; the regional political regime of the Dnipropetrovsk region in 1991-2016 and 2014-2018), O. Zorich (regional regime of Poltava and the region in the first half of the 90s of the twentieth century), N. Rotar (local and regional regimes of Chernivtsi and the region), V. Yaremchuk (local and regional regimes of Lviv and Lviv region; political elite of the Ivano-Frankivsk region), A. Kruglashov and A. Kuchuran (local regime of Chernivtsi), A. Yasinska (regional regime of Kharkiv region; political regional elite of Lviv region), V. Hnatiyk (subnational political regimes of the Transcarpathian, Lviv and Chernivtsi regions in the period 2010-2015), M. Horbatiyk (regional political regime of the Vinnytsia region). In addition, the number of scientific developments in the theoretical aspect of studying local and regional political regimes has also grown, in particular, the authorship of such scientists as M. Horbatiyk, M. Karmazina, A. Kuchuran, T. Bevz, S. Yanishevskyi, A. Bondarenko, N. Rotar, V. Hnatiyk, V. Krivoshein, M. Horbatiyk. If to compare the number of theoretical and practical publications on the study of local and regional political regimes, then in the period of 2016-2021, according to our calculations, 15 scientific materials of exclusively theoretical content and 39 scientific publications were published, which also contained the practical part of the study (although a significant part of them was focused on the analysis of the local/regional elite). In addition, since 2016, on the basis of the Department of Political Science of the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, annual international scientific conferences "Political Parties and Elections: Ukrainian and World Practices" (in memory of Y. Shveda) the problems of which are defined, in particular, by practical local and regional studies related to the study of local political regimes or the direction of their concern. Among the main topics of the conferences: regional features of the formation and development of political parties in Ukraine; party and other political actors of the regional level in Ukraine and the world; parameters of the regional political process in Ukraine and in the world; features of the regional electoral process in Ukraine, etc.

¹⁴ M. Shabanov, *Miskyi politychnyi rezhym u konteksti suchasnykh tsyvilizatsiynykh zmin*, *Perspektyvy* 2015, nr. 2(64), s. 150-157.

¹⁵ V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu: navchalnyi posibnyk*, Lviv, LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 632.

¹⁶ O. Mazur, *Kontseptualizatsiia politychnoho rezhymu v umovakh demokratychnoi transformatsii v Ukraini*, *Sievierodonetsk, Skhidnoukrainskyi Natsionalnyi universytet imeni Volodymyra Dalia* 2015, s. 433.

Thus, having analyzed the development of the study of local and regional political regimes in Ukraine from the moment the first developments were published until the end of 2021, we identified three stages in the formation and development of these studies: 1) the first stage (1991-2008) – the formation of the Ukrainian political science school, the study of aspects of political regimes at the national level, Ukrainian identity, the political elite and other national political processes and institutions, the formation of a foundation for the study of local and regional, and in general subnational political regimes; 2) the second stage (2009-2015) – the emergence of the first theoretical developments that concerned the study of local and regional (subnational) political regimes, the study of regional identities, the generalization of studies of the political regime at the national level; 3) the third stage (from 2016 until now) – the emergence and activation of practical research on local and regional (subnational) political regimes. It was within the framework of the third stage that the problem of testing various research methods and finding a universal methodology for conducting comparative studies of local and regional (subnational) political regimes in the Ukrainian context arose.

In general, based on the consideration of the historiography of the subject under study, we can government that on the basis of Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and thanks to the annual international scientific conferences “Political Parties and Elections: Ukrainian and World Practices” in Ukrainian political science, a new direction of local and regional (subnational) research has been formed, which has significant theoretical and practical prospects for political actors, participating in the process of development, adoption and implementation of public policies at the local and regional level, and civil society institutions involved in the control and monitoring of these policies. At the same time, practically oriented studies of local and regional (subnational) political regimes in Ukraine are quite similar, which is due to the unitary administrative-territorial structure of this government. In addition, the study of local political regimes is primarily associated with large cities, which in most cases are regional centers. Studies of regional political regimes are reduced to analysis within the territory of the regions. However, in regional political regimes, the greatest importance is still attached to cities with the status of regional centers, since they concentrate most of the economic, labor, information resources, etc., and their agenda affects the characteristics of entire regions.

Despite the conceptualization of local political regimes based on the legacies of foreign scientists, their practical research in Ukraine has its own methodological features, in particular, taking into account the national context. In fact, there is still a process of formation of methodology and methods for studying local political regimes, which would have a universal character for the implementation of comparative studies. In this context, we note that, for example, the methodological features of studies of local and regional (subnational) political regimes by T. Bevz, N. Rotar, V. Yaremchuk, A. Zorych, A. Yasinska and M. Horbatiuk are quite similar in their logic and structure. Let us briefly present the main aspects of the research of each of the authors.

So, first studying the local political regime of Dnipro in the period of 2010-2015, T. Bevz focused exclusively on the electoral component, through which the rules for the formation of local governments are determined, the electoral process is influenced and the configuration of political parties is formed at the level of the city council. Basically, the author's research concerned the comparison of the results of the elections of 2010 and 2015 to the Dnipro City Council. An important aspect was to identify the key areas that received the most representation in the city council, as well as to study the impact of the positioning of candidates for the position of mayor of the city, especially the winner of the election, as well as the course of the electoral process and its results.¹⁷ In later scientific works devoted to the analysis of the regional political regime of the Dnipropetrovsk region, T. Bevz noted that the nature of the cooperation of the political actors of the regime depends on: 1) its formation or blocking; 2) breadth of the regime (number and variety of participants); 3) regime efficiency.¹⁸ In view of this, she expanded the research methodology, including the following aspects: 1) the economic conditions for the formation of the regime; 2) the history of the formation of the regime; 3) the status and characteristics of the regime's elite; 4) determination of the influence of financial and industrial groups on the functioning of the regime; 5) the influence of regional identity and electoral sympathies of residents in the territory of the regime; 6) features of the interaction of local self-government bodies of the regime with the regional government administration and the central government as a whole.¹⁹ Even later, she added to this list of indicators an analysis of sociological data on the support of regional authorities, a study of key decisions of local governments and the regional government administration,²⁰ as well as the features of the communication component.²¹ In addition, the researcher did not disregard the value aspects of political identities (but on the example of studying the regional elite of the Sumy region).²² Therefore, according to T. Bevs, the main elements that construct a local or regional political regime should be considered: political actors (subjects of social action with a strategy to achieve political goals); institutions (a set of established norms and rules of political activity (formal/informal institutions)); resources (attribute, circumstance and good, the possession of which increases the ability to influence other individuals or groups). At the same time, the researcher

¹⁷ T. Bevz, *Mistsevi vybory yak zasib lehytymatsii lokalnoho politychnoho rezhymu* (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv 2010 ta 2015 rr. u Dnipropetrovsku), *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2016, nr. 1, s. 127, 146.

¹⁸ T. Bevz, *Pidstavy formuvannya, spetsyfika funktsionuvannya ta osoblyvosti transformatsii rehionalnoho politychnoho rezhymu Dnipropetrovska (1991-2016 rr.)*, *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2016, nr. 1, s. 56.

¹⁹ T. Bevz, *Rehionalni politychni rezhymy Dnipropetrovshchyny: etapy formuvannya, spetsyfika funktsionuvannya ta osoblyvosti transformatsii*, *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2017, nr. 2, s. 78.

²⁰ M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, N. Rotar, *Rehionalni politychni rezhymy v Ukraini: pidstavy formuvannya, spetsyfika funktsionuvannya, osoblyvosti transformatsii*, Kyiv, IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2018, s. 125-126.

²¹ T. Bevz, *Rehionalni osoblyvosti funktsionuvannya politychnoi systemy Ukrainy v konteksti hlobalizatsiynoho vykydku pandemii COVID-19*, *Society. Document. Communication* 2020, nr. 9/2, s. 11-32.

²² M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, M. Horbatiuk, O. Zorych, *Rehionalni politychni elity v Ukraini: osoblyvosti formuvannya, tsinnosti ta identychnosti (kinets 1991-2019 rr.)*, Kyiv, IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2020, s. 89-90.

focuses excessive attention on the method of personification (linking the regime with the personality of the mayor, head of the regional government administration, etc.).²³

The study of local and regional aspects of the political regime in Chernivtsi and the Chernivtsi region was based on the monograph by N. Rotar, which focuses on the formation and reproduction of the political identities of the city's residents and their self-identification. Symbolic resources, according to the researcher, are functionally related to identification, are designed to consolidate the regional community and legitimize political practices and interaction between the main subjects of the regime in the mass political consciousness. Symbolic resources reflecting the connection between the regional community and the national political space are formed in the process of understanding the connection between them in historical, cultural and political aspects. Among the symbolic resources of the Chernivtsi region, N. Rotar singled out the historical name, interethnic tolerance and Europeanness of the region.²⁴

In her later works, N. Rotar identified four key indicators that influence the construction of a local or regional political regime: 1) presidential discourse, which conceptualizes the very concept of a region; 2) electoral legislation, through which local authorities are formed and legitimized; 3) the impact of parliamentary activities in the context of regional policy development; 4) the government as an institution for the implementation of regional policy. However, the specifics of the institutional design of each specific political institution is determined by the peculiarities of the formation and functioning of such institutions as the institutions of the head of the regional government administration, parties, local self-government, public organizations, Euroregional cooperation, united communities and mediator institutions. In addition, the external positioning of the regional regime is determined by its relationship with the regions and cities of other countries, especially when it comes to cross-border cooperation.²⁵ Also, N. Rotar dwelled on a detailed analysis of the economic, educational and scientific resources of the region, the information environment.²⁶ Like other researchers of local or regional political regimes in Ukraine, N. Rotar analyzed in detail the results of local elections in the region and the interaction of local governments with the chairman of the Regional Government Administration.²⁷ At the same time, in order to be able to compare the regional regime of the Chernivtsi region with others in Ukraine, N. Rotar took into account various ratings that illustrate the socio-economic indicators of the region, the success of reforms, etc. (data from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) and ratings of non-profit organizations ("Regional Doing Business"

²³ T. Bevz, *Teoretyko-metodolohichni pidkhody ta alhorytm doslidzhennia politychnykh identychnosti u miskii hromadi*. URL: <http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/handle/123456789/13345> [10.05.2022].

²⁴ N. Rotar, *Symvolichni resursy chernivetskoho rehionalnogo politychnoho rezhymu*, *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2016, nr 81(1), s. 114.

²⁵ N. Rotar, *Instytutsiyni dyzain rehionalnogo politychnoho rezhymu u Chernivetskii oblasti*, *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2017, nr 88(2), s.46-47,55.

²⁶ N. Rotar, *Dynamika strukturykh resursiv rehionalnogo politychnoho rezhymu u Chernivetskii oblasti*, *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu: zb. nauk. statei*. Chernivtsi, ChNU 2017, nr. 35-36. s. 364.

²⁷ N. Rotar, *Vybory yak mekhanizm formuvannia i dynamiky rehionalnogo politychnoho rezhymu u Chernivetskii oblasti*, *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I.F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2018, nr. 93(1), s. 205-227.

ease of doing business rating, Ukrainian Cities Transparency Rating, Public Monitoring of Energy Efficiency).²⁸

In addition, N. Rotar separately studied the processes of dialogue or communication in the local space. Yes, in her opinion, the use of dialogue forms of political participation at all levels of the public administration system is the principle of an open partnership between the authorities and citizens, in which they act as equal subjects of relations. Each of the subjects of such a dialogue is endowed with certain resources that affirm their subjectivity and determine the potential for participation in it. In particular, institutional entities have a system of a special political infrastructure, citizens have the right to delegate powers to make political decisions and a number of conventional and non-conventional means of pressure on the authorities, public organizations, the institute of political expertise and the media, in particular, the ability to provide information exchange between the first two subjects of the dialogue, to accumulate and transmit the interests of citizens to the field of political discourse. N. Rotar also identified four options for dialogue between government institutions and stakeholders: 1) the traditional top-down strategy (basically, a monologue of power); 2) interaction limited from above (the authorities accept proposals from below, but do not respond to them); 3) a dialogue open to discussion (but the final choice is still with the authorities); 4) democracy of participation (open access to information, proposals from below are equivalent to proposals from the authorities).²⁹

In turn, V. Yaremchuk in his studies of the local political regime of Lviv also analyzes the formal and actual aspects, notes the factors that distinguish local political regimes from each other, including: the level of political culture and historical and cultural traditions of the region, the government of socio-economic development, the presence of charismatic regional political leaders, the configuration of the local party system, the level of internal autonomy along the line of “center – region” relations. In his opinion, the configuration of the local regime is determined by the interaction of four political actors: the city community as a whole, the city council, the regional council and the regional government administration. The researcher attaches great importance to the opposition “city regime – center” in different periods, in particular, in order to emphasize the higher level of democracy of the local regime.³⁰ In addition, the researcher analyzed the influence of history, culture, the wave of national revival on the functioning of the regime, that is, local identity. V. Yaremchuk also notes the importance of the representative component in the city council, analyzes the areas from which city deputies were elected, as well as changes in the deputy corps during different cadences. And as before, the researcher focuses on the personified factor, the analysis of the personal influence of the mayors and votes of the

²⁸ N. Rotar, *Zastosuvannya instrumentiv reitynhovoho otsiniuvannya funktsionalnosti rehionalnykh politychnykh elit* (na prykladi Chernivetskoï oblasti), *Naukovi zapysky IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2019, nr. 1 (97), s. 125-126.

²⁹ N. Rotar, *Kontseptualizatsiia politychnoho dialohu v prostori lokalnoi polityky Ukrainy, Vlada ta upravlinnia: zb. nauk. prats, nr. 8*, Chernivtsi, Bukrek 2021, s. 27-28.

³⁰ V. Yaremchuk, *Miskyi politychnyi rezhym u Lvovi: vnutrishni i zovnishni chynnyky formuvannia ta evoliutsii*, *Naukovi zapysky IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 2016, nr. 1, s. 91-92.

regional government administration on the formation of the agenda. To determine the key political actors of the local regime, Yaremchuk takes into account various ratings of the most influential people in the city in the categories of “politics”, “power”, “business”, “culture”.³¹ Also, his research analyzes the impact of institutions created to improve communication between local authorities, businesses and residents in the city, provides statistical data in terms of openness and transparency of local politics. Finally, in some studies of the local political regime in Lviv, Yaremchuk singled out the study of public participation as a separate component.

In later works, V. Yaremchuk, studying the features of an already regional political regime, draws attention to the fact that such studies depend on the resource and information base. Accordingly, the more information you can get from different sources, the more thorough the study will be. At the same time, it is necessary to use an interdisciplinary methodology of cognition, in particular, a combination of legal and sociological approaches, structural-functional, behavioral methods of cognition, etc., which involves the study of both formal legal norms and informal (real) practices in the implementation of policy in the region with the involvement of a wide range of political actors – competing groups of political actors, pressure groups, etc.³² Among the key aspects of the resource base of the study, V. Yaremchuk singled out: 1) geographical location; 2) historical and cultural factors; 3) area of the territory; 4) the number and ethnic composition of the population; 5) functioning of large budget-forming enterprises; 6) labor resources; 7) transport infrastructure; 8) economic indicators of imports and exports; 9) production structure; 10) results of sociological research; 11) documents on the websites of central and regional bodies of government power and local self-government, personal websites of political actors of the region, websites of public organizations; 12) scientific research; 13) achievements of analytical centers; 14) publications and other materials in the media, journalistic intelligence, etc. Thus, analyzing the source base for the study of the political elite of the Ivano-Frankivsk region, V. Yaremchuk singled out the importance of research by the Civil movement “CHESNO”, national public organization “OPORA”, national public organization “Committee of Voters of Ukraine”, national public organization “Anti-corruption action centre”, as well as local rankings to highlight the most influential people in the area.³³ But the researcher again determined the functioning of the regime through: 1) features of the relationship with the center; 2) party affiliation of the heads of cities and regional government administrations; 3) the representative composition of local self-government bodies (party affiliation and employment); 4) personnel appointments; 5) parameters of functioning and influence of financial and industrial groups; 6) priority areas of work of political parties

³¹ V. Yaremchuk, *Miskiy politychniy rezhym u Lvovi: vnutrishni i zovnishni chynnyky formuvannya ta evoliutsii*, Naukovi zapysky IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2016, nr. 1, s. 100.

³² V. Yaremchuk, *Rehionalni politychni rezhymy v Ukraini: Lvivshchyna (1990-2017 rr.)*, Kyiv, IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2018, s. 8-9.

³³ V. Yaremchuk V. *Politychna elita Ivano-Frankivskoi oblasti: dzherelnna baza doslidzhennia*, Naukovi zapysky IPiEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2019, nr. 1 (91), s. 193.

within the framework of the regime; 7) competition during the electoral process; 8) determination of the most influential people due to different public ratings; 9) socio-political moods of city dwellers.

Similarly, O. Zorychin his studies of the regional political regime of the Poltava region among the important aspects of the study highlights the geographical positioning of the region, its historical positioning and modern image, the transformation of socio-political sentiments and electoral sympathies of residents, the positioning of the heads of cities and indicators, access to resources of financial and industrial groups, political affiliation of business leaders, features and value orientations of the regional elite (political, economic, cultural, “shadow”), aspects of the functioning of regional media, etc.³⁴ Exploring the regional political regime of the Kharkiv region, A. Yasinska also analyzes the historical prerequisites for the formation of the regime, the characteristics of the regional elite, the results of local elections, relations with the central government, the importance of key enterprises in shaping the agenda, the impact of the Revolution of Dignity on the socio-political moods of the inhabitants of the region.³⁵ Again, the key research method is the influence of the mayor and the chairman of the regional government administration on the development and adoption of decisions. In the study of the regional elite of the Lviv region, A. Yasinska classifies it into three groups: 1) elected elite (people’s deputies of Ukraine, chairmen and deputies of regional, city, district, etc.); 2) appointed elite (chairmen of regional government administrations, their deputies, heads of structural divisions, etc.); 3) the elite, which, thanks to financial resources, authority, access to information and the formation of public sentiment, family ties, common business interests, etc., exerts its influence (representatives of property classes, business and media environment, organized crime, etc.).³⁶ An additional aspect of local and regional political regimes was studied by M. Horbatiuk. Thus, on the example of the Vinnytsia region, he analyzed the motives on which the regional elites act, contributing to or blocking the processes of formation of the amalgamated territorial community.³⁷

In addition to the works of these scientists, the work of A. Kruhlashov and A. Kuchuran was also devoted to significant studies of the local political regime of Chernivtsi. They used the concept of “urban arenas” by B. Ferman and P. Pererson to determine the specifics of the conflict between the mayor and the business elites of Chernivtsi, who controlled most of the deputy mandates in the city council. This conflict had a negative impact on the use of budgetary funds, the distribution of resources and hindered any decisions regarding the development

³⁴ M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, M. Horbatiuk, O. Zorych, *Rehionalni politychni elity v Ukraini: osoblyvosti formuvannya, tsinnosti ta identychnosti* (kinets 1991–2019 rr.), Kyiv, IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2020, s.86.

³⁵ A. Yasinska, *Pidstavy formuvannya rehionalnykh politychnykh rezhymiv u Kharkivskii oblasti (1991–2017 rr.)*, Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2018, nr. 1(93), s. 176–2014.

³⁶ A. Yasinska, *Rehionalna politychna elita Lvivshchyny: osoblyvosti stanovlennia (1990–2019 rr.)*, Society. Document. Communication 2021, nr. 13, s. 260–261.

³⁷ M. Horbatiuk, *Detsentralizatsiia i rehionalni politychni elity (na prykladi Vinnytskoi oblasti)*, Narodna tvorchist ta etnolohiia 2019, nr. 3(379), s. 76–88.

of the city.³⁸ Kuchuran also identified five aspects that need to be analyzed in the context of the study of local political regimes: 1) the general context of the functioning of the regime (geographic location, resource availability, socio-economic indicators, the powers of local self-government bodies and the type of electoral system); 2) identification of members of the ruling coalition (based on positional, reputational and problematic methods, as well as other methods); 3) a description of the available resources of the members of the ruling coalition; 4) determination on the basis of the listed resources of the interests of the members of the ruling coalition (especially through the analysis of conflict solutions); 5) the agenda of the functioning of the ruling coalition (official decisions, texts, program documents of the local self-government bodies, governments by the heads of cities and other influential political actors).³⁹

In the end, N. Karmazina proposed her list of components for the study of local political regimes, of which: 1) geographical, geopolitical, historical-political, ethno-national, socio-economic and cultural conditions for the functioning of communities in the region; 2) legal grounds for the development or degradation of the regional regime; 3) the resource base of the region; 4) features of the establishment and implementation of the rules of the game in the region; 5) the specifics of the interaction of formal and informal political actors at the regional level; 6) mechanisms of access to power and decision-making; 7) ways of distributing resources between regional political actors, as well as between them and the central government; 8) the specifics of the interaction strategy (through consensus, conflict, corruption, the use of administrative resources and other informal practices) of political and economic political actors along the horizontal and vertical lines of power and with the masses (in particular, the use of manipulation mechanisms, confrontation with civil society structures, etc.). In addition, given the development of regional political parties after the decentralization reform and changes in the electoral system in Ukraine, their study in the context of local political studies is also important.⁴⁰

Accordingly, it can be stated that all these studies of local or regional political regimes in Ukraine are cases of single comparisons (or case studies). They study the features of the relationship between key political actors, and the development of the regimes themselves is in a certain way divided into periods. Despite the excessive descriptiveness in such studies, it is still possible to generalize in a certain way the features of the study of the local regime. But such an approach, in our opinion, does not fully or completely make it possible to compare local or regional political regimes due to the lack of a universal approach and significant differences in the source base of research, etc. At the same time, the first comparative study of regional

³⁸ A. Kruhlov, A. Kuchuran, *Areny miskoi polityky: teoriia i praktychnyi pryklad* Chernivtsiv: Politolohichni ta pravnychi studii suspilno-politychnykh protsesiv KhX-pochatku XXI st.: zb. nauk. prats 2017, s. 111-118.

³⁹ A. Kuchuran, *Biznes yak politychnyi aktor miskykh politychnykh rezhymiv*, Visnyk Mariupolskoho derzhavnoho universytetu. Serii: Istorii. Politolohii 2016, nr. 15, s. 247-248.

⁴⁰ M. Karmazina, T. Bevz, N. Rotar, *Rehionalni politychni rezhymy v Ukraini: pidstavy formuvannia, spetsyfika funktsionuvannia, osoblyvosti transformatsii*, Kyiv, IPI-END im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy 2018, s. 23, 47.

political regimes in Ukraine was carried out by V. Hnatiuk in his dissertation “Features of the functioning of political processes at the regional level (on the example of Transcarpathian, Lviv and Chernivtsi regions in 2010-2015) (2021). The main problem of previous studies of local and regional political regimes, V. Hnatiuk noted that in the Ukrainian context, the classical methodology for Western science with the use of objective (institutional) and subjective (expert) components was not created and tested.⁴¹ That is, despite the understanding of this phenomenon and its conceptualization, in Ukraine there were problems with their measurement, and therefore with comparison. To compare the subnational (regional) political regimes of the Transcarpathian, Lviv and Chernivtsi regions, V. Hnatiuk proposed his own methodology, which included both institutional and expert components, and tested it. At the same time, the author identified nine indices in the institutional component of the methodology: 1) the index of the competitiveness of the electoral field; 2) index of electoral turnout in elections; 3) the index of transparency of the electoral process; 4) civil society development index; 5) succession control index; 6) index of temporary restriction; 7) index of the effective number of parties; 8) index of ideological diversification; 9) index of confrontational strength.⁴² At the same time, the expert part of the methodology was formed on the basis of the questionnaire method, which included seven blocks of questions: 1) domineering; 2) public; 3) electoral; 4) corruption and professionalism; 5) economics; 6) problematic; 7) position of an expert.⁴³ Based on the results of the institutional and expert components, the author proposed a typology of regional political regimes: autocracy, autocracy, hybrid regime, partial democracy and democracy.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, Hnatiuk's work contains several inaccuracies or misunderstandings, but this is evident precisely, if we talk about them in the context of local rather than regional political regimes, which this researcher was engaged in. First, this is a more classical study of the political regime, which is transferred from the national level to the regional one. Based on the results of the institutional and expert methodology, this author determines the type of regional political regime along the lines of “full autocracy – full democracy”, which clearly corresponds to the classical definition of the political regime as “methods and means of power”. However, this does not answer the classic question in the study of local political regimes about “who rules”, because the model of coalition formation regarding the achievement of a common agenda between local authorities, business and civil society is relatively poorly considered. Secondly, the study is essentially limited to the beginning of electoral cycles and does not consider (does not affect) the specifics of the change in the interaction between political actors in the period between elections. Thirdly, in the work of this author there is no

⁴¹ V. Hnatiuk, *Osoblyvosti funktsionuvannia politychnykh protsesiv na rehionalnomu rivni v Ukraini (na prykladi Zakarpatskoi, Lvivskoi i Chernivetskoi oblasti u 2010-2015 rr.)*, Lviv, LNU im. I. Franka 2021. s. 49.

⁴² V. Hnatiuk, *Osoblyvosti funktsionuvannia politychnykh protsesiv na rehionalnomu rivni v Ukraini (na prykladi Zakarpatskoi, Lvivskoi i Chernivetskoi oblasti u 2010-2015 rr.)*, Lviv, LNU im. I. Franka 2021. s. 105-112.

⁴³ V. Hnatiuk, *Osoblyvosti funktsionuvannia politychnykh protsesiv na rehionalnomu rivni v Ukraini (na prykladi Zakarpatskoi, Lvivskoi i Chernivetskoi oblasti u 2010-2015 rr.)*, Lviv, LNU im. I. Franka 2021. s. 119.

analysis of cases of development, adoption and implementation of public policies that are strategically important for the development of a local or regional political regime. After all, the absence of a “decision-making” method does not allow one to determine the interests of the political actors and their influence on decision-making. Fourth, despite the huge number of indices and indicators for analyzing the political component, the analysis of the economic component (impact of business) in this methodology is very limited. In the institutional component, there is no economic component at all, and in the expert component it is represented only by the question of the economic provision of the region, which is extremely subjective, as well as questions of determining the strength of the business community in comparison with other political actors. Therefore, there is no way to evaluate business resources and identify business political actors or business communities, financial and industrial groups, etc., which have a significant impact on decision making. Fifth, aspects of civil society are also under-analyzed. In the expert part of the methodology, the influence of civil society is also determined by the assessment of the strength and positioning of public organizations and trade unions, the influence of ideology and religion, the level of political culture in terms of involvement in local/regional processes. In the institutional part of the methodology, an index was formed to assess the level of control over the formation and implementation of the agenda, but there is no assessment of changes in socio-political sentiments and the definition of local/regional identity in general. Sixth, there is no aspect that would allow one to analyze the development strategy of a local or regional political regime, that is, the identification of key growth areas for which there is consensus. Therefore, if the methodology of V. Hnatiuk is acceptable and tested in the study of regional political regimes, especially in determining their autocratic/democratic deviation from the national political regime, then for comparative studies of local political regimes in the Ukrainian context, it is appropriate to continue the search for a methodology that synthesizes an assessment of democracy / autocracy regime, as well as the features of the relationship between the key political actors in shaping the agenda and development strategy of the local regime as such.

In our opinion, when developing a methodology for studying local political regimes, two groups of approaches within the framework of neo-institutionalism, including minimalist and maximalist, are important. The minimalist approach is enough to use to determine the type of local political regime and conduct a cross-regional comparison using several indices/indicators. The maximum approach should be taken for a more thorough comparison, using as many indexes/indicators as possible to detail the specifics of the agenda-setting process in local political regimes. It is on the maximalist approach that our methodology will be based, since it is necessary to explore the relationship in the triangle “public authority – business – civil society” and along the line “central authority – regional authority – local authority”. To do this, you need to select a sufficiently large number of qualitative and quantitative indices/indicators from three areas of public life in the local community – public policy, economics and civil society.

Thus, when forming the methodology and method for studying local political regimes, it is appropriate to include existing indices/indicators of the national level of analysis of political regimes and the political system as a whole. However, with their subsequent adjustment and detailing, due to the limitation of local regimes in space, a decrease in the necessary resources for the study. In addition, the aggregation and selection of indices/indicators is important not only for political science, but also for economics, sociology and other social sciences. At the same time, we believe that a set of indices/indicators for the study of local political regimes in Ukraine should be formed in such a way that, when summarizing the results, it would be possible to assess the following processes/parameters in the city/urban agglomeration, including: the level of democratization, decentralization and ensuring the principle of subsidiarity; identification of key political actors and institutions in making strategic and operational decisions for the development of the regime; the degree of economic attractiveness, transparency of doing business, the influence of business communities and corporations on the regime; the availability and effectiveness of mechanisms for representing interests, the level of inclusion of interested groups of the public environment in the process of forming the agenda; institutional features of the formation of the agenda, the adoption and strategic directions for the development of the regime and the institutional stability of the regime, etc.

It is appropriate to mean the level of democracy of a local regime through the imposition and adaptation of existing methods for determining political regimes on a national scale. In particular, these are such projects as: index of democratization in T. Vanhanen's project, "Freedom in the world" ("Freedom House"), "Nations in transit" ("Freedom House"), "Politics IV/V", Democracy Index ("The Economist Intelligence Unit"), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) and others. The most important in this context is the determination of the level of openness, competitiveness and representation in the course of the formation of local governments, as well as transparency, proportionality of accounting diverse interests and political responsibilities during the cadence of elected bodies. It is important to determine the influence of the level of proportionality of representation on the effectiveness of the regime. In general, this aspect determines the course of the regime at the local level, the degree of its deviation from the national level, the strength and potential influence of the "center" as in a normal period, and during crises of various origins.

In turn, the level of decentralization of power as a whole can be understood as a conditional indicator of the ratio between the resources that are transferred from the local level to other levels, and the resources that ultimately end up at the disposal of local governments of the local political regime. At the same time, the principle of subsidiarity characterizes the ability of the local regime effectively manage these resources and be responsible for ensuring economic growth and social improvement.

The identification of key political institutions and decision-making actors at the local regime level is possible due to a combination of the reputation method and the decision analysis

method. First of all, it is appropriate to use indices for measuring the strength of chairmen of local governments and other significant political actors and institutions. In addition, the characteristics of the key political actors and mechanisms of functioning of the political institutions of the local regime (primarily the quality of management and communication processes) determine the ability to generate and implement creative, innovative ideas and solutions that, in general, “flow” into stable local practices. This aspect generally determines the level of localization of the political process, its features and centers of political influence.

In general, the indicators that determine the degree of democratization, decentralization and identification of key political actors and institutions should include the following: 1) features of the electoral process and the electoral system of local representative institutions (competitiveness of elections; turnout in elections; electoral preferences; active and passive suffrage proportionality of the electoral system, etc.); 2) formal (institutional) and informal (behavioral) powers (including delegated) of local self-government institutions (mayor, local councils, regional councils, etc.); 3) distribution of powers between the legislative and executive authorities (vote of no confidence in the mayor or the head of the regional government administration, approval of members of the regional leadership, overcoming the veto of the head of the regional government administration on adopted acts, the creation and operation of the Chamber of Control and Accounts, etc.); 4) representation and legitimacy of political forces on the local territory (local party system; ideological features of the parties represented; the presence of regional political parties; party fragmentation; parliamentary variability; index of the effective number of parties); 5) features of the relationship “center – regional authorities – local authorities” (through the powers of the executive branch of government, the strength of the powers of the head of the territorial administration (term, party affiliation, territorial origin, informal ties with the center and local authorities, etc.); control of local processes by the region and the center, the level of regionalization and dependence of the region on the central government, institutional restrictions on the activities of local and / or regional self-government bodies); 6) institutional and actual restrictions on power on the part of the opposition (the ability to challenge legislative and executive decisions; control succession; the opposition’s chances of winning the next election); 7) features of the local and regional political elite (level of power and control of certain resources, methods of recruitment; social charter, prestige and financial resources, level of education and political culture); 8) the method of implementing power (relative independence, initiative of local authorities or significant dependence on the center and attempts to preserve the existing government); 9) capabilities, functions and accountability of law enforcement agencies; 10) the presence of sociopolitical divisions in society and individual regions; 11) compliance of local self-government institutions with territorial customs and traditions (municipal authorities have the opportunity to independently determine the model of local self-government, taking into account local traditions, the social composition of the population, economic development, etc.); 12) the effectiveness

of non-government political institutions; 13) the presence / absence of a local coalition to obtain a certain strategic result.

In turn, the degree of economic attractiveness can be determined on the basis of indices and indicators that are used to analyze the openness of countries to do business, in particular: the ease of doing business index ("World Bank"), the corruption perception index ("Transparency International"), various investment attractiveness indices, digital transformation, etc. Again, they need to be adapted to the local level. This cluster of indicators should demonstrate the level of resource availability (their impact on other aspects of the regime), the investment attractiveness of the local regime, as well as the ability of local and other levels of business elites, enterprises and corporations to influence the formation of the agenda of the local regime. The impact of economic features on public policy in local communities depends on such features as: 1) the level of economic development of the local territory, the size of the budget and investments; 2) resource availability of the city/agglomeration; 3) the influence of local, regional, national and global business elites; 4) economic structure of the local territory and region, infrastructure development (presence or absence of one or more dominant corporations/enterprises); 5) the level of support from regional, federal, government financial and industrial groups; 6) representation of the business elite in power local or regional institutions (officials dominate in regions with a poorly developed economy and where there are many government-owned enterprises, and business representatives prevail in economically developed regions; also, the style of economic leadership is tougher than the style of political leadership, and therefore the activities of local self-government bodies differ from national institutions due to the inclusion of a large number of deputies-entrepreneurs); 7) the level of local corruption.

The presence and effectiveness of devices for the consulate and the realization of the interests of different groups at the local level also have their own special features. In this context, the "principal – agent" theory (agent theory) has, for the most part, only a material manifestation, since a change in value orientations and the adoption of appropriate political decisions are possible only at the national level. Accordingly, for analyzing the level of realization of material interests, there are much more tools, primarily based on empirical data, than for analyzing the realization of postmaterialistic values. In addition, it is much easier to analyze the level of communication processes, feedback, effectiveness and ways of civil society involvement in the development, adoption and implementation of the agenda in the local political regime.

Therefore, the government and features of the development of civil society in local political regimes should be analyzed according to the following characteristics: 1) the level of political culture and political participation; 2) the level of freedom to form public organizations; 3) free access to alternative media and information about local authorities; 4) freedom of opposition activity; 5) availability of communication channels with non-government structures and the level of their inclusion in the process of development, adoption and implementation of political decisions; 6) the availability of communication channels and the results of interaction between

local authorities and the scientific community, as well as a research center, etc.; 7) an indicator of the number of non-government specialists working in local government institutions (presence of autonomous trade unions and business structures; various non-profit organizations, including church, religious, political, non-governmental and human rights organizations).

The characteristic of the institutional features of the formation of the agenda in the local political regime as a whole determines its burdensomeness, stability and effectiveness. First of all, we are talking about determining the practices most frequently used in the process of making the most important decisions of the local regime (primarily decisions on economic growth). This refers to practices due to which the local regime: 1) perceives the interest that has arisen; 2) develops a set of potential alternatives; 3) chooses the final solution; 4) implements this decision; 5) monitors the enumeration and the results of this decision. In this aspect, it is important to analyze the diversity of these practices, their openness and level of involvement. In addition, the stability of the local regime is manifested due to the duration and preservation of the strategic directions of the socio-economic growth of the city/urban agglomeration. In this context, it is important to analyze the duration of the declaration and the implementation of the strategic programs of the regime. A set of repetitive agenda-setting practices, clear "rules of the game" for all political actors, and the duration of strategic directions for socio-economic growth as a whole can determine the institutional stability of a local political regime.

In general, generalizing and summing up our scientific intelligence, it is reasonable to government that the development of research on local and regional political regimes in Ukraine can be divided into three stages: 1) 1991-2008. – laying the foundation for research; 2) 2009-2015 - theoretical developments, the transition from studies of regional identities to regional power, and ultimately – local and regional political regimes; 3) 2016 – until now – practical research, primarily case studies, the search for a method for comparative analysis of local regimes. The first practical studies of local and regional political regimes were laid by T. Bevz, N. Rotar, V. Yaremchuk, A. Zorich, A. Yasinska and M. Horbatiuk, who used case studies. The first comparative study of regional political regimes in Ukraine was conducted by V. Hnatiuk, who developed and tested his own methodology, which still has a number of shortcomings in the study of local political regimes. Therefore, in our opinion, the development of a new methodology for comparing local political regimes should be based on a maximalist approach (inclusion of a significant number of indices/indicators for complex comparison) and must contain the following indicators: 1) the scale of democracy and the level of decentralization of the regime; 2) a scale in the form of a triangle that determines the strength of local authorities, business and civil society in the process of forming the agenda and determining the strategic directions of socio-economic growth. These indicators, in particular, in the form of a rating of local political regimes, should demonstrate the so-called attractiveness of the latter for the realization of their own and corporate interests, doing business, and ensuring their own improvement. In addition, it is appropriate to take measurements over time to analyze the dynamics of changes in local political regimes, describe best practices and results in

individual regimes. Indices, indicators and other methods of national level analysis are appropriate to use at the local level with their appropriate adaptation. Moreover, at the local level, they receive a more empirical load, they are much cheaper to test and identify their shortcomings. We expect that in this context, the results of studies of local regimes will make it possible to significantly better evaluate, modernize and predict social and political processes at the national level. However, this requires detailing the indicated intention to generate a new methodology for analyzing and comparing local modes and clearly defined, understandable and balanced scales of the analysis itself, which should be the subject of a separate study, which we will deal with in the future. Only after that, such a methodology can be operationalized and verified using the example of Ukraine.

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TRENDS, DETERMINANTS AND PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS DEVELOPMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS

The article analyzes economic and political trends, determinants and problems of transport system, infrastructure and logistics development in the modern world. This is based on the assumption that the world transport system is a combination of national and regional transport systems, including a set of interconnected and interacting modes of transport, and vice versa. The author argued that the world transport system is characterized by territorial-geographical and profile-species structure and it can be classified by level of organization, geographical indication, level of development, modes of transport and infrastructure, etc. It is revealed that the development trends of the main modes of transport are related to the basic world economic processes, in particular to world production and trade. At the same time, it is proved that the world transport system is conditioned not only socio-economically, but also politically, in particular by the actions of the state, society or its individual segments both inside and outside the state.

Keywords: transport, transport system, infrastructure, logistics.

Tendencje, determinanty i problemy rozwoju systemu transportowego, infrastruktury i logistyki we współczesnym świecie: kontekst gospodarczy i polityczny

Artykuł analizuje trendy gospodarcze i polityczne, determinanty i problemy rozwoju systemu transportowego, infrastruktury i logistyki we współczesnym świecie. Odbywa się to w oparciu o założenie, że światowy system transportowy jest kombinacją krajowych i regionalnych systemów transportowych, w szczególności zbioru wzajemnie powiązanych i oddziałujących na siebie rodzajów transportu i odwrotnie. Argumentuje się, że światowy system transportowy charakteryzuje się strukturą terytorialno-geograficzną i specyficzną dla profilu, a także można go klasyfikować według poziomu organizacji, cech geograficznych, poziomu rozwoju, rodzaju transportu i cech infrastruktury itp. Ustalono, że kierunki rozwoju głównych rodzajów transportu są związane z podstawowymi globalnymi procesami gospodarczymi, w szczególności z globalną produkcją i handlem. Jednocześnie udowodniono, że światowy system transportowy jest determinowany nie tylko społeczno-ekonomicznie, ale także politycznie, w szczególności przez działania państwa, społeczeństwa lub jego poszczególnych segmentów zarówno wewnątrz państwa, jak i poza nim.

Słowa kluczowe: transport, system transportowy, infrastruktura, logistyka.

ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ, ДЕТЕРМІНАНТИ І ПРОБЛЕМИ РОЗВИТКУ ТРАНСПОРТНОЇ СИСТЕМИ, ІНФРАСТРУКТУРИ Й ЛОГІСТИКИ У СУЧАСНОМУ СВІТІ: ЕКОНОМІЧНИЙ І ПОЛІТИЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТИ

У статті проаналізовано економічні і політичні тенденції, детермінанти й проблеми розвитку транспортної системи, інфраструктури й логістики у сучасному світі. Це зроблено з огляду на припущення, що світова транспортна система є комбінацією національних та регіональних транспортних систем, зокрема сукупністю взаємопов'язаних і взаємодіючих видів транспорту, і навпаки. Аргументовано, що світовій транспортній системі властива територіально-географічна і профільно-видова структурованість, а також вона може бути класифікована за рівнем організації, географічною ознакою, рівнем розвитку, видами транспорту й інфраструктурною ознакою тощо. Встановлено, що тенденції розвитку основних видів транспорту пов'язані з базовими світовими економічними процесами, зокрема зі світовим виробництвом і торгівлею. Водночас доведено, що світова транспортна система зумовлена не лише соціально-економічно, а й політично, зокрема діями держави, суспільства або окремих його сегментів як всередині держави, так і за її межами.

Ключові слова: транспорт, транспортна система, інфраструктура, логістика.

In the development of its transport system, infrastructure and logistics almost every country and region of the world, especially Europe depends on trends and problems in this area at the global and international levels, both economically and politically. The main reason for this state of affairs is that almost every country and part of the world is an element and structural component of the global and international transport system, which has become in recent decades more and more globalized and transnational. This is due to the fact that in general, modern countries are gradually and on average becoming more developed in terms of infrastructure, income levels and human potential, which intensifies and streamlines the development of transport, etc. Accordingly, a whole range of issues, trends and problems are outlined, which reflect the parameters of the transport system, infrastructure and logistics in the modern world. Their research is of particular scientific interest, in particular due to the fact that the current state of development of the transport system, infrastructure and logistics in the world inevitably depends on both economic and political factors and contexts.

The stated topic or its individual components have always been and remain the subject of scientific research by a number of researchers and analysts who focus on the development of transport and transport systems in the world as a whole and at the level of individual countries and regions. In particular, in the context of the European cluster of research on transport, this can be seen in the works of such scientists as M. Bechtel¹, J. Bremmer², E. Efimova and K. Pinoniyemi³, A. Emirova⁴, V. Galakhov⁵, N. Jensen⁶, N. Krylova⁷, I. Mogilevkin⁸, V. Nazarenko and K. Nazarenko⁹, A. Rybchuk¹⁰, O. Zakharova¹¹. Their attitude and elaboration are extremely important in our attempt to systematize and structure the economic and political dimensions of trends and problems in the development of the transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the modern world.

Based on the analysis of the whole array of available research, it can be relatively easily stated that the world or international transport system is a set of integrated national and / or regional transport systems, represented by different interconnected and interacting modes of transport, which ensure the implementation of both domestic and international transport in order to ensure the stable functioning of national, regional and global economies¹². Thus, the world transport system is characterized by structure, which determines the possible directions of analysis of the transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the world in terms of specifics and features of the elements that make it up. First, the primary element of the world transport system is considered to be the national transport systems of individual countries and / or regions, but each such transport system has certain properties that allow them to be combined into diverse groups. As a result, the world transport system should be considered as a set of national and regional transport systems in terms of their socio-economic development, highlighting the transport systems of developed countries and regions, transport systems of

¹ Bechtel M., The Political Sources of Systematic Investment Risk: Lessons from a Consensus Democracy, *"The Journal of Politics"* 2009, vol 71, nr. 2, s. 661-677.

² Bremmer J., Managing Risk in an Unstable World, *"Harvard Business Review"* 2005, s. 51-60.

³ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, *"Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika"* 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

⁴ Emirova A., Transformatsiya transportnykh sistem v usloviyakh globalizatsii mirovoy ekonomiki, *"Nauchnyy zhurnal NIU ITMO. Seriya 'Ekonomika i ekologicheskij menedzhment'"* 2014, nr. 2.

⁵ Galakhov V., Evolyutsiya i periodizatsiya razvitiya transporta, *"Mir transporta"* 2004, nr. 4, s. 4-15.

⁶ Jensen N., Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment, *"The Journal of Politics"* 2008, vol 70, nr. 4, s. 1040-1052.

⁷ Krylova N., *Mizhnarodni stratehii rozvytku derzhavno-pryvatnoho partnerstva v transportnii baluzi*, źródło: <http://www.sworld.com.ua/index.php/ru/conference/the-content-of-conferences/archives-of-individual-conferences/march-2013> [odczyt: 12.12.2013].

⁸ Mogilevkin I., *Transport. Mirovaya ekonomika. Global'nyye tendentsii za 100 let*, Wyd. Ekonomist 2003.

⁹ Nazarenko V., Nazarenko K., *Transportnoye obespecheniye vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti*, Wyd. Tsentr ekonomiki i marketinga 2000.

¹⁰ Rybchuk A., Transportni systemy svitu – vazhlyvyi element hlobalnoi vyrobnychoi infrastruktury, *"Aktualni problemy ekonomiky"* 2004, nr. 7, s. 99-104.

¹¹ Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, *"Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI"* 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.; Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, *"Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn: politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty"*, Wyd. DPI 2011, s. 19-23.

¹² Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, *"Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI"* 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.; Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, *"Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn: politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty"*, Wyd. DPI 2011, s. 19-23.

developing countries and regions, and transport systems of underdeveloped countries and third world regions¹³. Secondly, by distinguishing the features of individual transport systems on a geographical basis, it is possible to distinguish such elements or regional transport systems within the world transport system as transport systems of North America, Latin America, Europe, the European Union, Asia, Africa, Australia, Oceania, etc.

Another approach to the structuring of the world transport system is based on the selection of modes of transport involved in the processes of transportation and delivering¹⁴. In this regard, we can identify the following elements of the world transport system: road transport system, rail transport system, sea and river transport system, air transport system, pipeline transport system and more¹⁵.

In turn, from the standpoint of the analysis of the world transport system as an object of global infrastructure and logistics, its elements should include the world's transport network, vehicles, transport companies and transport management system, which together constitute the so-called resource component of the world transport system¹⁶. In summary, this means that the world transport system can be classified by level of organization, geographical indication, level of development, modes of transport and logistics and infrastructure, etc., which are interconnected in the construction of a holistic knowledge of the transport system in the modern world. This will be manifested in the fact that national and / or regional transport systems as elements of the world transport system in terms of organization and development can belong to the transport systems of developed countries or regions, and to the transport systems of developing countries and regions, and by type of transport can be classified into road, rail and other transport systems. Moreover, this does not deny the fact that each element of the typology of the world transport system is characterized by its own infrastructural and logistical components – the transport network, vehicles, transport companies and more.

Their intercomparison and comparison make it possible to identify relevant trends in the modern (especially after the Second World War and later, including after the global financial and economic crisis of the early 21st century) transport system in the world. They are, for example, manifested in the fact that: more than half of the world's freight traffic is served by sea transport, instead, in the structure of intra-continental transport, three quarters are occupied by various land modes of transport; in Western Europe the leader in freight transport is road transport, in Central and Eastern Europe it is rail transport, on the other hand, in North America these modes of transport occupy approximately equal shares, although in general there is a noticeable tendency

¹³ Rybchuk A., Transportni systemy svitu – vazhlyvyi element hlobalnoi vyrobnychoi infrastruktury, «Aktualni problemy ekonomiky» 2004, nr. 7, s. 99-104.

¹⁴ Mogilevkin I., *Transport. Mirovaya ekonomika. Global'nyye tendentsii za 100 let*, Wyd. Ekonomist 2003.; Rybchuk A., Transportni systemy svitu – vazhlyvyi element hlobalnoi vyrobnychoi infrastruktury, «Aktualni problemy ekonomiky» 2004, nr. 7, s. 99-104.

¹⁵ Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, «Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn: politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty», Wyd. DPI 2011, s. 19-23.

¹⁶ Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, «Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn: politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty», Wyd. DPI 2011, s. 19-23.

to increase the share of road transport in the structure of both domestic and international transportation. On the other hand, developed countries successfully control more than two-thirds of the international freight market, while developing countries account for less than a third of the world's freight turnover¹⁷. As a result, the development of the world's transport system, logistics and infrastructure is characterized by the rapid growth of the transport network, especially highways, the length of which has at least doubled in the last half century. A much smaller share of traffic, but in absolute terms, is observed for air transport, whose cargo turnover has quadrupled over the same period. On the other hand, the absolute and relative values of rail transport are much lower and even negative, which today accounts for less than 10 percent of all transport routes. As for the road network, it is the widest in the United States, the EU and China. In turn, the longest inland waterways are in Brazil, the United States, Indonesia and India, and not in Europe¹⁸.

Along with the planned trends in the development of world transport, a topical issue still is the study of areas to expand the potential of the world transport system. The fact is that improving the efficiency of the transport system is one of the four fundamental factors in the globalization of the world economy, in particular, along with trade liberalization, the development of telecommunications and international standardization¹⁹. Thus, the world transport system is a link in the process of globalization of the world economy, which ensures the blurring of national / regional borders and the formation of a single world market²⁰. This is manifested in the fact that in the structure of the world transport system, different modes of transport have their own specifics of operation, especially currently, when the requirements for the quality of services are growing rapidly, ensuring maximum speed and convenience of transportation with minimal use of appropriate resources²¹.

Therefore, the potential of certain types of world transport, along with internal infrastructural factors determined by the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the transport network and moving vehicles, is most strongly influenced by global factors, in particular, the state, trends, dynamics and structure of world trade, which form the demand for a particular flow of goods in world markets and, as a consequence, determine the volume of demand for transportation services by certain modes of transport. In addition, the potential of the world transport system is affected by competition in world transport services markets and integration processes in the world economy, which determine the consolidation of traffic routes to relevant countries and regions within international transport corridors, thereby strengthening their transport potential.

¹⁷ Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn:politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty”, Wyd. DPI2011, s. 19-23.

¹⁸ Zakharova O., Struktura suchasnoi svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn:politychni, pravovi ta ekonomichni aspekty”, Wyd. DPI2011, s. 19-23.

¹⁹ Kuz'menko Yu., Globalizatsionnye protsessy mirovoy ekonomiki, vliyayushchiye na funktsionirovaniye mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy sistemy, „Viznik ekonomiki transportu i promislivosti” 2010, nr. 36, s. 36.

²⁰ Galakhov V., Evolyutsiya i periodizatsiya razvitiya transporta, „Mir transporta” 2004, nr. 4, s. 15.

²¹ Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI” 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.

This should be taken into account when studying the development trends of individual modes of transport, as their combination is an economic determination of the essence of the world transport system.

It is very important that the development trends of the main modes of transport are related to world economic processes, first of all to world production and world trade.

It is noteworthy that in the framework of land transport, which mainly provides inland and domestic transport of goods and passengers, the fiercest competition is observed between road and rail transport²². On the one hand, it is obvious that road transport plays a leading role in passenger transport, as, for example, the number of road vehicles is growing rapidly (especially due to the US, Japan and Western Europe, where the quality of highways is the highest in the world). As a result, it is in the developed countries of the world that motor transport dominates among other types of means of transport, sometimes accounting for more than 80 percent of freight and passenger turnover²³. On the other hand, it was found that rail transport holds the first place in the structure of world freight turnover, also steadily increasing the volume of traffic. Instead, in the structure of passenger turnover in most countries of the world, railways still occupy a small share, giving way to road and air transport (especially in the European Union and the United States).

As for non-land modes of transport, they are also in dynamic development, but in total they lag far behind the indicators of land transport in terms of freight, but especially passenger traffic. For example, the share of inland water transport in the structure of world freight and passenger turnover is less than five percent and is the most developed in China. Instead, the positions of non-land – in particular air and sea – transport in intercontinental (respectively) passenger and freight transport are much better. So, more than 80 percent of all foreign trade goods are transported by sea (especially from Asia, including China, India and Indonesia, and to a lesser extent North America and Western Europe). In turn, by an air transport which is characterized by high concentration and is the most globalizing industry of transport, not only all more intensive and passengers move more frequent but also goods and services move (especially in the USA, Japan, Germany).

At the same time, it should be noted that the development of the world transport system and infrastructure is sensitive to the development of the world economy and trade. Thus, in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, which since 2008 till 2009 led to a significant reduction in world production and trade, the volume of transportation by all modes of transport also decreased²⁴. Similar trends were relevant in the case of the regional structure of world trade in goods and services, and thus in the case of regional trends in transport development, especially in developed regions.

As for developing regions and countries with economies in transition, they also experienced a significant reduction in merchandise exports, but the rate of decline in trade was slower than the

²² Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „*Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI*“ 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.

²³ *EU energy and transport in figures 2010*, Wyd. Office for the Official Publications of the European communities 2010.

²⁴ Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „*Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI*“ 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.

world average. Interestingly, as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, it was recorded that: changes in freight and passenger turnover of all modes of transport are directly related to changes in world GDP, world merchandise exports and world exports of tourist services; the most dependent on the dynamics of GDP and the dynamics of merchandise exports is the freight turnover of sea and rail transport; changes in world GDP have the greatest impact on changes in passenger traffic by air; the dynamics of exports of tourist services is closely correlated with changes in passenger traffic by air and rail²⁵. A similar situation began to emerge as a result of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, as its effects affected not only transport in Europe, in what, however, the dependence of the regional and world transport system on both economic and political factors was fundamentally revealed.

As a result, it gives every reason to argue that current trends in the world economy determine not only the dynamics of transportation, but also the geography of global and international transport flows. So, the United States is both the world's largest exporter and importer, while China and Germany are the world's largest exporters. Also in the top ten of world trade are Japan, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and South Korea, and the most dynamic are China, India, Singapore, Chile and South Korea²⁶. As a result, these countries are major players in world trade, and therefore largely control the market for international transport, including sea, air, road and rail²⁷. In general, it is established that the dynamics of the structure of world merchandise exports over the past half century is characterized by some selected trends, namely: there is a reduction in the share of developed countries in the structure of world trade in goods; the share of developing countries in world exports is growing; there is a significant change in the regional structure of trade flows, due to which intra-regional trade is becoming widespread²⁸.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that some modes of transport are significantly influenced by integration processes that are actively taking place within the world economy and regional integration associations, including the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, etc. Thus, we can conclude that in modern conditions, the factors of the global and regional environment significantly affect the development potential of the transport system and logistics in the modern world²⁹.

In this context attention is deserved by the remark of scientists³⁰ that within the framework of processes of globalization of integrations exactly on their transport constituent it is possible to think of adequacy of decision of problems and implementations of the tasks that stand before subjects that form the world economic political systems. The fact is that today the world community is increasingly

²⁵ Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „*Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI*” 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.

²⁶ *UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2010*, Wyd. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2010, źródło: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdstat35_en.pdf [odczyt: 01.02.2022].

²⁷ *Review of Maritime Transport 2010*, Wyd. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2010, źródło: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2010flyer_en.pdf [odczyt: 01.02.2022].

²⁸ *UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2010*, Wyd. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2010, źródło: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdstat35_en.pdf [odczyt: 01.02.2022].

²⁹ Zakharova O., Hlobalni chynnyky rozvytku potentsialu svitovoi transportnoi systemy, „*Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI*” 2011, nr. 9-10, s. 14-17.

³⁰ Emirova A., Transformatsiya transportnykh sistem v usloviyakh globalizatsii mirovoy ekonomiki, „*Nauchnyy zhurnal NIUITMO. Seriya 'Ekonomika i ekologicheskij menedzhment'*”.

forming a single transport infrastructure and logistics complex, using the spatial location and resource potential of countries and ensuring their fairly integrated service. However, the history of certain modes of transport, differences in economics and politics, transport legislation in different countries has always been and has been on the way to integrate individual transport systems into a single system, and hindered the integration process within the world economy.

The issue of formation and efficient functioning of transport systems was especially acute in the 1970s in Western Europe, where countries were among the first to face transport problems, when integration processes were constrained by centrifugal trends in transport. The reason is that transport, with its universal connections, industries and distribution, has been and remains an important tool for countries and national corporations in their struggle against other countries' monopolies and the natural desire of governments to protect national transport "markets" from intrusion under "foreign flag"³¹.

As a result, already in the 80s of the twentieth century there was a significant increase in the number of multinational corporations, financial and industrial groups, intersectoral and intra-industry structures, associations, research and production associations, trading houses, which aimed to find new reserves in the intensified competition, in particular by structuring logistics systems to optimize infrastructure costs and improve customers' service. Most notably, transport systems have become a key factor in the development of such structures³².

Later, especially with the development of information technology, further changes took place in the field of transport management: it became possible to inspect the movement of goods in remote access and real time; there was an opportunity to actively develop and implement international transport programs and projects. The latter were aimed mainly at the formation and effective functioning of transport systems to ensure international transport, especially against the background of different histories of development of certain modes of transport and differences in economic and policy in transport legislation. Therefore, it was at this time that the problem of uniting the separate transport systems of individual countries into a single world transport system with the aim of continuity of cargo transportation, reduction of their delivery time, cost and risks.

Even later, in particular since the 1990s, leading countries have initiated or influenced major political changes in the development of the entire world economy. Almost soon after the collapse of the USSR and the socialist model of development, as well as the full formation of the EU, economic aspects became one of the main unifying factors in the development of the world economic system and its further integration. During this period, international conferences on transport and global / regional (primarily within the EU) transport systems began to take place periodically. For example, thanks to such conferences at different times a common transport policy and ways to modernize the transport system / network (consisting of nine transport corridors) of the European Union, etc. have been for example generated and created. At the same time, the number

³¹ Nazarenko V., Nazarenko K., *Transportnoye obespecheniye vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti*, Wyd. Tsentr ekonomiki i marketinga 2000, s. 67.

³² Emirova A., Transformatsiya transportnykh sistem v usloviyakh globalizatsii mirovoy ekonomiki, "Nauchnyy zhurnal NIU ITMO. Seriya 'Ekonomika i ekologicheskyy menedzhment'" 2014, nr. 2.

of different priority transport projects that receive support and funding from various regional, supranational and global structures has increased. These include interstate and transnational (including planned) logistics and transport systems such as “Collomodal” (Germany, the Netherlands and France, intermodal), “Hermes” (United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, France and Germany, freight), “Docimel” (freight), “UNCTAD” (UN, trade and information), “TEDIM” (UN, logistics, freight), “TACIS”, EU-CIS technical and auxiliary), etc., which are mostly aimed at improving service, environment and reducing logistics costs by removing customs, tax and other barriers, and so on³³.

Finally, from the XXI century onwards, the formation of the world transport system has entered a stage of large-scale integration process – globalization – which should be considered as one of the main trends in the economy and management of the modern world.

It is determined by the growing interdependence of economies and policies of all or almost all countries, which is based on the deepening internationalization of production and capital. At the same time, it is important that globalization should be understood at least dichotomously. First, from a macroeconomic standpoint as the globalization of the world economy, during which there is a process of convergence / integration of national markets for capital, securities, goods, services and labor, in which the world market is seen not just as a set of these markets, but as a single economic space and a single market with regional and national subsystems. Secondly, from microeconomic positions it is a desire of companies to globalize business and the introduction of global logistics systems at the meso - and macroeconomic level³⁴. In this context, it is obvious that significant changes in trade, customs, tax, transport legislation of many countries in the direction of liberalization lead to the creation and development of global interstate transport, telecommunications, distribution and other logistics systems, as well as the emergence of international transport and logistics intermediaries, which permits you to implement global or international logistics strategies taking into account all world markets and optimize total costs. This determines that the possibility of functioning of an organized world market economy is almost entirely determined by the parameters of transport systems of different levels, as well as their ability to integrate into the world transport system, meeting a range of technological, informational and other quality criteria. Moreover, globalization, including the transport system, is characterized by the complication of market relations, strengthening and systematization of competition, which, among other things, are due to: increasing the number of multinational corporations that position themselves in the international market as global actors; strengthening the role of the political factor in decision-making regarding the formation and development of transport corridors and transport systems in general; the growing role of ports in attracting cargo and intensifying competition between the ports of

³³ Sergeyev V., Kizim A., El'yashevich P., *Global'nyye logisticheskiye sistemy: Uchebnoye posobiye*, Wyd. Izdatel'skiy dom „Biznes-pressa“ 2001.

³⁴ Emirova A., Transformatsiya transportnykh sistem v usloviyakh globalizatsii mirovoy ekonomiki, *“Nauchnyy zhurnal NIU ITMO. Seriya ‘Ekonomika i ekologicheskij menedzhment’*” 2014, nr. 2.

individual regions; penetration into the national markets of transport services of large foreign companies and other countries; significant expansion of the list and increasing requirements for the quality of transport and logistics services³⁵.

However, even so, sufficient conditions for the formation of the world transport system on a global scale, and hence the world transport space, as it was not and still is not. In addition, since the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, the contradictions between the global nature of the economy, the processes of its regionalization and transnationalization and the predominantly national nature of economic regulation have significantly increased.

In such conditions, the regulation of national and the formation of international transport systems are aimed at solving rather contradictory tasks, which do not contribute to the consolidation of the world transport system. In this sense, the analytical agenda includes two issues – political factors in the formation and functioning of the global transport system, logistics and infrastructure, as well as cooperation between public and private / private sectors in the development of transport.

Starting to consider the first problem – that is, the political factors of the formation and functioning of the world transport system – we note that this is an extremely closed sphere of the world economy³⁶. The fact is that most often transport projects were thought and carried out based on the political interests of the respective countries' leadership or international organizations, but did not take into account both regional and national economic and commercial interests. As a result, there is a growing need to identify and assess political risks in order to justify the construction of transport infrastructure of international importance, but with taking into account the interests of economic and social institutions.

In this context, it is interesting that the identification and systematic research of political factors and the assessment of political risks in the field of transport and infrastructure began after the Second World War. This was primarily due to the active international political and commercial activities of a number of political actors, which gradually took into account various political factors and assessments of political risks in the formation and operation of transport logistics and infrastructure both in some countries of the world and theoretically in general³⁷, and with both positive (including stabilization and modernization) and negative (destabilizing) consequences³⁸. Moreover, among the factors of political destabilization in this context were changes in governments, legislatures and military administration, as well as force majeure, such as terrorist acts, natural disasters, etc. In addition, attention was focused on the effects and miscalculations of democratization through the prism of political risks, as, on the

³⁵ Emirova A., Transformatsiya transportnykh sistem v usloviyakh globalizatsii mirovoy ekonomiki, "Nauchnyy zhurnal NIU ITMO. Seriya 'Ekonomika i ekologicheskyy menedzhment'" 2014, nr. 2.

³⁶ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, "Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika" 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

³⁷ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, "Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika" 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

³⁸ Bremmer J., Managing Risk in an Unstable World, "Harvard Business Review" 2005, s. 52; Reith G., Uncertain Times: The Notion of "Risk" and the Development of Modernity, "Time & Society" 2004, vol 13, nr. 2/3, s. 385.

one hand, democracy reduces political risks through the use of the principles of predictability, stability and transparency of decision-making, but, on the other hand, the cost of maintaining a reputation affects the motivations of political leaders to expropriate multinational assets³⁹, especially during elections, when the ability of competing groups to influence political decisions increases⁴⁰. Ultimately, this has led to the separation of various sectoral and functional clusters of these issues and political issues, including information, diplomatic, power, and economic ones, “soft power” clusters, and so on⁴¹.

All this gave good reason to say that the political factors of economic development should be understood as actions of the state, society or their individual segments both inside and outside the country, which have a positive or negative impact on business operations, including these in transport system⁴². The fact is that the objects of transport infrastructure, especially in the global transport system, are large investment projects. Therefore, to assess the impact of political factors and political risks on their design / operation, it is necessary to apply theoretical and methodological approaches to investment risk management. In this sense, the conclusions of some researchers are noticeable that political risk is market or non-diversified, because it is determined by external factors that affect the market as a whole. At the same time, among the manifestations you can distinguish: nationalization or expropriation of property of foreign investors; adoption of regulations that hinder foreign contractors in every possible way; changes in tax legislation that lead to a fall in income or losses; violation of international treaties and agreements both at the state level and at the level of relations between individual firms and corporations⁴³.

Taken together, all this means that the influence of political factors on the creation and functioning of the world's transport infrastructure and logistics has both deep economic preconditions and profound economic consequences⁴⁴. As a result, various investment risks in the implementation of global transport infrastructure and logistics projects often scare away potential contributors and investors. In addition, the risks of investing in transport infrastructure exist within a country, but they come to the fore in the implementation of international and foreign projects, because the very fact of foreign participation in the project can be seen as interference or even violation of state sovereignty.

³⁹ Jensen N., Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment, *“The Journal of Politics”* 2008, vol 70, nr. 4, s.1042.

⁴⁰ Bechtel M., The Political Sources of Systematic Investment Risk: Lessons from a Consensus Democracy, *“The Journal of Politics”* 2009, vol 71, nr. 2, s. 661-677.

⁴¹ Braterskiy M., *Ekonomicheskiye instrumenty vneshney politiki i politicheskoye riski*, Wyd. Izdatel'skiy dom GU-VShE2010.; Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskoye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, *“Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika”* 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.; Wilson E., Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, *“Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”* 2008, vol 616, s. 110-124.

⁴² Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskoye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, *“Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika”* 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

⁴³ Vorontsovskiy A., *Upravleniye riskami*, Wyd. OTs-EiM2005, s. 17, 26-27.; Jensen N., Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment, *“The Journal of Politics”* 2008, vol 70, nr. 4, s. 1040-1052.

⁴⁴ Braterskiy M., *Ekonomicheskiye instrumenty vneshney politiki i politicheskoye riski*, Wyd. Izdatel'skiy dom GU-VShE2010, s. 8.; Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskoye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, *“Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika”* 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

At the same time, the influence of the political system of one or another state is determined by various factors⁴⁵. They create political uncertainty for the investor and, consequently, political risks, which are the product of political instability and political uncertainty in the context of the development of the transport system. Their emergence is due to such factors as the order of transfer of power, the continuity of public policy, forms and methods of exercising powers by local authorities, etc. Although, in contrast, the construction and modernization of the world transport infrastructure are the most powerful tools of political influence on individual countries and regions by political institutions and political elites.

Thus, it is obvious that the influence of the political factor on the transport system is multifaceted. On the one hand, in particular on the basis of the correlation of national risks and the volume of investment in national transport systems and infrastructure, it was found⁴⁶ that low risks of small countries do not guarantee investment, on the basis of which the practical absence of a connection between the size of risks and investments in the land transport infrastructure of individual countries has been proved⁴⁷. As a result, it has been noted that within the framework of the world transport system, decisions on the construction of transport infrastructure and logistics in accordance with current national legislation are made either by business representatives or the authorities. On the other hand, based on the correlation between investment and GDP per capita, as well as the length of the national territory, it is clear that there is no clear interdependence, but there is an evident link between national investment in terrestrial infrastructure and GDP⁴⁸. The fact is that among the leading countries in terms of investment in land transport infrastructure – first of all countries with large economies. This actually explains their activity in the construction and modernization of national transport networks and systems as part of the world's transport infrastructure. On the third hand, in particular on the basis of the correlation between the size of investments in land transport infrastructure and GDP (taking into account purchasing power parity), it is obvious that in the crisis period investment in transport infrastructure and logistics in general is growing, primarily through subsidies and loans and other sources of funding, although in developing countries they are still declining.

At the same time, funding rules and criteria for selecting projects for funding are developed within individual countries or integration groups, although fundamentally new support schemes in crisis and post-crisis periods are not observed. Instead, the list of potential recipients is adjusted due to changing market conjuncture.

In general, on this basis, we can offer several conclusions and arguments, in particular that: the assessment of political factors and related risks in the transport sector, in particular in its infrastructure and logistics sector, especially within the global transport system, is carried out unsystematically;

⁴⁵ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, „*Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika*” 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

⁴⁶ Weltman J. Don't forget bank stability, experts warn, „*Euromoney*” Thursday, July 18.

⁴⁷ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, „*Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika*” 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

⁴⁸ Weltman J. Don't forget bank stability, experts warn, „*Euromoney*” Thursday, July 18.

corruption in the construction of transport infrastructure is a factor in the deterioration of the business climate; political factors influencing transport logistics and infrastructure relate to the functioning of the political regime, and not to individual facts of misuse of public funds; in crisis period, the absolute increase in investment in the construction and further development of transport infrastructure is traditional, because in international trade, the transport sector remains consistently profitable for investors, and in the public policy sector, transport contributes to the creation of additional jobs and increase tax revenues to the national budget; political factors can exacerbate structural imbalances in the economy and the negative impact of economic policy on transport infrastructure; even with a relatively high assessment of national political risks, large-scale investments in the transport system, infrastructure and logistics are quite possible, after all, a high assessment of economic risk does not force foreign and / or national structures to invest in transport infrastructure⁴⁹.

In turn, starting to consider the second problem, mentioned above, and more precisely the cooperation between State and non-State / private sectors in the development of the transport system, we confirm that it mostly revolves around the phenomenon of State-private partnership. In recent years, new approaches and forms of interaction between the State and non-State / private sectors of the economy have been actively developed in world practice in order to quickly and efficiently implement new projects and develop a competitive environment. As a result, such forms of cooperation as State-private partnership have become widespread, in particular in transport infrastructure and logistics⁵⁰ as an area that is characterized by rapid payback requires significant investment, activates the banking sector, have significant social impact through job creation.

In the theoretical and methodological context, it should be noted that there are several options for defining and understanding State-private partnerships, which are still typically reduced to an institutional agreement between government and private sector on a joint venture in a project, including the development of international transport system⁵¹. The peculiarity of this case is that private investors receive attractive guarantees from the state, which are, inter alia, to minimize investment and political risks. In the analytical context, in particular in the sphere of transport system, infrastructure and logistics, such added value can be obtained in several cases: when the partnership allows implementing projects with a high level of priority faster; when a private partner can provide the project with special skills and abilities to manage complex complexes; when a private partner can add to the project the technology elaborated by him; when the skills of the private partner can help to attract a wider range of project financing tools; when the project can stimulate private interest in infrastructure development.

⁴⁹ Efimova E., Pinoniyemi K., Politicheskiye faktory formirovaniya sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy transportnoy infrastruktury, „*Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seriya 5. Ekonomika*” 2014, vol 2, s. 32-56.

⁵⁰ Krylova N., *Mizhnarodni stratehii rozvytku derzhavno-pryvatnoho partnerstva v transportnii baluzi*, źródło: <http://www.sworld.com.ua/index.php/ru/conference/the-content-of-conferences/archives-of-individual-conferences/march-2013> [odczyt: 12.12.2013].

⁵¹ Krylova N., *Mizhnarodni stratehii rozvytku derzhavno-pryvatnoho partnerstva v transportnii baluzi*, źródło: <http://www.sworld.com.ua/index.php/ru/conference/the-content-of-conferences/archives-of-individual-conferences/march-2013> [odczyt: 12.12.2013].

In this sense, it is theorized that within the world transport system public-private partnership is based mainly on six basic principles⁵²: participation (i.e. interaction of all stakeholders); adherence to the “good manners” (on the basis of which the rules are implemented without harm and complaints to the public); transparency (openness of the decision-making process); accountability (responsibility of politicians and political actors to society for the things said and done); justice (spreading the same rules to all members of society); efficiency (use of limited human and financial resources without losses, delays, damage to current and future generations). In the practical context of world transport policy, it was found that there had been many manifestations, and therefore classifications of State-private partnership models⁵³. In particular, the World Bank identifies four main groups of public-private partnerships, including in the transport sector: 1) management and leasing contracts, where the private partner takes over the management of the project for a certain period of time, and the ownership and investment obligations remain with the state, and in the case of leasing contracts, the state leases the project to a private partner for a fee, and operational risk passes to the private partner; 2) Concessions, when a private partner assumes the management of a state project in the field of transport for a certain period of time, but together with the investment risk. Concessions can be implemented in the form of: reconstruction, management and transfer, when a private partner reconstructs an existing facility, then manages and maintains the facility at its own expense and risk until the end of the contract; reconstructions, leasing, leases and transfers, when a private partner reconstructs an existing facility, then leases or leases it to the state and manages the project until the end of the contract; construction, reconstruction, management and transfer, when a private partner completes an existing facility and then manages and maintains it at its own expense and risk until the end of the agreement; 3) new projects, when a private partner or a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise builds and manages a transport facility during the term of the contract. New projects can be implemented in the form of: construction, leasing and transfer, when a private investor builds an object at his own risk, transfers ownership to the state, and then leases the object and manages it until the end of the contract; construction, management and transfer, when a private investor builds an object at his own risk, manages at his own risk and transfers ownership to the state at the end of the term of the agreement; construction, possession and transfer, when a private investor builds and owns an object at his own risk; commercial project, when a private investor builds a facility on the free market, in which the state does not provide guarantees of return on investment; leases, when the state leases an object from a private investor for a certain period of time, but the private investor builds a new object at his own risk, manages at his own risk during the contract; 4) alienation of property, when a private partner buys a share of the object from the state directly, through a public offer or privatization. Moreover, there are full and partial alienation of property: in the case of full alienation – a private partner

⁵² Harris C., Hodges J., Schur M., *Infrastructure Projects: A Review of Canceled Private Projects. Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector*, Wyd. World Bank 2003.

⁵³ Krylova N., *Mizhnarodni stratehii rozvytku derzhavno-pryvatnoho partnerstva v transportnii baluzi*, źródło: <http://www.sworld.com.ua/index.php/ru/conference/the-content-of-conferences/archives-of-individual-conferences/march-2013> [odczyt: 12.12.2013].

buys 100 percent of the object from the state, and in the case of a partial one, the private partner buys a share of the state-owned enterprise, and the management of the facility may remain with the state.

But the most interesting thing is that in the context of the development of the world transport system, logistics and infrastructure, the main factors that have influenced and still influence the use of State-private partnership in the implementation of transport projects are: global economic and financial crises; the need to intensify and develop competition in the market; use of more efficient technologies; greater motivation of the private sector to the efficiency and effectiveness of projects than is typical of the State sector⁵⁴. Accordingly, the phenomenon of State-private partnership in the context of transport development has found its active application primarily in the developed countries of the world, which have already better configured transport systems. Although, in contrast, the world and national transport systems are still characterized by: insufficient development of the legal framework in this area; political interference; slow standardization process; insufficient training of public sector staff⁵⁵. This, in turn, is largely a prerequisite and actualization of limiting and shifting the emphasis on the development of transport systems, logistics and infrastructure from the worldwide / global to the regional level, which is often the case in the European Union.

In general, the article argues that the formation and functioning of transport systems, logistics and infrastructure of different countries and regions of the world to a large extent, in particular economically and politically determined, has taken place and is still taking place in relation to world transport system trends. It is substantiated that the world transport system is a set of integrated national and regional transport systems of different countries of the world, represented by interconnected and interacting modes of transport, which ensure the implementation of domestic and international transport to ensure the stable functioning of the world economy. At the same time, it was noticed that the world transport system is characterized by territorial-geographical and profile-species structure, which determines the directions of analysis of the world transport system, logistics and infrastructure in terms of specifics and features of its components. Therefore, it is proved that the world transport system can be classified according to the level of organization, geographical indication, level of development, modes of transport and infrastructural attribute, which are interrelated in the construction of a holistic knowledge of the transport system. Their intercomparison and comparison made it possible to identify relevant trends in the development of the modern world transport system.

On this basis, it was revealed that the development trends of the main modes of transport are related to the basic world economic processes, in particular with world production and world trade. At the same time, it was noted that the development of the world transport system and infrastructure is sensitive to the development of the world economy and trade. As a result, it is motivated that current

⁵⁴ Krylova N., *Mizhnarodni stratehii rozvytku derzhavno-pryvatnoho partnerstva v transportnii baluzi*, źródło: <http://www.sworld.com.ua/index.php/ru/conference/the-content-of-conferences/archives-of-individual-conferences/march-2013> [odczyt: 12.12.2013].

⁵⁵ Schur M., von Claudy S., The Role of Developing Country Firms in Infrastructure: A New Class of Investors Emerges, "Gridlines" 2006, nr. 3, źródło: <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10742> [odczyt: 01.02.2022].

trends in the world economy determine the dynamics of transportation and the geography of global and international transport flows. It is revealed that the factors of the global and regional environment have a significant impact on the development potential of the world transport system. After all, in the framework of integration and globalization processes, it is their transport component that can be used to consider the adequacy of solving problems and fulfilling the tasks of the actors that shape the world (economic and political) systems. On the other hand, it has been shown that the world transport system is conditioned not only socio-economically but also politically.

At the same time, the political factors of economic development should be understood as the actions of the state, society or its individual segments both within the state and abroad. Thus, it is proved that the influence of the political factor on the creation and functioning of the international transport infrastructure, logistics and system has both economic pre-conditions and economic consequences.

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POLAND IN RANKINGS – THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRY IN A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION ON THE BASIS OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS

In 1989, Poland was one of the poorest countries in Europe at that time. The state – bankrupt could boast GDP *per capita* at the level of approx. 6 000 \$. Only Romania was in a worse position. Poland's GDP accounted only 38% of the average GDP of the European Community. The sources of the disastrous economic situation can be found not only in the People's Republic of Poland (PRL) period, but also in the Second Polish Republic (II RP). For example, at the end of the 1930s, only 7% of roads in Poland were paved for car traffic (90% in France). Since 1989, Poland has been steadily catching up with the European average. And so, in 1995 Poland's GDP *per capita* was 43% of the EU average, in 2000 – 48%, in 2010 – 62%, and in 2021 almost 80%. The GDP index – although the most popular – is more and more often criticized as it does not take into account the complex elements of the functioning of societies. Hence, it is recommended to refer to more precise measures, such as: Human Development Index, Actual Individual Consumption, Gini Index, OECD Life Better Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, Index of Economic Freedom, Ease of Doing Business Index, or other demographic, cyber-development, related to transport or state quality indicators. The article compares several dozen indexes, presenting the position of Poland, in order to reflect the real condition of the country, related with the most developed and competitive countries in the world. September 24, 2018, when Poland officially entered the FTSE Russell and Europe Stoxx 600 indices of developed markets, can be considered a symbolic date. Thus, it was included in the group of 25 most developed economies in the world. This fact (among others) gives rise to the postulate of admitting Poland to the group of G20 member states. Nevertheless, analyzing various indicators, it can be seen that in the rivalry among the nations with the highest civilization status in the hierarchy, details are decisive. Despite the many successes of recent decades, the road of building a strong, competitive and innovative state is still a long way off.

Keywords: *economy, relevance competition, geoeconomics, indexes, markers, comparative studies, forecasts.*

POLSKA W RANKINGACH – POZYCJA KRAJU W ZESTAWIENIU PORÓWNAWCZYM NA TLE WYBRANYCH WSKAŹNIKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH

Polska w 1989 roku była jednym z najbiedniejszych państw ówczesnej Europy. Państwo – bankrut okresu transformacji ustrojowej mogło poszczycić się PKB *per capita* na poziomie ok. 6 tys. \$. Jedynie Rumunia znajdowała się w gorszej sytuacji. PKB Polski stanowił zaledwie 38% średniego PKB ówczesnej Wspólnoty. Źródeł fatalnej sytuacji ekonomicznej należy szukać nie tylko w PRL-u ale także w II RP. Przykładowo pod koniec lat '30 jedynie 7 % dróg w Polsce miało nawierzchnię przystosowaną do ruchu samochodowego (we Francji 90 %). Począwszy od 1989 roku Polska stale goni średnią europejską. I tak w 1995 roku PKB Polski na mieszkańca wynosił 43% średniej unijnej, w 2000 roku 48%, w 2010 roku 62%, a w 2021 roku prawie 80%. Indeks PKB – choć najbardziej popularny – jest coraz częściej poddawany krytyce, jako nieuwzględniających złożonych elementów funkcjonowania społeczeństw. Stąd zaleca się odwoływanie do dokładniejszych mierników, chociażby jak: Wskaźnik Rozwoju Społecznego (*Human Development Index*), Rzeczywista Konsumpcja Prywatna (*Actual Individual Consumption*), wskaźnik Giniego, Indeks OECD Satysfakcja z Życia (*OECD Better Life Index*), Indeks Percepcji Korupcji (*Corruption Perceptions Index*), Wskaźnik Wolności Gospodarczej (*Index of Economic Freedom*), Wskaźnik Łatwości Prowadzenia Interesów (*Ease of Doing Business Index*), czy inne wskaźniki demograficzne, cyberrozwoju, dotyczące transportu czy jakości państwa. Artykuł zestawia porównawczo kilkadziesiąt indeksów, prezentując pozycję Polski w nich, w celu oddana realnej kondycji kraju, w szczególności na tle najbardziej rozwiniętych i konkurencyjnych państw świata. Za symboliczną datę można uznać 24 września 2018 roku, kiedy to Polska oficjalnie weszła do indeksów rynków rozwiniętych FTSE Russell i Europe Stoxx 600. Tym samym znalazła się w gronie 25 najbardziej rozwiniętych gospodarek świata. Fakt ten (obok innych) rodzi postulat przyjęcia Polski do grona państw-członków G20. Niemniej – analizując różne wskaźniki – widać, że w rywalizacji pośród narodów cywilizacyjnie sytuowanych najwyżej w hierarchii decydują detale. Pomimo wielu sukcesów ostatnich dekad, droga do celu, jakim jest zbudowanie silnego, konkurencyjnego, innowacyjnego kraju – jest jeszcze daleka.

Słowa kluczowe: gospodarka, konkurencyjność, geoeconomia, indeksy, wskaźniki, komparatystyka, prognozy.

Introduction

The year 2022 is a good time to summarize Polish battles for a better life, a better country and respect from others¹. Certainly, few people remember that in 1989 Poland was one of the poorest countries in Europe at that time. The state – bankrupt in the period of the political transformation – could boast a GDP *per capita* of approx. 6 000 \$. Only Romania was in a worse position. Bulgaria at that time had a GDP *per capita* of \$ 7,330. In Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia well over 8,000 \$. From the Czechs, with their GDP of 11,000 \$, there was a civilization gap. Needless to say, Poland's GDP was dramatic compared to the average of the European Communities, accounting for only 38% of the average GDP of the European Community. The average Pole lived at a level slightly exceeding 1/3 of the average European on the west of the Elbe. In relation to the Dutch or the Swedes, this disproportion was even greater. Compared to the citizen of Luxembourg, the average Pole was at the bottom of the poverty on the old continent.

It is worth mentioning that the sources of the disastrous economic situation should be sought not only in the architecture of the post-war Polish People's Republic (PRL), but above all in the condition of the state prior to World War II. The well-known American magazine „Life”, in an article dated August 29, 1938, published a fairly reliable photo report from Poland, from which emerges a slightly different country than the one that is internally mythologized and idealized as the Second Polish Republic (II RP). From the document entitled „Poland: Rich Men, Poor Men in the Land of Fields”, it can be learned that 40% of citizens could not read or write. The Polish economy was described in nomenclature as a „tragedy”, due to the fact that 70% of the society was a small-scale rural inhabitants. The poverty of the Polish countryside was illustrated by statistics showing that the average Polish family had to survive for around \$ 180 a year. All this in a country where great noble names noted down by the author of the report, such as: Potocki, Radziwiłł, Sapieha, Poniatowski, Zamoyski, Czartoryski, Krasiński, Sanguszko, and Chodkiewicz – „they sit in lofty pews in Catholic churches, return to their magnificent elegant houses cars that are half-wheeled in mud”².

The contemporary – still not fully resolved – problem with the transport infrastructure in Poland is nothing new. At the end of the 1930s, only 7% of the so-called national roads had a surface fully adapted to car traffic. In Denmark, this ratio reached 100%, in France 90%, in Germany 70%, and in the then Czechoslovakia 50%. In the mid-30s, only 58 thousand km of roads in Poland had the status of the so-called beaten road, and therefore paved in any way. Including only 2.5 thousand. km of roads deserved its name because they were covered with granite blocks, concrete slabs or asphalt. In 1930, „Gazeta Polska” pointed out that „today no one

¹ More on indicators reflecting the position of countries and the prevailing trends, see: *Indicator overview: comparative performance of countries and major trends*, OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris 2019.

² *Poland: Rich Men, Poor Men in the Land of Field (Bogaci i biedni w Krainie Pól)*, „Life” 29 sierpnia 1938 roku.

in the West is able to explain to people that there may be a country that has no roads, a country that advertises its belonging to the group of civilized nations”³.

Meanwhile, according to Eurostat data, in 2011 GDP *per capita* in Poland was 65% of the EU average, and in 2021 almost 80%. Taking into account individual consumption *per capita*, Poland ranked even higher in the wealth hierarchy in the EU. The level of individual consumption *per capita* was 80% of the EU average, which, after several years of EU membership, placed Poland higher than countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Estonia. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Greece had a similar result. Several years of rapid economic growth, in a situation of crisis and economic stagnation in other countries, have meant that Poland – since 1989 – has been steadily catching up with the European average faster than originally assumed. At that time, problems affected Poland to a small extent. During the financial crisis of 2007, Poland was the only EU country whose GDP did not decline. In the developed world, only Israel and Australia have managed to do so. Then the euro area debt crisis hit the EU. The south of Europe plunged into a crisis in which it remains to this day. Finally, the pandemic crisis and the war in Ukraine, paradoxically – compared to other countries in the region – strengthen Poland economically.


Gross Domestic Product

Still the most frequently used, though not the most reliable, indicator to reflect the degree of economic development of a given country is based on the Gross Domestic Product⁴ (or the Gross National Product or the Net⁵). And so, in 1995 Poland's GDP *per capita* was 43% of the EU average, in 2000 it was 48%, and in 2010 it was 62%. From 1988 to 2008, Poland's GDP grew by over 70%. In 2009, Poland was the 6th economy in the EU (nominal) and the 21st economy in the world. Later on, the world crisis came, through which Poland experienced a relatively dry foot, and already in 2011 recovered its losses. In 2014, Polish GDP broke another record – USD 542.5 billion, to set another record in 2018 – USD 587.4 billion.

³ *Polskie drogi przed wojną*, <https://zapasowe.net.pl/viewtopic.php?t=1418>, [access: 05.07.2022].

⁴ In economics, we can distinguish as many as three ways to obtain the desired value, which is considered to be GDP. (1) The expenditure method assumes that GDP is made up of buyers of all goods that have been produced in a given country during the last audited year ($GDP = \text{consumption} + \text{investments} + \text{government expenditure (excluding transfers)} + \text{inventory change}$). (2) The production method uses the assumption that GDP should be calculated in a more detailed way: among the entities that generate income in a given year, the so-called owners of factors of production, dividing them into employees, employers and the state ($GDP = \text{labor income} + \text{income from capital} + \text{state income} + \text{depreciation}$). (3) The income method assumes that when adding up the total value of goods, the value of goods and services that were used to produce them should be subtracted ($GDP = \text{country's output} - \text{intermediate consumption} = \text{sum of added value from all branches of the economy in a given country}$). See: PKB, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/pkb>, [access: 05.07.2022].

⁵ In addition to GDP, there is also the concept of GNP (Gross National Product). The latter indicator takes into account the income generated by all citizens of a given country, and therefore not only in, but also abroad. In this way, economic immigrants in Western Europe, as well as people who retain Polish citizenship and live permanently in, for example, Great Britain or Norway, have a significant impact on the amount of Polish GNP. See: PKB a PNB, czyli Produkt Krajowy Brutto a Produkt Narodowy Brutto, <https://www.infor.pl/prawo/encyklopedia-prawa/p/290763,PKB-a-PNB-czyli-Produkt-Krajowy-Brutto-a-Produkt-Narodowy-Brutto.html>, [access: 05.07.2022].

Figure 1. Development of Poland's GDP in 1990-2020

Source: World Bank data

Figure 2. Poland's nominal GDP in a comparative view (in USD)

	Country/Territory	UN Region	IMF		United Nations		World Bank	
			Estimate	Year	Estimate	Year	Estimate	Year
	World	-	93,863,851	2021	87,461,674	2020	84,705,567	2020
1	United States	Americas	25,346,805	2022	20,893,746	2020	20,936,600	2020
2	China	Asia	19,911,593	2022	14,722,801	2020	14,722,731	2020
3	Japan	Asia	4,912,147	2022	5,057,759	2020	4,975,415	2020
4	Germany	Europe	4,256,540	2022	3,846,414	2020	3,806,060	2020
5	India	Asia	3,534,743	2022	2,664,749	2020	2,622,984	2020
6	United Kingdom	Europe	3,376,003	2022	2,764,198	2020	2,707,744	2020
7	France	Europe	2,936,702	2022	2,630,318	2020	2,603,004	2020
8	Canada	Americas	2,221,218	2022	1,644,037	2020	1,643,408	2020
9	Italy	Europe	2,058,330	2022	1,888,709	2020	1,886,445	2020
10	Brazil	Americas	1,833,274	2022	1,444,733	2020	1,444,733	2020
11	Russia	Europe	1,829,050	2022	1,483,498	2020	1,483,498	2020
12	South Korea	Asia	1,804,680	2022	1,637,896	2020	1,630,525	2020
13	Australia	Oceania	1,748,334	2022	1,423,473	2020	1,330,901	2020
14	Iran	Asia	1,739,012	2022	939,316	2020	203,471	2020
15	Spain	Europe	1,435,560	2022	1,281,485	2020	1,281,199	2020
16	Mexico	Americas	1,322,740	2022	1,073,439	2020	1,076,163	2020
17	Indonesia	Asia	1,289,295	2022	1,058,424	2020	1,058,424	2020
18	Saudi Arabia	Asia	1,040,166	2022	700,118	2020	700,118	2020
19	Netherlands	Europe	1,013,595	2022	913,865	2020	912,242	2020
20	Switzerland	Europe	841,969	2022	752,248	2020	747,969	2020
21	Taiwan	Asia	841,209	2022	669,324	2020	668,500	2020
22	Poland	Europe	699,559	2022	596,618	2020	594,165	2020
23	Turkey	Asia	692,380	2022	720,098	2020	720,101	2020
24	Sweden	Europe	621,241	2022	541,064	2020	537,610	2020
25	Belgium	Europe	609,887	2022	521,861	2020	515,333	2020
26	Argentina	Americas	564,277	2022	383,067	2020	383,067	2020
27	Norway	Europe	541,938	2022	362,522	2020	362,009	2020
28	Thailand	Asia	522,012	2022	501,795	2020	501,795	2020
29	Israel	Asia	520,703	2022	407,101	2020	401,954	2020
30	Ireland	Europe	516,146	2022	425,889	2020	418,622	2020

Source: International Monetary Fund, IMF, UN, WB data

Thus, in nominal terms, the Polish economy corresponds to the size of the Swedish economy, Belgium or Taiwan. However, it should be borne in mind that all these three countries have incomparably fewer inhabitants (by „whom” they generate this income). Hence, it is recommended to use even more accurate gauges. The standard of living in a given country is better reflected by the GDP *per capita* indicator, i.e. the national income *per capita*. From the amount of GDP for a given year given in billions of dollars, the average value is calculated by dividing it by the number of inhabitants of a given country. Due to the relatively high (by European standards) level of the population of Poland, and consequently a large denominator in relation to the still average numerator, the country's position measured according to this index is not impressive (despite the sustained growth in recent years)⁶.

⁶ According to the data of the International Monetary Fund, Poland's GDP *per capita* in 2021 was USD 16.74 thousand. See: International Monetary Fund, IMF data.


Figure 3. Poland's GDP *per capita* in a comparative view (in USD)

	Country/Territory	UN Region	IMF		United Nations		World Bank	
			Estimate	Year	Estimate	Year	Estimate	Year
1	Liechtenstein	Europe	—	—	180,227	2020	175,814	2019
2	Monaco	Europe	—	—	173,696	2020	160,513	2019
3	Luxembourg	Europe	135,048	2022	117,182	2020	115,874	2020
4	Bermuda *	Americas	—	—	123,945	2020	107,080	2020
5	Ireland	Europe	101,509	2022	88,251	2020	85,268	2020
6	Norway	Europe	99,481	2022	86,871	2020	67,360	2020
7	Cayman Islands *	Americas	—	—	95,191	2020	85,083	2020
8	Switzerland	Europe	98,390	2022	88,919	2020	87,097	2020
9	Catar	Asia	84,514	2022	50,815	2020	50,124	2020
10	Brunei	Asia	79,818	2022	27,437	2020	27,443	2020
11	Singapore	Asia	79,578	2022	58,114	2020	59,798	2020
12	United States	Americas	76,027	2022	63,123	2020	63,414	2020
13	Iceland	Europe	74,417	2022	63,644	2020	59,270	2020
14	Denmark	Europe	68,094	2022	61,477	2020	61,083	2020
15	Australia	Oceania	67,464	2022	55,823	2020	51,660	2020
16	Sweden	Europe	57,678	2022	53,575	2020	52,274	2020
17	Netherlands	Europe	57,838	2022	53,334	2020	52,397	2020
18	Canada	Americas	57,408	2022	43,580	2020	43,258	2020
19	Greenland *	Americas	—	—	55,139	2020	53,041	2019
20	Israel	Asia	54,688	2022	47,034	2020	44,169	2020
21	Finland	Europe	53,745	2022	48,685	2020	48,773	2020
22	Austria	Europe	53,371	2022	48,106	2020	48,567	2020
23	Belgium	Europe	52,485	2022	45,028	2020	45,159	2020
24	Germany	Europe	51,104	2022	45,909	2020	45,208	2020
25	Macau *	Asia	50,578	2022	37,474	2020	39,403	2020
26	United Arab Emirates	Asia	50,349	2022	36,285	2020	36,285	2020
27	San Marino	Europe	49,601	2022	45,832	2020	47,731	2019
28	Hong Kong *	Asia	49,850	2022	46,611	2020	46,324	2020
29	New Zealand	Oceania	49,847	2022	43,972	2020	41,442	2020
30	United Kingdom	Europe	49,761	2022	40,718	2020	41,125	2020
31	British Virgin Islands *	Americas	—	—	49,357	2020	—	—
32	France	Europe	44,747	2022	38,559	2020	39,030	2020
33	Andorra	Europe	41,930	2022	37,072	2020	40,697	2019
34	Japan	Asia	39,243	2022	36,960	2020	40,193	2020
35	Kuwait	Asia	38,755	2022	24,809	2020	24,812	2020
36	Puerto Rico *	Americas	37,823	2022	36,052	2020	32,291	2020
37	Taiwan	Asia	36,051	2022	28,383	2020	—	—
38	South Korea	Asia	34,994	2022	31,947	2020	31,832	2020
39	Italy	Europe	34,777	2022	31,238	2020	31,714	2020
40	Guam *	Oceania	—	—	—	—	34,824	2020
41	New Caledonia *	Oceania	—	—	34,006	2020	34,789	2019
42	Malta	Europe	33,094	2022	33,771	2020	27,885	2020
43	Bahamas	Americas	32,077	2022	25,194	2020	25,194	2020
44	Cyprus	Europe	30,863	2022	28,133	2020	26,824	2020
45	Slovenia	Europe	30,159	2022	25,777	2020	25,517	2020
46	Spain	Europe	30,157	2022	27,409	2020	27,053	2020
47	Bahrain	Asia	29,103	2022	19,925	2020	20,410	2020
48	Aruba *	Americas	28,883	2022	23,386	2020	30,253	2018
49	Saudi Arabia	Asia	28,759	2022	20,110	2020	20,110	2020
50	Estonia	Europe	27,971	2022	23,106	2020	23,027	2020
51	Czech Republic	Europe	27,809	2022	22,911	2020	22,932	2020
52	Lithuania	Europe	25,015	2022	20,772	2020	20,234	2020
53	Portugal	Europe	24,465	2022	22,413	2020	22,178	2020
54	Turks and Caicos Islands	Americas	—	—	23,881	2020	23,880	2020
55	Oman	Asia	23,418	2022	12,409	2020	12,060	2020
56	Slovakia	Europe	21,865	2022	19,284	2020	19,287	2020
57	Latvia	Europe	21,311	2022	17,871	2020	17,728	2020
58	Greece	Europe	20,640	2022	18,117	2020	17,823	2020
59	French Polynesia *	Oceania	—	—	20,707	2020	14,324	2000
60	Northern Mariana Islands *	Oceania	—	—	—	—	20,660	2019
61	Hungary	Europe	20,338	2022	16,129	2020	15,991	2020
62	Iran	Asia	20,261	2022	11,183	2020	2,423	2020
63	Sint Maarten *	Americas	—	—	20,000	2020	29,160	2018
64	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Americas	19,117	2022	17,434	2020	18,438	2020
65	Barbados	Americas	19,110	2022	15,449	2020	15,374	2020
66	Poland	Europe	18,508	2022	15,764	2020	15,721	2020

Source: International Monetary Fund, IMF, UN, WB data

As can be seen in the *per capita* statement, the Polish Gross Domestic Product – although in nominal terms it is comparable to Swedish or Belgian and much higher than all Central and Eastern European countries – after dividing it into each inhabitant, it drops dramatically in the hierarchy, placing Poland in the positions of the end of the top 50 countries in the world. Apart from the hecatomb of World War II (Poland was the country most affected by the devastation), the collapse of the years 1975-1990, resulted in the break-away with the peloton of most civilized countries in the economic race. It is all more painful as it was the period of the fastest development of Western European countries, and some of them recorded growth during this time, allowing them to quickly become a wealthy country (*vide* Spain and a period of „desarrollo”). This was just impossible to make up in such a short time.

Figure 4. Growth of GDP *per capita* in Poland in 1950-2015 in a comparative view




Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, May 2016, <http://www.conference-board.org/data/economy/database/>, [access: 07.07.2022]

It should be emphasized that the most reliable index is, however, that one taking into account the so-called purchase power, i.e. the value of financial assets allowing the purchase of a representative basket of products. The level of the country's wealth / economic development calculated in this way allows to reflect the real structure of potential, taking into account the structure of internal factors, characteristic for a given country. Calculating the purchasing power parity, Poland performs much better than without taking them into account (although still pale compared to the richest countries).

Figure 5. GDP per capita as measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) by country as a percentage of the EU average (2018)

Source: Eurostat data

Figure 6. GDP per capita PPP in the European Union in 2018 (regions)

Source: Eurostat data

In 2018, regional GDP *per capita* expressed in purchasing power standard (PPS) ranged from 30% the European Union average in Mayotte, an overseas region of France (the Comoros archipelago in the Indian Ocean northwest of Madagascar), up to 263% in Luxembourg. In Poland, only Warsaw capital region advanced to the top 20 richest in the EU with GDP *per capita* above the average. „Warsaw capital region is ranked highest among all Polish regions. In the ranking of GDP *per capita* taking into account the purchasing power parity, Warsaw and its neighboring municipalities ranked 16th. GDP *per capita* of the capital and its vicinity was at the level of 47 000 PPS, 56% higher than the average. The comparison for Polish regions looks much worse if GDP *per capita* as expressed in euro. Even the richest Warsaw region, does not reach the EU average, with a GDP in euro of 94%. Warsaw and its vicinity are only ranked 112th. (...) The lowest level of GDP per capita in Poland, measured in PPS, was recorded in the Lubelskie Voivodeship. The Lublin region was ranked 231st in the ranking taking into account purchasing power and 232nd in the case of GDP expressed in euro. The other Polish regions do not fare much better. The Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie voivodships, counting in the PPS, are ranked 229, 224, 223 and 220 respectively”⁸.

Figure 7. The richest regions of the EU in 2018 (GDP in millions EUR, per capita and PPP)

Luksemburg	60 053	1	98 600	1	79 300
Southern	126 936	2	78 700	2	67 900
Eastern & Midland	175 305	3	73 400	3	63 400
Brussels Region	83 987	4	69 400	4	61 300
Hovedstaden	122 244	5	66 800	11	50 000
Hamburg	119 046	6	64 800	5	59 600
Stockholm	145 659	7	62 600	12	49 500
Île de France	733 875	8	59 700	8	53 700
Noord-Holland	166 941	9	58 700	10	51 200
Oberbayern	273 696	10	58 600	7	53 900
Utrecht	71 522	11	55 000	13	47 900
Helsinki-Uusimaa	91 241	12	54 800	23	43 500
Salzburg	29 044	13	52 400	18	46 500

Source: Eurostat data

The GDP index – although the most popular – is more and more often criticized as an indicator calculated annually for every economy in the world as an element of the so-called dry

⁸ Polska na mapie unijnego bogactwa. Tylko Warszawa ma PKB per capita powyżej średniej UE, <https://forsal.pl/artykuly/1457867,najbogatsze-i-najbiedniejsze-regiony-ue-pkb-per-capita-polska-warszawa-eurostat.html>, [access: 07.07.2022].

data that does not take into account the increasingly complex elements of the economy and society. An international discussion is ongoing, focusing mainly to the extent to which GDP should be treated as a reference point not so much about the condition of the economy as about the actual state of affluence of the society. These issues often do not complement each other, on the contrary – they are very divergent⁹.

Hence, GDP should not be overestimated as an indicator of the overall economic situation. However, if one wants to know the facts in a more nuanced and detailed way, it is also worth referring to other measures, such as:

- Human Development Index (HDI), which allows to measure the actual socio-economic development in a given country, because apart from GDP, this indicator also takes into account life expectancy and the number of years of education,
- Actual Individual Consumption (AIC), which represents real household consumption compared to the average using purchasing power parity¹⁰,
- The Gini index, which allows for the assessment of the dark side of countries which, on paper, often boast of an exemplary economic development, meanwhile experience significant social inequalities, where, however, economic growth is not distributed evenly, sometimes completely bypassing some groups e.g. in the USA (the Gini index is calculated by taking into account the income per household, showing the inequalities between them).


Poland in European Union

According to a study by the Center for Social and Economic Research, Polish GDP in the EU is over 50. greater than it would have been if the country had never joined the EU. „Since May 1, 2004, when Poland joined the European Union, Poland has received nearly EUR 138 billion. At the same time, it paid contributions in excess of EUR 6.1 billion. So the net financial benefits of Poland in connection with belonging to the European Union reach almost EUR 132 billion after seventeen years of membership”¹¹. If Poland had not joined the EU, its GDP *per capita* would not have been above 33,000 \$ PPP, but around 21-22,000 \$, which is one-third less, and in the period after 2004, GDP would grow only by less than 20% and not by over 90%.

⁹ GDP is criticized for not including, *inter alia*, internship, voluntary work, shadow economy, social work, ignoring the issue of unregistered costs (related to e.g. commuting), as well as ignoring social inequalities and environmental costs. G. Siemionczyk, *PKB to wskaźnik niewiarygodny, ale lepszych alternatyw, brakuje* <https://www.parkiet.com/gospodarka/art20630771-pkb-to-wskaznik-niewiarygodny-ale-lepszych-alternatyw-brakuje>, [access: 07.07.2022].

¹⁰ Most often, the AIC index coincides with GDP *per capita*. Countries with high AICs also have high GDP *per capita*. Nevertheless, sometimes the deviations are significant. And so, when looking at the AIC data and GDP *per capita* in the EU, it can be noticed that consumption is not entirely in line with GDP *per capita*. Often both indicators differ by +/- 2 points. The situation is different when one wants to get more detailed data and make an indicator that reflects the reality as closely as possible. Then, AIC is a much better measure, although it also has its drawbacks, as it does not take into account, *inter alia*, savings. See: *Polska goni średnią unijną. Rosnie konsumpcja i PKB per capita*, <https://obserwatorgospodarczy.pl/2019/06/19/polska-goni-srednia-unijna-rosnie-konsumpcja-i-pkb-per-capita/>, [access: 11.07.2022].


¹¹ R. Hirsch, *Bez Unii Europejskiej byłibysmy biedniejsi o jedną trzecią – są na to dowody*, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/bez-unii-europejskiej-bylibysmy-biedniejsi-o-jedna-trzecia-sa-na-to-dowody/6m21sz0>, [access: 11.07.2022].

Figure 8. Polish GDP *per capita* in the EU vs Polish GDP outside the EU


Source: J. Hagemeyer, J.J. Michałek, P. Svatko, *New Evidence on Economic Gains from EU Accession*, Ścieżka wzrostu rzeczywistego polskiego PKB i hipotetycznego PKB w scenariuszu pozostania poza Unią Europejską, CASE 2021, <http://www.case-research.eu/en/showcase-no-118-101828>, [access: 12.07.2022]

Economic development - a list of successes

Internal demand, consumption is the greatest stimulus of the country's economic growth. Poland is the largest market in Central and Eastern Europe. The influence of domestic demand on the rate of economic growth in recent years has been on average between 2 and 4 percentage points. This is due to the positive impact of total consumption, including consumption in the household sector and public consumption. On the other hand, the impact of investment demand on GDP growth ranged from 1 to 2 points, and consisted, *inter alia*, of the increase in inventories, gross accumulation and the positive impact of net exports on economic growth.

Figure 9. Figure 9. Share of household consumption expenditure and public expenditure in Poland's GDP

Source: W. Białek, *Popyt krajowy i wydatki konsumpcyjne gospodarstw domowych napędzały wzrost PKB*, Poland, Expenditure Approach, Contribution to Growth, Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices, <https://pl.investing.com/analysis/popyt-krajowy-i-wydatki-konsumpcyjne-gospodarstw-domowych-napedzaly-wzrost-pkb-w-i-200245755>, [access: 12.07.2022]

Figure 10. Share of domestic demand and net exports in Poland's GDP

Source: W. Białek, *Popyt krajowy i wydatki konsumpcyjne gospodarstw domowych napędzały wzrost PKB*, Poland, Expenditure Approach, Contribution to Growth, Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices, <https://pl.investing.com/analysis/popyt-krajowy-i-wydatki-konsumpcyjne-gospodarstw-domowych-napedzaly-wzrost-pkb-w-i-200245755>, [access: 12.07.2022]

Poland has managed to consolidate the records of a positive balance in foreign trade. For example, in 2010, 78.8% of Polish exports went to the EU market, while imports amounted to 59.1%.


Figure 11. Bilans handlu zagranicznego Polski w latach 2000–2020

Source: M. Samcik, *Bilans handlowy Polski*, <https://subiektywnieofinansach.pl/polska-unia-europejska-polexit-bilans-fundusze-europejskie/bilans-handlowy-polski/>, [access: 12.07.2022]

Poland is definitely the best in trade with the richest countries. Only in the period of January-February 2021, exports to developed countries amounted to PLN 160.6 billion, and imports - PLN 110.8 billion, which means a surplus of almost PLN 50 billion. The trade surplus

with other EU countries is PLN 43.6 billion, and by narrowing it down to the euro area – PLN 31.1 billion in plus¹².

Figure 12. Poland's trade balance in relations with the Germany (import/export in millions PLN)



Source: J. Bereźnicki, *Jak to leciało? Polska będzie rynkiem zbytu dla bogatych krajów UE? To spójrzcie na te dane*, <https://spidersweb.pl/bizblog/bilans-handlowy-polski-i-ii-2021/>, [access: 12.07.2022]


Poland has been an attractive for the companies investment country for many years. It has a huge impact on economic changes during transformation period. Foreign investors have contributed capital, cooperative networks as well as their culture and work organization, and today there are important part of the Polish economy¹³. The report of the Association of International Chambers of Industry and Commerce in Poland statutes that nearly 25,000 enterprises from 107 countries operates on Polish market. The most important investors in Poland are companies from Germany, the United States, Great Britain and France.

The value of foreign direct investment corresponds to 40% of Polish GDP. In the years 2004-2009, direct investments in Poland amounted to over \$ 94 billion (in the corresponding period: Lithuania approx. \$ 8 billion, Slovakia about \$ 18 billion, the Czech Republic about \$ 42 billion, Romania about \$ 53 billion, Hungary approx. \$ 32 billion). In 2010, the inflow of foreign direct investment amounted to \$ 9.7 billion, which placed Poland in the first place in the region. „At the end of 2018, it was \$ 228.5 billion, and a year later it was US \$ 236.5 billion. The employment in companies with foreign capital operating in Poland amounted to a total of almost 2 million people at the end of 2018, i.e. 15% of the total workforce in the private sector. This means that every sixth job position has been created by a foreign investor. In 2010-2018, there was a 2.5-fold increase in the number of jobs in companies with foreign capital”¹⁴.

¹² J. Bereźnicki, *Jak to leciało? Polska będzie rynkiem zbytu dla bogatych krajów UE? To spójrzcie na te dane*, <https://spidersweb.pl/bizblog/bilans-handlowy-polski-i-ii-2021/>, [access: 12.07.2022].

¹³ See: A. Rogala-Lewicki, *Zarządzanie przemysłem kultury ponowoczesnej. Nowy paradygmat geopolityki kultury*, „Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2018, No 1.

¹⁴ *Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce [RAPORT]*, <https://polskiprzemysl.com.pl/raporty/zagraniczne-inwestycje-w-polsce/>, [access: 11.07.2022].

Figure 13. Foreign investments in Poland 1996–2019 (in millions USD and as % of GDP)

Source: UNCTAD data

Poland was 14th in the world and 3rd in the EU, behind Germany and Sweden in terms of the value of the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2021. „The inflow of investments was record high and amounted to USD 24.8 billion. The inflow of FDI to Poland increased by 82% in 2021, and compared to 2019, i.e. before the pandemic, by 86%”¹⁵. In the years 2019–2021, foreign investors in Poland contributed to the creation of 339,000 jobs.

The Polish capital market is the most dynamically developing market in this part of the world. According to the data of the World Federation of Exchanges, the capitalization of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange amounted to 194 billion. \$ – which was the best result in the region in 2011. In turn, as of June 28, 2022, shares of 420 companies (including 45 foreign ones) were listed on the WSE. Their total capitalization amounted to over PLN 1.12 trillion, of which 561.6 billion was attributable to domestic companies and 563.1 billion to foreign companies¹⁶. Similarly, in terms of IPOs, the Warsaw Stock Exchange remains the leader, i.e., in the period from July to September 2011, a total of 61 companies debuted.

Warsaw is considered to be one of the fastest growing cities in Europe. In the Global Financial Centers Index ranking in March 2011, in the category of regional financial center, Warsaw beat such cities as Moscow, Budapest, Athens, for years remaining in the top 60 largest financial centers in the world¹⁷. In turn, in the ranking of the most popular cities for business published by CB Richard Ellis, Warsaw came fifth in Europe and twelfth in the world¹⁸.

Poles are enterprising and only Koreans work more – according to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development¹⁹. Poles work an average of 40.7 hours a week. Working

¹⁵ *Rekordowy napływ bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych do Polski. Wzrost o 82 proc.*, <https://forsal.pl/gospodarka/inwestycje/artykuly/8412713,rekordowy-naplyw-bezposrednich-inwestycji-zagranicznych-do-polski-wzrost-o-82-proc.html>, [access: 11.07.2022].

¹⁶ *Raport zintegrowany grupy kapitałowej GPW*, 2021, https://www.gpw.pl/pub/GPW/files/raporty_roczne/GPW_Raport_21.pdf, [access: 11.07.2022].


¹⁷ *GFCI 31 Rank*, <https://www.longfinance.net/programmes/financial-centre-futures/global-financial-centres-index/gfci-31-explore-data/gfci-31-rank/>, [access: 12.07.2022].

¹⁸ *Ranking lokalizacji biznesowych na świecie CBRE: Warszawa na 12. Miejsce*, <https://forsal.pl/artykuly/537089,ranking-lokalizacji-biznesowych-na-swiecie-cbre-warszawa-na-12-miejscu-mapa.html>, [access: 12.07.2022].

¹⁹ *Narodowy wskaźnik stresu bije rekordy: tuż za nami Koreańczycy*, <https://www.rynekzdrowia.pl/Po-godzinach/Narodowy-wskaznik-stresu-bije-rekordy-tuz-za-nami-Koreanczyzy-Po-godzinach,108716,10.html>, [access: 12.07.2022].

time does not meet the efficiency. Poland came second to last, with a GDP divided by work duration of just \$ 8.78. Only Mexico is worse. Moreover, according to the Extended DISC corporation, the National Stress Indicator (NSI) is very high in Poland. In 2009, it reached the level of 2.22, while in Great Britain it was 1.47, in Germany – 1.53, and in the USA – 1.51²⁰.

Figure 14. Students and absolvents of Polish Universities and Higher Schools (with foreigners)



Source: Szkolnictwo wyższe w roku akademickim 2020/2021 15.06.2021 r. (wyniki wstępne), Główny Urząd Statystyczny, https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5488/8/7/1/szkolnictwo_wyzsze_w_roku_akademickim_2020-2021.pdf, [access: 12.07.2022]

Poland can boast of a new generation of ambitious, talented young people who know languages and travel around the world. It is actually the first generation of Poles in many years, which in terms of quality is in no way inferior to its richer peers. Moreover, they are more competitive than them as they grew up in a country where there was still more competition due to fewer resources. In the last two decades, the number of students in Poland has increased from 403,000. in the academic year 1990/1991 up to 1.930,000 in the academic year 2007/2008. As of December 31, 2020, 1,215,300 studied at universities in Poland²¹.

In 2009, according to the OECD report, in Poland the largest percentage of people in the world obtained a master's degree. The total percentage of people with higher education in Poland is 20%. Over 63% of university graduates can boast a master's degree. This is a great success for a country that has, in twenty years, managed to make up for the great difference that separates it from developed countries. Interestingly, contrary to popular opinion, only 25% of graduates in Poland are Humanities and Arts, which is exactly the same as the average in 30 OECD countries. In 1992, there were 124 universities in Poland, including 18 non-public. In 2011, these proportions were respectively: 470 to 338. Quantity, however, still does not meet the quality. The conclusions of the OECD report are in contrast to the Shanghai ranking. Ten

²⁰ K. Sztandera, *Polacy najbardziej zestresowanymi pracownikami na świecie. 5 rad jak pozytywnie i zdrowo zarządzać stresem*, <https://in-npoland.pl/117029.polacy-najbardziej-zestresowanymi-pracownikami-na-swiecie-5-rad-jak-pozytywnie-i-zdrowo-zaradzacz-stresem>, [access: 12.07.2022].

²¹ *Szkolnictwo wyższe w roku akademickim 2020/2021 15.06.2021 r. (wyniki wstępne)*, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5488/8/7/1/szkolnictwo_wyzsze_w_roku_akademickim_2020-2021.pdf, [access: 12.07.2022].

Polish universities were included in the ranking list among 1,000 universities. Among Polish universities, the highest positions have been held for years by the University of Warsaw and the Jagiellonian University. Both universities ranked in the fifth hundred (401-500 places)²². Exact places are given only for the first 100 universities²³. In turn, in the Impact factor (IF) classification, conducted by the Institute of Scientific Information, reflecting the prestige and impact of scientific journals (the so-called citation index), in 2005 included 158 Polish titles on almost 14 thousand in the classification²⁴.

Rankings – a clash with reality (selected indicators)

Despite the visible achievements, Poland still ranks in the so-called middle positions, not only being able to break into the world leaders, but in some cases being embarrassing for a European country. A list of selected rankings reflects the current condition of the state civilization development in Poland²⁵.

1. Holistic perspective: (a) Human Development Index, HDI, (b) OECD Better Life Index

The Human Development Index is a synthetic indicator that describes the effects of the socio-economic development of countries (hence it is sometimes referred to the socio-economic development index). The index was developed in 1990 by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq. Since 1993, it has been used in its annual reports by the United Nations Development Agenda (UNDP). The HDI index assesses countries on three levels: „long and healthy life”, „knowledge” and „decent standard of living”. Since 2010, the following indicators have been introduced: (1) life expectancy, (2) average number of years of education received by residents aged 25 and older, (3) expected number of years of education for children starting the education process, (4) national income *per capita* in USD, calculated according to the purchasing parity of the currency (PPP). Poland's HDI in 2020 was 0.880²⁶.

²² Interpelacja nr 10596 do ministra nauki i szkolnictwa wyższego w sprawie światowego rankingu uczelni wyższych, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/INT7.nsf/main/6BAD48A8>, [access: 12.07.2022].

²³ The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) uses six objective metrics to rank world universities, including the number of Nobel Prize and Fields Medals alumni, staff, number of highly cited researchers selected by Clarivate Analytics, number of articles published in Nature and Science journals, number of indexed articles in Science Citation Index - Extended and Social Science Citation Index and per capita university scores. Over 2,000 universities are assessed by ARWU every year, and the best 1,000 are published. See: *Polskie uczelnie w światowym rankingu*, <https://uczelnie.info.pl/polskie-uczelnie-w-swiatowym-rankingu/>, [access: 12.07.2022].

²⁴ *Ocena jakości czasopism naukowych*, <https://www.biblos.pk.edu.pl/nauka/ocena-dorobku-publicacyjnego/ocena-jakosci-czasopism-naukowych>, [access: 13.07.2022].

²⁵ The current indexes are listed on the website: *Trading Economics*, <https://pl.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/ease-of-doing-business>, [access: 13.07.2022].

²⁶ *Wskaźniki rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego*, <https://zpe.gov.pl/a/wskazniki-rozwoju-spoleczno-gospodarczego/DVMT029uK>, [access: 13.07.2022].

Poland's position – 35 (data for 2020)

Poland performs well in a limited number of well-being dimensions relative to other countries in the Better Life Index. Poland outperforms the average in education and social connections. It underperforms average in income, health, environmental quality and life satisfaction. These assessments are based on available selected data. In Poland, the average household net-adjusted disposable income per capita is USD 23 675 a year, less than the OECD average of USD 30 490 a year. In terms of employment, about 69% of people aged 15 to 64 in Poland have a paid job, above the OECD employment average of 66%. In Poland, 93% of adults aged 25-64 have completed upper secondary education, higher than the OECD average of 79. In terms of the quality of the education system, the average student scored 513 in reading literacy, maths and science in the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). This score is higher than the OECD average of 488. On average in Poland, girls outperformed boys by 11 points, well above the average OECD gap of 5 points. In Poland, 82% of people say they are satisfied with the quality of their environment, lower than the OECD average of 84%. Concerning the public sphere, there is a strong sense of community and moderate levels of civic participation in Poland, where 94% of people believe that they know someone they could rely on in time of need, more than the OECD average of 91%. Voter turnout, a measure of citizens' participation in the political process, was 68% during recent elections, slightly lower than the OECD average of 69%²⁷. When asked to rate their general satisfaction with life on a scale from 0 to 10, Poles gave it a 6.1 grade on average, lower than the OECD average of 6.7²⁸.

1. Housing
 - a. Rooms per person – rank 35 / 41
 - b. Dwellings with basic facilities – rank 26 / 41
 - c. Housing expenditure – rank 29 / 41
2. Income
 - a. Household net adjusted disposable income – rank 29 / 41
 - b. Household net wealth – rank 24 / 41
3. Jobs
 - a. Employment rate – rank 23 / 41
 - b. Long-term unemployment rate – rank 6 / 41
 - c. Personal earnings – rank 25 / 41
 - d. Job security – rank 26 / 41
4. Community

²⁷ See: A. Rogala-Lewicki, *Citizens' involvement in public sphere – information as a ius publicum factor of the state of democracy*, „European Journal of Geopolitics” 2017, No. 5.

²⁸ *OECD Better Life Index. Poland*, <https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/poland/>, [access: 13.07.2022].

- a. Quality of support network – rank 14 / 41
- 5. Education
 - a. Educational attainment – rank 5 / 41
 - b. Student skills – rank 6 / 41
 - c. Years in education – rank 18 / 41
- 6. Environment
 - a. Air pollution – rank 37 / 41
 - b. Water quality – rank 23 / 41
- 7. Civic engagement
 - a. Voter turnout – rank 20 / 41
 - b. Stakeholder engagement for developing regulations – rank 9 / 41
- 8. Health
 - a. Life expectancy – rank 32 / 41
 - b. Self-reported health – rank 32 / 41
- 9. Life satisfaction – rank 30 / 41
- 10. Safety
 - a. Feeling safe walking alone at night – rank 28 / 41
 - b. Homicide rate – rank 7 / 41
- 11. Work-life balance
 - a. Employees working very long hours – rank 18 / 41
 - b. Time devoted to leisure and personal care 26 / 41

Poland's position – 27 out of 41 (data for 2020)

2. Corruption Perceptions Index – CPI

Prepared annually by Transparency International since 1995, the Corruption Perception Index is the leading indicator of corruption in the public sphere. In 2012, TI changed its research methodology. Unlike in previous years, the company went from 0 to 100 (0-10), with 0 being the most corrupt country and 100 being the most corrupt. This change makes it possible to closely monitor the trends and compare the results of previous years. In the 2012 CPI ranking, 75% of countries scored below 50 points, what according to International Transparency, bring the need to look closer into public institutions. In the ranking for 2021, Poland is placed 42 with 56 points. The average result for the Western Europe and European Union group, to which Poland belongs, is 66 points²⁹.

²⁹ Indeks Percepcji Korupcji 2021, <https://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/aktualnosci/14154,Indeks-Percepcji-Korupcji-2021.html>, [access: 13.07.2022].

Poland's position – 42 (data for 2021)

3. Index of Economic Freedom – IEF

This indicator reflects the restrictive regulations and the scope of coercion usage by the state apparatus in the economic sphere in various countries of the world, and is published by The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. The index assesses countries according to solutions and policies implemented in order to increase economic freedom. Each country is measured on 50 independent variables divided into 10 categories affecting economic freedom: (a) trade policy, (b) tax burden, (c) government intervention in the economy, (d) monetary policy, (e) capital movements, and foreign investment, (f) banking and finance, (g) wages and prices, (h) property rights, (i) legal regulations, (j) black market activity. The economic freedom index in Poland amounted to 69.7 points, which placed the country in the fourth ten in the group of „moderately free” countries³⁰.

Poland's position – 41 (data for 2021)

4. Ease of Doing Business Index – EDBI

Index was developed by the World Bank. A higher position in the ranking indicates better, usually simpler, rules governing business-related matters and stronger protection of property by law – which has a very strong effect on economic growth³¹. Index is based on research of laws and regulations conducted and verified by over 5,000 representatives of state authorities, lawyers, consultants, accountants and other professionals who deal with legal regulations relating to business on a daily basis³². A country's ranking is based on the average of 10 categories:

- establishing a company – procedures, time and required minimum initial contribution,
- obtaining building permits – procedures, time and cost of inspection and obtaining a permit,
- electricity ratio – time and cost of obtaining an electrical connection for a newly built enterprise,
- property registration – procedures, time and cost of registering property,

³⁰ P. Szubański, *Indeks wolności gospodarczej 2021. Polska awansowała*, <https://www.rp.pl/dane-gospodarcze/art8654381-indeks-wolnosc-gospodarczej-2021-polska-awansowala>, [access: 13.07.2022].

³¹ Index is also subject to criticism. It is indicated that the study explicitly recognizes the liberal Anglo-Saxon solutions as model ones, as a result of which countries with the Anglo-Saxon legal model occupies the leading positions, while countries with the German legal model (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) rank only in the second and third ten, as overregulated. See: J.I. Haidar, *Impact of Business Regulatory Reforms on Economic Growth*, "Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier", 2012, vol. 26(3), p. 285–307.

³² For example, in Australia, the country in the first place in the category of „setting up a company”, only 2 procedures are required to set up a company, the process itself takes an average of 2 days. The official cost is 0.8% of GDP *per capita*. There are no initial contribution requirements. In Guinea-Bissau, the second worst country in the first category, 17 procedures are required to start a business, it takes an average of 233 days. The official cost is 255.5% of GDP *per capita* and the minimum required contribution is 1006.6% of GDP *per capita*. See: W. Orłowski, *Konkurencyjność gospodarcza krajów. Propozycja alternatywnego pomiaru w kontekście dyskusji o konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki*, „Studia BAS”, 2018, vol. 3 (55), p. 23.

- receiving a loan – the degree of loan regulation and the amount of information on the loan,
- protection of investors – the scope of transparency and the scope of liability of the management board against shareholders,
- paying taxes - the number of taxes paid, hours spent annually on preparing tax returns and a portion of gross income which is the tax paid,
- foreign trade – the number of documents, signatures and time required for the entrepreneur to import or export,
- concluding contracts – procedures, time and cost of concluding and enforcing debt agreements,
- liquidation of the enterprise – time and cost related to the termination of operations and the recovery rate³³.

Poland's position – 40 (data for 2019)

5. Global Business Complexity Index – GBCI

The Global Business Complexity Index provides an authoritative overview of the complexity of establishing and operating businesses around the world. Index analyses the key trends affecting three business areas - accounting and tax, global entity management and HR and payroll. From TMF Group reports one could discover:

- which jurisdictions rank as the most complex – or simple – based on their business environments,
- where and how businesses are being pushed toward responsible governance and increased transparency,
- how digitalisation has advanced to remove traditional processes³⁴.

Poland was ranked 2nd in Europe and 10th in the world among the countries with the most complex regulations regulating business. In Europe, the easiest way to do business is in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Malta, the hardest - in France, Poland, Greece, Italy and Belgium. Brazil, France, Mexico, Colombia and Turkey are at the forefront of the least friendly countries in the world in this respect³⁵.

³³ Indeks łatwości prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej, https://pl.fw.wiki/wiki/Indice_de_la_facilit%C3%A9_de_faire_des_affaires, [access: 13.07.2022].

³⁴ The Global Business Complexity Index 2022, <https://www.tmf-group.com/en/news-insights/publications/2022/global-business-complexity-index/>, [access: 14.07.2022].

³⁵ Polska drugim krajem w Europie, w którym najtrudniej prowadzić biznes, <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/polska-drugim-krajem-w-europie-w-ktorym-najtrudniej-prowadzic-biznes-6659069869988384a.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

Poland's position – 10 worst in the world (data for 2021)

6. Mortality rate, infant

It is one of the indicators for assessing the health condition of the population and *de facto* development of a given country (especially the health care sector). The indicator reflects the number of infant deaths (children aged 0-1 years) in a given time period per 1000 live births. There are early infant mortality (up to 27 days of age) and late mortality (between 28 days and 11 months). Early (neonatal) mortality accounts for 70% of total infant mortality. In general, the highest value of the index is recorded in poor countries (e.g. over 100 in Afghanistan, over 90 in Somalia, over 80 in the Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, Chad and Niger), and the lowest in highly developed countries (e.g. Japan, Singapore – below 2)³⁶. Children born in the richest countries are up to 50 times more likely to survive the first month of life than children in the poorest regions of the world. In Poland, in the 1950s, infant mortality in Poland was 108 per 1000 births. This ratio in 2012 was 5.6 and in 2021 it was 3.57 deaths per 1000 live births, with the Western European average being around 2.5³⁷. However, the greatest progress was achieved thanks to the implementation of the Perinatal Care Improvement Program in the 1990s. Currently, Poland is in the middle of the ranks among the rich countries³⁸.

Poland's position – 26 (data for 2021)

7. Life expectancy

The statistical value corresponds to the average number of years of life left for an individual in a given age and group. In the particular case, at age 0 (i.e. for a newborn), life expectancy is equal to the average life expectancy in a given population³⁹. In Poland, the average life expectancy in 2015 was 78.58 years, including 81.71 for women and 75.31 for men⁴⁰. In 2017, men lived an average of 74 years, while women 81.8 years. Compared to 1990, it is longer by 7.8 and 6.6 years, respectively. In Poland, as in other countries, there is an excess of male mortality⁴¹. During the pandemic, the length shrank to around 77 years in 2020. This length is similar to the average from a decade ago and one and a half years shorter than in 2019⁴².

³⁶ *Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)*, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc, [access: 14.07.2022].

³⁷ *Zgony niemowląt*, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/zgony-niemowlat,35,1.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

³⁸ J. Wykowski, *W kilka dekad umieralność niemowląt w Polsce spadła 30-krotnie*, <https://infowire.pl/generic/release/685945/w-kilka-dekad-umieralnosc-niemowlat-w-polsce-spadla-30-krotnie>, [access: 14.07.2022].

³⁹ See: R. Caspari, *Jak wydłużyło się życie*, „Świat Nauki” 2011, No. 9 (241), p. 26-31.

⁴⁰ *Trwanie życia w 2017 r. (Life expectancy tables of Poland 2017)*, GUS, Warszawa 2018, file:///C:/Users/adwok/Downloads/life_expectancy_2017.pdf, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴¹ See: H. Kaplan, K. Hill, J. Lancaster, A.M. Hurtado, *A Theory of Human Life History Evolution: Diet, Intelligence and Longevity*, „Evolutionary Anthropology” 2000, vol. 9, p. 156-185.

⁴² B. Rogala, *Przez pandemię średnia długość życia w Polsce spadła do 77 lat*, <https://300gospodarka.pl/news/przez-pandemie-srednia-dlugosc-zycia-w-polsce-spadla-do-77-lat>, [access: 14.07.2022].

Poland's position – 36 (data for 2015)

8. Demography: (a) Total Fertility Rate, (b) Mortality Rate

The demographic crisis in Poland is intensifying⁴³. Its scale can be seen in the data published by the Central Statistical Office. They show that on March 31, 2021, the population of Poland was 38 036 100 people⁴⁴. This means that it was by 475 700 (1.2%) lower than at the 2011 census. In turn, at the end of June 2022, approx. 38 000 000 people. The fall of the border of 38 million Poles living in the country is almost certain. For every 10,000 an average of 21 people decreases annually (in 2021 – 27)⁴⁵. Two factors mainly affect the demographic level in the country - the fertility rate and the mortality rate

According to the definition used by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS), the fertility rate means the number of children that, on average, a woman would give birth during the entire reproductive period (15-49 years), assuming that in particular phases of this period she would give birth with the intensity observed in the analyzed year. The fertility rate is one of the most widely used for two reasons. First, it is not affected by differences or changes in the age-to-sex ratio, and second, it is an easily understandable measure of hypothetical full fertility. It is assumed that if the fertility rate fluctuates in the range of 2.10-2.15, we can talk about the so-called simple replacement of generations. This means that, each woman of reproductive age should give birth to slightly more than two children on average. Such a state is desirable in order to be able to ensure an optimal size of the workforce in the future, and thus not to overburden the pension system⁴⁶. According to the Central Statistical Office in the report „Poland in numbers 2021”, in 2020 over 355 000 births were registered. live. In other words, in Poland in 2020, out of 1,000 women of childbearing age, 1,378 children were born. After two years of growth (in 2016 and 2017), the number of births decreased by almost 20 000 compared to the previous year. This means that the fertility rate in Poland in 2020 was 1.378. This is the lowest result since 2016, when the fertility rate was 1.357.

On the other hand, the lowest fertility rate in Poland in the 21st century (1,222) was recorded in 2003⁴⁷. In 2011 7 146 000 children lived in Poland. children, which is over 36.0% less than in 1989. In 2035, children will constitute only 15.6% of the Polish population. Since 1989, the fertility rate below 2.1 no longer guarantees the replacement of generations in Poland⁴⁸.

⁴³ See: *Krajowe Centrum Rozwoju Demograficznego*, <https://ncrd.pl/>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴⁴ *Rocznik Demograficzny 2021*, GUS, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny-2021,3,15.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴⁵ M. Mazurek, *GUS podał nowe dane o urodzeniach. Ekspert: W lipcu przestaliśmy być 38-milionowym krajem*, <https://next.gazeta.pl/next/7,151003,28721795,gus-podal-nowe-dane-o-urodzeniach-ekspert-w-lipcu-przestalismy.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴⁶ *Współczynnik dzietności w Polsce. Najnowsze dane GUS*, https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/wspolczynnik-dzietnosci-w-polsce-najnowsze-dane-gus/, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴⁷ *Polska w liczbach 2021*, GUS, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/inne-opracowania/inne-opracowania-zbiorcze/polska-w-liczbach-2021,14,14.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁴⁸ *Podstawowe informacje o rozwoju demograficznym Polski do 2013 roku*, GUS, https://web.archive.org/web/20140505134710/http://old.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_11157_PLK_HTML.htm, [access: 14.07.2022].

The situation is worse in 8 out of 31 EEA countries: Portugal, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Malta (with the worst result: 1.14)⁴⁹. A certain regularity is noticeable – the worst results are achieved by the countries of southern Europe⁵⁰. It is worth noting that in several agglomerations the fertility rate is high, considering Polish conditions. The highest fertility rate in 2020 was recorded in the following regions⁵¹:

- Gdańsk – 1.75
- Poznań – 1.68
- Warsaw East – 1.67
- leszczyński – 1.61
- Warsaw West – 1.59
- nowosądecki – 1.59
- Warsaw – 1.58
- chojnicki – 1.56

Fertility rate – 1,4 (replacement of generations 2,1) (data for 2021)

The mortality rate, in turn, reflects the ratio of the number of deaths in a given period (usually a year) to the number of people as of the middle of the period or to the average number of people for that period – expressed in ‰ (per 1000 population)⁵². In 2020, over 477 000 people died in Poland (almost 68 000 more than the year before). This means that the death rate per 100,000 population reached the highest value since 1951 and amounted to 12.4⁵³. A worse result was recorded only in countries such as: Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia. The lowest number of deaths was recorded from 1960 to 1966 – less than 240,000. Since the 1970s, there has been an increase in the number of deaths per year, with little variation between years. Since 1976, the number of deaths has exceeded 300,000 annually, while in 1991 over 400,000 people have died. In the years 1992–2016, the number of deaths remained at the level of 359 500 (in 2002) and 394 000 (in 2015). Since 2017, it has been recorded over 400 thousand. deaths annually⁵⁴.

⁴⁹ See: H.P. Kohler, F.C. Billari, J.A. Ortega, *Low Fertility in Europe: Causes, Implications and Policy Options*, University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences 2006; J.R., Goldstein, T. Sobotka, A. Jasilioniene, *The End of 'Lowest-Low' Fertility?*, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2019.

⁵⁰ J. Rosa, *Polska wśród państw o najniższej dzietności w Europie. Wszyscy w regionie radzą sobie lepiej*, <https://300gospodarka.pl/news/eurostat-dzieci-rodzina-polska-europa>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁵¹ *Duże miasta przodują pod względem dzietności w Polsce. Jakie to będzie miało skutki?*, <https://forsal.pl/gospodarka/demografia/artykuly/8347449,wspolczynnik-dzietnosci-polska-duze-miasta-demografia.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁵² J.Z. Holzer, *Demografia*, Warszawa 1999.

⁵³ *Sytuacja demograficzna Polski do 2020 r. Zgony i umieralność*, GUS, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/sytuacja-demograficzna-polski-do-2020-roku-zgony-i-umieralnosc,40,1.html>, [access: 14.07.2022].

⁵⁴ In 2020, 2,218 people died as a result of road accidents, and as many as 4,553 people died as a result of suicides. The main causes of deaths were cardiovascular disease and cancer. COVID-19 was responsible for 9% in 2020 of all deaths. The reasons for as much as 12% deaths have not been accurately identified. M. Książkowski, *GUS: współczynnik zgonów w 2020 r. był najwyższy od blisko 50 lat*, <https://pulsmedycyny.pl/gus-wspolczynnik-zgonow-w-2020-r-był-najwyższy-od-blisko-50-lat-1137871>, [access: 14.07.2022].

Mortality Rate – 12,4 – 10 worst in the world (data for 2020)

9. Percentage of foreigners

Almost 460,000 foreigners had valid residence permits in Poland on January 1, 2021. Among them the largest groups were citizens of: Ukraine – 244 200, Belarus – 28 800, Germany – 20 500, Russia – 12 700, Vietnam – 10 900, India – 9 900, Italy – 8 500, Georgia – 7 900, China – 7 100 and Great Britain – 6 600⁵⁵. In 2021, in Poland a record was set in the number of work permits issued to foreigners. According to the data of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, in 2021 a record number - a total of almost 3 million - of various work permits were issued, including simplified statements allowing the employment of workers from the East, mainly from Ukraine and Belarus⁵⁶. Since the end of 2020, the number of foreigners legally living and working in Poland has increased by 12.9%. At the end of June 2021, 818,772 foreigners were registered in ZUS⁵⁷. In turn, according to GUS data, exactly 2,106,101 foreigners lived in Poland as at December 31, 2019⁵⁸. At the same time, according to Eurostat data for 2020, this figures does not change the picture in which Poland and Romania are the two European Union countries with the smallest percentage of citizens of other countries living in their territory⁵⁹. The EU Member State with the highest percentage of citizens from other countries was Luxembourg – with 47% of the total population of this country. A high percentage of foreigners (10% or more) was also recorded in Malta and Cyprus, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Germany, Belgium and Spain. On the other hand, in Poland and Romania, foreigners constituted less than 1% of the population⁶⁰. In 2011, this result was even worse – in total, foreigners constituted only 0.1% of the Polish population⁶¹. This means that for years Poland has been the worst country for immigrants among EU countries.

⁵⁵ *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce po 2020 r.*, GUS, <https://www.gov.pl/web/udsc/cudzoziemcy-w-polsce-po-2020-r>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁵⁶ A. Błaszczak, *Rekordowa liczba imigrantów zarobkowych w Polsce. Niezaspokojony popyt*, <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art19323661-rekordowa-liczba-imigrantow-zarobkowych-w-polsce-niezaspokojony-popyt>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁵⁷ K. Kropiwek, *Rosnie liczba cudzoziemców, którzy legalnie mieszkają i pracują w Polsce*, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Rosnie-liczba-cudzoziemcow-ktorzy-legalnie-mieszkaja-i-pracuja-w-Polsce-8188701.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁵⁸ When determining the number of foreigners living in Poland, the Central Statistical Office used 9 registers: PESEL, UdSC, ZUS, KEP, MR-PIPS, MNISW, MEN, KRUS and NFZ. M. Lis, *GUS podał szacowaną liczbę cudzoziemców w Polsce. Przekroczyła dwa miliony*, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/twoje-pieniadze/praca/liczba-cudzoziemcow-w-polsce-to-ponad-dwa-miliony-gus-podal-dane/ydbgxy9>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁵⁹ Eurostat, *Polska to najgorszy kraj dla imigrantów w UE*, <https://forsal.pl/artykuly/632046,eurostat-polska-to-najgorszy-kraj-dla-imigrantow-w-ue.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶⁰ In 2020, 23 million third-country nationals lived in the EU. This is 5.1% of the entire population of the Union. In addition, 13.5 million citizens of one EU country lived in the territory of another EU country - which in total gives 36.5 million foreigners. In 2011, 33.3 million foreigners lived in the EU of 27 countries, which constituted 6.6% of the total EU population. See: Eurostat, *na terytorium Polski mieszka najmniej obywateli innych państw*, <https://forsal.pl/gospodarka/demografia/artykuly/8129294,eurostat-w-polsce-mieszka-najmniej-obywateli-innych-panstw.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶¹ M. Walasik-Salek, *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce i UE według raportu Eurostatu*, <https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/cudzoziemcy-w-polsce-i-ue-wedlug-raportu-eurostatu>, [access: 15.07.2022].

Poland's position – 27 – last with Romania (data for 2020)

10. Emigracja

Temporary emigration covers people staying abroad for more than 3 months. Among them there are people who stay abroad even for many years, but have not deregistered from permanent residence in Poland. Emigration is difficult to capture statistically, because people leaving often do not report this fact to the authorities. Another obstacle is the situation of continuous migrations, in which people, after leaving one country, change their country of residence, leaving, for example, from Great Britain to Norway. The most popular destinations for Polish emigration are Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands and Ireland. According to the data of the Central Statistical Office, 2 239 000 Poles stayed abroad in 2021⁶². The upward trend in emigration continued until 2017. For example, in 2012, the number of Poles staying abroad increased by 100,000, to approx. 1.6 million. This meant then that the number of permanent residents of the country shrank to 37.1 million (to the level of the population at the end of 1984). Since 2018, Poland has recorded a negative balance of emigration, which means that more Poles return than emigrate. Moreover, an increase in immigration is recorded⁶³. In 2020, by 176 000 (year to year) decreased the number of Poles temporarily staying abroad in the EU (this is over 300,000 less than in the peak year 2017). The number of Poles living in the Netherlands increased the most (by 10,000) and in Norway (by 9,000 to 97,000). In turn, the population of Polish emigrants in the UK shrank by 164,000, i.e. nearly a quarter⁶⁴. Returns from Great Britain are almost entirely responsible for the retreat from emigration. Although the wave of emigration is already declining, according to UN data (worldwide), almost 4.5 million Poles still live outside the country (10.5%) of all (every tenth Pole is an emigrant), which is the 12th largest emigration in the world, right behind Indonesia and Afghanistan⁶⁵.

Poland's position – 12 highest result in the world (data for 2020)

11. Transport: (a) Fatality rate, roads, (b) Punctuality of trains index, (c) quality of roads

The overall ranking of the death toll rates in European countries has not changed significantly over the years. The Scandinavian routes are considered to be the safest. For example,

⁶² *Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2020*, GUS, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-czasowej-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-2004-2020,2,14.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶³ See: A. Rogala-Lewicki, *Imigracja do Polski współcześnie – przekrój statystyczny, kryteria inkluzyjności, dyskryminacja*, „Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2017, No. 4. See also: A. Rogala-Lewicki, *Kształtowanie „dobrej” imigracji do Polski współcześnie. Zarys prawnospołeczny wyzwań*, „Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2018, No. 4.

⁶⁴ M. Kalwasiński, *Polacy wracają z emigracji*, <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Polacy-wracaja-z-emigracji-8211632.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶⁵ A greater percentage of the nation than Poles lives in exile refers to the Portuguese, Irish, Romanians, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Croats, Armenians, Serbs, Georgians, North Macedonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Cypriots and Estonians. J. Frączyk, *Prawie 11 proc. Polaków żyje na emigracji. W Europie mało kto nas przebija w tej kategorii*, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/makroekonomia/na-emigracji-zyje-10-proc-polakow-w-europie-malo-kto-nas-przebija-w-tej-kategorii/j7kzxw4>, [access: 15.07.2022].

in Norway (16 deaths per million inhabitants), and in Sweden (18). In contrast, the highest mortality rates were recorded in Romania (93 deaths per million inhabitants), Bulgaria (81), Latvia (78), Croatia (72), and Poland (59). The EU average in 2021 was 44 deaths per million inhabitants⁶⁶. In the case of Poland, it is an improvement anyway. For example, in 2008, according to European Transport Safety Council data, Poland took the second, infamous place, just after Lithuania, in the European Union in terms of the number of road fatalities. 5,437 people died on the roads then – 143 per million inhabitants. In Lithuania – 148. These are official figures⁶⁷. In 2009, the situation improved slightly: 873 fewer people killed, 6191 fewer injured and 4,974 fewer accidents. It is worth mentioning that in the same 2009, police detained 173,324 drunk drivers. However, this does not change the general situation. Still, Poland occupies the highest places in these black statistics.

Poland's position – 22 (data for 2021)

In 2021, the average punctuality of trains in Poland was 90.1%. This means that nearly every 10 train did not reach the end station on time. In 2020, 94.6% of trains arrived at the end station on time. In 2021, the average delay at the end station for trains delayed by 6 minutes was over 21 minutes. On the other hand, the average delay on the route, at all commercial stop stations, was 18 minutes. The worst results were recorded by PKP Intercity (66.12%)⁶⁸. The situation has improved dramatically over the last decade. Only at the beginning of 2012, as many as 50,000 traveled not in line with the timetables. Such catastrophic statistics result mainly from the renovation and construction works on the tracks. Polish Railway Lines responsible for work on the tracks forced 12 000 *ad hoc* changes in schedules⁶⁹. Apart from works and random accidents, it should be noted that in Polish conditions, railways show an unhealthy tendency not to follow strict timetables. Most passengers admit that almost every train is more or less late. According to official sources, the average delays on railways in Europe in 2008/2009 were, for example, as follows: (a) France - 36 minutes, (b) Germany - 8 minutes, (c) Spain - 15 minutes, (d) Great Britain - 16 minutes, (e) Norway - 1 minute⁷⁰. In Poland in 2009, the average delay was as much as 46 minutes. In 2020, the average delay was 21 minutes. The requirements for

⁶⁶ UE: liczba ofiar śmiertelnych w 2021 r. znacznie poniżej poziomu sprzed pandemii, <https://www.rynekinfrastruktury.pl/wiadomosci/drogi/ue-liczba-ofiar-smiertelnych-w-2021-r-znacznie-ponizej-poziomu-sprzed-pandemii-80814.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶⁷ Moto AŻ – Barometr bezpieczeństwa, <http://akdp.org.pl/brd/>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶⁸ Punktualność pociągów. Funkcjonowanie transportu pasażerskiego w 2021 r., Urząd Transportu Kolejowego, file:///C:/Users/adwok/Downloads/Punktualnos_pasazerska_w_2021_r_.pdf, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁶⁹ P. Piękosz, Kolej w rozkładzie. Rozkłady jazdy także, <https://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/artykuly/408900,koleje-w-rozkladzie-rozkłady-jazdy-także.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁷⁰ When it comes to the comfort of traveling by rail, Switzerland is considered to be the top country. 36 years ago, a cyclical timetable was introduced there, which stipulates that trains leave the station at the same time. This makes it easier for travelers to remember departure and arrival times. Swiss train delays do not exceed 3 minutes and 89% connections are punctual. In the Netherlands, passengers are compensated for a train delay of 15 minutes. For an hourly delay, the equivalent of the train ticket price is reimbursed. 91 percent reach their destination on time. B. Cöllen, Niemiecka kolej na bakier z punktualnością i nie tylko, <https://www.dw.com/pl/niemiecka-kolej-na-bakier-z-punktualnos%C5%9Bci%C4%85-i-nie-tylko/a-43120569>, [access: 15.07.2022].

railways in Asia are even more stringent. In Japan, the delay tolerance on the 'Shinkansen' high-speed line is five seconds⁷¹. In the EU, a distinction is made between the punctuality rate of regional and long-distance trains. In Poland, for 2018, the indicator for the former was 92.48% (11th position), and for the latter 82% (11th position)⁷².

Poland's position – 11 in EU (data for 2018)

The World Competitiveness Yearbook for 2022, prepared by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), one of the most famous business schools in the world, touched upon, *inter alia*, quality of road infrastructure in the world. Since 2018, Poland's position in the ranking has been lower and lower. In the ranking of road infrastructure quality in 2022, Poland was ranked 43 among 63 countries. Since 2018, when the country was classified in 34th position, the position has been systematically decreasing in subsequent years: 2019 (36), 2020 (35) and 2021 (42). In 2022, the report authors rated Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden the best in terms of road quality, and Venezuela, Mongolia and Botswana the worst. 30 European countries were included in the ranking. Among them, Poland took 26th place. The quality of roads was lower in Croatia, Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria⁷³. Also Polish road agency (GDDKiA) informs about the need to improve the condition of national roads in its latest report. Its inspections showed that 37.3% of roads require renovation⁷⁴.

Poland's position – 43 (26 in Europe) (data for 2020)

12. Digitalization: (a) Internet users, (b) Speedtest Global Index, (c) E-Government Survey, (d) Terrestrial Trunked Radio

Twenty years ago, Poles had only less than 3 million fixed telephone lines (of which nearly 2.2 million belonged to private individuals). In 2011, there were over 50 million active mobile phones. Nobody dreamed about the Internet in 1989. In 2011, almost 17 million Poles used the electronic network⁷⁵. Official data for year 2020 indicates that in Poland there are 34,697,848 network users (14 million Facebook accounts), which constitutes 90.6% of the population⁷⁶.

⁷¹ *Punktualność pociągów w 2020 r.*, UTK, <https://utk.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/16753,Punktualnosc-pociagow-w-2020-r.html>, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁷² *Train punctuality across the EU, UK and Norway*, https://www.reddit.com/t/europe/comments/lpogb7/train_punctuality_across_the_eu_uk_and_norway/, [access: 15.07.2022].

⁷³ M. Michalak, *Jakość dróg w Polsce. Jak wypadamy na tle innych państw?*, <https://motofakty.pl/jakosc-drog-w-polsce-jak-wypadamy-na-tle-innych-panstw/ar/c4-16527797>, [access: 17.07.2022].

⁷⁴ *Raport o stanie technicznym nawierzchni sieci dróg krajowych na koniec 2020 roku*, GDDKiA, https://www.archiwum.gddkia.gov.pl/frontend/web/userfiles/articles/t/raporty_18751/2020/Raport%20stan%20na%20koniec%202020.pdf, [access: 17.07.2022].

⁷⁵ M. Jęzewski, *Jak wygląda dostęp do Internetu w Polsce? GUS ujawnia nowe dane*, https://ithardware.pl/aktualnosci/jak_wyglada_dostep_do_internetu_w_polsce_gus_ujawnia_nowe_dane-18755.html, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁷⁶ *World Internet Users and Population Stats*, <https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>, [access: 16.07.2022].

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the world is also digitally divided into the rich North and the poor South. Still every third person has never used the Internet⁷⁷. On the basis of CBOS research, one can see an increase in activity and its subjective and objective differentiation in access to and use of the Internet. The inactivity online is least relevant to the younger generation. Based on the data from 2020, it was found that 68% of respondents used the Internet at least once a week (in 2002 it was only 17% of the respondents, and in 2019, 69%). Internet use is widespread among respondents aged up to 34 (98% aged up to 24, 95% aged 25 to 34) and very widespread among respondents aged 35 to 44 (88%). In the age range from 45 to 54, Internet users represents almost two thirds of the respondents (56% of the respondents aged 55–64, 33% aged 65–74 and only 11% aged over 74 among the elderly). A higher rate of Internet usage concerns men (69%) than women (63%), with higher education (95%) or lower secondary (93%) than primary (22%) or basic vocational (54%). A relatively low percentage of people using the Internet was recorded in the group of unskilled workers and farmers

The share of Internet users was the lowest in rural areas (60%), and the highest among the inhabitants of cities with population of 500,000 and more (85%). The average number of hours spent online *per week* was 12.87 (21.30 hours for respondents aged 18-24)⁷⁸. According to CBOS research from 2019, 83% of people active on the Internet (57% of all respondents) made purchases via web, 73% of Internet users (50% of all respondents) used banking services. In the last month before the survey, in the group of people active on the Internet: 26% (18% of all respondents) used live broadcast, 25% (17% of all adults surveyed) posted photos on the Internet or videos, 29% (20% of respondents) read blogs, and 20% (14% of respondents) vloggers, 74% (50% of respondents) contacted friends via messenger, 5% (4% of respondents) ran a blog or website, 23% (16% of respondents) made an acquaintance online, and 16% (11% of all respondents) met a person. 66% of Internet users (46% of all respondents) had a registered account on some social networking site (among internet users aged 18-24 it was 96%, aged 25-34 88%, and aged 65 and over 37%)⁷⁹.

Poland's position – 28 (data for 2020)

The level of digital development of a given country is even better reflected by the indicator of broadband Internet access. In 2020, 89.6% of households in Poland had access to broadband Internet. This is 6.3% more than in 2019 and 13.9% more than in 2016. Taking into account households with the Internet, 99.1% of them have access to broadband Internet. 67.7% of households have access to fixed-line broadband Internet (+4.4 percentage points year to year), and

⁷⁷ M. Gajewski, *Co trzeci człowiek na świecie nigdy nie korzystał w Internecie*, <https://spidersweb.pl/2021/12/liczba-internautow-na-swiecie.html>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁷⁸ *Korzystanie z Internetu*, CBOS, komunikat z badań nr 85 z 2020 r.

⁷⁹ *Korzystanie z Internetu*, CBOS, komunikat z badań nr 95 z 2019 r.

66.7% to broadband mobile Internet (+12.4 percentage points year to year)⁸⁰. The Speedtest Global Index uses data from hundreds of millions of people in over 190 countries to measure both fixed and mobile broadband connections. Singapore ranks first with a download speed of 262.2 Mbps – more than double the global average, Poland – 27 (147.45 Mb/s)⁸¹:

1. Singapore (262.2 Mb/s)
2. Hong Kong (254.4 Mb/s)
3. Monaco (242.9 Mb/s)
4. Switzerland (222.0 Mb/s)
5. Thailand (221.0 Mb/s)
6. Romania (217.9 Mb/s)
7. South Korea (216.7 Mb/s)
8. Denmark (216.13 Mb/s)
9. Chile (209.8 Mb/s)
10. France (201.6 Mb/s)

Poland's position – 27 (data for 2021)

In Europe, progress in making public administration services available electronically, until 2013 was measured by the proportion of 20 basic gov services that were available online; the service was considered available when it was possible to be fully accomplished via Internet (in 2007, only five out of the basket of 20 surveyed services were available in Poland – only Bulgaria had a worse result in Europe). At that time, in the three best EU countries in this field (Austria, Malta, Slovenia), 19 out of 20 surveyed gov services could already be settled online, which gave an average of 95% of all general gov services. In 2010, half of the participating countries were already at least 90% and six countries were already at 100%. After modifying the measurement methodology, the indicators relating to 20 public services in the ministerial structure were replaced with indicators relating to the set of public services that are needed in selected life situations. Poland launched from a disastrous starting point in terms of the public sector's readiness to use IT techniques and technologies (in 2004, Poland was only ranked 93rd among 104 surveyed countries). In the period from 2007 to 2013, the distance in terms of online accessibility of public services between Poland and European leaders decreased from 70 percentage points to 19 points (in 2013, the online availability index of public services useful in seven life situations in Poland was 76% – 4 points above the EU average)⁸². According to the information from the Ministry of Digitization, the number of citizens that uses e-administration in public

⁸⁰ M. Szutiak, *Prawie 90% gospodarstw domowych w Polsce ma dostęp do szerokopasmowego Internetu*, <https://www.telepolis.pl/wiadomosci/prawo-finanse-statystyki/gus-xszerokopasmowy-internet-90-procent-gospodarstw-d-mowych-w-polsce>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸¹ *Gdzie jest najszybszy (i najwolniejszy) Internet na świecie?*, <https://mobirank.pl/2021/09/30/gdzie-jest-najszybszy-i-najwolniejszy-internet-na-swiecie/>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸² *Korzystanie z Internetu*, CBOS, komunikat z badań nr 85 z 2020 r.

services is growing (in 2019, more than 4.7 million citizens had “Authorized Profile” – PZ, of which over 2.1 million established it in 2019). Significant acceleration was noted in times of the pandemic: in May 2020, almost 360,000 new PZ were established (five times more year to year)⁸³. According to the information of the Ministry of Finance, by April 30, 2020, over 18.3 million declarations were submitted electronically as part of the PIT settlement for the previous year⁸⁴. The United Nations publishes an annual report on the computerization (digitalization) of state management processes: E-Government Survey⁸⁵. In the last year of 2021, Poland took the 47th place, while in 2010 – 45th, and in 2008 – 33rd. The first place in the UN ranking was taken by South Korea, the second by the Netherlands and the third by Great Britain. Higher than Poland were, among others, Slovenia, Russia, Lithuania, Croatia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and even Kazakhstan. Poland is deteriorating its position in the field of e-administration despite enormous investments in this area due to EU funds. Poland fared best in terms of human capital assessment. The worst was e-participation, i.e. how the administration interacts with citizens, conducts e-social consultations or e-voting⁸⁶.

Poland's position – 47 (data for 2021)

TETRA [Terrestrial Trunked Radio (formerly TransEuropean Trunked Radio)] – created by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), an open standard for digital radiotelephony dispatcher (trunked) communication, designed especially for public safety and rescue services (law enforcement). TETRA system is being introduced in countries where there is no standardized communication infrastructure⁸⁷. According to the Police Headquarters, the TETRA system was indicated in the Recommendation of Police Co-Operation of June 2003 to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985 as appropriate for usage by security, public order and rescue services in the Schengen area⁸⁸. For almost 20 years, the TETRA system has been implemented in Poland only (as a pilot) in four large cities: Warsaw,

⁸³ *Cztery miliony profili zaufanych od początku tego roku*, <https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfrizacja/cztery-miliony-profilu-zaufanych-od-poczatku-tego-roku>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸⁴ *Twój e-PIT czeka na Ciebie w e-Urzędzie Skarbowym*, <https://www.podatki.gov.pl/pit/wyjasnienia-pit/od-jutra-twoj-e-pit-czeka-na-ciebie-w-e-urzedzie-skarbowym/>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸⁵ *UN E-Government Survey 2020*, <https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey-2020>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸⁶ On the impact of the information revolution on societies and politics see: A. Rogala-Lewicki, *Informacja jako autonomiczny czynnik wpływu w przestrzeni publicznej – studium władztwa informacyjnego*, Częstochowa 2016. Zob. także: M. Castells, *Galaktyka Internetu. Refleksje nad Internetem, biznesem i społeczeństwem*, Poznań 2003; M. Castells, *Spółczesność sieci*, Warszawa 2007; M. Castells, *Władza komunikacji*, Warszawa 2013; T. Goban-Klas, P. Sienkiewicz, *Spółczesność informacyjna. Szanse, wyzwania i zagrożenia*, Kraków 1999; L. Porębski, *Elektroniczne oblicze polityki. Demokracja, państwo, instytucje polityczne w okresie rewolucji informacyjnej*, Kraków 2001; A. Rothert, *Cybernetyczny porządek polityczny*, Warszawa 2005; G. Rydlewski, *Rządzenie w świecie megazmian*, Warszawa 2009; G. Rydlewski, *Rządzenie w epoce władzy informacji, cyfryzacji i sztucznej inteligencji*, Warszawa 2020.

⁸⁷ *Co to jest TETRA*, <https://tetraforum.pl/co-to-jest-tetra/>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁸⁸ As stated by the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) in the justification to its report on the control of the emergency notification system (CPRs) and crisis management - a significant obstacle to the implementation of appropriate security standards is a variety of radio communication infrastructure or the lack of it. The best, so far known, solution in the field of standardizing the communication infrastructure is the implementation of the TETRA system. *Raport w sprawie kontroli dotyczącej systemu powiadamiania ratunkowego (tzw. CPR-ów) i zarządzania kryzysowego*, NIK 2011.

Kraków, Łódź and Szczecin. In 2019, the contract for „ETSI TETRA communication in 13 cities and urban agglomerations” was canceled, this time by the National Appeals Chamber (KIO)⁸⁹. The introduction of the TETRA system in the Police is still under question mark.

The TETRA system is implemented (partially or fully) in all EU countries except Poland

13. Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index – RECAI

Index, prepared since 2003 by the consulting company EY, covers 40 of the world's largest markets. From the end of 2021, EY also publishes the second ranking – the attractiveness of the market of long-term contracts for the purchase and sale of renewable electricity under PPAs⁹⁰. Poland is systematically improving its position. In 2013, Poland took 26th place. It was then pointed out that the weak position was due to, *inter alia*, high regulatory risk and planned changes in the field of solar energy support in the draft act on renewable energy sources. In the 59th edition of the RECAI ranking for 2021, Poland moved up three places (year to year) and was listed in the top twenty countries⁹¹.

Poland's position – 20 (data for 2021)

14. State quality: (a) Application of European Union law, (b) Civic participation – World Bank, (c) Press Freedom Index, (d) Democracy Index

The statistics of the implementation of EU law takes into account, first of all, a special limit of one percent of unimplemented directives to national legislation, or implemented with faults. The report of the European Commission on the implementation of EU law in the Member States for 2021 indicates that 36 proceedings were pending against Poland⁹². On the other hand, in the 2016 report, in the case of late transposition, Cyprus and Belgium had the highest number of open cases, and the lowest number of cases referred to Italy, Slovakia and Denmark. Germany and Spain, in turn, had the highest number of pending cases due to incorrect transposition or incorrect application of EU law, while Estonia had the lowest total number of open cases⁹³. There was, however, a period when Poland was one of the least

⁸⁹ J. Sabak, *TETRA dla Policji. Modernizacja, ale czy nowoczesność?*, <https://infosecurity24.pl/sluzby-mundurowe/policja/tetra-dla-policji-modernizacja-ale-czy-nowoczesnosc>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹⁰ The Polish Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) market is at an early stage of development, nevertheless, the progress is significant and the market itself is becoming more and more attractive. In 2021, the RES capacity contracted under PPA in Poland was ranked 5th in Europe, behind Spain, Sweden, Germany and Finland. *Polska coraz bardziej atrakcyjna dla inwestorów sektora zielonej energii*, <https://infowire.pl/generic/release/755757/polska-coraz-bardziej-atrakcyjna-dla-inwestorow-sektora-zielonej-energii>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹¹ M. Wierchowska, *Polska coraz atrakcyjniejsza dla inwestorów sektora zielonej energii*, https://www.cy.com/pl_pl/news/2022/07/polska-coraz-atrakcyjniejsza-dla-inwestorow-sektora-zielonej-energii, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹² *Monitoring the Application of European Union law 2021 Annual Report*, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/general_overview_en.pdf, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹³ *Member States compliance with EU law: not yet good enough*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1846, [access: 16.07.2022].

successfully implementing EU law in the Union. The 2011 report indicated that only Italy was worse. The best indicators for enforcing EU law referred to: Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg and Lithuania. In Poland it was then 2.1%, in Italy 2.4%. This has consequences in the number of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union⁹⁴.

Poland's position – 19 in EU (data for 2021)

Civic engagement is, next to social reliance and trust, one of the key elements in the concepts of social capital. Commitment includes activities based on mutual trust, aimed at the interests of various groups⁹⁵. In the Civic Participation index, prepared by the World Bank, Poland in 2021 was just above the world median with a score of 0.61, with a median of 0.60, and since 2015 it has recorded a sustained decline from 0.72⁹⁶. Moreover, in relation to countries with similar GDP, it records a lower level of social engagement⁹⁷.

Poland's position – 50 – note 0,61 – median 0,60, benchmark 0,75 (data for 2021)

The Press Freedom Index is compiled on the basis of an online questionnaire targeting journalists, lawyers, sociologists and other media experts from the countries and regions selected by the FSF. Classification covers 180 countries. The survey is available in 20 languages and includes 87 questions that cover media pluralism and independence, the environment in which information providers operate, the degree of self-censorship, the impact of the legislative framework on media activities, and the quality and transparency of a country's information support infrastructure. Based on the survey results, the „ScoA” is calculated⁹⁸. In the history of the ranking, Poland took the highest (18th) place in 2015 and the lowest (66th) in 2022, which is a decrease of 48 places⁹⁹.

Poland's position – 66 (data for 2022)

Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2006 (a unit within the “The Economist”) describes the condition of democracy in 167 countries around the world. The Democracy Index is based on 60 indicators grouped into five different categories: electoral process and

⁹⁴ J.K. Sokolowski, D. Stoliccki, *Przyczyny opóźnień w transpozycji dyrektyw europejskich do polskiego porządku prawnego w świetle analizy ilościowej krajowego procesu legislacyjnego*, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2016, vol. 2.

⁹⁵ F. Fukuyama, *Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu*, Warszawa–Wrocław 1997, s. 20.

⁹⁶ *Civic participation*, The World Justice Project – Rule of law, World Bank, https://govdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h7de3eda8?country=POL&indicator=27891&viz=line_chart&years=2015,2021, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹⁷ M. Johns, V. Saltane, *Citizen Engagement in Rulemaking: Evidence on Regulatory Practices in 185 Countries*, Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank Group.

⁹⁸ *The World Press Freedom Index*, <https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2022>, [access: 16.07.2022].

⁹⁹ *Polska spadła na 66. miejsce w rankingu wolności mediów. Najgorszy wynik w historii*, <https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artukul/wolnosc-mediow-ranking-2022-polska-jakie-miejsce-ostro-w-dol-dlaczego-najgorszy-wynik-w-historii>, [access: 16.07.2022].

pluralism, civil liberties, government functioning, political participation, and political culture. On the basis of the final results, countries are divided into „full democracies” (8-10), „flawed democracies” (7.9-6), „hybrid regimes” (5.9-4), and for „authoritarian systems” (below 4). Poland, with a score of 6.85, is considered as a flawed democracy¹⁰⁰.

Poland's position – 50 (data for 2020)

15. Henley Passport Index

The Henley Passport Index is a ranking of passports from 199 countries and indicates the passports of countries whose citizens enjoy the greatest freedom to travel. Passports rank according to the number of places their holders can reach without prior visa. Japan has topped the rankings for the fifth consecutive year. The citizens of Luxembourg, Italy, Finland, Spain, Germany, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Austrian, Great Britain, Portugal, Ireland, France, Norway, New Zealand, Belgium, USA, Malta, Greece, Czech Republic, Canada Australia and Hungary have a passports with greater impact than Poland¹⁰¹.

Poland's position – 25 (data for 2021)

Conclusions

In view of the above-presented data, deliberately covering various socio-economic spheres, the state sector cannot pass easily. Despite many successes noted by Poland after 1989, the path to build a strong, competitive, innovative, aesthetic country is still a long way off. All the more, the it should be implemented broadly understood reforms and actions aimed at accelerating this process. In the modern, constantly accelerating world, borrowing cycling terminology, not only keeping up with the peloton but also not participating in the so-called escapes – means regression and marginalization.

Overall, there is still a lot of work to be done, but a lot has certainly been achieved. In part, Polish success can be compared to the civilization leap of Spain in the second half of the 20th century. It is worth recalling that until the 1950s, despite completely different models of economic development, Poland and Spain were still at a comparable civilization level. In 1989, the Spaniards towered over the Poles five times. The current trend is turning in favor of Poland. The closing of another large EU budget (perhaps the last one that is so beneficial) should be considered a symbolic end of the period of departing from the model and opinion


¹⁰⁰ *Democracy Index: less than half the world lives in a democracy*, <https://www.ciu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/>, [access: 17.07.2022].

¹⁰¹ *Oto najmniejszy paszport na świecie. Polska w czołówce*, <https://businessinsider.com.pl/lifestyle/ranking-panstw-z-najlepszymi-paszportami-na-pierwszym-miejsu-japonia/hqt47b1>, [access: 17.07.2022].

of a backward, post-communist state and entering the period of strengthening the standards and reputation of a mature state. September 24, 2018, when Poland officially entered the FTSE Russell and Europe Stoxx 600 indices of developed markets, can be considered a symbolic date. Thus, Poland was included in the group of 25 most developed economies in the world¹⁰². The fact of certain achievements of the last decades (mainly economic) has its specific implications.

First, it is worth asking when Poland will realistically be able to catch up with the so-called West. Many economists note that Poland can catch up with the Western countries. For example, based on the trend from 2009–2019, it is possible to catch up with Great Britain in just 15 years. However, it is worth remembering that such forecasts are burdened with many unknowns and the objective itself is very optimistic. The richer country is, the slower its economic growth. The GDP growth of Great Britain (much more richer) by 0.1% in nominal terms is incomparable to the same growth in Poland. Nevertheless, the continuing tendency is that Poland is catching up with the West, which means it may catch up someday – under condition that will maintain sustained, high growth.

Figure 15. Figure 15. GDP of Poland and the United Kingdom Britain by 2040 according to average growth in 2009–2019



Source: International Monetary Fund WEO Forecasts, April 2022

Secondly – which may be even more meaningful from a geopolitical point of view – the Polish political class should lobby with all its strength in the international environment for Poland's admission to the group of G20 countries – the group of 19 richest countries in the

¹⁰² Ł. Madej, *Polska wśród najbardziej rozwiniętych krajów świata*, <https://inzynieria.com/budownictwo/wiadomosci/53687,polska-wsrod-najbardziej-rozwiniętych-krajow-swiate>, [access: 17.07.2022].

world and the EU¹⁰³. There are at least a few arguments for this¹⁰⁴. Firstly, it results from the size of the Polish economy. Poland is the world's 20th economy (GDP according to purchasing power parity). Moreover, there are members of the G20 economically weaker than the Polish economy, such as Argentina or South Africa. Secondly, Poland is the largest country in a certain region (Central and Eastern Europe) that is not represented at all in the G20. Thirdly, it is a country with a specific historical card, which has its political significance. It should be mentioned that Polish representatives participated in the G20 summits several times¹⁰⁵. Finally, one of the members is Russia, which, as some analysts claim, has excluded from the group of civilized societies, *ergo* should be excluded from the group of G20 members¹⁰⁶.

A moment of reflection on the achievements must not, however, obscure the fact that Poland, as a country located in Central Europe, should not only be able to „make up for lost years” but finally set European and world standards. Real achievement is not to do something on the minimum level that is required of all highly developed nations, but to become the top student and leader among them. It is a historic moment for Poland to enter a new sphere of challenges. The tasks facing the country is not to have a free market, but to make the economy innovative, self-creative and competitive, so that it could enter a new phase of progress, defeating the so-called middle development syndrome. In the competition among the most developed nations in the hierarchy, details and refinement are decisive, and in this respect – as the presented rankings indicate – Poland is only at the beginning of its path.

¹⁰³ The first summit was convened in 1999 in Berlin. The initiative to create the group came about after the Russian financial crisis in 1998 and the Asian crisis in 1997. One of the main initiators was the famous Larry Summers, secretary of the treasury in the administration of Bill Clinton. The creation of the group was intended to coordinate the world economy and prevent further crises – especially in the so-called developing countries. The group was created as an extension of the G7, or actually G8 (G7 + Russia), with other countries in the world playing an important role in the global economy. P. Wójcik, *Co to jest G20 i dlaczego Polska chce być w tej grupie? Wyjaśniamy*, <https://krytykapolityczna.pl/gospodarka/co-to-jest-g20/>, [access: 17.07.2022].

¹⁰⁴ In 2010, during a meeting with the diplomatic corps, the president Kaczyński expressed the opinion that Poland deserves a place among the G20 countries. In 2012, Tim Fergusson of Forbes wrote that Poland should replace Argentina in the G20. In this article, he proves that the Polish economy is on its way to a leading role in Europe, and as a result Poland has a much greater legitimacy for membership than Argentina, which is experiencing another crisis. Similar opinions were also expressed by the American magazine „Foreign Policy”, „The Wall Street Journal”, and also by Mamta Murthi of the World Bank. In 2014, during the 24th Economic Forum in Krynica, the consulting agency Ernst & Young presented the results of research on the optimal composition of the G20. After examining several thousand international trade, investment and institutional ties, following various selection criteria, optimal members with Poland were selected as one of them. See: D. Bosco, *Who would replace Argentina on the G20?*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/19/who-would-replace-argentina-on-the-g20/>, [access: 17.07.2022]; T. Fergusson, *G20: Boot Argentina, Include Poland*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/timferguson/2012/04/09/g20-boot-argentina-include-poland/?sh=549ac742da55>, [access: 17.07.2022].

¹⁰⁵ On March 16, 2017, the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and Economy Marcin Morawiecki received an invitation to the G20 summit in Baden-Baden from host Wolfgang Schäuble, the head of the German Ministry of Finance. See: *Morawiecki among the G20 finance ministers*, <https://www.rp.pl/gospodarka/art10575241-morawiecki-wsrod-ministrow-finansow-g20#p-1>, [access: 17.07.2022]. On April 6-7, 2017, a meeting of the G20 digital ministers took place in Düsseldorf. Poland was among the few invited non-G20 countries to the event. See: *Polska po raz pierwszy uczestnikiem spotkania ministrów ds. cyfrowych grupy G20*, <https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfrizacja/polska-po-raz-pierwszy-uczestnikiem-spotkania-ministrow-ds.-cyfrowych-grupy-g20>, [access: 17.07.2022].

¹⁰⁶ Excluding Russia from the G20 would require the consent of all other states, including, *inter alia*, China, India or Saudi Arabia, whose critical attitude towards Russian military operations in Ukraine is questioned. A. Krzysztozek, *Polska w G20 zamiast Rosji? „Perspektywa co najmniej mglista”*, <https://www.euractiv.pl/section/gospodarka/news/polska-g20-rozja-ukraina/>, [access: 17.07.2022].

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FEATURES OF THEORIZATION, VERIFICATION AND STRUCTURING OF REGIONALISM AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN UKRAINE IN 1991-2013 AND BEFORE THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

The article analyzes the features of theorization, verification and structuring of regionalism and regionalization as a possible basis for politicization of ethnicity in Ukraine in 1991-2013, i.e. before the Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular in its local phase since 2014 and in large-scale phase since 2022. This is done at the background of the statement that aggressive Russia has always proceeded from the ideological and propagandistic (including instilled in Ukraine) assumption that Ukraine is not a united and consolidated country, because it has historically been characterized by regionalism and regionalization, which Russia expects should were the basis for the politicization of ethnicity and the ethnolinguistic issue in Ukraine in 1991-2013. However, as the political and military practice of 2014-2022 showed, this calculation turned out to be largely erroneous and incomparable with the electoral, religious, linguistic, ethnic and other socio-political cleavages that historically characterized (and significantly were overestimated by Russia) post-Soviet Ukraine. To demonstrate this, various approaches to understanding and organizing regionalism in Ukraine were proposed, including two-component, four-component, eight-component, etc., each of which was structured and characterized. The author argued that any attempt to use the idea of regionalization of Ukraine – especially in its twofold logic (divided into “West” and “East” or the Right Bank and the Left Bank relative to the Dnipro River) – in the real socio-political process in this country, but especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and intensified on a large scale in 2022, failed. However, this does not mean that the issue of regionalism and regionalization in Ukraine should not be continued and developed, but in a completely different way and direction, especially in the context of European integration of this country.

Keywords: region, regionalism, regionalization, West, East, language, ethnicity, war, Russia, Ukraine.

Cechy teoretyzacji, weryfikacji i strukturyzacji regionalizmu jako możliwa podstawa polityki etniczności na Ukrainie w latach 1991-2013 i przed wojną rosyjsko-ukraińską

Artykuł analizuje cechy teoretyzowania, weryfikacji jako możliwej podstawy upolitycznienia etniczności na Ukrainie w latach 1991-2013, czyli przed wojną rosyjsko-ukraińską,

w szczególności w jej fazie lokalnej z 2014 roku oraz na dużą skalę od 2022 roku. Czyniono to na tle stwierdzenia, że agresywna Rosja zawsze wychodziła z ideologicznego i propagandowego (w tym zasadzonego na Ukrainie) założenia, że państwo to nie jest zjednoczone i skonsolidowane, bo było historycznie charakteryzujące się regionalizmem i regionalizacją, które według oczekiwań Rosji powinny być podstawą upolitycznienia etniczności i etnolingwistycznej kwestii Ukrainy w latach 1991-2013. Jednak, jak pokazuje praktyka polityczna i wojskowa lat 2014-2022, kalkulacja ta okazała się w większości błędna i nie do pogodzenia z wyborczymi, religijnymi, językowymi, etnicznymi i innymi podziałami sociopolitycznymi które byli właściwi historycznie postsowiecką Ukrainie (w Rosji znacznie przeszacowane). Aby to pokazać, proponuje się różne podejścia do rozumienia i porządkowania regionalizmu na Ukrainie, w tym dwusylabowe, czterosylabowe, ośmiosylabowe itd., z których każde jest ustrukturyzowane i scharakteryzowane. Twierdzi się, że wszelkie próby wykorzystania idei regionalizacji Ukrainy – przede wszystkim w jej dwusylabowej logice (z podziałem na „Zachód” i „Wschód” lub na prawy i lewy brzeg względem Dniepru) – w realnym procesie społeczno-politycznym w tym państwie, ale zwłaszcza w kontekście wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej, która rozpoczęła się w 2014 roku i na dużą skalę nasiliła się w 2022 roku, nie powiodła się. Co prawda wcale nie oznacza to, że problemy regionalizmu i regionalizacji na Ukrainie nie muszą być kontynuowane i rozwijane, ale w zupełnie innym kierunku i kontekście, zwłaszcza w planie integracji europejskiej tego kraju.

Słowa kluczowe: region, regionalizm, regionalizacja, Zachód, Wschód, język, etniczność, wojna, Rosja, Ukraina.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЇ, ВЕРИФІКАЦІЇ ТА СТРУКТУРИЗАЦІЇ РЕГІОНАЛІЗМУ ЯК МОЖЛИВОЇ ПІДСТАВИ ПОЛІТИЗАЦІЇ ЕТНІЧНОСТІ В УКРАЇНІ В 1991-2013 РОКАХ І ПЕРЕД РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЮ ВІЙНОЮ

У статті проаналізовано особливості теоретизації, верифікації і структуризації регіоналізму та регіоналізації як можливої підстави політизації етнічності в Україні в 1991-2013 роках, тобто перед російсько-українською війною, зокрема її локальною фазою з 2014 р. і широкомасштабною фазою з 2022 р. Це зроблено на тлі констатації, що агресивна Росія завжди виходила з ідеологізованого та пропагандистського (в тому числі насадженого в Україні) припущення, що ця держава не є єдиною і консолідованою, адже вона історично характеризувалась регіоналізмом і регіоналізацією, які, згідно із очікуваннями Росії, повинні були виступати підставою політизації етнічності та етномовного питання України в 1991-2013 рр. Однак, як продемонструвала політична і військова практика 2014-2022 рр., цей розрахунок виявився переважною мірою хибним та

не зіставимим з електоральними, релігійними, мовними, етнічними й іншими суспільно-політичними поділами, які історично характеризували (й відчутно переоцінювались у Росії) пострадянську Україну. Для демонстрування цього запропоновано різні підходи до розуміння і впорядкування регіоналізму в Україні, зокрема двоскладовий, чотирискладовий, восьмискладовий тощо, кожний із яких структуризовано та охарактеризовано. Аргументовано, що будь-які спроби використати ідею регіоналізації України – передусім в її двоскладовій логіці (із поділом на «Захід» та «Схід» або на Правобережжя і лівобережжя відносно Дніпра) – у реальному суспільно-політичному процесі в цій державі, однак особливо в контексті російсько-української війни, що почалась в 2014 р., а широкомасштабно інтенсифікувалась у 2022 р., провалились. Хоча це зовсім не означає, що проблематику регіоналізму та регіоналізації в Україні не потрібно продовжувати та розвивати, однак зовсім в іншому ключі і напрямі, особливо у контексті євроінтеграції цієї держави.

Ключові слова: *регіон, регіоналізм, регіоналізація, Захід, Схід, мова, етнічність, війна, Росія, Україна.*

In February 2014, the local Russian-Ukrainian war began, which was marked by the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (with the subsequent creation of pseudo-republics of the same name) by terrorist groups and Russian armed forces. During 2014-2022, this war continued to be local and hybrid. However, the situation changed dramatically in February 2022, when after the illegal and illegal (in terms of international law) recognition of the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and the declared Russian aggression against Ukraine, the local war in eastern Ukraine was transformed into a large-scale war, in which to varying degrees the entire territory of sovereign Ukraine was involved. It is noteworthy that in terms of strategic planning of expected steps and ideas about the course of this war – in any stage and form, i.e. before and after 2022 – aggressive Russia has always proceeded from ideological and propagandistic (including decades planted in Ukraine) assumption, that Ukraine is not united and consolidated neither politically, nor ethnically, nor linguistically, nor religiously, nor culturally, etc., since historically, at least in the period from independence to the pre-war period, it was characterized by regionalism and regionalization, which, according to the same plans and expectations of Russia, should have been the basis for politicization of ethnicity and ethno linguistic issues in Ukraine in 1991-2013. However, as the political and military practice of 2014-2022 showed, this calculation turned out to be largely erroneous and incomparable with the electoral, religious, linguistic, ethnic and other socio-political divisions that historically characterized (and significantly overestimated in Russia) post-Soviet Ukraine. After all, only in a small part of Ukraine, and quite conditionally and artificially – in particular in the Crimea

and Donbas – the expected regionalization and multifaceted regionalism, despite their partial relevance and validity, worked in the context of politicization of ethnicity and ethno linguistics as factors expected by Russia's military policy success in Ukraine. Accordingly, this issue is the focus of this scientific article, but primarily in retrospect, in particular on clarifying and streamlining the features of theorization, verification and structuring of regionalism as an expected or hypothetical basis for politicization of ethnicity and ethno linguistic issues in Ukraine in 1991-2013, that is, in the period before the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and became large-scale and geopolitical in 2022.

In general, it should be noted that the region as a certain formed territorial or even territorial-administrative unit with natural, economic, cultural and other features, with the existing (but not necessarily developed) regional identity of the population may have internal national or transnational borders, to play a certain role of integration or disintegration and to be the embodiment of the principles of subsidiarity and decentralization of governance, and thus on this basis to be used by separatists and irredentists to split a country. Accordingly, regionalism and regionalization as a justification and implementation of these contradictory functions of the region must be considered as ambivalent phenomena, the content of which varies depending on place and time¹.

Due to this, various domestic regional differences have long been a central topic of research in European and world politics, including politics in countries such as Ukraine². However, recognizing the fact that Ukraine at various times has needed and still needs to develop and apply European and global concepts of the region, regionalism and regionalization as a means of decentralization and deconcentration of power, as well as increasing the efficiency of government, in the presented scientific article the object of study is a different type and meaning of regionalism – as such a division of the state into parts, which under certain specific conditions is an obstacle to forming a single political community within the state borders and carries a certain threat of socio-political unity and possible disintegration. The fact is that in Ukraine in the pre-war period, i.e. during 1991-2013, various regional differences revealed powerful predictors of mass socio-political relations and political, in particular, electoral behavior. It follows that this country has historically developed a specific – not always the same as in European and world politics – delineation of the regional factor in the political or socio-political process, including in the context of hypothetical politicization of ethnicity as a factor of political disintegration. Although, in contrast, in the case of Ukraine, the interpretation of the region has never been and still is not consolidated, as its various theorists and practitioners have explained and explain either simply as a result of compositional effects or as regional differences in a broader form than the sum of demographic factors related to geographical divisions, etc. Accordingly, in the

¹ Kolodii A., *Ukrainskyi rehionalizm yak stan kulturno-politychnoi poliaryzovanosti*, "AHORA" 2006, vol 3 (Ukraine – rehionalnyi vymir), s. 69-91.

² Barrington L., Herron E., *One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences*, "Nationalities Papers" 2004, vol 32, nr. 1, s. 53-86.

case of Ukraine, region, regionalism and regionalization have always, at least until 2014, but mainly until 2022, had the meaning of dividing categories as a kind of explanatory variables of political or socio-political process using different regional structures and markers, on which our article will be focused in the format of retrospective analysis.

This means that in the case of regionalism and regionalization in Ukraine, the emphasis will be on the sense of the region used in that country, in particular on how the existing geographical divisions can be and have historically been controlled, managed and applied, although provided that they were inevitably supplemented by other factors, including ethno linguistic, including ethnic or national affiliation and use of language. To this end, the study will focus on the fact that in the case of Ukraine in 1991-2013, various regional positioning and mapping of regions was used, but first in the format of three basic and competing structures of regional development and regionalization in Ukraine: one with two regions, the second with four regions, and the third with eight regions (as well as certain modifications).

All of them, of course, have geographical regionalization at their core, but they impose or have previously imposed on it factors of ethno linguistic, socio-political and electoral content, etc.³, which, as a result, many theorists and practitioners have really started to take into account as probabilistic indicators of the subjectivity of ethnicity and possible political disintegration of Ukraine (which, as noted above, only partially became relevant and true against the military-political events of 2014-2022). Although, in contrast, all attempts at regionalization in Ukraine differ in that they were based on quite different preconditions for the separation of regions, including historical, socio-economic, electoral, linguistic, ethnic, demographic, etc. As a result, there was no, and still is, not single conceptual logic for interpreting regionalism in Ukraine, and the region itself has been modeled and interpreted as a "label" and an "intermediate geographical community." This was quite profitable, both theoretically and methodologically, and practically, because in the conditions that were characteristic of Ukraine, the geographical basis of the region was justifiably explained as the basic, as geographical (but not territorial) interests have always intersected with electoral positions and even political behavior in Ukraine, although they have not been able to become fixed, and therefore prognostic. Even more, because some researchers have strongly denied the expediency of regionalization of Ukraine, in particular due to the fact that regional differences in this country have never been static, but instead, were so dynamic that they were difficult to capture⁴. That is why quite artificial regionalism in Ukraine blurred regional divisions in this country.

³ Barrington L., Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine, *European Journal of Political Research* 2002, vol 41, nr. 4, s. 455-491.; Barrington L., The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 1997, vol 38, nr. 10, s. 601-614.; Birch S., *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 2000.; Craumer P., Clem J., Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 1999, vol 40, s. 1-26.; Holdar S., Torn between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics, *Post-Soviet Geography* 1995. – Vol. 36. – No. 2. – P. 112-132.; Kubicek P., Regional Polarization in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behavior, *Europe-Asia Studies* 2000, vol 52, s. 295-317.

⁴ O'Loughlin J., The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 2001, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 1-33.

At the same time, it is worth noting the theoretical and methodological remark that despite the basis of regions in the format of geographical understanding, they in Ukraine have always been formed on the basis of very important differences in population context, i.e. among the population. This has certainly shown theorizing that any visible regional impacts are variable if the situation among the population and in settlements and other lower levels on a geographical scale indicates variations within a broader geographical unit.

In the case of Ukraine, this has always been reflected in the fact that the patterns of local and regional levels of self-government have often demonstrated different tendencies and hypotheses to support or non-support the contradictory importance of geographical influence and regionalism in Ukraine⁵. In other words, the opinion that prevailed in the center of a particular isolated region and formed the conditional basis of regionalization may not coincide with the opinion in its middle or on the periphery, although this center and periphery may be population larger than the core of the conditional region. In addition, at least in 1991-2013, the situation was typical for Ukraine, when the existing political and administrative borders, on the basis of which the definition of conditional regions of the state was based, did not adequately determine the differences between the regions and their territories and population. Accordingly, regionalization in this context remained largely geographical rather than political one – except for the electoral context – and therefore could not be determined by prognostic potential in the context of other factors of regionalism and regionalization, including ethnic, linguistic, ethno linguistic, socioeconomic, religious, population / demographic and even contextual and temporal, etc⁶.

On the other hand, the correction of this situation served as a basis for isolating and postulating several approaches to regionalism and regionalization in Ukraine in 1991-2013, including two-component (often electoral and in the format of division into two regions of Ukraine – western and eastern, with the regions of Ukraine in a particular region in relation to the Dnieper, etc.), four-component one (in the format of mainly geographical division into four regions of Ukraine – western, central, southern and eastern), eight-component approach (primarily in terms of economic model of state development, disputes of historical experience and demographic characteristics with the division into eight regions of Ukraine), etc. Each of the proposed approaches in its manifestations had its own interpretations and forms of expression, and hence different prognostic effects, and therefore they should be considered separately and sequentially (for a summary, see Table 1).

⁵ O'Loughlin J., The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 2001, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 5.

⁶ O'Loughlin J., The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?, *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 2001, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 8; Huckfeldt R., Sprague J., *Citizens, Contexts, and Politics*, [w:] Finifter A. (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*, Wyd. American Political Science Association 1993, s. 281-304.

Table 1. Options for approaches to regionalization of Ukraine in relation to its regions and cities with special constitutional status (as of 1991–2013)

Regions and cities of Ukraine	Two-component approach to regionalization (2 regions)	Four-component approach to regionalization (four regions)	Eight-component approach to regionalization (eight regions)
Donetsk region	East	East	East
Lugansk region	East	East	East
Kharkiv region	East	East	Eastern center
Zaporizhzhya region	East	East	Eastern center
Dnipropetrovsk region	East	East	Eastern center
Crimea	East	South	Crimea
Sevastopol city	East	South	Crimea
Kherson region	East	South	South
Mykolaiv region	West	South	South
Odessa region	West	South	South
Chernihiv region	East	Center	North center
Sumt region	East	Center	North center
Poltava region	East	Center	North center
Chercasy region	West	Center	North center
Kirovograd region	West	Center	North center
Kyiv region	West	Center	North center
Kyiv city	West	Center	North center
Khmelnyski region	West	Center	West center
Zhytomyr region	West	Center	West center
Vinnysya region	West	Center	West center
Rivne region	West	West	West center
Volyn region	West	West	West center
Ivano-Frankivsk region	West	West	West
Lviv region	West	West	West
Ternopil region	West	West	West
Chernivtsi region	West	West	Southwest
Trans-Carpathian region	West	West	Southwest

Zródło: Barrington L., Herron E., *One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences*, "Nationalities Papers" 2004, vol. 32, nr. 1, s. 53–86.

First of all, we need to turn to the two-pronged approach to the regionalization of Ukraine, which in the situation of the Ukrainian socio-political reality of 1991–2013 has found perhaps the greatest reflection and reflection. It is obvious that Ukraine is a large country, whose territorial parts have different historical heritage, ethnic and ethnographic attributes, as well as cultural and socio-political preferences.

At the same time, when it comes to a kind of domestic culture, then the so-called cultural regionalism (in any of its reflections – whether Ukrainian or Russian as the most common in Ukraine) during the analyzed period was perceived as the wealth of the country traditionally proud. However, when it came to differences in societal culture (social or political values, norms and forms of behavior, the language used in public activities, the content of education, mass culture, etc.), then certainly arose – both naturally and artificially, and often fueled (especially from neighboring Russia, which is quite obvious geographically and historically) fears, warnings, or even wishes about the possible separation or disintegration of Ukraine⁷.

At the same time, the fact that the purely theoretical commitment of certain groups of the population to different ideologies, different political forces and opposing foreign policy orientations may be the norm of democratic development, instead, externally determined – by Russian politicians and even political thought⁸ – and often internally structured – among some political forces in Ukraine the emphasis was on their (these differences) overlap on the region's factor. It is in this context that in 1991-2013 the idea that bilateral differences in Ukraine – within two conditional regions of this country, i.e. the West and the East – were often designed, disseminated and tested under certain conditions (both internal and external) capable of segmenting society as a socio-political process with possible irreconcilability in relations between the political elites of Ukraine, in particular, as representing different regions, and thus leading or capable of leading to socio-political confrontations in the future (which was largely expected by the Russian side). Moreover, visually, such fears in the case of Ukraine during 1991-2013 were by no means unfounded and possible, especially in the electoral context, although they were often exaggerated. However, in the domestic and social context, they have been significantly minimized since 2014, what was not taken into account and realized by Russia.

The socio-political significance and danger of a two-pronged approach to the regionalization of Ukraine during 1991-2013 was that scholars, publicists and politicians often insisted that among all the lines of socio-political divisions in Ukraine, the role of the “region” in such a dichotomous perception of it was decisive one. After all, both Russian and often some Ukrainian politicians and even theorists have stated that, for example, Ukrainians and Russians in Donetsk had much more in common (in views, behavior, attitudes to socially important issues and problems) than Ukrainians of Donetsk and Ukrainians of Lviv, etc. The same applied to the Russians. However, in ethno linguistic or linguistic contexts it did not work similarly, since Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Donetsk, Kyiv or Uzhhorod differed from each other in different ways in relation to different geography – in one way linguistically, in another way ethnically, and in another one electorally. Therefore, a holistic view of the consequences of such a two-component regionalization was very hard to predict and even harder to systematize, since

⁷ Kolodii A., *Ukrainskyi rehionalizm yak stan kulturno-politychnoi poliaryzovanosti*, “AHORA” 2006, vol 3 (Ukraina – rehionalnyi vymir), s. 69-91.

⁸ Beleckij M., Tolpygo A., *Nacional'no-kul'turnye i ideologicheskie orientacii naseleniya Ukrainy. Po dannym sociologicheskikh oprosov*, „Polis” 1998, nr. 4, s. 75.

various researchers and practitioners were divided in their assessments of the nature and depth of interregional differences along the “West-East” axis.

In particular, the biggest controversies have traditionally been over the simplest but erroneous dichotomous division of Ukraine into “East” in the format of Donbas (as a personification of the pro-Russian vector of Ukraine’s development) and “West” in the format of Galicia (as a personification of Euro-Atlantic or pro-Western vector of Ukraine), as well as their supposedly natural opposition to each other as contradistinctions and irreconcilability. Even though the rest of Ukraine fell out of such a dichotomous division into “two regions” and was in a kind of “vacuum” and “in the middle”, the idea of opposing Donbas and Galicia with a view to positioning it as a logic of disputes and irreconcilability between Western / Western. Euro-Atlantic and Eastern / pro-Russian options for Ukraine’s progress have often been “rented out” and politicized as both some politicians in Ukraine, and in general most politicians in Russia. Moreover, in order to substantiate their ideas and intentions, they almost always resorted to the creation and dissemination of various abstract constructs and identities that allegedly characterized the “West” and “East” of Ukraine in the past, currently and in the future.

It is in this context and with this intention, as some Ukrainian researchers point out⁹, that the logic of artificial two-component regionalization of Ukraine, especially the authorship of some Ukrainian and Russian scholars and politicians, was to distinguish “pure types” of Western or Eastern ethnic, ethno linguistic, cultural, and thus political identity in Ukraine, which should, as expected, become alternatively hostile patterns or conflict-generating components and options for the future development of this country.

This was relied on in 2014-2022, etc., but this idea was being prepared and practiced throughout the period of Ukraine’s independence. Thus, a number of efforts have been made to present the so-called “Eastern Ukrainian identity” as a kind of creoles in culture and social life, in particular with the predominance of the Russian language, inclusion primarily in the information and mass cultural and socio-political space of Russia, in Russian capital and oligarchic clans in the economy, including on the basis of the internalization of the former communist regime and the promotion of former historical myths about “Rus as the cradle of the three nations” and about “the reunification of Ukraine with Russia as an act of historical justice.” In contrast, pro-Russian politicians and ideologues have sought to portray the so-called “Western Ukrainian identity” as radical right-wing, nationalist, and ingrained in the Soviet myth of “Banderaism,” hostile to Russia, and “Eastern Ukrainian identity,” in particular because it is “shadow,” “separate,” “hostile,” “unnatural” and completely “not capitalized” socially and culturally. Accordingly,

⁹ Kolodii A., *Ukrainskyi rehionalizm yak stan kulturno-politychnoi poliaryzovanosti*, „AHORA” 2006, vol 3 (Ukraina – rehionalnyi vymir), s. 69-91.; Kolodii A., *Radianska identychnist ta yii nosii v nezalezhnii Ukraini*, Konferentsiia dlia ukrainskykh vypusknnykiv prohram naukovooho stazhuvannia u SSHA “Ukraina v suchasnomu sviti. Sotsialni, etnichni i kulturni aspekty hlobalizatsii ta Ukraina” (Yalta, 12-15 veresnia 2002 r.), s. 36-37.; Riabchuk M., *Dvi Ukrainy: Realni mezhi, virtualni viiny*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003.; Hrytsak Y., *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Gitelman Z., Hajda L., Himka J.-P., Solchanyk R. (eds.), *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Wyd. Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 263-281.

due to the artificial opposition of these two “identities”, the emphasis was on the fact that they are incompatible, and therefore should be postulated and postulated as divergent actors of regionalization and regional behavior, even within a formally united and sovereign Ukraine.

On the other hand, Ukrainian theorists and practitioners have also often discussed the logic of Ukraine’s dichotomous regional division into West and East, but have done so for a completely different purpose and often denied Russian / anti-Ukrainian narratives, after all, they almost never resorted to the construct of “two Ukraines”, despite the existing ethno-national, ethno linguistic, linguistic and regional differences between different parts of sovereign Ukraine. Instead, they assumed that the opposition of the conditional East and West is mostly purely linguistic, not ethno linguistic or ideological, and insisted that the ethno linguistic and socio-political basis of dichotomous regionalization of Ukraine is harmful and dangerous in the context of expediency and need for Ukrainian civil nation in this country¹⁰.

At the same time, Ukrainian researchers have never denied binary, at least virtual, linguistic and electoral, regionalism in Ukraine, but in a much broader format than the opposition of Galicia and Donbas. Instead, they strongly suggested politicizing the subject and avoiding any political speculation on the subject as having the potential (successfully used by Russia and pro-Russian thought in Ukraine) to the ideologization of “disunity.”

Nevertheless, most Ukrainian and Western researchers in one way or another turned to the very figurative regionalization of Ukraine in two parts, although they based such regionalization on completely different reasons, including political-electoral and linguistic, although they did not deny that such a situation led to the polarization and strengthening of potential conditions of confrontation, although almost primarily of a national or interethnic nature. Particularly influential in this context was the scientific position expressed by S. Huntington¹¹ on the passage of the line of civilization division between Western (Catholic-Protestant) and Eastern (Byzantine-Orthodox) cultures on the territory of Ukraine, which was also adopted by Russian and pro-Russian forces and intellectuals. Although, as confirmed by the political history of Ukraine, mainly after 2014, it also turned out to be not entirely true, after all, the so-called Eastern (Byzantine-Orthodox) culture in Ukraine is also heterogeneous in the context of its involvement or commitment to one or another vector of socio-political development and regionalization in this country, which became apparent after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

In contrast, since the end of the 20th century, many Ukrainian and Western researchers have sought to theoretically and methodologically and empirically overcome the narratives and stereotypes of a two-pronged approach to the regionalization of Ukraine as politicized and not very relevant. Instead, they resorted to developing other options for understanding regional

¹⁰ Pohorila N., *Rehionalni podily v Ukraini: kilka zaperechen proty dykhotomii „Skhid-Zakhid“*, „*Nezaleznyi internet-resurs „Dialog“*“ ~29.06.2004; Riabchuk M., *Dvi Ukrainy: Realni mezhi, virtualni viiny*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003.

¹¹ Huntington S., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Wyd. Simon and Schuster 1997, s. 138, 165.

divisions and regionalism in Ukraine, which partially or completely overturned the approach mentioned above. After all, these options were based on different and various causal links, including not only linguistic, political or socio-political, but also economic, social, territorial, demographic, etc. It is in this context that the four-component or sometimes five-component approach to regionalism and regionalization in Ukraine has found its place, which distinguishes such regions of the country as the Center (actually the North Center), West, East and South¹². If, in addition, Crimea was singled out as a separate region, a six-part approach to regionalism in Ukraine was formed. However, one way or another, this approach was completely different from the two-component one, because it, giving a more or less concrete picture of regional peculiarities and differences in Ukraine, leveled and still levels the factor of polarization in the state. Especially since many theorists generally insist on the vagueness or conditionality of regional borders and divisions in Ukraine, after all, if we try to attach importance to all the differences and variations, then even the division of Ukraine into as many regions as there are administrative-territorial units of the highest level, oblasts, will not be enough for the analysis¹³.

There is another logic in the case of the eight-component approach to regionalization in Ukraine, which in 1991-2013 was used primarily by Western scholars. The main rationale for the approach from the eight regions of Ukraine is that for two and four regions there are not enough differences between territories with different historical, socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In addition, the definition of eight regions may not fully divide Ukraine in the context of the definition of social or political identity, as it most likely describes the historical and geographical determinants of regionalization in this country. (see table 1). Perhaps the main emphasis in this context is on the inappropriateness of separating the "eastern" region as monolithic within the four-component approach, not to mention the two-component approach. The main thing is that Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhia oblasts are so different in their four-component approach that it is inappropriate to single them out as one conditional region, but they need to be divided into two parts. At the turn of the century, most Western researchers believed that the eastern regions of Ukraine were exclusively Donetsk and Luhansk, which are on the border with Russia were maximally urbanized, industrial and Russian-speaking than all other areas under the four-component approach¹⁴. In addition, in these two oblasts of Ukraine in 1991-2013 there were the most ethnic Russians (excluding Crimea), and their relative share was more than half of the total population in each of the oblasts (at

¹² Kuzio T., The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition, "Contemporary Politics" 2000, vol 6, nr. 2, s. 147-149; Hrytsak Y., *National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk*, [w:] Gitelman Z., Hajda L., Himka J.-P., Solchanyk R. (eds.), *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, Wyd. Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 2000, s. 276.

¹³ Barrington L., Examining Rival Theories of Demographic Influences on Political Support: The Power of Regional, Ethnic, and Linguistic Divisions in Ukraine, "European Journal of Political Research" 2002, vol 41, nr. 4, s. 455-491.; Pohorila N., Rehionalni podily v Ukraini: kilka zaperechen proty dykhotomii „Skhid-Zakhid”, "Nezaleznyi internet-resurs „Dialog" 29.06.2004.

¹⁴ Hesli V., Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns, "Europe-Asia Studies" 1995, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 19-21.

least according to the 1989 census of Ukraine)¹⁵. A similar logic of delimitation of regions was used for the rest of Ukraine, on the basis of which eight regions of the country were identified, including East, East Center, Crimea, South, North Center, West Center, West and Southwest. In general, this logic of regionalization of Ukraine sought to divert socio-political discourse from the issue of ethnic or ethno linguistic nature, and therefore should be interpreted as more natural and historically determined. In other words, the emphasis was on the fact that the topic of regionalization was less filled and conditioned by ethnic or ethno linguistic stereotypes¹⁶.

However, the attempts to regionalize Ukraine in 1991-2013 were not exhaustive, as they were supplemented by other interpretations and approaches. For example, Ukrainian researcher A. Kolodiy¹⁷, studying Soviet identity and its bearers in Ukraine, stated the need to divide its territory into 11-12 regions, in particular on the basis of a number of factors: ethnic, linguistic, national, electoral, political, geographical, etc. but certainly with a reference to history, retrospectives and political and legal culture.

Thus, another attempt was made to deny the two-pronged approach, in particular by highlighting such (more static rather than dynamic) regions of Ukraine as Polissya (or North), Podillya (or Central), Center, Volyn (or North-West), Slobozhanshchyna (or Northeastern), Black Sea (or Southern), Lower Dnieper (Dnieper or Southeastern), Donbas (or Eastern), Galicia (or Western), Transcarpathia and Bukovyna or South-West), Capital (Kyiv) and Crimea. However, on the other hand, this approach has proved to be very or relatively fragmented, which some perceive as its main shortcoming in relation to relevance or irrelevance in the analysis of socio-political processes in Ukraine. At the same time, this does not deny the possibility of similarity of regions in one or another of their patterns or outlines, which in one way or another are important analytically and comparatively.

The general conclusion is that any attempt to use the idea of regionalization of Ukraine – especially in its twofold logic (divided into “West” and “East” or the Right Bank and the Left Bank relative to the Dnieper) – in the real socio-political process in this country, but failed in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and intensified on a large scale in 2022. Instead, even if they worked, they are very limited and not dichotomous, but in a limited area. The fact is that almost all attempts to regionalize Ukraine, but first of all two-component, were designed to conditionally “fit” the regions to the specified parameters. In addition, they, being abstract and metaphorical, were often politicized, since they focused on the polarization of socio-political views within

¹⁵ Arel D., *Federalism and the Language Factor in Ukraine*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Phoenix, 19-22 November 1992), s. 13; Shaw D., Crimea: Background and Aftermath of Its 1994 Presidential Election, *Post-Soviet Geography* 1994, vol 35, nr. 4, s. 221-246.; Solchanyk R., The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine, *Europe-Asia Studies* 1994, vol 46, nr. 1, s. 47-68.

¹⁶ Barrington L., *Stereotypes of Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine: Views of the Ethnic “Other”, and Their Implications*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (New York, 2001).; D’Anieri P., *The Mitigation of Ethnic Conflict in Ukraine: The Mysterious Case of the State that Didn’t Collapse*, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston, 1998).; Dawson J., Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 1997, vol 30, nr. 4, s. 427-444.

¹⁷ Kolodii A., *Radianska identychnist ta yii nosii v nezalezhnii Ukraini*, Konferentsiia dlia ukrainskykh vypusknikov proqram naukovoho stazhuvannia u SSHA Ukraina v suchasnomu sviti. Sotsialni, etnichni i kulturni aspekty hlobalizatsii ta Ukraina (Yalta, 12-15 veresnia 2002 r.), s. 36-37.

certain factors that were taken as the basis for regionalization: linguistic, ethno linguistic, electoral, etc. This is complemented by the fact that all existing attempts to regionalize Ukraine in 1991-2013 were limited in population, as they have always been based on the “centers / cores” of certain territories, but not these territories as a whole. In fact, as the events of 2014-2022 have shown, the real clustering of regions in Ukraine is dependent on populousness / population throughout the country, regardless of geography, after all, this, at first glance, amorphous (“non-eastern” and “non-western”) space demonstrated the idea of national consciousness and civic nation, which completely denied the logic of the two-part division of Ukraine. In other words, this means the fiasco of the two-pronged approach to the regionalization of Ukraine, because this approach has never represented the cultural and political characteristics of the center and the entire population between the conditional “West” and “East.” Especially their dynamism and the fact that regionalism is not only about socio-political and linguistic differences, but also about social, historical, cultural, economic, civil, ideological and civilization differences in general. However, this does not mean that the issue of regionalism and regionalization in Ukraine does not need to be continued and developed. Of course, it is necessary, but in a completely different way and direction, especially given the launch of European integration processes in this country. Accordingly, modern, more natural, rather than artificial, constructs of regions should be taken into account, which are defined not so much culturally and ethnically as cross-border, party-political, party-ideological, socio-class, religious, etc., even reflecting existing socio-political divisions and polarizations.

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ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEFINITION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELATIONS

The article analyzes and systematizes different political and institutional perspectives of defining and arrangement of relations between electoral and parliamentary parties, as well as the options of distinguishing between them in representative democracies. This is done in view of the fact that parties in representative democracies play a major role in organizing and articulating the demands, interests and needs of different groups of voters. Accordingly, the issue of theorizing and understanding political and institutional perspectives of defining and arrangement of relations between parties as participants in elections and fractions as parties in the parliaments of almost all democratic countries in the world was put on the agenda. To do this, the author analyzed and structured the differences between such notions as “party”, “electoral party”, “parliamentary party”, “faction”, “caucus” and “coalition”.

Keywords: party, electoral party, parliamentary party, fraction, caucus, coalition.

Partie wyborcze i parlamentarne w krajach demokratycznych: perspektywy polityczne i instytucjonalne określania i regulacji stosunków

Artykuł analizuje i systematyzuje polityczne i instytucjonalne perspektywy definiowania i regulowania relacji między partiami wyborczymi i parlamentarnymi, a także fakultatywne rozróżnienie między nimi w demokracjach przedstawicielskich. Dokonano tego z uwagi na fakt, że partie w demokracjach przedstawicielskich odgrywają główną rolę w organizowaniu i artykułowaniu prósób, interesów i potrzeb różnych grup wyborców. W związku z tym na porządku dziennym postawiono kwestię teoretyzowania i rozumienia politycznych i instytucjonalnych perspektyw definiowania i organizowania relacji i powiązań między partiami jako uczestnikami wyborów i frakcjami jako partiami w parlamentach niemal wszystkich demokratycznych krajów świata. W tym celu przeanalizowano i ustrukturyzowano różnice między takimi pojęciami jak „partia”, „partia wyborcza”, „partia parlamentarna”, „frakcja”, „fakcja” i „koalicja”.

Słowa kluczowe: partia, partia wyborcza, partia parlamentarna, frakcja, fakcja, koalicja.

ВИБОРЧІ І ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКІ ПАРТІЇ У ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИХ КРАЇНАХ: ПОЛІТИЧНА Й ІНСТИТУЦІЙНА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ОЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ВПОРЯДКУВАННЯ ВІДНОСИН

У статті проаналізовано і систематизовано політичну й інституційну перспективи означення та впорядкування відносин поміж виборчими і парламентськими партіями, а також опціонал розмежування між ними у представницьких демократіях. Це було зроблено з огляду на те, що партії в умовах представницьких демократій відіграють магістральну роль у впорядкуванні й артикулюванні запитів, інтересів і потреб різних груп виборців. Відповідно, на порядок денний було поставлено проблематику теоретизації і розуміння політичної й інституційної перспектив означення та впорядкування відносин і зв'язку між партіями як учасниками виборів та фракціями як партіями у парламентах майже всіх демократичних країн світу. Задля цього проаналізовано і структуровано відмінності між такими поняттями, як «партія», «виборча партія», «парламентська партія», «фракція», «факція» та «коаліція».

Ключові слова: партія, виборча партія, парламентська партія, фракція, факція, коаліція.

Almost every democracy in the world is organized in such a way that it represents the interests of the electorate in the representative bodies of power, but certainly in parliaments. The fact is that parliaments in representative democracies are always popularly elected bodies, and therefore their formation and organization are certainly influenced by voters. In this sense, if not all, then almost all representative democracies – moreover, regardless of their type – are usually characterized by the fact that their national parliaments are formed according to political principles and political logic, i.e. on the basis of representing the interests of voters through various political organizations. And among them, the main role is played primarily by political parties, which organize and articulate the requests, interests and needs of voters. Therefore, purely in the context of identifying the relationship between civil society / voters and representation by means of elections, parties in one way or another become more or less represented in national legislatures, already after that organizing them and politically influencing their powers and functionality. This, in turn, raises the question of theorizing and understanding the political and institutional perspectives of defining and regulating relations and relations between parties as election participants and factions as parties represented in the parliaments of almost all democracies.

The stated topics in different times were raised by political scientists, in particular such well-known classics as J. Blondel¹, W. Crotty², M. Duverger³, L. Epstein⁴, B. Hinckley⁵, K. Janda⁶, C. Jones⁷, V. Key⁸, A. Lijphart⁹, G. Loewenberg and S. Patterson¹⁰, R. Macridis¹¹, M. Mezey¹², P. Norton¹³, W. Riker¹⁴, R. Rose¹⁵, G. Sartori¹⁶, E. Schattschneider¹⁷, F. Sorauf¹⁸, A. Stern and S. Tarrow¹⁹, and other scientists.

We, in turn, will try to organize and systematize their works in order to outline, at least on a theoretical level, the political and institutional perspectives on defining and structuring relations and relations between electoral and parliamentary parties (factions) in democratic countries of the world. In proceeding to consider the topic of political and institutional perspectives on the definition and regulation of relations and relations between parties as participants in elections and factions as parties represented in the legislatures of almost all democracies of the world we insist (at least in existing terminology) on the use of all the already traditional concepts and definitions used in the theory of political coalitions and in the theory of parties and party systems, although certainly related to the comparative studies of national parliaments or legislatures in a whole. Thanks to this, the presented research can be aimed primarily at assessing the role and relationship of electoral parties and post-election / parliamentary parties, to determine the role of such external and mediating variables of this relationship as electoral and party systems, as well as to clarify the systemic interaction of the legislature with parliamentary, including governmental and opposition, parties. With this in mind, it is possible to organize and systematize knowledge not only about the relationship between electoral parties and parliamentary parties, but also about comparing and organizing the actual parties of the legislature, as well as trends and prospects for the development of parliaments based on the assessment of electoral and legislative behavior of political parties, both in parliaments and outside them²⁰.

¹ Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1973.

² Crotty W., *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, Wyd. Allyn and Bacon 1967.

³ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959.

⁴ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.; Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, "American Political Science Review" 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

⁵ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981.

⁶ Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

⁷ Jones C., *The Minority Party in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1970.

⁸ Key V., *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Crowell 1964.; Key V., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Wyd. Knopf 1949.

⁹ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

¹⁰ Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979.

¹¹ Macridis R., *Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas*, Wyd. Harper & Row 1967.

¹² Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

¹³ Norton P., Party Organization in the House of Commons, "Parliamentary Affairs" 1978, vol 31, s. 406-423.

¹⁴ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁵ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.

¹⁶ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

¹⁷ Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942.

¹⁸ Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F. (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

¹⁹ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, "Comparative Politics" 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

²⁰ Patterson S., Wahlke J., *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research*, Wyd. Wiley Interscience 1972.

At the same time, this type of research exposes some theoretical and methodological difficulties and problems in assessing the relationship between electoral and parliamentary parties in the context of institutional and political structuring of electoral procedures and the composition and functions of national parliaments as such. Thus, on the one hand, not all researchers and not always treat all parties represented in parliaments (including by election results) as parliamentary or as factions, after all, some of them are represented by a very small number of deputies and are not relevant, and some are formed on the basis of the division of other parliamentary parties / factions. On the other hand, it is not always clear what is the reason for scholars to name certain parties and political organizations in factions and whether the latter arise purely on a party basis or may be associations of non-party deputies (for which names are sometimes used instead the term “caucus”, even if its status is similar to the status of the term “faction” in parliament), etc.

Combining these two problems of separating political parties within parliaments, as well as trying to solve them in some way, J. Sartori argues that political scholars are still “traveling through the growing jungle of party politics, not even knowing where they should be, start their journey, not to mention where they are currently”²¹. “This is due to the fact that the research literature on the separation of parties, factions, caucuses and various types of parliamentary coalitions is surprisingly confused in the sense that how it distinguishes factions (parliamentary parties) from parties (election parties), parties and factions from coalitions, factions from factions and so on. And this is actually evidenced by the fact that political science has not advanced much in this direction, at least compared to the situation that was half a century ago, when scientists said that the various classifications and typologies of party systems are characterized by “disorder and abundance of definitions”²².”

The main core of this problem is the fact that political theorists and comparatives in the field of assessing political processes in parties and parliaments, including institutionalists, quite rarely articulate their attention on party-legislative groups or party groups in legislatures. Instead, they more or less focus on the relationship between the concept of “party” in its understanding of the electorate (i.e. the electoral party) and “party organization” (for parties in the election and post-election periods), since this interdependence is directly related to the level of democracy / democratization and interinstitutional relations in political systems. Even more so, as studies focusing on parties or factions in national parliaments very seldom describe party structuring at least a little “further” than its assessment, mainly in democracies. In contrast, institutionalists who mainly deal with legislatures and their institutional impact on entire political systems, as well as scholars interested in political parties, classify parliaments according to “many” variables and structural components, rather than focusing on comparing the nature of parties in legislatures and outside them. However, this can not help at all in resolving the

²¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 24.

²² Macridis R., *Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas*, Wyd. Harper & Row 1967, s. 22.

question of what parliament is in terms of party-political understanding of representative democracies in the modern world²³.

Accordingly, as a consequence of the complexity of defining parliaments in the party-political context, their classification is a gap, including on the basis of insufficient development and content of the phenomenon of parliamentary parties or parties / factions in legislatures, what is especially noticeable in the conditions of diffuse orientation of institutional and political structure and powers of parliaments, in particular concerning law-making processes.

J. Sartori, who examines the development of electoral parties and parliamentary factions in theory and in practice, tries to solve this problem in part, at least at the analytical level. He notes that the etymological and historical positioning of factions and parties as such is derived from the fact that they are "unfriendly" or "friendly" to the government and the executive branch in general. However, the researcher notes that such a dichotomy is historically and currently not entirely complete, as it should be supplemented by the category of faction, which started to be distinguished several centuries ago. In particular, according to the works of J. Sartori²⁴, E. Burke was the first to try to distinguish the party from the faction, without appealing to the category of faction (because at that time it was not typical to elect parties to national parliaments). This thinker, as one of the first proponents of the need to create and fill the content of the phenomenon of parties, argued that parties are a means to achieve certain ultimate goals and a functional association of like-minded people who pursue these goals. Instead, he insisted that caucuses (even though there were no party factions in parliaments, which were not the case in terms of not representing the people in power) were, on the contrary, groups interested in fighting and earning money, various dividends or conditional power. In general, Burke was perhaps the first political philosopher to place political parties within, rather than outside, the political system, albeit as such functional units, which in his time did not seek the support of the electorate, which revealed a significant irrelevance of his proposed understanding of the parties in relation to modern conditions.

However, over time, the logic of E. Burke, in particular due to the emergence, spread and intensification of suffrage, began to become more valid and relevant, since the parties in a democratic representation still began gradually, particularly in the mid-19th century, according to Duverger to position and be perceived as "parts of countries on a large scale"²⁵.

As a result, many scientists, including W. Crotty²⁶, K. Janda²⁷, L. Epstein²⁸, F. Riggs²⁹, J. Sartori³⁰, and others began to distinguish between parties by function and purpose, including

²³ Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979, s. 3.

²⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

²⁵ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959, s. 1.

²⁶ Crotty W., *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, Wyd. Allyn and Bacon 1967.

²⁷ Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

²⁸ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.; Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, "American Political Science Review" 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

²⁹ Riggs F., *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A theory of dynamic balancing*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1970.

³⁰ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

electoral and parliamentary, and then continued the debate over the separation of parties from factions, factions from caucuses and coalitions from those of interest.

However, the result of this academic and scientific process both initially became and over time remained largely confusing and uncorrected, as we can understand from the ideas of some scholars. Thus, American political scientists use the category of “caucus” mostly in a neutral sense, while European and other theorists use it in the sense in which E. Burke thought about caucus several centuries ago.

Summing up this situation, J. Sartori believes that the problem with evaluating parties is that the general theory of parties asks for preliminary information, which, in turn, will never be the future until there is a real general theory³¹. Similarly, F. Sorauf³² states that while at some levels the political theory of understanding parties is quite easy, intuitive and tangible, at other levels it is elusive, and what is significant is empirical. In the same vein, Hinckley argues that political theorists still do not know what a “political party” is when they argue that it is very important, and therefore they do not quite understand what is worth or not worth linking political parties and to compare their institutional and political importance³³. Accordingly, given this mess of information and knowledge about parties in political science, it is not surprising that the concepts of “caucus” and “faction” are also confusing and ambiguous. And this despite the fact that partologists and institutionalists still use certain, already classical, definitions of political parties as any political groups and organizations, which are represented during the elections and are able to represent candidates from the population to public institutions and authorities based on the election results³⁴. The proposed definition of a party is relatively valid in the sense that it at least partially distinguishes parties from factions and parties from factions, since parties are participants in elections, factions are parties in state institutions, primarily parliaments, and caucuses are parties or surrounding party organizations without representation or management of their members and candidates in state institutions. In this sense, the distinction between electoral and parliamentary parties in the context of legislatures is primarily along the lines of separation between parties and factions, and much less often in relation to caucuses in legislatures. Because factions as parliamentary parties are the main agents of the legislature, as they use and pursue both job and party image at the electoral level and therefore are partly a continuation of the electoral parties.

Nevertheless, even following the already classic definition of parties and their division into electoral and parliamentary, the need to separate and fill the concept of “caucus” in modern representative legislatures, which are formed as a result of national elections, remains quite obvious. Especially since parliamentary caucuses, as noted by the same J. Sartori, can be implemented in

³¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 106.

³² Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F. (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

³³ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981.

³⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 64.

the format of both inter-party and intra-party or non-party groups in parliaments, and therefore they may be derived or non-derived from electoral parties and / or parliamentary factions. Moreover, caucuses, like any group, which cannot be assessed as parliamentary parties / factions (although they may be part of them), should be divided into ideological³⁵, tendentious³⁶, personified³⁷, as well as those that address specific issues. From this conclusion, in turn, it follows that the structure of the parliamentary party (faction) and its parliamentary behavior can be understood in terms of its possible division into caucuses. As well as the fact that parliamentary factions or even caucuses can serve as a structured framework for understanding parliamentary coalitions, which are typically understood as the union of two or more parliamentary parties (factions) and / or caucuses in the care of forming governments. After all, parliamentary coalitions are inter-party / inter-factional and / or inter-caucusal groups designed to form and govern the government (at least in the case of parliamentary democracies), while parliamentary caucuses are, in this sense, inter-party groups of legislatures that, determining the outcome of the legislative process, do not manage it independently. In a slightly modified form, this means that there may be a governing coalition in parliament, but it may generate problems where factions of two or more parties and non-party MPs (united or not grouped) vote together as a caucus – a certain inter-factional or extra-factional, but necessarily supra-coalition construction.

It follows, as noted by H. Eulau and K. Hinckley³⁸, that all research on the composition of parliaments and their composition by parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions should be divided into two models – internal and external. The internal model describes the key structural and cognitive-behavioral variables that characterize parties, factions, and caucuses within legislatures. Instead, the external model describes the strength and influence of parties outside the institutional framework of parliaments, i.e. through the prism of the electoral system, the system of government and the powers of all branches and institutions of power, and not just the legislature.

Therefore, thanks to the two approaches, there are sufficient grounds and tools to determine the characteristics of parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions in parliaments, which, in turn, are one of the components of the latter. In addition, it is the external approach that simplifies the distinction between electoral and parliamentary parties, as the focus in this context is on party and factional behavior in parliaments following election results. And this, in turn, applies not only to the parties themselves, but also to coalitions, both electoral coalitions or electoral blocs, and mainly parliamentary coalitions, which further characterize party or surrounding party groups within political institutions – especially parliaments. This is how the opportunity

³⁵ Seyd P., *Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club*, "Government and Opposition" 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.

³⁶ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.

³⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 74-76.

³⁸ Eulau H., Hinckley K., *Legislative Institutions and Processes*, [w:] Robinson J. (ed.), *Political Science Almanac*: Vol. 1, Wyd. Bobbs-Merrill 1966, s. 85-189.

arises to classify the types of parliamentary groups, and this, in turn, serves as an impetus to determine the peculiarities of their separation from each other and order in the legislature.

In contrast, when researchers limit themselves to the study of parliaments only, i.e. the internal approach, then they limit the structural and behavioral variables that characterize parliamentary groups – factions, caucuses and coalitions. Thus, the theory of coalitions within the internal approach, for example, describes what is the process of uniting political interests in parliament, which groups are united for this purpose and what is the purpose of this process against the background of the functioning of parliament, and therefore it serves primarily as a means of addressing the problem of political composition and composition of parliaments. However, as W. Reiker convincingly points out, in political science party coalitions have long been a central concept of structural organization, but not only at the level of established and formed / elected institutions, but also in the course of their establishment and formation³⁹. This view is shared by B. Hinckley, who argues that the activities of the coalition are in fact a “small attempt at political activity”⁴⁰ or a kind of model of politics at the electoral and institutional levels or sections. The fact is that the coalition’s activities are aimed at the exercise of political power, a combination of conflict and coordination, and thus collective activity in general, and all this in total leads to situations that are governed by collective and mixed political motives, both at the election and post-election stages. Adding to the procedural nature of this course of events is the fact that it requires political skills, in particular in the form of coalition bargaining, compromise, mobilization of party support - both during the election and after them.

It follows that in this approach, parliaments inevitably emerge as collectives of people and groups of people who represent other people and who work through a combination of conflict and coordination, using power and coercion to promote the decisions they approve and make. Therefore, parliaments in this context should be perceived not only as existing political institutions of representative and collegial type, but also as environmental parameters used in testing various hypotheses and theories about the separation of electoral and parliamentary parties, etc. Since parties in parliaments are inevitably characterized by both the influence of electoral factors and the intra-parliamentary attributes of party groups, including stability, range of influence, tasks, goals, power, membership and size, etc. According to A. Stern and S. Tarrow⁴¹, parties, factions and caucuses in legislatures differ from each other in the degree of their stability. After all, in a two-party system, members of parliament, in the “ideal sense”, are members of one of two political parties, whose party membership determines voting, appointment to committees, awards, etc. Instead, in a more factionalized or fragmented legislature, the set and combination of factions determines each vote and appointment to one committee or another, so that deputies can switch from one issue to another. This is often compounded by the fact

³⁹ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁴⁰ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981, s. 4.

⁴¹ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, “*Comparative Politics*” 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

that in some cases of over-factionalized parliaments there are systems of responsible parties that form government cabinets⁴², in other cases situational agreements between scattered party groups prevail⁴³, and in other cases, parties form appointments in committees, but inter-party caucuses often determine the voting behavior of parliaments⁴⁴.

The range of legislative or parliamentary actions covered by coalitions also influences the organization and delimitation of factions, caucuses and parties in legislatures⁴⁵. After all, in a parliament or one of the chambers of a bicameral parliament, each party acts difficultly against the other party, thus determining the structure and political positioning of the legislature⁴⁶. Thus, the votes of deputies needed to adopt the functional rules of the previous chamber or the previous parliament, in particular on the appointment of committees, and to vote on the election of the speaker of the legislature, are almost always "ordinary" party votes.

However, this conclusion does not apply to the variety of options and configurations of voting by parties, factions and caucuses on various national issues, as some party groups are not active in all issues discussed, but only on a limited array or list of issues⁴⁷. And this despite the fact that political groups aimed at solving specific problems can be formed both within a party / faction, and between them or between them and non-party deputies, etc. In addition, the actions of parliamentary groups are not limited to voting, and also include actions on the election of leaders, appointments to committees, administrative lobbying, and distribution of financial grants among public policy areas. Therefore, determining the range of behavior of party-political groups in legislatures is an important indicator for distinguishing between parties, factions, factions and coalitions, in particular in their electoral and parliamentary sections.

Another important aspect of party organization and party organization of legislatures is the distribution of tasks and powers between parties, factions and caucuses in parliaments. At the same time, the division of tasks is traditionally the division of labor, which in the case of representative democracies is realized or should be realized due to the fact that the parties have numerous party target groups dealing with different aspects of party order and function⁴⁸ and various issues, even though they are largely interconnected through systems of parliamentary committees. It follows that parliamentary groups change as tasks are distributed among them. In turn, the distribution of power in parliamentary parties is, in essence, a matter of centralization of power and its hierarchy. Thus, some political parties, for example, are endowed with a much greater hierarchy than other political forces in the legislature, although a similar conclusion

⁴² Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942.

⁴³ Key V., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Wyd. Knopf 1949.

⁴⁴ Sinclair B., *Coping with Uncertainty: Building Coalitions in the House and the Senate*, [w:] Mann T., Ornstein N. (eds.), *The New Congress*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute 1981, s. 178-220.

⁴⁵ Seyd P., Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club, "Government and Opposition" 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.

⁴⁶ Ripley R., *Majority Party Leadership in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1969; Jones C., *The Minority Party in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1970.

⁴⁷ Williams P., *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic*, Wyd. Anchor Books 1966.

⁴⁸ Norton P., Party Organization in the House of Commons, "Parliamentary Affairs" 1978, vol 31, s. 406-423.

applies simply to the parliaments of different countries⁴⁹. In addition, the logic is very common that in parties where power is centralized or only relatively hierarchical, only a small number of leaders can influence the formation of the political course. Instead, in the cases of decentralized parties, the number of leaders is greater, and therefore more people should or can, according to theorists, speak about the strategic advantages of the parties⁵⁰. As for non-partisan factions or caucuses of non-factional deputies, they are generally located outside the hierarchical order or in accordance with an almost random order.

It is noteworthy that in parliaments that work according to the principle of simple (not absolute) majority in decision-making, there may be different combinations of distribution of tasks and powers of parties, in contrast to parliaments, which require an absolute or qualified majority to adopt all or at least part of their acts. Although this is not at all regulated by the attributes and characteristics of the parties themselves in the legislatures, instead it is another indicator of the definition of parliamentary structures.

As for the goals of political parties in the legislatures, they are also able to characterize the party-parliamentary and party-electoral configurations. At least since the party-factional goals in the parliaments correspond to the institutionalized norms in the sphere of political regimes. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that some parliamentary parties in some countries are fighting for a change in the current political regime, while other parties are not, although they insist on changing the system of government and inter-institutional relations⁵¹. At the same time, it is extremely important from the point of view of composition of parliaments to unite personal and collective goals of party-factional groups in legislatures. The fact is that parliamentary factions and parliamentary groups in general often or mainly act in the form of lobby groups, since they are characterized by the desire to achieve current personal goals, and parties instead should be perceived as a means of achieving collective goals. It follows that the extent to which a parliamentary group depends on personal and collective goals is certainly an important feature of the separation of electoral parties from parliamentary party-political groups⁵². In the electoral-political context, this is complemented by the importance of the moment who becomes a member of parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions⁵³, after all, the composition of these structural components of the legislature varies from country to country, and therefore determines the answer to the question of what they do. It is on this basis that some scholars note the correlation or relationship between heterogeneous and homogeneous constituencies (given that increasing heterogeneity in constituencies increases the intensity of

⁴⁹ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.; Ripley R., *Majority Party Leadership in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1969.

⁵⁰ King A., *How to Strengthen Legislatures: Assuming That We Want To*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *The Role of the Legislature in Western Democracies*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute 1981, s. 87-89.

⁵¹ Jackson R., Atkinson M., Hart K., Constitutional Conflict in France: Deputies' Attitudes Toward Executive-Legislative Relations, *"Comparative Politics"* 1977, vol 9, s. 399-420.

⁵² Fenno R., *Congressmen in Committees*, Wyd. Little Brown 1973.

⁵³ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, *"Comparative Politics"* 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

competition) in the context of parliamentary elections in the formation of parliamentary coalitions as a result⁵⁴. This is manifested in the fact that the parliamentary party, which represents a heterogeneous constituency, behaves differently than the party representing a homogeneous constituency, which, in turn, affects the successes and failures of various party-political groups in parliaments. The size of party groups in parliaments deserves special attention in this context.

However, in this case it is necessary to address not only the assessment of the absolute and relative size of parties, factions and caucuses, but also the assessment of the role of parliamentary coalitions, especially the minimally victorious. The fact is that it is through minimally victorious parliamentary-government coalitions that political / party-political players in parliament can maximize their own electoral, power and political benefits⁵⁵. At the same time, the easiest way to estimate the size of party groups in parliaments, according to M. Duverger⁵⁶ and J. Sartori⁵⁷, is to calculate the simple / absolute number of parties in the legislature. Identifying the number of factions, parties or coalitions in parliaments is a simple task, but it should be emphasized that this approach is not always effective⁵⁸. But in general, determining the number of parties / factions is important coming out of the fact that the difference between multi-party, bipartisan and one-party parliaments is decisive, and drawing on the idea that the number of parties, factions and caucuses is related to the organization and positioning of legislatures. Similarly, the degree to which parliament is factionalized or fragmented is another, and possibly more important, component of the evaluation of national legislatures⁵⁹. And this despite the fact that the issue of determining the number or ratio of the number and size of parties in legislatures suits the internal and external approaches to assessing the party-political composition of parliaments.

In general, in this theoretical block of our study, we need to conclude that the various internal criteria and indicators of party-political ordering of parliaments are quite logical and reasonable in characterizing the party attributes of parliaments. This is despite the fact that such criteria and indicators are quite analytically different, although in a purely experimental and empirical way they are still related and interrelated⁶⁰. This reflects, for example, the assumption that interinstitutional and party-electoral relations, constituency structure and electoral formula / system, as well as existing socio-political divisions can inevitably be combined and determine the party-political structure and different components of parliaments. It follows that in addition to the internal approach to assessing the political or party component of parliaments, special

⁵⁴ Fiorina M., *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*, Wyd. Lexington Books 1974.; Gerber E., Lewis J., Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, *Journal of Political Economy* 2004, vol 112, nr. 6, s. 1364-1383.

⁵⁵ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁵⁶ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959.

⁵⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

⁵⁸ Blondel J., Legislatures' Behavior: Some Steps Towards a Cross National Measurement, *Government and Opposition* 1969, vol 5, s. 67-85.; Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

⁵⁹ Seyd P., Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club, *Government and Opposition* 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.; Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

⁶⁰ Key V., *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Crowell 1964.; Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

attention should be paid to external factors, which are interpreted in political science as quite diverse and many-sided, and therefore as amenable to different classifications.

In this regard, for example, researchers primarily appeal to the fact that the separation of parliamentary and electoral parties in representative democracies is due to the typology of the latter. It is in this context that some scholars divide all representative democracies into majoritarian or consensus democracies⁶¹, while others suggest focusing on phenomena and phenomena such as consociative democracy⁶² or a developing society⁶³, after all thanks to them, it is possible to further delineate and differentiate the functionality of electoral and parliamentary parties and to structure and explain specific party systems. Moreover, scholars in this context are either explaining the role of parties in democratic societies, or demonstrating how parties and legislatures help to consolidate and to develop states.

In this regard, scholars have traditionally argued that elections play a crucial role in influencing party composition and behavior in legislatures, including through the prism of transforming and comparing electoral parties into parliamentary parties. The particular importance of electoral rules and competition is due to the fact that they determine typically the relationship between parliament and society, on the one hand, and parliament and government, on the other hand. In this regard, L. Epstein believes that a characteristic feature of parties is that they nominate candidates for party labels for their further election or non-election by society during the election⁶⁴. It is in this regard, many scholars consider it appropriate to use a variety of methods to measure the fractionalization or fragmentation of party systems, and at the electoral and parliamentary levels, as indicators that depend on the size and number, respectively, of electoral or parliamentary parties in a country, which the functionality of classification of party systems in them expands⁶⁵. But, according to J. Sartori, this does not permit a comprehensive solution to existing problems, as the types of party systems and the parameters of separation of electoral and parliamentary parties depend not only on the number and size of parties during elections and parliaments, but also on their electoral, then parliamentary behavior⁶⁶.

This position of researchers becomes especially important given that national legislatures are not exhaustive or "closed" political institutions, but instead, those political institutions that influence and regulate political systems and systems of interinstitutional relations, for which the functionality and understanding of the electoral and parliamentary parties, respectively, are also different. Therefore, an important factor in this context is the function of the influence of the

⁶¹ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984; Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1977.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

⁶² McRae K., *Consociational Democracy*, Wyd. McClelland and Stewart 1974.

⁶³ Boynton G., Kim C., *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1975.

⁶⁴ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.

⁶⁵ Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1967.; Rae D., Taylor M., Decision, Rules, and Policy Outcomes, "British Journal of Political Science" 1971, vol 1, s. 71-91.

⁶⁶ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

political system in general on the activities of the institution of parliament in particular, especially in its purely party-electoral context, as well as in the context of institutional and political powers of legislatures. In this regard, M. Mezi states that the leading function of parliaments is to develop tactics of state and political development, which is especially true for representative democracies⁶⁷. Similar or similar conclusions are held by other scholars, who clearly state that parliaments in the party-political sense are necessarily arenas of influence, but this influence is not static, but instead undergoes constant transformation⁶⁸. And this forces the same J. Sartori to motivate that in determining the powers of legislatures, the issue of classification of parties and party systems has always played, and will always play a decisive role and will have a leading potential⁶⁹. Therefore, in general, it follows that political parties that do not participate in the government process or do not have the potential to govern are less important than government parties, but they should still be taken into account and classified as such, that regulate the difference between the electoral and parliamentary arenas of party functioning.

All mentioned above shows that the correlation and relations between the electoral and parliamentary parties are of great research and practical interest⁷⁰. After all, the degree to which the external (non-parliamentary / electoral) organization of the party seeks to realize its aspirations to move to the format of internal (parliamentary / legislative) organization of the party is at the heart of the institutional and political issue of political representation in democracies. However, in some works and theories members of parliamentary parties are referred to as representatives, and in others – “agents”, but traditionally members of electoral parties are not perceived as one or the other. Given all the above, it is clear that the relationship between the electoral and parliamentary parties varies depending on the size, ideology and number of major parties in the system, but in connection with the differences between the electoral and parliamentary levels⁷¹.

This means that: the more programmatically controlled a party is, the greater the probability of external control of its legislators / deputies in the conditions of transformation of such a party from a purely electoral to a parliamentary one; the reduction in the size and number of the main parties makes it more likely that such political parties will be subject to external scrutiny, both during and after elections and in legislatures.

In this context, the combination of the results of elections to the legislature and the powers of parliaments, which are formed through the relevant elections, can streamline existing knowledge, because in this way it is possible to propose unique classifications of party systems at the legislature level⁷¹. Conceptually, the two basic classification variables of party systems at

⁶⁷ Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

⁶⁸ Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979, s. 10.; Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1973.; Polsby N., *Legislatures*, [w:] Greenstein F., Polsby N. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, Wyd. Addison-Wesley 1975, s. 277.

⁶⁹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 121-123.

⁷⁰ Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, *American Political Science Review* 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

⁷¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 128

the level of legislatures in this case should be considered the concentration of parties in parliament and dispersion of power, which forms or reveals the main reasons for the separation of parliamentary parties or transformation of electoral parties into parliamentary parties⁷². The first indicator – concentration – is typically quantitative, as it reflects the division of party systems within parliaments into one-party, two-party and multi-party, of course with a number of subtypes and related types (discussed in detail in different typologies of party systems). Instead, the second indicator – power dispersion – can be both quantitative and qualitative, but in general it typically reflects the extent to which parliamentary parties (as a result of election success) monopolize or divide political power⁷³. Accordingly, this means that the dispersion of power concerns mainly parliamentary and not electoral parties, at least in contrast to the first indicator. This is especially noticeable in the case of all types of party systems, except one-party ones, since parliamentary parties in them can distribute management and administrative functions in very different ways, especially if prime ministers, but also the election of presidents. It follows that the party-political nature and composition of the role of parliaments – through the prism of indicators of dispersion of power and concentration of political parties can vary from minor or minimal (in the case of one-party) to important or extremely important (in the case of both bipartisanship and multiparty system).

In general, on this basis, it should be emphasized that there are several important definitions that underlie the typology of party systems at the level of legislatures, as well as the separation of electoral and parliamentary parties in political systems. First, parties are calculated or taken into account not only when they are endowed with the potential for managerial influence, but also when they have a certain parliamentary size or parliamentary status. Second, caucuses are not parties, but groups without governing or managerial potential, albeit within parliament. Third, caucuses are mainly intra-party groups based on problem-solving, ideology, and personalism.

Fourth, the fragmentation or fractionalization of parliamentary parties, as opposed to electoral parties, concerns the number of parties with or without governing potential. In other words, it means that it is more influential for a party to be relevant in parliament than it is to be relevant in election.

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⁷² Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979.

⁷³ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

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BASIC PARAMETERS, MANIFESTATIONS AND OPTIONS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRACTICE OF POPULISM IN THE WORLD AT THE END OF THE 20th CENTURY

The article analyzes the supporting parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world, in particular in its various parts and in general, in the second half and at the end of the 20th century. The author states that populism began to diversify, but at the same time to be theorized and to acquire doctrinal outlines since the middle of the 20th century. The manifestation of this was that the conceptualization and empiricism of populism began to acquire signs of tendentious and recurring processes. Given these, the essence of populism in the dynamics of the second half of the 20th century is analyzed on the example of Europe as well as North and South America and so on. On this basis, it is argued that the understanding of populism has not become consolidated, unified and unilateral one in the second half – in the late 20th century. Firstly, populism can be a characteristic of both democratic and non-democratic (hybrid and autocratic ones) political regimes that determines its different orientation and vector. Secondly, populism can be perceived as both a negative and a positive socio-political phenomenon, although classically it is typically supposed to be a threat to democracy. Thirdly, populism depends in its interpretation not only on the part of the world, but also on the country, and therefore it should always be considered contextually. Fourthly, populism can be caused by very different reasons, but socio-economic factors are less frequently its causes than political factors. However, populism in the second half of the 20th century generally began to be doctrinalized and typologized based on a combination of several basic parameters and criteria that are traditionally reduced to confrontation and mobilization of the struggle between the “people” and the “oligarchy”/“elite”.

Keywords: politics, democracy, populism, political discourse, power, people, elite, party, political process.

Podstawowe parametry, wyglądy i możliwości konceptualizacji i praktyki populizmu na świecie w końcu XX wieku

Artykuł analizuje główne parametry, przejawy i opcje konceptualizacji i praktyki populizmu na świecie, w szczególności w różnych jego częściach i w ogóle w drugiej połowie – pod koniec XX wieku. Ustalono, że populizm zaczął się różnicować od połowy XX wieku, ale jednocześnie teoretyzować i przyswajając zarysy doktrynalne. Przejawem tego był fakt, że konceptualizacja i empiryzm populizmu zaczął nabierać oznak tendencji i powtarzalności. Biorąc to pod uwagę,

istotę populizmu w dynamice drugiej połowy XX wieku analizowano na przykładzie krajów Europy, Ameryki Północnej i Południowej itp. Na tej podstawie argumentuje się, że rozumienie populizmu w drugiej połowie – pod koniec XX wieku nigdy nie uległo utrwaleniu, ujednoliceniu i jednostronności. Po pierwsze, populizm może charakteryzować zarówno demokratyczne, jak i niedemokratyczne (hybrydowe i autokratyczne) reżimy polityczne, co determinuje jego odmienną orientację i kierunkowość. Po drugie, populizm może być postrzegany zarówno jako zjawisko negatywne, jak i pozytywne społeczno-polityczne, choć klasycznie jest postrzegane jako zagrożenie dla demokracji. Po trzecie, populizm w swojej interpretacji zależy nie tylko od części świata, ale także od kraju, dlatego zawsze trzeba o nim myśleć w sposób zdeterminowany kontekstem. Po czwarte, populizm może być determinowany bardzo różnymi przyczynami, ale na ogół mniej społeczno-ekonomicznymi, a częściej politycznymi. Niemniej jednak populizm w drugiej połowie XX wieku zaczął generalnie podlegać projektowaniu i typologii doktrynalnej opartej na połączeniu kilku podstawowych parametrów i kryteriów, które tradycyjnie sprowadzają się do konfrontacji i mobilizacji walki między „ludem” i „oligarchią”/”elitą”.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka, demokracja, populizm, dyskurs polityczny, władza, ludzie, elita, partia, proces polityczny.

БАЗОВІ ПАРАМЕТРИ, ВИЯВИ Й ОПЦІЇ КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЇ ТА ПРАКТИКИ ПОПУЛІЗМУ В СВІТІ НАПРИКІНЦІ ХХ СТОЛІТТЯ

У статті проаналізовано опорні параметри, вияви та опції концептуалізації і практики популізму у світі, зокрема в його різних частинах і загалом, в другій половині – наприкінці ХХ століття. Констатовано, що популізм із середини ХХ століття почав урізноманітнюватись, але водночас і теоретизуватись та набувати доктринальних обрисів. Виявом цього стало те, що концептуалізація й емпірика популізму почали набувати ознак тенденційних і повторювальних. Враховуючи це, сутність популізму в динаміці другої половини ХХ століття проаналізовано на прикладі країн Європи та Північної і Південної Америки тощо. На цій підставі аргументовано, що розуміння популізму в другій половині – в кінці ХХ століття так і не стало консолідованим, уніфікованим й одностороннім. По-перше, популізм може бути властивий і для демократичних, і для недемократичних (гібридних й автократичних) політичних режимів, що зумовлює його різну спрямованість та векторність. По-друге, популізм можна сприймати і як негативне, і як позитивне суспільно-політичне явище, хоча класично він типово сприймається як загроза демократії. По-третє, популізм у його трактуванні залежить не тільки від частини світу, а й від країни, а тому про нього завжди треба розмірковувати контекст-детерміновано. По-четверте, популізм може зумовлюватись дуже різними причинами,

але загалом рідше соціально-економічними, а частіше політичними. Тим не менше, популізм у другій половині XX століття загалом почали піддавати доктринальному оформленню і типологізації на підставі комбінування кількох базових параметрів та критеріїв, які традиційно зводяться до протистояння і мобілізації боротьби між «народом» та «олігархією»/«елітою».

Ключові слова: політика, демократія, популізм, політичний дискурс, влада, народ, еліта, партія, політичний процес.

Populism has long been the shape of political theorizing and political practice in almost every country in the world. Moreover, such a statement is considered relevant both currently and in retrospect, after all, according to the scientific achievements and peculiarities of real politics, this phenomenon is increasingly being resorted to causing the populism to be diversified and has been resorted to historically, including in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Accordingly, the state of conceptualization of populism in political science is considered to be quite developed, albeit such, that is inevitably constantly intensifying. However, at a certain stage of development of political thought / theory and political practice, there arose certain circumstances, on the basis of which the conceptualization and empiricism of populism started to acquire tendencies of a trend or recurrence. This puts on the agenda the need to streamline the themes of classical parameters, manifestations and even options for conceptualization and practice of populism in the world (in its various parts and regions), which became apparent no earlier than the second half - late 20th century.

The stated issues are developed in a number of scientific and ideological works and works that focus on the phenomenon of political populism or populism in politics. The authors of these publications are both scholars and politicians, due to whom populism in a certain period of its development, but not before the second half of the 20th century, was even outlined as a doctrinal or group category, brought into a certain conceptual, theoretical and political / party direction. Among them, in particular, such well-known scholars of populism as K. Abts and S. Rummens¹, D. Albertazzi and D. McDonell², I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter and D. McRae³, H.-G. Betz⁴, S. Bornschier⁵, M. Canovan⁶, M. Conniff⁷, T. Cowen⁸, C. De la Torre⁹, T. Di

¹ Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, „Political Studies” 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 405-424.

² Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007.

³ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „Government and Opposition” 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

⁴ Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994.

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⁷ Conniff M., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982.; Conniff M., *Populism in Latin America*, Wyd. University of Alabama Press 1999.

⁸ Cowen T., *Feisty, Protectionist Populism? New Zealand Tried That*, Wyd. Bloomberg L.P. (13 February 2017).

⁹ De la Torre C., Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador, „Latin American Perspectives” 1997, vol 24, nr. 3, s. 12-24.

Tella¹⁰, W. Galston¹¹, G. Germani¹², K. Hawkins¹³, G. Ionescu and E. Gellner¹⁴, C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Espejo and P. Ostiguy¹⁵, M. Kazin¹⁶, A. Knight¹⁷, E. Laclau¹⁸, R. Lowitt¹⁹, K. Luther²⁰, J. Mansbridge and S. Macedo²¹, Y. Mény and Y. Surel²², C. Mudde and C. Kaltwasser²³, K. Priester²⁴, K. Roberts²⁵, B. Stanley²⁶, P. Taguieff²⁷, N. Urbinati²⁸, S. Van Kessel, T. Bale and P. Taggart²⁹, A. Van Niekerk³⁰, K. Weyland³¹ and many others, even if they represent modern (since the beginning of the 21st century) political science.

Although, on the contrary, the staging of this theme certainly took place, thanks in part to the earliest reflections on populism within the dichotomous logic of confrontation along the lines of “people” – “political elite / dominant ideology”³², which were developed before the middle – 1960s of the 20th century, in particular by authors such as J. Allcock³³, J. Hicks³⁴, S. Lipset³⁵, R. Pipes³⁶ and some others. Therefore, given that there are many representatives and researchers of populism in this context, their ideas need to be structured, organized and systematized to develop a holistic view of the classical parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world in the second half of the 20th century,

¹⁰ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*“ 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 187-200.

¹¹ Galston W., The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, „*Journal of Democracy*“ 2018, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 5-19.

¹² Germani G., *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*, Wyd. Transaction Books 1978.

¹³ Hawkins K., Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo, „*Third World Quarterly*“ 2003, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 1137-1160.; Hawkins K., *Venezuelas Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹⁴ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

¹⁵ Kaltwasser C., Taggart P., Espejo P., Ostiguy P. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.; Taggart P., *Populism*, Wyd. Open University Press 2000.

¹⁶ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995.

¹⁷ Knight A., Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico, „*Journal of Latin American Studies*“ 1998, vol 30, nr. 2, s. 223-248.

¹⁸ Laclau E., *On Populist Reason*, Wyd. Verso 2007.

¹⁹ Lowitt R., *Fred Harris: his journey from liberalism to populism*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002.

²⁰ Luther K., Austria: A Democracy under Threat from the Freedom Party?, „*Parliamentary Affairs*“ 2000, vol 53, nr. 3, s. 426-442.

²¹ Mansbridge J., Macedo S., Populism and Democratic Theory, „*Annual Review of Law and Social Science*“ 2019, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 59-77.

²² Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002.

²³ Mudde C., The Populist Zeitgeist, „*Government and Opposition*“ 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 541-563.; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009.; Mudde C., Kaltwasser C., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.

²⁴ Priester K., *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 2007.

²⁵ Roberts K., Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America, „*World Politics*“ 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 82-116.

²⁶ Stanley B., The Thin Ideology of Populism, „*Journal of Political Ideologies*“ 2008, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 95-110.

²⁷ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007.; Taguieff P., Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem, „*Telos*“ 1995, vol 103, s. 9-43.

²⁸ Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, „*Constellations*“ 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 110-124.

²⁹ Van Kessel S., Bale T., Taggart P., Thrown with abandon? Popular understanding of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study, „*Acta Politica*“ 2011, vol 46, s. 111-131.

³⁰ Van Niekerk A., *Populism and political development in Latin America*, Wyd. Rotterdam University Press 1974.

³¹ Weyland K., Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, „*Comparative Politics*“ 2001, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 1-22.; Weyland K., Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe, „*Comparative Politics*“ 1999, vol 31, nr. 4, s. 379-401.

³² Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 165, 173.

³³ Allcock J., Populism: A Brief Biography, „*Sociology*“ 1971, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 371-387.

³⁴ Hicks J., *The Populist Revolt. A History of Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1931.

³⁵ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Heinemann 1960.

³⁶ Pipes R., Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry, „*Slavic Review*“ 1964, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 441-458.; Pipes R., *Russia under the Old Regime*, Wyd. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1974.

even at the beginning of the 21st century. Although the last period requires a separate scientific study, the expected results of our research may be useful at least in part, at least historiographically, since many modern researchers appeal to the topic of populism in retrospect.

Thus, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, it was well known that populism was “elitist” (when it was largely a means of gaining and retaining power) and “popular” (when it was a means of changing power and improving status, condition, and rights of society)³⁷, and that populism can promote pluralism and democratization in autocratic political regimes or the risks of declining democracy in the case of democratic political regimes, etc.³⁸. In other words, it was clear that populism needed to be context-sensitive³⁹.

This was mentioned during a number of seminars, colloquia and conferences on populism in the political process and political discourse, as well as a whole array of already classic publications (the authors of which were listed, including, the above mentioned ones, but first of all such authors as I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter and D. McRae⁴⁰, M. Canovan⁴¹, T. Di Tella⁴², G. Ionescu and E. Gellner⁴³), which highlighted the classical parameters, manifestations and options of conceptualization and practice of populism in the world (as of the time when such ideas were presented). Such worldview logic and reflection proved to be extremely important, as the outlined positioning of populism undoubtedly influenced its further development, conceptualization and transformation into a certain doctrinal direction, in particular on the example of the ideas and activities of such populist politicians and political forces as H. D. Perón and K. Menem in Argentina, J. Vargas and F. K. de Mello in Brazil, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, L. Cardenas in Mexico, V. R. H. de la Torre and A. Fujimori in Peru, “Democratic Action” in Venezuela, H. Ibarra in Ecuador, J. Rawlings in Ghana, T. Sankara in Burkina Faso, G. A. Nasser in Egypt, M. Gaddafi in Libya, F. Harris, J. Wallis, J. Carter, R. Whitaker, F. Harris and the American National Progressive Republican League in the United States, R. Muldoon in New Zealand, the “Flemish Bloc,” “Flemish Interest” in Belgium, the “National Front” in France and many others (some of them will be analyzed in more detail). Although this trend in itself has never been and ultimately could not become consolidated and completely unidirectional, after all, it was determined and defined by several groups of political practice, and therefore the political theorizing of populism, on which attention will actually be partly focused further.

One of the main features of the theorizing of populism in the second half of the twentieth century is, inter alia, that it began to be considered in a very broad context, rather than as it was before. The fact is that populism was previously thought of mainly in terms of European political geography, but since the 1970s, the 1980s, of the 20th century populism became a phenomenon common to the European region and other

³⁷ Laclau E., *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, Wyd. New Left Books 1977, s. 173.

³⁸ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr 2, s. 200.; Hennessy A., [w:] Ionescu G., Gellner E. (eds.), *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969, s. 29.

³⁹ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „*Government and Opposition*” 1968, vol 3, s. 176-177.; Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981, s. 172.

⁴⁰ Berlin I., Hofstadter R., McRae D., To define populism, „*Government and Opposition*” 1968, vol 3, s. 137-179.

⁴¹ Canovan M., *Populism*, Wyd. Junction Books 1981.

⁴² Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr 2, s. 187-200.

⁴³ Ionescu G., Gellner E., *Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, Wyd. Weidenfeld 1969.

parts of the world, including Latin America, Asia, Africa, etc. However, this revealed a kind of paradox of the development and conceptualization of populism in its classical perception (as evidenced by political history), since at this time populism began to be considered much more widely than before, in particular in worldview and doctrine, and in the context of political practice and differences from the already established ideologies of political parties, which actually concerned primarily European countries.

This is evidenced by the fact that populism in Europe at the turn of the 70-80s of the twentieth century was understood, for example, on the one hand, the characteristics of right-wing political movements (such as Pujadism, inspired by P. Pujad), as well as, on the other hand, practical and political rhetoric, program and positioning of right / far right political parties and figures, including against the background of established ideologies and parties. It is on this basis that the term "populism" entered a situation when it began to denote and define the direction and components of socio-political debates in a country, although until recently it meant almost nothing, since it was empty in its practical meaning political and party-electoral content⁴⁴. Another feature of this process on the example of European countries was that as soon as the phenomenon of populism came into political and doctrinal use, it began to develop and differentiate very quickly, after all, many theorists and political practitioners began to appeal to him, considering it convenient and quite encouraging in terms of the expected party-electoral and political advantages in the future.

Based on this, already in the 80-90s of the 20th century, populism began to play a practical and pragmatic (goal-oriented) role in the European political process and political debate, but above all in its "negative" perception that is, as a means of changing power and improving the status, condition and rights of society. A manifestation of this was the fact that populists were once called such well-known politicians as M. Thatcher in the United Kingdom or R. Reagan in the United States, who appealed to "popular feelings and prejudices"⁴⁵, and the phenomenon of populism began to be perceived as a challenge a time of liberal inevitability and triumphalism of the Western world⁴⁶. At the same time, the European option for interpreting populism was to realize it as the rhetoric of right-wing and far-right politicians and political forces, such as J. Haider and the "Austrian Freedom Party" in Austria, Le Pen and the "National Front" in France, W. Bossi and the "Northern League" in Italy, K. Blocher and the Swiss People's Party in Switzerland, K. Hagen and the "Progress Party" in Norway, F. De Vinter and "Flemish Interest" in Belgium, P. Portash and the People's Party in Portugal, P. Kiersgor and the Danish People's Party in Denmark, etc., however, not because they have a rather specific political style (although sometimes because of it), but mainly because they work and address within the specific discourse of the "people". This reveals the main logic of the difference between Western European populism of the second half of the 20th century from populism in almost all other

⁴⁴ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 122.

⁴⁵ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*” 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 188.

⁴⁶ Luther K., Austria: A Democracy under Threat from the Freedom Party?, „*Parliamentary Affairs*” 2000, vol 53, s. 426, 433.

parts of the world, for in the former ones the “people” are not necessarily poor and destitute, which cannot be said of the latter ones.

Instead, the focus of understanding the “people” in Western European populism in the second half of the twentieth century was its identification with the “populace” and ordinary people fighting corruption, elitism, emigrants, etc.⁴⁷

The situation is somewhat different, although largely inherited from Western Europe, in other European countries, in particular in Southern, Central and Eastern and Eastern Europe. Thus, in the countries of Southern Europe, the term “populism” is mostly used to discredit some politicians and political parties of others, i.e. their opponents, and not necessarily right-wing or far-right directions. However, for the countries of the region, particularly Greece, populism in the late 20th century was both political and doctrinal, particularly when it concerned (and frequently still does) a party such as “PASOK” or the All-Greek Socialist Movement with A. Papandreou (today the party leader is another person). After all, this political force is not right or ultra-right at all, but instead socialist or social-democratic and defends the ideology of the “third way”, according to which it defends the “ideal” of heterogeneous nonprivilege and “people’s struggle against political elite”⁴⁸.

The expansion of the paradigm and understanding of populism in Europe took place in the early 1990s. It was demonstrated by the fact that this phenomenon began to be discussed not only in the context of right-wing or far-right politicians and political forces, but also with regard to various measures and instruments of demagoguery that have started to be applied by some European politicians, such as S. Berlusconi in Italy, B. Tapis in France, P. Fortein in the Netherlands and others. An interesting feature is that populism, even in the party context, came to be understood as an appeal to the “people” through the media, not party structures, which led to the formation of a kind of anti-party and even anti-establishment discourse of “populism”. Accordingly, in addition to defining populism as a programmatic focus of some right-wing and far-right parties, it has come to be seen in Europe as a measure to condemn certain systemic political elites, and frequently entire party and even political systems, in particular through demagogic and spectacular appeals to “simple” political decisions and unfulfilled emotional promises of politicians⁴⁹.

However, at the same time, populism began to concern not only the anti-establishment discourse of individual politicians and political forces, but also the rhetoric and some positions of mainstream / systemic political parties, including their appeal to “comprehensiveness” as expression and involvement of “people” in politics⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 137.

⁴⁸ Lyrantzis C., *PASOK in power: the loss of the “third road to socialism”*, [w:] Gallagher T., Williams A. (eds.), *Southern European Socialism: Parties, elections and the challenge of government*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 1989, s. 38.

⁴⁹ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 131.; Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, „*Telos*” 1995, vol 103, s. 42.

⁵⁰ Mudde C., *The Populist Zeitgeist*, „*Government and Opposition*” 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 550.; Canovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 77-78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 87, 139.

Perhaps the main reason for this was a very significant weakening of the importance, ideological orientation and organizational structure of traditional European parties, including due to the emergence and dissemination of various issues and problems mainly post materialist content and nature. In other words, almost all political parties in Europe became more populist and all-encompassing when voters began to vote not so much for their programs (as they used to) as for their political leaders (for example, J. Chirac in France and T. Blair in the United Kingdom), what actually became the norm or at least the practice of personalizing politics in the 90s of the 20th century⁵¹. It follows that populism in the late 20th century, at least in a number of European countries, became a symptom of the construction of parties to the background or margins, as a result of which government began to become very comprehensive, undifferentiated and focused on "everyone's interests"⁵². As a result, the theorizing of European populism, at least in political discourse and the media, in the late twentieth century began to become negatively oriented⁵³. Perhaps the main reason for this was that the adjective "populist" started to be associated with the attribute of irresponsibility of power⁵⁴, and sometimes even with the denial of the logic and progress of globalization in the modern world by some politicians and political forces⁵⁵. However, in contrast, those politicians and political parties that were frequently called populist were more satisfied with this, as they appealed to their closeness to the electorate and the "people".

Another situation is historically different with regard to the understanding of the phenomenon of populism in Russia at the end of the 20th century, which in this context did not even completely follow the pan-European or Eastern European logic and differed significantly from most other post-communist European countries, although to some extent it approached the specifics and options of populism in some countries of Southern Europe. The brightest populists in this country, at least according to the media and political theorists⁵⁶, as well as style of behavior and discourse, in the late 90's of the 20th century were then President Boris Yeltsin and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

At the same time, populism in Russia and some other Eastern European contexts was also perceived as the result of the electoral success of some politicians at the dawn of the independence of the new post-Soviet states, especially given that they were opposed by former communist elites, who actually discredited the "new" political leaders. Accordingly, it was populism in this sense that frequently approached conditional nationalism in its spirit, as it typically reflected the opposition of the leaders of certain nations to the spirit of supranational

⁵¹ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 150.

⁵² ICanovan M., *The People*, Wyd. Polity Press 2005, s. 78.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 96.

⁵³ Van Kessel S., Bale T., Taggart P., Thrown with abandon? Popular understanding of populism as conveyed by the print media: a UK case study, „*Acta Politica*“ 2011, vol 46, s. 115.

⁵⁴ Di Tella T., Populism into the Twenty-first Century, „*Government and Opposition*“ 1997, vol 32, nr. 2, s. 188.

⁵⁵ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 217.

⁵⁶ Taguieff P., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 138-140.

elites. But perhaps the main specificity of Russia was that the term “populism” was used to denote such politicians, and not the term “populism” inherent in the populist style of behavior and appeal to the masses (in this sense as an attempt to save people’s history and culture)⁵⁷, which was at least inherent in this country in retrospect. A similar logic frequently worked in other post-Soviet countries, as well as in countries that were politically close to Russia or situationally through individual political leaders inherited the legacy of the communist past, particularly in Poland in the case of L. Walesa, A. Lepper and A. Kwasniewski, in Serbia in the case of S. Milosevic and V. Seselj, in Ukraine in the case of L. Kuchma, in Hungary in the case of I. Churka and J. Torgyan, in Slovakia in the case of V. Meciar, in Azerbaijan in the case of G. Aliyev, etc. Thus, populism in this context, as in Western Europe, was perceived, at least by theorists of political science and political discourse, mostly negatively and anti-systemically by the former government, former political elites, etc. and regardless of the consequences of populism – either democratization or autocratization.

In contrast, the logic of interpreting populism in the second half of the 20th century was completely or at least partially different in the United States, where the understanding of populism was largely less negative than in European countries, after all populism in this part of the world has proved to be quite popular and representative, rather than exceptional and degrading in political discourse and theorizing. A convenient trend in this interpretation of populism was set by US President J. Carter, who used the term “populism” to express a kind of honor on the basis of or in opposition to the classical political division between the “Republican Party” and the “Democratic Party” in the United States, after all due to this, the appeal was made to the importance of the “people” in American politics. Thus, according to some researchers, populism began to be perceived as a kind of regime or option of persuasion and finding common ground between the two extremes of American party policy or as a kind of synthesis of them primarily for the interests of the nation and “people”⁵⁸.

Following this logic, it is populism that helps to improve the breadth and range of positions of American parties among themselves, as it focuses on a certain middle position and the involvement of additional / new social groups in the democratic and mediatory political process. Nevertheless, American discourse has a slightly different understanding of populism, in particular as a popular or direct style of expressing one’s opinion by certain politicians, especially if it differs from the position of political elites⁵⁹. However, populism in the United States, at least in this context, is positioned as anti-government or anti-establishment, but it is not at all anti-systemic or anti-establishment, as it may be in European countries⁶⁰. Thus, in general, American populism or American-style populism plays an important role both in political creation in

⁵⁷ FallaP, *The Oxford Russian Dictionary*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993, s. 1064.; TaguieffP., *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique*, Wyd. Flammarion 2007, s. 141-145.

⁵⁸ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995, s. 3, 4.

⁵⁹ Urbinati N., Democracy and Populism, „*Constellations*” 1998, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 111.

⁶⁰ Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 110.

general and in establishing or restoring balance and the distribution of political power in the interests of socio-political groups and voters, although primarily within the framework of the majority principle⁶¹. In general, this means that populism is typically pluralistic and “positive” in the United States and mobilization and “negative” in European countries⁶².

Quite average logic, in this context, was used at one time, in particular until the middle of the 20th century, for example, in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where populism served both to mediate and to mobilize socio-political groups and the electorate. However, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, populism in this country began to be thought of more as a mobilization phenomenon with negative and sometimes even anti-systemic content and content. The fact is that the pro-populist biases of some politicians and political forces began to be thought of as certain labels with a humiliating content. In addition, the term “populism” has come to refer to certain reactionary political parties, in particular, as in Western Europe, radical or extremist right-wing political forces⁶³.

Quite or partially contrary to this, the meaning and logic of populism was formed and formalized in Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century, because populism in this region matured not so much on a democratic as on an autocratic basis unlike all other parts and regions of the world analyzed above. The fact is that populism in Latin America has matured not so much for political as for social and economic reasons and factors, as well as for different approaches to interpreting the essence and content of democracy and ways to achieve it in the future (as options for transit from autocracies in the region).

Whereas in most countries in the region that have appealed for such an explanation of populism, the process of transition from autocracies to democracies or at least hybrid regimes – and electoral democracies in general – took place mainly before the 1980s and 1990s, then they either stopped talking about the phenomenon of populism or began to use it in other senses and contexts. However, the “death” of populism⁶⁴ announced by some researchers did not take place in Latin America at all, as it was reborn and transformed, including paradigmatically and doctrinally. Moreover in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century conceptual debates and reflections on a renewed understanding of populism in the region began. In practical terms, this was a very relevant position, as populists began to be called politicians such as A. Fujimori in Peru, F. Collor in Brazil, K. Menem in Argentina and many others. But the biggest paradox was that the term “populism” itself began to transform, but now from its socio-economic content to its political content, as is the case in other parts of the world. Even more, the doctrinal politicians were considered populists at least for appealing to the principles of political and economic neoliberalism in their countries to replace socialism and socially oriented development

⁶¹ Kazin M., *The Populist Persuasion*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1995, s. 7.

⁶² Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994, s. 38.; Mény Y., Surel Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 198-199.

⁶³ Betz H.-G., *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1994, s. 4.

⁶⁴ Conniff M., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. University of New Mexico Press 1982, s. 217.

models that have been quite popular in the region at the time and before. Thus, something new was populist, which contradicted the generally accepted logic and model of political and socio-economic development from the previous stage of history⁶⁵. More specifically, populism or neo-populism was neoliberalism, which opposed the principles and achievements of classical populism in Latin America, in particular because the latter one defended the idea and logic of expansionism and distribution policy⁶⁶.

In general, the situation regarding the understanding and doctrinal content of populism in the late 20th century reached the point when this phenomenon began to be described as anti-systemic in the development of liberal democracy in the world. In other words, the content of populism, with the exception of the United States, has become more and more negative, as it has been associated with the "crisis", "erosion" or "dangers" of democracy in the world as a whole and in individual countries⁶⁷. In a somewhat weakened sense, populism has been permanently interpreted as a challenge and a change in procedural democracy, even though populism is based on the idea of the "people" and its protection and representation.

The explanation of some researchers frequently comes down to the fact that populism should be thought of as a distortion of democracy in essence, after all populism combines a specific political context, liberalism (including its principle of non-interference), anarchism and conservatism, and therefore in such an "explosive" mixture, it appears as a kind of uprising against the modern understanding of the state and against the political system⁶⁸. The manifestation of this is that populism is very different from democracy, including in the perception of "folk" and the "people", after all these categories in populism are not configured at all through solidarity with a specific group of society, instead, they are outlined as formal constructs that are in opposition to the political system and the existing and dominant ideas and principles⁶⁹. And this despite the fact, that theorists and practitioners of populism usually appeal to the "people" because of the principles of people's sovereignty and majority⁷⁰. Given this, it was already clear at the end of the 20th century that populism doctrinally challenges the current democratic socio-political reality and systemacy⁷¹, in particular due to the perception of the "people" as a homogeneous majority that opposes or wants to oppose the political establishment and elite.

⁶⁵ Roberts K., Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America, *„World Politics“* 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 106-107.; Weyland K., Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe, *„Comparative Politics“* 1999, vol 31, nr. 4, s. 379.

⁶⁶ Knight A., Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico, *„Journal of Latin American Studies“* 1998, vol 30, nr. 2, s. 240.

⁶⁷ Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, *„Political Studies“* 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 415.; Canovan M., Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, *„Political Studies“* 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 2-16; Mény Y., Sured Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002.; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 16.; Galston W., The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, *„Journal of Democracy“* 2018, vol 29, nr. 2, s. 5-19.

⁶⁸ Priester K., *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 2007, s. 48-51.

⁶⁹ Canovan M., Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, *„Political Studies“* 1999, vol 47, nr. 1, s. 3.

⁷⁰ Mény Y., Sured Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Wyd. Palgrave 2002, s. 25.

⁷¹ Mudde C., The Populist Zeitgeist, *„Government and Opposition“* 2004, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 543.; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. 23; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 3; Abts K., Rummens S., Populism versus Democracy, *„Political Studies“* 2007, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 420; Stanley B., The Thin Ideology of Populism, *„Journal of Political Ideologies“* 2008, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 100.

Although, in an even stronger version, populism even appeals not only to anti-systemicism, but also to anti-partisanship, which various politicians frequently try to educate in their supporters⁷². On the other hand, this logic did not immediately become basic in Latin America, where a kind of “classical” populism was initially more positively assessed, as it aimed to establish or test different models and options of democracy, instead, later in the format of “neo-populism” it became largely negatively determined, which was facilitated by the greater democratization of the countries in which it began to take place.

As a result, as early as the 1990s, political science argued that populism should be described as a multidimensional phenomenon composed of several basic characteristics that describe the various competing perspectives and options of populism, including: personalistic and paternalistic leadership; heterogeneous, dissimilar and multi-class logic of coalition in the political procession; a downward process of political mobilization that bypasses institutionalized forms of political representation; amorphous or eclectic ideology, the use of economic projects of constructs of distributive justice and methods of clientelism⁷³. The synthesis of these attributes leads researchers to the flexible conclusion that those politicians who are populists can focus on very different parameters of populism as a phenomenon and doctrine. In other words, within the framework of populism as an idea, there can be distinguished several options of populism as a practice including depending on the parameters by which populism can be defined as such. In addition, this means that populism as a political phenomenon can be easily and variously superimposed on different political contexts and various political forces within certain contexts and even ideologies, what gives good grounds to typify populism in various ways, including through the prism of inter-party competition in certain political systems. And it follows that ideologically populism does not have to be right-wing or far-right⁷⁴, after all it can be left-wing or far-left, and even centrist, etc., the main thing is that one type or another fulfilled the parameters of populism as a common denominator. And this even regardless of whether populism as such in a particular region is understood positively or negatively in a particular type of political regime – democratic or autocratic – but mainly depending on the logic and postulate of confrontation “political elite” and ideas of the “people”. After all, fundamental in the understanding of populism, as noted in the second half of the 20th century, was its interpretation as a political style that radicalizes and mobilizes the struggle between “people” / “folk” and “oligarchy” / “elite”.

As a result, the study found that the understanding of populism in the second half - late 20th century has not become consolidated, unified and one-sided. On the one hand, this

⁷² Taguieff P., *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, „Telos“ 1995, vol 103, s. 32, 34; Albertazzi D., McDonell D., *Twenty-first Century Populism*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 21.

⁷³ Roberts K., *Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America*, „World Politics“ 1995, vol 48, nr. 1, s. 88.

⁷⁴ Bornschier S., *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*, Wyd. Temple University Press 2010, s. 3; Mudde C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2009, s. 13, 26.

phenomenon is characteristic of both democratic and non-democratic (hybrid and autocratic) political regimes, which determines its orientation and vector. On the other hand, populism can be perceived as both a negative and a positive socio-political phenomenon, although today populism is typically perceived negatively, in particular as a threat to democracy. On the third side, the interpretation of populism differs not only from part to part of the world, but also from country to country, and therefore it is always necessary to think about it in a context determined. On the fourth side, the causes of populism can be both political and socio-economic factors. However, in modern political science it is argued that populism is still doctrinal on the basis of a combination of several basic parameters and criteria. However, they not only allow singling it out, but also on the basis of differences to typologize it, both theoretically and practically politically.

Therefore, populism should not be interpreted as something holistic and unified, but instead should be perceived as a heterogeneous phenomenon that outlines ideas, style of behavior, and discourse options, and the way of political behavior and strategy of actors and parties in the political process, although synthetically or generalized populism is determined by the confrontation and mobilization of the struggle between "people" / "folk" and "oligarchy" / "elite". In contrast, this provides at least some basis for arguing that populism in general is inherent in politics and the political process, after all virtually all politics that appeal to the "people" construct is or may be "populist".

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ZACHOWANIA AGRESYWNE, ICH UWARUNKOWANIA I NASTĘPSTWA W PERCEPCJI UCZNIÓW TRZECH SZCZEBLI EDUKACJI

1. Wprowadzenie

Reforma systemu oświaty z 1999 roku, poczynając od 1 września 1999r., doprowadziła po trzech latach realizacji do przekształcenia obowiązującego od 1968 r. dwustopniowego systemu szkolnictwa w strukturę trzystopniową.

W dniu 1 września 1999r. rozpoczęło się tworzenie i funkcjonowanie sześciolletnich szkół podstawowych i trzyletnich gimnazjów, w tym, z oddziałami integracyjnymi, szkół specjalnych, sportowych oraz mistrzostwa sportowego.

Trzy lata później, 1 września 2002 rozpoczęło się tworzenie i funkcjonowanie szkół ponadgimnazjalnych, w tym, z oddziałami integrującymi, szkół specjalnych, sportowych oraz mistrzostwa sportowego¹.

Dwudziestoletnia (1999-2019) realizacja reformy systemu edukacji budziła szerokie niezadowolenie społeczne i szkolnictwa wyższego oraz nauczycieli. Większość Polaków (70%) chciało likwidacji gimnazjów, powrotu ośmioletniej szkoły podstawowej, czteroletniego liceum i pięcioletniego technikum.

Kolejna reforma została przeprowadzona na podstawie ustawy z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 roku – Prawo oświatowe².

W okresie realizacji systemu trzech szczebli edukacji dość systematycznie odbywały się liczne konferencje, na których dostojne gremia naukowe powoływały nowe wydawnictwa i własne periodyki poświęcone fenomenologii, etiologii, eskalacji, profilaktyce i różnym aspektom przezwycięzania agresywności w codziennym życiu osób dorosłych, młodzieży i dzieci. Ta cała krzątanina była jednak w gruncie rzeczy jałowa, bo eskalacja zjawiska agresji permanentnie postępowała zamiast ulegać redukcji. Donosiły o tym dzienniki i tygodniki, zarówno centralne, jak i regionalne.

W dniu 27 stycznia 2012 roku uczestniczyłem w stolicy w obradach takiego gremium i byłem pod dużym wrażeniem z powodu dokonanych na nim ustaleń. Dumę zburzył jednakże doszczętnie artykuł Macieja Kałacha pt. „Szkoly zalewa fala przemocy”, jaki przeczytałem zanim zdołałem dotrzeć do swojego mieszkania³. Szczególnie zaszokowały mnie i sfrustrowały stwierdzenia: „w 2011 w podstawówkach i gimnazjach naszego regionu doszło do prawie 2 tys.

¹ „Dziennik Ustaw” 1999, nr 12, poz.96

² Ustawa z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 roku – Prawo oświatowe i ustawy wprowadzające popierane przez Prezydenta RP 9 stycznia 2017 roku i opublikowane 11 stycznia 2017 r., „Dziennik Ustaw” 2017, nr 1, poz.60. Tekst ujednolicony „Dziennik Ustaw” z 2021r., poz.1082

³ M. Kałach, Szkoły zalewa fala przemocy „Polska Dziennik Łódzki” 2012, nr 22, s.1 i 12-13.

przestępstw, w tym 405 rozbojów i wymuszeń. Jeszcze dwa lata temu takich przestępstw było w województwie łódzkim tylko 179. Coraz częściej wymuszeń dokonują dziewczyny – policjanci na długo zapamiętają 16 – latkę, która przez kilka miesięcy wymuszała w gimnazjum pod Pabianicami (...) od 1 zł do 3 zł. Za każdym razem groziła pobiciem młodszymi koleżankami. Ogółem w polskich podstawówkach i gimnazjach w 2011 r. doszło do 28 tys. przestępstw – jeszcze cztery lata temu było ich 17 tys.” (s.1). Coraz młodsi nieletni dokonywali coraz więcej czynów karalnych, nacechowanych dużą dozą agresji. Przemoc coraz częściej wkraczała do internetu jako forma porachunków między gimnazjalistami.

Doniesienia medialne o równie ponurej wymowie pojawiały się nader często od, co najmniej kilkudziesięciu lat. Niekiedy zawierały konkretne propozycje działań zmierzających do powstrzymania eskalacji agresywności młodzieży poprzez eliminację jej głównych uwarunkowań. Sama młodzież miała wiele trafnych spostrzeżeń dotyczących przejawów i uwarunkowań agresywności swoich rówieśników⁴. Dotychczas nie dokonano jednakże rozeznania przeobrażeń jakie następowały w spostrzeganiu agresywności własnej i rówieśników oraz jego najważniejszych uwarunkowań, przez naszą młodzież na kolejnych szczeblach obowiązującego w minionych latach systemu edukacji. Bez trafnego zdiagnozowania tego negatywnego zjawiska i jego głównych uwarunkowań nie można było racjonalnie ocenić negatywnych skutków funkcjonowania trzech szczebli systemu edukacji oraz programować skutecznych działań zmierzających do eliminowania w tym systemie edukacyjnym, bądź znacznego ich ograniczenia. W procesie diagnozowania zjawiska agresywności bardzo ważnym elementem jest jego spostrzeganie, zarówno przez ofiary, jak i sprawców ataków agresji.

2. Problem, cel metoda i teren badań

Do najważniejszych problemów badawczych należy niewątpliwie w miarę precyzyjne określenie rozmiarów, przejawów, przyczyn i skutków ataków agresji w percepcji uczniów trzech szczebli wdrożonego i realizowanego w latach 1999-2019, w naszym kraju systemu edukacji. Bez takich ustaleń nie można bowiem podejmować żadnych racjonalnych działań wychowawczych, prewencyjnych i resocjalizacyjnych, ograniczających przemoc i zjawisko agresji w szkołach i społeczeństwie. Na ścisłą zależność wojen i wszelkiej przemocy od stanu umysłów, zależnego od świadomości, kształtowanej przez percepcję odzwierciedlająca te negatywne zjawiska, trafnie wskazał ponad pół wieku temu sekretarz generalny ONZ Dag Hammarskjöld, który uważał, że wojny rodzą się w umysłach ludzi. Myśl tego męża stanu można uzupełnić dopowiedzeniem, iż takim zarodnikiem wojny i wszelkiej przemocy nie musi być z gruntu zbrodnicza intencja, jak w przypadku Hitlera, Stalina czy współczesnego nam Andersa Breivika lecz ignorancja. Ignorancja gimnazjalisty, ważącego prawie 100 kilogramów, spowodowała na przykład ciężki

⁴ J. Szalański, Korelatory wzmożonych skłonności agresywnych i deficytów ich kontroli u młodzieży w wieku życia 13-19 lat, [W:] T. Sakowicz (red.), Rodzina i szkoła wobec przemocy, Wyd. Jedność, Kielce 2004, s.391, 418-421; J. Szalański, A. Szarkowska, Nasilenie u młodzieży 13-15-letniej skłonności agresywnych, a spostrzeganie postaw wychowawczych rodziców, [W:] M. Binczycka -Anholcer (red.), Przemoc i agresja jako problem zdrowia publicznego, Polskie Towarzystwo Higieny Psychicznej, Warszawa 2005, s.104-105.

uszczerbek na zdrowiu ucznia klasy czwartej szkoły podstawowej podczas dość typowej zabawy chłopców na przerwie międzylekcyjnej. Uczeń z zaburzeniami hormonalnymi i dużą nadwagą nie zdawał sobie sprawy z tego, że ciężarem swojego ciała może uszkodzić ciało młodszego kolegi. Inną kategorią niewiedzy i ignorancji w relacjach między uczniami jest utożsamienie oplucia innego ucznia z kroplami deszczu, jakie na niego spadły z łaskawości nieba. W skutkach wymienione kategorie „niewiedzy” bądź „ignorancji” nie różnią się zasadniczo, gdyż obie mieszczą się w obrębie egoizmu egocentrycznego, przejawiającego się w moralności Kalego w powieści H. Sienkiewicza. Odmienne, charakterystyczną dla egoizmu socjocentrycznego moralności „nadludzi”, mających zawsze jedynie słuszną rację i monopol na najlepsze programy, manifestują politycy przeciwnych obozów stosując permanentnie ataki kuriozalnej agresji własnej z głośnym krzykiem, iż to oni są atakowani a nie ich ofiary. Doszło bowiem chyba do nieodwracalnego zafiksowania projekcyjnego spostrzegania zjawiska agresywności przez polityków, czego jesteśmy codziennie świadkami i co widzi i słyszy ucząca się młodzież, która często bywa porównywana do gąbki pod względem swej chłonności percepcyjnej.

Czy w takim klimacie społecznym możliwe są racjonalne programy skutecznego ograniczenia zjawiska agresywności poprzez wyplenianie jego zarodków i stymulatorów jego eskalacji z umysłów i serc młodzieży? Z pewnością istnieje taka możliwość, ale wymaga to czegoś więcej niż prowadzenie uczonych debat i wszechstronnych badań.

Badania takie są nieodzowne, ale same nie wystarczą do radykalnej zmiany klimatu wychowawczego, jako warunku koniecznego do odkształcenia umysłów preferujących zachowania agresywne i wrogość w kierunku zachowań prospołecznych i przyjaźni.

Bezpośredni, szczegółowy problem podjętych badań sprowadzono do podstawowego pytania : jak się kształtowała percepcja zachowań agresywnych własnych i rówieśników oraz ich uwarunkowań i skutków u uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji? Czy na kolejnych szczeblach edukacji uczniowie spostrzegali więcej czy mniej ataków agresji? Czy je potępiali, czy raczej tolerowali bądź wręcz akceptowali?

Badaniami w ramach seminariów dyplomowych za pomocą kwestionariuszy ankiet objęto w latach 2005-2011 blisko 2000 uczniów szkół podstawowych, gimnazjów i szkół ponadgimnazjalnych w Łodzi i czterech powiatach (kutnowskim, łęczyckim i łowickim) województwa łódzkiego oraz w Starachowicach, w województwie świętokrzyskim.

Za zawierające zadawalająco wiarygodne informacje uznano ankiety wypełnione przez :

- 367 (179 dziewcząt i 188 chłopców) uczniów klas V i VI szkół podstawowych,
- 801 (410 uczennic i 391 uczniów) gimnazjów oraz
- 465 (246 dziewcząt i 219 chłopców) licealistów.

W raporcie końcowym z przeprowadzonych badań uwzględniono zatem łącznie informacje zawarte w 1633 ankietach wypełnionych przez 835 uczennic i 798 uczniów , które zestawiono w tabelach, opisano i przeanalizowano.

Celem podjętych badań było uzyskanie odpowiedzi na 37 pytań uszczegółowionych, dotyczących następujących problemów :

1. Percepcja aktów agresji przez uczniów trzech kolejnych szczebli realizowanego w minionych latach edukacji, ich częstości i miejsc ataków.
2. Percepcja siebie i innych osób w roli ofiary i agresora.
3. Poczucie bezpieczeństwa w kontekście spostrzeganych ataków werbalnych i fizycznych.
4. Ocena agresywności dziewcząt i chłopców, jej nasilenia i ukierunkowania.
5. Ofiary ataków agresji najczęściej spostrzegane.
6. Percepcja antecedentów i współdeterminantów zachowań agresywnych.
7. Reakcje własne i rówieśników na spostrzegane ataki oraz zyski i straty z dokonywanych ataków.

3. Prezentacja, opis i analiza wyników badań

3.1.Spostrzeganie ataków agresji przez uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji

W tabeli 1 zestawiono rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi uczniów trzech szczebli edukacji

Tabela 1. Rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie : Czy kiedykolwiek spotkałeś się z przejawami agresji

odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=101		chłopcy N=96		razem N=197		dziewczeta N=221		chłopcy N=218		razem N=439		dziewczeta N=144		chłopcy N=86		razem N=230	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	74	73,3	76	79,2	150	76,1	174	78,7	179	82,1	353	80,4	127	88,2	71	82,6	198	86,1
nie	27	26,7	20	20,8	47	23,9	47	21,3	39	17,9	86	19,6	17	11,8	15	17,4	32	13,9

Odpowiedziało 466 uczennic i 400 uczniów, łącznie 866 osób.

Istotnie statystycznie różnią się rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi „tak” licealistek (88,2%) i gimnazjalistek (78,7%; $t=2,7$, $p<.01$) oraz uczennic szkół podstawowych (73,3%; $t=2,11$, $p<.01$).

Na kolejnych szczeblach edukacji nastąpił cztero- i sześcioprocentowy wzrost przejawów spostrzeganej agresji przez uczennice i uczniów, rozpatrywanych łącznie (76,1%, 80,4% i 86,1%). Licealistki spostrzegały przejawy agresji stosunkowo najczęściej, a uczennice podstawówek najrzadziej.

Dane zawarte w tabeli 2 odzwierciedlają procenty najczęstsze spostrzegania ataków słownych i fizycznych oraz obu rodzajów ataków równocześnie.

Tabela 2. Rozkłady liczebności najczęstszego spotykania się z atakami agresji

Rodzaj ataków	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=101		chłopcy N=96		razem N=197		dziewczeta N=400		chłopcy N=280		razem N=680		dziewczeta N=246		chłopcy N=113		razem N=359	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
słowne	39	38,6	45	46,9	84	42,6	269	67,3	93	33,2	362	53,2	168	68,3	74	65,5	242	67,4
t; p							9,32; .000											
fizyczne	26	25,7	15	15,6	41	20,8	33	8,2	52	18,6	85	12,5	38	15,4	14	12,4	52	14,5
t; p							4,05; .000											
oba równocześnie	36	35,7	36	37,5	72	36,6	98	24,5	135	48,2	233	34,3	40	16,3	25	22,1	65	18,1
t; p							6,44; .000											

Odpowiedziało 747 uczennic i 489 uczniów, łącznie 1236 osób.

Słowne ataki agresji spostrzegało: 42,6% uczniów podstawówek, 53,2% gimnazjalistów i 67,4% licealistek. Bardzo istotne (.000) różnią się procenty spostrzegania ataków słownych i istotnie przez gimnazjalistki i gimnazjalistów.

Z atakami fizycznymi spotykało się ponad 20% uczniów podstawówek oraz 12,5% uczniów gimnazjów i 14,5% licealistów. Ponad dwukrotnie częściej z atakami fizycznymi spotkali się uczniowie niż uczennice gimnazjów, a z atakami słownymi ponad dwukrotnie częściej spotykały się gimnazjalistki niż gimnazjaliści. Różnica ta jest bardzo istotna (.000) statystycznie. W takim samym stopniu różnią się procenty **równoczesnego spostrzegania obu rodzajów ataków** agresji przez dziewczęta (24,5%) i przez chłopców (48,2%) z gimnazjów.

Miejsca, w których badani uczniowie spotykali się z atakami agresji określają procenty zestawione w tabeli 3.

Z atakami agresji na terenie szkoły najczęściej (ponad połowa) spotykali się uczniowie podstawówek i gimnazjów, a prawie 25% licealistów. Istotnie częściej (.02) doświadczały agresji uczennice niż uczniowie podstawówek.

Statystyczną istotność osiągnęły również różnice między procentami odpowiedzi : licealistek oraz gimnazjalistek (6,47; .000) i uczennic podstawówek (5,44; .000), a także licealistów oraz gimnazjalistów (5,6; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (7,65; .000).

Na osiedlu agresję najczęściej (ponad połowa) spostrzegali licealiści oraz ponad 30% uczniów podstawówek i gimnazjów. W szkołach podstawowych uczennice istotnie częściej niż uczniowie spotykały się z agresją (2,24; .02). Istotnie różnią się również odsetki spostrzegania agresji na osiedlu przez licealistów oraz gimnazjalistów (2,4; .02) i uczniów podstawówek (3,72; .000); a także uczniów gimnazjów i podstawówek (2,04; .05).

Do doświadczania agresji w domu przyznało się od 1,1% uczniów podstawówek i gimnazjów do 14% uczniów. Istotnie częściej (2,73; .01) takie wskazanie dali licealiści niż licealistki.

Tabela 3. Miejsca najczęstszego spotykania się uczniów z agresją

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=167		chłopcy N=178		razem N=345		dziewczęta N=359		chłopcy N=331		razem N=690		dziewczęta N=230		chłopcy N=114		razem N=344	
	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%
w szkole	85	50,9	118	63,3	203	58,8	179	49,9	168	50,8	347	50,3	57	24,8	27	23,7	84	24,4
t; p	2,33; .02																	
w domu	7	4,2	2	1,1	9	2,6	5	1,4	4	1,2	9	1,3	10	4,4	16	14,0	26	7,6
t; p													2,73; .01					
na osiedlu	63	37,7	45	25,3	108	31,3	121	33,7	112	33,8	233	33,8	102	44,3	53	46,5	155	45,1
t; p	2,49; .02																	
na ulicy	10	6,0	10	5,6	20	5,8	30	8,3	29	8,8	59	8,5	29	12,6	8	7,0	37	10,7
na imprezie	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	4,5	12	3,6	28	4,1	25	10,9	7	6,1	32	9,3
w innych miejscach	2	1,2	3	1,7	5	1,5	8	2,2	6	1,8	14	2,0	7	30,0	3	2,6	10	2,9

Odpowiedziało 756 uczennic i 623 uczniów, łącznie 1379 osób.

Z agresją na ulicy, na imprezie i w innych miejscach uczniowie spotykali się znacznie rzadziej (od 0 do 30%). Tylko procenty spostrzegania agresji w innych miejscach przez licealistki (30%) i licealistów (2,6%) różnią się istotnie (.01).

Dane zestawione w tabelach 4 i 5 dość istotnie weryfikują częstość odpowiedzi z tabeli 3, dezawuuując je jako niewiarygodne. Z agresją w domu spotkało się bowiem nie od 1,1% do 14%, ale od 34% do 64,5%, na co wskazują odsetki zestawione w tabeli 4, dotyczące spostrzeganych w rodzinie kłótni, awantur i napaści fizycznych. Potwierdzają to dane zestawione w tabeli 5.

Tabela 4. Rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy w twojej rodzinie zdarzają się ataki agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
kłótnie, awantury	91	50,8	43	28,1	134	40,4	43	56,6	10	35,7	53	51,0
t; p	4,36; .000						1,97; .052					
napaści fizyczne	10	5,6	9	5,9	19	5,7	6	7,9	3	10,7	9	8,6
nie ma takich zdarzeń	78	43,6	101	66,0	179	53,9	27	35,5	15	53,6	42	40,4
t; p	4,2; .000											

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 360 uczniów, łącznie 615 osób.

Ponad połowa uczennic oraz 28,1% i 35,7% uczniów gimnazjów i liceów przyznało się do występowania w ich rodzinie *klótni i awantur*. Różnice między odsetkami wskazań uczennic i uczniów gimnazjum jest bardzo znamienne statystycznie (4,36; .000), a różnica między procentami wskazań licealistek i licealistów zbliża się do istotności (1,97; .052).

Wysoce znamienne statystycznie (4,2; .000), jest również różnica między odsetkami zaprzeczeń *występowania ataków agresji* w rodzinie przez gimnazjalistów i gimnazjalistki. W tabeli 5 zestawiono częstotliwości spostrzeganych ataków agresji w rodzinie.

Tabela 5. Rozkłady częstotliwości spostrzeganych ataków agresji w rodzinie

Częstotliwości	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczeta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%/	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
codziennie	6	3,4	2	1,3	8	2,4	2	2,6	-	-	2	1,9
kilka razy w tygodniu	12	6,7	4	2,6	16	4,8	8	10,5	2	7,1	10	9,6
kilka razy w miesiącu	19	10,6	18	11,8	37	11,1	13	17,1	4	14,3	17	16,3
raz w miesiącu	12	6,7	3	2,0	15	4,5	10	13,2	1	3,6	11	10,6
rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu	43	24,0	9	5,9	52	15,7	11	14,5	3	10,7	14	13,5
t; p	4,87; .000											
nigdy	87	48,6	117	76,4	204	61,5	32	42,1	18	64,3	50	48,1
t; p	5,48; .000						2,08; .05					

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Akty agresji w rodzinie spostrzegano : codziennie 2,4% uczniów gimnazjum i 1,9% licealistów; kilka razy w tygodniu: 4,8% gimnazjalistów i 9,6% licealistów; kilka razy w miesiącu 11,1% gimnazjalistów i 16,3% licealistów; raz w miesiącu 4,5% gimnazjalistów i 10,6% licealistów, rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu 15,7% gimnazjalistów i 13,5% licealistów, przy czym gimnazjalistki (24%) istotnie częściej (4,87; .000) niż gimnazjaliści (5,9%); nigdy nie spostrzegano 61,5% gimnazjalistów, w tym bardzo istotnie częściej (5,48; .000) uczniowie (76,4%) niż uczennice (48,6%) oraz 48,1% uczniów liceum (istotnie częściej 2,09; .05) chłopcy (64,3%) niż dziewczęta (42,1%).

Rozkłady częstości spotykania się uczniów z agresją w szkole zestawiono w tabeli 6.

Tabela 6. Rozkłady częstości spotykania się uczniów z agresją w szkole

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=172		chłopcy N=188		razem N=360		dziewczęta N=362		chłopcy N=308		razem N=670		dziewczęta N=176		chłopcy N=219		razem N=395	
	L	%/	L	%	L	%	L	%/p	L	%	L	%	L	%/	L	%	L	%
b. często/codziennie	25	14,5	51	27,1	76	21,1	47	13,0	60	19,5	107	16,0	23	13,1	63	28,8	86	21,8
t; p	3,0; .01												3,98; .000					
kilka razy w tygodniu	52	30,2	63	33,5	115	31,9	134	37,0	82	26,6	216	32,2	37	21,0	20	9,1	57	14,4
t; p							2,91; .01						3,28; .01					
kilka razy w miesiącu	27	15,7	26	13,8	53	14,7	75	20,7	71	35,1	146	21,8	10	5,7	10	4,6	20	5,1
t; p							3,56; .01											
raz w miesiącu	31	18,0	21	11,2	52	14,4	15	4,1	13	4,2	28	4,2	34	19,3	20	9,1	54	13,7
t; p													2,5; .02					
rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu	24	14,0	14	7,5	38	10,6	60	16,6	45	14,6	105	15,7	48	27,3	43	19,6	91	23,0
wcale	13	7,6	13	6,9	26	7,2	31	8,6	37	12,0	68	10,1	24	23,6	63	28,8	87	22,0
t; p													3,8; .000					

Odpowiedziało 710 uczennic i 715 uczniów, łącznie 1425 osób.

Z agresją w szkole nie spotkało się wcale : 7,2% uczęszczających do szkół podstawowych, 10,1% gimnazjalistów i 22% licealistów. Istotnie częściej (3,8; .000) chłopcy (28,84%) niż dziewczęta (13,6%). Spotykało się zatem około 93% uczniów podstawówek, prawie 90% gimnazjalistów i 78% licealistów.

Sporadycznie, rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu zaś spotykało się z agresją w szkole 10,6% uczniów najmłodszych, 15,7% gimnazjalistów i 23% licealistów. *Rzadko* (raz w miesiącu), *ale regularnie* spotykało się z agresją w szkole 14,4% uczniów podstawówek, 4,2% gimnazjalistów oraz 13,7% licealistów, przy istotnie częstszym (2,5; .02) spotykaniu się dziewcząt (19,3%) niż chłopców (9,1%).

Po kilka razy w miesiącu z agresją w szkole spotykało się 14,7% uczniów podstawówek, 21,8% gimnazjalistów, w tym istotnie częściej (3,56; .01) spotykali się chłopcy (35,1%) niż dziewczęta (20,7%) oraz ponad 5% licealistów.

Kilka razy w tygodniu (często) agresję w szkole spostrzegało 31,9% uczniów podstawówek i 32,2% gimnazjalistów, przy czym dziewczęta (37%) spostrzegały agresję istotnie (2,91; .01) częściej niż chłopcy (26,6%), oraz 14,4 licealistów – bardzo istotnie częściej (3,28; .01) spostrzegały dziewczęta (21%) niż chłopcy (14,4%).

Bardzo często (codziennie) z agresją w szkole spotykało się: 21,1% i 16% i 21,8% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Znamienne (3,0; .01) i bardzo znamienne (3,98; .000) częściej z agresją w szkole spotykali się uczniowie (27,1% i 28,8%) niż uczennice (14,5% i 13,1%) szkół podstawowych i liceów.

3.2. Percepcja siebie i innych osób w roli ofiary i agresora

W tabeli 7 zestawiono rozkłady procentowe doświadczania agresji

Tabela 7. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy doświadczyłeś ataku agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=100		chłopcy N=108		razem N=208		dziewczeta N=322		chłopcy N=295		razem N=617		dziewczeta N=201		chłopcy N=114		razem N=315	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	51	51,0	70	64,8	121	58,2	159	49,4	228	77,3	387	62,7	114	56,7	73	64,0	187	59,4
t; p	2,03; .05						7,3; .000											
nie	49	49,0	38	35,2	87	41,8	163	50,6	67	22,7	230	37,3	87	43,3	41	36,0	128	40,6

Odpowiedziało 623 uczennic i 517 uczniów, łącznie 1140 osób.

Ataków agresji na sobie nie doświadczało : 51% i 64,8 5, 49,4 i 77,3% oraz 56,7 i 64% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Istotnie częściej doświadczali agresji uczniowie (64,8%) niż uczennice (51%) podstawówek (2,03; .05) oraz bardzo znamienne (7,3; .000) gimnazjaliści (77,3%) niż gimnazjalistki (49,4%). Takich doświadczeń nie miało : 49%, 50,6% i 56,7% uczennic oraz 35,2%,22,7% i 36% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

W tabeli 8 zestawiono rozkłady procentowe uczniów atakujących inne osoby

Tabela 8. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy zdarzyło Ci się kiedyś kogoś zaatakować?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=62		chłopcy N=62		razem N=124		dziewczeta N=239		chłopcy N=209		razem N=448		dziewczeta N=76/t		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L/p	%	L	%
tak	17	27,4	35	56,5	52	41,9	114	47,7	157	75,1	271	60,5	28	36,8	20	71,4	48	46,1
t; p	3,38; .000						2,51; .02						3,8; .000					
nie	35	56,5	14	22,6	49	39,5	116	48,5	44	20,1	160	35,7	48	63,2	8	28,6	56	53,9
t; p	4,11; .000						6,62; .000						3,4; .000					
brak odpowiedzi	10	16,1	13	21	23	18,5	9	3	8	3,8	17	7,8	-	-	-	-	-	-

Odpowiedziało 377 uczennic i 299 uczniów, łącznie 676 osób.

Do atakowania osób (kogokolwiek) przyznało się ; 27,4%, 47,7% i 36,8% uczennic oraz 56,5%,75,1% i 71,4% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Na wszystkich szczeblach edukacji bardzo znamienne bądź znamienne częściej atakowali uczniowie niż uczennice. Gimnazjaliści atakowali istotnie częściej niż uczniowie podstawówek (2,67;.01), a gimnazjalistki istotnie częściej niż dziewczęta z podstawówek 92,98; .01) i licealistki (2,25; .05).

Do atakowania osób nie przyznało się : 56,5% i 22,6%, 48,5% i 20,1% oraz 63,2% i 28,6% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Uczennice bardzo znamienne częściej 9.000) niż uczniowie zaprzeczały atakowaniu innych osób. Nie udzieliło odpowiedzi 18,5% uczniów podstawówek i 7,8% gimnazjalistów.

W tabeli 9 zestawiono rozkłady procentowe atakowania przez uczniów osób

Tabela 9. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Kogo zaatakowałeś?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnej						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=50		chłopcy N=43		razem N=93		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L/t	%/p	L	%
rodzica	4	6,1	3	3,6	7	4,7			1	2,3	1	1,1	2	2,6	2	7,1	4	3,8
rodzeństwo	13	19,7	16	19,0	29	19,3	16	32,0	10	23,2	26	28,0	18	23,7	7	25,0	25	24,0
nauczyciela			3	3,6	3	2,0			3	7,0	3	3,2			1	3,6	1	1,0
kolegę	27	40,9	47	56,0	74	49,3	11	22,0	33	76,7	44	47,3	10	13,2	12	42,9	22	21,2
t; p							6,28; .000						2,93; .01					
nieznajomego	3	4,5	10	11,9	13	8,7	3	6,0	8	18,6	11	11,8	3	4,0	1	3,6	4	3,8
inną osobę	3	4,6	5	5,9	8	5,3	2	4,0	4	9,3	6	6,5	2	2,6	4	14,6	6	5,8
brak odpowiedzi	16	24,2			16	10,7	18	36,0			18	19,4	41	53,9	1	3,6	42	40,4
t; p													7,5; .000					

Odpowiedziało 192 uczennice i 155 uczniów, łącznie 347 osób.

Najczęściej **atakowano kolegów**. Atakowało : 40,9% i 56%, 22% i 76,7% oraz 13,2 % i 42,9% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Gimnazjaliści (76,7%) i licealiści (42,9%) atakowali bardzo istotnie (6,28; .000) bądź istotnie (2,93; .01) częściej niż gimnazjalistki (22%) i licealistki.

Najrzadziej atakowano nauczycieli i rodziców (<5%). Mniej niż 19% badanych atakowało nieznajomych, a inne osoby – mniej niż 15%.Dziewczęta w ogóle nie atakowały nauczycieli. Bardzo znamienne (7,5; .000) więcej licealistek (53,9%) niż licealistów (3,6%) nie udzieliło odpowiedzi na pytanie. Nie udzieliło odpowiedzi 24,2% uczennic podstawówek i 36% gimnazjalistek.

W tabeli 10 zestawiono częstotliwości atakowania przez badanych innych osób

Nie udzieliło odpowiedzi 10,1% uczennic i 30,7% uczniów. Jest to różnica bardzo znamienna statystycznie (4,72; .000).

Tabela 10. Częstotliwość atakowania innych osób

Częstotliwość	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%
codziennie	11	6,1	15	9,8	26	7,8	2	2,6	1	3,6	3	2,9
kilka razy w tygodniu	20	11,2	22	14,4	42	12,7	3	4,0	3	10,7	6	5,8
kilka razy w miesiącu	17	9,5	14	9,2	31	9,3	8	10,5	9	32,1	17	16,3
t; p							2,27; .04					
raz w miesiącu	14	7,8	6	3,9	20	6,0	10	13,2	2	7,1	12	11,5
rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu	51	28,5	25	16,3	76	22,9	25	32,9	12	42,9	37	35,6
t; p	2,58; .01											
nigdy	48	26,8	24	15,7	72	21,7	28	36,8	1	3,6	29	27,9
t; p	2,51; .02						7,8; .000					
brak odpowiedzi	18	10,1	47	30,7	65	19,6						
t; p	4,72; .000											

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Do atakowania kogokolwiek nie przyznało się 26,8% gimnazjalistek i 36,8% licealistek oraz 15,7% gimnazjalistów i 3,6% licealistów. Znamienne statystycznie (2,51; .02) jest różnica między procentami gimnazjalistek (26,8%) i gimnazjalistów (15,7%), a bardzo znamienne (7,8; .000) jest różnica między procentami odpowiedzi licealistek (36,8) i licealistów (3,6%).

Rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu atakowało istotnie więcej (2,58; .01) gimnazjalistek (28,5%) niż gimnazjalistów (16,3%). Istotność statystyczną osiągnęła różnica między procentami wskazań licealistów (42,9%) i licealistek (32,9%). Istotnie częściej (29,6; .01) atakowali licealiści niż gimnazjaliści.

Raz w miesiącu atakowało 6% gimnazjalistów i 11,5% licealistów.

Kilka razy w miesiącu atakowało 12,7% gimnazjalistów i 5,8% licealistów, a do codziennego atakowania przyznało się 7,8% i 2% respondentów z gimnazjów i liceów.

Uderzają stosunkowo najwyższe odsetki atakujących licealistów. 32,1% atakowało **kilka razy w miesiącu**, a 42,9% **rzadziej niż raz** w miesiącu. Rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu atakowało 32,9% licealistek i 28,5% gimnazjalistek. **Bardzo często** (codziennie) i **często** (kilka razy w tygodniu) atakowało 17,3% gimnazjalistek i 6,6% licealistek oraz 24,2% gimnazjalistów i 14,3% licealistów.

W tabeli 11 zestawiono rozkłady odpowiedzi na pytania : czy twoje ataki poprzedzało doznanie agresji?

Tabela 11. Rozkłady odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy doznana przez ciebie agresja spowodowała twój odwet?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	44	24,6	53	34,6	93	28,0	20	26,3	11	39,3	31	29,8
nie	36	20,1	22	14,1	48	14,5	18	23,7	8	28,6	26	25,0
brak odpowiedzi	99	55,3	78	51,0	191	57,5	38	50,0	9	32,1	47	45,2

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Twierdząco odpowiedziało na to pytanie około 30% ogółu badanych, w tym około 15% i 25% respondentów z gimnazjów i liceów. Nie udzieliło odpowiedzi 57,5% i 45,2% respondentów gimnazjów i liceów.

Własną agresję uznano infantylnie za odwet za uprzednio doznaną agresję 24,6% i 34,6% gimnazjalistów oraz 26,3% i 39,3% licealistów. Różnica między odsetkami tak uważających chłopców i dziewcząt z gimnazjów i liceów zbliża się do statystycznej istotności (1,99; .06) . Swoich ataków nie uznano za kontragresję 20,1% i 14,4% dziewcząt oraz 23,7% i 28,6% chłopców z gimnazjów i liceów.

Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie o stopień własnej agresywności w porównaniu z agresywnością rówieśników, zestawiono w tabeli 12

Tabela 12. Tabela 12. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: W jakim stopniu, w porównaniu z tobą, twoi rówieśnicy są agresywni?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
w takim samym	28	15,6	45	29,4	73	22,0	34	44,7	10	35,7	44	42,3
t; p	3,02; .01											
w mniejszym	42	23,5	27	17,7	69	20,8	12	15,8	2	7,1	14	13,5
w większym	109	60,9	81	52,9	190	57,2	30	39,5	16	57,1	46	44,2

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Za *agresywnych w takim samym stopniu jak rówieśnicy* uznano się istotnie więcej (3,02; .01) gimnazjalistów (29,4%) niż gimnazjalistek (15,6%) oraz nieistotnie więcej licealistek (44,7%) niż licealistów (35,7%).

Za *agresywnych w mniejszym stopniu niż rówieśnicy* uznano się 20,8% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i 13,5% uczęszczająca do liceów, a *agresywnych w większym stopniu* – 52,9% i 44,2% respondentów uczących się w gimnazjach i liceach.

Za *agresywne w większym stopniu niż rówieśnicy* uznano się istotnie więcej (3,2; .01) gimnazjalistek (60,9%) niż licealistek (39,5%).

Odsetki gimnazjalistów uważających siebie, w porównaniu z rówieśnikami, *za mniej* (17,7%) *oraz bardziej* (52,9%) agresywnych zdają się dość jednoznacznie sugerować utożsamianie przez dorastające dziewczęta i chłopców swej *tożsamości płciowej* (kobiecości i męskości) z *agresywnością*. Taką samą pozycję wzmacniają zawarte w tabeli 13 odsetki respondentów deklarujących poczucie swego bezpieczeństwa wśród rówieśników.

3.3. Poczucie bezpieczeństwa wśród rówieśników oraz częstotliwość i nasilenie werbalnych i fizycznych ataków dziewcząt i chłopców

Tabela 13. Rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy czujesz się bezpieczny wśród rówieśników?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=177		chłopcy N=170		razem N=347		dziewczęta N=410		chłopcy N=373		razem N=783		dziewczęta N=220		chłopcy N=106		razem N=326	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%/t	L	%/p	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%
tak	93	52,5	84	49,4	177	51,0	189	46,1	207	55,5	396	50,6	110	50,0	67	63,2	177	54,3
t; p							t=2,83											
raczej tak	67	37,9	55	32,3	122	35,2	176	42,9	105	28,1	281	35,9	92	41,8	32	30,2	124	38,0
t; p							t=4,37								t=2,08			
raczej nie	6	3,4	10	5,9	16	4,6	34	8,3	39	10,5	73	9,3	1	0,5	3	2,8	4	1,2
nie	11	6,2	21	12,4	32	9,2	11	2,7	22	5,9	33	4,2	17	7,7	4	3,8	21	6,4

Odpowiedziało 807 uczennic i 649 uczniów, łącznie 1456 osób.

Bezpiecznie bądź raczej bezpiecznie wśród rówieśników czuło się : 90,4% i 81,7%, 89% i 83,6% oraz 91,8% i 93,4% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Bezpiecznie czuło się istotnie więcej gimnazjalistów niż gimnazjalistek (2,83; .01) oraz licealistów niż uczniów podstawówek (3,81; .000), a *raczej bezpiecznie* – bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek niż gimnazjalistów (4,37; .000) i istotnie więcej licealistek niż licealistów (2,08; .05).

Wśród rówieśników nie czuło się zdecydowanie bądź raczej bezpiecznie mniej niż 20% (9,6% i 18,3%, 11% i 16,4% oraz 8,2% i 6,6%) uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Deklarowane poczucie bezpieczeństwa, z dużym prawdopodobieństwem, można potraktować jako przechwałki „największego zucha”, Stefka Burczymuchy, uwiecznione w wierszu Marii Konopnickiej.

W tabeli 14 zestawione rozkłady procentowe dokonywanych przez uczniów ataków werbalnych

Groźenie, szantażowanie i zastraszanie stosowało 21% badanych z podstawówek, 41,2% gimnazjalistów i 41,7% licealistów. Do takich ataków przyznało się 18,1% uczennic i 23,9% uczniów podstawówek, 46,7% gimnazjalistek i 41,2% gimnazjalistów oraz 36,4% licealistek i 49,1% licealistów, czyli bardzo znamienne więcej (3,93; .000) chłopców. Takie ataki stosowało bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek niż uczennic podstawówek (7,49; .000) i licealistów (4,21; .000) oraz istotnie więcej (2,52; .02) licealistek niż uczennic podstawówek, licealistów niż uczniów podstawówek (4,45; .000) i gimnazjalistów (4,45; .000).

Tabela 14. Rozkłady procentów werbalnych ataków uczniów

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=177		chłopcy N=170		razem N=347		dziewczeta N=410		chłopcy N=373		razem N=783		dziewczeta N=220		chłopcy N=106		razem N=326	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
groźenie, szantażowanie, zastraszanie	32	18,1	43	23,9	75	21,0	187	46,7	156	41,2	343	44,0	80	36,4	56	49,1	136	41,7
t; p													3,33; .000					
obmawianie	16	9,0	9	5,0	25	7,0	15	3,8	14	3,7	29	3,7	15	6,8	4	3,5	19	5,8
przeklinanie, ubliżanie, przezywanie	122	68,9	127	70,0	249	69,0	127	31,8	231	60,9	358	46,0	152	69,1	55	48,2	207	63,5
t; p							8,51; .000						3,72; .000					
poniżanie, wysmiewanie	135	76,3	138	76,7	273	76,5	333	83,2	277	73,1	610	78,3	149	67,7	67	58,8	216	66,3
t; p							3,42; .000											
wyludzanie	5	2,8	9	5,0	14	3,6	38	9,5	48	12,7	86	11,0	14	6,4	8	7,0	22	6,7

Odpowiedziało 797 uczennic i 673 uczniów, łącznie 1470 osób.

Stosunkowo najmniej ze stosowanych ataków słownych to : *obmawianie*- dopuściło się go od 3,5% do 9% respondentów oraz wyludzanie – stosowało je od 2,8% do 12,7% badanych uczniów.

Poniżanie i wysmiewanie stosowało 76,7%, 78,3% i 66,3% uczęszczających do kolejnych trzech szczebli edukacji. Czyniło to bardzo istotnie więcej (3,42; .000) gimnazjalistek niż gimnazjalistów oraz uczniów podstawówek (2,75; .01) i gimnazjalistów (3,21;.01) niż licealistów.

Na drugim miejscu pod względem liczebności ataków werbalnych znalazły się : **przeklinanie, ubliżanie, przezywanie**. Do takich ataków przyznało się ; 68,9% uczennic i 70% uczniów

podstawówek, 31,8% gimnazjalistek i 60,9% gimnazjalistów (różnica bardzo istotna : 8,52; .000) oraz 69,1% licealistek i 48,2% licealistów (3,72; .000, również bardzo istotna różnica). Istotnie więcej uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,2; .05) i licealistów (4,18; .000) oraz istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek (8,83; .000) i licealistek (8,88; .000) niż gimnazjalistek stosuje takie ataki werbalne. Gimnazjalistki uciekają się do takich ataków dwukrotnie rzadziej niż uczennice podstawówek. Odsetki uczennic podstawówek i licealistek są niemal identyczne.

Poniżanie, wyśmiewanie, przezywanie i przeklinanie było zatem wśród badanych uczniów powszechne. Stosowanie ataków werbalnych kształtowało niewątpliwie tożsamość ucznia – agresora i przekładało się na włączenie przez uczniów do nowego repertuaru zachowań ataków fizycznych.

W tabeli 15 zestawiono rozkłady procentowe spostrzegających przez uczniów kategorii ataków fizycznych.

Tabela 15. Rozkłady procentów spostrzeganych przez uczniów ataków fizycznych

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=177		chłopcy N=180		razem N=357		dziewczeta N=400		chłopcy N=379		razem N=779		dziewczeta N=220		chłopcy N=114		razem N=334	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
bicie	93	52,5	110	61,1	203	56,9	110	27,5	178	47,0	288	37,0	79	35,9	27	23,7	106	31,7
t; p							5,73; .000						2,38; .02					
grożenie, szczypanie	7	4,0	10	5,6	17	4,8	2	0,5	5	1,3	7	0,9	1	0,5	3	2,6	4	1,2
kopanie	47	26,5	51	28,3	98	27,4	51	12,7	169	44,6	220	28,2	37	16,8	36	31,6	73	21,9
t; p							10,46; .000						2,94; .01					
popychanie	36	20,3	22	12,2	58	16,3	23	5,8	18	4,7	41	5,3	81	36,8	45	39,5	126	37,7
rozbój	27	15,2	28	15,6	55	15,4	28	7,0	72	19,0	100	12,8	31	14,1	17	14,9	48	14,8
t; p							3,69; .000											
szarpanie	50	28,3	54	30,0	104	29,1	54	13,5	149	39,3	203	26,1	84	38,2	25	21,9	109	32,6
t; p							8,49; .000						3,21; .001					
zaczepki	12	6,8	20	11,1	32	9,0	14	3,5	26	6,9	40	5,1	81	36,8	45	39,5	126	37,7
zadawanie ran	1	0,6	-	-	1	0,3	25	6,3	34	9,0	59	7,6	37	16,8	9	7,9	48	14,4

Odpowiedziało 797 dziewcząt i 673 chłopców, łącznie 1470 osób.

Najczęściej stosowano bicie, kopanie, szarpanie, popychanie i zaczepki. Z **biciem** spotkało się 52,5% uczennic i 61,1% uczennic podstawówek, 27,5% gimnazjalistek i 47% gimnazjalistów (5,73; .000) oraz 35,9% licealistek i 23,7% licealistów (2,38; .02). Z tą kategorią ataków spotykało się: bardzo znacząco więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (5,72; .000) i licealistek (3,35; .000), uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (3,22; .01) i licealistów (6,94; .000), a także gimnazjalistów i licealistów (4,92; .000).

Z **kopaniem** spotkało się 26,5% i 28,3% uczęszczających do podstawówek, 12,7% i 44,6% uczęszczających do gimnazjów (10,46; .000) oraz 16,8 i 31,6% uczęszczających do liceów

(2,94; .01). Bardzo znamienne, bądź znamienne statystycznie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (3,43; .000) i licealistek (2,33; .05) oraz gimnazjalistów niż uczniów podstawówek (3,86; .000) i licealistów (2,54; .02) spotykało się z kopaniem.

Z **szarpaniem** spotykało się : 28,3% i 30% uczniów podstawówek, 13,5% i 39,3% uczęszczających do gimnazjów (8,49; .000) oraz 38,2% licealistek i 21,5% licealistów (3,21; .001). Z tą kategorią ataków spotykało się bardzo znamienne , bądź znamienne więcej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (5,74; .000) i uczennic podstawówek (2,05; .05) oraz bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek niż uczennic podstawówek (3,84; .000), a także gimnazjalistów niż licealistów (3,36; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (2,14; .05).

Z **popychaniem** spotkało się 20,03% i 12,2% uczęszczających do podstawówek, 7% i 19% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 36,8% i 39,5% uczących się w liceum . Z tą kategorią ataków spotykało się istotnie więcej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (8,98; .000) oraz licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (7,4; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (5,26; .000).

Do spostrzegania **rozboju** przyznało się od 7% do 19% badanych (ok.15% ogółem). Widziało go bardzo istotnie więcej (3,69; .000) gimnazjalistów niż gimnazjalistek oraz istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,73; .04) oraz istotnie więcej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (2,64; .01).

Z **zaczepkami** spotkało się mniej niż 10% uczęszczających do podstawówek i gimnazjów oraz blisko 40% uczęszczających do liceów. Z zaczepkami spotkało się bardzo znamienne więcej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (3,76; .000) i uczennic podstawówek (6,71; .000) oraz licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (6,85; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (5,22; .000).

Zadawanie ran widziała jedna uczennica podstawówki (0,6%) oraz 7,9% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i 14,4% badanych z liceów.

3.4.Ocena agresywności dziewcząt i chłopców , jej nasilenia i ukierunkowania

Dane zestawione w tabeli 16 przedstawiają opinie badanych dotyczącą agresywności dziewcząt.

Tabela 16. Rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy dziewczęta również są agresywne?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=89		chłopcy N=96		razem N=185		dziewczęta N=400		chłopcy N=337		razem N=737		dziewczęta N=191		chłopcy N=100		razem N=291	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	37	41,6	60	62,5	97	52,4	273	68,3	234	69,4	507	68,8	155	81,2	84	84,0	239	82,1
t; p	2,91; .01																	
nie	52	58,4	36	37,5	88	47,6	127	31,7	103	30,6	230	31,2	36	18,8	16	16,0	52	17,9

Odpowiedziało 680 uczennic i 533 uczniów, łącznie 1213 osób.

Mniej niż połowa (41,6%) uczennic podstawówek uważała, że dziewczęta są również agresywne. Tak też uważało istotnie więcej (2,91; .01) ich rówieśników (62,5%) oraz 68,3% i 69,4% uczęszczających do gimnazjów, a także 81,2% i 84% uczęszczających do liceów.

Tak uważało bardzo istotnie mniej : uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (4,67; .000) i licealistek (3,55; .000), gimnazjalistów niż licealistów 93,29; .01) uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (3,5; .000) i licealistów (6,6; .000).

Odmienną opinię miało 58,4% uczennic podstawówek, 31,7% gimnazjalistek i 18,8% licealistek oraz 37,5%, 30,6% i 16% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Najbardziej zbiczne są opinie licealistek i licealistów oraz gimnazjalistek i gimnazjalistów, a najmniej uczennic i uczniów podstawówek.

W tabeli 17 zestawiono opinie respondentów dotyczące stopnia agresywności dziewcząt w porównaniu z agresywnością chłopców.

Tabela 17. Rozkłady odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy zachowania dziewcząt są bardziej, tak samo, czy mniej agresywne niż zachowania chłopców?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=344		chłopcy N=288		razem N=632		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
bardziej	5	7,6	13	15,5	18	12,0	179	52,0	153	53,1	332	52,5	2	2,6	6	21,4	8	7,7
													2,36; .05					
tak samo	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	11,6	29	10,1	69	10,9	22	29,0	5	17,9	27	26,0
mniej	61	92,4	71	84,5	132	88,0	125	36,3	106	36,8	231	36,6	52	68,4	17	60,7	69	66,3

Odpowiedziało 486 uczennic i 400 uczniów, łącznie 886 osób.

Zachowania dziewcząt za **bardziej agresywne** niż zachowania chłopców uznało ; 7,6% uczennic i 15,5% uczniów podstawówek, 52% gimnazjalistek i 53,1% gimnazjalistów oraz 2,6% licealistek i 21,4% licealistów. Tylko procenty wskazań licealistek i licealistów różnią się istotnie statystycznie (2,36; .05).

Tak uważała ponad połowa uczęszczających do gimnazjów, bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek niż uczennic podstawówek (10,47; .000) i licealistek (15,2; .000) oraz gimnazjalistów niż licealistów (3,88; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (7,97; .000).

Zachowania dziewcząt **za tak samo agresywne** jak zachowanie chłopców uważało 11,6% i gimnazjalistek i 10,1% gimnazjalistów oraz 29 licealistek i 17,9% licealistów. Taka opinię

zaprezentowało istotnie więcej (2,99; .01) licealistek (29%) niż gimnazjalistek (11,6%), a nikt nie podzielił takiej opinii spośród uczęszczających do podstawówek.

Za mniej agresywne niż zachowanie chłopców uznało zachowanie dziewcząt 92,4% i 84,5%, 36,3% i 36,6% oraz 68,4% i 60,7% respondentów z kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Taką opinię zaprezentowało bardzo istotnie, bądź istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (10,67; .000) i licealistek (5,44; .000) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (9,82; .000) i licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (2,37; .02).

Dla blisko 90% ogółu uczęszczających do podstawówek, zachowania dziewcząt są mniej agresywne niż zachowania chłopców. Ponad 63% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i 59,3% uczęszczających do liceów uważało zachowania dziewcząt za bardziej, bądź tak samo agresywne jak zachowania chłopców. Taka konstatacja wskazuje na wyraźne zaburzenia percepcji agresywności zachowań u uczniów w wieku 13-16 lat, polegające na utożsamianiu własnego „dojrzwania” dziewcząt z uprawnieniem do zachowań agresywnych.

W tabeli 18 zestawiono rozkłady liczebności zachowań agresywnych charakterystycznych dla dziewcząt i chłopców.

Tabela 18. Rozkłady liczebności kategorii zachowań agresywnych charakterystycznych dla dziewcząt i chłopców oraz istotność różnicowania procentów.

Zachowania		Uczniowie									
kategorie	Charakterystyczne dla	gimnazjów					liceum				
		dziewczęta N=170		t; p	chłopcy N=153		dziewczęta N=76		t; p	chłopcy N=28	
		L	%		%	L	L	%		%	L
przezwiska	dziewcząt	155	86,6		80,4	123	74	97,4		89,3	25
	t; p	3,2; .001									
	chłopców	150	83,8		83,7	128	62	81,6		85,7	24
grożenie	dziewcząt	85	47,5	3,99;.000	26,8	41	38	50,0	2,13;.05	32,1	9
	t; p	6,61;.000			9,68;.000		3,9;.000			3,19<.01	
	chłopców	142	79,3		75,2	115	60	78,9		71,4	20
poniżanie	dziewcząt	100	55,9		46,4	71	48	63,2		60,7	17
	t; p				3,52;.001						
	chłopców	111	62,0		65,4	100	54	71,1		71,4	20
wyśmiewanie	dziewcząt	140	78,2	2,09;.05	68,0	104	71	93,4		92,9	26
	t; p	2,72;.001			2,13;.05		3,95;.000			2,65<.01	
	chłopców	117	65,4	3,83;.000	79,1	121	54	71,1		64,3	18
zastraszanie	dziewcząt	68	38,0	3,94;.000	19,0	29	18	23,7		21,4	6
	t; p	5,87;.000			7,32;.000		7,36;.000			5,72;.000	
	chłopców	121	67,6		68,0	104	58	76,3		82,1	23
wyludzanie pieniędzy	dziewcząt	16	8,9		12,4	19	1	1,3		7,1	2
	t; p	10,37;.000			7,09;.000		11,54;.000			4,74;.000	
	chłopców	96	53,4		47,7	73	50	65,8		57,1	16

szarpanie	dziewcząt	81	45,2		48,5	62	39	51,3		39,3	11
	t; p	3,68; .000			4,04 .000		2,36; .05				
	chłopców	115	64,2		70,6	108	53	69,7		60,7	17
kopanie	dziewcząt	35	19,6		23,5	36	4	5,3		10,7	3
	t; p	13,28; .000			9,68 .000		11,34; .000			4,63 .000	
	chłopców	138	77,1		71,9	110	64	71,1		57,1	16
bicie	dziewcząt	48	26,8		21,6	33	17	22,4		17,9	5
	t; p	14,78; .000			13,23 .000		9,78; .000			5,72 .000	
	chłopców	157	87,7		83,0	127	64	84,2		78,6	22
rozbój – odbieranie przemocą	dziewcząt	23	12,8		19,0	29	6	7,9	1,95; .051	25,0	7
	t; p	8,35; .000			6,74 .000		12,75; .000				
	chłopców	90; 50,3			53,6	82	49	64,5		46,4	13
zadawanie ran	dziewcząt	14	7,8		17,6	27	2	2,6	2,05; .05	17,9	5
	t; p	7,52; .000			4,44 .000		5,96; .000				
	chłopców	70	39,1		39,9	61	27	37,5		32,1	9

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Przezywanie, za charakterystyczne, zarówno dla dziewcząt jak i dla chłopców uznało : ponad 80% uczęszczających do gimnazjów (86,6% i 83,8% gimnazjalistów oraz 89,3% i 85,7% uczniów liceów. Bardzo istotnie częściej (3,2; .001) licealistki niż licealiści uważały zachowanie agresywne za charakterystyczne zarówno dla dziewcząt jak i dla chłopców.

Groźenie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało 47,5% gimnazjalistek i 26,8% (bardzo znamienne mniej -3,99; .000) gimnazjalistów oraz 50% licealistek i 32,1% (istotnie mniej – 2,13; .05) licealistów. Natomiast za charakterystyczne dla chłopców uznało to zachowanie 79,3% gimnazjalistek, 75,2 % gimnazjalistów oraz 78,9% licealistek i 71,4% licealistów. Bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek uważa to zachowanie za charakterystyczne dla chłopców (79,3%) niż dla dziewcząt (47,5% – 6,61; .000). Bardzo znamienne więcej (3,99; .000) gimnazjalistek (47,5%) niż gimnazjalistów (26,9%) uznało groźenie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt. Bardzo znamienne mniej (9,68; .000) gimnazjalistek (9,68%) niż gimnazjalistów (75,2%) uznało groźenie za charakterystyczne dla chłopców, a za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt blisko trzykrotnie mniej (26,8%).

Za charakterystyczne dla chłopców, groźenie, uważało 78,9% licealistek, a za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt 50% licealistek, czyli bardzo znamienne mniej (3,9; .000). Także spośród licealistów znamienne mniej (3,19; .01) uznało (32,1%) to zachowanie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt (32,1%). Licealistki i licealiści bardzo znamienne częściej uznawali groźenie za charakterystyczne dla chłopców. Podobnie postąpili gimnazjaliści i gimnazjalistki.

Poniżanie, zostało uznane za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt przez 55,9% gimnazjalistek i 46,4% gimnazjalistów oraz przez 63,2% licealistek i 60,7% licealistów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców uznało 62% gimnazjalistek i 65,4% gimnazjalistów oraz przez 71,1% i 71,4% uczennic i uczniów liceów. Istotnie częściej (3,52; .001) gimnazjaliści (65,4%) uznali

to zachowanie za charakterystyczne dla chłopców (przy 46,4% uznających takie zachowanie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt).

Wyśmiewanie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało istotnie więcej (2,09; .05) gimnazjalistek (78,2%) niż gimnazjalistów (68%) oraz 71,1% licealistek i 64,3% licealistów. Istotnie częściej (2,72; .001) gimnazjalistki uznawały wyśmiewanie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt niż za charakterystyczne dla chłopców (65,4%), a spośród gimnazjalistów uznało to zachowanie istotnie więcej (2,13; .05) za charakterystyczne dla chłopców (79,1%) niż dla dziewcząt (68%). Licealistki bardzo znamienne (3,95; .000) częściej uważały wyśmiewanie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt (93,4%) niż za charakterystyczne dla chłopców (71,1%). Także istotnie częściej 9% (2,65; .01) licealiści uznawali wyśmiewanie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt (92,9% do 64,3%).

Zastraszanie, za charakterystyczne dla chłopców uznało bardzo znamienne więcej (5,87; .000) gimnazjalistek (67,6%) niż uważających je za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt (38%). Także bardzo znamienne częściej gimnazjaliści (7,32; .000), licealistki (7,36; .000) i licealiści (5,72; .000) uznawali zastraszanie za charakterystyczne dla chłopców.

Wyludzanie pieniędzy zostało uznane przez połowę uczęszczających do gimnazjów i ponad połowę uczęszczających do liceów za charakterystyczne dla chłopców oraz przez bardzo znamienne (.000) mniej respondentów uważających je za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt (1,3% do 12,4%).

Szarpanie zostało zakwalifikowane za bardzo charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt przez 45,2% i 48,5% oraz 51,3% i 39,3% respondentów z gimnazjów i liceum, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców przez 64,2% i 70,6% oraz 69,7% i 60,7% uczących się w gimnazjach i liceum. Bardzo znamienne, bądź znamienne częściej gimnazjalistki (3,68; .000), gimnazjaliści (4,04; .000) i licealistki (2,36; .05) kwalifikowali szarpanie jako charakterystyczne dla chłopców.

Kopanie, w opinii 19,6% gimnazjalistek i 23,5% gimnazjalistów oraz 5,3% licealistek i 10,7% licealistów, stanowi zachowanie charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt, a w opinii 77,1% i 71% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz dla 71,1% i 57,1% uczęszczających do liceum, za charakterystyczne dla chłopców. Zarówno uczennice jak i uczniowie obu szczebli edukacji bardzo istotnie częściej kwalifikowali kopanie jako charakterystyczne dla chłopców.

Bicie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewczyn uznało 26,8% i 21,6% oraz 22,4% i 17,9% respondentów objętych badaniami szczebli edukacji, a przez 87,7% i 83% gimnazjalistów oraz 84,2% i 78,6% licealistów za charakterystyczne dla chłopców. Za charakterystyczne dla chłopców uznawali bardzo znamienne częściej (.000) uczennice i uczniowie obu szczebli edukacji.

Rozbój został uznany za zachowanie charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt przez 12,8% i 19% oraz 7,9% i 25% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i liceum, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców,

przez 50,3% i 53,6% oraz 64,5% i 46,4% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i liceum. Uczennice i uczniowie gimnazjów i uczennice liceum bardzo znamienne częściej (.000) uważali rozbój za charakterystyczny dla chłopców. Uczniowie i uczennice obu szczebli edukacji i uczniowie gimnazjów bardzo znamienne (.000) częściej uważali rozbój za charakterystyczny dla chłopców.

Zadawanie ran, dla 7,8% i 17,6% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz dla 2,6% i 17,9% respondentów liceum stanowiło zachowanie charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt, a dla 39,1% i 39,9% oraz 37,9% i 32,1% respondentów obu szczebli edukacji za zachowanie charakterystyczne dla chłopców. Bardzo znamienne bądź znamienne częściej zadawanie ran uznawali uczniowie gimnazjów i liceum oraz licealistki.

W tabeli 19 zestawiono rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie : Czy młodzi ludzie są obecnie bardziej agresywni niż dawniej?

Tabela 19. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy młodzi ludzie są obecnie bardziej agresywni niż dawniej?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=101		chłopcy N=96		razem N=197		dziewczęta N=340		chłopcy N=350		razem N=690		dziewczęta N=127		chłopcy N=55		razem N=182	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	66	65,3	50	52,1	116	64,9	251	73,8	267	76,3	518	75,1	101	87,4	30	54,5	141	77,5
t; p	1,9; .052												4,49; .000					
nie	15	14,9	14	14,6	29	14,7	50	14,7	41	11,7	91	13,2	14	10,0	10	18,2	24	13,2
nie wiem	20	19,8	32	33,3	52	26,4	39	11,5	42	12,0	81	11,7	12	1,6	15	27,3	17	9,3
t; p	2,1; .05												4,21; .000					

Odpowiedziało 568 uczennic i 501 uczniów, łącznie 1069 osób.

Twierdząco odpowiedziało 65,3% uczennic i 52,1% uczniów podstawówek (.052) oraz 87,4% licealistek i 54,5% licealistów (.000). Opinię tą podzielało istotnie więcej : gimnazjalistek niż uczennic podstawówek (3,96; .000) oraz bardzo znamienne więcej gimnazjalistów niż licealistów (3,07; .01) i uczniów podstawówek (4,21; .000). Opinii tej nie podzielało od 10% do 18,2%. Nie miało natomiast wyrobionej opinii od 1,6% (licealistki) do 33,3% (uczniowie podstawówek). Nie miało opinii na ten temat istotnie więcej uczniów niż uczennic podstawówek (2,1; .05) oraz bardzo znamienne (.000) więcej licealistów niż licealistek (4,21; .000); uczennic podstawówek niż licealistek (4,42; .000); uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (4,16; .000); licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (2,42; .02).

Zestawienie w tabeli 20 rozkłady procentów opinii badanych uczniów na temat brutalności rówieśników.

Tabela 20. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy twoi rówieśnicy są brutalni?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=62		chłopcy N=62		razem N=124		dziewczęta N=405		chłopcy N=362		razem N=767		dziewczęta N=229		chłopcy N=114		razem N=343	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	14	25,6	17	27,4	31	25,0	147	36,3	140	38,7	287	37,4	62	27,1	37	32,5	99	28,9
nie	39	62,9	31	50,0	70	56,4	140	34,6	130	35,9	270	35,2	99	43,2	31	27,2	130	37,9
t; p													2,97; .01					
nie wiem	9	14,5	14	25,6	23	18,6	118	29,1	92	25,4	210	27,4	68	29,7	46	40,3	114	33,2
t; p													2,0; .05					

Odpowiedziało 696 uczennic i 538 uczniów, łącznie 1234 osoby.

Opinie o brutalności rówieśników zadeklarowało 25% -38,7% respondentów. Nie wystąpiły znaczące różnice w procentach opinii. Nie podzielało opinii o brutalności rówieśników 62,9% uczennic i 50% uczniów podstawówek, 34,6% i 35,9% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 43,2% licealistek i 27,2 % licealistów (różnica istotna – 2,97; .01).

Stosunkowo największy odsetek uczennic podstawówek nie podzielających takiej opinii jest bardzo znamienne wyższy od odsetka takich opinii gimnazjalistek (4,26; .000) i istotnie większy od odsetka opinii licealistek (2,83; .01).

Taką opinię podzielało istotnie więcej uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,06; .05) i licealistów (2,93; .01).

Nie miało wyrobionej opinii na ten temat 14,5% uczennic i 25,6% uczniów podstawówek, 29,1% gimnazjalistek i 25,4% gimnazjalistów oraz 29,7% licealistek i istotnie więcej licealistów (92,0; .05). Opinii dotyczącej brutalności rówieśników nie miało istotnie mniej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,91; .01) i licealistek (2,82; .01) oraz istotnie więcej licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (2,9; .01) i uczniów podstawówek (2,04; .05).

W tabeli 21 zestawiono rozkłady liczebności wskazań kto najczęściej bywa sprawca agresji.

Tabela 21. Rozkłady liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie: Kto najczęściej bywa sprawca agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
młodzi koledzy	3	4,5	4	4,8	7	4,7	8	4,5	10	6,5	18	5,4	6	7,9	6	21,4	12	11,5
rówieśnicy	7	10,6	22	26,2	29	19,3	19	10,6	28	18,3	47	14,2	10	13,2	8	28,6	18	17,3
t; p	2,55; .03																	
starsi koledzy	54	81,8	53	63,1	107	71,3	132	73,7	105	68,6	237	71,4	51	67,1	11	39,3	62	59,6

t; p	2,64; .01													3,32; .001							
dorośli	2	3,0	5	5,9	7	4,7	20	11,2	10	6,5	30	9,0	9	11,8	3	10,7	12	11,5			

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 586 osób.

Starszych kolegów uznano za najczęstszych sprawców agresji aż 81,8%, 73,7% i 67,1% uczennic oraz 63,1%, 68,6% i 39,3% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Uczennice podstawówek i liceów dokonały takiej oceny istotnie częściej (.01 i .001) niż uczniowie. *Młodszy koledzy* tak zostali ocenieni przez mniej niż 10% respondentów, z wyjątkiem 21,4% licealistów. Analogicznie niskie są odsetki wskazań dorosłych jako najczęściej napadających.

Nieco częściej (poniżej 30%) miano takie uzyskiwali rówieśnicy. Takiej kwalifikacji dokonało istotnie więcej (2,55; .03) uczniów (26,2%) niż uczennic (10,6%) podstawówek.

Zestawione w tabeli 22 rozkłady procentowe obrazują ukierunkowanie obserwowanej przez uczniów agresji dziewczyn.

Tabela 22. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Na kogo z reguły jest skierowana agresja dziewcząt?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%/t	L/p	%	L	%
na kobiety	22	33,3	20	23,8	42	28,0	90	38,3	21	13,1	111	28,1	53	69,7	10	35,7	63	60,6
t; p							6,09; .000						3,26; .000					
na mężczyzn	14	21,2	33	39,3	47	31,3	73	31,1	97	60,6	170	43,0	7	9,2	4	14,9	11	10,6
t; p	2,68; .01						6,02; .000											
na kobiety i na mężczyzn	12	18,2	20	23,8	32	21,3	72	30,6	42	26,3	114	28,9	16	21,1	14	50,0	30	28,8
t; p													3,02; .000					
na rówieśników	7	10,6	5	6,0	12	8,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
na młodszych kolegów	11	16,7	6	7,1	17	11,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Odpowiedziało 377 uczennic i 272 uczniów, łącznie 649 osób.

Najczęściej obserwowano *agresję dziewczyn skierowaną na kobiety* oraz *na mężczyzn*. *Skierowanie na kobiety* wskazało 33,3% uczennic i 23,8% uczniów podstawówek oraz bardzo znamienne więcej (6,09; .000) gimnazjalistek (38,3%) i licealistek 69,7% (3,26; .01) niż gimnazjalistów (13,1%) i licealistów (35,7%).

Z reguły skierowanie agresji na kobiety wskazało istotnie więcej licealistek niż uczennic podstawówek (4,39; .000) i gimnazjalistek (5,31; .000) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,0; .05).

Na drugim miejscu pod względem częstości wskazań obserwowanej agresji dziewczyn znaleźli się mężczyźni. Miano ofiar przyznało im : 21,2% uczennic i 39,3% uczniów podstawówek (2,68; .001) oraz 31,1% gimnazjalistek i 60,6% gimnazjalistów (6,02; .000), a także 9,2 % i 14,9% uczęszczających do liceów.

Trzecie miejsce pod względem częstości uzyskało ukierunkowanie agresji dziewczyn zarówno na kobiety jak i na mężczyzn.

Taką opinię podzieliło 18,2% uczennic i 23,8 % uczniów podstawówek, 30,6% gimnazjalistek i 26,3% gimnazjalistów oraz bardzo istotnie mniej (3,02; .000) licealistek (21,1%) niż licealistów (50%).

Ukierunkowanie agresji dziewczyn z reguły na rówieśników oraz na młodszych kolegów wskazało 8% i 11,35 uczęszczających do podstawówek.

W tabeli 23 zestawiono rozkłady procentów obrazujące ukierunkowanie obserwowanej przez uczniów agresji mężczyzn/chłopców.

Tabela 23. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Na kogo z reguły są skierowane zachowania agresywne mężczyzn/chłopców?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczeta N=119		chłopcy N=153		razem N=272		dziewczeta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
na kobiety	7	10,6	3	3,6	10	6,7	34	28,6	14	9,2	48	17,6	7	9,2	1	3,6	8	7,7
t; p	4,08; .000																	
na mężczyzn	16	24,2	41	48,8	57	38,0	73	61,3	97	63,4	170	62,5	42	55,3	19	67,8	61	58,7
t; p	3,26; .01																	
na kobiety i mężczyzn	23	34,9	12	14,3	35	23,3	12	10,1	42	27,4	54	19,9	27	35,5	8	28,6	35	33,6
t; p	2,94; .000																	
na rówieśników	6	9,1	13	15,5	19	12,7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
na młodszych	14	21,2	15	17,8	29	19,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Odpowiedziało 261 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 526 osób.

Tylko uczęszczający do podstawówek, jako ofiary agresji chłopców wskazali młodszych (21,2% i 15,5%) oraz rówieśników (9,1% i 15,5%).

Stosunkowo najczęściej za ofiary obserwowanych aktów agresji chłopców/mężczyzn wskazywano mężczyzn oraz równocześnie kobiety i mężczyzn. Mężczyzn jako ofiary wskazało istotnie (3,26; .01) więcej uczniów (48,8%) niż uczennic (24,2%) podstawówek oraz ponad 60% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i około 60% uczęszczających do liceów. Takie wskazanie dało istotnie więcej (2,18; .05) licealistów niż uczniów podstawówek.

Ukierunkowanie obserwowanej agresji chłopców z reguły zarówno na kobiety jak i mężczyzn wskazało bardzo znamienne (2,94; .000) więcej uczennic (34,9%) niż uczniów (14,3%) podstawówek, bardzo znamienne (3,91; .000) gimnazjalistów (27,4%) niż gimnazjalistek (10,1%) oraz około 30 % uczęszczających do liceów. Zarówno na kobiety jak i na mężczyzn wskazało *jako ofiary agresji* chłopców/mężczyzn; bardzo znamienne więcej (3,83; .000) uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek; licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (4,14; .000) oraz istotnie więcej (2,49; .02) gimnazjalistów niż uczniów podstawówek.

Na kobiety jako ofiary agresji męskiej wskazało bardzo znamienne więcej (4,08; .000) gimnazjalistek (28,6%) niż gimnazjalistów (9,2%) i po kilka procent uczennic i uczniów liceów.

3.5. Ofiary ataków spotykane najczęściej

Dane zestawione w tabeli 24 przedstawiają procenty wskazań najczęstszych ofiar spostrzeganej agresji

Tabela 24. Rozkład procentów liczebności odpowiedzi na pytanie: Kto najczęściej bywa ofiarą agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczeta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczeta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
młodszy koledzy	22	33,3	31	36,9	53	35,3	71	39,7	74	48,4	145	43,7	31	40,8	11	39,3	42	40,4
osoby niepełnosprawne	6	9,1	3	3,6	9	6,0	8	4,5	6	3,9	14	4,2	1	1,3	1	3,6	2	1,9
starsi ludzie	3	4,5	3	3,6	6	4,0	10	5,6	8	5,2	18	5,4	1	1,3			1	1,0
osoby wyróżniające się wyglądem	28	42,4	34	40,5	62	41,3	90	50,3	65	42,5	155	46,7	43	56,6	16	57,1	59	56,7
rówieśnicy	7	10,6	13	15,4	20	13,3												

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 586 osób.

Najczęściej, jako ofiary spostrzeganej agresji, respondenci wskazywali *osoby wyróżniające się wyglądem*: 42,8% i 40,5%, 50,3% i 42,5% oraz 56,6% i 57,1% wskazań z kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Na drugim miejscu, pod względem częstości wskazań, jako ofiary spostrzeganej agresji znaleźli się *młodszy koledzy*; 33,3% i 36,9%, 39,7% i 48,4% oraz 40,8% i 39,3% wskazań. *Najczęściej na ofiary typowano osoby niepełnosprawne, starszych ludzi i rówieśników* (kilka bądź kilkanaście procent).

W tabeli 25 zestawiono rozkłady procentów wskazań wielokrotnie atakowanych rówieśników.

Tabela 25. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy wśród Twoich rówieśników są wielokrotnie atakowani?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	26	39,4	39	46,4	65	43,3	97	54,2	73	47,7	170	51,2	28	36,8	15	53,6	43	41,3
nie	40	60,6	45	53,6	85	56,7	82	45,8	80	52,3	162	48,8	48	63,2	13	46,4	61	58,7

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 586 osób.

Wielokrotne atakowanie rówieśników obserwowało 39,4% uczennic i 46,4% uczniów podstawówek, 52,2% gimnazjalistek i 47,7% gimnazjalistów oraz 36,8% licealistek i 53,6% licealistów. Gimnazjalistki spostrzegały to istotnie częściej niż uczennice podstawówek (2,09; .05) i licealistki (2,61; .02).

W tabeli 26 zestawiono odsetki nie atakowanych rówieśników.

Tabela 26. Rozkład procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy wśród swoich rówieśników masz takich, którzy nie są atakowani?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	41	62,1	38	45,2	79	52,7	99	55,3	54	35,3	153	46,1	50	65,8	16	57,1	66	63,5
t; p	2,06; .05						3,73; .000											
nie	25	37,0	46	54,8	71	47,3	80	44,7	99	64,7	179	53,9	26	34,2	12	42,9	38	36,5

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 586 osób.

Ponad połowa badanych uczennic oraz 45,2%, 35,3% i 57,1% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji nie obserwowało w swoim otoczeniu nieatakowania rówieśników. Tak oznajmiło istotnie (2,06; .05) więcej uczennic niż uczniów podstawówek i bardzo znamienne (3,73; .000) więcej gimnazjalistek niż gimnazjalistów.

3.6. Percepcja antecedensów i współdeterminantów zachowań agresywnych

Tabela 27. Rozkład procentowy spostrzegania czynników (okoliczności) poprzedzających agresywne zachowania

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=39			chłopcy N=34			dziewczeta N=90			chłopcy N=80			dziewczeta N=153			chłopcy N=86		
	L	%		L	%		L	%		L	%		L	%		L	%	
zdrada kolegi/ koleżanki	4	10,3		4	11,8		5	5,5		1	1,2		6	3,5		11	7,2	
krzywdząca opinia	3	7,7		8	23,5		10	11,1		8	10,0		18	10,6		30	19,6	
doznanie ataku	5	12,8		5	14,7		12	13,3		40	50,0		52	30,6		31	20,3	
t; p	5,53; .000																	
poniżenie	16	41,0		10	29,4		26	28,9		21	26,3		47	27,6		21	12,8	
niepokój	1	2,6		1	2,9		2	3,3		2	2,5		5	2,9		9	5,9	
brak poczucia bezpieczeństwa	2	5,1		1	2,9		3	4,1		10	11,1		13	7,7		9	5,9	
gniew	8	10,5		5	14,7		13	17,8		24	26,7		29	17,1		42	27,4	
t; p	3,8; .000																	

Odpowiedziało 282 uczennic i 200 uczniów, łącznie 482 osoby.

Antecedensem najczęściej obserwowanym okazało się **poniżenie**. Wskazało je 41% uczennic i 29,4% podstawówek, 28,9% gimnazjalistek i 26,3% gimnazjalistów oraz 17,2% licealistek i 12,8 licealistów. Poniżenie, jako antecedens agresywnego zachowania wskazało istotnie więcej : uczennic podstawówek niż licealistek (2,67; .01), uczniów podstawówek niż licealistów (2,21; .05) i gimnazjalistów niż licealistów (2,21; .05).

Doznanie ataku, jako okoliczność poprzedzającą agresywne zachowanie, wskazało 12,8% uczennic i 14,7% uczniów podstawówek, 13,3% gimnazjalistek i bardzo znacznie więcej (5,53; .000 oraz 17,2% licealistek i 26,7% licealistów. Taką opinię wyraziło bardzo istotnie więcej gimnazjalistów niż uczniów podstawówek (4,28; .000) i licealistów (3,87; .000).

Gniew, za antecedens agresywnego zachowania uznało 10,5% uczennic i 17,7% uczniów podstawówek, 26,7% gimnazjalistek i 6,2% gimnazjalistów (3,8; .000) oraz 27,4% licealistek i 29,1% licealistów. Taka opinię podzieliło istotnie mniej gimnazjalistów niż licealistów (4,1; .000).

Zdradę (sprzeniewierzenie zaufania) kolegi/koleżanki, jako antecedens agresywnego zachowania wskazało 10,3% uczennic i 11,8% uczniów podstawówek oraz przez 1,2% i 3,5% uczęszczających do kolejnych dwóch szczebli edukacji.

Krzywdząca opinia stanowiła dla 7,7% i 23,5%, 11,1% i 10% oraz 19,6% i 16,3% badanych spostrzegany antecedens agresywnego zachowania. Mniej niż 10% badanych za czynnik poprzedzający zachowanie agresywne uznało niepokój i bardzo znacznie więcej za taki czynnik uznało *brak poczucia bezpieczeństwa*.

W tabeli 28 zestawiono odsetki wskazań czynników najczęściej współwystępujących z agresją.

Tabela 28. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytania: Co, twoim zdaniem najczęściej wywołuje agresję?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowej						gimnazjalnej						licealnej					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
poczucie bezradności	16	24,2	23	27,4	39	26,0	76	42,5	40	26,1	116	34,9	39	51,3	15	53,6	54	51,9
t; p							3,21; .01											
chęć rozwiązania konfliktu	16	24,2	25	29,8	41	27,3	64	35,8	66	43,1	130	39,2	28	36,8	13	46,2	41	39,4
niedowar-tościowanie	24	36,4	18	21,4	42	28,0	79	44,1	41	26,8	120	36,1	8	10,5	14	50,0	22	21,2
t; p			2,02; .05				3,39; .001						3,92; .000					
chęć zdobycia szacunku	34	51,5	38	45,2	72	48,0	93	52,0	69	41,1	162	48,8	36	47,4	13	46,2	49	47,1
chęć wyładowania złości	48	72,7	34	40,8	82	54,7	133	74,3	76	49,7	209	62,9	20	26,3	17	60,7	37	35,6
t; p			5,12; .000				4,37; .000						3,34; .000					
brak perspektyw, szans powodzenia	9	13,6	7	8,3	16	10,7	47	26,3	30	19,6	77	23,2	32	42,1	16	57,1	48	46,2
poczucie niesprawiedliwości	28	42,4	39	46,4	77	51,3	90	50,3	65	42,5	155	46,7	48	63,2	16	57,1	64	61,5
brak przyjaciół	21	31,8	23	27,4	44	29,3	72	40,2	35	22,9	107	32,2	31	40,8	11	39,3	42	40,4
t; p							3,46; .000											
inne							3	1,7	10	6,5	13	3,9						

Odpowiedzi udzieliło 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 576 osób.

Zdecydowanie dominującym czynnikiem, najczęściej wywołującym agresję okazała się **chęć wyładowania złości**. Takiego mniemania było 72,7% uczennic i 40,8 % uczniów podstawówek, 74,3% gimnazjalistek i 49,7% gimnazjalistów oraz 26,3% licealistek i 60,7% licealistów. Bardzo znamienne statystycznie (.000) różnią się odsetki uczennic i uczniów, którzy podali taką ocenę. Uczyniło tak istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek i gimnazjalistek niż uczniów podstawówek i gimnazjalistów oraz istotnie więcej licealistów niż licealistek.

Taki rozkład procentów wskazań wydaje się mieć związek, w przypadku uczennic, z szybszym dojrzewaniem emocjonalnym dziewcząt, które przejawia się również zwiększeniem kontroli gniewu. Odsetki wskazań uczniów nie sugerują natomiast takiego postępu.

Chęć zdobycia szacunku, jako najczęściej wywołującą agresję, została wskazana przez prawie połowę ogółu respondentów. Taką rekomendację dość zgodnie dało 51,5% i 45,2%, 52% i 41,5% oraz 47 i 46,2% uczennic i uczniów z kolejnych szczebli edukacji (różnice nieistotne).

Poczucie niesprawiedliwości również uznano za należące do najczęstszych motywów agresji. Wskazało je 42,4% uczennic i 46,4% uczniów podstawówek, 50,3% gimnazjalistek i 42,5% gimnazjalistów oraz 63,2 licealistek i 57,1% licealistów. Takich wskazań dało istotnie więcej (2,53; .02) licealistek niż uczennic podstawówek.

Niedowartościowanie zostało zaliczone do czynników najczęściej wywołujących agresję przez 36,4% uczennic i 21,4% uczniów podstawówek (2,02; .05), 44,1% gimnazjalistek i 26,8% gimnazjalistów (3,39; .002) oraz bardzo znamienne więcej (3,92; .000) licealistów (50%) niż licealistek (40,5%) i gimnazjalistów (2,3; .05) oraz uczniów i uczennic podstawówek (3,76;.000).

Brak przyjaciół, to następny z najczęstszych powodów agresji wskazany przez 31,8% uczennic i 27,4% uczniów podstawówek, 40,2% gimnazjalistek i 22,9% gimnazjalistów (3,46; .000) oraz przez 40,8% licealistek i 39,3% licealistów. Powód ten istotnie wskazało więcej licealistów niż gimnazjalistów (2,68; .01).

Chęć rozwiązania konfliktów jako powód agresji wskazała znacząca część badanych : 24,2% i 29,8%, 35,*% i 43,1% oraz 36,8% i 46,2% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli szkolnej edukacji. Tak mniemało istotnie mniej uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,08; .05) i licealistów (5,56; .000).

Poczucie bezradności jako powód najczęściej wywołujący agresję zostało wskazane przez najstarsze uczennice(51,3%) i uczniów (53,6%), a najrzadziej przez najmłodszych (24,2% i 27,4%) oraz przez bardzo znamienne (3,21;.001) więcej gimnazjalistek (42,5%) niż gimnazjalistów (26,1). Tak też uważało znamienne statystycznie mniej; uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,84; .01) i licealistek (3,81; .000); uczniów podstawówek (2,57; .02) i gimnazjalistów(3,79; .000) niż licealistów.

Brak perspektyw (szans powodzenia) to motyw najczęściej wskazywany przez najstarsze uczennice (42,1%) i uczniów (57,1%), a najrzadziej przez najmłodszych respondentów (13,6% i 8,3%), a po środku plasują się procenty wskazań uczęszczających do gimnazjów (26,3% i 19,6%). Taki pogląd podzielało istotnie mniej : uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,84; .01) i licealistek (3,81; .000); uczniów podstawówek (2,47; .02) i gimnazjalistów (2,71;.01) niż licealistów.

Tabela 29 zawiera odsetki zachowań agresywnych w sytuacjach niewiedzy jak inaczej można się zachować.

Tabela 29. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy są sytuacje, w których reagujesz agresją, ponieważ nie wiesz jak inaczej mógłbyś się zachować?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=100		chłopcy N=107		razem N=207		dziewczęta N=322		chłopcy N=304		razem N=626		dziewczęta N=220		chłopcy N=114		razem N=334	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	23	23,0	33	30,8	56	27,0	164	50,9	158	52,0	322	51,4	104	47,3	57	50,0	161	48,2
nie	63	63,0	62	57,9	125	60,4	139	43,2	118	38,8	257	41,1	84	38,2	36	31,6	120	35,9
nie wiem	14	14,0	12	11,2	26	12,6	19	5,9	28	9,2	47	7,5	32	14,5	21	18,4	53	15,9

Odpowiedziało 642 uczennic i 525 uczniów, łącznie 1167.

Zachowania agresywne, jako reakcje na sytuację braku wiedzy o możliwości innego zachowania, wskazało 23% uczennic i 30,8% uczniów podstawówek, 50,9% gimnazjalistek i 52% gimnazjalistów oraz 47,3% licealistek i 50% licealistów.

Najmniejszy odsetek odpowiedzi „tak” uczennic podstawówek istotnie różni się od wyższych od niego odsetek gimnazjalistek (5,37; .000) i licealistek (2,97; .01).

Odpowiedzi „nie” udzieliło 63% uczennic i 57,9% uczniów podstawówek, 43,2% gimnazjalistek i 38,8% gimnazjalistów oraz 38,2% licealistek i 31,6% licealistów. Reakcjom agresywnym na sytuację niewiedzy zaprzeczyło bardzo istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (3,56; .000) i licealistek (4,25; .000) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (3,45; .000) i licealistów (4,07; .000). Natomiast brak wiedzy o możliwościach nieagresywnego zachowania się wykazała połowa badanych z drugiego i trzeciego szczebla edukacji oraz 23% i 30,8% badanych z pierwszego szczebla edukacji.

W tabeli 30 zestawiono rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie : co twoim zadaniem, sprzyja atakowaniu innych ?

Tabela 30. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie : Co, twoim zadaniem, sprzyja atakowaniu innych ?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=101		chłopcy N=96		razem N=197		dziewczeta N=400		chłopcy N=391		razem N=791		dziewczeta N=220		chłopcy N=114		razem N=334	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
duża swoboda	46	45,5	39	40,6	85	43,1	218	54,5	167	42,7	385	48,7	116	52,7	55	48,2	171	51,2
t; p							3,34; .000											
zbyt surowy reżim domowy	15	14,9	9	9,4	24	12,2	74	18,5	79	20,2	153	19,3	40	18,2	25	21,9	65	19,5
dyscyplina domowa nie ma znaczenia	40	39,6	48	50,0	88	44,7	108	27,0	145	37,1	253	32,0	64	29,1	34	29,8	98	29,3
t; p							3,69; .000											

Odpowiedziało 721 uczennic i 601 uczniów, łącznie 1322 osoby.

Duża swoboda, sprzyja atakowaniu innych, zdaniem 45,5% uczennic i 40,6% uczniów podstawówek, 54,5% gimnazjalistek i 42,7% gimnazjalistów (3,34; .000) oraz 52,7% licealistek i 48,2% licealistów.

Zbyt surowy reżim domowy sprzyja atakowaniu innych, zdaniem 14,9% uczennic i 9,4% uczniów podstawówek, 18,5% gimnazjalistek i 20,2% gimnazjalistów oraz 18,2% licealistek i 21,9% licealistów.

Zestawione odsetki nie potwierdzają potocznej legendy o sprzyjaniu atakowania innych przez wysoki rygoryzm domowy. Atakowanie innych sprzyja w większym stopniu duża swoboda niż zbyt surowy reżim domowy.

Zdaniem znacznego odsetka respondentów dyscyplina domowa nie ma znaczenia jako czynnik sprzyjający atakowaniu innych. Tak uważało 39,6% uczennic i 50% uczniów podstawówek, 27% gimnazjalistek i 50% uczniów podstawówek, bardzo znacznie mniej gimnazjalistek, niż gimnazjalistów (3,69; .000).

Istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,36; .02) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,28; .05) i licealistów (3,03; .01) nie uznało znaczenia dyscypliny domowej jako czynnika sprzyjającego atakowaniu innych.

W tabeli 31 zestawiono odsetki wykazań okoliczności najczęściej wyzwalających agresję młodzieży.

Tabela 31. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Co. Twoim zadaniem, najczęściej wyzwała agresję młodzieży?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
chwalenie innych	22	33,3	23	27,4	45	30,0	41	22,9	48	31,4	89	26,8	10	13,2	9	32,2	19	18,3
t; p													1,97; .051					
przezywanie	39	63,3	50	59,5	89	59,3	131	73,2	91	59,5	222	66,9	57	75,0	16	57,1	73	70,2
t; p							2,65; .01											
zyskanie uznania	7	10,6	9	10,7	26	17,3	20	11,2	32	20,9	52	15,7	6	7,9	4	14,3	10	9,6
atakowanie osób najbliższych	9	13,6	-	-	9	6,0	84	46,9	44	28,8	128	38,6	42	55,3	14	50,0	56	53,8
t; p							3,46; .001											
wzbudzenie podziwu płci przeciwnej	-	-	12	14,3	12	8,0	44	24,6	38	24,8	82	24,7	11	14,5	5	17,9	16	15,4
zamach na dobra osobiste	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	26,3	34	22,2	81	24,4	25	32,9	10	35,7	35	33,6
programy tv, gry komputerowe	-	-	-	-	-	-	84	46,9	50	32,1	134	40,4	45	59,2	11	39,3	56	53,8
t; p							2,65; .01						2,11; .05					
inne, brak odpowiedzi	7	10,6	17	20,2	24	16,0	7	3,9	7	4,6	14	4,2	1	1,3	3	10,7	4	3,8

Odpowiedzi uzyskano od 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, a więc od 576 osób.

Najczęściej wyzwalają agresję *wyzwiska (przezywanie)*, to opinia 63,3% uczennic i 59,5% uczniów podstawówek, znacznie więcej (2,65; .01) gimnazjalistek (73,2%) niż gimnazjalistów (59,5%) oraz 75% licealistek i 57,1% licealistów.

Na drugim miejscu pod względem częstości ułożywały się **programy telewizyjne i gry komputerowe**. Wskazało je istotnie więcej (2,65; .01) gimnazjalistek (46,9%) niż gimnazjalistów (32,1%) i (2,11; .05) licealistek (59,2%) niż licealistów (39,3%).

Chwalenie innych zajęło trzecie miejsce pod względem częstości, jako najczęściej wyzwalające agresję młodzieży. Wskazało je 33,3% uczennic i 27,4% uczniów podstawówek, 22,9% gimnazjalistek i 31,4% gimnazjalistów oraz 13,2% licealistek i 32,2% licealistów (różnica na granicy statystycznej istotności ; 1,97; .051). Chwalenie innych wymieniło istotnie więcej (2,88; .01) uczennic podstawówek niż licealistek.

Atakowanie osób najbliższych wskazało 13,6% uczennic podstawówek, bardzo znamienne (3,46; .001) więcej gimnazjalistek (46,9%) niż gimnazjalistów (28,8%) oraz 55,3% licealistek i 50% licealistów. Licealiści wymieniali osoby najbliższe istotnie częściej niż gimnazjaliści (2,09; .05).

Wzbudzenie podziwu płci przeciwnej jako najczęściej wyzwalające agresję młodzieży zostało wskazane przez 14,3% uczniów podstawówki, 24,6% gimnazjalistek i 24,8% gimnazjalistów oraz 14,5% licealistek i 17,9% licealistów. Tak uważało istotnie więcej gimnazjalistek (2,02; .05) oraz gimnazjalistów niż uczniów podstawówek (2,03; .05).

Zamach na dobra osobiste jako najczęściej wywołujący agresję młodzieży wymieniło 26,3% gimnazjalistek i 22,2% gimnazjalistów oraz 32,9% licealistek i 35,7% licealistów. Licealiści istotnie częściej niż gimnazjaliści dali taką odpowiedź.

Zyskanie uznania (prestiz) uznało za najczęściej wyzwalające agresję młodzieży 10,6% i 10,7% respondentów najmłodszych, 11,22% gimnazjalistek i 20,9% gimnazjalistów oraz 7,9% licealistek i 14,3% licealistów.

Odsetki zestawione w tabeli 32 przedstawiają rozkład opinii uczniów na temat zachowania przez środki społecznego przekazu, filmy i gry komputerowe do niewłaściwego zachowania

Tabela 32. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy do niewłaściwego zachowania zachęcają środki społecznego przekazu, filmy, gry komputerowe?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=167		chłopcy N=180		razem N=347		dziewczęta N=393		chłopcy N=361		razem N=754		dziewczęta N=220		chłopcy N=111		razem N=331	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	104	62,3	79	43,9	183	52,7	277	70,5	214	59,3	491	65,1	186	84,6	71	64,0	257	77,6
t; p	3,49; .000						3,24; .01						3,99; .000					
nie	36	21,6	74	41,1	110	31,7	87	22,1	100	27,7	187	24,8	30	13,6	32	28,8	62	18,7
nie wiem	27	16,1	27	15,0	54	15,6	29	7,4	47	13,0	76	10,1	4	1,8	8	7,2	12	3,6

Odpowiedziało 780 uczennic i 652 uczniów, łącznie 1432 osoby.

Twierdzącej odpowiedzi udzieliło bardzo znamiennej więcej uczennic niż uczniów trzech szczebli edukacji : 62,3% uczennic i 43% uczniów podstawówek (3,49; .000), 70,5% gimnazjalistek i 59,3% gimnazjalistów (3,24; .01) oraz 84,6% licealistek i 64% licealistów (3,99; .000). Taką odpowiedź dało bardzo znacznie więcej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (4,36; .000) i uczennic podstawówek (5,09; .000) oraz istotnie mniej uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (3,42; .000) i licealistów (3,41; .000).

Przecząco odpowiedziało istotnie mniej licealistek niż gimnazjalistek (2,72; .01) i uczennic podstawówek (2,03; .05).

„Nie wiem” odpowiedziało istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,78; .02) i licealistek (4,18; .000) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż licealistów (2,15; .05).

3.7. Reakcje własne i rówieśników na ataki agresji, oraz na zyski i straty wynikające z dokonywanych ataków

Tabela 33 zawiera odsetki najczęstszych reakcji badanych na atak agresji

Tabela 33. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Co najczęściej czynisz widząc atak agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=145		razem N=324		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
dołączasz do atakujących	-	-	8	9,5	8	5,3	10	5,6	20	13,8	30	9,3	2	2,6	1	3,6	3	2,9
dołączasz do obrony	42	63,6	38	45,2	80	53,3	88	49,2	55	37,9	143	41,1	30	39,5	14	50,0	44	42,3
t; p	2,29; .05						2,81;											
stoisz z boku	14	21,2	25	29,8	39	26,0	81	45,2	70	48,3	151	46,6	44	57,9	13	46,4	57	54,8
odchodzisz, uciekasz	10	15,2	13	15,5	23	15,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 257 uczniów, łącznie 578 osób.

Najczęstszą reakcją na widok ataku agresji było **dołączenie się do obrony**. Do takiej reakcji przyznało się 63,6% uczennic i 45,2% uczniów podstawówek (2,29; .05), 49,2% gimnazjalistek i 37,9% gimnazjalistów (2,81; .000) oraz 39,5% licealistek i 50% licealistów.

Dołączenie do obrony zadeklarowało istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (2,06; .05) i licealistek (3,22; .01).

Znaczne odsetki badanych **stało z boku i gapiło się** na atak agresji. Bierne zachowanie zadeklarowało 57,9% licealistek i 46,4% licealistów, 45,2% i 48,3% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 21,2% uczennic i 28,8% uczniów podstawówek.

Biernie zachowało się bardzo znamienne mniej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (3,89; .000) i licealistek (5,41; .000) oraz uczniów podstawówek niż gimnazjalistów (2,89; .01).

Odejście (ucieczkę) od ataków agresji zadeklarowało 15% najmłodszych badanych.

Najrzadziej, badani przyznali się do **dolączania do atakujących**. Tak zadeklarowało 9,5% uczniów najmłodszych, 5,6% gimnazjalistek i 13,8% gimnazjalistów oraz 2,6% licealistek i 3,6% licealistów.

W tabeli 34 zestawiono odsetki odpowiedzi badanych, obrazujące obserwowane przejawy chęci przeciwstawiania się kolegów z klasy agresji.

Tabela 34. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Czy ktoś z Twojej klasy chce przeciwstawić się agresji?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół											
	gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
tak	83	46,4	58	37,9	141	42,5	34	44,7	13	46,4	47	45,2
nie	8	4,5	24	15,7	32	9,6	-	-	2	7,1	2	9,0
nie wiem	88	49,1	71	46,4	159	47,9	42	53,3	13	46,4	55	52,9

Odpowiedziało 255 uczennic i 181 uczniów, łącznie 436 osób.

Kolegów z klasy, chcących przeciwstawić się agresji, wskazało 46,4% gimnazjalistek i 37,9% gimnazjalistów oraz 44,7% licealistek i 46% licealistów. Zdaniem 4,5% gimnazjalistek i 15,7% gimnazjalistów nikomu z klasy nie chciało się przeciwstawić agresji. Prawie połowa bądź nieco więcej (46,4% do 53,3%) badani przypisali brak wiedzy na ten temat.

Tabela 35 zawiera odsetki wskazań korzyści wynikających dla badanego z dokonywanych ataków.

Tabela 35. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Jakie korzyści wyniknęły dla ciebie z dokonanych ataków?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczęta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczęta N=50		chłopcy N=46		razem N=96		dziewczęta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
pochwała rodzica	6	9,1	6	7,1	12	8,0	-	-	3	6,5	3	3,2	-	-	-	-	-	-
szacunek kolegów	5	7,6	17	20,2	22	14,7	5	10,0	16	34,8	21	21,8	6	7,9	7	25,0	13	12,5
t; p	2,31; .05						2,99; .01						2,30; .02					
uznanie własnej racji	6	9,1	8	9,5	14	9,3	10	20,0	15	32,6	25	26,0	23	30,3	10	35,7	33	31,7

poczucie szczęścia	3	4,5	5	6,0	8	5,3	6	12,0	10	25,7	16	16,7	6	7,9	4	14,3	10	9,6
odebranie czegoś	2	3,0	6	7,1	8	5,3	7	14,0	2	4,4	9	9,4	2	2,6	1	3,6	3	2,9
brak odpowiedzi	44	66,7	42	50,0	86	57,3	22	44,0	-	-	22	29,9	39	51,3	6	21,4	45	43,3
t; p	2,09; .05												3,1; .01					

Odpowiedziało 192 uczennice i 158 uczniów, łącznie 350 osób.

Ponad połowa uczęszczających do podstawówek, ponad 40% gimnazjalistek oraz 51,3% licealistek i 21,4% licealistów **nie udzieliło** odpowiedzi. Uczyniło tak istotnie więcej uczennic niż uczniów: podstawówek (2,09; .05) i liceów (3,1; .01) oraz bardzo znamienne więcej uczennic podstawówek niż gimnazjalistek (3,91; .000).

Szacunek kolegów, jako korzyść wynikającą dla badanego z dokonanych ataków wskazało istotnie mniej uczennic niż uczniów podstawówek (2,31; .05) gimnazjów (2,99; .01) i liceów (2,3; .02).

Uznanie własnej racji jako korzyść z dokonanych ataków, wskazało ponad 9% najmłodszych uczniów 20% i 32,6% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 30,3% licealistek i 35,7% licealistów. Takie wskazania dało stosunkowo najwięcej badanych uczęszczających do liceów. Zaskakuje i zdumiewa, że najstarsi uczniowie usiłują wymuszać uznanie własnych racji siłą pięści, a nie siłą argumentów. Procent wskazań licealistów jest bardzo znamienne wyższy od procentów wskazań uczennic (5,99; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (3,2; .01), procent wskazań licealistek – od uczennic (4,02; .000) i uczniów (3,95; .000) podstawówek.

Poczucie szczęścia, jako korzyść wynikającą z dokonanych ataków wymieniło 4,5% i 6% najmłodszych, 12% i 25,7% uczniów gimnazjów oraz 7,9% i 14,3% uczących się w liceach.

Taka opcję wskazało bardzo istotnie bądź istotnie więcej gimnazjalistów niż uczennic (6,75; .000) i uczniów (2,52; .01) podstawówek oraz licealistek (3,5; .000).

Odebranie czegoś, jako korzyść wyniesioną z ataku, wymieniło 3% i 7,1% najmłodszych uczniów, 14% gimnazjalistek i 4,4% gimnazjalistów oraz 2,6% i 3,6% z liceów. Odsetki wskazań nie różnicowały istotnie badanych.

Do pochwały rodziców za dokonane ataki przyznało się 9,1% i 7,1% najmłodszych uczniów oraz 6,5% gimnazjalistów.

Brak wypowiedzi, świadczący o nieprzyznaniu się do korzyści z ataków odnotowano w ankietach 66,7% uczennic i 50% uczennic podstawówek, 44% gimnazjalistek oraz 51,3% licealistek i 21,4% licealistów. Uczennice podstawówek (2,09; .05) i liceów (3,1; .01) istotnie częściej tak postąpiło niż uczniowie.

W tabeli 36 zestawiono rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytania : Co czułeś po dokonanym ataku?

Brak odpowiedzi świadczy o nieujawnieniu przez respondentów własnego odczucia po dokonanym ataku. Takim unikiem posłużyło się istotnie więcej uczennic podstawówek (2,58; .01) i liceów (2,91; .01) niż uczniów. Spośród gimnazjalistów od udzielenia odpowiedzi uchyliło się 40% uczennic.

Poczucie winy zadeklarowało 25,8% uczennic i 38,1% uczniów podstawówek (2,32; .01), 12% gimnazjalistek i 9,3% gimnazjalistów oraz 13,2% licealistek i 14,3% licealistów. Bardzo istotnie więcej uczniów najmłodszych niż gimnazjalistów (4,17; .000) i licealistów (2,81; .01) zadeklarowało takie odczucie.

Tabela 36. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Co czułeś po dokonanym ataku?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczeta N=50		chłopcy N=43		razem N=93		dziewczeta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
poczucie winy	17	25,8	32	38,1	49	32,7	6	12,0	4	9,3	10	10,7	10	13,2	4	14,3	14	13,5
wstyd	17	25,8	13	15,5	30	20,0	2	4,0	2	4,7	4	4,3	10	13,1	2	7,1	12	11,5
niesmak	7	10,6	11	13,1	18	12,0	5	10,0	4	9,3	9	9,7	11	14,5	3	10,7	14	13,5
dumą	4	6,0	8	9,5	12	8,0	4	8,0	9	20,9	13	14,0	1	1,3	-	-	1	1,0
satysfakcję	3	4,5	11	13,1	14	9,3	10	20,0	18	41,9	28	30,1	11	14,5	9	32,1	20	19,2
t; p										3,59; .000				4,4; .000				
inne	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	6,0	6	13,9	9	9,7	3	3,9	6	21,4	9	8,6
t; p														2,17; .05				
brak odpowiedzi	18	27,3	9	10,7	27	18,0	20	40,0	-	-	20	21,5	30	39,5	4	14,3	34	32,7
t; p		2,58; .01												2,91; .01				

Odpowiedziało 192 uczennice i 155 uczniów ,łącznie 347 osób.

Wstyd przeżyło 25,8% uczennic i 15,5% uczniów podstawówek 4% i 4,7% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 13,1% licealistek i 7,1% licealistów. Stosunkowo najwyższy procent wskazań odczuwanego wstydu przez uczennice podstawówek jest bardzo znamienne wyższy od procentów takich wskazań przez gimnazjalistki (7,73; .000) i gimnazjalistów (3,92; .000) oraz przez licealistki (3,28; .000) i licealistów (3,41; .000).

Trzecie pozytywne **odczucie niesmaku** po dokonanym ataku przeżyło 10,6% i 13,1% najmłodszych uczniów, 10% i 9,3% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 14,5% i 10,7% licealistek i licealistów.

Stosunkowo najwyższy odsetek (20,9%) wskazań *odczuwanej dumy* po dokonanych ataku przez gimnazjalistów (20,9%) jest istotnie wyższy (2,31; .01) od odsetka wskazań uczennic podstawówek (6%).

Stosunkowo najwyższy odsetek (41,9%) wskazań odczuwanej przez gimnazjalistów *satysfakcji* po dokonaniu ataku jest bardzo znamienne wyższy od odsetka wskazań gimnazjalistek (3,59; .000) , uczennic (4,97; .000) i uczniów (3,1; .003) podstawówek oraz licealistek (6,78; .000). Odsetek wskazań licealistów jest natomiast bardzo istotnie wyższy od procentów wskazań licealistek (4,4; .000) oraz uczennic i uczniów podstawówek.

Inne odczucie (nieokreślone) wskazało istotnie więcej licealistów niż licealistek (2,17; .05).

Od udzielenia *odpowiedzi uchyliło* się istotnie więcej uczennic niż uczniów podstawówek (2,58; .01) i liceów (2,91; .02). Stosunkowo najwyższy procent uchyień gimnazjalistek od udzielenia odpowiedzi jest bardzo istotnie wyższy od procentów uczennic podstawówek (4,23; .000) i istotnie wyższy od procentu licealistów (2,27; .05).

W tabeli 37 zamieszczono rozkłady procentów wskazanych skutków, jakie można przypisać zachowaniom agresywnym.

Tabela 37. Rozkłady procentów odpowiedzi na pytanie: Jakie skutki można przypisać zachowaniom agresywnym?

Odpowiedzi	Uczniowie szkół																	
	podstawowych						gimnazjalnych						licealnych					
	dziewczeta N=66		chłopcy N=84		razem N=150		dziewczeta N=179		chłopcy N=153		razem N=332		dziewczeta N=76		chłopcy N=28		razem N=104	
	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%	L	%
prestiz	8	12,1	9	10,7	17	11,3	28	15,6	40	26,1	68	20,5	11	14,5	6	21,4	17	16,5
podporządkowanie sobie kogoś	27	41,0	28	33,3	55	36,7	105	58,7	73	47,7	178	53,6	49	64,5	12	42,9	61	58,7
t; p													2,0; .05					
chwilowe uznanie	25	38,0	19	22,6	44	29,3	69	38,5	72	47,1	141	42,5	42	55,3	18	64,3	60	57,7
t; p	2,05; .05																	
dezaprobata kolegów	17	25,8	17	20,2	34	22,7	46	25,7	26	17,0	72	21,7	17	22,4	7	25,0	24	23,1
dezaprobata rodziców	36	54,6	41	48,8	77	51,3	35	19,6	19	12,4	54	16,3	20	26,3	6	21,4	26	25,0
nieprzyjemna kara	44	66,7	48	57,1	92	61,3	104	58,1	75	49,0	179	53,9	40	52,6	9	32,1	49	47,1
t; p													3,46; .000					
Inne	3	4,6	6	7,1	9	6,0	4	2,2	5	3,3	9	5,9	2	2,6	3	10,7	5	4,8
niezadowolnienie nauczycieli	36	54,6	41	48,8	77	51,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Odpowiedziało 321 uczennic i 265 uczniów, łącznie 586 osób.

Stosunkowo najczęściej badanych wskazało *nieprzyjemną karę*, jako możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań. Tak uczyniło 66,7% uczennic i 57,1% uczniów podstawówek, 58,1% gimnazjalistek i 49% gimnazjalistów oraz 52,6% licealistek i 32,1% licealistów (3,46; .000).

Drugie miejsce pod względem częstości wskazań zajęła *dezaprobatą rodziców*. Wskazało ją jako możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań 54,6% uczennic i 48,8% uczniów najmłodszych, 19,6% gimnazjalistek i 12,4% gimnazjalistów oraz 26,3% licealistek i 21,4 licealistów.

Stosunkowo najwyższy odsetek wskazań uczennic podstawówek bardzo znamienne różni się od procentów takich wskazań przez : gimnazjalistki (10,8; .000), gimnazjalistów (16,62; .000), licealistki (4,61; .000) i licealistów (5,08; .000).

Odsetek wskazań dezaprobaty rodziców przez uczniów podstawówek (48,8%) jest bardzo istotnie wyższy od odsetków wskazań przez gimnazjalistki (9,97; .000), gimnazjalistów (6,03; .000), licealistek (4,75; .000) i licealistów (4,76; .000).

Na trzecim miejscu, pod względem częstości wskazań znalazł się odsetek wskazań *podporządkowania sobie kogoś*, jako możliwego skutku agresywnych zachowań. Takie wskazanie dało 41% i 33,3% uczniów najmłodszych, 58,7% i 47,7% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 64,5% licealistek i 42,9% licealistów. Procenty wskazań uczennic trzech szczebli edukacji wyraźnie dominują nad odsetkami uczniów. W przypadku badanych licealistów jest to różnica istotna statystycznie (2,0; .05).

Stosunkowo najwyższy procent wskazań licealistek jest istotnie wyższy od procentów wskazań uczennic podstawówek (2,94; .01) i licealistów (2,52; .01) oraz bardzo znamienne większy od procentów wskazań uczniów podstawówek (6,90; .000) i licealistów (4,29; .000).

Stosunkowo najwyższy odsetek wskazań licealistek jest natomiast bardzo znamienne większy od odsetek wskazań tego z możliwych skutków przez uczennice (4,21; .000) i uczniów podstawówek (6,07; .000) oraz gimnazjalistów (2,95; .01).

Chwilowe uznanie jako możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań wskazało stosunkowo najczęściej licealistów (64,3%), istotnie więcej uczennic niż uczniów podstawówek (2,05; .05). Odsetek wskazań licealistów jest bardzo istotnie wyższy od odsetka wskazań uczennic (2,91; .003) i uczniów podstawówek (9,14; .000) oraz gimnazjalistek (7,09; .000). Odsetek wskazań licealistek jest natomiast bardzo znamienne większy od procentów wskazań gimnazjalistek (7,09; .000), uczniów (9,14; .000) i uczennic (2,9; .001) podstawówek.

Najmniejszy odsetek wskazań uczniów podstawówki różni się bardzo istotnie od odsetka wskazań gimnazjalistek (3,58; .000) i gimnazjalistów (5,37; .000).

Dezaprobatą kolegów, to możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań dla 22% i 20,2% najmłodszych uczniów, 25,7% i 17% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 22,4% i 25% uczęszczających do liceów.

Prestiż, jako możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań, wskazało 41% uczennic i 33,3% uczniów podstawówek, 58,7% gimnazjalistek i 47,7% gimnazjalistów oraz 64,5% licealistek i 42,9% licealistów.

Niezadowolnienie nauczycieli, jako możliwy skutek agresywnych zachowań wskazali jedynie najmłodsi badani: 54,6% uczennic i 48,8% uczniów.

Inne potencjalne skutki wskazało po kilka procent badanych, najwyżej – 10,7% licealistów.

4. Rekapitulacja ustaleń

4.1. Percepcja aktów agresji

Z przejawami agresji spotkało się 76,1%, 80,4% i 86,1% zbadanych, którzy uczęszczali do kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Najczęściej (88,2%) spotykały się z takimi atakami licealistki.

Z *atakami werbalnymi* spotkało się 42,6% uczęszczających do szkół podstawowych, 53,2% uczęszczających do gimnazjów i 67,4% do liceów, a z *atakami fizycznymi* – 20%, 12,5% i 67,4% badanych. Oba rodzaje ataków spostrzegało natomiast 24,5% uczennic i 48,2% uczniów gimnazjów.

Z *atakami agresji na terenie szkoły* najczęściej (ponad 50%) spotykali się uczniowie najmłodsi i gimnazjaliści oraz prawie 25% licealistów. Spośród najmłodszych istotnie częściej na terenie szkoły atakowane były uczennice niż uczniowie.

Na *osiedlu* agresje najczęściej spostrzegali licealiści (46,5%), i ponad 30% badanych z podstawówek i gimnazjów.

Do *wylądowania agresji w domu* przyznało się od 1,1% do 11% badanych. Do kłótni i awantur w rodzinie przyznała się ponad połowa uczennic oraz 28,1% gimnazjalistów i 35,7% licealistów.

Do *ataków agresji w rodzinie* rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu przyznało się od 5,9% do 24% badanych, a zaprzeczyło ich występowaniu od 42% (licealistki) do 76,1% (gimnazjaliści).

Z *agresją w szkole* nie spotkało się wcale 7,2% uczęszczających do podstawówek, 10,1% gimnazjalistów i 22% licealistów.

4.2. Percepcja siebie i innych jako ofiary oraz agresora

Ataków agresji doświadczyło 58,2%, 62,7% i 59,9% badanych z kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Istotnie częściej ofiarami byli uczniowie niż uczennice.

Do *atakowania innych* (kogokolwiek) przyznało się od 27,4% do 47% uczennic oraz od 56,5% do 75,1% uczniów z kolejnych szczebli.

Najczęściej atakowano kolegów (40,9% i 56%; 22% i 76,7%; 13,2% i 42,9%) i rodzeństwo (19,7% i 19%; 32% i 23,2%; 23,7% i 25%) uczennic i uczniów.

Do atakowania osób nie przyznało się : 56,5%, 48,5% i 63,2% uczennic oraz 22,6%, 20,1% i 28% uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Uczennice bardzo znamienne częściej niż uczniowie zaprzeczały atakowaniu innych.

Codziennie atakowało od 2,6% do 9,8% badanych. Kilka razy w tygodniu od 4% do 14,4% badanych , a rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu od 16,3 do 42,9% badanych.

Jako odwet za doznaną agresję potraktowało własne ataki 24,6% i 34,6% gimnazjalistów oraz 26,3% i 39,3% licealistów.

Rówieśników za mniej agresywnych od siebie uznało 23,5% i 17,7% badanych z gimnazjów oraz 15,8% i 7,1% uczęszczających do liceów, a za agresywnych w większym stopniu – 60,9% i 52,9% oraz 39,5% i 57,1% badanych.

4.3. Poczucie bezpieczeństwa wśród rówieśników oraz częstotliwość i nasilenie werbalnych i fizycznych ataków dziewcząt i chłopców

Bezpiecznie, bądź raczej bezpiecznie czuło się wśród rówieśników od 84,7% (uczniowie z podstawówki) do 93,4% (licealiści) badanych. Tego typu deklaracja przypomina przechwałki Stefka Burczymuchy.

Do grożenia, szantażowania i zastraszania przyznało się 21% uczęszczających do podstawówek oraz ponad 40% gimnazjalistów i licealistów.

Do poniżania i wyśmiewania przyznało się od 66,3% do 78,3% badanych, a do przeklinania, ubliżania i przezywania – 69%, 46% i 63,5% uczęszczających do kolejnych szczebli edukacji. Obmawiało mniej niż 10% badanych.

Z ataków fizycznych najczęściej spostrzegano: bicie-52,5% i 61,1%, 27,5% i 47% oraz 35,9% i 23,7% badanych.

Z *kopaniem* spotkało się 26,5% i 28,3% badanych z podstawówek, 12,7% i 44,6% uczęszczających do gimnazjów oraz 16,8% i 31,6% badanych z liceów.

Z szarpaniem spotkało się 28,3% i 30%, 13,5% i 39,3% oraz 39,2% oraz 39,2% i 21,5% badanych z kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Popychanie spostrzegało od 7% do 19% badanych (około 15% ogólnej liczby badanych). *Zaczepki* spostrzegało mniej niż 10% badanych.

4.4. Ocena agresywności dziewcząt i chłopców, jej nasilenia i ukierunkowania

Dziewczęta, *za również agresywne* uznało 41,6% uczennic i 62,5% uczniów podstawówek, 68,3% i 69,4% badanych z gimnazjów oraz 81,2% i 84% uczących się w liceum.

Dziewczęta, *za bardziej agresywne od chłopców* uznało 12% badanych z podstawówek, 52,5% gimnazjalistów i 7,8% licealistów.

Za agresywne tak samo jak chłopcy uznało dziewczęta 10,9% badanych z gimnazjów i 26% licealistów, a za mniej agresywne – od 88%, 36,6% i 60,7% badanych z kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Przezywanie, za charakterystyczne zarówno dla dziewcząt jak i dla chłopców uznało 86,6% i 83,8% badanych w gimnazjum oraz 89,3% i 85,7% badanych w liceach.

Groźenie za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało 47,5% gimnazjalistek i 26,8% gimnazjalistów oraz 50% licealistek i 32,1% licealistów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców uznało to zachowanie ponad 70% badanych z gimnazjów i liceów.

Poniżanie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało od 46,4% do 71,9% ankietowanych, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – od 62% do 71,4% ankietowanych.

Wysmiewanie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało 64,3% i 93,4% ankietowanych, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – 64,3% do 79,1% badanych.

Zastraszanie, jako charakterystyczne dla chłopców wskazało od 67,6 do 82,1% ankietowanych, a jako charakterystycznych dla dziewcząt – od 21,4% do 38%.

Wyludzanie pieniędzy za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało poniżej 9% uczennic oraz 12,4% i 7,1% uczniów gimnazjów i liceów a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców - 53,4% i 65,8% uczennic oraz 47,7% i 57,1% uczniów gimnazjów i liceów.

Szarpanie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało 45,2% i 51,3% uczennic oraz 48,5% i 39,3% uczniów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – 64,2% i 69,7% uczennic oraz 70,6% i 60,7% uczniów.

Kopanie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało mniej niż 20% (19,6% i 5,3%) uczennic oraz 23,5% i 10,7% uczniów.

Bicie, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało 26,8% i 22,4% uczennic oraz 21,6% i 17,9% uczniów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – 87,7% i 84,2% uczennic oraz 83% i 78,6% uczniów.

Rozbój – zabieranie przemocą, za charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt uznało mniej niż 13% uczennic i nie więcej niż 25% ankietowanych uczniów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – 50,3% i 64,5% uczennic oraz 53,6% i 46,4% uczniów.

Zadawanie ran stanowiło zachowanie charakterystyczne dla dziewcząt – dla 2,6% – 7,8% uczennic i dla 17,6% – 17,9% uczniów, a za charakterystyczne dla chłopców – dla 39,1% i 37,5% uczennic oraz 39,9% i 32,1% uczniów objętych badaniami.

Młodych ludzi za bardziej agresywnych obecnie niż dawniej uznało od 65,8% do 87,4% uczennic oraz od 52,1% do 77,5% uczniów.

Za brutalnych uznało swoich rówieśników 25% uczniów podstawówek i 37,4% gimnazjalistów i prawie 89% licealistów. Pozostali ankietowani (56,4% i 35,2% i 37,9%) tak nie uważali lub nie orientowali się (18,6%, 27,4% i 33,2%).

Jako *częściej atakujących* wskazano starszych kolegów (71,3%, 71,4% i 59,6%) przy czym istotnie częściej tak wskazywały uczennice niż uczniowie podstawówek i liceów.

Rówieśnicy, jako najczęściej atakujący, zostali wskazani przez nie więcej niż 13,2% uczennic oraz przez 26,2%, 18,3% i 17% uczniów.

Zdaniem 33,5%, 38,3% i 69,8% uczennic oraz 23,8%, 13,1% i 35,7% uczniów agresja dziewcząt z reguły jest *kierowana na kobiety*. Natomiast zdaniem 21,2%, 31,1% i 9,2% uczennic agresja bywa kierowana z reguły na mężczyzn. Na obie płcie agresja bywa kierowana zdaniem 18,2%, 31,6% i 21,1% uczennic oraz 23,8%, 26,8% i 50% uczniów.

Ukierunkowanie na rówieśników i młodszych wskazało 10,6% i 16,7% uczennic oraz 6% i 7,1% uczniów podstawówek.

Ukierunkowanie zachowań agresywnych mężczyzn z reguły na kobiety wskazało 28,6% gimnazjalistek i 10,6% uczennic podstawówek oraz po kilka procent pozostałych zbiorowości. Ukierunkowania na mężczyzn wskazało 24,2% i 67,8% uczniów. Ukierunkowanie na obie płcie wskazało od 10,1% (gimnazjalistki) do 35,5% (licealistki) objętych badaniami.

Skierowanie agresji mężczyzn na rówieśników wskazało 12,7% uczęszczających do podstawówek, a na młodszych – 19,3% badanych z podstawówek.

4.5. Ofiary ataków spotykane najczęściej

Osoby wyróżniające się wyglądem jako atakowane najczęściej zostały wskazane przez 42,1%, 40,5%, 50,3% i 42,5% oraz 56,6% i 56,7% badanych.

Młodszy koledzy zostali wskazani przez 33,3% i 36,9%, 39,7% i 48,4% oraz 40,8% i 39,5 % uczennic i uczniów.

Osoby niepełnosprawne i starsze wskazało mniej niż 10% badanych, a rówieśnicy zostali wskazani przez od 10,6% do 15,4% badanych z podstawówek.

Wielokrotnie atakowanych spośród rówieśników wskazało 39,4% i 46,4%, 54,2% i 47,2% oraz 36,8% i 41,3% badanych.

Wśród rówieśników nie spotkało wielokrotnie atakowanych 62,1%, 45,2%, 55,3% i 35,3% oraz 65,8% i 63,5% uczennic i uczniów objętych badaniami.

4.6. Percepcja antecedensów i współdeterminantów zachowań agresywnych

Najczęściej spostrzeganym czynnikiem poprzedzającym zachowanie agresywne było *poniżenie sprawcy agresji*, wskazane przez 41%, 21,4%, 28,9% i 26,3% oraz 17,2% i 12,8% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Na gniew wskazało 10,5%, 14,7%, 26,7% i 6,2% oraz 27,4% i 29,1% badanych.

Uprzednie doznanie ataku wskazało 12,8%, 14,7%, 13,7% i 50% oraz 20,3% i 26,7% objętych badaniem.

Krzywdzącą opinię wymieniło od 7,7% do 23,5% badanych z podstawówek.

Zdradę kolegi, niepokój i brak poczucia bezpieczeństwa wskazało od 1,2% do 11,4% badanych.

Chęć wyladowania złości wskazało 54,7%, 62,9% i 60,7% badanych z kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Chęć zdobycia szacunku wskazała prawie połowa badanych.

Poczucie niesprawiedliwości wskazało od 42,4% do 63,2% badanych.

Niedowartościowanie wskazało 10,5% (licealistki) do 50% (licealiści).

Brak przyjaźni wskazało od 34,8%, 40,2% i 40,8% uczennic oraz 27%, 22,9% i 39,3% uczniów.

Chęć rozwiązania konfliktu wskazało 24,2% i 29,8%, 35% i 43,1% oraz 36,8% i 46,2% badanych.

Poczucie bezradności najczęściej wskazywały 51,3% i 53,6% uczennice i uczniowie a najrzadziej 24,2% i 27,4% badań z podstawówek.

Brak perspektywy najczęściej (42,1% i 57,1%) wskazywały uczennice i uczniowie najstarsi, a najrzadziej (13,6% i 8,1%) najmłodsi.

Brak wiedzy na temat możliwości nieagresywnego zachowania wskazało 23% uczennic i 30,8% uczniów podstawówek, 50,9% i 52% badanych w gimnazjach oraz 47,3% i 50% uczęszczających do liceów.

Atakowaniu innych najczęściej sprzyja duża swoboda, według 45,5% i 40,6%, 54,5% i 42,8% oraz 52,7% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Zbyt duży reżim domowy wskazało od 9,4% (uczniowie podstawówek) do 21,9% (licealiści) badanych.

Dla 39,6% i 50% badanych z podstawówek, 27% i 37,1% oraz 29,1% i 29,7% dyscyplina domowa nie ma wpływu na atakowanie innych.

Przeżywanie za najbardziej wyzwalające agresję młodzieży uznało 63,3% i 59,5%, 73,2% i 59,5% oraz 75% i 57,1% uczennic i uczniów kolejnych szczebli.

Programy telewizyjne i gry komputerowe, wpływające na atakowanie wskazało 46% i 32,1% oraz 59,2% i 39,2% uczennic i uczniów gimnazjów i liceów.

Atakowanie bliskich, jako wyzwalające agresję, wskazało od 13,6% do 55% badanych, a chwalenie innych wskazało od 13,2% licealistek do 33,3% uczennic podstawówek.

Zamach na dobra osobiste, jako wyzwalające atak, wskazało od 22,2% gimnazjalistów do 35,7% licealistów.

Chęć zyskania uznania (prestżu) wywołuje taki agresji zdaniem 7,9% do 20,9% badanych.

Od 43,9% (gimnazjaliści) do 84,6% (licealistki) badanych wskazało na *zachęcanie do niewłaściwych zachowań przez środki masowego przekazu, filmy i gry komputerowe*.

4.7. Reakcje własne i rówieśników na ataki agresji oraz zyski i straty wynikające z dokonywanych ataków

Najczęstszą reakcją na widok agresji było dołączenie się do obrony 63,6% uczennic i 42,5% uczniów podstawówek, 49,2% i 37,9% badanych z gimnazjów oraz 39,5% i 50% uczęszczających do liceów.

Znaczne odsetki widzów stało z boku i gapiło się na atak (57,9% i 46,4% z liceów, 45,2% i 48,3% z gimnazjów oraz 21,2% i 28,8% uczących się w podstawówkach).

Odejście (ucieczkę) zadeklarowało 15% najmłodszych respondentów.

Dołączenie do atakujących zadeklarowało 9,5% uczniów najmłodszych, 5,6% gimnazjalistów oraz 2,6% licealistek i 3,6% licealistów.

Kolegów z klasy, chcących przeciwstawić się agresji wskazało 46,4% gimnazjalistek i licealistów oraz 44,7% licealistek i 37,9% gimnazjalistów.

Połowa badanych nie wiedziała jak postąpić w takiej sytuacji.

Tylko nieliczni respondenci (3,2% do 9,1%) – uzyskali pochwałę rodziców za dokonane ataki.

Szacunek kolegów uzyskało 20,2% uczniów podstawówek, 34,8% gimnazjalistów i 25% licealistów oraz 7,6% do 10% uczennic podstawówek i gimnazjów.

Uznanie własnej racji uzyskało od 9,1% do 30,3% uczennic oraz od 9,5% do 35,7% uczniów.

Poczucie szczęścia jako korzyść z dokonanego ataku wskazało 25,7% gimnazjalistów oraz po kilka bądź kilkanaście procent badanych.

Odebranie czegoś jako korzyść z ataku wskazało od 2,6% (licealistki) do 14% (gimnazjalistki).

Nie udzieliło odpowiedzi od 21,4% (licealiści) do 66,7% (uczniowie podstawówek) badanych.

Na pytanie : co czuleś po dokonanym ataku, nie udzieliło odpowiedzi 27,3% uczennic i 10,7% uczniów podstawówek, 40% gimnazjalistek oraz 39,5% licealistek i 14,3% licealistów.

Wstydzilo się po dokonanym ataku 25,8% i 15,5% najmłodszych respondentów, 4% i 4,7% gimnazjalistów oraz 14,5% i 10,7% licealistów.

Niesmak odczuło od kilku do kilkunastu procent badanych, a *dumę* – od 1,3% (licealistki) do 20,9% (gimnazjaliści) respondentów.

Satysfakcję odczuło od 4,5% (uczennice najmłodsze) do 41% (gimnazjaliści) badanych.

Spśród zdecydowanie negatywnych skutków zachowań agresywnych najczęściej wymieniano *nieprzyjemną karę* : 66,7% uczennic i 57,1% uczniów podstawówek, 58,1% gimnazjalistek i 49% gimnazjalistów oraz 52,6% licealistek i 32,1% licealistów.

Dezaprobatę rodziców wskazało 54,6% i 48,8% uczęszczających do podstawówek, 19,6% i 12,4%, respondentów z gimnazjów oraz 26,3% i 21,4% licealistów.

Dezaprobatę kolegów wskazało 25,8% i 20,2%, 25,7% i 17% oraz 22,4% i 25% badanych.

Ze skutków negatywnych podporządkowania sobie kogoś wskazało 41% i 33,3%, 58,7% i 47,7% oraz 64,5% i 42,9% uczennic i uczniów z kolejnych szczebli edukacji.

Chwilowe uznanie wskazało 38% i 22,6%, 38,5% i 47,1% oraz 55,3% i 64,3% badanych uczniów.

Prestiż jako skutek agresji wskazało 12,1% i 10,7%, 15,6% i 26,1% oraz 14,5% i 21,4% respondentów.

4.8. Kilka refleksji

Przedstawiony w miarę szczegółowo zarys spostrzegania własnych i cudzych zachowań agresywnych przez uczniów trzech szczebli edukacji, funkcjonujących w latach 1999-2019 w trakcie reformy systemu edukacji w Polsce oraz uwarunkowań i następstw tych zachowań skłania do refleksji nad dokonanymi ustaleniami badawczymi na podstawie odpowiedzi w ankietach udzielonych przez 1633 uczniów (835 uczennic i 798 uczniów) szkół podstawowych (179 dziewcząt i 188 chłopców uczęszczających do V i VI klasy szkół podstawowych), 801 (410 uczennic i 391 uczniów) gimnazjów i 465 (246 dziewcząt i 219 chłopców) licealistów.

Dokonane ustalenia nie ujawniły wyraźnego trendu spadkowego w częstotliwości zachowań agresywnych wraz z postępującym wiekiem uczniów. Uczniowie nie wiązali w swoich wizjach własnego dojrzewania i swojej dorosłości z opanowaniem i hamowaniem swoich agresywnych impulsów lecz z przyzwoleniem sobie na takie zachowania.

Pragnęli być dorosłymi, by móc przeklinać jak ojcowie i starsze rodzeństwo, palić papierosy, skutecznie odpierać wszystkie ataki, przyjmować używki itp.

Inicjatorzy i realizatorzy reformy systemu edukacji nie przewidzieli negatywnych następstw takiego przedsięwzięcia. Oby podobne pochopne „reformowanie” nigdy więcej nie było wprowadzone.

5.0. Zaprezentowane i opracowane wyniki badań pochodzą z wykonanych pod moim kierunkiem dwóch prac magisterskich i siedmiu prac licencjackich

Prace magisterskie :

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Zachowania agresywne, ich uwarunkowania i następstwa w percepcji uczniów trzech szczebli edukacji

Streszczenie

Badania przeprowadzono w latach 2005-2011 w ramach seminariów dyplomowych z psychologii resocjalizacyjnej za pomocą kwestionariusza ankiety zawierającej 37 uszczegółowionych pytań dotyczących :

- percepcji aktów agresji przez uczniów trzech kolejnych szczebli systemu edukacji, ich uczestnictwo i miejsce dokonywania ataków,
- percepcji siebie i innych osób w roli ofiary i agresora,
- poczucia bezpieczeństwa w kontekście spostrzeganych ataków werbalnych i fizycznych,
- oceny agresywności dziewcząt i chłopców, jej nasilenie i ukierunkowania,
- najczęściej spostrzeganych ofiar ataków,
- percepcji antecedensów i współdeterminantów zachowań agresywnych,
- reakcji własnych i rówieśników na spostrzegane ataki,
- dostrzeganie zysków (korzyści) i strat z dokonywania ataków.

Badaniami objęto blisko 2000 uczniów szkół podstawowych, gimnazjów i szkół ponadgimnazjalnych w Łodzi i czterech powiatach (kutnowskim, łęczyckim, łowickim i radomszczańskim województwa łódzkiego oraz w Starachowicach w województwie świętokrzyskim.

Za wiarygodne uznano informacje udzielane przez :

- 367 (179 dziewcząt i 188 chłopców) uczniów klas V i VI szkół podstawowych,
- 801 (410 uczennic i 391 uczniów) gimnazjów oraz
- 465 (246 dziewcząt i 219 chłopców) licealistów.

Udzielone odpowiedzi zestawiono w 37 tabelach, omówiono, przeanalizowano i zinterpretowano.

Aggressive behaviour, its determinants and consequences as perceived by pupils at three levels of education

Summary

The research was conducted between 2005 and 2011 as part of graduate seminars in Resocialization Psychology by means of a survey questionnaire containing 37 detailed questions on:

- the perception of aggression by pupils at three successive levels of the education system, their participation and places of the attacks,
- the perception of oneself and others as a victim and an aggressor,
- feelings of safety in the context of perceived verbal and physical attacks,
- assessing girls and boys' aggressiveness, its intensity and targeting,
- the most common victims of attacks,
- the perception of antecedents and co-determinants of aggressive behaviour,
- their own and their peers' reactions to perceived attacks,
- seeing the advantages (benefits) and losses from carrying out attacks.

The survey covered nearly 2000 primary, secondary and high schools students in Łódź and four districts (Kutno, Łęczyca, Łowicz and Radomsko of Łódź Voivodeship) and in Starachowice (Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship).

The information provided by the following were found to be credible:

- 367 (179 girls and 188 boys) fifth-grade and sixth-form graders,
- 801 (410 girls and 391 boys) of lower secondary schools and
- 465 (246 girls and 219 boys) of secondary schools.

The responses provided were summarised in 37 tables, discussed, analysed and interpreted.

Nota o autorach

Romanyuk Anatolij – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, profesor Wydziału Studiów Europejskich, Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, profesor Katedry Politologii Lwowskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Franka, e-mail: anatoliy.romanyuk@gmail.com

Białobłocki Zbigniew – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, profesor w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: wsgk@wsgk.com.pl

Artymyshyn Pavlo – I. Krypiakewych Institute of Ukrainian Studies National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Ukraine) ORCID: 0000-0002-7501-797X, e-mail: p.artymyshyn@gmail.com

Polovyi Taras – Lviv Polytechnic National University (Ukraine) ORCID: 0000-0002-7908-6606, e-mail: taraspolo@gmail.com

Białobłocki Krzysztof – doktor nauk o zarządzaniu, asystent w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: wsgk@wsgk.com

Lytvyn Vitaliy – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, docent Katedry Politologii Lwowskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Franka, e-mail: lytvyn.vitaliy@gmail.com

Panczak-Białobłocka Nadia – doktor habilitowany nauk politycznych, profesor w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, Dziekan Wydziału Studiów Europejskich, e-mail: nadia.panczak@gmail.com

Stepan Rishko – postgraduate student of the Department of Political Science, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, e-mail: stepan.rishko@lnu.edu.ua

Białobłocka Magdalena – asystent w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: wsgk@wsgk.com

Adam Rogala-Lewicki – doktor nauk politycznych, adiunkt w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, adwokat.rogala.lewicki@gmail.com

Białobłocki Tomasz – doktor nauk politycznych, adiunkt w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: t.bialoblocki@icloud.com

Moszczyńska Aneta – asystent w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: aneta.kosiorek@poczta.onet.pl

Białobłocka Sławomira Maria – doktor habilitowany, adiunkt w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie, e-mail: wsgk@wsgk.com

Szalański Jan – doktor habilitowany nauk humanistycznych w zakresie psychologii, profesor w Akademii Nauk Stosowanych Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie

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 - artykuł z pracy zbiorowej: J. Witkowski, Polskie wybory, w: Wybory parlamentarne w Polsce po roku 1989, red. S. Kobus, Warszawa 2007, s. 54.
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