



**Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie**

**NR 7 CZERWIEC 2017**

**PÓŁROCZNIK**

# STUDIUM EUROPY ŚRODKOWEJ I WSCHODNIEJ

**ISSN 2353-8392**

**KUTNO 2017**



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Mazowieckie Centrum Poligrafii  
**Nakład:** 250 egz.

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## **Evolution of Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards the USSR and Russia in the context of the annexation of the Crimea and warfare in Donbas over the years 2014-2017**

The author focuses on the evolution of Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards the historical heritage of the USSR and Russia. Qualitative stages describing the most crucial changes have been singled out. The author explicates the impact of the annexation of the Crimea and warfare in particular areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions on Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards Russia and the USSR's historical legacy. It has been specified that there is interchangeability/volatility in people's attitude and factors which precondition it have been determined.

*Keywords: historical memory, national memory, citizen, public position, identity.*

## **Еволюція ставлення громадян України до СРСР та Росії у контексті анексії Криму та війни на Донбасі 2014-2017 рр.**

Розглянуто еволюцію ставлення громадян України до історичної спадщини СРСР та Росії. Виділено якісні етапи, коли відбулися найбільш помітні зміни. Окреслено вплив анексії Криму та військових дій в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей на ставлення громадян України до Росії та історичної спадщини СРСР. Зазначено змінність/волатильність у ставленні громадян та окреслено чинники, які це зумовлюють.

*Ключові слова: історична пам'ять, національна пам'ять, громадянин, суспільна позиція, ідентичність.*

Evolution of the Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards the USSR must be reviewed in the context of historical memory and its evolvement. The problem of historical memory takes a significant place not only in historical and psychological, but also in political sciences. We interpret historical memory as a totality of scientific and non-scientific beliefs of separate citizens, social groups and society in general as to the past/common past. A related notion, which has been actively put to use, is national memory. V. Soldatenko conceives it as: "a peculiar phenomenon of social conscience, a bulk of knowledge, images and value estimations of past events, selectively preserved by a nation, namely those events, which have crucial impact on its evolution, self-identification, state forming and civilizational achievements, which are consensually perceived in a society as the most significant ones for the future self-preservation, consolidated existence and

further constructive development”<sup>1</sup>. Despite the difference between the mentioned notions, especially as to their bearers, hereinafter we will interpret them as identical.

Historical memory is characterized by a number of peculiarities, which should be taken into consideration in the process of its evaluation. Firstly, in spite of the fact that it is focused on the past, historical memory itself is a present attribute, influencing political actors' and citizens' political conscience and political behavior. Secondly, rather often it is an instrument for achieving political goals. This determined instrumental function is presupposed by a high level of sensitivity of evaluations, renderings and interpretations of the past for some people and social groups. Emotional component of perceiving the past can noticeably restrict rationality of social actors' political behavior and remarkably enhance their irrationality. In this case a representative example is ethnic political parties' experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far back as existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990-1991, which, to mobilize the voter base of their own ethnic group, turned to certain episodes of historical memory during the WWII period, what significantly influenced inter-ethnic hostilities and led to an acute inter-ethnic conflict.

Special attention should be paid to historical memory when it refers to a separated society, when there are regions with distinctive historical past, therefore with different heroes, evaluations of events and so forth. Such determined distinction/distinctions are capable of enhancement, achievement of synergetic effect under conditions of ascribing these differences due to voters' political orientation in various regions to competitive political parties. In this case not always we can speak of forming a corresponding social and political distinction, however we refer to a strong politicization of past. With this respect we agree with L. Nahorna's summing-up, that “consolidation of people over interpretation of past is possible only in stable social mediums with unidirectional values. Within riven, polarized societies, the scope of historical memory is a continuous zone of improvisations and conflicts connected with them”<sup>2</sup>.

Determination of attitude towards the Soviet heritage presupposes comprehension of its peculiarities. Among them we automatically distinguish the existence of a large number of people, who were born and lived against the USSR background. For many of them this Soviet period is connected with personal attitude towards parents, family, childhood and youthfulness, active period of life. This should be complemented by age characteristics of these people, as a vast majority of them either have retired or are on the line to become pensioners. Retirement mainly presupposes a considerable change of their financial status for the worse and stimulates comparison of the past and present to the disfavor of the latter. Secondly, perception of the Soviet history has always been ideology-driven and not abstractly, but in correspondence with an established “Procrustean bed”, when a categorically positive evaluation of reality was established and a negative connotation of anything oppositional was outlined. Criteria of these

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<sup>1</sup> Derzhavotvorchi ta tsyvilizatsiini zdobutky Ukrainskoho narodu: Natsionalna ta istorychna pamiat. – Iss.1. – K., 2011. – Pp.15-16.

<sup>2</sup> Nahorna L. Istorychna pamiat: teorii, dyskursy, refleksii. – K.: IPIEND im. I.F.Kurasa NAN Ukrainy, 2012. – P.16.



evaluations may be deduced as to various decisions and events after the October Revolution in 1917. To our mind, rather notable is the “Short Course on the All-Union Communist Party (B)”, which was published in 1938 and for a long time programmed “the only accurate” view of historical events and a wide complex of worldview issues. Under this approach and practice, any shift away from a positive evaluation of the Soviet experience, its criticism was interpreted as a betrayal and crime, which caused even criminal responsibility. Over the extended period in the history of an independent Ukraine, due to inertness or deliberate policy, the line of non-critical treatment of the Soviet heritage has been carried on with emphasis on special heroic outcomes/topics like: industrialization in late 20s-30s, victory in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945, post-war economic recovery, development of outer space, development of cities, social programs etc. Thirdly, the collapse of the USSR led to the fact, that Russia declared itself to be the continuator state of the USSR, and to some extent it referred to its historical heritage. Therefore, criticism of the Soviet past associated with criticism of the Russian Federation, and presupposed sensibility of official Russia to various pluralistic assessments of historical events, retreat from the officially supported version/versions.

A question of attitude to the USSR in Ukraine has its own context and, at the same time, its regional peculiarities. Firstly, there are time differences as to joining and acquiring “standard” Soviet characteristics by separate regions. Western Ukraine was annexed to the USSR/Ukrainian SSR as a result of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Poland between the Third Reich and the USSR; in autumn 1939 Northern Bukovyna entered the USSR/Ukrainian SSR and in 1940 and 1945 Zakarpattia was annexed. Under these circumstances, handover of the Crimea in 1954 to Ukraine did not play any role, as the Soviet regime in the Crimea was established in the course of the civil war in late 20s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Introduction of the Soviet regime in these regions was accompanied by widespread repressions and various kinds of resistance, including an organized guerilla movement up to the 50s. This was the greatest distinction from other regions of Ukraine, where the Soviet regime had existed, from the October Revolution or the period of the civil war and any resistance was subdued during the pre-war period. Moreover, various representatives of the eastern Ukraine, very often acted like promoters of the Soviet regime and the “face”/representatives of the very regime in new regions/districts. Secondly, in Ukraine since the 50s nonconformist/dissident movement had been actively establishing and developing. In the 50s-60s appeared and acted such movements as: the Ukrainian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union (1959-1961), the United Liberation Party of Ukraine (1955-1958), the Ukrainian National Committee (1957-1962), the Ukrainian National Front (1964-1967) etc. In the 60s the Sixtiers’ movement was established, which was mainly represented by writers: Lina Kostenko (1930), Vasyl Symonenko (1935-1963), Ivan Drach (1936), Ivan Svitlychnyi (1929-1992), Yevhen Sverstiuk (1928-2014), Ivan Dziuba (1931). A bit later they were joined by: Vasyl Stus (1938-1985), Mykhailo Osadchy (1936-1994), Ihor Kalynets (1939), Ivan Hel (1937-2011) and others. In the conceptual frame the ideas of national development and non-admission of

internationalization/Russification were defined in I. Dziuba's publications<sup>3</sup>. The abovementioned personalities and many others, who might not always fight in a classical way of opposition, and only in many cases publicly condemned/doubted some drawbacks, suffered terrible and successive prosecutions/arrests. Having signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was established in Kyiv in 1976 (in the USSR in total existed only 5 Helsinki Groups). From the beginning of transformational changes and the process of liberalization political prisoners were released and returned to Ukraine and became actively involved into civil processes. Former political prisoners/dissidents in concentration camps, jailhouses, exile had been "put through the mill" and returned die-hard communists. It found its representation in the activity of the People's Movement of Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy), which was founded in 1989 in the form of a civil-political organization and at first declared its support to the basis and goals of transformation processes. However, at the 2<sup>nd</sup> All-Ukrainian Assembly in 1990 the Rukh's Program was supplemented with the requirement of achieving independence of Ukraine and it obtained anti-communist orientation. Thirdly, the universal phenomenon of the Soviet period was the process of ethnic regions Russification, which resulted in: deliberate migration policy, aimed at increasing the number of the Russians in the Soviet republics; overall spread/promotion of the Russian language in all spheres of social life; criticism/limitation of display of national life and support/promotion of internationalism on the basis of the Russian language "as a language of international communication". In accordance with the outcomes of the population census of 1959 in Ukraine lived 16,9% of the Russians, and according to the results of the population census in 1989 this number equaled 22,1%. Besides, all population in the Soviet Union was under constant and powerful propaganda influence and one of its directions was to form "new historical society" – the Soviet people. The rate of the "Soviet person phenomenon" extension is represented in A. Kolodii's publications, based on the outcomes of the sociologic survey, conducted in July 2000 by the Center for Social and Marketing Research "SOCIS" on request of the State Property Fund of Ukraine. The attention should be paid that the survey was conducted in 2000, i.e. under conditions when Ukraine have been independent for already nine years, and this gives grounds to suggest some kind of fall in a number of "Soviet people" among the population of Ukraine and some regions in comparison with the moment of independence proclamation in 1991.

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<sup>3</sup> Dziuba I.M. Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia? – K.: Vydavnyzhyi dim «KM Academia», 1998 – 276 p.

**Table 1.** Population with Soviet Identity in the Regions of Ukraine<sup>4</sup>

Region	Division of the "Soviet" according to the regions* (%)	Division of population according to the regions** (%)	Number of the "Soviet" in every region (%)
Eastern	27,52	13,69	25,17
South-Eastern	17,20	11,11	19,39
Crimea AR	15,48	6,86	28,25
Southern	8,85	8,49	13,04
North-Eastern	6,63	7,51	11,07
Central	5,90	11,08	6,67
Kyiv	5,65	7,26	9,75
Northern	4,42	8,25	6,72
North-Western	3,69	8,95	5,15
South-Western	3,19	8,28	4,83
Western	1,47	8,52	2,17
Total over Ukraine	100	100	12,52

\*from the whole population in Ukraine;

\*\*from its all population

Over the process of change of the attitude towards the USSR heritage we can single out several stages. Our periodization is based upon the presidential terms in Ukraine, as the presidential institution, despite the forms of government system, was and still is determinative in formation and functioning of political life/political process in Ukraine. The first stage covers the period from the declaration of independence and to the unscheduled presidential elections in 1994. A fruitless attempt of military takeover, conducted by an orthodox part of administration of the USSR communist party on August 19-22, 1991 became a catalyst for the USSR collapse. On August 24, 1991 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine and almost simultaneously on August 30, 1991 the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine was prohibited on the grounds of the state takeover charge (May 14, 1993 the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine allowed people, who shared communistic ideas to create their own party organizations, what formed legal basis for renewal of the Communist Party of Ukraine in June). At this stage decommunization had rather inertial and spontaneous character. On the one hand, there was a possibility to speak/write publicly about any controversial moments/events in the history of Ukraine, which had been "closed" earlier. The process of an independent country formation on the basis of a former union republic presupposed national, individual comprehension of the historical past of the Ukrainian nation. Within the education system such subjects as history of the Communist Party of the Soviet

<sup>4</sup> Antonina Kolodii. *Radianska identychnist ta ii nosii v nezalezhnii Ukraini* // Ukraine in Modern world. Social, ethnic and cultural aspects of globalization and Ukraine. Conference for Ukrainian alumni of scientific apprenticeship programs in the US. Participants' reports. – Kyiv: Stylos, 2002. – Pp. 36-55.

Union, basic concepts of Marxism-Leninism were abolished. In early 90s, in three regions, i.e. Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil nearly all names of cities, towns, villages, streets, institutions and etc., connected with the communist and Soviet history were renamed. However, in other regions of Ukraine such acts were not registered or those were individual cases (dismantling of the monument to the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1991 in Kyiv). On the other hand, as Andrew Wilson noticed an official ban of a communist party did not result in decommunization of the society. Moreover, weakness of national-democratic parties and support of national communists in voting for independence in August 1991, led to a “historical compromise of the right wing”, which meant that the majority of national-democratic parties agreed to leave former communists at different levels of the state apparatus in return of development of an independent country and refusal from its rebirth in another, new form of the USSR<sup>5</sup>. The second stage covers the term of L. Kuchma (July 19, 1994-January 25, 2005). A quite common characteristic/peculiarity was a multi-vector nature of his policy. During the first electoral campaign in 1994 the key message was the requirement for legislative settling of bilingualism (the Ukrainian and Russian languages were to have obtained an equal status) and the emphasis on the necessity of closer relations with Russia. During the second electoral campaign in 1999 L. Kuchma positioned himself as a pro-western candidate. He declared and made steps towards development of relations with the EU and NATO, took a strict stand, concerning Tuzla island issue and Russian invasion in 2003 and at the same time, under the conditions of deterioration in relations with the West, after the Cassette Scandal, supported movement of Ukraine towards the Single Economic Space with Russia and a range of other post-Soviet countries. Such ambiguity is disclosed in his symbolic work “Ukraine is not Russia”,<sup>6</sup> where he, in a consistent manner, discusses about differences between the Ukrainians and Russians, divergences in views over cultural and historic past and mutual claims. In the book he emphasizes that Ukraine cannot be Russia. The third stage is marked by V. Yushchenko’s term (January 23, 2005 – February 25, 2010). In his activity V. Yushchenko dynamically referred to the history and culture of the Ukrainian nation. On Inauguration Day on January 22, 2005 he was also declared Hetman of Ukraine, what should underline the connection between modern Ukraine and the state forming period of the Cossack epoch. Thus, it should signify sustainability of state traditions. On November 28, 2006 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the Law “On Holodomor 1932-1933 in Ukraine”, in which Holodomor was recognized as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. In May 2009 the Central Investigation Department of the State Security Service of Ukraine took proceedings against officials, whose actions resulted in a genocide, which led to a mass destruction of people<sup>7</sup>. Legal proceedings were issued against the former

<sup>5</sup> Wilson A. *Ukraińcy*. – Grupa Wydawnicza Bertelsmann Media. Fakty. – Warszawa, 2002. – S. 182-185.

<sup>6</sup> Kuchma L. D. *Ukraina ne Rosiia*. – M.: Vremia, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> According to the outcomes of the forensic scientific and demographic examination conducted by M. V. Prukha Institute of Demography and Social Research of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine as to November 30, 2009 as a result of the conducted genocide in Ukraine died 3 941 000 people.

higher government of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR: J. Stalin, V. Molotov, L. Kahanovych, P. Postyshev, S. Kosior, V. Chubar, M. Khataevych and others. Conducted investigative activities and social discussions along with the analysis of certain facts and documents invited attention to the USSR's historical heritage of a quite wider period. Constant attention on the side of the head of the country V. Yushchneko and a number of state institutions towards the historical issues of Ukraine, especially within the context of relations with Russia, as V. Kravchenko believes, resulted into "...Ukrainian-Russian war of national mythologies, which dropped into diplomatic and even economic, since both sides gave not less attention to symbolic reality, than a social one<sup>8</sup>. However, all attempts of some radical national parties to initiate and adopt a state program of decommunization failed. Another stage covers the period when V. Yanukovych was the head of the state (February 25, 2010 – February 22, 2014). To some extent he tried to carry out L. Kuchma's "multi-vector" policy. During his presidency such tasks as: introduction of a visa-free regime and establishing a free-trade zone with the EU became of top-priority. He refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and North Ossetia despite Russia's claims and encouragement. At the same time without preliminary social discussions V. Yanukovych in 2010 signed with the President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev a treatment concerning the status and conditions of the Black Sea Navy Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, according to which the rent term was prolonged for 25 years till 2042. In November 2013, a week before the "Eastern Partnership" summit in Vilnius, where the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement was to have been signed, M. Azarov government announced termination of preparations of signing the treaty. This decision caused a wave of protests, which eventually resulted in the Revolution of Dignity, which started another period of decommunization. The Russian Federation's financial, informational, consultative and organizational support to V. Yanukovych's regime presupposed verbal and symbolic resistance of protesters as to the Russian authorities. In the course of the Revolution of Dignity on December 8, 2013 Lenin monument was stricken down to the ground, which caused a chain reaction of destroying monuments to various Soviet party and State leaders (this process was called "Leninfall"). The subsequent events like: a runaway of all key actors, headed by V. Yanukovych to Russia; active anti-Euromaidan position of Russian top-officials and leading mass media; annexation of the Crimea and support of separatists groups in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine put on the agenda the issue of decommunization and re-evaluation of modern Russia's role towards Ukraine. On July 22, 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted for dissolution of the Communist faction and the following prohibition of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In March 2015, the Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine approved draft laws on decommunization: "On the Legal Status and Honoring of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century", "On Remembering the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War 1939-1945", "On Access to the Archives of Repressive Bodies of the Communist Totalitarian

<sup>8</sup> Kravchenko V. Ukraina. Imperia. Rosia. Vybrani staty z modernoi istorii ta istoriohrafii. – K., 2011. – Pp. 464-479.

Regime from 1917-1991” and “On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting Propaganda of their Symbols”. All laws were adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on April 9 and on May 21, 2015 they came into force. In December 2015 District Administrative Court of Kyiv completed the lawsuit of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine against the Communist Party of Ukraine and ruled to ban its activities. These statutory documents created a legal base for critical evaluation of the Soviet period in the history of Ukraine. Additional or even a crucial factor became annexation of the Crimea by the Russia Federation under the conditions of matter-of-fact military intervention over March 2014 and the Russian-Ukrainian war in the east of Ukraine, which was commenced in the middle of April 2014. These and other factors’ impact had great influence on the Ukrainian citizens’ attitude towards the USSR, what can be easily seen by reference to the data in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Do You Regret Now the Collapse of the USSR in 1991? (%)<sup>9</sup>

Opinion poll date	Yes	No	Difficult to answer
December 2010	46,0	36,0	18,0
March 2013	41,0	44,0	15,0
April 2014	33,0	49,0	18,0
September 2015	31,0	56,0	14,0
September 2016	35,0	50,0	15,0

Opinion polls were conducted in different years by the sociological group “Rating”. Undoubtedly, the final outcome is influenced by the absence of respondent from the Crimea in 2014, as well as respondents from the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2015. The results testify that after the Revolution of Dignity people’s position has been characterized by higher volatility. If over the previous period (before the Revolution of Dignity) had been characterized by a gradual tendency to reduction of positive comprehension of the USSR, then the 2014 events led to an abrupt qualitative and quantitative change in people’s attitude. The lowest index was in 2015, when only 31 % of interviewed felt sorry for the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, the opinion poll conducted in 2016 registered another result – beginning of growth/“rollback”. What was it caused by? On the one hand still there is a factor of war. On the other hand, numerous social problems, which have not been solved, form a synthetic position “unrealized demands of the Maidan”, which determines wavering of the people’s position.

Within this context the regional correlation and dynamics of changes/evolution of attitude towards the USSR in main regions of Ukraine becomes of great interest, and the outcomes are represented in Table 3. It should be taken into account that even if the opinion poll was

<sup>9</sup> Sociological group “Rating”: Dynamics of nostalgia for the USSR [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [http://ratinggroup.ua/research/Ukraine/dinamika\\_nostalgi\\_po\\_ssr.html](http://ratinggroup.ua/research/Ukraine/dinamika_nostalgi_po_ssr.html)

conducted by one and the same social agency, which used a single approach within two surveys under consideration, the content of regions differ.

**Table 3.** Regional Review of Dynamics Concerning the Question “Do You Regret Now the Collapse of the USSR in 1991?” (%)

Region	April 2014 <sup>10</sup>	September 2015 <sup>11</sup>	September 2015 <sup>12</sup>
Ukraine	33,0	31,0	35,0
Donbas	61,0	-	-
East	47,0	39,0	40,0
South	50,0	49,0	42,0
Center	31,0	25,0	39,0
North	16,0	-	-
West	8,0	12,0	18,0

We register influence of several tendencies in the course of the three years. Over 2014-2015 the tendency to reduction of nostalgia for the USSR predominated. The most sensitive it was for citizens in the East (reduced by 8%) and Center (6%). Whereas in the West of the country grew the tendency of compassion towards the USSR (4%). Over 2015-2016 differently-directed tendencies became even more prominent. In the South the movement for further reduction of nostalgia for the USSR preserved (reduction equaled 7%). However, in the rest regions of Ukraine was registered a growth of affection for the Soviet past. The biggest index was recorded in the Central part of Ukraine (growth of 14%) and of 6% percent raised positive attitude in western regions, achieving quite considerable index of 18%. Additional information is represented by the opinion poll conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), concerning the dynamics of the Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards the Russian Federation (Table 5). In Table we can see a proportion of the respondents, who defined their attitude as “very well” and “rather well”.

**Table 4.** “What Is Your General Attitude Towards Russia?” (%)<sup>13</sup>

Date	05.2009	06.2010	11.2011	02.2012	02.2013	02.2014	05.2014	09.2014	02.2015	02.2016	12.2016
%	93,0	92,0	80,0	85,0	85,0	78,0	52,0	48,0	34,0	36,0	40,0

<sup>10</sup> Sociological group “Rating”: Nostalgia for the USSR and attitude towards certain USSR personalities [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: [http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/nostalgia\\_po\\_ssr\\_i\\_otnoshenie\\_k\\_otdelnym\\_lichnostyam.html](http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/nostalgia_po_ssr_i_otnoshenie_k_otdelnym_lichnostyam.html)

<sup>11</sup> Sociological group “Rating”: Dynamics of nostalgia for the USSR [Electronic resource] – Access mode: [http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika\\_nostalgii\\_po\\_ssr.html](http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika_nostalgii_po_ssr.html)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Kyiv International Institute of Sociology: How have the Ukrainian population's attitude towards Russia and the Russian population's attitude towards Ukraine changed? [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=report&cid=608&page=2>

As the opinion poll data show, despite some volatility, the absolute majority of the Ukrainian people traditionally treated Russia rather well. Qualitative changes took place after annexation of the Crimea and commencement of hostilities in eastern part of Ukraine, what is proved by the data of May and September 2014. Fall in the level of positive attitude of the highest index (May 2009) in comparison with the lowest one (February 2015) equaled almost 3 times. However, over 2016 was formed a tendency, concerning gradual growth of positive attitudes towards Russia. The abovementioned tendency is quite unexpected and illogical. Stable invariables still are: annexation of the Crimea and permanent military actions in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are accompanied by deaths and injuries of soldiers and civilian population from the Ukrainian side. After the Revolution of Dignity the process of decommunization is actively spreading. After the change of the names of towns, villages, streets, enterprises and organizations decommunization spread over the holidays, when holidays, connected with the Soviet symbols must be excluded. Besides, the process of emancipation of the Russian language from the public space is actively pursuing as well as the policy of Ukrainization is being followed.

However, despite constant impact of the abovementioned factors the tendency of positive attitude towards the historical heritage of the USSR and Russia is growing. The first thing that comes to mind is an analogy of pendulum or recurrence of the situation which occurred after the Orange Revolution. At that time, great expectations, which had not been implemented in the sphere of social and economic reforms, under the condition of pursuing Ukrainization, led to revenge of the Party of Regions. Thus, uncertainty, partial character of reforms, preservation of a high level of corruption, while the level of the people's welfare is lowering, cause dissatisfaction with current authority and contribute to the search for a new political agent of change. Consequently, actions aimed at decommunization and Ukrainization are perceived as important, but they are not enough for solving a heap of existing problems. Moreover, absence of progress as to improvement of the social and economic situation forms a public position that in such a way authority is trying to avoid reforms, and not to admit a qualitative change of the situation. Under these conditions political dichotomy "authority - opposition" causes repetition of the situation, when disappointment in the outcomes of the accomplished work leads to voting against the political agents of authority, what consequently means voting for opposition which includes messages concerning improvement of relations with Russia and refusal from critical attitude towards the historical legacy of the USSR. Besides, we cannot but take into account the fact that for the part of people who are under the poverty line it is inherent to be nostalgic about the past, when they were young and life was better.

Danger of such tendency has a number of dimensions. Let us enumerate them without special gradation: due to the war conflict there is a categorical, close to dichotomy apprehension of the situation in the country, which is represented by a construction "friend or foe" with a comprehension of "foe" as almost an enemy; a large part of people have experienced a "school" of war and have working knowledge of using weapon, moreover they take up power



as an accepted instrument of solving problems. Both alternatives lead to radicalization of views and behavior. An additional factor is the absence of significant democratic actors/competitors within the ruling political majority.

Therefore, we may state that the Ukrainians' attitude towards the historical heritage of the USSR and contemporary Russia are closely interrelated. Over the period of its independence the Ukrainians' attitude towards the historical heritage of the USSR and its legal successor has undergone two stages. The first one starts with the declaration of independence and finishes with annexation of the Crimea in February 2014. This stage is characterized by a very cautious attitude of the national leadership and main political actors as to overestimation of the USSR historical heritage, taking into consideration the position of the Russian Federation (the exception was period of V. Yushchenko's presidency). At the same time the accent was made on forming a special view/approach and it was represented in a rather high level of nostalgia for the Soviet times and absolute predominance of positive attitude towards Russia. Annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in February 2014 and provocation and subsequent military invasion of a part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions became crucial points and resulted in implementation of decommunization policy in Ukraine and qualitative changes of the majority Ukrainians' attitude towards Russia. However, this tendency was rather short, though it was marked by the lowest level of nostalgia for the USSR. The results of 2016 let us suppose that the new tendency, when the attitude towards Russia and the USSR becomes better, is being taken place. We may reckon that after the 2014-2015 shock there will be a "rollback" which will be represented in growth of positive attitude towards Russia and the USSR's historical heritage. We believe that the indices will not return to the 2010 level, but will register much higher level than it was in 2015 that will represent a peculiar "stable group". This index will be under the influence of the results or absence of the results from the reforms. Despite the characteristic of these two tendencies the year of 2014 became a crucial one, and to our point, it commenced a new stage in Ukrainian citizens' attitude towards the historical legacy of the USSR and Russia.

## **Isolation and taxonomy of semi-presidentialism with nominal presidents in central and Eastern European Countries of the eu: as exemplified by Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia**

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical justification for different types and systems of republican government. The author conducted the comparative analysis of the presidential powers in various systems of republican government and explained the nature and different types of semi-presidential systems of government as exemplified by Central and Eastern European countries of the EU. The researcher also argued and identified the main attributes of semi-presidentialism with nominal presidents in the context of its distinction from parliamentarism as exemplified by Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia and defined the correlation between parliamentary democracy, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism.

*Keywords: semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism, parliamentary democracy, system of government, nominal president, cohabitation, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia.*

## **ВИОКРЕМЛЕННЯ ТА ТАКСОНОМІЯ НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ З НОМІНАЛЬНИМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТАМИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНОЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ КРАЇНАХ ЄС: НА ПРИКЛАДІ БОЛГАРІЇ, ЧЕХІЇ, СЛОВАЧЧИНИ ТА СЛОВЕНІЇ<sup>1</sup>**

Запропоновано теоретико-методологічні визначення та емпіричні обґрунтування різних видів і систем республіканського державного правління. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз сили повноважень президентів у різних системах республіканського державного правління і пояснено природу та різні типи напівпрезиденталізму на прикладі центрально-східноєвропейських країн ЄС. Аргументовано й окреслено головні атрибути напівпрезиденталізму з номінальними президентами у контексті його відокремлення від парламентаризму на прикладі Болгарії, Чехії Словаччини та Словенії й означено кореляцію між парламентською демократією, парламентаризмом і напівпрезиденталізмом.

*Ключові слова: напівпрезиденталізм, парламентаризм, парламентська демократія, система державного правління, номінальний президент, когабітація, Болгарія, Чехія, Словаччина, Словенія.*

<sup>1</sup> An earlier and Ukrainian version of the article was published in one of the previous bulletins.

## Introduction

Nowadays Political Science literature singles out two foremost methodological approaches to understanding political (constitutional) systems of republican government – *dichotomous* and *trichotomous*. *The first* one views two classical systems of republicanism – presidentialism and parliamentarism. *The second* adds to scientific analysis the category of ‘semi-presidentialism’, sometimes calling it ‘mixed republicanism’. However, we consider it is methodologically incorrect as the ‘mixed’ combination can occur within both classical (‘pure’) presidentialism and classical (‘pure’) parliamentarism, not to mention semi-presidentialism. We support the trichotomous analysis of contemporary systems of government (or political systems) and understand that initiating the splitting in the given theoretical and methodological direction is caused by an ambiguous vision of political systems, some of which, on the one hand, are close to parliamentarism or presidentialism, and on the other hand, cause definitive requirements for semi-presidentialism. This occurs in two directions: in the perspective of research of some similarities and in the differences between the semi-presidential and presidential systems of government and between the semi-presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Thus, the key point of distinction is the formal and actual positioning of the powers of such institutions as the president, prime minister and parliament<sup>2</sup>.

When shifting the problem to Central and Eastern European countries of the EU we must realise that some republics have a significant correlation of powers, in particular, of the presidents, who are elected, on the one hand, popularly and, on the other hand, in the parliaments. Consequently, the question arises and refers to the point how to interpret these systems and is it necessary to distinguish between them? This is why the political systems of Central and Eastern European countries of the EU are the objects of research, and the main problem of the research are semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents/heads of state in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU, in particular Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Accordingly, the objective of the article is to distinguish theoretically, methodologically and empirically between the principles/attributes of parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism in the context of republican systems of government *with popularly elected, but nominal (weak or ceremonial) presidents*. To solve this problem, we suggest to consider several problems. The first part of the study focuses its attention on the conceptual and empirical parameters of constitutional systems of government and the powers of presidents in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU, the second part of the study concerns theoretical and practical dimension of the problem of distinction between semi-presidentialism or parliamentarism with the position of nominal presidents in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU, and the third part of the study affects the problem of constitutional systems’ varieties in parliamentary democracies.

<sup>2</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

### **The constitutional systems of government and the powers of presidents: conceptual and empirical parameters of scientific analysis in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU**

The suggested research focuses on the problem of conceptual definition and distinguishing between forms and systems of government in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU, which have the positions/institutions of nominal presidents, who in some republics are popularly elected and in other republics are elected in the parliaments. The common feature of these two scenarios is the fact that the cabinet and the head of the cabinet are collectively responsible only to the parliament/legislature. The Political Science traditional classification of constitutional systems typed by Elgie<sup>3</sup> makes it clear that in a case when president is popularly elected it is used to say about semi-presidentialism or presidentialism. In return, in a case when president is elected in parliament it is used to say about parliamentarism.

It is clear according to the definitions of three different types of republican systems of government. *The semi-presidential type of republican government* is a constitutional system, which is characterised by the position of a president, popularly elected for a fixed term, as well as a prime minister and cabinet, who are necessarily collectively responsible to a parliament. *The presidential type of republican government* is a constitutional system, which is characterised by the position of a president, popularly elected for a fixed term, while the members of presidential administration (cabinet) are not considered collectively responsible to a parliament. *The parliamentary type of republican government* is a constitutional system, in which a president is authorised because of indirect elections (e.g. in parliament), and a prime minister and cabinet are necessarily collectively responsible to a parliament. This interpretation does not consider the powers of presidents, but the latter significantly affect the actual positioning of certain constitutional (especially semi-presidential) systems.<sup>4</sup> There is a possibility of presidentialisation or parliamentarisation (generally personalisation) of different constitutional systems. Therefore, the latter may function on practice as more presidential or parliamentary systems, constitutionally remaining semi-presidential systems. Nonetheless, they can also function as semi-presidential systems. This is the characteristic of such Central and Eastern European countries of the EU as

<sup>3</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>4</sup> This is an advantage of the classification of constitutional systems, which value lies in the fact that we should not refer to the relative properties of political process. Therefore, there is an avoidance of the elements of subjectivity in the classification. This means that the separation of different constitutional systems should be performed without interpretation of presidential powers. The powers of the latter vary depending not only on the constitutional, but also on the political preconditions. All political preconditions, especially within semi-presidentialism, are created after elections, including parliamentary elections, because they are concentrated at the institution of cabinet, which is collectively responsible to a parliament. See detailed: V. Lytvyn, *Podviynna Vykonomavcha Vlada: Teoriya ta Praktyka Yevropeys'koho Pivprezidentalizmu*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiya, psykholohiya, komunikatsiyi" 2009, vol 3, s. 25-33.; R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.; R. Elgie, *Variations on a theme: a fresh look at semi-presidentialism*, "Journal of Democracy" 2005, vol 16, nr 3, s. 1-21.; R. Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations*, "Political Studies Review" 2004, vol 2, nr 3, s. 316-317.; R. Elgie, *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. OUP 1999, s. 1-21.

Poland, Lithuania and Romania.<sup>5</sup> The given perspective poses a theoretical and methodological viewpoint of the article. Its essence is represented in Table 1.

It is immediately clear (using the definitions of Elgie<sup>6</sup>), that among the analysed Central and Eastern European countries of the EU we may define (as of 2016) semi-presidential republics in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, and parliamentary republics in Estonia, Latvia and Hungary. Furthermore, it is clear that presidential republics do not represent any case in the region, because in each analysed country a cabinet is collectively responsible only to a parliament.

Nevertheless, in the analysed cases of the presidential powers in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU for 1994–2016 (see detailed Table 1), there are the examples of commensurability of presidential powers in formally semi-presidential and parliamentary republics (as defined by Elgie<sup>7</sup>)<sup>8</sup>. In particular, in McGregor's<sup>9</sup> unweighted and weighted methods of calculation of presidential powers in Central and Eastern European countries (estimated for 1994), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Slovenia, on the one hand, and parliamentary Czechia, Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand. According to Fry's<sup>10</sup> method (estimated for 1997), the commensurate countries were, on the one hand, semi-presidential Bulgaria and Slovenia and, on the other hand, parliamentary Czechia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. According to Roper's<sup>11</sup> method (estimated for 2000), the commensurate semi-presidential countries were, on the one hand, Lithuania (with weaker president) and, on the other hand, Slovenia (with stronger president). According to Siaroff's<sup>12</sup> method (estimated for 2003), the commensurate countries were, on the one hand, semi-presidential Slovenia and Slovakia and, on the other hand, parliamentary Czechia, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia. According

<sup>5</sup> It certainly means that the formal and actual powers of presidents affect the separation of different types of semi-presidentialism. In particular, there may be semi-presidential systems with nominal/ceremonial presidents (prime ministers and cabinets are much more powerful), semi-presidential systems with strong/omnipotent superpresidents (prime ministers and cabinets are significantly weaker) and semi-presidential systems with different correlation of the 'approximate balance' of presidents' and prime ministers' powers. The latter group includes the countries dominated by presidents or prime ministers, but their prevalence is not crucial. See detailed: O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: Presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr 4, s. 619-643.

<sup>6</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>7</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>8</sup> According to Elgie, Bulgaria (since 1991), Croatia (since 1991), Czechia (since 2012), Lithuania (since 1992), Poland (since 1990), Romania (since 1990), Slovakia (since 1999) and Slovenia (since 1992) are contemporary semi-presidential republics in the region. Instead, Estonia, Latvia and Hungary are contemporary parliamentary republics in the region (previously Slovakia (until 1999) and Czechia (until 2012) also were parliamentary republics). See detailed: R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.; R. Elgie, *Semi-presidentialism: An increasingly Common Constitutional Choice*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, Y.-S. Wu (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2011, s. 1-20.; R. Elgie, *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. OUP 1999, s. 1-21.

<sup>9</sup> J. McGregor, *The Presidency in East Central Europe*, "RFR/RL Research Report" 1994, vol 3, nr 2, s. 12-16.

<sup>10</sup> T. Frye, *A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1997, vol 30, nr 5, s. 523-552.; T. Frye, *Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: A Political Economy Explanation*, Wyd. Center for Continuing Education 1999.

<sup>11</sup> S. Roper, *Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes*, "Comparative Politics" 2002, vol 34, nr 3, s. 256-263.

<sup>12</sup> A. Siaroff, *Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, nr 3, s. 287-312.

**Table 1.** Comparative analysis of the presidential powers in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU (1994–2016)<sup>1</sup>

The method of calculation (year of estimation)	Bulgaria	Croatia	Czechia	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Slovenia	Minimum and maximum percent or points in the method
McGregor unweighted method (1994)	51	50	44	41	56	31	52	56	48	47	30	0' – 100' (%)
McGregor weighted method (1994)	46	46	37	36	52	30	47	51	45	39	27	0' – 100' (%)
Frye method (1997)	10.0	14.5	9.5	9.0	14.5	9.5	12.0	13.0	14.0	10.0	11.0	0' – 27' (pts)
Roper method (2000, only for some SP)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1	8	7	N.A.	3	0' – 24' (pts)
Staroff method (2003)	3	4	1	2	1	1	4	3	5	2	1	0' – 9' (pts)
Krouwel method (2003, only for the pre-EU)	-0.5	N.A.	-4.5	-4.5	-2.0	-2.5	+0.5	0.0	-2.0	-2.0	-3.0	-7' – +7' (pts)
Shugart & Carey method (2004, not for all)	2	N.A.	3	2	N.A.	N.A.	3	3	6	4	N.A.	0' – 40' (pts)
Taghyev method (2006, only for post-USSR)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	14.0	N.A.	14.0	20.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0' – 56' (pts)
Amingone & Careja method (2007)	12.0	10.5	11.0	8.5	13.0	7.5	13.5	13.5	13.0	12.0	9.0	0' – 29' (pts)
Amingone & Careja unweighted method (2008)	1.83	1.76	1.76	1.59	1.90	1.52	1.93	1.93	1.90	1.83	1.31	0' – 3' (pts)
Amingone & Careja weighted method (2008)	1.83	1.76	0.88	0.79	0.95	0.76	1.93	1.93	1.90	0.91	1.31	0' – 3' (pts)
Staroff modified method (2008, only for SP)	2	3	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3	2	3	1	0	0' – 7' (pts)
Fruhstorfer method (2011)	19.7	24	15.0	21.3	18.0	21.3	20.2	24.7	25.8	26.5	17.8	0' – 56' (pts)
Shugart & Carey method (2013, not for all)	4	N.A.	N.A.	2	N.A.	4	4	3	6	2	4	0' – 40' (pts)
Lucky method (2013, not for all)	15.3	N.A.	16.5	N.A.	15.5	N.A.	27.0	15.75	N.A.	20.5	N.A.	0' – 38' (pts)
Krouwel method (2013, not for all)	-2.5	N.A.	-1.5	-2.5	-0.5	N.A.	+2.5	-0.5	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	-7' – +7' (pts)
Taghyev method (2013, not for all)	26.0	N.A.	18.6	18.0	25.1	N.A.	26.0	25.1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0' – 56' (pts)
Frye method (2013, not for all)	15.5	N.A.	N.A.	11.5	10.0	9.0	11.0	10.0	13.5	N.A.	10.5	0' – 27' (pts)
Staroff modified method (2013, only for the EU)	6.5	N.A.	5.5	2.5	6.5	3.5	6.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	2.5	0' – 10' (pts)
Elgie, Bucur, Dolez & Laurent method (2014)	0.25	0.33	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.12	0.32	0.29	0.31	0.14	0.14	0' – 1' (pts)
Elgie & Doyle method: Prespow1 (2015)	0.183	0.291	0.257	0.184	0.275	0.010	0.282	0.241	0.250	0.189	0.118	0' – 1' (pts)
Elgie & Doyle method: Prespow2 (2015)	0.293	0.372	0.270	0.174	0.380	0.067	0.380	0.443	0.463	0.314	0.169	0' – 1' (pts)
Staroff modified method (2015)	6.5	3.5	5.5	2.5	6.5	3.5	6.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	2.5	0' – 10' (pts)
Popular presidential elections (as of 2016)	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+ or -

Зділдо: K. Armingeon, R. Careja, *Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989–2007*, Wyd. University of Berne 2007; R. Elgie, D. Doyle, *Maximizing the reliability of cross-national measures of presidential power*, Wyd. International Political Science Association biennial conference, Montreal, 20–24 July 2014; R. Elgie, C. Bucur, B. Dolez, A. Laurent, *Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How Directly Elected Presidents Shape the Legislative Party System*, "Political Research Quarterly" 2014, vol 67, nr 3, s. 467–477; J. Fortin, *Measuring Presidential Powers: Revisiting Existing Aggregate Measurements*, "International Political Science Review" 2013, vol 34, nr 1, s. 91–112; A. Fruhstorfer, *Putting Presidents Power into Place: A Measurement of Constitutional Presidential Strength in Non-Presidential Systems*, ECPR General Conference 2014; T. Frye, *A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1997, vol 30, nr 5, s. 523–552; T. Frye, *Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: A Political Economy Explanation*, Wyd. Center for Continuing Education 1999; A. Kounov, E. Mazo, *Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States*, "Stanford University Working Paper" 2004; A. Krouwel, *Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries*, "Acta Politica" 2003, vol 38, s. 333–364; A. Krouwel, *Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European Countries*, "Amsterdam Working Paper" 2003, nr 2; C. Lucky, *Table of presidential powers in Eastern Europe*, "East European Constitutional Review" 1993–1994, vol 2, nr 4, s. 91–94; P. Magalhães, B. Fortes, *Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems: Presidential Powers, Electoral Turnout and the Performance of Government-Endorsed Candidates*, Wyd. Digital CSC 2008; E. Mazo, *Duverger's Dilemma: Debating the Uniqueness of Semi-Presidential Constitutions in Eastern Europe*, [w:] "Social Science Research Council", Dissertation Development Workshop on Governance in Eurasia, Wyd. University of Texas March 4–7, 2004; J. McGregor, *The Presidency in East Central Europe*, "REFRIL Research Report" 1994, vol 3, nr 2, s. 12–16; A. Romanuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Bjablovska, *Politychni instytuty krajin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014; A. Romanuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivnyalnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krajin Vyshehrad's'koy hrupy ta instykh krajin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: monohrafiya*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 102–111; S. Roper, *Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes*, "Comparative Politics" 2002, vol 34, nr 3, s. 253–272; M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 148–158; A. Staroff, *Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, nr 3, s. 287–312; E. Taghyev, *Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries*, "CEU Political Science Journal" 2006, vol 3, s. 11–21. Additionally see Elgie data from the Presidential Power Site, available at: [http://presidential-power.com/?page\\_id=2148](http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2148), accessed November 30, 2015.

<sup>1</sup> An earlier and Ukrainian version of the article was published in one of the previous bulletins.

to Krouwel's<sup>13</sup> method (estimated for 2003), the commensurate countries were, on the one hand, semi-presidential Slovenia and, on the other hand, parliamentary Czechia and Latvia. According to Shugart's and Carey's<sup>14</sup> method (estimated by Kounov and Mazo for 2004), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland, as well as parliamentary Czechia and Estonia<sup>15</sup>. According to Armingeon's and Careja's<sup>16</sup> initial, weighted and unweighted methods (estimated for 2007 and 2008), the commensurate countries were mostly semi-presidential Slovakia and Slovenia and parliamentary Czechia, Estonia and Latvia<sup>17</sup>. According to Siaroff's modified method (estimated for 2008, only for semi-presidential countries), the commensurate semi-presidential countries were Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia<sup>18</sup>. According to Fruhstorfer's<sup>19</sup> method (estimated for 2011), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovenia, as well as parliamentary Czechia, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia. According to Shugart's and Carey's<sup>20</sup> method (estimated for 2013), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Poland and Slovakia, as well as parliamentary Estonia. According to Lucky's<sup>21</sup> method (estimated for 2013), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Bulgaria, Czechia and Poland and parliamentary Hungary. According to Krouwel's<sup>22</sup> method (estimated for 2013), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, as well as parliamentary Estonia. According to Taghiyev's (Taghiyev, 2006: 11–21) method (estimated for 2013), the commensurate countries were parliamentary Estonia and the semi-presidential Bulgaria and Czechia. According to Fry's<sup>23</sup> method (estimated for 2013), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Poland and Slovenia and parliamentary Hungary and Latvia. According to Siaroff's modified method (estimated for 2013 and 2015), the commensurate countries were semi-presidential Slovenia and parliamentary

<sup>13</sup> A. Krouwel, *Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries*, "Acta Politica" 2003, vol 38, s. 333-364; A. Krouwel, *Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European Countries*, "Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. Working paper" 2003, nr 2.

<sup>14</sup> M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 148-158.

<sup>15</sup> A. Kounov, E. Mazo, *Reexamining Presidential Power in the Post-Soviet States*, "Stanford University Working Paper" 2004; E. Mazo, *Duverger's Dilemma: Debating the Uniqueness of Semi-Presidential Constitutions in Eastern Europe*, [w:] "Social Science Research Council": Dissertation Development Workshop on Governance in Eurasia, Wyd. University of Texas March 4-7, 2004.

<sup>16</sup> K. Armingeon, R. Careja, *Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2007*, Wyd. University of Berne 2007.

<sup>17</sup> J. Fortin, *Measuring Presidential Powers: Revisiting Existing Aggregate Measurement*, "International Political Science Review" 2013, vol 34, nr 1, s. 91-112.

<sup>18</sup> P. Magalhães, B. Fortes, *Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems: Presidential Powers, Electoral Turnout and the Performance of Government-Endorsed Candidates*, Wyd. Digital CSIC 2008.

<sup>19</sup> A. Fruhstorfer, *Putting Presidents Power into Place: A Measurement of Constitutional Presidential Strength in Non-Presidential Systems*, ECPR General Conference 2014.

<sup>20</sup> M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 148-158.

<sup>21</sup> C. Lucky, *Table of presidential powers in Eastern Europe*, "East European Constitutional Review" 1993-1994, vol 2, nr 4, s. 81-94.

<sup>22</sup> A. Krouwel, *Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries*, "Acta Politica" 2003, vol 38, s. 333-364; A. Krouwel, *Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European Countries*, "Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. Working paper" 2003, nr 2.

<sup>23</sup> T. Frye, *A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1997, vol 30, nr 5, s. 523-552.; T. Frye, *Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: A Political Economy Explanation*, Wyd. Center for Continuing Education 1999.

Estonia<sup>24</sup>. Finally, according to Elgie's and Doyle's<sup>25</sup>, Elgie's, Bucur's, Dolez's and Laurent's<sup>26</sup> methods (estimated for 2014 and 2015), the commensurate countries were parliamentary Estonia and Latvia and semi-presidential Bulgaria, Czechia (much less), Slovakia and Slovenia. Popularly elected presidents (as of 2016) were typical for Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

### **Semi-presidentialism or parliamentarism with the positions of nominal presidents in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia: theoretical and practical dimension of the problem**

Based on this (according to the frequency of the commensurability of the presidential powers in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU), we define (as of 2016) the similarity of the presidential powers, on the one hand, in semi-presidential Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia and, on the other hand, in parliamentary Estonia, Hungary and Latvia. Elgie's<sup>27</sup> logic shows that it is definitively clear that the analysed constitutional systems are to be taken literally. There is no invisibility in the cases of treatment the republicanism types, where presidents are elected in state legislatures (parliaments), as parliamentary systems of government. On the other hand, from the theoretical and methodological perspective, there is a request for clarification on how it should be actually (based on the presidential powers) interpreted the republican systems of government with nominal/ceremonial, but popularly elected presidents in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia – as semi-presidential (semi-presidentialism) or parliamentary (parliamentarism) republics. Along with that, it is proved that Lithuania, Poland and Romania are certainly (formally and actually) semi-presidential systems. Therefore, the primary hypothesis of the article lies to test the opinion that in democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe with nominal/ceremonial, but popularly elected presidents, semi-presidentialism is prevailing. However, these countries in their political practice are often operating on some components and principles of institutional/procedural logic of parliamentary republics.

However, one should take into account, that other attempts to define these political systems, in particular, are extremely parliamentary. This, for example, is typical for Siaroff<sup>28</sup>, who treats these systems as models of parliamentarism with nominal/ceremonial presidential powers. The scientist being a fan of the dichotomous approach to the classification of republican systems of government does not single out semi-presidential republic as a separate system of

<sup>24</sup> A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014; A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivnyal'nyy analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehrad's'koyi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: monohrafiya*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 102-111.

<sup>25</sup> R. Elgie, D. Doyle, *Maximizing the reliability of cross-national measures of presidential power*, Wyd. International Political Science Association biennial conference, Montreal, 20–24 July 2014.

<sup>26</sup> R. Elgie, C. Bucur, B. Dolez, A. Laurent, *Proximity, Candidates, and Presidential Power: How Directly Elected Presidents Shape the Legislative Party System*, "Political Research Quarterly" 2014, vol 67, nr 3, s. 467-477.

<sup>27</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>28</sup> A. Siaroff, *Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, nr 3, s. 287-312.



government. That is why his position is clear. Instead, Ozsoy<sup>29</sup> treats these systems as ‘unusual parliamentary models with elected but weak presidents’. The scientist bases this on fact that these varieties of republicanism (even prototypes of republicanism for their little representation in the world) should be defined as ‘hybrid’ cases for their institutional functioning. We believe that there is a positioning error of republican systems of government with popularly elected but weak/nominal presidents in this context. ‘Hybridity’ is often regarded as controversy on the ‘pure types’ of republicanism, meaning presidentialism and parliamentarism. ‘Hybridity’ is often understood as a ‘synthesis of presidentialism and parliamentarism’, i.e. actually semi-presidentialism. However, Ozsoy<sup>30</sup> believes that parliamentary systems of republican government sometimes may include the combination of ‘pure’ parliamentary systems of government (when legislature and executive is concentrated in hands of permanent or situational parliamentary majority, regardless of the cabinet type) and the option of direct and popular presidential elections. Instead, the researcher ignores the point that parliamentary systems do not inherent an idea of ‘dual legitimacy’ and ‘dual executive’ of political power. The author comes solely from a subjective judgment that weakness of presidential powers transforms ‘formally’ semi-presidential systems (defined by Elgie<sup>31</sup> and partially by Duverger<sup>32</sup>) into ‘actual’ parliamentary systems. However, there are no comments on the possibility that any formal parliamentary type of republicanism (when the president is elected in the parliament, also as defined by Elgie<sup>33</sup>) with the fairly/moderately strong head of state can be positioned as semi-presidentialism or can be transformed into semi-presidential system of government. The key observation in the set of Ozsoy’s<sup>34</sup> perspective is that republican systems of government with popularly elected but nominal presidents are parliamentary republics, because they have cabinets, which are collectively responsible only to parliaments. However, these features of political systems, according to the statement of Strom<sup>35</sup>, are not considered as clear attributes of the system of government, because they primarily indicate the system and method of coming to power and the method of exercising the power, which are more correlated to the questions about democratic or autocratic type of government. Therefore, we are committed to the claim that the way of cabinet accountability and responsibility to parliament is a measure of parliamentary democracy (and of such its special attribute, as the ‘chain of delegation and accountability’ between parliament and cabinet) and not of parliamentary system of government.

<sup>29</sup> S. Ozsoy, *An Unusual Parliamentary Model with Elected but Weak Presidents and Its Virtues and Vices*, Presented at Conference of International Political Science Association “Political Regimes, Democratic Consolidation and the Quality of Democracy”, São Paulo, February 18, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> S. Ozsoy, *An Unusual Parliamentary Model with Elected but Weak Presidents and Its Virtues and Vices*, Presented at Conference of International Political Science Association “Political Regimes, Democratic Consolidation and the Quality of Democracy”, São Paulo, February 18, 2011.

<sup>31</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>32</sup> M. Duverger, *A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1980, vol 8, nr 2, s. 166.

<sup>33</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

<sup>34</sup> S. Ozsoy, *An Unusual Parliamentary Model with Elected but Weak Presidents and Its Virtues and Vices*, Presented at Conference of International Political Science Association “Political Regimes, Democratic Consolidation and the Quality of Democracy”, São Paulo, February 18, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> K. Strom, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 261-289.

In order to test our hypothesis, we proceed with the formal interpretation of semi-presidentialism (as in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia, which are really semi-presidential, because they have popularly elected presidents and their cabinets are collectively responsible to parliaments), trying to verify it factually. The logic of the verification of semi-presidentialism in these countries lies in comparing procedural and institutional features of parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism (obviously, presidentialism is not to be checked). Meanwhile, additionally we try to match the analysed countries in terms of their convergence to formal/actual parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism (as sometimes they have more or less attributes of different types of republican government).

Moreover, for fairness, it should be noted that the analysed countries could not even be interpreted as semi-presidential systems, using the 'classical' definition of semi-presidentialism, provided by Duverger. The scientist defined semi-presidentialism as a political system ('regime' or system of government), where: a) The president, elected under the universal vote, has many powers; b) The president has the prime minister and ministers opposite himself, who possess executive power and stay in the cabinet for as long, as the parliament express them a vote of confidence (or until the parliament express them a vote of no confidence)<sup>36</sup>. However, the definition provided by Duverger is not enough, as it is difficult to define whether president has significant powers. In addition, such treatment of semi-presidentialism introduces the elements of subjectivity (which the Table 1 reflects) and therefore it loses its scientific value and integrity.

Nevertheless, the approach proposed by Duverger helps us to understand that formal semi-presidential systems of government (based on the presidential powers) can actually function (based on the discrepancy of constitutional texts and political events) as semi-presidential or parliamentary systems of government (or can function logically following the specified varieties of republicanism). In this regard, Elgie<sup>37</sup> notes that constitutionally strong presidents sometimes are actually institutionally and politically weak, or vice versa. In addition, the actual positioning of systems of government types depends on the type of political culture and on the institutionalised patterns of how national constitutions carry out in practice. At the same time, it is not possible not to mention in the theoretical and methodological analysis the importance and impact of political parties and party systems on the actual positioning of any constitutional type of political system. On this basis, we offer to outline the institutional and procedural parameters of political systems in the analysed Central and Eastern European countries of the EU (based on the application of case studies and regional comparisons).

The critical evidence of whether the analysed systems of government are semi-presidential lies in the verification of their experience of *cohabitations*. Cohabitation is a scenario of institutional and procedural development of only semi-presidential system of government, when

<sup>36</sup> M. Duverger, *A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1980, vol 8, nr 2, s. 166.

<sup>37</sup> R. Elgie, *Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 53-71.

president and prime minister represents the opposing parties, but the presidential party has no representation in cabinet<sup>38</sup>. Considering the existing researches, it should be urgently noted that different types of republican government could be tested in different institutional scenarios. For example, parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism most often enable the existence of the unified majority systems<sup>39</sup>, but semi-presidentialism also enables the existence of the divided minority systems<sup>40</sup> and the divided majority systems (the latter incorporates cases of cohabitations)<sup>41</sup>.

Therefore, we decided to use the scenario of the divided majority systems as a test mechanism to verify existence or nonexistence of semi-presidentialism in republican systems of government in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU with nominal, but popularly elected presidents. We would like to note that in the first group of analysed countries (Bulgaria and Slovenia) there are direct obligations of presidents to consult with parliamentary majority (absolute or relative majority in parliaments) or the largest parties, when presidents propose candidates for prime ministers. That is why cohabitation automatically occurs when a political party (or coalition) is opposed to president and when it is dominant in parliament. In the second group of analysed countries (Czechia and Slovakia), the preconditions for resolving disagreements about presidential and parliamentary candidates for prime minister post are not provided. This is because constitutionally in these countries presidents and prime ministers are charged on the structure of the executives. Given these assumptions, we consider the actual examples of cohabitations in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU with nominal, but popularly elected presidents (see detailed Table 2).

It is also advisable as a case, which reflects the logic of cohabitation, to verify and consider how the real (actual) powers of formally weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents are changed and if they are change at all. For this, we appeal to the first two-year experience of cohabitation (01.1995 – 02.1997) between Prime Minister Zhan Videnov (BSP) and President Zhelyu Zhelev (SDS) in Bulgaria. During the period of cohabitation (since 1995 and even earlier, i.e. before the formation of Videnov cabinet), president Zhelev filled his formal powers with some actual levers of political, imperative and powerful influence. Consequently, we must clearly understand the differences between de facto and de jure powers of the presidents and prime ministers in the terms of cohabitations. In fact, President Zhelev participated in the formation of Videnov cabinet and in the choice of cabinet ministers. Identical procedures took

<sup>38</sup> R. Elgie, *Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 53-71.; D. Samuels, M. Shugart, *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2010.; V. Lytvyn, *Teoriya ta Praktyka Kohabitatsiyi v Napivprezidents'kykh Systemakh Yevropy*, "Osvita rehionu: politolohiya, psykholohiya, komunikatsiyi" 2011, vol 4, s. 140-149.

<sup>39</sup> The unified majority system is the least institutional conflict scenario of any republican system of government, because head of state is a supporter of the cabinet party (parties) course, while president and prime minister have the support of the same parliamentary majority.

<sup>40</sup> The divided minority system is a conflict scenario of only semi-presidential systems of government, when president and prime minister (and none at all in this respect) have no support of the legislative majority.

<sup>41</sup> The divided majority system is a conflict scenario of only semi-presidential systems of government, when president, unlike prime minister, has no support of the parliamentary majority.

place before the period of cohabitation when two non-party (technocratic) cabinets in Bulgaria were created and led by Berov and Indzhova. President Zhelev also participated in the decisions to dismiss the cabinet and to appoint early parliamentary elections<sup>42</sup>. However, the constitution of Bulgaria does not formally provide selecting cabinet ministers as a direct prerogative of the president of Bulgaria. Therefore, it is clear that cohabitations play the roles of ‘accelerators and generators of the heads of state additional powers’ in republican systems of government with popularly elected, but weak (nominal) presidents. It has led to the fact that these republican systems function in some completely different parameters than it is typical for traditional cases. Similar positions were demonstrated in the researches of Schleiter, Morgan-Jones<sup>43</sup> and Baylis<sup>44</sup>. They are not enough in order to interpret, for example, Bulgaria and other similar republican cases as parliamentary systems of government<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> V. Ganev, *Bulgaria II*, “East European Constitutional Review” 1994, vol 62, nr 3, s. 62-64.

<sup>43</sup> P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *The Eastern Enlargement of the EU and The Semi-Presidential Revolution*, “Journal of European Affairs” 2004, vol 2, nr 4, s. 10-12.

<sup>44</sup> T. Baylis, *Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe*, “World Politics” 1996, vol 48, s. 317.

<sup>45</sup> O. Protsyk, *Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-Presidentialism*, “Political Studies” 2006, vol 54, s. 220.; T. Sedelius, *The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Örebro Studies in Political Science 2006, s. 314.; M. Shugart, *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, “French Politics” 2005, vol 3, s. 323-351.; M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 41.

**Table 2.** The cases of cohabitation in republican systems of government with nominal, but popularly elected president in in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU (as of 2016)<sup>46</sup>

Country	The president, years	The party of the president*	The prime minister, years	The party of the prime minister*	The party composition of the cabinet	The period of cohabitation
Bulgaria (1991–2016)	Zhelev (1992–1997)	SDS	Videnov (01.1995–02.1997)	BSP	BSP + BZNS (AS) + PKE	01.1995–02.1997
	Stoyanov (1997–2002)	SDS	Sakskoburgotski 1 (07.2001–03.2004)	NDSV	NDSV + DPS	07.2001–01.2002
Bulgaria (1991–2016)	Purvanov 1 (2002–2007)	BSP	Sakskoburgotski 1 (07.2001–03.2004)	NDSV	NDSV + DPS	01.2002–03.2004
			Sakskoburgotski 2 (03.2004–02.2005)	NDSV	NDSV + DPS	03.2004–02.2005
			Sakskoburgotski 3 (02.2005–08.2005)	NDSV	NDSV + DPS + NV	02.2005–08.2005
Czechia (2012–2016)	Purvanov 2 (2007–2012)	BSP	Borisov (07.2009–02.2013)	GERB	GERB	07.2009–01.2012
	Plevneliev (2012–2016)	GERB/independent	Oresharski (05.2013–07.2014)	BSP	BSP + DPS	05.2013–07.2014
Czechia (2012–2016)	Zeman (2013 – incumbent)	SPOLZ/ CSSD (by 2009)	Nečas (04.2012–06.2013)	ODS	ODS + TOP09 + LIDEM (VV)	01.2013–06.2013
			Sobotka (01.2014 – incumbent)	CSSD	CSSD + ANO + KDU-ČSL	01.2014 – incumbent
Slovakia (1999–2016)	Gašparovič 1 (2004–2009)	HZD	Dzurinda 3 (12.2003–09.2005)	SDKU	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH + ANO	06.2004–09.2005
			Dzurinda 4 (09.2005–02.2006)	SDKU	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH	09.2005–02.2006
			Dzurinda 5 (02.2006–06.2006)	SDKU	SDKU + SMK-MKP	02.2006–06.2006
Slovakia (1999–2016)	Gašparovič 2 (2009–2014)	HZD (SMER)	Radicova (07.2010–03.2012)	SDKU-DS	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	07.2010–03.2012
	Dimovšek (2002–2007)	LDS	Janša 1 (12.2004–09.2008)	SDS	SDS + NSi + SLS + DeSUS	12.2004–12.2007
Slovenia (1992–2016)	Pahor (2012 – incumbent)	ZLSD/ independent	Janša 2 (01.2012–01.2013)	SDS	SDS + NSi + SLS + DeSUS + DL	12.2012–01.2013
			Janša 3 (01.2013–02.2013)	SDS	SDS + NSi + SLS + DeSUS	01.2013–02.2013



However, in this perspective, there is one hidden and problematic element of comparative analysis. It lies in the fact that in times of cohabitations a 'shading' of formal constitutional (de jure) powers of presidents usually happens with the addition of behavioural and political factors and actual (de facto) powers of the presidents. This is why some researchers interpret the dynamics of displacement of formal presidential powers with actual presidential powers as an undemocratic practice. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept such an idea, because the formal dynamics of presidential powers is the prerogative of the constitutional (or legal) perspective and the actual dynamics of presidential powers is the prerogative of the electoral (or political) nature. The only controversy in this case is the fact of undemocratic elections. Conversely, if the electoral process is estimated as pluralistic and transparent, then it is not possible to talk about the undemocratic substitution of the formal presidential powers with actual presidential powers. Consequently, cohabitations in democratic republics with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents are quite normal results of the political process, which calls into the question the parliamentary nature of such republics.

Based on analysed empirical data we reached the conclusion that semi-presidentialism is formally and actually implemented in Central and Eastern European republics with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents. Based on this comparative analysis tool, we can prove that such political systems inherent dualism of executive power (dual executive), which is considered to be the crucial and the most cited attribute of semi-presidentialism. This argues that the dualism of executive power (dual executive) should be considered formally (or constitutionally) and actually (or politically). Every analysed country of Central and Eastern Europe, according to its constitution text, provides two centres/cores of the executive power, i.e. president and prime minister. Czechia and Slovakia make it even more clearly. However, in fact it occurs more noticeably during the periods of cohabitations, when the dualism of executive power is being politicised. This means that the formal powers of presidents are minor (nominal), but they can correlate and even grow politically or informally during the periods of the divided majority systems. In parallel, it outlines the operational logic of the republics with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents. In the case of the formal type of dual executive and weaknesses of the presidential powers, such systems often operate on the model of parliamentary republics (parliamentarism). Instead, in the case of the actual type of dual executive and growth of the informal presidential powers, such systems clearly work as semi-presidential republics (semi-presidentialism). Meanwhile it is impossible to generate two concurrent and simultaneous findings of the varieties of the same political system, we conclude that Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia (as for 2016) are semi-presidential republics with nominal presidents. Considering their recent periods of cohabitations (especially in 2009–2016), we should indicate the growth of the informal presidential powers, i.e. the strengthening of the actual dualism of executive, which would last until the return of the republican governments into the phase of the unified majority system, which tends to semi-presidentialism with dominance of parliament.

The proposed logic is largely consonant with the ideas of Elgie<sup>47</sup>. Based on the marker of leadership of president or prime minister, the researcher has identified several types of semi-presidential systems: the system of dominance of president; the system of dominance of prime minister; the system of transition of dominance from president to prime minister; the system of transition of dominance from a balanced leadership to prime minister; the system of balanced leadership.

Additionally, we offer to outline such variety of semi-presidentialism as the system of limitations of the prime-ministerial dominance. According to this logic, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia in conditions of the unified majority systems follow the semi-presidentialism based on the dominance of the prime minister (i.e. semi-presidentialism with nominal president). Instead, in conditions of the divided majority systems (cohabitations) these countries follow the semi-presidentialism based on the limitations of the prime-ministerial dominance. Essentially, this means that formally semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents may change by phases from the dominance of prime ministers to the scenarios of cohabitations.

Nevertheless, the indicated logic of institutional analysis of republican governments with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents in Central and Eastern Europe countries of the EU is incomplete. It needs clarification with the help of the comparison of special (separate) cases. The matter is that the conventional distinctions among the formal (constitutional) and actual (political) systems in the region do not fully determine the distribution of the roles and functions between the branches of power because there is a wide variation of power possibilities of presidents (heads of states), prime ministers and parliaments within each country. Therefore, with the aim to assess additional properties of constitutional systems' extrapolating in practice and to check whether semi-presidentialism is peculiar to the analysed countries it is suitable to use the information about the peculiarities of the main political and institutional actors among which there is a comparative distinction. This is distinction of president, prime minister and parliament at least in a problematic area attributed to the authorities of the executive branch of government. Based on the consideration of the main political institutions within the context of foreign affairs of each analysed country and on the above-suggested data we make conclusions about every political system in our sample.

In *Bulgaria*, constitutionally and politically there exists a peculiar and quite unclear position of the president, especially in the context of realisation of executive power. However, it does not prevent us from classifying the position of the president of Bulgaria as nominal, weak or ceremonial<sup>48</sup>. Nonetheless, according to the constitution, it is clear that the president represents the country in international relations and concludes international agreements. Instead of it,

<sup>47</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.; R. Elgie, *Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 53-71.

<sup>48</sup> S. Andreev, *Corruption, legitimacy and the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America*, "Review of Sociology" 2008, vol 14, nr 2, s. 93-115.; T. Sedelius, *The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Örebro Studies in Political Science 2006, s. 141-144.



the cabinet (as the highest executive body) is responsible for the implementation of domestic and foreign policy of Bulgaria. This proves that the president at least partially is a part of the structure of the dual model of executive power (dual executive), which has been objectified during some periods of cohabitation.

In *Slovakia*, we can define a formally weak, ceremonial and nominal head of state. However, foreign policy is included constitutionally to the scope of the powers of the president who represents the country in the international relations and holds negotiations or procedures of international agreements ratifications. Despite this, the president may delegate the cabinet to conclude international treaties. That is a characteristic feature of almost all presidents since 1993 (when Slovakia was formally a parliamentary republic, because by 1999 the presidents were elected in legislature). According to various scientific data, the foreign policy of Slovakia actually and usually (except for brief cases of cohabitations) has been assigned to the area of cabinet powers. The reason for this is the absence of sufficient political resources of the presidents for the exercise of executive power. Nevertheless, the political resources of the presidents significantly increased twice (as was demonstrated above) during the scenarios of the divided majority systems when the presidential powers multiplied based on the scenarios of actual dualism of executive power<sup>49</sup>.

In *Czechia* (which only in 2012 introduced the post of a popularly elected head of state), the role of the president is also significantly limited. Nevertheless, the president represents the country abroad, negotiates and ratifies treaties. The Czech President may delegate the cabinet to conclude international treaties. This fact confirms the similarity of the Czech and Slovak systems of government. The highest specificity of the Czechia lies in the fact that almost immediately after the beginning of testing of this system of government (with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents) it put into the practice the divided majority system (cohabitation). In other words, this system of government has worked at once as a semi-presidential one<sup>50</sup>.

In *Slovenia*, we can also define a weak, ceremonial and nominal head of state. However, constitutionally and politically it is foreseen that the president should directly represent the country abroad<sup>51</sup>: even though the cabinet is responsible for foreign and, in particular, European policy and the signing of international treaties. In fact, this is a direct testimony of dualism of executive power (at least in foreign affairs).

<sup>49</sup> M. Rybář, D. Malová, *Slovakia's Presidency: Consolidating Democracy by Curbing Ambiguous Powers*, [w:] R. Elgie, S. Moestrup (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2008, s. 180-200.; M. Tavits, *Direct Presidential Elections and Turnout in Parliamentary Contexts*, "Political Research Quarterly" 2009, vol 62, nr 1, s. 42-54.; M. Tavits, *Geographically Targeted Spending: Exploring the Electoral Strategies of Incumbent Governments*, "European Political Science Review" 2009, vol 1, nr 1, s. 103-123.; M. Tavits, *Presidents with Prime Ministers*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009, s. 119-129.

<sup>50</sup> M. Kubát, *Co je a co není poloprezidentský režim a proč je dobré nevědět nejen v souvislosti s českou politikou*, [w:] M. Kubát, T. Lebeda (eds.), *O komparativní politologii a současné české politice. Miroslavu Novákovi k 60. narozeninám*, Wyd. Karolinum 2014, s. 45-55.; M. Brunclík, M. Kubát, *Contradictory Approaches: Discussing Semi-Presidentialism in Central Europe*, "Analele Universității din București. Seria Științe Politice" 2016, vol 18, nr 1, s. 67-79.; J. Kysela, *První volba prezidenta pootevřela dveře poloprezidentskému systému*, "Česká pozice" 2013.

<sup>51</sup> A. Krasovec, D. Lajh, *Have democratization processes been a catalyst for the Europeanization of party politics in Slovenia?*, "Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans" 2008, vol 10, nr 2, s. 183-203.

According to Elgie's<sup>52</sup> classification, the definitive institutional and procedural attributes of republican government are shown in Table 3. They help to verify the presence or absence of semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU with weak (nominal), but popularly elected presidents, i.e. in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Table 3 additionally confirms the already suggested conclusion that the model of semi-presidentialism with a nominal (ceremonial) head of state is implemented formally and actually in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia. In the conditions of the unified majority systems, such models of semi-presidentialism operate in a parliamentary-like way, when the president is positioned as the symbolic leader of a nation that has almost no significant constitutional powers, is not an active creator of political decisions, though the president is a part of the dual executive. The absence of influential presidential powers means that the presidential authority legitimacy in case of the unified majority system manifestations will not be directed against the prime minister. It also will not point the head of state as a political rival of the head of cabinet.

**Table 3.** Central and Eastern European countries of the EU with weak (nominal) presidents, which constitutions formalise the semi-presidential system of government (as of 2016)<sup>53</sup>

Country	Dualism of the executive power (dual executive)	Direct popular election of president	The powers of president in executive	The right of president to appoint prime minister	Cabinet collective responsibility to parliament
Bulgaria	+	+ (93)	+ (98–103)	+ (99, 102)	+ (111, 112)
Czechia	+	+ (54)	+ (62–65)	+ (62)	+ (68)
Slovakia	+	+ (101)	+ (102)	+ (110)	+ (115)
Slovenia	+	+ (103)	+ (107–108)	+ (111)	+ (116)

This means that real political (including executive) power traditionally belongs to prime minister who is responsible to parliament for all aspects of the country's political course. Nevertheless, very rarely (in periods of the divided majority systems) these systems of government (as mentioned above) can function in a divergent manner. There is a special influence on this of the hypothetical dangers of increase of conflicts' power in the system with a formally dual executive. Actual manifestations of a dual executive influence the system of government even more. In particular, it should be understood that a popularly elected president is a 'veto-player' that can have a significant impact on the manifestations and actions of prime minister, especially

<sup>52</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.; R. Elgie, *Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies*, "Taiwan Journal of Democracy" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 53-71.

<sup>53</sup> Figures in parentheses are constitution articles' numbers, which regulate the use of these procedures. It is important that the constitutions of Czechia and Slovakia attribute presidents to the structures of the executive. The constitution of Bulgaria indicates the need for use of a parliamentary system of government. However, according to the provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution of Bulgaria, it means that Bulgaria is not a parliamentary republic (parliamentary system of government), but parliamentary democracy. Table 3 has been compiled based on the constitutions of Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia.

in the field of controversial powers of president and prime minister. A president (in the most of the analysed countries) can veto international agreements and therefore block the foreign policy of the state. In addition, president, even in semi-presidential systems of government with nominal heads of state, is a chief of the armed forces. It breaks the integrity and monism of the executive power of cabinet and prime minister in defence policy. This proves that even in these systems, especially at times of cohabitations, executives work at least in part as dual branch of power. That is the classification attribute of semi-presidentialism. At the same time, it is necessary to understand the specific features of semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents:

1. There is a limited opportunity of institutional conflicts in the executive between president and prime minister in these systems. They mostly occur only under conditions of cohabitation and usually concern the issues and problems of foreign affairs and foreign policy of a country<sup>54</sup>.
2. The conflicts in the executive of semi-presidentialism with the nominal heads of state are always unidirectional. This means that president being characterised and determined with the limited constitutional powers and roles tries to expand his (or her) political influence at least concerning certain things. Therefore, president purposefully opposes cabinet headed by prime minister.
3. There are occasional and even rare manifestations of attributes of diffuse responsibility between the head of state and the head of cabinet in these systems. As a result, the political and power processes almost do not get dual and controversial meaning.
4. In such systems, the possibility of an actual constitutional ambiguity is excluded as much as possible, even during periods of cohabitations when actual powers of the presidents relatively increase. This is because in these scenarios the models and systems of power begin to act in accordance with the requirements of constitutional regulations and reglamentations.
5. In such systems it is always clear who is a dominant player/actor of executive (to more or less extent it depends on whether the prevailing model of dual executive is the unified majority system, the divided majority system or the divided minority system). It is a prime minister. However, it is interesting that only informal powers of prime minister decrease. This is usually the case of cohabitation, when informal powers of president increase.

The important definitive feature of semi-presidential systems with nominal president lies in the fact that they are obligatory introduced, according to Shugart and Carey<sup>55</sup>, as primer-presidential systems. This means that in the construction of dual executive there is a peculiar

<sup>54</sup> M. Tavits, *Presidents with Prime Ministers*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009, s. 31.

<sup>55</sup> M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 148-158.; M. Shugart, *Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns*, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, s. 323-351.

feature of semi-presidentialism: prime minister always (at least formally and in most cases actually) dominates president. In such structure of the power, prime minister solely and cabinet collectively are responsible only to parliament. Some researchers (for example, Siaroff<sup>56</sup>) often use this institutional attribute (especially if the head of state and the head of cabinet represent the same political party or parties, which are the members of the parliamentary coalition) as a sufficient prerequisite of reinterpretation of premier-presidential systems with nominal presidents as parliamentary systems with nominal presidents. By this logic, the premier-presidential systems with slightly stronger presidents should be classified as parliamentary systems with 'corrective' presidents, and premier-presidential systems with very strong presidents should be classified as parliamentary systems with presidential dominance. In fact, this interpretation leads to considering the dichotomous classification of political systems obsolete in contemporary Comparative Politics. Respectively according to Elgie<sup>57</sup>, such systems in terms of the logic of institutional and political process should better be classified as semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents. Therefore, the previous conclusion is incorrect, because it does not include neither institutional nor procedural nature of origin of the presidential post: in parliamentary systems of government a president is elected only in parliament, while in the premier-presidential semi-presidential systems (regardless of the powers of presidents) he or she is elected popularly. This means that the systems of parliamentary republicanism actually prevents from cohabitation. An exception is the situation when president, elected by the previous composition of parliament, performs his or her powers during the formation of new cabinet and during the change of the position of a president on the results of the next composition of parliament. This is the inherent feature of higher political institutions' formation in parliamentary systems of government. Instead, cohabitation, as demonstrated above, can take place in the premier-presidential semi-presidential systems. This is revealed in the following categorical feature of premier-presidentialism, in particular, with a nominal president: if legislature chooses a prime minister, who ideologically and partly opposes the president, then the latter will have to accept the appointment and this will be the reason for the beginning of cohabitation. Therefore, the interaction among semi-presidentialism (even with the nominal president) and party system defines how the interrelationship between president and prime minister will work in practice: whether prime minister will be subordinated to president, president will be subordinated to prime minister or president will stay with prime minister in cohabitation. Instead, in parliamentary systems of government, president at all is not hierarchically taken into account in the process of cabinet formation, because president is elected within the legislative body. Since the positions of president and the head of cabinet in parliamentary systems are replaced mainly by the representatives of the same parties or parties that entirely (or almost) are the members of

<sup>56</sup> A. Siaroff, *Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, nr 3, s. 287-312.

<sup>57</sup> R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, nr 2, s. 219-238.

the same coalitions or even (in periods of political crisis) non-party candidates, then samples and examples of parliamentarism function as the unified majority system.

In return, semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents (and almost all other types of premier-presidential systems) actually and mainly operate under the parliamentary-like logic of premier-presidentialism. This, similarly to classical parliamentary republics, occurs in periods of prevalence of the unified majority systems in formally semi-presidential republics. However, it is always preserved the institutional capacity of semi-presidentialism as constitutional system of dual executive. It depending on the party composition of parliament and the will of the electorate in the process of presidential elections can stop working at any time for the parliamentary-like logic. Instead, based on the formation of the divided majority system (cohabitation) or the divided minority system semi-presidentialism can turn towards actual strengthening of the presidential powers. This means that unlike the parliamentary system of government semi-presidentialism (even with nominal president) retains/reserves the immanent influence of president on the structuring of the current system of government in a country. Such institutional capacity of the analysed countries of Central and Eastern Europe is incorporated within the existing constitutions of these countries.

### **Instead of conclusion. Constitutional systems' varieties in parliamentary democracies**

A significant observation in the perspective of distinction among parliamentary systems and semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents should be implemented in the context of the category of 'parliamentary democracy', which is now referred to almost all Central and Eastern European countries of the EU. It is particularly important to understand that parliamentary democracy is not equal to the parliamentary system of government (i.e. parliamentarism). Parliamentary democracy is a format of a democratic government in which cabinet is at the top of the executive, but simultaneously under the condition that prime minister and cabinet are always responsible only to the popularly elected parliament. There is the serial communication and connection between the delegation and representation of powers in parliamentary democracy: from voters to parliament and from parliament to cabinet. There is also the serial relationship between responsibility of officials and responsibility of voters: cabinet responsibility to parliament and parliament responsibility to electorate. This means that in terms of democratic government semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents (and other premier-presidential systems) and parliamentary systems both are parliamentary democracies. In other words, we can observe the differences among distinctive republican systems of government within the same political regime (democratic or autocratic). The discrepancy lies in the fact that, in general, in semi-presidential systems of government the conflicts in dual executive (or intra-executive conflicts) have the interinstitutional nature. We are talking about the conflict between a president and a prime minister who get their 'credentials' in different ways, but the initial mechanisms of them are nationwide elections. In return, in parliamentary systems of government

the conflicts in monistic executive (or intra-cabinet and intra-parliament conflicts) have the intra-institutional nature. We are talking about the conflict between the parliamentary majority and opposition, between the partners in a coalition, between prime minister and ministers representing distinct political parties<sup>58</sup>. Therefore, it is clear that the semi-presidential system with a nominal president and the parliamentary system, for which a ceremonial president is peculiar a priori, differs institutionally: herewith the former are much more complicated than the latter.

Therefore, it is clear that the parliamentary democracy can be diverse and can be outlined as a semi-presidential or parliamentary system of government. In the first case, there is always a latent potential of struggle for influence in executive. In the second case, this is not a necessarily characteristic. In general, semi-presidential systems of government in this context are positioned as institutionally unstable patterns, especially when it comes to formal proportionate of powers of president and prime minister as the centres/cores of executive (i.e. a balanced semi-presidentialism). The fact is that the head of state in this scenario may require the exercise of a dominant influence on the political process. At least with regard to the fact that president is popularly elected to protect the interests of the whole country: as opposed to prime minister who is elected by parliament only because of the influence of the cabinet parties' electorate. Therefore, president can represent himself as 'more legitimate'. Thus, popularly elected presidents clearly, but always subjectively understand the point that their formal powers do not exactly correspond to the mandate by which they are endowed by voters<sup>59</sup>. It also happens that because of a reliance on their personal social popularity presidents, who are formally weaker than prime ministers (scenarios of the premier-presidential systems), try to act as 'the interpreters of the will of the people' in an attempt to find additional actual instruments of influence on the political system. Instead, prime ministers face the dilemma of exercising executive power in the context of the 'political arenas' or 'domains' that are positioned as constitutionally contradicting and controversial. The indicated problem gets especial emphasis when the realisation of social and economic reforms in a country is a failure, for which are directly responsible the heads of cabinets and not presidents. This point informally increases the powers of the heads of state. Moreover, the specified institutional paradox illustrates the dilemma of dual legitimacy of the premier-presidential forms of semi-presidentialism, which is not typical for parliamentary republics and makes a very substantial institutional and contextual difference between them. This observation takes a particular importance in the political scenario when president is more popular and socially influential (by the virtue of his or her dissociation with the political parties that form a cabinet) than prime minister. In fact, this situation leads to 'technical or

<sup>58</sup> T. Bergman, E. Damgaard, *Delegation and Accountability in European Integration: The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union*, "Journal of Legislative Studies" 2000, vol 6, nr 1, 192 s.; T. Bergman, W. Müller, K. Ström, *Parliamentary democracy and the chain of delegation*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 255-260.; K. Ström, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 261-289.; K. Ström, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003.

<sup>59</sup> T. Sedelius, *The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Örebro Studies in Political Science 2006, s. 251.

partial cohabitation' (when the non-party president opposes the party prime minister), when president is often considered as more legitimate than cabinet.

With this in mind, the specificity of semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents (as a kind of premier-presidential system and the model of parliamentary democracy) in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU is the moment that their potential of institutional imbalance is minimised with the minor constitutional powers of presidents. It makes the system of government in terms of the unified majority system to function in more parliamentary-like patterns. However, it makes the system of government in terms of the divided majority system (cohabitation) to function in parameters of semi-presidentialism. This means that the hypothetical possibility of turning president of the ceremonial head of state into the influential (or at least more powerful than prime minister) official is to a lesser extent peculiar for the semi-presidential systems with nominal presidents. Therefore, the analysed samples of premier-presidentialism are rarely subjected to institutional crisis scenarios because they usually formally and actually operate within the concept of semi-presidentialism. From this point of view, the republican systems of government with nominal/ceremonial, but popularly elected heads of state should be interpreted as sufficiently stable, but also as sufficiently consistent with the principles of parliamentary democracy<sup>60</sup>. This directly and conclusively proves the hypothesis that the republican systems of government with nominal, but popularly elected presidents in Central and Eastern European countries of the EU are inherently/formally and consequently/actually the cases of semi-presidentialism.

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<sup>60</sup> T. Sedelius, *The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Örebro Studies in Political Science 2006, s. 201-204; M. Tavits, *Presidents with Prime Ministers*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009, s. 143.

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## Patterns of minority governments' stability in european parliamentary democracies

The article is dedicated to analyzing patterns of minority governments' stability in European parliamentary democracies, in particular in the European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism (in 1944-2016). The author found that minority governments are relatively less stable than majority governments. However, the researcher argued that the single-party minority governments on average are more stable than minority coalition governments.

*Keywords:* minority government, parliamentary democracy, systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, duration of minority governments, stability of minority governments.

## ПАТЕРНИ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ

Проаналізовано патерни стабільності урядів меншості у європейських парламентських демократіях, зокрема в європейських системах позитивного і негативного парламентаризму (упродовж 1944-2016 рр.). Виявлено, що уряди меншості відносно менш стабільні, ніж уряди більшості. Водночас, аргументовано, що однопартійні уряди меншості усереднено більш стабільні, ніж коаліційні уряди меншості.

*Ключові слова:* уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, системи позитивного і негативного парламентаризму, тривалість урядів меншості, стабільність урядів меншості.

Government stability is one of the determinative and essential indices of expediency or in expediency of choice and quality of some or other political systems and political institutes and processes approved in them, as well as a predictor of system stability, democratic representativeness and accountability and prospects of further strengthening/consolidation of democracy<sup>1</sup>. From this perspective minority governments are not the exceptions, especially in European parliamentary democracies, where institutional scenarios are determined though not in all countries, but in average they occur quite often and are not now interpreted as ad-hoc and necessarily as "critical and risky". Therefore, analysis and definition of stability among minority

<sup>1</sup> Z. Somer-Topcu, L. Williams, *Survival of the fittests? Cabinet duration in Postcommunist Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 2008, vol 40, nr. 3, s. 313-329.

governments, especially on the background of theoretical and methodological peculiarities and preconditions of a comparative research, types, theoretical and empirical principles, models and ways of formation and accountability, party-electoral, ideological and power-oppositional attributes and determinants of minority governments, as well as executive-legislative and intra-governmental relations and process of legislation in the context of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies is rather urgent and forward-looking, as they are capable of discovering certain patterns of inter-institutional relations.

We may conclude this on the basis of various theoretical-methodological and empirical works by such scientists as Z. Byaloblocki<sup>2</sup>, C. Conrad and S. Golder<sup>3</sup>, D. Diermeier and A. Merlo<sup>4</sup>, L. Dodd<sup>5</sup>, R. Elgie and M. Maor<sup>6</sup>, J. Huber and C. Martinez-Gallardo<sup>7</sup>, M. Laver, K. Shepsle and N. Schofield<sup>8</sup>, V. Lytvyn and A. Romaniuk<sup>9</sup>, L. Martin and R. Stevenson<sup>10</sup>, F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fettelschoss and P. Harfst<sup>11</sup>, G. Sartori<sup>12</sup>, L. Savage<sup>13</sup>, Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, B. Russett and L. Williams<sup>14</sup>, K. Strom<sup>15</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>16</sup>, S. Wesche<sup>17</sup>, E. Zimmerman<sup>18</sup> and many others. They describe

<sup>2</sup> Z. Byaloblocki, *Stabilnist ta efektywnist urjadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. Vydavnychyy tsentr LNU imeni I. Franka 2013.

<sup>3</sup> C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr. 1, s. 119-150.

<sup>4</sup> D. Diermeier, A. Merlo, *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46-79.

<sup>5</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>6</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, "West European Politics" 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.; M. Maor, *The Dynamics of Minority Rule: A Bargaining-Based Theoretical Framework*, Presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum, Germany 1990.

<sup>7</sup> J. Huber, C. Martinez-Gallardo, *Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2004, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 27-48.; J. Huber, C. Martinez-Gallardo, *Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Political Science Review" 2008, vol 102, nr. 2, s. 169-180.

<sup>8</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1998, vol 1, s. 28-54.; M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multi-Party Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. OUP 1990.

<sup>9</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Konseptualne vyznachennya ponyattya „uryadova stabilnist”*, „Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu”, Seriya: Politolohiya, Sotsiolohiya, Filozofiya 2008, nr 10, s. 37-42.; A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: instytutsiyni vymir*, Lviv 2004.; A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: Monografija*, Wyd. Vydavnychyy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.; A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshebradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: monografija*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.

<sup>10</sup> L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33-50.

<sup>11</sup> F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fettelschoss, P. Harfst, *Party government in Central European democracies: A data collection (1990-2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, s. 869-893.; F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fettelschoss, *Cabinet Government and Cabinet Ministers in Central Eastern European Democracies: A Descriptive Cross National Evaluation*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Uppsala, April 13-18, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> G. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. CUP 1976.

<sup>13</sup> L. Savage, *A product of their bargaining environment: Explaining government duration in Central and Eastern Europe*, "SEI Working Paper" 2012, nr. 130.

<sup>14</sup> Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments, 1945-98*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2010, vol 40, nr. 4, s. 805-833.; Z. Somer-Topcu, L. Williams, *Survival of the fittest? Cabinet duration in Postcommunist Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 2008, vol 40, nr. 3, s. 313-329.; Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, vol 87, nr. 3, s. 624-638.

<sup>15</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. CUP 1990.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199-227.

<sup>16</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

<sup>17</sup> S. Wesche, *Electoral systems and their effect on the survival of minority and coalition governments in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. The University of Ottawa 2013.

<sup>18</sup> E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

definitive and methodological measurement parameters and evaluation of stability among different types of governments; however they lack a systematic, but not a descriptive focus on specialized statistics of minority governments' stability. Even despite the fact that minority cabinets, at least among European parliamentary democracies, are formed with high frequency and in fact make a third part of all party governmental cabinets.

We suppose that such historiographical situation is rather often caused by an intuitive (at the worst by a non-system) position of a number of scientists, especially from the countries where minority governments are not formed or are even impossible. The point is that in such a case scientists are inclined to study the analyzed political institutes as "short-term aberrance" of political systems, which are, first of all, generated by rather stable and, correspondingly, more effective majority governments. G. Sartori believes that such logics of non-studying minority governments' stability to some extent supplements perception of the latter as the cases, which "either disguise themselves as coalitional governments of majority, which de-facto enjoy support of the majority in legislature", or are often acting cabinets, which in general are "weak" and "non-durable"<sup>19</sup>. Z. Somer-Topcu, L. Williams<sup>20</sup> and L. Savage<sup>21</sup> reckon that to instability of minority governments contributes the fact that they are less economically and socially efficient and thus it is more difficult for them to respond to social and political, as well as general system challenges. It, as V. Bogdanor<sup>22</sup> and K. Strom<sup>23</sup> note, becomes especially clear on the basis of appealing to minority governments as to "tangential subjects" of wider scientific studies, in particular party-electoral systems and coalition theory. R. Elgie and M. Maor<sup>24</sup> state that the reason is that in such research the attention is mainly focused on peculiarities of formation and accountability of minority governments against the background of implemented institutional and procedural rules.

However, little attention is paid to the very nature of functioning, support (especially legislative initiatives and program policy) and "survival" (stability) of minority governments. It is rather relevant in cases when minority governments compose if not more than 75% of all governmental cabinets, then at least a half of them, though they and political systems within which they function in general, position themselves as quite stable, politically and socially-economically effective (as, for example, in Denmark, Spain, Norway, Croatia, and in due time Finland). Besides, it is relevant in the context, when a lot of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies have functioned over several years and full

<sup>19</sup> G. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. CUP 1976, s. 178.

<sup>20</sup> Z. Somer-Topcu, L. Williams, *Survival of the fittests? Cabinet duration in Postcommunist Europe*, "Comparative Politics" 2008, vol 40, nr. 3, s. 313-329.

<sup>21</sup> L. Savage, *A product of their bargaining environment: Explaining government duration in Central and Eastern Europe*, "SEI Working Paper" 2012, nr. 130.

<sup>22</sup> V. Bogdanor, *Multi-party Politics and the Constitution*, Wyd. CUP 1983.

<sup>23</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. CUP 1990.

<sup>24</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, "West European Politics" 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.

legislative terms (as, for instance, the governments of A. Van Acker A. (1954–195) in Belgium, A. Rasmussen (2001–2005) in Denmark, S. Lemass (1961–1965 pp.) and B. Ahern (1997–2002) in Ireland, F. Gonzalez (1989–1993), J. Aznar (1996–2000) and J. Zapatero (2004–2008 and 2008–2011) in Spain, G. Borg Oliveira (1962–1966) in Malta, O. Nordli (1977–1981), G. Brundtland (1985–1989) and K. Bondevik (2001–2005) in Norway, A. Guterres (1995–1999) in Portugal, W. Churchill (1951–1955) in the UK, T. Erlander (1960–1964 and 1964–1968), G. Persson (1998–2002 and 2002–2006) and F. Reinfeldt (2010–2014) in Sweden, B. Borisov (2009–2013) in Bulgaria, A. Brazauskas (2001–2004) in Lithuania, M. Zeman (1998–2002) in the Czech Republic and so on, and thus they were authorized to influence all significant changes in political and social-economic system of the corresponding countries. Therefore, it is obvious that minority governments are not always characterized by the intuitive and abovementioned logics of instability, but in general require detailed theoretical, methodological as well as empirical attention.

From the theoretical and methodological point of view it is rather important that specialized studies of government stability interpret this notion as the ability of a government to perform its duties and a stable state of governmental cabinet functioning which is characterized by its long-term existence, preservation of crucial internal and external characteristics of governments<sup>25</sup>. At the same time, the most approved evaluation category for government stability is “government durability”, while “the index of governmental stability” is less used. Governmental durability is time measured between the “starting point” and “destination point” of certain government functioning. The index of governmental stability, in its turn, is a percentage or a fractional rate, which represents the percent of maximum possible period (in European parliamentary democracies it depends on a parliamentary term or its leading chamber under constitution or in practice) the government was functioning.

L. Dodd<sup>26</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>27</sup>, K. Strom<sup>28</sup>, D. Sanders and V. Herman<sup>29</sup>, I. Budge, J. Woldendorp and H. Keman<sup>30</sup>, F. Muller, K. Fetzelschoss and P. Harfst<sup>31</sup> and others state that another theoretical and methodological addition is represented by the fact that a type of governmental cabinets (which is manifested by a number of governmental parties (single-party and coalitional governments) and

<sup>25</sup> V. Lyryyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennya ponyattya „uryadova stabilnist“*, „Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu“, Seriya: Politolohiya, Sotsiolohiya, Filosofiya 2008, nr 10, s. 38–39.; Z. Byaloblocki, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist uryadiu u politychnykh systemakh krzym Skhidnoyi Yevropy*, Wyd. Vydavnychyy tsentr LNU imeni I. Franka 2013, s. 15.; E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23–52.; M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1998, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 28.

<sup>26</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>27</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

<sup>28</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199–227.

<sup>29</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, “Acta Politica” 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346–377.

<sup>30</sup> J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Party government in 48 democracies: An update (1945–1998)*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Press Budge.

<sup>31</sup> F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fetzelschoss, P. Harfst, *Party government in Central European democracies: A data collection (1990–2003)*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2004, vol 43, s. 869–893.

by a character of their representativeness in legislature (majority and minority governments)) may hypothetically influence stability/duration of governments. In general, as P. Warwick<sup>32</sup>, J. Huber, S. Martinez–Gallardo<sup>33</sup> and B. Powell<sup>34</sup>, K. Gonrad and S. Golder<sup>35</sup>, F. Muller-Rommel and K. Fetzelschoss<sup>36</sup>, A. Romaniuk and V. Lytvyn<sup>37</sup> speculate, it is represented in the fact that the most stable (at least among party governments) including those in European parliamentary democracies are majority cabinets (especially single-party) and the least stable are minority cabinets (especially coalitional ones).

Determined connection becomes much stronger in case when legislatures turn to be less factionalized and polarized, and on the contrary it becomes weaker, when legislatures are more factionalized and polarized. However, Z. Maoz and Z. Somer-Topcu<sup>38</sup> reckon that interconnection between polarization of party systems and government stability, especially in case of minority cabinets, is not unlitery and statistically significant, as it can adjust itself depending on other factors, including party- and institutionalized ones. Correspondingly, taking into consideration whether a party or parties, which assemble and support minority governments, are traditionally a subset of political forces of optimally ideological positioning, polarization of party systems is an important, but an additional factor, which explains stability among minority governments. Nevertheless, D. Diermeier, and A. Merlo<sup>39</sup> think that the number of parliamentary parties is even of greater significance as, for instance, growth of parties in number (as “veto-players”) in legislature leads to a conflict both within the frames of a cabinet and within relations between governments and legislature (or governmental and non-governmental parties). That is why, governments must quite often function on the grounds of “mutual acquiescence” mechanisms, which are revealed in the fact that governmental cabinets and parliamentary parties’ leaders, which compose them, must apply permanent rotations of cabinet ministers as an instrument of searching their support in legislature and a way to adjust “rewards” for both governmental and oppositional parties. Therefore, it is theoretically clear that governments’ stability, including minority cabinets, depends on difficulties in conducting negotiations between factions and legislative deputies<sup>40</sup>. At the same time, it is quite expected that due to inadequacy of minority cabinets (which always are either governmental coalitions or coalitions of parliamentary

<sup>32</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.

<sup>33</sup> J. Huber, C. Martinez-Gallardo, *Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2004, vol 34, nr. 1, s. 27–48.; J. Huber, C. Martinez-Gallardo, *Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Political Science Review” 2008, vol 102, nr. 2, s. 169–180.

<sup>34</sup> B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

<sup>35</sup> C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2010, vol 49, nr. 1, s. 119–150.

<sup>36</sup> F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fetzelschoss, *Cabinet Government and Cabinet Ministers in Central Eastern European Democracies: A Descriptive Cross National Evaluation*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Uppsala, April 13–18, 2004.

<sup>37</sup> A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: Monografija*, Wyd. Vydavnychyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.; A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehnedskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: monografija*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.

<sup>38</sup> Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments, 1945–98*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2010, vol 40, nr. 4, s. 805–833.

<sup>39</sup> D. Diermeier, A. Merlo, *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, “Journal of Economic Theory” 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.

<sup>40</sup> B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

parties, which compose governments and support them) to enjoy permanent “support” of legislatures such institutional constructions are less stable than majority governments<sup>41</sup>. The exceptions are the cases of such minority cabinets (single-party or coalitional), which are scenarios of formal agreements between governmental and non-governmental parties in legislatures.

In their turn R. Elgie, M. Maor<sup>42</sup> note that durability/stability of minority governments depends on how effectively they can use the support of legislature (being a member of governmental and non-governmental parties), in particular from the perspective of minority cabinets’ liabilities to conduct relations with non-governmental parties, their behavior, anticipated and factual results. It is especially actual in the case when minority governments gain votes of confidence concerning commencement and support for various legislations in legislatures (notably much more often, than in case of majority cabinets), as well as in context of avoiding parliamentary votes of non-confidence by minority governments. If such liabilities, and correspondingly possibilities to pursue policy through influence on the legislative procedure, are not presupposed, then “survival”/stability of minority governments is/can be a result of exclusively specific procedures of institutional process, within which cabinets are functioning. However, such rules conventionally cannot be a “resource” for continual “survival” of minority cabinets (and governments as a whole), and thus stability of minority cabinets traditionally depends on political and inter-party agreements within the frames of legislature<sup>43</sup>.

In this context it is notable that minority cabinets substantially differ from majority cabinets, as the former in contrast to the latter, are not characterized by a dichotomy “government/governmental parties – opposition/oppositional parties”<sup>44</sup>. Consequently, minority governments in comparison with majority governments are less determined by the existence of two straightly conflict blocs in legislature, as necessarily there are parties or separate deputies (groups of deputies) who: a) absolutely support minority cabinets; b) absolutely oppose minority cabinets; c) formally or informally do not support minority cabinets, but at the same time do not oppose them directly. And this determines the fact that relative (on the background of majority governments) stability or instability of minority governments is a result of constant negotiations between political parties or separate deputies (groups of deputies) of legislature, who, on the one hand, support minority cabinets and, on the other hand, do not oppose to minority cabinets, ensuring or not ensuring them permanent or situational majority in legislature. The point is that those political forces which are neither governmental nor oppositional must either support (directly – by means of voting or

<sup>41</sup> C. Teare, *Cabinet Durability within Parliamentary Democracies: The Italian Model*, Wyd. Creighton University; C. Mershon, *The Costs of Coalition*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2002.

<sup>42</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, “West European Politics” 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.

<sup>43</sup> M. Maor, *The Dynamics of Minority Rule: A Bargaining-Based Theoretical Framework*, Presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum, Germany 1990.

<sup>44</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, “West European Politics” 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.



indirectly – abstaining from voting) or be against government's initiatives, but in any case they cannot but express their position concerning the situation.

As a result such political forces must constantly reevaluate their strategy towards minority governments, and thus they always “swing between government and opposition”<sup>45</sup> or parties and deputies, who provide absolute support or unconditionally oppose minority cabinets. However, M. Laver, N. Schofield<sup>46</sup> state that such constant reevaluation of strategies can cause both intra-party and inter-party conflicts within governmental and non-governmental parties, and thus, especially when situational political forces use oppositional rhetoric and are “shifting” towards parliamentary opposition, it theoretically leads to reduction of legislative capabilities and consequently stability of minority governments. Therefore, minority cabinets are formed beforehand or initially and are constantly functioning (throughout the term of their being in office) in crisis mode. It is enhanced by the fact that minority governments, due to rational prospects in particular, first of all try to satisfy their own and party's interests and political goals (namely electoral, official, party, ideological, organizational, as well as their combinations etc.), and thus they mainly “push off” and influence the positions of situational (non-governmental, but at the same time non-oppositional) political forces of legislature. Nevertheless, the nature of inter-party bargaining and negotiations between minority governments and political parties which assemble them and situational political forces in legislature are immanently more acute, than in case of majority governments and therefore minority governments are less stable/durable than majority cabinets<sup>47</sup>.

Extremely rarely controversial situations concerns those minority governments, which are capable of successive (especially in long-term prospects) overcoming problems of bargains and negotiations between cabinets and political parties, which compose them, and situational political forces in legislature, and thus they can, in particular, on the basis of partial and overall formal agreements<sup>48</sup>, stick to commitments, concerning their relations with non-governmental parties, their behavior and anticipated and factual results. Relatively stable are those minority governments, which do not function on the basis of formal agreements between governmental and non-governmental parties, but on the contrary use situational (ad hoc) strategies of their political behavior, concerning passing and adopting legislations<sup>49</sup>. The point is that in such case minority governments' ability to stick to commitments, concerning their relations with non-governmental parties, their behaviour, anticipated and factual results, is even smaller and more temporary/situational. And finally, as it was mentioned above, if minority governments cannot stick to their commitments and anything

<sup>45</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, “West European Politics” 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.

<sup>46</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multi-Party Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. OUP 1990, s. 145-147.

<sup>47</sup> R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, “West European Politics” 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.

<sup>48</sup> A. Thomas, *The 1987 Danish Election*, “West European Politics” 1988, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 114-118.

<sup>49</sup> H. J. Nielsen, *The Danish General Election of 1981*, “West European Politics” 1982, vol 5, nr. 3, s. 305-307; R. Elgie, M. Maor, *Accounting for the Survival of Minority Governments: An Examination of the French Case, 1988-1991*, “West European Politics” 1992, vol 15, nr. 4, s. 57-74.

else is constitutionally presupposed (on the basis of specific, though limited in time, rules of an institutional design), then it traditionally must be in advance terminated in their powers.

The abovementioned conclusion is supplemented by theoretical and methodological studies by S. Wesche<sup>50</sup> and N. Balke<sup>51</sup>, who mark that situations with parliamentary minority, and especially minority cabinets, when the latter are formed too often, but at the same time are very instable, permanently generate early parliamentary elections. It is presupposed by the fact that minority governments, keeping in view frequent early elections, are less burdened with a “risk” to lose their powers and authority, as they can easily regain them (in another inter-party environment) in future. A. Smith states that on the other hand governments (including minority ones) are more agreeable to pre-term parliamentary elections, when they are to a greater extent sure in their future victory<sup>52</sup>. It is especially the case for minority cabinets, in particular “those which are close to failure”, as then they hope to get additional (in comparison with current composition of legislature) places in parliament, and thus can even strive for transformations of minority cabinets into majority governments. M. Laver<sup>53</sup> argues that realizing such relative insignificance of losing deputy’s seats (and hoping to return to legislature in future), minority governments more often appeal to early parliamentary elections than majority governments do, and thereby they “artificially” reduce their durability and relative stability. However, such minority governments’ strategies are mainly inherent to the institutional frames, described not by non-majoritarian or less-majoritarian electoral formulae, but by proportional or more proportional systems. Analogical situation, though different as to resources, can be observed, when situational (non-governmental and non-oppositional) parties and parties oppositional to minority governments expect growth in electoral preferences, as they can appeal to pre-term elections and therefore termination of minority governments against the will of the latter<sup>54</sup>. But this mainly presupposes neutralization and reduction of stability among current minority governments as it is extremely difficult to achieve balance, when all non-governmental parties simultaneously and in general would gain better electoral results, than current governmental parties.

However, such theoretical and methodological approach does not fully correspond to the-  
orization of problems concerning minority governments’ stability, but on the contrary is mainly defined by K. Strom’s<sup>55</sup> remarks that: in average minority governments are less stable (durable) than majority cabinets; single-party minority cabinets are traditionally more stable (durable) than coalitional minority governments; minority governments are relatively more stable (durable) in case when they are more often formed. Moreover, the researcher focuses on the fact that minority

<sup>50</sup> S. Wesche, *Electoral systems and their effect on the survival of minority and coalition governments in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. The University of Ottawa 2013.

<sup>51</sup> N. Balke, *The Rational Timing of Parliamentary Elections*, “Public Choice” 1990, vol 64, nr. 2, s. 201-216.

<sup>52</sup> A. Smith, *Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2003, vol 33, s. 397, 402.

<sup>53</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

<sup>54</sup> L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33-50.; S. Wesche, *Electoral systems and their effect on the survival of minority and coalition governments in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. The University of Ottawa 2013.

<sup>55</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. CUP 1990, s. 116-117, 238.

governments are less stable than majority cabinets<sup>56</sup>, if only because they often are “crisis” governments (which are formed during political crises) and oppose factual majority in legislatures<sup>57</sup>, while minority governments can be more stable and can be called “a rational decision” under certain institutional and procedural and political conditions<sup>58</sup>. On the other hand D. Dodd<sup>59</sup> notes that stability of minority governments is largely limited by the fact, that while pursuing their policy they constantly or permanently face negotiations conducted between non-governmental parties, and the latter, in their turn, may hypothetically discuss resignation of minority cabinets, as well as dissolution of legislatures (aiming at further parliamentary elections). For instance, it happened in 1993 in Slovakia, when at first on the basis of changes in composition of the coalitional government headed by V. Meciar, a single-party minority government was formed, however, later due to the intra-party crisis, majority transition to opposition in legislature and vote of non-confidence to the minority government, the latter was resigned<sup>60</sup>. Generally speaking it reveals that minority governments’ “risks” are greater than “risks” of majority cabinets and that is why the former are less stable than the latter<sup>61</sup>.

However, the abovementioned and largely theorized conclusion does not fully work on the basis of empirical comparison, concerning the statistics of durability (stability) of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies, in particular within the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. On the contrary, on the basis of the analysis of minority government stability in European parliamentary democracies, over the period of 1944-2016 (in different countries various time periods were analyzed) see Table 1, and on the basis of the statistical fact, which is known in the context of European parliamentary democracies, that single-party and coalitional minority governments are less stable than single-party and coalitional majority cabinets and party cabinets as a whole<sup>62</sup>, it has been studied and determined that: a) minority governments are more durable/stable than majority governments only in such Western European countries as Denmark, Spain, Norway and Sweden (as of 2004<sup>63</sup>), as well as in such Central-Eastern European countries as

<sup>56</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2007.; Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments, 1945-98*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2010, vol 40, nr. 4, s. 805-833.; J. Huber, C. Martinez-Gallardo, *Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Political Science Review” 2008, vol 102, nr. 2, s. 169-180.

<sup>57</sup> M. Taylor, V. Herman, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, «American Political Science Review” 1971, vol 65, nr. 1, s. 8-37.

<sup>58</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. CUP 1990, s. 199.

<sup>59</sup> L. Dodd, *Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis*, “American Political Science Review” 1968, vol 68, nr. 3, s. 1101.

<sup>60</sup> J. Blondel, F. Müller-Rommel, *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave 2001.; K. Henderson, N. Robinson, *Post-Communist Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 1997.

<sup>61</sup> Z. Somer-Topcu, L. Williams, *Survival of the fittests? Cabinet duration in Postcommunist Europe*, “Comparative Politics” 2008, vol 40, nr. 3, s. 313-329.

<sup>62</sup> A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: Monografija*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.; A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshebradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: monografija*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.

<sup>63</sup> A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: instytutsiyniy vymir*, Lviv 2004, s. 206. ; A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy: Monografija*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.

Lithuania, Romania, Croatia and the Czech Republic (as of 2015<sup>64</sup>); b) minority governments are more stable in the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe as opposed to Central-Eastern European countries, however in the systems of negative and not positive parliamentarism; c) among the countries, where minority cabinets (even if they were formed once or several times) are the most stable/durable, we name Denmark, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Malta (in order of increasing of the average duration of minority governments); d) to the countries, where minority cabinets (even if they were not so frequently formed) in average are the least durable/stable, belong Lithuania, Finland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Iceland, Slovenia and the Netherlands (in order of decreasing of the average duration of minority cabinets); e) durability of minority governments does not directly-proportionally correspond with the frequency of minority government formation (especially it is observed in Greece and Malta, where minority governments are formed extremely rarely, however, they are very stable, as well as in Italy, Latvia and Finland, where minority governments are or were earlier formed quite often, though they were not very stable); f) in average temporary governmental cabinets (except Belgium and Iceland) are less durable, than permanent minority governments, moreover it can be observed both in Western European countries and Central-European countries, as well as in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism; g) single-party minority cabinets are traditionally more stable, than coalitional minority cabinets, especially among European parliamentary democracies (in particular in Western and Central-Eastern Europe), both in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, however with several remarks: in average coalitional minority governments are more durable than single-party minority cabinets first of all in western European systems of positive parliamentarism (especially in Belgium, Ireland, Italy and France in 1945-1958); in average single-party minority governments are more stable than coalitional minority governments, first of all in western European systems of negative parliamentarism (except Austria, Denmark, Iceland, France, Sweden and the countries, where single-party minority cabinets are not formed); in average single-party minority cabinets are more durable than coalitional minority cabinets first of all in Central-Eastern European systems of positive parliamentarism (except Poland and Slovakia as well as the countries where single-party minority cabinets are not formed).

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<sup>64</sup> A. Romaniuk, V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Vyshebnadskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: monobrafiiia*. Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016.



II. PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES						
2.1. SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES						
Bulgaria (since 1990)	544	848	241	588	414	
Estonia (since 1992)	555	555	–	588	522	
Latvia (since 1990)	297	297	–	–	297	
Lithuania (since 1990)	503	503	–	–	503	
Poland (since 1989)	262	307	35	228	296	
Romania (since 1990)	420	420	–	528	377	
Serbia (since 2007)	–	–	–	–	–	
Slovakia (since 1990)	248	275	140	237	251	
Slovenia (since 1990)	180	180	–	–	180	
Hungary (since 1990)	349	349	–	349	–	
Croatia (since 2000)	527	527	–	706	408	
The Czech Republic (since 1990)	566	659	194	667	498	
Montenegro (since 2006)	–	–	–	–	–	
In average	401	421	170	496	361	
2.2. SYSTEMS OF NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES						
–	–	–	–	–	–	
ALL PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES						
In average	401	421	170	496	361	
ALL EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM						
In average	451	482	189	500	411	
ALL EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM						
In average	571	624	160	614	516	
ALL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES (ALL EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM)						
In average	510	551	172	564	455	

Źródło: G. Ieraci, F. Poropat, *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> (odczyt: 01.02.2017).; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, L. Knöppel, *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012* (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries), Wyd. Universität Bern 2014.; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, S. Engler, P. Potosidis, M. Gerber, P. Leimgruber, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2009*, Wyd. University of Berne 2011.

Besides, in generally and averagely (see Table 1) it is argued that key problems of durability/stability of minority governments in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism in European parliamentary democracies are: a) a bigger number of possible scenarios, as in comparison with majority cabinets, concerning the loss of a vote of confidence or obtaining a vote of no confidence by minority cabinets (first of all it happens as a result of oppositional and situational parties' desire, which in fact compose majority in legislature, dictate their rules and political preferences as to parties that belong to minority governments, not entering cabinets and not taking direct political responsibility for the decisions taken by governments); b) lesser degree or insufficient degree of institutionalization of minority cabinets, as in comparison with majority cabinets; c) participation of a less, or insufficient number of political actors in the process of distribution of major posts and spheres of influence, as in comparison with majority cabinets; d) dominance of intuitive, but not always rational ideas concerning the fact, that minority cabinets are less effective and legitimate, than majority cabinets<sup>65</sup>. Quite interesting is a fact that frequency of formation and stability of minority cabinets is higher in those European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, political systems of which are based on the principles of consensus and corporatism, parliamentary support to minority governments is provided by parties with different (even oppositional) ideologies, as well as party systems which are not characterized by dominant parties.

At the same time, as it was mentioned above the highest stability level of minority governments is observed within the systems of negative parliamentarism, which can be found only in parliamentary democracies in western European countries. In average, especially on the background of a high frequency of minority governments' formation, it is peculiar of such countries as Denmark and Sweden, and earlier Norway, where support and "maintenance" of minority cabinets took place in accordance with the rule, due to which in the abovementioned cases systems of powerful parliamentary committees are "stereotyped", and therefore it means participation of both governmental and situational and oppositional parties to parliamentary and governmental/managerial activity and processes of taking political decisions. As a result the rule, according to which a part of minority governments' responsibilities is focused in various internal structures of legislature, has been institutionalized<sup>66</sup>. However, even despite this it is argued that stability of minority governments in the system of negative parliamentarism would be higher, if all countries of this type (as it was presupposed earlier) were characterized by minority governments. And as the practice shows it is not peculiar of Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, where minority cabinets are not institutionalized, but on the contrary are positioned as exceptional and even "critical-risky" situations. And

<sup>65</sup> Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, vol 87, nr. 3, s. 626.; B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, vol 36, nr. 2, s. 271-287.; M. Ireland, S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, vol 45, s. 547-568.

<sup>66</sup> M. Mohunova, *Skandinavskiy parlamentaryzm. Teoriya y praktika*, Moskva 2001, s. 37-38, 104-105.; D. Arter, *Scandinavian Politics Today*, Manchester 1999, s. 211-217.

eventually what concerns a slight instability, and consequently effectiveness of some minority cabinets in the systems of negative parliamentarism, where such institutional scenarios are rather widespread, it is quite obvious that it is presupposed by the fact, that they are characterized not by a “guaranteed”, but by a “silent” support of cabinets by legislatures.

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## **Stability and efficiency of coalition governments in Poland and Czech Republic: comparative analysis**

The article was dedicated for evaluation of government stability and study of government efficiency of coalition governments in Poland and Czech Republic. To evaluate the compiled index of cabinet efficiency we have used data of such scientific institutions as Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit and Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide. Revealed cabinet stability and cabinet efficiency did not always correlate with each other. In general government efficiency was higher in the period before accession to the EU. It is underlined, that the most efficient coalition governments Poland and Czech Republic were minimum-winning coalitions.

*Keywords: coalition governments, minimum-winning coalitions, political parties, Republic of Poland, Czech Republic, comparison*

## **СТАБІЛЬНІСТЬ І ЕФЕКТИВНІСТЬ КОАЛІЦІЙНИХ УРЯДІВ ПОЛЬЩІ ТА ЧЕСЬКОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ: ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ**

Стаття присвячена визначенню урядової стабільності та дослідженню ефективності коаліційних урядів в Республіці Польща та Республіці Чехія. Для вимірювання компільованого індексу ефективності урядів було використано дані таких дослідницьких інституцій як Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit та Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide. Встановлено, що показники стабільності та ефективності урядів не завжди корелюють один з одним. В загальному ефективність була вищою в період до вступу в ЄС. Підкреслено, що найбільш ефективні коаліційні уряди Польщі та Чехії є мінімально-переможними коаліціями.

*Ключові слова: урядова коаліція, мінімально переможна коаліція, політична партія, Республіка Польща, Чеська республіка, порівняння*

## **Stabilność i skuteczność rządów koalicyjnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Republiki Czeskiej: analiza porównawcza**

Artykuł jest poświęcony ocenie stabilności i badaniu skuteczności rządów koalicyjnych w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Republice Czeskiej. Dla wymierzenia skompilowanego indeksu skuteczności rządowej zostały wykorzystane dane takich instytucji badawczych jak Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit oraz Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide. Ujawnione wskaźniki stabilności i skuteczności rządowej nie zawsze korelują pomiędzy sobą. Generalnie biorąc, skuteczność była wyższa w okresie do przystąpienia do UE. Podkreślono, iż najbardziej skuteczne rządy koalicyjne Polski i Republiki Czeskiej to są koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie.

*Słowa kluczowe: koalicje rządowe, koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie, partie polityczne, Rzeczpospolita Polska, Republika Czeska, porównanie*

Aktualność tematu niniejszej pracy jest związana przede wszystkim z tym, że procesy integracji i demokratyzacji dokonujące się w Polsce i Czechach, doprowadziły do znaczących zmian w obszarze procesów wewnątrz-politycznych a w szczególności tych, co opisują: skuteczność i stabilność. Bardzo ważnym w ocenie rządów jest okres sprawowania władzy – czy był to okres transformacji politycznej, który kończył się z wstąpieniem kraju do EU, czy był to okres istnienia demokracji konsolidowanej, czyli okres po dołączeniu się kraju do Unii Europejskiej.

Obiekt badania – rządy koalicyjne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Republiki Czeskiej; przedmiotem badania są rządy koalicyjne w kontekście ich stabilności i skuteczności. Głównym celem niniejszej pracy zostało ocena stabilności i skuteczności rządów koalicyjnych tych krajów.

Dla przeprowadzenia analizy porównawczej rządów koalicyjnych bardzo ważnym jest wyznaczenie stabilności i skuteczności rządowej.

Przeanalizowane czynniki przekładają się na stabilność, a w konsekwencji na długość ich trwania. Ogólnie stosowanym kryterium przy wyróżnianiu danego rządu jest osoba premiera oraz skład koalicji. Warto jednak tak uzyskane zestawienia dopełnić informacjami dotyczącymi trwałości poszczególnych koalicji, zwłaszcza jeśli w ramach takiego samego ich składu dochodziło do zmiany na stanowisku premiera.

Należy zaznaczyć, iż w niniejszym opracowaniu będziemy korzystać z teoretycznych i praktycznych ustaleń ukraińskiego badacza systemów politycznych i rządów A. Romaniuka, który wyróżnia gabinety jednopartyjne oraz koalicyjne. Z kolei gabinety jednopartyjne powstają w formie jednopartyjnych gabinetów większościowych i jednopartyjnych gabinetów

mniejszościowych<sup>1</sup>. Gabinety koalicyjne bywają gabinetami większościowymi oraz mniejszościowymi. Większościowe gabinety powstają jako minimalnie zwycięskie koalicję lub koalicję nadwyżkowe.

Stabilność rządu będzie również mierzyć się trwałością jego działania, zaczynając od formalnego mianowania/zatwierdzenia lub uzyskania wsparcia w parlamencie, i do momentu dymisji<sup>2</sup>.

W Polsce pierwsze w pełni wolne wybory odbyły się w 1991 r. W przypadku Czech pierwsze wolne wybory zostały przeprowadzone w 1992 r. jeszcze w ramach większego państwa – Federacji Czechosłowackiej. Od tego momentu zaczynamy analizę rządów koalicyjnych. W opracowaniu opisałem i przebadalem gabinety koalicyjne sformowane i funkcjonujące w latach 1991-2015 w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Czechach, poczynając od gabinetu J. Olszewskiego w Polsce oraz V. Klause w Republice Czeskiej, do końca trwania ostatniego gabinetu koalicyjnego E. Kopacz w Polsce i gabinetu B. Sobotky w Czechach. Gabinet sformowany przez PiS w końcu 2015 r. był rządem jednopartyjnym większościowym, dlatego nie został uwzględniony w niniejszym badaniu<sup>3</sup>.

Na podstawie analizy różnych sposobów i jednostek obliczania, są przedstawione rezultaty/wskaźniki stabilności rządów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Republiki Czeskiej w różnych okresach czasowych:

<sup>1</sup> A. Romaniuk *Typologia gabinetów rządowych w krajach Europy Zachodniej: analiza porównawcza*, „Czasopismo Lwowskiego uniwersytetu. Seria: Nauki filozoficzne”, 2007. wyd. 10, s. 235 – 244.

<sup>2</sup> V. Lytvyn *Conceptual Definition of „Cabinet Stability”*, „Scientific Bulletin of Uzhgorod University: Political Science, Sociology, Philosophy”, 2008, Vol. 10, P. 37-42.

<sup>3</sup> W. Gizicki *Political Systems of Visegrad Group Countries*, 2012. s. 154, Dostęp: [http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political\\_Systems\\_of\\_Visegrad\\_Group\\_Countries\\_Gizicki\\_Wojciech\\_ed](http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political_Systems_of_Visegrad_Group_Countries_Gizicki_Wojciech_ed) [odczyt od 05.11.2016];



Rozpatrując rządy koalicyjne i ich stabilność, nie analizujemy działań ostatnich rządów, a więc rządu B. Sobotky w Czechach i gabinetu jednopartyjnego B. Szydło.

W Polsce istniały cztery gabinety mniejszościowe na czele z J. Olszewskim (1991-1992), H. Suchocką (1993), L. Millerem (2003-2004) oraz M. Belką (2004-2005). Pierwsze dwa rządy były koalicjami mniejszościowymi z konstrukcją zrównoważoną przeważnie dzięki dużej liczbie partii w koalicji. Indeks stabilności rządowej dla dwóch koalicji mniejszościowych z konstrukcją zrównoważoną wynosił 0,23, podczas gdy indeks stabilności rządowej dwóch koalicji mniejszościowych z partią dominującą był na poziomie 0,30. Średni wskaźnik wszystkich gabinetów koalicji mniejszościowych w Polsce został zmierzony i wynosił 0,27. Warto zauważyć, iż wszystkie rządy koalicyjne mniejszościowe zaistniały w Polsce zanim stała się członkiem UE. Po dołączeniu Polski do UE taki rodzaj gabinetów mniejszościowych nie wyłonił się.

Minimalnie zwycięskich rządów w Polsce było 12. Do wstąpienia do UE istniało 5 koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z konstrukcją zrównoważoną (dwa gabinety H. Suchockiej 1992-1993, W. Pawlaka 1993-1995, J. Oleksy w 1995 r., oraz W. Cimoszewicza 1996-1997) i dwa gabinety koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z partią dominującą (gabinety J. Buzka 1997-2000 i L. Millera 2001-2003). Indeks stabilności rządowej dla tych 5 koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z konstrukcją zrównoważoną jest oceniany na poziomie 0,30, zaś dla dwóch gabinetów koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z partią dominującą na poziomie 0,50. Średni indeks stabilności rządowej dla wszystkich minimalnie zwycięskich gabinetów Polski do 2004 r. wynosił 0,36.

Po przyłączeniu Polski do UE istniało pięć gabinetów koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z partią dominującą (gabinety K. Marcinkiewicza 2006, J. Kaczyńskiego 2006-2007, dwa gabinety D. Tuska 2007-2014 oraz gabinet E. Kopacz w 2015 r.) dla których indeks stabilności rządowej obliczono na poziomie 0,52.

Z podanej tabeli wynika, że najbardziej trwałymi i stabilnymi rządami koalicyjnymi okazały się gabinety minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą D. Tuska w 2007-2014 r. i gabinet koalicji minimalnie zwycięskiej z partią dominującą J. Buzka w latach 1997-2000. Na podstawie analizy stabilności rządów, które funkcjonowały w Polsce od 1991 r., można wnioskować, iż koalicję rządowe nie były stabilne i trwałe za wyjątkiem dwóch gabinetów D. Tuska i rządu J. Buzka, chociaż warto zauważyć, że koalicja SLD-PSL przetrwała w stanie niezmiennym w latach 1993-1997.

Koalicję stworzone między 1993 r. a 1997 r., oraz między 2007 i 2015 r. istniały w stanie niezmiennym. W obu wypadkach były koalicjami minimalnie zwycięskimi z najwyższym indeksem stabilności rządowej. Najmniej stabilnymi okazały się pierwsze rządy, które były de facto koalicyjnymi rządami mniejszościowymi z konstrukcją zrównoważoną – rządy J. Olszewskiego oraz H. Suchockiej w latach 1991-1993.

Biorąc pod uwagę czynnik ideologiczny formowania koalicji gabinetowych w Polsce i wskaźniki ich stabilności, to warto podkreślić, że ogólnie z udziałem centrolewicowej SLD zostało sformowanych 6 rządów koalicyjnych, z których 3 działały jako koalicję minimalnie zwycięskie

z konstrukcją zrównoważoną, średni indeks ich stabilności wyniósł 0,33. Indeks jednej minimalnie zwycięskiej koalicji z partią dominującą obliczono na poziomie 0,34, jeśli chodzi zaś o dwie koalicje mniejszościowe ich średni indeks stabilności stanowił 0,30. Generalnie rzecz biorąc, średni indeks stabilności rządowej wszystkich gabinetów koalicyjnych z udziałem SLD wyniósł 0,34, przy czym pięć (zdecydowana większość gabinetów SLD) koalicyjnych gabinetów SLD istniała przed przystąpieniem Polski do UE.

Przy udziale prawicy i centroprawicy z PC, UD, AWS, PiS i PO sformułowano dziewięć rządów koalicyjnych. Do wejścia Polski do UE istniały cztery gabinety koalicyjne z udziałem partii prawicowych, z których dwie zostały ukształtowane jako rządy minimalnie zwycięskie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną ze średnim wskaźnikiem stabilności 0,24. Również w tym okresie koalicja minimalnie zwycięska z partią dominującą J. Buzka posiadała indeks stabilności rządowej na poziomie 0,65. Dwie koalicje mniejszościowe uzyskały jedynie 0,14 stabilności. Po wstąpieniu Polski do UE w czasie rządów prawicy i centroprawicy utworzono pięć koalicji minimalnie-zwycięskich, a średni indeks ich stabilności był na poziomie 0,5. Wnioskujemy zatem, że gabinety koalicyjne z udziałem prawicy były bardziej stabilne po przyłączeniu Polski do UE. Średni indeks stabilności rządowej wszystkich gabinetów z udziałem partii prawicowych został obliczony na 0,45. Rządy koalicyjne z udziałem lub dominacją partii prawicowych i centroprawicowych były bardziej stabilne aniżeli koalicje centroprawicy, zwłaszcza po przyłączeniu się Polski do UE w 2004 roku.

Z powyższej analizy wynika, iż po wejściu Polski do UE, stabilność koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich wzrosła z 0,36 do 0,57. Ogólnie, stabilność rządowa i trwałość rządów koalicyjnych, uformowanych po przystąpieniu do UE, wzrosła w porównaniu do okresu transformacyjnego.

Polskie doświadczenie kształtowania rządów koalicyjnych potwierdza fakt, iż najbardziej stabilne koalicję powstają w wyniku zawierania koalicji przez dwóch uczestników, a nie przez trzech (na przykładzie rządu minimalnie zwycięskiego z partią dominującą J. Kaczyńskiego), czterech (koalicyjny gabinet mniejszościowy z konstrukcją zrównoważoną J. Olszewskiego) lub przez siedem koalicjantów (jak w przypadku koalicji H. Suchockiej w latach 1992-1993).



**Tabela 2.** Kształt, przyczyny formowania oraz dymisji gabinetów koalicyjnych w Republice Czeskiej (1992–2015)<sup>5</sup>

Premier gabinetu	Okres sprawowania urzędu	Skład partyjny gabinetu	Typ gabinetu/ konstrukcja gabinetu	Partia premera	Liczba mandatów partii rządowych/skład izby niższej	Przyczyny formowania gabinetu	Przyczyny dymisji gabinetu	TGD	TGL	ISR
1	2	3	4	5	8	9	10	11	12	13
V. Klaus (I)	02.07.1992 – 31.12.1992	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA + KDS	RWM/MZK/d	ODS	105/200	Dymisja	Ogłoszenie niepodległości	179	0,49	0,12
V. Klaus (II)	01.01.1993 – 01.06.1996	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA + KDS	RWM/MZK/d	ODS	105/200	Ogłoszenie niepodległości	Wybory parlamentarne	1230	3,37	0,86
V. Klaus (III)	04.07.1996 – 30.11.1997	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA	KM/d	ODS	99/200	Wybory parlamentarne	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	506	1,39	0,68
J. Tosovsky	02.01.1998 – 20.06.1998	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA + YC* + n.p.	KM/z (NP)	n.p.	31/200	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	Wybory parlamentarne	168	0,46	0,23
V. Spidla	17.07.1998 – 15.06.2002	CSDD	JM	CSDD	74/200	Wybory parlamentarne	Wybory parlamentarne	1408	3,86	0,98
V. Spidla	15.07.2002 – 01.07.2004	CSDD + KDU-CSL + US-DEU	RWM/MZK/d	CSDD	101/200	Wybory parlamentarne	Rezygnacja z urzędu	706	1,93	0,49
V. Spidla (I)	04.08.2004 – 30.03.2005	CSDD + KDU-CSL + US-DEU	RWM/MZK/d	CSDD	101/200	Dymisja	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	236	0,65	0,17
S. Gross (II)	31.03.2005 – 25.04.2005	CSDD + US-DEU	KM/d	CSDD	88/200	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	Dymisja	25	0,07	0,02
J. Panoušek	25.04.2005 – 03.06.2006	CSDD + KDU-CSL + US-DEU	RWM/MZK/d	CSDD	101/200	Dymisja	Wybory parlamentarne	398	1,09	0,29
M. Topolánek (I)	04.09.2006 – 03.10.2006	ODS + n.p.	JM	ODS	81/200	Wybory parlamentarne	Odmowa w wotum zaufania	29	0,08	0,02
M. Topolánek (II)	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	ODS + KDU-CSL + PZ	KM/d	ODS	100/200	Dymisja	Odmowa w wotum zaufania	795	2,18	0,55
J. Fischer	07.06.2009 – 29.05.2010	N.P.	T	N.P.	0/200	Dymisja	Wybory parlamentarne	352	0,96	0,25
P. Nečas (I)	28.06.2010 – 17.04.2012	ODS + TOP09 + WV	RWM/MZK/z	ODS	118/200	Wybory parlamentarne	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	649	1,78	0,53
P. Nečas (II)	27.04.2012 – 17.06.2013	ODS + TOP09 + LIDEM (VV)	RWM/MZK/z	ODS	101/200	Zmiana kompozycji partyjnej	Rezygnacja z urzędu	410	1,12	0,33
J. Rusnok	10.07.2013 – 25.10.2013	N.P.	T	N.P.	4/200	Rezygnacja z urzędu	Wotum nieufności	105	0,29	0,09
B. Sobotka	17.01.2014 – czynnym	CSDD + ANO + KDU-CSL + US-DEU	RWM/MZK/d	CSDD	111/200	Wybory parlamentarne	-	-	-	-

Tabela została opracowana na podstawie informacji empirycznej, opracowania własnego i istniejących danych naukowych: Political institutions in Central and Eastern European countries: Political institutions in Central and Eastern European countries: A Comparative analysis, ed. Anatoly Romanuk, Vitaliy Lytvyn, Natalia Panchak-Bialoblińska, 2014, 358 p., W: Gazdki Political Systems of Visegrad Group Countries, 2012, s. 15-4, Dostęp: [http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political\\_Systems\\_of\\_Visegrad\\_Group\\_Countries\\_Gazdki\\_Wojciech](http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political_Systems_of_Visegrad_Group_Countries_Gazdki_Wojciech) od 05.11.2016r.;  
M. Gallagher Election Indices Database / Michael Gallagher: – Trinity College Dublin: Department of Political Science, 2013. – Dostęp: <http://www.utdallas.edu/~mga1091/EI/Systems/Docs/ElectionIndices.pdf> [odczyt od 05.11.2016r.]; H. Döring *Parliaments and governments database (ParGov)*: Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version, ed. Holger Döring, Philipp Manow. – University of Bremen: Centre for Social Policy Research, 2013. Dostęp: <http://dev.parlgov.org/> [odczyt od 12.04.2013]

<sup>5</sup> Wykaz skrótów: TGD – Tworzenie gabinetu w dniach; TGL – Tworzenie gabinetu w latach; ISR – Indeks stabilności rządowej; n.p. – niepartyjny (premier, skład gabinetu rządowego); JW – Gabinet jednopartyjny wiskozłowy; JM – Gabinet jednopartyjny rnmizkosłowy; KW – koalicyjny gabinet wiskozłowy; KM – koalicyjny gabinet mizkosłowy; MZK – minimalnie zwycięska koalicja; NZK – nadwyzkowo-zwycęska koalicja; T – rząd techniczny (niepartyjny); d – konstrukcja rządu koalicyjnego z partią dominującą; z – zrównoważona konstrukcja rządu koalicyjnego;

W Republice Czeskiej zostało utworzone trzy gabinety mniejszościowe z partią dominującą i tylko jeden z nich zaistniał w okresie do wejścia do UE – gabinet V. Klause z partią dominującą w latach 1996-1997, którego indeks stabilności rządowej wyniósł 0,68. Po przyłączeniu do UE istniały dwie takie koalicje (gabinety S. Grossa w 2005 r. oraz gabinet M. Topolanka w latach 2007-2009), a średni indeks ich stabilności rządowej był na poziomie 0,29 z czego wynika, iż po dołączeniu się Czech UE, indeks stabilności rządowej gabinetów koalicyjnych mniejszościowych spadł.

Ogólnie w Republice Czeskiej istniało osiem koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich, i dwie z nich zostały sformowane z konstrukcją zrównoważoną a sześć jako koalicje z partią dominującą. Do 2004 r. utworzono dwie koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie (dlatego że dwa gabinety V. Klause istniały w latach 1992-1996, co było spowodowane ogłoszeniem niepodległości Czech 1 stycznia 1993 r.) z partiami dominującymi (gabinet V. Klause 1992-1996 i gabinet V. Spidly 2002-2004). Ich indeks stabilności rządowej wyniósł 0,73. Minimalnie zwycięskie koalicję z konstrukcją zrównoważoną utworzono po przystąpieniu Czech do UE (dwa gabinety P. Neczasa w okresie 2010-2013), dla których indeks stabilności rządowej oceniony został na 0,43. Po przyłączeniu się Czech do UE zostały także utworzone dwie koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą (gabinety S. Grossa w latach 2004-2005 oraz J. Paroubeka w latach 2005-2006), dla których indeks stabilności rządowej obliczony został na poziomie 0,23. Średnie wskaźniki indeksu stabilności rządowej dla wszystkich koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich w Czechach wyniósł 0,46, przy czym średnie wskaźniki wszystkich gabinetów koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich (było ich łącznie cztery) jest wyższy niż indeks stabilności rządów minimalnie zwycięskich z konstrukcją zrównoważoną, których stabilność z kolei oceniono na 0,43. W związku z tym, że gabinety minimalnie zwycięskie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną sformowano po przystąpieniu Czech do UE okazały się one być bardziej stabilne niż koalicję minimalnie zwycięską z partią dominującą, w analogicznym okresie.

Przeważającym rodzajem rządów w Czechach była koalicja minimalnie zwycięska, a najwyższym poziomem stabilności pomiędzy nimi dysponował drugi gabinet V. Klause (1993-1997) z indeksem 0,86, który jest najwyższym wskaźnikiem dla wszystkich gabinetów koalicyjnych w Czechach. Generalnie rzecz biorąc zaczynając od roku 2002 w Czechach uformowano nietrwale i niestabilne gabinety koalicyjne, co pozwala wnioskować, że wskaźnik stabilności dla wszystkich gabinetów koalicyjnych w Republice Czeskiej obniżył się po przystąpieniu do UE w roku 2004.

Biorąc pod uwagę czynnik ideologiczny formowania koalicji gabinetowych w Czechach i wskaźniki ich stabilności, to warto podkreślić, iż z udziałem centroprawicowej ODS, jako głównej siły prawicowej w spektrum politycznym Republiki Czeskiej, utworzono pięć gabinetów koalicyjnych, i pierwszy z nich był sformowany do wstąpienia kraju do Unii w formacie partii dominującej oraz posiadał najwyższy indeks stabilności rządowej – 0,98. Pozostałe cztery gabinety zostały uformowane po roku 2004, przy czym dwie z nich utworzone zostały jako koalicję

mniejszościowe z indeksem 0,59, a także dwie koalicję minimalnie zwycięskie z indeksem w 0,43. Średnie wskaźniki stabilności z udziałem lub dominacją ODS wyniosła 0,61.

Główna lewicowa partia polityczna Czech, a właśnie CSSD stworzył pięć gabinetów koalicyjnych, z których cztery zostały utworzone jako koalicję minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą, a jeden gabinet był rządem koalicji mniejszościowej z partią dominującą. Ogólnie indeks stabilności rządowej koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z udziałem centrolewicy z CSSD wynosi 0,32, a indeks jednego rządu mniejszościowego z partią dominującą jest 0,02. Średni indeks stabilności rządowej gabinetów koalicyjnych z udziałem CSSD wyniosł 0,24, co stanowi dwa razy mniejszy wynik w porównaniu do indeksu stabilności rządowej centroprawicy z ODS. W związku z tym nasuwa się wniosek, że rządy koalicyjne centroprawicy z ODS niezależnie od rodzaju koalicji są bardziej stabilne i trwałe niż koalicje z CSSD.

Rolę negatywną w zabezpieczeniu stabilności i trwałości czeskich rządów koalicyjnych odegrał wysoki poziom efektywnej liczby partii parlamentarnych. Wszystkie rządy w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Czechach są bardziej stabilne jeżeli są ukształtowane jako układy koalicyjne z partią dominującą, co jest charakterystyczne dla wszystkich koalicji większościowych w ogóle. Podczas gdy koalicyjne rządy mniejszościowe utworzone przeważnie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną notują znacznie gorsze wskaźniki. Natomiast, jako najmniej stabilne rządy koalicyjne uważa się gabinety koalicji mniejszościowych z konstrukcją zrównoważoną.

Podsumowując możemy stwierdzić, iż najmniej stabilne rządy koalicyjne istniały wówczas w Polsce, gdy gabinety koalicyjne formowały się w ramach systemu semiprezydenckiego i przeważnie zostały ukształtowane jako koalicję minimalnie zwycięskie. Natomiast, indeksy stabilności w Republice Czeskiej są nieznacznie wyższe jak w Polsce.

Po wstąpieniu do UE stabilność i trwałość gabinetów koalicyjnych wzrosła w Polsce, natomiast w Czechach te wskaźniki znacznie spadły.

Należy także zwrócić uwagę na skuteczność opisanych w niniejszej pracy rządów koalicyjnych. Na użytek badań naukowych z zakresu skuteczności rządowej, powstało dużo rozpraw, metodyk, mechanizmów oraz praktyk opracowanych przez licznych naukowców – niektóre z nich charakteryzują się jednokierunkowością a reszta to kompleksowe opracowania. Najbardziej przydatne dla przeprowadzenia analizy skuteczności rządów koalicyjnych w Polsce i Czechach są ratingi takich organizacji międzynarodowych jako Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit oraz Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, które zostały włączone w bazę Banku światowego. W naszej analizie skuteczności my nie bierzemy pod uwagę skuteczność ostatniego jednopartyjnego rządu większościowego w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (B. Skrzydło od 2015 r.) oraz minimalnie zwycięskiego rządu koalicyjnego w Czechach (B. Sobotky od 2014 r.). Także, ta statystyka obejmuje informację o wskaźnikach Polski i Czech jedynie od roku 1996 (wcześniejsze dane nie są dostępne). Dlatego wprowadziliśmy skompilowany indeks skuteczności rządowej, który przewiduje analizę całego szeregu indyktorów skupionych w granicach sześciu głównych kierunków: głosowanie i odpowiedzialność (wytyczona granica

prawa wyboru realizowanego przez obywateli państwa, a także możliwość wpływania na kształt przyszłego rządu oraz wolność wypowiedzi, zrzeczeń i możliwość zakładania niezależnych środków przekazu informacji); stabilność polityczna (wskaźnik tego jak postrzegana jest złożoność niekonstytucyjnej zmiany rządu oraz przejawy przemocy a szczególnie terroryzmu); skuteczność rządu (określenia jakości działań instytucji publicznych, a także usług które świadczy rząd, poziom wolności w stosunku do presji politycznej, jakość implementacji, wykonanie decyzji przyjętych przez organy władzy wykonawczej); jakość regulacyjna (zdolność rządu do tworzenia i implementacji kierunku działań politycznych w interesach sektora prywatnego); prawo prawa (poziom zgodności rozwoju społecznego-politycznego z przypisanymi prawami oraz poziom przestrzegania prawa własności, działalności sądowniczej, a także zapobieganie przestępczości i przemocy); kontrola korupcji (zdolność rządu do przeciwstawiania się różnym formom przejawów działań korupcyjnych)[11]. Użyto wyników oznaczonych jako równoległe w czasie, w stosunku do wewnętrznych parametrów skuteczności[39].

Omawiając indykatory skuteczności rządów koalicyjnych Polski i Czech, sytuacja dla każdego wskaźnika skompilowanego indeksu skuteczności w okresie 1996-2015 lat wygląda następująco:

**Tabela 3.** Skompilowany indeks skuteczności rządzenia gabinetów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1996–2015) według Freedom House, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, Economist Intelligence Group<sup>6</sup>

Premier gabinetu	Okres sprawowania urzędu	Skład partyjny gabinetu	Typ gabinetu/ typ konstrukcji	Partia Premiera	Liczba mandatów partii rządowych/skład rządu	SIS FRH	SIS PRS	SIS EUU	ISR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
J. Oleksy	06.03.1995–24.01.1996	SLD + PSL	GW/MNZK/Z.	SLD	303/460	0,90	0,82	0,64	0,22
W. Cimoszewicz	7.02.1996–21.09.1997	SLD + PSL	GW/MNZK/Z.	SLD	303/460	0,90	0,82	0,64	0,40
J. Buzek (I)	31.10.1997–06.06.2000	AWS + UW	GW/MNZK/d.	AWS	261/460	0,94; 0,87	0,82; 0,74	0,62; 0,60	0,65
J. Buzek (II)	07.06.2000–18.10.2001	AWS	JM	AWS	201/460	0,87	0,74	0,60	0,34
L. Miller (I)	19.10.2001–03.03.2003	SLD + PSL + UP	GW/MNZK/d.	SLD	258/460	0,85	0,76; 0,74	0,64	0,34
L. Miller (II)	04.03.2003–02.05.2004	SLD + UP	KM/d	SLD	216/460	0,85; 0,81	0,74	0,64; 0,60	0,29
M. Bełka	24.06.2004–25.09.2005	SLD + PSL + UP + SDP <sup>+</sup> *	KM/d	SLD	171/460	0,81; 0,82	0,74; 0,78	0,60	0,31
K. Marcinkiewicz (I)	10.11.2005–04.05.2006	PS	JM	PS	155/460	0,82; 0,78	0,78; 0,76	0,60; 0,62	0,23
K. Marcinkiewicz (II)	05.05.2006–10.07.2006	PS + SRP + LPR	GW/MNZK/d.	PS	245/460	0,78	0,76	0,62	0,09
J. Kaczyński (I)	14.07.2006–13.08.2007	PS + SRP + LPR	GW/MNZK/d.	PS	245/460	0,78; 0,77	0,76; 0,77	0,62;	0,52
J. Kaczyński (II)	13.08.2007–19.10.2007	PS	JM	PS	155/460	0,77	0,77;	0,62	0,09
D. Tušek (I)	16.11.2007–09.10.2011	PO + PSL	GW/MNZK/d.	PO	240/460	0,77; 0,79; 0,75; 0,76	0,77; 0,78; 0,75	0,62; 0,65; 0,66	0,98
D. Tušek (II)	18.11.2011–09.09.2014	PO + PSL	GW/MNZK/d.	PO	235/460	0,76; 0,75;	0,75; 0,71	0,66	0,70
E. Kopacz	22.09.2014–25.10.2015	PO + PSL	GW/MNZK/d.	PO	235/460	0,69	0,78-	0,67-	0,27
B. Szydło	16.11.2015–czynnny	PIS	JW	PIS	235/460	-	-	-	czynnny

Tabela została opracowana na podstawie informacji empirycznej, opracowanie własnego i istniejących danych naukowych: Political institutions in Central and Eastern European countries: Political institutions in Central and Eastern European countries: A comparative analysis, ed. Anatoly Romanuk, Vitaliy Lylyyn, Nadia Panchak-Bialoblotska, 2014, 358 p.; W. Giercki Political Systems of Visegrad Group Countries, 2012, s. 154, Dostęp: [http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political\\_Systems\\_of\\_Visegrad\\_Group\\_Countries\\_Wojciech\\_Giercki](http://www.academia.edu/5973255/Political_Systems_of_Visegrad_Group_Countries_Wojciech_Giercki), ed. dostęp: od 05.11.2016); M. Gallagher Election Indices Dataset / Michael Gallagher – Trinity College Dublin: Department of Political Science, 2013. – Dostęp: [http://www.rtd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/michael\\_gallagher/EISystems/Doctcs/ElectionIndices.pdf](http://www.rtd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Doctcs/ElectionIndices.pdf) (dostęp: od 05.11.2016); H. Döring *Parliaments and governments database (ProfGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies*. Development version, ed. Holger Döring, Philip Manow. – University of Bremen: Centre for Social Policy Research, 2013. – <http://dev.parlgov.org/> (dostęp: od 12.04.2013)

<sup>6</sup> Tłuszym odznaczyono indeks skuteczności w osramim roku sprawowania władzy przez rząd. Ten wskaźnik myli obliczamy w zagadnieniu. Wykaz skrótów: SIS – skompilowany indeks skuteczności; ISR – Indeks stabilności rządowej; np. – niepartyjny (premier, skład gabinetu rządowego); JW – Gabinet jedнопartyjny większościowy; JM – Gabinet jedнопartyjny mniejszościowy; KW – koalicyjny gabinet większości; KM – koalicyjny gabinet mniejszościowy; MZK – minimalnie zwycięska koalicja; NZK – nadwyszkowo- zwycięska koalicja; T – rząd techniczny (niepartyjny); d – konstrukcja rządu koalicyjnego z partią dominującą; z – zrównoważona konstrukcja rządu koalicyjnego;

Liczba koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich w Polsce, które zostały poddane analizie wynosi dziewięć, a ich średnie wyniki przedstawiają się następująco: FRH=0,81, PRS=0,77, EIU=0,63. Jeśli chodzi o wskaźniki skuteczności czterech minimalnie zwycięskich rządów do momentu wejścia Polski wynoszą one: FRH=0,88, PRS=0,78, EIU=0,63. W okresie po wejściu Polski do UE przeanalizowaliśmy działania pięciu gabinetów minimalnie zwycięskich dla których indeksy skuteczności zostały obliczone na poziomie: FRH=0,75, PRS=0,75, EIU=0,65. W Polsce występują różnice jeśli chodzi o skuteczność wśród koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich. W Polsce istniały dwa gabinety minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą przed wejściem do UE i cztery koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą po przyłączeniu się do UE. Wyniki skuteczności dla pierwszych dwóch gabinetów wynoszą: FRH=0,86, PRS=0,74, EIU=0,64, a po wejściu do UE dla minimalnie zwycięskich rządów koalicyjnych z partią dominującą wskaźnik skuteczności zmienił się i wynosił: FRH=0,75, PRS=0,75, EIU=0,65. Średnie wskaźniki dla tych dwóch grup są następujące: FRH=0,80, PRS=0,75, EIU=0,63. Wszystkie dwie koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną (rząd J. Oleksego 1995-1996, W. Cimoszewicza 1996-1997) zostały utworzone do wejścia Polski do UE i dla nich wskaźnik skuteczności wynosił: FRH=0,78, PRS=0,82, EIU=0,64, co z kolei pozwala wnioskować, że w Polsce koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie z partią dominującą są mniej skuteczne niż koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną.

Skuteczność rządów koalicyjnych Polski do wejścia do UE była wyższa, aniżeli wskaźniki rządów koalicyjnych, ukształtowanych już po przystąpieniu do struktur unijnych.

Biorąc pod uwagę charakter ideologiczny koalicji, bardziej skuteczny był rząd z centrolewicowym SLD, niż rządy centroprawicowych AWS, PiS oraz PO. Zaczynając od roku 1996 (okresu od którego zaczynają się pierwsze informacje o skuteczności rządowej), z udziałem SLD zostały utworzone trzy koalicje minimalnie zwycięskie, z których dwie zaistniały jako rządy z konstrukcją zrównoważoną, a jedna jako koalicja z partią dominującą.

Dwa rządy koalicyjne mniejszościowe też były rządami SLD, dla których skuteczność została obliczona na poziomie: FRH=0,84, PRS=0,77, EIU=0,60. Średni wskaźnik skuteczności dla rządów minimalnie zwycięskich SLD to: FRH=0,88, PRS=0,78, EIU=0,64. Z kolei wskaźnik skuteczności dla koalicji minimalnie-zwycięskich AWS-UW, PiS-LPR-SRP oraz PO-PSL to: FRH=0,77, PRS=0,76, EIU=0,64. Przy czym skuteczność centrolewicy i centroprawicy zależy od okresu funkcjonowania (do lub po wejściu do UE). Dla istniejących do czasu członkostwa w UE trzech rządów SLD-PSL, wskaźniki skuteczności wynoszą: FRH=0,88, PRS=0,79, EIU=0,64, a dla ostatniego rządu minimalnie-zwycięskiego SLD-PSL-UP L. Millera (i dwóch gabinetów koalicji mniejszościowych z dominacją SLD po przystąpieniu do UE –L. Millera w latach 2003-2004 oraz M. Belki w latach 2004-2005) indeks skuteczności został obliczony na poziomie: FRH=0,83, PRS=0,75, EIU=0,62. Centroprawica charakteryzuje się podobną oceną: dla jednego gabinetu minimalnie zwycięskiego z partią dominującą J. Buzka z AWS w latach 1997-2001 ten wskaźnik wynosi: FRH=0,87, PRS=0,74, EIU=0,60, a dla pozostałych

pięciu koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich po przystąpieniu do UE ten sam wskaźnik to: FRH=0,75, PRS=0,75, EIU=0,65.

Z powyższej analizy można wnioskować, że większa skuteczność rządów koalicyjnych występowała przed przystąpieniem do UE, a po nim skuteczność ta spadła. Bardziej skutecznymi rządami okazały się rządy koalicyjne centrolewicy niż rządy centroprawicy, zwłaszcza przed wstąpieniem do UE. W Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wskaźniki stabilności rządowej nie wywierają wpływu na skuteczność rządową. Najwyższe wskaźniki skuteczności zaobserwowaliśmy u minimalnie zwycięskich rządów z konstrukcją zrównoważoną J. Oleksego i W. Cimoszewicza, chociaż była to jedna i ta sama koalicja partyjna. Minimalnie zwycięskie rządy z partią dominującą D. Tuska okazały się jednymi z najmniej skutecznych rządów, chociaż to były najbardziej stabilne i trwale gabinety w historii III Rzeczypospolitej.

**Tabela 4.** Skompiłowany indeks skuteczności rządzenia gabinetów Republiki Czeskiej (1996–2015) według Freedom House, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, Economist Intelligence Group

Premier gabinetu	Okres sprawowania urzędu	Skład partyjny gabinetu	Status gabinetu/ typ konstrukcji	Partia Premiera	Liczba mandatów partii rządowych/skład Izby niższej	SIS FRH	SIS PRS	SIS EIU	ISR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V. Klaus (II)	01.01.1993 – 01.06.1996	ODS + CDU-CSL + ODA + KDS	GW/MZK/d.	ODS	105/200	0,91	0,70	0,71	0,86
V. Klaus (III)	04.07.1996 – 30.11.1997	ODS + CDU-CSL + ODA	KM/d.	ODS	99/200	0,91	0,70	0,71	0,68
Josef Tošovský	02.01.1998 – 20.06.1998	CDU-CSL + ODA + US* + n.p.	KM/r. (N.P.)	n.p.	31/200	0,83	0,80	0,59	0,23
V. Špidla	17.07.1998 – 15.06.2002	CSSD	JM	CSSD	74/200	0,83;0,72;0,73	0,80;0,74;0,77	0,59;0,57;0,67	0,98
V. Špidla	15.07.2002 – 01.07.2004	CSSD + CDU-CSL + US-DEU	KW//MZK/d.	CSSD	101/200	0,73;0,74	0,77	0,67;0,65	0,49
S. Gross (I)	04.08.2004 – 30.03.2005	CSSD + CDU-CSL + US-DEU	KW/MZK/d.	CSSD	101/200	0,74;0,75	0,77;0,78	0,65	0,17
S. Gross (II)	31.03.2005 – 25.04.2005	CSSD + US-DEU	KM/d.	CSSD	88/200	0,75	0,78	0,65	0,02
J. Paroubek	25.04.2005 – 03.06.2006	CSSD + CDU-CSL + US-DEU	KW/MZK/d.	CSSD	101/200	0,75;0,77	0,77	0,65;0,67	0,29
M. Topolánek (I)	04.09.2006 – 03.10.2006	ODS + b.p.	JM*	ODS	81/200	0,77	0,77	0,67	0,02
M. Topolánek (II)	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	ODS + CDU-CSL + PZ	KM/d.	ODS	100/200	0,79;0,77;0,78	0,77	0,67	0,55
J. Fišer	07.06.2009 – 29.05.2010	N.P.	T	N.P.	0/200	0,78	0,77;0,78	0,67	0,25
P. Nečas (I)	28.06.2010 – 17.04.2012	ODS + TOP09 + VV	KW/MZK/r.	ODS	118/200	0,78;0,80	0,78;0,75;0,71	0,67	0,53
P. Nečas (II)	27.04.2012 – 17.06.2013	ODS + TOP09 + Lidem (VV)	KW/MZK/r.	ODS	101/200	0,80;0,78	0,71;0,72	0,67;0,68;0,66	0,33
B. Sobotka	17.01.2014 – Czynny	CSSD + ANO CDU-CSL	KW/MZK/d.	CSSD	111/200	-	-	-	-

Obliczenie przeprowadzono na podstawie: *The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project* – Dostęp: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> (dostęp od 12.05.2016); Political institutions in Central and Eastern European countries: A Comparative analysis, ed. Anatolij Romanjuk, Vitalij Lytvyn, Nadia Panchak-Bialoblotska, 2014, 358 p. do wniosku, iż skuteczność wszystkich koalicji minimalnie zwyciężskich w Czechach, których istniało ogólnie (które są przeanalizowane) szesć, ich średnie wyniki dorównywały: FRH=0,79, PRS=0,73, EIU=0,69. Skuteczność dwóch minimalnie zwyciężskich rządów do przayżenia się do UE została obliczona następująco: FRH=0,82, PRS=0,72, EIU=0,68. Po wejściu do UE przeanalizowaliśmy cztery gabinety minimalnie zwyciężskie dla których indeksy skuteczności zostały wymierzone: FRH=0,77, PRS=0,74, EIU=0,69. Warto dodać, iż stabilność rządów minimalnie zwyciężskich po wstąpieniu Czech do UE spadła do indeksu 0,33, gdy w ogóle rzecz biorąc indeks stabilności rządowej wszystkich koalicji minimalnie zwyciężskich zaczynając od 1993 r. wyniósł 0,509, a rządy minimalnie zwyciężskie V. Klause oraz V. Špidly do wstąpienia Czech do UE posiadali indeks w 0,68%, odpowiednio w ten czas koalicję minimalnie zwyciężskie byli o wiele bardziej stabilne.

7 N.P. – gabinet niepartyjny.

8 JM – Gabinet jednopartyjny mniejszościowy.



Skompilowany wskaźnik koalicyjnego rządu mniejszości V. Klause do wejścia do UE został obliczony jak:  $FRH=0,91$ ,  $PRS=0,70$ ,  $EIU=0,71$ , a po wejściu do UE wskaźniki skuteczności dwóch koalicji mniejszościowych wyniosły:  $FRH=0,76$ ,  $PRS=0,77$ ,  $EIU=0,66$ . Przy czym gabinet mniejszościowy V. Klause był o wiele bardziej stabilny w porównaniu do dwóch gabinetów mniejszościowych, ukształtowanych po wstąpieniu Czech do UE z indeksem stabilności rządowej 0,68 przeciw indeksu 0,29 w ostatnich dwóch rządów.

W Czechach nie zaobserwowaliśmy różnicy istotnej w skuteczności rządów minimalnie zwycięskich z partią dominującą, których było cztery, i dwóch rządów minimalnie zwycięskich z konstrukcją zrównoważoną (dwa gabinety P. Neczasa w latach 2010-2013), dlatego skompilowane wskaźniki skuteczności tych trzech organizacji analitycznych podają następujące wyniki: dla koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich z partią dominującą indeks skuteczności rządowej jest:  $FRH=0,79$ ,  $PRS=0,76$ ,  $EIU=0,67$ , a dla rządów z konstrukcją zrównoważoną:  $FRH=0,79$ ,  $PRS=0,72$ ,  $EIU=0,67$ . Oprócz tego, te dwa rządy minimalnie zwycięskie z konstrukcją zrównoważoną zaistniały po wchodzeniu Czech do UE.

Więc, biorąc pod uwagę charakter ideologiczny koalicji, to rząd był bardziej skuteczny w którym brał udział albo uczestniczył centroprawicowy ODS, niż rządy centrolewicowych CSSD. Zaczynając od 1996 r. (okresu w którym zaczynają się pierwsze dane o skuteczności rządów), za udziału ODS było sformowano trzy minimalnie zwycięskie koalicje, dwie z których, jak już wspominaliśmy, były konstrukcjami zrównoważonymi wskaźniki których są następujące:  $FRH=0,83$ ,  $PRS=0,71$ ,  $EIU=0,68$ , gdy wskaźniki skuteczności dla koalicyjnego gabinetu mniejszości V. Klause obliczone jak:  $FRH=0,84$ ,  $PRS=0,74$ ,  $EIU=0,69$ . Średnia skuteczność dla koalicji w jakich brała udział ODS jest następująca:  $FRH=0,84$ ,  $PRS=0,73$ ,  $EIU=0,69$ . Koalicję z dominacją CSSD nie są na tyle skuteczne o czym świadczą następujące dane: trzy minimalnie zwycięskie koalicje otrzymały taki rezultat –  $FRH=0,75$ ,  $PRS=0,77$ ,  $EIU=0,65$ , a wynik jednego gabinetu mniejszościowego na czele z S. Grossem:  $FRH=0,75$ ,  $PRS=0,78$ ,  $EIU=0,65$ , co jest wiele mniej niż średnie wskaźniki dwóch koalicji mniejszościowych z udziałem ODS. Oprócz tego, rząd minimalnie zwycięski V. Klause z ODS stosownie wybranej nami metodologii jest najbardziej skuteczny wśród wszystkich rządów Czech zaczynając od 1996 r. z wskaźnikami:  $FRH=0,91$ ,  $PRS=0,70$ ,  $EIU=0,71$ , a najmniej skutecznym rządem okazał się rząd minimalnie zwycięski z partią dominującą V. Spidly z wynikiem:  $FRH=0,74$ ,  $PRS=0,77$ ,  $EIU=0,65$ . Średnio dla rządów centrolewicowych CSSD wskaźnik skuteczności został obliczony:  $FRH=0,75$ ,  $PRS=0,77$ ,  $EIU=0,65$ . Wnioskujemy, że koalicje w których dominowała lub uczestniczyła centroprawicowa ODS byli bardziej skuteczne niż rządy centrolewicy CSSD.

Otóż, indeks stabilności rządowej koreluje ze skutecznością rządów koalicyjnych, świadectwem czego jest działalność pierwszego gabinetu koalicyjnego V. Klause z indeksem stabilności rządowej 0,86, który jest najwyższy wśród wszystkich gabinetów Republiki Czeskiej. Obliczając skuteczność nie tylko rządów koalicyjnych zwróciliśmy uwagę na to że najwyższe wskaźniki skompilowanego indeksu skuteczności rządu pokazują nie tylko jedynie drugi

minimalnie-zwycięski rząd z partią dominującą i koalicyjny gabinet mniejszościowy z partią dominującą V. Klause (1993-1997), a także dwa gabinety koalicji minimalnie zwycięskiej z konstrukcją zrównoważoną P. Neczasa (2010-2013). Najmniej skutecznym był koalicyjny gabinet mniejszościowy niepartyjnego J. Tosowskiego i jednopartyjny rząd mniejszościowy M. Zemana (1998-2002) z CSSD, który przetrwał przez całą kadencję parlamentarną i posiadał najwyższy wskaźnik stabilności rządowej, i jednocześnie charakteryzował się przeciętną skutecznością.

Możemy stwierdzić, iż najmniej stabilne rządy koalicyjne istniały w Polsce wówczas, gdy gabinety koalicyjne formowały się w ramach systemu semiprezydenckiego i przeważnie zostały ukształtowane jako koalicję minimalnie zwycięskie. Natomiast indeksy stabilności w Republice Czeskiej są nieznacznie wyższe jak w Polsce.

Po wstąpieniu do UE stabilność i trwałość gabinetów koalicyjnych wzrosła w Polsce. Natomiast w Czechach te wskaźniki znacząco spadły.

Wnioskując, konstatujemy że w ogóle skuteczność rządów koalicyjnych była wyższa do przystąpienia Czech do UE, a po tym nieco spadła. Rządy minimalnie zwycięskie były bardziej skuteczne w porównaniu do rządów mniejszościowych. Centrolewicowe rządy koalicyjne okazały się bardziej efektywne w porównaniu z rządami koalicji centroprawicowych w Polsce. Natomiast w Republice Czeskiej wyższe wskaźniki skuteczności rządowej wystąpiły w gabinetach sterowanych przez centroprawicę.

W wyniku operacjonalizacji wymienionych danych empirycznych dochodzimy do wniosku, iż wyższe wskaźniki skuteczności rządów koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich, tak samo jak rządów koalicji mniejszościowych wykazują rządy koalicyjne Polski, zwłaszcza w okresie do wstąpienia Rzeczypospolitej do UE.

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## **Towards systematizing and updating the definition and indicators for measuring the stability of governments: theoretical and methodological cut**

The article is dedicated to theoretical and methodological systematizing and updating the definition and indicators for measuring the stability of governments. The researcher examined theoretical, methodological and empirical results that variously describe the fullness and the essence of the concept of “government stability”. For this the author analyzed the essence of the notions of “government,” “governmental cabinet,” “cabinet of ministers” and “stability”. As a result, the researcher highlighted and systematized the indicators and measurement tools for analyzing stability of governments.

*Keywords:* government, governmental cabinet, cabinet of ministers, stability, duration, stability of governments.

## **ДО ОНОВЛЕННЯ Й СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЇ ДЕФІНІЦІЇ ТА ІНДИКАТОРІВ ВИМІРЮВАННЯ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ УРЯДІВ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ РОЗРІЗ**

Стаття присвячена теоретико-методологічному оновленню та систематизації дефініції й індикаторів вимірювання стабільності урядів. Дослідник розглянув теоретико-методологічні та емпіричні напрацювань, які по-різному описують наповненість і суть поняття «стабільність урядів». Для цього проаналізовано сутність понять «уряд», «урядовий кабінет», «кабінет міністрів» і «стабільність». Виділено і систематизовано індикатори й інструменти вимірювання стабільності урядів.

*Ключові слова:* уряд, урядовий кабінет, кабінет міністрів, стабільність, тривалість, стабільність урядів.

Government stability is a relatively “new” concept in comparative political studies. However, it has come into the focus of numerous study cases, elaborated by scholars from various national schools of political science. In its turn, this causes a number of positive (in particular diversification of research), as well as negative (segmentation and non-unified character of research) consequences. Therefore, overcoming and combining, especially on the basis of updating and systematization of definitions and indicators for measuring the stability of governments

(interchangeably – government stability) is quite an urgent task for comparative researchers and thus it determines topicality and relevance of the corresponding study.

This outlined range of problems is mainly grounded or at least is derivative from the current works by such scientists as D. Baron<sup>1</sup>, J. Blondel<sup>2</sup>, E. Damgaard<sup>3</sup>, L. DeWinter<sup>4</sup>, L. Dodd<sup>5</sup>, J. Druckman<sup>6</sup>, L. Frischtak<sup>7</sup>, Grofman and P. van Roosendaal<sup>8</sup>, I. Indridason and C. Kam<sup>9</sup>, G. King<sup>10</sup>, M. Laver, N. Schofield and K. Shepsle<sup>11</sup>, A. Lijphart<sup>12</sup>, G. Luebbert<sup>13</sup>, V. Lytvyn<sup>14</sup>, C. Nikolenyi<sup>15</sup>, D. Sanders and V. Herman<sup>16</sup>, K. Strøm<sup>17</sup>, A. Swaan<sup>18</sup>, M. Taylor and V. Hermann<sup>19</sup>, J. Toole<sup>20</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>21</sup>, E. Zimmerman<sup>22</sup> and many others.

Analysis of the works allows us conclude that in modern political science there is a number of theoretical-methodological and empirical studies which in different ways disclose essence and fullness of the concept “government stability”. In particular, some works examine such structural elements of governments, which compose a theoretical-methodological foundation

- <sup>1</sup> D. Baron, *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems*, „American Political Science Review“ 1991, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 137-164.
- <sup>2</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science“ 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180-203.
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- <sup>4</sup> L. DeWinter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Doring (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115-151.
- <sup>5</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.
- <sup>6</sup> J. Druckman, *Party Factionalism and Cabinet Durability*, „Party Politics“ 1996, vol 3, s. 397-407.; J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 2002, vol 46, s. 760-771.
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- <sup>9</sup> I. Indridason, C. Kam, *Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 621-656.
- <sup>10</sup> G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.
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- <sup>12</sup> A. Lijphart, *Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.
- <sup>13</sup> G. Luebbert, *A Theory of Government Formation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 229-264.
- <sup>14</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Konseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist“*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seria: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia“ 2008, vol 10, s. 37-42.; V. Lytvyn, *Porivnialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krajin Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.; V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist: teoretyko-metodolohichni zasady doslidzhenia*, „Ukrainska natsionalna ideia: realii ta perspektyvy rozvytku“ 2009, vol 21, s. 117-121.
- <sup>15</sup> C. Nikolenyi, *Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe*, „Party Politics“ 2004, vol 10, s. 123-150.
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- <sup>22</sup> E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

for the so-called “structural approach” to the analysis of government stability (L. Dodd<sup>23</sup>, C. Nikolenyi<sup>24</sup>, K. Strom<sup>25</sup>, P. Roosendaal<sup>26</sup> and P. Warwick<sup>27</sup> and others). Other researchers analyze influence of institutional parameters of political systems on governmental stability, what makes the basis for the so-called “institutionalized approach” (J. Blondel<sup>28</sup>, J. Druckman<sup>29</sup>, D. Sanders and V. Herman<sup>30</sup>, M. Taylor<sup>31</sup>, J. Toole<sup>32</sup> and others). Other works combine the impact of unforeseen events on governmental stability and are actualized within the so-called “external approach” (K. Strom<sup>33</sup>, J. Druckman and M. Thies<sup>34</sup>, G. King<sup>35</sup>, G. Luebbert<sup>36</sup>, P. Warwick<sup>37</sup> and others). Besides, recently there have been conducted many attempts to combine the above-mentioned approaches, taking into account the influence of some ministers on the stability of governments (V. Lytvyn<sup>38</sup>), what provides the basis for constructing an “internal” approach, which in parallel accounts “details and advantages” of more certified ideas. It is if not a ground, then a precondition for working out a consolidated determination of government stability as a political category, operationalization of which let us draw a number of scientific conclusions and predictions. Taking into consideration the fact that the obtained ideas and conclusions must be elaborated, specified and systematized, as it, probably, creates distinct prospects of defining new applied and theoretical knowledge.

Solving the set tasks we first of all appeal to definitions of those notions and categories, which mainly determine the definition and indicators for government stability. In the first instance we refer to interpretation of the terms “government” and “stability”.

We consider “government” on the assumption of the institutional nature of its functioning. One of the ways to express the mechanism of state authorities functioning is correlation between powers of political institutions and institutes of political authority. Under the neo-institutionalism political institutions are determined differently, in particular as: the rules of approving political and managerial decisions; rules, regulations and political strategies; formal rules,

<sup>23</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

<sup>24</sup> C. Nikolenyi, *Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe*, „Party Politics” 2004, vol 10, s. 123-150.

<sup>25</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>26</sup> P. van Roosendaal, *Government Survival in Western Multi-Party Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1997, vol 32, s. 71-92.

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<sup>28</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science” 1968, vol 1, nr 2, s. 180-203.

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<sup>31</sup> M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review” 1971, vol 64, s. 28-37.

<sup>32</sup> J. Toole, *Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe*, „Party Politics” 2000, vol 6, s. 441-461.

<sup>33</sup> K. Strom, *Contending Models of Cabinet Stability*, „American Political Science Review” 1998, vol 82, s. 923-941.

<sup>34</sup> J. Druckman, M. Thies, *The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration*, „American Journal of Political Science” 2002, vol 46, s. 760-771.

<sup>35</sup> G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.

<sup>36</sup> G. Luebbert, *A Theory of Government Formation*, „Comparative Political Studies” 1984, vol 17, s. 229-264.

<sup>37</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>38</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uradiiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalny universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.

procedures of achieving political consent and practices, which structuralize relations between subjects; collective actions concerning managing and extension of the field of individual actions, which make up a political system. According to the neo-institutional methodology we may state that institutes are a set of formal rules, as well as informal restrictions and mechanisms of their forced actualization; frames of organizations and regularities, where political actors influence the results of political processes. That is why political institutes and establishments serve for taking compulsory decisions and their actualization in practice. Concerning this G. Gohler assumes that when they are longstanding, then they are applied to perform positive influence on a political structure and social matter<sup>39</sup>.

Controversial is a question concerning specific definition of current political institutes. Their narrow definition merely touches formal establishments, formed in accordance with the law, and on the contrary their broad definition presupposes unofficial institutes, which may develop in correlation between individual and collective actors. As to the latter W. Merkel and A. Croissant state that political values and practice must be considered as those which have unofficially determined character<sup>40</sup>. Leading function of institutes, according to D. North<sup>41</sup>, lies in providing stability due to smoothing changes in correlation with the rules of the game. Within this context we apply a scientific position, due to which political institutes "are connected" with formal principles, structures, functions, positions towards other institutes. For instance, G. Lanzara emphasizes that any political institute is a result of the process, where the structure/system of interdependencies and criteria for stabilization and legitimation of a political institute is formed<sup>42</sup>. Role of any separate institute or a class of institutes (prime-minister, government, president etc.) can be comprehended only under condition when it (they) exists in the midst of the whole political system. In his turn, P. Patnam mentions, that evaluation of institutes requires analysis of their actions in a diversified social, economic, political environment. Thus, the most important thing is that the regularity of social-political and state-legal development of all countries in the world is a concentration of leading powers by the institutes of the executive branch.

The government represents the apex of the executive system. Its reference of work may be reduced to implementation of laws and exercising tasks in the sphere of management. The government (predominantly and traditionally) is in possession of executive political power, which is probably the most significant in the country. Moreover, the government is a collegiate body of executive power of general competency, it manages the country; it is the apex of a multistage pyramid in the system of executive power, which includes regional, local bodies/agencies etc. it

<sup>39</sup> G. Gohler, *Einleitung*, [w:] G. Gohler (ed.), *Grundfragen der Theorie politischer Institutionen: Forschungsstand, Probleme, Perspektiven*, Wyd. Westdeutscher Verlag 1987, s. 7-14.

<sup>40</sup> W. Merkel, Croissant A., *Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien*, „Politische Vierteljahresschrift“ 2000, vol 41, nr. 1, s. 18.

<sup>41</sup> D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 3.

<sup>42</sup> G. Lanzara, *Self-Destructive Processes in Institution Building and Some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1998, vol 33, nr. 1, s. 1.

is not a narrowly specialized regulatory body, but a body of general competence, which manages state executive structures in all spheres of social life.

Political and legal status of the government is specified by the constitution or a special law. The role of the government and ways of its formation/powers depend on the provided form and system of state governance, historical peculiarities of the country. For instance, in classical presidential republics the executive branch is headed by the president, which is perceived as its embodiment and a direct bearer. "Government" categories are not singled out here, but such terms as the "executive power" or "presidential administration" are used. In countries with parliamentary and in many republics with a mixed form/system of government (predominantly under a mixed constitutional form of the government scientists mean a semi-presidential system) the president does not belong or partially belongs to the structure of the executive power. Their powers and authorities are presupposed by the status of the head of the country. However, the president's competence includes separate responsibilities in the sphere of the executive power, most of which may be implemented only through the government. That is why, the interrelations between the head of the state and that of the government are usually determined as a model of "dualism of the executive power"<sup>43</sup>. On this basis, it becomes clear that the government's activity and its stability are first of all presupposed by the construction of political power, which exists in one country or another.

Regarding this, it is difficult to present a universal definition of the government. M. Laver and K. Shepsle mention: "If we consider formation of any government we will face confusion, connected with activity of a large pool of politicians, officials, lobbyists, interested groups, electorate and analysts. Namely this approach makes every single government profoundly distinctive from another one"<sup>44</sup>. In this context the government is linked to the results of the parliamentary elections and parliament's activity. According to D. Baron<sup>45</sup> the notion "government" is used to appeal to the parties, which do not speak against a vote of confidence on their political grounds. M. Matilla and T. Raunio mark that the results of the elections determine the "starting" point as to a new government formation: almost in all cases they are an outcome of the elections and are partially independent of these results<sup>46</sup>. M. Laver and K. Shepsle underline that one should distinguish the government as an "independent institute" and an "institute of political actors, who are represented in the parliament and ensure its support during voting"<sup>47</sup>. In general it means that it is reasonable to study the notion of the government within the parliamentary

<sup>43</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivnialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiy natsionalny universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 58.

<sup>44</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 5.

<sup>45</sup> D. Baron, *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems*, „American Political Science Review“ 1991, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 157.

<sup>46</sup> M. Matilla, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, „European journal of political research“ 2004, vol 43, nr. 2, s. 264.

<sup>47</sup> M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 264.



and mixed form/system of governance, where the executive power is exercised by both the president and the government, as the governmental institutes within the presidential form/system of governance has their own significant peculiarities.

At the same time, it is quite notable that in political science such definitions as the government, governmental cabinet and cabinet of ministers are simultaneously used to determine a political body of executive powers (from the perspective of evaluating parliamentary and semi-presidential systems). The government is an institute which carries out administration throughout the country or over a part of it. The governmental cabinet is a form of the government, where the prime-minister or the president forms the cabinet of ministers, committing its members to take charge of the corresponding ministries. The cabinet of ministers is a committee, formed out of the most significant members of the government, including the prime-minister (president) and ministers<sup>48</sup>. M. Gallaher, M. Laver and P. Mair interpret the government as a “totality of main political figures, formally appointed by the head of the state, but in fact chosen by the prime-minister after consultations with the governmental parties”<sup>49</sup>. However, if we take into consideration apolitical activists and formation of non-party governments it is necessary to focus on the need to carry out consultations with parties or the need to find support for the government in the parliament. That is why we agree with V. Lytvyn’s definition, according to which the “government” is a “fixed composition of politicians and professionals, formally appointed by the head of the state, but in fact chosen by the prime-minister, who have a right to take political decisions concerning all questions within the competence of the government according to the constitution of the country”<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, we support the remark that from the comparative-politological perspective analysis of the government in its wide sense is full of various interpretations, and thus is quite problematic. The government is a “political institute, which includes the cabinet of ministers and service/maintenance staff”. However, it is necessary to apply a narrower, constitutionally presupposed, understanding of the cabinet of ministers.

Next category, which requires specification, is “stability”, in particular “governmental stability”. There are a lot of interpretations of the content and essence of the notion, which political science borrowed from natural sciences, where “stability” means a fixed state, characterized by the ability to continual existence and preservation in time. Besides, the term has a group of analogues in other disciplines. Nevertheless, we appeal to the interpretation of stability as to the ability of a system to keep parameters within certain boundaries, oppose outbreaks and return to the balanced state in case of deviations. Semantically, stability borders the notions of firmness, balance, steadiness and variability.

Therefore, political process is determined through this understanding of stability. However, the notion of “political stability” is not absolutely précised. On the basis of a general scientific

<sup>48</sup> P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998, s. 128.

<sup>49</sup> M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

<sup>50</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 33.

comprehension of stability, we propose to determine its political component as a characteristic or a state of “political life” of the society, which reveals in stable functioning of all political institutes, in adherence to legal, political and moral regulations/traditions, in peaceful solution of conflict situations, which let the system function effectively, develop and preserve its structure and qualitative determination. Taking into account this definition we may trace the connection between stability and effectiveness, which must be actualized on the basis of an asserted requirement concerning evaluation of governmental stability. We keep in mind such aspects of political stability as: 1) systematical (regularities/tendencies of an integral development of the political system, institutes and processes); 2) functional (programs of actors in the political process (political actors) with possible and real results of their activity); 3) cognitive (a political actor must possess up-to-date and full information concerning political institutes, phenomena and processes).

V. Lytvyn mentions that on the basis of this construction it is quite clear that stability of governments is an abstract notion<sup>51</sup>, because it can refer to various significant moments in governments’ activity in different ways. It becomes especially urgent in the context of a widespread interpretation of stability as “functioning of one government” over the extended period of time. Along with that, of great importance is understanding of political stability as a balance of forces, which determine governments’ activity<sup>52</sup>. Taking into account these determined categories it is obvious that there is a need to define stability of governments as the ability of the cabinet of ministers, in case of falling out of the balanced state of the political system, to return to this state (keeping in mind two parameters: internal – imbalance on the basis of contradictions within the government; external – governmental stability is under the influence of institutional and constitutional peculiarities of a political system, political context and political environment); as the ability of the cabinet of ministers to react to the changes in the political environment (political disturbances or accidental obstacles, political crises) and preserve almost the same configuration and behavior throughout a long period of time<sup>53</sup>. On the basis of studying specifying notions we support the conclusion, provided by the Ukrainian scholar, that stability of governments in its wide sense is the ability of the government to be in office and perform its duties: while in a narrow sense it means a stable state of government’s functioning, which is characterized by the capacity for a continuous existence, preservation of fundamental internal and external parameters.

However, one should keep in mind other definitions of the governmental stability, such as: situational and operational parameters of dynamics in the government’s activity and the

<sup>51</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 33.

<sup>52</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist”*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Serii: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia” 2008, vol 10, s. 37-42.; V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist: teoretyko-metodolohichni zasady doslidzhenia*, „Ukrainska natsionalna ideia: realii ta perspektyvy rozvytku” 2009, vol 21, s. 117-121.

<sup>53</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Porivniialnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy: dys. ... kand. polit. nauk*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010, s. 34.

results of agreements between the major political forces; absence of crisis, preconditioned by the change of governments; distinctive properties of changes under a modifying influence of political will, aimed at slowdown (or stimulation) of changes and destabilization (or stabilization) of the governmental cabinets; ability of the cabinet to self-preservation under conditions which threaten its existence; forms of "legitimization of an executive hierarchy"; the outcomes of peculiarities of power-executive relations which influence the quality of governance; a stable layer of interrelations between the executive and legislation branches (when the government solves crises and by means of successful institutionalization of new patterns of integration and resource partition); an ability of the government to remain in office after various dramatic changes in the political environment; a consent, which ensures the existence of a stable political regime.

From this perspective an additional moment and attribute for evaluation of the stability of governments must be determination of political systems as democratic or non-democratic. The point is that in democratic countries one type of initial conditions has been elaborated (mainly party-electoral determinants are in the focus), which especially influence the process of evaluation of governmental stability. While in non-democratic countries it is impossible to speak of analogical nature of initially elaborated influences, as other mechanisms of development of relations in this context, which evaluate governmental stability, have been institutionalized there. That is why, taking into account such peculiarities of factors, which predetermine functioning of the cabinets of ministers, we suggest applying two directions of interpretation for the stability of governments: contextual and institutional. Under the first one the analysis of mechanisms of changes is focused on achieving/violation of balance between the cabinet and its outer context (J. Linz<sup>54</sup>, R. Dahl<sup>55</sup>, J. Blondel<sup>56</sup> and others). In the second one we may trace a kind of connection between governmental stability and formal regulations/practices, as well as informal procedures and rules of the game (J. March<sup>57</sup>, D. Olsen and P. Norton<sup>58</sup>, D. North<sup>59</sup>, R. Putnam<sup>60</sup>, S. Huntington<sup>61</sup> and others). In the late 1980s – early 1990s was formed a third (cross-disciplinary) approach towards analysis of the stability of governments, in particular on the basis of the management theory as a determinant of the government's ability to ensure stable and effective political process (M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle<sup>62</sup>, L. Frischtak<sup>63</sup>, G. Hidden<sup>64</sup>, A.

<sup>54</sup> J. Linz, *Democracy's Time Constraint*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 19-37.

<sup>55</sup> R. Dahl, *The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems*, „Public Administration Review“ 1947, vol 7, nr. 1, s. 1-11.

<sup>56</sup> J. Blondel, F. Muller-Rommel, *Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-making in Western European Cabinets*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1993.

<sup>57</sup> J. March, J. Olsen, *The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life*, „American Political Science Review“ 1984, vol 78, s. 734-749.

<sup>58</sup> D. Olson, P. Norton, *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1996.

<sup>59</sup> D. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

<sup>60</sup> R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work*, Wyd. Greenwood Publishing Group 2002.

<sup>61</sup> S. Huntington, *Will more Countries Become Democratic?*, „Political Science Quarterly“ 1984, vol 99, s. 193-218.

<sup>62</sup> M. Bratton, N. Van de Walle, *Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses*, [w:] G. Hyden, M Bratton (eds.), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Wyd. Rienner 1992.

<sup>63</sup> L. Frischtak, *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*, „World Bank Technical Paper“ 1994, vol 254.

<sup>64</sup> I. Indridason, C. Kam, *Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2008, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 621-656.

Korotayev<sup>65</sup>, W. Swatos<sup>66</sup> and others). Relating to this it becomes clear that the stability of the government must presuppose effectiveness or ineffectiveness of governments (and in general the whole process of state development, as the government is in charge of the internal and external policy) in certain democratic or non-democratic parameters of environment.

B. Powell<sup>67</sup> and P. Schmitter<sup>68</sup> validate the scientific position that institutional conditionality of the governmental stability presupposes analysis of influence made by the participants of the political process, who take part in functioning of governmental cabinets. J. Linz<sup>69</sup> mentions that there must be variability within the frames of governments, as the electorate share the desire of continuousness and stability of governments and readiness to conditions of influence caused by a great number of variables in the governmental activity. It means that the indicator for the governmental stability are formalized measures, presupposed by the law, as well as formal and informal political institutes (president, parties, elections etc.), which may impact the governmental cabinets.

In this context it is rather significant to differentiate indicators for the governmental stability due to various ways of government formation. The stability of governments under their parliamentary way of formation is outlined by "termination" of the cabinet within its legislative terms (term limit of the parliament). In his turn, L. Dodd defines disorders or shifts in a single-party or coalitional government as a rotation during a division of cabinet posts between the parties and as changes in division of posts<sup>70</sup>. It means that the indicator for the stability of governments is a party composition of governments. Governmental stability in cases of a presidential (or non-parliamentary) way of the cabinet formation faces understanding of termination of the cabinet within the terms of the head of the state. In this context a party composition of governmental cabinets is not always an indicator, which can give an answer to the question concerning division of ministerial posts (however, even in such systems, though not always, it is necessary to get an agreement from the legislative body as to the governmental cabinet formation). In any case designation of party determinants' influence in the processes of governments' formation and resignation has a principal value. It is not always fundamental, as often institutionalized practices, which allow, in fact, forming governmental cabinets without the legislative power's consent. Besides, in some countries prevail (in quantity) non-party cabinets, which must be taken into account as well.

Despite this, party determinants of the government formation must be taken into consideration. First of all, it is clear that the governmental stability is determined by the size and

<sup>65</sup> A. Korotayev, A. Malkov, D. Khaltourina, *Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: secular cycles and millennial trends*, Wyd. URSS 2006.

<sup>66</sup> W. Swatos, *Time, Place, and Circumstance: Neo-Weberian Studies in Comparative Religious History*, Wyd. Greenwood Press 1990.

<sup>67</sup> B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

<sup>68</sup> P. Schmitter, J. Santiso, *Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 69-92.

<sup>69</sup> J. Linz, *Democracy's Time Constraint*, „International Political Science Review“ 1998, vol 19, nr. 1, s. 19-37.

<sup>70</sup> L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

complexity of party systems. It can be followed on the basis of ideas by J. Blondel<sup>71</sup> (duration of single-party cabinets), D. Sanders, V. Herman<sup>72</sup> and P. Warwick<sup>73</sup> (influence of factionalization, types ideological spectrum of party systems on the stability of governments). Secondly, it is obvious that the governmental activity is almost always presupposed by the fact of simple support/non-support of the cabinets by key political (exogenous) actors, among which the most significant role is played by parties. W. Riker<sup>74</sup> and A. Swaan<sup>75</sup> single out several party variables of the governmental stability: power and activity of parties within the government (governmental parties); ideological positions of the parties; patterns and peculiarities of coalitional and non-coalitional, as well as party and non-party processes in different countries (they presuppose formation of non-party and party governments, among the latter are coalitional and single-party ones etc.).

Special attention must be paid to correlation of institutional features within the executive-legislative relationships and the stability of governments. It is derivative from the patterns and attributes of positioning statuses/roles of governments, presidents, parliaments<sup>76</sup> and turns around presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems of governance, in particular while dividing and combining cabinets' powers. It presupposes comprehension of executive and legislative relations as a starting point for analysis of the governmental stability. Its significance can be explained by the fact that the post of the prime-minister is inherent to almost all countries (except traditional presidential republics and absolute monarchies) and ministers (in different quantity) depending on the parliamentary confidence. Moreover, most frequently namely the parliament is authorized to express a vote of non-confidence to governments (or some ministers)<sup>77</sup>. From this perspective, when we speak of parliamentary and presidential ways of government formation in the context of evaluating their stability it is necessary to apply such indices of the latter as formation of the government, vote of non-confidence to the government, resignation of the government, dissolution of the parliament<sup>78</sup>.

Besides, there exist other indicators for the stability of governments. B. Grofman and P. Roosendaal place them within the frames of such correlation<sup>79</sup>: power of parties in the parliament – attributes of party balance in the governmental cabinets; ideological positioning

<sup>71</sup> J. Blondel, *Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies*, „Canadian Journal of Political Science“ 1968, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 180-203.

<sup>72</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.

<sup>73</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

<sup>74</sup> W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

<sup>75</sup> A. Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.

<sup>76</sup> L. DeWinter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] Doring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115-151.

<sup>77</sup> H. Doring, *Is Government Control of the Agenda Likely to Keep „Legislative Inflation“ at Bay?*, [w:] H. Doring (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 654-687.; Olson D., Norton P., *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London 1996.

<sup>78</sup> M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

<sup>79</sup> B. Grofman, P. van Roosendaal, *Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.

– inter-party competitiveness – composition of the governmental cabinets; constitutional/institutional characteristics of the political process – executive-legislative relations – composition of cabinets; internal context – parliaments and governments; anticipated consequences of dissolution of governments – stability of governments. E. Zimmerman proposes an analogous scheme of research perspectives of the governmental stability: the stability of the government depends on party attributes of the cabinet and parliament, type of the government, characteristics of governmental and oppositional parties, and conditions for government formation<sup>80</sup>.

At the same time, analysis tools for studying the stability of governments would not be full only on the basis of constructing its indicators. It is also necessary to operate the units of evaluation. Due to this a logical theoretical and methodological abstraction of the governmental stability is reduced to a practical and empirical specificity of certain cases, outlined in time. It serves a ground for drawing a conclusion that the stability of governments is a model of analysis, which combines in it ideal and logical, as well as practical and factual characteristics of governmental cabinets' functioning in various countries.

From this perspective it becomes clear, that cabinets of ministers subsequent to the results of their activity "output" various quantitative data, but they (the data) are directly comparable with the parameters and peculiarities of different countries. The most comprehensible among the tools, which determine the governmental stability, is the government duration (duration of governments). However, M. Laver proves that there are divergences in determining the governmental duration through such notions as the cabinet duration and cabinet durability. The former means the time between the "start" and "end" of the government's existence; the latter defines a potential duration of governments on the basis of the influence carried out by the model of governments' formation (either presidential or parliamentary). I. Budge<sup>81</sup> and H. Klingemann<sup>82</sup> consider duration of governments, their party composition and division of posts to be the most significant features of governments. B. Grofman, P. Roosendaal<sup>83</sup> and K. Zorn<sup>84</sup> believe such combination to be not an accidental one, as every cabinet is important as a model of development or approbation of new theoretical and practical models, including political and legislative ones. P. Warwick took a step further, trying to prove the hypothesis, that the government duration is an absolute indicator for stability of modern political regimes (first of all democracies)<sup>85</sup>.

<sup>80</sup> E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

<sup>81</sup> I. Budge, H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>82</sup> H.-D. Klingemann, R. Hofferbert, I. Budge, *Parties, Policies and Democracy*, Wyd. Westview Press 1994.

<sup>83</sup> B. Grofman, P. van Roosendaal, *Modeling cabinet durability/cabinet termination. A synthetic literature review and critique*, „British Journal of Political Science” 1997, vol 27, s. 419-451.

<sup>84</sup> C. Zorn, S. Van Winkle, *A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789-1992*, „Political Behavior” 2000, vol 22, s. 145-166.

<sup>85</sup> P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

Moreover, it is important to estimate and analyze not only generalized key figures of the cabinet duration, but also mechanisms of their explanation. Here, the fundamental importance belongs to the way of formation and support of the governmental cabinet. As it was stated above, it often happens as a result of the parliament's or president's influence on the cabinet duration. Relating to this, A. Lijphart singles out several theoretical and methodological issues: is it necessary to count "supporting parties" as governmental parties (as the latter influence formation of ideas as to a probable preterm termination of the government's activity); is there a requirement to change some members of the cabinet of ministers (for example, the prime-minister or several ministers) to terminate their activity<sup>86</sup>. However, the most important question concerns the way which cabinet must be determined as that which terminated its activity. The most frequent grounds for termination of the government's activity is division of ministerial posts, renewal of the cabinet after haggling over the posts (recurrent naming of the cabinet by the president/prime-minister under conditions of forming non-party and single-party governments). Moreover, activity of the governmental cabinet is believed to be terminated, when the parliamentary/presidential elections (depending on the model of government formation) are to take place and thus there is a necessity to form a new cabinet. In such a case there is no sense whether the formation of the government leads to a renewal of its previous composition. As a result, there appears a significant question concerning stages and approaches, according to which one should differentiate between the type of the governments: formed after the elections and temporary ones; dissolved due to death (illness) of the prime-ministers or pre-term elections; dissolved on the basis of the president's order or on the basis of reformatting of the composition of the parliamentary majority (or minority).

From the perspective of the cabinet duration these governments coincide with the cases when the cabinets of ministers come into office and when their powers end that is with a fixed time terms of governments' activity. "Starting point" for the government means any cabinet formed after the elections and resignation of the previous government. The government always resigns, when new elections are held (parliamentary or presidential), depending on the model of government formation) or on the basis of the president's order or other constitutional preconditions (concerning all models of government formation). Following the ideas proposed by K. Beyme<sup>87</sup>, J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge<sup>88</sup>, it should be mentioned that the governmental cabinets' activity may be ended due to such events: legislative restrictions, which cause frequency of parliamentary or presidential elections; death or illness of the prime-minister; vote of non-confidence to the cabinet (or the prime-minister); breakdown of the governmental coalition, caused by inner divergences of the government's political course;

<sup>86</sup> A. Lijphart, *Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1984, vol 17, s. 265-279.

<sup>87</sup> K. von Beyme, E. Martin, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Gower 1985.

<sup>88</sup> J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Political Data 1945-1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1998, vol 33, s. 125-164.

willful resignation of the cabinet; conflicts between the cabinet of ministers (the prime-minister) and the head of the state.

Besides, it is necessary to single out two groups of termination of powers of the governments: 1) technical (scheduled elections of the president or parliament (depending on the type of the system) accidents); 2) discretionary (pre-term elections of the initial actor of governmental formation/resignation, willful extension of the government by means of engaging the parties, which were not formerly present in it; change of a significant part of ministers and the structure of the cabinet within the non-party governments; resignation of the prime-minister, caused by the vote of non-confidence in the parliament or on the basis of the president's order, resignation of the prime-minister due to the conflicts between the governmental parties, resignation of the prime-minister due to conflicts between the governmental parties and personal motives)<sup>89</sup>. Determination of time definition (and namely time is considered to be an indicator for the government duration) within the governments' activity is estimated in the same way, close to the people's will (only the source of legitimacy of governments is changing: in case of a parliamentary way of government formation legitimacy is embodied in the positions of the president and parliament; and in the sense of the presidential way of government formation legitimacy depends on the elections of the head of the state) and allows taking into account parliamentary characteristics (especially the role of the parliamentary opposition)<sup>90</sup>.

At the same time, there are different measurement units of the governmental stability and duration. The most apparent are days, months and year. However, according to D. Sanders and V. Herman, they are not always effective as elective terms of various parliaments or presidents in different countries mainly correlate (the country with "shorter terms" of parliamentary/presidential powers and authorities immanently lead to lesser stability of the government). That is why, additional instruments of measuring the stability of governments are: "survival of the government" – is a maximum period of time, over which the government can perform its duties; indicators for general instability of governments – is an annual average number of terminated governments, which is observed in-between the elections; indicators for biased instability of governments – is an annual average number of alterations within the composition of the government. J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge emphasize that the duration of the government is represented in days, months and years, while the survival of the government is described by a correlation between the duration and a maximum period of time in office (cabinet durability)<sup>91</sup>. Supplementary, to explain the survival of the government one should take into account differences in constitutional characteristics of governmental resignations. Among them M. Laver and N. Schofield single out the following: accession to the post (investiture in case of

<sup>89</sup> E. Damgaard, *Cabinet Termination*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Muller, T. Bergman (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Style in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 303-304.

<sup>90</sup> D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica” 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 353.

<sup>91</sup> J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *Political Data 1945-1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1998, vol 33, s. 125-164.



formal voting for approval of a presidential nominee in the presidential or parliamentary model of government formation); governmental authority (under condition that the government may dissolve a legislative body); parliamentary authority (becomes significant when the parliament may dissolve itself)<sup>92</sup>. This list we elaborate with a president's possibility to choose between the cabinet resignation (by means of vote of non-confidence) and the parliament dissolution. Such scientific specificity presupposes usage of such instrument of the government's stability analysis as the index of the governmental stability. This is an indicator that shows which part of the most possible period of time – terms of the parliament/president in accordance with the constitution – the governmental cabinet was functioning<sup>93</sup>.

Summarizing all the instruments for measuring the stability of the governments we argue that it must be implemented in terms of comparing indices of the governmental duration and governmental stability. It will to the fullest extent represent the issues under study and will include a comparative political science equality, entirety and scientific character as well.

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<sup>92</sup> M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

<sup>93</sup> J.-E. Lane, S. Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, Wyd. SAGE 1999, s. 304.

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## **DISSIDENT MOVEMENT AS A HISTORICAL PROTOTYPE OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION: GENERALIZATION BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF “REAL SOCIALISM” REGIMES IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological generalization of the phenomenon of dissident movement as a historical prototype of political opposition in the regimes of “real socialism” in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The author identified key types of nonconformist actions that can shear the political opposition, i.e. resistance, disagreement or dissent and opposition. It was generalized that the discovered and determined sequence of nonconformist actions is described with a common root, i.e. protest. However, it was theoretically and methodologically argued that the logical structure of the triad “resistance – dissent – opposition” have to be determined on the basis of social and political importance of a given scientific construct.

*Keywords: opposition, resistance, dissent, protest, “real socialism”*

## **Дисидентський рух як історичний прототип політичної опозиції: узагальнення на підставі аналізу режимів «реального соціалізму» в Польщі, Угорщині та Чехословаччині**

Стаття присвячена теоретико-методологічному узагальненню феномену дисидентського руху як історичного прототипу політичної опозиції на прикладі режимів «реального соціалізму» в Польщі, Угорщині й Чехословаччині. Автор виокремив ключові типи нонконформістських дій, які можуть дотичні до політичної опозиційності – опір, незгода, дисидентство чи інакомислення, а також опозиція. Узагальнено, що виявлена та детермінована послідовність нонконформістських дій описується спільним коренем – протестністю. Водночас, теоретико-методологічно аргументовано, що логічна структура становлення тріади «опір – дисидентство – опозиція» обов'язково має визначатись на підставі соціальної та політичної значимості зазначеного наукового конструкту.

*Ключові слова: опозиція, опір, дисидентство, протестність, «реальний соціалізм».*

Політична опозиція, з однієї сторони, є «антиподом» уряду чи влади у межах будь-якої політичної системи, але, з іншої сторони, є пояснювальною змінною «демаркації» різних форм суспільно-політичної активності та політичного нонконформізму<sup>1</sup>. Це передусім виявляється у тому факті, що політична опозиція «розміщується» на межі таких понять, як «дисидентство», «опір», «тероризм», «фракційність» тощо<sup>2</sup>, хоч останні (як форми суспільно-політичної активності і політичного нонконформізму), маючи можливість бути передумовами й прототипами опозиційності, не є її «чистими» варіантами. Теоретико-методологічно це чи не найбільше проявляється у тому факті, що протестність і дисидентство є більш всеосяжними аналітичними категоріями, ніж політична опозиція, а тому не можуть обмежуватись винятково сферою політики. Це також зрозуміло з огляду на те, що протестність та дисидентство можуть відбуватися як на рівні протистояння окремих частин влади/уряду (зокрема його фракцій), так і на рівні протистояння влади/уряду та їхніх різних альтернатив (зокрема політичної опозиції). Відповідно, суперечливі вияви політичного (суспільно-політичного) активізму та політичного нонконформізму у формі політичної опозиції завжди є відображенням протестності і дисидентства, але ідентичного не можна сказати про зв'язки зворотного характеру.

Але фіналізовані позиції дослідників з цього приводу суттєво різняться. Так, з однієї сторони, А. Алібасік<sup>3</sup> зауважує, що на відміну від протестності і дисидентства сутність політичної опозиції є специфічною і обмеженою, бо традиційно резервується у мирній, конституційній, конструктивній, відповідальній та лояльній формах, які заперечують сепаратизм, а натомість пристають на узгоджені правила гри, навіть попри те, що це може не гарантувати їм влади. Суплементарне значення у цьому контексті має врахування типу політичного режиму, в якому відбуваються ті чи інші вияви суспільно-політичного активізму й соціальної і суспільно-політичної активності. З цього приводу Г. Іонеску та А. Мадаріага<sup>4</sup> зауважують, що дистинкція політичної опозиції від протестності та дисидентства проявляється передусім у недемократичних однопартійних політичних режимах, де слабо інституціоналізованою є парламентська політична опозиція, а натомість часто виявляються її «неконституційні» чи «неінституціоналізовані» форми.

З іншої сторони, науковці аргументують, що важливим для детермінування і структуризації політичної опозиції є її розмежування на рівні понять «опозиція як політичний

<sup>1</sup> Albrecht H., *Political Opposition and Authoritarian Rule in Egypt: Dissertation*, Wyd. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Albrecht H., *How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt*, "Democratization" 2005, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 379.; Albrecht H., *Political Opposition and Authoritarian Rule in Egypt: Dissertation*, Wyd. Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen 2008.; Oberschall A., *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 1973.; Almeida P., *Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings*, "American Journal of Sociology" 2003, vol 109, nr. 2, s. 348.; Parry G., *Opposition Questions*, "Government and Opposition" 1997, vol 32, nr. 4 s. 459.; Alibasic A., *Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in The Arab World: a M.A. Thesis*, Kuala Lumpur 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Alibasic A., *Political Opposition in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought in The Arab World: a M.A. Thesis*, Kuala Lumpur 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Ionescu G., de Madariaga I., *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution*, Wyd. The New Thinker Library 1968.

інститут» і «опозиція як форма суспільного протесту»<sup>5</sup>. Хоч і в цьому зрізі не вдається оминати теоретико-методологічних непорозумінь, адже у такій дистинкції більшою мірою приховано не стільки розрізнення політичної опозиції і різних форм суспільно-політичної активності й політичного нонконформізму, скільки той факт, що політичну опозицію доцільно трактувати відповідно у вузькому та широкому розумінні. Це особливо очевидно з огляду на те, що політична опозиція як форма суспільного протесту може формуватися і функціонувати у демократичних та недемократичних суспільствах (зокрема у формі протестності й дисидентства), а політична опозиція як політичний інститут – винятково у демократичному режимі. Як наслідок цього та намагаючись перевірити й верифікувати запропонований вище теоретико-методологічний ракурс окреслення протестності і дисидентства, аргументуємо, що до них доцільно апелювати як до прототипів політичного нонконформізму і політичної опозиції, зокрема на прикладі існуючих раніше режимів «реального соціалізму» в Польщі, Угорщині та Чехословаччині (сьогодні – в Чехії та Словаччині).

Це актуалізується тим фактом, що майже через три десятиліття (станом на грудень 2016 р.) після закінчення епохи «реального соціалізму» та впливу комуністичного політичного режиму колосальні за значенням події, які мали місце у перерахованих країнах (які сьогодні становлять субрегіон під назвою Вишеградська група) в 1988–1991 рр., відійшли на «задній план» суспільно-політичних інтересів. Річ у тому, що вони сьогодні вважаються винятково історичними подіями, про які, по суті, згадують з нагоди різних ювілеїв<sup>6</sup>. Відповідно, колективні спогади про події 1988–1991 рр. були значною мірою зміщені через підвищення вагомості досвіду процесів посткомуністичних трансформацій. Як наслідок, цілком очевидно, що, до прикладу, те, що сьогодні трактують як політичну чи парламентську демократію, зокрема на підставі апелювання до інститутів політичної опозиції, було у період до 1988 р. в зовсім іншому стані й форматі. Тим не менше, це не означає, що аналізовані феномени взаємно дихотомізовані, адже саме з протестності та дисидентського антикомуністичного соціально-політичного руху визріла частина політичних партій у країнах аналізованого субрегіону, а політична конкуренція здебільшого перейшла на засади співвідношення владних/урядових та опозиційних сил (що методологічно стало основою виникнення феномену політичної опозиції в Польщі, Угорщині, Чехії і Словаччині). Такий підхід змушує комплексно проаналізувати історичні прототипи політичного нонконформізму і політичної опозиції в субрегіоні, а такої їх вплив на більш сучасне трактування політичної і парламентської опозиції. Крім того, такий підхід

<sup>5</sup> Tkachenko T., *Opozycja jako polityczny instytucyj i forma spulshnogo protestu*, „Polityczny menezhment” 2007, vol 5, s. 40-45; Postyrian H., *Opozycja ta opozycyjnizm v teoretycznykh spivstavleniakh*, [w:] Varzar I. (ed.), *Polityczna opozycja: teoriia ta istoriia, svitovy dosvid ta ukrainska praktyka. Materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii*, Kiev 1996, s. 172-177.; Berestova G., *Opozycja jako forma projavu politycznogo protestu*, „Naukovi chasopys Natsionalnogo pedahohichnogo universytetu imeni M.P. Drahomanova. Serii 22. Politychni nauky ta metodyka vykladannia sotsialno-politychnykh dystyplin” 2014, vol 15, s. 84-89.

<sup>6</sup> Pollack D., Wielgohs J., *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 7.

є поєднувальним й у площині компаративного зіставлення різних ресурсних форм опозиції – недемократичної та демократичної.

Відповідно, значення антикомуністичного дисидентства та протестності, які виявлялись у соціалістичному таборі сучасних країн Вишеградської групи, принаймні до 1988–1991 рр. (чи, іншими словами, по-суті ресурсність політичної опозиції у свого часу недемократичних країнах, які сьогодні становлять Вишеградську групу), полягає в тім, що вони слугували своєрідним плацдармом, на підставі якого «вкорінювалась» віра у не завжди успішні демократичні практики, а додатково посилювалась віра у демократію як в більш ефективний політичний режим, аніж його тогочасний інверсний аналог – «реальний соціалізм». Водночас, таке трактування призначення і ролі протестності та дисидентства не стало унілатеральним й однозначним, адже навіть сьогодні в аналізованих країнах часто інкорпоровано думку про те, що не протестні та дисидентські групи володіють «правом власності над минулим», а натомість, що це «право» ініціально належить представникам комуністичного режиму (це особливо поширена позиція передусім політсил, які є спадкоємцями комуністичних партій режимів «реального соціалізму»).

Вирішуючи проблему запропонованої теоретико-методологічної та емпіричної дихотомії, концентруємось передусім на тому, на скільки важливою виявилась роль протестності, дисидентства і політичного нонконформізму на формування політичної опозиції в країнах субрегіону. Із огляду на це, аргументуємо, що різні дослідження дисидентського руху як прототипу політичного нонконформізму і політичної опозиції в колишніх комуністичних країнах сучасної Вишеградської групи не є новим завданням. Вони здійснювались і раніше, однак у різних країнах різною мірою. Найбільш помітними в цьому зрізі є Польща, Чехія і Словаччина; менш помітною – Угорщина. На це є своя причина: наукове дослідження протестності та дисидентського руху, приміром, у Польщі почалось з моменту виникнення протестних організацій; вивчення ж протестності і дисидентських рухів, наприклад, в Угорщині важко провести й сьогодні, зокрема внаслідок відсутності даних достовірного характеру (зокрема щодо розповсюдження різних нонконформістських політичних установок, кількісного і якісного характеру протестних та дисидентських структур, соціальної бази антикомуністичних рухів, їх регіонального представництва, а також тематичного профілю, зв'язків між собою у національному та міжнаціональному контексті тощо).

Водночас, важливо й те, що сьогодні є ціла низка наукових напрацювань, на які в будь-якому зрізі доцільно опиратись як на засадничі, аналізуючи протестність та дисидентство як прототипи політичного нонконформізму і політичної опозиції в вибірці сучасних країн Вишеградської групи. Йдеться передусім про доробки таких вчених,



як А. Arato і J. Cohen<sup>7</sup>, С. Barker<sup>8</sup>, С. Békés, М. Byrne і J. Rainer<sup>9</sup>, N. Bermeo і P. Nord<sup>10</sup>, M. Bernhard<sup>11</sup>, A. Bozóki<sup>12</sup>, M. Brandt<sup>13</sup>, K. Brown<sup>14</sup>, J. Bugajski і M. Pollack<sup>15</sup>, J. Curry<sup>16</sup>, A. Dudek<sup>17</sup>, G. Ekiert<sup>18</sup>, H. Fehr<sup>19</sup>, B. Falk<sup>20</sup>, G. Hodos<sup>21</sup>, J. Holzer<sup>22</sup>, T. Huszár<sup>23</sup>, T. Judt<sup>24</sup>, P. Kecskemeti<sup>25</sup>, M. Kennedy<sup>26</sup>, P. Kenney<sup>27</sup>, M. Kubát<sup>28</sup>, J. Kubik<sup>29</sup>, R. Laba<sup>30</sup>, B. Lindner<sup>31</sup>, G. Litván<sup>32</sup>, D. Mason<sup>33</sup>, D. McAdam, J. McCarthy і M. Zald<sup>34</sup>, E. Neubert<sup>35</sup>, N. Nielsen<sup>36</sup>, M. Osa<sup>37</sup>, D. Ost<sup>38</sup>, A. Paczkowski<sup>39</sup>, S. Penn<sup>40</sup>, S. Persky<sup>41</sup>, D. Pollack і J. Wielgohs<sup>42</sup>, G. Skilling<sup>43</sup>,

<sup>7</sup> Arato A., Cohen J., *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Wyd. MIT Press 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Barker C., *Festival of the Oppressed: Solidarity, Reform, and Revolution in Poland, 1980-81*, Wyd. Bookmarks 1986.

<sup>9</sup> Békés C., Byrne M., Rainer J., *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Wyd. CEU 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Bermeo N., and Nord P., *Civil Society before Democracy*, Wyd. Rowman and Littlefield 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Bernhard M., *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.

<sup>12</sup> Bozóki A., *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*, Wyd. CEU Press 2002.

<sup>13</sup> Brandt M., *Für eure und unsere Freiheit? Der Polnische Oktober und die Solidarnosc-Revolution in der Wahrnehmung von Schriftstellern aus der DDR*, Wyd. Weidler 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Brown K., *Stalinization and its Discontents: Subcultures and Opposition in Hungary, 1948-1956*, Students Conference 2004, s. 149-159.

<sup>15</sup> Bugajski J., Pollack M., *East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition, and Social Activism*, Wyd. Westview Press 1989.

<sup>16</sup> Curry J., *Dissent in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Praeger 1983.

<sup>17</sup> Dudek A., *Reglamentowana Rewolucja: Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988-1990*, Wyd. Arcana Historii 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Ekiert G., *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1996.

<sup>19</sup> Fehr H., *Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit und soziale Bewegungen: Fallstudien über Bürgerbewegungen in Polen und der DDR*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialw 1996.

<sup>20</sup> Falk B., *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Hodos G., *Show Trials – Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe 1948-54*, Wyd. Praeger 1987.

<sup>22</sup> Holzer J., *Solidarnität - Die Geschichte einer freien Gewerkschaft in Polen*, Wyd. C.H. Beck 1985.

<sup>23</sup> Huszár T., *A magyar értelmiség a 80-as években (Hungarian Intellectuals in the 1980s)*, Wyd. Kossuth 1986.

<sup>24</sup> Judt T., *The Dilemmas of Dissidence: the Politics of Opposition in East Central Europe*, [w:] Fehér F., Arato A. (eds.), *Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Transaction Publishers 1991, s. 253-302.

<sup>25</sup> Kecskemeti P., *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces In the Hungarian Uprising*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1961.

<sup>26</sup> Kennedy M., *Professionals, Power, and Solidarity in Poland*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

<sup>27</sup> Kenney P., *A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

<sup>28</sup> Kubát M., *Political Opposition in Theory and Central European Practice*, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Kubik J., *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*, Wyd. The Pennsylvania State University Press 1994.

<sup>30</sup> Laba R., *The Roots of Solidarity*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1991.

<sup>31</sup> Lindner B., *Die demokratische Revolution in der DDR 1989/90*, Wyd. Christoph Links Verlag 1998.

<sup>32</sup> Litván G., *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956*, Wyd. Longman 1996.

<sup>33</sup> Mason D., *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland. 1980-1982*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1985.

<sup>34</sup> McAdam D., McCarthy J., Zald M., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>35</sup> Neubert E., *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989*, Wyd. Ch. Links 1997.

<sup>36</sup> Nielsen N., *Revolutions in Eastern Europe: The Religious Roots*, Wyd. Orbis Books 1991.

<sup>37</sup> Osa M., *Solidarity and Contention*, Wyd. University of Minnesota Press 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Ost D., *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968*, Wyd. Temple University Press 1990.; Ost D., *The Defeat of Solidarity*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Paczkowski A., *Strajki, bunty, manifestacje jako 'polska droga' przez socjalizm*, Wyd. Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Penn S., *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Persky S., *At the Lenin Shipyard: Poland and the rise of the Solidarity Trade Union*, Wyd. New Star Books 1981.

<sup>42</sup> Pollack D., Wielgohs J., *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004.; Pollack D., *Politischer Protest. Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR*, Opladen 2000.

<sup>43</sup> Skilling G., *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 1989.

J. Staniszkis<sup>44</sup>, M. Szabó<sup>45</sup>, M. Tatur<sup>46</sup>, R. Tokés<sup>47</sup>, A. Touraine<sup>48</sup>, F. Váli<sup>49</sup>, R. Zuzowski<sup>50</sup> та чимало інших.

Вони важливі передусім із огляду на те, що генералізують теоретико-методологічні межі розуміння протестності та дисидентського руху як прототипу політичного нонконформізму та політичної опозиції в аналізованому субрегіоні. Річ у тому, що, як зауважують вчені, залежно від конкретного наукового підходу до аналізу протестності та дисидентства можна отримувати інколи зовсім протилежні результуючі висновки. Тому одне із дослідницьких завдань у зрізі з'ясування сутності протестності і дисидентського руху як історичних прототипів нонконформізму та політичної опозиції у режимах «реального соціалізму» в сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи полягає передусім у виробленні базових категорій, які характеризують предмет проведеного в розвідці аналізу. Це дуже очевидно у зрізі дослідження протестності та нонконформізму, зокрема політичної за змістом форми опозиційності.

Так, відомо, що представники герменевтичного підходу трактують опозицію та опозиційність (як і будь-яку форму суспільно-політичної активності) з принципів саморозуміння акторів. Відповідно, до опозиції потрібно зараховувати будь-яку людину, яка вважає себе «опозиціонером». Беручи за основу такий теоретико-методологічний підхід, помічаємо, що індивіди та групи, які діють «опозиційно», однак не вважають себе «опозицією» (вказана специфіка була досить характерною для сучасних країн субрегіону до другої половини 80–х рр. XX ст.), випадають із «поля» наукового аналізу, оскільки не вписуються в дефініювання «опозиції». У той же час, помітним є вирізнення, яке стосується двох груп політичних акторів: одних, які були «політично активними» у неофіційних секторах (це, зокрема, стосується політиків, які мусили трактуватись як «орієнтовані на реформи партійні функціонери»); других, які суб'єктивно сприймали свою участь в офіційному секторі як опозиційну (бо в неперманентних ситуаціях вони могли виступати проти «жорсткої лінії» поведінки комуністичного політичного режиму).

Відповідно, критично важливим у цьому ракурсі є розуміння того, як відбувався транзит від авторитаризму до демократії у сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи. Річ у тім, що дві гіпотетичні групи політичних акторів (за умови їх розрізнення і в зрізі їхньої взаємодії) вирішально впливали на генерування можливостей демократичних змін. При цьому, головний прихований чинник такої інтеракції полягав у тому, що групи політичних акторів походили від різних соціальних арен, які значною мірою були ізольованими одна від одної

<sup>44</sup> Staniszkis J., *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1984.

<sup>45</sup> Szabó M., *A disszidensek hangjai: A szocializmus kritikája a Magyar ellenzék irányzatának gondolkodásában, 1968-1988*, Wyd. ISES Füzetek 2008.

<sup>46</sup> Tatur M., *Solidarność als Modernisierungsbewegung*, Wyd. Campus 1989.

<sup>47</sup> Tokés R., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1979.

<sup>48</sup> Touraine A., *Solidarity. The Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland 1980-1981*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1983.

<sup>49</sup> Váli F., *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1961.

<sup>50</sup> Zuzowski R., *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee "KOR"*, Wyd. Praeger 1992.

(що власне й було ознакою авторитарного або диктаторського політичного режиму): з однієї сторони – з суспільства, а з іншої сторони – з держави<sup>51</sup>. І за аналогією, якщо за основу взяти протилежний шлях та висновок про характер політичних дій із огляду на їхні об'єктивні результати/впливи, очевидними стають інші концептуальні моменти<sup>52</sup>: по-перше, в субрегіоні свого часу було багато протестних або дисидентських виступів і рухів, які так і не отримали політичних результатів/впливів; по-друге, політичні наслідки/впливи протестної діяльності проти авторитарного політичного режиму часто були непрямыми, тобто не помітними у такій й ж мірі, як прямі наслідки впливу індивідуальних дій певних інших акторів. Сумарний висновок як правило вибудовується з взаємозв'язку конкретних наслідків/впливів. Різниця лише у тому, що прямий вплив політичних акторів отримує «незворотну» реакцію з боку влади (режиму). Загалом ж очевидно, що герменевтичний підхід до трактування політичної опозиції щонайменше є некомплексним, адже значною мірою обмежує поле наукового аналізу.

На противагу йому доцільно використовувати прагматичний підхід стосовно трактування політичної опозиції. Річ у тому, що він дозволяє інтегративно зрозуміти інтеракції акторів у соціальному середовищі через різні атрибутивні особливості таких інтеракцій. Як наслідок, варто виокремлювати три типи нонконформістських дій, котрі можуть бути дотичними до політичної опозиційності. Перша з них – це опір, що характеризує узагальнені чи персоналізовані, колективні чи індивідуальні форми діяльності, які спрямовані на подолання чи руйнування впливу політичного (до прикладу, комуністичного) режиму. Опір містить відмінні форми діяльності – конспіративна і громадська діяльність, насильницька (військова) і ненасильницька (мирна) діяльність, спонтанні та організовані дії. При цьому, опір використовується як категорія, що характеризує діяльність соціальних і політичних суб'єктів – партій, церкви, мілітаризованих груп, – котрі будь-яким чином прагнуть захистити себе від становлення «диктатури» (наприклад, комуністичної партії, що у випадку країн аналізованої вибірки було характерно на початку інкорпорації режиму «реального соціалізму»). Це виявилось передусім в тім, що після імплементації монополії на політичну владу комуністичних партій, яка у випадку Польщі, Угорщини та Чехословаччини була датована 1945–1949 рр., період політичного опору було по суті завершено. Дещо згодом події означеного характеру (зокрема, в Угорщині у 1956 р.) хоч і відбувались, однак позиціонувались як дуже рідкісні

Другий різновид нонконформістських дій комуністичному політичному режиму – це незгода, дисидентство чи інакомислення. У прагматичному контексті потрібно розуміти, що такі дії мали диференціальний характер, бо під ними на увазі мались різноманітні форми сумнівів стосовно легітимності офіційної ідеологічної доктрини партії (аж до відмови

<sup>51</sup> Karl T. Schmitter P., *Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe*, "International Social Science Journal" 1991, vol 43, s. 269-284.

<sup>52</sup> Broszat M., *Resistenz und Widerstand*, [w:] Broszat M. (ed.), *Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol. IV: Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt*, Munich 1981, s. 691-709.

від цієї доктрини). Вихідною особливістю такого стану справ вважалась критика режиму «реального соціалізму» за порушення базових символів соціалістичного руху – рівності, свободи та солідарності – лідерами різних комуністичних партій країн субрегіону. У 1950–1960 рр. ця ревізійністська критика здійснювалась передусім і переважно інтелектуалами, які були членами чи прихильниками Комуністичної партії Радянського Союзу. Вони об'єднувались з приводу потреби модернізації економічної системи та часткової демократизації політичної системи в умовах соціалізму. Водночас, К. Джоппке<sup>53</sup> у визначенні такої ревізійністської специфіки критики системи вбачає актуальне (або ініціальне) ядро дисидентства. Воно полягало у фундаментальному «розвороті» від соціалістичної утопії та на практиці передбачало орієнтацію на розширення індивідуальних прав і свобод людини. Саме у цьому акті дослідник вбачає найважливіший «поворотний момент» в історії дисидентства у субрегіоні. Крім того, саме з огляду на це, потрібно розуміти, що дефінітивне «прикріплення» дисидентства до ідеологічного політичного спектру, зокрема до відмови від соціалістичних цінностей, позиціонується як вкрай вузьке. З іншого боку, треба виокремлювати широке і вузьке трактування дисидентства: вузьке має у своїй основі саме зазначену вище специфіку, а широке суплементарно звернене до руйнування соціалістичного конструкту розвитку та натомість апробації альтернативних шляхів політичної еволюції. На практиці це помічаємо в період 70–80-х рр. ХХ ст., коли релевантною у дисидентському русі країн субрегіону виявилась прихильність до цінностей і орієнтацій на права людини й конституціоналізм. Крім того, саме у цей час дуже популярними виявились конотації з приводу теоретичної значимості соціал-демократії: вони були помітні навіть у реформістських намаганнях окремих комуністів, які прагнули піддаштувати авторитарний режим під принципи конституціоналізму.

Водночас, примітною є теоретико-методологічна проблема з приводу того, чи потрібно класифікувати «дисидентами» тих політиків та адміністраторів, які намагались запропонувати в Польщі, Угорщині і Чехословаччині інституції, що наближували б режими «реального соціалізму» до принципів верховенства права (із огляду на те, що прихильники соціал-демократії у форматі «робітничих рад» часто піддавались переслідуванням). Така постановка проблеми змушує нас виділяти дві групи політичних й адміністративних акторів (чи акторів політичної і адміністративної природи): власне дисидентів та інших акторів, які більшою мірою займались артикуляцією критицизму режимів «реального соціалізму». Такий підхід до класифікації акторства вибудовано на підставі позицій «релевантного дискурсу» в контексті системи соціальної комунікації. Тому він є більш відповідним як критерій порівняльного аналізу, аніж як ідеологічна орієнтація на різноманітних варіантах критики тогочасного політичного режиму. Саме тому під дисидентством та незгодою у представленому дослідженні запропоновано розуміти: всі пролонговані дискурси й типи поведінки, які спрямовані на критику

<sup>53</sup> Joppke C., *East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist Regime*, Wyd. New York University Press 1995.

політичного режиму; своєрідну автономну сферу публічної політичної чи культурної комунікації за межами офіційних інститутів/інституцій політичної партії-держави (в прив'язці до комуністичного політичного режиму), у якій відкрито заперечується будь-яка претензія режиму щодо контролю над суспільним життям.

Суплементарно, систематичним профілем/виявом дисидентства, для прикладу, варто вважати «самвидав» – публічні дебати, які проводились поза державною і були доступними для всіх. Відповідно, найбільш важлива ознака дисидентства полягала у тому, що в його межах йшлося про своєрідне напруження з приводу всіх відкритих закликів до перетворення правил вільної комунікації, які характеризували цю площину «неофіційної громадськості»<sup>54</sup>. Іншими словами, діяльність дисидентів не була спрямована винятково на усунення впливу комуністичних режимів. Вона, більшою мірою, мала на меті розширення сфери автономності дій в умовах, які прослідковувались в аналізованих країнах. Але навіть попри те, що означувана категорія мала відношення до державного контролю, дефінітивна межа між категоріями «опозиція» і «дисидентство» у політичному (навіть політологічному) сенсі була дуже тонкою. Річ у тому, що коли йдеться про політичну опозицію, то найчастіше на увазі маються соціальні групи, які через різні форми організованої колективної дії прагнуть не лише розширити особисті свободи в межах існуючого режиму, проте й публічно вирішити питання легітимності політичного режиму. Тому цілком очевидно, що межа між «чистим» дисидентством і «класичною» опозицією доволі важко піддається як теоретико-методологічному, так і емпіричному розрізненню.

В умовах репресивності чи її загрози (як показує досвід аналізованих країн) це пояснювалось передусім тим, що опозиційні групи часто були змушені формулювати своє негативне/несхвальне ставлення до політичного режиму. Однак той атрибут, що «сила репресивності» з-поміж різних країн і навіть в межах однієї країни відрізнялись у різні періоди часу, ускладнює класифікаційну чіткість порівняльного аналізу. Відповідно, в конкретному аналітичному випадку категорія «опозиція» була схильною позначати політичні «партії» і групи антикомуністичної резистентності в ініціальній фазі режимів «реального соціалізму», а також політичні утворення, які вийшли із дисидентського середовища наприкінці 80–х рр. XX ст. Річ у тому, що метою цих політичних сил (на відміну від безпосередньо дисидентських рухів) було заперечення політичного режиму і тиск на нього засобами організованих дій, зокрема, демонстрацій та переговорів (зокрема на підставі так званих «круглих столів», які свого часу виявились засобом врегулювання політичної кризи практично у всіх країнах субрегіону). Як наслідок і на підставі такого теоретико-методологічного трактування, очевидно, що опозиційними потрібно вважати не всі дисидентські структури, а, наприклад, такі з них, як «громадянські комітети» «Солідарності» у Польщі, новосформовані партії-рухи в Угорщині тощо. Відповідно,

<sup>54</sup> Voronkov V., Wielgoths K., *Soviet Russia*, [w:] Pollack D., Wielgoths J. (eds.), *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 95-118.

в прагматичному ракурсі потрібно зауважувати, що опозиція вважається третім типом нонконформістських дій комуністичному політичному режиму. Узагальнено очевидно, що виявлена і детермінована послідовність нонконформістських дій описується спільним коренем – протестністю.

Водночас, теоретико-методологічно важливо, що логічна структура становлення тріади «опір – дисидентство – опозиція» обов'язково має визначатись на підставі соціальної і політичної значимості зазначеного наукового конструкту в площині його оцінювання у межах режимів «реального соціалізму». А це, у свою чергу, зведено до питання про те, чи протестно-опозиційні групи, котрі в 70–80-х рр. ХХ ст. мали місце в Польщі, Угорщині і Чехословаччині й включали незначну кількість інтелектуалів, реально становили загрозу стабільності «соціалістичного порядку». Польща, в котрій об'єднаний протестний рух робітників і опозиційна інтелігенція змогли 1980 р. отримати суттєві політичні поступки, котрі в принципі не були сумісні з логікою тогочасної політичної системи, на перший погляд інтерпретується як єдиний випадок, коли на поставлене вище питання можна відповісти ствердно. З іншої сторони, до уваги потрібно брати події, котрі мали місце у 1956 р. в Угорщині (повстання у формі протестного опору) чи у 1968 р. в Чехословаччині (так звана «Працька весна»). Тоді група опозиційних інтелектуалів майже не відіграла жодної ролі у конструюванні протестності. Більше того, вона навіть не позиціонувалась як «проект опозиційності», оскільки в цьому випадку доцільніше було апелювати до значення реформістських груп в істеблішменті комуністичної верхівки. Тому в цілому релевантним є висновок: за винятком подій у Польщі в 1980–1981 рр., в субрегіоні, аж до кінця 80-х рр. ХХ ст., більше не було випадків, коли опозиції вдавалося мобілізуватись у широкі протестні рухи, які становили би екзистенціальну загрозу для комуністичного політичного режиму<sup>55</sup>.

Разом із цим, генерується зворотне теоретико-методологічне питання про те, чи були так звані протестні/нонконформістські групи політично іррелевантними. Якщо би це було правдою, то будь-які спроби/дії із приводу використання репресивних способів боротьби проти дисидентів вважались б просто параноїдальними реакціями представників влади. Для підтвердження цієї думки звертаємось до суто матеріальної сторони питання: наскільки вважались б виправданими безпідставні витрати, які здійснювались для контролю за населенням країн з боку спецслужб. Такий підхід до вирішення проблеми чітко демонструє, що у всіх комуністичних режимах, які мали місце в субрегіоні, навіть маргінальні дисидентські групи інтелектуалів сприймалися як «потенційна загроза» системній цілісності політичних режимів. Коли би виникла більша загроза, тоді ймовірно було би порушено засадничу передумову єдності комуністичної партійної еліти – так званий «адміністративний клас», який складався із великої кількості керівних кадрів

<sup>55</sup> Pollack D., Wielgohs J., *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 12.

середнього рівня партійного апарату, промисловості, служб безпеки, освіти та державного управління. Відповідно, будь-які гіпотетичні прояви соціально-політичної активності та нонконформізму представників дисидентських груп трактувались як загроза легітимності влади комуністичної партії<sup>56</sup>.

Водночас та фактично, небезпека, що породжувалась дисидентством, була значно меншою, ніж ймовірна мобілізація широкого протестного руху проти політичного режиму. Річ передусім у тому, що останній міг та врешті-решт спромігся підірвати надійність адміністративного класу (тобто номенклатури державних чиновників та партійних функціонерів), які перебували у прямій командній залежності від ресурсів та волі партійного керівництва. Однак оскільки варіативність мобілізації протестного руху значною мірою залежала саме від розвитку дисидентства, придушення останнього вважалось центральною передумовою забезпечення комуністичної влади (хоч у різних країнах – в різній формі і актуалізованості). Саме на цій підставі варто дотримуватись результуючого висновку про те, що варіативні особливості становлення і розвитку дисидентського руху в субрегіоні позиціонувались як залежні змінні розвитку систем «реального соціалізму», як індикатор, який у деталізованій формі може допомогти в оцінюванні відмінностей комуністичного режиму в різних країнах і специфічності співвідношення у кожній оцінюваній країні принципів легітимності та стабільності.

Наступний важливий ракурс зіставлення релевантності дисидентства та політичної опозиції в період комуністичного правління у Польщі, Угорщині та Чехословаччині стосується значимості протестних варіацій у площині політичний подій саме 1988–1991 рр. Річ у тому, що в такому контексті політологічний аналіз доволі суттєво ускладнюється, оскільки дуже часто вживаною у цьому ракурсі постає специфіка, згідно якої колапс тодішніх комуністичних режимів і перехід до демократії був заслугою тільки дисидентських/опозиційних груп та рухів. Разом із цим, з теоретико-методологічного погляду (який, зазвичай, є основою напрацювань соціологів) варто наголосити, що падіння комуністичних режимів здебільшого виявилось результатом системних помилок у конструюванні систем «реального соціалізму» та їх структурної нездатності протистояти тиску конкуренції в умовах «холодної війни»<sup>57</sup>.

Відповідно, широкою і контрверсійною в науковій літературі позиціонується думка про те, що дисидентство й масові протести 1989 р. («весна народів») не були вирішальними причинами розпаду комуністичних режимів, оскільки в контексті розвитку відмінних виявів протестності комуністичні режими розраховувались як такі, що «вижили» й модифікувались. На відміну, серед чинників, які вплинули на колапс комунізму, доцільно виділяти такі: нездатність до інновацій, яка обумовлена атрибутами системного розвитку; економічна відсталість у порівнянні із західними промисловими країнами, які послідовно

<sup>56</sup> Brie M., *Staatssozialistische Länder Europas im Vergleich*, [w:] Wiesenthal H. (ed.), *Einheit als Privileg*, Campus, Frankfurt 1996, s. 41.

<sup>57</sup> Kuran T., *Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989*, "World Politics" 1991, vol 44, nr. 1, s. 7–48.

від початку ери інформаційних і комунікаційних технологій зростали у своїй ефективності; прогресуюча втрата лояльності серед населення країн субрегіону й субрегіону в цілому у 80–і рр. ХХ ст.

Але іманентно генерується й інше, хоча й часто суплементарне, теоретико-методологічне питання: чи правомірно у межах соціальних наук інтерпретувати протестні/дисидентські сили/рухи винятково як «побічні ефекти» розвитку та колапсу політичних режимів. Річ у тому, що коли говорять про ефекти «побічності» дисидентства, то зазвичай на увазі мають щонайменше декілька ракурсів такого трактування. До прикладу, Е. Неуберт аргументує, що падіння комуністичного режиму в субрегіоні стало «історичною послугою ... опозиції уможливити, у її боротьбі з тоталітарним режимом, самолібералізацію суспільства»<sup>58</sup>. К. Оффе запропонував зворотню позицію в аргументації того, що зміна політичних режимів не виявилась спричиненою політичною діяльністю «знизу» чи «зверху», а натомість була значною мірою детермінована «масовим відтоком» жителів субрегіону на Захід. Тому дослідник фактично підтвердив значення протестності чи дисидентства (принаймні наприкінці 80–х рр. ХХ ст.) як короткотермінового «побічного ефекту»<sup>59</sup>. Тим не менше, навіть в силу «побічності» або меншої вагомості впливу дисидентства, варто більшою мірою говорити про значення й альтернативного підходу, згідно якого, як аргументує М.–Д. Охсе<sup>60</sup>, зміна політичних режимів у тій чи іншій країні/субрегіоні відбувається на підставі інтеракції між різними акторами.

У такому випадку потрібно зауважувати та враховувати той факт, що структурні фактори, функціональні протиріччя і невідповідності у системі, а також зовнішні передумови (наприклад, скасування «доктрини Брежнева») не мали жодного ефекту «в собі», а лише чинили опосередкований вплив, адже вони позначались на дії різних політичних акторів. Дії цих акторів, у свою чергу, не позиціонувались як неминучі результати структурних факторів, а натомість же виявлялись результатом політичних цінностей та цілей, наявності ресурсів для дій, інтерпретації ситуацій для вжиття заходів та відповідних рішень, котрі могли проявитись тим або іншим чином. Відповідно, крах комуністичних режимів у сучасних країнах Вишеградської групи не міг достатньою мірою бути поясненим процесуально: особливо якщо до уваги не брати його як результату взаємодії різних політичних акторів, зокрема крізь призму об'єктивних інтерпретацій сприйняття умов минулого та очікуваних дії учасників політичного процесу в світі своїх цілей у майбутньому. З погляду окресленої актор-орієнтованої парадигми, цілком очевидно, що дія дисидентських рухів вважалась досить актуальною: навіть якщо вона мала досить диференціальне значення у подіях переворотів на прикладі різних країн субрегіону. Із огляду на це, ми дотримуємось

<sup>58</sup> Neubert E., *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989*, Wyd. Ch. Links 1997, s. 826.

<sup>59</sup> Offe C., *Die Integration nachkommunistischer Gesellschaften: die ehemalige DDR im Vergleich zu ihren osteuropäischen Nachbarn*, Paper presented at the 26th Congress of the German Society for Sociology, October 1, 1992, s. 36.

<sup>60</sup> Ohse M.-D., *German Democratic Republic*, [w:] Pollack D., Wielgohs J. (eds.), *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 73-94.



висновку, що в контексті колапсу режимів «реального соціалізму» та в оцінюванні перспектив становлення «справжньої» політичної опозиції в країнах Вишеградської групи у будь-якому випадку потрібно враховувати історію дисидентства в якості незалежної пояснювальної змінної конкретного зразку політичного транзиту.

Відповідно, провідне теоретико-методологічне питання у контексті дослідження політичної протестності й зокрема дисидентства в системах «реального соціалізму» – це пояснення передумов формування аналізованих категорій, а також національних відмінностей їхнього розвитку. Більш узагальнено воно зводиться до необхідності вироблення чіткої відповіді на питання про те, як так могло статися, що в умовах диктаторського/автократичного політичного режиму виникли різні форми відкритого політичного нонконформізму. Відповідаючи на нього, теоретики найчастіше є однозначними, адже зазначають, що режими «реального соціалізму» позиціонувались, від початку і до кінця, не більше як особливі різновиди тоталітаризму/авторитаризму, що майже не відрізнялись за своєю суттю від інших авторитарних режимів. Однак з огляду на це, не зовсім зрозумілими стають такі явища як протестність: зазвичай, будь-який опір у випадку тоталітарного режиму може бути мислимим лише у формі спорадичних конспіративних дій. З цього приводу К. Фрідріх і З. Бжезинський<sup>61</sup> зауважують, що у тоталітарному суспільстві опозиції перешкоджає розвиватись саме організація тоталітарного терору. Як наслідок, очевидно, що розмежування між ініціальною фазою тоталітаризму і посттоталітарним періодом (який наступив з крахом сталінізму) виявилось, крім інших вимірів, у зміщенні ключових принципів комуністичного правління від акцій масового терору до вибіркової репресивності й ідеологічних/соціополітичних стратегій легітимізації. Така тенденція виявилась вагомим передумовою пояснення гіпотетичності/ймовірності виникнення ідей дисидентства<sup>62</sup>. Однак вона не повною мірою може відповісти на питання про те, чому в посттоталітарний період широка мережа політичного і культурного дисидентства змогла розвинути, наприклад, у Польщі (внаслідок чого саме в цій країні на ідеях протестності сформувалась реальна політична опозиція, яка була здатна проводити консолідовані політичні дії, зокрема впливати на курс демократичного транзиту й ініціальний хід постсоціалістичних реформ), але не спромоглась в аналогічній мірі постати специфікою дисидентського руху, приміром, в Угорщині (де дисидентство зазвичай позиціонувалось не більше як короткотривала подія, лімітована «інкорпорованим колом» інтелектуалів, про що свідчило повернення до влади після 1990 р. модернізованих пострадянських чи посткомуністичних партій).

Загалом, підсумовуючи модальні відмінності комуністичного політичного режиму, а також зважаючи на національне детермінування систем «реального соціалізму» в різних

<sup>61</sup> Friedrich C., Brzezinski Z., *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1956, s. 131.

<sup>62</sup> Saxonberg S., Thompson M., *Opposition and Dissidence in Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism*, Paper presented at the conference "Dissent and Opposition to State Socialism in Central and Eastern Europe from a Comparative Perspective", Frankfurt, November 2-4, 2001.

країнах сучасної Вишеградської групи, аргументуємо, що в кожному кейсі «комунізм» був готовий здійснювати репресивні дії щодо будь-яких проявів протестності і нонконформізму. Натомість, цікавою у цій ситуації є інша кореляція: відмінності, які виявились відразу після припинення періоду сталінізму, неодмінно почали позиціонуватись як вкрай важливі, однак недостатні, адже природа таких відмінностей залишилась не до кінця відомою. З огляду на це, Г. Кітчелт запропонував своєрідне «інструктивне пояснювальне відштовхування», коли в залежності від досоціалістичного рівня соціальної та економічної модернізації, а також політичної мобілізації (зокрема буржуазії і робітників промислових підприємств) виділив різні види комуністичного режиму, кожний з яких характеризувався різним ступенем внутрішньої узгодженості і соціальної прив'язки комуністичної еліти. У країнах, в яких історично слабо розвинені комуністичні партії зіткнулися із деякими традиціями демократії міжвоєнного періоду і впливом умовно сильної буржуазії, комуністична еліта вдалася до своєрідних «пільгових заходів» задля суспільства – на відміну від країн із традиційно сильним комуністичним рухом чи нерозвиненістю буржуазії<sup>63</sup>. Тому такі країни, як Польща і Угорщина, приміром, відповідно та на відміну від Чехословаччини володіли найбільш сприятливими історичними передумовами для виникнення механізмів інтелектуальної критики і протестності, зокрема дисидентства, політичним режимам. При цьому, як зауважують Д. Поллак та Я. Вієлгоґс<sup>64</sup>, зазначена норма й специфіка виявилась більш поширеною в перерахованих країнах, починаючи з 50-х рр. ХХ ст., ніж, приміром, у Чехословаччині в однаковий аналітичний період дослідження.

Разом із цим, варто розуміти, що «стартові» історичні умови і типологічні ознаки політичного режиму позначають лише більш загальні відмінності у можливостях «формування» політичного нонконформізму. Для того, щоб уточнити конкретні моделі розвитку, профільний характер та силу дисидентства як прототипу політичної опозиції, треба поряд з загальними передумовами розглядати й низку специфічних факторів, передусім різні (матеріальні, часові, персональні та інформаційні) ресурси. Важливу роль також, вочевидь, відіграють суб'єктивні фактори у середовищі акторів протестного/дисидентського руху – ціннісні орієнтації та політичні цілі, а також їхня здатність та готовність до формування мережових організаційних структур. У зв'язку з цим, атрибутивне значення для окреслення того, що собою становив дисидентський рух в Польщі, Угорщині і Чехословаччині в 1945–1987 рр., виконують релігійні, інституційні, культурні, національні, економічні, соціальні, історичні фактори тощо. Такий мультифакторний підхід вписується в напрацювання, які були запропоновані науковою спільнотою щодо оцінювання особливостей та атрибутів створення, поширення й зміни різних модальних форм та форматів соціальних рухів. Разом із цим, в аналізі

<sup>63</sup> Kitschelt H., *Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies*, "Party Politics" 1995, vol 1, nr. 4, s. 447-472.; Kitschelt H., Mansfeldova Z., Markowski R., Tóka G., *Post-Communist Party Systems*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

<sup>64</sup> Pollack D., Wielgojs J., *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004.

варто застосовувати й класичні наукові доробки, які виходять з принципів дослідження опозиційності як феномену демократичного світу. Їхній симбіоз становить собою теоретико-методологічну єдність розмежування понять протестності, дисидентства та опозиційності й забезпечує комплексність отримуваних емпіричних результатів. З іншої сторони, заявлена теоретико-методологічна специфіка потребує уточнення, зокрема на підставі подальших досліджень з врахуванням емпіричних виявів протестності та дисидентства в країнах субрегіону.

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## **The “dilemma of simultaneity” as a conceptual predictor of post-communist countries of Europe modernization’s logistics: theoretical and methodological cut**

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological analysis of the “dilemma of simultaneity” as the conceptual predictor of post-communist Europe modernization’s logistics. It was determined that the initial premise to overcome the “dilemma of simultaneity” was political modernization or democratization of post-communist countries of Europe and that in some countries modernization was realized in three areas, and in some other countries in four areas (i.e. in the form of a “triple” or “quadruple” transition). The author argued that the “dilemma of simultaneity” as a proper and on time logistics model of post-communist transformation and modernization in various European countries is not fully methodologically unified. It was also revealed that initially the “dilemma of simultaneity” was a dichotomy (in political and economic areas), but later became a trichotomy (including issues of territorial and national restructuring). In addition, initially the “dilemma of simultaneity” had negative direction, but nowadays is a positivist value. At the same time, it was argued that overcoming the “dilemma of simultaneity” is an overcome and turning such results of institutional development of post-communist European countries as modernity, statehood and prospects of the EU membership.

*Keywords: transit, transformation, modernization, the “dilemma of simultaneity”, post-communist countries of Europe.*

## **«ДИЛЕМА ОДНОЧАСНОСТІ» ЯК КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНИЙ ПРЕДИКТОР ЛОГІСТИКИ МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЇ ПОСТКОМУНІСТИЧНИХ КРАЇН ЄВРОПИ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ ЗРІЗ**

Стаття присвячена теоретико-методологічному аналізу «дилеми одночасності» як концептуального предиктора логістики модернізації посткомуністичних країн Європи. Визначено, що ініціальною передумовою подолання «дилеми одночасності» була політична модернізація або демократизація посткомуністичних країн Європи, а також, що в деяких країнах модернізація реалізовувалась в трьох аспектах чи сферах, а в деяких – в чотирьох (тобто у формі «потрійного» чи «чотирного» транзиту). Аргументовано, що «дилема одночасності», будучи належною та своєчасною логістичною моделлю посткомуністичної трансформації і модернізації різних країн Європи, не повною мірою є уніфікованою

методологічно. Виявлено, що ініціально «дилема одночасності» була дихотомічною (політичною та економічною), але вже згодом стала трихотомічною (включаючи проблематику територіальної і національної реструктуризації). Крім того, ініціально «дилема одночасності» мала негативістське спрямування, а сьогодні має позитивістське значення. Одночасно, аргументовано, що подолання «дилеми одночасності» здебільшого виявилось подоланням і досягненням таких результатів процесів інституційного розвитку посткомуністичних країн Європи, як модерність, державність і перспективи вступу й сам вступ до ЄС.

*Ключові слова:* *транзит, трансформація, модернізація, «дилема одночасності», посткомуністичні країни Європи.*

In the course and as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the system of political, social-economic relations limited by the “Warsaw Pact” post-communist European countries within the frames of logistics and plans for their modernization had not only to expand democracy and market economy, but sometimes create new state institutions and modern nations. The result is that nowadays it is a generally accepted fact that transformation processes in post-communist European countries had their peculiarities, which in no way resembled analogous processes in non-post-communist countries. Taking into account a large scale of tasks, which were to be solved within the course of modernization, political elites of post-communist countries of Europe faced a question: which sphere or spheres require top-priority modernization/reformation. Concerning this in the then and modern science have been elaborated two approaches as to solution of a problem: the first appealed to the consistent stages of social-economic and political modernization (on the pattern of the most Western European countries), while the second focuses on the simultaneity of stages of diversified modernization (what had not been peculiar of state reforms’ logistics before). However, the most interesting appeared to be conclusions and outcomes of the processes of modernization in different post-communist European countries, as on the average the most successful were the countries which modernized all spheres of national life not gradually, but simultaneously. It became the reason for theoretical-methodological focusing on the essence of simultaneous political, social-economic, system and sometimes national reformation and modernization, what in political science is usually described as a “dilemma of simultaneity” concept.



The proposed range of problems has been directly or indirectly studied in works by such scholars as: L. Balcerowicz<sup>1</sup>, J. Beyer<sup>2</sup>, J. Brada<sup>3</sup>, V. Bunce<sup>4</sup>, M. Dobry<sup>5</sup>, J. Elster<sup>6</sup>, S. Fischer and A. Gelb<sup>7</sup>, O. Havrylyshyn, I. Izvorski and R. Van Rooden<sup>8</sup>, R. Kollmorgen<sup>9</sup>, T. Kuzio<sup>10</sup>, W. Merkel<sup>11</sup>, C. Offe<sup>12</sup>, J. Sachs<sup>13</sup>, D. Travin i V. Gelman<sup>14</sup>, H. Wiesenthal<sup>15</sup>, C. Wyplosz<sup>16</sup>, W. Zapf<sup>17</sup>, G. Zelenko<sup>18</sup> and others. Crucial and significant markers/categories became modernization, reform, transit and logistics, which allow (in particular owing to the empirical experience of multidirectional processes in various post-communist European countries) theoretical-methodological redefinition and verification of the essence of the "dilemma of simultaneity" concept. However, complex theoretical-methodological analysis of the "dilemma of simultaneity", in particular the issue of

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- <sup>2</sup> J. Beyer, *Beyond the Gradualism-Big Bang Dichotomy: The Sequencing of Reforms and Its Impact on GDP*, [w:] J. Beyer, J. Wielgohs, H. Wiesenthal (eds.), *Successful Transitions. Political Factors of Socio-Economic Progress in Post-socialist Countries*, Wyd. Nomos 2001, s. 23-39.; J. Beyer, *Transformationssteuerung als Governance-Problem*, [w:] F. Bönker, J. Wielgohs (eds.), *Postsozialistische Transformation und europäische*, Wyd. Metropolis 2008, s. 79-94.; J. Beyer, J. Wielgohs, H. Wiesenthal, *Successful Transitions. Political Factors of Socio-Economic Progress in Post-socialist Countries*, Wyd. Nomos 2001.
- <sup>3</sup> J. Brada, *The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How far? How Fast?*, „Post-Soviet Affairs“ 1993, vol 9, nr. 1, s. 87-110.
- <sup>4</sup> V. Bunce, *The Political Economy of Post-Socialism*, „Slavic Review“ 1999, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 754-793.
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- <sup>6</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.; J. Elster, *The Possibility of Rational Politics*, „Archives Européennes de Sociologie“ 1987, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 67-103.
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- <sup>9</sup> R. Kollmorgen, *Theories of Postcommunist Transformation. Approaches, Debates, and Problems of Theory Building in the Second Decade of Research*, „Studies of Transition States and Societies 2013, vol 5, nr. 2, s. 88-105.
- <sup>10</sup> T. Kuzio, *The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition*, „Contemporary Politics“ 2000, vol 6, nr. 2, s. 143-164.
- <sup>11</sup> W. Merkel, *Die Konsolidierung postautoritärer und posttotalitärer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung*, [w:] H. Süsmuth (ed.), *Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas*, Wyd. Nomos 1998, s. 39-61.; W. Merkel, *Plausible Theory, Unexpected Result: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“ 2011, vol 2, s. 11-29.; W. Merkel, *Restriktionen und Chancen demokratischer Konsolidierung in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften: Ostmitteleuropa im Vergleich*, „Berliner Journal für Soziologie“ 1994, vol 4, s. 463-484.; W. Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, Wyd. VS-Verlag 2010.; W. Merkel, *Theorien der Transformation post-autoritärer Gesellschaften*, [w:] K. von Beyme, C. Offe (eds.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Wyd. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1996, s. 30-58.
- <sup>12</sup> C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social Research“ 1991, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 865-881.; C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur“ 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292.; C. Offe, *Dilemma odnoveremnosti: demokratizatsiya i rinochnaya ekonomika v Vostochnoy Evrope*, [w:] P. Shrykov, S. Shvanits, V. Gelman (eds.), *Pecoroty istorii: Postsotsialisticheskie transformatsii glazami nemetskih issledovateley*, Wyd. Letniy sad 2003, vol 2, s. 6-22.; C. Offe, *Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience*, Wyd. Polity Press 1996.
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- <sup>15</sup> H. Wiesenthal, *Contingencies of Institutional Reform: Reflections on Rule Change, Collective Actors, and Political Governance in Post-socialist Democracies*, Wyd. MPG Arbeitsgruppe Transformationsprozesse 1996.; H. Wiesenthal, *Politics Against Theory: On the Theoretical Consequences of Successful Large-Scale Reforms in Postcommunist Europe*, „Perspectives on European Politics and Society“ 2002, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 1-22.; H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives“, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.
- <sup>16</sup> C. Wyplosz, *Ten Years of Transformation: Macroeconomic Lessons*, Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank ABCDE Conference, Washington, April 28-30, 1999.
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- <sup>18</sup> H. Zelenko, *Navzdohimma Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003.

its conceptual expediency, has not been elaborated or has been conducted peripherally in the political science. Therefore, the aim of the research is a theoretical-methodological systematization and verification of the “dilemma of simultaneity” concept as a predictor of modernization logistics in post-communist European countries.

Before we directly appeal to the concept under study, let us focus on the theoretical-methodological remark provided by H. Zelenko<sup>19</sup> that the crucial factors for modernization in post-communist European countries were social-cultural/social, economic and political level of development of society in this or that country, as well as the fact that in post-communist countries of Europe (at least in those which managed to modernize themselves fully or nominally) did not exist arguments as to necessity or irrelevance of reformation. However, in post-communist countries of Europe namely political modernization was of the highest priority, as in countries with a nonorganic type of modernization political sphere is traditionally a synthetic one towards the others. It influenced the ways of modernization in post-communist European countries which started and occurred just in the sphere of politics, i.e. when there was political will for changes. And thus consistent political modernization was a factor and a guarantor for improvements in all other spheres of social life. Importance of political modernization revealed in the fact, that it secured institutional provision of democracy functioning and included: differentiation of political structure, when there was formed a branching network of social-economic, political and other institutions of the society, which were immediately aimed at providing stability and order; structural and essential transformation of a political system, which was aimed at disclosing all of its potentialities, formation of a political structure of social action, elaboration of political strategies and political tactics as the instruments for transformation. Besides, initial political modernization was rather significant as it promoted implementation of democratic procedures in all spheres of social process what means: rationalization and assurance of power efficiency as crucial factors of governments’ credibility and its support by people; provision of wide participation of citizens in political life; creation of integral and mutually agreed at different levels system of political socialization; commitment to ensure a feedback between a political system and a person<sup>20</sup>. As a result, namely political modernization or democratization determined scenarios of further modernization/reformation process in post-communist countries of Europe.

Another theoretical-methodological remark is a position according to which inequality of development of various spheres of social life in post-communist European countries led to the fact that these countries in their political and social spheres were to carry out tasks, concerning their modernization, whereas in the economic field these task were connected with post-modernization. It was presupposed by several factors of early transit of post-communist European countries, in particular by the facts that: a) over a certain period of time democratization

<sup>19</sup> H. Zelenko, *Navzdohimna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

<sup>20</sup> O. Babkina, V. Horbatenko, *Politolohiia: Posibnyk dlia studentiv vyschbykh navch. zakladiv*, Kiev 2001, s. 280-282.

processes in post-communist countries of Europe were being held within a strictly designated space, in isolation from a global process of democratization and on the basis of its own ideology, and thus had different duration and sometimes were characterized by divergences; b) over the years of "real socialism" regime there was formed a special social-economic, political and ideological environment, which had a great impact on the transitional processes in the post-communist period; c) setting up of communistic regimes led to disintegration of civil societies, artificial simplification of social and class structure of societies and demolition of all structures and ties, which formed the grounds for political, economic, cultural and ideological pluralism. Namely this promoted the appearance of such a significant peculiarity of young post-communist democracies in Europe, as a need for simultaneous or maximally synchronized accomplishment of social-economic and political transformations<sup>21</sup>. It explained the fact that transformations in post-communist countries could have and frequently had a synchronized character and quite often simultaneously occurred in political, economic, social-cultural, system and even national spheres. Besides, substantial influence on the course of modernization transformations had the fact that reforms in post-communist countries of Europe often took place in parallel with nationhood maintenance. And this, as T. Kuzio<sup>22</sup> states, means that in some post-communist countries modernization was actualized in three aspects or spheres, and in some countries even in four (that is in a form of a "triple" or "quadruple" transit).

At the same time, it is important that in political science there has never been a theoretical-methodological unanimity as to the fact whether multidirectional modernization and reformation had to be consistent or simultaneous in post-communist countries. Thus, some researchers insisted on incompatibility of simultaneous transformations in the economic and political sphere and noted that before starting democratization post-communist governments had to concentrate on implementation of economic reforms or on the contrary to appeal to introduction of democracy previously to commencement of economic reforms<sup>23</sup>. A. Aslund insisted on initial character of political reformation and stated that for post-communist countries democratization was an essential precondition for a successful transition to market economy<sup>24</sup>. The same opinion is shared by Z. Brzezinski who believes that "political reform serves as an initial basis for effective economic reform, and certain democratic political consensus and effective political process are vital conditions for the first critical phase of transformations in post-communist countries"<sup>25</sup>. A controversial opinion was supported by the adherents of the

<sup>21</sup> H. Zelenko, *Navzdohinna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

<sup>22</sup> T. Kuzio, *The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition*, „Contemporary Politics“ 2000, vol 6, nr. 2, s. 143-164.

<sup>23</sup> L. Armijo, T. Bierkster, *The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions*, [w:] L. Diamond, M. Plattner (eds.), *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Baltimore 1995, s. 230.

<sup>24</sup> G. Vainshtein, *Postkommunistyckoe razvitye blazanny zapadnoi politykoi*, „Myrovaia ekonomyka i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya“ 1997, vol 8, s. 145.

<sup>25</sup> Z. Brzezinski, *The Great Transformation*, „The National Interest“ 1993, vol 33, s. 6.

“dilemma of simultaneity” concept, in particular C. Offe<sup>26</sup>, J. Elster<sup>27</sup>, W. Merkel<sup>28</sup>, A. Przeworski<sup>29</sup>, A. Umland<sup>30</sup>, V. Gelman and D. Travin<sup>31</sup>, H. Wiesenthal<sup>32</sup>, who clearly remarked that successful reforms in post-communist European countries, especially since 1989, might have been rather multidirectional, though have occurred to the fullest degree simultaneously. Finally, another group of scientists, for example H. Zelenko<sup>33</sup>, argued that there could not be a universal recipe concerning the subsequence of post-communist transformations in Europe. At the same time, as more than twenty-year experience of the analyzed countries shows (nowadays they are mostly interpreted as post-communist ones), there is a significant opposition between factual actualization and positive verification of successfulness of simultaneous reforms and modernization. Therefore, systematic and theoretical-methodological understanding of the essence of the “dilemma of simultaneity” concept is extremely important, as can serve as a model of other political regimes’ transition in future.

When we deal with theorization of the “dilemma of simultaneity”, first of all we proceed from the methodological remark made by C. Offe (perhaps the “founder” of the analyzed concept), according to which the scale of reforms in different post-communist countries of Europe did not have analogues in the world history. The reason could be a need for simultaneous nature of modernization processes. Continuing his logics and reflecting on the prospects of post-communist transformations in the early 90-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the scientist states that transformation and modernization under post-communist circumstances had at least a three-dimensional character. The point is that post-communist European countries faced the necessity to change one-party regimes (or regimes on the basis of party-hegemon) for competitive democracies, planned systems in economy for market mechanisms and empire

<sup>26</sup> C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social Research“ 1991, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 865-881.; C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur“ 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292.; C. Offe, *Dilemma odnoveremennosti: demokratizatsiya i rinochnaya ekonomika v Vostochnoy Evrope*, [w:] P. Shtyikov, S. Shvanits, V. Gelman (eds.), *Povoroty istorii: Postsotsialisticheskie transformatsii glazami nemetskikh issledovateley*, Wyd. Letniy sad 2003, vol 2, s. 6-22.

<sup>27</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

<sup>28</sup> W. Merkel, *Die Konsolidierung postautoritärer und posttotalitärer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung*, [w:] H. Süssmuth (ed.), *Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas*, Wyd. Nomos 1998, s. 39-61.; W. Merkel, *Plausible Theory, Unexpected Result: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“ 2011, vol 2, s. 11-29.; W. Merkel, *Theorien der Transformation post-autoritärer Gesellschaften*, [w:] K. von Beyme, C. Offe (eds.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Wyd. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1996, s. 30-58.

<sup>29</sup> A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

<sup>30</sup> A. Umland, *Pochemu Evropeyskomu Soyuzu sleduet predstavit stranam Vostochnogo partnerstva perspektivu chlenstva v ES*, „Geopolitika“, źródło: [http://www.geopolitika.lt/index.php/ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/file\\_download.php?artc=5685](http://www.geopolitika.lt/index.php/ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/file_download.php?artc=5685) [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

<sup>31</sup> D. Travin, V. Gelman, „Zagolubivyye” rossiyskoy modernizatsii: smena pokoleniy i traektorii reform, „Neprikosnovennyiy zapas” 2013, vol 4, nr. 90, źródło: <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2013/4/2g.html> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

<sup>32</sup> H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives”, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.

<sup>33</sup> H. Zelenko, *Navzdohimna Modernizatsiia: Dosvid Polshchi ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Krytyka 2003, s. 18-20.

regimes for national states<sup>34</sup>. Almost the same views were shared by A. Przeworski<sup>35</sup> and J. Elster<sup>36</sup>, who together with C. Offe argued that the logical model of the "dilemma of simultaneity" constructed in such a way lied in the fact that if the countries of the "old" Europe at first came through a long way of national-state building, later created the basics for capitalism and only then transferred to democracy (besides the process of modernization were not always successful and quite often witnessed "throwbacks" over the centuries and decades), then the countries of the "new" Europe had to solve all the tasks simultaneously, as they faced a "triple" or even a "quadruple" transit, carrying out difficult and painful reforms in all spheres at the same time, "right there and then". Consequently, the researchers in different ways argued that necessity of simultaneous achieving effective economic and political reforms makes successful "integral reforms" absolutely senseless<sup>37</sup>.

Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that temptation to extend all changes in time, to build up a succession (at first market, then democracy or vice versa) or completely reject the reforms was too strong. C. Offe supposed that the "dilemma of simultaneity" meant that despite all obvious obstacles and challenges, only simultaneous implementation of democracy and market reforms could bring to the post-communist countries, namely Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, quite a rapid success, while the attempts to solve all these tasks "step by step" posed a threat of escalating political, economic and social crises<sup>38</sup>. J. Elster shared the same position and in late 80-s – early 90-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the systems of Central-Eastern European countries just started their formation (renovation) in his work "The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reforms"<sup>39</sup> hypothesized that in Central-Eastern European countries, namely in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic it appeared to be possible to combine such transit categories as "necessity", "impossibility" and "simultaneity". The point is that transformation of communist regimes in the region over the period of the "third wave" of democratization was considerably different from the "shifts" of political regimes during the "first" and "second" waves of democratization. The main distinction was that two or even three transformational processes took place simultaneously in the region: political transformation (from authoritarianism to democracy), economic transformation (from a planned-controlled economy to the market one) and system

<sup>34</sup> C. Offe, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa*, „Merkur“ 1991, vol 4, s. 279-292.; C. Offe, *Dilemma odnorenemosti: demokratizatsiya i rynochnaya ekonomika v Vostochnoy Evrope*, [w:] P. Shtyikov, S. Shvanits, V. Gelman (eds.), *Povoroty istorii: Postsotsialisticheskie transformatsii glazami nemetskih issledovateley*, Wyd. Letniy sad 2003, vol 2, s. 6-22.

<sup>35</sup> A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

<sup>36</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polszajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

<sup>37</sup> W. Merkel, *Plausible Theory, Unexpected Result: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft“ 2011, vol 2, s. 11-29.

<sup>38</sup> C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Tripie Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social research“ 2004, vol 71, nr 3, s. 501-528.

<sup>39</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] Polszajski P. (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.

transformation (formation of national states). Besides, in this case transformation was understood as a historical process of changes, which is a unity of several components – transformation of the political system of the society, transformation of a “political person” (human being, elite, collective body and organization), transformation of political culture of the society and a person (ideas, norms, level of political relations). In its turn, political transformation must be interpreted on the basis of sovereignty, political participation, supremacy of law, stability of democratic institutions, political and social integration, while economic transformation was distinguished on the basis of the level of social and economic development, structure of market and competitive processes, currency and price stability, respect to private property, level of a general welfare, stability and effectiveness of the economic system etc. However, the most important is the fact that changes in Central-Eastern Europe by their essence correspond to the changes which earlier had taken place in Western Europe. But in the western world these processes occurred evolutionally and gradually, but not simultaneously and accelerationally.

As a result, it is absolutely clear that the researchers interpreted the “dilemma of simultaneity” as an appropriate and well-timed logistic model of post-communist transformation and modernization of various European countries. Also, the scientists drew attention to theoretical-methodological and prognostic peculiarities and essence of the “dilemma of simultaneity” and argued that its overriding in different post-communist countries of Europe was possible due to consolidation of internal and external factors and stimuli of political, economic, social (system) and perhaps national transformation, as well as democratization, liberalization and modernization in general. On the other hand, they discovered that the assumption concerning the obstacles between the political-driven introduction of capitalism and construction of democratic institutes on the basis of the “dilemma of simultaneity” concept has not got through the final empirical evaluation, as a result of which the concept in the form of hypothesis in the theoretical-methodological perspective is often positioned as an “exhausted” one. In current paper on these grounds we repeatedly justify, that temptation of elites to extend all transformations in time, to build up a succession into a “logical chain” or completely reject the reforms was too strong.

One can place emphasis on the fact that the tasks, which were set before post-communist countries of Europe were in fact deviant in comparison with the problems of other democratic transitions from the past. However, till the middle of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century all or almost all countries in the region quite smoothly and successfully transformed into consolidated or semi-consolidated democracies. Besides, these countries in average needed 15 years to create more or less competitive market economies, stable liberal democracies, integrated national communities, substantial civil structures and functional administrative machine. Moreover, development of some post-communist countries of Europe since the fall of “the iron curtain” became a well-deserved example, worthy of admiration for the transformational success. As a result, nowadays former post-communist European countries are a valuable element of the

EU. Even more, as a result of the financial crisis, which commenced in the EU in the late 2008, namely "new" countries of Europe, and not "old" EU members found themselves at advantage. In general, it means that the "dilemma of simultaneity" appeared to be less serious for post-communist countries of Europe, than theoreticians and practitioners of the transit from the regimes of "real socialism" earlier believed. All this makes us argue, that the "dilemma of simultaneity" displays the fact that a simple unification of three or four problems of transit, transformation and modernization is not an explicative factor in post-communist development, but rather plays a role of "logical interrelation" between the patterns of reforms. Such presentation of a problem means that simultaneity, interdependence and internal logics influence the fact how each sphere of transit and transformation may become a reason for further obstacles and even "mutually obstructive effects" in the sphere of "pursuing modernization processes". Relating to this, it is evident that consolidation of democracy, for instance, must theoretically become more complicated due to the structural complexity of transit of various sectors of national economy. And on the contrary, each component of the "dilemma of simultaneity" overriding process may intensify each other in case of their successfulness.

At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the theorization by H. Wiesenthal<sup>40</sup> concerning the idea that the "dilemma of simultaneity" is not methodologically unified to the fullest extent. The point is, that different post-communist countries, which in due time experienced the "dilemma of simultaneity" diversified on the basis of their starting environment, as well as the choice, made on the eve of triggering reformation-modernization process. Due to this and taking into account variable influence of political elites, different "local" conditions, national and regional peculiarities of development, they finally managed to achieve excellent modernization results at different times. As C. Offe<sup>41</sup> supposed, that the "dilemma of the simultaneity" in average is justified and substantiated by the so-called "possibility of rational policy", when political actors and ordinary citizens clearly realize accuracy of choice of reformation-modernization movement. And this means that solution to the "dilemma of simultaneity" cannot be absolutely assigned to the gradualism or radical logistics of reformation, transformation and modernization<sup>42</sup>. In other words: desire to implement as much as possible transformations and reforms does not mean or guarantee and sometimes even neutralizes social comprehension and institutional reliability of political elites<sup>43</sup>. Besides, at first sight it seems that "one-time" effects of multidirectional reforms are not so much synchronized to be interpreted as instantaneous.

<sup>40</sup> H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives“, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.

<sup>41</sup> J. Elster, *The Possibility of Rational Politics*, „Archives Européennes de Sociologie“ 1987, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 67-103.

<sup>42</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] Polzajski P. (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.; C. Offe, *Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe*, „Social Research“ 1991, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 865-881.

<sup>43</sup> H. Wiesenthal, *The Dilemma of Simultaneity Revisited – Or Why General Skepticism about Large-Scale Reform Did Not Apply to the Postcommunist Transformations*, Prepared for the International Conference „Thirty Years of the Third Wave of Democratization: Paradigms, Lessons, and Perspectives“, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), December 10-11, 2004.

For example, this is theorized by the thing that democratization and market reforms cannot be simultaneously correlated with economic growth<sup>44</sup>.

Therefore, it is obvious that the “dilemma of simultaneity” concept is constructed as a result of rationally-oriented denial of the hypothesis of “necessity and impossibility of simultaneous economic and political reforms”<sup>45</sup>. It means, that initially the “dilemma of simultaneity” had dichotomized nature (political and economic), but later it turned into a trichotomized one (including problems of territorial and national restructuring). Moreover, in the beginning the “dilemma of simultaneity” had negative coloring, as C. Offe elaborated it as a predictor of impossibility of reforms and modernization of all spheres of state life<sup>46</sup>. The explanation was hidden in the arguments that “stern” desire for the “shock therapy”, which must have become a source for constructing democratic-capitalistic model of development of post-communist Europe, was expected not only as unsustainable, but obviously not very promising from the perspective of logistics. Consequently, a failure of the “shock therapy” must have resulted in non-overriding of the “dilemma of simultaneity” and approaching towards the logic of succession of changes and reforms<sup>47</sup>. Only later, especially in consequence of operationalization and approbation of the concept, the “dilemma of simultaneity” from being impossible acquired positivist assignment, as on the basis of it scientists started to speak of perspectives of synchronous modernization in other regions and countries of the world<sup>48</sup>. For this were made many steps in modernization direction, which revealed that a combination of radical economic reforms in the shape of the “shock therapy” and a strategy of a “big bang” on the one hand and radical democratization, on the other hand, is possible and even effective. The point is that their synthesis has not appeared to be an ephemeral phenomenon, but on the contrary brought profound system-related results.

Though, on the contrary it gave W. Merkel and H. Wiesenthal a chance to argue that overriding of the “dilemma of simultaneity” in fact appeared to be overcoming and comprehending of such results of processes of institutional development in post-communist European countries as modernity, statehood and opportunities of joining the EU and factual accession to

<sup>44</sup> A. Åslund, *The Advantages of Radical Reform*, „Journal of Democracy” 2001, vol 12, nr. 4, s. 42.; J. Beyer, *Beyond the Gradualism-Big Bang Dichotomy: The Sequencing of Reforms and Its Impact on GDP*, [w:] J. Beyer, J. Wielgohs, H. Wiesenthal (eds.), *Successful Transitions. Political Factors of Socio-Economic Progress in Post-socialist Countries*, Wyd. Nomos 2001, s. 23-39.

<sup>45</sup> J. Elster, *The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform*, [w:] P. Polzajski (ed.), *Philosophy of social choice*, Wyd. IFiS Publishers 1990, s. 309-316.; A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1991.

<sup>46</sup> C. Offe, *Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience*, Wyd. Polity Press 1996.

<sup>47</sup> L. Balcerowicz, *Understanding Postcommunist Transitions*, [w:] L. Diamond, M. Plattner (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1996, s. 63-77.; W. Zapf, *Modernisierung und Modernisierungstheorien*, [w:] W. Zapf (ed.), *Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften*, Wyd. Campus 1991, s. 23-39.

<sup>48</sup> R. Kollmorgen, *Theories of Postcommunist Transformation. Approaches, Debates, and Problems of Theory Building in the Second Decade of Research*, „Studies of Transition States and Societies 2013, vol 5, nr. 2, s. 88-105.; J. Beyer, *Transformationssteuerung als Governance-Problem*, [w:] F. Bönker, J. Wielgohs (eds.), *Postsozialistische Transformation und europäische*, Wyd. Metropolis 2008, s. 92.; M. Dobry, *Introduction: When Transitory Meets Simultaneous Transitions*, [w:] M. Dobry (ed.), *Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social Sciences*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000, s. 3-4.



the Union<sup>49</sup>. On the other hand, it substantiates our previous hypothesis, according to which system modernization of post-communist countries of Europe started with political modernization or democratization, as the latter appeared to be a "driver" of economic competitiveness, impressive enhancement of economic efficiency and welfare of population<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> W. Merkel, *Systemtransformation*, Wyd. VS-Verlag 2010, s. 434; H. Wiesenthal, *Politics Against Theory: On the Theoretical Consequences of Successful Large-Scale Reforms in Postcommunist Europe*, „Perspectives on European Politics and Society“ 2002, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 1-22.; J. Beyer, J. Wielgoths, H. Wiesenthal, *Successful Transitions. Political Factors of Socio-Economic Progress in Post-socialist Countries*, Wyd. Nomos 2001.

<sup>50</sup> K. Müller, *Europäisierung – Zur kulturellen Codierung der postkommunistischen Transformation*, [w:] F. Bönker, J. Wielgoths (eds.), *Postsozialistische Transformation und europäische*, Wyd. Metropolis 2008, s. 121-142.

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## **LEGAL AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTION OF PRESIDENT IN UKRAINE: FROM KRAVCHUK TO POROSHENKO**

The article deals with political and legal status of the institution of president in Ukraine. The author considered the evolution of presidential power. For this purpose, he accounted the period from the first (after the declaration of independence of Ukraine) president – Leonid Kravchuk – until the incumbent president – Petro Poroshenko. In order to achieve the objectives, the researcher pointed at the competence of the president of Ukraine, taking into account changes in the legislation, the potential political impact of a particular person who has power and is dependent on the political situation.

*Keywords: the institution of president, presidential powers, political influence of president, system of government, constitution, the “orange revolution”, the “revolution of dignity.”*

## **ПРАВОВА ТА ПОЛІТИЧНА ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ ІНСТИТУТУ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА В УКРАЇНІ: ВІД КРАВЧУКА ДО ПОРОШЕНКА**

У статті розглядається політико-правовий статус інституту президента в Україні. Розглянуто еволюцію президентської влади. З цією метою, до уваги включено період від першого, після проголошення незалежності України, президента – Леоніда Кравчука – та чинного президента – Петра Порошенка. З метою вирішення поставлених завдань вказуємо на компетенції президента України, беручи до уваги зміни в законах, потенційний політичний вплив конкретної людини, яка має владу та залежить від політичної ситуації.

*Ключові слова: інститут президента, повноваження президента, політичний вплив президента, система влади, конституція, «помаранчева революція», «революція гідності».*

## **Ewolucja prawna i polityczna instytucji prezydenta na Ukrainie: od Krawczuka do Poroszenki**

W artykule analizowany jest status polityczno-prawny instytucji prezydenta na Ukrainie. Przedstawiamy ewolucje władzy prezydenckiej. W tym celu zaczynamy od kadencji pierwszego, po uzyskaniu przez Ukrainę niepodległości, prezydenta – Leonika Krawczuka i kończymy

obecnie sprawującym władzę – Petrem Poroszenkiem. Na użytek realizacji postawionego celu wskazujemy na cechy charakterystyczne kompetencji prezydenta Ukrainy, uwzględniając przy tym zmiany prawa, potencjał wpływu politycznego konkretnej osoby sprawującej urząd oraz obowiązującą koniunkturę polityczną.

*Słowa kluczowe: instytucja prezydenta, kompetencje prezydenta, wpływ polityczny prezydenta, system władzy, konstytucja, rewolucja pomarańczowa, rewolucja godności.*

### **1. Rola i miejsce prezydenta w systemie instytucji państwa**

Uprawnienia prezydenta oraz jego status prawny regulowane są przez ustawę zasadniczą – Konstytucję Ukrainy. Na wstępie należy zaznaczyć, że Konstytucja nie jednokrotnie stanowiła przedmiot walk politycznych, co z kolei prowadziło do zmian formy rządów. Kolejno Ukraina była republiką prezydencko-parlamentarną i parlamentarno-prezydencką. Zmiana ta wyrażała się nie tylko ewolucyjnością demokratycznego charakteru formy rządów – Ukraina bowiem nie tylko zmieniła formę rządów na parlamentarno-prezydencką, a poczyniła również i krok do tyłu w kierunku prezydencko-parlamentarnego sposobu sprawowania władzy. W obecnej chwili na Ukrainie obowiązuje parlamentarno-prezydencka forma rządów, co jest wynikiem zmian o charakterze rewolucyjnym zapoczątkowanych w listopadzie 2013 r. Nastąpiły one poprzez wznowienie obowiązywania Ustaw z dnia 8 grudnia 2004 (nr 2222-IV), 1 lutego 2011 (nr 2952-VI) i z dnia 19 września 2013 (nr 586-VII)<sup>1</sup>, nadając nowy kształt Konstytucji.

W myśl tej redakcji Konstytucji prezydent Ukrainy jest głową państwa i reprezentantem jego interesów. Do tego jest także gwarantem suwerenności państwa, integralności terytorialnej, przestrzegania Konstytucji Ukrainy oraz praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela<sup>2</sup>. Co pozwala twierdzić, że właśnie prezydent jest kluczową figurą w systemie podziału władzy.

Dla zrozumienia obowiązującego porządku należałoby wskazać na ewolucyjny sposób zmian statusu prezydenta Ukrainy korzystając w tym celu z perspektywy historycznej. Tak więc, według Konstytucji URSSR z dnia 1978 prezydent obejmuje najwyższe stanowisko w państwie, jest głową państwa ukraińskiego i przewodniczy władzy wykonawczej<sup>3</sup>. Konstytucja Ukrainy z 28 czerwca 1998 mówi natomiast o tym, że prezydent nie należy do żadnej z władz, pełni natomiast funkcję równoważenia każdej z nich. Status ten de jure w dalszym ciągu obowiązuje, nie zważając na szereg zmian, które były wprowadzane do ustawy zasadniczej w części dotyczącej instytucji prezydenta. Tym niej mniej Konstytucja Ukrainy jasno nie precyzuje funkcji arbitrażowej prezydenta. Za zaproponowanym sądem stoi stwierdzenie,

<sup>1</sup> Ustawa o wznowieniu obowiązywania niektórych zapisów Konstytucji Ukrainy z dnia 21 lutego 2014 (nr 742VII).

<sup>2</sup> art. 102 Konstytucji Ukrainy z dnia 15.05.2014.

<sup>3</sup> Ustawa URSSR o prezydencie Ukrainy z dnia 05.07.1991.

które zresztą było już przetoczone, że „prezydent Ukrainy [...] jest gwarantem przestrzegania Konstytucji Ukrainy”<sup>4</sup>.

Artykuł 106 Konstytucji Ukrainy wymienia uprawnienia prezydenta. Jego analiza pozwala na stwierdzenie, że prezydent posiada kompetencje wobec każdej z władz, a nawet więcej – uczestniczy w ich kształtowaniu. Konstytucja Ukrainy dokonuje jednak ich ograniczenia, równoważąc je z kompetencjami Rady Najwyższej, co z kolei spowodowane jest naturą parlamentarno-prezydenckiej formy rządów.

Cechami charakterystycznymi instytucji prezydenta na Ukrainie są:

- ogólnopaństwowy charakter – kompetencje prezydenta rozpow szechniają się na całe terytorium Ukrainy;
- reprezentacja – jest oficjalnym reprezentantem interesów Ukrainy;
- wybieralność – objąć urząd prezydenta Ukrainy można jedynie w wyniku bezpośrednich, powszechnych, równych wyborów poprzez tajne głosowanie;
- jednoosobowość – instytucja prezydenta jest reprezentowana tylko przez jedną osobę, której przyznano odpowiednie kompetencje czyli prawo do przyjmowania aktów normatywno-prawnych;
- stała działalność – pełni obowiązki w sposób stały i nie przerwany, uzyskuje wynagrodzenia z tytułu przyznanych mu przez Konstytucję i Ustawy uprawnień. Instytucja prezydencka do tego jest także nie ograniczona ramami czasowymi.

W związku z czym można by powiedzieć, że na równi z innymi instytucjami władzy państwowej (władzą ustawodawczą, wykonawczą i sądowniczą) kluczową rolę pełni instytucja prezydencka. Przydzielono jej bowiem najważniejszą funkcję – gwarantowania przestrzegania ustawy zasadniczej. W tym układzie prezydent nie jest jednak nadrzędnym wobec wymienionych trzech władz, a znajduje się on na równi z nimi i pełni przy tym funkcję arbitrażową. Tak na przykład, zważając na fakt, iż Ukraina jest republiką parlamentarno-prezydencką, większość kompetencji prezydenta jest realizowana za zgodą parlamentu: „powołuje, za zgodą Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy, Prokuratora Generalnego Ukrainy i odwołuje go z urzędu”<sup>5</sup>. Wyjątkiem są uprawnienia, które w sposób bezpośredni dotyczą przestrzegania ustawy zasadniczej, na przykład: „zarządza przedterminowe wybory do Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy w terminie określonym w niniejszej Konstytucji”<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> art. 102 Konstytucji Ukrainy z dnia 15.05.2014.

<sup>5</sup> art. 106, p. 11 Konstytucji Ukrainy z dnia 15.05.2014.

<sup>6</sup> art. 106, p. 7 Konstytucji Ukrainy z dnia 15.05.2014.

## **2. Funkcje i uprawnienia prezydenta Ukrainy**

Funkcjami prezydenta są najważniejsze kierunki jego działalności (najważniejsze obowiązki) jako głowy państwa, umotywowane jego rolą i znaczeniem dla systemu organów władzy państwowej<sup>7</sup>.

Analiza Rozdziału V Konstytucji Ukrainy oraz szeregu innych aktów prawnych w tym zakresie, pozwala na wyodrębnienie następujące z nich:

1. W oparciu o obiekt (przedmiot) działalności: a) zapewnienie niezależności państwa, integralności terytorialnej i bezpieczeństwa narodowego Ukrainy; b) zapewnienie przestrzegania praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela; c) zapewnienie ciągłości władzy; d) sprawowanie kontroli nad polityką zewnętrzną państwa; e) kształtowanie składu personalnego organów władzy państwowej; f) funkcja jurysdykcyjna.
2. Według form (sposobów) działalności: a) ustanawiająca; b) normotwórcza; c) funkcja stosowania prawa; d) kontrolna<sup>8</sup>.

Konstytucja Ukrainy definiując prezydenta jako gwaranta suwerenności państwa, integralności terytorialnej, nadaje mu określone funkcje i kompetencje/ uprawnienia. Prezydent dba o niezależność państwa, bezpieczeństwo narodowe i ciągłość władzy, przewodniczy Radzie Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Narodowej, podejmuje decyzje o ogólnej bądź częściowej mobilizacji oraz wprowadzeniu w razie zagrożenia interwencją zbrojną stanu wojennego w całym państwie bądź części jego regionów.

Pełniąc funkcje gwaranta praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela prezydent realizuje przypisane mu zadanie poprzez prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej: wydaje dekrety i rozporządzenia w celu ochrony praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela; w razie potrzeby podejmuje decyzję o wprowadzeniu na całym terytorium bądź w poszczególnych jego regionach decyzji o stanie nadzwyczajnym; w razie potrzeby ogłasza poszczególne miejscowości obszarami nadzwyczajnej sytuacji ekologicznej.

Uprawnienia prezydenta zakładają z kolei konkretne prawa i obowiązki głowy państwa dotyczące rozwiązywania problemów (kwestii) znajdujących się w jego obszarze odpowiedzialności<sup>9</sup>.

Ogólnie rzecz ujmując, kompetencje prezydenta można by wyróżnić w następujące grupy:

1. Kompetencje przedstawicielskie;
2. Kompetencje ustawodawcze;
3. Kompetencje ustanawiające;
4. Kompetencje dotyczące kontroli<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> В. Годованець, Конституційне право України, Київ 2005, s. 360.

<sup>8</sup> О. Ярмиш, В. Серьогін, Державне будівництво та місцеве самоврядування в Україні, Харків 2002, s. 123.

<sup>9</sup> В. Годованець, Конституційне право України, Київ 2005, s. 360.

<sup>10</sup> Н. Шапгала, Конституційне право України, Задорожня 2012, s. 479.

Na kompetencje przedstawicielskie składają się prawa i obowiązki prezydenta dotyczące realizacji ogólnych działań związanych z reprezentacją państwa zarówno na poziomie państwowym jak i międzynarodowym.

Wyróżnia się następujące kompetencje prezydenta w dziedzinie polityki wewnętrznej:

- Prezydent Ukrainy jest gwarantem suwerenności państwa, integracji terytorialnej Ukrainy, przestrzegania Konstytucji Ukrainy oraz praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela (art. 102);
- gwarantuje niepodległość państwa, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, ciągłość władzy (art. 106, p. 1);
- zwraca się z orędziami do ludu i z corocznymi oraz nadzwyczajnymi orędziami do Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy o stanie państwa (art. 106, p. 2);
- stoi na czele Rady Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego i Obrony Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 18);
- podejmuje, zgodnie z ustawą, decyzję o powszechnej albo częściowej mobilizacji, o wprowadzeniu stanu wojennego (art. 106, p. 20);
- udziela prawa łaski (art. 106, p. 25, cz. 1);
- przyznaje nagrody państwowe; ustanawia odznaczenia Prezydenta Ukrainy i nagradza nimi (art. 106, p. 26, cz. 1).

Działalność w dziedzinie polityki zagraniczej polega na:

- reprezentacji państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych, sprawowaniu kierownictwa nad polityką zagraniczną państwa, prowadzeniu rozmów oraz negocjacji i podpisywaniu umów międzynarodowych Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 3, cz. 1);
- podejmowaniu decyzji o uznaniu innych państw (art. 106, p. 4, cz. 1);
- powoływaniu i odwoływaniu szefów przedstawicielstw dyplomatycznych Ukrainy w innych państwach i organizacjach międzynarodowych, przyjmowaniu listów uwierzytelniających i odwołujących przedstawicieli dyplomatycznych innych państw (art. 106, p. 5, cz. 1).

Kompetencje ustawodawcze – prawa i obowiązki prezydenta w dziedzinie tworzenia, przyjęcia i implementacji prawa:

- prawo inicjatywy ustawodawczej w Radzie Najwyższej Ukrainy (art. 93, cz.1);
- projektom ustaw nadaje status pilnych, co skutkuje ich rozpatrywaniem przez Radę Najwyższą jako takich które muszą być rozpatrywane w pierwszej kolejności (art. 93, cz. 2);
- posiada prawo weta wobec ustaw uchwalonych przez Radę Najwyższą Ukrainy (prócz ustaw przewidujących zmiany w Konstytucji), kierując je do powtórnego rozpatrzenia przez Radę Najwyższą Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 30, cz 1);
- podpisuje ustawy uchwalone przez Radę Najwyższą Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 29, cz 1);



- Prezydent Ukrainy działając na podstawie i wykonując Konstytucję i prawa Ukrainy, wydaje dekrety i rozporządzenia, które podlegają egzekucji na całym na terytorium Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 31).

Kompetencje ustanawiające – prawa i obowiązki prezydenta Ukrainy w dziedzinie, powoływania, reorganizacji i likwidacji innych organów państwa:

- powołuje, za zgodą Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy, Premiera Ukrainy, uchyla jego uprawnienia i podejmuje decyzje o jego odwołaniu (art. 106, p. 9);
- powołuje, na wniosek Premiera Ukrainy, członków Gabinetu Ministrów Ukrainy, kierowników innych urzędów centralnych organów władzy wykonawczej, a także kierowników lokalnej administracji państwowej i uchyla ich uprawnienia (art. 106, p. 10);
- powołuje, za zgodą Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy, Prokuratora Generalnego Ukrainy i odwołuje go z urzędu (art. 106, p. 11);
- powołuje połowę Zarządu Banku Narodowego Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 12);
- powołuje połowę Narodowej Rady Ukrainy do spraw Telewizji i Radiofonii (art. 106, p. 13);
- powołuje i odwołuje, za zgodą Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy, Przewodniczącego Komitetu Antymonopolowego Ukrainy, Przewodniczącego Funduszu Majątku Państwowego Ukrainy, Przewodniczącego Państwowego Komitetu do spraw Telewizji i Radiofonii Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 14);
- tworzy, reorganizuje i likwiduje, na wniosek Premiera Ukrainy, ministerstwa i inne centralne organy władzy wykonawczej, działające w granicach środków, przewidzianych na utrzymanie organów władzy wykonawczej (art. 106, p. 15);
- powołuje jedną trzecią sędziów Sądu Konstytucyjnego Ukrainy (art. 106, p. 22);
- tworzy sądy w trybie określonym w ustawie (art. 106, p. 23);
- wyznacza przedstawiciela Prezydenta Ukrainy w Radzie Najwyższej Autonomicznej Republiki Krym.

Kompetencje dotyczące kontroli – prawa i obowiązki prezydenta Ukrainy w dziedzinie, kontroli nad przestrzeganiem prawa w innych organach władzy państwowej:

- rozwiązuje Radę Najwyższą Ukrainy, o ile jej posiedzenia nie mogą się rozpocząć w ciągu trzydziestu dni od pierwszej zwykłej sesji plenarnej (art. 106, p. 8, cz. 1);
- uchyla akty Gabinetu Ministrów Ukrainy i akty Rady Ministrów Autonomicznej Republiki Krym (art. 106, p. 16, cz. 1);
- zwraca się do Rady Najwyższej z prośbą o wszczęcie dyskusji nad odpowiedzialnością Gabinetu Ministrów i w razie potrzeby przyjęcia Rezolucji o braku zaufania do Gabinetu Ministrów Ukrainy.

### 3. Ewolucja instytucji prezydenta na Ukrainie: wymiar polityczno-personalny

Historia instytucji prezydenta na Ukrainie zaczyna się wraz z przyjęciem trzech ustaw za sprawą których powstała ów instytucja. Są to: Ustawa o ustanowieniu urzędu prezydenta Ukraińskiej RSR oraz wprowadzeniu zmian i uzupełnień do Konstytucji (Ustawy zasadniczej) Ukraińskiej RSR; Ustawa o prezydencie Ukraińskiej RSR; i Ustawa o wyborach prezydenta Ukraińskiej RSR. Zostały one przyjęte 5 lipca 1991 r. i wprowadziły zmiany do obowiązującej w tym czasie Konstytucji URSS z 1978 r. U podstaw wymienionych aktów prawnych założono koncepcję nowej Konstytucji Ukrainy, która z kolei została przyjęta przez Radę Najwyższą 19 czerwca 1991 r.<sup>11</sup>

Pierwszym prezydentem niepodległej Ukrainy został wybrany w wyborach powszechnych Leonid Krawczuk. Ukraińska badaczka problemu – Marija Karmazina w sposób zwięzły opisując jego dość krótką kadencję, mówi o tym jej sens można by odtworzyć za pomocą jedynie dwóch słów: polityk odwrotu (korzystając z terminologii J. Kina). Krótka prezydentura Leonida Krawczuka doskonale mieści się w granicach treściowych tego właśnie fenomenu i świadczy o tym, że pierwszy ukraiński prezydent posiadał zdolność do porzucenia (z pomocą środków politycznych) kilkudziesięcioletniej radzieckiej i kilkusetletniej rosyjskiej imperialnej przeszłości Ukrainy, stawiając (chciałoby się powiedzieć, że na zawsze) kropkę w jej losie bycia okrajem imperium<sup>12</sup>.

Porzucając KPU Leonid Kuczma w wyborach prezydenckich, które odbyły się 1 grudnia 1991 r., wystartował jako kandydat pozapartyjny. Zwyciężył już w pierwszej turze, co sprawiło, że już 5 grudnia tego samego roku Ukraina otrzymała swojego pierwszego prezydenta.

1 grudnia 1991 odbyło się również referendum, w którym obywatele mieli wypowiedzieć się na temat niepodległości Ukrainy, po którym wszczęto proces międzynarodowego uznania nowego państwa, co sprawiło, że przed nowym prezydentem powstało dość ważne zadanie – reprezentowanie Ukrainy na arenie międzynarodowej. „Zadanie to było utrudnione przez fakt, iż na arenie międzynarodowej Ukraina dotychczas była postrzegana jako «część Rosji». Od pierwszych dni swojej prezydentury Leonid Krawczuk, stawiając na zachowanie sformułowanych przez wiele dziesięcioleci relacji ukraińsko-rosyjskich, w tym samy czasie był promotorem idei tworzenia samodzielnej polityki zagranicznej państwa ukraińskiego”<sup>13</sup>.

Ważnym wydarzeniem, które nastąpiło za czasów obejmowania przez Leonida Krawczuka stanowiska prezydenta Ukraina, jest rezygnacja Ukrainy z broni jądrowej. Decyzja ta, z perspektywy ówczesnego czasu wydawała się być całkowicie uzasadniona – ułatwiała integrację Ukrainy do światowej wspólnoty. Z perspektywy natomiast współczesnych realiów – konfliktu na Wschodzie Ukrainy, można by twierdzić, że zachowanie broni jądrowej, jest niezbędnym do zachowania równowagi sił wobec potencjalnego wroga, sąsiada.

<sup>11</sup> Ф.Г. Бурчак, Президент України, Київ 1997, s. 4.

<sup>12</sup> М.С. Кармазіна, Президентство: український варіант, Київ 2007, s. 118.

<sup>13</sup> Кравчук Леонід Макарович. Герої України, <http://ukrgeroec.narod.ru/KravchukLM.html> [07.06.2017].

W lipcu 1994 r. na Ukrainie do władzy przychodzi nowy prezydent – Leonid Kuczma. W czasie kampanii wyborczej, akcentując na potrzebie zbliżenia się z Rosją oraz przyznanie językowi rosyjskiemu statusu języka urzędowego, był popierany przez Rosję. W czasie sprawowania już władzy prowadzona przez niego polityka w sposób zasadniczy różniła od proklamowanych haseł we wspomnianej kampanii wyborczej. Kuczma oczywiście współpracował z Kremlem lecz także starał się skierować Ukrainę w stronę Europy. Działania te doprowadziły między innymi także do konfliktu Kuczmy z partiami lewicowymi, które w tym czasie dysponowało dość dużym wpływem na społeczeństwo.

W październiku 1994 w polityce społeczno-gospodarczej nowy prezydent postawił na relacje rynkowe. Dokonano szeregu zmian, czemu towarzyszył rozwój gospodarczy, które jednak trudno określić jako działania sprzyjające zbliżaniu się z Unią Europejską. Tak jak bowiem, w swojej większości, prywatyzacje przedsiębiorstw dokonały osoby wywodzące się z najbliższego otoczenia Leonida Kuczmy<sup>14</sup>.

Próbując wskazać na pozytywne zmiany, które zaszły za pierwszej kadencji Leonida Kuczmy należałoby wymienić następujące z nich:

- pojawienie krajowej jednostki walutowej – hrywny;
- przyjęcie nowej Konstytucji Ukrainy;
- przyjęcie tekstu hymnu Ukrainy;
- zażegnanie kryzysów w gospodarce.

Po raz drugi Leonid Kuczma objął stanowisko prezydenta 14 listopada 1999 r. W 2002, co jest warte podkreślenia, ogłosił nowy program który miał by skierować Ukrainę w stronę UE. W czasie kampanii wyborczej wiele mówiono o tak zwanym „nowym Kuczmi” i znacznych zmianach, w rzeczywistości jednak w czasie jego drugiej kadencji zrobiono sporo mniej.

24 sierpnia 2002 Kuczma wychodzi z pomysłem zmian w Konstytucji, w wyniku których miało by dojść do dużych zmian w relacjach uprawnień parlamentu i prezydenta. Powodem takich działań, jak uważali eksperci, była świadomość, iż po wyborach 2004 będzie musiał zostawić pełniony przez siebie urząd i chęć objęcia stanowiska premiera, co dało by mu możliwość zachowania wpływu na ukraińską politykę<sup>15</sup>.

Pomysłodawcą tej reformy był nie tylko Leonid Kuczma, ale również i Wiktor Janukowycz wraz ze swoim otoczeniem. Opozycja natomiast była jej przeciwna. Była powiem pewna zwycięstwa swojego kandydata – Wiktora Juszczenki, a reforma sprawiłaby, że układ sił faktycznie pozostał by bez zmian. 8 grudnia 2004 Rada Najwyższa uchwaliła jednak zmiany do Konstytucji, które zakładały zmiany formy rządów z prezydencko-parlamentarnej na parlamentarno-prezydencką.

<sup>14</sup> Епоха Кучми: десять неоднозначних років. BBC Україна, [http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2013/08/130809\\_kuchma\\_epoch\\_sx](http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2013/08/130809_kuchma_epoch_sx) [07.06.2017].

<sup>15</sup> Тамże.

Opisane działania są pierwszym przykładem manipulowania Konstytucją, który zakładał zmianę uprawnień prezydenta Ukrainy, kierując się przy tym interesami poszczególnych osób czy grup politycznych. Reforma ta bowiem umożliwiała Leonidowi Kuczmię zachowanie dotychczasowych wpływów na ukraińskiej scenie politycznej, nawet tracąc stanowisko prezydenta. Oznaczała także osłabienie instytucji prezydenta Ukrainy poprzez zmiany jego uprawnień (kompetencji).

Kolejny prezydent – Wiktor Juszczenko objął stanowisko 10 stycznia 2005 r. w warunkach obowiązywania parlamentarno-prezydenckiej formy rządów. Drodze Juszczenki do stanowiska prezydenta Ukrainy towarzyszyła rewolucja pomarańczowa, istota której przypomnijmy polegała na uświadomieniu przez społeczeństwo potrzeby nagłej zmiany, którą, jak w tym czasie jak się wydawało, może zapewnić Wiktor Juszczenko. Po wybraniu nowego prezydenta rzeczywistość w sposób dość znaczący odbiegała od oczekiwań – zamiast globalnych zmian i poprawy jakości życia przyszło rozczarowanie. Nie zważając na fakt, iż polityka Juszczenki była nakierowana na zbliżenie z UE i NATO społeczeństwo nie mogło jednak wybaczyć lekkomyślności w realizacji obietnic wygłoszonych na Majdanie. W związku z czym porażka Wiktora Juszczenki w kolejnych wyborach wydawała się oczywista.

Na skutki zmian konstytucji nie przyszło nam długo czekać. W czasie rządów Juszczenki byliśmy świadkami konfliktu pomiędzy nim a osobami, którzy popierali go w czasie kampanii wyborczej. Konflikt ten był dynamizowany za sprawą nowego formatu kompetencji prezydenta, który zakładał deprecjonowanie instytucji prezydenta w stosunku do parlamentu. Mimo faktu, iż Kuczma stracił swoją dotychczasową pozycję, dokonano osłabienia instytucji prezydenta. Naszym zdaniem taka zmiana konstytucji jest pozytywnym krokiem w kierunku demokratyzacji kompetencji prezydenta, jego roli i znaczenia w systemie politycznym państwa. Można by także założyć, że gdyby zmiany do Konstytucji były bardziej fundamentalne działalność ówczesnej władzy byłaby także dużo skuteczniejsza.

W wyniku wyborów prezydenckich w 2010 zwycięstwo odniósł Wiktor Janukowycz. Negatywne skutki jego prezydentury były przewidywalne, ale jednak jej wynik przerósł wszystkie prognozy. Mieliśmy do czynienia z załamaniem praktycznie wszystkich sfer życia społecznego. Znaczna część ludności wyjechała za granicę, podjęto działania na rzecz wznowienia dyktatury politycznej, utworzono klanowo-oligarchiczny model kapitalizmu państwowo-monopolistycznego, Ukrainę doprowadzono do bankructwa z dużym deficytem budżetowym.

Z perspektywy analizy polityczno-prawnej instytucji prezydenckiej należałoby zaznaczyć, że na samym początku kadencji Janukowycza, pod pretekstem naruszeń proceduralnych, anulowano Ustawę o zmianach do Konstytucji z dnia 8 grudnia 2004. Tym samym Ukraina powróciła do konstytucji z 1996 r., a tym samym i prezydencko-parlamentarnej formy rządów. Prezydent z powrotem uzyskał uprawnienia do nominacji kandydatury premiera i decydowania w dużym stopniu o składzie rządu, co sprawiło, że instytucja prezydenta dominowała nad parlamentem. Połączenie mało demokratycznych kompetencji prezydenta z osobą Wiktora Janukowycza,

doprowadziło do kardynalnych zmian w systemie politycznym charakteryzujących się przybieraniem przez system oznak reżimu autorytarnego.

Zamiast przewidywanego „zakręcania śrubek” polityka Janukowycza doprowadziła do nowego Majdanu, na którym społeczeństwo zażądało nie przyjście do władzy nowego kandydata, a dymisji Janukowycza i jego otoczenia. Tym razem rewolucja nabrała nieco innych obrotów – zmobilizowała się rekordowa ilość obywateli, dochodziło do konfliktów zbrojnych oraz masakry demonstrantów. W rezultacie naród osiągnął postawiony przez siebie cel – prezydent i najbliższe jego otoczenie uciekli z państwa.

W okresie pomiędzy utratą przez Janukowycza władzy a kolejnymi wyborami prezydenckimi swoje funkcje sprawowała tak zwana „władza kryzysowa”. 21 lutego 2014 Rada Najwyższa pod przewodnictwem Arsenija Jaceniuka przyjęła Ustawę o wznowieniu obowiązywania niektórych zapisów Konstytucji Ukrainy, w wyniku czego Ukraina powróciła do Konstytucji z 2004 r., co skutkowało powrotem do dominacji parlamentu w relacjach parlament – prezydent.

Nowym prezydentem, odnowionej już Ukrainy z jasno wyrażonymi demokratycznymi dążeniami został Petro Poroszenko. Uzyskał znaczne poparcie obywateli tak jak w kampanii wyborczej kreował się jako osoba kompetentna, która rozumie potrzeby/problemy społeczeństwa oraz wie jak je rozwiązać. Na obecną chwilę możemy jednak twierdzić, że większość cech charakterystycznych wizerunkowi wyborczemu Petra Poroszenki nie została pozytywnie zweryfikowana przez społeczeństwo, co sprawia, że z perspektywy dnia dzisiejszego, są traktowane jako część technologii politycznych.

Poroszenko, zarówno jak i Juszczenko, został prezydentem republiki parlamentarno-prezydenckiej. Rządy pierwszej jednak w sposób zasadniczy różniły się od rządów Juszczenki. Praktyka bowiem wskazuje na fakt, że de jure w warunkach republiki parlamentarno-prezydenckiej Poroszenko de facto udało się stworzyć model prezydencko-parlamentarny, który w swojej autorytarnej istocie może konkurować jeśli nie z modelem zbudowanym przez 2 lata przez Wiktora Janukowycza, to na pewno z modelem obowiązującym za czasów rządów Leonida Kuczmy. Taki stan rzeczy, jak się wydaje, jest spowodowany: po pierwsze, cechami osobowościowymi samego Petra Poroszenki, który będąc skutecznym przedsiębiorcą przyzwyczajony jest do zarządzania w sposób autorytarny; po drugie – sytuacją obecnego stanu rzeczy na Ukrainie, czyli aneksją przez Rosję Krymu i wojną na Donbasie wspieraną przez wspomnianą już Rosję, co sprawia, że obywatele chętniej udzielają poparcia silnemu przywódcy, co z kolei pozwala na usprawiedliwienie nie niedemokratycznych i nieprofesjonalnych działań motywowanych obroną interesów państwa.

Podsumowując analizę ewolucji instytucji prezydenckiej na Ukrainie, należy zaznaczyć, że zarówno jak i w innych republikach postradzieckich, jej działalność, prócz podstaw prawnych, w sposób dość wyraźny uzależniona jest od cech osobowościowych każdego z prezydentów, w tym także od koniunktury społeczno-politycznej charakterystycznej dla określonego okresu czasu.

## **Anti-immigrant far-right parties in the visegrad countries: representation, political success and ideological positioning**

The article is devoted to consideration and comparison of representativeness, political (electoral, parliamentary and governmental) successes and ideological positioning of anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries. The researcher explained that the formation of anti-immigrant parties in the region has passed several stages that were conditioned with significant events of their development, but reckoned that the electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties are distinctive. It was found that anti-immigrant parties in the countries of Visegrad group ideologically are the products of post-materialistic society. The author also stated that the rhetoric of anti-immigrant parties in the region gained publicity and relevance after 2010, when the problems of migration policy of the European Union appeared to be the most dangerous. Generally speaking, it was argued that ideological issues of migration policy are the cornerstone of ideological and political positioning of anti-immigrant parties, but they are not sufficient to warrant their positioning as a separate ideological family of parties.

*Keywords: party, anti-immigrant party, "new right" parties, "new" policy, the Visegrad countries.*

## **АНТИІМІГРАНТСЬКІ УЛЬТРАПРАВІ ПАРТІЇ В КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ: РЕПРЕЗЕНТАТИВНІСТЬ, ПОЛІТИЧНІ УСПІХИ ТА ІДЕОЛОГІЧНЕ ПОЗИЦІОНУВАННЯ**

Стаття присвячена розгляду й порівнянню репрезентативності, політичних (електоральних, парламентських і урядових) успіхів й ідеологічного позиціонування антиіммігрантських партій в країнах Вишеградської групи. Дослідник аргументував, що формування антиіммігрантських партій в регіоні пройшло кілька етапів, які зумовлювались певними знаковими подіями їхнього розвитку. Але виявлено, що електоральні успіхи антиіммігрантських партій є дистинктивними. Встановлено, що ідеологічно антиіммігрантські партії у країнах Вишеградської групи є продуктом постматеріалістичного суспільства. Виявлено, що риторика антиіммігрантських партій у країнах регіону розголосу та актуальності набула після 2010 р., коли максимально виявились проблеми міграційної політики Європейського союзу. Аргументовано, що ідеологічно питання міграційної політики є нарізним каменем ідеологічного і політичного

позиціонування антиіммігрантських партій. Але це не є достатньою підставою їхнього позиціонування як ідеологічної сім'ї партій.

**Ключові слова:** партія, антиіммігрантська партія, «нові праві» партії, «нова» політика, країни Вишеградської групи.

The issue of migration policy in the Visegrad countries found its representation in constructing one of the divisions of the “new” policy, which combined issues concerning protection of ethnic community’s rights and liberties in certain countries, as well as solutions of migration problems and preservation of national heritage. It is incorporated in the fact that since the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however mainly in 2003-2016 some “new” far-right political parties in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic started positioning themselves as straightly anti-immigrant, consequently this phenomenon (first of all on the ground of supplementing experience of anti-immigrant parties in Western European countries) was generalized and substantiated in political science. It revealed in the fact that the main attribute and distinctive marker of anti-immigrant parties became their mainly populist and even xenophobic<sup>1</sup> trend against immigrants. Therefore, it is quite urgent and topical in political science to specify and systematize knowledge on history of formation, representativeness, ideological positioning and political (electoral and governmental) successes of anti-immigrant parties, in particular on the instance of the Visegrad countries, which over 2015-2017 were the ones, which to the biggest extent faced the problems of the migration crisis in Europe.

Current range of problems has found its theoretical and methodological justification in the works by such scholars as I. Androshchuk<sup>2</sup>, D. Art<sup>3</sup>, J. Berg<sup>4</sup>, L. Bustikova<sup>5</sup>, M. Fennema<sup>6</sup>, B. Filatov<sup>7</sup>, G. Harris<sup>8</sup>, J. Hainmueller and M. Hiscox<sup>9</sup>, C. Keller<sup>10</sup>, M. Krtolica<sup>11</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1997, s. 251.; A. Romanyuk, *Sociopolitychnyj podil „novoyi polityky” v krayinax Zabudnoyi Evropy*, „Politohichnyj visnyk” 2007, vol 27, nr. 239-253.

<sup>2</sup> I. Androshchuk, *Ultrapravi politychni partii, yikhnie pokhodzhenia, ideolohichne pozysionuvannia ta miste v partinui systemi Chekhii (1990-2015 rr.)* „Politykus” 2016, vol 1, s. 7-13.

<sup>3</sup> D. Art, *Inside the Radical Right. The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.

<sup>4</sup> J. Berg, *Race, Class, Gender and Social Space: Using an Intersectional Approach to Study Immigration Attitudes*, „The Sociological Quarterly” 2010, vol 51, nr. 2, s. 278-302.

<sup>5</sup> L. Bustikova, *The Radical Right in Eastern Europe*, [w:] *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2017.

<sup>6</sup> M. Fennema, *Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, „Party Politics” 1997, vol 3, nr. 4, s. 473-492.

<sup>7</sup> B. Filatov, *Patriotychni partii suchasnoho ES: osoblyvosti instytutsinoho dyzainu*, „Zbirnyk naukovykh prats „Hilecia: naukovyi visnyk” 2017, vol 116, nr. 1, s. 322-326.

<sup>8</sup> G. Harris, *The extreme right in contemporary Europe: a sign of the times or an enemy within the gates?*, Paper prepared for the EUSA Biennial Conference, Boston, March 5-7, 2015.

<sup>9</sup> J. Hainmueller, M. Hiscox, *Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe*, „International Organization” 2007, vol 61, nr. 2, s. 399-442.

<sup>10</sup> S. Carolyn, *Elections and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the European Union*, Presented in session „Attitudes towards immigration: change over time” at the 3rd International ESS Conference, Lausanne, July 13-15, 2016.

<sup>11</sup> M. Krtolica, *The new radical right political parties in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe: danger to the democracy or just an illiberal décor?*, Wyd. The University „Ss. Cyril and Methodius” 2016.

R. Kunovich<sup>12</sup>, G. Lahav<sup>13</sup>, L. McLaren<sup>14</sup>, L. Quillian<sup>15</sup>, J. Rovny<sup>16</sup>, S. Schneider<sup>17</sup>, I. Sletaune<sup>18</sup>, N. van de Walle<sup>19</sup>. However, appealing to them does not generate a systemized logical frame and diversified image concerning understanding of the anti-immigrant parties' phenomenon in the Visegrad countries, which is a key task of the current research.

It is historically known, that anti-immigrant political parties in the Visegrad group started their formation in the late 80s and early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. During this period were formed such parties as: "The Coalition for Republic – Republicans" and "The Right Bloc" (Pravý Blok, PB) – in the Czech Republic; the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) and the People's Party "Our Slovakia" (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, LSNS) – in Slovakia; "The Party for Justice and Life" (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) – in Hungary; the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN), "The Party X" (Partia X Patriotów Polskich, X), the Polish National Community (Polska Wspólnota Narodowa, PWN), "The Polish National Front" (Polski Front Narodowy, PFN), "Fatherland" (Ojczyzna, O), "Action Poland" (Akcja Polska, AP), The Catholic-National Movement (Ruch Katolicko-Narodowy, RKN) and "The Polish Accord" (Porozumienie Polskie, PrP) – in Poland.

The second stage of anti-immigrant parties' formation in the Visegrad countries was observed in the early and late 2000s, when were established such political forces as: "The League of Polish Families" (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), "The National League" (Liga Narodowa, LN), "The Alliance for Poland" (Przymierze dla Polski, PdP), "The League of Sovereignty Protection" (Liga Obrony Suwerenności, LOS), "The Defense of the Polish People" (Obrona Narodu Polskiego, ONP), "The Family – Fatherland" (Rodzina-Ojczyzna, R-O), "The Native Home" (Dom Ojczysty, DO), The Polish National Party (Polska Partia Narodowa, PPN), "The Polish Forum" (Forum Polskie, FP), "The Patriotic Movement" (Ruch Patriotyczny, RPt), "The Polish National Congress" (Narodowy Kongres Polski, NKP), "Forward Poland" (Naprzód Polsko, NP), "The Patriotic Poland" (Polska Patriotyczna, PP), "The Alliance of the Polish Nation" (Przymierze Narodu Polskiego, PNP) and "Libertas" (Libertas Polska, LP) – in Poland; "The Movement for Better Hungary" (Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom, Jobbik) – in Hungary; "The Republicans of Myroslav Sladek" (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS), "The Labor Party" (Dělnická strana,

<sup>12</sup> R. Kunovich, *Social Structural Sources of Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe*, „International Journal of Sociology“ 2002, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 39-57.

<sup>13</sup> G. Lahav, *Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union: Does it Matter?*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 2004, vol 37, nr. 10, s. 1151-1183.

<sup>14</sup> L. McLaren, *Anti-Immigrant Threat in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants*, „Social Forces“ 2003, vol 81, nr. 3, s. 909-936.

<sup>15</sup> L. Quillian, *Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe*, „American Sociological Review“ 1995, vol 60, nr. 1, s. 586-611.

<sup>16</sup> J. Rovny, *The Other „Other“: Party Responses to Immigration in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. University of Gothenburg 2014.

<sup>17</sup> S. Schneider, *Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Outgroup Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat*, „European Sociological Review“ 2008, vol 24, nr. 1, s. 53-67.

<sup>18</sup> I. Sletaune, *Anti-immigration parties in the European Parliament*, Wyd. University of Oslo 2013.

<sup>19</sup> N. van de Walle, *Neither Right, Nor Left, But French? Historical Legacies, the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, and the Far Right in France*, „CUREJ“ 2008, vol 86.



DS), “The Labor Party of Social Justice” (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti, DSSS) and “The Independent Democrats” (Nezávislí demokraté, ND) – in the Czech Republic; “The Right Slovak National Party” (Pravá Slovenská národná strana, PSNS) – in Slovakia.

And finally since 2010 the third stage of anti-immigrant parties formation in the Visegrad group has started, as at that time were formed such political forces as: “The Congress of New Rights” (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP), “The National Movement” (Ruch Narodowy, RN) and Kukiz’15 (Kukiz’15, K) – in Poland; “We are Family” (Sme Rodina, SR) and “The Nation and Justice” – “Our Party” (Národ a spravodlivos – Naša strana, NaS-NS) – in Slovakia; “The Czech Sovereignty” (Česká suverenita, ČS) – in the Czech Republic.

Generally, it allows us to summarize that historically the biggest number of anti-immigrant parties over the whole period after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty system, among the analyzed countries, were formed in Poland, while the lowest number appeared in Hungary. Initially, formation of anti-immigrant parties was presupposed by the Euro-integration processes in the region, later it was the result of joining the EU, and now it is the consequence of the European migration crisis. Along with that, it is notable that not all of the abovementioned parties are functioning nowadays, as many of them (in detail see Table 1) at different times stopped their activity. Moreover, not all anti-immigrant parties are equally politically (electorally and governmentally) successful.

In this context, i.e. in the light of electoral and governmental successes of anti-immigrant parties, there are good reasons to divide all countries of the region into three groups. The first group is represented by the Czech Republic, where the impact of the “new right” parties is rather slight/transitional, though earlier it was characterized by their popularity (as in case of the political force “The Coalition for Republic – Republicans” (SPR/RSC)), in particular their presence in the parliament. To the second group belong Poland and Hungary, where anti-immigrant parties are represented in legislature (as of 2017 in Poland it is Kukiz’15, and before it was “The League of Polish Families” (LPR), in Hungary – “The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik), earlier it was “The Party for Justice and Life” (MIÉP)), though traditionally (with some exceptions) they do not participate in government formation. Finally, to the third group belongs Slovakia, where anti-immigrant parties are permanently represented in legislature (as of 2017 there are 3 such parties, namely the Slovak National Party (SNS), the People’s Party “Our Slovakia” (LSNS) and “We are Family” (SR)), and some of them (in particular the Slovak National Party) occasionally take part in formation of governmental cabinets (in detail see Table 1).

In general, it makes the ground for the conclusion that the most influential “new right” anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries since the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were and are (in descending order of political successes) such political forces as “The Slovak National Party” (SNS), “The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik), “The League of Polish Families” (LPR), Kukiz’15 (K), “The Party for Justice and Life” (MIÉP) and “The Coalition for Republic – The Republic Party of Czechoslovakia” (SPR-RSC), The People’s Party “Our Slovakia” (LSNS) and “We are Family” (SR).

**Table 1.** Anti-immigrant parties (and movements/associations which are equivalent to them) in the Visegrad countries: ideological positioning and political successes (1989–2017)

Country	Name of the party/electoral bloc ideological positioning	Year of the party formation	Maximum number of electorate, %	Maximum number of parliamentary mandates	Parliamentary representation (number of times)	Maximum number of votes at the elections to the EP, %	Maximum number of MEP	Representation in the EP	Governmental party (number of times)
Poland	The Catholic-National Movement (Ruch katolicko-Narodowy, RKN): national-Catholicism, euro-scepticism, anticommunism	1997 – effective	K	5 (2005)	2	–	–	–	–
	“The League of Polish Families” (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR): national-conservatism, national-Catholicism, Christian-democracy, euro-scepticism, protectionism, solidarism	2001 – effective	8,0	38 (2001)	2	15,9	10 (2004)	1	2
	“The National League” (Liga Narodowa, LN): national-democracy, euro-scepticism	2007 – effective	K	3 (2007)	1	K	–	–	–
	“The Congress of New Rights” (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP): liberal-conservatism, social-conservatism, euro-scepticism	2011 – effective	1,1	1 (2015)	1	7,2	4 (2014)	1	–
	The National Movement (Ruch Narodowy, RN): national-conservatism, national-Catholicism, nationalism, euro-scepticism	2012 – effective	K	1 (2015)	1	1,4	–	–	–
	Kukiz'15 (Kukiz'15, K): nationalism, right populism, euro-scepticism, republicanisim	2015 – effective	8,8	42 (2015)	1	–	–	–	–
Slovakia	The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS): Slovak nationalism, national-conservatism, social-conservatism, euro-scepticism	1989 – effective	13,9	22 (1990)	9	5,6	1 (2009)	1	7
	The People's Party “Our Slovakia” (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS): Slovak nationalism, euro-scepticism, right populism, national-conservatism, social-conservatism, antiglobalism	2000 – effective	8,0	14 (2016)	1	1,7	–	–	–
	“We are Family” (Sme Rodina, SR): conservatism, right populism, euro-scepticism	2015 – effective	6,6	11 (2016)	1	–	–	–	–
Hungary	“The Party for Justice and Life” (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIEP): Hungarian nationalism, social-conservatism	1993 – effective	5,5	14 (1998)	1	2,4	–	–	–
	“The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik Magyarországet Mozgalom, Jobbik): Hungarian nationalism, irredentism, social-conservatism, euro-scepticism, anti-globalism, anti-Zionism, neo-Nazism, extremism	2003 – effective	20,2	23 (2014)	2	14,8	3 (2009, 2014)	2	–
The Czech Republic	“The Coalition for Republic – Republicans” (Sdružení pro Republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR/RSC): national-conservatism, republicanisim, euro-scepticism, anti-Germans, anti-globalism, right populism	1989–2001, 2008–2013, 2016 – effective	8,0	18 (1996)	2	0,3	–	–	–

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.04.2017]; W. Nordsteck, A. Ramonatte, *Parties and Elections in Europe: The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*, Źródło: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/> [odczyt: 01.04.2017].

## Other anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries

### ***Erstwhile politically (electorally and governmentally) unsuccessful parties:***

*Poland:* the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN) – 1989–2004, “The Party X” (Partia X Patriotów Polskich, X) – 1990–1999, “The Polish National Front” (Polski Front Narodowy, PFN) – 1991–1995, “Fatherland” (Ojczyzna, O) – 1992–1996, “Action Poland” (Akcja Polska, AP) – 1992–1998, “The Family – Fatherland” (Rodzina-Ojczyzna, R-O) – 2003–2006, “The Native Home” (Dom Ojczysty, DO) – 2004–2005, The Polish National Party (Polska Partia Narodowa, PPN) – 2004–2014, “The Polish Forum” (Forum Polskie, FP) – 2005–2006, “The Patriotic Movement” (Ruch Patriotyczny, RPt) – 2005–2014, “The Polish National Congress” (Narodowy Kongres Polski, NKP) – 2007–2010, “Forward Poland” (Naprzód Polsko, NP) – 2008–2010, “The Alliance of the Polish Nation” (Przymierze Narodu Polskiego, PNP) – 2009–2013, „Libertas“ (Libertas Polska, LP) – 2009–2014.

*The Czech Republic:* “The Republicans of Myroslav Sladek” (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS) – 2001–2008, “The Labor Party” (Dělnická strana, DS) – 2003–2010, “The Independent Democrats” (Nezávislí demokraté, ND) – 2005–2015.

### ***Currently existing and electorally (electorally and governmentally) unsuccessful parties:***

*Poland:* “The National Revival of Poland” (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP) – since 1981, the Polish National Community (Polska Wspólnota Narodowa, PWN) – since 1990, “The Polish Accord” (Porozumienie Polskie, PrP) – since 1999, The Polish-Polonia Organization of the Polish Nation – Polish League (Polsko-Polonijna Organizacja Narodu Polskiego – Liga Polska, ONP-LP) – since 2000, “The Alliance for Poland” (Przymierze dla Polski, PdP) – since 2001, “The League of Sovereignty Protection” (Liga Obrony Suwerenności, LOS) – since 2002, “The Defense of the Polish People” (Obrona Narodu Polskiego, ONP) – since 2005, “The Patriotic Poland” (Polska Patriotyczna, PP) – since 2008.

*Slovakia:* “The Right Slovak National Party” (Pravá Slovenská národná strana, PSNS) – since 2001, “The Nation and Justice” – “Our Party” (Národ a spravodlivos – Naša strana, NaS-NS) – since 2011.

*The Czech Republic:* “The Right Bloc” (Pravý Blok, PB) – since 1996, “The Labor Party of Social Justice” (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti, DSSS) – since 2004, “The Czech Sovereignty” (Česká suverenita, ČS) – since 2011.

The peculiarity of the Slovak National Party is that it is permanently represented in the Slovak legislature and several times participated in the governmental cabinet formation. As to its ideological positioning it is a social-national party, which in its rhetoric quite often uses ultranationalist extremist slogans, concerning Hungarians, Roma and homosexuals, which

allows us to define it as neo-racial<sup>20</sup>. This political party is notable for the 2008 events, when on its official website in the section for discussing party issues was published a map, where the territory of Hungary was divided between two countries – Slovakia and Austria. After public disclosure the map was deleted, and the party denied its implication to the accident. Along with that, numerous misunderstandings are caused by the background of one of the party leaders J. Sloty, in particular concerning “aggression” against the Hungarians. It was revealed, for example, in the fact that he repeatedly called the fascist leader J. Tiso “one of the most outstanding sons of the Slovak nation”<sup>21</sup>. Being a member of the government the party often demands the position of the Minister of human rights and national minorities. In their turn, ideological attributes of the People’s Party “Our Slovakia” (LSNS) and the party “We are Family” (SR) are Slovak nationalism, euro-scepticism, right populism, national-conservatism, social-conservatism and anti-globalism.

In reference to the most representative and successful anti-immigrant party in Hungary – “The Movement for Better Hungary” (Jobbik) we may say that this political force is conventionally interpreted by political scientists as radical-nationalistic, fascist or neo-fascist, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and homophobic<sup>22</sup>. Quite interesting is the fact that the party interprets itself as a “principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian force”, whose main task is to protect Hungarian values and interests. Nowadays, the party positions itself as one of the largest (electoral successes) in Hungary, however it is in opposition. Furthermore, the party is represented in the European parliament (according to the results of 2009 and 2014 elections). Another “new” anti-immigrant right party of Hungary (which was successful earlier) is “The Party for Justice and Life” (MIÉP), which was mainly characterized as anti-Semitic. In 2005 this party joined the ranks of Jobbik forming “The Alliance of Parties of Third position” (MIÉP–Jobbik). Consequently, only the former of the analyzed Hungarian “new” right anti-immigrant parties enjoys electoral successes now.

The peculiarity of anti-immigrant parties in Poland is the fact that their number in the country is the highest in the region, however only one of them, namely “The League of Polish Families” (LPR), was earlier characterized as the most successful far-right anti-immigrant political force in the Visegrad countries. It revealed in the fact that in due times this party was

<sup>20</sup> S. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2004, s. 44.; Z. Barany, *The East European gypsies: regime change, marginality, and Ethnopolitics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2002, s. 408.; I. Jeffries, *Eastern Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century*, Wyd. Routledge 2002, s. 352.; S. Ramet, *Whose democracy?: nationalism, religion, and the doctrine of collective rights in post-1989 Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 1997, s. 128.; S. White, J. Batt, P. Lewis, *Developments in Central and East European politics*, Wyd. Duke University Press 2007, s. 63.

<sup>21</sup> *New Slovak Government Embraces Ultra-Nationalists, Excludes Hungarian Coalition Party*, „Hungarian Human Rights Foundation”, July 9, 2006.

<sup>22</sup> R. Frucht, *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture*, Wyd. ABC-CLIO 2004, s. 359-360.; G. Huggan, Law J., *Racism Postcolonialism Europe*, Wyd. Liverpool University Press 2010.; S. Inder, *Democracy, ethnic diversity, and security in post-communist Europe*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2001, s. 97.; H. Kitschelt, *Left-libertarian parties*, „World Politics” 1988, vol 40, nr. 1, s. 194-234.; A. Lisiak, *Urban Cultures in (Post) Colonial Central Europe*, Wyd. Purdue University Press 2010, s. 18.; M. Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2001, s. 262.; L. Schori, *Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*, Wyd. Ashgate 2007.; M. Teich, D. Kováč, M. Brown, *Slovakia in History*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.

represented in the government (twice in 2006-2007). In reference to its ideological positioning political scientists have some divergences. However, it is typically described as a populist, clerical and nationalist political force. For example, A. Michlic gives characteristics of the groups which participated in formation of the party calling them chauvinistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic. Among the most interesting ideas, which laid the foundation to the party's programs at different times were the following: legalization of "soft drugs", legalization of abortions, euthanasia as well as same-sex marriages; introduction of death penalty; publication of the secret police's archives over the period of communistic development in Poland ("absolute decommunization")<sup>23</sup>. However, even despite such position the party gained its representation in the European parliament in 2004. On the other hand, its popularity significantly decreased after 2007. In 2015 appeared its electoral substitution – the party (association) Kukiz'15 (K), which on the basis of nationalism, right populism, euro-scepticism and republicanism, managed to lead more than 40 deputies into the Polish Seim and as a result became the most parliamentary successful anti-immigrant political force in the history of the post-communist Poland.

Finally, in the Czech Republic anti-immigrant political parties usually are not electorally and parliamentary and governmentally successful and are numerically insignificant. The exception is "The Coalition for Republic – Republicans" (SPR/RSC), which in the late 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was represented by almost 10% of members of the Chamber of Deputies. This party is quite interesting as it was formed in 1989 within the boundaries of the then Czechoslovakia. After that it changed its format and even was banned for several times, however in due course of time it restarted its activity<sup>24</sup>. This is a national-conservative, republican, Roma-phobia, anti-Germans, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and euro-sceptical far-right party, which adheres to the principles of the Austrian school of economics. It is in harsh opposition to the European Union, NATO and current Czech migration policy. Besides, it is important that at proper time SPR/RSC gained its additional popularity due to clear and strict anti-immigrant rhetoric, aimed first of all against the Vietnamese, who worked in the Czech Republic on the basis of the agreements between the communistic countries, as well as its position against Roma<sup>25</sup>. It is quite notable, that anti-immigrant rhetoric to a much smaller degree is present in activity of such political forces in the Czech Republic as: "Dawn of Direct Democracy" (UPD), later renamed

<sup>23</sup> S. Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2004, s. 94. Borejsza, J., K. Ziemer, M. Hulas, *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Europe: Legacies and lessons from the twentieth century*, Wyd. Polska Akademia Nauk 2006, s. 365.; L. Langea de Sarah, S. Guerrab, *The League of Polish Families between East and West, past and present*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies“ 2009, vol 42, nr. 4, s. 527-549.; J. Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present*, Wyd. University of Nebraska Press 2006, s. 363.; R. Pankowski, M. Kornak, *Poland*, [w:] C. Mudde (ed.), *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2005, s. 157-159.; S. Ramet, *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010, s. 80.

<sup>24</sup> I. Androshchuk, *Ultrapravi politychni partii, yikhnie pokhodzhennia, ideolohichne pozysionuvannia ta miste v partiinii systemi Chekhii (1990-2015 rr.)*; „Politykus“ 2016, vol 1, s. 7-13.; M. Basl, M. Mareš, J. Smolík, P. Vejvodová, *Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR*, Wyd. Grada 2011, s. 240.; A. Cerqueirová, *Republikáni: šokující odhalení*, Wyd. Unholy cathedral 1999.; M. Mareš, *Right-Wing Extremism in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2012, s. 2.

<sup>25</sup> V. Hlousek, L. Kopeček, *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East Central and Western Europe Compared*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing 2010, s. 213-214.; J. Smolík, *Česká krajní pravice ve volbách do Evropského parlamentu v roce 2009*, „Rexter“ 2010, vol 8, nr. 1, s. 75-96.

into “Dawn – National Coalition” (Úsvit – Národní koalice, UNK), on the basis of which then appeared the party “Freedom and Direct Democracy” (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD). This is a euro-sceptical political force, which adheres to the ideological fundamentals of national-liberalism, right populism, anti-immigrant/anti-Islamic rhetoric and is mainly focused on the problems of direct democracy and patriotism. In average and on the grounds of the analysis of program concepts and slogans of the above-mentioned parties it is obvious that anti-immigrant political forces in the Czech Republic are first of all far-right, as they focus on the established problems and issues of the Czech social and political development, namely: anti-Roma public mood in regions of an escalated interethnic tension<sup>26</sup>; criticism of migration processes, incorporated in potential moderate Islamophobia<sup>27</sup> (many anti-immigrant organizations in the Czech Republic support Islamic struggle against Israel and the USA, and thus interpret anti-Semitism as anti-Zionism).

Generally speaking, referring to the ideological positioning of anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries, we may state the abovementioned conclusion that the analyzed political forces are the products of the post-materialistic society and are based on the market economy and parliamentary democracy. However, they are characterized by the desire to strengthen national identity, protect national culture, in particular by means of isolation and reinforcement of national homogeneity, preserving high level of living standards, intensification of security concerning home-national life, limitation of immigration, reduction of taxes and state expenditures, reinforcement of the state's role in terms of maintaining law and order, protection of traditional family values. Therefore, on the example of such parties we can observe formation of a “new” independent family of right parties, which differ from the family of traditional right parties. The conclusion is that ideologically we cannot interpret such political forces as exclusively anti-immigrant ones; however the question of migration policy is at any rate a cornerstone of their ideological and political positioning.

In general it is noted that the main political and ideological principles of anti-immigrant parties in the Visegrad countries, especially in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, a bit less in the Czech Republic, are euro-scepticism, anti-globalism, mono-nationalism and its predominant position over the ethnic, religious and sex diversity (in Poland concerning the Jewish minority; in Slovakia – as to Hungarians, Roma and sexual minorities; in Hungary – as to people of Hebrew origin, Roma, representatives of sexual minorities; in the Czech Republic – as to Roma), radicalism, extremism, chauvinism, xenophobia, neo-Nazism and populism. In Poland one can clearly observe clerical tendencies of the “new right” parties: nevertheless “The League of Polish Families” stands for legalization of “soft” drugs, abortions, euthanasia, same-sex marriages and death penalty. It is also notable, that rhetoric of anti-immigrant parties in the countries of the

<sup>26</sup> M. Marč, *National and right-wing radicalism in the new democracies: Czech Republic*, Paper for the workshop of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on „Right-wing extremism and its impact on young democracies in the CEE countries“, Budapest, November 19, 2010, s. 11-12.

<sup>27</sup> J. Smolík, *Česká krajní pravice ve volbách do Evropského parlamentu v roce 2009*, „Rexter“ 2010, vol 8, nr. 1, s. 75-96.

region became quite popular and urgent only after 2010, when to the greatest possible extent revealed problems of the EU migration policy, to which the Visegrad countries belong as well.

At the same time, anti-immigrant parties in the region are distinctive. Thus, in Poland the distinguished parties tend to the ideas and principles of nationalism, national-radicalism, national-conservatism, national-Catholicism, Christian democracy, solidarism, protectionism, anti-globalism and euro-scepticism. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia anti-immigrant parties traditionally function on the grounds of nationalism, national-conservatism, national-socialism, republicanism, euro-scepticism, right populism, anti-Semitism, anti-globalism and neo-Nazism. Finally, Hungarian anti-immigrant parties are conventionally established on the ideas of Hungarian nationalism, irredentism, social-conservatism, euro-scepticism, anti-globalism, anti-Zionism, neo-Nazism and extremism.

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## **Transformation of the Republic of Bulgaria and politicization of the society's ethnic awareness**

The paper deals with politicization of ethnic awareness of the society over the period of transformational changes, what especially negatively revealed in the Balkans. Permanent, relentless conflicts, which loomed large in the region in the 90s of the previous century, occasionally emerge nowadays. However, the state despite all events which take place in the neighboring countries and complexity of internal political, social and economic situation managed to avert apparent social confrontation. The analysis of the transformational process in Bulgaria gives us reasons to conclude that the state lacks a clear program of ethnic policy development, while manifestations of nationalism were enough to commence the changes. After joining the EU and NATO situation in the country experienced a vast improvement.

*Keywords: the Republic of Bulgaria, politicization of the society, transformation, political parties, coalitions, ethnic awareness, confessions.*

## **ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ РЕСПУБЛІКИ БОЛГАРІЯ ТА ПОЛІТИЗАЦІЯ ЕТНІЧНОЇ СВІДОМОСТІ СУСПІЛЬСТВА**

У статті досліджено політизацію етнічної свідомості населення в період трансформаційних змін, що особливо негативно проявилася на Балканах. Перманентні, незатухаючі конфлікти, які нуртували в регіоні впродовж 90-х рр. минулого століття, періодично виникають і нині. Але державі, незважаючи на події у сусідніх державах і складність внутрішньої політичної, соціальної та економічної ситуації, вдалось уникнути явної суспільної конфронтації. Аналіз процесу трансформації в Болгарії дає підстави для висновку, що в державі відсутня чітка програма розвитку етнічної політики, а проявів націоналізму, особливо на початку змін, було достатньо. Після вступу в ЄС та НАТО ситуація в державі суттєво покращилася.

*Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, політизація суспільства, трансформація, політичні партії, коаліції, етнічна самосвідомість, конфесії.*

Transformational processes which have been taking place in Bulgaria for over a quarter of a century greatly influenced politicization of the society. Being “stable” in its political meaning

until 1989, in the years of changes Bulgaria demonstrated absolutely different patterns of behavior. Dissatisfaction with the state of political, economic and social policy of the government made Bulgarians come out in the streets and squares with mottos, banners etc. stating their negative attitude to the policy of the government in force, and various social phenomena. Besides, enhancement of social politicization in Bulgaria was largely influenced by the growth of the society's ethnical awareness in the course of the transformational period, which was especially supported by the conflict oppositions in the Balkans. However, permanent, relentless conflicts which loomed large in the region in the 90s bypassed Bulgaria. It evidently managed to avoid apparent social confrontation, despite all events which took place in the neighboring countries and complexity of internal political, social and economic situation.

**The aim of the paper** is to give coverage to the dynamics of changes in the Bulgarians' ethnic awareness in the period of its transformation and prospects of its development.

**Recent studies and publications.** The analysis of the recent studies shows that in Ukrainian political science these problems have been studied in the works by V. Burdiak, M. Milova, I. Osadtsa and others. Significant interest has been demonstrated by the Bulgarian scientists S. Antonov, I. Miglev, M. Yelchinova, A. Zheliazkova, S. Radoslavov, Ye. Radushev, V. Stoianov. However, we believe that the problems of ethnic politicization of society have not been fully analyzed. This motivated the author to carry on the studies in the given field.

**Findings and discussion.** Promotion of democracy in the Republic of Bulgaria (RB) started on November 10, 1989 when the Central committee of the Bulgarian Communistic Party superseded its secretary general T. Zhyvkov. New leaders did not have a clear idea of the future of the state and ways of its development. Over the course of several days in Bulgaria appeared dozens of political parties. Their leaders after emotional public speeches at the political meetings, which at that time constantly took place in the center of Sofia felt themselves national heroes. And the Bulgarian society fell into euphoria.

Over the years of transformation political pluralism found expression in activity of 200 parties, unions, movements and other organizations, which on the eve of the elections formed four-five coalitions: with the Bulgarian socialistic party (BSP), the Union of democratic forces (UDF), the Movement for Rights and Liberties (MRL), the parties "Ataka", GERB (Coalition for Bulgaria, the Union of democratic forces, the Bulgarian agrarian national union (BANU), the National movement Simeon the Second (NMSS). In fact, the political model of the Republic of Bulgaria till 2001 had been bipolar, and suffered changes with the appearance of new political forces<sup>1</sup>.

In addition to the scheduled parliamentary elections three times in Bulgaria took place pre-term elections and all new governments declared introduction of liberal methods of management. Generalizing main political features of the development of the Republic of Bulgaria it is necessary to state the following: democracy and pluralism of political life; restoration of

<sup>1</sup> Burdiak V.I. Respublika Bolharia na zlami epoch: politychna transformatsiia suspilstva. Monography. Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2004. P. 219.

basic liberties of the society – freedom of speech, freedom of movement inside the country and abroad; democratization of working relations with a right for social and political protests; active, but one-vector pro-western foreign policy; dynamic changes of leaders in politics, caused by a quick pace of changes, mistakes, and even interpersonal intrigues; joining the EU and NATO and adaptation to the conditions of further development within these organizations.

Transformation included many deformations in political relations: without any critical evaluation different foreign models of management non-effective for the specific nature of the Republic of Bulgaria were introduced in the institutions and public authorities; liberalism, which was taken rather slowly and termination of significant functions of the state hardened the state of main national institutions – army, police, courts; introduction of western loyalty of public administration into the state and population affected Bulgaria and caused pathological corruption; weak financial and administrative control created conditions for an excessively high influence of the shadow economy; weakness of authority contributed to emergence of organized crime; unprincipled and amoral redistribution of property, illogical banking supervision formed another social protection of the society. Thus, the way to the final end was not easy, and included rollback and struggle.

The Republic of Bulgaria made a number of mistakes in human resourcing as well. Theoreticians, who did not have managerial experience, were nominated to high state positions. They quite well knew foreign models of democracies, but did not realize what to do with Bulgaria as an object of management and reformation. A big mistake of the period of changes was permanent confrontation of managers and opposition; the Rights' and the Lefts' views on the main political problems usually were just opposite.

In the course of the economic changes the Republic of Bulgaria also made a range of political, conceptual, principal managerial mistakes: economic reforms were excessively hot-buttoned. Reforms were developing not on the basis of correction, but on the grounds of disorder; without national strategy and organizational planning of changes in the course of the implementation; the framework of reforms was monetarism, which at that time was outdated, banking and real sectors opposed each other; interference of the international financial institutions into financial-economic activity of Bulgaria was higher, than it was prohibited by the official agreements; privatization was conducted just to form a new structure of ownership; many mistakes were made while choosing new owners – competitors from the neighboring countries, investors from off-shore zones; cooperative agricultural system was liquidated by an organizational and legal order, agricultural production was developed without subsidiaries.

Thus, from the very beginning of the transformation the Republic of Bulgaria found itself in a quite hardened situation. Along with economic and social realia of Bulgaria, significant tense was caused by ethnical problems, crippling social development of the country. To our mind, traditionally known syndrome of “Balkanism”<sup>2</sup> retains its relevance even today. Therefore,

<sup>2</sup> *Allport G. W.* The Nature of prejudice. New York: Doubleday, 1958. P. 81.

politicization of ethnical awareness in the Republic of Bulgaria during the period of transformation, formation of the state ethnic policy, its meaning for development of democracy, has a significant influence on modern political process, and without any doubts will carry impact on the future.

In addition to the Bulgarians who compose 85% of the population in the Republic of Bulgaria live representatives of other ethnic groups. Traditionally, in Bulgaria emphasis of social communication is connected not only with ethnicity but also confessionalism. Religious Bulgarians (mainly), Russians, Greeks, Romanians are Eastern Catholic Christians, while Turks, a part of Roma, Bulgarians and Tatars are Muslims. The biggest ethnical minority in the Republic of Bulgaria is a Turkish one, which worship Islam since the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. Orthodox version of Islam or Sunnism was established in Bulgaria due to the Ottoman administration, religious activists<sup>3</sup> and due to migration of the Turkmen from the Minor Asia, who were settled peasants and handicraft workers<sup>4</sup>.

Development of ethnical politics in Bulgaria is now on the third stage, which commenced after the collapse of socialism in Central Eastern Europe, when the communist theory and practice lost their value, and democracy, which changed them have not yet obtained required force and experience. Thus, in ethnical politics appeared a so-called vacuum, which is to be filled with two forces, either democracy with an internationally established human rights, or nationalism, both right and left. The main scene for manifestation of nationalism in the Republic of Bulgaria is represented by two topics: right for education in the native language and political organizations on the ethnic grounds. In both cases the political space is full of arguments, both on the side of the left and of the right. The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria prohibits formation of parties on the ethnic grounds and declares the ideas of the national unity. Article 2 states that "The Republic of Bulgaria is a unified state with local self-administration. No autonomous territorial formations are allowed"<sup>5</sup>.

However, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia showed how fragile can be traditional forms of co-existence in various extreme situations, as if proving S. Huntington's thesis, concerning the clash of civilizations<sup>6</sup>. It mattered for Bulgaria with its different ethnic, religious and language minorities. Transformation of social system in the Republic of Bulgaria aggravated the feeling of ethnic awareness of people, and therefore this period is sometimes called the time of "rebelled" ethnicity, "mobilized" ethnicity and sometimes even a period of new national restoration. That is why, attitude of the civil society in Bulgaria is closely connected with growing ethnicity, and important social processes of reformation of various spheres of life have ethnic variability. In

<sup>3</sup> Zheliazkova A. Mezhdunarodni adaptatsii i nostalgiiata: Bylgarskite turtsi v Turtsiia / Syst. A. Zheliazkova. Sofia: Mezhdunarodny tsentr po problemite na maltsinstvata i kulturniat vzaimodeistviia, 1998. P. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Radushev Ye. Demograficheski i etnoreligiozni protsesy v Zapadnite Rodopi prez XV-XVIII (Opyt za preosmysliane na ustoiichivi istoriohraficheski modeli) // Istoricheskoto bdeshe. 1998. № 1. P. 61.

<sup>5</sup> Konstitutsiia na Respublika Bylharii. Prieta or Velikoto narodno sybranie 12 yuli 1991 Sophia: Nova zvezda, 2002. P. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington S.P. After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave // Journal of Democracy. 1997. Vol. 8. № 4 (October). P. 9-10.

the Republic of Bulgaria ethnicity often takes declarative, manifested forms, becoming a mobilizing factor for acquiring dignity, collective strive for advantages on the political arena and determines social behavior of the society.

In 1965-1985 a rapid growth of population (from 8.2 to 8.9 mln.) was registered in Bulgaria, while to 2002 it reduced by 11% in comparison with 1985. In its ethnic composition the majority belongs to the Bulgarians (almost 84%). Among other ethnic groups are the Turks (9.5%), the Roma (4.6%). According to the data of the 2001 population census for 84.5% the Bulgarian language is native, for 9.6% it is the Turkish language and for 4% – the Gipsy language.<sup>7</sup>

As the Turks makes the biggest ethnic group, than the question of the minority status is traditionally connected with the rights and liberties of the Turks. The notion ethnic Turks is precedent-setting in scientific relation both in Bulgaria and Turkey<sup>8</sup>. In 1992 the number of the Bulgarian Turks (for whom the Turkish language is native) was 800 052 or 9,43% of the population in the state. But not all agree with this statistics and consider that at that time there were not more than 500 000 – 600 000 “real” Turks, while the rest 800 000 were “supplemented” by Roma and Bulgarian-Muslims, who were registered as the Turks. However, certain circles in Turkey speculate on the exaggerated data as to the Turks in the Republic of Bulgaria. In 1994 a deputy of Majlis and a member of the Party of national activity S. Shakhin stated that in the Republic Bulgaria lived 3 mln Turks, including pomaks (people from intermarriages between the Bulgarians and Muslims), Turkish-speaking Roma<sup>9</sup>, and later the Movement for Rights and Liberties (the party of ethnic Turks) insisted on this statistics in its election programme.

From the ethnic-linguistic perspective the Turks are close to the Bulgarian Tatars<sup>10</sup>, who preserved their identity and formed a modern group of Tatars in the Republic of Bulgaria. Some citizens identified themselves as the Turks and immigrated to Turkey in 1989. In 1992 4 515 (0.05%) of them registered in Bulgaria, though they believe that there are 20 000 of them here. A half lives in cities, the rest in villages in the north-eastern part of Bulgaria. The Tatars in general are Muslim-Sunnites, though they identify themselves as more moderate than the Turks in question of religion. In the language context they assimilate with the Turks and this makes revival of their identity even more complicated<sup>11</sup>.

The Roma-Muslim community largely exceeds the Tatars one in the Republic of Bulgaria. Thus, in accordance with the Turkish estimations they compose almost 75% of the Roma population, according to the other estimation it is 40% from all Bulgarian Roma. In 1992 313 396 (3.69%) identified themselves as the Roma, while unofficially there are 500 000 – 800 000 Roma in Bulgaria. The majority of them are Christians, and this supports the thought that the Roma

<sup>7</sup> *Naselenie Bolbarii*. Perepis 2001 hoda. URL: [http://www.worcount.com/1/centrevropa\\_files/naselbolgar.htm](http://www.worcount.com/1/centrevropa_files/naselbolgar.htm)

<sup>8</sup> *Stoianov V.* Turskoto naselenie v Bylharia mezhdru poliusite na etnicheska politika: Bulgaro-Turcica 2. Sophia: Publ. House Lik, 1998. P. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Tri miliona turtzii prebroi u nas deputat Medzhlisa* // Trud. 1994. 21 yanuari.

<sup>10</sup> *Antonov S., Mihlev I.* Tatars // Obshnosti i identichnosti v Bylharii. Sophia, 1998. P. 356.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* P. 360.

adopt a religion point of view of the majority in the country they inhabit and changing their place of residence they change religion: "In Christian lands they are Christians, in Muslim lands they are Mohammedans, and among Protestants they will be Protestants"<sup>12</sup>. The same specificity characterizes them in the Republic of Bulgaria, what explains the reduction of number of Muslims among the Roma ethnoses. Therefore, the Muslim society is not homogeneous, does not have common language, self-awareness and includes various ethnic groups – the Turks, Tatars, Pomaks, Roma, Gagauzes etc.

For ethnic groups existence several factors are of great importance: origin – objective historical feature; cultural peculiarities, including language and religion; ethnic self-awareness, represented in ethnic name. The category of ethnic self-awareness is determined in different ways<sup>13</sup>. It makes the research more complicated, as every time it is necessary to correlate methodological principles, which allow studying regularities of social development of an ethnic group and personality. Each ethnoses of the Republic of Bulgaria has ethnic self-awareness, mentality, which often cause tension in social communication, complicate transition to democracy. The Bulgarian Orthodox Christians are more externally open, frank, categorical and objective in communication. Besides, the peculiarities of the national character and sense of being a part of the dominating majority are put not in the last place by the Bulgarians, as well as the essential characteristics of a person as a bearer of these peculiarities<sup>14</sup>.

Development of Islam in Bulgaria after 1989 is connected with empowerment of minorities, what concerns all Muslims, despite their division in Sunnites, Shiites, Turks, Tatars, Roma or Pomaks. Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine the state of the Turks and Muslims at the end of Zhivkov's ruling, when the attempts to assimilate them under pressure led to the fact that almost 320 000 Muslims (later were provided numbers of 330 000, 350 000 and even 360 000) who were expelled from the country "during the process of revival" escaped to Turkey in 1989. The difference matters, but the thing is not only in that, but more than 1 mln people were forcibly deprived of basic human rights – communication in native language, support and development of traditional culture, own names, rights to manifest themselves and the way how they felt.

After the change of the regime a new government fostered all efforts on settlement of the causes and consequences of the failure of the assimilation policy. However, even the first attempts caused fierce ethnic tension. The Bulgarians took action in public meetings with nationalistic slogans: "Bulgaria for Bulgarians!", "No to Turks in the parliament!". The Turks' mottos were not better<sup>15</sup>. In some regions extremists desecrated Muslim building and even exploded

<sup>12</sup> *Marushyakova Ye.* Tsihanite v Bylharii i tiakhnata relihiia // *Aspekty ne etnokulturnata situatsiia v Bylharii*. Sophia: TsID, 1992. P. 112.

<sup>13</sup> *Drobyszheva L. M.* Natsionalizm, etnicheskoe samosoznanie i konflikty v transformiruiushchemi obschestve // *Natsionalnoe samosoznanie i natsionalizm v Rossiiskoi Federatsii nachala 90 hodov*. Moscow, 1994. Pp. 30-31.

<sup>14</sup> *Yelchinova M.* Modelirane na etnichnaia obraz v situatsiia na perekhod // *Perekhodyt v Bylharii prez pohleda na sotsialnite nauki*. Sophia, 1997. P.163.

<sup>15</sup> *Tri miliona turtsii prebroi u nas deputat Medzhliisa* // *Trud*. 1994. 21 yanuari.

Jamis (mosques)<sup>16</sup>. In response to these actions Muslims started to demand autonomy, arm themselves and form military groups.

In the early 90s scientists accentuated on severe tension in ethnic policy of the Republic of Bulgaria: growth of ethnic self-awareness of the Turkish population in the state; irrepressible Bulgarian nationalism, which was connected with it and disguised as a reaction to the Turkish national awareness; attempts, as it was before, to neutralize conflict potential through the policy of maneuvering and retreat by both sides<sup>17</sup>.

In fact, the government had to pursue the policy of maneuvering. Similar actions were conducted by the Turks. Political representatives of minorities managed to mute differences, keep ethnic peace and order within the state and gradually revive rights and liberties of the minority. Any step in this direction caused heated debates in political circles either in connection with return of Turkish-Arabian names and the right to study the Turkish language in the educational institutions or in connection with the MRL and its constitutional legitimacy. Gradually, in the Republic of Bulgaria people started deeply realizing the complexity of the situation, understand the needs of “other” co-citizens, less react to different pseudo-patriotic appeals of certain circles. The society “maturated” too painfully and durably, but there was no sense to expect something else, as changes in mental consciousness occur rather slowly, not taking into account the fact that the process was fueled by live Balkan nationalism, which violently took place in the neighboring countries.

Resurgence of the minority’s rights started with restoration of Muslim names. This is the most important act, as ethnicity is most vividly expressed (and under different changes is the easiest subject to be blurred) in three moments of social and personal identification – name, marriage and funeral. A person’s name relates it with the family, kin, ancestors, and consequently with the history, memories of the place of birth, community they were leaving in. A change of Turkish-Arabian names into Bulgarian ones, which was conducted by T. Zhyvkov’s government over 1980-1985 caused anger and indignation among the Turks, led to protests, overt action against the government, bloodshed, as this fact, deprived people of kin and religious affiliation as well as cultural identity<sup>18</sup>. A name is a foundation of a person’s identification, but special significance it acquires in life and views of Islamic people. Being deprived of their name people of faith “after their death cannot stand before Allah, who calls people by name to judge them for their living and take the righteous to heaven”<sup>19</sup>. But there were other facts that required return of the names. In a secularized society names are visible indices of the Turks identity, thus their

<sup>16</sup> *Tri bona v zeleno dariava na madanskata dzhamiia bratty na Yozal* // Trud. 1993. 1 sept.

<sup>17</sup> *Höpken W.* Türken und Pomaken in Bulgarien // SOEM. 1992. № 32. S. 144.

<sup>18</sup> *Stojanov V.* Ausgrenzung und Integraation: Die bulgarischen Türken nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg // Österreichische Osthefte. 1997. H.2. № 39. P.203.

<sup>19</sup> *Zbeliazkovo A.* Turtsii // Obshchnosti i identichnosti v Bylharii. Sophia, 1998. P. 390.



change was interpreted as a rough interference in the personal world and an awful attempt to eliminate family affiliation.

In the Republic of Bulgaria it was difficult to solve the problem of the native language in the educational establishments and army; of establish Islam religious seminaries, institutes, specialization of Turkish Studies in the Center of Eastern Languages and Cultures; of preparation Muslim clergy, upbringing the younger generation on the basis of fundamental moral values of the world religion as an inseparable part of their traditional culture. In 1990 the Islamic institute under the Grand Mufti, four religious seminaries, which are funded by various Arab and Turkish funds were established.

Appearance of Turkish-speaking publications was a positive step in revival of the minority, but in the Republic of Bulgaria almost no books are published in Turkish, except the language books. Not many books are in specialized reading halls in the district of mixed residence of Bulgarians and Turks. There are no Turkish-speaking programs in on-line media either. It makes the Bulgarian Turks install their TV sets and radios on Turkey and broadcast their programs. Indifference of the state institutions of the former (socialistic) regime towards minorities' culture and fall in control over preservation of their values can explain the cases of destruction of literature in Turkish villages and theft of unique Islamic relics with the aim to sell them abroad. Nowadays, development of ethnic groups' culture in the Republic of Bulgaria is the very minorities' concern without limitation, however without any assistance from the state. It makes the Turkish Movement for Rights and Liberties turn for help to Turkey and the latter provides it.

The MRL used a Constitutional right to organize unions. In 1992 in Shumen was registered a Union of the Turkish Language and Culture, which contributes to development of minorities and encourages studies of dialects, folklore, traditions and ethnography of the Turkish population in the Republic of Bulgaria. Such unions also function in other regions. In 1993 the union in Kardzhali held the first special event of local Turkish folklore joining together 18 groups, including guests from Turkey. In 1995 in Stambolovo took place the first festival of Turkish folklore, where participated 14 groups from different regions of Bulgaria. It positively influences cultural life of minorities and social-political process in general. National festival in Haskovo coincided in time with local elections and the literary evening "Dumka" (Thought) held on the eve of the students' festival in Shumen in 1995 was recognized a first step to creation of the MRL youth organization<sup>20</sup>.

Minorities' rights are best displayed in the sphere of religion, though even here there are some contradictions, caused by the desire of government to establish political control over their activity. Muslims support charitable funds and unions, in particular provide financial aid. The Bulgarian national fund for Islamic culture development established by N. Gendjev and Saudi Arab-funded supports private school in village Glodjevo, assists in building temples, publishing Islamic literature, sends products and medicines to Muslims in Macedonia and Albania. In

<sup>20</sup> *Syzdava akademichna struktura // Trud. 1992. 19 yuni.*

1993 a group of foreigners tried to establish a charitable General Islamic Union in the Republic of Bulgaria, but did not provide addresses of the members, and that was the reason for further refusal from Sofia's city prosecutor's office<sup>21</sup>. At that time was founded the fund Hair in Plovdiv, aimed at training personnel upon the special program of Marshall's fund from the USA. After graduation alumni were to take roots in the political system of the Republic of Bulgaria and deal with Muslims' problems. The chairman of the fund S. Merdjan, who came to the Party for democratic changes from the MRL and M. Hodji expected for the state support. Not having received it they accused the government, president's adviser in ethnical minorities' issues M. Ivanov and the head of the international center for minorities' problems and cultural cooperation A. Zheliazkova of spending in their own discretion money received from the embassies to solve ethnic issues in Bulgaria. In 1994 Muslims schools in Shumen and Ruse were funded by the Saudi Arabian fund Al-Uakfal-Islam from the Netherlands. It had references from Grand Mufti F. Sali, but the fund was not registered, as such organization was not found in the Netherlands<sup>22</sup>. And such examples are numerous.

A split among Muslims causes tension in the Republic of Bulgaria, affects students in religious seminaries, regularity of salary payment for teachers and religious workers, but does not break an everyday ritual of worshippers. According to the 2016 sociological surveys the most religious community in the Republic of Bulgaria is Muslims. The number of religious people is twice of that among Christians. Muslims accurately and certainly adhere to the religious rites. Every third Pomak or Turk (34% and 33% correspondingly) from the groups of worshippers state that they offer up 5 compulsory prayers to Allah every day. To the question "Do you believe in God?" positively answered 73% of surveyed Turks, 66% of Bulgarian Muslims and 59% of Roma against 37% of Bulgarian Christians<sup>23</sup>. Thus, it is a fact that the Muslim community has a great need in support for religion tradition, and it explains such an intensive construction of cult buildings in the Republic of Bulgaria after 1989.

Construction of new temples and reconstruction of old ones is the matter of worshippers, but they are supported by foreign funds. Thus, in 1993 in Razgrad was established a fund of Makbul Ibrahim Pasha Jami with the aim to renovate great Jami. The fund searched for sponsors in the Arabian world and the World Islamic Bank gave \$1 mln for restoration Muslim temples in the Republic of Bulgaria, including Shumen Tombul-Jami and Razgrad Jami Ibrahim Pasha, transferred \$25 mln for construction of the biggest Jami in the Rhodope in Madan and sent \$4 mln for the backwards regions of the Republic Bulgaria, and 500 000 of it for Madan region<sup>24</sup>.

Such displays of charity concern Bulgaria, as the majority of citizens have a negative attitude towards construction of Jamis due to a potential threat for the state. In the parliament deputy

<sup>21</sup> *Islamski syiu iska registratsiia u nas // Trud. 1993. 18 dekmvri.*

<sup>22</sup> *Petima daskali ot Turtsiia idvat v Shumen // Trud. 1994. 8 septemvri.*

<sup>23</sup> *Byllbariite khristiane SA po-malko relihiozni ot miusulmanite // 24 chasa. 2016. 9 septemvri.*

<sup>24</sup> *Petima daskali ot Turtsiia idvat v Shumen // Trud. 1994. 8 septemvri.*

B. Sarev stated that in the Rhodope minarets are higher than trees. Self-withdrawal of the state from the process of regeneration of minorities' culture, education, construction of religious buildings etc. releases it from a number of liabilities, but creates conditions for uncontrollable penetration of potentially threatening influence into the Republic of Bulgaria, including representatives of Islamic cults and fundamentalists from Pakistan, Iran, Algeria, Syria or Egypt<sup>25</sup>.

Therefore, transformation in the Republic of Bulgaria largely politicized ethnic awareness, putting demonstrative return of all important peculiarities of ethnic affiliation at the first place. The Turks renewed their names, worship, wear national clothes. The Pomaks stuck in the problems of their identity as some identify themselves as Bulgarians, while others – as Turks, and the feature of this affiliation is renewal of old names or preservation of new ones. The Bulgarians are vividly interested in their rituals and restore them. In fact, changes lead to restoration of equilibrium, which runs around the "friend or foe" division and is of high priority among the elders. Young people do not possess traits of tolerance to local people with a mixed composition and it is quite difficult for them to overcome interethnic tension. Though, homogenization of totalitarianism is perceived by the Bulgarians as unification, it led to negative due to a natural need in ethnic separation, traditions and ethnic communication.

The analysis of the process of politicization in Bulgaria shows that in the 90s the state lacks a clear program of ethnic policy development, while manifestations of nationalism were more than enough. The Constitution is evidence as according to it the Republic of Bulgaria is a single-national state. The situation changed for the better when Bulgaria joined the European Union. Trying to meet all the requirements of the EU, Bulgaria significantly improved conditions for ethnic minorities' development. Being an EU member Bulgaria is in an effort to fully adhere to the rights and liberties of the citizens. It is difficult to be done, as the main problem, like in other CEE countries, is produced by the Rome ethnic minority. However, they rather create not political, but social problems for the Bulgarian society.

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<sup>25</sup> *Satovchanskiiat raion se prevyrna v Meka za emisari* // *Trud*. 1994. 30 april.

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## **The identity of ukrainians and russians at the background of ethnic relations in the independent Ukraine (1991–2017)**

The article is dedicated to analyzing the problem of formation and characteristics of Ukrainian and Russian identity at the background of ethnic relations in the independent Ukraine. The author revealed an array of problems that determine the confrontation of Russian and titular ethnic groups in Ukraine. The researcher argued that it is impossible to isolate the mechanisms of authentication and identity of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine, but instead it is useful to examine all the trends, which characterize ethnic relations in Ukraine, in depth.

*Keywords: Russian minority, identity, Ukrainians, Russians, ethnic relations, Ukraine.*

## **ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ УКРАЇНЦІВ І РОСІЯН НА ФОНІ МІЖНАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ ВІДНОСИН В НЕЗАЛЕЖНІЙ УКРАЇНІ (1991–2017)**

У статті проаналізовано питання формування та особливостей ідентичності українців та росіян на фоні міжнаціональних відносин в незалежній Україні. Виявлено масив проблем, які детермінують конфронтацію російського та титульного етносів в Україні. Аргументовано, що не можна уніфіковано виокремлювати механізми ідентифікації та ідентичності українців та росіян в Україні, а натомість варто поглиблено розглядати усі тенденції, які притаманні міжнаціональним відносинам в Україні.

*Ключові слова: російська меншина, ідентичність, українці, росіяни, міжнаціональні відносини, Україна.*

National self-consciousness and identity of the post-Soviet societies profoundly influence politics and economy of the former USSR republics. The point is that the ethnical identity was formed together with two different, however connected aspects: its essence and contradiction. On the one hand, nationalists (as the representatives of their own nations' identity) offered specific proposals concerning the essence of the collective identity of the societies in their own countries. On the other hand, not all citizens of new (in due time distinguished after the collapse of the USSR) countries agreed on common priorities of the nationalistic movements. Actually, international relations in the post-Soviet countries often turn around one crucial question, whether the post-Soviet society and politicians accept manifestations of

nationalism. In this case, a key role in opposing the essence of the national identity was played by former communists. Therefore, one of the profound and major differences of the post-Soviet countries in the 1990-s was political and ideological connection within each of them among former communist and new nationalist elites. It was reflected in various forms: marginalization of communists by nationalists, prosecution and arrests of nationalists, cooptation of nationalists within the national parliaments, bargaining with nationalists or even merging and comparison with nationalists. That is why, such various types of relations revealed different stages and forms of social consensus as to the national authentic character of the new countries after the collapse of the soviet regime. In the case of Ukraine, they are largely, if not crucially, represented through the dichotomy of the Ukrainians' and Russians' identity, what makes a subject of the current research.

A range of scientific problems has been elaborated in the works by such scientists as D. Arel<sup>1</sup>, P. D'Anieri<sup>2</sup>, L. Barrington and E. Herron<sup>3</sup>, S. Burant<sup>4</sup>, J. Casanova<sup>5</sup>, I. Ivanov<sup>6</sup>, Z. Kohut<sup>7</sup>, P. Kolstoe<sup>8</sup>, P. Kubicek<sup>9</sup>, T. Kuzio<sup>10</sup>, I. Lozowy<sup>11</sup>, P. Pirie<sup>12</sup>, I. Prizel<sup>13</sup>, G. Schopflin<sup>14</sup>, S. Shulman<sup>15</sup>, G. Smith<sup>16</sup>, R. Solchanyk<sup>17</sup>, O. Subtelny<sup>18</sup>, A. Wilson<sup>19</sup>, K. Wolczuk<sup>20</sup> and many

<sup>1</sup> D. Arel, *Ukraine. The temptation of the Nationalizing State*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 157-188.

<sup>2</sup> P. D'Anieri, *Nationalism and International Politics*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1997, vol 3, nr 2, s. 1-28.

<sup>3</sup> L. Barrington, E. Herron, *One Ukraine or Many?: Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences*, "Nationalities Papers" 2004, vol 32, nr 1, s. 53-86.

<sup>4</sup> S. Burant, *Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 1995, vol 47, nr 7, s. 1125-1144.

<sup>5</sup> J. Casanova, *Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine*, [w:] B. Rubin, J. Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 81-103.

<sup>6</sup> I. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy*, Wyd. Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Z. Kohut, *History as Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine*, [w:] F. Starr [red.], *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY-London 1994, s. 123-146.

<sup>8</sup> P. Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*, Wyd. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1995.

<sup>9</sup> P. Kubicek, *Dynamics of Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism: Empire Breaking to State-Building*, "Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism" 1996, vol 23, nr 1-2, s. 39-50.

<sup>10</sup> T. Kuzio, *National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1996, vol 2, nr 4, s. 582-608.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press, New York 1997.

<sup>11</sup> I. Lozowy, *The Popular Movement of Ukraine "Rukh" 1994: Statehood, Democracy, Reforms*, Wyd. International Relations Secretariat, Popular Movement of Ukraine Rukh, Kyiv 1994.

<sup>12</sup> P. Pirie, *National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 1996, vol 48, nr 7, s. 1079-1104.

<sup>13</sup> I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998.

<sup>14</sup> G. Schopflin, *Nations Identity Power: The New Politics of Europe*, Wyd. Hurst and Company, London 2000.; G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 19-35.

<sup>15</sup> S. Shulman, *Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine*, "Nationalities Papers" 1998, vol 26, nr 4, s. 615-632.

<sup>16</sup> G. Smith, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.; G. Smith, *The Post-Soviet States, Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1999.

<sup>17</sup> R. Solchanyk, *The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability*, [w:] T. Kuzio [red.], *Contemporary Ukraine*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1998, s. 17-40.

<sup>18</sup> O. Subtelny, *Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 189-207.

<sup>19</sup> A. Wilson, *Myth of National History in Belarus and Ukraine*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin [red.], *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 182-197.; A. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, NY 1997.

<sup>20</sup> K. Wolczuk, *History, Europe and the "National Idea": The "Official" Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine*, "Nationalities Papers" 2000, vol 28, nr 4, s. 671-694.

others. Herewith, the analysis of the studies worked out by the abovementioned scholars gives us profound reasons to argue that all national peculiarities and social-political debates, caused by them, influenced formation of a wide range of political events in Ukraine in the early 1990-s and 2000-s, including those, which concerned the language, nationality, economic and political reforms, security and foreign relations. National identities became social facts of the countries and people's life in the epoch of the post-Soviet politics. That is the identity started being analyzed as an independent marker, which undergoes systematic analysis, aimed at studying the reasons for arguments, explaining institutionalization of these or other national minorities, as first of all it concerns division along ethnic lines etc<sup>21</sup>.

Mainly, it was presupposed by the fact that Russian leaders of different periods eternalized the idea of Ukrainian-Russian close integration. The situation is supplemented by the fact that in 1991 Ukraine could not boast its continuous national self-identical history, and thus depended on the historical connections with the Russian authorities and identity<sup>22</sup>. It is quite notable, that the most distinctive feature of the Ukrainian history is its *regional divergences*, which eventually influenced the essence and contradiction of the Ukrainian national identity. In this case we speak about the diversity of the historical experience within Ukraine, on the basis of which were elaborated different interpretations of the Ukrainian national identity after 1991. Regional disputes over the Ukrainian national identity were the result of removing borders and changes of the institutional contexts, in the context of which Ukrainian nationalists, as well as soviet officials strived for achieving their cultural, economic and political goals. And only when a reformation period and publicity was initialized in the USSR, several the then and new Ukrainian organizations commenced mobilization to support aims, connected with the "survival" of the Ukrainian nation, or, in other words, to "unite" the symbols of the Ukrainian nation with specific projects.

The cornerstone of the Ukrainian national identity since the late 80-s – early 90-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is derived from the concept of the "Rukh"<sup>23</sup>. Ukrainian nationalists proved that Ukraine for a long time had been characterized by its national identity<sup>24</sup> and traced the political line of modern Ukraine back to the medieval Kyiv Rus. It put Ukrainian nationalists in direct opposition to Russia as to the "proprietary rights" on such historical events and this led to a political conflict between the countries<sup>25</sup>. That is why, in the Ukrainian nationalistic ideology Russia was mixed up in all Ukrainian nationalistic debates over the reasons of unsteady and incapable countries. Such "disputable" moments of nationhood also became a part of the

<sup>21</sup> R. Abdelal, *National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective*. – Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> M. Von Hagen, *Does Ukraine Have a History?*, "Slavic Review" 1995, vol 54, nr 3, s. 658-673.

<sup>23</sup> *The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring "Rukh": Program and Charter*, Wyd. Smoloskyp, for the Ukrainian National Association, Baltimore 1990, s. 11.; I. Lozowy, *The Popular Movement of Ukraine "Rukh" 1994: Statehood, Democracy, Reforms*, Wyd. International Relations Secretariat, Popular Movement of Ukraine Rukh, Kyiv 1994, s. 21-22.

<sup>24</sup> J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, Wyd. Columbia University Press, New York 1963.

<sup>25</sup> P. D'Anieri, *Nationalism and International Politics*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1997, vol 3, nr 2, s. 1-28.

historical memory of the Ukrainians<sup>26</sup>. As a result, Ukrainian nationalists offered to combine the idea of their nation with other specific goals. They stated that economic dependence on Russia carried a threat to the national security<sup>27</sup>. Nationalists persisted that Europe has a crucial significance for the essence of the Ukrainian national identity. That is why the platform for the foreign policy of Ukrainian nationalists, as A. Wilson believes, was a clear and summarized anti-Russian and pro-European vector/character of the further intentions of the Ukrainian people<sup>28</sup>. The nationalists' proposals concerning the content of the Ukrainian national identity were perceived by some Ukrainians, but denied and opposed by others. Consequently, since the 80-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Ukrainian society in its collective identity was to be divided along regional lines, which was based on the historical divergences.

It was revealed in the fact that the nationalistic parties and their proposals of self-identity and political development were and still are quite popular in western regions, especially in Halychyna, as well as in the cities of central Ukraine, including Kyiv<sup>29</sup>. However, the east and south of Ukraine mainly (though the number has been decreasing over 1991-2017) oppose the nationalistic parties and support communistic and socialistic ones, as well as regionally-oriented parties, which do not agree with the nationalists' stress on the Ukrainian identity in opposition to Russia and pro-European vector<sup>30</sup>. That is why, the doctrine character in developing conceptions, which represent the population of eastern and southern Ukraine are embodied in several vectors, determined as following: *pan-Slavic identity*, *rudimentary soviet identity*, *regional identity* (moreover, none of these vectors is in inner opposition to Russia)<sup>31</sup>. The idea that in fact the Russians and Ukrainians have much more in common than have any differences, that they are not "strange" to each other<sup>32</sup> has become fundamental for the three conceptions. Thus, any characteristic of eastern Ukrainians as "pro-Russian" is misleading. More accurate is a statement according to which the majority of population in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine is not against Russians. Eastern and southern Ukrainians do not try to join Russia as a new country or empire<sup>33</sup>. Historically, they just have a contrary vision towards what means

<sup>26</sup> Z. Kohut, *History as Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine*, [w:] F Starr [red.], *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY-London 1994, s. 123-146; A. Wilson, *Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin George [red.], *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Hurst, London 1997, s. 187.

<sup>27</sup> Rukh, *New Way for Ukraine*, Kyiv 1998; *Ukrainian National Assembly, Economic Program of UNA*, Kyiv 1998.

<sup>28</sup> A. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, NY 1997, s. 173.

<sup>29</sup> T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 152-160.; P. Kubicek, *Dynamics of Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism: Empire Breaking to State-Building*, "Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism" 1996, vol 23, nr 1-2, s. 39-50.

<sup>30</sup> T. Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, Wyd. St Martin's Press, New York 1997, s. 19-20.; I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998, s. 367-368.

<sup>31</sup> P. Pirie, *National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 1996, vol 48, nr 7, s. 1079-1104.

<sup>32</sup> S. Shulman, *Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine*, "Nationalities Papers" 1998, vol 26, nr 4, s. 615-632.

<sup>33</sup> T. Kuzio, *National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1996, vol 2, nr 4, s. 599.; R. Solchanyk, *The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability*, [w:] T. Kuzio [red.], *Contemporary Ukraine*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1998, s. 30-31.



to be a Ukrainian. D. Arel<sup>34</sup> stresses out that eastern and southern Ukrainians are less preoccupied with the thoughts that close integration to Russia may influence their identity, as they determine it equally both on the Russian culture and the Ukrainian one<sup>35</sup>.

Therefore, the Ukrainian political spectrum in the early 90-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century appeared to be too polarized concerning foreign policy. As a result of this, institutionalization of the Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine became a logical representation of preferences among Russian-speaking, but Ukrainian-ethnic as well as Russian-ethnic population of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, which, according to the results of the elections (both presidential and parliamentary), supported those political forces and political leaders who were close to them. The factor, which influenced institutionalization of the Russian ethnic minority is also the absence in Ukraine of a strong centrist political position, and thus all civil and political debates were influenced by two oppositional and staunch arguments concerning the question how the Ukrainian nationhood, including its national idea after 1991, should be developed. And though immanently it is clear that political and economic integration to the EU and CIS is obligatory opposing principles, the Ukrainian government habitually was not able to choose its vector between these options. Herewith, I. Prizel supposes that the Ukrainian national identity, which was disputed at the regional level, led to formation of various agenda concerning the national question and was differently represented in different regions. Ukrainians admitted that their country is permanent; however they could not come to agreement as to the ways of achieving the aim of the nationhood<sup>36</sup>.

Perhaps the most significant catalyst for institutionalization of the Russian minority towards the Ukrainian titular ethnos, as the experience has shown, became the notion of the “political or national myth”. Myth has always been playing an important role in elaboration of national authentic character and formation of its national consciousness. Just through the myths ethnical groups reveal internal representations of their immanent traits, and by means of the myths occurs formation of the image and perception of an ethnical community in a concentrated, bright and crystalized form. Any political decision which concerns the international topics cannot be treated in isolation from the social-cultural and symbolical context, in which it is evaluated. That is why, G. Schopflin emphasizes that in this regard in most cases politics is imagined as a sphere, which is regulated by rationality, clear reflections of practical nature, which, supposedly, can be described by losses and benefits of the classical model. However, in fact the practice draws other conclusions<sup>37</sup>. Significant influence belongs to the myths: in this

<sup>34</sup> D. Arel, *Ukraine. The temptation of the Nationalizing State*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 179.

<sup>35</sup> O. Subtelny, *Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 194; S. Burant, *Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus*, “Europe–Asia Studies” 1995, vol. 47, nr 7, s. 1125–1144.

<sup>36</sup> I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998, s. 371.

<sup>37</sup> G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 27.

sense politics, especially one concerning national issues is rather an aspect of totality of the cultural system. Each action arises in an extended cultural context. And here reveals symbolic nature of institutionalization in attempts to act on the side of national minorities<sup>38</sup>. Moreover, underlining drawbacks of rationalistic methods and approaches towards the analysis of the process of national feelings' formation G. Schopflin states that "there are certain aspects of our world, which cannot be embraced by simple rationality ...processes, ideas, values, mechanisms and others are hidden from an ordinary regime of evaluation"<sup>39</sup>. The scientist states that irreplaceability of the myth analysis lies in the fact that a myth and myth analysis is one of the ways to examine the concealed part of thinking, prejudice, superstitions. All this is a necessary part of the way, by which the communities determine their world<sup>40</sup>.

Taking this into consideration, we insist that constructions of myths have several significant consequences for formation of motives and real actions of different national identities (peoples, minorities, ethnic groups): 1) national myths are psychological basics, composing of convictions, assumptions, prejudice and superstitions and also can be determined as a set of independent models of self-identification (this system has a substantial influence on the processes of elaboration of the Ukrainian national identity); 2) myths concerning Russia and Ukraine and their mutual comprehension and representation may influence elaboration of the Ukrainian national identity even more, than it can be comprehended by a rational analysis<sup>41</sup>; 3) national myths are always subjective in their character – that is why they do not create an objective reality. From this perspective institutionalization of the Russian ethnic minority lies in its contradiction of negative consequences brought by the Soviet regime.

The point is that, nowadays in the comparative ethnical and political science there is a dilemma as to the way of evaluating the processes in the post-Communist countries: 1) either as a "nationalization of states" (according to R. Brubaker); 2) or as a "nationalization of regimes" (according to H. Smith). In this case, the thing is how elites comprehend the process of focusing prioritized attention on "working out" national authentic character of major ethnic groups. From this perspective, applying of a mythological discourse referring to Ukraine is not directed only at evaluation of the biggest ethnic groups in the country, but it is also an attempt to minimize negative influence of historical and ethnical and cultural variables, which have been overlapping Ukraine since the imperial and soviet periods.

Over 25 year-long history of Ukraine it has been evident: that ways of applying mythological discourse and factors of national-state building do not correspond with the state building process in Ukraine within the terms "nationalization of the state". K. Wolczuk states that trying

<sup>38</sup> L. Holy, *The Little Czech Nation and the Great Czech Nation: National Identity and the Post-Communist Social Transformation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>39</sup> G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 19.

<sup>40</sup> G. Schopflin, *Nations Identity Power: The New Politics of Europe*, Wyd. Hurst and Company, London 2000, s. 79.

<sup>41</sup> G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 19-35.

to form the idea of celebrating “centuries-long desire and fight of the Ukrainian people for the independent state, the elites abstained from accentuating on ethnic-cultural and language differences between the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups”<sup>42</sup>. In this context it is necessary to insist on the fact that the elite is trying to highlight a dominant position of the Ukrainian majority. One of the reasons, explaining why Ukraine cannot be determined as a “nationalized state” lies in the fact that exact configuration of ethnic groups’ components into the “Ukrainian people” still remains vague, and thus the position of the Ukrainian ethnic nation is not rising up. Besides, Ukraine has underestimated the importance of all actions aimed at implementation of language and cultural framework, which would lead to positive consequences. As a result, the Russian national minority was passively institutionalized, while the former despite embarrassing and poor policy pursued by the political elites in Ukraine received a chance to develop a bit distinctive display of a cultural and mythological essence.

Finally, one can observe significance of a strong negative correlation between the level of endurance, provided by the soviet regime institutionally, and social-cultural heritage on the one hand, while on the other hand one can speak only of the projects’ prospects aimed at state building in post-Soviet Ukraine, which over 1991-2017 have been much more evident in eastern Ukraine in particular. Besides, quite notable is a positive correlation between the power of the pre-soviet values, and traditions and prospects of the state building, which are mainly inherent to western Ukraine. The determinants are also represented by strong cause-and-effect relationship between the level of democratic consciousness and adherence on the part of the Ukrainian people and possibility of successful national state building in Ukraine. At the same time the discourses concerning democratization and national state building in Ukraine are interconnected up to the point that is much lower than the indices, peculiar of neighboring countries. The reason is historical peculiarities of development of Ukraine as a part of different state formations, as well as a lack of independent state’s experience and a lack of elements, which make the grounds for the national idea and set sights on fragmentation of a support base, aimed at national state-building<sup>43</sup>.

From this perspective, institutionalization of the Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine has been taking place in accordance with a stage process (however to a lesser extent, than it concerns identification of the Ukrainian ethnos as titular), which was offered by G. Pridham. The researcher singles out four basic theories, due to which it is possible to evaluate post-Soviet transition: 1) functional; 2) transnational; 3) theories of genetic filling; 4) interactive<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> K. Wolczuk, *History, Europe and the “National Idea”: The “Official” Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine*, “Nationalities Papers” 2000, vol 28, nr 4, s. 689.

<sup>43</sup> V. Zaslavsky, *Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Societies*, “Daedalus” 1992, vol 121, nr 2, s. 97-121.

<sup>44</sup> G. Pridham, *Comparative Reflections on Democratisation in East-Central Europe: a Model of Post-Communist Transformation?*, [w:] G. Pridham, A. Agh [red.], *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe*, Wyd. Manchester University Press, Manchester-New York 2001, s. 1-24.

*Functionalism* due to the researched approach of institutionalization presupposes identification of necessity in economic, social and cultural paradigms and preconditions, which determine cross-regional, as well as cross-national development within the context of democratic changes<sup>45</sup>. *Transnationalism* puts a stress on a complicated complex of internal and external factors of institutionalization of a titular ethnos and national minorities. Genetic theories are elaborated on the basis of a political choice, what is more inherent to the processes of evaluating the Russian minority's acting in Ukraine: a principal display of it is the so-called "own uncertainty as to the democratic approach"<sup>46</sup>. Finally, *interactivity* of evaluation a given problem lies in comparing positions of identities towards changes of political regimes: in this case quite notable is a line between the titular Ukrainian ethnos, which to a greater extent has been striving for European integration and the Russian minority which holds the ideas of joining various pro-Russian interstate structures. Of principal importance here is a balance between economic and political tendencies, which are taken into consideration by the representatives of these or other identities<sup>47</sup>.

Quite significant place in evaluating the influence of national myths on institutionalization of national minorities belongs to the first years of post-communist development in Ukraine. This period of dramatic and profound political-social transformations, which took place immediately after the collapse of the USSR was characterized by ideological and cultural vacuum, ambiguousness of values and ideas, feeling of social and cultural senselessness. Breakdown of a former set of ideas, social, political and cultural conceptions gave a birth to the vision of cognitive chaos and uncertainty. Atmosphere of ideological vacuum or ambiguity appeared to be a favorable ground for various political mythologies, which tried to fill in this vacuum. Post-communist area became a fertile field for public passion, fears, illusions and frustration. Old ideological confidence appeared to be "dead". And instead of them emerged new mythologies, in particular to ensure quick and satisfactory response for painful dilemmas. Political myths became an answer to the feelings of breaking-up, fragmentation and general mess of the post-communist stage of development<sup>48</sup>.

In Ukraine the problem revealed in a failure to form that ethnocentric myth, as correspondence of relations between the representatives of two biggest nationalities (Ukrainians and Russians) was at the level of latent impacts of the Ukrainian and Russian (as well as a political one) mythologies.

<sup>45</sup> D. Rustow, *Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model*, "Comparative Politics" 1970, vol 2, nr 3, s. 343.

<sup>46</sup> G. Pridham, *Comparative Reflections on Democratisation in East-Central Europe: a Model of Post-Communist Transformation?*, [w:] G. Pridham, A. Agh [red.], *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe*, Wyd. Manchester University Press, Manchester-New York 2001, s. 7.

<sup>47</sup> O. Kirchheimer, *Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs*, "American Political Science Review" 1965, vol 59, nr 4, s. 964.; V. Zaslavsky, *Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Societies*, "Daedalus" 1992, vol 121, nr 2, s. 97-121.

<sup>48</sup> V. Tismaneanu, *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. Princeton University Press, Princeton-New Jersey 1998, s. 18.

One can name a number of approaches towards how the historical experience of Ukraine and Russia influenced formation of a competitive mythological discourse in modern Ukraine. One of the approaches is based on a fundamental *concept of “dissimilarity (divergency)”* and proves a key role of external influences and external perception as to strengthening of a group adherence and affiliation of certain communities and construction of their ethnical boundaries. Employment of the concept as to formation of the Ukrainian identity is a contrast of the authoritarian and “Asian” character of Russia, as well as arguments and requirements concerning democratic, demotic and “European” character of the Ukrainian people. Namely these grounds are used as a moral basis and explanation of necessity on the part of Ukraine to distance itself from Russia, if it wants to revive its identity<sup>49</sup>. In correspondence with the main principles of the approach, if Ukraine wants to strengthen its national idea it must enlarge and exaggerate its differences from Russia. Since the Ukrainian-Russian relations are marked with a long history/casualness of tense relations, the processes of cultural replication and mythological discourse must be estimated as the phenomena of general significance, if the aim is to delimitate “Ukrainian” from “Russian”. That is why, G. Schopflin argue that the element of “divergency” is a source of legitimation of claims on “unity and moral dignity”. According to him, the practice of choosing “divergent” allows ethnic communities to justify its authentic, unique and strong character. Thus the presence of an external object of comparison plays an important role in building external boundaries of the national states<sup>50</sup>.

Instead of this the national myth of ethnic Russians in Ukraine is reduced to a traditional postulation of the principle of “brotherhood”, according to which Russia is considered as a “big brother”, while Ukraine – as a “small brother”. From the point of view of the process of institutionalization of the ethnical minority the given principle is evaluated as determinative in formation of geopolitical priorities of a bigger part of population in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine etc. Besides, for the sake of objectiveness, as well as on the basis of methodological principles, it is necessary to state that formation of the Russian national minority’s acting in Ukraine over 1991-2013 was grounded on combination of several fundamental approaches towards the phenomenon, which is called a process of national identity formation. The first one is the approach of “dissimilarity (divergency)”; the second one states that cultural and ideological features of cooperation with a former motherland (Russia) and a dependent community have impact on formation of national identities (the so-called *concept of cultural reproduction*), as a result of which one can trace formation of own cultural paradigm of the Ukrainians, which is not always comparable with the ethnic Russians’ priorities; the third approach is a trick of manipulation with foreign political processes on the side of the political elites, which resulted in depreciation of the role of the Russians’ factor in the process of establishing the Ukrainian

<sup>49</sup> A. Wilson, *Myth of National History in Belarus and Ukraine*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin [red.], *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 182-197.

<sup>50</sup> G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 19-35.

nationhood; the fourth approach describes a crucial role, played by Ukraine while forming the identity of the Russian empire and the crisis of this imperial identity in the Russian mythological discourse in relation towards the Ukrainian national authentic character. That is why, in each of the approaches, which are peripheral to the process of establishing the Ukrainian national identity, one can observe, on the one hand, weak but at least some displays of the Russians' politization in Ukraine.

However, it should be stressed that formation of *modern Russian identity in Ukraine* is quite a contradictory and complex-integrated process. First of all, one must take into account the determinants of a general scientific notion "Russian minority", secondly, pay attention to certain historical aspects of determining the first category in the format of "the Russian national minority in Ukraine". These processes, which to some degree are developing in parallel, have a number of stumbling stones. That is why, it is obvious that there is a necessity to analyze and study the whole complex of comprehension in this sphere, to come to a conclusion which correlates with the development of the Russian minority and its institutionalization in Ukraine.

Since the moment when the USSR republics declared their independence, the image of the soviet ethnic-cultural demographic situation has changed rather significantly. The point is that, the collapse of the USSR determined the regularity of the phenomenon of the Russian diaspora, as twenty-five millions of Russians found themselves distributed over the newly created countries, which immanently were assessed in the function and format of political motherlands of other nationalities (titular as to the Russians). That is why relocated Russians either had to return to the newly created Russia or respect original political identities, what in fact distinguish them as a new Russian diaspora from former soviet socialist republics. Much more acute problem, which emerged after the collapse of the USSR, was determination of relations, which presumably were to establish between new "ethno-cultural partners" within the former union republics, as well as between the Russians as the nation and the post-communist Russian Federation. Such specificity characterized any and all countries, which currently exist throughout the post-soviet territory, just in different extent and quality.

The collapse of the USSR stimulated the idea of "*sovereignty*" development, which challenged the old idea of the ethnic interrelation under the guise of "*sovietization*", and led to opening and recognition of new political (national) identities "in another dimension for evermore"<sup>51</sup>. V. Klyuchevsky focused attention on close relations between the state expansion and migration which was the main function of the process when "Russia colonized itself"<sup>52</sup>. And on the contrary, R. Pipes stated that V. Klyuchevsky ignored the fact that at the moment of colonization those regions were inhabited, that is why Russia was a colonizer of foreign lands

<sup>51</sup> V. Shlapentokh, M. Sendich, E. Payin, *The New Russian Diaspora, Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, Wyd. : M.E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1994, s. 40-41.

<sup>52</sup> P. Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*, Wyd. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1995, s. 18-19.

and the Russians had unique relations with the minorities of the very colonies<sup>53</sup>. This perspective now is interpreted as a Russian myth or, according to G. Smith, as the Russian perception of an “imaginary community”<sup>54</sup>. And in its turn, a mythological point of view resonates with the Russian understanding of a modern flow of events in relation to the Russian neighbors, especially those, which are a part of the CIS.

Providing systematic relations with fixed value of political instrument had an impact on the fact that the Russian minority in “neighboring countries” was interpreted as a top-priority (as of Russian) “player”, as well as prestige in the post-soviet world. Russophilian myths demonstrated and carry on demonstrating their power and stern, while at the same time they just alternate former “soviet” identity with a new monolithic Russian identity, where the important place belongs to the Slavic aspect of relations, which as the Russians persist must take place between the Russian and non-Russian republics. This factor was institutionalized by many Russian scientists to make former soviet republics closer to each other from the point of view of various national communities and dispersion of ethnic heterogeneity of the former Soviet Union<sup>55</sup>. That is why, among the factors which influence the problems of national identity within former soviet republics (in particular in Ukraine), “artificial fields” of minorities mostly concern the essence and role of displaced Russians.

However, the result was that at the dawn of Ukrainian independence and new national idea the soviet identity lost a chance to determine international relations and unite (in different forms) former soviet nationalities. Consequently, the Russians started establishing their positions abroad as national minorities or diaspora. Over the period after the collapse of the USSR the Russian population of diaspora finally faced a double choice – to stay in non-Russian countries in the form of a political minority or even opposition or to live the territories of non-Russian countries. As a result Russia wished to fill in the vacuum, created after the loss of the “soviet” identity and manifestations of irredentism, especially in the regions, where from the geographical and historical point of view Russians predominated, first of all we speak of the territories boarding on Russia (particularly it can be observed under V. Putin’s regime, whose activity was and still is aimed at restoration of Russia’s authority throughout Eastern Europe).

One of most conceptual questions, which contributed to a social crack in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR, was a tripartite social and cultural division of almost all population in Ukraine into the Ukrainians-Ukrainophones, Ukrainians-Russophones, and ethnic Russians<sup>56</sup>. This division diversified the Ukrainian national agenda concerning foreign policy and influence on international relations. A determined attempt to puzzle out in this two-value division

<sup>53</sup> R. Pipes, *Reflections on the Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union*, [w:] N. Glazer, D. Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Cambridge 1975, s. 453–465.

<sup>54</sup> G. Smith, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, s. 23.

<sup>55</sup> R. Khasbulatov, R. Sakwa, *The Struggle for Russia, Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution*, Wyd. Routledge, London 1993.

<sup>56</sup> G. Smith, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, s. 119.

as classification of identities of the Ukrainian nation meant to elaborate an approach towards each group on the basis of appealing to the notion of the “mother tongue”. The sociological survey conducted in 1989, 64% of the Ukrainian population classified the Ukrainian language as their “mother tongue”, while 9% of the ethnic Ukrainians classified the Russian language as the “mother tongue”. On the contrary, 22% of the Ukrainians acknowledged “Russianness” from the point of view of ethnic affiliation and language. Such situation had an enormous historical tradition. Ukraine had been undergoing a seventy-year period of language and ethnic “merging” in the USSR epoch, when the Russians and Ukrainians got mixed in their everyday life. Many people in the society accepted and used both the Russian and Ukrainian languages as their mother tongues; the same situation was observed among the Russians, many of whom believed Ukraine to be their motherland or “homeland”<sup>57</sup>. Thus, even greater extent of uncertainty was created by means of an obvious “ethnic flow” in Ukraine. However, officially, the Russian diaspora, which inhabited or is still living in Ukraine, is just a minority, with the language, culture and social-political status, which are shifted towards the periphery of national and state interests<sup>58</sup>.

*The Ukrainians-Ukrainophones* are the coordination groups whose ethnical-political discourse is focused on the unique and real rights of the country population and creates a political precedent for an area, named Ukraine. These Ukrainians are characterized by a scornful attitude towards the Ukrainians-Russophones and ethnic Russians and a strong protection of the indigenous population’s rights. In the context of main structural principles of the Ukrainophones often are such notions as “indigenous population”, “colonialism” and “Russification” (in its negative meaning), this group always stands for distinct nationalistic arguments in a law’s favor. The community is situated away from the Russians due to their traditional European authentic character and all this became a firm foundation in the Ukrainian national discourse.

*The Ukrainians-Russophones* is a unique group in Ukraine, as they share general (common) principles with the Ukrainophones. The Russophones contribute to the principle of sovereignty, which appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union, becoming a manifestation of neo-political identity<sup>59</sup>. They stand for the territorial rights of Ukraine from the point of view of traditional Russian “space”, which was changed by compulsory russification, in particular within the frames of various projects of russification. At the same time, the Russophones do not deny the nationalistic approach of the Ukrainians or the existence of the Ukrainian “I”,

<sup>57</sup> S.M. Birgerson, *After the Breakup of Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States, and Eurasian Security*, Wyd. Praeger, Westport 2002, s. 102-104.

<sup>58</sup> V. Shlapentokh, M. Sendich, E. Payin, *The New Russian Diaspora, Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, Wyd. : M.E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1994, s. 59.

<sup>59</sup> N. Diuk, A. Karatmycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence*, Wyd. John Wiley & Sonse, Inc., New York 1993, s. 73-75.



their autonomous confessions work in parallel with the Ukrainophones' ones, stating that the former have real fundamental traditions in deep and long history<sup>60</sup>.

With respect to the Russian minority in Ukraine the situation forms due to differences in Ukraine's and Russia's policies, concerning the velocity of social transformations<sup>61</sup> in each country. Both countries created social targets and expectations, which form congruous lines for each other. The Ukrainians-Ukrainophones support ethnical-political discourse, which is focusing on determination of the so-called "indigenous" population, which portrays Russians from outside or from a traditional colonial point of view as "settlers" or even "enemies". The consequences of this ethnical-political discourse are double: first of all they mean evaluation of long-term moral claims against the Russian diaspora, as to the rights officially obtained by the Ukrainians and Russians in 1991; secondly, we are referring to the potential of land invasion by the Ukrainians, which nowadays are predominantly inhabited by the ethnic Russians. However, the second influence corresponds to applying of the former one and leads to dangerous preconditions for formation ethnocentric reproaches.

Russian-oriented Ukrainians (Russophones) represent the counter approach, which positions the idea, that any nationalistic Ukrainophones, who support the first discourse, in fact are ethnical-political "foreigners" in Ukraine and an "artificial implant"<sup>62</sup>. Current discussion over the ethnic issues in Ukraine are based on the concepts of "group identity", "national revival", and "Ukrainian nation", comprehending that these terms describe people in Ukraine. Ukraine is a complex ethnic structure that represents one piece, which formerly played a part in extension of Russia before the collapse of the Soviet Union<sup>63</sup>.

Eventually, current relations between the Ukrainophones and Russophones are one of the contradictory ideals, which preserve their own underflows. In particular, Russophones still conceive Ukraine as an appendix to the Russian Federation, inseparably connected with it. Therefore, there is a latent threat to the interrelation dimension of the Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, living in Ukraine, as the representatives of the "ethnic democracy", as it represents the elements of "ethnic reprisals".

The problem of identification of the Russian minority in Ukraine is a fact that the representatives of the minority often designate Russia as their "ethnocentric protector"<sup>64</sup>. On the other hand, Russian nationalism<sup>65</sup> is characterized by the element, which presupposes control over Russians, who identify themselves as the representatives of other countries. Thus, since the

<sup>60</sup> G. Smith, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, s. 121-122.

<sup>61</sup> V. Shlapentokh, M. Sendich, E. Payin, *The New Russian Diaspora, Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, Wyd. : M.E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1994, s. 59.

<sup>62</sup> G. Smith, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, s. 121-122.

<sup>63</sup> J. Billington, *Russian Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope*, Wyd. The Free Press, New York 1992.

<sup>64</sup> G. Smith, *The Post-Soviet States, Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1999, s. 67.

<sup>65</sup> S.M. Birgersson, *After the Breakup of Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States, and Eurasian Security*, Wyd. Praeger, Westport 2002.

1990-s Russia has been expressing great concern that among former soviet republics one can observe restoration of ethnocracy and, at least, strengthening of a political dialogue concerning renovation of ethnocratic states<sup>66</sup>. It was revealed in a rather acute form during the Crimea annexation in 2014 and military hostilities over 2014-2017. And in case of Ukraine the tendency is reflected as a result of incorporated influence of two poles – the Russian government and communities of the Russian national minority.

An obvious reason for such situation is that over the recent years Russians in Ukraine have been challenging Moscow to make the latter play direct and more effective role “in supporting” Russians, who conceive themselves as those “abandoned” by Moscow<sup>67</sup>. Russian foreign policy more and more pays attention to the “related ethnic community”, which lives outside the Russian Federation. “Care for Russians” from the neighboring countries is integrated into modern Russian policy<sup>68</sup>. During V. Putin’s regime Moscow has been demonstrating several sources of influence on the former republics aiming at defending Russian communities abroad. Firstly, it is a use of military forces. The second source of Russia’s influence is energy and economics<sup>69</sup>. The third one is described by Russia’s participation in regional organizations<sup>70</sup>. That is why, the fact that millions of foreigners, who have relations with the motherland, and are currently living in Ukraine and other former soviet republics, forms the mechanism of ethnic influence of Russia, when they create the impression that everything is focused on the ethnic-political problems following the pattern of former soviet republics.

On the basis of this, it should be emphasized that ethnic Russians in Ukraine are pursuing the goal of formation of their own identity, grounded on evaluation of their own history and its different stages. As a result, being institutionalized, Russians have not elaborated their united authentic character in Ukraine. It is embodied (over the period of 1991-2014) in several diversified variations: *little Russian identity* (starting with the period of the tsarist Russia) is mainly inherent to the population of southern regions of modern Ukraine and Kharkiv region, which historically correlates with Slobozhanshchyna), *soviet identity* (since the period of forming the conception of a “united soviet population”) is predominantly characteristic of eastern regions of Ukraine (especially the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions), *east-Slavic identity* (originates from the times of the soviet predominance, however its biggest popularity achieved over the territories during the post-communist period) is peculiar of the majority of Ukrainian regions, where exist settlements of ethnic Russians; *Ukrainian identity* (in fact was embodied in the late 80-s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when appeared potential preconditions and possibilities to

<sup>66</sup> G. Smith, *The Post-Soviet States, Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1999, s. 60-67.

<sup>67</sup> C. Ziegler, *The Russian Diaspora in Central Asia: Russian Compatriots and Moscow’s Foreign Policy*, “Demokratizatsiya” 2006, vol 14, nr 1, s. 103-126.

<sup>68</sup> G. Smith, *The Post-Soviet States, Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 67.

<sup>69</sup> R. Dannreuther, *Can Russia Sustain Its Dominance in Central Asia?*, “Security Dialogue” 2001, vol 32, s. 245-258.; J. Perovic, *From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia’s Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia*, “Demokratizatsiya” 2005, vol 13, nr 1, s. 61-85.

<sup>70</sup> I. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy*, Wyd. Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2002, s. 26-28.

create a new independent state) a little number of ethnic Russians became the adherents of this variant of the national ideology.

A specific place in this context belongs to the Crimea, annexed by Russia. There one can observe a *combination of mainly two identities – a little Russian identity and as soviet identity*. That is why in some scientific studies there is an idea that in Ukraine it is necessary to distinguish two groups of ethnic Russians – *namely Russians and Crimean Russians*.

Generally speaking, on the basis of the received data it is clear that in the independent Ukraine it is necessary to distinguish at least three (broaden) variations of institutionalization of the Russian minority: 1) “pro-little Russian”; 2) “pro-soviet”; 3) “mixed” (which is visualized in a permanent desire for integration with Russia – the Crimea). On the other hand, identity of the ethnical Russians in Ukraine always overlaps the problem of regional consciousness, what is the most characteristic of eastern Donbas and the Crimea. It means that politicization of the Crimea Russian ethnicity decreases due to its pro-integration paradigm towards the autonomous character; however, politicization of Donetsk Russian national minority increases due to a symbolic monolithic status to pro-Russian regionalism. In our case even of greater importance is a conclusion that regionalism in Ukraine<sup>71</sup>, fragmentation of the society along language and ethnic lines, as well as institutionalization of the Russian minority (together with the Ukrainian titular ethnos) caused difficulties in formation of a conscious and consistent society. It can be extended by the obstructive influence of the soviet type of political culture and a huge, unmanageable and ineffective institutional foundation, which was inherited from the soviet past. Namely these factors must come into a focus of state and national building processes in the post-soviet Ukraine. On the contrary, the most significant place is preoccupied by the conception of the “Ukrainian people”, which on the one hand is balancing between the Ukrainian and Russian elements of the population, and on the other hand does not solve it in a way within the context of further political and social-economic priorities.

In this regard it is possible to draw a clear conclusion, conformable with the ideas, expressed by J. Casanova that: the Ukrainian state must be classified as a nationalizing state<sup>72</sup> only in a narrow view of the notion. The point is that Ukraine, as a matter of principle, cannot avoid the necessity of state building in the sense of establishing a comprehensive political society (community). In this respect, it is necessary even to change the systematic conceptualization, proposed by J. Linz, concerning the categories “polis” and “demos”<sup>73</sup>, as well as conceptual differences between the categories a “national state” and a “state-nation”<sup>74</sup> to the problem of applying the conception of a “nationalizing state” as in case of Ukraine. According to the scientist, Ukraine

<sup>71</sup> L. Barrington, E. Herron, *One Ukraine or Many?: Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences*, “Nationalities Papers” 2004, vol 32, nr 1, s. 53-86.

<sup>72</sup> J. Casanova, *Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine*, [w:] B. Rubin, J. Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 87.

<sup>73</sup> J. Linz, *Plurimazionalismo e Democrazia*, “Revista Italiana di Scienza Politica” 1995, vol 25, s. 21-50.

<sup>74</sup> J. Linz, *Staatsbildung, Nationbildung und Demokratie*, „Transit” 1994, vol 7, s. 43-62.

“is not a nationalizing state in a strict sense of the definitions concerning absolute comparison (congruency – author) of its polis (as a people’s community) and its demos (as a national community)”<sup>75</sup>. Finally, another fundamental conclusion refers to diversity of political culture, which determines politization of the Ukrainian titular ethnos and the Russian minority: concerning the former we speak of an active type, aimed at democratic transformations; in case of the latter one should state passiveness of its attributes.

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<sup>75</sup> J. Casanova, *Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine*, [w:] B. Rubin, J. Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 87.

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## **Public structures as effective mechanism of forming of social capital in democratic countries.**

In of the article the mechanisms of forming of social capital is examined in modern countries. It of is shown that accumulation and зрiстання of social capital maybe only in democratic countries. Reasonably, that him the purposeful forming and increase in space of міжособових, intergroup connections and relations gives an opportunity to find a way to harmonization of political, social, economic interests, to improve possibilities them rational expression at state level. The of presence of social capital directly influences on the achievement of stability in society and assists to democratic development, and his absence, the disconnected brakes development of civil society.

*Keywords: social capital, public associations, public society, democratic development, stability.*

## **Громадські структури як дієвий механізм формування соціального капіталу у демократичних країнах**

У статті розглядаються механізми формування соціального капіталу у сучасних країнах. Показано, що накопичення і зрiстання соціального капіталу можливо лише у демократичних країнах. Обґрунтовано, що його цілеспрямоване формування і нарощування в просторі міжособових, міжгрупових зв'язків і стосунків дає змогу знайти шлях до гармонізації політичних, соціальних, економічних інтересів, покращити можливості їх раціонального вираження на державному рівні. Наявність соціального капіталу безпосередньо впливає на досягнення стабільності в суспільстві та сприяє демократичному розвитку, а його відсутність, роз'єднаність гальмує розвиток громадянського суспільства.

*Ключові слова: соціальний капітал, громадські об'єднання, громадське суспільство, демократичний розвиток, стабільність.*

## **Spółeczne struktury jak działającej mechanizm kształtowania socjalnego kapitału w demokratycznych krajach**

W artykule rozpatrują się mechanizmy kształtowania socjalnego kapitału we współczesnych krajach. Pokazano, że gromadzenie i зрiстання socjalnego kapitału możliwie tylko

w demokratycznych krajach. Uzasadniono, że jego celowe kształtowanie i zwiększanie w obszarze interpersonalnych, międzygrupowych związków i stosunków daje możliwość znaleźć drogi do harmonizacji politycznych, socjalnych, ekonomicznych interesów, polepszyć możliwości ich racjonalnego wyrażenia na państwowym poziomie. Obecność socjalnego kapitału bezpośrednio wpływa na osiągnięcie stabilności w społeczeństwie i pomaga rozwojowy demokratycznemu, a jego nieobecność, alienacja hamuje rozwój obywatelskiego społeczeństwa.

*Kluczowe słowa: socjalny kapitał, społeczne zjednoczenia, społeczne społeczeństwo, demokratyczny rozwój, stabilność.*

Процес накопичення соціального капіталу надзвичайно тривалий і трудомісткий. Як і фінансовий капітал, соціальний капітал швидше наростає там, де він вже є. Там же, де його немає, він накопичується або дуже повільно або зовсім не зростає. Розгубити ж його можна відносно швидко. Від фінансового капіталу соціальний відрізняється в одному суттєво – його не можна позичити, він не виникає миттєвою передачею. Його цілеспрямоване формування і нарощування в просторі міжособових, міжгрупових зв'язків і стосунків дає змогу знайти шлях до гармонізації політичних, соціальних, економічних інтересів, покращити можливості їх раціонального вираження на державному рівні. Наявність соціального капіталу безпосередньо впливає на досягнення стабільності в суспільстві та сприяє демократичному розвитку, а його відсутність, роз'єднаність гальмує розвиток громадянського суспільства. Нестача соціального капіталу порушує соціально схвалювані зв'язки між групами населення, ускладнює взаємодію та кооперацію між ними, скорочує легальні економічні можливості та соціальні ресурси і відкриває шлях до асоціальної поведінки, тому вагомим чинником асоціальних явищ в Україні (поряд із іншими соціально-економічними чинниками) є дефіцит соціального капіталу<sup>1</sup>.

Соціальний капітал має особливу природу, інші закони та закономірності розвитку; він формується на основі жертвності громадян; він зростає залежно від того, наскільки його витрачають. Отримані надбання перебувають у власності всього суспільства; його може використати не лише той, хто напрацьовує його за рахунок власного часу, енергії, здібностей і талантів, а також будь-який інший громадянин, який активно включився в процес його виробництва. Людина накопичує соціальний капітал у спільній творчій діяльності з іншими людьми все своє життя, передає його іншим людям в різних формах. У вигляді мудрості життя, матеріалізованих результатів праці, що слугують прикладом для здійснення соціально значущих вчинків. Якщо індивідуальний соціальний капітал людини не став цінністю для інших людей, не отримав визнання і попиту в суспільстві, то він і не

<sup>1</sup> Левчук Н. М. Асоціальні явища як наслідок дефіциту соціального капіталу в Україні / Н. М. Левчук // Український соціум. – 2011. – № 1. – С. 135-147 (С. 142).



є таким. Із моменту громадського визнання індивідуальний соціальний капітал починає свій істинний рух у суспільстві, отримуючи можливість стрімкого розвитку та зростання.

Механізми формування соціального капіталу можна розділити на механізми формування та закріплення соціальних норм, включаючи і норми соціальної взаємодії; механізми формування соціальної довіри. Україна є у пошуку як механізмів першої групи, так і другої. Зокрема, постають проблеми: 1) пошуку нових форм взаємодії органів державної влади та інститутів місцевого самоврядування з громадянським суспільством; 2) налагодження системи інформування населення про діяльність влади, намагання забезпечити сталий зворотній зв'язок між інститутами влади та громадянами у рамках формування культури державно-громадського управління<sup>2</sup>; 3) можливості використовувати механізми та інструментарію електронної демократії на центральному і місцевому рівнях державного управління<sup>3</sup>; 4) запровадження механізмів громадської експертизи<sup>4</sup>; 5) впровадження інших сучасних діалогових форм політичної комунікації (на їх значимості наголошує О. Крутій<sup>5</sup>).

Систематична взаємодія громадських організацій із органами державного управління та інститутами місцевого самоврядування утворює постійну й різнобічну комунікацію між владою та громадянами, забезпечує такий дефіцитний в умовах нашої країни сталий зворотній зв'язок, а через його – налагоджені канали й отримання управліннями своєчасних реакцій суспільства на дії або бездіяльність влади, що становить важливий стимул її вдосконалення. Проте нині відсутня дієва система залучення громадян до розробки управлінських рішень. Традиційні форми взаємодії (відділи по роботі із зверненнями громадян) втрачають свою актуальність, а більш сучасні форми, такі, як реалізація громадянами своїх прав щодо управління територією через участь у діяльності громадських рад при органах виконавчої влади та місцевого самоврядування, не мають достатньої підтримки<sup>6</sup>. Найзручнішою для громадян формою впливу на місцевий розвиток залишається участь у виборах місцевих рад, у той час як у європейських країнах запорукою успішного розвитку виступає активний соціальний діалог влади з населенням у різних його формах.

Однією з форм такого діалогу є створення громадських рад при органах виконавчої влади. Це звична практика країн, що сповідують демократичні принципи управління,

<sup>2</sup> Крутлашов А. М. Громадські ради як комунікатор між владою та організованою громадськістю : регіональний досвід і потенціал розвитку / А. М. Крутлашов. [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : [http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/commentaries/expert\\_opinion/anatolii-kruglashov/grtcencial-rozvitku.htm](http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/commentaries/expert_opinion/anatolii-kruglashov/grtcencial-rozvitku.htm). – Назва з екрана. - Дата звернення: 09.05.2015.

<sup>3</sup> Береза А. В. Реформування публічної влади: сучасні концепції та політична практика: монографія / А. В. Береза. – К.: Логос, 2012. – 360 с.

<sup>4</sup> Лащиба М. В. Громадська експертиза діяльності органів виконавчої влади: крок за кроком / М. Лащиба, О. Хмара, О. Орловський; Укр. незалеж. центр політ. дослідж. : Порядок проведення громадської експертизи діяльності органів виконавчої влади: від А до Я : матеріали тренінгу. – Дніпропетровськ, 2010. – С. 16-17.

<sup>5</sup> Крутій О. М. Сучасний стан діалогової комунікації між органами державної влади та громадськістю в українському суспільстві / О. М. Крутій // Електронне наукове фахове видання «Державне управління : удосконалення та розвиток». – 2012. – № 2 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: <http://www.dy.nauka.com.ua/?op=1&z=386>. – Назва з екрана.

<sup>6</sup> Крутій О. М. Сучасний стан діалогової комунікації між органами державної влади та громадськістю в українському суспільстві / О. М. Крутій // Електронне наукове фахове видання «Державне управління : удосконалення та розвиток». – 2012. – № 2 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: <http://www.dy.nauka.com.ua/?op=1&z=386>. – Назва з екрана.

наприклад, у Данії поширена практика призначення членів консультативних органів. В Естонії діє Єдина комісія Уряду та представників об'єднань громадян, завданнями якої є виконання програми діяльності з реалізації Концепції розвитку громадянського суспільства<sup>7</sup>. У ЄС практика консультування з громадськістю (у т. ч. і з бізнес-середовищем) у процесі прийняття рішень стала обов'язковою умовою для органів Союзу одразу після прийняття Амстердамської угоди (1997): проведення широких консультацій і публікації проектів документів для їх обговорення зацікавленими сторонами до їх прийняття. Окремі кроки були зроблені й в Україні, проте потребує оцінки ефективність їх впровадження. Так, Постановою Кабінету Міністрів України від 03.11.2010 р. № 996 було затверджено «Порядок проведення консультацій з громадськістю з питань формування та реалізації державної політики».

Партнерство держави та громадських рухів слугує не лише зміцненню існуючого громадянського суспільства, а накопиченню соціального капіталу та подальшому його розширенню. Розвиток соціального капіталу через активізацію участі населення в суспільному житті є важливою частиною концепції громадянського суспільства. Один із найважливіших аспектів соціального капіталу полягає в здатності до створення об'єднань і до взаємодії. Ця здатність зумовлена культурною специфікою, ступенем довіри. Взаємодія держави та громадянського суспільства є максимально продуктивною, коли держава та громадянське суспільство зрілі, а громадяни – соціально активні.

Розвитку соціального капіталу сприяє розвиток е-врядування, яке покращує демократичність врядування через інтерактивну (більш відкриту й учасницьку форму) взаємодію з іншими суспільними акторами: діяльність в он-лайн покращує доступ громадян до урядової інформації, послуг і порад для забезпечення участі громадян і задоволення процесом урядування. Наприклад, урядовий портал Сінгапура не тільки надає інформацію про державні органи, але й дозволяє зробити деякі дії, для яких раніше населення було змушене відвідувати державні установи. Е-врядування стало синонімом сучасної інноваційної держави, центральними елементами якої виступають якість, довіра і швидкість. Методи е-врядування трансформували уряди, зробивши їх більш доступними для своїх громадян, більш підзвітними, ефективними й прозорими. Застосовані належним чином механізми е-врядування здатні зцементувати стосунки між урядом і громадянами, а відтак допоможуть урядам завоювати суспільну довіру шляхом проведення політичного курсу, сформованого під впливом громадської участі. Тому уряди всього світу активно сприяють впровадженню методів е-врядування у всі сфери взаємодії зі своїми громадянами. Наріжним каменем у цих зусиллях виступає надання інформації широкій громадськості. Одним із аспектів е-врядування є залучення громадян до прийняття важливих стратегічних рішень із

<sup>7</sup> Береза А. В. Реформування публічної влади: сучасні концепції та політична практика: монографія / А. В. Береза. – К.: Логос, 2012. – 360 с. (С. 248–249).

питань державного та регіонального розвитку шляхом референдуму, обговорення рішень міської ради, парламенту за посередництвом форумів, блогів і чатів<sup>8</sup>.

Зростанню соціального капіталу, на думку автора статті, сприятиме переформатування громадянина в е-громадянина, попри усю складність такого процесу з огляду на ще недостатню комп'ютеризацію суспільства в цілому та (порівняно з розвинутими країнами) низький відсоток користувачів Інтернету. У компанії «In Mind Factum group» підраховали, що наприкінці 2012 р. рівень проникнення Інтернету на території України становив майже 44 %. Станом на кінець 2015 року загальна Інтернет-аудиторія на всій території України (без урахування Криму) зросла до 59 % і складає 21,8 млн користувачів (порівняємо: у 2014 р. – 18,8 млн); ці дані є результатами дослідження, проведеного компанією Factum Group Ukraine)<sup>9</sup>. Але варто зауважити, що доречно говорити не лише про кількісні, а й про якісні характеристики, адже важливий не сам вихід у Мережу, а її використання з певною соціально-корисною метою; уже сьогодні треба гостро ставити питання про Інтернет-культуру (кіберкультуру користувачів Мережі) та роль електронної комунікації у накопиченні соціального капіталу (як приватного, так і колективного).

З огляду на тенденцію кількісного розростання мережі Інтернет Україною, можна прогнозувати формування національного е-громадянина, який активно реалізовуватиме свої права та виконуватиме обов'язки саме за допомогою використання інформаційних технологій (е-вибори, е-консультації, е-нормотворення та інші техніки е-участі). Проте, досягнення такого завдання потребує розробки методики стимулювання використання можливостей Інтернету саме для громадських ініціатив, дебатів, публічних обговорень, тобто усього, що формує соціальний капітал, а не виключно перегляду фільмів чи приватного спілкування у соціальних мережах.

Е-громадяни, як активні Інтернет-користувачі, для реалізації своїх прав і виконання деяких обов'язків можуть активно використовувати такий інструмент сучасної демократії та новий засіб політичної комунікації як блог – веб-сайту з регулярним оновленням записів, зображень, використання мультимедіа. Їх значимість для зростання саме соціального капіталу у тому, що блоги зазвичай публічні та передбачають сторонніх читачів, які можуть вступати в публічну полеміку з автором (у відгуках до блог-запису або в своїх блогах), вони створюють відчуття «віртуального віче» (Л. Лессиг), на якому учасники не зібрані водночас, і розмови яких можуть бути і незв'язаними. Це своєрідний незрежисований громадський полілог із його тематичними перескакуваннями, складною взаємодією реплік, розривом діалогічних єдностей.

<sup>8</sup> Митко А. Електронна демократія в дії / А. Митко // Наук. вісник Волинс. нац. ун-ту ім. Лесі Українки. – 2011. – № 20 (217). – С. 20-23. – (Серія «Міжнародні відносини»).

<sup>9</sup> Кількість регулярних інтернет-користувачів в Україні зросла до 21,8 млн [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: [http://gazeta.ua/articles/life/\\_kilkist-regulyarnih-internetkoristuvachiv-v-ukrayini-zroslo-do-218-mln/633061](http://gazeta.ua/articles/life/_kilkist-regulyarnih-internetkoristuvachiv-v-ukrayini-zroslo-do-218-mln/633061). – Назва з скрана. – Дата звернення: 24.06.2015.

Потужним інструментом взаємодії між державою та громадянським суспільством за посередництвом сучасних інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій є е-консультації у численних формах (web-сторінка, на якій подаються вибрані запитання від громадян із відповідями за підписом осіб, уповноважених на прийняття рішень в організації; можливість коментувати розміщені в он-лайн статті чи документів; on-line секція для запитань запрошеним особам; on-line конференції (1-3 тижні), що дозволяє віртуально зібрати учасників віддалених фізично один від одного; використання on-line інструментів (списки розсилки е-поштою); чат, який завдяки розвинутому програмному забезпеченню дозволяє взаємодіяти в реальному часі, навіть якщо інтенсивність діалогу обмежена, цим завойовується достатньо велика аудиторія в специфічний час; on-line опитування та дослідження тощо).

Як один із шляхів активізації взаємин між особою та владою, їх зближення та формування довіри населення до влади можна розглядати модель державного управління е-уряд, яка заснована на використанні сучасних інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій із метою підвищення ефективності та прозорості влади, а також встановлення суспільного контролю над нею. Ця модель не лише дозволяє підвищувати ефективність урядів, але й демократизувати процедуру надання послуг громадянам. Е-уряд, як єдина модернізована система, спроможна об'єднати всіх державних органів, які надаватимуть послуги населенню (фізичним особам, компаніям, підприємцям) за допомогою Інтернету, електронних терміналів чи навіть мобільного телефону.

Одним із компонентів системи заходів формування соціального капіталу є підтримка громадсько-політичних рухів, які мають бути тим чинником, що допомагає державній владі визначити та вирішити актуальні проблеми, що в подальшому дасть змогу отримати підтримку суспільства. Готовність громадян до участі в громадських рухах, з одного боку, свідчить про високий рівень соціального капіталу в суспільстві, з другого – саме ця участь формує соціальний капітал, який, у свою чергу, є однією з основних складових високого рівня політичної участі населення<sup>10</sup>.

Дієвим механізмом формування соціального капіталу, на думку автора статі, є розвиток різноманітних форматів громадського мовлення (насамперед, радіо та телебачення), яке висвітлює життя громади. Громадське мовлення фінансується за рахунок коштів громадськості, зібраних методом краудфандингу, який є ще одним способом громадської кооперації і, відповідно, нарощування потенціалу довіри, соціального капіталу і, відтак, соціального партнерства.

Саме соціальне партнерство виступає одним із механізмів формування соціальної довіри, позаяк – механізмом соціальної взаємодії, ефективним інструментом узгодження інтересів як державних, так і громадських, некомерційних і комерційних соціальних

<sup>10</sup> Савко Ю. Громадянське суспільство, соціальний капітал і політична участь / Ю. Савко // Вісник Львів. ун-ту. Серія : «Філософські науки». – 2002. – Вип. 4. – С. 151-158.

структур; це той механізм демократії, який не пов'язаний із боротьбою за владу, спосіб конструктивної взаємодії для вирішення соціальних проблем, «вигідний» для кожного сектора окремо (державного, комерційного та некомерційного) і населення території, де воно реалізується, в цілому.

Якщо виходити з тези, що соціальний капітал формується з приватного капіталу особи (індивідуального капіталу людини), то революційні та воєнні події 2013-2016 рр. істотно змінили багатьох: визріло усвідомлення потреби змін, але власними зусиллями. Гаслами висувається самоорганізація, розширення кола відповідальності кожного за звичні межі – до громади, держави. Укріплюється усвідомлення персональної відповідальності за власне життя, успіх, добробут. Убивання вірусу байдужості всередині себе, активізація зв'язків між людьми – рішучий стрибок до якісно-кількісного зростання соціального капіталу. У той же час накопичення соціального капіталу підсилює ефективність інших видів капіталу.

Держава може створювати умови для накопичення й розвитку соціального капіталу в суспільстві. Сферою, в якій цей політичний інститут має найбільш доступні важелі для накопичення соціального капіталу, є система освіти; освітні інституції не просто створюють людський капітал у процесі формального навчання, але й сприяють накопиченню соціального капіталу шляхом удосконалювання соціальних правил і норм. Також держава побічно сприяє створенню соціального капіталу за допомогою надання необхідних соціальних і економічних свобод, зокрема охорона права власності, соціальна і національна безпека тощо. Але держава негативно впливає на накопичення соціального капіталу, якщо починає займатися діяльністю, яку краще передати приватному сектору або інститутам громадянського суспільства. Здатність до співробітництва заснована на традиціях і історичній практиці, й коли держава забирає на себе більшість функцій, люди стають залежні від неї й втрачають здатність до спонтанної взаємодії<sup>11</sup>.

Погоджуємося з думкою В. Єлагіна, що поза впливом держави існують, принаймні, два додаткових джерела накопичення соціального капіталу. Першим є релігія; хоча й не всі форми релігії є позитивними з боку соціального капіталу (сектантство, релігійний фанатизм і екстремізм). Другим джерелом соціального капіталу у країнах, що розвиваються, є глобалізація. Хоча вона частково ставить під загрозу давні традиції, але одночасно породжує нові образи, звичаї й набутий досвід, починаючи від організації економічної діяльності й закінчуючи діяльністю неурядових організацій<sup>12</sup>.

Соціальний капітал передбачає існування інститутів, відносин і норм, що визначають якість і кількість соціальних взаємодій у суспільстві та сприяють стійкому розвитку країни. Долаючи класові, гендерні, етнічні та релігійні бар'єри, соціальний капітал сприяє кооперації зусиль громадян задля досягнення певних політичних, економічних, соціальних і культурних інтересів. Дієздатність будь-якої громади залежить від її соціального капіталу.

<sup>11</sup> Coleman J. *Foundations of Social Theory* / J. Coleman. – Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. – 1990. – 1014 p. (P. 307).

<sup>12</sup> До прозорості через публічні консультації та комунікацію // Урядовий кур'єр. – 2012. – 24 жовтня. – № 194 (4838). – С. 14.

Для оцінки якості певних механізмів формування соціального капіталу необхідний надійний інструментарій його вимірювання. Останнє ж є непротим завданням, бо мова йде про нематеріальні та не завжди доступні спостереженню характеристики. Як правило, найбільш використовуваними індикаторами соціального капіталу є рівень довіри (Р. Патнам), громадянська та політична активність (Дж. Конвей) і соціальні норми, вимірювані на індивідуальному рівні й усереднюються для отримання характеристик спільнот.

Відтак, найдієвішим інструментом формування соціального капіталу є громадські структури. Проблема соціального капіталу як суспільної бази та основи легітимності влади багатоаспектна для перспективних досліджень у царині політичної науки. Потребує вивчення вплив соціального капіталу на політичну модернізацію України (зворотній зв'язок у системі «влада - суспільство», забезпечення групової та індивідуальної участі громадян у політичному житті тощо).

## **Innovation Policy Of Social And Economic Development: Essence And Structuring**

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological review of the phenomenon of innovation and innovative socio-economic development. The scientist analyzed the nature, structure and expected strategies and consequences of innovative socio-economic development. On this basis, it was argued that innovations increase its efficiency on the basis of policy, including government, implementation of innovations. It was found that the effectiveness of innovation policy promotes socio-economic and political modernization.

*Keywords: innovation, policy of innovations, socio-economic development, modernization.*

## **ПОЛІТИКА ІННОВАЦІЙ СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО РОЗВИТКУ: СУТНІСТЬ ТА СТРУКТУРИЗАЦІЯ**

Стаття присвячена теоретико-методологічному розгляду феномену інновацій та інноваційного соціально-економічного розвитку. Вчений проаналізував сутність, структуризацію та очікувані стратегії та наслідки інноваційного соціально-економічного розвитку. На підставі цього було аргументовано, що інноваційність зростає у своїй ефективності на підставі реалізації політики, в тому числі й державної, інновацій. Виявлено, що ефективність інноваційної політики сприяє соціально-економічній та політичній модернізації.

*Ключові слова: інновація, політика інновацій, соціально-економічний розвиток, модернізація.*

Innovation is the idea, the newest product in the sphere of technical equipment, technology, job organization and management, as well as in other spheres of scientific and social activity, which being the outcome of innovation activity, is based on benefits from research and advanced experience. Moreover, innovation is a result of systematic activity, aimed at fulfillment of achievements of scientific and technological advance and their improvement, what contributes to qualitative and quantitative changes in different areas of economy and provides enhancement of efficiency and getting competitive advantages<sup>1</sup>. Taking this into consideration, it becomes quite obvious that it is rather necessary to account innovation

<sup>1</sup> *Kerivnyctvo Oslo. Rekomendatsii shchodo zboru ta analizu danykh stosoyno innovatsii*, Wyd. Orhanizatsiia ekonomichnoho spivrobitytstva ta rozvytku 2009.

development for providing competitiveness of national economies and social sectors, and thus it must be a subject to innovation policy. The point is, that innovation plays or perhaps may play a very significant role in developing universal civilization and each state in particular. Correspondingly, most of modern states are constantly trying to create and improve national innovation systems to support the process of creation and implementation of innovations. Besides, every state itself is endowed with certain innovation potential, i.e. an ability of various spheres of national economy to produce scientific products, which suit the requirements of the world market. From this perspective, it is notable that innovation potential includes various scientific, project and design elaborations, development services, connected with elaboration of new production, instruments and equipment for scientific actions, means of technological control etc.

In theoretical-methodological light it is extremely important as innovation policy may generate different theoretical and practical outcomes, first of all in social-economic development. For the first time it was noted by J. Schumpeter, who in the 40s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century derived and justified the phenomenon of “innovation waves”, which over the period of tended to become shorter. The scientist remarks that innovation waves, which are traced to the times of the industrial revolution of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in England appear and disappear every 50-60 years. The first innovation wave took place from 1780-1840 and was preconditioned by appearance of steam engines and development of textile industry and metallurgy. The second innovation wave was protracted for over 50 years and ended approximately in 1900 and was connected with development of railways and steel production. The third way which also stretched for 50 years was bound up with the spread of electricity and development of the internal-combustion engine. The fourth wave took place from 1950 up to the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and was characterized by achievements in chemical industry, electronics and aerospace industry. And finally, the fifth wave started in 1989 with a wide spread of “client-server” corporate networks, rapid development of software, multimedia and telecommunications<sup>2</sup>. Each “new wave” brought/brings the beginning of another “social-economic epoch”, which, in its turn, is characterized by a swift growth of investment. Even despite the fact that after each of the innovation waves there is “another recession”, countries in general become richer and thus must be interested in implementation of corresponding innovation policy, including that in a social-economic sphere.

In this context policy of innovation or innovation policy is interpreted as a shift of the emphasis on usage of essentially new technologies, transition to producing advanced technology products, taking progressive organizational and managerial decisions in the sphere of innovation activity, what concerns both micro- and macroeconomic processes of development. It results in the fact that objective changes in social and economic development incessantly lead to a new model of economy development, which is characterized by radically

<sup>2</sup> M. Best, *Nozaiia konkurentstva: Instytuty promyslennoho razvytyia*, Wyd. Teis 2002.



new characteristics and priorities. It is also revealed in the fact that quite a significant role in a society's life now belongs to the spheres, which are based on the so-called "high-tech solutions", as well as the fields which directly meet the needs of people.

The abovementioned topicality can be observed and made more profound in the works of a number of scientists such as: D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson<sup>3</sup>, A. Banerjee and E. Duflo<sup>4</sup>, V. Bondar<sup>5</sup>, N. Buhas and H. Hladka<sup>6</sup>, I. Chukhno<sup>7</sup>, S. Cozzens and R. Kaplinsky<sup>8</sup>, L. Fedulova, H. Androshchuk and O. Fomova<sup>9</sup>, A. Gavrylov<sup>10</sup>, Z. Gerasymchuk<sup>11</sup>, F. Goldshtein<sup>12</sup>, A. Hall, N. Clark and G. Naik<sup>13</sup>, A. Kasych<sup>14</sup>, A. Kondrashykhin<sup>15</sup>, L. Kryvenko and V. Mylashenko<sup>16</sup>, M. Krupka<sup>17</sup>, J. Lorentzen<sup>18</sup>, T. Marchenko<sup>19</sup>, O. Nahorna<sup>20</sup>, H. Nahorniak and Y. Vovk<sup>21</sup>, T. Papaioannou<sup>22</sup>, E. Reinert<sup>23</sup>, V. Soloviov, H. Koreniako and V. Holovatiuk<sup>24</sup>,

<sup>3</sup> D. Acemoglu, J. Robinson, *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*, Wyd. Crown Publishing Group 2012.

<sup>4</sup> A. Banerjee, E. Duflo, *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*, Wyd. Public Affairs 2011.

<sup>5</sup> V. Bondar, *Rol innovatsiinoi diialnosti u sotsialno-ekonomichnomu rozvytku rehioniv*, „Ekonomika ta upravlinnia pidpryiemstvamy mashynobudivnoi haluzi: problemy teorii ta praktyky“ 2013, vol 2, nr. 22, s. 109-118.

<sup>6</sup> N. Buhas, H. Hladka, *Rol innovatsiinoho faktoru v zabezpechenni staloho sotsialno-ekonomichnoho rozvytku rehionu*, „Efektyvna ekonomika“ 2016, nr. 11.

<sup>7</sup> I. Chukhno, *Rol innovatsii v zabezpechenni sotsialno-ekonomichnoho rozvytku rehionu*, „Investysii: praktyka ta dosvid“ 2015, nr. 7, s. 124-127.

<sup>8</sup> S. Cozzens, R. Kaplinsky, *Innovation, Poverty and Inequality: Cause, Coincidence or Co-Evolution?*, [w:] *Handbook of Innovation Systems and Developing Countries: Building Domestic Capabilities in a Global Setting*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2009, s. 57-82.

<sup>9</sup> L. Fedulova, H. Androshchuk, *Osoblyvosti rozvytku innovatsiinoi polityky Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu: vykykly dlia Ukrainy*, „Problemy nauky“ 2014, nr. 7-8, s. 40-43.; L. Fedulova, *Innovatsiina ekonomika*, Wyd. Lybid 2006.; L. Fedulova, *Innovatsiyni rozvytok ekonomiky: model, systema upravlinnia, derzhavna polityka*, Wyd. Osnova 2005.; L. Fedulova, *Ekonomika znan*, Wyd. NAN Ukrainy 2009.; L. Fedulova, O. Fomova, *Teoriia ta praktyka formuvannia innovatsiinoi stratehii korporatyvnykh struktur: monografija*, Wyd. KhNU 2009.; L. Fedulova, *Inklyuzyvni innovatsii v systemi sotsialno-ekonomichnoho rozvytku*, „Ekonomika: realii chasu“ 2016, vol 3, nr. 25, s. 56-65.

<sup>10</sup> A. Gavrylov, *Rehionalnaia ekonomika i upravlenye: Uchebn. posobyie dlia vuzov*, Wyd. YuNYTY -DANA 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Z. Gerasymchuk, *Rehionalna polityka staloho rozvytku: metodolohiia formuvannia, mekhanizmy realizatsii*, Wyd. Nadstytia 2001.

<sup>12</sup> F. Goldshtein, *Innovatsiynni menedzhment: Ucheb. posobyie*, Wyd. TRRU 2008.

<sup>13</sup> A. Hall, N. Clark, G. Naik, *Technology Supply Chain or Innovation Capacity? Contrasting Experiences of Promoting Small Scale Irrigation Technology in South Asia*, „UNU-MERIT Working Paper“ 2007.

<sup>14</sup> A. Kasych, *Vilemia konseptsii stratehichnoho upravlinnia v praktyku vitchyzniannykh pidpryiemstv*, „Biznes-Infom“ 2014, nr. 11, s. 290-294.

<sup>15</sup> A. Kondrashykhin, *Innovatsiini zasady sotsialno-ekonomichnoho rozvytku rehionu: strukturno-institutsionalnyi aspekt*, „Naukovi pratsi NDFI“ 2012, vol 3, nr. 60, s. 177-182.; A. Kondrashykhin, *Koordynatni vymiry innovatsiinoho prostoru rehionu*, Wyd. DETUT 2010.

<sup>16</sup> L. Kryvenko, V. Mylashenko, *Formuvannia innovatsiinoi modeli rozvytku Ukrainy – zaporuka ekonomichnoho zrostantia*, „Visnyk Ukrainiskoi akademii bankivskoi spravy“ 2011, vol 2, nr. 31, s. 16-20.

<sup>17</sup> M. Krupka, *Finansovi instrumenty derzhavnogo rebuliuвання ta pidtrymky innovatsiinoi sfery*, „Finansy Ukrainy“ 2001, nr. 4, s. 77-84.; M. Krupka, *Finansovo-kredytni mekhanizmy innovatsiinoho rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr Lvivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Ivana Franka 2001.

<sup>18</sup> J. Lorentzen, *Low-Income Countries and Innovation Studies: A Review of Recent Literature*, „African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development“ 2010, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 46-81.

<sup>19</sup> T. Marchenko, *Rehionalni aksenty innovatsiinoi strukturnoi polityky ukrainy v transformatsiynnykh koordynatakh rozvytku*, „Ekonomika“ 2007.

<sup>20</sup> O. Nahorna, *Innovatsiyni rozvytok natsionalnoi ekonomiky: diabnostyka problem, vazbeli aktyvizatsii*, „Finansovyi prostir“ 2014, vol 2, nr. 14, s. 108-113.

<sup>21</sup> H. Nahorniak, Y. Vovk, *Rol derzhavnoi innovatsiinoi polityky u zabezpechenni rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Sotsialno-ekonomichni problemy i derzhava“ 2012, vol 1, nr. 6, s. 202-209.

<sup>22</sup> T. Papaioannou, *How inclusive can innovation and development be in the twenty-first century?*, „Innovation and Development“ 2014, vol 4, nr. 2, s. 187-202.

<sup>23</sup> E. Reinert, *How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*, Wyd. Constable 2007.

<sup>24</sup> V. Soloviov, H. Koreniako, V. Holovatiuk, *Innovatsiyni rozvytok rehioniv: pytannia teorii ta praktyky: monografija*, Wyd. Fenik 2008.

F. Santiago<sup>25</sup>, L. Sapun<sup>26</sup>, I. Taranenko<sup>27</sup>, O. Tarasova<sup>28</sup>, V. Zhyhailo<sup>29</sup>, V. Zianko<sup>30</sup> and others.

They argue that a display of successful implementation of innovation policy within a social-economic sphere is the fact that production becomes more focused not on a mass consumer, but on specific needs of some individuals, i.e. small markets. The number of entrepreneurial groups, especially small and medium businesses, which are capable of rapid adapting to the requirements of the environment is growing at fast pace. Fast rates of political and social-economic modernization of life lead to growing requirements as to the quality of goods and services, as well as to their diversification. Consequently, the society becomes more open-minded and perceptive to innovations as means of achieving the required diversity.

Besides, there is re-evaluation of a human factor in economy, as growth the role of creative personnel who obtain necessary knowledge and are the bearers of innovations in the spheres of organization, scientific-technical and ecological culture. New model of economic development under the conditions of innovation policy is based on an innovation type of development, and presupposes a change of the notions of scientific-technical progress and scientific-technical development. However, there appear new social priorities: welfare, intellectualization of business activity, employment of advanced and information technologies, ecological compatibility and so on. This model requires new financial and credit policy, effective stimulation of innovations, development of scientific spheres and reduction of nature exploitation fields of economy, shifts in types of entrepreneurial activity, active engagement of small and medium business to manufacturing etc. It is quite notable that the result of innovation policy in the social-economic sphere leads to practical approval and spread of a new model of economic development in the form of venture entrepreneurship and involvement of risk capital to financing innovation business. Herewith, forms and motives of such engagement are absolutely different: from sponsor support to mutual interest in profits by means of share buyback or share capital payment. Quite widely-spread practice is creation of specialized funds of scientific-innovation development.

Therefore, innovations influence social-economic dynamics: on the one hand, they open new possibilities for enhancement of the social sphere and economy, on the other hand – make impossible continuation of this enhancement in traditional directions. The point is that social-economic nature of innovations prioritizes market novelty over scientific-technical one.

<sup>25</sup> F. Santiago, *Innovation for inclusive development*, „Innovation and Development” 2014, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1-4.

<sup>26</sup> L. Sapun, *Problemy formuvannia innovatsiinoi modeli rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Mekhanizm rehulivannia ekonomiky” 2008, nr. 1, s. 212-218.

<sup>27</sup> I. Taranenko, *Modyfikatsiia globalizatsiino-innovatsiinoi modeli svitovoi ekonomiky na zasadakh staloho rozvytku: novi vymiry konkurentospromozhnosti*, „Yevropeiskyi vektor ekonomichnoho rozvytku: zb. nauk. pr.” 2013, vol 1, nr. 12, s. 172-185.

<sup>28</sup> O. Tarasova, *Vplyv derzhavy na formuvannia investytsiino-innovatsiinoho potentsialu ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Ekonomika kharchovoi promyslovosti” 2015, vol 1, nr. 25, s. 66-68.

<sup>29</sup> V. Zhyhailo, *Innovatsiynnyi protses kak faktor ustoiychoho sotsyalno-ekonomicheskoho razvytiya*, „Vestnyk Moskovskoho hosudarstvennogo oblastnogo unyversyteta. Seryia: ekonomyka”, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 13-18.

<sup>30</sup> V. Zianko, *Innovatsiine pidpryjemnyctvo: sutnist, mekhanizmy i formy rozvytku: monohrafiia*, Wyd. Universum 2008.; V. Zianko, *Innovatsiine pidpryjemnyctvo v Ukraini: problemy stanovlennja i rozvytku: Monohrafiia*, Wyd. Universum 2005.; V. Zianko, *Novatorstvo – osnovnyj napriam rozvytku stratezhichnoho menedzhmentu*, „Visnyk UDUVGhP. Ekonomika” 2003, vol 1, nr. 20, s. 224-229.

Market novelty presupposes user's recognition of the innovations' useful properties and advantages over alternative goods, and if innovations represent technological process, then such innovations can be recognized as successful, if they allow raising profits due to lowering costs and improving quality<sup>31</sup>. That is why every innovation may be characterized not only by absolute, but also relative market novelty. Ideas, practice or objects, which are perceived as new, are innovations, if to measure them by time since their first appearance or invention<sup>32</sup>.

Taking into account the fact that nowadays quite popular have become the ideas of the innovation process and innovation activity not as a "linear chain" of knowledge transference in accordance with the stages of innovation cycle and promoting new goods at the market, but as a structure with an inverse relationship between its elements. Main parameters of any market economy are demand, investment activity and prices and they have a remarkable influence on the character and intensiveness of innovation activity, however, there is still no answer to the question why and when appear these or those directions of technological development. Taking a model of "life circle" of goods/products as a base, we can state that over the years the characteristics of goods/products and innovation process will change and along with them the strategy of competitiveness and social-economic growth will change too. In course of time development of production process becomes more capital intensive, production performance increases due to a larger labor division and specializations, flow of materials within the process becomes more rational, products are more standardized and the scale of manufacturing increases<sup>33</sup>.

That is why developing innovation activity (conducting innovation policy) within the country and contributing to the biggest extent, owing to present means and ways, to its implementation, states and/or regions have comparatively modest as to qualitative parameters and technical potential resources, in fact can decide essential problems. First of all, innovation activity will create in the country or region possibilities to solve problems of social-economic development at the modern, advanced level, in particular with least losses of time. Secondly, innovation activity will become a source of preservation and in further creation of new job places in the spheres of science and techniques, lowering social tension and provide a possibility to support scientific schools and traditions by attracting youths and professionals to the process, i.e. will help solving a number of acute social and economic problems, connected with difficulties and peculiarities of a modern period of social-economic development. Therefore, the necessity of changes, which are aimed at providing conditions for stable development of the country and/or region, brings to the foreground changes in social and economic directions, which are

<sup>31</sup> N. Buhas, H. Hladka, *Rol innovatsiinoho faktoru v zabezpechenni staloho sotsialno-ekonomichnoho rozvytku rehionu*, „Efektyvna ekonomika“ 2016, nr. 11.

<sup>32</sup> V. Zhyhailo, *Innovatsyomnyi protsess kak faktor ustoičyvoho sotsialno-ekonomyčeskoho razvytyia*, „Vestnyk Moskovskoho gosudarstvennoho oblastnoho unyversyteta. Seryia: ekonomyka“, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 13-18.

<sup>33</sup> V. Zhyhailo, *Innovatsyomnyi protsess kak faktor ustoičyvoho sotsialno-ekonomyčeskoho razvytyia*, „Vestnyk Moskovskoho gosudarstvennoho oblastnoho unyversyteta. Seryia: ekonomyka“, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 13-18.

represented in the structure of population employment, raising living standards, development of education and medicine, infrastructure of the service industry and mass media and so on<sup>34</sup>.

In this context T. Marchenko remarks that to the main measures of innovation policy of social-economic development implementation at the national and regional levels belong: development of national and regional infrastructure of innovation activity (establishment of technology parks, technopolis, innovative business-incubators, and commodity exchanges, consulting centers, engineering centers, marketing, advertising, auditing and certification companies); introduction of national and regional mechanisms of constant monitoring for innovation activity, estimation of implementation processes within priority directions of scientific-innovative potential and innovation activity, performance evaluation of applying funds, received from the state and local/regional budgets; reconstruction and modernization of state and regional enterprises on the grounds of novel technological basis; enlargement of a number of small innovative entrepreneurs; creation of scientific-educational training centers for scientific personnel, high qualification professionals; organization of scientific-innovative structures, specialized in fundamental research, due to strategic directions of innovative technologies development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and practical research, which determine innovative development of the national and regional economic complex; organization of scientific-research centers in the state and region to fulfill orders on contract basis, concerning scientific-research results, conducted by small and medium enterprises, which do not have their own scientific-technical and research-investigational consortiums and other innovative structures in the sphere of production; establishment of scientific-financial and investment-technological groups on the basis of amalgamation of interests of technologically and co-operationally connected enterprises, scientific and research institutions, banks, investment, financial and insurance companies, whose common aim is to receive profit by means of producing and merchandising competitive products; formation of national and regional system of easy-term loans of scientific-innovative research; introduction and approbation of a regional mechanism of reinvesting revenues, received from implementation of scientific-innovative programs and projects; giving easy-term loans to entrepreneurs to implement new technologies, know-how and scientific-research developments; free accommodation for promising young scholars and leading high-professional specialists; creation of national and regional data banks of scientific-innovative potential and transfer of technologies; process of efficient use of state and local innovative funds and ensuring return of innovative credits, raising the level of their intended use<sup>35</sup>.

The abovementioned measures of innovation policy are extremely important, at least because people's needs in any sphere of activity, first of all social-economic, are characterized by outperforming growth rates (in comparison with possibilities to satisfy them) from year to year along with the growth of population. However, at the same time, when unsatisfied needs

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<sup>34</sup> A. Gavrylov, *Rehionalna ekonomyka i upravlenye: Uchebn. posobie dlia vuzov*, Wyd. YuNYTY -DANA 2002.

<sup>35</sup> T. Marchenko, *Rehionalni aktsenty innovatsiinoi strukturalnoi polityky ukrainy v transformatsiynykh koordynatakh rozvytku*, „Ekonomika“ 2007.

generate conflicts, it is necessary to find an intellectual approach to the problem how to find new ways to meet the needs. Herewith, a law of competition (competitiveness) comes into effect in the market economy, as those who are first and succeed in implementing current innovation, reap excess profit owing to the technological or economic innovation, gain political or social-cultural success etc. Taking into account constant acceleration of scientific and technical progress and enhancement of globalization and integration processes, namely innovations and creativity are to become main factors of success not only in case of separate enterprises, but even whole countries<sup>36</sup>.

Correspondingly, the role of innovation policy in the social-economic sphere first of all is revealed in the fact that it provides or at least can provide stable social-economic growth<sup>37</sup>. However, it requires some national or regional (depending on innovation) social-economic conditions, like enhancement of intellectual potential for continuous implementation of innovation processes, attracting groups of stake-holders to carry out innovation processes, formation of innovative infrastructure of social and economic direction, development of innovative technologies, required namely for the economy of a certain state or region. A necessary precondition for implementation of social innovations is development of a scientific sector, which will promote social and innovation activity of the state and regions. As a result, formation of attractive innovative environment is a long process, which requires capital investment. Without state support development of innovation processes is rather complicated. Therefore namely state innovation policy is extremely significant in innovative and thus social-economic development of some countries and regions<sup>38</sup>.

Taking this into consideration, it is obvious that to launch and rationalize innovation policy all corresponding regulatory acts must contribute to stimulation of competitiveness between the country and regions. In its turn, national antitrust legislation must prevent unfair competition. The role of the state in the process of transition of the state's economy to the innovative path of development is in the necessity to elaborate, improve and implement legislative environment for ensuring innovation processes. The state is a direct participant in the innovation activity, first of all as a subject, which manages this activity and guarantees its support<sup>39</sup>. To achieve effective implementation of innovation system the state must become an immediate participant of innovation activity, as formation of attractive innovative climate requires capital investment both into fundamental sciences and practical research-engineering developments<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> V. Podljesna, *Podatkove reguljuvanja inovacijno-investicijnykh procesiv v Ukrajinu*, „Problemy i perspektyvy rozvytku bankivskoji systemy Ukrajinu: zb. nauk. pracj” 2009, nr. 25, s. 317-324.

<sup>37</sup> N. Buhas, H. Hladka, *Rol inovatsijnogo faktoruv zabezpechenni stalogo sotsialno-ekonomichnogo rozvytku rehionu*, „Efektyvna ekonomika” 2016, nr. 11.

<sup>38</sup> N. Buhas, H. Hladka, *Rol inovatsijnogo faktoruv zabezpechenni stalogo sotsialno-ekonomichnogo rozvytku rehionu*, „Efektyvna ekonomika” 2016, nr. 11.

<sup>39</sup> A. Kasych, *Vtilennia konseptsii stratehichnogo upravlinnia v praktyku vitchyznianykh pidpriemstv*, „Biznes-Infom” 2014, nr. 11, s. 290-294.

<sup>40</sup> O. Tarasova, *Vplyv derzhavy na formuvannia investytsiino-innovatsijnogo potentsialu ekonomiky Ukrainy*, „Ekonomika kharchovoi promyslovosti” 2015, vol 1, nr. 25, s. 66-68.

Another principle aimed at formation of the system and mechanism of managing innovation policy is creation of conditions for optimal development of scientific-technical potential of economy. The point is that formation of strategies is one of the essential tasks, which may ensure possibility of periodical over-evaluation of a ratio between the rates of scientific, technical and production potentials. Correspondingly, the main principle of innovation must be represented by implementation of state innovation policy, aimed at introduction of innovative model of structural reconstruction and economic and social sectors growth. To provide continuous character of the state in a scientific-technical sphere, the innovative segment of economy must be reformed in its turn, and this is possible only under renovation of mechanism of formation priority direction of science and technical development. Besides, it is feasible to enlarge rates of program-aimed funding of science within the state scientific institutions. It is obvious from the fact that in modern real life the world economic crisis quite easily “rejects” weak and dithering. Therefore, only new knowledge and innovation, in the basis of which are scientific results and high technological achievements, determine social-economic prospects of each country. Thus, success of every country and its place in the global economy directly depends on the level of science and technology development, incorporated in categories of innovation policy. Only they all together may form certain national competitive advantages and create foundation for modernization and integration of the country into the world scope of knowledge<sup>41</sup>.

As a result, it is evident that the innovation model of social-economic development of the country is materialization of scientific and technical progress’ achievements, which is a way of social-economic development<sup>42</sup>. Main attention of the innovation model of development is aimed at forming innovative type of a wide reconstruction of economy and social sector. It may be used for some territories, spheres and enterprises may be fundamental for a widened reconstruction of entrepreneurs of all forms of ownership on the basis of applying innovative ideas and products. That is why the innovation model, having combined social-economic interests may form flexible scientific production and the market of innovative products, integrate common efforts of the state and enterprises to elaborate and implement strategic innovation policy. Besides, the innovation model of development is characterized by such features as: intellectualization of production activity; appliance of advanced information technologies; ecological compatibility; creativity of staff; welfare of people.

However, implementation of all stages of the innovation process, from fundamental research to practical actualization of new technologies, in many commercially promising spheres of science and technology is closely connected with high expenses and is effective in case of various types of state support and state policy. According to the levels and forms of support in the world experience one can single out state strategies, aimed at actualization of innovation activity:

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<sup>41</sup> N. Buhas, H. Hladka, *Rol innowacyjnego fakturowu w zabezpecheniu staloho sotsialno-ekonomichnobo rozvytku rehionu*, „Efektywna ekonomika” 2016, nr. 11.

<sup>42</sup> Z. Gerasymchuk, *Rehionalna polityka staloho rozvytku: metodolohiia formuvannia, mekhanizmy realizatsii*, Wyd. Nadstytoria 2001.

strategy of active interference – purposeful funding and significant preferences for commercial organizations; strategy of decentralized regulation, which is a complex mechanism of the state participation in scientific and innovation spheres, when to the foreground of scientific-technical and innovation activity come entrepreneurs, and the state is trying to create them legal, economic and other conditions for this activity; mixed strategy is used in the countries, where the economy is largely based on a state sector, when the state applies a strategy of active interference to the state enterprises, while to the rest it applies a strategy of decentralized regulation.

In general, it means that state innovation policy is a complex of principles and mutually supportive economic, legal, organizational, social methods of planning, stimulation, regulation and control over processes of innovation activity in scientific-technical and production spheres. The aim of the state innovation policy is promoting development of science, techniques, technologies, growth of innovation activity, which provides competitiveness of products at the world market, defensive capacity of the state, improves ecological situation, contributes to venture long-term business etc. Keeping this aim in mind, the state determines priority orientations of developing innovation activity and ways to support entrepreneurships, which implement state innovative programs. In its turn, innovation policy of an enterprise is a system of practical management of innovations in the context of a specific enterprise, regardless of the forms of ownership and subordination. It is developed and implemented under the influence of many factors: results of fundamental scientific research, competitiveness, which is a propelling force for developing entrepreneurship and so on.

Extrapolating received theoretical and methodological results directly on social-economic development, it is evident that modern social-economic processes have formed certain requirements to the countries' development strategies, on the contrary to the 19<sup>th</sup> century – first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when economy and social sector of the most countries were developing rather randomly and not in accordance with some patterns. Pragmatic efforts to prevent destructive crises like the world economic crisis and great depression in the late 20s – early 30s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century led to elaboration of Kane's theory and economic model, actualized by Roosevelt in the USA. Since then development of economy in countries occurs in accordance with the chosen models. From this perspective, the innovation model of social-economic development of the country is materialization of achievements of scientific-technical progress, which is a means of economic and social development. Main directionality of the innovation model is focused on forming a type of innovation reconstruction of the national economy. It cannot be applied to separate territories, spheres, enterprises. It may be fundamental for a widened reconstruction of entrepreneurs of all forms of ownership on the basis of applying innovative ideas and products. Thus, the innovation model, having combined social-economic interests may form flexible scientific production and the market of innovative products, integrate common efforts of the state and enterprises to elaborate and implement strategic innovation policy.

In this context it becomes notable that depending on the way of innovation process organization, one can single out various models of innovative entrepreneurship: on the grounds of internal organization, when innovations are created and mastered within the enterprise by its specialized departments; on the basis of external organization with the help of contracts, when orders for creation or mastering innovations are divided between the parts of organizations; on the grounds of external ventures, when an enterprise establishes subsidiary venture companies, which attract additional supplementary means to implement an innovative projects. Therefore, innovation policy and activity, on the basis of cost avoidance, attraction of internal reserves, multiplicative effect, contributes to effectiveness of the social-economic system, establishment and development of modern social-economic relations, growth of economic welfare.

Such logics suggest that innovation and innovation policy make a precondition for modernization. In fact, modernization is a process of taking innovative decisions concerning the usage of the most significant achievements of scientific-technical progress. In its foundations lies a continuous and oriented process of search for those forms and methods, which give a chance to improve efficiency of social production functioning, level of satisfying the society's and its members' needs. Modernization processes, which are actualized on the basis of innovations, create grounds for social-economic growth and improvement of the society's well-being. Modernization carries on previous processes of development and at the same time is growing out of them. Due to modernization we can overcome some limitations and continue development at the new level. The only continuous process of society's development represents the chain "idea – innovation process – basic innovation – new technological state – innovative decisions – development – modernization – development on new grounds". Modernization, in its turn, is combined with transformation processes, which concern social-economic life of the society, its economic, social, legal, cultural and other spheres, as well as governmental policy. Changes within these spheres are interrelated with each other and constantly undergo mutual influence and correction. Unequal development or admiration for improvements of just one of the spheres as a consequence can be characterized by local, limited character of modernization.

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## **The Role of English as the Means of International Communication for the Development of World Market**

The article points out the role of English as the means of international communication in the formation and development of the global market. The process of globalization of international relations is referred to as the factor which puts forward a requirement to form and introduce into the world linguistic circulation the universal means of international communication. The role of transnational corporations in the globalization of world market and establishing English as the means of international communication is highlighted. The implementation of latest informational –communications technologies, based on a wide use of English as well as global communication systems is elucidated.

*Keywords: trade market, globalization of economic relations, international economic relations, transnational monopolies, investments, means of international communication.*

## **РОЛЬ І ЗНАЧЕННЯ АНГЛІЙСЬКОЇ МОВИ ЯК ЗАСОБУ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ У ПОШИРЕННІ СВІТОВОГО РИНКУ**

В статті розкривається роль англійської мови як засобу міжнародної комунікації в утворенні та розвитку глобального ринку. Процес глобалізації міжнародних відносин вважається чинником, який висуває вимогу створення і впровадження у світовий комунікаційний обіг універсального засобу міжнародного спілкування. Висвітлюється роль транснаціональних корпорацій у глобалізації світового ринку та закріпленні за англійською мовою ролі засобу міжнародної комунікації. Досліджується впровадження новітніх інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій, які базуються на широкому використанні англійської мови, а також глобальні комунікаційні системи.

*Ключові слова : торговий ринок, глобалізація економічних відносин, міжнародні економічні відносини, транснаціональні корпорації, інвестиції, засоби міжнародної комунікації.*

## **ZNACZENIE ANGELSKIEGO JAKO POMOcą KOMUNIKACJI MIĘDZYNARODOWEJ DLA ROZWOJU ŚWIATOWYCH RYNKACH**

W artykule podkreślono rolę języka angielskiego jako środka komunikacji międzynarodowej w rozwoju globalnego rynku towarowym. Rola globalizacji stosunków międzynarodowych, które w naturalny sposób podnosi popyt tworzenia i zarządzania globalnego obrotu środków językowych w komunikacji międzynarodowej. Wskazano na rolę korporacji transnarodowych w globalizacji rynku światowym oraz zatwierdzenie języka angielskiego jako powszechnie przyjętych środków komunikacji międzynarodowej. To rzuca światło na wpływ na globalny wprowadzenia na rynek nowoczesnych technologii informacyjnych i komunikacyjnych, w oparciu o szerokie zastosowanie języka angielskiego, jak i globalnych systemów komunikacyjnych.

*Słowa kluczowe: handel, globalizacja rynku stosunków gospodarczych, międzynarodowych stosunków gospodarczych, ponadnarodowych monopoli, inwestycje, środki komunikacji międzynarodowej.*

The formation and effective functioning of a multi-level system of global economic relations, that is, the world market, is the prerequisite for successful economic development of all the countries of the world. This requirement gained particular importance in conditions of globalization of international connections and relations, which stipulate integration and convergence of national markets. Although, according to D.Graddol, "the globalization era is nearing its end"<sup>1</sup>, global financial system, global market of goods and services is functioning and developing as an objective reality.

It is overall globalization of economic relations of all countries that has led to fundamental qualitative changes in the structure of the world commodity market.

The expansion and development of world market has put forward the requirement to improve the relations between the players of the market.

The contacts between the players in the sphere of global exchange of goods represent a continuous communication along "production-trade-consumption" chain and increase the efficiency of these contacts, a common universal means of communication, primarily a verbal one, is necessary. In other words, the language of international communication is the tool to facilitate international finance and trade.

It is quite obvious that for a successful sales process, a buyer and a seller should communicate through mutually acceptable means of communication, that is to say communicate in the same language and understand each other.

It should be noted, that the formation of national languages was taking place concurrently with the formation of national markets. To be more precise, it is in the market places where,

<sup>1</sup> David Graddol, *English Next: Why Global English May Mean the End of English as a Foreign Language*, London 2006, p.97.

in the process of buying and selling, the need for standardized forms of verbal communication objectively arose. The degree of integration, into a particular national market of a certain part of the population living in this or that area determines the peculiarities of their language. For example, the language spoken in Eastern Galicia is significantly different from that of Eastern Ukraine, as these regions for centuries belonged to different states, hence, were involved in different national markets.

The gradual formation, expansion and improvement of the planetary, global commodity market naturally require universally recognized linguistic means of communication. V. Alpatov points out that "... the laws of the market can help meet the needs of mutual understanding, a reduction of linguistic diversity and the spread of major languages" [6, 25]. These properties of market laws gained a particular role in the period of globalization of international relations, when the national economies of nearly all countries became involved in a single world economic system.

There is no doubt that the dominant role of certain countries in the global market is ensured by their military, political and economic power.

It is also undeniable that the language of these countries necessarily acquires the features of the means of international communication.

As D. Crystal writes, "The influence and authority of the international language results not only from the military power of its speakers, who can impose their language, it requires a strong economy to preserve it and spread further".<sup>2</sup>

It can be argued that it is the level of economic development of the country speaking a particular language that creates conditions for global linguistic dominance of that language over others, for its establishment as the universal means of communication.

Since English-speaking countries possess the most powerful economic potential, it is quite natural that English is the dominant means of international communication in the global trade environment.

According to F. Grin, "English is the de facto language of communication between people speaking different languages"<sup>3</sup>. And it is this feature of the English language that makes it an effective means of international communication in establishing market contacts.

At the institutional level the influence of English language in the international economic relations is reflected in the fact that international organizations, which form and regulate these relations, use English as an official language. That is why the players of market relations are supposed to know English. Apart from other advantages, the knowledge of the language helps the parties to market transactions to familiarize themselves with legal and regulatory framework for commercial behavior in the global market.

<sup>2</sup> Дэвид Кристал, *Английский язык как глобальный*, Москва 2001, с.25.

<sup>3</sup> Francois Grin, *European Economic Integration and the Fate of Lesser-Used Languages*, "Languages Problems & Language Planning", Vol.17 Number 2 1993p.

It should be noted that even the eventual exit of Great Britain from the EU can't change the linguistic situation in the market environment of the European Union. English is deeply ingrained in the sphere of formal and informal communication in the institutional system of the EU. So it is hard to imagine that it will be substituted by some other, equal language.

Globalization of international relations facilitated international business activities and the emergence of transnational corporations. This, in turn, made global transnational corporations the main driving force of economic growth and emphasized their role in international production and international exchange of goods. The United Nations has justly described these corporations as "the productive core of the globalizing world economy." Moreover, transnational corporations not only monopolize the world market, but also make a significant contribution to the development of many countries. TNCs played a pivotal role in rapidly and successfully advancing such economies as India, China and South Korea.

It should be noted that TNCs plan and carry out their activity taking into consideration not national, but international interests. Partners from many countries are involved in this activity, and active business communication between them requires the use of international means of communication. Business communication in a universal language is becoming increasingly urgent, as business contacts are constantly widening. To ensure fruitful cooperation between specialists of different countries it is necessary to know the language of business communication which at the same time will be the international means of communication. English has all features to gain the position of a universal language. Moreover, TNCs business activities "are less identified with particular countries or even don't want to be identified with them"<sup>4</sup>.

The national languages of the host countries where head offices of TNCs are located are not so popular with the TNC officials, because they prefer to use English as an official language.

On this occasion, the world-renowned linguist K. Tryusho writes that «the process of granting a special status to the English language ... embraced all the big firms in the 1990s, and especially those which sought to achieve positions in the global markets»<sup>5</sup>.

Thus, the strengthening of a commercial position in the international market is directly dependent on the degree of the use of English in this activity as an international means of communication.

At the same time it should be noted that the globalization of market relations involves not only an active international exchange of goods, but also of labor force, that causes labor migration, the movement of employees from one country to another.

Hiring these employees is impossible without contacts with the employers which, in turn, implies linguistic communication between them.

And it is English that became the most appropriate language of such communication.

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<sup>4</sup> Claude Truchot, Key Aspect of the Use of the English in Europe, Language Policy Division Directorate of School, Strasbourg 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Claude Truchot, Key Aspects of the Use of the English in Europe. Language Policy Division Directorate of School, Strasbourg 2002.

Thus, by improving the efficiency of business contacts, the use of English contributes to the development and improvement of the structure of the world market and brings closer the interests of subjects of world economic relations.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that English itself in conditions of globalization acquires all the features of a commodity resource, its use, distribution and promotion in the international linguistic space being a form of business activity.

Therefore, it is quite possible to speak about competition within the planetary linguistic environment where English proves to be highly competitive, surpassing the corresponding indexes of other world languages.

The opinion that “the knowledge of the English language is a key to global competitiveness”<sup>6</sup> is now widely shared in the international business community.

However, there are many developed non-English-speaking countries, which consider their own national languages to be a precious capital and regard their languages as equal to English on the global linguistic market. In fact, we can see attempts to bolster the competitiveness of national languages on the global market, primarily Chinese and Japanese being examples of this on the global linguistic market. An American statesman, lawyer, and professor L. Panetta writes in this respect, that “all the Japanese corporations pay for the English language courses and invest much into linguistic training ... of their managers. And yet, the complications of doing business in Japan result from the businessmen’s demands to use Japanese in all the business dealings... They use their complicated language as the most valuable capital”<sup>7</sup>. It is not hard to presume that other countries may start to put forward similar requirements, as long as their global economic influence continues growing.

It is noteworthy that to market a product (especially it concerns the promotion of goods to the international market) requires certain marketing efforts, the most important of them being preparation and carrying out advertising campaigns. The spread of information in the form of advertisement facilitates the promotion of a certain product to the global consumer market. Experts in the field of advertising (PR) consider a commercial to be a form of a personal ‘exhortative’ communication<sup>8</sup>. That is why the availability of a universally understood language is a prerequisite for an effective and efficient advertising. English plays the role of such a universally spoken language in today’s globalized world. It is not surprising that in 1972, only three out of thirty world’s biggest advertising agencies were not the USA property (two belonged to Japan and one to Great Britain). Moreover, as D. Crystall writes, “the official language of all

<sup>6</sup> Anne Jonson, *The Rise of English. The Language of Globalization in China and European Union*, Macalister International, 2009 Vol.22, Article 12.

<sup>7</sup> Leon Panetta. *Foreign Language Education: If Scandalous in the 20th Century, What Will Be in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Retrieved June 3rd, 2011 from.

<sup>8</sup> Anne Jonson. *Op. cit.*, p.54-55.

the advertising agencies, such as The European Association of Communications Agencies, was and still is the English language”<sup>9</sup> .

Since production and consumption of goods in current conditions has an international character, the description of the product and instructions for the consumer of these goods should become comprehensible to all.

The marketing situation is created where a consumer should understand the language of the producer .

This requirement gained particular importance considering the fact that all manufacturers use English as a working language. It especially, concerns manufacturers from China, India, South Korea, Arab and other countries whose languages are inaccessible for the majority of foreign consumers.

Therefore, market attractiveness of goods that are produced in these countries , marketed within their country, and expanded to the global market , must be not only well grounded but also accompanied by an English text.

Proceeding from the above said, we can declare that dominance of English in the world market has a logical and objective character.

It should be noted that global economy, in general, and the world market , in particular, are becoming more dependent on information flows.

The use of information and communication technologies creates an absolutely new situation in the world market that is becoming increasingly dependent on its information component of flows. Moreover, the information is acquiring the features of a specific product more and more, thus expanding the opportunities of global market and saturating it with qualitatively new content.

It is easy to notice that in the era of globalization, a planetary linguistic space is increasingly governed purely by market laws, and it has gradually turned into a global linguistic market. Beginning with the first half of the previous century a new kind of commercial activity in the field of global business was formed :English language training in English. For example, transnational organizations promoting British culture and language such as the British Council (1934),the International House (1953) etc. were established . Among their main aims have **always** been to promote a wider knowledge of the English language. Moreover, many of them openly proclaim the protection of business interests in the global market as the main purpose of their activity. For example , the English 2000 project of The British Council clearly stated objective of the organization: “Use the position of English as the language of the world market in the interests of Great Britain...”The ability to speak English helps people to understand the British approach to life, British...values and business goals.”<sup>10</sup> .

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<sup>9</sup> Дэвид Кристалл. Наз. раб., с.143.

<sup>10</sup> Анне Jonson, Op. cit., p. 9.



TNCs pursue the same policy. As Leon Panetta has noted: “American corporations are keen to invest in teaching English in various countries. For example, a big corporation hires native English teachers to conduct English courses abroad.”<sup>11</sup> The corporations often retain them on staff to guarantee that their employees are good enough to communicate in English, which means a greater saturation among young people with English language skills. Such practices, undoubtedly, impact the overall situation in linguistic and goods and services market globally.

At the same time universities in Europe and Asia more and more actively use English to teach some subjects, first of all because of internationalization of education. Students from many different countries are trained at these universities, and they are sure to face language problem unless they know an international language understood by all. That is why it is only natural that German and French universities introduce courses for both foreign and native students taught in English. It gives grounds for R. Phillipson to conclude that “English is becoming the dominant language of higher education in the whole world.”<sup>12</sup>

Supply with information of business highly increases the efficiency of exchange of goods, promotes trade facilitation and enhances business activity on a global scale.

Moreover, electronic information communication (the Internet) creates marvelous opportunities for global marketing by promoting products through advertising to the mass market. Massive spread of advertisements and commercial offers of all sorts through the Internet raises the issue of the language to be used for such purposes. According to D. Crystal, «so far we can only dream of a really multi - language “Global network” ...English still remains the language of international communication in the Internet »<sup>13</sup>.

Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that on the one hand, English as the language of international communication is an effective instrument for promotion of goods and services in the world market. On the other hand, market economy laws and rules of commercial behavior in the global market objectively require the formation and introduction into international practice of certain means of international communication, one of which is the use of English.

<sup>11</sup> Leon Panetta, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Phillipson, The new linguistic imperial order: English as in EU lingua franca or lingua frankensteinia? ‘Unions: past-present-future’, *Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies*, Vol.1: Issue 2, 2008, 189-203, 201.

<sup>13</sup> Дэвид Кристалл, Назв. раб., с.176.

## Geopolityczny wymiar stosunków Rosja – Zachód

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych czynników geopolitycznych i geoeconomicznych (takich jak: współpraca gospodarcza, wojskowa, kultura strategiczna, możliwe konflikty) w stosunkach Rosji z krajami Zachodu. Po upadku Związku Sowieckiego geopolityka stała się jednym z czynników kształtujących cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, jak również elementem mobilizującym społeczeństwo rosyjskie w dążeniu do tych celów.

*Słowa kluczowe: geopolityka, Rosja, Zachód.*

Gospodarka Federacji Rosyjskiej jest w dużej mierze uzależniona od eksportu surowców energetycznych, a co za tym idzie jej polityka ekonomiczna jest ściśle powiązana ze strategią energetyczną. Oficjalne dane mówią o tym, że surowce energetyczne stanowią ponad 50 proc. struktury całego eksportu i stanowią ponad jedną czwartą rosyjskiego PKB<sup>1</sup>. Jak podkreśla Konstantin Simonow, prezes Centrum Politycznego Rosji i autor raportu o transformacji Rosji w 2007 r.: „cała polityka Putina oparta jest na budowaniu siły dzięki drogiej dzisiaj energii”<sup>2</sup>. Ważnym dokumentem, kształtującym priorytety rosyjskiej polityki energetycznej była „Strategia energetyczna Rosji do 2030 r.”<sup>3</sup>.

W rosyjskiej strategii energetycznej kluczowym kierunkiem jest Unia Europejska, która jest odbiorcą 80 procent rosyjskiego eksportu ropy i ponad 90 procent eksportu gazu ziemnego. Unia jest nie tylko kluczowym importerem rosyjskich surowców energetycznych, ale i najlepiej placącym. Warto jednak odnotować tendencję kurczenia się rynku unijnego dla Rosji z uwagi na politykę dywersyfikacji źródeł energii w UE. Mimo to, jak podkreśla wielu ekspertów rynku energii, jeszcze na długie dziesięciolecia Unia Europejska pozostanie najważniejszym partnerem handlowym Rosji<sup>4</sup>.

Drugim strategicznym odbiorcą rosyjskich surowców są Chiny. Na początku 2011 roku oddano do użytku ropociąg Zachodnia Syberia – Ocean Spokojny (EPSO). Warto dodać, że dużą część rurociągu po stronie rosyjskiej udało się sfinansować dzięki ogromnej pożyczce udzielonej Moskwie przez Pekin (25 mld USD). W zamian za co Rosja zobowiązała się dostarczać ropę do Chin przez najbliższe dwadzieścia lat. Ścisła współpraca energetyczna Rosji i ChRL poszerzona została dzięki EPSO także o rynek japoński i koreański<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Pot. R. L. Larsson, *Russia's Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier*, Stockholm, March 2006.

<sup>2</sup> *Putin to biznesmen, a dopiero potem polityk*, „Rzeczpospolita”, 20.05.2008.

<sup>3</sup> <http://minenergo.gov.ru/aboutminen/energostrategy/> [09.01.2015].

<sup>4</sup> O. Zakrzewska, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w stosunkach Rosja-Unia Europejska w kontekście współzależności eksportowo-importowych*, „Studia i Prace Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego SGH” 2014, nr 2, s. 163-164.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.paliwa.pl/news/chiny-ruszyly-dostawy-ruruciagiem-espo> [10.01.2017]

Kierunek europejski jest także istotny pod względem współpracy wojskowej, która przekłada się na zacieśnienie relacji politycznych. Warto podkreślić fakt, że sektor zbrojeniowy dostarcza ok. 20 proc. miejsc pracy w przemyśle, zatrudniając 2,5-3 mln pracowników. Jest to jeden z najwyższych współczynników na świecie<sup>6</sup>. Kluczowymi partnerami Rosji w Europie są w tym zakresie Francja, Niemcy i Włochy. Konflikt na Ukrainie i sankcje Unii Europejskiej na jakiś czas wyhamowały niektóre inicjatywy gospodarcze. Warto jednak przytoczyć kilka kontraktów podpisanych jeszcze przed aneksją Krymu przez Rosję, które dobrze obrazują główne kierunki polityki ekonomicznej Moskwy na kierunku europejskim.

9 lutego 2011 r. minister obrony Federacji Rosyjskiej Anatolij Sierdiukow podpisał umowę z niemieckim koncernem Rheinmetall, reprezentowanym przez dyrektora generalnego Klauusa Eberhardta. Umowa dotyczy budowy nowoczesnego wojskowego centrum szkoleniowego w miejscowości Mulino, niedaleko Niżnego Nowogrodu. Rheinmetall to jeden z największych i najnowocześniejszych koncernów zbrojeniowych w Europie, mający bogatą tradycję, założony jeszcze w 1889 r. Mulino to z kolei największy poligon artyleryjski w Rosji, stworzony w latach trzydziestych ubiegłego wieku. Obecnie służy do testowania nowoczesnej broni przed wdrożeniem jej do jednostek.

Budowany przez niemiecki koncern ośrodek szkoleniowy ma dysponować najnowocześniejszym wyposażeniem i oprogramowaniem do symulacji działań bojowych od szczebla drużyny do szczebla brygady. Rheinmetall ma dostarczyć nowoczesne wyposażenie informatyczne oraz specjalną amunicję przyjazną dla środowiska. W przyszłości nie wyklucza się wspólnych ćwiczeń sił zbrojnych obu państw. Warto podkreślić, że Rheinmetall jest pierwszym zagranicznym koncernem dopuszczonym do budowy infrastruktury wojskowej na terenie Federacji Rosyjskiej<sup>7</sup>.

3 grudnia 2010 r., Anatolij Serdiukow poinformował, że Moskwa zakupi od Rzymu dziesięć lekkich samochodów wielozadaniowych (LMV M65). Ma to być prelude do zakupu technologii oraz stworzenia rosyjsko-włoskiej spółki (*Iveco-Rostechologie*), która będzie w Rosji produkować te pojazdy (w perspektywie mówi się o ok. 1000 sztuk). Nie wykluczone, że LMV trafią do innych resortów siłowych FR i będą wykorzystywane do działań antyterrorystycznych na Kaukazie<sup>8</sup>.

17 czerwca 2011 r. w Sankt Petersburgu przedstawiciele rosyjskiego *Rosoboroneksportu* podpisali umowę z francuskim koncernem DCNS w sprawie zakupu dwóch okrętów desantowych klasy *Mistral*. Kontrakt ma być zrealizowany do 2015, a jego wykonawcą będzie francuska stocznia w Saint-Nazaire. Wartość kontraktu to ponad miliard euro. Jeden z okrętów trafi do Dalekowschodniego Okręgu Wojskowego FR. Jednostki klasy *Mistral* to nowoczesne okręty projekcji siły, o wyporności 21 tys. ton, z bardzo zaawansowanymi systemami dowodzenia i łączności, mogące zabrać na pokład batalion piechoty zmechanizowanej lub batalion czołgów, albo w razie

<sup>6</sup> <http://sputniknews.com/russia/20090602/155148607.html> [11.01.2017].

<sup>7</sup> [http://de.rian.ru/security\\_and\\_military/20110615/259454991.html](http://de.rian.ru/security_and_military/20110615/259454991.html) [10.01.2017].  
[http://www.redstar.ru/2011/06/18\\_06/1\\_03.html](http://www.redstar.ru/2011/06/18_06/1_03.html) [10.01.2017].

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.altair.com.pl/start-4898/> [10.01.2017].

konieczności do 35 śmigłowców. Obecnie dostarczenie okrętów jest odroczone w czasie z uwagi na sankcje UE, jednakże chłodna analiza ekonomiczna każe przypuszczać, że kontrakt zostanie zrealizowany<sup>9</sup>.

Nie bez znaczenia na perspektywy rozwoju gospodarki i kierunki dalszej polityki ekonomicznej Rosji był kryzys na tamtejszym rynku finansowym z 15–16 grudnia 2014 r. Rubel stracił wówczas około jednej czwartej wartości. Bank Centralny Federacji Rosyjskiej dokonał szeregu interwencji na rynku walutowym, podnosząc przy tym stopy procentowe aż o 6,5 proc. Jednym z głównych powodów był systematycznie spadające ceny ropy naftowej na światowych rynkach. Zniesienie zachodnich sankcji i stabilizacja cen ropy pozwoliłaby zahamować recesję na rynku rosyjskim, jednak należy się liczyć raczej z długotrwałą stagnacją, której towarzyszyć będą interwencje administracyjne na rynku walutowym<sup>10</sup>. Problemy rosyjskiej gospodarki nie będą raczej skutkowały zmianą polityki gospodarczej i niewiele wskazuje na to, aby taka zmiana miała nastąpić w najbliższym czasie. Potwierdziło to m.in. wystąpienie prezydenta Władimira Putina z 4 grudnia 2014 r.<sup>11</sup>

Analiza rosyjskich założeń długofalowej polityki ekonomicznej oraz doktryn strategicznych wymagają lepszego poznania źródeł rosyjskiej kultury strategicznej. Od III wojny północnej (1700-1721) do rewolucji bolszewickiej 1917 r. Rosja prowadziła ponad 70 wojen, z czego jedynie 4 na własnym terytorium<sup>12</sup>. Zdolność do ekspandowania jest integralnym elementem rosyjskiego myślenia strategicznego. Źródła kultury strategicznej są często dzielone na warstwę fizyczną, odnoszącą się do podstaw geograficznych polityki państwa, warstwę polityczną, obejmującą analizę systemu politycznego i świadomość strategiczną elit oraz warstwę cywilizacyjną, korespondującą z obszarem tradycji i dominujących paradygmatów ideologicznych. Poniżej zamieszczono tabelę z „kodami strategicznymi” mającymi wpływ na kształtowanie rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej oraz polityki gospodarczej<sup>13</sup>.

**Table 1.** Źródła rosyjskiej kultury strategicznej

Warstwa fizyczna	Warstwa polityczna	Warstwa cywilizacyjna
Rozciągłość geograficzna	Doświadczenia historyczne	Dziedzictwo mongolsko-bizantyjskie
Klimat	Świadomość strategiczna elit decyzyjnych (militaryzacja myślenia, <i>czekistowski</i> rodowód decydentów)	Mitologia i symbolika narodowa (mity historyczne, np. Moskwa-Trzeci Rzym, mity geopolityczne, np. Rosja-Eurazja)
Struktura demograficzna	System organizacji resortów siłowych i dyplomacji	Relacje religie-państwo (symfonia władz)
Surowce naturalne	Technologia w służbie polityki	Dominująca ideologia („euroazjatycki oświecony konserwatyzm”)

<sup>9</sup> <http://lenta.ru/news/2011/06/17/mistral/>. [10.01.2017].

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-12-17/kryzys-putinowskiego-modelu-gospodarki-w-rosji> [09.01.2017].

<sup>11</sup> <http://kremlin.ru/news/47173> [9.01.2017]

<sup>12</sup> O wojnie w rosyjskiej kulturze strategicznej czyt. W. Kirillow, J. Kriuczukow, *Wlįjanije wojny na razwitiie i mieżdunarodnoje znaczenije Rosii w mirie*, „Wojennaja mysl” 2008, nr 2, s. 10-21.

<sup>13</sup> Por. T.W.Grabowski, *Rosyjska siła. Siły Zbrojne i główne problemy polityki obronnej Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach 1991-2010*, Kraków 2011, s. 10. Przyjęto klasyczny podział warstw geopolitycznych, por. L. Moczulski, *Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni*, wyd. 2, Warszawa 2010.

Oficjalne dokumenty Federacji Rosyjskiej w zakresie bezpieczeństwa np. doktryny wojenne, nie powinny stanowić jedynej bazy do szczegółowej analizy zamierzeń politycznych Moskwy, lecz raczej dawać ogólny obraz jej głównych wektorów strategicznych. Doświadczenia historyczne wskazują, iż tego typu dokumenty są opracowywane w Federacji Rosyjskiej przede wszystkim na potrzeby bieżącej rozgrywki dyplomatycznej i stanowią jedynie odbicie stanu relacji Rosji ze światem zewnętrznym<sup>14</sup>.

Obecnie obowiązująca „Doktryna wojskowa Federacji Rosyjskiej”, została podpisana 5 lutego 2010 r. przez prezydenta Dmitrija Miedwediewa wraz z dokumentem „Podstawy polityki państwa w sferze powstrzymywania nuklearnego do 2020 r.” (nie udostępniony publicznie). Kluczowym elementem rosyjskich sił zbrojnych dającym strategiczną przewagę nad większością państw świata jest arsenał nuklearny. W nowej doktrynie wojskowej pojawił się ważny fragment odnoszący się do tego rodzaju broni. Brzmi następująco: *„Rosja zastrzega sobie prawo do użycia broni nuklearnej w odpowiedzi na użycie przeciwko niej i jej sojusznikom nuklearnej lub innego rodzaju broni masowej zagłady, a także w przypadku agresji na Rosję z użyciem broni konwencjonalnej, kiedy zagrożone jest samo istnienie państwa. Decyzję o użyciu broni nuklearnej podejmuje Prezydent Rosji”*<sup>15</sup>.

Według oficjalnych informacji, siły zbrojne Federacji Rosyjskiej w styczniu 2014 r. dysponowały 489 strategicznymi środkami przenoszenia broni jądrowej, wyposażonymi w ok. 1700 głowic bojowych. W ramach wojsk raketowych strategicznego przeznaczenia wchodzi 311 kompleksów raketowych, wyposażonych w 1078 bojowych głowic jądrowych. Arsenał ten składa się z 52 raket P-36M2 (SS-18), 40 UR-100 NUTTCH (SS-19), 108 lądowych systemów Topol (SS-25), 60 zestawów Topol-M w podziemnych silosach (SS-27), 18 mobilnych systemów Topol-M (SS-27) i 33 mobilnych zestawów z raketami RS-24 Jars. Rosyjska marynarka wojenna, dysponuje 7 okrętami strategicznymi z raketami balistycznymi na pokładzie, które dysponują 416 głowicami jądrowymi. W skład Floty Północnej wchodzi pięć okrętów 667BDRM (Delta IV), wyposażonych w 80 wyrzutni raketowych. We Flocie Oceanu Spokojnego bazują dwa okręty raketowe klasy 667 BDR (Delta III), wyposażone w 32 rakiety R-29R (SS-N-18). Lotnictwo strategiczne dysponuje 66 ciężkimi bombowcami strategicznymi, w tym 11 Tu-160 i 55 TU-95MS. Ponadto w systemie wczesnego ostrzegania w czerwcu 2014 r. pracowały dwa satelity<sup>16</sup>.

Rosyjska armia podzielona jest na cztery okręgi wojskowe: Zachodni, Południowy, Centralny i Wschodni. Marynarka wojenna obejmuje cztery floty: Bałtycką (dowództwo w Bałtiju), Czarnomorską (dowództwo w Sewastopolu), Północną (dowództwo w Siewieromorsku), Oceanu Spokojnego (dowództwo we Władywostoku) oraz Floty Kaspijską (dowództwo w Astrachaniu)<sup>17</sup>. Ogółem w Siłach Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej służy ok. 850 tys. żołnierzy, z tego w wojskach lądowych – ok. 250 tys., w wojskach powietrznych – ok. 150 tys., w marynarce

<sup>14</sup> Por. *Doktryna wojskowa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, BBN, Warszawa 2010, s. 2-3. A. Romanowski, B. Musiałowicz, *Kierunki rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej*, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2006, nr 2.

<sup>15</sup> [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/461](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461) [10.01.2017]

<sup>16</sup> <http://russianforces.org/rus/current/> [10.01.2017].

<sup>17</sup> <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/902235810> [11.01.2017].

wojennej – ok. 130 tys., w strategicznych wojskach raketowych – ok. 80 tys., w wojskach powietrznodesantowych – ok. 35 tys. i jednostkach wsparcia ok. 200 tysięcy<sup>18</sup>. Wydatki na zbrojenie wyniosły w 2013 r. 68,2 mld USD<sup>19</sup>. Na potencjał militarny Federacji Rosyjskiej składają się nie tylko siły i środki będące w podporządkowaniu Ministerstwa Obrony, ale szereg różnych formacji mundurowych, często nie gorzej uzbrojonych niż regularne wojsko (także w wozy bojowe i transportery opancerzone). Do ważniejszych służb należą np. Federalna Służba Bezpieczeństwa, Służba Wywiadu Zagranicznego, Federalna Służba Ochrony, Wojska Wewnętrzne Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, funkcjonariusze Ministerstwa ds. Sytuacji Nadzwyczajnych, Federalna Służba Wykonania Wyroków Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości Federalna Służba Celna Federalna Służba Kontroli Obrotu Narkotykami. W formacjach tych służy blisko milion funkcjonariuszy<sup>20</sup>.

4 września 2014 r. brytyjski magazyn „Foreign Policy” opublikował artykuł pt. „Nuklearna opcja Putina”<sup>21</sup>. Autorem był Jeffrey Taylor, mieszkający w Rosji, amerykański dziennikarz. Tekst był także szeroko powielany przez polskie media, z uwagi na sugestie możliwego ataku jądrowego Federacji Rosyjskiej na Warszawę i Wilno. To nie pierwszy przypadek rozważania ewentualności użycia przez Rosję taktycznej broni jądrowej (TBJ). W kwietniu br. Loren Thomson na łamach „Forbesa” rozważał użycie rosyjskiej TBJ na Ukrainie<sup>22</sup>. Chłodna analiza każe odrzucić pogroźki takich polityków jak Władimir Żyrinowski o tym, że „Warszawa zostanie doszczętnie spalona”<sup>23</sup>.

Z punktu widzenia czysto wojskowego, użycie broni jądrowej w obecnej sytuacji geostrategicznej byłoby bardzo niebezpiecznym precedensem. Nawet hipotetyczne użycie tego rodzaju broni byłoby praktycznie ograniczone wyłącznie do niewielkich ładunków, obliczonych na wywołanie ogromnego efektu psychologicznego. Zastosowanie taktycznej broni jądrowej staje się zatem przede wszystkim elementem wojny psychologiczno-informacyjnej. Wskazują na to liczne wypowiedzi i analizy na łamach wydawnictw fachowych rosyjskich oficerów wysokiej rangi<sup>24</sup>.

Choć nie można wykluczyć ograniczonego użycia TBJ, to jednak powielanie rosyjskich pogroźek przez polskie media wpisuje się w politykę siania strachu, będącą jedną z kluczowych zasad rosyjskich koncepcji prowadzenia wojen informacyjnych. Szeroko i celnie pisał na ten temat Anatolij Golicyn<sup>25</sup>.

Korzenie nowoczesnych rosyjskich koncepcji wojen informacyjnych sięgają II wojny światowej, kiedy to w Wojskowym Instytucie Języków Obcych rozpoczęto prace nad tzw.

<sup>18</sup> Szerzej zob. *The Military Balance*, London 2013 s. 199-244.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-press-statement-52d7> [11.01.2017].

<sup>20</sup> T. Grabowski, *Siły Zbrojne i główne problemy polityki obronnej Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach 1991-2010*, Częstochowa 2011, s. 116-117.

<sup>21</sup> [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/04/putins\\_nuclear\\_option\\_russia\\_weapons](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/04/putins_nuclear_option_russia_weapons) [10.01.2017].

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/> [10.01.2017].

<sup>23</sup> Por. <http://telewizjarepublika.pl/co-pomysli-putin-zyrinowski-powie-kochamy-polske-ale-w-razie-wojny-zostanie-doszczętnie-spalona,11523.html> [10.01.2017].

<sup>24</sup> Zob. np. [http://www.observer.materik.ru/observer/N8\\_2005/8\\_05.htm](http://www.observer.materik.ru/observer/N8_2005/8_05.htm) [10.01.2017].

<sup>25</sup> A. Golicyn, *Nowe kłamstwa w miejsce starych: komunistyczna strategia podstępów i dezinformacji*, Warszawa 2007.

specpropagandą. W 2000 r. Instytutu przekształcono w Wydział Zagranicznej Informacji Wojskowej Uniwersytetu Wojskowego Ministerstwa Obrony Federacji Rosyjskiej. Od 2008 r. kieruje nim płk Wadim Paramonow. Na Wydziale rozwijane są koncepcje współczesnego wykorzystania technologii informacyjnych w działaniach wojskowych<sup>26</sup>.

Ważnym elementem w rozwoju współczesnych koncepcji wojen informacyjnych było pojawienie się „Doktryny bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego Federacji Rosyjskiej”, która została podpisana 9 września 2000 r. przez prezydenta Władimira Putina. Dokument ten zapoczątkował oficjalnie wprowadzenie teorii wojny informacyjnej do programów nauczania w instytutach i uczelniach resortowych (np. Akademia Kryptografii, Łączności i Informatyki FSB), Akademia Federalnej Służby Ochrony w Orle, Woroneski, Akademia MSW w Wołgogradzie) oraz wybranych uczelniach cywilnych (MGIMO, Akademia Dyplomatyczna przy MSZ FR). Instytucją koordynującą programy nauczania i kierunki rozwoju rosyjskiej teorii zostało Naukowo-Metodyczne Stowarzyszenie Uczelni Wyższych Rosji na rzecz Kształcenia w Zakresie Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego (ros. *Учебно-методическое объединение по образованию в области информационной безопасности*). Stowarzyszenie powstało z inspiracji FSB<sup>27</sup>.

W rosyjskich analizach dalszego rozwoju sił zbrojnych podkreśla się wzrastający udział takich czynników jak: wzrost wykorzystania uzbrojenia wykorzystującego nanotechnologię, robotykę, wzrost roli wojsk specjalnych i powietrzno-kosmicznych, duży wzrost roli wojny informacyjnej w działaniach bojowych i polityce zagranicznej, wprowadzenie globalnych sieciowych systemów kierowania siłami i środkami walki<sup>28</sup>.

Jednym z ważniejszych procesów kształtujących możliwy przyszły układ sił w Europie, w tym ewentualny przebieg konfliktu Rosji z państwami członkowskimi NATO/UE, jest przebieg konfliktu na wschodzie Ukrainy. Można wyróżnić tutaj kilka podstawowych scenariuszy na najbliższą przyszłość:

- Wojna we wschodnich obwodach Ukrainy jako lokalna wojna prowadząca do federalizacji tego państwa z szeroką autonomią dla obwodów wschodnich (bądź uzyskaniem statusu podobnego do Naddniestrza).
- Interwencja rosyjska na szeroką skalę, prowadząca do „balkanizacji” Ukrainy (podział na kilka formalnie niezależnych państw).
- „Pełzająca wojna” rozrzedzona o Naddniestrze, co skutkować będzie destabilizacją południowego zachodu Ukrainy (możliwy wariant zajęcia Rusi Karpackiej przez Węgry).
- „Pełzająca wojna” rozszerzona o kraje bałtyckie, wykorzystująca liczną mniejszość rosyjską na Łotwie i w Estonii oraz prowokacje rosyjskie na Litwie z wykorzystaniem polskiego resentymentu. Celem: kompromitacja skuteczności gwarancji obrony zbiorowej Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego.

<sup>26</sup> J. Darczewska, *Anatomia rosyjskiej wojny informacyjnej. Operacja krymska – studium przypadku*, Warszawa 2014, s. 9. <http://www.vumo.su/> [10.01.2017].

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.isedu.ru/> [10.01.2017]. Por. J. Darczewska, *op. cit.*, s. 10.

<sup>28</sup> Горбунов В.Н., Богданов С.А., *О характере вооруженной борьбы в XXI веке*, „Восенная мысль”, 3/2009, s. 5-6.

- Rodzaj „wojny buntowniczej”<sup>29</sup> prowadzonej przeciwko Polsce z terytorium Republiki Białoruś i tzw. Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego z wykorzystaniem aktywów operacyjnych rosyjskich tajnych służb na terytorium RP.

W kontekście inicjowania i prowadzenia przyszłych działań nieregularnych przez Federację Rosyjską szczególnie aktualna jest koncepcja „wojen buntowniczych” (ros. *miatieżnaja wojna*), stworzona przez pułkownika Jewgienija Messnera. Czynniki charakterystyczne dla wojny buntowniczej to przede wszystkim: brak formalnego wypowiedzenia wojny i unikanie oficjalnego angażowania się państwa w działania zbrojne, co powoduje zatarcie różnic między okresem pokoju i wojny. Wojna buntownicza, wojna hybrydowa charakteryzuje się ponadto brakiem linii frontu, odpaństwowieniem grup bojowych, wzrastającą rolą wojsk specjalnych i tajnych służb, zrównaniem regularnego wojska ze zrewoltowanym społeczeństwem, wzrostem kluczowej roli działań informacyjno-psychologicznych, oraz terroru. Ponadto należy zwrócić uwagę na niskie koszty tego typu działań w stosunku do wojen tradycyjnych<sup>30</sup>.

### Zamiast podsumowania

Szereg scenariuszy dotyczących przyszłego konfliktu Rosji z Zachodem był analizowany od początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych przez Centrum Kurginiana. Oto jeden ze scenariuszy ukutych w okresie tzw. *pierestrojki*: „Do władzy w Rosji dochodzi autorytarny rząd, który natychmiast zaczyna zastraszać małe byłe republiki radzieckie pod pretekstem obrony praw Rosjan, porozrzucanych po państwach WNP. W ciągu pół do dwóch miesięcy napięcie stale rośnie, a następnie 18 rosyjskich dywizji, wspieranych przez sześć białoruskich, uderza wzdłuż granicy polsko-litewskiej. Litwa zwraca się do NATO, które rozwija w Polsce pierwsze „sily szybkiego reagowania”, a następnie 18 dywizji i 66 eskadr lotnictwa taktycznego. Po 90 dniach konfliktu Zachód uzyskuje przewagę”<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> Zob. szerzej: L. Sykulski, *Rosyjska koncepcja wojen buntowniczych Jewgienija Messnera*, „Przegląd Geopolityczny” 2015, t. 11, s. 109-111.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> А. Новиков, *Византийская альтернатива*, „Век и мир” 1994, nr 5-6.



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### Summary

The aim of the article is to present selected geopolitical and geoeconomic factors (such as economic, military, strategic culture, possible conflicts) in Russia's relations with Western countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, geopolitics has become one of the factors shaping the Russian Federation's foreign policy objectives as well as an element that mobilizes Russian society towards these goals.

*Key words: geopolitics, Russia, West.*

## **Social-political and social-economic transformation of the Slovak Republic**

The way of the Slovak Republic (SK) towards democracy and market economy appeared to be very hard. Starting position for implementation of reforms objectively was less favorable in comparison with the neighboring countries. The fundamental law of the SK guaranteed political pluralism, civil rights and liberties for citizens. In 2004 the state became a full member of the EU and NATO. In 2005 main macroeconomic indices of the state reached a threshold level, established by the Maastricht Treaties, and as to the rate of GDP increase and direct foreign investment Slovakia joined the EU leaders. Along with the achievements in the political life of the country there are also serious continuous problems. Among them are: irredentist attitudes among the Hungarian minority which fuel conflict potential in the Slovak-Hungarian relationship; hardships of social integration of the Roma population. An acute problem is corruption, the level of which is higher than in other Visegrad countries. Aiming at formation of conditions for stable continuous growth Slovakia carries out a “reset” of the economic policy. Large-scale reforms of the social system and social policy in SK have been implemented.

*Keywords: the Slovak Republic, the EU, social-political changes, transformation, social policy, economic policy, reforms*

## **СУСПІЛЬНО-ПОЛІТИЧНА ТА СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ СЛОВАЦЬКОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ**

Шлях Словаччини до демократії і ринкової економіки виявився дуже важким. Стартові позиції для проведення реформ були об'єктивно менш сприятливими порівняно з сусідніми країнами. Основний закон СР гарантував політичний плюралізм, цивільні права та свободи громадянам. У 2004 р. держава здобула статус повноправного члена в НАТО і ЄС. У 2005 р. основні макроекономічні показники держави зросли до порогового значення, встановленого Маастрихтськими угодами, а за темпами росту ВВП і прямих іноземних інвестицій Словаччина ввійшла в число лідерів ЄС. Поряд з досягненнями в політичному житті країни є й серйозні тривалі проблеми. Серед них: ірредентистські настрої в середовищі угорської меншини, які підживлюють конфліктний потенціал у словацько-угорських відносинах; труднощі соціальної інтеграції ромського населення. Гострою проблемою залишається корупція, рівень якої вищий, ніж в інших країнах Вишеградської групи. З метою формування умов для сталого тривалого зростання

в Словаччині здійснюється «перезавантаження» економічної політики. Здійснені широкомасштабні реформи соціальної системи і соціальної політики в СР.

**Ключові слова:** *Словацька Республіка, ЄС, суспільно-політичні зміни, трансформація, соціальна політика, економічна політика, реформи*

The “Velvet” revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989) and further peaceful demise of the country (January 1, 1993) turned over a new page in the history of Slovakia: the republic which previously was a part of the federative state gained complete sovereignty and stepped on the path of radical social-political and social-economic transformation. Its foreign policy paradigm changed essentially: the Slovak society made a choice of preference for a civilization model, inherent to the countries of Western Europe. The Slovak Republic took a line at activation of relations with main international organizations, namely joining the EU and NATO and implementation of “pursuing” model of modernization by means of adopting western institutes of market and democracy<sup>1</sup>.

The way of SK towards democracy appeared to be winding and challenging. Starting position for implementation of reforms objectively was less favorable in comparison with the neighboring countries<sup>2</sup>. A shift to the market model of economy Slovakia started from scratch, having no experience in reforming a planned economy, which Slovenia had, as it started its transition from the “market socialism” to the market economy, or Hungary, which already had a 25-year-old experience of “cooperative socialism” and widely used market instruments, or Poland which stepped on the way of political democratization in the early 1980s.

Slovakia had to take more efforts than any other CEE country to overcome structural disproportions, formed during the socialist period, when the Slovak economy was developing under the influence of a more developed Czech Republic’s needs and intensive attraction of the republic to the processes of socialist economic integration. On the background of other Eastern European countries the SK’s economy stood out due to its over-pressured heavy industry and militarization, a little amount of finalizing industrial production (what indicates the function of Slovakia as a supplier of semi-finished products for the Czech Republic), excessive energy-, material-, import capacity<sup>3</sup>. Taking into account that only 15% of Slovak enterprises manufactured civil goods (others produced intermediate production and heavy military weapons), it was much more difficult for SK, than any other CEE country to cross over to new markets and come through the demise of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, shrinkage of the USSR market capacity due to the transition to convertible currency trade, discontinuing of military purchases after the end of the Warsaw Pact.

<sup>1</sup> *Vysbehradskaja* Yevropa: otkuda i kuda, Dva desiatiletia po puti reform v Venhrii, Polshe, Slovaki i Chekhii / ed. L.N. Shishelina. Moscow: Ves mir, 2010. Pp. 179-180.

<sup>2</sup> *Prokop L.* Příprava a průběh měodluky v České republice v roce 1993. ČNB 1994. URL: <http://www.cnb.cz>.

<sup>3</sup> *Stein E.* Česko-Slovensko. Konflikt, roztržka, rozpad. Praha: Academia věd České republiky, 2000. S. 335; *Rychlík J.* Rozpad Československa. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989-1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2000. S. 305.

Along with an unfavorable start there were other “aggravating” circumstances. The process of democratic consolidation of the society were complicated by practically 10-year-old absence of political consensus as to Euro-Atlantic choice, collapse of Czechoslovakia, necessity to create Slovak statehood and formation of own “Slovak” identity<sup>4</sup>. Not easy were Slovak economic reforms, their course had many deviations, which were represented in alternating attempts to transform either in accordance with liberal-monetary or social-democratic formulations.

Over the first 5 years of independent development when the coalition headed by Vladimir Meciar (1994-1998) was in power, Slovakia noticeably deviated from the trajectory, presupposed by European integration. Euro-Atlantic choice which had already become a consensual strategic course for the neighboring countries, the authority in SK still had some doubts. The majority of the political elite and influential intellectuals criticized a unilateral foreign policy orientation, reckoning that only preservation of balance in relations between the West and East may guarantee SK geopolitical future, military security and economic flourishing.

State economic policy of the period ignored suggestions of the Washington consensus, shock therapy was alternated by a new strategy, which presupposed enhancement of state regulation of economy, evolutionary way of changes, formation of social market economy. Instead of recommended measures of financial stability there was implemented expansion of state investment for the sake of creation of new centers of growth, in place of relying on foreign investment they adhered to dynamic development at the cost of internal sources. The establishment of the country strived for preserving production and financial potential in the national ownership and thus put aside foreign investors from privatization processes. V. Meciar pursued independent internal political course and did not react to the growing international criticism of his authoritarian ruling, he neglected democratic principles and violated national minorities’ rights<sup>5</sup>. In a special report provided by the US State Department (1996) Slovakia was attacked for non-adherence of the human rights. Z. Brzezinski was quite frank in evaluating V. Meciar’s foreign policy line, stating that “perhaps Meciar is not a bad politician, but as a state strategist he is weak. In case if Slovakia does not become a member of NATO, the history will return him a strict verdict, as he enjoyed full confidence of the voters and this will simplify Slovak integration into NATO... This is a tragedy for all Slovak people and you are to bitterly repent of this”<sup>6</sup>.

Among the foreign policy alternatives to the EU and NATO membership politicians discussed acceptance by Slovakia neutrality or a Swiss solution, conception of geo-political and geo-economical role of the country as a bridge between the West and East, possibility to create in Europe a system of collective defense involving Russia. Balancing between the East and West, which “once will be evaluated by historians as a search for an individual Slovak way of post-socialist

<sup>4</sup> *Lukan B.* Osobnosti transformatsyionnoho protsesa v Slovaki v 1993-2000 // *Mezhdunarodnyi dialoh*. 2001. № 1. P. 93.

<sup>5</sup> *Rzhevskii V.* Slovakiia: Politicheskie oponenty pomenialis roliami // *Kompas*. Moscow. 1994. № 46. P. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Duleba A.* Konec súčasnej strednej Európy? Ukrajina a Slovensko po prvej vlne rozšírenia NATO. Geopolitické scenáre budúceho vývinu neintegrovanej strednej Európy a alternatívy pre Slovensko. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, 1998. S. 13.

transformation<sup>7</sup>, caused exclusion of Slovakia from a range of Eastern European countries, which were first in a line to join the EU and NATO<sup>8</sup> and removal of V. Meciar from power<sup>9</sup>.

Over a period when the coalition of right parties headed by M. Dzurinda (1998-2006) was in power, the country returned to the Eurointegration path<sup>10</sup>. At the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium there was a consensus of political elites as to strategic foreign policy course<sup>11</sup>. In 2000 Slovakia joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in 2004 became a full member of the EU and NATO. The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic over these years was marked by loyal attitude towards NATO military actions (support of bombing in Yugoslavia and intervention to Iraq, Slovak military forces were sent to Iraq etc.) and demonstrative breaking ties with Russia (termination of political contracts, renunciation of the visa-free agreement, which was in advance of the European integration realia, break military-technical ties and so on)<sup>12</sup>.

During the period of M. Dzurinda ruling Slovakia experienced a new round of neo-liberal economic changes. There were conducted structural reforms (tax system, labor market, medical care and pension system), which were admitted by the World Bank as “the most radical reforms in the world”, actualized strict pattern of financial stabilization. In 2005 main macroeconomic indices of SK “fitted in” the threshold requirements, established by the Maastricht Treaties, and as to the rate of GDP increase and direct foreign investment Slovakia joined the EU leaders. The World Bank awarded SK with an honorable status “World leader in the sphere of reforms” and put it on the list of 20 states with the best conditions for doing business. Successes in reforms strengthened international authority of the country and contributed to rapid Euro-Atlantic integration<sup>13</sup>.

Besides, M. Dzurinda’s government commenced large-scale reforms of social system and social policy in Slovakia<sup>14</sup>. the reform of the social system in SK aimed at alternating a traditional way of redistribution of targeted aid and socially dysfunctional groups of people. New social policy included reformation of three crucial spheres of the social system: social welfare and family policy; a system of pension protection; labor market to increase the employment level. The law, which was in force till the end of 2003, presupposed provision of social welfare to financially disadvantaged people without any limitation in time and despite personal activity of welfare recipients. To the category of financially disadvantaged people in SK belonged citizens whose

<sup>7</sup> *Krejčí O.* Slovensko, genius loci // *Ekonom*, 2007. 13.02.

<sup>8</sup> *Vyshebradskaia* Yevropa: otkuda i kuda, Dva desiatiletia po puti reform v Venhrii, Polshe, Slovaki i Chekhii / ed. L.N. Shishelina. Moscow: Ves mir, 2010. P. 257.

<sup>9</sup> *Hlás G.* Visegrad – A Personal Memoir of Cooperation // 15 Years of Visegrad. Bratislava: International Visegrad Fund., 2006. P. 51.

<sup>10</sup> *Vyshebradskaia* Yevropa: otkuda i kuda, Dva desiatiletia po puti reform v Venhrii, Polshe, Slovaki i Chekhii / ed. L.N. Shishelina. Moscow: Ves mir, 2010. P. 244.

<sup>11</sup> *Opyt demokraticheskikh preobrazovani v Slovaki* / Ed. M. Butor, H. Mesezhnikova, M. Koldara. Bratislava: Institut obshchestvennykh problem, 2007. P. 98.

<sup>12</sup> *Rosii i Tsentralno-Vostochnaia Yevropa: vzaimootnosheniia v 21 veke* / Ed. N.V. Kulikova, I.I. Orlik, N.V. Feit. Moscow: IE RAN, 2012. Pp. 249–250.

<sup>13</sup> *Strany Tsentralnoi i Yuho-Vostochnoi Yevropy: sistemnye transformatsyi, sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe i politicheskoe razvitie v 2006*. Moscow: IE RAN, 2007. P. 170.

<sup>14</sup> *Reforma* socialneho system a socialnej politiky na Slovensku. URL: [www.noviny-mpsv.cz/](http://www.noviny-mpsv.cz/)

monthly income was below the subsistence rate (4210 korunas). This category comprised 10.4% of SK population. People, who were financially disadvantaged under this law, got 1450 or 2900 korunas correspondingly, depending on fact whether the reasons of their poor financial state were objective or subjective. Social payments to financially disadvantaged people for the first half of 2003 equaled 4.9 billion korunas.

In November 2003, the SK parliament adopted a new law concerning benefits for financially disadvantaged people<sup>15</sup>, which introduced changes into the system of social payments. The law did not divide people in accordance with the objective or subjective reasons of their poverty. Since 2004 an amount of payment has been designated due to the composition of a family. To determine a month income into account were taken money earned by all members of a family living together. The sizes of payments were: for single people – 1450 korunas, for single people with children (no more than 4) – 2160 korunas; for single people with more than 4 children – 3160 korunas; for couples without children – 2530 korunas; for couples with children (no more than 4) – 3210 korunas; for couples with more than 4 children – 4210 korunas; for pregnant women – 350 korunas, starting with the 4<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy and under condition of regular medical control. Also, the legislator determined the upper limit of social payment per one family – 10 500 korunas<sup>16</sup>.

The Slovaks carried out a new privatization, in the course of which infrastructural monopolies (transport, energy, communication), strategic industrial enterprises and system-forming banks, which had earlier been removed from privatization or had been held under the state's control due to a "golden share", were put up for sale for foreign strategic investors. Reforms gave impulse to stable economic development and took the country from worst to first in the region as to the rates of direct foreign investment growth and consequently export and GDP. Another side of success was lost of national control over strategic branches and bank sector, restriction of a social sphere (reduction of state assignment for development of social spheres, commercialization of socially-significant services), a level of social stratification grew.

Since 2006 a social-democratic party Smer-SD headed by Robert Fico came into power in Slovakia. R. Fico's activity as the prime-minister testified that he accepted succession of V. Meciar's foreign policy and economic course in a number of aspects. After the victory at the 2006 parliamentary elections R. Fico formed a coalitional government, which included the party Movement for Democratic Slovakia (MDS) headed by V. Meciar and Slovak National Party (SNP) headed by J. Slota<sup>17</sup>. Slovak diplomacy under R. Fico displayed the desire towards balanced and multi-vector nature. Over the last years the SK foreign policy has been characterized by a European accent, indisputable "Atlanticism" of the previous period was alternated by a more critical attitude towards the US policy and NATO military strategy, priority of the "Eastern" direction

<sup>15</sup> *Zákon z 26. novembra 2013 o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov.* URL: [http://www.upsvar.sk/buxus/docs/urady/GA/PvHN\\_c\\_417.pdf](http://www.upsvar.sk/buxus/docs/urady/GA/PvHN_c_417.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> *Reforma socialneho system a socialnej politiky na Slovensku.* URL: [www.noviny-mpsv.cz/](http://www.noviny-mpsv.cz/)

<sup>17</sup> *Blaha L. Analiza.* URL: [www.inst-asa.sk](http://www.inst-asa.sk)

of the Slovak policy politicians declared development of comprehensive relations with Russia<sup>18</sup>. In the sphere of internal policy R. Fico actualized course on revival of the “European model of a social state”. Relating this tasks of first priority were struggle against unemployment, social support for financially disadvantaged people, restoration of state control over the economic sphere. In his program speech the prime-minister R. Fico declared that “on the one hand we want to add practical nature to the images of Slovakia as a social state, while on the other hand we strictly adhere to the Maastricht criteria, which limit us to a great extent”<sup>19</sup>.

Despite all difficulties Slovakia managed to adapt to all external crisis challenges with minimal losses and at year-end 2009 did not look like an outsider on the general European background: the scales of GDP recession and level of the budget deficit complied with average indices in the Eurozone; the state debt was held on more than a satisfactory level (the lowest but one index in the Eurozone); correlation between the gross external debt and GDP was rather lower than its partners from the monetary union had.

A number of specific “Slovak” circumstances contributed to easing of crisis phenomena in the economy. Thus, a low level of the state debt allowed Slovakia using instruments of budget-tax policy in counter-cyclical regulation of economy. Due to this the economic growth was supported (fiscal impulse in 2009 let it avoid the GDP contraction on “additional” 2.4%, and in 2010 – add it to the growth in 1.9%<sup>20</sup>), stability in the social sphere (growth of poverty risk was only 0.2%) and internal political stability were preserved. Slovakia made a well-timed step joining the Eurozone on January 1, 2009, which protected the country from cataclysms at the currency market and made it attractive for investors<sup>21</sup>.

Stabilizing influence on the economic situation in the midst of crisis had the banking system, which coped with difficulties, caused by recession in economy, without the state support and foreign funding. Since 2010 an average rate of the Slovak GDP growth returned to positive values. The crisis officially ended; and the state came to pre-crisis levels of production and since 2011 has come to growth. However, on the way out of crisis the economy determined a number of evident weaknesses: rates of increase were significantly lower than in the period of economic glut; the correlation between the sources of increase changed (the country was mainly obliged for it to the growth of foreign demand, whereas growth of internal demand both consumer and investment got behind); the situation on the labor market continued to worsen, as revival in a corporate sector did not bring growth of employment, but just detained its fall.

Therefore, having demonstrated quite high sustainability under conditions of global shocks, the Slovak economy failed to avoid some of its negative consequences, to which we may refer:

<sup>18</sup> Kopytina M. Rossiia – Slovakiia: ekonomicheskie sviazi v pervom desiatiletii 21 veka // Mir peremen. 2013. № 2. Pp. 125-140; Kobrinskaia I. Ya., Frumkin B. Ye. Mir 2020: Rossiiskaia I tsentralno-vostochnoyevropeiskaia perspektivy. Moscow.: IMEMO RAN, 2010. P. 115.

<sup>19</sup> Fico R. Mame pred sebou diabolsky plan. URL: <http://spravypravda.sk/>.

<sup>20</sup> Program stability SR na roky 2009 až 2012. Bratislava, Januar 2010. Офіційний сайт Міністерства фінансів СР. URL: <http://www.finance.gov.sk>.

<sup>21</sup> Bazhan A. I. Ekonomicheskii rost v tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Yevrope // Yevrointehratsiia: vliianie na ekonomicheskoe razvitie Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Yevropy. Moscow: IE RAN, 2014. P. 13.

break up of stable enlargement of investment and consumer demand, unfavorable changes in dynamics of employment and unemployment, loss of fiscal balance<sup>22</sup>. The crucial condition for accelerating economic growth in Slovakia is increase in internal demand. The foundation for investment growth is laid, but it will require several years to return to the pre-crisis level, not speaking of becoming a main trigger for growth.

It is evident, that there is no sense to depend on rapid growth of consumer activity, as an increase in personal consumption is limited by strict borders of budget economy, low level of Slovak salary, high level of unemployment, enhancement of population to savings. For instance, in the Czech Republic an average salary in 2014 was 332 euros, in Hungary – 333, in Slovakia – 360, in Poland – 410. Thus, in all these countries average salary is the lowest among the EU members. However, it should be mentioned, that comparison of changes in minimal salary from 2008 up to 2015 shows considerable increase in Slovakia – 58%<sup>23</sup>. But until internal factors and sources for development are not found, the economy will be in a zone of slow rates of increase: the Ministry of Finance of Slovakia does not expect to return to previous dynamics before 2020<sup>24</sup>. Due to the absence of prospects for rapid revival of internal demand there is a close interdependence of the Slovak economy on the situation in the European economy.

The risk of subsequent recession for Slovakia is growing, as under conditions of weak internal demand any external challenges will have a more destructive potential. At the same time, on the credit side of the country is its low debt load (43.6% of the GDP in 2016 against 87.2% on average across the Eurozone), favorable banking sector, which does not require any restructuring; also there is interest of international business to invest into the Slovak economy, what promises accelerated restoration of demand for labor resources. Having stable macroeconomic situation, favorable business climate and euro as a national currency Slovakia remains a lighthouse for investment flows. Surge of direct foreign investment since 2010 has been resuming: transnational corporations activate enlargement of their Slovak enterprises and get their manufacturing capacities from the neighboring countries to Slovakia with the goal to reduce operational costs and lower economic risks.

From its side, Slovakia steps up efforts aimed at attracting direct foreign investment, in competitive struggle for foreign investment again investment stimuli function, what helped the country to get many prestigious financial assets. Thus, it is possible that in future will realize expectations as to return to the “good old days” and former model of growth, based on a wide attraction of direct foreign investment. But now investment prospects of the Slovak economy look ambiguous and one of the reasons is euro. In the pre-crisis period, when labor productivity growth faster than salary, cost of labor was rather low, what made investment into the Slovak economy more cost efficient than in the neighboring countries.

<sup>22</sup> Kopytina M. *Ekonomika Slovačkii v usloviakh hlobalnykh potriasanii // Svobodnaia Mysl*. 2012. № 9/10. Pp. 37-50.

<sup>23</sup> Shysbelina L. *Vyshehradskaiia chetverka: 25 let na karte Yevropy*. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope620150926>

<sup>24</sup> *Narodny program reformiem Slovenskej republiky 2011–2014*. Bratislava: Slovenský republika, April 2011. S 4-5.



The situation changed when national currency was changed for a single European one: due to a high conversion rate this change of a Slovak koruna, which is a history now, turned into an increase of an average salary at the level of 7.4 euro per hour. Nowadays, it is the highest number in Central and Eastern Europe after the Czech Republic, which can be a “two-edged sword”: euro as a national currency attracts to the country international investors, who focus their attention on lowering currency risks of investment, but will push off those who are oriented on minimization of manufacturing costs.

As in the nearest future due to preservation of uncertainty on currency markets in CEE, international investors will be afraid to invest money into economy of even such successful countries as Poland and the Czech Republic, Slovakia may be a winner in a struggle for post-crisis flows of direct foreign investment. But when currency markets stabilize and investment flows resume, than it won't be enough just to have an advantage of euro as a national currency to draw over direct foreign investment from the neighbors, who will offer much more favorable environment for creation and preservation of job places.

Aiming at formation of conditions for stable continuous growth Slovakia carries out a “reset” of the economic policy. In accordance with a national plan of recovery in economy adopted in 2010<sup>25</sup>, a period for boosting economic growth on the basis of enlarging budget costs is already finished. An adopted program of quite rapid budget consolidation presupposed lowering of budget deficit to the EU norms up to 2013 and stabilization of the size of the state debt to 2015. In medium- and long-term perspective to the foreground come tasks aimed at improving institutional environment and implementation of structural reforms, which in 2000s had top priority for the country. An essentially important emphasis is placed on increasing stability of state finances. Solution of the task is connected with strengthening of institutional boundaries of the budget policy and reformation of the social sphere, first of all pension and health care systems to make them correspond to demographic and financial realia of the country.

Budget consolidation in the interests of improvement of macroeconomic stability will be combined with implementation of structural reforms, aimed at promoting economic growth, employment and quality of life. The agenda includes issues connected with increasing the efficiency of the national system of education and scientific-research sphere. Such ambitious task must provide systematic improvement of investment climate, which would allow Slovakia to join a group of 15 countries with best conditions for doing business till 2020. In this regard, it is planned to remove main risks related to investing into the Slovak economy (corruption, imperfect justice system and non-sufficient protection of the ownership rights), to conduct tax reform, which will lower administrative pressure on tax payers, as well as modernize labor legislation, to enhance economic growth. Thus there will be applied new elements in the economic policy. The answer of the Slovak government to challenges of the post-crisis development must be transition to responsible, conservative budget policy, improvement of institutions and acceleration of structural reforms.

<sup>25</sup> *Narodny program reforiem Slovenskej republiky 2011–2014*. Bratislava: Slovenský republika, April 2011. S 4-5.

The Constitution adopted in 1992 proclaimed Slovakia a democratic country with a parliamentary form of government; a single chamber parliament was formed and the institution of president introduced. The fundamental law of the country guaranteed political pluralism, civil rights and liberties. Imbalance of branches of power revealed in 1993-1998 in the form of “premierial absolutism” (combination of parliamentarism with authoritarian role of the prime minister) was corrected. Constitutional changes which took place in 1998-1999 introduced direct presidential elections and in a new way determined presidential responsibilities, what strengthened position of the president while parliamentary responsibility was on the government. As a result Slovakia evolved from the parliamentary to parliamentary-presidential system of governing what preserves stability even under conditions if the president and government belong to different political forces. A party system of Slovakia is characterized by a high fragmentation (over 100 registered parties and movements) and polarization. The most influential player of the left wing is the party “SMER-SD” headed by R. Fico.

The leader of the right wing of political spectrum is the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ-DS) headed by M. Dzurinda. A peculiarity of the political field in Slovakia, a country with a complicated history and high political heterogeneity, is the presence of numerous formations with a marked nationalistic orientation. In this group the most active one is the Slovak National Party, which stands for protection of traditional Christian values and Slovaks’ national identity, as well as the Party of Hungarian Coalition, which represents interests of the Hungarian minority. The Communist party is left on the periphery of political process (communists only once in the history of independent Slovakia entered the parliament). Multiparty character of Slovakia presuppose such peculiarities of the country’s political process as coalitional character of governments (except the last one, formed in 2012 by social-democrats) and instability of executive power. Demise of interparty alliances repeatedly (1994, 2002, 2006, 2012) led to government resignations, dissolution of parliaments and calling elections.

In the 2000s changes towards consolidation of post-communist multi-party character have been commenced. Political polarization is lowering, as the reached consensus on the general strategic course determines non-antagonistic character of contradictions between key political forces. There appeared a tendency towards formation of two-party political system. The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union and SMER which in the 2000s became main rivals in the political struggle more and more evolve in the direction of “catch-all” parties, whose peculiarities are loss of ideological determination and orientation on maximal mobilization of electorate, despite their social status and ideological preferences.

Therefore, for over a quarter of the century of post-communist development Slovakia has experienced fundamental democratic changes. There took place transition from one-party autocratic system to multi-party system and democracy. If in 1997 in the ranking of countries according to the level of political rights and civil liberties, as the Freedom House reported, Slovakia was at the same level with Russia and was a bit in advance of Macedonia and Moldavia, than at the beginning

of the new century it appeared to be among the group of consolidated “new” democracies. An important role in democracy development was played by an external factor: a number of EU and US walkouts in protest (1994-1996) as to the internal political development of the country; Brussels actions as to “compel” Slovakia to implement political specifications of membership in the EU; political and financial support of the West provided to the opposition to V. Meciar’s government.

In a line with achievements in the political life of the country there are serious long-term problems. Among them we can name irredentist attitudes among the Hungarian minority which fuel conflict potential in the Slovak-Hungarian relationship and hardships of social integration of the Roma population. An acute problem is corruption the level of which, as Transparency International put it, in 2016 is higher than in other Visegrad countries. According to the data provided by Transparency International Slovakia is the 7<sup>th</sup> most corrupted country-member of the EU<sup>26</sup>. In professional circles there is critical attitude towards the ability of Slovak diplomacy to stand for national interests in the EU procedural and institutional sphere and influence the decisions concerning strategic issues of the European development. When Slovakia joined the EU and the Eurozone general European interests are more and more shifting to the periphery of the state policy and internal political life of the country. In relation to this it is illustrative that right opposition, which from the very beginning supported accession of Slovakia to the European Union in 2009 voted against ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to weaken ruling left-of-center coalition. In its turn, left opposition in 2011 for similar purposes blocked ratification of the legislation as to enlargement of the European Financial Stability Facility, which was a key provision of the Eurozone rescue plan offered by the EU. It is evident, that confrontation of government and opposition does not contribute to political stabilization of the country.

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<sup>26</sup> Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. URL: [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2016](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016)

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## **Technocratic governance and democracy: key contradictions, their consequences and ways to overcome**

The article is devoted to the comparison of the concepts of technocracy/technocratic governance and democracy, as well as checking how democratic a nature of technocratic governance is. It was argued that technocratic governance is in opposition to democracy, but rather borders with autocracy (non-democracy) and found out that technocratic governance leads to weakening the procedures of delegation of authority and accountability between voters and parties, parties and governments, increasing external pressure on politicians and weakening ideological patterns of political process. The researcher confirmed that technocratic governments lack political competition, participation of citizens as key “principals” of democratic political regimes and political legitimacy. However, it was conceptualized that technocratic governance has both positive and negative moments through the prism of democracy: positive moments are short-term and negative moments are long-term. The author determined that the formation of technocratic governments in the long-term/repetitive perspective is not democratic, because it leads to patrimonialism of various inter-institutional relations. On the other hand, it was found that the more democratic is a political system, the greater is the likelihood that technocratic governments and technocratic governance will be temporary.

*Keywords: technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance, democracy.*

## **ТЕХНОКРАТИЧНЕ УРЯДУВАННЯ ТА ДЕМОКРАТІЯ: КЛЮЧОВІ ПРОТИРІЧЧЯ, ЇХ НАСЛІДКИ ТА ШЛЯХИ ПОДОЛАННЯ**

Стаття присвячена зіставленню концептів технократії/технократичного урядування та демократії, а також перевірці того, наскільки демократичною за своєю суттю є природа технократичного урядування. Аргументовано, що технократичне урядування є опозиційним демократії, а натомість суміжними з автократією (недемократією). Виявлено, що технократичне урядування зумовлює ослаблення процедур делегування повноважень і відповідальності та підзвітності між виборцями й партіями, партіями й урядами, збільшення зовнішнього тиску на політичних діячів, а також ослаблення ідеологічності політичного процесу. Підтверджено, що технократичним урядам бракує політичної конкуренції, участі громадян як ключового «принципала» демократичних політичних режимів і політичної легітимності. Водночас, концептуалізовано, що технократичне урядування крізь призму демократії має свої як позитивні, так і негативні моменти:

позитивні моменти є короткостроковими, а негативні – довгостроковими. Детерміновано, що формування технократичних урядів у довготривалій/повторюваній перспективі не є демократичним, адже призводить до патронажності варіативних систем міжінституційних відносин. З іншої сторони, виявлено, що чим більше демократичним є політичний режим, тим більшою є ймовірність, що технократичні уряди/технократичне урядування у ньому будуть тимчасовим.

**Ключові слова:** *технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування, демократія.*

The idea of technocratic/technical or expert governmental/managerial/state decisions as rational ones and those which are in the foundation of effective economic development induced appearing of various scientific views as to reasonability of managing in accordance with technocratic principles. On the one hand, the reason is vivid success of some countries, which managed to modernize applying technocratic model of management in their institutional and reformation development. On the other hand, technocratic governance comes under criticism in the light of its compatibility or incompatibility with principles and ideals of democracy and democratic political regime. It happens so, because in one case democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon and satellite of modernity, and thus democracy is a result of social and economic development, but is not its precondition; in the other case the idea of technocratic governance can be just a front for stabilization and rooting of non-democratic political regimes, which appealing to technocratic intentions of governance, in fact do not conduct modernization and systematic reformation. Consequently, it is quite obvious that not all democratic and non-democratic regimes, which try out technocratic governance, have modernized themselves. Especially it can be observed in the case with authoritarian political regimes, as democratic political regimes statistically are more often modernized. All this brings about a question as to what extent the nature of technocratic governance is theoretically democratic, as well as what the primary divergences between democracy and technocracy are.

Responding to the question we appeal to scientific works by such scholars as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strøm<sup>1</sup>, D. Bell<sup>2</sup>, H. Brunkhorst<sup>3</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>4</sup>, M. Centeno and L. Wolfson<sup>5</sup>, R.

<sup>1</sup> O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.

<sup>2</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973.

<sup>3</sup> H. Brunkhorst, *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

<sup>4</sup> J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom*, Wyd. Gateway 1970.

<sup>5</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, "Theory and Society", 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335.; M. Centeno, L. Wolfson, *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, "Desarrollo Económico" 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

Dalton and M. Wattenberg<sup>6</sup>, J. Ellul<sup>7</sup>, R. Formica<sup>8</sup>, J. Galbraith<sup>9</sup>, D. Greenberg<sup>10</sup>, J. Gunnell<sup>11</sup>, J. Hopkin<sup>12</sup>, C. Invernizzi Accetti and B. Christopher<sup>13</sup>, J. Kysela and Z. Kuhn<sup>14</sup>, P. Mair<sup>15</sup>, D. McDonnell and M. Valbruzzi<sup>16</sup>, J. Meynaud<sup>17</sup>, G. Njalsson<sup>18</sup>, S. Odugbemi<sup>19</sup>, G. Pasquino and M. Valbruzzi<sup>20</sup>, G. Pastorella<sup>21</sup>, D. Price<sup>22</sup>, S. Scarrow<sup>23</sup>, S. Schmidt<sup>24</sup>, M. Schudson<sup>25</sup>, D. Skelton<sup>26</sup>, I. van Biezen, P. Mair and T. Poguntke<sup>27</sup>, M. Williams<sup>28</sup> and others. It is observed that peculiarity of applying technocratic governance and technocratic cabinets in democratic political regimes lies in the fact that the very phenomenon of loading political processes with the elements of technocracy is considered to be exceptional. The point is that in such cases apolitical nature/ neutrality of political process can be seen in the light of mainly political or social-economic crises and disturbances. Therefore, first of all from the perspective of the theory of a rational choice, politicians and politics must be neutral to overcome negative crisis phenomena within the shortest possible time. However, as politics is a phenomenon with an ideological coloring, it is worth considering that technocrats must be best in coping with task of neutrality.

At the same time, it was found out that the main danger of technocratic governance is that it “limits” democratic requirements, according to which people must elect those officials, who

- <sup>6</sup> R. Dalton, M. Wattenberg, *Parties without partisans: political change in advanced industrial democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.
- <sup>7</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967.
- <sup>8</sup> R. Formica, *Governo tecnico? La Costituzione non lo prevede*, Wyd. Stampa Libera 2011.
- <sup>9</sup> J. Galbraith, *The new industrial state*, Wyd. Houghton-Mifflin 1971.
- <sup>10</sup> D. Greenberg, *The Myth of the Scientific Elite*, “Public Interest” 1965, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 51-62.
- <sup>11</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, “Technology and Culture” 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392-416.
- <sup>12</sup> J. Hopkin, *Technocrats have taken over governments in Southern Europe. This is a challenge to democracy*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2012.
- <sup>13</sup> C. Invernizzi Accetti, B. Christopher, *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.
- <sup>14</sup> J. Kysela, Z. Kuhn, *Presidential elements in government – The Czech Republic*, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2007, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 91-113.
- <sup>15</sup> P. Mair, *The Challenge to Party Government*, “EUI Working Paper SPS” 2007, nr. 9.
- <sup>16</sup> D. McDonnell, M. Valbruzzi, *Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.
- <sup>17</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968.
- <sup>18</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, “Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56-81.
- <sup>19</sup> S. Odugbemi, *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.
- <sup>20</sup> G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, “Journal of Modern Italian Studies” 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.
- <sup>21</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.; G. Pastorella, *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, “Political Studies” 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.
- <sup>22</sup> D. Price, *The scientific estate*, Wyd. Belknap Press 1965.
- <sup>23</sup> S. Scarrow, *Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era*, “Party Politics” 2010, vol 16, nr. 6, s. 823-843.
- <sup>24</sup> V. Schmidt, *Can Technocratic Government Be Democratic*, Wyd. Telos 2011.; V. Schmidt, *Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and Throughput*, “Political Studies” 2013, vol 61, nr. 1, s. 2-22.
- <sup>25</sup> M. Schudson, *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, “Theory and Society” 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.
- <sup>26</sup> D. Skelton, *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.
- <sup>27</sup> I. Van Biezen, P. Mair, T. Poguntke, *Going, going, ... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2012, vol 51, nr. 1, s. 24-56.
- <sup>28</sup> M. Williams, *Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America*, “Political Science Quarterly” 2006, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 119-139.

exercise power/governance. That is why technocratic government a priori cannot be seen as those which “run for” certain positions. It often happens, that technocratic modernization of social and economic processes in certain countries may take place in parallel with limitation of democratic institutionalization processes, what is revealed in “separation” from a classical rule, due to which “people elect people”. That kind of logic, for instance, is used to guarantee “survival” of authoritarian regimes, when elections are held on a regular basis and there is an illusion of representativeness, but in fact the country is developing in accordance with the patterns of subordination and “moderate repressiveness”. From this perspective technocratic governance as an idea of possessing power is in the focus of leaders of almost all authoritarian regimes as the slogan “modernization” serves a basis for additional legitimation of political power. As a result of this it is quite obvious that from the theoretical and methodological point of view technocratic governance restrains democratic tradition not only under conditions of a single-party system, but in general in case of all possible variants of non-party politics and autocracy, in particular in the context of the so-called military/war political regimes, client-like types of multi-party regimes, neo-patrimonial regimes etc<sup>29</sup>. And it results into theoretical and methodological positioning, according to which formation of technocratic governmental cabinets and technocratic model of governance often leads to transformation of the idea of representative democracy into the practice of “delegative dictatorship”. In particular it argues that further establishing of conventionality/traditionalism of technocratic governance limits the process of formation and institutionalization of democracy, as electorate stop determining/electing those who are real leaders in an executive vertical.

Such theorization of a negative connection between technocratic governance and democracy has economic, political and philosophical background and is rooted in the postulate, according to which a model of technocratic governance is less democratic (if non-democratic at all), than the idea of political/party governance, if only because technical or leadership qualities, which make the foundation of technocratic governance are determined on the basis of “special” knowledge and productivity. That is why technocratic governance is characterized by such patterns as: meritocracy – process of decision-taking on the basis of current knowledge, and oligarchy – process of decision-taking on the basis of assigned capitals, financial influence and interference in governance of specialized groups of interest. Therewith, G. Njalsson<sup>30</sup> theorizes, that technocratic governance to any extent is based on representativeness of specific specialized groups of interest (certain social and lobby-groups, coopted into politics through the so-called “econocrats” and “bureaucrats”) in a political process or in a process of state governance, and thus is carried out on the basis of a cognitive set of directions aimed at solving management issues. Just in connection with this scientists suppose that “technostructure”

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<sup>29</sup> L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1993, s. 73-74.

<sup>30</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, “Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56-81.



(elements of technocratic governance) tends to avoid categorical transition to a platform of any political party, and on the contrary prefers “to adjust oneself to a currently political party in force”. There is numerous historical evidence of this fact, as technocrats, for example, successfully cooperated with fascist totalitarian regimes and authoritarian dictatorship regimes as well as liberal-democratic regimes.

In a like manner M. Weber<sup>31</sup> argues that instrumental rationality of technical or technocratic governance of bureaucrats (even despite the emphasis on its rational and legal nature and procedural rules of decision-taking processes) largely tends to transformation into an autonomous form of politics formation, and therefore encroaching on politics function itself. As a result, the scientist states that technocratic bureaucracy does not suit to implementation of the mentioned function, as embracing “worldview neutrality” it is often a derivative from conservative convictions of “higher” classes’ representatives, where, as a rule, bureaucrats/technocrats are recruited. That is why, as M. Weber supposes, just when a politician must seek support in a competitive civil/political forum, a bureaucrat/technocrat is responsible only from the views and perspective of qualification standards and effectiveness. Correspondingly, the problem of modern society and technocratic governance as its component is limitation of bureaucrats/technocrats as to the relevant role, and thus prevention of their “undermining” activity in the sphere of neutralizing democratic political will. It is especially urgent question with regard to the fact that technocratic bureaucratization is not just a form of state governance, but it rationalizes tendencies of all associative characteristics of modern life, including legislation and economy. This, in its turn, is a precondition for theorization and agitation as to the fact that technocracy largely restrains significance of a political sphere, undermines traditional comprehension of power and political rationality. More specific worries appear due to the problem of bypassing or atrophy of political institutions of democratic representation. That is why R. Lapp argues that scientists holding crucial consultative positions have great power, however decisions taken by several technically qualified employees do not “dictate” civil control over the taken decisions and can generate situations, where an “ordinary method of restraints and counterbalance in democracy may be not enough”<sup>32</sup>.

By analogy, though on the basis of the elitist democracy theory, J. Ellul<sup>33</sup> states that dominance of “techniques” in a modern society (technocratic governance) usually “undermines democracy” and “creates new aristocracy”. In this case politics is positioned only by “illusion” and a correct choice of political problems depends on technical professionals, who make decisions, aimed at power implementation. As a result, the risk of technocratic governance is that a powerful state is transformed into a simple tool of influence in hands of technocrats. It can be observed as politics under conditions of technocratic governance has a tendency to “shift

<sup>31</sup> H. Gerth, W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

<sup>32</sup> R. Lapp, *The new priesthood: the scientific elite and the uses of power*, New York 1965, s. 2-3.

<sup>33</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967, s. 274.

towards executive power". And this, indeed, is just "a stage in gradual liquidation of political action in itself". Generally, it means that growth of the technocratic component and technocratic governance is a "symptom" of many circumstances, which "necessarily subordinate political decisions to technical estimations", and goals to results. Thus, appears a perception that technocracy is a kind of elitism, where ruling elite combines the most qualified representatives. Such elite is chosen/formed on the principles of professional training and not democratic elections<sup>34</sup>. It creates the impression that technocrats "perform" politics, which is grounded exclusively on technical criteria, unlike politicians, who take their decisions depending on next elections. In its turn, such dichotomy means that political recommendations of technocrats may have much larger influence, than political recommendations of elected officials. Therefore, technocrats may be connected with non-democratic procedures in the process of decision making<sup>35</sup>. In other words, it can be done beyond the parliament, politics, first of all, is carried out by bureaucrats-technocrats, who are not accountable to electorate. And this contradicts the idea that politicians take decisions, and bureaucrats/technocrats govern them. Consequently, in this perspective namely officials and technocrats take decisions and implement them.

The point is that the decisions taken by technocrats and technocratic governmental cabinets not to the full extent (though can be based on credibility of parliamentary parties or non-affiliated deputies) but correspond to constructions of legitimacy of political power ("the chain of delegation of authority and responsibility" among the head of the state, parliament and government). As a result, in the context of technocratic governments/technocratic governance executive power is exercised by officials, accountable only to the legislative branch and/or head of the state, however who are not elected by people (as it is in case with party governments/party governance). Besides, responsibility for such governments' activity is partially on publicly elected parties, which entrust "executive mandates" to such cabinets. All this clearly shows that in this "chain of responsibility", non-party technocratic governments and technocratic systems of governance make one significant theoretical problem, which may explain the practice of their insignificant presence in some regimes and predominance in others. The problem is supplemented by the fact that just under the conditions of technocratic governments and technocratic governance are "undermined" requirements towards representative democracy, as electorate loses the potential of associating themselves with political parties<sup>36</sup>.

On average, in various studies devoted to the given problem as G. Pastorella<sup>37</sup> says, it is uncovered that technocratic governance and technocracy in general in their etymological comprehension and as to their definition are in opposition to democracy, and even have much in common

<sup>34</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 789.

<sup>35</sup> B. Schneider, *The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America*, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva (eds.), *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1998, s. 77.

<sup>36</sup> P. Mair, *The Challenge to Party Government*, "EUI Working Paper SPS" 2007, nr 9.

<sup>37</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.; G. Pastorella, *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, "Political Studies" 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.

with autocracy (non-democracy). Therewith, alongside with populism they (technocracy and technocratic governance) are “Scylla and Charybdis” of democratic ideals, and “political pathology”<sup>38</sup>, which can cause “the end of the democracy we all know”<sup>39</sup>. Nevertheless, the combination of technocratic and non-democratic governance can be a direct predecessor of democratic regime establishment in one country or another, or even in one region or another. It is determined by the fact, that the essence of technocratic governance, as the political practices show, was initially tested on the examples of non-democratic political regimes in various countries and in various regions. And only after that the non-democratic nature of technocratic governance and technocracy was scientifically proved or refuted. Consequently a number of scientists, in particular D. Bell<sup>40</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>41</sup>, M. Centeno and L. Wolfson<sup>42</sup>, J. Galbraith<sup>43</sup>, D. Price<sup>44</sup>, M. Schudson<sup>45</sup>, M. Williams<sup>46</sup>, argue that technocracy and technocratic governance are of no serious hazard to democracy, as they cannot “challenge” the political nature of leadership in democratic regimes. D. Bell<sup>47</sup>, for instance, notes that in the post-industrial society technical skills make a base and grounds for accession to power, and those elite groups, which come to the foreground of the model, are scientists. Besides, taking into account that the notion of “technocracy” in the West goes beyond the frames and acts within the notions of political liberty and democracy, a western technocrat, as a rule, is much more inclined to technical, and not political issues, and that is why employs such specificity to implement tasks and not to exercise power<sup>48</sup>. Even taking this into consideration, technocrats can abuse their power and undermine foundations and principles of democracy, as they take control over the information flows. However, another group of scientists warns about the non-democratic/autocratic nature and consequences of scientification/juridification of political processes on the basis of technocratic governance. In addition to the abovementioned, such position is peculiar of the researchers of political regimes, but not the investigators of technocracy. The point is that, the “hazard” of technocracy and its principal non-compatibility with democracy are depicted by the theoreticians of democratic regimes, as well as the researchers of autocratic/non-democratic regimes, who assume that there is some connection between technocratic and non-democratic governance. Thus, J. Meynaud<sup>49</sup> states that technocrats are determined by the desire to simplify the political arena by means of elimination and suppression of different political

<sup>38</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, “Technology and Culture” 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392.

<sup>39</sup> H. Brunkhorst, *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

<sup>40</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973.

<sup>41</sup> J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom*, Wyd. Gateway 1970.

<sup>42</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, “Theory and Society”, 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335; M. Centeno, L. Wolfson, *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico” 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

<sup>43</sup> J. Galbraith, *The new industrial state*, Wyd. Houghton-Mifflin 1971.

<sup>44</sup> D. Price, *The scientific estate*, Wyd. Belknap Press 1965.

<sup>45</sup> M. Schudson, *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, “Theory and Society” 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.

<sup>46</sup> M. Williams, *Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America*, “Political Science Quarterly” 2006, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 119-139.

<sup>47</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973, s. 358.

<sup>48</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 789.

<sup>49</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968.

actors. Technocrats are less flexible, consensus-oriented and pragmatic than politicians are, and to a large extent they are inclined to commit political errors and blunders. Moreover, technocrats usually focus on planning, economic, but not political criteria of governance, as they use detailed and technically-oriented techniques of governance, what can greatly assist in transforming political regimes into authoritarian.

However, as G. Pastorella<sup>50</sup> argues, that it is quite evident that the mainstream problems of connection between technocratic governance and democracy are certain scientific opinions, in accordance to which: a) disturbance of the very fact of a technocratic government and technocratic governance is presupposed by the institutional constructions which reveal those drawbacks of democracy which are hidden in party governments, namely weakening of the procedures concerning delegation of authority and responsibilities as well as accountability between electorate and parties, parties and governments, increasing external pressure on politicians and weakening ideological patterns of political process<sup>51</sup>; b) technocratic governments and technocratic governance are often constitutionally unregulated<sup>52</sup>, though on the other hand, they are not forbidden constitutionally<sup>53</sup>; c) technocratic governments and governance are less determined by rationalist logics, as they do not correlate with the mechanisms of transferring cabinet positions conventional in democratic regimes and are not interested in gaining electoral support of people<sup>54</sup> (though succumb to the procedures of vote of investiture and non-confidence); d) technocratic government is a symptom of crisis and “undermines” institutionalized form of party democracy phenomenon<sup>55</sup>, and thus contributes to “growth” of populist party and party systems; e) governments of technocratic type and models of governing generated by them lack political competitiveness and participation of people as a key “principal” of democratic political regimes<sup>56</sup>; f) technocracy and technocratic governance lack political legitimacy<sup>57</sup>, even on the background of party-populist governance.

However, it is possible to solve the problem of mutual correlation between technocratic governance and democracy. J. Meynaud apprehends it in the possibility to do technical functions of governance more “accountable for their actions to democratic power” and reassures that they are

<sup>50</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.

<sup>51</sup> O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.; G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, “Journal of Modern Italian Studies” 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.; N. Urbinati, M. Warren, *The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 2008, vol 11, s. 403.; S. Odugbemi, *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.

<sup>52</sup> R. Formica, *Governmento tecnico? La Costituzione non lo prevede*, Wyd. Stampa Libera 2011.

<sup>53</sup> J. Tully, *The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy*, “The Modern Law Review” 2002, vol 65, nr. 2, s. 206.; J. Kysela, Z. Kuhn, *Presidential elements in government – The Czech Republic*, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2007, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 98.

<sup>54</sup> G. Pasquino, L. James, P. Mancini, *The future of the Western liberal order*, Wyd. T. Academy 2013.

<sup>55</sup> C. Invernizzi Accetti, B. Christopher, *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.; S. Hanley, *Unexpected consequences of an unexpected Prime Minister? The 2009-10 Fischer administration in the Czech Republic*, EUSA Thirteen Biennale Conference, Baltimore 2013.; G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, “Journal of Modern Italian Studies” 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.

<sup>56</sup> M.-C. Esposito, M. Christine, *Populismes: l'envers de la démocratie*, Wyd. Vendémiaire 2012, s. 15.

<sup>57</sup> D. Skelton, *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.

“under control of supreme power”, combined of “elected representatives”<sup>58</sup>. On the other hand, it is known that in practice there has not been created any effective and direct formula how to implement democracy with technocratic governance. A bit different strategy of solving the above-mentioned problem of correlation between technocratic governance and democracy is proposed by J. Ellul<sup>59</sup>, who believes “depolitization and repolitization” to be the only answer. As nowadays techniques/technocracy is more and more merging with a country, it is necessary to avoid this state, and then to resume democratic control over the country and managerial apparatus. Such logic is rather obvious taking into account the fact, that despite apparent problems of connection between knowledge and power in modern society, science and democracy are to complement each other in future as well. The point is that modern democracy requires participation of a scientist, while the scientist must bear civil responsibility. In that regard S. Lakoff believes that “the main reason, as it was before, is still fear of technocracy that democratic theories have not caught with democratic practice yet”<sup>60</sup>. However, it is quite an apparent phenomenon, especially from Yu. Habermas’ standpoint<sup>61</sup> that technique/technology cannot but be under control of a democratic society.

Thus, we came to a conceptual conclusion on our research that in the context of democracy technocratic governance has both positive and negative moments: positive moments are short-term, while negative are long-term. It means that if a technocratic government is created for the purpose of steering the country out of political and economic crisis, then it is likely to have positive result on the process of governance (in particular as a result of collective unified force of political responsibility, and not a diversified disagreement of political parties). However, when technocratic governmental cabinets or technocratic governance in general become conventional and permanent, it significantly undermines the idea of democratic governance, accountability and political responsibility, leads to personalization of a political process. It is reasoned by the fact, that namely responsibility is a cornerstone idea, which is formally established in the institutional frames of modern democracy’s development. With that in mind, the very idea of establishing technocratic governments and technocratic governance in long-term/continual perspective is not democratic, as it leads to protection form of variable systems of inter-institutional relations. On the other hand, we conclude that the more democratic a political regime is, the higher is the possibility that technocratic governments/technocratic governance there will be temporary. On the contrary, authoritarianization of political regime leads to the fact that the phenomenon and practice of technocratic/non-party government formation become conventional.

<sup>58</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968, s. 299.

<sup>59</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967, s. 274.

<sup>60</sup> S. Lakoff, *Knowledge, Power, and Democratic Theory*, “Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science” 1972, vol 394, s. 10.; D. Greenberg, *The Myth of the Scientific Elite*, “Public Interest” 1965, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 51-62.

<sup>61</sup> J. Habermas, *Toward a rational society: student protest, science, and politics*, Boston 1970, s. 59-60.

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## **Political parties of the Czech Republic on the way to consolidated democracy**

The paper deals with the development of the political process in the Czech Republic in the first post-communist decade. It is characterized by a special struggle between two biggest political parties, which surprisingly for the Czech society made a political deal – “Agreement on the Creation of a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic”, signed by the Czech Social-Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party. Other parties considered this agreement to be a “deception of voters” and during the course of the election campaign severely criticized both “pro-communist” social-democrats and “entirely corrupted” civic democrats. The abovementioned period was characterized by controversial, complicated and ambiguous development, but the outcomes are clear – transformation of the Czech Republic into a stable European country with a well-established market economy and sustainable political system.

*Keywords: the Czech Republic, political parliamentary parties, political agreements, president of the republic, political class, oppositional agreement.*

## **ПОЛІТИЧНІ ПАРТІЇ ЧЕСЬКОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ НА ШЛЯХУ ДО КОНСОЛІДОВАНОЇ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ**

У статті досліджено розвиток політичного процесу в Чеській Республіці у перше посткомуністичне десятиліття. Він позначений особливою боротьбою між двома найбільшими політичними партіями, які несподівано для чеського суспільства уклали політичну угоду – «Договір про створення стабільного політичного простору в Чеській Республіці, укладений між Чеською соціал-демократичною партією і Громадянською демократичною партією». Інші партії вважали цю угоду «обманом виборців», а в ході передвиборної кампанії виступали з гострими нападами і на «прокомуністичних» соціал-демократів, і на «наскрізь корумпованих» громадянських демократів. Означений період мав суперечливий, складний та неоднозначний розвиток, але його результат очевидний – перетворення Чехії в стабільну європейську державу з уже сформованою ринковою економікою та усталеною політичною системою.

*Ключові слова: Чеська Республіка, політичні парламентські партії, політичні угоди, президент республіки, політичний клас, опозиційний договір*



Analyzing the first decade of the development of the political process in the Czech Republic it is necessary to state that it is characterized by a distinct time frame. On the one hand, on January 1, 1993 the Czech Republic became an independent state and this is commonly believed to be a lower limit. On the other hand, an upper limit was designated by February 2003 when Vaclav Havel, the eternal head of the state (and before he was the president of Czechoslovakia) left the office and further election of Vaclav Klaus, the former prime-minister and leader of the Civic Democratic Party (CDP), as new head of the state.

The abovementioned period was characterized by controversial, complicated and ambiguous development, but the outcomes are clear – transformation of the Czech Republic into a European country with a well-established market economy and sustainable political system. The Czech Republic is a state which joined the European Union and NATO being one of the well-prepared applicants. Finally, it is the state where the change of leaders, from “devotionalist-idealist” V. Havel to “pragmatist” V. Klaus (though some elements of idealism are inherent to him) took place rather painlessly, by constitution means, even despite previous conflicts which had existed between them and complicated nature of electing the second president of the Czech Republic, presupposed by dominance of the social-democrats (CSDP) and their allies in the parliament, who offered their own alternative candidates.

The author by means of the institutional approach and conflict resolution techniques analyzes the role of the political class in the Czech Republic within the transformational shifts over the last years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Studying the changes which took place in main political institutions of the Czech Republic, the author applied axiomatic, ideographic, comparative, systematic and statistical methods, which contributed to objective coverage of political compromises in the Czech Republic. The article is based on the materials of the central Czech civil-political magazines, including “Lidové noviny”, “Mladá fronta dnes”, “Přítomnost. Politický a kulturní čtvrtletník”, “Právo”, “Respect” and others, which efficiently described all events of the political life of the state.

In 1997 the Czech Republic, in comparison with previous years, after another scheduled elections to the parliament experienced a reduction in numbers of parliamentary parties from six to five, what to some extent promoted factual accomplishment of restructuring of political forces in the state: on the left wing social-democrats enhanced their predominant position, on the right wing, as a result of disintegration of a former Civic Democratic Party emerged two parties, characterized by liberal-conservative views. One of them, (“renovated” CDP) managed to defend its positions under the pressure of a new, but a small and amorphous Freedom Union (FU). Eventually, the Christian-Democratic Union – Czech People’s Republic (CDU-CPP) remained the status of the most popular and distinctly formed centrist party.

Formally, despite the victory of the social-democrats, the parties of the former right of center coalition one more time gained the majority in the parliament: the Civic Democratic Party, the Christian-Democratic Union – the Czech People’s Party and the Freedom Union

in total had 102 representatives out of 200. However, in fact it was a stalemate situation. The administration of the Christian-democrats did not want to give their votes for V. Klaus to elect him prime-minister, while the latter did not consider the possibility of cooperation with the leaders of the Freedom Union in the frames of the same cabinet, and this almost destroyed him as a politician. When President Havel charged M. Zeman, as a head of the party, which won the elections, to conduct negotiations concerning government formation, there appeared a possibility of a non-standard “left-right” coalition including the CSDP, CDU-CPP and FU. However, the Freedom Union from its ideological points of view refused to take part in formation of such a cabinet. M. Klima notes that “the fact that they did not manage to form a standard majority government, either right- or left-of-center, testifies of retention of ideological prejudices and importance of personal enmity...”<sup>1</sup>. It should be mentioned that relations between almost all parliamentary parties’ leaders – V. Klaus and J. Ruml, V. Klaus and J. Luks, J. Ruml and M. Zeman – over the analyzed period were not just far from friendly or even neutral, but even far from tactful, what was underlining that among the highest representatives of the Czech political classes there was no mutual understanding or even a desire to sacrifice own interests for the sake of stability in the domestic policy of the country.

At the same time, the arrangements offered by the social-democrats to their potential partners were extremely beneficial. In negotiating with J. Luks (CDU-CPP) and J. Ruml (FU) the CSDP leader M. Zeman agreed with a division of ministerial posts in future coalitional cabinet between three parties in the ratio 8:4:4 – despite the fact that the number of places in the Chamber of Deputies, gained by the social-democrats, the Christian-Democratic Union – the Czech People’s Republic and the Freedom Union was approximately 3 : 1 : 1 to the advantage of the Czech Social Democratic Party<sup>2</sup>. Besides, in spite of the fact that his party achieved the majority of votes M. Zeman displayed readiness to refuse an appointment of the prime-minister in favor of J. Luks who could become a compromise figure, more acceptable personality for liberals from the Freedom Union than M. Zeman himself as he acquired a reputation as a left socialist<sup>3</sup>. The Christian democrats agreed on the proposal of the Czech Social Democratic Party, however J. Ruml refused it from ideological positions. He stated, that the Freedom Union did not want to “deceive their voters”, as in the course of the election campaign the FU severely attacked both “pro-communist” social-democrats and “entirely corrupted” civic democrats<sup>4</sup>. Thus, in the first days of July 1998 there was no possibility in the Czech Republic to form the government which would enjoy parliamentary support of the majority.

The way-out of the situation was found on July 9, 1998 in Prague when a political deal – “Agreement on the Creation of a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic between

<sup>1</sup> *Klima M.* Kvalita demokracie v České republice a volební inženýrství. Praha, 2001. S. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Klima M.* Kvalita demokracie v České republice a volební inženýrství. Praha, 2001. S. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Práva.* 1998. 3. červenec.

<sup>4</sup> *Lidové noviny.* 1998. 6. červenec.

the Czech Social-Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party” was signed. It became the result of several-day negotiations between the leaders of the Czech Social-Democratic Party (CSDP) and the Civic Democratic Party. In the Czech political elite and mass media this document was shortly named an “oppositional agreement” and scientists characterized it as a “political earthquake”<sup>5</sup>. Actually, for the majority of the Czech society it was difficult to comprehend and come to terms with the fact that two leading parties, which over the last five years had been acting like irreconcilable opponents not just made a political truce, but divided power in the state. Not long before the event the leaders of the CSDP and the CDP categorically denied any possibility of cooperation between the parties. Thus, M. Zeman stated that “a large coalition of the Czech Social-Democratic Party and the Civil Democratic Party from the both sides would be a deceit of the voters”<sup>6</sup>. The same thought was expressed by V. Klaus, who underlined that “speculations on the fact that the Civil Democratic Party after the elections could put up with the formation of a social-democratic government of minority are groundless”<sup>7</sup>.

To our mind, among the crucial arguments for the oppositional agreement, first of all, was an actual stalemate situation, which occurred on the Czech political arena after the 1998 elections; secondly, the need to preserve standard mechanisms of parliamentary democracy, though by means of such an unordinary political decision as this agreement – a result of classic interpretation of policy as an “art of possible”. Consequently, the oppositional agreement unblocked the political system of the Czech Republic, without applying mechanisms of changing Constitutional principles of parliamentary democracy and at the same time preserving representativeness of political parties in the Czech parliament.

Similar examples of cooperation between two leading political parties had been registered before. Thus, after the 1996 elections the Czech Social-Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Party came to an agreement, according to which the social-democrats gained a right to hold main posts in the lower chamber in exchange for assistance for the right-of-center minority government while voting for confidence in the government. But the 1998 oppositional agreement significantly broadened the boundaries of cooperation between the CSDP and the CDP. First of all, the social-democratic cabinet which, according to the agreement, was formed and led to power by M. Zeman in July 1998 enjoyed much lesser support of the parliament than the last government headed by V. Klaus in 1996-1997 (74 and 99 deputies correspondingly). Therefore, support of the Civic Democratic Party was the only sufficient precondition for M. Zeman’s cabinet functioning. The oppositional agreement was not limited to division of positions in the government and both chambers of the parliament between two parties, but designed a further program of cooperation, aimed at changing the whole model of the state-political order in the Czech Republic. Limitation of the presidential authorities became the second important goal of

<sup>5</sup> Voráček E. Mitteleuropäische Lage und politische Stabilität in Tschechien. Zivilgesellschaft und demokratische Konsolidierung // Transition – Erosion – Reaktion. Zehn Jahre Transformation in Osteuropa / Ed. D.Schorkowitz. Frankfurt a. Main, 2002. S. 321.

<sup>6</sup> *Právo*. 1997. 15. květen.

<sup>7</sup> *Lidové noviny*. 1998. 10. červen.

the party-partners, as V. Havel severely criticized new relations between the Civic Democratic Party and the Czech Social-Democratic Party, considering the oppositional agreement to be a brute deceit of voters and a shameless division of power, which potentially may threaten the fundamentals of civil society in the Czech Republic<sup>8</sup>.

For the system of political parties in the Czech Republic and the Czech society in general the agreement between the CSDP and the CDP had two main consequences. First of all, there occurred consolidation of a number of small political subjects, whose existence was threatened by the monopoly on power of two large parties formed after the 1998 elections. Secondly, there appeared and growth estrangement between the elite of the political class in the Czech Republic and the civil society, which started comprehending parties as structures, interested in division of authorities, lobbying interests of separate groups of the ruling elite (big business, officials etc.), instead of executing primary function of political parties – representation and protection of interests of broad layers of population.

The former tendency revealed in 1998 when the Christian democrats, who had to become opposition for the first time since 1918, made close ties with another small oppositional party – the Freedom Union and later with the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Democratic Union. Cooperation of these political parties started in autumn 1998 when they created a coalition and participated in the elections to the Senate and local authorities. Later on these political forces formally made an agreement as to mutual political strategy (September 1999), and in a year they enhanced their decisions in the so-called “The Treaty of Saint Wenceslas”, signed by the leaders of four parties on September 28, 2000 (on St. Wenceslas day). The agreement presupposed a common position of a new “coalition of four” as to several main questions of political life of the country. Firstly, it was an opposition to the following monopolization of the Czech political arena by the Civic Democratic Party and the Czech Social-Democratic Party; and close cooperation of four parties in the course of local and parliamentary election campaigns. Members of coalition decided to create a common list of candidates for the elections to the Senate in autumn 2000 and the Chamber of Deputies in 2002<sup>9</sup>.

The coalition tried to position itself in the political life of the Czech Republic as a force which equally opposed both to the social-democrats and the civic democrats, blaming them of sacrificing their program goals for the sake of power ambitions. Not less role was played by the social initiatives (1999) aimed at the initiators of the oppositional agreement, which represented anti-system protest of a large part of the Czech society.

On July, 1999 was published a dissertation “Impulse – 99”, which was signed by 186 leading social activists. The authors’ dissertation aim was later explained by one of its initiators, political

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<sup>8</sup> *Žadoucí je člověk zásadový a konsensuální. Rozhovor s prezidentem republiky Václavem Havlem // Přítomnost. Politický a kulturní čtvrtletník. 2001. Č. 1. S. 14.*

<sup>9</sup> The text of the Treaty of Saint Wenceslas, see for instance: *Lidové noviny*. 2000. 29. září.

counselor of V. Havel, political scientist J. Pehe, who stated that it was the protest against “the partners of the (oppositional – T. F.) agreement, who carried on preserving the political regime, which essentially was anti-civil”. J. Pehe believed that the main aim of the agreement was “to give two parties control over the majority of spheres of social, political and economic life. This partocracy is dangerous as it narrows down democratic discussion in the country to the agreement of two party administrative offices, which primarily act in their own interests... A citizen is being imposed a role of a passive consumer of the party policy, which most commonly is just a virtual game... This refers to the fight between the adherents of democratic open society and those who wish to limit it in the interest of preserving own power and personal benefits”<sup>10</sup>.

Till the beginning of autumn 1999 almost 2 000 people had signed the declaration “Impulse – 99”, including the archbishop of Prague and primate of the Czech church M. Vlk, president of the Czech Academy of Science R. Zahradnyk, vice-president of the National Bank Z. Tuma, leader of trade unions, senator R. Falbr, famous film director, “Oscar” winner Z. Sverak and others<sup>11</sup>.

Despite the names of such famous signers, a distinct parallel, drawn by the organizers of the “Impulse – 99”, between their initiative and dissident “Charter – 77”, and indirect, but doubtless support of the new movement on the side of Grad (in Grad situated the residence of the head of the state)<sup>12</sup>, “Impulse – 99” did not unite social layers and groups, which were disjointed and unsatisfied with the oppositional agreement and its political consequences. The main reason, perhaps, must be principally anti-system orientation of this social initiative, moralized pathos of the organizers, who condemned not only the specific political course of two biggest Czech parties, but also “immoral” character of politics itself.

More specific and organized display of civil dissatisfaction in the Czech Republic was a campaign “Thank you, get away!”, organized in November-December 1999 on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the “Velvet” revolution by the former leaders of the students’ movement, who participated in the events of 1989. In many cities throughout the Czech Republic took place mass meetings, where the participants demanded resignation of leaders of the “negotiated” parties, government and parliament<sup>13</sup>. But those meetings had no serious consequences. The organizers were not ready to such mass social support and lost their heads, having heard the appeals to create an effective political “third force”, able to resist the Civic Democratic Party and the Czech Social-Democratic Party. Thus, the movement “Thank you, get away!” more than the dissertation “Impulse – 99” revealed the desire of a certain part of the Czech society to institutionalize political forces, which stood against the oppositional agreement and its main outcome – domination of two biggest parties.

<sup>10</sup> Pehe J. «Impuls – 99» v kontextu současného politického vývoje // *Respect*. 2000. 29. březen.

<sup>11</sup> Stránský M.J. «Impuls – 99» – Consensus and Confrontation // *The New Presence*. 1999. № 9. P. 2-8.

<sup>12</sup> *A Crying Need for Intellectuals*. Interview with Czech President Václav Havel // *The New Presence*. 1999. № 4. P. 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Lidové noviny*. 1999. 18, 20, 21. září; *Právo*. 1999. 18-20. září. ta iii.

However, long-expected changes did not take place and dissatisfaction with the political situation grew into a latent phase, being represented at best in political scientists' and analysts' complaints that belliciously apprehended an "oppositional-negotiated" system. "Politics in the Czech Republic, – stated J. Pehe – became a senseless ritual, a set of political combinations... None of the veterans of the Czech political life for the last 10 post-communist years has shown readiness to work out new ideas and conceptions. Politics reached the level of continuous fight for power and personal benefits. The Czech Republic is suffering from absolute inefficiency of its political elite"<sup>14</sup>.

Negative attitude of the biggest part of the society towards the political elite and its activity in the late 90s found its representation in the fall of confidence to the majority of political institutions. It is significant, that the level of confidence to some individual politicians was much higher than to the "institutions-collective bodies, whose effectiveness depends on their ability to search consensus and reach compromises"<sup>15</sup>. Thus, according to the survey, conducted by the specialists from T. H. Masaryk University in 1998, president of the Czech Republic V. Havel enjoyed 60% support, while 23% did not trust him: M. Zeman was supported by 50% of respondents, non-confidence was expressed by 27%. At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers in general had support only of 26% of people, while 51% did not support it; level of confidence to the parliament was even lower – 15% in each case (non-confidence – 64% and 55% correspondingly)<sup>16</sup>.

Dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, expressed by the broad layers of the society led to the growth of apolitical attitudes among population, disgust to politics as it was, which resulted in an abrupt decrease of activity among the Czech voters. It was clearly displayed in November 1998, when the elections to the Senate and local authorities took place. It should be mentioned, that in accordance with the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Senate (the upper chamber of the Czech parliament) consists of 81 senators. One third of them, i.e. 27 people, are elected every two years according to the majority voted system in two rounds in single-seat electoral districts. The first elections to the Czech Senate, when all senators were elected took place in 1996; second (partial) elections were in 1998; third – in 2000; fourth – at the end of 2002<sup>17</sup>. For the first time in the post-communist history of the Czech Republic during the first round of the Senate elections only 42.4% of people who had the right to vote came to polling stations. During the second round there was a kind of "electoral collapse" when only 20.4% of the Czech population were voting and in some electoral districts voter turnout was even lower – 14-15%<sup>18</sup>. However, some political analysts saw the reason not in general dissatisfaction of the population with the political situation in the Czech Republic, but in unpopularity

<sup>14</sup> *Pehe J.* A Year of Stagnation // *The New Presence*. 1999. № 2. P. 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Muller K., jr.* Češi a občanská společnost // *Politologická revue*. 2001. Č. 2.S. 28.

<sup>16</sup> *Muller K., jr.* Češi a občanská společnost // *Politologická revue*. 2001. Č. 2.S. 29.

<sup>17</sup> *Konstitutsiia* Cheskoj Respubliky z 16 hrudnia 1992 roku // *Konstitutsii novykh derzhav Yevropy ta Azii*. Kyiv: Pravo, 1996. Pp. 496-499.

<sup>18</sup> *Pravo*. 1998. 23. listopad.

of the Senate as an institution, insufficient clearness of its functions and doubts in the society concerning reasonability of existence of the upper chamber of the Czech parliament<sup>19</sup>. Level of confidence in the Senate at the end of 1998 – beginning of 1999 equaled 11-15%<sup>20</sup>.

Resounding triumph at the elections to the Senate gained parties, which entered the “coalition of four” (the CDU-CPP, the FU, the CDP and the DU). They were struggling for 13 senator seats out of 27. Civic democrats had 7 representatives; quite unexpectedly the social-democrats sustained crushing defeat and gained only 3 seats. Two communist-candidates entered the Senate<sup>21</sup>. For the Czech Social-Democratic Party a period of the first year and a half after signing the oppositional agreement was especially difficult. In 1998-1999 a steady decline of the social-democrats’ rating was observed and in December 1999 it bottomed 16%, whereas popularity of the civic democrats and communists reached 20-22%<sup>22</sup>. Prime-minister M. Zeman, being to some extent “more right” than “the right parties” themselves (thus, only when the cabinet of the social-democrats was in office started privatization of the biggest Czech banks and there was observed the growth of foreign investment in the Czech Republic), however, at every opportunity he criticized his predecessors from the right wing. The expression “burned earth” (*spalená země*), which was used by the social-democratic prime-minister to characterize the state of affairs in the country at his coming to power, became a part of the Czech political folklore, as it earlier happened with the phrase “to take the government by the throat”<sup>23</sup>.

At the same time, despite all the causticity and figurativeness of M. Zeman’s expressions, a psychological influence of the oppositional agreement on that part of the Czech Social-Democratic Party’s electorate, which supported the party at the elections as a direct alternative to the rights was negative: these voters were extremely disappointed with the agreement between their party and the Civic Democratic Party. On the contrary, being clearly formed and ideologically consolidated electorate of the civic democrats apprehended the oppositional agreement much easier, as a felicitous political instrument, which gave the rights an opportunity to some extent control the policy of the left cabinet. Comparative growth of the communists’ popularity, first of all, might be explained by the fact that a part of left-radical protesting electorate quitted the Czech Social-Democratic Party (after signing the oppositional agreement). Besides, the communists won support of those citizens, who stood against joining NATO in spring 1999.

In autumn 1999 the social-democrats and the civic democrats conducted complicated negotiations as to the draft of the law on elections. The Civic Democratic Party by all means tried to gain advantage over the Czech Social-Democratic Party, but when negotiations did not bring desired results, the former proposed an initiative to liquidate the oppositional agreement, to resign the social-democratic cabinet and to create a government of broad (so-called

<sup>19</sup> Právo. 1998. 18. listopad.

<sup>20</sup> Právo. 1998. říjen; 1999. 27. leden.

<sup>21</sup> *Statistická ročenka České republiky*. 1998. Praha, 1999. S. 577.

<sup>22</sup> Čermák M. Václav Klaus, Miloš Zeman: Souběný portrét. Praha, 1998. S. 86.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* S. 88-89.

“iridescent”) coalition, which could be formed by the representatives of all parliamentary parties, except the communists, i.e. the civic democrats, the social-democrats, the Christian democrats and the Freedom Union. Most likely such proposal of the Civic Democratic Party was just another new way to exert pressure on the social-democrats, a “crack of a whip”, which had to make an impression on the unmanageable Czech Social-Democratic Party<sup>24</sup>.

Additional measure of such influence was a refusal of the civic democrats to adopt the 2000 draft budget, which was introduced by the government. Consequently, in October 1999 the Czech Republic entered another streak of political crisis, which, on the one hand, was marked by an escalation of contradictions between the partners to the oppositional agreement, and, on the other hand, by a general social tension, which found its representation in the mass movement “Thank you, get away!”. In fact, the budget became a subject to political bargains: the Civic Democratic Party showed readiness to adopt it, only in the case the Czech Social-Democratic Party agreed to adopt a draft of an electoral reform in the version which would be advantageous for the civic democrats. Eventually, the crisis within the political class was resolved in January 2000, when was signed the so-called patent of mutual support, which was the continuation of the oppositional agreement and heralded a new stage of modern political process in the Czech Republic.

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<sup>24</sup> *Respect*. 1999. Č. 45. S. 20.



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## Vitaliy Dubenskyi – The Hesychast-Poet

The paper partly examines the biography of the poet and monk Vitaliy Dubenskyi. The author includes an analysis of Dubenskyi's work, called «Dioptra ...», which is a classic example of hesychast literature. Great attention is paid to the criticism of the «earthly world» and its opposition to the «divine world». Elements of humanism in Dubenskyi's poetic writings are also noted.

*Keywords: orthodoxy, hesychasts, earthly world, righteous humanism*

## Віталій Дубенський – поет-ісихаст

Розглядається частково біографія поета та ченця Віталія Дубенського. Проаналізовано його твір «Діоптра...», як приклад ісихастиської літератури. Звернено увагу на критику «світу земного» та його протиставлення «світу божественного». Відзначено елементи гуманізму в постичному творі.

*Ключові слова: православ'я, ісихаст, світ земний, праведник, гуманізм*

Маловідомою є постать поета-ченця Віталія з Дубна, який залишив після себе книгу під назвою «Діоптра...», що вперше побачила світ у 1612 році. Повна назва цього видання звучить так – «Діоптра сиречь зеркало. Альбо изображение язвістное живота человеческого в мире. От многих Святых Божественных писаний и отческих догмат съставленная. На словенский язык вичное памяти годным отцем Виталием игуменом в Дубні переложена и написана»<sup>1</sup>. Видана вона була Віленським братством.

Із цієї назви можемо зробити кілька висновків. По-перше, її автор належав до настоятелів одного з дубенських монастирів. Дубно ж було одним із центрів Острозького князівства. Тут часто перебував князь Василь-Костянтин Острозький. По-друге, на час виходу книги її автор уже помер.

Відомий список «Діоптри...» 1604 р., який, вважається, зняли з оригіналу твору. Назва тут книги дещо інакша. Там, зокрема, вказується, ігуменом якого монастиря був Віталій. Це – монастир Чесного Хреста<sup>2</sup>. У той час у Дубно існував Спаський монастир,

<sup>1</sup> Віталій. Діоптра... - Єв'ю, 1612.

<sup>2</sup> Перетц В. Н. Отчет об экскурсии семинария русской филологии в Житомир 21-26 октября 1910 года // Университетские известия. – 1911. – № 9. – С. 25.

заснований князями острозькими, що мав статус архімандритії. До нього належали два монастирі – Чесного Хреста в Дубні, де настоятелем, як бачимо, був Віталій, й Воскресенський у селі Підбірчє<sup>3</sup>.

Є документи, які стосуються діяльності Віталія. Настоятелем зазначеного монастиря Святого Хреста він став у 1603 р. Тоді князь Василь-Костянтин Острозький видав презенту на ігуменство «священоіоку ієродиякону Віталію, що в благочесті подвигається». Це сталося після того, як від цього ігуменства відмовився служебник Олександр Пуцяницький<sup>4</sup>. У той час керівництво монастирями часто здійснювали люди світські. Адже монастирі мали земельні володіння, які приносили доходи. Цими «хлібами духовними» нерідко й користувалися світські люди. Віталій же очолив монастир, будучи духовною особою. Схоже, це сталося, коли йому було чимало років. На той час він зарекомендував себе як чернець-аскет. Князь Василь-Костянтин Острозький, який надав йому презенту, намагався в своїх володіннях створити монастирські осередки, в яких зосереджувалися освічені люди і які, відповідно, такими людьми очолювалися. До таких осередків, зокрема, належав Дерманський Троїцький монастир<sup>5</sup>. Тому вибір Віталія на ігуменство в Дубенському монастирі Чесного Хреста не видається випадковим. Він, судячи з передмови до «Діоптри...», зарекомендував себе як проповідник й перекладач з грецької та латинської мов<sup>6</sup>.

Про вченість Віталія, його зорієнтованість на релігійне просвітництво, вважають деякі дослідники, опосередковано свідчить згадка в листі Івана Вишенського до стариці Домникії. Там полеміст, захищаючись від закидів на свою адресу про те, що він не вчився і забороняє іншим учитися, пише так: «Я не ганю граматичне вчення і ключ до пізнання складів та речень, як деякі гадають і так кажуть: «Оскільки сам не вчився, через те нам заздрить і забороняє». Таке, знаю, перш за все пан Віталій, волинський казнодія, кидав. Але від цього я зовсім не печалюся і байдуже мені до наклепу й приниження, і не соромлюся брехні, яку накладає на мене заздрість»<sup>7</sup>. Дослідники вважають, що Іван Вишенський мав на увазі саме Віталія Дубенського, автора «Діоптри...»<sup>8</sup>. Адже писався лист до стариці Домникії в 1605 р. – тоді, коли Віталій зарекомендував себе як проповідник. Однак насторожує те, що Іван Вишенський називає свого опонента «паном». На той час Віталій був ігуменом монастиря Чесного Хреста. Сумнівно, що Іван Вишенський не знав про його статус. Тому таке іменування, яке, радше, личить для світської особи, видається дивним. Можливо, Іван Вишенський мав на увазі якогось іншого Віталія. Хоча вказівка «волинський казнодія» ніби вказує на нього. Та як би не було (чи вказував Іван Вишенський на

<sup>3</sup> Довбищенко М. Волинська шляхта у релігійних рухах (кінець XVI – перша половина XVII ст.). – К., 2008. – С. 674.

<sup>4</sup> Мицько І. Острозька слов'яно-греко-латинська академія (1576-1636). – К., 1990. – С. 86.

<sup>5</sup> Лопатська Н. Дерманський Свято-Троїцький монастир // Острозька академія. Енциклопедія. – Острог, 2010. – С. 102-105.

<sup>6</sup> Віталій. Діоптра... – Арк. I нн.

<sup>7</sup> Вишенський І. Твори / пер. з книжної української мови В. Шевчука. – К., 1986. – С. 173.

<sup>8</sup> Шевчук В. Муза роксоланська. Українська література XVI – XVIII століть: У двох книгах. – К., 2004. – Кн. перша. – С. 223.

Віталія Дубенського в своєму листі до стариці Домникії, чи ні), але безсумнівно, що автор «Діоптри...» належав до освічених людей.

Однак висока освіченість не заважала Віталію стояти на позиціях аскетизму й несприйняття суєтного світу, про що й свідчить «Діоптра...» Ігуменство відволікало його від чисто духовних справ. Доводилося займатися й справами матеріальними. Так, Віталій у травні й вересні 1607 р. був присутній у Острозі на судовій суперечці між монастирем Чесного Хреста, якого він представляв, та дубенським міщанином Харком Григоровичем<sup>9</sup>. Сумнівно, що його приваблювали такі справи. Радше він втікав від них.

Із передмови до «Діоптри...» можна зрозуміти, що в Останні роки життя Віталій покинув Волинь і перебрався в Литву, прибувши до Вільна<sup>10</sup>. Чому це сталося – можемо лише гадати. Найбільш імовірно, це було пов'язано зі смертю князя Василя-Костянтина Острозького в 1608 р. Віталій, можна так зрозуміти, втратив свого покровителя. Він вирішив шукати для себе середовище, де можна було б знайти прихисток і реалізовувати свої творчі плани. Чи не найкраще це можна було зробити у Вільні, де існувало сильне православне братство.

Там, певно, Віталій і знайшов вічний спокій. А вже після смерті віленські братчики надрукували його «Діоптру...» Ця невелика книжечка мала щасливу «видавничу долю». Окрім видання в Єв'ю (сучасне місто Вівес у Литовській республіці) в 1612 р., вийшли ще її видання в тому ж Єв'ю в 1642 р, Кутеїні в 1651 та 1654 рр. та Могилеві в 1698 р. Можемо твердити, що книга користувалася популярністю, а її ідеї виявилися близькими для певного кола людей – передусім православних традиціоналістів.

Книги під назвою «Діоптра» зустрічаються в грецькій літературі. Наприклад, є така книга Филипа Пустельника (Салітарія). Вона, до речі, була видана в 1604 р. в перекладі латинською мовою в Інгольштадті. Чи використовував цю книгу Віталій, однозначно твердити не можемо. Але, безперечно, він користувався грецькими й латинськими аскетичними творами, в т. ч. й творами прихильників ісихазму. Віталій демонструє ісихастське несприйняття світу й осуджує його реалії. Книга складається з трьох частин – «О прізренни мира», «О нравех мира», «Яко подобает прізревшим суєту мира сего достойно работати Іс. Христу». Це повчальний аскетичний твір, де йдеться про зневагу до матеріального світу, про те, які в цьому світі порядки (звісно, із їхнім осудженням) і, нарешті, про те, як повинна себе поводити людина, що зневажила суєту світу і хоче служити Христу. Прозовий текст чергується з невеликими віршами-гномами.

Дослідники не знайшли аналогів у грецькій літературі «Діоптри...» Віталія. Тобто можемо говорити про оригінальність цього тексту. Хоча, зрозуміло, Віталій черпав ідеї з відповідної літератури, яка походила переважно з грецького православного середовища.

<sup>9</sup> Мицько І. Острозька слов'яно-греко-латинська академія (1576-1636). – С. 86.

<sup>10</sup> Віталій. Діоптра... – Арк. 2 нн.

Іван Франко, якому належить перша наукова розвідка про «Діоптру...» Віталія, досить стримано оцінював літературну вартість цього твору. Говорячи про вірші, вміщені в цій книзі, він зазначав, що «...вони не виявляють у їх автора поетичного таланту ані оригінальності, не підіймаються ніде понад рівень шаблонованої аскетичної моралізації, та проте не слід зовсім забувати про них як про одну з найдавніших (перед 1612 роком!) проб українського віршування, а надто як пробу висказування в короткій віршованій формі певних моральних правил, життєвих обсервацій...»<sup>11</sup>

Можна погодитися із такими міркуваннями. Справді, сьогоденішнього читача вони не вразять. І все ж, на наше думку, Франко занадто критично підходив до віршів Віталія, оцінюючи їх, радше, з позицій вимог кінця XIX ст., ніж з позицій початку XVII ст. Уявлення про те, якою має бути поезія, в різні часи – тим паче в такі віддалені – помітно різнилися. До того ж для Віталія віршування було «технічним прийомом», щоб популяризувати думки про аскетичний спосіб життя. Це була така собі «поезія розуму», а не «поезія серця», чи то почуттів, яка цінувалася в Нові часи.

Нам передусім цікаве змістовне наповнення «Діоптри...» Віталія. Аналіз дає підстави говорити, що це був твір ісихастського характеру. Автор говорить, що основою достойного життя є надія на Бога:

«Тебі же довіаєт, къ богу приступити,  
И всю надежду свою на нь възложить»<sup>12</sup>.

Відповідно, людська діяльність, а особливо діяльність чернеца, повинна стати не-настанним служінням Ісусу Христу<sup>13</sup>. На перший погляд, у таких міркуваннях немає нічого незвичного, це є типовий православний погляд на світ. Ось один із віршів Віталія, де йдеться про любов до Ісуса Христа:

«Понеже ты Христос любовне призывает  
И райская врата усердно отверзает,  
Оставльше противная вся помышления,  
Благи твори пути своя и мышления.  
Не пристращайся сии благ живота сего,  
Но вся купно презирай, елика суть его.  
Да ся за сие небесных благ не лишити,  
Их же въ будущем животі насладиши.  
Пребывай, яко на пути, въ животі сем,  
Да ся Ісус Христом, господем нашим, по сем  
Въцариши. Ему же вичная слава,

<sup>11</sup> Франко І. Зібрання творів: У 50-ти т. – К., 1981. – Т. 31. – С. 158-159.

<sup>12</sup> Віталій. Діоптра... - Арк. 82.

<sup>13</sup> Там само. – Арк. 75 зв.

Съ отцем, и духом святым, честь и держава»<sup>14</sup>.

Саме Христос, вважає Віталій, є надійним другом людини, на якого можна поклатися:

«Хощеши ли имѣти крѣпко чаяніе,  
На Христа възлагай свое упованіе.  
Той бо ест вѣрный друг, своих не забывает,  
Их же, яко зѣницу ока, съблюдают»<sup>15</sup>.

Не світові, а Богові, Ісусу Христу, закликає служити Віталій, трудитися задля нього. Саме це забезпечить «вічну славу»:

«Аще хощеши въ вѣчной славі жити,  
Потщися Христу угодно служити»<sup>16</sup>.

При цьому любов до Бога, Ісуса Христа однозначно пов'язується із втечею від суєтного, мирського світу:

«Бѣжи, бѣжи въ землю обѣтованъную,  
Святымъ отъ вѣка уготованъную,  
Да ся къ пристанищу прійти сподобиши,  
Идеже Христовыхъ ся благъ насладиши»<sup>17</sup>.

Взагалі ідея «втечі від світу» червоною ниткою проходить через усю «Діоптру...»<sup>18</sup>. Власне, до такої втечі закликали ісихасти. Ця ідея зустрічається в Івана Вишенського, інших представників традиціоналістського напрямку в українській суспільній думці ранньомодерного періоду. Знаходить вона також у творчості й діяльності Григорія Сковороди. Ось ще один вірш, де Віталій говорить про втечу від світу:

«Бѣжи, яко губительства, мирскихъ сластей  
И всяческихъ плотскихъ безъмістныхъ страстей.  
Да будетъ душа твоя выну чиста  
И съдіється Христова невіста»<sup>19</sup>.

Маємо типову ісихастську ідею: мирський світ «брудний», сповнений різних нечистот; тому праведнику, аби спастися, треба бути якомога подальше від цього

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<sup>14</sup> Віталій. Діоптра... - Арк. 120 зв. – 121.

<sup>15</sup> Там само. – Арк. 71 зв.

<sup>16</sup> Там само. – Арк. 73.

<sup>17</sup> Там само. – Арк. 75.

<sup>18</sup> Там само. – Арк. 2 зв., 91, 94 зв., 98 зв., 110.

<sup>19</sup> Там само. – С. Арк. 119 зв.

«бруду»; лише так душа збереже чистоту, стане «нареченою Христа». Звідси й рекомендація Віталія:

«Хотяяй узріти бога ясно,  
Храни чистоту опасно»<sup>20</sup>.

Саме «втеча від світу» забезпечує небесне блаженство:

«Аще хощеша сподобити,  
Оных небесных благ насладити,  
Сует и лестий мирских удалися,  
Всех, яже суть въ мирі, блюдиша»<sup>21</sup>.

Закономірно, як типовий ісихаст, Віталій демонструє несприйняття видимого світу. Закликає закривати очі, щоб не бачити його зваб, затуляти вуха, щоб не чути звуків. Бо зваби світу ведуть до пекла:

«Не вижд мира, но сміжи своя очеса,  
И егда что глаголет, затвори ушеса.  
Той бо зраком и гласом своим прельщает  
И въ дно адово скоро отсылает»<sup>22</sup>.

Або ось ще один вірш у такому дусі:

«Хотяяй смерътных бід не познати,  
Тщися лестий мирских біжати»<sup>23</sup>.

Віталій спеціально протиставляє світ божественний, якого уособлює Ісус Христос, світу земному, гріховному:

«О яко лучше ест Христу работати,  
И с ним въ горъных обителех царствовать,  
Нежели ради мирской лютой работы  
Познати глад и туне своя изъливати поты.  
Тім же ты чужими бідами накажиша,  
Жестокаго ига мирского храниша  
И иго Христова носи любезнійшее,  
Выну, яко увяло многоціннійшее»<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Там само. – С. Арк. 118.

<sup>21</sup> Там само. – С. Арк. 63.

<sup>22</sup> Там само. – Арк. 66 зв.

<sup>23</sup> Там само. – Арк. 69 зв.

<sup>24</sup> Там само. – Арк. 77 зв.

Отже, Христове ярмо (іго) є легким – на відміну від того ярма, яке накладає на людей мирський світ. Воно не робить людей пасивними (лінивими), навпаки веде до духовних трудів:

«Бремя господня ига не творить лінива  
О спасеніи, но выну бодра и тьщалива»<sup>25</sup>.

Слідування шляхом праведності вимагає зусиль – носіння Христового іга:

«Аще хоцещи ся съ Христом веселити,  
Не лінися иго єго носити»<sup>26</sup>.

Віталій навіть дає рекомендації, як повинен трудитися праведник:

«Отверъжи убо сон и нераденіе,  
Възлюбви святых путь, труд и бѣденіе»<sup>27</sup>.

Принагідно варто відзначити, що ісихасти розробили систему «духовних трудів». Важливим її елементом було нічне «бденіє», коли аскет відмовлявся від сну й молився. Саме таке «бденіє», на їхню думку, наближало людину до Бога. Не важко помітити, що саме про це й веде мову Віталій.

Закономірно, що автор «Діоптри...» змальовує земний світ у непривабливому світі:

«О велія излишества и срама,  
Что прочеє реку, народ безъ брама.  
Или кумир въ мирі истуканъный.  
Паче черв земленъный окаянъный.  
Тольма тьщитъся на земли възносити  
И Спасу не хоцет ся подобити»<sup>28</sup>.

Взагалі для Віталія земний світ – лицемірний: він, являючи нам красу, насправді є суєтним, негарним:

«Коль праведно нарицається сей мир  
Въ божественъном писаніи лицемір,  
Іже въсюду красоту нам являет,  
Внутрьюду же суету съкрывает»<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> Там само. – Арк. 79 зв.

<sup>26</sup> Там само. – Арк. 80 зв.

<sup>27</sup> Там само. – Арк. 76.

<sup>28</sup> Там само. – Арк. 5 зв.

<sup>29</sup> Там само. – Арк. 6.



Взагалі цей світ не варто любити:  
 ...Убо все въ мирі тьщетно любленіе,  
 Суета и духа озлобленіе»<sup>30</sup>.

У «Діоптрі...» автор намагається вести мову про конкретні вади світу. Одним із них він називає діяння, які є лихими, шкодять людям:

«Наказующому тя богу повинися  
 И лихоимъства, яко губительства, хранися»<sup>31</sup>.  
 Вказує він і на такий недолік – як намагання досягнути старшинства, отримати владу:  
 «Веліе буйство старійшинъства желати,  
 На нем же слово о душах въздати»<sup>32</sup>.

Проте земний світ представлений у «Діоптрі...» фрагментарно й поверхово. Це можна зрозуміти. Адже Віталія, як ченця й прихильника ісихазму, мало цікавив реальний світ. Для нього це був антисвіт, якого треба сторонитися.

Автор «Діоптрі...» спеціально наголошує на тлінності світу. Говорить, що вічним є лише Бог<sup>33</sup>. Тлінність світу обумовлює й смертність людини, тіло якої й належить до цього тлінного світу. Звідси ще одна ідея «Діоптрі...» – пам'ятай про смерть<sup>34</sup>. Проводячи своє земне життя, людина повинна думати про кончину й, служачи Богові, прагнути потойбічного спасіння:

«Удоб всяческая презирает,  
 Иже по вся дъни поминает,  
 Яко скоро иматъ умрѣти  
 И, вся оставъше, въ земли истлѣти»<sup>35</sup>.

У Віталія є навіть розлогий вірш, де він говорить про блаженну людину, яка постійно думає про смерть:

«Блажен, иже ся выну о смерти поучает  
 И тоя въ мирѣ всюду по вся часы чаает,  
 Утро помышляетъ ся въвечер не жити  
 И паки въвечер наутрѣ къ тому не быти.  
 Блажен, иже на суетная не упова,  
 Но на исход дѣла своя уготова.

<sup>30</sup> Там само. – Арк. 13 зв.

<sup>31</sup> Там само. – Арк. 115; а також 116, 116 зв.

<sup>32</sup> Там само. – Арк. 22.

<sup>33</sup> Там само. – Арк. 90.

<sup>34</sup> Там само. – Арк. 106, 108, 108 зв., 109.

<sup>35</sup> Там само. – Арк. 103 зв.

Сегò зло получєніє не срящет,  
Єгда смерть люютая готова обрящет.  
Блажен, иже ся таков быти труждает,  
Таков въ час смертнѣй обрѣстися желяет.  
Сей получить за труды изгнаніє  
Вѣчнаго покоища достояніє»<sup>36</sup>.

Взагалі попри несприйняття світу в «Діоптрі...» зустрічаємо своєрідний гуманізм:  
«Таков человек быти от многих вѣмняється,  
Каков ест сей, съ ним же он съдружается.  
Аще ли хоцещи, брате, человека познати,  
Совѣтуюю ти, дружеству его вѣнимати.  
Всяко бо животное подобное любить  
Себі навѣче и съ ним хоцет ся дружити»<sup>37</sup>.

Як бачимо, Віталій закликає не лише любити людей, а взагалі всіх живих істот. У принципі, подібне людинолюбство чи навіть «живолюбство» притаманне було прихильникам ісихазму.

Основні ідеї «Діоптрі...» викладені в такому вірші:

«Ниже кто Христу любезный бывает,  
Развѣ сей иже мир презирает.  
Никто же может бога любить,  
Аще себе, мир не хоцет презрѣти.  
Посем, любимиче мой, познаеши,  
Аще любовь свою къ богу стяжаеши.  
Єгда прежде мира ся отречеши,  
И въ слѣд Христов, день и ноц, течеши.  
Тѣмъ же, елико бога возлюбѣши,  
Толико вся земленѣная презриши.  
Не хоцет бог имѣти раздвоєно  
Въ нас сердце наше, ниже раздѣлено,  
Но ціло всегда хоцет съдержати.  
Тѣмъ же не достоить нам погубляти  
Преблагаго сокровища толика,  
Презираем подѣ солнцем вся, елика  
Суть прелестна, духа утѣшеніє

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<sup>36</sup> Там само. – Арк. 104 зв. – 105.

<sup>37</sup> Там само. – Арк. 100.

Получим и житія съвершеніе»<sup>38</sup>.

Отже, аналіз «Діоптри...» дає підстави твердити, що її автор дотримувався ісихастських поглядів. Ці погляди і знайшли вияв у означеному творі. Тобто в особі Віталія маємо поста-ісихаста. Взагалі ісихазм був поширеним явищем у середовищі тодішніх православних українських традиціоналістів. Зокрема, на позиціях ісихазму стояв згадуваний Іван Вишенський. Якщо останній справді дискутував із Віталієм Дубенським, то це стосувалося не питань світоглядних, а питань, які стосувалися освітньої діяльності. Можливо, Віталій, який непогано знав латину й греку, наполягав на вивченні цих мов і взагалі високо цінував філологічну освіту, в чому Іван Вишенський особливо сенсу не бачив.

Попри невисокий рівень віршів Віталія в них відчувається «живий струмін», виразне авторське «я». На це звертав увагу Іван Франко, пишучи, що автор «Діоптри...» «... все-таки зумів навіть на чужій канві, проявити доволі виразний образ свого внутрішнього «я» і свого часу. Перебравши ті незугарні вірші, ми віднайшли в їх основі живу симпатичну людину...»<sup>39</sup>. Певно, не лише ісихастські ідеї, популярні в середовищі православних традиціоналістів, а й також ця симпатичність сприяли поширенню «Діоптри...» Віталія. Не випадково вона витримала кілька видань й стала популярною лектурою.

<sup>38</sup> Там само. – Авт. 2 зв.

<sup>39</sup> Франко І. Зібрання творів: У 50-ти т. – Т. 31. – С. 171-172.

## **Comparative analysis of political regimes in Eastern European Countries: correlation of hybrid and authoritarian political practices (1991-2016)**

The article is dedicated to comparative analyzing political regimes in Eastern European countries and making correlation of their hybrid and authoritarian political practices in 1991-2016. The researcher used such methods of analysis of political regimes as “Freedom in the World”, “Nations in Transit”, Vanhanen scheme, Democracy Index of “The Economist Intelligence Unit”, project “Polity IV” and so on. As a result it was mapped all received effective data of divergent comparative methods of democracy and autocracy assessment, on the basis of which the author held their correlation in terms of common and distinctive findings and displayed adjacent/coupled design for understanding political regimes in Eastern Europe.

*Keywords: political regime, democracy, autocracy, authoritarianism, hybrid regime, Eastern Europe.*

## **ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ РЕЖИМІВ У КРАЇНАХ СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ: КОРЕЛЯЦІЯ ГІБРИДНИХ ТА АВТОРИТАРНИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ПРАКТИК (1991-2016)**

У статті порівняльно проаналізовано політичні режими у країнах Східної Європи і здійснено кореляцію їхніх гібридних та авторитарних політичних практик у 1991-2016 рр. Для цього автором використано такі методики аналізу політичних режимів, як «Свобода у світі», «Нації в транзиті», схема Т. Ванханена, індекс демократії «The Economist Intelligence Unit», проект «Polity IV» тощо. В результаті зіставлено усі отримані результативні дані розбіжних порівняльних методик оцінювання демократії і автократії, проведено їхню кореляцію на предмет спільних і відмінних висновків та виведено суміжну/спарену конструкцію розуміння політичних режимів у Східній Європі.

*Ключові слова: політичний режим, демократія, автократія, авторитаризм, гібридний режим, Східна Європа.*

Modern political systems in the institutional perspective (in particular within the context of inter-institutional relations in the triangular “head of the state – government – parliament”) function not only in with regard to the form and systems of public administration,

but also in respect of various types of political regime. It institutionalizes that any political regime influences the form and the public administration system, as well as the form and the system of public administration have impact on the political regime. The point is that a political regime is an institutionalized set of main formal and informal regulations and practices, which structure mutual relationship in the “core” of political authority (horizontal relations) and its interrelation with a society (vertical relations). To outline horizontal relations one usually applies interrelation between branches of government, while to determine vertical relations one analyzes ways of accession to power, mechanisms of implementation and restriction. Varied combinations of relations within the political system become a reason for formation of different types of political regimes, and therefore various positioning of basic institutions, which function within the political system. From this point of view Eastern European region – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova Russia and Ukraine – is not the exception, and categorization of three “wide” types of political regimes – democratic, hybrid and authoritarian – is applied to them, however distinguishing the countries in different ways. Thus, the task of the research is a multifold taxonomy of political regimes in Eastern European countries, in particular on the basis of applying various comparative methods and distinctions, as well as making an average-general conclusion, concerning the types of political systems in the region.

The abovementioned topic is not a new one, as it has been partially described in a number of works by such scholars as S. Levitsky and L. Way<sup>1</sup>, H. Chehabi and J. Linz<sup>2</sup>, L. Diamond<sup>3</sup>, K. Collins<sup>4</sup>, H. Hale<sup>5</sup>, J. Linde and J. Ekman<sup>6</sup>, V. Bunce and S. Wolchik<sup>7</sup>, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott<sup>8</sup>, J. Ishiyama<sup>9</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regime change in Peru and Ukraine in comparative perspective*, Wyd. University of Strathclyde 2001.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: International Linkage, Organizational Power, and the Fate of Hybrid Regimes*, Paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30 - September 2, 2006.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2002, vol 13, nr 2, s. 51-65.; L. Way, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2005, vol 16, nr 2, s. 131-145.

<sup>2</sup> H. Chehabi, J. Linz, *Sultanistic Regimes*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1998.

<sup>3</sup> L. Diamond, *Thinking About Hybrid Regimes*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2002, vol 13, nr 2, s. 21-35.

<sup>4</sup> K. Collins, *Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.; K. Collins, *Clans, Pacts and Politics in Central Asia*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2002, Vol 13, nr 2, s. 137-152.

<sup>5</sup> H. Hale, *Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, “World Politics”, 2005, vol 58, nr 1, s. 133-165.; H. Hale, *Why Not Parties? Electoral Markets, Party Substitutes, and Stalled Democratization in Russia*, “Comparative Politics”, 2005, vol 37, nr 2, s. 147-166.; H. Hale, *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.

<sup>6</sup> J. Linde, J. Ekman, *Patterns of Stability and Performance in Post-Communist Hybrid Regimes*, [w:] E. Bakke, P. Ingo (eds.), *20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State-Breakup and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2011, s. 97-120.

<sup>7</sup> V. Bunce, S. Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2011.

<sup>8</sup> K. Dawisha, B. Parrott, *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.

<sup>9</sup> J. Ishiyama, *Political Party Development and Party ‘Gravity’ in Semi-Authoritarian States. The Cases of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan*, “Taiwan Journal of Democracy”, 2008, vol 4, nr 1, s. 33-53.; J. Ishiyama, *Neopatrimonialism and the Prospects for Democratization in the Central Asian Republics*, [w:] S. Cummings (ed.), *Power and Change in Central Asia*, Wyd. Routledge 2002, s. 42-58.

E. Korosteleva<sup>10</sup>, S. Eke and T. Kuzio<sup>11</sup>, M. Ottaway<sup>12</sup>, M. McFaul<sup>13</sup>, D. Beacháin<sup>14</sup>, D. Greenberg<sup>15</sup>, J. Hellman<sup>16</sup>, T. L. Karl and P. Schmitter<sup>17</sup>, J. Wedel<sup>18</sup>, S. White, G. Gill and D. Slider<sup>19</sup> and others. However, the problem of political regimes, especially in some Eastern European countries is quite transient, and therefore requires permanent refreshment, what in fact lies in the focus of the current research.

It is necessary to refresh and verify the scientific position, according to which in Eastern Europe there are no democratic political regimes, but exist only hybrid and authoritarian ones. To check/prove the fact that today (namely as of 2015/2016) in Eastern Europe there are just hybrid and authoritarian regimes (i.e. there are no liberal representative democracies in the region) it was decided to employ approaches prevailing in comparative political science, concerning practical evaluation of modern (or non-existent) political regimes, which in accordance with a generally accepted classification must be divided into democratic and autocratic, while the latter comprises authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

However, before comparing political regimes in Eastern European countries, it should be mentioned that there are two peculiar classificatory curves as to the ways how democratic or in general other regime changes (as a matter of form after the collapse of the USSR the countries of the region declared their wish to make their political regimes democratic) take place: 1) linear (on the grounds of evaluation of political regimes' attributes changing and samples of countries in the course of time); 2) non-linear (as a result of the democracy level assessment, or as in case of autocratic changes in specific countries or samples of countries at a given time). Since in our research we deal with the political systems of the post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe, it should be pointed out that the concepts of linear-mode or vector-mode development of democracy were premature. Moreover, even much doubt can be thrown upon the notion of transference or transition, as some of the post-Soviet countries do not "transfer" at all and just create new patterns of consolidated, but at the same time non-democratic political regimes

<sup>10</sup> E. Korosteleva, *Democratic authoritarianism: public preferences in Belarus and its neighbors*, "Northwestern Journal of International Affairs", 2003, vol 5, s. 31-39.; E. Korosteleva, *Is Belarus a demagogical democracy?*, "Cambridge Review of International Affairs", 2003, vol 16, nr 3, s. 527-535.; E. Korosteleva, *The quality of democracy in Belarus and Ukraine*, "Journal of communist Studies and Transition Politics", 2004, vol 20, nr 1, s. 122-143.

<sup>11</sup> S. Eke, T. Kuzio, *Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus*, "Europe-Asia Studies", 2000, vol 52, nr 3, s. 523-547.

<sup>12</sup> M. Ottaway, *Democracy challenged: the rise of semi-authoritarianism*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment 2003.

<sup>13</sup> M. McFaul, *The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in the Post-communist World*, "World Politics", 2002, vol 54, nr 2, s. 212-244.

<sup>14</sup> D. Beacháin, *The color revolutions in the former Soviet republics: successes and failures*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2010.

<sup>15</sup> D. Greenberg, *Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1993.

<sup>16</sup> J. Hellman, *Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions*, "World Politics", 1998, vol 50, nr 2, s. 203-234.; J. Hellman, *Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Post-Communist Transitions*, "East European Constitutional Review", 1996, vol 1, nr 5, s. 46-53.

<sup>17</sup> T. L. Karl, P. Schmitter, *From Iron Curtain to Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists for Students of Post-communism?*, "Slavic Review", 1995, vol 54, nr 4, s. 965-978.; T. L. Karl, P. Schmitter, *The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?*, "Slavic Review", 1994, vol 53, nr 1, s. 173-185.

<sup>18</sup> J. Wedel, *Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking "Transition" in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, "Journal of International Development", 2003, vol 15, s. 427-440.

<sup>19</sup> S. White, G. Gill, D. Slider, *The politics of transition: shaping a post-Soviet future*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993.

and practices. With bitter irony we conceive those definitions of democratic transit, which are often declared by political elites from the post-socialistic countries in Eastern Europe, like a “wide grey zone”, “defective democracy”, “hybrid democracy”. The point is that 20-25 years ago in most post-Soviet countries (not only in Eastern European countries) there was an outburst of an unprecedented political activity, the society broke free of communistic ideology, for the first time people started getting interested in political news and participating in political life. However, in 5-7 years people “got tired” or how some scientists suppose just “became undeceived” from the illusions. Protest energy if not exhausted is supported not by beliefs in democratic transformations, but by non-acceptance of “unfair government”. Consequently, it is absolutely obvious that in many cases post-communist transformations have not grown into transit towards democracy. In fact, we deal with authoritarian regimes, aimed at strengthening their autocracy, thus at a maximal neutralization of any “offences against power” on the part of the society (not even mentioning the official definition of opposition). The abovementioned fully refers to all Eastern European countries under analysis – just to different extents or time paradigms. As a result it is necessary to study peculiarities of various political regimes’ development stage-by-stage and from various methodological angles, as well as its consequences in the comparative context. With this end in view we offer analysis and empirical interpretation of various estimating methods of democratic or authoritarian development (political regimes) in Eastern European countries (and there is a great deal of them in modern comparative political science) – linear and non-linear.

The former directly concerns the moment, dealing with the development of political rights and civil liberties of a person and citizen. The technique, offered by “Freedom House” has been implemented since 1972 under the name “Freedom in the World” (speaking of Eastern European countries it covers the year of 1991, when the countries became independent). “Freedom in the World” is an annual comparative assessment of political rights and civil liberties. According to the methodology, each country is assigned a numerical rating based on a 1 to 7 scale for political rights and political liberties. “1” point assigns a high level of freedom and “7” points – the lowest possible degree for civil liberties. In general, these ratings describes whether the country is classified as “free”, “partly free”, “not free”. “Free country” as to the indices of rights and liberties receives an overall index within 1-2.5 points, “partly free country” gets 3-5 points, “not free country” – 5.5-7 points. In Eastern Europe the situation is the following:

**Table 1.** Level of Freedom in Eastern European Countries According to the Project “Freedom in the World” by “Freedom House” (1991–2015)<sup>20</sup>

Country	1991		1992		1993		1994		1995	
	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
Azerbaijan	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6
Belarus	4	4	4	3	5	4	4	4	5	5
Armenia	5	5	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4
Georgia	6	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	5
Moldova	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4
Russia	3	3	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	4
Ukraine	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	4
Country	1996		1997		1998		1999		2000	
Azerbaijan	6	5	6	4	6	4	6	4	6	5
Belarus	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Armenia	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Georgia	4	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	4	4
Moldova	3	4	3	4	2	4	2	4	2	4
Russia	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Ukraine	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	4	4
Country	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
Azerbaijan	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
Belarus	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	7	6
Armenia	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	4
Georgia	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	3
Moldova	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	4
Russia	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	6	5
Ukraine	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	2
Country	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
Azerbaijan	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
Belarus	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6
Armenia	5	4	5	4	6	4	6	4	6	4
Georgia	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3
Moldova	3	4	3	4	4	4	3	4	3	3
Russia	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	5
Ukraine	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3
Country	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
Azerbaijan	6	5	6	5	6	6	6	6	7	6
Belarus	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	6
Armenia	6	4	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	4
Georgia	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Moldova	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Russia	6	5	6	5	6	5	6	6	6	6
Ukraine	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	3

Źródło: *Freedom in the World 2016: Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure*, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

<sup>20</sup> Table symbols: PR – political rights; CL – civil liberties.



According to the given data Azerbaijan is assigned as a “partly free country” during 1991–1992, and from 1997 to 2002. Over the rest of the period it is determined as “not free”. Belarus, on the basis of “Freedom House” ratings is named “partly free” over 1991 – 1995, and since then it is designated as “not free” (what is actual nowadays). Over the period of 1991 – 2015 Armenia has been assigned as “partly free” and its status has not been categorically changed. In 1991 Georgia was “not free”, however since 1992 it belongs to the category of “partly free” countries. Moldova, similarly to Armenia in 1991 – 2015 has been determined as “partly free”. Russia over 1991 – 2003 is assigned as “partly free”, however since 2004 it has become “not free”. From the perspective of liberties development the biggest achievements have been demonstrated by Ukraine, as over the period of 1991 – 2015 its status has not been lower than “partly free”, and in 2005 – 2009 it was even defined as a “free” country. However, due to a chain of events happening since 2010 Ukraine has been again assigned and still is “partly free” (though since 2014 the index has been improving). Analyzing liberties on the basis of the methods offered by “Freedom House” we may conclude that among Eastern European countries, according to 2015 data, only Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (with liberty index 3.0) can be called electoral democracies, however being partly free countries. Armenia got index 4.5 and is partly free, though it is not an electoral democracy. Belarus, Azerbaijan and Russia are characterized by the lowest overall indices – 6.5, 6.5 and 6.0 correspondingly.

Another method, offered by “Freedom House” in 1997, we believe to be even more advanced. It is called “Nations in Transit” and refers to 29 countries. This method evaluates progress and setbacks of democratic processes from Central Eastern European countries to the Eurasian part of the former USSR. The rating covers 7 indices: National Democratic Governance (NDG<sup>21</sup>), Electoral Process (EP<sup>22</sup>), Civil Society (CS<sup>23</sup>), Independent Media (IM<sup>24</sup>), Local Democratic Governance (self-government) (LDG<sup>25</sup>), Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI<sup>26</sup>), Corruption (C<sup>27</sup>). Each country is assigned certain numerical rating from “1” to “7” points in respect of each indicator. “1” point shows a high level of democracy, while “7” points is the lowest degree of democracy. The ratings follow a quarter-point scale (“0.25” points). The

<sup>21</sup> National Democratic Governance (NDG). Considers the democratic character and stability of the governmental system; the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of legislative and executive branches.

<sup>22</sup> Electoral Process (EP). Examines national executive and legislative elections, electoral processes, the development of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process.

<sup>23</sup> Civil Society (CS). Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.

<sup>24</sup> Independent Media (IM). Addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the emergence of a financially viable private press; and internet access for private citizens.

<sup>25</sup> Local Democratic Governance (LDG). Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities.

<sup>26</sup> Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI). Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.

<sup>27</sup> Corruption (C). Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives.

rating itself is based on expert reviews. As a result we receive an overall rating of democratic processes within such groups of political regimes: 1) consolidated democracies (1–3 points); 2) semi-consolidated democracies (3–4 points); 3) transitional systems/hybrid regimes (4–5 points); 4) semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (5–6 points); 5) consolidated authoritarian regimes (6–7 points). According to 2015 data (calculated in 2016) the situation in Eastern European countries is the following:

**Table 2.** Level of Democracy in Eastern European Countries. According to the Project “Nations in Transit” by “Freedom House” (as of 2015)

Country	EP	CS	IM	NDG	LDG	JFI	C	Total
Azerbaijan	7,00	7,00	7,00	6,75	6,50	7,00	6,75	6,86
Belarus	6,75	6,25	6,75	6,75	6,75	7,00	6,25	6,64
Armenia	5,75	3,75	5,75	5,75	5,75	5,50	5,25	5,36
Georgia	4,50	3,75	4,00	5,50	5,25	4,75	4,50	4,61
Moldova	4,00	3,25	5,00	5,75	5,50	4,75	6,00	4,89
Russia	6,75	6,25	6,50	6,75	6,25	6,25	6,75	6,50
Ukraine	3,50	2,25	4,00	5,75	5,25	6,00	6,00	4,68

Źródło: *Nations in Transit 2016*, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

It can be seen that in Eastern Europe there are no democratic countries. Mainly, we have to speak of authoritarian political regimes: 1) consolidated in – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia; 2) semi-consolidated in Armenia. Besides, three countries of the region as of 2015 are determined as transitional regimes, namely Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In general, in linear representation the process of democratization in Eastern European countries over the period of 2001 – 2015 is as follows:

**Table 3.** Level of Democracy in Eastern European Countries. According to the Project “Nations in Transit” by “Freedom House” (2001 – 2015)

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Azerbaijan	5,54	5,46	5,63	5,86	5,93	6,00	6,00	6,25
Belarus	6,38	6,46	6,54	6,64	6,71	6,68	6,71	6,57
Armenia	4,83	4,92	5,00	5,18	5,14	5,21	5,21	5,39
Georgia	4,58	4,83	4,83	4,96	4,86	4,68	4,79	4,93
Moldova	4,50	4,71	4,88	5,07	4,96	4,96	5,00	5,07
Russia	5,00	4,96	5,25	5,61	5,75	5,86	5,96	6,11
Ukraine	4,92	4,71	4,88	4,50	4,21	4,25	4,25	4,39
Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Change
Azerbaijan	6,39	6,46	6,57	6,64	6,68	6,75	6,86	↓
Belarus	6,50	6,57	6,68	6,71	6,71	6,71	6,64	=
Armenia	5,39	5,43	5,39	5,36	5,36	5,36	5,36	↓
Georgia	4,93	4,86	4,82	4,75	4,68	4,64	4,61	=

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Moldova	5,14	4,96	4,89	4,82	4,86	4,86	4,89	=
Russia	6,14	6,18	6,18	6,21	6,29	6,46	6,50	↓
Ukraine	4,39	4,61	4,82	4,86	4,93	4,75	4,68	↑

Źródło: *Nations in Transit 2016*, źródło: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

Comparing data of 2001 and 2015 we draw the following conclusions: 1) in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia is observed a gradual decrease in indices of democratic development; 2) the most significant decline is peculiar of Azerbaijan and Russia; 3) in Belarus we observe stable prevalence of authoritarian tendencies with very low indices; 4) in Georgia and Moldova the indices have almost remained the same and the countries are determined as hybrid regimes; 5) Ukraine over the period of 2001 – 2015 is evaluated as a stable transitional system/hybrid regime (with the best indices in 2005 – 2009; nowadays Georgia and Moldova have come near Ukrainian indices).

One of non-linear methods of democracy/autocracy evaluation is a model, offered by J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, R. Vreeland. The method, elaborated by these scholars, suggests evaluating each country under analysis as a democracy or non-democracy. Democracy is a case, when executive and legislative branches are directly or indirectly elected on the basis of a general election law, there is a multiparty system, and in power (particularly in parliament) there are parties which do not belong to the political regime. These are also the cases which are indistinctive of dominant parties and elites consolidation: there are no instances of non-constitutional exclusion from representation in legislature, as well as instances of president staying in power as a result of postponement of scheduled elections. From this perspective among Eastern European countries we may single out the following democracies: 1) Armenia (since 1991); 2) Georgia (since 2004); 3) Moldova (since 1991); 4) Ukraine (since 1991 p.). Other countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia) over a period of 1991 – 2015 (though starting at different years) cannot be evaluated as democratic.

Quite extended and formalized index of democratization is T. Vanhanen's model/theoretical scheme, which defines democratization on the basis of two perspectives: competition and participation. In such a case competition is assessed as a percent of votes, which are not given to the biggest party, as a result of the elections. Participation is even more formalized, as it is a direct voter turnout for the electoral campaign. Then these figures are summed up and the result is divided by "100" to obtain the index, which hypothetically can change from "0" (complete absence of democracy) up to "100" (full democracy). The indices of Eastern European countries over 1991 – 2014 are provided in Table 4.

As we can observe, over the period of 1991 – 2014 the level of democracy in the region first of all has lowered in Russia and Georgia, and increased in Belarus, Armenia and Moldova, and has been permanently or temporary stable in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. At the same time,

any growth or decline in the level of democracy does not fully speak for the type of the political regime, as the lowest level of democracy (the highest level of autocracy) as of 2014 has been peculiar of Azerbaijan and Belarus, a bit higher it was in Georgia, Russia and Armenia, while Ukraine and Moldova were characterized by the highest level.

**Table 4.** Index of Democracy in Eastern Europe. According to T. Vanhanen's Model (1991–2014)

Year	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
1991	3,0	5,9	16,6	17,2	7,6	18,2	22,3
1992	10,3	5,9	14,6	19,8	7,6	15,3	22,3
1993	3,2	5,9	14,6	19,8	7,6	42,0	22,3
1994	2,9	7,2	14,6	19,8	11,0	27,0	30,1
1995	2,6	8,0	14,3	19,8	9,8	29,9	30,1
1996	2,3	8,0	17,4	19,8	18,5	29,9	30,1
1997	2,3	7,2	17,4	19,8	18,5	29,9	30,1
1998	6,9	7,2	18,0	19,8	22,0	29,9	29,9
1999	6,9	7,2	16,2	13,8	22,0	28,8	29,8
2000	11,7	7,2	16,2	13,7	22,0	29,4	32,6
2001	11,7	14,8	16,2	13,7	10,3	29,4	29,8
2002	11,7	14,8	16,2	13,7	10,3	29,4	30,2
2003	17,3	14,8	23,4	13,7	10,3	22,2	30,2
2004	17,3	16,0	20,9	6,6	10,3	17,3	33,2
2005	17,3	14,8	23,4	6,6	20,0	17,3	33,2
2006	17,3	11,1	20,9	6,6	20,0	17,3	32,6
2007	9,3	11,1	18,5	6,6	20,0	15,4	30,7
2008	8,9	11,1	24,3	15,4	20,0	16,6	30,7
2009	10,2	11,1	24,3	13,7	19,5	16,6	30,7
2010	9,2	13,7	24,3	13,7	24,2	16,6	29,8
2011	9,2	13,7	24,3	13,7	24,2	23,6	29,8
2012	9,2	13,7	37,0	21,3	24,2	18,9	32,4
2013	6,0	13,7	20,6	13,8	24,2	18,9	32,4
2014	6,0	13,7	20,6	13,8	32,2	18,9	23,6

Źródło: T. Vanhanen, *Measures of Democracy 1810–2014 [dataset]: Version 7.0 (2016-05-30)*, Finnish Social Science Data Archive, 2015, źródło: <http://www.fsd.uta.fi/en/data/catalogue/FSD1289/meF1289e.html> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

Another index of democracy development, elaborated by the company Economist Intelligence Unit, is quite wide, as it consists of 60 markers, combined in basic indicators: 1) CL – civil liberties (freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to a fair judicial process); 2) DPC – democratic political culture (social consensus concerning functioning and sustainability of democratic principles); 3) EPP – electoral process and pluralism (category, which describes situation concerning free and fair competitive elections and reflects satisfaction with the level of political freedom); 4) FG – functioning of government (shows the extent to which the institutions are controlled by the elected

representatives at the parliamentary level; competence of the state service and inclination to corruption); 5) PP – political participation (evaluates the number of women in parliament, freedom of participation in political parties etc.). Each category is evaluated from “0” to “10” in the respect of improving the categorical index of democracy development. As a result, the project singles out several types of political regimes: 1) full democracies (in average 8–10); 2) flawed democracies (6– 8); 3) hybrid regimes (4–6); 4) authoritarian regimes (1–4). On this ground an overall index of democracy in Eastern European countries has been elaborated:

**Table 5.** Level of Democracy Development in Eastern Europe. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2010-2015)

Country	2010	2015						
		EPP	FG	PP	DPC	CL	Average	Regime
Azerbaijan	3,15	0,50	2,14	3,33	3,75	3,82	2,71	Authoritarian
Belarus	3,34	1,75	3,57	3,89	6,25	2,65	3,62	Authoritarian
Armenia	4,09	4,33	2,86	4,44	2,50	5,88	4,00	Hybrid
Georgia	4,59	8,67	4,29	5,56	5,00	5,88	5,88	Hybrid
Moldova	6,33	7,92	4,29	6,67	4,38	8,53	6,35	Flawed democracy
Russia	4,26	2,67	2,86	5,00	2,50	3,53	3,31	Hybrid
Ukraine	6,30	5,83	3,93	6,67	5,00	7,06	5,70	Hybrid

Źródło: *Democracy Index*, Wikipedia.org, źródło: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy\\_Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].; *Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, źródło: [http://www.eiu.com/public/topical\\_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015](http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015) [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

As we can see, the most significant indices of democracy development as of 2015 were shown by Moldova. The lowest degrees were characteristic of Belarus, Azerbaijan and Russia. The first one was assigned as a flawed democracy, two other as authoritarian regimes. Finally, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine were determined as hybrid regimes. Quite interesting is the fact that in comparison with 2010 data, the overall level of democracy in Eastern European countries has lowered in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Ukraine, and on contrary it has grown in Belarus, Georgia and Moldova.

Another index of democracy/types of political regimes evaluation is a combined level of polity development, offered in the project “Polity IV” (currently the project “Polity V” is being elaborated). This index is based on the markers of institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy. While evaluating democracy the following indicators are taken into account: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and alternative political leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive; 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in everyday life as well as in acts of political participation. During the process of its evaluation autocracy is defined as the absence of regular dimensions of political competitiveness and failure to provide political liberties, while democracy is measured by positive versions of the same

indices. Each of two dimensions is measured according to the scale from “0” to “10” points. The combined index of polity development is calculated as a difference between the democratic and autocratic levels. Thus, the regimes may vary from “+10” up to “-10” points. In the context of Eastern European countries over the period of 1991 – 2015 the situation is the following:

**Table 6.** Combined Level of Polity Development in Eastern Europe. According to the Project “Polity IV” (1991-2015)

Year	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
1991	-3	+7	+7	+4	+5	-	+6
1992	+1	+7	+7	+4	+5	+5	+6
1993	-3	+7	+7	+4	+7	+3	+5
1994	-3	+7	+7	+4	+7	+3	+7
1995	-6	0	+3	+5	+7	+3	+7
1996	-6	-7	-6	+5	+7	+3	+7
1997	-6	-7	-6	+5	+7	+3	+7
1998	-7	-7	+5	+5	+7	+3	+7
1999	-7	-7	+5	+5	+7	+3	+7
2000	-7	-7	+5	+5	+7	+6	+6
2001	-7	-7	+5	+5	+8	+6	+6
2002	-7	-7	+5	+5	+8	+6	+6
2003	-7	-7	+5	+5	+8	+6	+6
2004	-7	-7	+5	+7	+8	+6	+6
2005	-7	-7	+5	+7	+9	+6	+6
2006	-7	-7	+5	+7	+9	+6	+7
2007	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+7
2008	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+7
2009	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+7
2010	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+6
2011	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+6
2012	-7	-7	+5	+6	+9	+4	+6
2013	-7	-7	+5	+7	+9	+4	+6
2014	-7	-7	+5	+7	+9	+4	+4
2015	-7	-7	+5	+7	+9	+4	+4

Źródło: *The Polity Project*, Systemicpeace.org, źródło: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html> [odczyt: 1 listopada 2016].

As the results of the evaluation show, in Eastern Europe Moldova and Georgia belong to more democratic countries, transient/anocratic variant (more democratic than authoritarian) is characteristic of Ukraine, Armenia and Russia; authoritarian variant is represented by Azerbaijan and Belarus. In general, the situation (most but not all) is correlated with the results represented by other methods.

However, there is a question, introduced at the beginning of the research, how the final decisions concerning political regimes in Eastern Europe should be taken (at least at the time of conducting the research). To answer the question we compare all the results obtained in

the course of evaluation due to various comparative methods of assessing democracy and autocracy, correlate them to draw common and varying conclusions and elaborate contiguous/paired construction of interpretation of political regimes in the region. We suppose that the more coincidence are, the more obvious it is that such cases must be treated as political regimes, which compose the most quantitative instances, referring to specific countries.

**Table 7.** Correlation of Political Regimes in Eastern European Countries. According to Various Comparative Methods (as of 2015)

Project	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Armenia	Georgia	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
«Freedom in the World»	Not free country	Not free country	Partly free country	Partly free country	Partly free country	Not free country	Partly free country
«Nations in Transit»	Consolidated authoritarianism	Consolidated authoritarianism	Semi-consolidated authoritarianism	Hybrid regime	Hybrid regime	Consolidated authoritarianism	Hybrid regime
CGV Model <sup>28</sup>	Autocratic regime	Autocratic regime	Democratic regime	Democratic regime	Democratic regime	Autocratic regime	Democratic regime
V Model <sup>29</sup>	Less democratic	Less democratic	More democratic	Less democratic	More democratic	Less democratic	More democratic
EIU Model <sup>30</sup>	Authoritarian regime	Authoritarian regime	Hybrid regime	Hybrid regime	Flawed democracy	Hybrid regime	Hybrid regime
Polity IV	Authoritarian regime	Authoritarian regime	Anocratic regime	Democratic regime	Democratic regime	Anocratic regime	Anocratic regime
More common	Authoritarian regime	Authoritarian regime	Hybrid regime	Hybrid regime	Hybrid/ democratic regime	Authoritarian regime	Hybrid regime

Appliance of the abovementioned comparative methods and their comparison (in the form of correlation) demonstrate the following conclusions: 1) the most democratic country in the region is Moldova (electoral and flawed democracy); 2) less democratic countries in the region are Georgia and Ukraine (electoral democracies, but hybrid regimes); 3) a bit less democratic country of the region is Armenia (hybrid regime, but not electoral democracy); 3) the least democratic countries of the region are Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia (authoritarian regimes, electoral autocracy). But as electoral and flawed democracies are not equal to liberal (full) democracy, it has been decided to single out two groups of Eastern European countries: authoritarian regimes – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia; and transitional (in linear representation of democracy) hybrid regimes – Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This mainly proves the conclusions, drawn by the projects “Freedom in the World” and “Polity IV”.

However, there are other (which have both common features and differences) approaches to classification of modern political regimes. One was offered by S. Levitsky and L. Way and is called the concept of “competitive authoritarianism”<sup>31</sup>. The scientists interpret these political

<sup>28</sup> CGV model – J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, R. Vreeland's model.

<sup>29</sup> V model – T. Vanhanen's model.

<sup>30</sup> EIU model – The Economist Intelligence Unit model.

<sup>31</sup> S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regime change in Peru and Ukraine in comparative perspective*, Wyd. University of Strathclyde 2001.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: International Linkage, Organizational Power, and the Fate of Hybrid Regimes*, Paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30 - September 2, 2006.; S. Levitsky, L. Way, *The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2002, vol 13, nr 2, s. 51-65.; L. Way, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism*, “Journal of Democracy”, 2005, vol 16, nr 2, s. 131-145.

regimes within the frame of hybrid political regimes. The point is that competitive authoritarianism (or competitive authoritarian regime) is a civil (civic) political regime in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which there is abuse of power on the part of political parties and leaders in power, concerning their administrative and political preferences over the opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that oppositional parties/leaders use democratic institutions for gaining power. But they are not democratic, as the political playing field is skewed to the advantage of the power actors. Competitiveness in this way is real, but unfair. Consequently, competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime, which characterizes both autocracy and democracy. Within the practical field one must speak of regularity of elections, oppositional parties and leaders' participation in them. On the other hand, in favor of authoritarianism may testify: 1) absence of free elections; 2) absence of a broad protection of civil liberties; 3) uneven playing field for political competitiveness. In case of the analyzed Eastern European countries (in fact it concerns various time periods) the authors assume that competitive authoritarianism is characteristic of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. However, there is a fine line between them (both institutional and contextual).

Combination of various attributive elements of evaluation of competitive types of authoritarian regimes leads to distinguishing their procedural kinds: thus, competitive authoritarian regimes may function within three main directions: 1) democratization (free and fair elections, broad protection of civil rights and liberties, equality of competitive conditions for political struggle); 2) non-stable authorization (process of several political transformations, which in general do not result in democracy – change of leaders of the authoritarian type took place just once); 3) stable authoritarianization (absence of transformational changes, permanent staying of successive authoritarian leaders in power). Taking this into consideration, for the last ten years movement towards democratization has been noticed only in case of Ukraine (however, one can say that this country is characteristic of non-stable dynamics of regime development), Georgia and Moldova. At the same time, non-stable authoritarianization is peculiar of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia (though to a lesser degree, than movement towards democratization). Finally, stable authoritarianization is observed in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Russia.

To conclude, let us state that if authoritarianism is to be interpreted as a stable dynamics of authoritarian political regime development, then it is obvious that in Eastern Europe authoritarian regimes (less competitive) are represented by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia. If correlation between authoritarianism and democracy is treated as “pure authoritarianism”, then all other countries of the region are characterized by hybrid/changeable dynamics of political regime development (as they are more competitive, than “pure authoritarian regimes”). And this proves our previous conclusion, predetermined by the correlation of types of political regimes in Eastern European countries.



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## **Presidential election 2015 on emigration. Quantitative analysis as a method of presenting the actual state**

### **Introduction**

The base of contemporary democracy there is the right to participate in presidential elections, which are, as a rule, universal and direct, as well as equal and secret, according to point 127 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. A society, understood as a general public by their electoral rights, is still, to a lesser extent, aspiring to take direct part in the election of the head of state.<sup>1</sup> Such a right is granted to all citizens of the country in which the presidential election take place, as defined in point 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland at the latest on election day ends 18 years of age. It is worth noting that not everyone who crosses this magic threshold can be identified as a voter. The right to vote is vested in those who hold the full rights of the public, who have not been denied the right to vote by the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal and the person in full mental authority.<sup>2</sup>

The prevalence of the presidential election is expressed in the drafting of voters by the municipal offices, which are supposed to allow the voter to vote. The list includes citizens who meet the above requirements, including persons in hospitals, social welfare facilities, penitentiaries or detention centers.<sup>3</sup> At this point, it is particularly important to add that people of Polish descent who have been on immigration for a longer or shorter time may also vote.

At the time of the Polish presidential election campaign 2015, Internet forums devoted to Polonia issues and social networking sites such as Facebook had heated discussions over the matter of voting by people who did not live in their country of origin and still enjoy the right of election. Constituentists, lawyers and politicians joined in this discussion. The aim of this article is to bend over the presidential elections 2015 in the context of the migration of Poles. From a methodological point of view, it is intended to be used as a test material for quantitative analysis and justification for its wide application in political science and humanities which, as a result of incorrect assumptions, abounds in nonparametric data, resulting in objective results of research that could be representative.

Thus, the thesis set out in this article is the statement that quantitative analysis as a research tool can be used in political science to obtain objective results that are representative

<sup>1</sup> M. Chmaj, W. Skrzydło, *System wyborczy na urząd prezydenta RP*, [w]: „System wyborczy w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”, Wyd. Zakamycze., Kraków 2002., s. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.

<sup>3</sup> M. Chmaj, W. Skrzydło, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

and used for further exploratory research. The research questions that are supposed to be used as guides are:

- a. What is the main assumption of quantitative analysis in the theoretical aspect?,
- b. How quantitative analysis as a tool can be used in political science?,
- c. In what way the statistical databases can be used as a source of information?,
- d. How to use the quantitative analysis to analyze the results of the election on emigration?.

Paying particular attention to the fact that the phenomenon of migration is becoming more powerful and the number of Poles abroad, especially in the United Kingdom, is increasing significantly, leading to social and political disputes, expressed even in the Brexit idea, the Polish presidential elections in the UK are the basis of exploration for this tool. It is intended to examine the mechanisms of electoral behaviour and attitudes of migrants towards such actions.

### **Quantitative analysis – the theoretical aspect**

The basis of the quantitative study is to examine the objective theories. These theories may be verified by analyzing relationships between predetermined variables. They can be measured by the use of appropriate tools, but results obtained in the form of numbers, which are often the result of complex mathematical activities, may be subjected to further procedures, this time statistical.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of using such an approach is to verify the theory by deduction, the logical reasoning that leads to constructive conclusions based on the collected data. On the road of analysis, there is also some sort of protection against errors, such as the calculation of a statistical error margin.<sup>5</sup> In addition, alternative explanations are tested, and most importantly, the results obtained are reproducible and can be generalized, which is reduced to the notion of representativeness.

On the basis of these premises, it can be said that qualitative analysis is one of the most objective research methods, based on specific data rather than the subjective feelings of the people subjected to the experiment. Its postpositivistic assumptions make it clear that in a broadly understood science, it belongs to a more traditional method, based not on the conviction of the researcher or the research group, but on the clearly presented data subjected to specific calculations. However, following the modern expressions of this thought, Philips and Burbules<sup>6</sup>, this method cannot be reduced to absolutely perfect and infallible. Human behaviour and attitudes are so individual that this method is only to be used as a basis for constructing high probability applications but cannot become the sole determinant of the phenomenon.

Determinism and reductionism are two approaches, the determinants of action when using the quantitative method as the exploratory one. The first of these assumes that research

<sup>4</sup> J. W. Creswell, *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill 2008., s. 110.

<sup>5</sup> Ch. D. Nachmias, *Metody badawcze w naukach społecznych*, Wyd. Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2001., s. 179.

<sup>6</sup> D. C. Philips, N. C. Burbules, *Postpositivism and educational research*, Lanham, NY: Rowman & Littlefield 2000., s. 120.

is conducted in order to know the causes of the phenomenon that produce certain results and effects.<sup>7</sup> Identifying causes and assessing them, leading to specific behaviours, effects are particularly well studied through the use of experiment. Reductionism, in turn, boils down to the knowledge of theory and truth, bringing theory to its elemental components. Then they are verified.<sup>8</sup> This idea is applicable to the study of variables contained in hypotheses as well as research questions. Therefore, so much attention is devoted to the relevance of the last two elements, since in fact they depend on the success of the whole project and the confirmation of the hypothesis and, consequently, its application to the larger community. Special attention is paid to the existence of theses and truths, hereafter referred to as theories, which are subjected to verification and refinement to understand the world, behaviour and attitudes of the individuals and its mechanism.

This kind of analysis particularly emphasizes the standards of accuracy and reliability adopted by the researcher. Objectivity is understood as the essential aspect of conducting research, the competent work of the author. Hence the idea of verifying and testing, even multiple, methods and conclusions in the context of the possibility of error.<sup>9</sup> For this, in the study that adopts this approach, space is devoted to attempts to formulate theorems that are relevant as well as true from the point of view. They are intended to be used for exploration and exploration of a particular situation. They can also be used in descriptive desires for causal relationships.

The quantitative approach allows us to look at the statistics as evidence, hereafter referred to as rational arguments in scientific polemics, which are often accused of lack of objectivity. The data and the way in which they are used significantly influence the process of crediting information that is still erroneously perceived as nonparametric, which cannot be used as a reliable knowledge base in research processes. The information collected, properly transformed, can be used for quantitative analysis, which is undoubtedly understood as a rational, objective and reliable method.

### **The practical implementation of quantitative analysis in political sciences**

Political science belongs to one of the fields of humanities and social sciences.<sup>10</sup> Unlike science, it puts it in a slightly more difficult position, because often its representatives are accused of lack of objectivity, rational approach to the research problem and attempts to solve it, making unreasonable hypotheses, or drawing too far-reaching conclusions based on subjective convictions and sometimes even misunderstanding the problem. In contrast to the natural sciences, where it is very easy to verify the hypothesis by conducting an experiment and proving the well-known truth that “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”, the political sciences and problems they deal with

<sup>7</sup> J. W. Creswell, *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2007, s. 97.

<sup>8</sup> J. W. Creswell, op. cit., s. 109.

<sup>9</sup> J. W. Creswell, *Projektowanie badań naukowych. Metody jakościowe, ilościowe i mieszane*, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2013, s. 33.

<sup>10</sup> A. Chodubski, *Wstęp do badań politologicznych*, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 1996, s. 20.

are understood as interdisciplinary ones, to clarify which knowledge is needed. Many related disciplines, without which the problem under investigation cannot really exist.<sup>11</sup> Although it raises a lot of controversy among experts in particular fields, it actually opens up many ways to the use of scientific methods and tools. Thanks to its complexity, it allows us to look at the “old” methods, often underestimated, incomplete from a completely new scientific perspective. Through their innovative use, they can become a tool used to explore new areas emerging with the development of civilization.<sup>12</sup>

One of the oldschool tools that are more well-known and widely used in the research process is the survey questionnaire, also called the survey.<sup>13</sup> It is mainly used to collect data for further use. These may be numerical figures, but also those related to attitudes and opinions as well as the preferences of the surveyed population. Use of the survey will allow you to receive more detailed information, provided that it is appropriately structured and that questions are set so that ambiguous or disputable answers can be avoided. Properly designed not only in terms of content but also graphic, it allows to organize the collected data, which definitely influences the quality of the test and avoids the error during its execution. You can not forget the financial value of being able to carry it completely free in the age of highly developed technology, which definitely makes the tool very attractive giving it new meaning.

This solution is widely used in academic research by academic cross-cutting organizations such as the European Social Survey. Among the many issues we can observe the ways of conducting research using surveys, questionnaires, and political science. Cyclically, every 2 years, surveys are conducted on the political life of societies from different countries. In their issues, they concern the political issues of the research group, their confidence in the political world, forms of electoral participation, fidelity to the political parties, as well as socio-political orientation.<sup>14</sup>

Confirming the validity of the assertion about the empirical application of the questionnaire in political science, reference should be made, for example, to the Voting Behavior in the 2012 Election, devoted to the electoral behaviour of Americans during the election of President B. Obama four years ago.<sup>15</sup> Then conclusions were drawn which could serve as a guide for how to effectively design and conduct a survey. It is mentioned too many questions with “socially accepted answers”, questions related to the past, which resulted in the reluctance of the respondents, expressed in the lack of response or even mistreatment of the interviewer. It

<sup>11</sup> Sociology, psychology, demography, economics, as well as law or philosophy certainly belong to such disciplines. It's just not one of them. These, the most popular, having the greatest impact on the process and the degree of comprehension of the complexity of phenomena presented under the concept of phenomena with a political nature.

<sup>12</sup> In the new areas that appear with the development of civilization, it is undoubtedly the phenomenon of mass external migration, with which the world is currently struggling on a large scale. In fact, until now, it was not particularly interested in representatives of the scientific world. Only this postwar and in the 80's. However, it did not constitute the basis for the development of new research opportunities apart from the most famous ones, such as analysis of archival documents (used by Prof. E. Olszewski in the process of studying the migration of Poles to Norway).

<sup>13</sup> A. A. Campbell, G. Katona., *Pojęcie i typy badań sondażowych, sondaże ankietowe.*, [w]: S. Nowak, „Metody badań socjologicznych”, Warszawa 1965., s. 351 – 371. (The use of the questionnaire for several decades is justified by the year of publication).

<sup>14</sup> European Social Survey., <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>, access on 27.12.2016.

<sup>15</sup> Voting Behaviour., ICPSR., <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/instructors/setup2012/voting.jsp>, access on 27.12.2016.

is important to point out that this questionnaire has become an interview, which could have a negative impact on the end result.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the idea of using the survey as a data collection tool did not disappoint. He failed the way it was carried out. He turned out to be too childish, predictable, stout.

### **The presidential election on emigration – the attempt of available dates analysis**

In this part of this article I would like to draw considerable attention to Poles – migrants going to Great Britain for various reasons. For the most part, these are purely economic incentives designed to provide them with a better quality of life for themselves and their offspring. This goal also bears the idea of family reunion, the development of migration networks among friends and acquaintances. Their “wandering” started in 2004 when the EU, when accepting Poland to its group, opened the borders of the states already under the new labor force, which was conditioned by the rapid economic development of the host country. More migratory waves allowed the settlers to settle in the Islands, which became the basis for an attempt to assimilate with the people. At the same time, there has been a number of discussions about the shape of the country’s migration policy, its possible changes. Among the many important issues discussed by politicians and representatives of both countries is the issue of the election of Polish immigrants abroad. Taking into account the scale of this phenomenon as well as the political life of the country of origin, it is not possible to go indifferently next to such an important issue, which is not so much a place in professional literature or even in the course of a political or scientific debate.

There is little more space for data collection among Poles in Britain to show their electoral behaviour, attitudes and opinions about the preferences and the way voters cast their votes during the presidential elections in their country of origin. This was the case in 2015 when the only statistic data was those obtained from the National Electoral Commission and the Polish Embassy in Great Britain. They were mainly concerned with the number of polling stations, each assigned a number, the number of voters in that district, and the number of votes cast, with particular regard to the number of votes cast on individual candidates.<sup>17</sup> Contrary to Polish, the UK’s statistical databases do not have as much detail as the country of origin. At the same time, it is important to note that despite their accuracy, many weaknesses remain.

Such statistics, full of mathematical and quantitative data, can be used to build theories that can be verified in a further research process and their structure and effect can lead to scientifically valid conclusions. By analyzing this data, an image of the distribution of electoral forces in individual circles is generated, which in turn is attributed to particular geographic regions, so that we can obtain meaningful data on political orientation depending on the area

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<sup>16</sup> It is so-called the negative interview result that we most often deal with at the time of the interview so that we get satisfactory results.

<sup>17</sup> Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza., pkw.gov.pl., access on 05. 2015.



inhabited. In order to clarify the conclusions, a map can be prepared on the basis of these data, which will allow a preliminary assessment of the aforementioned aspects.

In addition, the statistics presented by PKW allow to determine which regions are inhabited by migrants most willing to participate in political life, and in which Polonia completely avoids even participation in head-of-state elections. Data analysis, conducted in this respect, will provide an answer to the question of whether and how the specificity of the area inhabited by migrants affects their electoral behavior. In this way, the independent variable, which is electoral behavior, can be verified for the dependent variable, geographic factor, resident region of Great Britain. The research question posed in this way has not yet found in the Polish literature the object and subject of the answer. The factors that could influence the way in which the migrants would like to live when they arrive are not bothered. Is it random, or is it rational, dictated by certain assumptions. In addition, data can show the percentage of migrants participating in the political life of the country of origin to those who did not participate. It is then possible to ask the question of the extent to which people leaving the country are interested in the political life of the country, and whether there are discrepancies between the different groups living in a particular area. The result of such an analysis can be used in some kind of futuristic approach, by which you can be tempted to present predictions whether these people intend to return to the country (especially when we talk about Brexit) or still remain there. Such an approach can of course be used, but only on the assumption that people who participate in elections are interested in living the country because of the possibility of return. But those who do not participate do not want to come back. However, it must be noted that the approach may be too superficial. The research problems outlined above can be answered satisfactorily

### **The quantitative analysis implementation in the case of election in Great Britain**

Quantitative analysis at its broad application in the humanities can be used for data analysis to enable the research questions to be answered during the research process. It does not question, and even suggests, that a properly selected and transformed tool is used for a thorough analysis of Poles' electoral behaviour – migrants in the UK. It is assumed that, thanks to properly prepared and conducted analysis, the answers to the research questions put forward will draw concrete conclusions not only in the field of methodological but also political science.

It is proposed to use the survey as a research tool to gather objective data on migrants' attitudes towards the 2015 presidential elections in Poland. A well-designed questionnaire, which consists predominantly of closed questions to avoid ambiguous answers, and well-prepared scales, avoids middle values, will provide data that can then be used as a basis for verifying hypotheses. Questions should relate primarily to metrics. This will allow verification and classification of the group of people.

Based on the collected data, a chi-chi independence test can be performed using a suitable computer program<sup>18</sup> used to verify statistical hypotheses, in a specialist literature called pi value<sup>19</sup>. Using this tool will allow you to verify hypotheses relating to dependence, strength, direction, tendencies. And in the case of electoral behaviour testing, dependency testing is highly advisable as it is through this that it is possible to determine the specificity of the behaviour of the population studied. The question of what might be considered as a determinant of the study of electoral behaviour may be the relationship between the specificity of the inhabited area and party identification. The proposed test will allow you to show between which independent and dependent variables a relationship occurs and what kind of relationship it is and what affects it.

Based on the data collected through the survey, the correlation, correlation, statistical, stochastic correlation<sup>20</sup> between the selected characteristics<sup>21</sup> can also be determined. In this, it will be very helpful to create a contingency table, which must be the first step leading to the chi2 independence test<sup>22</sup>. Performing such a test will allow verification of the null hypothesis (dependency) and the alternative (no dependency), resulting in the calculation of the r-Pearson correlation coefficient. Using this tool will allow the researcher to determine the strength of the relationship between the two variables<sup>23</sup>. Conducting the proposed research will help answer the questions posed at the beginning, by testing the tool to identify the direction and method of subsequent research and its results can be used by the institutions that ultimately deal with electoral and electoral behaviour<sup>24</sup>.

## Conclusions

Political science as a branch of the humanities in all its complexity is the source of constant search, discovery of new phenomena and the laws governing them. Although it is sometimes difficult to prove the validity of the assumptions of non-mathematical sciences, this does not mean that it is impossible. The identified problem, skillfully researched methods and appropriately transformed tools can serve as an instrument to explain issues even seemingly unverifiable as it is in the case of electoral behaviour. The ability to use quantitative analysis, a survey that is the basis for the collection of information, not contained in any available statistical database,

<sup>18</sup> An R program is proposed, which is designed for humanities researchers struggling with so-called. Nonparametric data. It is an interdisciplinary program which in this context should be understood as providing the opportunity to use multiple data sources, transform statistical databases, verify them and perform the corresponding mathematical combinations with them. What makes it easy to work in it is definitely the ability to save each operation and return to it smoothly. What encourages the researcher's ability to influence the appearance of the end result, such as histograms widely understood. An additional advantage is its free, legal version to download on the Internet.

<sup>19</sup> This particular term has been proposed to be used by W. Starzyńska *Statystyka praktyczna*, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2000., s. 288.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>23</sup> A detailed study was presented at the Regional, Community and Citizens' Conference held on 27-28 October 2016 at the initiative of the Chair of Political Systems, Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz.

<sup>24</sup> A detailed study was presented at the Regional, Community and Citizens' Conference held on 27-28 October 2016 at the initiative of the Chair of Political Systems, Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz.

and then calculates dependency using appropriate formulas can answer questions that are not in-depth analysis in contemporary science.

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## The Background of Ethnic Conflicts in the European Union based on the example of Great Britain, Spain and France

The article concerns the issue of ethnic conflicts in the selected countries of the European Union. The origin of the conflicts is explained by conflicts among different groups pursuing various interests. Cultural and religious identity, the idea of being socially recognized, freedom from discrimination, freedom of religion often have a further negative impact on conflicting relationships. The absence of dialogue between actors of the conflicts brings about the ongoing increase of different acts of violence.

The Great Britain, Spain and France are the examples of the multicultural countries with multi-faceted origin of ethnic conflicts. Searching for the roots of the ethnic conflicts reference should be made to interethnic relationships with their beginning in distant historical epochs. It will enable understand, among others, the Irish's reluctance to the British or the front pages news.

*Keywords: ethnic conflict, national minority, ethnic group*

### PREFACE

Ethnic conflicts have been built permanently into the history of nations due to existing numerous ethnic groups with their distinct differences pursue different objectives that may generate conflicts. Initially it was the fight for territory to gain influence on more areas, develop their culture and civilization. Over time, some groups transformed into nations and manager to set up strong states, still with groups with no majority status, though having a distinct national identity. Taking these into account it shall be said that ethical conflict may become an argument about identity of peripheral group or take a form of inequality, economic marginalization or social and political discrimination.<sup>1</sup>

Ethnic conflict by Krzysztof Kwaśniewski is defined as „*a conflict where two or more groups remain in opposition to one another, and when their main reason to act is national identity not power or possession struggle.*”<sup>2</sup>

Janusz Mucha describes ethical conflict from social conflict point, as: „*one of the types of relationships among more or less consistent social groups within a broader cultural composition.*”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. Kalandyk, *Etniczny konflikt o tożsamość a zmiana identyfikacji językowej Tybetańczyków w Tybetańskim Regionie Autonomicznym*, ZN TD UJ – Nauki Humanistyczne, No. 1/2010, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> K. Kwaśniewski, *Konflikt etniczny. Sprawy Narodowościowe 1994*, Vol. III, Notebook I (4), p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> J. Mucha, *Oblicza etniczności. Studia teoretyczne i empiryczne*, Nomos, Kraków 2005, p. 95.

Today we can observe the change of the character of military conflicts. It has been foreseen by Samuel Huntington in his „Clash of Civilizations?“. The scientist claims that the factor determining the post-Cold War era will become cultural differences as the fundamentals of internal conflicts based upon religious differences. Such an approach will appear self-evident bearing in mind culture as the strongest element of a human being self-consciousness. Hence, it shall not be surprising that the culture distinctness leads to the strongest conflicts. Besides the post-Cold War era it has been the period when the self-consciousness of social groups increases and strongly emphasises the right of the nations to self-determination, thereby the rise of conflicts and acts of violence.<sup>4</sup> Thus the objective of utmost importance, ensuring peace in Europe is solving the problems on the grounds of nationality. The importance of the issue proves a serious involvement of the Catholic Church.<sup>5</sup> Pope John Paul II himself recognized the issue of minorities as an important facilitator influencing peace when in 1989 dedicated the 22<sup>nd</sup> International Day of Peace to respecting minorities.<sup>6</sup>

#### **HISTORICAL BACKGRUNDS OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC CONFLICTS.**

Ethnic conflicts in Europe have their roots in previous epochs. To reach present form they developed upon numerous historical and political events over the centuries.

The issues of national minorities and related conflicts appeared in 1648, after the Thirty Years' War. It was then when the rule „*cuius regio eius religio*“ („whose rule, his religion“) was softened and some ethnic groups were allowed to profess their faith. To some extent it protected those of other beliefs.<sup>8</sup>

The 18<sup>th</sup> century brought other problems for minority issues. It was the time when Poland was divided between three partitioning powers which governments left the Poles only freedom of religion. The laws of the invaders dictated and implemented their own policy of assimilation and denationalizing what, in turn brought about uprising of Poles against Russification and Germanization. The Congress of Vienna, in 1815 authorized only treaty protection of religious minorities, the Polish majority issue remained without any solution. Only in the Berlin Treaty of 1878 the rules concerning protection of Turkish, Romanian and Greek minorities in Bulgaria were formulated.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The situation is exacerbated by the number of nations – more than 80 – in 36 countries. That means that the number of states is as a half of less than the nations, and most of them are not ethnically homogenous but are multicultural with minorities. The subject literature it is given the number of 100 of the minority groups in Europe. As it is seen, the problem occurs in almost each of the European country. Similarly – all over the world.

<sup>5</sup> N. Wons, *Autonomia mniejszości narodowych w Europie. W świetle nauczania społecznego kościoła*, Redakcja Wydawnictw Wydziału Teologicznego Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole 2005, p. 129-130.

<sup>6</sup> See more: The Message of John Paul II for the 22<sup>nd</sup> International Day Of Peace of January, 1<sup>st</sup> 1989, „To Built Peace, Respect Minorities“.

<sup>7</sup> J. Byczkowski, *Mniejszości narodowe w Europie 1945 – 1974*, Opole 1976, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> The rule was implemented on the bases of the Augsburg's Religious Peace in 1555r, allowed the „Lords of Reich“ among them – electors imposing their faith on others. The decisions concerning peace did not finish conflicts in Reich, but only reduced religious tensions.

<sup>9</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., p. 34.

In other European countries it was only the end of the First World War changed the position of national minorities as the Treaty Versailles did not solve the „*roots of national tensions*”. Apart from that the rise of national or racist ideologies over the inter-war period led to strong emphasising of anti-Semitic slogans, chauvinism and animosity towards other minority groups escalating mutual prejudices. We witnessed it often during the big, the 20<sup>th</sup> century conflicts.

The circumstances in Europe changed radically over the Cold War.<sup>10</sup> The term – separatism was used for the first time. The term was tightly connected to acting political groups struggling for independence. Viktor Grotowicz defined separatism as: „*political tendency to separate a part of the territory from a state and setting up a separate state's structure or joining the territory to a neighbour country.*”<sup>11</sup> Józef Byczkowski sees the rise of separatist tendency as „*expressing tendency to embody the right to self-determination by the national groups who (...) had not been able to achieve it for various reasons.*” Especially strong need to solve the accumulated national problems could have been observed in the United Kingdom, Spain and France.<sup>12</sup>

### **The United Kingdom**

Ethnically motivated conflicts have lasted in the UK since the 17th century. The Kingdom of England conquered Wales and Ireland and signed the Personal Union with Scotland, the territory was included into the United Kingdom. The English hegemony provided added economical values for the rest of population through: making active use of strong economy and achievements of the colonial British Empire by representatives of these groups in the British Parliament. Additionally, it boosted the attractiveness of English culture and adopting English as a mother tongue, the language of both, politics and the enlightenment revolution. Regardless the above mentioned benefits in the United Kingdom the Welsh, Irish and Scottish national movements demanded equality for their national identities.<sup>13</sup>

In the United Kingdom the national issue was connected to migrant minorities, and according to Józef Byczkowski the immigrants with their roots in former British colonies.<sup>14</sup>

### **Ireland**

Today exist two Irish countries: Ireland – fully independent and the Northern Ireland, often termed Ulster – a part of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.<sup>15</sup>

In Ireland the anti-English movement has been strong since the very beginning of the British imperial conception. The British for the first time conquered Ireland in the 12<sup>th</sup> century as a result of their colonial policy they imposed their law and language on the Irish. In the 16<sup>th</sup>

<sup>10</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., p. 112 – 114.

<sup>11</sup> V. Grotowicz, *Terroryzm w Europie Zachodniej w imię narodu i lepszego sprawu*, PWN, Warszawa-Wrocław 2000, p. 310 – 311.

<sup>12</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., p. 114.

<sup>13</sup> M. Hroch, *Małe narody Europy. Perspektywa historyczna*, Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków 2003, p. 52.

<sup>14</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>15</sup> V. Grotowicz, op. cit., p. 316.

century, Anglicanism as the official religion in the United Kingdom was introduced, and both supporters of the union with the United Kingdom and the Irish opposed any connections with the protestant London. As a result the Catholics were deprived their civil and economic rights. Since then the conflict has taken the form of national and religious grounds bringing about numerous conflicts and thousands of cost thousands of people of their lives. The most difficult situation was in Ulster where fertile land caused further conflicts. Olivier Cromwell brought about bloodshed among the Irish Catholics in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In 1783 it was established parliament where might sit only Irish protestants who at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century organized a secret unit "United Irish" . as a primary goal set: democratization, wider autonomy for Ireland and equality for Catholics. Unfortunately, the unit was broken down and Ireland was 'punished' by dissolution of parliament and incorporated by the United Kingdom in 1801. After almost 40 years since then, the Irish again struggled for their autonomy under the leader, Daniel O'Connell. In 1840 it was set up the unit „Repeal” with the main focus – abolition of the union. However, because of the wave of hunger over 1845-49, the movement broke down.<sup>16</sup>

The 19<sup>th</sup> century it is the time of two political movements with the main objective to regain independence. One of them, *Home Rule*, which supporters timed at autonomy in internal issues, and in British parliament they agitated for self-government in Ireland within federation, with their government and parliament. Another movement, *The Irish Republican Brotherhood* with the political party *Sinn Fein* (We ourselves).<sup>17</sup>

Another outbreak took place after nearly half a century's hiatus – till the outbreak of the First World War. Though, without waiting until the war has been finished, in April 1916, a group of Irish nationalists proclaimed in Dublin the Irish Republic. It is called The Easter Rising. Unfortunately, again brutally suppressed by the British.<sup>18</sup> After the bloody fight the Irish turned towards the radical groups, and it resulted in setting up in 1919 The Irish Republic Army (IRA), additionally supported by the oldest national Irish political party – Sinn Fein. The Irish Republic Army fought against British administration and demanded withdrawal of the British.

In 1920 the London government divided Ireland into two parts, one with the capital in Dublin, and another in Belfast. Both the capitals gained the right to establish regional parliaments, however with restricted competences. In 1921 Ireland as the Irish Free State – with its capital in Dublin, gained dominium status.<sup>19</sup> Six counties of Ulster, home to protestants who moved away from power and discriminated Catholics from power<sup>20</sup> were incorporated by the UK. In 1922, the lost by the Republicans parliamentary elections were followed by civil war, won by the supporters of the division of the country into two parts. Nearly after the quarter of

<sup>16</sup> M. Hroch, op. cit., p. 53 – 54.

<sup>17</sup> V. Grotowicz, op. cit., p. 317.

<sup>18</sup> M. Hroch, op. cit., s. 53 – 54.

<sup>19</sup> British dominium was an ex ample of systemic form within the framework if British Empire and it was a transitional form between self-governmental colony and an independent country.

<sup>20</sup> S. Parzymies, *Stosunki międzynarodowe w Europie. 1945-2004*, Dialog, Warszawa 2004, p. 385.

the century Ireland gained new status and „(...) *It is hereby recognized and declared that the part of Ireland heretofore known as Eire ceased, as from the eighteenth day of April, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, to be part of His Majesty's dominion.*”<sup>21</sup>

The sharpest wave of conflict occurred in the 60s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Data presented by Krzysztof Kubiak demonstrate, „that since 1969 in the Irish conflict about 3.5 thousand people died, and more than 25 thousand were injured.”<sup>22</sup>

### **Wales**

Wales lost its independence in 1536 being incorporated by Henry VIII, the king of England. The full integration with the United Kingdom took place after five centuries, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23</sup> The Welsh accepted the British hegemony by peaceful means, did not oppose to limited autonomy of their country and accepted English as an official language. Only the 30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century revealed the first symptoms of dissatisfaction from the Welsh, what was caused by deterioration of people's material status, in particular Welsh workers, worse-paid than the English ones. A specifically called and sent commission explain the problem by low education of Welsh workers who were no English-skilled, and therefore could not improve their social status. The solution was to be English language introduced to education. The order did not obliged the private educational institutions ran by Catholics (nonconformists), which over the time stayed Celtic.<sup>24</sup> The changes activated nationalists who much stronger fought for protection of Welsh language as well as the culture, and as a result for strengthening the national identity.<sup>25</sup> Despite such utmost efforts the Anglicization has not been stopped. The national movement in Wales turned into two directions: political and cultural, it was a peaceful process to gain autonomous rights, these were speeches at political rallies and meetings.<sup>26</sup> Moreover the nationalistic tendencies calmed down, after 300 years Welsh National Assembly for Wales was established in May 1999.<sup>27</sup>

### **Scotland**

Until the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Scotland existed as an autonomous kingdom, thereby its stronger historical traditions. In the personal union with the United Kingdom in 1603, Scotland took the position of the weaker partner. More than hundred years later Scotland became a part of a real union as component of the Great Britain. Acting against the English

<sup>21</sup> *The Public General Acts of 1949*, London 1949, p. 364.

<sup>22</sup> K. Kubiak, *Wojny konfliktów zbrojnych i punkty zapalne na świecie*, Trio, Warszawa 2007, p. 71.

<sup>23</sup> L. Kulińska, *Konflikty i punkty zapalne w Europie*, w: *Konflikty współczesnego świata*, pod red R. Borkowskiego, Uczelniane Wydawnictwo Naukowe – Dydaktyczne, Kraków 2001, p. 58.

<sup>24</sup> M. Hroch, op. cit., p. 54 – 55.

<sup>25</sup> Although the Welsh language disappears it cannot be claimed the national identity of Welsh weakens and they are fully assimilated. The national pride and patriotism are the features of the Gaelic North and southern counties. Each Welshman residing and Cardiff visits the monument of the Sons of Wales, annual ethnographic festival in Eisteddfod, and begins with singing the Welsh “Land of my Fathers”.

<sup>26</sup> No counting vandalism attacks as bomb blasting a water filter pumps in the Northern Wales to attract attention of public.

<sup>27</sup> K. Kubiak, op. cit., p. 73.



hegemony in 1715 and 1745 did not bring successes to the Scottish people but breakdown of the family system and confiscation of the land. These resulted in waves of emigration towards the richer South. This contributed to the division of the state into two groups:

- „highlanders” – Catholic families from the north, supporting full autonomy of Scotland,
- „lowlanders” – Presbyterians from the south supporting the real union.

The Union brought about the loss of identity and the state's issues were decided in London. On the other hand, however, it gave some real material benefits to the Scottish people.

The modern national movement of Scotland begun in 1853 when the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights was set up. The demands of Scottish nationalists concerns administrative disagreements not cultural or linguistic ones. It has no reference to cultural heritage of the Celtic tradition, however the ethnic features of Scottish cultural traditions are still maintained in the form of characteristic outfits, dances or folk orchestras.<sup>28</sup>

The 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the time of rebirth of Scottish nationalism contributing to obtain representation in the British parliament, and after 300 years, similarly to Wales, parliamentary elections were held in 1999.

## **Spain**

The marriage of Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella of Castile contributed to constitute, in the 15<sup>th</sup> century Spanish state. Ferdinand II of Aragon was a Catalan Prince and Isabella of Castile ruled the Basque provinces. In the initio period both of these areas kept their autonomies and separation. After three centuries the monarchy's power was centralised and integrated under the reign of Philip V. Only in the Basque country the pace of change slowed down.

National movements in Spain started to develop in the middle the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Initially these occurred locally and escalated into an a mass with time. Severely repressed are compared by researchers to mass murder of Kurds by the Turkish.<sup>29</sup>

In Spain the strongest sense of differentiation occurs can be seen in Catalans, Basques and Galicians. These are three main ethnical groups constantly aim to their self-definition. The Catalans are the strongest group in contemporary Spain. Since the 12<sup>th</sup> century, Catalonia has been dependent upon Aragon despite their own legislation or strong national culture. Until 18<sup>th</sup> century Catalanian used to be the official language in administration, literature, science and art. However, Catalonia was relatively very quickly influenced and within half of a century was incorporated by Spain, losing any privileges: own educational system and state freedom in favour of Spanish governor. Influenced by the Spaniards, Catalonians gained economic growth.<sup>30</sup> Since

<sup>28</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>29</sup> M. Hroch., op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>30</sup> An ex ample can be observed since the 18th century economic growth of Barcelona due to free trade with the Spaniards.

the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century it has been published the first Catalan national journal. In 1882 the first congress convened and under which it was sought the strengthening the role of Catalan language, weakening the centralized in Madrid power and rebirth of traditional system of law. Unfortunately, the aspirations were not strongly supported by the Catalonians and yet in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the attitude changed when nationalists gained their ground and support among the Catalonians.<sup>31</sup>

The tendencies to regain autonomy by Catalonia blighted by the triumph of general Francisco Franco in the civil war in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Franco was against any national movements, national symbols and languages of minorities were banned. Repressions of society led to weakening the Catalan movement on its way to freedom at the moment of prosperity.<sup>32</sup> The Catalonians, however, as a national group were strong enough to stay oppose the assimilation under the Francoist regime and protect traditional Catalan language. Catalan separatists were seeking to gain autonomy, not to separate from Spain, and expressed it in their political motto: *“Free Catalonia in free Spain”*.<sup>33</sup>

The Basque provinces since the Middle Ages has kept a strong position, they were under the king of Castile, though never a part of the Castilian kingdom. The Castilians were allowed to use their dialects. The first conflict occurred when the king, Philip V, intended to incorporate the Basque provinces into the centralized Spanish state. The Basque were not enslaved, managed to maintain their status, though the idea of autonomy was delayed. Some uprisings against the influence of the king of Spain did not bring about expected by the Basques results. The final of the Basque issue was the resolution, so called the 2<sup>nd</sup> Carlist War in 1876, the Basques lost their legal separation and were incorporated by the Spanish Kingdom. These events resulted in a deep national identity crisis, exacerbated by the ban on the Basque dialects.<sup>34</sup> The official language of administration and cultural life became Spanish. In 1895 the circumstances changed after activity of the Basque national movement similar to the Catalan movement and it was established the Basque Nationalist Party, and very soon met social expectations. Next parliamentary elections showed high percentage of ‘yes’-votes for the party. Unexpected death of the founder of the party, Sabino de Arana, divided the movement into a group of radicals and moderate activists. Radicals tended to regain independence for the Basque Country, and the others: autonomy with economical benefits from belonging to Spain. The national movement was supported until fascists with general Franco, mentioned above, seized power in Spain. Similarly to Catalonia, the movement came to an end. The leaders were made leave the country. Then nationalists became more radical and besides agitation occurred terrorist attacks against gen. Franco’s regime.<sup>35</sup> In 1958 on the political stage occurs The Basque Home and Liberty r.

<sup>31</sup> M. Hroch, op. cit., p. 60 – 61.

<sup>32</sup> Tamżc, p. 61.

<sup>33</sup> J. Byczkowski, op. cit., s. 127.

<sup>34</sup> Dialect was used only by the Basque fishermen and peasants.

<sup>35</sup> M. Hroch, op. cit., p. 61 – 63.

(ETA)<sup>36</sup> with very strong independence aspirations. They were the major resistance against general Franco's regime.<sup>37</sup> ETA had no opportunity to share demands in a democratic way but only through terroristic attacks. Another minority group in Spain, besides Catalonians and Basques, are the Galicians. Until the founding of the Spanish kingdom, Galician had been the official language of judiciary and administration, then was replaced by Spanish. In 1931 was set up the Galician National Party aimed at regaining autonomy, reestablishment of Galician as an official language, nationalisation of the economy. Unfortunately, Francoist regime did not support the demands, and the national movement in Galicia lost its influence, mainly due to low national consciousness. National movement in Galicia rather supports regional than national consciousness, what may be a sort of paradox in turn to being Galician language skilled by more than 90% of population.<sup>38</sup>

### France

In France it is hard pressed to find historical ethnical movements, although the French revolution was an incentive for some national movements in Europe. In France, next to Iparretarrak (IK)<sup>39</sup> acted separatist movements in Corsica and in Brittany. The National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) used to be very active in the 80s and 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and their major aim was to separate Corsica from France. The movement organised terroristic attacks against French administration or security forces, and became known for so called "blue nights" when they blew at the same time up a few villas belonging to the French from continent, after earlier informing the owners about their planned action. Separatists were fully equipped, wore masks and usually uniforms. They held night meetings and briefings with journalists brought by them to the places with instructions concerning further plans and demands of the organisation to inform society. In 2014 it was announced demilitarisation and the end of separatist activity of the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC).<sup>40</sup>

In Brittany, since the 60s of the previous century has been acting The Breton Liberation Front (FLB), aimed at separation Brittany from France, preserving their own Breton rich tradition and customs. Members of the organisation organised blew up in the air buildings belonging to government, industrial networks or transformer stations. In 1971 the name of the organisation was changed into the Breton Revolutionary Army (ARB).<sup>41</sup>

<sup>36</sup> S. Parzymies, *Stosunki międzynarodowe w Europie 1945 – 2004*, Dialog, Warszawa 2004, p. 394.

<sup>37</sup> Here shall be mention the role of the Basque Church in cultivating language and the Basque national traditions but also about inglorious role of some priests with far right views supporting ETA. In 1969 military tribunal in Burgos convicted of supporting the escape one of the ETA members, Miguel Echeverri Iztueta, were condemned for long jail.

<sup>38</sup> M. Hroch, *op. cit.*, . 64.

<sup>39</sup> In the French Basque Country acted an organisation Iparretarrak, counterpart of Spanish ETA. One of their most known actions was in 1984 at the airport of Biarritz before the arrival of French president F. Mitterand who was opposed the rebirth „the Basque culture”.

<sup>40</sup> L. Kulińska, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>41</sup> L. Kulińska, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

At present the major issue in France is the ethnic and cultural conflict among the Muslim minorities, flow from former French colonies. They do not eradicate their cultural patterns, often live in absolute poverty, on the boundary of law, in anger and frustration, inequality mostly of the younger generation, amplifying the effect of rebellion against the system, violence or terrorist attacks. All these factors contribute in public discussion about the further direction of the modern Republic of France. Whether assimilate Muslims, even by enforcement or create multicultural state with ethnic groups freely cultivating their traditions, customs and religious. If the first way would be chosen it could lead towards fascism, close to beliefs of the National Front of Le Pen<sup>42</sup> lighting against radical Islam and flowing waves of immigrants or any other appear of Islamicisation, explaining: “*cultural heritage of Islam does not match French society*,”<sup>43</sup> and makes a significant contribution to the level of unemployment in France.

#### **ENHANCEMENT OF ETHNICAL MOVEMENTS AND CONFLICTS AFTER THE II WORLD WAR.**

Regina Artymiak describes the 20<sup>th</sup> century as „*the century of mega-death*.” It is difficult not to agree with such an attitude taking into account two World Wars and the post-wars times were not fully peaceful.<sup>44</sup> The day of 9<sup>th</sup> May 1945 did not guarantee stabilisation either in Europe and all over the world. Nation-building processes became active and new problems occurred. The end of the II World War brought political break down of Europe into two blocs – the Western and Eastern ones. The Eastern remained under the strong influence of Soviet Union, and the Western tender to found the United State of Europe. This period is called the Cold War with the characteristic an arms race between west and east and ideological war: capitalism against communism. Within this work more important will be presenting facts with direct impact on events in Great Britain, Spain or France.

The end of the II World War was also the end of colonization by European Empires such as Great Britain, Belgium, Holland or France. Despite the desire of the imperialists neither manage nor reconstruct their empires. Even Winston Churchill did not succeeded in such efforts, though noted: – „*I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire*.”<sup>45</sup> Norman Davies claims one of the reasons to preserve the old scheme of the Empire was the level of education of some of the colonial elites educated in Europe and were conscious enough to their desire: „*a new breed of colonial elites, many of them educated in Europe, had learned the language of nationalism and democracy and were pressing their demands of independence*.” Besides: „*connections between colonies and Metropolis over the II World*

<sup>42</sup> K. Kubiak, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>43</sup> M. Nowicki, *Klub przyjaciół Krenla*, Newsweek Polska No. 20/2014, 12-18 May 2014.

<sup>44</sup> R. Artymiak, *Wojny i konflikty w XX wieku*, w: *Konflikty współczesnego świata*, Ed. Robert Borkowski, Uczelniane Wydawnictwa Naukowo-Dydaktyczne, Kraków 2001, p. 38.

<sup>45</sup> www.https://www.jstor.org/journal/jworldhistory

*Was loosened. There were no military forces to bring back the old order; there was no will to prolong the superiority of one race of another.*<sup>46</sup>

Decolonisation is a process of replacing colonial system by independent countries that used to be former depended territories.<sup>47</sup> It is not a homogenous process and was conducted in accordance of imperial state.<sup>48</sup> The process of decolonisation in the Commonwealth was a peaceful process with the agreement of Metropolis. Over the initial phases the rights of the inhabitants were broaden by amending constitutions, status of autonomies were given, and finally recognising independence of the British colonies. All of these post-colonial countries were incorporated by the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1947, and since 1949 – to Commonwealth<sup>49</sup> and recognised the queen Elisabeth II the Head of the Commonwealth of Nations.<sup>50</sup>

The process of decolonisation in France confronted the military movements for independence because the Metropolis took the hard line. Most significant in the process of regaining independence by the French colonies was the war in Algeria in Indochina. The process of decolonisation is divided in the source literature into a few phases (easy dating in the peaceful breakup of colonies, more complicated in the cases of military actions):<sup>51</sup>

- The first phase: over 1945 – 1955:
  - a. Wars of independence in the French Indochina (Vietnam – 1945, Cambodia – 1953) and in Dutch Eastern India (where the Dutch colonies after the Japanese occupation did not control the territory and in 1949 was founded the Republic of Indonesia),
  - b. International agreements concerning the occupied territories (Korea – 1945),
  - c. Decolonisation based on voluntary decision of Metropolis (India, Pakistan – 1947).
- Second phase: 1956 – 1975, regaining independence of African countries<sup>52</sup> means the end of the colonial epoch of Great Britain, Portugal and France in Africa. Concurrently, in Asia the British colonies were decomposed. The major political loss for the Great Britain were Cyprus and Malta, strategic points to control in the Mediterranean basin. Gibraltar stayed still under the British jurisdiction. In the second phase of decolonisation the French Empire much more often peacefully accepted the independence of autonomous territories. In 1968 Spain lost its influence in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

<sup>46</sup> N. Davies, *Europa – rozprawa historyka z historią*, Znak, Kraków 1998, p. 1137 – 1145.

<sup>47</sup> Colonialism created different forms of dependence between metropolis and overseas countries: colony, protectorate, dominium, condominium, dependent territories, concessions. The dependent territories were managed by local self-governments of white settlers or local state or tribe structures combining the old structures of power with the European methods of managing; it was the form typical for the British Empire.

<sup>48</sup> P. Ostaszewski, *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne. Zarys wykładów*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 2008, p. 145 – 146.

<sup>49</sup> In the Commonwealth the power was transferred in elections

<sup>50</sup> [www.tomaszewska.com.pl/oprac.dekolonizacja.pdf](http://www.tomaszewska.com.pl/oprac.dekolonizacja.pdf), (access: 19.04.2017)

<sup>51</sup> P. Ostaszewski, op. cit. p.153 – 168.

<sup>52</sup> „The Year of Africa” it is called the 1960, when their independence regained 17 countries in Africa.

- 1976 – 2002 – period of substantive solution in Rhodesia – the last British colony, the Republic of South Africa and Namibia and final Spanish withdrawal from Africa. The Western Sahara as the former Spanish colony became free from Spanish influences 1976.

Decolonisation has changed the structure of economy either in Metropolis and colonies. The Empires lost their access to cheap labour and primary resources. There were founded many countries called as countries of the Third World and unfortunately, till these days they have been struggling with poverty. Additionally, the lack of democratic tradition in many of these countries results in authoritarian or totalitarian governments, where still ethnical wars break out. One of such examples can be the Congolese crisis (Katangese succession), the civil war in Ruanda, Burundi or Sierra Leone.<sup>53</sup>

The breakdown of the colonial system led to mass migrations from the former colonies to Metropolis, therefore the biggest ways of immigrations from third countries reached Great Britain and France. It resulted in ethnic and racial problems reflecting conservative and racist attitudes. Anthony Giddens rightly noted: *„some may enjoy the new culture and ethnic mix seeing in it an important aspect of cosmopolitan society. Others find it as a dangerous phenomenon Those who look at the world from a fundamentalist position, seek refuge in established traditions reject dialogue with anyone who differs from them. Many of today’s ethnic conflicts around the world express of such fundamentalist attitudes..”*<sup>54</sup>

Mass migrations after the II World War influenced the economic, social and demographic and political situations. Initially welcomed warmly, immigrants from the poorer countries in the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – when the time of prosperity came to an end, occurred to become treat to the indigenous people, expressing their dissatisfaction towards minorities that led to conflicts. The flow of minorities resulted in a significant broaden of culture and mentality different than the native, and it also brought about new tensions. Therefore Elżbieta Michalik-Muciek is right saying: *„The presence of the new minorities is for (...) states if not a problem then it is a challenge indicating the need of creating new mechanisms of adaptation that will allow to avoid conflicts on either side of those integrating and integrated.”*<sup>55</sup>

Bartosz Bolechów claims that problems that occurred in Great Britain after the post-war period were directly related to the Empire and colonial heritage. The attacks were not carried out in Metropolis but aimed at security power and British seats of administration in the colonies.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> P. Ostaszewski, op. cit. p. 171 – 172.

<sup>54</sup> A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 301.

<sup>55</sup> E. Michalik – Muciek, *Polityka państw europejskich wobec nowych mniejszości*, w: *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w procesach transformacji oraz integracji*, po red. E. Michalik i H. Chalupczak, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2006, p. 130.

<sup>56</sup> B. Bolechów, *Terroryzm w świecie podwubiegunowym*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2002, p. 205.

The departs of the rule:

- Assassination attempt of the president of Marks & Spencer retail company in 1973 (by Carlos)<sup>57</sup>,
- Killing a policewoman in front of Libyan embassy in London in 1984,
- Attack perpetrated over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988,<sup>58</sup>
- Bombing attack of Arabian newspaper Al – Hayet in 1997.

All of these incidents, according to Bartosz Bolechów<sup>59</sup>, were of exogenous character, that means they were not aimed at Great Britain. He also notices that the British state, similarly to other European countries, meets the problems of extremism and violence among the immigrants.

In France, similarly to other former Empires, acts of violence occurred as a result of colonial history. It differed in its character and sources to compare to Great Britain. The major problems exacerbating violence towards the French state, according to the above cited B. Bolechów was: „*the Algerian problem, leftist terrorism, fighting Islam, (...) internal ethnic separatisms*”<sup>60</sup> as well as the terrorist activity of the Carlos the Jackal known for his spectacular terrorist attack in France.<sup>61</sup>

Attacks associated with the Algerian issue were the most severe for France two decades the was in Alger ended and took place in 1991, after the legislative elections won by Islamists, and cancelled for that reason. The fact was widely reported in France and was a strong signal of a threat of losing influence in Algeria. For fear of refugees and migrants, after the political destabilisation in Algeria, France supported Algerian government and this, in turn, resulted in a sharp increase of absolute terror, and France continues to struggle with the refugees until today. The Algerian issue still brings problems, the biggest problem for the French is the Muslim minority, unfortunately, economically inefficient. This is the group supporting Islam, as Dawid Warszawski says in his article: „*despite widespread secularisation in France, Islam – contrary to Catholicism, Protestantism or Judaism – is still a strange religion, religion of illegal immigrants, terrorists or enemies of equality of women’s rights*”.<sup>62</sup> Modern France struggles for increasing extremisms and influence of chauvinistic and radical ideas trotted out by such organisations as the National Front, which incites to violence.<sup>63</sup>

In addition, in France occur regional separatisms, mainly conflicts within three national groups – Corsican, Bretons and Basques.

<sup>57</sup> His name by birth: Ilich Ramirez Sanchez in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, hiding behind the pseudonym Carlos, by news paper called Jackal, was the most dangerous terrorist.

<sup>58</sup> PanAm jet exploded after terrorist attack – flight from London to New York – killed 259 people on board (of 21 countries) and 11 on ground. Next to crash of Air India jet and 9/11 attacks it was the largest in its scale terrorist attack.

<sup>59</sup> B. Bolechów, op. cit., p. 205 – 206.

<sup>60</sup> B. Bolechów, *dz. cyt.*, p. 187.

<sup>61</sup> Today, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez is imprisoned for the third life sentence requested by prosecutors (there is no death penalty in the French law). Sanchez is responsible for death of almost 2000 people. He was arrested in 1994.

<sup>62</sup> D. Warszawski, *Najmlodsza córka meczetu*, „Magazyn Gazety Wyborczej” November, 8 1996, p. 12 – 13

<sup>63</sup> B. Bolechów, op. cit., p. 192 – 194.

The major problem in Spain was the Basque separatism. The roots of the violence can be found at the time of general Franco regime and strong national identity of the Basques. Beginning of the terrorist activity of the Basque Home and Freedom (ETA) were very close to the regional policy of general Franco. Due to revocation of privileges arising from the status of being autonomy, extension of state apparatus led to rising nationalist attitudes. The primary reason of the Basque conflict was suppression of national aspirations of the Basques and Catalonians by general Franco. The Basque terrorism actively influence Spanish policy as a strong habitat of terrorism. It is not an easy issue to be solved because based upon regional aspirations versus government. Additionally, economical crisis it getting deeper what is scrupulously exploiting by separatists to manipulate, especially the young unemployed people.<sup>64</sup>

### **RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AS THE MAJOR CONTEMPORARY CAUSE OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS.**

Large inflow of Arabic migrants seeking for better place to live resulted in undermining of safety of the native residents, in particular because the relationships between Islamic countries and the West have been always marked by conflicts. The division into „ours” and „strangers” despite strong tendency towards European integration and full globalization are very clear. Lack of perspectives for the young, unemployment, limited access to social goods to the members of different cultures leads to frustration and attempts to oppose such a situation through violent conflicts. Cultural distinctiveness of the Arabic immigrants is clearly seen in particular on the religious level.

Religion undoubtedly is the sphere that cultivated through centuries integrates and unities communities. As the bearers of cultural values allows to retain national identity of a group in a narrower, and nation – in a wider meaning. Religion, on the other hand, is also the way to discrimination of the minorities on this ground. In this context we have the words of John Paul II who said about discrimination: „(...)one must not deprive the poor of this world their last wealth, their faith and practicing their religious, as it is the fullest way of expressing Man's freedom.”<sup>65</sup> However, watching the events in Europe and all over the world we can see religion or deep faith brings solace to the poor and in need. Respect for all religions shall give us belief of reciprocity. Unfortunately, more and more often we can witness of using religion as the tool for military solution of conflicts, in particular those on ethnic ground<sup>66</sup> as well as with religious fundamentalism.

Fundamentalism is a way of thinking that supporters in an uncompromising way share the idea based upon belief of superiority of some aims over all other, overriding some aims over others. Fundamentalism is identified with religion and then we can say it is religious

<sup>64</sup> B. Bolechów, op. cit. p. 240 – 246.

<sup>65</sup> John Paul II Speech of April, 27<sup>th</sup> 2001 to the participants of the 7<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the Pope Social Academy, "Globalisation and the Ethics". [www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/jan\\_pawel\\_ii/przemowienia/globalizacja\\_27042001.html](http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/jan_pawel_ii/przemowienia/globalizacja_27042001.html)

<sup>66</sup> The example of religious wars can be crusades (1096-1272), the Hussites wars (1419-1434), the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the Huguenots War (1626-1629).



fundamentalism which relates to movements aiming at religious revival of social life based on God's commandments.<sup>67</sup>

Anthony Giddens defines religious fundamentalism as follows: „*unconditional subordination to defined rules or the concept of rigid opinions. (...) it is the attitude taken by the religious group that the fundamental texts shall be understood literally, and as a result – the doctrine shall refer to each aspect of social, economic and political lives.*” The phenomena is relatively new, excessively displayed on media, even abused and raises concerns and prejudices with regard to people of other religions. Fundamentalism is a kind of defensive reaction to be stripped of one's own national identity and directly against globalization.<sup>68</sup>

Fundamentalism shall not be treated as one, homogenous ideology, as Barbara Kobzarska-Bar claims: „*some fundamentalists place the „truths” propagated by them above the written on the pages of major monotheistic religious prohibition of taking lives and calls for „saint” crusade against dissenters.*” Such action of fundamentalism shows religious and political background of Muslim criminal groups and gives religious background of terrorist attacks. It is crucial not to interpret or confuse with fundamentalism, in particular of its radical shape, however, it seems to be the Islamists expectation.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, it is really important to recognise the differences between fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism, not to discriminate Muslims and not to use violence against them.<sup>70</sup>

Religious fundamentalists politicize Islam, and their main goal is catching social life back to the system based upon Allah's orders and treating religion as a foundation of ultimate values.<sup>71</sup> More often we can face more radical acting fostered by unemployment of young Muslims, living conditions and inability of any changes of functioning in Arab states. Such behaviours bring about the popularity of radical Islam enables young people to get rid out of difficult economical and social situations. The religious community teaches new values that to be protected makes the people fight against oppressors. Therefore the radicals make use of the fact that Islam does not belong to pacifistic religions and military attacks are explained by orders in Quran.<sup>72</sup>

On the territory of the European Union Muslim fundamentalism is strong in France, Great Britain where exist strong Muslim communities. The only presence of the „strangers” brings about different types of special tensions that, unfortunately, are getting stronger because they

<sup>67</sup> B. Kobzarska-Bar, *Fundamentalizm religijny muzułmańskich organizacji terrorystycznych a stan zagrożenia w Europie*, „Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego”, 2014, vol. 8, No. 1, p. 167.

<sup>68</sup> A. Giddens, *Socjologia*, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 582.

<sup>69</sup> Islamist is described a person who back supporters of a political form of Islam. The term does not mean jihadist. Jihadist through violence, suicide and terrorist attacks expresses acts of martyr's death and heroic fight for faith and Muslims. Islamism means pollicised Islam.

<sup>70</sup> B. Kozarska-Bar, op. cit., p. 168.

<sup>71</sup> Radical Islam takes a form of fighting extremism, it comes from Islam. It origins are in Muslims who wanted to bring back their native culture and religion through military way acting on the ground of jihad, as the only way of fight the West. The radicals strongly emphasis flagrant historical injustice caused by the activity of the West towards the Arab countries through public opinion manipulation aimed at discrediting Islam. Thus, in the terrorist attacks occurs the issue of the terrifying threat propagated by some of imams. A point of concern is recruitment of volunteers from the European countries to fight on the side of Muslims. The presence of the volunteers is explained as the clear advantage of Islam over Christianity.

<sup>72</sup> B. Kobzarska-Bar, op. cit., p. 172 – 179.

insubordinate the relevant rules and obligation in the country. This seems to be obvious that minorities excessively display their religious rituals and own customs presenting their arrogant attitude towards natives these will bring about ethnically and religious motivated violence and riots. Such situations relatively often occur in France. France as a secular state<sup>73</sup>, besides the freedom of conscience and belief, and religion is a solely the matter of individual. Therefore ostentatious outfits and religious symbols in schools and other public places to manifest one's own belonging to Islam was seemed a disregard of the constitution of the Fifth Republic and legally banned by amendment of the educational code of March, the 15<sup>th</sup> 2004, and in 2010 the ban was extended on all the public places. The ban, on the one hand was to stop visualisation of the religious preferences and cultural identity in the secular France, and on the other – as an instrument of the French government against Islam.<sup>74</sup>

On the ground of Christianity we meet fundamentalism in the North Ireland between two branches – Catholics and Protestants. Despite the major reason of the conflict is politically motivated, it is evident the religious difference intensified the mutual hostility. It is worth memorising the events of 1972 known as „Bloody Sunday”. On Sunday, the 30<sup>th</sup> January 1972, in Londonderry, British paratroopers open fire at demonstrating Catholics and kill 13 of them. The Irish, in retaliation to the death of innocent people, burn British embassy in Dublin. The „Bloody Sunday” shows how absurd and silly it was the fight between protestants and Catholics, where Catholics destroy in their own independent country (the Irish Republic) valuable architectonic monument. Against the background of these events were written patriotic songs and a film showing the events from over a half of a century.<sup>75</sup>

## SUMMARY

Multiculturalism is one of the major challenges of the modern Europe under the influence of globalisation is being shaped into multicultural continent. We shall discuss multiculturalism when over a limited area reside two or more groups of different traditions, culture or languages. The large number of ethnic groups lead to frequent conflicts. Seeking for sources of such phenomenon we shall look at interethnic relationships and problems left over the previous times as the core are: colonization and migrations. Ethnical conflict may become a conflict referring the identity of a minority group or fight against inequality or social, economical and political discrimination. 19<sup>th</sup>

Additionally, Europe of the turn of the 20 and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries shall meet a new problem, that means mass immigration, in particular Muslims. The phenomenon considerably influenced the increase local nationalist societies, separatisms and the activeness of terrorist organisations.

<sup>73</sup> Formal-legal separation of the state and Church in France has existed since December, the 9<sup>th</sup> 1905 on the bases of Constitution, subjected to many amendments, removing Concordat and indicating France as a secular state.

<sup>74</sup> M. Madej, Z. Pasek, *Kulturowe i prawne aspekty kontrowersji wokół chusty muzulmańskiej we Francji*, Studia Prawa Wyznaniowego, Vol. 15-2012, p. 193 – 200.

<sup>75</sup> V. Grotowicz, op. cit. p. 324.

With the benefit of hindsight the idea of segregating the immigrants in camps and ghettos was wrong and brought about strengthening their identity with “Umma” – communities within the framework of the so-called Umma (followers of Islam define themselves as ‘Umma’ – community of true believers) , and additionally sharpen their radicalism.

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## **Рецензія на рукопис монографії «Уряди меншості в європейських парламентських демократіях» Панчак-Бялоблоцкої Надії Василівни**

Рукопис монографії «Уряди меншості в європейських парламентських демократіях» представляє собою комплексний механізм дослідження означеної проблематики в демократичних країнах Західної та Центрально-Східної Європи відповідно після Другої світової війни і колапсу системи «Варшавського договору». Вибір країн не випадковий, оскільки вони не тільки окреслюються феноменом та конструктом парламентської демократії, однак і є членами чи асоціюються з Європейським союзом, а тому врахування їхнього інституційно-процесуального досвіду, зокрема з приводу урядів меншості, вкрай важливе для України.

Доволі значну увагу автор рукопису монографії Панчак-Бялоблоцка Н. В. присвятила визначенню феноменів європейських парламентських демократій та урядів і урядових кабінетів. З огляду на це, було концептуалізовано, типологізовано і градуйовано статистику урядів у сучасних європейських парламентських демократіях. Однак магістральною у монографії виявилась проблематика феномену, підстав виокремлення, сутності, ознак, особливостей, типів, причин, умов, моделей та способів формування, функціонування і відповідальності урядів меншості у різних прикладах європейських парламентських демократій й загалом у Європі. Наголосу заслуговує авторська позиція щодо оцінювання таких параметрів урядів меншості, як їхня стабільність, ефективність та політичні і соціально-економічні наслідки. Також актуальність монографії окреслена потребою переходу на якісно новий зміст і рівень системи політичної науки в Україні. Річ у тому, що в рукописі монографії ефективно синтезовано різноконцептуальні якісні і кількісні методи порівняльного аналізу (на прикладі урядів меншості), що має розвивати у вітчизняній політичній науці доказовість, прагматизм, системність і логічність.

Запропонований рукопис монографії про уряди меншості в європейських парламентських демократіях ґрунтується на класичних і найновіших здобутках порівняльно-політологічної, конституційноправової, партіологічної і псефологічної дисциплін та теорії коаліцій, а також різних методологічних підходів у їх межах. Структура рукопису монографії чітка: визначено зміст та обсяг обов'язкових для засвоєння теоретико-методологічних відомостей, окреслено послідовність механізмів їх практичної імплементації на прикладі європейських парламентських демократій.

Високий науковий рівень викладу теоретичного матеріалу монографії вдало поєднується із його актуальністю та практичною важливістю. Особливої уваги заслуговує подана в рукописі монографії систематизація знань про конституційно-правові, інституційно-політичні, виконавчо-законодавчі, партійно-електоральні, ідеологічні і владно-опозиційні

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параметри/атрибути формування, функціонування та відповідальності урядів меншості у європейських парламентських демократіях. Крім того, в рукописі монографії забезпечено логічний зв'язок і взаємодію між усіма елементами представленої політологічної знання. Це дозволяє отримати комплексне, системне і функціональне уявлення про уряди меншості в європейських парламентських демократіях, збагнути їхню детермінованість й атрибутивність у сучасному міжінституційному середовищі та політичному процесі.

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