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Wstęp

2014 rok stał się szczególnym dla Ukrainy, krajów Europy Środkowej i całego świata. Owa szczególność uwarunkowana jest szeregiem zdarzeń, jakie miały i mają miejsce w Ukrainie i determinowały narodowy, regionalny i światowy proces polityczny. Początek tym wypadkom dała Rewolucja Godności, która objęła znaczną część Ukrainy i wyraźnie określiła brak zgody większości społeczeństwa Ukrainy na utratę europejskiej perspektywy i pragnienia zmian społeczno-politycznych. Dramatyczne działania z końca lutego 2014 r., gdy rządzący autorytarny reżim zastosował brutalną siłę do zduśnięcia akcji protestu, doprowadziły do upadku reżimu i zmiany politycznej konfiguracji w Radzie Najwyższej Ukrainy. Jeśli wydarzenia na Majdanie w Kijowie i wielu innych majdanach pod względem formy i skutków są podobne do rewolucji, to aneksja Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską i wybuch separatyzmu we wschodnich i południowych obwodach przy aktywnym poparciu Rosji konceptualnie są podobne do kontrrewolucji. Całkowite znaczenie rewolucyjnego paradygmatu w pewnym stopniu uzależnione jest od wyników przedterminowych wyborów parlamentarnych 26 października 2014 r., jakie mają umocnić/uprawomocnić jego konsekwencje i zdolność instytucji prezydenta i nowego parlamentu do przyjęcia kompleksu reform tak niezbędnych dla ukraińskiego społeczeństwa. Rozwój opcji kontrrewolucyjnej odbywał się zgodnie z tradycyjnym schematem: próba zachowania starego systemu i wsparcie sąsiada, zainteresowanego brakiem zmian i wewnętrzną słabością Ukrainy. Przy czym wysoka waga zmian w Ukrainie spowodowała naruszenie przez kierownictwo Rosji szeregu umów/norm międzynarodowych dotyczących terytorialnej integralności i nie ingerowania w sprawy wewnętrzne. Rosja, która przez długi okres po upadku Muru Berlińskiego czuła się częścią Europy i świata demokratycznego jako partner w dziele konstruowania europejskiej pokojowej wspólnoty, na skutek swojej brutalnej ingerencji w wydarzenia na Ukrainie, przekształciła się w potężne zagrożenie dla krajów regionu i całej Europy. Sam fakt wymienionych działań bezpowrotnie zmienił sytuację w regionie i całej Europie. Odpowiednio, ocena naukowa procesów politycznych w regionie pozostaje aktualną dla zrozumienia przebiegu procesu politycznego w poszczególnych krajach i całym regionie oraz wyodrębnienia czynników, jakie wpływają na zmiany instytucjonalne. Publikacja poświęcona jest szerokiemu spektrum problemów politycznych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i odzwierciedla punkt widzenia polskich i ukraińskich badaczy. Spodziewamy się, że nasze publikacje wespół z innymi będą sprzyjać lepszemu zrozumieniu stanu rzeczy oraz tendencjom rozwojowi politycznego tej części Europy.

Вхід

2014 рік став особливим для України, країн Центральної Європи і цілого світу. Ця особливість зумовлена низкою подій, які мали і мають місце в Україні і детермінували національний, регіональний і світовий політичний процес. Початок цим подіям дала Революція Гідності, яка охопила значну частину України і чітко окреслила незгоду більшості українського суспільства із втратою європейської перспективи та прагнення суспільно-політичних змін. Драматичні події кінця лютого 2014 року, коли правлячий авторитарний режим використав брутально силу для придушення акцій протесту, призвели до падіння режиму і зміни політичної конфігурації у Верховній Раді України. Якщо події на Майдані в Києві і багатьох інших майданах за формою та наслідками подібні до революції, то анексія Криму Російською Федерацією та вибух сепаратизму в східних та південних областях за активної підтримки Росії концептуально подібні до контрреволюції. Повноцінність революційної парадигми певною мірою узалежнена від результатів дострокових парламентських виборів 26 жовтня 2014 р., які мають закріпити/легітимізувати її результати та здатності інституту президента і нового парламенту прийняти комплекс реформ так необхідних українському суспільству. Розвиток контрреволюційної складової відбувався згідно традиційних лекал: спроба зберегти стару систему і опертя на допомогу сусіда, зацікавленого у відсутності змін і внутрішній слабкості України. При цьому висока вартість ставки щодо змін в Україні спровокувала порушення керівництвом Росії низки міжнародних угод/норм стосовно територіальної цілісності, невтручання у внутрішні справи. Росія, яка тривалий період після падіння Берлінського муру сприймалася Європою і демократичним світом в якості партнера по конструюванню європейського мирного дому, внаслідок свого брутального втручання в події на Україні, перетворилась на потужну загрозу для країн регіону і цілої Європи. Сам факт означених подій безповоротно змінив ситуацію в регіоні і цілій Європі. Відповідно, наукова оцінка політичних процесів в регіоні залишається актуальною для розуміння ходу політичного процесу в окремих країнах і цілому регіоні та виокремлення чинників, що впливають на інституційні зміни. Піврічник присвячений широкому спектру політичних проблем регіону Центрально-Східної Європи і відображає кут зору польських та українських дослідників. Сподіваємося, що наші публікації разом з іншими будуть сприяти кращому розумінню стану справ та тенденціям політичного розвитку цієї частини Європи.

Особливості трансформації суспільних рухів у політичні партії (на прикладі Чехії та Словаччини)

Розглянуто передумови утворення суспільних рухів у Чехії та Словаччині; проаналізовано особливості їх діяльності; виокремлено чинники трансформації суспільних рухів «Громадянський форум» та «Громадськість проти насилля» у політичні партії.

Ключові слова: суспільні рухи, трансформації політичних систем, комуністичні партії, незалежність, революція, демократизація.

Peculiarities of social movements' transformation into political parties (at the example of Czech Republic and Slovakia)

The preconditions of social movements' creation in Czech Republic and Slovakia are considered; peculiarities of its activity are analyzed. The author singled out factors of transformation of social movements „Civic Forum” and „Public against Violence” into political parties.

Keywords: social movements, transformation of political systems, communist parties, independence, revolution, democratization

Протести у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж ХХ століття в цілому були засновані на традиціях мобілізації людей у рамках нестабільних політичних ситуацій. Таким чином, появу в 1989 році політичних можливостей для масової мобілізації та розвитку протестної культури слід розглядати як вагомий початок зародження опозиційних суспільних рухів. Їх утворення та подальша діяльність стали каталізатором демократизації країн Центрально-Східної Європи.

Чехословаччину можна вважати зразком демократичної діяльності опозиційних суспільних рухів, враховуючи, що досягнення мети цих рухів відбулося мирним шляхом, без використання зброї та кровопролиття. Тому вивчення передумов утворення, особливостей діяльності, а також подальшої інституціоналізації суспільних рухів у Чехії та Словаччині дасть можливість детально проаналізувати їх роль у демократизації цих країн, розглянути вплив політичних партій, які утворилися з цих рухів, на подальший розпад Чехословаччини, а також виробити певний можливий сценарій розвитку подій у країнах, які зараз перебувають на шляху переходу до демократії.

Передумови утворення та особливості діяльності суспільних рухів розглядали багато науковців. Зокрема, значний внесок у розвиток теорії суспільних рухів зробили американські науковці Г. Блумер, У. Корнхаузер, Д. Макадам, С. Терроу, Ч. Тілі, французький учений А. Турен, американський соціолог Н. Смедзер, польський дослідник П. Штомпка, російські дослідники О. Здравомислова, О. Яницький [1, с. 91], О. Ротмістров [5] та інші. Суспільні рухи у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи досліджували канадські науковці Дж. Крапфл [13] та В. Гомез [10], угорський дослідник М. Сабо [14] та інші. Політичні партії країн Центрально-Східної Європи також аналізували науковці, серед яких – українські дослідники А. Романюк та Ю. Шведа [4], німецький дослідник Г.-Й. Феєн [6], американський вчений Г. Кітшельт [11], нідерландський політолог П. Копецкі [12].

Метою статті є визначення передумов утворення «Громадянського форуму» у Чехії та «Громадськості проти насилля» у Словаччині, аналіз соціального контексту та особливостей їх діяльності, а також причин подальшої трансформації цих рухів у політичні партії.

У Чехословаччині, як і в інших країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, у кінці 80-х рр. назріла криза комуністичної влади. Рух протесту проти політичного режиму розгортався під гаслами демократичних перетворень, незалежності, а також зближення з Європою.

На хвилі антикомуністичних виступів у Чехії виникає опозиційний рух – «Громадянський форум» (ГФ) на чолі з В. Гавелом, у Словаччині його аналогом стає «Громадськість проти насилля» (ГПН), яку очолив Я. Чарногурський.

Значний вплив на вектор діяльності протестних рухів у Чехословаччині мала польська профспілка «Солідарність», яка виникла ще у 1980 р. і до початку 1990-х рр. перетворилася на сильне та впливове опозиційне формування. У Польщі був один важливий ресурс, якого так не вистачало Чехословаччині: активісти із роками досвіду організації та проведення антикомуністичного опору. Чеським дисидентам бракувало чіткої структури їхніх протестів [2, С. 122]. У кінці 1980-х рр. польські та чеські інтелектуали організовували спільні зустрічі з метою обговорення і пошуку шляхів вирішення існуючих проблем. Для Чехословаччини важливість цих зібрань полягала, перш за все, у можливості перейняти досвід польського антикомуністичного руху. Все ж, на відміну від Угорщини та Польщі, суспільні рухи у Чехословаччині залишалися досить слабкими. Це пов'язано, перш за все, з тим, що профспілки, інтелігенцію та дисидентів у цій країні населення не підтримувало значною мірою.

Нацистська окупація 1939-1945 рр., тоталітарна комуністична держава та «Празька весна» 1968 р. радикально скоротили чисельність чеської еліти та змінили її характер. З одного боку, знищили фізично або ж вигнали до еміграції, а з іншого відтіснили на узбіччя суспільства. Таким чином, чеська еліта, яка намагалася вивести власне суспільство на якісно новий рівень розвитку, у 1989 р. була знесилена, нечисельна, слабка та надійно

ізолювана від суспільства комуністичним режимом. Це були невеликі групи, до яких належали переважно інтелектуали найрізноманітнішої політичної орієнтації, а також найбільш рішучі та сміливі представники інших суспільних верств, переважно студенти та робітники. Найбільш чисельною, відомою і впливовою була група «Хартія 77» [8].

Спочатку таку назву мав маніфест про права людини, підписаний у Чехословаччині на початку 1977 р. групою чеських та словацьких правозахисників, проте за короткий час «Хартія 77» перетворилася у політичну опозицію та рух за права людини. Фактично прийняття цієї Хартії було пов'язано з ратифікацією Чехословаччиною документів ООН у галузі прав людини. Хоча офіційна Прага, як і Москва, зобов'язалася виконувати міжнародні домовленості, на практиці про них ніхто й не пам'ятав. Поступово «Хартія 77» стала розширювала поле своїх зацікавлень від прав людини до довкілля та економічної реформи. Але сама «Хартія 77» не зуміла зайняти нового місця децентралізованої, зорієнтованої на конкретні проблеми політичної опозиції. Радше, окресливши питання, вона стала фундаментом для утворення нових типів опозиції.

Тим часом, у Словаччині на перший план почали виходити екологічні проблеми, особливо після аварії на Чорнобильській АЕС. Питання охорони довкілля було не рівнозначним антикомунізму; проте для багатьох саме воно стало першим кроком у цьому напрямку. Поява екологічних протестів допомогла перетворити боротьбу проти правлячого режиму з інтелектуального заняття на сфокусовану полеміку. Проте, словацьку опозицію обмежувала ізоляція її членів. «Зелені», митці, церква, інтелектуали оберталися у різних колах [2, С. 123]. Їм не вистачало згуртованості та погодженості у конкретних діях, що б значно полегшило досягнення визначених цілей. У свою чергу «Хартія 77» хоч і не змогла об'єднатися у єдину потужну опозиційну силу, все ж стала фундаментом для утворення впливових антикомуністичних рухів «Громадянського форуму» (ГФ) у Чехії та «Громадськості проти насилля» (ГПН) у Словаччині.

Щодо останнього існують різні погляди на його виникнення. Англійський дослідник Саймон Сміт зазначає, що ГФ був заснований до ГПН у м. Гуменне та інших містах Східної Словаччини. Чеський професор Ян Рихлік стверджує, що підрозділи ГФ були створені у м. Кошице та деяких частинах Західної Словаччини. Чеський історик та політолог Іржі Сук зазначав, що ГФ був утворений швидше, ніж ГПН у Центрально-Східній Словаччині. Ян Рихлік припускає, що координувальний центр ГФ, який знаходився у Празі, скасував усі словацькі підрозділи ГФ наприкінці листопада або на початку грудня 1989 року, після чого вони були реорганізовані як філіали ГПН. У свою чергу І. Сук надає докази того, що багато підрозділів ГФ протидіяли їх злиттю з ГПН у 1990 році та щосили намагалися зберегти свою первісну ідентичність [13].

ГФ був утворений 19 листопада 1989 р., через два дні після початку Оксамитової революції, як реакція на жорстокий розгін поліцією студентської демонстрації 17 листопада. Упродовж десяти днів загального страйку, який розпочався на початку

революції, словацький ГФ був створений на робочих місцях та у містах, принаймні у 27 із 38 регіонів Словаччини, на які вона була розділена у 1989 році. З моменту заснування і протягом двох років, ГФ мав вагомий вплив на політичне життя країни.

Популярності ГФ сприяла його доступність для простих громадян. Засновники форуму описали його як «відкритий для всіх сегментів і сильних сторін чехословацької громадськості» [10] й підкресливали, що «кожен може приєднатися до Громадянського форуму» і що це «рух обох наших народів». ГФ звернувся до суспільства з простою та зрозумілою програмою, у якій закликав повернутися до свободи, демократії, державної незалежності та Європи. Рух також виявився спроможним ефективно спонукати суспільство до початку активних дій, спрямованих проти чинного режиму (відомих під назвою «Оксамитова революція») та на підтримку вимоги нового напрямку розвитку країни [3]. На відміну від ГФ, ГПН був більш обмеженим. У його установчій декларації зазначено, що це рух лише «культурної та академічної громадськості». Хоча ГПН закликала громадян до боротьби задля діалогу та демократії разом із нею, проте, насправді, не запрошувала людей вступити до своїх лав. Це, мабуть, причина того, що група братиславських громадян вирішили створити незалежний Братиславський ГФ як більш відкритий, ніж його аналог ГПН.

ГПН намагалася врятувати свої позиції в очах громадськості у декларації 22 листопада, де підкреслювалося, що ініціатива відкрита для усіх громадян, які відмовилися від насильства. Також було зазначено, що ГПН хоче стати «рухом у масштабах всього суспільства», але, як і раніше, не визначалася необхідність створення філії за межами Братислави. З огляду на газетні коментарі та листи, які надходили до ГПН, громадяни вважали цей рух назвою Братиславського ГФ [7]. Із часом осередки ГФ починають перейменовувати у ГПН або об'єднувати з ним. Делегат від ГПН у м. Прешові зазначив, що причиною зміни назви осередків ГФ на ГПН є теза словацького актора Мікулаша Ласа: «Нове ім'я є частиною руху відновлення у Словаччині, тоді як ГФ виник та існує у чеських містах нашої Батьківщини». Іншими словами, «ГФ виник не тут, і ми підкоряємося іншій владі, яка визначає значення наших дій» [13]. Так, до червня 1990 року ГФ зник зі Словаччини.

Особливості виникнення ГПН у Словаччині слід розглядати крізь призму політичних подій, які відбувалися у цій країні в кінці 80-х – на початку 90-х рр. Колишній учасник ГПН Ладіслав Снопко зазначав, що у Чехії до 1989 р. дисидентів було значно більше, ніж у Словаччині, де їх можна було «перелічити на пальцях». На його думку, ГПН виник як реакція на інцидент у Празі 17 листопада, хоча у Словаччині відбулася студентська демонстрація за день до початку революції, тобто 16 листопада. Саме за Братиславою на наступний день протести студентів почалися й у Празі. Проте, Л. Снопка все ж вказує, що ГПН утворився майже одночасно з ГФ, бо їх виникнення було пов'язане спільною першочерговою метою діяльності – поваленням комуністичної

влади [9]. Якщо до початку революції дисиденти та інші опозиційні групи, з яких пізніше утворилися протестні рухи, не відзначалися своєю політичною силою та впливом, то з часом ГФ та ГПН стають наймасовішими та найвпливовішими в республіці, бо саме вони відіграли вирішальну роль в організації та проведенні «Оксамитової революції» – безкровному поваленні комуністичного режиму в Чехословаччині в результаті вуличних акцій протестів 16 листопада – 29 грудня 1989 р. Лідери ГФ та ГПН очолили народне повстання, зуміли надати йому організованого характеру й упродовж кількох тижнів домогтися докорінних змін у суспільно-політичному житті Чехословаччини.

Оксамитова революція у Чехословаччині розпочалася з розгону поліцією студентської демонстрації, проте швидко вона перейшла в мирне русло. Це пов'язано, перш за все, з тим, що в перші дні й тижні після листопада 1989 р. стратегія діалогу з комуністами в дусі популярного на той час гасла «ми не такі, як вони» (тобто «ми не будемо боротися з ними їх методами») отримала перевагу над стратегією повного усунення комуністів від участі в управлінні громадськими справами та заборони комуністичної партії як екстремістської та злочинної [8]. Тому комуністи продовжували брати участь у політичному житті країни. Таким чином, ГФ та ГПН у листопаді та грудні 1989 р. разом проводили переговори з Комуністичною партією Чехословаччини і прагнули налагодити з нею конструктивний діалог, спрямований на узгодження спільних дій із метою здійснення демократичних перетворень в країні.

Керівництво ГФ, яке на початках утворювали чеський письменник-драматург, дисидент В. Гавел та невелика група інших ключових дисидентів, вирішило залучити до своїх лав сторонніх людей, які раніше не брали участі в опозиційних рухах. Цей крок був свідомою спробою легітимації ГФ як керівника демократичної трансформації шляхом становлення його широкого представництва серед громадськості. Члени опозиції усвідомлювали, що вони є відносно малою та ізольованою групою у чехословацькому суспільстві та потребують участі й підтримки більшості громадян. Крім того, опозиція, яка об'єднувала письменників, журналістів, учених, істориків і філософів, потребувала спеціальних умінь та знань у галузі економіки та інших сферах життєдіяльності суспільства. Тому досить швидко ГФ у своїх лавах досяг представництва робочого класу та багатьох членів Комуністичної партії Чехословаччини. Найважливішим досягненням членів ГФ було те, що їх підтримували академіки та технократи, які не входили до лав опозиційних сил, а були членами так званої «сірої зони». Це означало, що вони ніколи не були в опозиції до комуністичного режиму, а, з іншого боку, ніколи не належали до членів Комуністичної партії [10].

Комуністичний режим у Чехословаччині капітулював відносно швидко. У другій половині грудня 1989 р. було досягнуто згоди щодо зміни уряду, обрання Вацлава Гавела на пост президента і проведення перших вільних і справедливих парламентських виборів у червні 1990 р. Такому швидкому успіху суспільних рухів посприяло певною

мірою й те, що в Чехословаччині частково зберігалися довоєнні чеські суспільні, політичні, економічні та культурні традиції і звичаї. Комуністам, попри всі їх зусилля, не вдалося повністю замінити їх соціалістичними. Суспільство відгукнулося на заклики повернутися до цих традицій, оскільки вони полегшували його адаптацію у процесі зміни суспільного ладу [8].

Разом із досягненням першочергової мети перед ГФ та ГПН поставили нові, не менш значущі завдання. Під час посткомуністичного транзиту в Чехословаччині стала актуальною проблема національного самовизначення – зокрема, вийшли на поверхню, отримавши нове звучання, проблеми взаємовідносин між двома основними націями та державно-територіальними частинами федерації [10].

Навесні 1990 р. у Братиславі пройшли демонстрації з вимогою змінити назву держави, щоб відобразити рівноправний характер відносин між двома народами та нагадати чехам, Європі, всьому світу про словаків як про самобутній, самостійний народ, якого пригнічувало те, що їх «приховували» за терміном «чехословаки». У квітні 1990 р. з'явилася нова назва країни – Чеська та Словацька Федеративна Республіка. У передвиборчій програмі всі партії Словаччини включили пункт про новий державно-правовий устрій країни. Вимога створення нової незалежної словацької держави містилась у програмі створеної у грудні 1989 р. Словацької національної партії та рухів, які пізніше, вже після виборів, долучилися до неї. За конфедеративний устрій Чехословацької держави першою виступила Партія свободи – «традиційна» партія, яка існувала протягом всього соціалістичного періоду, але у грудні 1989 р. змінила програму.

Улітку 1990 р. проблема майбутньої чехословацької державності стає однією з головних у країні. Поступово словацькі партії, як «традиційні», так і тільки створені, за своїми поглядами на словацько-чеські відносини розділилися на тих, які виступали за збереження федерації, але в оновленій демократичній формі, і тих, хто почав схилитися до конфедерації та навіть до створення незалежної словацької держави. Щодо першої групи, перш за все, слід назвати рух ГПН. У його передвиборчій програмі, прийнятій у травні 1990 р., відзначалося прагнення «виступати за повне самовизначення словацького народу», а також підкреслювалося: «Словацьку державність ми розуміємо як природне і невід'ємне право завершити реалізацію всіх аспектів суверенітету сучасного європейського народу. Її відродження ми бачимо у єдиній демократичній федерації з такою самою суверенною чеською державністю. Федерацію ми розуміємо як спільні дії, як взаємовигідне об'єднання сил на основі спільних внутрішньо та зовнішньополітичних, економічних та культурних інтересів» [7, с. 225]. З одного боку, словаки хотіли залишитися з Чехією та користуватися перевагами більшої за територією держави, а, з іншого боку, прагнули самостійності Словаччини. Така суперечлива позиція не завадила ГПН залишатися авторитетною політичною силою з великою кількістю прихильників. Щодо ГФ, то він, як і його аналог ГПН, виступав проти комуністичної влади, прагнуч

здійснити демократичні трансформації, зблизитися з Європою. На відміну від ГПН, який першочергову роль приділяв незалежності Словаччини, то ГФ створювався як організація, опозиційна до керівництва Чехословаччини та правлячої КПЧ.

ГФ, як і ГПН, брав участь у перших демократичних парламентських виборах у червні 1990 р. як різновид широкої «парасолькової» групи, що включала в себе різні менші організації та партії. ГФ легко отримав перемогу у Чеській частині федерації, набравши майже 50 % голосів тоді, як Комуністична партія – 13 %. У Словацькій частині ГПН також отримала більшість голосів.

Новий федеральний парламент із перевагою ГФ та ГПН у перший електоральний термін отримав численні виклики. Перш за все, новий уряд мав намір провести велику кількість економічних та політичних реформ. Таким чином, було прийнято так званий люстраційний закон, що діє й дотепер і забороняє вищим функціонерам колишньої комуністичної партії (від районного секретаря й вище), а також усім офіцерам, агентам та інформаторам колишньої служби державної безпеки займати вищі посади в державному управлінні (закон не поширюється на виборні посади). Незважаючи на необхідність реформування всіх сфер життєдіяльності Чехословаччини, конституційні питання, які стосувалися федерального статусу країни та влади її складових Чеської та Словацької республіки, стали першочерговими питаннями порядку денного [10].

У цей самий час ГФ поглинули внутрішні суперечки щодо структури руху, а також ідеологічні непорозуміння щодо міри та швидкості економічної трансформації [13]. Як і інші опозиційні «парасолькові» рухи в регіоні, ГФ включав лібералів, консерваторів, соціальних демократів, реформованих комуністів, християнських демократів тощо. Наявність серед членів фронту представників різних ідеологічних напрямків стала причиною таких суперечностей.

Група проринкових лібералів разом із міністром фінансів та економістом Вацлавом Клаусом виступала за швидку приватизацію та лібералізацію, а також хотіла трансформувати ГФ у більш ієрархічну партію-організацію. До її опонентів у межах ГФ належали різні групи колишніх дисидентів та комуністів. Вони протидіяли трансформації ГФ у партію чи набір партій та наголошували на необхідності створення ринкової економіки, що характеризувалася змішаними формами власності.

Суперечка загострилася в останні місяці 1990 р., коли В. Клаус був обраний на пост голови ГФ. Його вступ на посаду символізував велику перемогу тих членів руху, які підтримували трансформацію форуму в політичну партію правого спрямування. Представники іншої групи в межах ГФ протидіяли цьому. Їхньою головною метою було підтримувати структуру ГФ як руху.

Ці суперечності та поділи зрештою призвели до розпуску ГФ в лютому 1991 р. Група В. Клауса утворила нову партію – Громадянську демократичну партію (ГДП), у той час як ліберальна група вирішила зберегти вільнішу структуру та отримала назву

Громадянський рух (ГР). Третя група, що об'єднувала осіб, які спочатку вступили до форуму як протопартія Громадянський демократичний альянс (ГДА), вирішила зберегти свою ідентичність та заснувати ГДА як незалежну правоцентристську партію [10].

Вибори в червні 1992 р. протиставляли праве крило ГДП та ГДА одnorідним центристам ГР, бо безліч інших партій разом із реформованою Комуністичною партією брали участь у коаліціях з іншими незначними групами під назвою Лівий блок [14].

Із трьох спадкоємців Громадянського форуму ГДП була найорганізованішою. Після досягнення повного контролю над ГФ група, яку очолював В. Клаус, вийшла з форуму в найкращій та найвигіднішій позиції. При цьому зберегла підтримку більшості регіональних делегатів форуму. Керівництво ГДП налічувало найменше представників серед колишньої антикомуністичної опозиції. Проте серед членів партії домінували технократи, спеціалісти та деякі экс-комуністичні чиновники. Вони, по суті, захопили контроль над ГФ та заснували одну з найкраще організованих партій у Чеській частині федерації. ГДП мала чітку орієнтацію на цінності західної моделі демократії та ринкової економіки.

На протипагу ГДП, у ГР та ГДА домінували экс-дисиденти. ГР був вільний та аморфний рух, який не підпадав під визначення політичної партії та цілеспрямовано називав себе центристською силою з правилами вільного членства. ГДА очолювала мала група экс-дисидентів-інтелектуалів та технократів із Праги, які намагалися ідентифікувати себе як невелику виборчу партію спеціалістів із проринковими ліберальними та консервативними цінностями.

Вибори 1992 р. ознаменували беззаперечну перемогу ГДП та її програми швидкої ринкової трансформації. ГДП набрала майже 30 % голосів. ГДА не вдалося перетнути 5 % бар'єр для того, щоб пройти до федерального парламенту Чехословаччини, і ледь вистачило голосів (5,9 %) для того, щоб пройти в Чеський парламент. ГР не вдалося перетнути виборчий поріг на обох рівнях і, як наслідок, був позбавлений впливу на політичне життя країни.

У Словаччині ГПН розпався навесні 1991 р., коли з нього виокремився на чолі з В. Мечьяром Рух за демократичну Словаччину (РЗДС). Восени 1991 р. із частини ГПН сформувалася консервативна партія Громадянський демократичний союз на чолі з М. Поруб'яком, близька за своєю програмою та позиціями до Громадянської демократичної партії (ГДП) В. Клауса.

У червні 1992 р. у Чехословаччині відбулися парламентські вибори. РЗДС, який набрав найбільшу кількість голосів у Словаччині, наголошував на необхідності розпуску федерації та досягненні незалежності Словаччини. Переговори між ГДП та РЗДС із цього питання, зрештою, призвели до взаємної згоди мирного роз'єднання країни [10].

Суперечки між членами ГФ не були єдиною причиною розпаду руху та подальшої його інституціоналізації. Можна виділити низку інституційних та ціннісних чинників

трансформації суспільних рухів у Чехії та Словаччині. Вагомим інституційним чинником стала відміна статті Конституції щодо керівної ролі комуністичної партії. Це дозволило ГФ та ГПН діяти на правовій основі вже як парламентській опозиції, яка наділена широким спектром політичних прав, а також закріпило принцип політичного плюралізму, який також сприяв трансформації цих рухів.

До ціннісних чинників слід віднести, перш за все, прагнення Чехії та Словаччини до західноєвропейських цінностей, зміну політичного дискурсу в цих країнах, а також виникнення нових завдань на основі вирішення попередніх. Останнє зумовило формування в суспільних рухах не лише тактики, але й певної стратегії подальших дій, що характерно для політичних партій. Суспільні рухи в Чехословаччині були антикомуністичні, тому після досягнення своєї основної мети (повалення комуністичної влади) вони ставили перед собою низку інших важливих завдань, серед яких, перш за все були демократичні перетворення. Також важливою метою ГПН у Словаччині було досягнення незалежності власної держави. Вирішення цих завдань потребувало побудови довготривалого плану дій, що стало важливою причиною інституціоналізації суспільних рухів.

Через десять років після розпаду Чехословаччини Л. Снопка, як колишній член ГПН, зазначав: «Поділ був єдиним логічним рішенням, яке Вацлав Клаус придумав у 1992 році. Одна країна не може існувати, якщо вона знаходиться у руках двох політичних суб'єктів, які повністю відрізняються ідеологічно... Багато політологів звинувачують нас у формуванні «Громадськості проти насилля». Кажуть, що якщо б ми приєдналися до «Громадянського форуму» з самого початку, це врятувало б федерацію. Насправді ми почали «Громадськість проти насилля» у Братиславі, як тільки дізналися про це. Обидві ці організації почали одночасно. Ми діяли так само, як «Громадянський форум» у Празі, але до 10 грудня ми не координували нашу діяльність. Цілковито можливо, що якби ми узгодили наші програми з самого початку, революція була б іншою» [9].

Отже, недієздатність комуністичної влади в умовах, що склалися, прагнення до європейських цінностей, а також необхідність демократичних перетворень стали причиною виникнення ГФ у Чехії та ГПН у Словаччині. Їх діяльність, а також швидке досягнення бажаного результату свідчить про вирішальну роль цих рухів у демократизації Чехословаччини. ГПН і ГФ представляли собою громадян, яких об'єднував образ спільного ворога – тоталітарної комуністичної влади. Коли він зник, у рухах відразу виділилися групи з різними політичними поглядами, зокрема, на подальшу долю Чехословаччини. Тому трансформація ГПН і ГФ, як і в подальшому розпад ЧСФР, були немінучими.

Результати дослідження можуть бути використані для аналізу особливостей посткомуністичної трансформації Чехословаччини, причин розпаду ЧСФР та з'ясування ролі суспільних рухів у досягненні незалежності й вирішенні актуальних проблем перехідних суспільств.

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Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych – wybrane zagadnienia zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego

Artykuł koncentruje się wokół problematyki zapewniania bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych przez samorząd terytorialny. Szczegółowej analizie zostają poddane regulacje dotyczące gminy oraz powiatu, które mają w swoich kompetencjach wiele zadań z zakresu realizacji obowiązku zapewnienia na ich terenie bezpieczeństwa obywatelom. Narracja jest prowadzona z punktu widzenia ustrojowego prawa administracyjnego i nauk o bezpieczeństwie a także politologii.

Słowa kluczowe: Bezpieczeństwo lokalne, samorząd gminny i powiatowy, zarządzanie kryzysowe

The article concentrates around the problems of assuring of the safety of local communities by the territorial self-government. To the detailed analysis become surrendered regulations concerning populaces and the administrative district which has in their own competences many assignments from the range of the realization of the duty of the assurance on their ground of the safety to citizens. The narration is led from the point of view of the constitutional administrative law and also the political science.

Keywords: The local safety, the self-government communal and of district, the crisis management

Wprowadzenie

Bezpieczeństwo stanowi nieodłączny element funkcjonowania społeczności lokalnych, wyraża się ono w zaspokojeniu podstawowych jego potrzeb w tym potrzeby bycia bezpiecznym w sensie podmiotowym jak i przedmiotowym. Szczególne zadania w tym obszarze pełni samorząd terytorialny, którego zasadniczym celem jest między innymi zapewnianie bezpieczeństwa na swoim obszarze działania. Poczucie bezpieczeństwa mieszkańców danej jednostki terytorialnej są jednym z czynników rozwojowych i zarazem jej atrakcyjności. Z kolei brak zaspokojenia potrzeby bezpieczeństwa odczuwany przez mieszkańców i przedsiębiorców, to główny powód ich odpływu.

Życie na obszarze, na którym nie jest zapewnione bezpieczeństwo prowadzi do ucieczki osób wykształconych oraz przedsiębiorczych a to z kolei prowadzi do stagnacji rozwoju gospodarczego i jednoznacznie wpływa na wizerunek jednostki terytorialnej. Słusznie zauważają

T. Serafin i R. Parszowski, że bezpieczeństwo zawsze wiąże się z kwestią komfortu życia wolnego od zagrożeń preferowanych przez mieszkańców danego obszaru.

Poczucie bezpieczeństwa zarazem wpływa na kształtowanie się podstawowych więzi i tożsamości, które czynią daną społeczność miejscową organizmem spójnym, solidarnym, zdolnym do aktywnego tworzenia i ochrony wspólnych wartości i dóbr¹. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie wybranych zadań władz lokalnych w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego, które bezpośrednio wpływa na funkcjonowanie i kształtowanie się podstawowych wartości społeczeństwa lokalnego. Analiza ma charakter instytucjonalny. Autor zamierza przedstawić wybrane aspekty politologiczne i normatywne dotyczące bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. W związku z powyższym w przedmiotowych rozważaniach posługuje się metodą indukcyjną oraz analizą instytucjonalno – prawną.

Autor zakłada następującą hipotezę badawczą, którą postara poddać się weryfikacji: poszczególne organy administracji publicznej są zobligowane przez ustawodawcę do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa. Szczególnie istotne zadania zostały nałożone na gminę i powiat, które dysponując dość rozległym instrumentarium w tym obszarze. Stąd można przyjąć, że gmina i powiat posiadają wszelkie atrybuty, aby zapewnić bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnej.

Gmina i powiat oraz ich zadania z zakresu bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego

W doktrynie gminę definiuje się, jako prawnie zorganizowany terytorialny związek osób określonym w ustawie, jako wspólnota samorządowa. Z kolei przez powiat rozumie się lokalną wspólnotę samorządową oraz odpowiednie terytorium. Powiat, tak jak gmina, ma wymiar społeczny. Kwalifikacja mieszkańców, jako wspólnoty następuje z mocy prawa. Przynależność do wspólnoty nie jest, zatem uzależniona ani od rozstrzygnięcia organów powiatu, ani od woli mieszkańców².

Z uwagi na to, że powiat jest podmiotem o charakterze terytorialnym, drugim jego elementem jest obszar. W tym zakresie powiaty stały się w zasadzie sukcesorami dawnych rejonów administracyjnych, należących do systemu organów administracji rządowej.

Ustawa o samorządzie powiatowym³ ustanawia dwie kategorie powiatów. Powiat jest zasadniczą jednostką podziału terytorialnego, która obejmuje całe obszary graniczących z sobą gmin (powiat ziemski) albo cały obszar miasta (miasto na prawach powiatu). Przy tworzeniu, łączeniu, podziale, znoszeniu powiatów i ustalaniu ich granic należy dążyć do tego, aby powiat obejmował obszar możliwie jednorodny ze względu

¹ T. Serafin, S. Parszowski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych. Programy prewencyjne w systemie bezpieczeństwa*. Warszawa 2011, s. 14.

² S. Wykrętowicz, *Samorząd w Polsce. Istota, formy, zadania*, Poznań 2005, s. 12

³ Ustawa z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie powiatowym, Dz. U. z 2001 r, Nr 142, poz. 1592 (tekst jednolity)

na układ osadniczy i przestrzenny oraz więzi społeczne i gospodarcze, zapewniające zdolność wykonywania zadań publicznych⁴.

Zadania, które wykonują jednostki samorządu terytorialnego stanowią bardzo istotny element tego samorządu. Jak podkreśla się w literaturze zadania, które ma wykonywać samorząd powinny decydować między innymi o takich kwestiach, jak struktura samorządu, jego jednostki organizacyjne, wielkość aparatu pomocniczego, zakres przestrzenny jednostek samorządu terytorialnego czy wreszcie istnienie jednostek pomocniczych a także tym samym tworzenie związków i porozumień komunalnych⁵.

Ustawodawca posługując się pojęciem zadania wskazuje w sposób ogólny na cele, które ma osiągnąć w swojej działalności samorząd lub określone kierunki działań mając na uwadze zakres rzeczowy spraw należących do samorządu. W doktrynie pojawia się także pojęcie kompetencji. Często pojęcia kompetencje i zadania są mylone i utożsamiane.

Jak wskazuje Z. Leoński *kompetencja to zespół praw i obowiązków organu, obejmujący formy prawne działania, głównie o charakterze władczym. Są to zatem prawne formy realizacji zadań samorządu*⁶.

W Polsce funkcjonują trzy szczeble samorządu terytorialnego: gmina, powiat, samorządowe województwo. Każdy z nich wykonuje określone zadania. Do zakresu działania gminy należą wszystkie sprawy publiczne o znaczeniu lokalnym, niezastrzeżone ustawami na rzecz innych podmiotów. Gmina wykonuje zadania własne i zlecone. Zadania własne obejmują sprawy⁷:

- ładu przestrzennego, gospodarki nieruchomościami, ochrony środowiska i przyrody oraz gospodarki wodnej,
- gminnych dróg, ulic, mostów, placów oraz organizacji ruchu drogowego,
- wodociągów i zaopatrzenia w wodę, kanalizacji, usuwania i oczyszczania ścieków komunalnych, utrzymania czystości i porządku oraz urządzeń sanitarnych, wysypisk i unieszkodliwiania odpadów komunalnych, zaopatrzenia w energię elektryczną i ciepłą oraz gaz,
- lokalnego transportu zbiorowego,
- ochrony zdrowia,
- pomocy społecznej, w tym ośrodków i zakładów opiekuńczych,
- gminnego budownictwa mieszkaniowego,
- edukacji publicznej,
- kultury, w tym bibliotek gminnych i innych instytucji kultury oraz ochrony zabytków i opieki nad zabytkami,

⁴ S. Wykrętowicz, *Samorząd* op. cit., s. 13.

⁵ Z. Leoński, *Samorząd terytorialny w RP*, Warszawa 2001, s. 27.

⁶ *Ibidem*, s. 29.

⁷ Art. 7 ust 1 pkt 1-20 Ustawy dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym, Dz. U. z 2001, Nr 142, poz. 1591 ze zmianami.

- kultury fizycznej i turystyki, w tym terenów rekreacyjnych i urządzeń sportowych,
- targowisk i hal targowych,
- zieleni gminnej i zadrzewień,
- cmentarzy gminnych⁸,
- porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa obywateli oraz ochrony przeciwpożarowej i przeciwpowodziowej, w tym wyposażenia i utrzymania gminnego magazynu przeciwpowodziowego,
- utrzymania gminnych obiektów i urządzeń użyteczności publicznej oraz obiektów administracyjnych,
- polityki prorodzinnej, w tym zapewnienia kobietom w ciąży opieki socjalnej, medycznej i prawnej,
- wspierania i upowszechniania idei samorządowej,
- promocji gminy,
- współpracy z organizacjami pozarządowymi,
- współpracy ze społecznościami lokalnymi i regionalnymi innych państw⁹.

W przypadku zdań zleconych ustawy nakładają na gminę obowiązek ich wykonywania. Są to zadania z zakresu administracji rządowej, a także z zakresu organizacji przygotowań i przeprowadzenia wyborów powszechnych oraz referendum¹⁰. Ponadto zadania z zakresu administracji rządowej gmina może wykonywać również na podstawie porozumienia z organami tej administracji. Zaznaczyć należy, iż gmina może także wykonywać zadania z zakresu właściwości powiatu oraz zadania z zakresu właściwości województwa na podstawie porozumień z tymi jednostkami samorządu terytorialnego¹¹.

Z kolei samorząd powiatowy wykonuje określone ustawami zadania publiczne o charakterze ponadgminnym w zakresie¹²:

- edukacji publicznej,
- promocji i ochrony zdrowia,
- pomocy społecznej,
- polityki prorodzinnej,
- wspierania osób niepełnosprawnych,
- transportu zbiorowego i dróg publicznych,
- kultury oraz ochrony zabytków i opieki nad zabytkami,

⁸ Z. Bukowski, T. Jędrzejewski, P. Rączka, *Ustrój samorządu terytorialnego*, Toruń 2005, s.81.

⁹ Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym. (tekst jednolity)

¹⁰ Z. Niewiadomski, *Prawo administracyjne. Część ustrojowa*, Warszawa 2002, s.144.

¹¹ Z. Bukowski, i inni, *Ustrój*, op. cit. s.81

¹² Art. 4 ust 1 pkt 1-22 ustawy z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie powiatowym.

- kultury fizycznej i turystyki,
- geodezji, kartografii i katastru,
- gospodarki nieruchomościami,
- administracji architektoniczno-budowlanej,
- gospodarki wodnej,
- ochrony środowiska i przyrody,
- rolnictwa, leśnictwa i rybactwa śródlądowego,
- porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa obywateli,
- ochrony przeciwpowodziowej, w tym wyposażenia i utrzymania powiatowego magazynu przeciwpowodziowego, przeciwpożarowej i zapobiegania innym nadzwyczajnym zagrożeniom życia i zdrowia ludzi oraz środowiska,
- przeciwdziałania bezrobociu oraz aktywizacji lokalnego rynku pracy,
- ochrony praw konsumenta,
- utrzymania powiatowych obiektów i urządzeń użyteczności publicznej oraz obiektów administracyjnych,
- obronności,
- promocji powiatu,
- współpracy z organizacjami pozarządowymi.

Do zadań publicznych powiatu należy również zapewnienie wykonywania określonych w ustawach zadań i kompetencji kierowników powiatowych służb, inspekcji i straży, ponadto ustawodawca może nakładać na powiaty inne zadania z zakresu administracji rządowej z tym że zadania powiatów nie mogą naruszać zakresu działania gmin¹³.

Wybrane zadania władz lokalnych w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego

Zgodnie z obowiązującym porządkiem prawnym samorząd gminny wykonuje zadania z zakresu bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego. Podkreślić należy iż zadania samorządów gminnych w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego skupiają się na używaniu odpowiednich narzędzi służących do przeciwdziałania występowaniu zagrożeń a także właściwym do reagowania na poczynione już naruszenia tym zakresie.

Do tego służą odpowiednie formacje i służby czy to w postaci rządowych instytucji o zadaniach ogólnych takich jak Policja czy o charakterze dodatkowo wyspecjalizowanych sił porządkowych (straż leśna, służba ochrony kolei). Ich uzupełnieniem są formacje samorządowe w postaci straży gminnych/miejskich¹⁴.

¹³ M. Kallas, I. Lipowicz, Z. Niewiadomski, G. Szpor, *Prawo administracyjne*, Warszawa 2002, s.147.

¹⁴ Art. 7 ust 1 pkt 14 Ustawy z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym, Dz. U. z 2001, Nr 142, poz. 1591.

Podobnie również powiat realizuje zadania publiczne dotyczące porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa. Ustawa o samorządzie powiatowym zobowiązuje starostę w sytuacjach niecierpiących zwłoki, do podjęcia niezbędnych czynności należących do właściwości powiatu, związanych z zagrożeniem interesu publicznego, zagrażających bezpośrednio zdrowiu i życiu oraz spraw mających istotne znaczenie dla społeczności lokalnych.

Czynności te podlegają zatwierdzeniu przez Zarząd na najbliższym posiedzeniu¹⁵. Część przypadających samorządowi powiatowemu kompetencji w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego odpowiada tym, przypisanym gminie i obejmuje:

- wydawanie poleceń instytucjom państwowym dotyczących podjęcia konkretnych działań mających na celu zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego,
- otrzymywanie od właściwych komendantów Policji sprawozdań o stanie bezpieczeństwa,
- wydawanie stosownych uchwał regulujących problematykę bezpieczeństwa,
- pokrywanie wydatków inwestycyjnych, modernizacyjnych bądź remontowych jednostek Policji,
- żądanie od właściwego komendanta Policji przywrócenia stanu zgodnego z porządkiem prawnym na danym terenie,
- finansowanie dodatkowych etatów w Policji¹⁶.

Organem pomocniczym pełniącym dość istotną rolę w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego jest Komisja ds. bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego. Komisja funkcjonuje przez okres kadencyjny a do jej zadań należy:

- dokonywanie oceny zagrożeń porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa obywateli na terenie powiatu;
- przygotowywanie projektu powiatowego programu zapobiegania przestępczości oraz porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa obywateli¹⁷.

Komisja przygotowuje projekt programu zapobiegania przestępczości oraz porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa obywateli, natomiast uchwalenie go należy już do wyłącznej kompetencji rady powiatu

Komisja – jako gremium fachowców działające pod przewodnictwem starosty – powinna pełnić w powiecie funkcję nie tylko opiniodawczą, ale i inspirującą w dziedzinie ochrony bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego, za czym przemawia przede wszystkim skład komisji

¹⁵ T. Serafin, S. Parszowski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczności op. cit.*, s. 48.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, s. 49.

¹⁷ Art. 38a ust. 2 pkt 1 i 3 ustawy z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie powiatowym.

Trzeba tutaj także zauważyć, że ustawodawca, określając zadania komisji, konsekwentnie, podobnie jak przy określaniu ustawowych zadań samorządu powiatowego, posługuje się pojęciem bezpieczeństwo obywateli, a nie bezpieczeństwo publiczne, co być może wynika z faktu, iż uznaje zakres pojęcia bezpieczeństwo obywateli za mniejszy niż bezpieczeństwo publiczne, aczkolwiek trudno wskazać przyczyny wyboru takiej terminologii. Komisja bezpieczeństwa publicznego może współpracować z samorządami gmin z terenu powiatu, organizacjami pozarządowymi a także innymi instytucjami¹⁸.

Szczegółne zadania władz lokalnych w zakresie zapewniania bezpieczeństwa wynikają z ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym. Analizując poglądy teoretyczne na temat zarządzania można spotkać się z tematyką zarządzania w kryzysie, zarządzania sytuacją kryzysową, zarządzaniem kryzysowym, czy nawet sterowaniem kryzysem. Definicje te wiążą się z

- specyficznym działaniem abstrakcyjnego podmiotu w trudnej i pełnej zakłóceń sytuacji,
- konfliktogennym charakterem stosunków między różnymi podmiotami biorącymi w nim udział,
- działaniem w czasie klęsk żywiołowych i katastrof technicznych,
- obroną cywilną,
- gotowością cywilną lub planowaniem cywilnym¹⁹

W Encyklopedii Zarządzania zarządzanie sytuacją kryzysową zostało zdefiniowane jako opanowanie i wyjście z sytuacji kryzysowej jak i przygotowanie się na ewentualność jej zaistnienia. Kryzysem Encyklopedia nazywa się poważną, gwałtowną, niekorzystną zmianę o przełomowym znaczeniu. Sytuacja kryzysowa może powstać wskutek działania sił przyrody, żywiołów, coraz częściej jest też efektem działalności człowieka – lub jej zaniechania. W szczególności chodzi również o kryzysy gospodarcze i polityczne²⁰.

R. Wróblewski z kolei definiuje „zarządzanie sytuacją kryzysową” jako proces odpowiedzialnego kierowania państwem mającym na celu zapobieganie sytuacjom kryzysowym²¹.

Podobnie J. Konieczny który twierdzi że „zarządzanie w sytuacji kryzysowej to systematyczne i metodyczne przedsięwzięcia mające zapobiec lub zredukować wpływ kryzysu na wartości i zasoby społeczne za pomocą środków kierowania oraz kontroli i koordynacji²².

¹⁸ T. Serafin, S. Parszowski, *Bezpieczeństwo op. cit.*, s. 51.

¹⁹ J. Gryz, W. Kitler, (red) *Zarządzanie kryzysowe*, Toruń 2007, s. 28.

²⁰ Encyklopedia Zarządzania, Kraków 2007, s. 162.

²¹ R. Wróblewski, *Zarys teorii kryzysu, zagadnienia prewencji i zarządzania kryzysami*, Warszawa 1996, s. 9.

²² J. Konieczny, *Zarządzanie w sytuacjach kryzysowych, wypadkach i katastrofach*, Poznań-Warszawa 2001, s. 116

Niezwykle często zarządzanie kryzysowe sprowadza się do problematyki ochrony ludności i ratownictwa w sytuacjach noszących znamiona klęski żywiołowej, a nawet podczas zagrożenia wojennego i wojny.

Zarządzanie kryzysowe w takim ujęciu definiuje się jako całokształt działań i rozwiązań systemowych w sferze ochrony ludności, wypełnianych przez władze publiczne wszystkich szczebli we współdziałaniu z wyspecjalizowanymi organizacjami w celu zapobieżenia sytuacjom niebezpiecznym stwarzającym zagrożenie dla życia i zdrowia²³.

Zgodnie z ustawą o zarządzaniu kryzysowym z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 roku zarządzanie kryzysowe to działalność organów administracji publicznej będąca elementem kierowania bezpieczeństwem narodowym, która polega na zapobieganiu sytuacjom kryzysowym²⁴. Zarządzanie kryzysowe przebiega w czterech fazach.

- zapobieganie,
- przygotowanie
- reagowanie
- odbudowa

W fazie zapobiegania realizowane są przede wszystkim działania ograniczające skutki sytuacji kryzysowej. W fazie przygotowania odbywają się działania planistyczne dotyczące sposobów reagowania. W fazie reagowania realizowane są działania polegające na dostarczeniu pomocy poszkodowanym a w fazie odbudowy działania mające na celu przywrócenie zdolności reagowania, odbudowę zasobów służb ratowniczych, odtworzenie kluczowej infrastruktury telekomunikacyjnej, energetycznej, transportowej, paliwowej czy dostarczania wody. Działalność wójta w zakresie zarządzania kryzysem polega na kierowaniu, monitorowaniu, planowaniu, reagowaniu oraz usuwaniu skutków zagrożeń na terenie gminy. W ramach planowania cywilnego odpowiada on za realizację zaleceń do gminnego planu zarządzania kryzysowego oraz opracowywanie i przedkładanie jego Staroście. Wymienione zadania wójt organizuje przy pomocy odpowiedniej komórki – gminnego zespołu zarządzania kryzysowego. W skład gminnego zespołu zarządzania kryzysowego wchodzi:

- osoby zatrudnione w urzędzie gminy²⁵,
- pracownicy zespolonych służb, inspekcji i straży skierowanych przez przełożonych do wykonywania zadań w tym zespole na wniosek wójta,
- przedstawiciele organizacji ratowniczych²⁶.

Wójt, jako organ wykonawczy samorządu gminnego zapewnia na obszarze gminy realizację następujących zadań:

²³ J. Gryz, W. Kitler, (red) *Zarządzanie*, op.cit., s. 30.

²⁴ Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 roku o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz. U. z 2007, Nr. 89. poz. 590 z późn. zm.

²⁵ A także innych jednostkach organizacyjnych gminy.

²⁶ T. Serafin, S. Parszowski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczności op. cit.*, s. 52.

- całodobowe alarmowanie członków gminnego zespołu zarządzania kryzysowego, a w sytuacjach kryzysowych zapewnienie całodobowego dyżuru w celu zapewnienia przepływu informacji oraz dokumentowania prowadzonych czynności;
- współdziałanie z centrami zarządzania kryzysowego organów administracji publicznej;
- nadzór nad funkcjonowaniem systemu wykrywania i alarmowania oraz systemu wczesnego ostrzegania ludności;
- współpracę z podmiotami realizującymi monitoring środowiska;
- współdziałanie z podmiotami prowadzącymi akcje ratownicze, poszukiwawcze i humanitarne;
- realizację zadań stałego dyżuru na potrzeby podwyższania gotowości obronnej państwa²⁷.

Organem właściwym w sprawach zarządzania kryzysowego jest starosta, który ma do dyspozycji powiatowy zespół zarządzania kryzysowego, który jest jego organem doradczym, a w skład którego wchodzi między innymi specjaliści z zakresu ratownictwa, włączeni do Systemu na drodze umowy cywilnoprawnej, oraz powiatowe centrum zarządzania kryzysowego. Plan ratowniczy powiatu zawiera podstawowe zadania i procedury postępowania na wypadek wystąpienia zagrożeń.

Starosta zapewnia skuteczne warunki realizacji bieżących zadań ratowniczych przez jednostki Krajowego Systemu Ratowniczo- Gaśniczego na obszarze powiatu poprzez: uzgadnianie wspólnych działań tych jednostek, zatwierdzanie planów ratowniczych oraz programów działania powiatowych służb, inspekcji i straży oraz innych jednostek organizacyjnych powiatu w zakresie ich udziału w KSRG, określanie zadań KSRG na obszarze powiatu oraz kontrolę ich realizacji. Starosta uwzględnia w projekcie budżetu powiatu niezbędne środki finansowe na skuteczne działania ratownicze powiatowych służb, inspekcji i straży oraz innych jednostek organizacyjnych powiatu, a także dysponuje rezerwą budżetową powiatu, powołuje i przewodniczy powiatowemu zespołowi zarządzania kryzysowego²⁸.

W sytuacjach nadzwyczajnych zagrożeń życia, zdrowia, lub środowiska oraz w stanach kryzysu starosta kieruje KSRG w zakresie: określania celów do osiągnięcia i priorytetów działań ratowniczych, zabezpieczenia logistyki dla sił ratowniczych i pomocniczych, zapewnienia minimalnych wymogów do przetrwania ludności na obszarach (lub z obiektów) dotkniętych zdarzeniem, nadzorowania realizacji przydzielonych zadań oraz monitorowania przebiegu działań ratowniczych.

²⁷ Art. 20 ust 1 pkt 1-6 Ustawy z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 roku o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz. U. z 2007, Nr. 89. poz. 590 z późn. zm.

²⁸ Szerzej: J. Gryz, W. Kitler, (red) *Zarządzanie op. cit.*, s. 31-40.

Do zadań własnych powiatu w zakresie ochrony przeciwpożarowej należy: prowadzenie analiz i opracowywanie prognoz dotyczących pożarów, klęsk żywiołowych oraz innych miejscowych zagrożeń, prowadzenie analizy sił i środków KSRRG na obszarze powiatu, budowanie systemu koordynacji działań jednostek ochrony przeciwpożarowej wchodzących w skład KSRRG oraz służb, inspekcji, straży oraz innych podmiotów biorących udział w działaniach ratowniczych na obszarze powiatu, organizowanie systemu łączności, alarmowania i współdziałania między podmiotami uczestniczącymi w działaniach ratowniczych na obszarze powiatu.

Udział samorządu województwa w zarządzaniu kryzysowym na obszarze województwa został w znacznym ograniczony na rzecz wojewody. Marszałek województwa wyznacza jedynie przedstawiciela samorządu województwa do prac wojewódzkiego zespołu zarządzania kryzysowego²⁹. Finansowanie wykonywania zadań własnych z zakresu zarządzania kryzysowego na poziomie gminy i powiatu a także województwa planuje się ramach poszczególnych budżetów jednostek samorządów terytorialnych. Z kolei na zadania zlecone jednostki te otrzymują dotację celową z budżetu państwa³⁰.

Organy samorządu terytorialnego realizują różnego rodzaju programy prewencyjne, których celem jest podniesienie świadomości społeczności lokalnej w zakresie szeroko rozumianej prewencji w obszarze bezpieczeństwa. Owe programy są tworzone najczęściej na poziomie gminy bądź powiatu, rzadziej przez samorząd województwa.

Poprzez realizację przedmiotowych programów inicjuje się odpowiednie zachowania społeczne, które działają prewencyjnie a tym samym polepszają stan bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. Nie które jednostki samorządu terytorialnego podejmują działania w zakresie tworzenia straży sąsiedzkich czy grup samopomocy lub grup pomocy sąsiedzkiej. Jest to typowa inicjatywa oddolna a jej celem jest zwiększenie poziomu bezpieczeństwa na terenie gminy/powiatu/samorządu województwa. Poprzez edukację władze jednostek samorządów terytorialnych starają się także uczyć społeczeństwo w jaki sposób rozwiązywać określone problemy związane z bezpieczeństwem na poziomie lokalnym. Jak zatem można zauważyć samorządy podejmując odpowiednie działania polepszają stan bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych a tym samym powodują że na ich terenie mieszkańcy mogą czuć się bezpieczni.

Podsumowanie

Wydaje się, iż do elementarnych zasad polityki bezpieczeństwa zalicza się przetrwanie, integralność terytorialną a także standard życia w tym bezpieczeństwo publiczne. Bezpieczeństwo lokalne staje się bardzo ważnym aspektem z punktu widzenia poszczególnych mieszkańców danych terenów a także z perspektywy globalnej. Mieszkańcy coraz częściej wspólnie z władzami lokalnymi próbują tworzyć różnego

²⁹ T. Serafin, S. Parszowski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczności op. cit.*, s. 54.

³⁰ Art. 26 ust. 1-5 Ustawy z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 roku o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz. U. z 2007, Nr. 89. poz. 590 z późn. zm.

rodzaju programy prewencyjne, których celem jest polepszenie bezpieczeństwa na obszarze działania danego samorządu.

Ponadto kreowana jest współpraca z Policją czy innymi formacjami mundurowymi. W szczególności bardzo pomocna dla społeczności lokalnych jest działalność społeczno – organizatorska prowadzona przez służby mundurowe³¹. Poziom bezpieczeństwa zależy także od tego, kogo społeczność lokalna wybierze w wyborach do swoich ciał przedstawicielskich. Jeżeli są to politycy, którzy reprezentują określone poglądy i kładą nacisk na działania w zakresie polepszania bezpieczeństwa, społeczeństwo może czuć się bezpiecznie.

Gorzej kształtuje się sytuacja, w przypadku wybrania osób nieodpowiednich, którzy własne interesy przedkładają na interesy partykularne. W takiej sytuacji ich działania nie przedkładają się na wzrost poczucia bezpieczeństwa. Można, zatem stwierdzić że postawa osób reprezentujących społeczność powinna być nowatorska i czynna bowiem tylko wtedy można mówić o jakiś efektach w dziedzinie poprawy bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych koncentruje się wokół tworzenia straży miejskich/gminnych których celem jest zapewnienie porządku w gminie/mieście a także udział w różnego rodzaju akcjach ratowniczych.

Równie istotne jest powoływanie różnych komisji bezpieczeństwa, których zadaniem jest debatowanie i dochodzenie do konsensu w sprawach bezpieczeństwa lokalnego. W niektórych jednostkach samorządu terytorialnego bardzo istotną rolę pełnią lokalne strategie zapewnianie bezpieczeństwa.

Ich istotą jest kreowanie odpowiednich strategii działań profilaktycznych, zapobiegania przestępczości w skali lokalnej, wprowadzanie określonych działań społecznych i policyjnych. Bardzo istotną sprawą dla polepszenia bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych jest inicjowanie odpowiednich zachowań społecznych, w tym kształtowanie prospołecznych zachowań. Koncentrują się one na zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa w szkole, rodzinie, środkach komunikacji miejskiej/gminnej, ruchu drogowym itp.

Równie ważne są działania mające na celu pobudzenie aktywności obywatelskiej na rzecz bezpieczeństwa. W tym obszarze mieszczą się tworzenie grup sąsiedzkiej czujności, patroli obywatelskich, straży i innych formacji obywatelskich. Ważne jest kształtowanie idei Community policing³² oraz wprowadzanie odpowiednich metod rozwiązywania problemów społeczności lokalnych. Jak można zaobserwować zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnej nie jest zatem trywialnym i zarazem prostym. Samorządy gminny, powiatowy czy wojewódzki muszą zatem dysponować odpowiednimi regulacjami prawnymi oraz zasobami finansowymi oraz ludzkimi. Niekiedy

³¹ W szczególności przez Policję czy Straże

³² Model ten uznaje niedostateczność działań stricte policyjnych i zakłada konieczność prowadzenia działań kreatywnych w sensie kryminologicznym oraz włączania w rozwiązywanie problemów lokalnej społeczności.

największym problemem jest zapewnienie zasobów finansowych i osobowych. Wynika to z niezbyt płodnego systemu finansowania opartego o system finansów publicznych, który ulega deprawacji zwłaszcza obecnie w czasach kryzysu finansowego. Inną sprawą są ludzie, którzy tworzą procedury i je wdrażają. Z tym aspektem również jest bardzo duży problem.

Tworzenie kompetentnych straży gminnych/miejskich jest bardzo ważnym elementem, który wpływa na bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnej. Straż posiadając kompetencje w ramach której może udzielać pouczeń, zwracać uwagę czy ostrzegać przed niebezpieczeństwem, a także legitymowania, ujęcia osób stwarzających niebezpieczeństwo w tym dokonywania kontroli osobistej, nakładania grzywien, dokonywania czynności wyjaśniających, wydawania poleceń oraz zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa na terenie danej gminy jest bardzo istotną organizacją, która wpływa na poprawę bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych.

Owe zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa mieści się w zadaniach straży gminnej/miejskiej i niewątpliwie przyczynia się do poprawy życia społeczności lokalnej. Ważna rola przypada Komisjom ds. bezpieczeństwa powoływanym przez jednostki samorządu terytorialnego. Komisje takie przede wszystkim dokonują w miarę kompleksowych analiz zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa na terenie gminy, powiatu. W przypadku tej ostatniej jednostki są one powoływane obligatoryjnie.

Komisje bezpieczeństwa mimo że są jednostkami mającymi charakter bardziej doradczy to dość często angażują się w przygotowywanie różnego rodzaju dokumentów dotyczących bezpieczeństwa na arenie lokalnej. Jednym z takich dokumentów są różnego rodzaju strategie zapewniania bezpieczeństwa. W tworzenie takich strategii zaangażowani są wybrani urzędnicy jednostki samorządu terytorialnego, komisje, w tym komisja bezpieczeństwa oraz służby (Policja, Straż Pożarna, Straż Gminna/Miejska i inne).

Powstałe w wyniku konsultacji i uzgodnień lokalne strategie, których celem jest podejmowanie określonych działań mających istotny wpływ na poprawę bezpieczeństwa. Powstałe strategie są wdrażane na obszarze jednostek samorządu terytorialnego i również ich zapisy o ile są wdrażane w życie przyczyniają się do polepszenia bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych.

Uzupełnieniem opisywanych strategii są strategie działań profilaktycznych. Koncentrują się one między innymi na podejmowaniu działań, których celem jest zapobieganie przestępczości w tym zarówno drobnej przestępczości jak i tej mającej rozmiary o wiele większe.

W ramach strategii podejmuje się określone działania policyjne i społeczne. Jeśli chodzi o działania policyjne to ich celem jest wzmożenie czujności funkcjonariuszy policji na arenie lokalnej z kolei jeśli chodzi o działania społeczne to polegają one na szerokim włączaniu się społeczeństwa lokalnego w działania policji i innych organów zajmujących się bezpieczeństwem i dbaniem o porządek publiczny.

Spoleczne inicjatywy często koncentrują się wokół powoływanie straży obywatelskich czy grup czujności sąsiedzkiej. Ich celem jest prowadzenie szeroko rozumianej prewencji

mającej zapobiegać działaniom wprowadzającym nieład i niebezpieczeństwo w gminie bądź powiecie. Jest to tyle ważne że to samo społeczeństwo a zatem mieszkańcy danego terenu podejmują określone działania. Mają oni prawo do obywatelskiego zatrzymania osoby czy osób, które naruszają prawo a tym samym bezpieczeństwo.

W zapewnianiu bezpieczeństwa zasadniczą rolę pełni wdrażanie filozofii community policing. W filozofii tej chodzi o współpracy policji ze społecznością lokalną. Przyjmuje się że wspólne działania mieszkańców i policji są gwarancją wysokiej efektywności prowadzonych działań i zarazem lepszego zrozumienia specyfiki problemów występujących w danym miejscu³³. W idei community policing odchodzi się od działań typowo represyjnych w kierunku proaktywnej. Podnosi to zaufanie społeczne do policji i tym samym może ona liczyć na pomoc społeczną, która jest niebywale ważna w rozwiązywaniu problemów związanych z bezpieczeństwem lokalnym.

Reasumując można przyjąć iż organy jednostek samorządów terytorialnych są zobowiązane do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. Posiadają do tego odpowiednie instrumenty zarówno prawne jak i pozaprawne. Ich umiejętne wykorzystanie zależy od umiejętności władarzy sprawujących władze w samorządach. W sytuacji kiedy potrafią oni integrować społeczeństwo i zarazem inicjować określone zadania, zapewnianie bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych staje się funkcją dobrze zarządzanej jednostki samorządu terytorialnego. To z kolei przekłada się na ogóle jej wyniki a także określony stosunek społeczności lokalnych do swojej małej ojczyzny.

Powołane przez ustawodawcę gmina i powiat zostały zobligowane przez ustawodawcę do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa, w tym bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. W tym celu tworzone są różnego rodzaju programy, strategie, powoływane straże czy prowadzenie kampanii szkoleniowo- edukacyjnych. W tym kontekście należy przyjąć iż potwierdza się założona przez autora na początku artykułu hipoteza, że gmina i powiat dysponując dość rozległym instrumentarium prawnym i organizacyjnym są zobowiązane do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa na swoim terenie w tym ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem zamieszkującym bądź przebywającym tam jednostkom.

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Теоретико-методологічні засади дослідження політичних аспектів соціальної відповідальності бізнесу

У статті автор розглядає об'єктивні основи розвитку соціальної діяльності бізнесових структур та її політичні аспекти. Проаналізовано різні підходи до інтерпретації категорії «соціально відповідальний бізнес» та висловлено авторський підхід до цього поняття. Розглянуто чинні моделі соціальної відповідальності бізнесу у провідних країнах світу (американську, європейську та японську). Виявлено особливості прояву соціальної відповідальності бізнесу в Україні та визначено шляхи її подальшого розвитку.

Ключові слова: держава, соціальна відповідальність бізнесу, соціалізація бізнесу, громадянське суспільство.

Iryna Butyrka

Theoretical and Methodological Grounds for Research on Political Aspects of Corporate Social Responsibility

The author of the paper focuses on the objective grounds for development of social activity carried out by business structures and its political aspects. Various approaches to the interpretation of the category “socially responsible business” have been analyzed and the author’s explanation of this notion has been introduced. Current models of corporate social responsibility in leading countries of the world (American, European and Japanese) have been considered. The peculiarities of corporate social responsibility in Ukraine have been revealed and the ways of its further development have been established.

Keywords: state, corporate social responsibility, socialization of business, civil society.

Problem Statement and Relevance of the Study.

Transformational changes, which take place in the post-Communist countries, members of the EU, reveal themselves in modification of political, economic, social processes, while examining key foundations of social production and chosen priorities of its development. Last

financial crisis significantly weakened potentials of the EU member states, uncovered their weak sides, especially social issues in policy of the EU members of the last enlargement. The aims of the EU Lisbon Summit of 2000 and its main slogan “to make EU economy the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, despite all EU efforts, have not been achieved, and in general have been transferred into new “Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth: Europe 2020”¹.

Member states of the EU rather heavily suffer from globalization, which penetrates into all political, economic and social relations, make countries and the supranational organization itself search for the new ways out. We suppose, that one of such ways out is interconnection between the state and business and formation of corporate social responsibility, what has been already proved in practice by well-developed countries of Europe and the whole world. The problem of corporate social responsibility as an important constituent of social policy, aimed at increasing of living standards of citizens in the context of modern conditions, is in the focus of coordination of interests of authority, business-structures and society, and in such a case it is worthy of special attention.

Overview of Recent Studies and Publications

The issue of corporate social responsibility is of great interest for many researchers and has been described in a number of works by foreign scholars. These problems have been analyzed by Ph. A. Boiry², J. P. Boduan³, W. G. Ouchi⁴, J. B. Manheim, R. C. Rich⁵, A. Ries, J. Trout⁶, J. Riggs⁷, K. Eklund⁸, M. R. Amstutz⁹, D. Caldwell, M. Hancock¹⁰ and others. Corporate social responsibility is in the focus of much scientific research. Among Ukrainian scholars these questions are rather studied by economists (as opposed to political analysts), namely

¹ Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth [Electronic resource]. – Access Mode: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/-26

² Boiry Ph.A. Public Relations or the Strategy of Confidence [Transl. from French]. – M.: KG «Image Contact»: INFRA-N., 2001. – 178 p.

³ Boduan, J.P. Management of Company Image. *PR: The Subject and Skill* [Transl. from French]. – M.: KG «Image Contact»: INFRA-M., 2001. – 233 p.

⁴ Ouchi W.G. Methods of Production Organization: Japanese and American Approaches. – M.: Ekonomika, 1984. – 184 p.

⁵ Manheim J. B., Rich R. C. Political Science. Research Methods. – M., 1999. – 544 p.

⁶ Ries A., Trout J. Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind / Transl. from Engl., Ed. Yu. N. Kapturevskiy. – StP., 2001. – 256 p.

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V. Valikov, V. Shapoval¹¹, T. Zaiats, O. Diakonenko¹², V. Marchenko, V. Osetskyi¹³, S. Melnyk¹⁴, N. Suprun¹⁵, I. Tsaryk¹⁶ and others. The researchers, who investigate various aspects of corporate social responsibility, touch upon the question of subject characteristics of social responsibility, forms of its realization in practical activities of enterprises, evaluation of results at micro- and macro-levels, arrangement of conditions for its qualitative improvement etc. However, the abovementioned problem is rather complex and requires further investigations in this field.

The aim of the paper is to substantiate theoretical and methodological grounds for political aspects of corporate social responsibility (hereinafter CSR), to prove the objective need for appearance of this phenomenon, to underline its role in a modern society, to analyze CSR models in leading countries of the world and specific features of CSR in Ukraine.

Findings and Discussions.

In academic literature there are various interpretations of the notion “corporate social responsibility”. Various differences can be traced due to the level of justification, chosen direction and level of generalization. Thus, in the shorthand notes of the Round Table proceedings, devoted to the issues of moral and business, it was mentioned that CSR is a voluntary business’ contribution to the development of society in political, social, economic and ecological spheres, related to the primary activity of a company¹⁷. N. Suprun states, that CSR is a long-term commitment of a company as to ethical business doing and encouragement of economic development of an enterprise, community and society in general¹⁸. O. Paskaver shares the same opinion¹⁹. It is obvious that in the first case the matter is in the businessmen’s desire to take part in improvement of society’s living conditions, and in the second one the transformation of this desire into the constant entrepreneurs’ duty is in the focus of attention. The

¹¹ Shapoval V.M., Valikov V.P. National Model of Corporate Social Responsibility: Problems of Formation and Prospects for Further Development // *State and Regions*. – 2007. – № 6. – Pp. 197-203. (In Ukrainian)

¹² Zaiats T. A., Diakonenko O. I. Transformational Changes of Social and Labour Relations in the Context of Social Capital Formation // *Economy and regions*. – 2012. – № 1 (32). – Pp. 111-117. (In Ukrainian)

¹³ Osetskyi V. L., Marchenko V. M. Corporate Social Responsibility in Ukraine as a Factor of Ensuring its Competitiveness // *Economy and State*. – 2007 – № 1. – Pp. 9-12. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁴ Melnyk S. V. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Constituent of Social Policy in Ukraine // *Economy and State*. – 2007. – № 5. – Pp. 71-73. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁵ Suprun N.A. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Factor of Stable Development // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 3. – Pp. 71-74. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁶ Tsaryk I. M. Peculiarities of Market and State Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility under the Conditions of Economic Cyclicity // *Actual Problems of Economy*. – 2011. – № 1 (115). – Pp. 155-159. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁷ *Moral and Business (Shorthand Notes of the Round Table Proceedings)* // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 2. – Pp. 128-156. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁸ Suprun N.A. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Factor of Stable Development // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 3. – Pp. 71-74. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁹ Paskaver O. Yo. *Big Ukrainian Capital: Relations between Authority and Society* / O. Yo. Paskaver [and others] ; Centre of Economic Development. – K.: Dukh I Litera, 2007. – 130 p.

authors of the work "Social Responsibility of Business: Interpretation and Implementation"²⁰ propose to consider CSR to be one of the important components of company's commercial success. We reckon such approach to social responsibility to be a characteristic of commercial benefit and a part of business-structures' interests.

More thorough definition of CSR is introduced in the Report from the Forum of Corporate Social Responsibility, where the participants determinate social responsibility as a business-structures' strategy, as "a company's responsible attitude towards its product or service, customers, employees, partners; as a company's active social position, which lies in a harmonious coexistence, cooperation, interaction and continuous dialogue with society, participation in solving the most acute social problems"²¹. Thus, according to this interpretation of the content of CSR, cooperation between business and society, which is carried out for the benefit of public interests compliance, comes to the foreground. The same opinions are expressed by other researchers²², in particular V. P. Valikov and V. M. Shapoval²³, who state that the aim of CSR is to guarantee social security and social defense, taking into consideration abidance by the norms and rules of Ukrainian legislation, and by principles of business ethics, taking into account personnel's and consumers' interests, environmental protection.

Unambiguous assertion of some subjects' rights is in opposition to the definition of CSR, according to which social responsibility must be aimed at respecting the interests of all the parties concerned and protection of their rights. Thus, business can be considered to be socially responsible, only when there are mechanisms, instruments, which will constantly ensure such kind of interaction. Otherwise, when business structures carry out separate social events, one can speak only of declaration of social responsibility.

Analysis of the mentioned approaches to the notion of CSR let us state that, it does not make any sense to consider social responsibility as a phenomenon, which represents either business' or society's interests. So, one should take into account different parties' interests in such an activity. Besides, CSR should not be viewed as separate businessmen's wish or as imposed appropriate demands of society. Persons' own wish, society's or companies' desires do not appear from scratch and are not spontaneous or accidental. They just can seem to be such on the surface of actual reality.

Desires and duties as subjective phenomena in fact reflect imminent objective needs and induce to the search for ways of their meeting. To our point of view, the overall development

²⁰ Social Responsibility of Business: Interpretation and Implementation [Electronic Resource]. — Access Mode : [http://www.un.org.un/files/Concept Paper.pdf](http://www.un.org.un/files/Concept%20Paper.pdf). (In Ukrainian)

²¹ Social Responsibility of Business: Principles of Systematic Action // Report from the Forum of Corporate Social Responsibility in Ukraine. — K., 2006. — 22 p. (In Ukrainian)

²² Moral and Business (Shorthand Notes of the Round Table Proceedings) // Economy and Prediction. — 2009. — № 2. — Pp. 128-156. (In Ukrainian)

²³ Shapoval V.M., Valikov V.P. National Model of Corporate Social Responsibility: Problems of Formation and Prospects for Further Development // State and Regions. — 2007. — № 6. — Pp. 197-203. (In Ukrainian)

of business-structures' social activity should be referred to acceleration of innovational improvements in the sphere of production and economy in general, which in their turn replace the conventional principles and forms of functioning of other spheres of society.

As it is known the crucial tendency of modern development is creation of knowledge-driven economy, establishment of informational society. That is why the main source of economic and social progress now is human's intellect, capable of making a choice of development priorities, improving the mechanism of productive processes, estimating the need for organizational improvements in the sphere of business activities and so on.

Under these conditions, the principles of business functioning in the frames of capitalistic economy change, as now the main stipulation for capital reproduction and its accumulation is an increase of intellectual potential and its massive realization in the benefit of wealth capitalization. The objective need for attracting human's intellect to the productive process, its transformation into the stem of social and economic development becomes more and more apparent in the business-structures' desire to accumulate social investment, i.e. investment into human capital assets. Therefore, in fact personified capital creates basis for its own reproduction and flowering, as nowadays without intellectual grounds it is doomed to the gradual deterioration and decay.

Reconfiguration of an investment pattern for the sake of social investment must occur in concrete organizational and legal perspective. It creates the need for formation of an appropriate legislation and regulatory framework for development of business-structures' social responsibility, its institutionalization, establishment of partnership relations on the ground of business ethics, business participation in elaboration of social projects and social program execution. Of course, it is impossible to assert, that in this case companies lose their own commercial interests and are fully transformed into the bearers of social interests. Striving for enrichment, dictated by the principle of economic determinism, does not lose its significance. But to some extent it is subordinated to the individuals' mutual interests. Some kind of symbiosis of combination of various interests by means of such phenomenon as application of CSR is observed.

So, on the one hand, for the benefit of achievement commercial goals business pays attention to social responsibility, which is defined as a factor that increases its business reputation and improves its image. Due to this, economic state and conditions for development of the companies are enhanced. One can observe the increase in the number of business partners, amount of additional investment, promotion of goods on the market, strengthening of competitiveness etc.

As influential corporate structures' experience shows, such regularities of development in fact assert themselves. For instance, scientists have analyzed operating results of 18 most famous American companies, which have been on the market for more than a hundred of years, and come to the conclusion that if the activity of these companies has first of all been oriented

on social values, they enjoyed 15 times bigger profit on every dollar, than on the average in the overall American economy in general²⁴. According to the data from Conference Board, companies which own socially responsible business, gain much better financial indexation in comparison with companies of traditional orientation. Thus, return on investment in the socially responsible companies is bigger in 9.8%, return on assets – in 3.55%, profit on the sale – in 2.79%, profit on income – in 63.5%²⁵.

But let us consider the results of such business-structures' social conduct from a different angle. Having transformed mechanism of social responsibility into the means of obtaining commercial success, companies, at the same time, function as market participants, interested in improvement of the quality of products and observance of consumers' interests, bearers of solution of unemployment problems, guarantors of social security, reliable sources of financial resources, environmentalists, as preservation of environment creates conditions for reproduction and development of human society. Social activity of business structures gives a chance to change fundamentally the form of the very social and labor relations and social and psychological management methods in a business environment, maintenance of ethic norms of conduct among personnel, leaders' care of workers' and their families' social needs, improvement of their living conditions, all these things contribute to harmonization of social relations on the basis of current social problems solving²⁶. So, business together with a state becomes a member of social transformations and changes within the political system of society, ensuring formation of civil society.

We assume that in the context of the social role of modern business, it is not enough to mention only social responsibility. When business acquires specific social characteristics, one can state, that a process of gradual business socialization is occurring. At first being created by the individual interests, after some time it changes into the form of combination of private and social interests, assists the process of society in general. Gradual evolution of business on the social basis, being objective in its nature, largely depends on those general conditions, which are in the foundations of entrepreneurial business²⁷, i.e. we mean the degree of economic, political, legal, civil maturity of any society.

The process of business socialization can be accelerated or, on the contrary, slowed down with the help of various means of influence upon it. We suppose, the crucial role here belongs to the state regulation. Means of state influence are different in various countries. That is why,

²⁴ Moral and Business (Shorthand Notes of the Round Table Proceedings) // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 2. – P. 138. (In Ukrainian)

²⁵ Suprun N.A. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Factor of Stable Development // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 3. – Pp. 72-73. (In Ukrainian)

²⁶ Zaiats T. A., Diakonenko O. I. Transformational Changes of Social and Labour Relations in the Context of Social Capital Formation // *Economy and regions*. – 2012. – № 1 (32). – Pp. 112-113. (In Ukrainian)

²⁷ Osetskyi V. L., Marchenko V. M. Corporate Social Responsibility in Ukraine as a Factor of Ensuring its Competitiveness // *Economy and State*. – 2007 – № 1. – P. 11 (In Ukrainian)

it reasonably to speak of various models of state regulation of CSR. The leading ones are American, European and Japanese models. Main differences between them lie in the degree of legal influence on social activity of business structures and in the chosen methods of business encouragement to solve social issues. For instance, the essence of models of CSR regulation in some countries must be studied.

The American model is distinguished by a philanthropic approach, selectiveness and voluntariness of social measures. Corporate social responsibility, as a rule, does not refer to the main company's activity that is why its scope can be easily reduced. This model is characterized by a low legal regulation of corporate social responsibility. The attention given to it from the country is rather reasonable. The state prefers not elaboration of appropriate laws, norms or legislations, which regulate social aspects of entrepreneurial business' activities, but measures aimed at strengthening their economic motivation as to their social activity²⁸. In some cases the USA uses such economic key factors as preferential taxation, concessional lending, subsidy assistance under the condition of participation in social projects elaboration, encouragement to create corporate funds of insurance, pension, innovation, charitable activity and so on. Thus, the American model is characterized by liberal character of the state influence on CSR.

The European model of CSR regulation is based on the thought-out legislation and presupposes strict legal regulation of relationships between the state power, business and society in general in the context of chosen social goals. The appropriate standards as to CSR function here, the adherence to which is obligatory. For instance, this is ISO 6000 standard – quality control work, oriented on consumers; ISO 14000 standard – ecology; OHSAS 18000 standard – personnel. In the context of the European model of CSR regulation, health service, pension maintenance, insurance business, control over ecological situation, companies' responsibility to the regions etc. are the subjects to obligatory legal regulatory activity.

Social reporting is obligatory for European companies. All companies prepare special social reports, or in other words reports on stable development. Such reports contain information about companies' activities in the sphere of social and labor relationship and in the sphere of environmental protection. The content of these social reports is made public, and this positively influences internal relations of companies' administration and personnel, promotes cooperation between businessmen and bodies of public administration, improves companies' business reputation, increases a number of socially responsible companies. In highly-developed European countries some special types of state honors and rewards for active participation in social activity have been introduced. Thus, Belgium with the help of an

²⁸ Melnyk S. V. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Constituent of Social Policy in Ukraine // *Economy and State*. – 2007. – № 5. – Pp. 72-73. (In Ukrainian); Tsaryk I. M. Peculiarities of Market and State Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility under the Conditions of Economic Cyclicality // *Actual Problems of Economy*. – 2011. – № 1 (115). – Pp. 157-159. (In Ukrainian)

appropriate law controls market promotion of socially accountable goods and use a social reward – correspondence to eight ILO conventions. In 2000 in Denmark, the Ministry of Social Affairs introduced social reward to evaluate company's social responsibility degree, which is determined on the basis of company's responses according to its social activity. In Greece, the Institute of Hygiene and Security annually rewards companies, which considerably improve working conditions and the level of health protection.

To evaluate properly the quality of goods, EU countries use product labeling «EcoReward»²⁹. If in the context of the American model CSR is defined only as an optional and additional activity, then within the European model social responsibility is transformed into the crucial strategy, which focuses companies on achieving the specified business goals and increasing investment attractiveness.

The Japanese model of CSR is a bit different from the European one as to its key principals of construction, though it also presupposes active interference of the state with social activity of companies. First of all, the Japanese model of CSR is characterized by non-organizational and legal and commercial basis, and specific philosophy of human relationships, aimed at comprehension of universal human values and prerogative of social development. Here belong different aspects of out-world perception, determination of place and significance of every individual in a society, formation of sense of responsibility for the future of the society. The core of human relationship is solidarity and mutual help of employees as a part of work collective. That is why in the bases of their formation lies the principle of "industrial family", in the context of which every worker assumes liability for its prosperity. Such "industrial family" fully depends on the monolithic unity of members of personnel and thorough consistency of acts. Such feeling of unity is not determined or regulated by legislation. It is formed in the process of mutual work and greatly depends on human treatment of business managers to their personnel.

Great role is played by education in the context of participating in problems of society and comprehension of the need for their solution. All around the world volumes of social investment of business structures continually grow. Thus, nowadays only European funds' assets of social direction (SRI-funds) equal \$ 15 bn. Assets of socially responsible mutual funds in the USA in 2007 equaled \$ 2.71 tn. During 2005 and 2007 socially responsible investment increased more than 18 %, while, wider sphere of assets increased less than 3%. During the same period European market of social investment grew from €1 tn. to €1,6 tn³⁰.

Social responsibility of Ukrainian business is just at the beginning of its way. Nowadays, it is a manifestation of philanthropy, it takes the form of sponsor support provided by separate

²⁹ Social Responsibility of Business: Interpretation and Implementation [Electronic Resource]. — Access Mode : [http://www.un.org.un/files/Concept Paper.pdf](http://www.un.org.un/files/Concept%20Paper.pdf). (In Ukrainian)

³⁰ Mozhovyi Ya. I. Models of Corporate Social Responsibility in Banks [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua>. (In Ukrainian)

companies. Concern “Niko”, JSC “Kyivstar”, JSC «System Capital Management», JSC “Obolon” and others belong here. Sponsors and patrons focus their attention on such types of social activity as: social projects support, improvement of quality of goods, welfare assistance for low-income citizens, handicapped people, institutions of social service, hospitals, cooperation with local authorities, making charitable contributions, encouragement to volunteering etc. At the same time investment, aimed at environmental protection and renewal, introduction of energy efficiency and resources-saving technologies, improvement of working conditions at enterprises, personnel self-development, increasing of innovation activity etc., is rather miserable. National researchers have defined the most important directions of the following CSR development in the context of Ukrainian economy and society in general. Here belong: – improvement in competitiveness of enterprises on the basis of investment activity expansion due to the overall realization of intellectual potential of the society; – improvement of corporate management; – cooperation with pressure groups; – development of people’s capital; – adherence to the principle of equal opportunities (for persons of different sex, handicapped citizens); – environmental protection and renewal; – achievement of responsible integration into international markets³¹.

We suppose that there is a necessity to create appropriate conditions for further activation of social activities of national business structures. The greatest expectations should be put on the state regulation of CSR. In this regard there is a need: – to elaborate legal and regulatory framework of CSR development; – to ensure appropriate institutionalization of social activity of entrepreneurial structures; – to widen informational field with the aim to make public directions and outcomes of enterprises’ social activities; – to make active use of economic key factors for encouraging CSR; – to expand the network of social interaction including all parties concerned; – to ensure control over ethic norms of doing business; – to resist corruption, corporate raiding, illegal schemes of cooperation; – to intensify a closer watch for observance of labor legislation at the enterprises; – to assist transformations of business’ social responsibility into a constituent part of state’s social policy.

We assume that in future under the favorable conditions, diversity and expansion of the boundaries of entrepreneurial structures’ social activities will change its content and essence both in the production sphere and in the society in general. On the basis of fragmentary episodes concerning the solution of social issues, this activity must be transformed into an inalienable element of business development, key strategies of enterprises, well-established component of the mechanism of its functioning.

Summary and Conclusions. Phenomenon of corporate social responsibility is stipulated, to our mind, by a gradual change of quality characteristics of modern productive processes,

³¹ Osetskyi V. L., Marchenko V. M. Corporate Social Responsibility in Ukraine as a Factor of Ensuring its Competitiveness // *Economy and State*. – 2007 – № 1. – Pp. 10-12. (In Ukrainian); Suprun N.A. Corporate Social Responsibility as a Factor of Stable Development // *Economy and Prediction*. – 2009. – № 3. – Pp. 72-74. (In Ukrainian)

which require new knowledge, technologies, perfect and innovational methods of management. The principle of economic determinism, appropriate of every type of entrepreneurial activity, now acquires new forms in practice. Traditional variant of market participants' economic behavior is aimed at enriching of entrepreneurs, lowering of costs, increasing of profits and so on, starts giving place to entrepreneurial activity of an appropriate image, which is characterized by high business reputation and considered reaction to the needs of the society. Therefore, entrepreneurial activity runs high to a new level of development and represents itself in a social sphere of any society. We suppose that intensification of CSR causes its socialization or business implementation into the social environment under the condition of ethic norms compliance and respect to the social values.

Business socialization has not been finished yet, though separate components of this process can be clearly traced in the leading countries of the world. In Ukrainian economy CSR has rather demonstrative character against the background of an obvious desire of business structures to enrich themselves in all the circumstances. It cannot be determined as something strange, as in Ukraine's economy there are only basis of the free market and the process of accumulation of capital is just taking place. But alongside with the development of the market principles of economic performance, the content of any business activity will change not only economically, but also socially. This process can be accelerated due to cooperation with a state by means of economic regulation, usage of political factors, improvement of legislative norms of business structures' functioning, creation of conditions for proper motivation of entrepreneurs, conscious attraction of enterprises to social problems solving.

Outlook for further research can be defined as determination of new forms of subjects' social interaction within the system "business – authority – society", examination of issues of corporate social responsibility institutionalization, elaboration of specific measures aimed at activation entrepreneurs' social activity, its interaction with civil society organizations (political parties, civil organization, non-governmental organization etc.).

Методологічні основи дослідження внутрішніх та зовнішніх вимірів політичної трансформації країн ЦСЄ

У статті розглянуті методологічні підходи вчених до проблеми демократизації посткомуністичних країн ЦСЄ, які вказують на їх багатоманітність. Вчені обирають у кожному випадку для аналізу конкретної країни адекватний підхід, який дає змогу виявити її специфіку, розкрити суть змін. Демократія – це феномен, що перебуває в постійному розвитку, самооновленні. У ХХІ ст. її особливості вже починають проявлятися. Це впливає і на консолідацію демократії, яка в більшості країн ще в процесі формування, тобто ще не відбулася.

Ключові слова: демократія, методологічні підходи, внутрішні та зовнішні виміри політичної трансформації, Центрально-Східна Європа

Methodological Bases for Research on Internal and External Dimensions of Political Transformation of the CEE Countries

The paper focuses on the scholars' methodological approaches to the problem of democratization of the post-communist CEE countries, which point out their diversity. Every time analyzing any specific country, scholars choose an adequate approach, which helps to display its specificity, reveal the essence of the changes. Democracy is a phenomenon in its constant development, self-renewal. In the 21st century its characteristic features have started the process of their exposing. It also influences consolidation of democracy, which in most countries is still in the process of formation, i.e. has not occurred yet.

Keywords: democracy, methodological approaches, internal and external dimension of political transformation, Central and Eastern Europe.

Being global as to their scope political transformations, which have expanded in the CEE region, vividly prove that political systems and regimes of the states have been undergoing

considerable reforming for two decades already. In every society their essence is rather specific and has internal and external dimensions: institutional boundaries of political processes formed by the current legal system of a state and a political regime that functions at the level of public authority, which besides formal legal institutions, has other constituents, and the influence of the external environment where the state acts with a diversified system of interconnections, different in their content and forms. The analysis of the methodological bases for research on political transformations in the CEE has attested scholars' considerable interest in the problem of transition to democracy, revealed a great number of methodological approaches used in the course of research, and this is naturally, as a methodological approach emphasizes the most significant things in the phenomenon and in the notion, which is designated by this phenomenon respectively.

To our point of view the leading tendency of the world's political development of the last decades is the transition from totalitarianism and authoritarianism to democracy, for this purpose we take into account the facts of current regimes' collapse in Spain and Portugal, collapse of military dictatorship in Argentina, Brazil, Greece, South Korea, transformational processes in the CEE countries, the attempts of the most independent countries established on the territory of the former USSR to develop democratic political systems. Profound political changes, which occurred in the CEE region, have led to the vital weakening of authoritarian positions and expansion of democratic boundaries, which require thorough research on experience, scrupulous investigation of western and other models of social and political transformations, positive and negative lessons of democratization.

"Fall of communism between 1989 and 1991 across the whole region", states M. A. Vachudova "which was accompanied by the fall of the USSR, appeared to be the key point for political development of Eastern European countries. For many of them it was also a period that led to the mass movement which fought for national independence: the number of states in the "communist" region grew from 9 in 1989 to 27 in 1995"¹. During the period of socialism the CEE countries had a number of significant distinctive features, but the most appreciable difference between them revealed during the post-revolution period. The differences became noticeable from the first years of democratization due to the specific features of historical development, different approaches and different understanding of the CEE countries of the following steps in building democracy, market economy and joining Europe². Such political process was rather peculiar in the Czech Republic³.

¹ Vachudova M. A. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism* / [Transl. from English by Taras Tsymbal]. – K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2009. – P. 18.

² Dahrendorf R. *After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society* / [Transl. from English]. – M.: Ad Marginem, 1998. – Pp. 22-23.

³ Žatkuliak J. a kol. *November '89 Medzník vo vývoji slovenskej spoločnosti a jeho medzinárodný context*. – Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV vo vyd. Prodam, 2009. – S. 17.

The experience of the transitional societies proves that movement towards democratic changes is not possible without proper scientific research. The most detailed description of the methodological bases for democratization is given in foreign researchers' papers, as principal political schools, which study stable democratic institutions and traditions, using the experience of democratic countries, have been formed in America and Europe long time ago. In Ukraine democratization has started since the country gained its independence, and at that time first research devoted to this problem appeared. However, there are many "blank pages" of methodological character both in foreign and national studies of political processes in transitional societies.

H. Schultze believes that in spite of the fact that much time has passed since the fall of socialistic political system, the researchers of the processes of political transformations that take place in the CEE countries are rather limited in their capabilities. Some scholars, defining the necessity of studying political processes in these countries as one of the constituents of the worlds' phenomenon of post- authoritarian changes, underline the existence of serious analytical difficulties, while comparing them with the democratic development in other regions of the world⁴. Some of them object the embodiment of the CEE countries into the sphere of general "post-authoritarian comparative studies". Ph. C. Schmitter⁵, T. L. Karl⁶ and V. Bunce⁷ express radical arguments in support of this thesis.

The scholars have not worked out a unified approach to the essential correlation of the notions "transit" and "transformation". V. Helman considers them to be synonymic⁸. But in transitology two dimensions can be singled out: the first studies "transitional period", the second investigates the essential model of political changes, which take place at this stage, i.e. transformation. Transit is defined as the transition of a political regime from one qualitative stage to another, i.e this is an interval between two regimes, with an undetermined final result – development of democracy or return to authoritarianism (A. Kolodii⁹, V. Kobylnyk¹⁰, V.

⁴ Terry S.M. Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They? // *Slavic Review*. – 1993. – Vol. 52. – № 2. – P. 335.

⁵ Schmitter Ph.C., Karl T.L. The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far East Should They Attempt to Go? // *Slavic Review*. – 1994. – Vol. 53. – № 1. – P. 176.

⁶ Karl T.L., Schmitter Ph.C. From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism? // *Slavic Review*. – 1995. – Vol. 54. – № 1. – P. 965-966.

⁷ Bunce V. Regional Differences in Democratization: The East Versus the South // *Post-Soviet Affairs*. – 1998. – Vol.14. – № 3. – P. 187-211; Bunce V. Should Transitologists Be Grounded? // *Slavic Review*. – 1995. – Vol. 54. – № 1. – P. 111-127.

⁸ Helman V.Ya. Post-Soviet Political Transformations // *Polis*. – 2001. – № 1. – P. 15. (In Ukrainian)

⁹ Kolodii A. Ukrainian "Orange Revolution": Essence and Lessons for Transitology // *Development of Democracy and Democratic Education in Ukraine: Collected Scientific Papers Following the International Scientific Conference in Lviv, May 20-23, 2005* [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://www.lvivacademy.com/visnik/cv/kolodiy.html>. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁰ Kobylnyk V. Peculiarities of Democratization in Post-Communist Societies / Vasyl Kobylnyk // *Political Science in Ukraine: Current State and Prospects: Proceedings of the All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference (Lviv, May 10-11, 2007)* [Ed. M. Polishchuk, L. Skochylas, L. Uhryn]. – Lviv: TsPD, 2008. – P. 119. (In Ukrainian)

Leshchenko¹¹, O. Marchak¹², O. Nikonorov¹³, O. Romaniuk¹⁴, H. Shypunov¹⁵). The scholars underline that in case of transition to democracy the phases of liberalization, democratization and socialization can be singled out.

D. Rustow conventionally distinguishes 5 main components in transit: preconditions; initial point of political transit; aim of transit (state of society, political system and regime which are strived for by reformers); the process of transit itself with specific content; transit outcome (depends on the circumstances of democratic process development)¹⁶. He points out that transition to democracy is a complex social and political aspect which includes 3 successive stages – preparatory, decision making and adaptation of the society to new political and economic mechanisms; the crucial role for political consensus is played by the previous conditions, viz. national unity, minimal level of economic development, existence of social differentiation in society. These problems are emphasized by Hungarian political scientist R. Tökes¹⁷.

In 1990s A. Przeworski wrote that democracy is just one of the possible results of authoritarian regimes collapse and distinguished the processes of a state democratization (in the meaning of institutions) and democratization of a political regime, i.e. changes in relations between the state and civil society¹⁸. Such approach as a recognition of transition variety in the CEE countries: imitation of the western patterns, formation of hybrid regimes, return to authoritarianism, critical attitude to the application of classical theoretical transitology for generalizing processes that take place in the CEE, has become a commonly accepted in

¹¹ Leshchenko V.M. Triad Methodological Interpretation of Transitional Path of a Political Party // Modern Ukrainian Politics. Politicians and Political Analysts about It. – K.: UTsPM, 2010. – Issue. 19. – Pp. 48-49. (In Ukrainian)

¹² Marchak O.M. Democratic Transit in Post-Communist Countries: Theoretical and Methodological and Application Aspects: Author's Abstract of Dissertation for the Degree of Candidate of Political Sciences: speciality. 23.00.02 «Political Institutions and Processes». – Odesa, 2007. – Pp. 5-6. (In Ukrainian)

¹³ Nikonorov O.V. Problems of Transformation of Political Regime in Ukraine // Modern Ukrainian Politics. Politicians and Political Analysts about It. – K.: UTsPM, 2010. – Issue. 19. – Pp. 18-19. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁴ Romaniuk O.I. Models of Post-Communist Transformations // Political Management. – 2006. – № 3. – Pp. 36-38. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁵ Shypunov H. Methodology of Analysis of the Transforming Societies: Transitological Approach // Political Science in Ukraine: Current State and Prospects: Proceedings of the All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference (Lviv, May 10-11, 2007) [Ed. M. Polishchuk, L. Skochylas, L. Uhryn]. – Lviv: TsPD, 2008. – Pp. 43-45. (In Ukrainian)

¹⁶ Rustow D. Transitions to Democracy: Toward to Dynamics Model / Dankwart Rustow // Polis. – 1995. – № 5. – Pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ Tökes R.L. Transitology: Global Dreams and Post-Communist Realities / R.L.Tökes // Central Europe Review. – 2000. – Vol. 2. – № 10. – Pp. 180-181.

¹⁸ Przeworski A. Democracy and the Market; Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America / A. Przeworski; [Transl. from English by Yu. H. Alekseeva and others]; Ed. V. A. Bazhanova. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1999. – P. 65.

national, Russian and Western science (V. Burdiak¹⁹, H. Weinstein²⁰, T. Carothers²¹, A. Pakharev²², F. Rudych²³).

Every time new democratic political reality has increased its hold in peculiar, individual, but inevitable connection with the previous non-democratic traditions. V. Bunce assumes that “the processes of social formation take place in an imitated cultural society, in a single social fund of finished patterns of symbols, interpretation, perception, explication of social action, which occurs in a modern world”²⁴. The process is characterized by cultural traumas, among which one can single out: firstly, non-confidence syndrome; secondly, anxious expectation of future; thirdly, nostalgia for the past; fourthly, political apathy; fifthly, post-communist traumas of collective memory²⁵. M. A. Vachudova adhering the theory of “path-dependency”, which she calls the problem of “inheritance”, points out that “post-communist states, evidently, have not descended from the one place and undoubtedly they do not walk in the same direction. The spectrum of the results of political evolution among²⁷ post-communist countries impressed in 1995: they varied from consolidated democracies to consolidated authoritarian regimes, and between these poles there were different intermediate variants”²⁶.

Next methodological approach, which is worth describing while studying democratization of the CEE countries and which gives an opportunity to analyze the most important processes is an evolutionary one. Thus, in the Czech Republic he search for the social mechanism of fair distribution of social goods among people has started since the Middle Ages, during the Hussite Revolution²⁷, and carried on during the next centuries, and the idea itself was identified with democracy. Russian scholar A. Kovler in his research “Crisis of Democracy? Democracy on the Edge of the 21st century”²⁸, says, that modern democracy which was

¹⁹ Burdiak V. Transformation of Post-Socialist Countries: Unification or Expansion of Variations of Democratic Tread // Uzhhorod University Academic Newsletter. Series: Political Science, Sociological Science Philosophy. – Issue 12. – Uzhhorod: Hoverla, 2009. – Pp. 201-206. (In Ukrainian): Burdiak V. I. Globalization and Political Transformations in European Post-Socialist Countries // Innovational Development of Society under the Conditions of Cross-Cultural Interactions. Proceedings of the 2nd All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference. April 27-30, 2009, Sumy. – Sumy: SOIPPO, 2009. – Pp. 82-84. (In Ukrainian)

²⁰ Weinstein H. Russia: Politics, Economy, Russian Transit in the Context of Global Democratization // World's Economy and International Relations. – 2000. – № 10. – Pp. 78-80. (In Russian)

²¹ Carothers T. The End of Transition Paradigm // Journal of Democracy. – 2002. – Vol. 13. – № 1. – P. 8.

²² Pakharev A. Post-Soviet Political Regimes: between Authoritarianism and Democracy / A. Pakharev // Political Management. – 2010. – Special Issue. – Pp. 13-14. (In Ukrainian)

²³ Political Regime and the Rule of People in Ukraine: Politological Analysis: Monograph / Ed. prof. F. M. Rudych. – K., 2011. – 498 p. (In Ukrainian)

²⁴ Bunce V. Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South / V. Bunce // Post-Soviet Affairs. – 1998. – Vol.14. – № 3. – P. 189.

²⁵ Sztompka P. Cultural Trauma in Post-Communist Society / P. Sztompka // Sotsis. – 2001. – № 2. – Pp. 3-12; Sztompka P. Social Change as a Trauma / P. Sztompka // Sotsis. – 2001. – № 1. – Pp. 6-16.

²⁶ Vachudova M. A. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism / [Transl. from English by Taras Tsymbal]. – K.: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2009. – P. 18.

²⁷ Kubai I. M. Influence of the Hussite Revolution on Institutional and Ethnic and National Processes in the Czech Lands at the End of the 14th – the Beginning of the 16th Centuries: Author's Abstract of Dissertation for the Degree of Candidate of Political Sciences. – Chernivtsi, 2009. – Pp. 5-6. (In Ukrainian)

²⁸ Kovler A. I. Crisis of Democracy? Democracy on the Edge of the 21st century / Ed. B. N. Topomin. – M.: RAN, IGIP, 1997. – P. 31. (In Russian)

commenced in the 18th century and the beginnings of which can be traced back to antiquity, in the 20th century underwent such crisis, which can cast doubt on its existence, that modern crisis of democracy has several symptoms, namely national identity crisis, crisis of forms of political activity, civic consciousness crisis. These words can be referred to the Czech Republic, where democracy was originated in 1918, together with the First Czech Socialist Republic and evolved up to 1968 in Czechoslovakia, revived in 1989-1992 in Czecho-Slovakia and finally reached the level of consolidation, developing since 1993 in the Czech Republic.

Considering whether should democracy exist or not in the 21st century, A. Kovler studies democracy in various dimensions of theory and practice and observes, that it is time to reinterpret traditional principles of democracy; analyses problems of democratic centre and periphery, peculiarities of western and eastern democracy development. He highlights various paths of democratization: redemocratization after foreign occupation (Denmark, countries of Benelux Union, Austria); reformation of political institutions after liberation (France, Italy); implementation of democracy by foreign occupants (Germany, Japan); change of authoritarian regimes (CEE countries); democratization by agreement with opposition (Spain)²⁹.

Modern interpretations of democracy differ in approaches to studying its characteristic features, procedures, implementation sphere, produced values. A. Madatov denotes following approaches to democracy investigation: political and institutional (for political regime analysis); processual and procedural (for characterizing vital activity of any society at the state and local levels, including political parties); culturological, which combines democracy with certain social culture, based on the principles of individual's autonomy, toleration and civil responsibility; axiological, which indicates specific political and social values, is inseparably connected with the liberation principle, human rights and creation of maximal conditions for personal development³⁰.

However B. Guggenberger singles out only 2 types of conceptual approaches in the theory of democracy: normative and empirical-descriptive (descriptive)³¹. Within the frames of the normative approach the scholar analyses and proves the issue of democracy in an ideal state and how it surpasses other forms of public management. Empirical and descriptive approach accentuates attention on real democracy and its practical actions. We believe, that such differentiation allows providing approximate orientation, as normative principles appeal to experience, political practice, and empirical principles and theoretical structures are never limited by realias, which are interpreted and classified according to certain aspects. Within the

²⁹ Kovler A. I. Crisis of Democracy? Democracy on the Edge of the 21st century / Ed. B. N. Topornin. – M.: RAN, IGIP, 1997. – P. 15. (In Russian)

³⁰ Grachev M. N., Madatov A. S. Democracy: Methodology of Study, Analysis of Vistas. – M.: Publishing House «ALKIGAMMA», 2004. – Pp. 3-4. (In Russian)

³¹ Guggenberger B. The Theory of Democracy // Polis. – 1991. – № 4. – P. 141.

models there are various tendencies to research, aimed at determined tasks, with emphasis on some elements of the problem.

Most Czech academicians interpret democracy as a rational form of the state system, using rational and utilitarian approach, which determines democracy as an effective form of governance, which harmoniously combines people's and social groups' interests. Democracy is a dynamic form of reaction to the social processes which gives a chance to solve many problems; a society with an effective mechanism of search, selection and choice of political decisions in case of people's and society's initiatives realization; fundamentally connected with market economy and let one judge about the openness of the society to any ideas and solutions of social development tasks, chosen by people.

Rational and utilitarian grounds for democracy one can find in N Luhmann's³² system theories and K. Deutsch's work "The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control"³³. The scientists consider democracy to be a rational form of state governing, not from the point of view of humanist values, but as the most suitable way of adaptation to external conditions, a possibility for preservation and development of best social conditions for people. N. Luhmann, due to the evolutionary approach to analysis of societies, describes the dynamics of evolution of all important spheres of sociality: law, politics, science, education, religion, art, economy and love. The main principle of the evolution theory, he defines as "evolution transforms any little chance of appearance of any phenomenon into a large possibility of its preservation"³⁴. Modern interpretation of evolution is the idea of changes in nature and society, their direction, order and regularities; and in narrower sense it is defined as a slow, gradual change, as opposed to revolution³⁵.

N. Luhmann states that system theory differentiates between the system and the external world, which influences it. Differentiation between the system and the external world makes evolution possible, as any system cannot evolve from itself. Systemic and theoretical basis of evolution is understood as the circumstance, according to which structural changes can occur in the system, but they must succeed in the external world. Evolutionary diversification and multiplied systems are diversification and multiplication of the external worlds. The minimal precondition of evolution is suitability of the system to the external world³⁶. This approach helps while analyzing democracy as a form of political system of a society, which is defined as a system. The external spheres for a political system can become economic, social, spiritual

³² Luhmann N. *The World Society as a Social System* / [Transl. from German by A. Antonovskiy]. – M.: Publishing House „Logos”, 2004. – P. 93.

³³ Deutsch K.W. *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* / Karl W. Deutsch. – N. Y.: Free Press, 1963. – P. 25.

³⁴ Luhmann N. *Evolution* / [Transl. from German by A. Antonovskiy]. – M.: „Logos”, 2005. – P. 8.

³⁵ *The Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary*. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. – M.: „The Great Russian Encyclopedia”; StP: „Nornint”, 1998. – P. 1388. (In Russian)

³⁶ Luhmann N. *Evolution* / [Transl. from German by A. Antonovskiy]. – M.: „Logos”, 2005. – P. 29.

spheres of any society, political systems of other countries. Political system of a society is external for a political institution.

A huge role in the theory of evolution is played by a happenchance. He writes that “the system substitutes its need for the full knowledge of the external world for something that is a chance for it. Only due to this evolution is possible”³⁷. The happenchance is interpreted as “the connection of the system with the external world, which slips out of synchronization with the help of the means of the system”, “the ability of the system to make use of the events, which cannot be carried out and coordinated by the system itself. From this point of view a happenchance is understood as danger, chance, favourable conditions”³⁸. N. Luhmann’s approach is backed up by R. Dahl who points out that “the triumph of democracy is usually determined by a number of lucky chances. But these chances fully depend on what we do”³⁹.

R. Dahl states that “impulse to democratic governance descended from “logic of equality”⁴⁰, when all members of the union strived for taking mutual decisions. Such conditions appeared 500 B.C. in ancient Greece and Rome and existed for several centuries. The decline of ancient democracies was caused by the internal system problems, which could not have been solved by own efforts. Communicative processes between various structures were inefficient and did not help in eliminating controversy. Societies were segmented, and the system way of conflicts solution was not institutionalized.

Modern democracies, based on traditions, acquire new essential and procedural characteristics. The precondition for democratization is the process of political systems’ sovereignty formation and constitutional validity of their regimes. Sovereign states stipulate relatively homogeneous regime of power relations on their territories, and this settles monopoly on violence. In contradiction to the state, appears civil society with its non-violent, contracting self-organization according to the norms of the natural law and human rights.

Democracy in the 20th century has proved its vitality and demonstrated positive methods in solving various political, social and economic tasks, but realias of the 21st century put in doubt its further efficient functioning. It is connected with a new phase of democracy evolution, with challenges of the time. Difficulties related to the democratic governance exist in non-consolidated and classical democracies, and this indicates their inner problems. V. I. Kovalenko states that “serious questions arise as for the correlation between representative action democracy and direct democracy, political democracy and its other types, democracy and economic growth, human rights in the global world and so on”⁴¹.

³⁷ Ibid. – P. 41.

³⁸ Ibid. – P. 42.

³⁹ Dahl R. On Democracy. – M.: Aspect Press, 2000. – P. 30.

⁴⁰ Ibid. – P. 16.

⁴¹ Kovalenko V. I. Problems of Transforming Democracy in the Context of New Challenges / V. I. Kovalenko // Newsletter of Moscow University. Series. 12. // Political Sciences. – 2007. – №2. – P. 4. (In Russian)

Former president of Poland W. Jaruzelski does not deny the acknowledgement of the deep character of radical system changes, but at the same time he underlines their qualitatively new, peaceful, gradual, prolonged character and offers the notion of “evolutional revolution”⁴². This definition is rather close to the process of “reflution” – a combination of a number of vigorous measures of revolutionary nature with essential, but rather prolonged, peaceful reforms. This term belongs to the British journalist and political analyst T. G. Ash⁴³. Historian from Russia V. V. Mariina believes that events since 1989 are “rather” a revolution, and not a single time, but of “an evolutional character, prolonged in time”⁴⁴.

Backing up the ideas of the prominent academicians, let us remind that “the Velvet Revolutions” took place in the regions of Central and South-East Europe simultaneously, but now this region, which once was seen as a homogeneous one, and nearly all was a part of a socialist camp and Soviet military block, is not associated any more with Eastern Europe, but again has been divided into two traditional historical parts. “The Velvet Revolutions” had various forms: from “round tables” between authority and opposition, first, after the long break, multiparty elections and mass people movements. The discussions over the nature of those events in various countries have been still held. And the revolutions themselves do not have strict definitions, though are usually described with the help of such adjectives as “democratic” and “anti-communist”. To our point of view, it should be mentioned that to some extent they were counter-revolutionary, as they not only eliminated current system, but restored the former one, though at another stage of its development.

Revolutions and post-revolutionary development of the post-communist countries clearly showed the imaginable homogeneity of this European region. The very notion “the Velvet Revolutions” is more suitable for the CEE countries, but is absolutely inadmissible if one describes the events in Romania or countries from the post-Yugoslavian region. On the basis of this, we assume that the revolution of 1989 in Czechoslovakia must be analyzed with the help of the evolutionary approach, which has been mentioned above, and that in this country as opposed to other central European countries, one revolutionary shock was not enough, and through the number of subjective reasons there were two such shocks in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1989 and in 1992.

R. Dahrendorf stated “to become better, at first must become worse. Even if successive policy leads to the fact that the stores will be full of goods, and money will acquire real value, not substituted by the black market rate, many people will still earn very little salary to allow buying these goods, and many will lose their jobs. It is difficult to say how much time it will

⁴² Jaruzelski W. *Lessons of History Are Not Salt on the Wounds* / W. Jaruzelski; Interviewed by V. Oskotsky. – Ryazan: Uzoroche, 2000. – P. 32. (In Russian)

⁴³ Ash T.G. *We the People: the Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* / T.G. Ash. – Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990. – P. 67.

⁴⁴ *Public Transformations in the Countries of Central and South-East Europe (90s of the 20th – Beginning of the 21st century)* / Ed. Yu.S. Novopashyn. – M.: Slavonic Studies Institute RAN, 2008. – P. 307. (In Russian)

take to pass it, but undoubtedly more than the term of the first parliament. It is quite possible that all this will cause disappointment among many people, so acute, that it will put at threat new constitutional structure and economic reforms, which have been promised so many times and brought so little good for people⁴⁵.

Subjective reasons are much related to “new democracies”. O. Encarnacion states, that they demonstrate main formal attributes of political democracy, namely free and competitive elections, but deprived of any essential inclination to values, associated with liberal democracy, tolerance, government responsibility and respect to human rights in particular⁴⁶. Finally, neglection of stable values leads to erosion of democracy.

Most political analysts refer objective reasons for problems of modern democracies with globalization processes. H. Weinstein supposes that “there is blurring of national state sovereignty, an increase in transparence of its boundaries and detection of higher dependence of its inner life upon the external factors which have global character”. This limits authoritative powers of the state internal institutions, lowers quality of their functioning, on the basis of democratic government⁴⁷. Global interdependence violates habitual democratic order of managing political and social and economic processes.

Among major methodological approaches to the study of the indicated problem it is necessary to mention neo-institutionalism. Ukrainian scholars A. Kolodii⁴⁸, M. Lendel⁴⁹, A. Romaniuk⁵⁰ believe that neo-institutionalism, as opposed to the classical institutionalism, confers equal importance on formal institutions – a state, self-government, parties; and non-formal ones, which are fixed in the society at the level of practice and influence people’s behavior and value formation. This approach helps to analyze the influence on the flow of political process not only within formalized structures, but also unwritten rules of political interrelation, study cause-and-effect relationship between different levels of politics. It should be mentioned that in 80s of the 20th century the founders of the normative school of neo-institutionalism J. March and J. Olsen came to the conclusion that the crucial point for interpretation of the essence of political development of society was a composition of institutions⁵¹.

⁴⁵ Dahrendorf R. After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society / [Transl. from English]. – M.: Ad Marginem, 1998. – P. 94.

⁴⁶ Encarnación O.G. Tocqueville’s Missionaries. Civil Society Advocacy and the Promotion of Democracy. URL // [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://old.russ.ru/politics/meta/20010222-tok.html>

⁴⁷ Weinstein H.I. Variable World and Problems of Democracy Functioning // World Economy and International Relations. – 2007. – № 9. – P. 11. (In Russian)

⁴⁸ Kolodii A. Neo-institutionalism and Its Cognitive Means in Political Research / Antonina Kolodii // Lviv University Newsletter: Philosophical Sciences. – Issue 9. – Lviv: Ivan Franko LNU, 2006. – P. 60. (In Ukrainian)

⁴⁹ Lendel M. Modern Methodological Approaches to Study of Local Political Processes (in the Context of the CEE Countries) // Lviv University Newsletter: Philosophical and Politological Studies. – 2010. – Issue 1. – Pp. 97-105. (In Ukrainian)

⁵⁰ Romaniuk A. New Institutionalism and the Notion of Institution in Political Science / Anatolii Romaniuk // Lviv University Newsletter: Philosophical Sciences. – Issue 9. – Lviv: Ivan Franko LNU, 2006. – Pp. 190-199; (In Ukrainian)
Romaniuk A. Main Stages of Development of the Political Thought in the 20th century / Anatolii Romaniuk // Lviv University Newsletter: Philosophical and Politological Studies. – 2010. – Issue 1. – Pp. 19-28. (In Ukrainian)

⁵¹ March J.G. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics / J.G. March, J.P. Olsen. – New York: Free Press / Macmillan, 1989. – P. 134.

D. North emphasizes that “institutions” are the rules of the game within the society or restrictions made by people: formal (organizations) and non-formal. First determine structures of any political system and forms of its legitimate power. Other are defined as traditions, customs, moral values or mutual agreements. Formal rules can be quickly changed by taking legal or political decisions, while customs and traditions etc. evolve in the process of institutionalization, as they are stipulated by the previous development⁵². Having used this concept for analysis of political post-communist development of the CEE region, one can discover institutionalization of norms, roles, values and standards of political conduct, which is vital for democratization. There are three scholar schools, which study the reasons of institutional choice of post-communist societies: school of social and economic modernization, which emphasizes the role of economic development, urbanization and spread of communication; school of political culture, according to which people’s orientations determine stability of democratic institutions; school of dependence theory, where current development depends on the historical development path (*path-dependency*) or in other words, historical institutionalism, which recognizes the role of the former institutional and cultural inheritance in the process of the new rules creation. We suppose the combination of the 2nd and the 3rd approaches to be rather efficient for analyzing politics in the CEE, and interrelation between these approaches fully harmonizes with the methodological tools aimed at investigation of the transformational process in the post-communist CEE countries and it is reasonable to use them during the research.

Therefore, the abovementioned scholars’ methodological approaches to the problem of democratization of the post-communist CEE countries point out their diversity. Scholars, choosing certain approaches, complete them with their own views and in every case, they choose an adequate approach, which helps to display its specificity, reveal the essence of the changes. However, the research still continues, as in modern democracy people choose what they think is useful for self-development, due to the possibilities it grants. That is why, democracy is a phenomenon in its constant development, self-renewal. Democracies of various social eras are rather different. In the 21st century democracy will also acquire its characteristic features, which have just started the process of their exposing. Processes of new democracies formation and consolidation in the CEE countries are complex and contradicting. The post-communist period showed their differences in economic, social and political structures, notwithstanding the similar influence of socialism. Progressive governmental economic reforms caused the decay of living conditions. All this influenced consolidation of democracy which in most countries is still on the stage of formation, i.e. has not been realized yet.

⁵² North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. – K.: Osnovy, 2000. – P. 198.

Питання європейської та євроатлантичної інтеграції Республіки Болгарія в програмах болгарських парламентських партій

Дана стаття присвячена питанням європейської та євроатлантичної інтеграції Республіки Болгарія на початку 2000-х років в програмах парламентських політичних партій. Здійснено аналіз діяльності урядів І. Костова та С. Сакськобурготські і доведено, що саме за їх каденції Республіці Болгарія вдалося значно просунути на шляху до вступу в ЄС та НАТО. Вказано на особливості передвиборчої парламентської кампанії 2005 р. через призму оцінки передвиборчих програм у питаннях європейської та євроатлантичної інтеграції. Визначено основних симпатиків та відвертих противників вступу Болгарії в НАТО напередодні парламентських виборів 2005 р. Охарактеризовано особливе місце ультра націоналістичної коаліції “Атака”, яка в своїй передвиборчій кампанії оголосила такі пріоритети як негайний вивід болгарських військ з Іраку, вихід країни з НАТО, припинення продажу сільськогосподарських земель іноземцям, перегляд уже закритих розділів переговорів з ЄС і нове обговорення невідгідних для РБ умов тощо. Це дозволило їй завоювати голоси 400 тисяч виборців Болгарії і зайняти 4 місце за підсумками парламентських перегонів 2005 р.

Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, політична партія, коаліція, уряд, програма партій, європейська та євроатлантична інтеграція.

The issue of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Bulgaria in program of болгарian parliamentary parties

This article examines the views of Bulgarian political parties on Bulgaria's European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the early 2000s. The analysis of actions of I. Kostov's and S. Sakskoburgotski's governments proves that Bulgaria has taken a significant step forward to entering the EU and NATO during their terms of office. The features of 2005 parliamentary election

campaigners described regarding the views of political parties on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The main proponents and opponents of Bulgaria's admission to NATO are defined. The article also describes the particular role of the ultranationalist "Ataka" coalition, which declared such priorities as withdrawal from Iraq, secession from NATO, prohibition of selling the agricultural lands to foreigners, reconsideration of conditions disadvantageous for Bulgaria etc. These allowed the coalition to gain 400 000 votes, which granted it the 4th place in the parliamentary election.

Keywords: *Republic of Bulgaria, political party, coalition, government, party's program, European and Euro-Atlantic integration.*

In the context of the possible accession of Ukraine into NATO and the European Union (EU) becomes relevant study of the experience of some European countries in the way of their membership in these organizations. During the last years of the XX century – beginning of the XXI centuries, Republic of Bulgaria (RB) made a lot in this direction. Almost the same conditions after the collapse of the totalitarian communist regimes in RB and Ukraine, but different positions of countries in the European integration aspirations at the present stage make even more urgent the question of studying the path of European integration of RB.

The aim of this study is the research of European integration SB after the overthrow of the totalitarian regime T. Zhivkov in 1989, as well as the characteristics of the programs of the main political parties of the country at that period through the prism of European integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the country.

Great attention to the issues of European integration has paid Bulgarian scholars such as, G. Karasimeonov¹, I. Baeva², J. Zhelev³, B. Kalinova⁴. They all agree that RB should take its appropriate place on the map of Europe, because it is both geographically and historically always has been, is and will be a part of Europe.

At the end of 1990, the Great National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria has announced a life-changing decision, and it adopted a resolution, which was proclaimed the desire of the country to participate in the life of the European community. October 1, 1991, the EU took the decision to start negotiations on signing with the RB of the Association Agreement⁵.

Different government, different political parties have gradually paved the way for the country's Euro-Atlantic structure. In the 90s of the twentieth century to power in turn came

¹ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. – София: ГорексПрес, 2003. – 224 с.

² Баева И. България и Източна Европа. – София: Парадигма, 2001. – 272 с.

³ Желев Ж. Интелигенция и политика: Статии, есета, речи, интервюта. – София: Лит. форум, 1995. – 277 с.

⁴ Калинова Б., Баева И. Българските преходи 1939-2002. – София: Панорама, 2002. – 208 с.

⁵ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. – София: ГорексПрес, 2003. – с. 87.

from the Bulgarian socialist party (BSP), the former Communist party of Bulgaria⁶, and its main political rival – the Union of democratic forces (UDF), which was part of a coalition of the Alliance of democratic forces (ADF)⁷.

After an unsuccessful attempt to control the country BSP, come to power by ADF headed by I. Kostov. With taking the responsibility for the leadership of the UDF government headed by the new Prime Minister, the leader of the ADF I. Kostov political process in the country moved into a new phase. The government consisted mainly of representatives of the ADF and its allies – the National Alliance (NA)⁸. ADF and its partners NA received a good starting point for the implementation of its management program. The main objectives of the government were outlined in the party's election program in 1997 and in the government programme. A priority was the reform in the social sphere, social insurance, health care, pension reform, and foreign policy – the country's integration into the EU and NATO.

One of the most successful areas of government activity I. Kostov was foreign policy. The country has moved significantly closer to NATO membership, and in 1998 the government approved the National strategy of the RB to join the EU. In 2001, the Parliament adopted a National strategy for accelerated accession of RB to the EU⁹.

In the first years of democratic changes BSP did not support the country's accession to NATO, but modernization BSP resulted in its rejection of the negative attitude to NATO. In the adopted party resolution was noted that the membership of the RB in NATO is part of the inner orientation. In may 2000 were 44 Congress, BSP, which approved the new party line¹⁰.

In the next parliamentary elections the vast majority gets newmade political power of the National movement Simeon the Second (NMSS), which was formed around the personality of the former king of the country Simeon Sakskoburgotski (Simeon the Second). Quickly prepared the pre-election platform¹¹ based on the software of the speeches of the leader of Simeon the Second outlined the single solid versatile combination of proposals that combined elements of liberal and populist socio-economic offers rapid economic development, social justice, morality in politics, the fight against corruption and the integration into the EU and NATO.

⁶ Баева И. България и Източна Европа. – София: Парадигма, 2001. – с. 123; Калинова Б., Баева И. Българските преходи 1939-2002. – София: Панорама, 2002. – с. 185-187.

⁷ Желев Ж. Интелигенция и политика: Статии, есета, речи, интервюта. – София: Лит. форум, 1995. – с. 94.

⁸ Ibid. – с. 103.

⁹ Кирилик В. Євроінтеграційний шлях Республіки Болгарія: досвід для України // Політика і час. – 2005. – № 11. – с. 44.

¹⁰ Баева И. България и Източна Европа. – София: Парадигма, 2001. – с. 261.

¹¹ Тошков Н. Бъдещето на България: Цар Симеон II и предимствата на конституционната монархия. – София: Унив. изд. Св. Климент Охридски, 2001. – с. 44-47.

The government of Simeon the Second has supported the initiatives of the previous government in foreign policy¹², and the accession of the RB in NATO in 2004 confirmed the irreversibility of these processes. In General, according to foreign experts, and the Bulgarians, 2004 was for RB European year¹³. Continued this year with positive reviews of the EU on accession of the RB in NATO in 2007, though the EU has made some serious comments and requirements before the Bulgarian society. The government and the President had to make major concessions to the EU¹⁴. Another drawback was the lack of Bulgarian society about the pros and cons of European integration of the country, but the country's leaders were able to quickly resolve this issue¹⁵.

The parliamentary elections of 2005 by reformatted Bulgarian Parliament, which consisted of 7 political formations – the “Coalition for Bulgaria”, created around BSP, NMSS, Democrats for a strong Bulgaria (DSB), the coalition of the Bulgarian people's Union” (Union of free Democrats, VMRO-Bulgarian national movement (VMRO-BNM) and others), the Movement for rights and freedoms (MRF), the coalition of “Attack” and the UDF, which was again ADF.

The most unexpected result of the parliamentary elections of 2005 in the RB became the 4th place of the ultra-nationalist coalition “Attack”. In the election program “Attack” declared such priorities as immediate withdrawal of the Bulgarian troops from Iraq, the country's withdrawal from NATO, stopping the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, the viewer is already closed sections of the negotiations with the EU and a new discussion disadvantageous for RB conditions, etc.¹⁶, than won a vote of approximately 400 thousand voters, and at the same time shocked the other part of the Bulgarian political class and society in General. On membership of the RB in the EU, the coalition “Attack” requires that the Bulgarian interests defended.

Other participants 40 public meetings (NC) in their policy documents also drew attention to the issues of European integration of the RB. The program BSP separately address the question of the possible accession to the EU, the results of the country's entry into NATO and the prospects of improving trading opportunities of the country in the context of European integration processes.

¹² Манова Д. Внешняя политика Болгарии и новые реальности в мире. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/14.12.vun6na_politika.htm

¹³ Мартинов К. 2004 – Европейский год Болгарии. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/2712_european_year.htm

¹⁴ БСП: Да продаваме земя само на граждани на ЕС. – Режим доступа: <http://www.mediapool.bg/site/bulgaria/bulgaria.shtml>

¹⁵ Симеон Сакскобургготски: Обществото се нуждае от пояснителна кампания за ЕС. – Режим доступа: http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/show/Default.asp?storyid=5009&rubrid=101#Scene_1

¹⁶ Програмна схема. – Режим доступа: http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=29

Signed trade agreements with the EU and the European free trade Association reflected the priorities of the Bulgarian foreign policy and opened up great opportunities reorientation of trade exports to countries with developed market economies¹⁷.

BSP advocated close cooperation with the Council of Europe, EU, Euro-Atlantic cooperation, including cooperation with NATO. Activity in the main European intergovernmental organizations increased economic opportunities for solving problems of transition to a market economy and a modern civil society, obtaining political guarantees to the external security of the country. From the point of view of the European and national security it would be appropriate cooperation of RB and NATO, which would be accompanied with the transformation of the organization into a universal system of pro-European or global security that would have given the opportunity to participate in all European States, including Russia. For BSP has gained fundamental importance is the question of accession of RB in political and military alliances through the holding of national referendums.

Another participant NC NMSS was an ardent supporter of Euro-Atlantic integration of the RB. The party saw in NATO and EU security guarantees for the country. After the tragic events of 11 September that shook the world, the active participation of RB in the global security system was the only guarantee of its national security¹⁸.

In the election platform of the UDF stated that the country should obespechit its citizens from internal and external factors. «Today, the external security of the country is associated with membership in NATO, because the state is clearly unable to cope with internal security itself»¹⁹.

The absence of RB relevant legislation has raised concerns that created a huge problem not only by citizens, but also for EU accession. The low level of equity paralyzed the energies of the citizens, stimulated pessimism, hampered the development of the country. However, SAT on the time already possessed upgraded, technically equipped and well-trained army of more than 40 thousand people. Such a force was able to effectively implement the national defense and to represent the country in the operations of the UN and NATO.

The membership of the RB in the EU and NATO was the purpose of the UDF since the establishment of the Association. «A common European foreign policy we have two pillars that define a valuable place RB, namely, the Eastern expansion and the establishment of peace, stability, security and democracy in the new neighbours of the EU and cooperation with Mediterranean countries not members of the EU. We see a special role for RB in regional cooperation in the Balkans and in the black sea region. An important question of stability and

¹⁷ Програма на Българската Социалистическа Партия. – Режим доступу: <http://www.bsp.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&sr=0323&n=000002&g=18>

¹⁸ Декларация на ценностите. – Режим доступу: <http://www.ndsv.bg/?magic=0.1.4.10.0.1.0>

¹⁹ Предизборна платформа на ОДС. – Режим доступу: <http://www.ods.bg/documents.php?id=6>

democracy in neighboring countries to create a security zone. This is a major national priority of our foreign policy»²⁰.

CPF, despite the clearly expressed liberal values, held the position of parliamentary consensus on foreign policy priorities of the country, which was reflected in the following software principles²¹:

- the membership in NATO;
- the qualitative progress in the negotiations on the accession to the EU;
- the clear definition of the role of RB as a stabilization factor in the Balkans on the basis of equality and good neighbourly relations with the countries of the region;
- the progress in relations with countries with which RB lost the traditionally good relations.

For this purpose CPF developed cooperation with other political forces regarding the Europeanization of norms and ideals of civil society. CPF stood on the principles of the fastest harmonization of national legislation with the developed European countries. They also played for stable economic growth, competitiveness and access of goods and services to the markets of the EU and NATO and at the same time for the freedom of movement of people and capital²².

After the unexpected scale for mankind terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, before a modernized civil society task is to defend their own values, to protect them from the attacks of international terrorism.

In the field of Balkan policy CPF adhered to the following principles:

- the installation of the unifying principles between all countries of the region and a re-consideration of the principles that separate them;
- the creation and successful use of economic mechanisms of cooperation, which would influence the development of the Balkan region;
- the effective use of the instruments of EU regional policy for the development of the Balkan region;
- the formation of the multicultural environment in the relationship;
- the crisis of tolerance in interethnic relations;
- the Europeanization of the Balkans and cultivation of the Euro-Atlantic value systems.

The country's accession to the Euro-Atlantic community in the activities of the Movement for a Free Bulgaria (MFB) was characterized as a crucial historical moment. «Today our

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Програмна декларация. – Режим доступу: <http://www.dps.bg/files/documents/programnadeklaraciadps.doc>

²² Ibid.

task is a strong RB in the United Europe. The power of the country lies in its safety, dignity and well-being of Bulgarian citizens»²³.

One of the members of the coalition of the “Bulgarian people’s Union» – supported the determined efforts of the Bulgarian government on the path to full membership in NATO and the EU. «In our opinion the Euro-Atlantic integration decides to a great extent a question of national security, creates the opportunity for new development of the Bulgarian economy in a strong competitive environment with clear rules of the game for all participants. Within such a large and leading in the world democratic community as the EU, the RB will become a defender and spiritual leader for millions of Bulgarians living outside the country. The purpose of VMRO-BNR is RB, which takes its equal place in the European community»²⁴.

Another member of the coalition of the Bulgarian people’s Union” is a Union of free Democrats (UFD) believed that RB is among the countries-founders of European and world civilization. Today they stand for:

- the foreign policy of the country, which is based on a national consensus on joining NATO and the EU should focus on matters of national security, trade development and activation of the external activity of RB;
- the full membership in NATO as the only way of ensuring security of the country and the revival of the defense industry, should lead to the attraction of investment and sustained revival economic environment in the country;
- the accession to the EU should stimulate economic development of the Republic of Belarus and to provide the possibility of integrating the country into the European trading, technology and infrastructure policy;
- the priority remains the development of relations with the US and other NATO partners;
- the revival of relations with the Russian Federation and other CIS countries;
- the cooperation and continuity in relations with regional partners for approval of the RB as one of the main factors of stability in see²⁵.

Bulgarians, half of whom considered themselves Europeans²⁶, given the issue of European integration is fully in the hands of politicians in the country²⁷. Foreign policy priority for the new Parliament of the RB became the membership in the EU²⁸. Most laws adopted 40-mi NT

²³ Програмни насоки на ДСБ. – Режим доступу: <http://www.dsb.bg/display.php?page=7>

²⁴ Калинова Б., Басва И. Българските преходи 1939-2002. – София: Панорама, 2002. – 208 с.

²⁵ Програма на “Съюза на свободните демократи”. – Режим доступу: <http://ssd.bg/page.php?24>

²⁶ Цветкова Р. Половина българских граждан считают себя европейцами. – Режим доступу: <http://www.bnr.bg/NR/exeres/6CD73E3B-C78F-4671-95C6-45EEB5BFC46A.htm>

²⁷ Димитрова М. Болгары оставили евроинтеграцию в руках политиков. – Режим доступу: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/2103_cvrointegracia.htm

²⁸ Дымова Е. Внешнеполитические приоритеты нового болгарского правительства. – Режим доступу: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/061005_vneshnepol_prior.htm

is associated with the development of the Bulgarian legislation in connection with the membership of RB in the EU from 1 January 2007²⁹. At the first session of the NT 40s convocation deputies adopted the law on European integration³⁰. In the state budget of the RBs for 2006 were allocated almost € 250 million on the country's membership in the EU³¹.

A big supporter of the European integration of the RB was then President of the country, H. Pyrvanov, President from the BSP. Not the last place in the European integration aspirations of RB was occupied by questions of cooperation with other countries within South-Eastern Europe. In South-Eastern Europe in recent years has established specific region precedent – all countries have joined forces for a joint future, and they have established a full trust. Depending on the stage and pace of their development, all see countries have directed their efforts to join the EU and NATO. Visit of the President of the RB in the course of 2005, the countries of the Balkan Peninsula confirms the policy of the RB towards Euro-Atlantic integration of the see countries. H. Pyrvanov suggested development strategy, which is to unite all countries in the region, despite the fact whether they are members of NATO and the EU at the moment, or not³². Countries-members of NATO and the EU has recognized the role of RB in the processes of European integration of South-Eastern Europe. In particular, the German foreign Minister Joschka Fischer during a meeting with the President of the RB, Pyrvanov confirmed attempt RB become “the chief lobbyist of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of those countries that have not yet joined NATO and the EU³³.”

Thus, RB in the early 2000-ies became a full member of NATO and the EU. An important factor in this process was the support of virtually all political parties in the country who understand the positive consequences of this process for Bulgaria. Distinguished position at that time only one parliamentary party, namely the ultra-nationalist coalition “Attack”, which was proposed to revise the existing agreement between the RB and NATO, the RB and the EU.

²⁹ Обретенова Т. Приоритетом в работе парламента Болгарии является членство в ЕС. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/221205_parliament_EU.htm

³⁰ Обретенова Т. Завершилась первая сессия Народного собрания 40-го созыва. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/231205_parliament_1st_session_over.htm

³¹ Обретенова Т. Приоритеты госбюджета Болгарии на 2006 год связаны с социальной ответственностью и европейской ориентацией. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/271205_BUDGET_2006.htm

³² Ценова А. Послания президента Георги Пырванова. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/1103_parvanov_sammit.htm

³³ Филипов К. Поездка президента Болгарии по странам Балканского полу острова. – Режим доступа: http://www.bnr.bg/RadioBulgaria/Emission_Russian/Theme_Monitor/Material/0405_Parvanov_Balkani.htm

Вплив локальної демократії на формування консолідованої демократії

Аннотація: У стаття аргументовано лінії впливу локальної демократії на формування консолідованої демократії на національному рівні, а саме: вплив на колективну свідомість; формування активного громадянського суспільства через сферу практик та постійного персонального спілкування в локальних демократичних процесах; співпраця всіх суспільних груп громади, а саме: бізнесу, громадських активістів, політиків, влади. Визначено, що у країнах перехідної демократії поширеною є модель локальної керованої демократії, яка штучно обмежує участь інститутів громадянського суспільства, які й без того малорозвинені в місцевому самоврядуванні. Зауважено, що, як правило, ця модель тимчасова і в більшості випадків трансформується в локальну демократію участі або компромісу. Схарактеризовано особливості локальних політичних процесів у перехідних суспільствах.

Ключові слова: локальна демократія, політична культура, громадянське суспільство, суспільні групи, громадські політики, політичний процес

Wpływ demokracji lokalnej na kształtowanie demokracji skonsolidowanej

Streszczenie: artykuł wskazuje linie wpływu demokracji lokalnej na kształtowanie się demokracji skonsolidowanej na poziomie krajowym.: wpływ na świadomość zbiorową; tworzenie aktywnego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego poprzez podejmowanie działań w lokalnych procesach demokratycznych; współpracę wszystkich grup w społeczeństwie: biznesu, działaczy społecznych, polityków i sprawujących władzę. Ustalono, że w krajach demokracji przejściowej rozpowszechniony jest model „zarządzanej” demokracji lokalnej, sztucznie ograniczający udział instytucji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w działalności samorządów lokalnych. Zauważono, że w zasadzie model ten jest tymczasowy i w większości wypadków jest transformowany w lokalną demokrację uczestnictwa lub kompromisu. Scharakteryzowano cechy lokalnych procesów politycznych w społeczeństwach przejściowych.

Słowa kluczowe: demokracja lokalna, kultura polityczna, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, grupy społeczne, politycy publiczni, proces polityczny

Svitlana Bula, Oksana Shurko

The impact of the local democracy into the formation of consolidated democracy

This article analyzes the direction of the impact of local democracy into the formation of consolidated democracy at the national level, namely the impact on the collective consciousness; the formation of an active civil society through the scope of practice and continuous exercise of personal communication in local democratic processes; cooperation of all social groups in society, such as business, social activists, politicians. It is defined that there is a model of democracy in the countries in transition prevalent locally managed democracy, that artificially limits the participation of civil society institutions, which are already underdeveloped in local government. It is noted that as a general rule, this time model, in most cases is transformed into a local democracy participation or compromise. Characteristically, these are features of the local political processes in transitional societies.

Keywords: local democracy, political culture, civil society, community groups, public politicians, political process.

Локальна демократія – це та сфера публічного життя, де індивід вчиться бути громадянином, значна частина політичної соціалізації належить саме вмінню жити в громаді. Піднесення демократії, що вважають найвизначнішою подією ХХ ст., разом з тим означає, що потрібно аналізувати не лише формальні інститути, але й політичні позиції і цінності, що є складовою частиною політичної діяльності та політичного процесу. Політична культура виступає обов'язковим елементом будь-якої політичної системи суспільства. За допомогою політичної культури індивід спроможний адаптуватися в політичному просторі і здійснювати в ньому специфічні функції соціальної взаємодії, політичної участі і взаємодії.

Для української політичної культури характерна полісуб'єктність. Якщо за радянських часів основним суб'єктом політики була держава, яка формувала підданський тип політичної культури, то в незалежній Україні, особливо останнім часом, кількість суб'єктів, носіїв активістського типу політичної культури, значно зросла, оскільки змінилась

роль громадських організацій, функціонує багатопартійна система та зріс рівень політичної культури громадян. Проте якість суб'єктів політичної діяльності, рівень демократизації політичної культури досі є недостатніми через малі показники інформованості та залучення населення до політичного життя. До того ж відчутна мала готовність самого населення до нелегітимних форм соціального протесту, що в демократичних умовах є ознакою належного рівня політичної культури¹.

Соціологічні дослідження показують, що попри те, що Україна є європейською державою, політична культура українського народу відрізняється від культури європейського народу. О. Кіндратець зазначає, що ця відмінність виявляється «перш за все в ставленні до законів (низька законослухняність), до політичної сліти влади (не раціональне ставлення, а емоційне)»². Окрім цього, у нас все ще зберігається тяжіння українців до авторитарного стилю управління. Усі ці складові політичної культури українського народу роблять перехід до розвиненої демократії дуже затяжним.

Надумку В. Сичової, на еволюцію політичної культури в Україні впливає регіональний менталітет, який зумовлений міжконфесійними відмінностями, особливостями врівнень та культової практики. Так, греко-католики, що сконцентровані переважно за Заході України, за своєю догматикою тяжіють до західноєвропейського християнства, пов'язаного з римським правом і поняттям приватної власності, до влаштування вільного способу життя, а для православного населення Сходу України характерні колективістське ставлення до життєвих проблем, прагнення надособистої мети, милосердя, поблажливості до людських вад. Тож можна говорити про більшу готовність греко-католицького Заходу країни, а не православного Сходу, до лібералізації суспільства, ринкової конкуренції³.

На розвиток партійної системи України, на думку Р. Мартинюка, значною мірою впливають і регіональні субкультури. За системою політичних цінностей Правобережна Україна тяжіє до західноєвропейської цивілізації з акцентом на інститути приватної власності, прав особистості, індивідуалізму, тоді як система цінностей Лівобережної України демонструє східні колективістські начала й не виявляє високої зацікавленості до інтеграції в загальноєвропейське культурне середовище⁴.

Далі автор зазначає, що Західна Україна, насамперед Галичина, слугує прикладом готовності поступитися власною самостійністю задля збереження української національної держави. Водночас Схід і Південь виявляють регіоналізм самодостатності. В

¹ Кисельов С., Рябов С. Політична культура в контексті загальнокультурного процесу України / С. Кисельов, С. Рябов // Магістеріум. Політичні студії. – К.: НУ «Кієво-Могилянська академія», 2008. – Вип. 31. – С. 5–6.

² Кіндратець О. М. Політична культура як чинник демократичних перетворень / О. М. Кіндратець // Гуманіт. вісн. ЗДА. – Запоріжжя, 2009. – Вип. 39. – с.205.

³ Сичова В. В. Роль партій у формуванні політичної культури як чинника саморегуляції громадянського суспільства / В. В. Сичова // Політичні партії в незалежній Україні: роль та місце в політичній трансформації суспільства : наук. зб. / уклад. В. В. Нікітін. – Х., 2001. – с.73–74.

⁴ Мартинюк Р. Партійна система України та регіональні чинники в її розвитку / Р. С. Мартинюк // Політичні та соціологічні студії : зб. наук. пр. – Чернівці : Букрек. – 2010. – Т. 9. – с.181

АР Крим існує не стільки економічна самодостатність, скільки соціокультурна й ідеологічна відокремленість⁵.

У цьому контексті можна, мабуть, казати, що в сучасного українського суспільства немає консенсусної політичної культури з узгодженим ставленням громадян до політичних сил та політичного вектора розвитку держави.

Отже, політична культура українського суспільства є неоднорідною, її поділ на субкультури, які можуть бути різними в різних соціальних, етнічних та інституційних середовищах і, зокрема, у місцевих громадах, культурне тло яких визначається комбінацією цих середовищ і рівнем місцевої політичної культури, а також істотно впливає на розвиток локальної демократії.

Локальна демократія залежить від специфіки регіонального політичного процесу, від розстановки сил на регіональній політичній арені та від структури регіональної еліти, оскільки місцеві еліти в більшості випадків тісно пов'язані з регіональною елітою. Канали й механізми участі регіональної еліти в місцевих політичних процесах є досить різноманітні: або регіональна еліта активно втручається у місцеві вибори, просуваючи своїх кандидатів, або вона віддає територіальні одиниці під контроль тих чи інших бізнес-груп, або взагалі не виявляє інтересу до політичного процесу на місцевому рівні⁶.

Активна участь громадян у вирішенні питань місцевого значення у формах, передбачених чинним законодавством, сприяє структуруванню суспільства. Визначальну роль в активізації громадськості у управлінській діяльності мають відігравати інститути самоврядування й самоорганізації населення. Локальна демократія може розглядатись як діяльність, направлена на конструювання політичного значення територіальних утворень.

Основними чинниками, що впливають на розвиток політичного процесу і на регіональному, і на місцевому рівні є: 1) діяльність місцевих рад, обраних на пропорційній основі; 2) активність політичних партій, громадських організацій у політичному процесі; 3) розвиток комунікацій між громадськістю та представницькими органами самоврядування.

Специфіка місцевих органів влади полягає в тому, що вони безпосередньо стосуються кожної людини, яка проживає на відповідній території. А тому й формувати місцеві органи влади мають місцеві мешканці. Зрозуміло, що місцеві органи влади підпорядковані центральним, але лише в межах повноважень останніх. Зокрема, Верховна Рада може впливати на місцеві органи влади через закони й постанови, Кабінет Міністрів, міністерства та відомства – через свої нормативно-правові акти, а суд, звісно, – через судові рішення.

⁵ Мартинюк Р. Партійна система України та регіональні чинники в її розвитку / Р. С. Мартинюк // Політичні та соціологічні студії : зб. наук. пр. – Чернівці : Букрек. – 2010. – Т. 9. – с. 181

⁶ Цветков В. В. Демократія і державне управління: теорія, методологія, практика : монографія / В. В. Цветков. – К. : Юрид. думка, 2007. – с.84.

Локальний рівень розглядають як простір, де органічно можуть розроблятися демократичні взірці інститутів та поведінки, оскільки саме тут можлива безпосередня участь громадян в ухваленні загальноважливих рішень за одночасного обрання ними представників у легітимні органи влади. Локальна демократія розглядається як політичний курс, який проводять центральні органи влади щодо місцевого самоврядування. Від політики центральної влади стосовно місцевих адміністративно-територіальних одиниць істотно залежить і політичний процес на місцевому рівні, і можливості місцевих органів влади щодо ухвалення самостійних рішень⁷. Можна сказати, що політичний курс центральної влади задає рамки, у яких протікають політичні процеси на місцевому рівні.

Під моделлю місцевої політики на локальному рівні демократії розуміють характер вироблення і прийняття рішень, а також тип відповідальності, що склався в суспільстві. Це поняття охоплює і спосіб взаємодії владної еліти з іншими групами соціальних акторів. Як впливає з визначення, це поняття наближене до поняття політичного режиму як способу реалізації управлінських рішень⁸, тому центральне місце у формуванні моделей влади належить місцевим лідерам.

На переконання більшості дослідників, політичні еліти першими досягають схильності до легітимності та процедурних норм демократії – спочатку, цілком можливо, з корисливих мотивів як таких, що сприятимуть приходу до влади. Саме тому, якщо ці еліти зацікавлені в консолідації демократії (з будь-яких причин), вони сприятимуть поширенню серед населення взірців демократичної, а отже, за твердженням Г. Алмонда і С. Верби, і громадянської культури зокрема⁹.

Регіональна еліта, з одного боку, є втіленням навколишнього середовища, носієм політичної культури та ідеології, з іншого – відповідальна за вдосконалення і поширення цього явища на соціальний простір. Л. Харченко вважає, що на сьогодні в Україні помітні ознаки так званої «латиноамериканської» моделі еліт. Для неї характерне використання влади для забезпечення власних комерційних інтересів, які стоять вище за інтереси громадянина, суспільства, загальнонаціональні. Дослідниця вважає, що ця риса характерна для перехідних періодів, проте є загроза її усталення як основи політичної культури політичної еліти України¹⁰.

За результатами моніторингу, проведеного 11 жовтня 2011 р., у результаті виборів 2010-го в Україні до місцевих рад, більшість депутатського корпусу складається з

⁷ Панов П. В. Политическое сообщество: конструирование и институционализация / П. В. Панов // Политические исследования. – 2007. – № 1. – с.14

⁸ Гаджиев К. Политическая наука : пособ. для преподават., асп. и студ. гуманит. фак. / К. Гаджиев. – М., 1994. – с.12

⁹ Верба С. Представницька демократія і демократичні громадяни: філософське та емпіричне розуміння / С. Верба // Демократія : антологія / упоряд. О. Проценко. – К. : Смолоскип, 2005. – С. 894–897.

¹⁰ Харченко Л. Політична культура регіональних політичних еліт: можливі підходи до визначення (на прикладі Львівської області) [Електронний ресурс] / Л. Харченко. – Режим доступу: http://old.niss.gov.ua/book/StrPryor/St_pr5/04-Xorc.

представників бізнесу (керівники підприємств державної, комунальної та приватної форми власності). У різних регіонах ця цифра коливається від 50% до 70%. Подальше просування представників бізнес-кіл до місцевих рад потенційно створює більші передумови використання та розвитку різноманітних схем лобіювання бізнес-інтересів у міських радах, за таких умов можлива також і політика протекції інтересів бізнес-груп регіонів, що містить корупційні ризики.

Кожен регіон вирізняється своїми особливостями під час формування більшості в місцевих радах та взаємин міського голови з депутатським корпусом. Попри загальні тенденції посилення впливу ПРУ після місцевих виборів 2010 р. в Україні загалом наявні тенденції подальшого зменшення уваги до ініціатив та позицій опозиційних сил, там, де регіонали мають більшість, робота місцевих рад демонструє яскраві регіональні особливості, мотивовані селекторальним вибором.

Спостерігаються відмінності партійного представництва в органах місцевого самоврядування в різних регіонах України. Так, у результаті виборчої кампанії 2010 р. на місцевих виборах до Львівської міської ради виборола представництво партія «Україна соборна», яка в жодному іншому регіоні не набрала достатньої кількості голосів. Також вперше у Львові отримала представництво партія «УДАР». У Полтаві приголомшливу перемогу здобула раніше невідома партія «Совість України», залишивши позаду ті партії, що представлені в парламенті. До Севастопольської міської ради пройшов «Русский Блок», набравши 8,88% голосів і посівши друге місце за кількістю депутатів. У Сумській міській раді представлена партія «Рідне місто (24 депутати із 76 можливих місць). Схожа ситуація в Одеській міській раді, представництво до якої виборола партія «Родина»¹¹.

У Тернопільській, Івано-Франківській та Львівській областях обласні ради очолили представники ВО «Свобода», тоді як на Сході України органи місцевого самоврядування фактично очолює Партія регіонів. Отже, «Свобода», яка не представлена у Верховній Раді і перебуває в опозиції до чинної влади, фактично є владною силою на місцях. Водночас, вигравши вибори на місцях, представники «Свободи» не мають впливу на органи виконавчої влади, оскільки виконавча вертикаль будується за принципом централізації. Такий стан зводить функції локальної демократії лише до лобіювання інтересів територіальної громади на центральному рівні, без можливостей самостійного врегулювання проблем.

Нині громадяни України голосують, орієнтуючись не на зміст партійних програм, а на особистість лідерів, що підтверджують результати виборів. Найхарактернішим недоліком партійних програм у більшості випадків є те, що визначаються цілі без вказівки на засоби їх досягнення, зазвичай партії уникають у програмах наведення конкретних завдань, цифрових показників, термінів реалізації.

¹¹ Місцеві вибори в Україні 2010 р. [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: <http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki>.

Своєрідна унікальність місцевих виборів полягає в їх ще більшому відстороненні від партійно-політичних чи владних орієнтирів. Виборці «вимірюють» свого кандидата за іншою шкалою. Останній має довести, що він «свій», гарний господарник, захисник інтересів людей і, в підсумку, сконсолідувати навколо себе відносно більшість голосів, які, проте, можуть бути далеко не визначальними (за кількістю) для цього округу.

На локальному рівні в перехідних суспільствах спостерігається також тенденція до політизації роботи міських рад. Зокрема, органи місцевого самоврядування виявляють надмірну активність у сфері гуманітарної політики національного рівня, що, звісно, виходить за межі їхніх повноважень. Наприклад, реакція на позбавлення Степана Бандери звання Героя України, на мовні питання, на використання копій Прапора Перемоги та радянської символіки під час святкувань 9 травня тощо. На тлі невідповідності реального змісту політичної діяльності місцевих депутатів очікуванням громади в соціально-економічній сфері (освіта, розвиток малого бізнесу, організація дозвілля для дітей та молоді).

Відзначимо, що випадків, коли б невеликі партії з чітко визначеною програмою вирішення місцевої або регіональної проблематики проходили до місцевих рад, є дуже мало. Відповідно, для позитивного ухвалення рішення невеликі політичні партії потребують постійної підтримки з боку домінуючих політичних сил у раді. Отож пропорційність виборів до місцевих рад не змінила характеру розподілу владних повноважень на місцях і сприяла посиленню конфронтації між депутатами.

Попри те, демократичність та локальна демократія – це стратегія врегулювання конфліктів шляхом не отримання домінуючих позицій, а внаслідок співпраці і досягнення компромісів. Це і є консолідована демократія, до якої прямує Україна. І. Павленко вважає, що «консолідована демократія передбачає обмеження влади більшості. Волевиявлення більшості поєднується із захистом прав меншості, а співробітництво еліт є основною відмінною рисою політики»¹². Отже, консолідована демократія – це така демократія, коли жоден суб'єкт влади не володіє ні монопольним правом на прийняття рішень та здійснення управління, ні монопольним правом вето. Цей принцип особливо актуальний нині для України, оскільки розглядається як один із шляхів національної консолідації.

Значною мірою дослідження та експертні опитування, проведені в регіонах спостерігачами ОПОРИ, продемонстрували, що такі питання безпосереднього життя громади, зокрема покращення рівня шкільної освіти в громаді, модернізація шкіл, комп'ютеризація, оновлення матеріально-технічної бази; вирішення питань збирання, транспортування, утилізації та знешкодження відходів; заходи з реабілітації людей з

¹² Павленко І. А. Стратегія внутрішньої демократизації політичних партій в Україні / І. А. Павленко // Стратегічні пріоритети. – 2007. – № 2 (3). – С. 175–182.

особливими потребами та забезпечення для них повноцінної інфраструктури; ремонт і будівництво інфраструктури тощо далеко не завжди ефективно відображалися в рішеннях міських рад упродовж моніторингового періоду.

Спостерігачі також відзначають появу більшого рівня відкритості місцевих рад, міського голови, насамперед у контексті використання нових інформаційних технологій, модернізації веб-сайтів. Водночас подібні позитивні висновки стосуються тих регіонів, місцева влада яких має політичну волю системно оприлюднювати інформацію про свою діяльність, бажання надавати її громаді в повному обсязі, не керуючись вибірковими критеріями виставлення тих чи інших повідомлень, звітів, проєктів рішень¹³.

Представленість політичних партій у місцевих органах влади кожного регіону має велике значення для його розвитку, оскільки саме тут приймаються рішення, що впливають на всі сфери життя місцевої громади. Самі ж партії, завдяки діяльності в місцевих органах, реально впливають на політичний процес в окремих регіонах України і мають можливість впливати на прийняття програм соціально-економічного розвитку і вирішення різних питань на локальному рівні.

Результати виборів на місцевому рівні засвідчили відсутність в окремих регіонах підтримки з боку населення місцевих структур політичних партій, які одержали перевагу в загальнонаціональному масштабі; чітку регіональну диспропорцію у представництві політичних партій у місцевих радах (монополізація місцевої влади однією політичною силою).

За умови існування відкритого громадянського суспільства, а як результат цього – і ефективної локальної демократії, всі громадяни наділені рівними правами та обов'язками. Таке суспільство, на думку Р. Патнама, побудоване на внутрішній взаємодії і співпраці, а не на вертикальних зв'язках влади та залежності. Громадяни взаємодіють як рівні, а не як начальники та підлегли¹⁴. Зрозуміло, що сучасне суспільство не може відмовитись від переваг розподілу праці й від потреби у політичному керівництві. Однак, як зазначає Р. Патнам, лідери такого суспільства мають бути відповідальними перед своїми громадянами і відчувати цю відповідальність.

Політична відповідальність розглядається як відповідальність за здійснення публічної влади. Основними вимогами при цьому є моральні та правові норми, відповідно до яких можна виокремити морально-політичну і політико-правову відповідальність.

¹³ Стан локальної демократії в містах України: роль громад та органів місцевого самоврядування : аналітичний звіт за підсумками виконання проєкту «Моніторинг діяльності органів місцевого самоврядування у сфері розвитку локальної демократії» [Електронний ресурс] / за ред. В. І. Брудного, А. С. Крупника, О. С. Орловського. – Одеса : ХОББІТ ПЛЮС, 2008. – 168 с. – Режим доступу: <http://wvorora.or.ua/news/1167-vysnovky-gromadskogo-monitoringu>.

¹⁴ Патнам Р. Д., Леонарді Р., Нанетті Р. Й. Творення демократії: Традиції громад. Активності в сучасній Італії / Р. Д. Патнам, Р. Леонарді, Р. Й. Нанетті ; пер. з англ. В. Ющенко. – К. : Основи, 2001. – 302 с.

Морально-політична відповідальність виражається у відповідальній поведінці як ставленні до виконання громадянських обов'язків. Настання такої відповідальності відбувається у формі громадського осуду поведінки її суб'єкта і не передбачає застосування щодо нього яких-небудь формалізованих санкцій. Політико-правова ж відповідальність передбачає настання для її суб'єкта негативних юридичних наслідків (дисциплінарний, адміністративний, кримінальний чи конституційний характер) у разі недотримання ним правових норм¹⁵.

Політико-правова відповідальність є інституалізованою формою, тому підстави її настання та санкції щодо суб'єкта відповідальності визначаються законодавством. Такими санкціями можуть бути: дострокове припинення повноважень представницького органу, дострокове припинення дії депутатського мандата, скасування або зупинення дії виданого органом чи посадовою особою правового акта тощо.

Відносини політичної відповідальності по-різному складаються за різних моделей організації публічної влади на місцях, тоді як інститути політичної відповідальності представницького органу перед відповідною місцевою громадою є спільними для всіх моделей. Засобами реалізації такої відповідальності виступають інститути імперативного мандата депутата представницького органу та місцевого відкличного референдуму. Імперативний характер мандата депутата представницького органу полягає в тому, що він зобов'язаний виконувати накази виборців і може бути достроково відкликаний ними. Такий мандат характерний в основному для соціалістичних країн. Так, у Конституції СРСР 1977 р. передбачалось, що «виборці дають накази своїм депутатам» (ч. 1 ст. 102) та «депутат, який не виправдав довіри виборців, може бути в будь-який час відкликаний за рішенням більшості виборців у встановленому законом порядку» (ч. 2 ст. 107)¹⁶.

У демократичних країнах використовують переважно вільний мандат, який означає, що депутат не несе юридичної відповідальності перед виборцями і не може бути відкликаний ними. Засобом реалізації політичної відповідальності депутатів місцевого представницького органу перед виборцями є інститут відкличного референдуму. Проте Конституція України відповідальність органів місцевого самоврядування передбачає лише щодо законності їхніх рішень (ч. 2 ст. 144)¹⁷. Стосовно Закону України «Про місцеве самоврядування в Україні» від 21 травня 1997 р.¹⁸, то він встановлює відповідальність органів та посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування перед територіальною громадою

¹⁵ Малкіна Г. М. Інститути політичної відповідальності в системах місцевої влади / Г. М. Малкін // *Нова парадигма*. – К. : Вид-во ім. М. П. Драгоманова, 2010. – Вип. 95. – С. 112–113.

¹⁶ Конституція (Основной Закон) Союза Советских Социалистических Республик : принята на внеочередной седьмой сессии Верховного Совета СССР девятого созыва 7 октября 1977 г. – М. : Политиздат, 1977. – 62 с.

¹⁷ Конституція України : офіц. вид. / Верховна Рада України. – К. : Парламент. вид-во, 2006. – 160 с.

¹⁸ Про місцеве самоврядування в Україні : Закон України від 21 травня 1997 р. № 280/97-ВР // *Відомості Верховної Ради України*. – 1997. – № 24.

(ст. 75), місцевих рад – перед відповідними головами (ст. 78) і сільських, селищних, міських голів та голів районних та обласних рад – перед відповідними місцевими радами (ст. 79). Інституціональним засобом реалізації такої відповідальності вистає призначуваний місцевою радою референдум щодо дострокового припинення повноважень ради, їхніх голів, який можуть ініціювати виборці, а також рада, сільський, селищний та міський голова.

Місце локальної демократії в системі влади в Україні передовсім визначається Конституцією України та нормативно-правовими актами. Як і в інших перехідних суспільствах із змішаною формою правління, органи місцевого самоврядування виконують роль агента державних органів влади. Локальна демократія не може розвиватись повною мірою, оскільки механізми формування (призначення голів районних та обласних адміністрацій, відсутність бюджетної автономії тощо) не дають змоги повністю забезпечити такі принципи локальної демократії, як відповідальність, обмеження влади та контроль. Заразом локальна демократія визначається політичною культурою громадян, яка на сьогодні містить різні політичні позиції і цінності залежно від регіону держави. Локальна демократія визначається також партійною системою, активністю громадських організацій. На жаль, більшість з них орієнтована на вертикаль влади, на місцевих виборах спостерігаються лише поодинокі випадки формування місцевих партій, блоків, ініціатив. Істотним на шляху становлення локальної демократії є налагодження комунікації між громадськістю та представницькими органами самоврядування через мережу Інтернет, формування офіційних сайтів органів місцевого самоврядування та механізмів електронної демократії.

Місцеве самоврядування – це втілення влади і свободи, що вимагає оптимального поєднання в господарсько-економічному житті публічних і приватних інтересів. У цьому розумінні власність – одна із форм вираження свободи й самоорганізації населення. Індивідуально-громадський тип власності створює економічні підвалини демократичних форм самоорганізації соціального життя на підставі принципів свободи, поєднання громадських і владно-правових регуляторів життя. Саме у відносинах власності, що стосуються найглибших основ повсякденного людського життя, виявляються найважливіші особливості муніципальної демократії, індивідуальних і колективних прав громадян у місцевому самоврядуванні¹⁹.

До муніципальної власності, за українським законодавством, належать: кошти місцевого бюджету, муніципальні позабюджетні фонди, майно органів місцевого самоврядування, а також муніципальні землі та природні ресурси, що перебувають у муніципальній власності; муніципальні підприємства та організації; муніципальні банки та фінансово-кредитні організації; муніципальний житловий фонд і нежитлові

¹⁹ Бондарь Н. С. Гражданин и публичная власть: конституционное обеспечение прав и свобод в местном самоуправлении: учебное пособие / Н. С. Бондарь. – М. : Городец, 2004. – с. 87

приміщення та житлово-експлуатаційні і ремонтно-будівельні підприємства з їх обслуговування; установи й об'єкти охорони здоров'я (крім обласних лікарень і диспансерів), народної освіти (крім спецшкіл для дітей, які страждають на хронічні захворювання), культури і спорту; об'єкти інженерної інфраструктури міст (за деякими винятками входять до складу майна підприємств), міського пасажирського транспорту (враховуючи метрополітен), зовнішнього благоустрою, а також підприємства, що здійснюють експлуатацію, обслуговування, утримання та ремонт зазначених об'єктів; підприємства роздрібно́ї торгівлі, громадського харчування та побутового обслуговування населення; гуртово-складські потужності, підприємства і підрозділи виробничо-технічної комплектації, необхідні для забезпечення товарообігу й обсягів послуг зазначених підприємств; інше рухоме і нерухоме майно. Суб'єктами права муніципальної власності виступають міські та сільські громади, тобто публічно-правові утворення загалом, а не їхні органи управління, яким делегуються права з управління муніципальною власністю.

Комунальна власність, особливо земельні питання, часто стають визначальними для представницьких органів влади. При цьому варто зауважити, що, за оцінками аналітиків, приблизно 70% складу місцевих рад становлять представники бізнесу, керівники державних, приватних, комунальних підприємств²⁰. Така тенденція створює передумови для системного лобіювання окремих бізнес-інтересів заангажованими депутатами, збільшення рівня корупційних ризиків у діяльності депутатського корпусу. Це викликає недовіру до органів місцевого самоврядування, а також до механізму виборів, що відображається на явці виборців. Інститути прямої демократії, що передбачаються локальним виміром, також не можуть бути ефективно задіяні, оскільки нормативно-правова база їх використання недосконала в Україні, а також не вистачає політичної волі до використання референдумів та плебісцитів.

Локальна демократія повинна сприяти розвитку колективної свідомості громадян, розумінню ними загальних потреб й ухваленню рішень без розрахунку на центральну владу. І це має здійснювати розвинене громадянське суспільство, яке може існувати тільки за демократичної форми правління, оскільки до нього входять громадяни, які діють у громадській сфері, щоб виразити свої інтереси, обмінюватись інформацією, виробляти спільні цілі, ставити вимоги до держави і вимагати відповідальності від державних чиновників. Громадянське суспільство асоціюють зі сферою солідарності, у якій напружено переплітаються абстрактний універсалізм і партикуляристські версії спільноти. Громадянське суспільство не тільки обмежує свавілля влади, але може

²⁰ Громадянська мережа ОПОРА оцінила особливості роботи місцевого самоврядування у 15 регіонах [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: <http://www.opora.org.ua/news/1156-100-dniv-dijalnosti-chy-bezdijalnosti-miskyh-rad-rezultaty-gromadskogo-monitoringu-v-15-mistah-ukrajiny>

вирішити конфлікти, долучитися до виховання поінформованих, готових на жертви заради загального блага, більш свідомих громадян.

Як зазначає Л. Даймонд у праці «В напрямку демократичної консолідації», громадянське суспільство – це інститут для стримування влади демократичних урядів, контролю за потенційними зловживаннями та порушеннями закону і представлення їх до публічного розгляду²¹. Громадянське суспільство підтримує роль політичних партій у стимулюванні активної участі громадян у політичному житті та щодо впливу на управління державою на всіх рівнях, зокрема на місцевому. Саме на місцевому рівні різні групи можуть впливати на громадську політику і розвивати політичні навички та вміння, тому що демократизація локального уряду відбувається одночасно з розвитком громадянського суспільства. Воно може сприяти розвитку інших атрибутів демократії, таких як толерантність, поміркованість, схильність до компромісів і повага до протилежної думки, а також слугувати каналом для висловлення та представлення інтересів. Найбільша загроза демократії – це пасивність і байдужість з боку громадян, проте громадяни не тільки повинні відстоювати свої права, але й поважати і визнавати авторитет уряду.

Однак інститут політичних партій у перехідних суспільствах встановлюється по-різному. Партії змагаються за виборця, а не за втілення програми, у результаті маємо появу клієнтелістських та лідерських партій. При цьому партії централізовано розбудовують свою структуру і, як свідчить досвід України, здобувають місця і на центральному рівні, і в органах місцевого самоврядування.

Для побудови консолідованої демократії, на нашу думку, політичні партії повинні пропонувати чіткі програми й ефективно виконувати функцію артикуляції інтересів. Лише за таких умов ми матимемо ефективно представлений публічний інтерес. Органи представницької влади на місцях можуть бути сформовані не тільки з політичних партій національного зразка, але й громадських ініціатив місцевого рівня. Чіткі політичні програми дозволять виконати ще й іншу функцію – подолати горизонтальну фрагментацію українського суспільства, поділ за регіонами.

Формування ефективної локальної демократії дозволить істотно оновити політичну еліту України, адже в цих умовах громадські діячі здобуватимуть навички політичної поведінки без корупції, хабарництва та клієнтелізму.

О. Батанов та В. Кампо, аналізуючи досвід зарубіжних країн, виводять дві моделі локальної демократії – «залежно від відносин між органами місцевого самоврядування та інститутами громадянського суспільства: локальна демократія участі та локальна

²¹ Раймонд Л. В напрямку демократичної консолідації / Л. Раймонд // Даймонд Л., Платтнер М. Ф. Глобальне відродження демократії : пер. з англ. / Л. Даймонд, М. Ф. Платтнер ; наук. ред., передмова, комент. і покажчик імен Є. Виноградова. – Львів : Ахілл, 2004. – с.293.

керована демократія. Крім цього, можуть виникати моделі локальної компромісної демократії та локальної конфліктної демократії»²².

Локальна демократія участі полягає в тому, що відповідно до чинного законодавства створюються необхідні умови участі політичних партій, громадських організацій та ЗМІ у вирішенні питань місцевого значення. Завдяки цьому інститути громадянського суспільства реально впливають на вирішення питань місцевого значення. Така модель реалізується у країнах класичної демократії та новодемократичних країнах, де інститути громадянського суспільства мають значний досвід участі у справах місцевого самоврядування, а саме США, Франція, Польща, Чехія.

Локальна компромісна демократія ґрунтується на ідеї політичного компромісу між місцевими політичними силами задля досягнення спільної політичної мети. Ця модель демократії полягає в тому, що в реалізації беруть участь різні, іноді протилежні за політичною суттю партії та інші інститути громадянського суспільства. Вона характерна для багатьох країн нової демократії.

У країнах перехідної демократії поширена модель локальної керованої демократії, яка штучно обмежує участь інститутів громадянського суспільства, які й без того мають нерозвинений характер у місцевому самоврядуванні. Підставою для такої моделі є і державна муніципальна політика, і байдужість громадськості до справ місцевого самоврядування.

Запроваджуючи локальну керовану демократію, виконавча влада країн перехідної демократії механічно переносить на місцеве самоврядування елементи старої радянської системи: вертикаль влади, ручне управління, колективну безвідповідальність. Якщо окремі органи місцевого самоврядування цих країн не миряться з принципами локальної керованої демократії, тоді вони вступають у затяжні конфлікти із виконавчою владою, що нерідко закінчується відставкою або притягненням до юридичної відповідальності опозиційних до влади керівників самоврядування.

Отже, головними лініями впливу локальної демократії на формування консолідованої демократії на національному рівні є вплив на колективну свідомість, розбудова громадянського суспільства (особливо в частині формування публічного інтересу та його представництва завдяки політичним партіям), співпраця між різними групами територіальної громади, вплив на колективну свідомість. Локальна демократія має сприяти розвитку колективної свідомості громадян, розумінню ними загальних потреб й ухваленню рішень без розрахунку на вищу центральну владу. І це має здійснювати розвинене громадянське суспільство, яке може існувати тільки за демократичної форми правління, адже його громадяни діють у громадській сфері для вираження своїх інтересів, обміну інформацією, формулювання спільних цілей, висунення вимог до держави

²² Батанов О. В., Кампо В. М. Муніципальне право зарубіжних країн : навч. посіб. : у 2 ч. / за заг. ред. П. Ф. Мартиненка. – К. : Знання України, 2006. – Ч. 1. – с. 116-118.

та державних чиновників. Друга лінія – це формування активного громадянського суспільства через сферу практик і постійного персонального спілкування в локальних демократичних процесах. Адже громадянське суспільство – це сфера солідарності, у якій напружено переплітаються абстрактний універсалізм і партикуляристські версії спільноти. Громадянське суспільство не тільки обмежує свавілля влади, але може вирішувати конфлікти, долучитися до виховання поінформованих, готових на жертви заради загального блага, більш свідомих громадян. Громадянське суспільство не лише підтримує роль політичних партій у стимулюванні активної участі громадян, а створює передумови для їх ефективної діяльності та впливу на управління державою на всіх рівнях. Головна небезпека формування політичних партій без врахування громадянського суспільства – це перетворення їх на клієнтельські та харизматичні закриті групи партій, які змагаються за виборця, а не за програми. Лакмусовим папірцем для них стає рівень локальної демократії, де вони можуть продемонструвати свої реальні навички артикуляції інтересів, їх реалізації. Обґрунтовано думку, що для побудови консолідованої демократії політичні партії повинні пропонувати чіткі програми й ефективно виконувати функцію артикуляції інтересів. Так ми матимемо ефективно представлений публічний інтерес. Органи представницької влади на місцях можуть бути сформовані не лише з політичних партій національного зразка, але й із громадських ініціатив місцевого рівня. Чіткі політичні програми дозволять виконати ще й іншу функцію – подолати горизонтальну фрагментацію українського суспільства, поділ за регіонами.

Наступна лінія впливу локальної демократії на консолідовану демократію – співпраця всіх суспільних груп громади – бізнесу, громадських активістів, політиків, влади. Механізми пошуку компромісів та консенсус переносяться на інший рівень демократії, тим самим сприяючи розвитку інших атрибутів демократії – толерантності, поміркованості, схильності до компромісів і поваги до протилежної думки.

Формування ефективної локальної демократії дасть змогу істотно оновити політичну еліту України, адже в цих умовах громадські діячі здобуватимуть навички політичної поведінки без корупції, хабарництва та клієнтелизму.

Проаналізувавши досвід зарубіжних країн та моделей локальної демократії (локальна демократія участі, локальна керована демократія, локальна компромісна демократія та локальна конфліктна демократія), визначено, що у країнах перехідної демократії поширеною є модель локальної керованої демократії, яка штучно обмежує участь інститутів громадянського суспільства, які й без того мають нерозвинений характер у місцевому самоврядуванні. Підставою для такої моделі є і державна муніципальна політика, і байдужість громадськості до справ місцевого самоврядування. Ця модель виникає під впливом конфліктів органів місцевого самоврядування та органів виконавчої влади, як правило, вона є тимчасовою і в більшості випадків трансформується в локальну демократію участі або компромісу. Локальні політичні процеси перехідних

суспільств характеризуються тенденцією до централізації, політизацією питань порядку денного, майновими конфліктами. Особливу роль у політичних процесах на локальному рівні відіграють інститути громадянського суспільства, особливо політичні партії. ЗМІ дають можливість налагодити комунікацію між громадами та органами місцевого самоврядування. Громадські організації – з одного боку, стають активними учасниками процесів, уможливають самореалізацію громадян, з іншого – їхня активність потребує додаткових легітимісних факторів, оскільки їх територіальна громада не обирає безпосередньо. Політичні партії в перехідних суспільствах на локальному рівні схильні відображати позицію центральних керівних органів партій і неохоче беруть на себе навантаження щодо артикуляції публічних інтересів та їх реалізації. Водночас потребують розвитку організаційні форми локальної демократії: місцеві ініціативи, референдум, органи самоорганізації населення.

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Transparency and public information policy in Norway – a model to follow for Central-Eastern European states

Norway – a northern country with a huge territory and proportionately small population, with impressive resources, is a graceful example of the use of new technologies in the process of building an open and transparent information society. In Scandinavia, doctrine of open government was born, and the very first legislative regulations of access to public information was implemented. It's Norway, as one of three countries, alongside with the United Kingdom and the United States, where the first time in the history technological web – the Internet – linked international community. Norway was taken as a example to diagnose the transition of modern societies from the model of representative democracy to the model of information democracy, as well as a shift from the public attitude of access request – requiring the involvement of citizen, to an attitude of free publication. Finally, in this country one can observe one of the most advanced e-government and e-voting systems. Hence, countries in the Central and Eastern Europe should closely monitor solutions and learn from them.

Keywords: transparency, public information policies, responsibility, e-government, technology, human rights, participation, civic control.

Przejrzystość polityki informacji publicznej w Norwegii jako wzór dla państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

Norwegia – jako północny kraj z ogromnym terytorium i proporcjonalnie niewielką populacją, a przy tym z imponującymi zasobami, jest wdzięcznym przykładem wykorzystania nowych technologii w procesie budowy otwartego i transparentnego społeczeństwa informacyjnego. To w Skandynawii narodziła się doktryna otwartego rządu, wdrożono pierwsze rozwiązania legislacyjne w zakresie dostępu do informacji publicznej. To Norwegia, jako jedno z trzech państw, obok Wielkiej Brytanii oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych, została po raz pierwszy w historii połączoną międzynarodową siecią – Internetem. To m.in. na przykładzie Norwegii zdiagnozowano przejście nowoczesnych społeczeństw od modelu representative democracy

do systemu information democracy, jak również odejście sektora publicznego z postawy access request – wymagającej zaangażowania obywatela i zastąpienie jej postawą free publication. To wreszcie w tym kraju można obserwować jedne z najbardziej zaawansowanych i rozbudowanych systemów e-administracji czy e-votingu. Stąd państwa regionu Środkowo-Wschodniej Europy winny bacznie obserwować tamtejsze rozwiązania i czerpać z nich pomysły dla siebie.

Słowa kluczowe: *przejrzystość, polityka informacyjna, odpowiedzialność, e-rząd, technologie, prawa obywatelskie, partycypacja, cywilna kontrola.*

Between entities occurring in public sphere there are relations formed already at the sub-conscious level. It is all about specific mode of informational interaction between these entities. The nature and shape of those relationships can be very different. The “set theory” explains this well. There are known symmetrical relations (equivalence), asymmetric (supremacy), and crossed (some elements of the relationship are superior and others inferior and vice versa). Communication determinants towards citizen can either derive from initiative of the citizen, or from the actions of the government agencies or be shared (double-sided). At given time there are data that remains available only for the citizens, or stays exclusively at the disposal of the authorities, or remains in the resources of state authorities and citizens at the same time.

Relations citizen – state authorities are the essence of a democratic regime. The specificity of these relationships is variability. Democracy, *ex definitione*, remains space that citizens fills in by everyday relationships. This is how the social order circle works. Each of the participants’ brings its share to this order.

With the civilizational development, the emergence of new communication tools – frequency and nature of relations had been transformed. The context of social communication (people between one another and with the institutions) functioning in society determines the shape of themselves and institutions (including political) created by them. However, over the decades there has been a total redesign of informational relations¹.

Dag Wiese Schartum, a professor at the University of Oslo, dean of the Section for Information Technology and Administrative Systems, when describing the reasons, forms following diagnosis. „An antagonistic relationship between government and citizens fits well with the mode of the 1950s and 1960s, when this legislation was prepared, and when legislation, to a large extent, came into existence to protect individuals from an ever stronger government. Forty years on, other aspects of government receive much more attention. Today, government

¹ Tomasz Goban-Klas draws attention to the need to emphasize the semantic difference between the terms: communicating, and communication. The researcher stresses that initially in his work he used “communicating processes” to determine phenomenon. Now, however, it is more inclined to use the term – communication – which reflects a better sense of the process. See Goban-Klas, T. (1987). *Komunikowanie masowe. Zarys problematyki socjologicznej*. Cracow; T. Goban-Klas, T. (1999). *Spółczesność informacyjna. Szanse, zagrożenia, wyzwania*. Cracow; Goban-Klas, T. (2011). *Wartki nurtu mediów. Ku nowym formom społecznego życia informacyjnego*. Universitas Cracow.

is regarded more as being at the service of its citizens. Citizens are not merely the subject of power, but increasingly playing role of customer and consumer of government services”². The change affects not only the technological aspect, but foremost social one. Never in history so much information flows in the direction of the citizen. The state power sphere has passed a long way from antagonistic attitude (closing) to open (building relationships), involving citizens in public information processes.

The citizens began to articulate their will not only during the time of general elections (which are largely an abstract act), but above all every day, through the new informational paths. Socio-political system passed way up from representative democracy to information democracy.

The transformation of the public sphere was the result of informational changes. Herbert Burkert attempted to define public sector information – the very key category in this context. „Public sector information is information that is generated by governments and administrations on whatever level (communal, regional, federal) or by institutions under government control regardless of their legal status”³.

Access to information (as defined above) unleashed new patterns of governance. Burkert merit is the observation that the creation of public sector information has shifted whole citizen – state authorities relationships. First of all – it meant “the grand” opening of public sector sphere, secondly – a new approach to information management, thirdly – the involvement of civil sector to the processes of decision-making. Burkert describes this transition (shift) as “awakening interest of the private sector”. „Under the perspective the public sector both in US and even more so in Europe seemed to have developed a sort of double-bind relationship to public sector information: in the moment of parting, the public sector realized how dependent it had become on information resources for governing in the up-coming information society (...)”⁴.

A similar nature of the shift had been also noticed by the others. The very accurate analysis of changes in the democratic systems was introduced by two German scientists: Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, who drew attention to the crisis of the institutions of representation. They confronted the concept of representative democracy, with the theories of social relations, emphasizing the importance of distance between the government and the citizen. According to them, between the state power (selected on the principle of representation) and the civic sphere, there is a free space. The most important for maintaining healthy democratic

² Schartum, D.W. (2004). „Information access legislation for the future? Possibilities according to a Norwegian experience” in G. Aichholzer, H. Burkert (ed.), *Public sector information in the Digital Age. Between Markets, Public Management and Citizens' Rights*, Cheltenham, Northampton, Massachusetts, pp. 76.

³ Burkert, H. (2004). “The mechanics of public sector information” in G. Aichholzer, H. Burkert (ed.), *Public sector information in the Digital Age. Between Markets, Public Management and Citizens' Rights*, Cheltenham, Northampton Massachusetts 2004, pp. 3.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 9.

processes is to keep the distance that does not kill the public discourse (as the quintessence of democracy). „Representative government inevitably establishes distance between the rulers and the ruled, implying the possibility that this distance may attain such proportions that it would be difficult to continue to speak of democracy. Political processes in democracies therefore can, and must, always confront the question of whether they satisfy democratic criteria. How responsive are these political processes to the demands of citizens, and to what extent can citizens control this responsiveness?“⁵.

The crisis of political representation model, as emphasized by the authors, can be easily seen. Klingemann and Fuchs links it with the concept of congruence. It's about the level of adequacy, reflecting the expectations compliance with the activities of civil authority. The more effective state authorities responds to the needs of its citizens (economic, moral, ideological, infrastructural), the stronger support it receives in return. „Congruence at the level of political processes exists where the specialized actors (parties, governments, politicians), who are the vehicles and organizers of these processes, can give citizens what they want. If they can do so, they satisfy the democratic criterion of responsiveness“⁶.

On this concept, the whole mechanism of democratic change of state power, settles. It is impossible to eliminate social dissatisfaction and discontent. Due to limited resources, public authorities that are able to satisfy all, does not exist. If, however, the level of dissatisfaction exceeds the ceiling majority support, the change occurs. The crisis, as Klingemann and Fuchs underline, appear only when public discontent is not reduced by the change of state authorities. It can be described as a crisis of formal political structures that are dysfunctional to society's expectations.

Democracy does not tolerate the state of imbalance, and automatically corrects the inefficient units. It is the most important reason why the government had to change and get closer to citizens, involving them in the decision-making processes. „The relationship between citizens and the state is bilateral, so it can be disturbed from either direction. But we shall assume to begin with that the relationship has been fundamentally modified and has given rise to disturbances in congruence because citizens have changed“⁷. In this sense, on the shift stage, one can talk about the existence of civilization modernization that includes societal and individual modernization. There has been an increase of institutionalized, and non-institutionalized political participation.

Societies felt and recognized the strength of their own abilities. The process of spreading the horizontal responsibility between collective co-actors in public sphere has begun. At the same time when support for democratic individualistic values increased, the attachment

⁵ Fuchs, D., Klingemann, H.D. (1995). Citizens and the state: A changing relationship? in H.D. Klingemann, D. Fuchs (ed.) Citizens and the state, New York 1995, pp. 2.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 2.

⁷ Ibidem, s. 10.

to political parties and institutional political participation declined. Therefore the growth of political apathy raised. Western societies entered the area of influence of postmodern cultural trends that could be compared with hedonistic self-actualization – a genre in which person could have taken action only if, at the same time, saw the individual benefits.

State powers had to employ all available means to stimulate broader growth. Strengthening the countries could not be done without strengthening its citizens. It became clear that wasting the potential of its citizens, leads to political suicide. Modern states are not strong because of the strength of public authorities, but by the force of its citizens. Paradoxically, authorities if wants to hold a significant position, must constantly strengthen its own citizens (supporting entrepreneurs, diminishing bureaucracy of administration, introducing proactive tax system, providing security, developing broadly understood infrastructure, etc.). On the rule of side-effect, the role of the citizen rose to the rank of the controller and supervisor. Dag Wiesie Schartum explains, that „in this perspective, access to such information is, first and foremost, a prerequisite because it gives individuals and collective entities (companies, associations etc.) the ability to control the exercise of political power”⁸. Rational and well-informed citizen requires from the government actions that will significantly contribute to the improvement of the environment in which he operates. State agencies are forced to organize the public sphere more efficiently.

Abovementioned shift, from the point where state power makes the public information available only on request of citizen, to the model of active and constant transmittion of information, was in fact the transition from the access request to the publication regime. This process had to undergone on two characteristic levels: (1) raise awareness among citizens (citizens enlightening) – proactive attitude, where the government was forced to take information activities resulting in involving citizens; (2) control – a reaction where citizens become fully integrated entities, and equipped with the tools to make checks and manifest reaction (e.g. discontent), critically evaluating state agencies.

It should be noticed that civil supervision implemented through information tools, could actually contribute to the improvement, only if reflected in stimulating the state institutions to efficiently carry out public tasks. Schartum describes the abovementioned relationship by using the concept of information flares, where the status of both sides should be properly balanced – so that excessive control does not paralyze government agencies, and that its absence does not lead to impunity. When this golden mean can be achieved? Schartum concludes that when the relations between the two parties will be characterized by the exact balance of information potential. Paradoxically, in order to maintain the necessary balance, the public authorities must continuously and deliberately weaken themselves. „The traditional approach outlined is, in many ways, appealing, since it is citizen as controller who takes action

⁸ Schartum, D.W. op.cit., pp. 70.

and decides the issues at stake. On the one hand, the approach is rather time-consuming for the individual, and thus creates thresholds, which may be hard to cross-over. By and large, only the very well-informed and very angry citizen is likely to use their legal right to access relevant information”⁹.

In order to maintain this balance the necessary and comprehensive actions, both at the level of “publication” and the “access request” is needed. For example in Norway there are three separate acts that deal with this task: the Freedom of Information Act, the Personal Data Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Each of these laws refer to different kinds of information, introduces catalog of eligible entities¹⁰. For stimulating the growth factors it is necessary, therefore, to present attitude of “publication”. Enormous possibilities in this respect arose from the massive proliferation of the Internet. Relations citizen – state authorities naturally channeled directly towards the citizens – end-users. Finally the concept: “publish-as-much-as-you-can” prevailed and won.

It is doubtless, that citizens are the heart of democracy. If the real grounds and opportunities for participation are not provided for the people there is no space for democracy. In this political system everything has to be consulted, and than decided with and via citizens. Fulfilling democratic standards means respecting human rights. As we are now living in society of information, one the most important privilege of citizens is the right to know (the right to obtain information). This could meet democratic criteria only by social participation. Traditional approach force us to encounter in this field at least such human rights, as free and fair elections, representative assemblies, accountable executives. But modern civilisational achievements gives the real chance to change the idea of government. We are facing the real opportunity to provide citizens with the touchable forms of participation. New type of democracy will mean for the regular citizens not only the act of voting. It will means regular and touchable engagement in political processes.

New developments have expanded real routes for citizens to participate more distinctly in public policy-making. The idea of representative democracy now enters into the new dimension. Citizens are increasingly demanding more transparency and accountability from their authorities. Citizens enjoy higher levels of income, education and opportunities offered by information age, which previous generations could only dream about. This has a significant influence to political aspect of social life. Due to the technological opportunities which modern societies use widely there is no place to hide for government. Educated, well-informed citizens

⁹ *Ibidem*, s. 75.

¹⁰ Dag Wiese Schartum made a comparison of those three acts in terms of conditions of information. And so, according to the author, the Freedom of Information Act equips with the privilege information everybody and applies to metadata (information about information, or information created by other information), and the information assigned to a specific case (case-relevant information). In turn, the Personal Data Act refers only to the dedicated people (registered persons), and refers to metadata and the information assigned to a particular matter. Finally, the Administrative Procedure Act provides access to information about specific case and gives the power to information only for parties. See more Schartum, D.W. *op.cit.*, pp. 72.

now expects from the public institutions to take their positions into consideration, when decision-making. Modern society equipped with ICT weapons keep authorities on eye constantly.

One has to admit that current governments in democratic states are not only under general constitutional pressure but mostly under real-time civil pressure exercised by citizens. It is nothing surprising that non-governmental associations sometimes have in their disposal more detailed knowledge and professional information than public units responsible for the same sphere of interest. What is more, when government runs a policy which is not popular and does not find wide acceptance in society, it has to be ready for consequences. Modern societies do not hesitate. They use every kind of sources and measures. Quick, precise nets of communication enable them to find supporters. There is a possibility to establish a massive movement against unpopular public decision. There is no government in the democratic part of the world which could present regardless attitude to this kind of power.

Without no doubt it is one of the major reasons why modern authorities not only want to inform citizens about their public activity but also present openness for collaboration during decision-making processes. It seems to be clear that democratic governments do not want to manifest against the social power. What is more they want to make advantage of it and exploit this human energy for the purposes converges with own political goals. Cooperation in this field means benefits for both sides. Engaging citizens in policy-making allows governments to respond to social expectations, but in the same time authorities could expect better understanding and political support. Finally, but the most essential consequence of common acting is efficiency in designing better (more acceptable and expected) policies and improving their implementation by better quality of political decisions.

Authors of OECD report from 2002 – *Citizens as Partners: Information, Consultation Public Participation in Policy-making* – are trying to find the most important features that contributes to strengthening state relations with its inhabitants. They stressed that in their relations with citizens, governments must ensure that: (1) information is complete, objective, reliable, relevant, easy to find and understand; (2) consultation has clear goals and rules defining the limits of the exercise and government's obligation to account for its use of citizens' input; (3) participation provide sufficient time and flexibility to allow for the emergence of new ideas and proposals by citizens, as well as mechanism of their integration into government policy-making processes¹¹.

The main term associated closely to this phenomenon is and still remains information. Do we exactly are aware of what it is? Marian Mazur's, co-founder of Polish cybernetics established qualitative definition of information as a supplement for Claude's E. Shannon's definition of information from his initial theory of information. Mazur has managed to introduced distinction between describing information and identifying information and proved

¹¹ Citizens as Partners – information, consultation and public participation in policy-making. (2001) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

that only identifying information is the same information in the Shannon theory and formula

$$H(x) = - \sum_{i=1}^n p(i) \log_2 p(i).$$

Mazur has always emphasized that term – quantity of information – brings misunderstandings in doctrine. It suggests that if we know what the quantity of information is, we can discover what the information itself is – what is not true. Mazur was also very disappointed with whole types of definition that he faced. He used to claim with irritation that in international literature one could discover 3 types of publications concerning information. In the first type of publications, the quantity of information is in the straight manner called information which is unacceptable. In other types of publication authors tend to use term information in such phrases, like: collecting information, dissemination of information, disclosing information – without any attempt of clarification. Finally, there are publication where authors are trying to define information using other unclear terms like: data, wisdom, communication – which find place on the other levels.

Personally, I would postulate to look at the information only on the grounds of relation with analytical attributes of the information receiver. Is not a true that the process of information is strictly attached to analytical processes and it concerns only those types of brain equipped beings which appear in the nature. Do the stone knows what information is. The key word is intelligence. Information doesn't have to be send intentionally. The unconscious sender could be snow that falls down, shadow that was cast, emitted color, the sound of engine or stones falling from the mountain. *Sine qua non* condition, in this circumstances should be the relation with entity equipped with an analytical and interpretational tools. If something is a subject of analytical process, it is already an information. Every kind of receiver would interpret in its way. The same information could be received and understood in different manner by teenager and professor, by farmer and nurse finally by man and woman. The level of education, life experiences, feelings, wisdom, particular approach – everything have an impact on analytical processes. An issue to decide is whether information appears only when receiver with analytical measures appears, or we could treat information as a self-phenomenon. The sound of stones falling down could be a warning for the trapper about soon coming avalanche. In the first approach this would be an information because there is a trapper, who can undertake analytical process. In the second approach even though there won't be anyone and anything with this kind of skills (absolutely nothing) it still will be an information – because some "providence" knows that this information happened.

Modern approach to information is very closely attached to technology. In other words – there is no technology without information and *vice versa*.

Europe still maintain a very strong position in world advanced technology sphere. Especially when it concerns information and communication technology. We all have to take into consideration and remember that World Wide Web, mobile telephone standards GSM, MPEG standard for digital resources and ADSL technology were invented in Europe. Day

by day, number of Internet users increases. It jumped from the 43% level in 2005 to 56% in 2008. The majority of Europeans uses broadband Internet everyday. Europe became a world leader in broadband Internet domain. With 150 million abonents Europe is the biggest market in the world. Almost 90 % of companies in Europe has the access to broadband Internet. More than 80 % of households has access with the average transmission speed with more than 2 Mb/s. Those promising statistics show the potential of European society. If we consider advanced technology, computer and information capability of people living in Europe, it is worth to stress that very special role in developing those domains played Scandinavian nations.

It is just impossible to analyze relation between massive information flow is modern societies and its impact for condition of the states without taking into consideration Scandinavian countries, especially Norway. This northern country with huge territory and proportionally small population is an ideal example of modern and developed society. Every newcomer will quickly notice that Norwegian society is very well-organized and computerized. Almost every simple activity (like administration duties, paying of invoices) could be undertaken or solved via electronic path. Norway took a part in the very first part of Internet development in the world. As we all know the first electronic web connection – ARPANET was established in USA for the military purposes. Than some educational institutions wanted to deploy the opportunities which gives this fast and simple communication for their needs. But the first international web connected free countries: USA, UK and Norway. This fact had a significant consequences for the Norwegian society. Norway from the very beginning achieved the position of the leader of the new technology deployment, especially in the field of communication. One could find the backgrounds of this phenomenon not only in maturity of Norwegian society but also in the geographical and sociological considerations. Norway as huge country with huge distances between areas of living and small population density. Those kind of society needed an efficient measure of communication.

Internet penetration in Norwegian society estimates for about 90.9% in 2009, what gives this country second position just after Iceland – 93.2 %. Climate and weather features might have also an impact. We all have to be aware about disadvantages connected with the Internet. Most commonly, usage of the Internet regularly (more than five hours a week) reduces the time spend with friends and family and the social direct contact abilities¹².

The quality of information is one the most important issues in Norway, where freedom of expression and freedom of information are taken for granted like in others Western liberal democracies. Freedom of information legislation (also known in the U.S. as “sunshine laws”) are rules that guarantee access to data held by the state. It establish a “right-to-know” legal process by which requests may be made for government-held information, to be received freely or at minimal cost, barring standard exceptions. Also variously referred to as open records or

¹² <http://news.stanford.edu/pr/00/000216internet.html> [Accessed 4 of May 2015]

(especially in the U.S.) sunshine laws, governments are also typically bound by a duty to publish and promote openness. In many countries there are constitutional guarantees for the right of access to information, but usually these are unused if specific legislation to support them does not exist.

Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 is the oldest one. It has granted public access to government documents. It thus became an integral part of the Swedish Constitution, and the first ever piece of freedom of information legislation in the modern sense. In Sweden this is known as the Principle of Public Access (*Offentlighetsprincipen*). But this kind of information connection between citizens and state government wasn't obvious in other states. In 1998 Freedom of Information Act have been introduced only in twelve countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, the USA, Denmark, Ireland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Council of Europe, has decide to publish recommendations for member States in 1979, more than 200 years after the first Swedish regulation.

- (i) Everyone within the jurisdiction of a member state shall have a right to obtain, on request, information held by the public authorities other than legislative bodies and judicial authorities.
- (ii) Effective and appropriate means shall be provided to ensure access to information.
- (iii) Access to information shall not be refused on the ground that the requesting person has not a specific interest in the matter.
- (iv) Access to information shall be provided on the basis of equality.
- (v) The foregoing principles shall apply subject only to such limitations and restrictions as are necessary in a democratic society (such as national security, public safety, the prevention of crime, or the preventing of the disclosure of information received in confidence) and for the protection of privacy and other legitimate interests, having, however, due regard to the specific interest of an individual in information held by the public authorities which concerns him personally.
- (vi) Any request for information shall be decided upon within a reasonable time.
- (vii) A public authority refusing access to information shall give the reason on which the refusal is based, according to law and practice.
- (viii) Any refusal of information shall be subject to review on request¹³.

Now over 85 countries around the world have implemented some forms of such legislation. From the historical point of view we still can find slight and more significant differences. In the literature of domain one could find two historical broad approaches to disclosure of government information. The first is that government decides both what it shall release to the public and when. This is official secrecy tradition in the UK, where all government information is secret unless it is to release. Second approach concerns all the *aquis* of what we called

¹³ Recommendation R (81) 19 of the Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe.

– Freedom of Information. All governmental information is available to the public except those cases where the authorities must explain and justify the restriction of access. This model exist in USA and in the most of the European countries including Nordic that should be treated as a originators and founders of this legislation.

European Union has also decided to implement Freedom of Information regulations. In 1993 European Commission issued a Decision of the Council enforcing FoI for Commission documents. Than in 2001, regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, granted a right of access to documents of three institutions to any Union citizen and to any natural or legal person residing, or having its registered office, in a Member State. Term – document in this Act is defined broadly and it is assumed that all documents, even if classified, may be subject to right of access unless it falls under one of the exceptions. If access is refused, the applicant is allowed a confirmatory request. A complaint against a refusal can be made with the European Ombudsman and/or an appeal can be brought before the Court of First Instance. In addition, the Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information sets out the rules and practices for accessing public sector information resources for further exploitation. Since 2008, the European Commission operates the Register of Interest representatives, a voluntary register of lobbyists in the European Union.

Paradoxally, in 1997 the UK Government committed itself in a White Paper to produce a draft of Freedom of Information Bill in summer 1998. This, it was said, would give everyone a legal right to see information held by national, regional and local government and by some other organizations working on behalf of government. The security and intelligence services and the special forces would be exempt. The recommendations and opinions included in this White Paper concludes that everyone would have the right to see records of information held, like their own tax, social security and medical records. Anyone would also have the right to ask the organizations covered by Act to give other records or information about their day-to-day business. For example, more information about food safety, medical safety, pollution and other issues of public interest would be available¹⁴. The fact that United Kingdom, motherhood of opposite do Scandinavian approach to public information disclosure has decided to implement Freedom of Information regulations in year 2000 is a significant *signum temporis* of information age.

We could observe that Freedom of Information as a general rule of public activity switched from the reactive model into active one. Norway presents general approach of disclosing public information. But still even though the general rule is quite understandable and does not

¹⁴ Blackstock, M.A., Oppenheim, Ch. (1999). Legal issues for information professionals. Freedom of information. Loughborough, pp. 249-250

bring any doubt with common meaning, there can appear some disagreements with drawing the boundaries of this freedom.

Freedom of information applied to the right to obtain and receive information from accessible sources. “In Nordic countries, steps have been taken to counteract the tendency towards bias in public information policy. This has been done by means of the principle of public access, which affirms a duty to provide information on request. One can simply request to examine public documents. It is of course lawful to exempt certain documents from public disclosure, and there have been disagreements concerning the criteria for such exemptions. It is characteristic that, when the parliamentary ombudsman investigated the practice of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice in 1997, he founded grounds to criticize 32 out of 35 investigated decisions that are taken and, secondly, as a participant in the democratic process, one must have access to specific knowledge of the circumstances”¹⁵.

The Principle of Public Access means that the general public are to be guaranteed an unimpeded view of activities pursued by the government and local authorities; all documents handled by the authorities are public unless legislation explicitly and specifically states otherwise, and even then each request for potentially sensitive information must be handled individually, and a refusal is subject to appeal. Further, the constitution grants the Right to Inform, meaning that even some (most) types of secret information may be passed on to the press or other media without risk of criminal charges. Instead, investigation of the informer’s identity is a criminal offense.

Norwegian Article 100 of the Constitution gives access to public documents. The basic principle of the law is as following. Everyone has the right to access to State and municipal documents and to be present at sittings of courts and elected assemblies. Article 100 of the 1814 Constitution was amended in October 2004 to include a specific right of access to access documents and attend court proceedings and meetings. The changes were recommended by the Governmental Commission on Freedom of Expression. The new Article 100(5) now states: “everyone has a right of access to the documents of the State and of the municipal administration and a right to be present at sittings of the courts and of administrative bodies elected by the people. Exceptions may be laid down in law in order to protect personal data security and other weighty reasons”. Old article hasn’t been changed since the adoption in the Constitution in 1814. It remained unchanged for so long period of time because it just fulfilled expectation. New version was precededenced after eight years of public discussion. Francis Sejersted from the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, claim that “during the eight years in which the new article was being considered, there was a quite extensive public debate on the grounds for and restrictions on freedom of expression”¹⁶.

¹⁵ Sejersted, F. (2005) Freedom of information in a Modern Society. IFLA Journal, pp. 302.

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp.302-303.

Freedom of Information Act anticipates restriction – exemptions in respect of internal documents, in respect of information subject to a statutory duty of secrecy, on the basis of the document's contents and on the basis of lapse of time.

The restriction occurred to be problematic field. But it's nothing surprising and it depends on social acceptance for receiving one public service instead of other. Particularly it may concerns public security. In different countries the level of tolerance for this kind of social contract differs. In difficult situations, such as treats connected with terrorism, information attacks, counterattack measures taken by state (the only institution which could provide security to the citizens) very often include restrictions with freedom of expression and freedom of information. In Norway, general approach to the restrictions are tend to be similar to other European practices. This is due to outlined rule from article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights where one can find clearly that restrictions on freedom of expression must be shown to be necessary in a democratic society.

There is a broad exemption for internal documents when the agency has not completed its handling of the case unless the agency has dispatched the document. Documents are also exempt from release if they are made secret by another law or if they refer to national security, national defense or international relations, financial management, the minutes of the Council of State, appointments or protections in the civil service, regulatory or control measures, test answers, annual fiscal budgets or long-term budgets, and photographs of persons entered in a personal data register.

This is how restrictions look like in reality. Maybe this could be one of the reason why the Norwegian government released a white paper in April 1998 proposing changes in Freedom of Information Act – law with about 30 years of service. These include changing the subject of the request to information from documents, limiting the internal documents exemption, and making the law consistent with European Union requirements on access to environmental information.

In 2001, the Parliament amended the act to allow applicants to civil service positions and promotions to refuse consent to have their names disclosed. The Ombudsman criticized the government in his 2001, 2002 and 2003 reports on the implementation of the amendment as bodies were refusing in many cases to disclose any names or consider the public interest in high government positions. In 2003, he stated that it would appear that the administration is practicing the provision in a more restrictive manner than appears to be the intention of the lawmaker. If access is denied, individuals can appeal to a higher authority and then to the Storting's Ombudsman for Public Administration or a court. The Ombudsman's decisions are not binding but are generally followed. There have been very few court cases. In October 2004, the government announced that it was planned to introduce a bill to replace the Act with a new law that "provides for greater transparency than the current Freedom of Information Act". The bill was introduced in 2005 and enacted May 2006, superseding the previous law.

Norwegian Freedom of Information Act guarantee in its article 2 that every person (not only Norwegian citizens) may demand of the pertinent administrative agency to be apprised of the publicly disclosable contents of the documents in a specific case. The same applies to case registers and similar registers and the agenda of meetings of publicly elected municipal and county municipal bodies. The administrative agency shall keep a register pursuant to the provisions of the Archives Act and its regulations¹⁷.

It is worth to mention that in Norway one can also find regulation concerning access to information in special domains, like environmental information, classified information, criminal information, military secrets, or archives and personal data.

Official documents in Norway are defined as information which is recorded and can be listened to, displayed or transferred and which is either created by the authority and dispatched or has been received by the authority. All records are indexed at the time of creation or receipt and some ministries make the electronic indexes available on the Internet or through e-mail.

Requests can be made in any form including anonymously and must be responded immediately. Internal guidelines issued by the Ministry of Justice says that requests should be responded to in three days. The Ombudsman in 2000 ruled, that “it should be possible to decide most disclosure requests the same day or at least in the course of one to three working days, provided that no special, practical difficulties were involved. Release may be delayed if the documents then available give a directly misleading impression of the case and that public disclosure could therefore be detrimental to obvious public or private interests”¹⁸.

In theory, the Scandinavian countries are potential open data leaders. There is a long and well-rooted tradition of transparency in government, backed by far-reaching freedom of information legislation. In Norway, the legislation was recently amended to include a paragraph on database information (an adjustment prompted by the EU’s PSI directive). Other legislation, notably on the right to access to environmental information, provide additional tools for open data advocates, journalists and others who want access to public sector data.

Olav Anders Øvrebø, Assistant Professor at the University of Bergen, who recently worked on a report on open government data in Norway, shows that in practice, however open data remains a quite obscure question in the public sphere. The political attention generated by open data debates is nowhere near the levels seen in the US and UK. There are some signs of change, though. Recently, the Ministry of Government Administration has indicated that it will soon launch an Apps for Democracy-like competition. The success of some open data initiatives such as weather data from the Meteorological Institute and (on a smaller scale) of airline traffic data from the state airport company Avinor, has stirred some interest among state agencies. On the “demand” side, Øvrebø states, it’s fair to say that the legal tools I mentioned

¹⁷ Freedom of Information Act, <http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20060519-016-eng.pdf> [Accessed 6 of May 2015]

¹⁸ <http://www.freedominfo.org/countries/norway.htm> [Accessed 5 of May 2015].

are not very well known and little used when it comes to forcing access to data sources. In contrast, claiming access to text documents is routine among Norwegian journalists, so also in this area the potential is there. At our university department, we plan to continue our project with a different approach – building applications or services, hopefully in cooperation with Norwegian media. This way, we want to demonstrate how government data can be re-used in ways that stimulate public debate. We also have an ambition to strengthen the development of computational journalism. If we succeed in this, we can give a small contribution to what must be a long term goal for the open data community – moving from raw data to real insight¹⁹.

Nevertheless, Norway still remains leader position among countries with the most developed system of dissemination of public information. Norway is also one of the world leaders in open government doctrine and state information policy. Open government is the political doctrine which holds that the business of government and state administration should be opened at all levels to effective public scrutiny and oversight. In its broadest construction it opposes reason of state and national security considerations, which have tended to legitimize extensive state secrecy. The origins of open government arguments can be dated to the time of the European Enlightenment: to debates about the proper construction of a then nascent civil society.

Revolutionary changes in the conditions of informational relationship between the citizen and the public authorities have led to the formation of a distinct philosophical and political concepts in this regard. The idea of open government consists of a combination of factors, such as: best practices, regulations, attitudes, experiences, and finally the conviction that certain reflexes in the public space, in the various activities in different conditions and situations – commonly taken into account, decide whether state power can be classified as open.

Open government is inclusive attitude, combining society in the name of achieving, no matter how pathetic it sounds, common goals and benefits. Open government attitude can be compared to the two modes of behavior of public servant, who is either surly looking at an applicant from the top and handles it carelessly, without showing even good will, or is courteous, helpful, works at every step, operates transparently, and does not settle the matter “under the table”. These are two radically different attitudes, providing *de facto* the specific position of state power. The following relationship is clearly visible. In the countries which occupy the highest positions in the rankings of the comfort and quality of life (e.g. the Scandinavian countries) open-government model is an absolute standard for years. Another attitude has already emerged virtually outside the Nordic cultural sphere, and is treated as a historical model, in which “own information resources are treated as property, that can serve as additional benefits”²⁰.

¹⁹ <http://blog.okfn.org/2010/02/18/open-government-data-in-norway-mounting-interest-but-no-breakthrough-yet/> [Accessed 7 of May 2015].

²⁰ Schellong, A. Stepanets, E. (2011). Unchartered waters. The State of Open Data in Europe, CSC Business Solutions Technology Outsourcing, Public Sector Study Series, pp. 2, CSC_policy_paper_series_01_2011_unchartered_waters_state_of_open_data_europe_English_2.pdf [Accessed 7 of May 2015].

The idea of open government grows on the foundation of a broader concept – the idea of transparency²¹. It refers more to the imperative of attitude that accompanies every action, than sanctions the need to share information. While the concept of transparency is the product of the era of enlightenment, the doctrine of open government is already its postmodern extension. The postulate of promoting open government concept combines many social environments – integrating pro-democracy, human rights, environmental, left-wing movements, and so-called free software movements.

Linking doctrine of open government only to the legislation of freedom of information is a mistake. The concept of open government is more capacious. It is an attitude, a way of life (in this case the state institutions), and finally value. „Opening up data to the public promises to create public value: ensuring transparency and accountability, encouraging innovation and economic growth, educating and influencing people, or improving efficiency of the government. These values make public sector information (PSI) a strategic resource, potentially important for different public sector agencies, private businesses, academia, citizens and civic organizations”²².

The concept of open government, derives its popularity from the new technological possibilities. Open government is a specific way of organization of the country, that exploits digital communication tools. This way is reflected in many aspects, including:

- control – civic supervision aimed at contributing to the improvement of the quality of public agencies, including reduction of corruption, arrogance and other irregularities;
- social development – improving social skills, providing higher level of education, a sense of shared responsibility, creating positive instincts, promoting civic participation, volunteerism, increasing social capital;
- economic development – raising standards of living, improving conditions for businesses, reducing unemployment, improving competitiveness;
- transparency – ensuring the verifiability of the state institutions, eliminating unpredictability and ambiguity in public behavior, clarity of decision-making and funding;
- participation – ensuring the participation of citizens in the governance process, public consultations, providing access to relevant information and documents, preferring common solutions;
- commitment – the elimination of social exclusion;

²¹ The beginning of realizing the concept of transparency, is admitted to be Swedish Freedom of the Press Act from XVIII century, that reaches also Finland (as a territory then subordinated to Sweden). This prescriptive approach strongly influenced the formation of a specific political context in this part of Europe. In Finland in 1951, the Law on Publicity of Official Documents was after introduced. In the US, the Freedom of Information Act – FOIA was passed in 1966. Similar legislation was adopted in 1970 in Norway and Denmark. In 1978, in France and the Netherlands, in 1982 in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The rest of the democratic countries made up the backlog in the '90s and later.

²² Schellong, A., Stepanets, E. op.cit., pp. 2.

- cooperation – engaging in coordination, stimulating mutual understanding, eliminating clichés, replacing the hierarchical model into horizontal, flexibility systems (networks), explaining procedures;
- openness – building trust and respect in relationships, sharing resources;
- efficiency – the inclusion of all available resources (accumulation of social forces).

Level of openness is gradable and can be used as a criterion of prevalence of open government²³. It is worth mentioning that more and more tools of open government arrives, including sharing and exchange of information, interactive consulting, document open formats ensuring cataloging, creation of databases in open manner.

It should reflect the prevailing trend of this phenomenon in this regard. It is important to emphasize that the concept of open government is being introduced in public sphere at this very moment. Huge amounts of public information, collected and circulated for years by state institutions, on our eyes are shared for the public. „Over the years, public bodies have created and accumulated vast amounts of information – ranging from scientific, economic and geospatial data to reports – available in a wide variety of structures and formats. With the diffusion of technology in every branch of government, the proliferation data continues at an ever increasing speed”²⁴.

In all so called modern doctrines of state, the transparency demand of public space is one of the foundations of the system. The model of implementation of the open government criteria is closely associated with the different categories of state resources and the concept of open data. Like the others, it is a wide category that refers to the same values as the concepts of open source, open access, open government – remaining in close relationship with such projects, like e-government, as well as the idea of good government. Without modern, technological tools open data concept will remain only as a postulate. „Open data is a philosophy. (...) The concept applies both to data in raw and processed form, including data as varied as genetic sequences, geographic information, electromagnetic emissions, images, public transport schedules, data from medical experiments, voting results, reports and so on. In general, definitions of open data do not offer insight into what data are, but rather on the issue of openness and reuse. Public data are commonly defined as data that are not subject to valid privacy, security or privilege limitations”²⁵. Open data refers directly to the postulate of totally free information,

²³ For example, in the Netherlands Citizenlink card was adopted, as a public commitment. Citizen has the right to choose the channel to realize contact with the authorities. The goal is to reduce administration costs by 25%. The heart of the card is ten principles based on which both central and regional governments have to function. Supervisory authorities have been empowered to submit annual reports on compliance with the rules. Netherlands in the final rankings of the OECD ranks among the top five countries providing the highest standard of e-services, and the card itself won UN Public Service Award. See more Poelmans, M. (2007). Reinventing public service delivery by implementing the e-Citizen Charter, Amsterdam; Bayens, G. (2006). E-government in the Netherlands: An architectural approach, 2006, <http://www.via-nova-archi-tectura.org> [Accessed 8 of May 2015].

²⁴ Schellong, A., Stepanets, E. op.cit., pp. 2.

²⁵ Ibidem, s. 5.

incorporating the area of freedom of all data, regardless of their nature or rank. In this sense, each piece of public information should be open. These kind of approach could be noticed in American President inauguration Memorandum.

Barack Obama in his Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies about Transparency and Open Government, claimed that Openness could strengthen democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government and stressed three aspect of his administration to follow. (1) Government should be transparent. Transparency promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their government is doing. Information maintained by the Federal Government is a national asset. My administration will take appropriate action, consistent with law and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms that the public can readily find and use. Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies to put information about their operations and decisions online and readily available to the public. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public feedback to identify information of greatest use to the public. (2) Government should be participatory. Public engagement enhances the government's effectiveness and improves the quality of its decisions. Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments and agencies should offer Americans increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide their government with the benefits of their collective expertise and information. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public input on how we can increase and improve opportunities for public participation in government. (3) Government should be collaborative. Collaboration actively engages Americans in the work of their government. Executive departments and agencies should use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate among themselves, across all levels of government, and with nonprofit organizations, businesses, and individuals in the private sector. Executive departments and agencies should solicit public feedback to assess and improve their level of collaboration and to identify new opportunities for cooperation²⁶.

Open government is widely seen to be a key hallmark of contemporary democratic practice and is often linked to the general public information policy. The latter can be described as an overall view of activities and political decisions made in public sphere closely related with providing information to public opinion. The most important goal of public information policy is to satisfy informational needs of society and to obtain public understanding and acceptance for the efforts and actions which the government is undertaking. States that runs everyday and reliable information policy wins trust and confidence not only from their citizens but also from the international partners. Well-informed society is participating society.

²⁶ Barack Obama Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies – Transparency and Open Government, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf [Accessed 9 of May 2015]

Role of the quality of information and price of information becomes more and more important along with fastest propagation of model of information society (information civilization) basing its values on access to data, knowledge and high quality of education. Degree of civilization and standard of life become directly more dependent not only on informational level of government but first of all on citizens knowledge. Individuals, through the wide access to data, obtains social, political and economic subjectivity. With the assistance of technological instruments, they participate equal in positive aspect (creating, suggesting, effecting the political decisions) as well as in negative aspect (realizing kind of civil control of the authority). Image of modern society is a vision of active people, who realize different interests, being in the same time familiar with different domains of lives what makes them able to take part and act in public area formerly reserved for involved entities.

Public authorities establishes and develops information systems which are to provide citizens, economic entities with necessary information, treated in this circumstances as a public good. Government has to create such information systems, as: state law information system, statistics information system, alert and security information system, administration information system, government activity information system, economic information system. This means, distributing information connected with elections, tax payments, labour market, education, welfare benefits, social insurances, health care system, security, business activity and many others. One could claim that if information systems are insufficient or simply if society suffers from the lack of information, everyone face the problem of information gap and asymmetry in information flow balance.

Public information policy sets out how the government discloses information and consults with its stakeholders (citizens and other actors) – so as to promote better awareness and understanding of its policies, and operations. Those kind of activity truly creates civil society and stimulates citizens for political engagement. Modern communication technologies (ICT), improved efficiency in the worldwide telecommunications market, gives an outstanding tool for both sides: citizens and public authorities to communicate each other.

Using ICT in the public sector, is dedicated to achieve high standards in government efficiency, improving the quality of public services and modernizing authorities. “The Norwegian public sector started using ICT much earlier than the advent of what is today known as e-government. The main driver for ICT use was, and remains, internal efficiency through automation of administrative processes. Until the late 1990s, central government had played a limited role in developing its ICT use. Instead, ICT had been developed more or less autonomously by agencies, which have used it mainly to support their own internal administration and/or service delivery processes and to achieve technical goals, including output efficiency”²⁷.

²⁷ OECD e – Government Studies – Norway, (2005), pp. 165.

One of the most common tool to exercise communication between state and citizens are the state web portal and www sites. Norway decided to establish portal Norway.no “The idea to establish a portal took shape in the context of effort to achieve administrative simplification. In 1999, the project for a public sector portal was included in the Norwegian Governments’ program – a simpler Norway. The objective was to give to the public sector a more unified appearance and make the search for public institutions and information simpler. The means identified to achieve was to create a portal that, in many ways, was similar to a phone book but that also contained a short description of the organisation of the structure and functions government. The portal also aimed to increase public agencies’ online presence and improve the quality of public services on the Internet”²⁸.

Norway.no should be considered as the gateway to the public sector in Norway. Portal was launched by the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration in January 2000. Some private vendors were also involved in the establishment of the portal. The portal aims to help members of the public find public information and access public services more easily. Norway.no is a service run by the Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Difi), and is subordinate to the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs. Norway.no presents information and services in Bokmål Norwegian – www.norge.no, Nynorsk Norwegian – www.noreg.no and English – www.norway.no. A Sami version of the portal – www.norga.no is also being developed. Norway.no also comprises a help desk service. Our help desk team can tell people which authority they should contact with questions about public services, rights and regulations. Most people contact us by telephone, e-mail, e-chat or SMS. Information on how you can contact is found on our web page Ask Us! From Norway.no you can access the one-stop online service centre MyPage. MyPage offers citizens a secured interaction point with public agencies, presentation of personal data stored in public registers and the opportunity to submit online applications and notifications. DIFI is responsible for managing and developing content for MyPage as well as providing guidance and information on how to use the online service centre.

As we consider the history of developing modern tools of contact between administration and citizens in Norway it has to be mentioned that whole period should be divided. One could discover significant changes of approaches to the electronic administration from decentralised form of it in 1970s, connected with the whole reform of administration (which resulted in general decentralisation) than centralisation in early 1980 (connected with providing greater interoperability), and than once more decentralisation (due to the project called New Public Management), and finally centralisation after 1990 (with a goal to achieve general public administration objectives). But since 1980s governments initiatives found supporting feedback in Norwegian society acceptance to this kind of activity and raised awareness of its

²⁸ OECD e – Government Studies – Norway, (2005), pp. 165.

use. Norwegian information society strategy's focused seriously on this tool to promote and spread economic development.

When it comes to public units responsible for deployment and maintenance of ICT administration projects we can also divide the history of Norwegian e-government into at least 2 periods during when the responsibility was in the hands of couple of Ministries and the period after 2004, namely after the reform which donated all the power into the hands of Ministry of Modernisation. Up until the creation of the new Ministry, the Ministry of Trade and Industry had the overall responsibility for ICT coordination in general society while the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration was responsible for ICT use and policies in public administration. Coordination was ensured on the level of State Secretaries on ICT, who could also find support in a serious of groups composed of senior e-government officials in central agencies. Current public bodies which take the responsibility for e-government consist of following entities: the State Secretaries' Committee on ICT, composed of 11 State Secretaries, the eContact group composed of senior officials from most ministries, the Ministry of Modernisation which develops and coordinates ICT police across different sectors and the Coordinating Body for e-Government established under Ministry of Modernisation which includes 13 leaders of central government institutions and 2 municipalities.

Everyone knows that building e-government is not a easy thing to do. It desires coordinated works in many public fields. It's would be enough to mention such featured obstacles, like: legal and regulatory barriers or budgetary barriers. That's why, the whole process of e-government creation is endless and need constant improvement. What is more, e-government mostly provide public administration services for the end-users. Bearing in mind the fact that public administration constantly evaluates, e-government will not ever have it's final shape. Still, Norwegian experiences in this field are one the most developed comparing to other states. "These achievements, however, only provide part of the picture of the overall impact that ICTs have had on the public sector. While Norway has been at the forefront in applying ICT to internal back office of government organisations to enable process efficiency and inter-organisational data sharing, it is in the middle of the pack in terms of the delivery of electronic services in the front office government (in comparison with EU countries). Much of the back office improvements were already achieved during the 1980s, at an early stage of e-government development and have provided a foundation for yet more improvements in both the front and the back office. Despite its early achievements on back office integration, Norway is now confronted with the same challenges as those countries which focused its e-government strategy on service delivery first, such as better integrating back office systems with front office service delivery. The challenge for Norway is to fing a path that best exploits the well-integrated

government-wide use of technology, while respecting the tradition of a decentralized, consensus-based government”²⁹.

OECD report about Norwegian e-government found other shortcomings in the state model of social electronic engagement. “In contrast to other Nordic countries, in Norway there are relatively few projects to improve citizens’ online consultation and participation in policy making being undertaken by central government. Most of the e-government initiatives that do exist are targeted on providing information to citizens, rather than engaging them in e-consultation or e-participation. As in most other OECD countries, seemingly little civil society mobilisation is focused on e-government issues, though ICT and the Internet is an increasingly important organising tool for civil society organisations”³⁰.

Speaking about e-engagement, one should consider that it does not only includes e-government projects. Another very interesting modern tool is e-voting. In this field Norway has also interesting achievements. Due to the common problems with integrity and security of e-voting systems mostly one can witness only trials with the regional reach rather than well-prepared state project. We can observe that different countries treat e-voting phenomenon from different angle. The attitudes to e-voting vary a lot and should be seen in relation to the different political traditions and particular characteristics of social development. “There are three different perspectives from which e-voting may be considered. One is negative perspective: that e-voting is not interesting as an option at all. Another is a restrictive perspective: that e-voting may be considered only in the polling stations. The third perspective is the more liberal one: that voting over the internet may be considered in uncontrolled environments”³¹. Most commonly e-voting is still treated as an experiment to run than a historical imperative. The traditional paper ballot is a very strong and touchable manifest of democracy. Digital polling machines seem to be too artificial for the voters. However, statistics claim that more or less half of responders in development democracies are open for the new way exposing political preferences.

In Norway, for example after e-voting experiment, which took place in the three municipalities of Oppdal, Bykle and Larvik during the regular local and regional elections on September 2003 the opinions were different. “During the project period at the local elections in 2003 Norwegian voters were asked about their opinions on VOI if such a voting procedure had been provided. It should be noted that they were not presented with the possible advantages and disadvantages relating to this voting option. In sum, six out of ten voters said they would like to vote over the Internet”³².

²⁹ OECD e – Government Studies – Norway, (2005), pp. 18-19/

³⁰ OECD e – Government Studies – Norway, (2005), pp. 19.

³¹ Electronic voting – challenges and opportunities, Ministry of Local Government and regional Development, (2006), pp. 25.

³² *Ibidem*, pp. 28.

Other but one of the most significant step forward in the transparency Norwegian episode was the Norwegian Government decision from 2008 which states that all information on state-operated web sites should be accessible in the open document formats HTML, PDF or ODF. This means an end to the time when public documents are published in closed formats only. This means that, everybody should have equal access to public information. From 2009 on, Norwegian citizens are able to freely choose which software to use to get access to information from public offices. More competition between suppliers of office programs will be another effect of the government's decision.

The Government's decision was as follows:

- HTML is the primary format for publishing public information on the Internet.
- PDF (PDF 1.4 and later or PDF/A ISO 19005-1) is obligatory when there is a wish to keep a document's original appearance.
- ODF (ISO/IEC 26300) is to be used to publish documents to which the user should be able to make changes after downloading, e.g. public forms to be filled out by the user. This format is also made obligatory.

Minister of Government Administration and Reform Heidi Grande Røys said, that for many years, Norway had no specific software policy. This is now changing. Our government has decided that ICT development in the public sector shall be based on open standards. In the future, we won't accept that government bodies are locking users of public information to closed formats.

The government decision does not prevent state bodies from using other document formats in their communication with the users, provided that the documents also are produced in one of the obligatory formats, ODF or PDF. State and municipal organs as well should be able to receive documents in these formats from their partners or users³³.

Norway is also a country with well-developed electronic infrastructure in terms of access to legislative documents. The first system, called JURIS, started its operations at the University of Oslo in 1971. In this same time, the Norwegian Law Compendium (*Norges lover*) was created. In 1983, the electronic database of legal acts was made available in full to public use. Currently, in Norway there is a whole range of different catalogs, repositories and databases of legal information, including the most common: Lovdata (a system used by legal professionals – <http://www.lovdata.no>), ODIN (ministerial website – <http://odin.dep.no>), Domstolen (judicial review – <http://www.domstol.no>) and many others³⁴.

Since 80s Norway in the majority of various world rankings of countries occupies leading positions. One should be aware that the status of Norway to a large extent is determined by the characteristic model of its economy. The country is among the richest in the world and, more

³³ <http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/networking/?m=200712> [Accessed 12 of May 2015].

³⁴ See more Thorpe, S., Features – Online Legal Information in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, <http://www.llrx.com/features/scanda.htm> [Accessed 11 of May 2015].

importantly, its financial status is largely based on the extraction and sale of energy resources. Norway is the world's "top 5" oil exporters. Oil and gas sector accounts about 22 % of the Norwegian GDP and 67 % of total export. Norway is the most important guarantor of natural gas supplies to the EU (approx. 20 % of gas consumption in the EU, according to data from 2010) and a major exporter of metals (leading producer of ferroalloys and primary aluminum). Other traditional sectors of economic activity is shipbuilding (the fourth largest fleet in the world), as well as fishing and fish farming.

With such a wealth, Norway leads prudent management policy. In contrast to the oil Arab countries, the majority of income does not spent on consumption and cultivation of "gigantism", but collects at the national capital-investment fund. The Norwegian State Pension Fund consists of two funds: State Pension Fund – World, formerly known as the National Petroleum Fund (*Statens pensjonsfond – Utland, SPU*), and the State Pension Fund – Norway (*Folketrygdfondet*). The fund was established in the early 90-ies of the last century and is currently the world's second largest state fund for investment and savings (after the Abu Dhabi Fund). It has 1% of all shares listed on global stock exchanges. The Fund's investment strategy developed by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance assumes, in addition to the prohibition on investing funds in Norway, the investment chapter in the proportions: 60% of funds in equities, 35-40% in bonds and 5% in real estate. The Fund began investing in 1998 from the stock exchange, in 2000 opened up to emerging markets, and in 2011 started dealing with the real estate sector. In accordance with the recently adopted new strategy, Fund is to invest more in emerging markets and the real estate sector. This investment machine is present in 82 countries around the world and has in its portfolio over 8 thousand shares of global companies. Public information is that the average real rate of return since 1998 until 2014 was 3.75% (nominal – 5.83%). Investments in emerging markets yielded 7.4% gain and were driven mainly by China, India, Russia, Turkey and Brazil³⁵. For comparison, in developed markets fund earned 3.7%. In 2014 the fund value corresponds to 183% of GDP. The forecasts assume that by 2030 it will increase to approx. 220% of GDP. It is estimated that the assets of the Norwegian State Pension Fund at the end of 2014 years were worth approx. \$ 900 billion³⁶. For comparison, the nominal value of Polish GDP in 2013 amounted to \$ 525.9 billion³⁷. Taking into account that Norway has a population of 5 million people, it means gives 178 thousand \$ per capita of accumulated savings. Theoretically, every Norwegian is already a millionaire (it has accumulated more than one million kroner savings on the public account). There is therefore public conviction that potentially anyone could financially afford for two-generation vacation. Money, however,

³⁵ See Norwegia: w co inwestuje największy fundusz świata?, <http://forsal.pl/artykuly/817619,norweski-fundusz-majatkowy-w-co-inwestuje-najwiekszy-fundusz-swiatea.html> [Accessed 11 of May 2015].

³⁶ Jak zarabia największy norweski fundusz emerytalny?, <http://investlife.pl/jak-zarabia-najwiekszy-norweski-fundusz-emerytalny/> [Accessed 11 of May 2015].

³⁷ World Bank data, See <http://www.worldbank.org/pl/country/poland>, [Accessed 11 of May 2015].

should mainly be financial security for an aging population and ensure the safety of pension when they run out of reserves³⁸.

It should be noted that Norway has set an ambitious goal, not only to respect the principle of openness at home, but also to promote such behavior abroad. For years, it monitors the processes of extraction of natural resources in such countries, as Nigeria and Azerbaijan. Norway is also a driving force in implementing standards ensuring transparency in international economic activities and strives to create relevant standards in this area (e.g. *An international convention on transparency in international economic activity*). Norway wants to reduce abnormalities (e.g. “tax havens”)³⁹. Taking into account the overall achievements of this country in the promotion of transparency in Europe and worldwide, and the proven fact that greater openness of the state sector, result directly in a higher standard of civilization indicators – Poland and other country in the region should look closely at the deployed instruments there and treat it as an example to introduce.

³⁸ See more W Norwegii każdy jest milionerem, <http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/W-Norwegii-kazdy-jest-milione-rem-3032599.html> [Accessed 11 of May 2015].

³⁹ Norwegian Commission , dealing with capital flows from developing countries (Norwegian Commission on Capital Flight From Developing Countries), published a report treated as an extension of early document of the OECD in 1998 – Harmful Tax Competition. Norway thus is one of the most important advocates of the Global Financial Integrity Project, which aims at establishment of a fair world trade rules and tax. Zob. Tax havens and development: a damning report, <http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2009/06/tax-havens-and-development-damning.html>, (24.01.2012). [Accessed 12 of May 2015].

Faith and religious practices as a form of human longing for the permanence

Keywords: psychology, pedagogy, rehabilitation, faith, religion, vanishing, to elapse, deprivation of liberty, freedom

The article is based on the author's book "Skazani, ale nie potępieni" ["Convicted but not condemned"].¹ The research has been conducted in four penitentiaries like in: Grudziadz, Lubliniec, Warsaw-Grochow, Warsaw-Sluzewiec. In 2003 prisoners were enquired with two questionnaires discussed, and in 2004 prisoners from the custody Warsaw-Sluzewiec – were asked to fill the "**Questionnaire of an imprisoned person**". The preparation and application of this new enquiry tool issued from the necessity for a more detailed research of addiction problems (alcohol and drugs) and of paying more attention to the addictions. Researcher have been done in small groups, which was imposed by the specific character of the penitentiaries (necessity of keeping safe conditions, and, in the case of the temporarily arrested it was dictated by the division into, so called, isolation groups, which are connected with prisoners' isolation on this stage of penal proceedings).²

The research included three questionnaires: "Values preference", "Personal questionnaire", and "Questionnaire of an imprisoned person".³

THE TOPIC DEVELOPMENT

In "**Values preference**"⁴ – the section concerning which social-cultural group a respondent belongs includes questions about a respondent's: age, sex, education and social descent. Because of the fact that the respondents were imprisoned people, staying in custodies and penitentiaries, this part of the data was supplemented with information about the prisoner's status – person temporarily arrested or person already convicted. The questionnaire consists of two sections; each of them has 18 values put in alphabetical order. The respondents were to classify them, within each of these sections separately, by attributing different ordinal numbers (from 1 to 8) to every value, starting from the most to the least important one for the enquired.

¹ K. Pierzchała, *Skazani, ale nie potępieni* [Convicted but not condemned], Oficyna Wydawniczo-Poligraficzna „Adam”, Warsaw 2004.

² Ibidem, p. 71.

³ Ibidem, p. 65.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 66.

“**The personal questionnaire**” was the next research tool. This extensive questionnaire consists of 68 questions, open and closed ones, which often have many sub-points. These questions can be divided in two thematic sections.

First, chronologically: division

- a. general personal data, sex, faith, age, social descent, education (1-5)
- b. home: childhood and youth (6-13,21,22)
- c. family: marriage or concubine, children (14-20, 21, 23)
- d. prison: prison past, present imprisonment, religious life in prison, personal perspective of leaving the prison (24-50)
- e. future: plans for the future and respondent’s evaluation of the opportunities to fulfill these plans (48, 51-68).⁵

Second, thematic : division

- a. general personal data: sex, faith, age, social descent, education (2-5)
- b. family and intimates: in the past, present and future (6-8, 14, 15, 17-20, 39, 40, 54, 55-61)
- c. beliefs: respondent’s attitude, home atmosphere, aspects of religious life, religious life in prison (1, 9-13, 16,21-23,29-38,41-46)
- d. imprisonment: prison past, present imprisonment, personal perspective of leaving the prison (6, 24-28, 40,47, 49, 50)
- e. future: commitments and plans for the future and respondent’s evaluation of the chances to fulfill these plans (48, 51-53, 54, 55-61, 63-68).⁶

“**Questionnaire of an imprisoned person**” was the third tool practiced in the researches. It is based on the “Questionnaire of character”, which had been used in researches of secondary school students. The fact that mostly adult people were enquired in this research determined the changes and expansion of the personal-data-part. That is why the questions about: education, job, gaining independence and setting up a family, civil status, children – were included in the questionnaire. Questions about the relationships with the family were also expanded with the following aspects: contacts with one’s parents and siblings; financial relations (financial help or supporting) between a respondent and his parents, siblings, partners; providing for children. Questions concerning religious practices and receiving sacraments were also expanded and differentiated in the time aspect: the situation, before detention and the present situation in the imprisonment conditions. Moreover, there were added some questions about staying in prison. The most important part of a questionnaire, from the point of view of a researcher who studies addictions, are the questions concerning addiction problem (addiction to nicotine, alcohol and drugs). In order to lead a successful therapy, one has to make spiritual and religious values again

⁵ Ibidem, pp. 66.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 66–67.

most important. Demotion and, as a result, decline of these values sometimes make people feel the meaninglessness of life, which then results in addictions, especially to alcohol and drugs.⁷

Therefore, the questionnaire includes six questions about the way the respondents judge mutual relations between faith, freeing oneself of addictions and imprisonment.⁸

The research involved imprisoned people, i.e. people, who has broken the law and had already been convicted of it, or against whom there was a probably supposition of impeding penal proceedings.

Table 1. Total number of respondents

Questionnaire	Sex	Temporarily arrested	Convicted	No information	Total
Preference of values	Women	38	141	1	180
	Men	103	114		217
	Total	141	255	1	397
Personal questionnaire	Women	42	147	1	190
	Men	90	112		202
	Total	132	259	1	392
Questionnaire of an imprisoned person	Women	0	0	0	0
	Men	76	68	0	144
	Total	76	68	0	144

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 73.

Almos 97% of respondents declared Roman Catholic faith, which clearly renders the situation of faith in our country. The table below shows a detailed list of answers to the questions about faith.

Table 2. Table 2. Faith of imprisoned people

Questionnaire	Personal questionnaire		Questionnaire of an imprisoned person	
	N	%	N	%
Roman Catholic	380	96,9	139	96,5
Greek	3	0,8	2	1,4
Pentecost	1	0,3	0	0,0
Jehovah's witnesses	3	0,8	0	0,0
Non-believers	3	0,8	3	2,1
No answer	2	0,5	0	0,0

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 74.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 67; J. Ziemniak, *Rola Kościoła i wartości religijnych w profilaktyce uzależnień* [The role of the Church and of religious values in the prevention of addiction], [w:] *Profilaktyka uzależnień drogą do wolności człowieka* [Addiction Prevention way to human freedom], Eds. Cz. Czekiera, I. Niewiadomska, TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE KUL, Lublin 2001.

⁸ K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 67.

The respondents were also asked how they mark their belief in the following way: believing and practicing; believing and practicing irregularly; believing but not practicing and non-believers. Table no 3 shows the responses. Apparently, one might think that the percentage of believers is very high – since only two respondents (1,4%) declared themselves as non-believers. However, it should be taken into consideration that people who say they are believers but not practicing ones are, in fact, non-believers. And in this context the percentage of believers insignificantly exceeds half of the respondents: 42,4% of people believing and practicing, 13,6% of believing and practicing irregularly. If one verified these answers, by asking about particular frequency of religious practice, it could turn out that the above percentages resulting from prisoners' declaration should be exchanged.⁹

Table 3. Belief and practice of imprisoned people

Belief and practice	Questionnaire of an imprisoned person	
	N	%
believing and practicing	59	42,4
irregularly	19	13,6
believing but not practicing	59	42,4
non-believers	2	1,4

Origin: K. Pierzchała, *Skazani...*, [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 75.

The questionnaire included more detailed questions, as well, such as those concerning religious practice in the times before and after imprisonment. The respondents were to answer: how often they say individual prayers (alone), take part in collective prayers (with other people, e.g. prayer meetings), attend masses, do self-examination and receive Holy Communion. Many respondents did not give definite answers, just Yes or No. Such attitude towards filling in a questionnaire discredits the sense of responsibility of imprisoned people. Nevertheless, the results have been compared in Table 4.¹⁰

⁹ Ibidem, p. 74.

¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 74–75.

Table 4. The frequency of religious practices of imprisoned people

Frequency	Individual prayer		Prayer with other people (prayer meetings)		Attending Masses		Going to confession		Receiving Holy Communion	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Never	48	50	120	97	53	80	67	110	64	111
Rarely	10	3	7	3	19	6	27	4	27	4
Sometimes	9	10	1	3	20	2	13	0	14	0
Often	11	15	2	2	4	4	0	1	1	1
No frequency given	66	66	14	39	48	52	37	28	38	28

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 76.

A – period of time before imprisonment

B – during imprisonment

Vast amount of answers, in which the respondents confirm their involving in certain forms of religious practice, without saying how often this practice is or was performed, makes it impossible to state real frequency of religious practicing.¹¹

However there are some differences in certain respondents' judgement of their own sense of responsibility and duty, the most frequent level is the same for the majority of the enquired prisoners, and the average is 0,7 on behalf of the sense of responsibility. The table given below shows the results. There is a strong correlation between declared sense of duty and sense of responsibility – Pearson's correlation ratio – 0,459.¹²

The following open questions were included in the questionnaire ("Questionnaire of an imprisoned person") in order to enable the respondents to express their opinions on the subject of their belief, its growth and development during the stay in prison, during the therapies and on the influence their faith had on their fight with addictions:¹³

26. Has faith and religious practicing helped me to fight with any of addictions – if so, how?
27. Has my stay in prison affected my attitude to religion and belief-if so, how?
28. What influence has the members of the prison ministry (prison chaplain, nuns, and members of prison fraternity) had on the change of my attitude to religion and faith?
29. Has my attitude to evil (especially to the crime I committed) changed under the influence of my participation in religious life during my stay in prison and the meetings with representatives of the prison ministry?
30. Has my belief and participation in religious life and the meetings with representatives of the prison ministry helped me to free myself of any addictions and how?

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 75.

¹² Ibidem, p. 129.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 141.

31. Has participation in the therapy affected my attitude to religion and faith – if so, how?¹⁴

Unfortunately, it should be clearly pointed out, that the enquired prisoners either did not give any answers to the above questions or answered with only one word (“Yes” or “No”), which, excluding question 26, makes it impossible to interpret the answers or evaluate the respondents’ intentions.¹⁵

However, there are some more extensive answers, which can claim for the fact, that these respondents have more intense, mature religious and inner life and that they developed the sense of duty and responsibility. Some of the prisoners’ answers are quoted below in several characteristic groups.¹⁶

All those statements are presented in the original form, thus some lexical-grammatical mistakes and unfinished thoughts may occur in the text. Only spelling was corrected. The first statements quoted are the answers that can be described as the most developed and religiously mature ones.

“While I was on therapy I converted myself, I pray a lot, I trust all my problems to God’s hands. My faith helps me very much and I know that if I endure in my belief and will not stand back from God I will not take drugs... I converted myself; I’m starting to learn how to live a life that was given to us by God, to be a “good person”. I pray a lot and this is the most important thing for me... I regret the things I did – I confessed my sins and I feel better... I pray and I believe for myself and I have found what I missed in my life to be happy, that is God.” (aged 25, when he was 18 he started taking drugs).¹⁷

“I believe in God and I prayed that He could help me to free myself of addiction, I think that it helped me somehow, too... I am more composed after each Mass and after receiving Holy Communion.” – (aged 43, has been drinking from the age of 17, has been taking drugs for 7 years now).

“Yes – alcohol – I realized that the lack of spiritual life and the lack of faith in God and religious practice was one of the reasons of my addiction. Break in my practice caused emptiness and depravation in myself. I realized that when I got to prison. Returning to practice helps mi to survive and get back to “normal” healthy life.... I can understand the values and benefits that faith gives. I have understood the need to be faithful. ... The chaplain – the only person, -whom I can confess to, he can talk with me like a human being. The nuns can make the prayer meetings nice with their behavior, faith, very good example and serenity. They managed to convert me and give me faith, ... I hope I will fight alcohol addiction – by being faithful

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

to God and by actively participating in (religious) practicing.” – (aged 52, lies been smoking from the age of 18, has been drinking from the age of 35).¹⁸

“My faith of God helps me in the therapy gives me hope and faith in success... it (stay in prison) strengthened my belief... I like the way the Mass is celebrated, a close contact with other members of the ministry.” (aged 53, has been smoking and drinking from the age of 20).¹⁹

“In my opinion my faith and everyday practice “Prayer” helps me survive here, in prison, I am faithful to God and I know He cares for me and watches over me, he is my Heavenly Father... I pray and he helps me and watches over my safety... the chaplain, the nuns certainly had influence on my attitude to religion, it was surely a great progress in my belief that you let me have a rosary, holy pictures, a prayer book and that I had opportunity to go to confession and receive Holy Communion and get God’s blessing.” (aged 19, does not admit of any addictions).²⁰

Not all the answers are developed and give evidence of a great religious involvement, as, for example, the answer to question 27, concerning the influence of staying in prison on a respondent’s attitude to faith and religion: “it influenced me because I stay under closure and I have more time for praying” – (aged 19, has been drinking alcohol and taking drugs since he was 12 years old).²¹

However, in the statement quoted above, one can see honesty and truth.

Between those short answers included some statements quite pretty in their simplicity, such as e.g: “I started to believe” – (aged 29, has been smoking and taking drugs since he was 13 years old); “yes, during (he therapy / started to believe in God again” – (aged 35, has been smoking and drinking since he was 18 years old).” I understood that the crime I had committed would not have happened if I had been closer to God” – (aged 49, has been smoking since he was 18 years old, has been drinking – does not say how long).²²

Unfortunately, there were, critical statements, too:

“...at first I attended the therapy meetings, but prisoners are difficult listeners what made me give up, since I could not concentrate properly.” – (aged 45, only smokes).²³

“...they (members of the prison ministry) had no influence... I don’t attend the meetings” – (aged 25, smokes and drinks)²⁴

“...he made me realize that people who are excessive practitioners turn out to be cheaters and they use religion for their own purposes” – (aged 25, has been smoking since he was 17 years old)²⁵

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 142–143.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 143.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 143.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 143.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 143.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 143.

Quite often the respondents declared their innocence, what clearly shows that they had not fully understood the aim of the questionnaire, as well as they needed to present themselves as victims, not as delinquents. It may also mean that they did not feel guilty.²⁶

“I am innocent I was wrongly accused of the crimes I had not committed” – (aged 20, been smoking since he was 15 years old, has been drinking since he was 17 years old).²⁷

“...my attitude to evil did not exist, and I did not committed any crime” – (aged 18, has been smoking since he was 15 years old, has been drinking since he was 17 years old).²⁸

“... in no way, because I was not guilty, the policemen who imprisoned me they once took me to a forest and robbed me, when I wanted to take the case into public I was set up by the police to have stolen 100 PLN.” – (aged 39, has been smoking since he was 15 years old, has been drinking since he was 17 years old).²⁹

“... if I did evil to other person it would, perhaps, but did not...” – (aged 25, has been smoking since he was 17 years old).³⁰

To sum up the answers to those questions was not an easy task, but, finally, I managed to collect all the results after classifying each answer into one of the following evaluation groups:

- positive evaluation,
- indifferent evaluation,
- negative evaluation,
- evaluation impossible.³¹

These results are presented in the table below.

Table 5. Evaluation of the answers to the open questions of total imprisoned respondents

Question number:	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.
Positive evaluation	34	46	28	31	16	16
Indifferent evaluation	72	69	72	57	67	51
Negative evaluation	0	4	1	0	0	0
Evaluation impossible	38	25	43	56	61	77

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 145.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 143.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 143.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 144.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 144.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 144.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 144.

In the one third of cases (average: 34,7%, from 11,1% to 51,9%, depending on the question) imprisoned respondents did not give answers that would allow any interpretation (terse or irrelevant answers) or did not give any answer at all; there were mostly indifferent evaluations, most often very short ones (average: 44,9%, from 35,4% to 50,0%, depending on the question). The least exhaustive answers were given to questions 30 and 31 (11,1% each) about the influence their faith had on the therapy and the influence the therapy had on their faith. It is a surprisingly small amount of answers, all the more so as in the case of question 29 and, almost identical, question 30, the respondents gave twice as many (23,6%) positive and exhaustive answers. In total, 5 answers had negative character (0,6%), of which 4 answers were given to question 27 about the influence that imprisonment had on faith; and 1 answer – to question 28 about the influence the representatives of the prison ministry had on the respondents' faith.³²

As it can be noticed, indifferent evaluations, or cases when evaluation is impossible, preponderate. It results from very terse answers or even the lack of answers. However, where there was a possibility to evaluate the answers, those were mostly positive evaluations, that is, giving evidence that faith and religion practice were helpful in freeing oneself from addiction, in understanding the nature of evil and in changing of the attitude to the committed crime. Imprisonment and contacts with the representatives of the prison ministry, especially with the chaplain and the nuns (which was stressed by the respondents), had positive influence on their faith – both experiencing and practicing. Taking part in the therapies organized in disaccustoming sections also had positive influence on prisoners. It could be noticed in the respondents' answers, as well as in everyday contacts with prisoners. It has been also reflected in the answers to open questions, which is shown in Table 6.³³

Table 6. Evaluation of the answers to open questions of imprisoned respondents from therapeutic sections

Question number:	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.
Positive evaluation	16	14	7	10	9	11
Indifferent evaluation	26	28	23	21	21	25
Negative evaluation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Evaluation impossible	11	11	23	22	23	17

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 146.

Comparing with people imprisoned in total, the people undergoing therapy gave slightly more exhaustive answers (33,6%- no answers or answers which do not allow any

³² Ibidem, p. 144.

³³ Ibidem, pp. 144–146.

interpretation), but differences between particular questions were insignificant and there were no negative answers.³⁴

Table 7. Evaluation of the answers to open questions of imprisoned people from “ATLANTIS” section

Question number:	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.
Positive evaluation	13	10	5	7	7	8
Indifferent evaluation	13	16	16	16	15	16
Negative evaluation	0	0	0	0	0	0
Evaluation impossible	4	4	9	7	8	6

Origin: K. Pierzchała, Skazani..., [Convicted ...], op.cit., p. 147.

The most exhaustive answers were given by the prisoners undergoing anti-alcoholic therapy in “ATLANTIS” section. There was 27% of positive answers and 21,1% of terse answers or answers which do not allow any interpretation. Unfortunately, most answers were evaluated as indifferent -51,1%, although they were extensive, they were often irrelevant.³⁵

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

In the prisoners’ statements we can find confirmation of the fundamental truth that without God and His principles there is no morality, law and order on the Earth. How significant do appear the words, quoted before, said by people who had broken the law: “I understood that the crime I committed would not have happened if I had been closer to God”, “the lack of spiritual life, of faith in God, the lack of religious practice were one of the reasons of my addiction”, “Break in practices created emptiness of myself and depravation”. It is the lack of values, which today’s “liberal” and “free”- from morality and principles – Europe does not want to know or have in its constitution (the values of which the greatest advocate is our Catholic Church) that leads the human race to decay, and people – through moral depravation, spiritual emptiness, addictions, and crimes – directly to prison. Nevertheless, prison chaplains fight for the imprisoned people’s morality. In the chaplains’ environment we mean not just rehabilitation, but, first of all, evangelism, therefore, the effort aiming at the contact with Christ, strengthening faith and, curing the moral spine. In this field there are more and more intense conversions, which result in a complete transformation of life, although that does not happen very often. People who managed, owing to Christ, to get a new look at their lives and discover their lost humanity, become really rehabilitated. On the other hand, we cannot give up rehabilitation processes in their most general concept. We live in a very crime-causing society and nobody tries to eliminate this pathology. Constant exposing of violence and pornography deprive people. If a person is psychically weak, then when coming to prison he is already

³⁴ Ibidem, pp. 146–147.

³⁵ Ibidem, pp. 147–148.

deprived. The main reasons are bad families, where there are no moral examples and no love³⁶ (Sikorski, 2004). That is why a great role of catholic educators, psychologists, therapists and priests is to care for the values and realize them in life.

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Технократичне урядування та модернізація: теоретичні принципи та емпіричний досвід взаємозв'язку

У дослідженні проведено науковий аналіз теоретичних принципів та емпіричного досвіду взаємозв'язку технократичного урядування і модернізації в різних країнах світу. Запропоновано концептуальне визначення понять технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування та модернізація. Виокремлено й деталізовано сценарії та особливості позитивної і негативної кореляції технократичного урядування і модернізації. Виявлено типи технократичної модернізації.

Ключові слова: політичний режим, технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування, модернізація, демократія, авторитаризм.

Technocratic governance and modernization: theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship

The article is dedicated to scientific analysis of theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization. The author proposed the conceptual definitions of technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance and modernization, singled out and detailed scenarios and features of positive/negative correlation between technocratic governance and modernization, discovered types of technocratic modernization.

Keywords: government (regime), technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance, modernization, democracy, authoritarianism.

The idea of technical government/administrative/public decisions as the rational ones, which are in the basis of efficient economic development and management, has induced the appearance of the scientific conceptions, concerning the appropriateness of governance organization, according to the principles of technocracy, in particular as to the search for ways of public (including political and economic) development modernization. On the one hand, the reason is brilliant success of some countries of the world, which have managed to modernize themselves, applying the technocratic model of democratic or non-democratic governance in their political, institutional and reformational experience. On the other hand, not all countries, which have announced and evaluated (or at least just tried to test) the technocratic model of governance, managed to achieve

significant or even some results in modernization of social, political and economic processes. Consequently, within the theoretical and methodological context, which is amplified with experience of empirical correlation, the correlation between technocratic governance and modernization is not always absolutely clear, especially the relationship between technocratic governance and politics, in the light of taking and realizing decisions, which promote modernization. That is why, investigation of theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization for current political science is of great concern and high priority, but is not comprehensively and thoroughly disclosed.

However, in the course of theoretical description of the problem, concerning relationship between technocracy, technocratic governance and modernization, especially in the context of disclosure and comparative analysis of various attributes of such relationship, we cannot but operate available methodological and empirical data, derived from western scientific sources, on the grounds of which principal and initial methods of evaluation of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization have been formed. Among scholars, who have studied the processes of evaluation and fleshing out current scientific problem, one should single out: M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli¹, P. Donmez², T. Bellows³, J. Bresnan⁴, G. Peters⁵, B. T. Khoo⁶, T. Shiraishi⁷, P. Silva⁸, J. Yoon⁹, G. Njalsson¹⁰, M. Centeno¹¹, E. Bryld¹², J. MacDougall¹³, B. Schneider¹⁴, R. Putnam¹⁵, M. Muramatsu

¹ M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, Ministers in Italy: notables, partymen, technocrats and mediamen, „South European Society and Politics” 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117–152.

² P. Donmez, Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context, Warwick 2010.

³ T. Bellows, Bureaucracy and development in Singapore, „The Asian Journal of Public Administration” 1985, vol 7, s. 55–69.

⁴ J. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.

⁵ G. Peters, Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who’s Who and Does It Make Any Difference?, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.; G. Peters, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, „Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

⁶ B. Khoo, No insulation: politics and technocracy’s troubled trajectory, „IDE Discussion Paper” 2010, nr 236.

⁷ T. Shiraishi, Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series” 2006, vol 05-E-008.

⁸ P. Silva, State Capacity, Technocratic Insulation, and Government-Business Relations in South Korea and Chile, Wyd. Nueva Serie FLACSO 2000.; P. Silva, Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavin Phenomenon’, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.

⁹ J. Yoon, The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China, Presented at the Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, DC, March 31-April 1, 2007.

¹⁰ G. Njalsson, From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy, „Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

¹¹ M. Centeno, The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy, „Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, s. 307–335.

¹² E. Bryld, The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems, „Development in Practice” 2000, vol 10, nr 5, s. 700–705.

¹³ J. MacDougall, The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order, „Asian Survey” 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166–1183.

¹⁴ B. Schneider, The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America, Wyd. St Martin’s Press 1998, s. 77–95.

¹⁵ R. Putnam, Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy, „Comparative Political Studies” 1997, vol 10, s. 388–412.

and E. Krauss¹⁶, I. Takashi and J. Purnendra¹⁷, J. Gunnell¹⁸, J. Straussman¹⁹, F. Marangoni²⁰, R. Tirtosudarmo²¹, Y. Bangura²², M. Thandika²³ and others.

Among the research, offered by the above mentioned scholars, the definitions of technocracy, technocratic governance and modernization, as well as some theoretical and empirical characteristics and attributes of their relationship are genuinely comprehensible. In particular, technocracy is *interpreted* as the way of governance and administration, which is based on the concrete grounds for application of special skills and techniques and the regime of decision-making on the basis of realization of expert recommendations²⁴. Thus, the government can be called technocratic (in the wide (system) and narrow (institutional) sense of the notion “government”), despite the way of its formation (parliamentary or non-parliamentary), which is, first of all, based not on political and ideological/party patterns of its activity, but on non-party/non-ideological and expert parameters of its purpose and functions²⁵. That is why, technocratic governance can be attractive and even necessary in case of

¹⁶ M. Muramatsu, E. Krauss, Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking: The case of Japan, „American Political Science Review“ 1984, vol 78, nr 1, s. 126–146.

¹⁷ T. Inoguchi, J. Purnendra, Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1997.

¹⁸ J. Gunnell, The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy, „Technology and Culture“ 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392–416.

¹⁹ J. Straussman, The Limits of Technocratic Politics, Wyd. Edison 1978.

²⁰ F. Marangoni, Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office, „Bulletin of Italian Politics“ 2012, vol 4, nr 1, s. 135–149.

²¹ R. Tirtosudarmo, Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

²² Y. Bangura, Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy, „CODESRIA Monograph Series“ 1994, vol 1, nr 94.

²³ M. Thandika, Incentives, Governance, and Capacity Development in Africa, „African Issues“ 2002, vol 30, nr 1, s. 15–20.

²⁴ Such definition of technocracy is an averaged one, because the problem of technocratic governance is very wide and diverse. Technocracy cannot be viewed within one concrete investigation, moreover as there are various approaches to interpretation of technocracy both within the frames of modern science and in the context of approved political practice. Firstly, technocracy should be interpreted as the theory and “innovational” movement, which stands for control over labor resources, reformation of financial institutions and reorganization of the social system, based on the results, provided by technologists and engineers. Secondly, this is the system of governance with application of technocratic theory. Thirdly, this is any practical usage of the theory of technocratic governance. That is why, it is evidently, that at the same time the following definitions of technocracy may be correct: 1) theory or system of society, according to which, state governance is under the control of scientists, engineers and experts; 2) mechanism of state governance under the control of scientists, engineers and expert; 3) state of development, which is determined and regulated, according to the mentioned principle; 4) system of governance, based on the rule of technical experts; 5) society, which is marked by domination of people with specialized skills, mainly engineers; 6) governance of “technicians”, who are guided by imperatives of technologies; 7) forms/methods of governance (administration), when engineers, scientists, medical workers and other technical experts strictly control the process of decision-making in the appropriate (including political) spheres; 8) administrative and political predominance of state elite and allied institutions in a society, which try to dictate single paradigm of politics, based on instrumental and rational techniques of power implementation. See in detail.: Collins English Dictionary, Wyd. William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 2009.; Online Etymology Dictionary, Wyd. Douglas Harper 2010.; Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, źródło <http://www.britannica.com/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].; T. Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System, Wyd. Batoche Books 2001.; M. Centeno, The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy, “Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, nr 3, s. 314.

²⁵ Correspondingly, O. Protsyk states, that all technocratic governments, at least regarding the way they are formed and function on the basis of non-party/non-ideological and/or expert patterns, should be divided into two types – technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts (technocrats) and technocratic/non-party governments without ministers-experts (technocrats). The former can be formed fully on the basis of non-party or partially party constituents (minister-expert or technocrat can at the same time represent party-ideological motives), but the crucial meaning in this context belongs to minister's ability to solve efficiently the tasks, raised by the ministry or the government. The latter in the process of their initialization and formation is determined by the primary perspective on exclusion of any (or all) party-ideological components, as the ability to solve effectively the tasks, raised for the minister, ministry and government, is defined on the grounds of non-party composition. It means, that all technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts (technocrats) or technocratic/non-party governments without mi-

“general weakness of great institutions’ power and non-effectiveness of governments, burdened with financial problems and complexity of state institutions”²⁶. Technically, ministers and members of any technocratic government are not professional politicians (or the political element of their careers goes to the background) or even members of political parties. On the contrary, in the process of technocratic government formation the crucial role is played by the experts (or technocrats) in the spheres of activity of separate ministries or departments²⁷. The important role in the context of political apathy belongs to the head of the government. Typically, one can speak of technocratic government in its pure form, when the position of the government executive (which can be congruent with the position of the head of the state) is also technocratic, non-political, non-party or non-ideological, and not less, than two thirds of ministers are technical servants. Together with this, there are cases, when the position of the government executive in the state is occupied by the leader of the biggest party, but the composition of the government is a technocratic/non-party and an expert one.

One can speak of technocratic governance in case of application of scientific and expert methods of important political decision-making and solution of social and economic problems. In this light traditional economic, political and philosophical approaches are determined. Besides, it is initially stipulated, that the model of technocratic governance is, by definition, less democratic, than the idea of political (ideological) governance. The point is, that technical or political qualities of technocrats are determined on the basis of their special knowledge and productivity. That is why, technocratic governance is immanently characterized by such patterns as: “meritocracy” – the process of decision-taking on the basis of actual knowledge, and “oligarchy” the process of decision-taking on the basis of appropriated capital and financial influence. Consequently, technocratic governance in this or that way is always based on representation of concrete, specific interest groups in the political process or in the process of state administration. Alongside with this, as G. Njalsson states, technocratic governance is realized on the grounds of a cognitive set of directives, as a result of which, it (more often than political/ideological governance) is, first of all, aimed at solving the problems of governance. It results in the fact, that hypothetically (not including the human factor) technocratic governance, less than political or ideological governance, is oriented on the interests of certain social and lobbying groups,

nisters-experts (technocrats) can be a logical projection of party/ideological patterns of cabinets formation, but the positions are occupied not by the party functionaries, but by non-party representatives of parties, which either form or support governments. The ministers of technocratic/non-party governments can have no connections with political parties or authoritative institutions, which form or support governments. Besides, it is necessary to mention, that technocratic governments can be permanent or temporary. The general rule is that the more democratic the political regime is, the higher chances are, that the technocratic government will be temporary. On the contrary, authoritarianisation of the political regime, leads to the fact, that the phenomenon and practice of technocratic/non-party governments formation become fixed.

²⁶ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, „Comparative Politics“ 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339–358.

²⁷ The classic example is the occurrence, when the minister of Finance is a person with academic economic education, who has been working for many years in the IMF, for instance, and also has never run for the elective positions and have not actively participated in the elections. But in this case, we speak only of an example. There is no direct requirement, that ministers are economist by profession. The point is that they can be political scientists, lawyers, doctors etc.

and but, on the contrary, is based on dichotomy of all officials/executives of “econocrats” and “bureaucrats”²⁸. Namely this, leads to theorization, that technocratic governance itself (due to the nature of personnel management) promotes social, political and economic modernization and system reforms as well, at least in the context, that technocratic governments themselves can implement “painful reforms”, which are necessary to save this or that country from crisis or collapse or contribute to its modernization. Along with this, the thought, that ministers of any technocratic cabinet, being more able to sustain lobbying group pressure and ready to implement unpopular economic, political and social reforms, become more effective, than any party or ideological cabinets, only in the questions of initiating of reforms, but not their implementation or immutability, is postulated²⁹. The point is, that initializing modernization reforms, technical or technocratic governments do not depend or have little dependence on political parties, which usually are not ready to pay for their electoral losses for institutionalization of political, economic or social changes³⁰.

At the same time, the category of “*modernization*” and its partial synonym “*development*” require additional study within the context of establishment and development of comparative political science and theory of international relationships. V. Gel'man argues, that in political discourse, modernization is interpreted in different ways: from introduction of technological innovations to the “substitution of all bad by all good”. In social sciences, modernization means the transition process of some countries into “modern societies”, which presupposes the fact of borrowing and creation of own basic institutions on the model of western patterns³¹. It is of interest, that modernization encloses both social and economic (industrialization, urbanization, improvement of education level, mobility, expansion of mass media, lowering of inequality level), political (spread of political rights and liberties, establishment of electoral competitiveness, party systems, separation of powers) and sociocultural constituents (transformation of mass values and goals of mass behavior). First of all, modernization operates with the category “development”. It is the process of lowering absolute poverty and inequality and achievement of full realization of human potential; combined process of capital accumulation, increase in people's earnings per capita, improvement of people's skills, and also acceptance of new technological style and other related social and economic changes. Nowadays, two perspectives of modernization are single out – economic (social-economic) and political. S. Lipset (the founder of the so-called “liberal school of modernization”) links up patterns of economic growth with democratization processes, proves mutual interdependence between political

²⁸ G. Njalsson, From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy, „Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56–81.

²⁹ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, The Political economy of democratic transitions, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

³⁰ But as a result of this, technocratic governance possess minimal “mandate of responsibility” to parties (in particular in the context of parliamentary way of government formation). However, usually the key “agents” of political responsibility for technocratic governance are the countries' leaders.

³¹ V. Tsapf, Teoriya modernizatsiyi i razlichie putey obshchestvennoho razvitiya, „Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya” 1998, nr 8, s. 14–26.

and social-political modernization. It means, that in general capitalistic development contributes to prosperity of democracy on the basis of class structure transformation. But the events, which took place in the so-called “new autocracies” (mainly countries of Latin America and South-East Asia), have made to reconsider the paradigm of interrelation between regimes and development. S. Huntington (who is the founder of the so-called “conservative school of modernization”) has analyzed numerous negative consequences of political modernization, which are related to the instability of regimes, crisis of governance, growth of conflicts and political violence. That is why, the factor for successful modernization is the ability of government institutions to ensure control over the process and minimize the uncontrolled participation of society in general, and its separate groups in particular, in political life. Due to this A. Leftwich has proposed the rule of modernization: democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon and a satellite of the present time, and that is why democracy is a result of social and economic development, but not its precondition.

The acceptance of the previous conclusion, concerning correlation between technocratic government and governance, and modernization is possible in consideration of the fact, that in modern world of scientific inventions and informational pace, the idea of technical/expert decisions mainly influenced the growth of manufacturing/industrial management effectiveness both in the West (mostly in the USA, and to the less extent in Western and Eastern Europe and Latin America), and in the East (to the greatest extent in Japan, South Korea and other industrialized countries in Asia). Taking this into consideration, technocratic governance is often estimated as attractive, even in those countries, where it has not been fully or partially implemented into practice. G. Wilson explains this by the fact, that the condition for administrative decision-taking on the basis of technocracy and technocratic governance is the point, that this process occurs with the help of professionals, armed with the knowledge “about natural iron laws and can adapt to them”³². This logic of theoretical interrelation between technocratic governance and modernization derives from F. Bacon’s argumentation that knowledge is paradigm of power. Besides, methodologically in favor of positive correlation between technocratic governance and modernization attest concepts of “bureaucracy rationalization”, proposed by M. Weber, of “new order” (T. Veblen), of “end of ideology” (D. Bell, E. Shils, S. Lipset, J. La Palombara, R. Lane). To the large extent such conclusions are consonant with some social theories and hypothesis, viz. elite technocracy (S. Lakoff, H. Brooks, P. Piccard, N. Calder, D. Schooler, P. Bereano, G. Boyle), bureaucratic technocracy (J. Meynaud, D. Price), neo-Marxism (M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, J. Habermas and others), Taylorism (A. Ranney, J. Kasson) and others.

It means, that positive correlation between technocratic governance and modernization is possible on the basis of coordination between political will and *technocratic rationalization*, which being formal, consists in the ability to carry out calculation and estimation within the frames of administrative or any other decision-taking processes. Thus, success of modernization depends on whether

³² G. Wilson, Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice, “Development and Change” 2006, vol 37, nr 3, s. 505.

there is political will for rational technocrats' activities, even despite the fact, if such actions contradict politicians' various ideological convictions and values. In fact it proves, that the desire to reform and modernize certain system, to provide technocratic governance, must be based on indifference to politics, which for sure will have political consequences. Taking this into account, it becomes clear why the government in the process of executive authority realization can stay "impassive" and politically indifferent, being, at the same time, collegial and even caused by political necessity. Thereby, it does not matter what the motives for technocratic government existence or formation are. There are cases, when technocratic government is formed politically or apolitically, by the head of the country or parliament, in direct dependence on constitutionally prescribed mechanism of government formation, from constitutional/formal and political/actual formats of governance systems, types of political regimes. Much more problems in the course of evaluating prospects of development and modernization arise, when the idea of technocratic governance serves only as the "guise" for stabilization and establishment of non-democratic political regimes, which accentuating on the technocratic intentions of the government, in fact do not carry out modernization and system reformation.

In order to comprehend reliable correlation between technocratic/non-party governance and prospects and consequences of modernization, we offer to distinguish a set of countries, which have used or use practice or rhetoric of technocratic governance. The instances of constant (or often repeated) technocratic governance and permanent formation of technocratic governments (technocratic/non-party governments with ministers-experts and technocratic/non-party governments without ministers-experts) are or in their days were: Japan (after WWII, since the 50s of the 20th century), Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines (mainly in 60s-90s of the 20th century, and some of them still nowadays), the United Arab Emirates (since 90s of the 20th century), Chile (1973–1990), Spain (1959–1973), Greece (1950–1973), Brazil (1968–1973), China (since 80s of the 20th century), Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia (since 90s of the 20th century), Georgia (in 2004–2012) etc. The examples of accidental (unsteady) technocratic governance and nonpermanent formation of technocratic governments are: Italy (Prime-Ministers L. Dini and M. Monti), Iceland (Prime-Minister B. Thordarson), Finland (Prime-Ministers R. von Fieandt, R.R. Lehto, R. Kuuskoski, T. Aura, K. Liinamaa), Bulgaria (Prime-Ministers L. Berov, R. Indzhova, M. Raykov), Greece (Prime-Ministers Y. Grivas, X. Zolotas, L. Papademos, P. Pikrammenos), Czech Republic (Prime-Minister J. Fischer), Portugal (Prime-Minister A. N. da Costa) etc.³³

Such a list of cases proves, that technocratic governance and technocratic governments (with or without experts) are not distinctive of democratic political regimes, which, for the most part,

³³ H. Döring, P. Manow, Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

are socially, economically and politically modernized (Japan is a rather interesting exception³⁴)³⁵. However, the examples of steady technocratic governance are or were peculiar of nondemocratic (authoritarian and hybrid) political regimes. That is why, according to the conception and theoretical assumptions, they, first of all, must be modernized. In general, it seems, that not many countries, which apply or have applied the technique of technocratic/non-party government, managed to modernize themselves. Nearly always, countries with democratic and hybrid political regimes (for instance Japan and Georgia) have been modernized. Less often models of technocratic governance have been modernized in authoritarian political regimes. Among them, the most successful in the context of modernization have become, for example: Indonesia, Chile, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand etc.³⁶. Often authoritarian regimes, which on the basis of the technocratic governance model, have managed to modernize themselves, are called regimes of authoritarian development, modernization authoritarianism. The result of technocratic modernization within the social and economic sphere under the conditions of authoritarian regimes is usually the creation of foundations for political modernization and democratization, but in most cases after the collapse of technocratic governance models, which became the precondition for transition of authoritarianism towards democratization. On the contrary, countries, which use the technique of non-party governance without attraction of experts-technocrats, have not been able to modernize themselves or have partially undergone the process of modernization. The instances are: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan and so on. China is a specific exception. Not going deep into the specificity of technocratic (non-party) governance in every mentioned country in detail, we single out general patterns of how technocratic governance and prospects and consequences of modernization correlate with each other.

Firstly, technocratic modernization takes place in democratic, but more often in strict authoritarian political regimes, which contribute to the rapid capitalistic growth and development. These regimes are endowed with the centralized structure of authority and strong impulse towards elimination and subordination of all potential centres of “antagonistic powers”. Among the reasons, why namely authoritarian political regimes promote technocratic modernization, one can single out:

³⁴ T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California 1982.

³⁵ R. Aron, *Alternation in Government in the Industrialized Countries*, „Government and Opposition“ 1982, vol 17, s. 3–21.; M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, *Ministers in Italy: notables, partymen, technocrats and mediamen*, „South European Society and Politics“ 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117–152.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, „Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen“ 2008, vol 39, nr 4, s. 810–831.; O. Protsyk, *Ministerial appointments in new democracies: evidence from Eastern Europe*, 2011 IPSA-ECPA Conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

³⁶ See, for instance: T. Shiraiishi, *Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis*, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series“ 2006, vol 05-E-008.; P. Silva, *Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavin Phenomenon’*, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies“ 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.; P. Silva, *State Capacity, Technocratic Insulation, and Government-Business Relations in South Korea and Chile*, Wyd. Nueva Serie FLACSO 2000.; T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and development in Singapore*, „The Asian Journal of Public Administration“ 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55–69.; B. Khoo, *No insulation: politics and technocracy’s troubled trajectory*, „IDE Discussion Paper“ 2010, nr 236.; J. Yoon, *The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China*, Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, DC, March 31 – April 1, 2007.

active suppression of consumption, and effective mobilization of the masses for industrialization; technocratic rationality, which is revealed in the fact, that the process of achievement of the goals at the early stage of industrialization (due to reliable infrastructure, great volumes of capital, imported technologies, extension of industrial bases of production, and relative simplicity of production at low prices) is more efficient; isolation from pressure on the side of social interests and coordinated policy (limited political variations on the basis of the fact, that the regime isolates itself from social interests pressure, avoids critical influence of “electoral cycle”, as a result of which economic and political confidence in the agents of modernization); ideology of development (authoritarian regime can create national ideology, where the need for hard work martyred for economic development is determined, as a result of which the authority of separate “moral values of the state” – national discipline, national unity, importance of stable national development, determination of politics is strengthened). It is very often believed, that under the conditions of authoritarianism, technocratic governance contributes to modernization only in the case, when there is a unity of bureaucratic type of authoritarianism and experimentalism. In this context the unique type of legitimacy of authority is formed, which is based on the faith in “revolutionary project”. If it happens, then the value of choice between political regimes falls away: the main point is, that “the state of development” must be realized, which consists in the low level of corruption and high level of stability, participation in various international and political markets etc. The precondition for technocratic modernization is the concept of “integrated economy” construction, which provides a specific set of social ties that bound the state and society. As a result of this, institutionalized channels of discussion political and economic process goals are ensured and it becomes clear, that modernization is possible despite political regime, but it depends on the “unifying nature” of relations within the country. That is why, modernization occurs in places, where it is possible to avoid main risks of the main agents of modernization: problems of capital attraction, invention of new products and technologies, search for new markets, preparation of qualified engineers and employees etc. It mainly contributes to liberalization of political regime, and under the conditions of authoritarianism, liberalization serves as an unsteady balance, as it usually (in future) leads to the gradual transformation of authoritarianism into democracy. It means, that when technocratic governance influences social and economic modernization of authoritarian regimes, then, in prospect, it will inevitably influence political modernization of such regimes. But if technocratic governance under the conditions of authoritarianism does not ensure effectiveness, then this regime loses its legitimacy, which is believed to be the only source for “justification” of retaining the power. On the other hand, a typical characteristic of authoritarian-technocratic modernization lies in the fact, that the regime, where it takes place, ends with a critical event, the cause for which is considered to be formation of modern social and economic, and maybe political institutions, which is the reason for transition from authoritarianism to democracy (though after that the process of modernization goes on).

Historical and political experience regulates the existence of several models of positive relationship between technocratic governance and modernization, especially in the former and current regimes of an authoritarian type. For instance, in Singapore (period of “Lee Kuan Yew’s regime”, 1959–1990) was realized the reformist/moderate plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization, which occurred in the context of personified authoritarianism: the efficient bureaucratic apparatus was created “from the scratch”, and with a “strict hand” deep economic transformations³⁷, which changed the “city-state” into the world’s financial and economic center, were implemented. Similar plan was realized in some other countries and regions of Asia, in particular in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan (which, along with Singapore are traditionally named “the Asian tigers” or “the Asian dragons”) in 1960-1990, when they showed annual economic growth, at the level of more than 7%. After that, Hong Kong and Singapore have become international financial centers, and South Korea and Taiwan – world’s leaders in production of informational technologies. Their experience, according to the reformist/moderate plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization, is copied by other authoritarian countries in Asia, in particular the so-called “the Asian tiger cubs” (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and the United Arab Emirates (since 1990s, starting with modernization of Dubai)³⁸. In Chile (A. Pinochet’s regime, 1973–1990) a forceful plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization was tested: opposition was successfully suppressed, liberals and reformers (the group “Chicago boys”) got freedom of actions in the economic sphere, the ideas and principles of neoliberalization and monetarism were combined, (“shock therapy”, accelerated and thorough process of private property development, attraction of foreign investment, limitation of state’s role in the sphere of economy) and national reality in Chile, as a result of which, due to “suppression of people” (measures of terror, frustration and dispossession) and economic reforms, modernization of the economic and social system took place in the country, and soon afterwards in the context of military and personified authoritarianism appeared the notion of “Chilean economic miracle”. Specificity of Chile lies in the fact, that

³⁷ T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore*, „Asian Journal of Public Administration“ 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55–69.; P.-S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner, *Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore’s National Innovation System*, Paper presented at 4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream), 4-6 July 2005.

³⁸ T. Shiraishi, *Technocracy in Indonesia: A Preliminary Analysis*, „RIETI Discussion Paper Series“ 2006, nr 05-E-008.; J. MacDougall, *The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order*, „Asian Survey“ 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166–1183.; B. Anderson, *Les Eruditions Indonesiens et l’Ordre Nouveau. Politique de ideologie du Mahasiswa Indonesia (1966–1974)*, „Pacific Affairs“ 1986, vol 59, nr 3, s. 541–542.; V. Hadiz, *Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia*, Wyd. Routledge 1997, s. 63.; W. Bello, D. Kinley, E. Elinson, *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines*, Wyd. Institute for Food and Development Policy 1982.; A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya, *The Politics and Economics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya (eds.), *The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 1992, s. 1–9.; A. Laothamatas, *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Thailand: A Political Explanation of Economic Success*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, K. Jayasuriya (eds.), *The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 1992.; C. Baker, *A Short Account of the Rise and Fall of the Thai Technocracy*, Unpublished draft manuscript 2009.; N. Hamilton-Hart, *Banking Systems a Decade After the Crisis*, [w:] A. MacIntyre, T. Pempel, J. Ravenhill (eds.), *Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University 2008, s. 45–69.; L. Stifel, *Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand*, „Asian Survey“ 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1184–1196.; J. Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1993.; R. Tirto Sudarmo, *Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development*, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

as a result of authoritarian model of technocratic modernization, principles of personal success, career and consumption were implanted in the country, new “Chilean mentality” (combination of individualism, dynamism and competitiveness) was implemented into life; predominance of economic liberties over art and political liberties was ensured, and the project of “guarded democracy” was created³⁹. Similar forceful plan of authoritarian and technocratic modernization was partially implemented in Spain (1959–1973), Greece (1950–1973), Brazil (1968–1973)⁴⁰, Turkey (in the 2nd half of the 20th century)⁴¹, Ghana (after revolution of 1981)⁴².

Secondly, a specific variant of combination of technocratic governance and modernization nowadays (and in last decades) is demonstrated by China. The point is, that one cannot determine technocratic governance in China as the one, which promotes modernization. At present, there is no united approach towards the interpretation of the causes for modernization tendencies in China: one group of scientists assume, that China has challenged current western model of the world order⁴³; another group of researchers prove, that “prolonged stagnation” is still continuing in China and economic prosperity will not be considered a steady one, till the main principles of democracy and rule of law are not determined. It is obvious, that the notion of “the Chinese model” (which cannot be named an “economic miracle”) also requires strict determination in the context of modern conditions, which is realized on the patterns of “capitalistic authoritarianism” that “rationalizes tyranny” under the guise of local traditions and culture. Crucial modern characteristics of such a model: coexistence of economic modernization and nondemocratic policy; state control over “key positions” of economy (what is not peculiar of technocratic modernization in general); economic governance “from top downward”; gradual (additional) reforms in various spheres; “Confucian variant” of correlation between leaders and followers (people have the “obligation to submit”, and legitimacy of authority is based on its ability to bring benefits to people); connection with democratic centralism; the idea that development is not possible without stability. The problem is complicated by the fact, that the Chinese model is not monolithic. In other words, since the 80s of the 20th century, several Chinese models can be distinguished: experimental ascending agrarian reform after 1978; economic decentralization and its partial political liberalization in the 80s of the

³⁹ C. Huneeus, Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The ‘ODEPLAN Boys’ and the ‘Gremialists’ in Pinochet’s Chile, „Journal of Latin American Studies” 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461–501.; P. Silva, In the name of reason: technocrats and politics in Chile, Wyd. Penn State Press 2008.; P. Silva, State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941, „Bulletin of Latin American Research” 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281–297.; P. Silva, Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks, „Journal of Latin American Studies” 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385–410.; P. Silva, Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the ‘Lavin Phenomenon’, „European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies” 2001, vol 70, s. 25–39.; P. Silva, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.

⁴⁰ R. Kaufman, Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model, [w:] D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1979, s. 165–253.

⁴¹ U. Akçay, Technocrats in Power?, Prepared for „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On” conference, 22 May 2009.; P. Donmez, Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context, Wyd. University of Warwick 2010.

⁴² D. Moore, Development Discourse as Hegemony: Towards an Ideological History – 1945–1995, [w:] D. Moore, G. Schmitz (eds.), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, Wyd. Macmillan 1995, s. 1–53.

⁴³ A. Subramanian, The Inevitable Superpower, „Foreign Affairs” 2011, vol 90, nr 5, s. 66–78.

20th century; repressiveness and intensification of control after the Tiananmen Square protests; reformation of the state enterprises at the end of the 90s in the 20th century; the idea that “it is nice to be rich” (creation of many small and medium enterprises); egalitarian and socially-oriented construction of “scientific development”; the trend, that “the state sector moves forward and the private sector moves backwards”. It means, that from one stage to another the increase in technocratic constituent of governance in China is observed. But it leads not only to modernization, but rather to formation of the antimodel of coherent economic approach, which legitimizes cultural relativity and exclusiveness, and emphasizes national and state sovereignty. All this proves, that the Chinese model of authoritarian and technocratic governance does not fully conform to modernization expansion, as very often the question is in the ability of the Communist party to adapt to the changes⁴⁴.

Thirdly, not all democratic and authoritarian political regimes, which approve technocratic governance, undergo modernization. Especially, it can be observed in the case of authoritarian political regimes, as usually democratic political regimes are modernized (as it is proved by the statistical data). Often, the idea of technocratic governance is used only to create the guise (“cover”) for reforms, and for stabilization of authoritarian regime itself. In this case “survival” of authoritarian regimes is influenced by their sematic emulative nature, when the elections are held and the semblance of representativity is created, but in fact the country develops in accordance with the patterns of submission and “moderate repressiveness”. Taking this into consideration, technocratic governance as the idea of retaining the power is in the focus of leaders of nearly all authoritarian regimes, as the motto of modernization serves as the grounds for additional legitimization of political authority. At the same time, in fact political leaders of some countries have not possessed and do not have even now any scientific data concerning the directions and levels of modernization with the help of technocratic governance. They just appeal to the experience of the countries, which under the conditions of authoritarianism appeared to be rather successful, but do not implement in practice those mechanisms and steps, which are taken for comparison. The classic examples of the states, which make use of technocratic governance as the guise for retaining their political power, are some post-Soviet authoritarian regimes in Europe and Asia, in particular Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia etc.⁴⁵. They approved the

⁴⁴ Y. Huang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus, „Asia Policy” 2011, vol 11, s. 1–26.; L. Cheng, L. White, China’s Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald, „Modern China” 1991, vol 17, nr 3, s. 342–388.; L. Cheng, L. White, Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy, „The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, s. 1–35.; X. Zang, The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?, „Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 787–803.

⁴⁵ One can observe here some Soviet and post-Soviet causality. The countries, which have been analyzed, are the former republics of the Soviet Union, which is usually spoken of as the crucial moment of technocratic governance. For instance, the Soviet leader L. Brezhnev had technical education and in 1986, 90% of members of the Political Bureau were engineers. Such a practice was mainly implemented in the authoritarian countries, which exist on the USSR’s ruins. Moreover, nowadays the idea of technocratic governance is called “communist”: “working class is in power, and administration is carried out by experts”. The point is that, the ideas of technocracy and authoritarianism are considered to be adjacent ones or parallel (the notable is the experience of China). As a result of this, the idea of electivity is denied, and the emphasis is made on the “quality” of the appointed officials. However, such interpretation of technocratic governance is not a guarantee for organizational effectiveness. Moreover, one speaks rather of “pseudotechnocratic” governance, which results in establishment and realization of the question, concerning “preservation” of political regimes and exclusion of elements of ideological opposition. In fact, it is revealed in the fact, that under “pseudotechno-

postulate, that accelerated democracy is not possible because of the weakness of the civil society in the USSR, and as a result leads to chaos, and decided to move in the authoritarian direction, often swerving from ideology and policy. Thus, it is very often stated, that within authoritarian regimes different specific models of technocratic/non-party governance, which are based on the complete isolation of “government” from social groups’ interests, have been implemented. This idea has become a precursor for the postulate, concerning rationality of “technocratic and modernization authoritarianism” in the post-Soviet world⁴⁶.

However, in fact modernization has not occurred or it has been extremely limited. First of all, the efficient combination of effective and productive bureaucratic apparatus and mechanisms and patterns of authoritarian regimes functioning has not been ensured. Secondly, military and bureaucratic plan of authoritarian modernization in the post-Soviet countries has appeared to be not very efficient: to modernize the regime, military or law enforcement systems must initially rise in opposition to the former regime or the former stage of regime development⁴⁷. And in modern authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet countries this constituent is the guise for business-projects. Thirdly, technocratic modernization on the basis of single-party predominance is non-prospective in the context of autocracies among the post-Soviet countries. The point is that, there is not a single party, which being authoritatively-authoritarian, would be able or at least just try to conduct successful social and economic transformations⁴⁸ (to the least extent it touches the party “New Azerbaijan”, YAP). Neither administrative machine, nor political leaders of the country, who prefer support of the current authoritarian mechanism of relations between the state and the party, is interested in this. It is notable, that the “United Russia” (ER) has not become the leading channel for recruiting administrative elite: today it is filled up only by means of patronage and clientistic relations. That is why, even if the Kremlin orders the ruling party to conduct the “course of modernization” by means of party structures, it will appear that the party does not have any own levers of pressure on society and administrative apparatus⁴⁹. Inclusion of technocratic and non-party governance in the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes has not led to their modernization and due to the fact that basic principles of modernization have not been implemented⁵⁰: system orientation on achievement of goals aimed at social-economic and political development, active industrial and regional policy, intensive

cratic” governance, non-party ministers, who would have to be the experts or technocrats, are “people, who belong both to the world of governance and the world of business”. See: L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Cambridge 1993, s. 73–74.

⁴⁶ V. Hel'man, *Vozvrashchenie Levafana? Politika retsentralizatsiyi v sovremennoy Rossiyi*, „Polis” 2006, vol 2, s. 90–109.; G. Holsow, *Elektoral'nyy avtoritarizm v Rossiyi*, „Pro et Contra” 2008, vol 12, nr 1, s. 22–35.

⁴⁷ B. Taylor, *Russia's Passive Army: Rethinking Military Coups*, „Comparative Political Studies” 2001, vol 34, nr 8, s. 924–952.; O. Kryshтанovskaya, *Rezhym Putina: liberal'naya militokratiya?*, „Pro et Contra” 2002, vol 7, nr 4, s. 158–180.; M. Afanas'ev, *Rossiyskiye elity razvitiya: zapros na noviy kurs*, Moskva 2009.

⁴⁸ V. Hel'man, *Perspektivy dominiruyushchey partiyi v Rossiyi*, „Pro et Contra” 2006, vol 10, nr 4, s. 62–71.; A. Homberh, *Evolutsiya v usloviyakh dyktatury*, „Pro et Contra” 2008, vol 12, nr 1, s. 46–61.

⁴⁹ V. Hel'man, *Politicheskiye partiyi v Rossiyi: ot konkurentsii – k yerarkhiyi*, „Polys” 2008, vol 5, s. 135–152.

⁵⁰ O. Haman-Holuvyna, *Avtoritarizm razvitiya ili avtoritarizm bez razvitiya: sud'by modernizatsiyi na post-sovetskom prostranstve*, „Vesnyk MHIMO” 2010, vol 4, s. 77–84.

development of science and education, stimulation on the basis of the meritocratic principles of vertical mobility, formation of appropriate institutional infrastructure. However, the following features have been revealed: weakness of function of strategic aiming; unjustified and irrational strengthening of sectoral and regional disproportions; neglect of the meritocratic principles of vertical mobility; predominance in discourse of old-fashioned ideas, concerning relationship between economic and social factors in the state governance; non-optimal correlation between civilian and national interests in the processes of state policy formation; corruptive nature of the administrative system as the characteristic of system formation. And it despite the economic growth, which is just a ground for interpretation of some post-Soviet countries as the countries of “authoritarian industrialism” (as in case with China). The point is, that economic growth without development of the quality of people’s potential is not modernization. All this absolutely proves the conclusion, that in most authoritarian regimes of the former Soviet Union technocratic and modernization projects failed.

The key reasons for non-effective correlation between technocratic/non-party governance and prospects of modernization in the post-Soviet countries are: low quality of technocratic governance and the absence of complete comprehension of this process itself; deficiency of stimuli for conduction of successive course of modernization; shortage of agreement on the side of agents of regime stability (law enforcement agencies/military men, bureaucratic apparatus, dominating party etc.); absence of effective bureaucratic apparatus; absence of wide state autonomy and isolation of bureaucrats from the influence of groups of special interests; insubordination of bureaucracy to the state leaders, and its concernment not in long-term effectiveness of work, but in short-term officials’ political loyalty; fear of strict and fundamental transformations; maximization of hierarchal control in the system of governance, which leads to decrease in administration efficiency; process of hidden “profilisation” of political decision-taking process on the basis of “primary interests” predominance; weakness of modernization values and goals in the structures of various motivational characteristics of elites; predominance of clientistic relations in the system of elite formation, neglect of the meritocratic principles of governance⁵¹.

But theoretically, one should not neglect the variant, when the majority of political elite is interested in real modernization reforms, and not in populist rhetoric, when it has sufficient competence for their implementation, whereas authoritarian regime can create factual grounds for realization of positive social and political changes, promote concentration of social resources and efficiency of governance. When authoritarian political regime is established by the ruling elite, which is not interested in real technocratic modernization, then “modernization appeals” will be used as the guise for achievement of other goals. The problem is, that every authoritarian regime uses technocratic and modernization rhetoric, but not every authoritarian regime implements it in practice.

⁵¹ R. Brym, V. Gimpelson, The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s, „Slavic Review” 2004, vol 63, nr 1, s. 90–112.; P. Evans, D. Raukh, Byurokratiya i ekonomicheskiy rost: mezhranovoy analiz vozdeystviya „veberianyzatsiy” hosudarstvennogo apparata na ekonomicheskiy rost, „Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologiya” 2006, vol 7, nr 1, s. 38–60.

To conclude, it should be mentioned, that technocratic governance may promote political, social and economic modernization only in case, when there is synthesis of politics and technocracy within the frames of a certain political system. However, not in a wide sense, that is, as a result of combination of technocratic and political/ideological governance principles, but in a narrow one, when politics, in the context of institutions, regimes and states, requires technocracy for complex/effective elaboration of political process, implementation of reliable political choice (especially in the light of modernization and reformations), and besides enforcement of all expert decisions; and technocracy, as governance of experts-technocrats, requires politics, particularly sanctions of authority, just to be heard, not mentioning its productive and efficient usage (in the light of adherence to the process of modernization and reformation). In other words, technocratic governance can promote social, political and economic modernization only in case, when it is predetermined for this and is chosen by politicians, (political regime) and is also supported and encouraged by the latter. On the contrary, technocratic governance does not contribute to modernization in case, when it is fully used as a mechanism of retention of power, its stabilization or embedment of a political regime, as an instrument of achieving the goals, set by a political regime and only then the goals of reformation and modernization. If the process of technocratic governance is isolated from the system pressure (from the part of a political regime), interference and functions “without fear and affection”, then in prospects it has more chances to promote social, economic and political modernization. But if the process of technocratic governance is coopted as an inner-system phenomenon of political regime and is applied as its “guise”, then the chances to conduct successful reforms and modernization lower. One more empirical conclusion is that the technocratic model of modernization appeared to be successful mainly in those countries, where the positions of the heads of the states are rather powerful, who (even in accordance with the constitution) have the rights to form the governmental cabinets. These are usually classical presidential republics, more rarely absolute monarchies.

Along with this, it should be stated, that technocratic governance, under the conditions of parliamentary or non-parliamentary ways of government formation and application of various constitutional systems of governance in different types of political regimes (democratic and non-democratic), immanently prevents political modernization. The point is that, the main danger of technocratic governance is, that it “limits” a democratic demand, regarding the problem, that people must choose those officials, who conduct executive power (i.e. governance). That is why, the governments of the technocratic type a priori are not determined as those, which “run for” the certain position. Thus, it often happens, that technocratic modernization of social and economic processes in a certain country can go on along with the limitation of institutionalizing process of democracy, which is revealed in deviation from the classical rule, according to which “people elect people”.

That is why, the conclusion about theoretical principles and empirical experience of relationship between technocratic governance and modernization is that this relationship can have both positive and negative consequences. Positive results are short-term, and negative results are long-term. It means, that if technocratic government is created with the aim of getting out the country of political or economic crisis or contributing to its modernization, then it will likely to have positive effect on the process of governance in the country. But when technocratic governments become traditional and steady, it undermines the idea of democratic governance, accountability and political responsibility, leads to personalization of political process, as well as to institutionalization of patronage.

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Уряди меншості в європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму: особливості та причини формування, принципи функціонування та стабільність

У статті розглянуто особливості формування, принципи функціонування, стабільність урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму. Автор визначив місце урядів у системах міжінституційних відносин європейських парламентських демократій, уточнив сутність розподілу парламентських демократій на системи позитивного та негативного парламентаризму, окреслив місце урядів меншості та їх види у системах позитивного парламентаризму, деталізував історію урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму, окреслив ключові причини/мотиви формування/відставок урядів меншості в системах позитивного парламентаризму, схарактеризував особливості стабільності урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму.

Ключові слова: уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, позитивний парламентаризм, негативний парламентаризм, вотум довіри/вотум інвеститури, однопартійний і коаліційний уряд меншості, стабільність урядів.

Minority cabinets in european systems of positive parliamentarism: features and causes of formation, principles of functioning and stability

The article is dedicated to analyzing features of formation, principles of functioning and stability of minority cabinets in European systems of positive parliamentarism. The author identified the role of cabinets in systems of inter-institutional relations in European parliamentary democracies, specified the nature parliamentary democracies' distribution onto the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, outlined minority cabinets' role and variations in systems of positive parliamentarism, detailed the history of minority cabinets in European systems of positive parliamentarism, outlined the key reasons/motives of formation and resignations of minority cabinets in systems of positive parliamentarism, characterized features of minority cabinets' stability in European systems of positive parliamentarism.

Keywords: *minority cabinet, parliamentary democracy, positive and negative parliamentarism, vote of confidence/vote of investiture, single-party and coalition minority cabinets, cabinet stability.*

In modern European constitutional systems of governance (parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary and semi-presidential republics) one can observe stable tendencies towards development of *parliamentary democracy* and *parliamentarism*, the increase of their role in governing social processes, the revival of the idea of priority of legislative power in the state mechanism¹. Parliamentary activity promotes application of the checks and balances system not only between separate elements of the state mechanism, but also within the legislative body. But under the conditions of parliamentary democracy, the role of parliamentary institution and phenomenon of parliamentarism is important in the context of *inter-institutional relations*, for instance, the influence of the parliament on the process of *government* formation, functioning and resignation. It is rather urgent in cases of minority cabinets, as they are represented by the parties, which totally do not have stable majority in the parliament, and depend on ad hoc agreements which take place between various parties and deputies in the parliament. It means, that under the rule of minority cabinets, different formal and factual parameters of inter-institutional relations between the government and parliament, i.e. institution of parliament and phenomenon of parliamentarism, acquire exceptional importance.

According to the mechanism of parliaments' influence on government formation/resignation, parliamentary democracies are divided into the systems of *positive and negative parliamentarism*². Within the systems of *negative parliamentarism* the process of government formation does not directly depend on a positive (the one, which is supported by absolute or relative majority of deputies in the parliament) vote of confidence or depends on a negative vote of confidence in the government on the part of the parliament. Negative vote of confidence in the government means, that to start its work, the government must get a vote of

¹ *Parliamentary democracy* is traditionally interpreted as the democratic political system and democratic political regime (which, according to their structure can be a parliamentary republic, parliamentary monarchy or semi-presidential republic), where the governments/executive power are formed, supported, and also tolerated by the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament. See: V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process in the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. Peele (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1984.; A. Bruswitz, *Vad menas med parlamentarism?*, "Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift" 1929, vol 32, s. 323–334.

² T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 41–43.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115–151.; L. De Winter, P. Dumont, *Uncertainty and Complexity in Coalition Formation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 123–158.; U. Sieberer, *The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis*, "West European Politics" 2011, vol 34, nr 4, s. 731–754.; F. Russo, L. Verzichelli, *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 2014.; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.; M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences"; T. Louwse, *Unpacking "positive" and "negative" parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences" of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

confidence/vote of investiture, which means that the majority of deputies in the parliament will not vote against the prime-minister, constitution or program of the government. Thus, the government under the conditions of negative parliamentarism starts its activity only when it or its prime-minister is nominated by the head of the state or the parliament, without present support (a vote of confidence/vote of investiture) for the prime-minister, personal composition and program of the government by the absolute or relative majority of the parliamentary deputies or under the condition that the absolute majority of parliamentary deputies do not vote against the prime-minister, personal composition or program of the government. Correspondingly, the government gets vote of confidence from the parliament by the very fact of nomination of the prime-minister or the composition of the government or in case of non-objection to the personality of the prime-minister or the composition of the government by absolute majority of deputies in the parliament. However, the cabinet is considered to be valid, till it does not get a positive (which is supported by absolute or relative majority of parliamentary deputies, depends on each specific situation) vote of no confidence or while it does not receive a refusal of silent or negative confidence³. That is, the system of negative parliamentarism – institutionally-constitutional scenario, which is based on perpetual silent confidence in the cabinet, supported by the majority of deputies in the parliament (when the parliament does not refuse confidence to the government or does not pass a vote of no confidence in the government), or on the constant negative confidence in the cabinet, which is not objected by majority of parliamentary deputies. Power of the parliament is especially revealed in government functioning, as the refusal of silent confidence in the government or non-insurance of negative confidence in the government on the part of the parliament, concerning almost any issue, which is in the government competence can become a direct reason for government resignation (refusal of confidence in the government or loss of confidence in the government in the systems of negative parliamentarism, is, in fact, associated with a vote of no confidence in the systems of positive parliamentarism)⁴. It indicates, that within the systems of negative parliamentarism, parliamentary majority should not constantly and actively rise against the government, and the government makes use of silent confidence of the parliament, as a result of this, it is not the government, who must prove its support for the parliament, but

³ Under the conditions of the system of negative parliamentarism confidence/investiture in the government is not always based on the parliamentary majority, because it cannot be guaranteed or can be secured negatively in the process of government formation. However, the refusal of positive confidence in the government or discontent of requirements, regarding negative confidence in the government in the process of government functioning is a reason for the long-term resignation of the government. Non-receipt or loss of positive confidence by the government or loss of negative confidence on the part of the parliament can cause resignation of the government or resignation of the government and parliament and the pre-term elections of the latter.

⁴ T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50.; K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

vice versa, the parliament must prove that “it cannot bear the government”⁵. The examples of the systems of negative parliamentarism are/were: Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Finland (till 2000), France and Sweden⁶. Among of them, the most specific are Sweden and Portugal, where a negative vote of confidence/vote of investiture is presupposed. Thus, to realize its functions, the government must get a vote of confidence/vote of investiture, which means, that absolute majority of parliamentary deputies should not vote against the prime-minister, composition and program of the government. It is called negative majority and is characterized by the technique of combination of the principles of negative and positive parliamentarism⁷. In fact, it serves as formalization of negative parliamentarism, as the government acts till absolute majority of parliamentary deputies do not vote against it. If a vote of confidence in the government is supported by relative majority of deputies in the parliament, then the government goes on making use of its authority, because the negative absolute majority threshold is not reached⁸. The United Kingdom is rather a specific case, as a vote of confidence in the cabinet is not presupposed in this country. But, in fact, a vote of confidence in the government is represented by a vote of confidence in the speech of a candidate for the prime-minister position during the first meeting of the newly elected parliament. That is why, when one speaks of the United Kingdom, one refers not to a vote of confidence, but to the “moment of investiture”, as the vote of confidence in the candidates’ speech, as the practice shows, it is rather a symbolic and assertive and positive procedure which does not possess a “constitutional mandate”⁹.

Specificity of all systems of *positive parliamentarism* lies in the fact, that the process of government formation directly depends on a positive (which is supported by absolute/relative majority of parliamentary deputies¹⁰) vote of confidence in the government on the part of

⁵ O. Khomenko, *Vykonavcha vlada za umov parlamentnoi respubliki ta monarkhii (parlamentnoi demokratii)*, “Forum prava” 2012, vol 1, s. 1042; I. Protsiuk, *Status uriadu v parlamentnii respubliki*, “Derzhavne budivnytstvo i mistseve samovriaduvannia” 2011, vol 21, s. 27.

⁶ M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPJ Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences”; T. Louwse, *Unpacking ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

⁷ T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 45; T. Bergman, When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception, [w:] W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

⁸ V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process in the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. L., Peele, *Comparative government and politics: Essays in Honor of S.E. Finer*, Wyd. Heinemann 1984, s. 56; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

⁹ J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

¹⁰ I. Budge, M. Laver, *Office seeking and policy pursuit in coalition theory*, “Legislative Studies Quarterly” 1986, vol 11, s. 485–506; M. Laver, *Between theoretical elegance and political reality: Deductive models and cabinet coalitions in Europe*, [w:] G. Pridham, *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986, s. 32–44; M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990; M. Laver, K. A. Shepsle, *Coalitions and cabinet government*, “American Political Science Review” 1990, vol 84, s. 873–890; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

the parliament. It means, that the government starts its activity only when it (its prime-minister, personal constitution or/and program) passes a vote of confidence/vote of investiture by absolute or relative majority of parliamentary deputies (depends on every specific case). Correspondingly, the cabinet is valid till it has parliament's confidence or till it does not get a positive vote (supported by absolute/relative majority of parliamentary deputies) of no confidence (including simple or constructive vote of no confidence). It means, that within the system of positive parliamentarism, confidence/investiture in the government is constant and is ensured both at the stage of its initiating/formation, and in the process of its functioning. It also presupposes, that in the instrument of positive parliamentarism, the mechanism of influence on formation of a vote of confidence/vote of investiture in the government, duration of government formation, role of causes, and predictable consequences of the government advanced resignation are incorporated. In general, it shows, that parliamentary institution in the process of formation and determination of the type and composition of the governments in the systems of positive parliamentarism, is more important, than in the systems of negative parliamentarism. Among the examples of the systems of positive parliamentarism in the European parliamentary democracies, such countries as: Belgium (where the peculiarities of vote of confidence/vote of investiture are not formally mentioned, but are applied in practice), Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland (since 2000), Croatia and the Czech Republic¹¹ are singled out.

The process of distinguishing the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism is especially actual in the context of *minority cabinets*. The scientists usually suppose, that minority cabinets are often formed within the systems of negative parliamentarism, as the institutional conditions are more favorable there. But, as the experience of the European parliamentary democracies shows, rather often minority cabinets are formed in the systems of positive parliamentarism (for detailed information see Table 1). That is why, the research on minority cabinets within the systems of positive parliamentarism is very urgent and necessary. It will help to determine the way how positive parliamentarism correlates with minority cabinets, whether positive parliamentarism is a disembodied category according to the results for the governments. It will help to determine key reasons for formation, attributes of functioning and stability of minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism. To solve this problem, first of all, we focus on the theoretical and methodological clarification of the essence of minority cabinets, and then on evaluation of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism.

¹¹ C. R. Conrad, S. N. Golder, *Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119–150.; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, S. Engler, P. Potolidis, M. Gerber, P. Leimgruber, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2009*, Wyd. University of Berne 2011.; T. Louwse, *Unpacking "positive" and "negative" parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop „The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences“ of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014

“*Minority cabinets*” are interpreted as the government cabinets, parties or party of which (i.e. parties that composite the government and are in office) do not make up absolute majority of places/mandates in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. It means, that minority cabinet is a formal-institutional case, when a parliamentary party individually or in a coalition with other parliamentary parties/leading chambers of the parliament, the share of which is less than a half or just a half of the full composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, forms the government. That is why, a share of parliamentary parties, which are not members of minority cabinets, equals more than 50% from the full quantity of mandates in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. But the reason for formation and further functioning of minority cabinet under the conditions of positive parliamentarism must be silent confidence in the government cabinet, supported by majority (absolute or relative, depends on every single case) of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (when the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament does not refuse confidence to the government or does not pass a vote of no confidence in the government)¹². Though, the format of providing a vote of confidence in minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism is constitutionally predetermined – in different ways in each country (depends on peculiarities of a positive vote of confidence), it is usually reduced to the silent support of the nominated candidate for the prime-minister, composition and/or program of the government. It means, that in case of minority cabinets formation in the systems of positive parliamentarism, governmental and some/all non-governmental parliamentary parties must support the government cabinet by absolutely or relative parliamentary majority (depends on the country). But, it is under the condition, that apart governmental parties, all other parties, which support the cabinet, are not its members and are not in office.

Minority cabinets, as well as all other party governments are divided into two types – single-party and coalition. *Single-party minority cabinet* is a cabinet, whose party (which is a member of the government, thus is in office) does not have absolute majority of mandates in the parliament, i.e. has support of less than 50% or 50% sharp of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or non-formal silent confidence in the government is provided by another/other party/parties in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or deputies with no party affiliation). *Coalition minority cabinet* is a cabinet, whose

¹² V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 1973, nr 3, s. 191–212.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227.; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, “Legislative Studies Quarterly” 1986, nr 11, s. 583–605.; C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29.; T. Bergman, *When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception*, [w:] W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225.; C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the ‘Danish Miracle’*, “Journal of Public Policy” 2002, nr 21, s. 63–80.; B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41–62.; M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 2002, nr 25, s. 259–280.; A. Skjæveland, *Modeling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond*, “Party Politics” 2009, nr 15, s. 715–735.

parties (which are the members of the government, thus are in office) do not constitute absolute majority in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, alone have support of less than 50% or 50% sharp of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or non-formal silent confidence in the government is provided by another/other party/parties in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or deputies with no party affiliation)¹³.

It is theoretically and empirically known, that minority cabinets can be a forced measure or a simple phenomenon of inter-institutional political process, and also relations between the elected political parliamentary parties, elected to the parliament (under the condition that none of them has absolute majority in the parliament), but which, taking into consideration various reasons, cannot or do not want to form majority coalition cabinets (minimal-triumphant or excessive-triumphant). That is why, in most cases (in particular in the systems of positive parliamentarism) works the rule, according to which, inability or unwillingness of the parties, which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament, to form coalition majority cabinets, are the reasons for appearance of several alternatives in front of the parties, political system and the country, namely: to form majority cabinet in the format of “wide coalition” or “coalition of national unity”; to form a single-party or coalition minority cabinet; to form non-party cabinet; pre-term parliamentary elections. It is obvious, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism, the most common, but not a single way out from the situation, when parliamentary parties, which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament, cannot form coalition majority cabinets, is to form minority cabinets. But, in course of their activity, especially in the systems of positive parliamentarism, single-party and coalition minority cabinets carry out the same functions, as majority cabinets. The essential difference is that the head of the government must pay more attention to the threat of the pre-term resignation of the cabinet, caused by the refusal of silent confidence or by a vote of no confidence in minority cabinet. It means, that the large part of their attention, the prime-minister of minority cabinet pays to the relations with the parliamentary parties (both with government and non-government parties, which provide silent support for minority cabinet, and also with oppositional parties) and deputies with no party affiliation, what is less distinctive of majority cabinets. The point is that insufficient attention on the part of the prime-minister to non-government parties or parliamentary deputies with no affiliation, who provide formal and non-formal support for minority cabinet, can lead to the refusal of a silent vote of confidence in such government (what can often become a reason for the pre-term resignation of

¹³ It is reasonable to divide all minority cabinets into two models: minority cabinets with unstable support on the basis of the ad hoc agreement (the examples of such minority cabinets are rather accidental and are not peculiar of inter-institutional environment) and minority cabinets with stable support on the basis of general agreement between governmental and non-governmental/oppositional parties in exchange for some concession to non-governmental/oppositional parties (the examples of such minority cabinets are permanent, and stable in inter-institutional environment). This dichotomy is usually referred to coalition minority cabinets, where the structures of inter-party relations and competitiveness, in particular regarding support for the cabinets in the course of their formation and functioning, are much more visible and broader.

minority governments within the systems of positive parliamentarism, see Table 1). Nevertheless, the most frequently minority cabinets within the systems of positive parliamentarism resign as a result of regular or pre-term parliamentary elections. It does not mean that they are very stable, but on the contrary, minority cabinets are formed in case of political/inter-institutional crisis, when it is impossible to form majority cabinet, regular elections are in the near future or there is an agreement as to the pre-term elections, and till the results of the elections are made public, minority cabinet is to function. Consequently, it is clear, that minority cabinets (single-party and coalition) are more institutionally flexible in their political course, and are more open in the context of considering interests of the main political (in particular parliamentary) groups, than majority cabinets. It is very actual in the light of such fragmented party systems, as in Italy, Latvia, Romania. Besides, the agreement of all parliamentary parties to form minority cabinets in some European systems of positive parliamentarism is also based on the existence of a wide range of possibilities among parliamentary committees and commissions to influence internal and international life (it is rather actual for the systems of positive parliamentarism in Central-Eastern European countries). Under this conditions it is acceptable for the parties, which have party factions in the parliament, to concentrate their influence on parliamentary commissions activity (it is peculiar of Ireland, Italy, Romania)¹⁴.

Taking this into consideration, T. Bergman¹⁵ assumes that minority cabinets, in particular in most systems of positive parliamentarism, became stereotyped and widespread phenomena. But the scientist states, that positive parliamentarism in the light of peculiarities of a positive vote of confidence in cabinets just complicates the process of minority government formation.¹⁶ J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin and B.E. Rasch¹⁷ affirm, that it is not possible to make a single conclusion, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism, the frequency of government

¹⁴ The situation in the context of hypothetic formation of minority cabinets in the system of positive parliamentarism is a bit simplified by competitive relations between the parliamentary parties, which are likely to create permanent or situational parliamentary majority. To give one parliamentary party the right to form minority cabinet is the "lesser evil" for other parties, and that is why they will be interested in maintenance of the current correlation of political importance of the current parliamentary parties. It means, that minority cabinet on the basis of non-government parties' influence can have rather strong and stable support of the parliamentary majority, be capable of living and even stable. It is especially actual, when the right to form minority cabinet is given to the centrist party, and majority in the parliament belongs to the parties, which come from various parts of left-right ideological party spectrum, in particular, when some of the parties are not allowed to participate in the process of cabinet formation (the force of the so-called technique of "sanitary cordon"). During 1947-1987 it was peculiar of Italy, where minority cabinets were formed on the basis of Christian democrats (the centrist party). Very often this Italian experience is interpreted as the demonstration of the "sanitary cordon" technique, used against the Italian communists. In general, it means, that formation of minority cabinet is a logical way out of the situation, concerning the opposition between parties in the parliament. It goes without saying, that in such a case, minority cabinet can be criticized from the both parts of the spectrum, but the ideological opposition is a constraining factor for consolidation of representatives of oppositional parties, with the aim of the government overthrow.

¹⁵ T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 61.

¹⁶ The identical conclusions are supported by other researchers. See: L. De Winter, *Parties and government formation, portfolio allocation, and policy definition*, [w:] K.R. Luther, F. Müller-Rommel, *Political Parties in the New Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 171–206.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115–151.; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; T. Saalfeld, *Members of parliament and governments in western Europe. Agency relations and problems of oversight*, European journal of political researches 2000, vol 37, s. 353–376.

¹⁷ J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

formation is lower, than in the systems of negative parliamentarism. The researchers confirm that as of 2009 in the systems of positive parliamentarism, minority governments in the time sample equaled 26% of total number of party government terms, and on the contrary, in the systems of negative parliamentarism it was 36% of total number of party government terms. And this clearly determines, that minority cabinets, except Scandinavian countries (as the systems of negative parliamentarism, where minority cabinets are formed permanently) are approved under the conditions of the parliamentary democracy (in particular in all Central-Eastern European countries) within the systems of positive, but not negative parliamentarism¹⁸. This is proved by the data, given in Table 1, which represents the history of minority cabinets formation and functioning in the European systems of positive parliamentarism in 1944-2014.

¹⁸ Additionally see.: K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; M. Taylor, M. Laver, Government coalitions in Western Europe, „European Journal of Political Research” 1973, vol 1, s. 205–248.

Table 1. The History of Minority Cabinets Formation in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)¹⁹

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The Prime-Minister	Duration of the cabinet in power	Type of the cabinet	The Prime-Minister's party	Party composition of the cabinet	Ideological positioning of the party cabinet	Deputies of government parties/ composition of the parliament, №	Reasons of the cabinet resignation	Duration, days
Belgium								
P.-H. Spaak I	13.03.1946 – 20.03.1946	SPM	BSP-PSB	BSP-PSB	SD, DS	66/202	Change of the cabinet composition	7
A. Van Acker IV	22.04.1954 – 02.06.1958	CM	BSP-PSB	BSP-PSB + LP-PL	SD, DS, L	106/212	Parliamentary elections	1480
G. Eyskens II	23.06.1958 – 04.11.1958	SPM	PSC-CVP	PSC-CVP	CD, E	104/212	Change of the cabinet composition	131
L. Tindemans I	25.04.1974 – 11.06.1974	CM	CVP	CVP + PSC + PVW + PRL	CD, CH, L, CL, SL	102/212	Change of the cabinet composition	46
L. Tindemans III	06.03.1977 – 18.04.1977	CM	CVP	CVP + PSC + PVW + PRL	CD, CH, L, CL, SL	102/212	Parliamentary elections	42
G. Verhofstadt III	10.06.2007 – 21.12.2007	CM	0-VLD	MR + PS + 0-VLD + SPa+Spi	L, CL, SD, SL	75/150	Change of the cabinet composition	191
Y. Leterme III	13.06.2010 – 06.12.2011	CM	CD&V	PS + MR + CD&V + CDH	SD, L, CL, CD, CH	70/150	Change of the cabinet composition	533
Bulgaria								
P. Dimitrov	05.11.1991 – 28.12.1992	SPM	SDS	SDS	CD, C, NC	110/240	Loss of vote of confidence	413
S. Sofiyanski	12.02.1997 – 20.05.1997	SPM	SDS	SDS	CD, C, NC	69/240	Parliamentary elections	98
B. Borisov I	27.07.2009 – 20.02.2013	SPM	GERB	GERB	C, P	116/240	Voluntary resignation	1283
P. Orshanski	29.05.2013 – 23.07.2014	CM	n/p	KzB + DPS	SD, DS, L, SL, Min, T	120/240	Voluntary resignation	414
B. Borisov II	07.11.2014 – current	CM	GERB	GERB + RB + ABV	C, P, SD	118/240	–	–
Croatia								
I. Račan III	30.07.2002 – 23.11.2003	CM	SPH	SPH + HSS + HNS + LS + LIBRA	SD, AF, E, A, SC, L, SL, EC	65/151	Parliamentary elections	473

¹⁹ Belgium governments have been analyzed since 1946, Bulgarian – since 1991, Croatian – since 2000, Czech – since 1992, Estonian – since 1992, Finnish – since 2000, German – since 1949, Greek – since 1974, Hungarian – since 1990, Irish – since 1944, Italian – since 1945, Latvian – since 1993, Lithuanian – since 1992, Maltese – since 1992, Romanian – since 1989, Slovakian – since 1990, Slovenian – since 1990, Spanish – since 1977. The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets. Lines with temporary (acting) minority cabinets are marked with grey. Legend: SPM – single-party minority cabinet; CM – coalition minority cabinet; n/p – non-party affiliation of the prime-minister; YT – duration of the government; A – agrarianism; AF – antifascism; C – conservatism; CD – Christian democracy; CH – Christian humanism; CL – conservative liberalism; DS – democratic socialism; E – Europeanism; EC – ecological conservatism; Eco – ecologism; EL – economic liberalism; ES – Euroscepticism; L – liberalism; LC – liberal conservatism; Min – national minorities' interests; N – nationalism; NC – national-conservatism; P – populism; R – regionalism; S – socialism (communism); SD – social-democracy; SC – social-conservatism; SL – social-liberalism; T – technocracy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
I. Sanader I	23.12.2003 – 10.02.2006	CM	HDZ	HDZ + DC	CD, N, C, NC, E, L, LC	66/152	Change of the cabinet composition	767
I. Sanader I	11.02.2006 – 25.11.2007	SPM	HDZ	HDZ	CD, N, C, NC, E	66/152	Parliamentary elections	644
J. Kosor II	10.07.2010 – 23.12.2011	CM	HDZ	HDZ + HSS + SDSS	CD, N, C, NC, E, A, SC, EC, SD, SL, Min, AF	75/153	Parliamentary elections	523
Czech Republic								
V. Klaus III	02.07.1996 – 28.11.1997	CM	ODS	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA	C, LC, L, ES, CD, R	99/200	Change of the cabinet composition	506
J. Tosovsky	02.01.1998 – 16.07.1998	CM	n/p	KDU-CSL + ODA + US	CD, R, L, T	31/200	Parliamentary elections	194
M. Zeman	17.07.1998 – 14.02.2002	SPM	CSSD	CSSD	CD	74/200	Parliamentary elections	1287
M. Topolánek I	16.08.2006 – 03.10.2006	SPM	ODS	ODS	C, LC, EL, ES	81/200	Loss of vote of confidence	47
M. Topolánek II	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	CM	ODS	ODS + KDU-CSL + SZ	C, LC, L, ES, CD, R, Eco, SL	100/200	Loss of vote of confidence	795
Estonia								
T. Vahi III	01.12.1996 – 13.03.1997	SPM	EKK	EKK	L	41/101	Voluntary resignation	102
M. Siimann	14.03.1996 – 28.03.1999	SPM	EKK	EKK	L	41/101	Parliamentary elections	1094
S. Kallas	28.02.2002 – 09.04.2003	CM	ERe	EK + ERe	L, SD, SL, P	46/101	Parliamentary elections	399
A. Ansip III	21.05.2009 – 06.03.2011	CM	ERe	ERe + IRL	SD, SL, P, C, CD, NC	50/101	Parliamentary elections	645
Finland								
Since 2000, after the introduction of the system of positive parliamentarism, minority cabinets are not peculiar.								
Germany								
Since 1949, after the introduction of the system of positive parliamentarism, minority cabinets are not peculiar.								
Greece								
K. Mitsotakis	11.04.1990 – 09.09.1993	SPM	ND	ND	CD, C, LC, EL, E	150/300	Loss of vote of confidence	1228
A. Samaras I	20.06.2012 – 21.06.2013	SPM	ND	ND	CD, C, LC, EL, E	129/300	Change of the cabinet composition	361
Hungary								
F. Gyurcsány III	02.05.2008 – 28.03.2009	SPM	MSZP	MSZP	SD	190/386	Voluntary resignation	326
G. Bajnai	14.04.2009 – 25.04.2010	SPM	MSZP	MSZP	SD	190/386	Parliamentary elections	371
Ireland								
J. Costello I	18.02.1948 – 13.06.1951	CM	FG	FG + Lab + CnP + CnT + NL	CD, LC, SC, E, SD, C, A	67/147	Parliamentary elections	1195
É. de Valera VIII	13.06.1951 – 02.06.1954	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	69/147	Parliamentary elections	1069
S. Lemass II	11.10.1961 – 21.04.1965	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	70/144	Parliamentary elections	1270
S. Lemass III	21.04.1965 – 10.11.1966	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	72/144	Voluntary resignation	559

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
J. Lynch I	10.11.1966 – 02.07.1969	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	72/144	Parliamentary elections	952
G. Fitzgerald I	30.06.1981 – 09.03.1982	CM	FG	FG + Lab	CD, LC, SC, E, SD	80/166	Parliamentary elections	249
C. Haughey II	09.03.1982 – 14.12.1982	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	81/166	Parliamentary elections	275
C. Haughey III	10.03.1987 – 12.07.1989	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	81/166	Parliamentary elections	842
C. Haughey IV	12.07.1989 – 11.02.1992	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	83/166	Voluntary resignation	929
A. Reynolds I	11.02.1992 – 12.01.1993	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	83/166	Parliamentary elections	331
J. Bruton	12.12.1994 – 26.06.1997	CM	FG	FG + Lab + DUP	CD, LC, SC, E, SD, DS	82/166	Parliamentary elections	914
B. Aherm I	26.06.1997 – 06.06.2002	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	81/166	Parliamentary elections	1780
Italy								
A. De Gasperi IV	31.05.1947 – 12.05.1948	CM	DC	DC + PRI + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, L, SL, SD	230/556	Parliamentary elections	342
A. De Gasperi VIII	16.07.1953 – 28.07.1953	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Voluntary resignation	12
G. Pella	17.08.1953 – 15.01.1954	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Voluntary resignation	148
A. Fanfani I	18.01.1954 – 30.01.1954	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Change of the cabinet composition	12
M. Scelba	10.02.1954 – 06.06.1955	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	295/590	Voluntary resignation	476
A. Segni I	22.07.1955 – 16.05.1957	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	295/590	Voluntary resignation	654
A. Zoli	19.05.1957 – 19.07.1958	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Parliamentary elections	420
A. Fanfani II	01.07.1958 – 15.02.1959	CM	DC	DC + PSDI	CD, P, E, SD	295/596	Change of the cabinet composition	224
A. Segni II	15.02.1959 – 24.02.1960	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Voluntary resignation	369
F. Tambroni	26.03.1960 – 19.07.1960	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Voluntary resignation	113
A. Fanfani III	26.07.1960 – 12.02.1962	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Change of the cabinet composition	556
G. Leone I	21.06.1963 – 05.11.1963	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	260/630	Change of the cabinet composition	134
G. Leone II	24.06.1968 – 19.11.1968	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Change of the cabinet composition	145
M. Rumor II	05.08.1969 – 17.02.1970	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Change of the cabinet composition	192
G. Andreotti I	17.02.1972 – 26.02.1972	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Loss of vote of confidence	9
G. Andreotti II	26.07.1972 – 12.07.1973	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	315/630	Change of the cabinet composition	346
A. Moro IV	23.11.1974 – 07.01.1976	CM	DC	DC + PRI	CD, P, E, L	281/630	Change of the cabinet composition	404
A. Moro V	12.02.1976 – 30.04.1976	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Parliamentary elections	78

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
G. Andreotti III	29.07.1976 – 16.01.1978	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	262/630	Loss of vote of confidence	527
G. Andreotti IV	11.03.1978 – 31.01.1979	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	262/630	Change of the cabinet composition	320
G. Andreotti V	20.03.1979 – 31.03.1979	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PRI	CD, P, E, SD, L	291/630	Parliamentary elections	11
F. Cossiga I	04.08.1979 – 19.03.1980	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	291/630	Change of the cabinet composition	225
A. Fanfani VI	17.04.1987 – 28.04.1987	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	225/630	Parliamentary elections	11
R. Prodi I	18.05.1996 – 09.10.1998	CM	PpP	PDS + PpP + DINI-RI + FdV	SD, DS, CD, L, Eco	288/630	Loss of vote of confidence	861
M. D'Alema II	21.12.1999 – 25.04.2000	CM	DS	DS + PpP + RII + PdC + FdV + UDEUR + ID	SD, SL, DS, CD, L, S, Eco	295/630	Voluntary resignation	124
G. Amato II	28.04.2000 – 31.05.2001	CM	n/p	DS + PpP + RII + PdC + FdV + UDEUR + ID + SDI	SD, SL, DS, CD, L, S, Eco	295/630	Parliamentary elections	393
Latvia								
V. Birkavs	07.08.1993 – 14.09.1994	CM	LC	LC + LZS	L, CL, A	48/100	Loss of vote of confidence	397
M. Gailis	15.09.1994 – 20.12.1995	CM	LC	LC + TPA	L, CL	41/100	Parliamentary elections	455
G. Krasts II	08.04.1998 – 03.10.1998	CM	LC	TB/LNNK + LC + LZS + KDS	N, NC, ES, L, CL, A, CD	35/100	Parliamentary elections	175
V. Kristopans I	26.11.1998 – 03.02.1999	CM	LC	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	N, NC, ES, L, CL, C	46/100	Loss of vote of confidence	67
V. Kristopans II	04.02.1999 – 15.07.1999	CM	LC	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	N, NC, ES, L, CL, C	46/100	Loss of vote of confidence	161
I. Emsis	09.03.2004 – 01.12.2004	CM	ZZS	TP + ZZS + LPP	C, LC, A, EC, ES, CD	42/100	Loss of vote of confidence	262
A. Kalvītis II	08.04.2006 – 06.11.2006	CM	ZZS	TP + ZZS + LPP	C, LC, A, EC, ES, CD	42/100	Parliamentary elections	208
V. Dombrovskis II	17.03.2010 – 02.10.2010	CM	JL	ZZS + JL + PS + TB/LNNK	A, EC, ES, C, LC, EL, N, NC	44/100	Parliamentary elections	195
V. Dombrovskis IV	25.10.2011 – 27.11.2013	CM	V	V + ZRP + NA	LC, C, N, NC, EL, ES	50/100	Voluntary resignation	752
Lithuania								
A. Abišala	21.07.1992 – 02.12.1992	CM	n/p	SK + LKDP	C, E, CD, NC, LC, N	60/135	Parliamentary elections	131
R. Pakšas II	26.10.2000 – 02.07.2001	CM	LIIS	LIIS + NS	L, SL	63/141	Loss of vote of confidence	246
A. Brazauskas I	03.07.2001 – 14.12.2004	CM	NS	NS + LSDP	SL, SD	29/141	Parliamentary elections	1241
A. Brazauskas III	11.04.2006 – 31.05.2006	CM	LSDP	DP + LSDP + LVLS	L, SL, P, SD, A	69/141	Change of the cabinet composition	50
G. Kirkilas	04.07.2006 – 27.11.2008	CM	LSDP	LSDP + LiCS + LVLS + PDP	L, SL, CL, A	55/141	Parliamentary elections	863
Malta								
G. Borg Olivier I	05.03.1962 – 07.04.1966	SPM	PN	PN	C, CD, E, N	25/50	Parliamentary elections	1472
Poland								
J. K. Bielecki	12.01.1991 – 23.12.1991	CM	KLD	ZSL + SD + KLD + PC	A, S, L, CD	103/460	Parliamentary elections	341
J. Olszewski	23.12.1991 – 06.06.1992	CM	PC	ZChN + PC + PL	C, N, NC, CD, A	121/460	Loss of vote of confidence	163

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
W. Pawlak I	05.06.1992 – 10.07.1992	SPM	PSL	PSL	A, CD, SC	48/460	Loss of vote of confidence	35
J. Buzek II	07.06.2000 – 18.10.2001	SPM	AMS	AMS	CD, C	201/460	Parliamentary elections	491
L. Miller II	01.03.2003 – 01.05.2004	CM	SLD	SLD + UP	SD, E	216/460	Change of the cabinet composition	420
K. Marcinkiewicz I	31.10.2005 – 04.05.2006	SPM	PIS	PIS	C, NC, SC, P, ES	155/460	Change of the cabinet composition	184
Romania								
N. Vacaroiu I	13.11.1992 – 17.08.1994	SPM	n/p	FDSN	SD	117/341	Change of the cabinet composition	634
N. Vacaroiu II	18.08.1994 – 01.09.1996	CM	n/p	PDSR + PUINR	SD, N	147/341	Change of the cabinet composition	733
N. Vacaroiu III	02.09.1996 – 11.12.1996	SPM	n/p	PDSR	SD	117/341	Parliamentary elections	99
A. Nestase I	20.12.2000 – 19.06.2003	SPM	PDSR	PDSR	SD	155/345	Change of the cabinet composition	899
A. Nestase II	19.06.2003 – 28.11.2004	SPM	PSD	PSD	SD	155/345	Parliamentary elections	519
C. Popescu-Tariceanu I	29.12.2004 – 03.12.2006	CM	PNL	PNL + PD + UDMR + PUR	L, CL, C, R, SC	134/332	Change of the cabinet composition	694
C. Popescu-Tariceanu II	07.12.2006 – 01.04.2007	CM	PNL	PNL + PD + UDMR	L, CL, C, R	134/332	Change of the cabinet composition	114
C. Popescu-Tariceanu III	05.04.2007 – 30.11.2008	CM	PNL	PNL + UDMR	L, CL, C, R	86/332	Parliamentary elections	595
E. Boc II	23.12.2009 – 19.05.2010	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR	L, LC, CD, C, R	137/334	Change of the cabinet composition	146
E. Boc III	19.05.2010 – 06.02.2012	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR + UNPR	L, LC, CD, C, R, SD	153/334	Voluntary resignation	617
M. R. Ungureanu	09.02.2012 – 27.04.2012	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR + UNPR	L, LC, CD, C, R, SD	158/334	Loss of vote of confidence	78
V. Ponta I	07.05.2012 – 09.12.2012	CM	PSD	PSD + PNL + PC	SD, L, CL, C, SC	147/334	Parliamentary elections	212
V. Ponta III	04.03.2014 – 27.11.2014	CM	PSD	PSD + UDMR + PC + UNPR	SD, C, R, SC	191/412	Change of the cabinet composition	263
V. Ponta IV	15.12.2014 – current	CM	PSD	PSD + LR + PC + UNPR	SD, L, SC	195/412	–	–
Slovakia								
V. Meciar IV	19.03.1993 – 16.11.1993	SPM	HZDS	HZDS	C, NC, P	66/150	Change of the cabinet composition	237
J. Moravcik	16.03.1994 – 12.12.1994	CM	APR	SDL + KDH + APR + ADS + NDS	S, SD, CD, SC, L	71/150	Parliamentary elections	266
M. Dzurinda III	08.02.2006 – 03.07.2006	CM	Smer	Smer + LS-HZDS + SNS	SD, P, C, NC, N, ES	50/150	Parliamentary elections	145
I. Radkova I	08.07.2010 – 11.10.2011	CM	SDKU-DS	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CD, LC, SC, L, ES	75/150	Loss of vote of confidence	453

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
I. Radicova II	20.10.2011 – 10.03.2012	CM	SDKU-DS	SDKU-DS + SdS + KDH + MH	CD, LC, SC, L, ES	73/150	Parliamentary elections	140
Slovenia								
J. Dmosek I	22.04.1992 – 25.01.1993	CM	LDS	SDP + LDS + Zs + SDZS + DS	SD, L, SL, Eco	40/80	Parliamentary elections	273
J. Dmosek IV	26.01.1996 – 10.11.1996	CM	LDS	LDS + SKD	L, SL, CD, SC	37/90	Parliamentary elections	284
A. Bajuk	07.06.2000 – 15.10.2000	CM	SLs	SLs + SDS	CD, C, A, LC, NC	35/90	Parliamentary elections	128
B. Pahor II	27.06.2011 – 20.09.2011	CM	SD	SD + LDS	L, SL, SD	33/90	Loss of vote of confidence	83
Spain								
A. Suarez I	04.07.1977 – 01.03.1979	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	166/350	Parliamentary elections	597
A. Suarez II	05.04.1979 – 25.02.1981	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	168/350	Voluntary resignation	680
L. Galvo-Sotelo	26.02.1981 – 28.10.1982	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	168/350	Parliamentary elections	602
F. Gonzalez III	05.12.1989 – 14.07.1993	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	175/350	Parliamentary elections	1299
F. Gonzalez IV	09.07.1993 – 06.05.1996	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	159/350	Parliamentary elections	1017
J. M. Aznar I	05.05.1996 – 27.04.2000	SPM	PP	PP	C, LC, CD, EL	156/350	Parliamentary elections	1432
J. L. R. Zapatero I	17.04.2004 – 09.03.2008	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	164/350	Parliamentary elections	1402
J. L. R. Zapatero II	12.04.2008 – 20.11.2011	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	169/350	Parliamentary elections	1298

Zródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov)*: An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

Parties in Belgium: BSP-PSB – the Belgian Socialist Party (Belgische Socialistische Partij – Parti Socialiste Belge); LP-PL – the Liberal Party (Liberale Partij – Parti libéral); PSC-CVP – the Christian People’s Party (Parti Social Chrétien – Christelijke Volkspartij); CVP – the Flemish Christian People’s Party (Christelijke Volkspartij); PSC – the Democratic Center (Parti Social Chrétien); PVV – the Party of Freedom and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang); PRL – the Liberal Reformist Party (Parti Réformateur Libéral); MR – the Reformist Movement (Mouvement Réformateur); PS – the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste); O-VLD – the Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten); SPa+Spi – Another Socialist Party – the Social and Liberal Party (Socialistische Partij Anders / Sociaal-Liberale Partij); CD&V – the Christian Democrats and Flemings (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams); CDH – the Humanistic Democratic Centre (Centre Démocrate Humaniste).

Parties in Bulgaria: SDS – the Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na Demokratichnite Sili); GERB – the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya); KzB – the Coalition for Bulgaria (Koalitsiya za Balgariya); DPS – the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi); RB – the Reformist Bloc (Reformatorski Blok); ABV – the Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (Alternativa za balgarsko vazrazhdane).

Parties in Croatia: SPH – the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske); HSS – the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka); HNS – the Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (Hrvatska narodna stranka – Liberalni demokrati); LS – the Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka); LIBRA – the Party of Liberal Democrats (LIBRA – Stranka liberalnih demokrata); HDZ – the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica); DC – the Democratic Centre (Demokratski centar); SDSS – the Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka).

Parties in the Czech Republic: ODS – the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana); KDU-CSL – the Christian-Democratic Union – People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová); ODA – the Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliance); US – the Union of Freedom (Unie svobody); CSSD – the Czech Social-Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická); SZ – the Green Party (Strana zelených).

Parties in Estonia: EKK – the Estonian Coalition Party (Eesti Koonderakond); ERe – the Estonian Reformist Party (Eesti Reformierakond); EK – the Estonian Centrist Party (Eesti Keskerakond); IRL – the „Pro Patria“ and „Res Publica“ Union (Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit).

Parties in Greece: ND – the New Democracy (Néa Ďimokratía).

Parties in Hungary: MSZP – the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt).

Parties in Ireland: FG – the Fine Gael (Fine Gael); Lab – the Labour Party (Labour Party); CnP – the Republican Party (Clann na Poblachta); CnT – the Earth Party (Clann

na Talmhan); NL – the National Labour Party (National Labour Party); FF – the Fianna Fail (Fianna Fáil); PD – the Progressive Democrats (Progressive Democrats); DLP – the Democratic Left (Democratic Left).

Parties in Italy: DC – the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana); PRI – the Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano); PSLI – the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (Partito Socialista Lavoratori Italiani); PLI – the Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano); PSDI – the Italian Democratic-Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano); PDS – the Democratic Party of Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra); PpP – the People’s Party for Prodi (Popolari per Prodi); DINI-RI – the Dini List – Italian Renewal (Lista Dini – Rinnovamento Italiano); FdV – the Federation of Green (Federazione dei Verdi); DS – the Left Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra); RiI – the Italian Renewal (Rinnovamento Italiano); PdCI – the Party of Italian Communist (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani); UDEUR – the Union of Democrats for Europe (Unione Democratici per l’Europa); ID – the Democrats (I Democratici); SDI – the Italian Democrats-Socialists (Socialisti Democratici Italiani).

Parties in Latvia: LC – the Latvian Way (Latvijas Ceļš); LZS – the Farmers’ Union of Latvia (Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība); TPA – the Political Union of Economists (Tautsaimnieku politiskā apvienība); TB/LNNK – For Homeland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK); KDS – the Christian-Democratic Union (Kristīgi demokrātiskā savienība); JP – the “New Party” (Jaunā partija); TP – the People’s Party (Tautas Partija); ZZS – the Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība); LPP – the First Latvian Party (Latvijas Pirmā partija); JL – the “New Era” (Jaunais Laiks); PS – the Civic Union (Pilsoniskā savienība); V – the “Unity” (Vienotība); ZRP – the Reformist Party (Reformu partija); NA – the national Alliance for Latvia (Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!”).

Parties in Lithuania: SK – the Coalition “Sajudžio” (Sajudžio koalicija); LKDP – the Lithuanian Christian-Democrats (Lietuvos Krikščionys Demokratai); LliS – the Liberal Union of Lithuania (Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga); NS – the New Union (Naujoji sąjunga); LSDP – the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party (Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija); DP – the Labour Party (Darbo Partija); LVLS – the Lithuanian Popular Peasant Union (Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga); LiCS – the Liberal and Centrist Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga); PDP – the Civic Democratic Party (Pilietinės demokratijos partija).

Parties in Malta: PN – the National Party (Partit Nazzjonalista).

Parties in Poland: ZSL – the United People’s Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe); SD – the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne); KLD – the Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny); PC – the Centre of Comprehension (Porozumienie Centrum); ZChN – the Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe); PL – the Peasant’s Alliance (Porozumienie Ludowe); PSL – the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe); AWS – the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy); SLD – the Union of Democratic Left (Sojusz

Lewicy Demokratycznej); UP – the Labour Party (Unia Pracy); PiS – the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość).

Parties in Romania: FDSN – the Front of National Democratic Salvation (Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale); PDSR – the Party of Social-Democracy in Romania (Partidul Democrației Sociale în România); PUNR – the Party of Romanian National Unity (Partidul Unității Naționale a Romanilor); PSD – the Social-Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat); PNL – the National Liberal party (Partidul Național Liberal); PD – the Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat); UDMR – the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România); PUR – the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator); PD-L – the Democratic Liberal Party (Democratic Liberal Party); UNPR – the national Union for Romanian Progress (Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României); PC – the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator); LRP – the Liberal Reformist Party (Partidul Liberal Reformat).

Parties in Slovakia: HZDS – the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko); SDL – the Party of Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej ľavice); KDH – the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie); APR – the Alternative for the Realism Policy (Alternatíva politického realizmu); ADS – the Alliance of Democrats (Aliancia demokratov Slovenska); NDS – the National Democratic Party (Národno-demokratická strana); Smer – Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia); LS-HZDS – the People's Party – the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko); SNS – the Slovakian National Party (Slovenská národná strana); SDKU-DS – the Slovakia Democratic and Christian Union (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana); SaS – the Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a solidarita); MH – the Bridge (Most-Híd).

Parties in Slovenia: SDP – the Party of Democratic Renewal (Stranka demokratične preнове); LDS – the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Liberalna demokracija Slovenije); ZS – the Greens of Slovenia (Zeleni Slovenije); SDZS – the Social-Democratic Union of Slovenia (Socialdemokratska zveza Slovenije SDZS); DS – the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka); SKD – the Slovenian Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati); SLS – the Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka); SDS – the Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka); SD – the Social Democrats (Socialni demokrati).

Parties in Spain: UCD – the Union of Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE – the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PP – the People's Party (Partido Popular).

As the *experience* proves, minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism are not the consolidated phenomenon, as in some countries they have become the predominating type of the governments (i.e. are formed more often than majority cabinets, what is peculiar of Romania and Spain), in other countries they have become an ordinary or

institutionalized phenomenon (i.e. constitute more than a third, but less than a half of all cabinets, what is native to Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Italy and Latvia), in the third countries, they have appeared to be a rare phenomenon (i.e. constitute a third or less of all cabinets, what is distinctive of Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), and in the fourth countries they have not been approved or had been used just once (Finland after 2000, Germany and Malta). The biggest number of minority cabinets during 1944-2014 (including temporary and acting governments) were formed in Italy (26), Romania (14) and Ireland (12). The biggest per cent of minority cabinets among other government cabinets (including temporary and acting governments) were observed in Spain (66,7), Romania (66,7) and Ireland (46,2). The least number of minority cabinets during 1944-2014 (including temporary and acting governments) were formed in Malta (1), Greece (2) and Hungary (2). The smallest per cent of minority cabinets among other government cabinets (including temporary and acting governments) were observed in Malta (6,7), Greece (9,1), Belgium (15,2) and Hungary (18,2). None minority cabinet was formed in such countries with the system of positive parliamentarism, as Finland and Germany (for detailed information see Table 2). Among all minority cabinets, which were created within the European systems of positive parliamentarism in 1944-2014 (and the total number of which, including temporary and acting governments, was 119 or 30,4 % of all government cabinets), the majority (115 or 96,6 %) was formed by stable minority cabinets. It shows, that in the countries, where minority cabinets are formed rather often, they constitute an ordinary phenomenon of inter-institutional (parliament and government) relations (what is peculiar of the systems of positive parliamentarism in Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, and Spain²⁰). On the contrary, for instance, in Bulgaria a half of minority cabinets is formed by temporary or acting governments. It argues, that minority cabinets in Bulgaria are not stable, and even when they are formed, they are considered to be temporary anticrisis/crisis phenomena (the exception is the minority cabinet of 2009-2013, headed by B. Borisov). It is peculiar, that among all minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, the majority is formed by the coalition governments (67 coalition to 52 single-party cabinets), and it differentiate between the systems of positive parliamentarism and the systems of negative parliamentarism, where among all minority cabinets, single-party cabinets predominate. The number of coalition minority cabinets is bigger than single-party minority cabinets in Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (whereas in the last three countries, single-party minority cabinets have not been formed at all). Single-party minority cabinets prevail over coalition minority cabinets in Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Malta and Spain (whereas in the last four countries, coalition minority cabinets have not been formed at all). The equal number of coalition and single-party minority cabinets is native to Estonia,

²⁰ K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191-212.

Ireland and Poland (for detailed information see Table 2). In most European systems of positive parliamentarism, especially in those countries, where minority cabinets are formed rarely and accidentally, such governments are cabinets with unstable support on the basis of the ad hoc agreement in particular, it is peculiar of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and predominantly Latvia. However, in some European systems of positive parliamentarism, especially where minority cabinets are formed rather often, such governments are institutionalized, and sometimes (but not always) with stable support on the basis of general agreement. Non-government parties in such systems provide minority cabinets with parliamentary support/majority and publicly declare it. Here belong Ireland (especially in 40–60s and 80–90s of 20th c.), Italy (especially in 40–80s of 20th c.), Spain (especially since 1989), and partially Croatia and Romania.

Table 2. The Statistics of Minority Cabinets in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)²¹

Country	Number of all governments, №	Number of all single-party minority cabinets	Number of all coalition minority cabinets	Percentage of all single-party minority cabinets	Percentage of all coalition minority cabinets
Belgium (since 1946)	46	2	5	4,3	10,9
Bulgaria (since 1991)	13	3	2	23,1	15,4
Croatia (since 2000)	9	1	3	11,1	33,3
Czech Republic (since 1992)	15	2	3	13,3	20,0
Estonia (since 1992)	14	2	2	14,3	14,3
Finland (since 2000)	9	–	–	–	–
Germany (since 1949)	25	–	–	–	–
Greece (since 1974)	22	2	–	9,1	–
Hungary (since 1990)	11	2	–	18,2	–
Ireland (since 1944)	26	6	6	23,1	23,1
Italy (since 1945)	66	15	11	22,7	16,7
Latvia (since 1993)	22	–	9	–	40,9
Lithuania (since 1992)	15	–	5	–	33,3
Malta (since 1962)	15	1	–	6,7	–
Poland (since 1989)	20	3	3	15,0	15,0
Romania (since 1990)	21	4	10	19,1	47,6
Slovakia (since 1990)	15	1	4	6,7	26,3
Slovenia (since 1990)	16	–	4	–	25,0
Spain (since 1977)	12	8	–	66,7	–
Total, №	392	52	67	13,3	17,1

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

Minority cabinets nearly in all European systems of positive parliamentarism became the leading and overall variant of inter-institutional balance between legislative and executive

²¹ The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets.

branches under the condition of inability to form single-party and coalition minority cabinets of the “minimum range” format. The point is, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism “wide coalitions” or “coalitions of national unity” are formed extremely rarely. The exception is Germany, where since 1949 there has not been any minority cabinet, on the contrary, to solve conflicts concerning government formation, when it was not possible to form the “minimum ideological range” government (in case of Germany this is minimal-triumphant coalition), they three times formed “wide coalitions” between the ideological and government-forming rivals. Nowadays, to the systems, where minority cabinets have not been approved, belong Finland, Greece, Hungary and Malta (there were few or no minority cabinets). In other European systems of positive parliamentarism “wide coalitions” or “coalitions of national unity” have not been formed at all or their quantity is lesser than the number of minority cabinets.

The analysis of the European systems of positive parliamentarism, which are permanently or rarely or even not characterized by minority cabinets, argues, that there are several key reasons and motives for parliamentary parties to form minority cabinets (they are not distinctive of all countries and all cases of minority cabinets). *Firstly*, minority cabinets are more often formed in the context of the systems, where strong parliamentary opposition is formalized or stereotyped/established (for instance, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Romania). The key attributes and resources of any strong parliamentary opposition usually are legal-political determination of parliamentary minority’s status and rights and/or formation and functioning of the systems of strong parliamentary committees²². *Secondly*, minority cabinets are more often formed in case of political systems, where group interests are usually predetermined not by pluralistic, but by corporate relations²³ (partially Belgium, Italy and Latvia, though it is not peculiar of Germany, where corporate relations have become widespread). It means, that great influence on minority cabinets functioning has non-parliamentary political opposition: minority cabinets are interested in extra-parliamentary support for their political activity and their political programs, and non-parliamentary political opposition (including various groups of interests) is interested in realization of its goals and tasks. *Thirdly*, minority cabinets theoretically (but not always practically, due to various historical, social and political

²² K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Oxford 2008.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227.; K. Strom, I. Budge, M. J. Laver, *Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1994, vol 38, nr 2, s. 303–335.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1998, vol 4, nr 1, s. 21–59.; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, *The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements in Parliamentary Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1999, vol 5, nr 3–4, s. 255–282.; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 249–307.; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Committee Effects on Legislation*, [w:] H. Döring, M. Hallerberg, *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation Across Western Europe*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 91–111.; W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *The Keys to Commitment: Coalition Agreements and Governance*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 159–199.

²³ G. M. Luebbert, *A theory of government formation in multiparty democracies*, Wyd. Stanford University 1983.; G. M. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Government Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

reasons) must be formed more often in case of the systems of positive parliamentarism, where the institution of a positive vote of confidence/vote of investiture, which is based on support, provided not by absolute, but by relative majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament/leading chamber of parliament, is institutionalized. The point is, that a positive vote of confidence in the government on the basis of relative majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament/leading chamber of parliament, does not make oppositional parties directly and frankly back up minority cabinets. Consequently, some oppositional parties, which do not declare their support for minority cabinets, can become loyal towards minority cabinets, in case when they are supported by other oppositional parties. In the context of a vote of confidence in minority cabinet on the basis of relative majority, the silent confidence of oppositional parties can be revealed. It cannot happen in case of a vote of confidence on the basis of absolute majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament or leading chamber of parliament. But the main comment is, that in general within the systems of positive parliamentarism in the light of formal-obligatory necessity for minority cabinet to pass a positive vote of confidence from the parliament, the main political responsibility is on minority cabinets, which must prove, that they have confidence and support of majority in the parliament. *Fourthly*, minority governments are more often formed in the political systems, where there is a strong, but not predominant parliamentary party (as, for instance, the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Croatia, the Fianna Fail (FF) in Ireland, the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) or the Democratic-Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)). The point is, that appropriateness of formation and duration of functioning of minority cabinets directly depend on the fact, that weak oppositional parties cannot reach the agreement as to the alternative for minority governments. *Fifthly*, in multiparty (not two-party or two and a half party) systems, minority cabinets are usually formed in the case, when they are headed by the parliamentary parties, which ideologically are more close to the center, conditionally speaking left-center, centrist, and right-center political parties, but which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament. At least, it happens more often, than in case, when such governments are headed by the parties, which ideologically are far from the center (left or right) and are in opposition to each other²⁴. That is why, minority cabinets are formed with the help of strong parties, which are ideologically close to the center.

However, even these suggested reasons and motives for minority cabinets formation in the European systems of positive parliamentarism *are not stable*. The point is, that in the analyzed representative sample of the countries, minority cabinets, in case of inability to form majority

²⁴ C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29.; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50.; N. Schofield, *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, s. 1–33.

cabinet, are rather rarely considered as those, which should be formed for the whole parliamentary term after parliamentary elections. This is permanently (but not always) has been peculiar of Ireland and Spain. On the contrary, minority cabinets are usually formed to solve political, inner-parliament and inter-party crisis, which is the result of the pre-term resignation of the former majority or minority government. Moreover, minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism are often formed shortly before regular or pre-term parliamentary elections, the results of which must help to form majority cabinet. For instance, this is represented by the institutional practice of such countries as Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The intermediate variant is shown by Italy and Romania. In general, it is obvious, that minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, at least in comparison with roles and interpretation of majority governments, *cannot be determined as the main format of cabinet-formation scenarios*.

And this is in spite of the fact, that minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism very often *ideologically* imitate majority cabinets. In general, in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, in the party and ideological context predominate minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of Christian democracy, social democracy and populism, Minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of liberalism, conservatism, liberal-conservatism, social-liberalism, social-conservatism, and national-conservatism are rarely formed. The number of minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of conservative liberalism, agrarianism, ecologism, nationalism, regionalism, socialism and technocracy is even less. The number of parties, representing Euroscepticism and Europeanism, is approximately the same. In Belgium, minority cabinets usually combine the principles and values of social-democracy, Christian democracy and liberalism; in Bulgaria – Christian democracy, conservatism, social-democracy; in Croatia – Christian democracy, nationalism and conservatism; in the Czech Republic – conservatism, liberal conservatism, and Christian democracy; in Estonia – liberalism and social-democracy; in Greece – Christian democracy and conservatism (liberal conservatism); in Hungary – social-democracy; in Ireland – populism and conservatism; in Italy – Christian democracy and populism; in Lithuania – liberalism and social-liberalism; in Romania – social-democracy and liberalism; in Slovenia – social-liberalism and liberalism; in Spain – social-democracy and Christian democracy. Latvia, Poland and Slovakia were characterized by minority cabinets, which combine extremely different political ideologies.

The key reasons for *minority cabinets resignation and dismissal* in the European systems of positive parliamentarism traditionally are (in the way of lowering the frequency of certain factor's influence on minority cabinet resignation): regular/pre-term parliamentary elections, change of the cabinet composition, loss of a vote of confidence in minority cabinet on the part of the parliament, voluntary resignation of the government (or the prime-minister). But in different countries some correlation between these key factors of minority cabinets resignation

have been observed. For instance, in Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain prevails the factor of regular or pre-term parliamentary elections, in Belgium, Italy and Romania – the factor of the change of the cabinet composition, in Bulgaria – the factor of voluntary resignation of the government. In Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Poland an approximately equal number of different factors has been observed. In general, all terminal factors of minority cabinets resignation institutionalize their *stability*. The tendency of minority cabinets functioning in the systems of positive parliamentarism (even despite the fact, that in some of them minority cabinets are institutionalized) is their shorter period of functioning, in comparison with majority cabinets²⁵. But some minority cabinets appear to be very stable and even in accordance with their average indices, they draw nearer to majority cabinets. This is represented by the data from Table 3, devoted to the comparative analysis of stability of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism.

Table 3. Stability of Minority Cabinets in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)²⁶

Country	Stability of all minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary single-party minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary coalition minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent single-party minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent coalition minority cabinets, years
Belgium	0,95	–	0,95	–	–	0,19	1,26
Bulgaria	1,51	0,70	2,32	0,27	1,13	1,13	3,52
Croatia	1,65	–	1,65	–	–	1,76	1,61
Czech Rep.	1,55	0,53	1,80	–	0,53	1,83	1,78
Estonia	1,53	–	1,53	–	–	1,64	1,43
Finland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Greece	2,18	–	2,18	–	–	2,18	–
Hungary	0,95	–	0,95	–	–	0,95	–
Ireland	2,37	–	2,37	–	–	2,27	2,46
Italy	0,75	0,02	0,78	0,02	–	0,59	1,01
Latvia	0,81	–	0,81	–	–	–	0,81
Lithuania	1,39	–	1,39	–	–	–	1,39
Malta	4,03	–	4,03	–	–	4,03	–
Poland	0,75	–	0,75	–	–	0,65	0,84
Romania	1,18	–	1,18	–	–	1,47	1,05
Slovakia	0,68	–	0,68	–	–	0,65	0,69
Slovenia	0,53	–	0,53	–	–	–	0,53
Spain	2,85	–	2,85	–	–	2,85	–
Total	1,31	0,49	1,34	0,15	0,83	1,54	1,18

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

²⁵ A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh system kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy: instytutsiynyi vymir*, Lviv 2004, s. 206.

²⁶ The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets.

In particular, on the average, all minority cabinets (including temporary or acting ones) in 1944–2014 lasted only 1,31 years (what, is more than on the average in the European systems of negative parliamentarism – 1,28 y.). The longest one in Greece (2,18 y.), Ireland (2,37 y.), Malta (there existed one minority cabinet, which lasted for 4,03 y.) and Spain (2,85 y.), i.e. in those countries, where party systems have great tendencies towards two-party system. The shortest in Slovenia (0,53 y.), Slovakia (0,68 y.), Poland (0,75 y.), Latvia (0,81 p.), Italy (0,75 y.), Hungary (0,95 y.) and Belgium (0,95 y.), i.e. in those countries, where the party systems are usually defined as multi-party and factionalized/fragmented. It is notable, that in the European systems of positive parliamentarism there is no correlation between stability of minority cabinets and institutionalization of minority cabinets as a stable phenomenon. For example, minority cabinets were often formed in Ireland and Italy (in the latter even more often), but in the former they lasted on the average for 2,37 y., in the latter – just for 0,75 y. The same can be observed in case of little institutionalization of minority cabinets. Similar logic can be demonstrated by duration of the temporary cabinets, which are less stable, than permanent minority cabinets. Among minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism more steady usually are single-party cabinets. It is peculiar of Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, and also Greece, Hungary, Malta and Spain (in the last four countries there were only single-party minority cabinets). Among single party minority cabinets, the most durable were governments in Malta (4,03 y.), Greece (2,18 y.), Ireland (2,27 y.) and Spain (2,85 y.). However, among minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism, coalition cabinets have appeared to be more stable in Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Poland, Italy, Slovakia and also in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (in the last three countries there were only coalition minority cabinets). Among coalition minority cabinets, the most durable during 1944-2014 appeared to be governments in Bulgaria (3,52 y.) and Ireland (2,46 y.). Nearly the same time of duration of coalition and single-party minority cabinets was recorded in the Czech Republic (1,83 y. to 1,78 y.) and Slovakia (0,65 y. do 0,69 y.). Among the key problems of little duration/stability of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, one should single out: 1) a bigger number of possible scenarios, as in comparison with majority cabinets, concerning the loss of a vote of confidence or obtaining a vote of no confidence by minority cabinets²⁷; 2) less degree or insufficient degree, as in comparison with majority cabinets, of institutionalization of minority cabinets; 3) participation of a less, or insufficient number, as in comparison with majority cabinets, of political actors in the process of

²⁷ It happens as a result of a wish of oppositional parties, which actually form majority in the parliaments, to dictate their own will and political inclinations to minority cabinets, not joining the composition of the government or not taking direct political responsibility for the decisions, taken by the governments.

distribution of major posts and spheres of influence; 4) ideas and notions (not always rational and truthful²⁸), concerning the fact, that minority cabinets are less effective and legitimate, than majority cabinets. However, frequency and stability of minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism increase, when political systems are constructed on the basis of consensus, corporatism, and when parliamentary support for minority cabinets is provided by parties with different (even opposed) ideologies, and party systems are not characterized by predominant parties.

²⁸ Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, nr 87, s. 626.; B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.; M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.

Minority governments in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism: emphasis on the features of European systems of negative parliamentarism

The article is dedicated to analyzing the features of formation, principles of functioning and stability of minority governments in European systems of negative parliamentarism. The author identified the role of governments in the systems of inter-institutional relations in European parliamentary democracies, specified the nature of parliamentary democracies distribution into the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, outlined minority governments role and variations in the systems of negative parliamentarism, tested the hypothesis that the negative parliamentarism promotes the formation of minority governments, detailed the history of minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism, outlined the key reasons/motives of formation and resignations of minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism, characterized the features of minority governments' stability in European systems of negative parliamentarism.

Keywords: minority government, parliamentary democracy, positive and negative parliamentarism, positive confidence, negative confidence, silent confidence, investiture, the moment of investiture, single-party and coalition minority governments, opposition, government stability.

As the practice of state-building shows, steady trends in relation to the development of *parliamentary democracy* and *parliamentarism* can be observed in modern European constitutional systems (parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary and semi-presidential republics), as well as an increase of their role in the management of social processes, and a revival of the idea of legislature priority in state mechanism¹. The parliament activity facilitates application of the system of checks/balances not only between separate elements of state mechanism, but also inside of legislative body. But in conditions of parliamentary democracy the role of parliament institute and the phenomenon of parliamentarism are particularly important in the context of *inter-institutional relations*, particularly the impact of parliament on the process of formation, functioning and early termination of the *government* powers. The implementation

¹ What is usually meant under the parliamentary democracy is a democratic political system and a democratic political regime (which subject to the constitutional system of the government can be a parliamentary republic, parliamentary monarchy or semi-presidential republic), in which the government/executive power is formed, supported, and also tolerated by the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament. Refer to: V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process in the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. Peele, *Comparative Government and Politics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1984.; A. Bruszczyński, *Vad menas med parlamentarism?*, "Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift" 1929, vol 32, s. 323–334.

of this phenomenon occurs in the case of minority governments, since they are presented by parties, which jointly do not have any permanent majority in the parliament, and thus depend on situational arrangements between various parties and deputies in the parliament. It means that in conditions of minority governments the formal and actual parameters of the parliament and government inter-institutional relations assume particular significance, that is, the role of the institution of parliament and parliamentarism phenomenon.

Parliamentary democracies are divided into the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism² by the mechanisms of the parliaments impact on formation/termination of governments power. In the systems of *positive parliamentarism* the formation of government directly depends on positive (that is, such that is supported by a vast/relative majority of parliament deputies³) vote of confidence in the government on the part of parliament. It means that the government cabinet commences its activity only after provision (to him, his prime-minister, personnel, program) of the vote of confidence/investiture by a vast or relative majority of the parliament deputies (depending on a specific analyzed case). Accordingly, the government cabinet should be deemed to be operational for the time it enjoys confidence of the parliament or until a positive vote of no confidence is expressed (that is, such that is supported by the vast or relative majority of parliament deputies). It means that in conditions of the systems of positive parliamentarism the confidence/investiture in the government is permanent and is provided both at the stage of its initiation/formation, and in the process of its functioning. It also contemplates that the tool of positive parliamentarism incorporates the mechanism of impact on formation of the government, vote of confidence/investiture, duration of the government formation, role of a founder and anticipated consequences of the early termination of governments powers. *The examples of positive parliamentarism systems* among European parliamentary democracies are presented by Belgium (in which the peculiarities of vote of confidence/investiture are not delineated formally, but are used in practice), Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,

² T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 41–43.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115–151.; L. De Winter, P. Dumont, *Uncertainty and Complexity in Coalition Formation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Government and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 123–158.; U. Sieberer, *The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis*, "West European Politics" 2011, vol 34, nr 4, s. 731–754.; F. Russo, L. Verzichelli, *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 2014.; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.; M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences"; T. Louwse, *Unpacking 'positive' and 'negative' parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop „The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences“ of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

³ I. Budge, M. Laver, *Office seeking and policy pursuit in coalition theory*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, vol 11, s. 485–506.; M. Laver, *Between theoretical elegance and political reality: Deductive models and government coalitions in Europe*, [w:] G. Pridham, *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986, s. 32–44.; M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.; M. Laver, K. A. Shepsle, *Coalitions and government government*, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, s. 873–890.; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland (since 2000), Croatia and the Czech Republic⁴.

In the systems of *negative parliamentarism* government formation does not directly depend on the positive vote of confidence (supported by the vast or relative majority of parliament deputies) or depends on the negative vote of confidence in the government on the part of parliament. The negative vote of confidence in the government means that for the government to start functioning it should receive the vote of confidence/investiture, the essence of which consists in the fact that the vast majority of parliament deputies should not vote against the prime minister, composition or program of the government. It means that the government cabinet in conditions of the system of negative parliamentarism commences its activity after it or its prime minister is nominated by the head of state or by the parliament without the support (vote of confidence/investiture) of prime minister, personnel or government program by the vast or relative majority of parliament deputies or provided that the vast majority of parliament deputies does not vote against the prime minister, composition or program of the government. Accordingly, it is believed that the government cabinet receives confidence in the parliament by a mere fact of nomination of its prime minister or government composition or by non-objection of the candidature of prime minister or government composition by the vast majority of deputies in the parliament. The government cabinet is deemed to be effective until a positive vote of no confidence (such that was supported by the vast or relative majority of parliament deputies, depending on a specific analyzed case) is expressed to it or until a silent or negative confidence is denied to it. And it means that in conditions of negative parliamentarism systems the confidence/investiture in the government is not always based on parliamentary majority, because it can fail to be provided or can be provided negatively in the process of government formation. Instead, a denial to the positive confidence in the government or failure to meet the requirements of negative confidence in the government in the process of government functioning is a reason for early termination of government powers. Actually it means that the system of negative parliamentarism is an institutional and constitutional scenario, which is based on a permanent silent confidence in the government cabinet, supported by the majority of parliament deputies (when the parliament does not deny confidence to the government or does not express the vote of no confidence in the government) or under a permanent negative confidence in the government cabinet, against which fact the vast majority of the parliament deputies raises no objections. A failure to adhere to or loss of positive confidence by the government or a failure to provide the government with a negative confidence in the parliament in the systems of negative parliamentarism causes resignation of the government, or resignation of the government and dissolution of the parliament

⁴ C. R. Conrad, S. N. Golder, *Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119–150.; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, S. Engler, P. Potolidis, M. Gerber, P. Leimgruber, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2009*, Wyd. University of Berne 2011.; T. Louwse, *Unpacking "positive" and "negative" parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop „The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences“ of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

and its early elections. It means that the institution of parliament is less significant than in the systems of positive parliamentarism in the process of formation and determination of governments type and composition in the negative parliamentarism systems. Instead, the power of parliament in the systems of negative parliamentarism manifests itself particularly in the course of the government functioning, since a denial to the silent confidence in the government or failure to provide negative confidence in the government on the part of parliament on practically any issue of the government cabinet competence is a direct reason for the government resignation (a denial to the confidence in government or the government loss of confidence in the parliament in the systems of negative parliamentarism is actually associated with the vote of no confidence in the systems of positive parliamentarism)⁵. It means that as opposed to the systems of positive parliamentarism, where a government has to permanently and actively depend on the support of majority in the parliament, in the systems of negative parliamentarism the majority in parliament should not permanently and actively oppose the government. That is, the systems of negative parliamentarism initially sort of indicate that the government used a silent confidence of the parliament, as a result of which it is not the government that has to prove its support to the parliament, but the parliament should prove that it “can not stand the government any longer”⁶. *What presents classic examples of the system of negative parliamentarism* are the countries, where the formation of government cabinets does not depend on the parliamentary positive vote of confidence. We can single out such European democracies among them as Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland (before 2000) and France⁷.

Instead, *specific cases* are presented by the systems of negative parliamentarism in Sweden and Portugal. In these countries the vote of confidence/investiture in governments is provided for, but it is *negative*. It means that for the government to function, it should receive a vote of confidence/investiture, the essence of which consists in the fact that the vast majority of parliament deputies should not vote against the prime minister, composition or program of the government. It is called a *negative majority* and outlined by a technique of combining the principles of negative and positive parliamentarism⁸. As a matter of fact, the mentioned rule serves as formalization of the

⁵ T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50. ; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Governments and Coalition Bargaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

⁶ O. Khomenko, *Vykonavcha vlada za umov parlamentskoi respubliky ta monarkhii (parlamentskoi demokracji)*, “Forum prava” 2012, vol 1, s. 1042.; I. Protsiuk, *Status triadu v parlamentskii respublitsi*, “Derzhavne budivnytstvo i mistseve samovriaduvannia” 2011, vol 21, s. 27.

⁷ M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences”; T. Louwse, *Unpacking “positive” and “negative” parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

⁸ T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 45.; T. Bergman, When minority governments are the rule and majority coalitions the exception, [w:] W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

negative parliamentarism, since the government functions until the vast majority of parliament deputies votes against it. If the relative majority of parliament deputies votes against the vote of confidence in the government, the latter shall retain its authority, because the threshold of negative vast majority has not been achieved. A peculiarity of Sweden consists in the fact that a specific vote of confidence in the government in the country has a *prognostic value*. The parliament of Sweden has to approve the candidature of prime minister, proposed by the talman (speaker). Such candidature should be deemed to have been approved provided that the vast majority of the Riksdag members does not vote directly against it.⁹ A rather interesting event occurred in 1978, when the head of the Liberal People's Party (FP) O. Ullsten was elected as the Prime Minister of Sweden by votes of only 39 deputies representing his party (their number amounted to a little more than 1/10 of parliament members), whereas 55 conservatives and 17 communists had voted against him. The remaining parliamentarians abstained from voting¹⁰. Instead, a peculiarity of Portugal consists in the fact that a specific vote of confidence in the government in the country has an *actual or true value*, because the government, appointed by the president, should within ten days face the parliament with a program, which will be accepted if the vast majority of parliamentarians does not vote against it. The United Kingdom also presents an interesting case of the synthesis of positive and negative parliamentarism. This country formally does not provide any vote of confidence in the government cabinet, a candidature for the prime minister of which is offered by the Crown. At the same time, the vote of confidence in the government cabinet actually takes place, which is basically the vote of confidence in the speech of a candidate for prime minister at the opening session of newly-elected parliament. But it does not correspond to a classical understanding of the vote of confidence/investiture, which is interpreted as the stage of government cabinet formation, at which the parliament has a possibility to express its opinion with regard to feasibility of the government formation, in view of the results of which a

⁹ In Sweden the government is formed by way of the Riksdag electing the prime minister and by way of approving the composition of cabinet (investiture), formed by the prime minister. If it is necessary to elect the prime minister the talman convenes representatives of each party group (faction) in the Riksdag. He consults with a vice-talman and after that he transfers the stipulated candidature to a plenary meeting of the Riksdag without advance preparation of this issue in a commission. The prime minister is deemed to have been chosen provided that the vast majority of parliament deputies does not vote for him. A person, elected as the prime minister, has to form his cabinet and present it for approval of the Riksdag together with a government program. The situation in Denmark is somewhat similar, but controversial at the same time. If allocation of seats in the parliament after elections clearly points to a certain party or parties (usually with the largest number of seats), then a monarch appoints them as the country government. In case if the result of parliamentary elections is indefinite, the monarch should convene a range of meetings, at which the elected parties formulate their wishes with regard to the composition of the government, its head and program. Then the monarch appoints an agent, so that he conducted negotiations with elected parties on formation of the government. After the end of negotiations one more meeting is held by the monarch himself, following which he appoints the new Prime Minister of Denmark. A key difference from Denmark is just that the parliament should not affirm the candidature of prime minister by a negative vote of confidence. Instead, in Denmark a principle of silent confidence in the government cabinet on the part of government is regulated. In fact, Denmark and Sweden demonstrate two versions of the European systems of negative parliamentarism in correlation.

¹⁰ I. Protsiuk, *Status wriadu v parlamentskii respubliki*, "Derzhavne budivnytstvo i mistseve samovriaduvannia" 2011, vol 21, s. 28.; V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process ill the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. L., Peele, *Comparative government and politics: Essays in Honor of S.E. Finer*, Wyd. Heinemann 1984, s. 56.; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.; A. Cherkasov, *Hlava hosudarstva y pravyytelstvo v stranakh sovremennogo myra* (Konstyutysonno-pravovoe rehulyrovanye y praktyka), Moskva 2006, s. 149.

completeness of the government formation is checked. Instead, in case of the United Kingdom this refers more likely to the “*moment of investiture*”, because the vote of confidence in the candidate’s speech, as practice shows, is a symbolic and affirmative-positive procedure (for which the vast majority of the parliament composition votes). More than that, the “moment of investiture” in the United Kingdom has no “constitutional mandate,” but it is regulated in sub-constitutional documents, and in parliament regulations in particular. Therefore it is obvious that the moment of investiture here is a subject of arrangements, and accordingly the United Kingdom is conditionally assigned to the system of negative parliamentarism¹¹. That is why a viewpoint has been accepted in general that the systems of negative parliamentarism among European parliamentary democracies are represented by Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, Finland (before 2000), France and Sweden.

Distinguishing of the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism is particularly topical in the context of minority governments. Scientists usually believe that one of the results of negative parliamentarism is the formation of *minority governments*, which occurs more often than in conditions of positive parliamentarism systems. That is why the analysis of minority governments is particularly important in terms of the negative parliamentarism systems. It will help to determine whether the negative parliamentarism actually facilitates formation of minority governments in a consolidated way, or the negative parliamentarism is a category, separated for the types of governments based on consequences. This in parallel will facilitate determination of the key causes of formation and attributes of minority governments in negative parliamentarism systems. In order to resolve the problem encountered, we should primarily address the theoretical and methodological specification of the concept of minority governments, and then proceed to the assessment of minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism.

We understand “*minority governments*” as the term, which in conditions of multiparty system reflects the government cabinets, the party or parties of which (that is, the parties that form part of governments, and that is why they receive portfolios) do not constitute a vast majority of seats/mandates in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament. It means that the *minority government* is such a formal and institutional case, when a parliamentary party independently or in coalition with other parties of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, the share of mandates of which amounts to less than half of complete composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, forms a government. Accordingly, the share of parliamentary parties, which do not form part of the minority government, amounts to more than fifty percent of the total number of the parliament mandates or the leading chamber of the parliament mandates. But what constitutes grounds for formation or further functioning of the minority government (as well as of the majority government or any other government) in conditions of negative parliamentarism is a permanent silent confidence in the government cabinet, which is supported by

¹¹ J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

the majority (vast or relative majority depending on the analyzed case) of the deputies of parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (when the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament does not deny confidence to the government or does express the vote of no confidence to the government)¹², or a permanent negative confidence in the government cabinet, to which the vast majority of the deputies of parliament/leading chamber of the parliament do not oppose. Although a format of providing confidence in the minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism has been determined constitutionally (in each country in its own way), after all it comes down to the presence of silent confidence in the nominated candidature for the prime minister or its non-denial by the vast majority of mandates in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. It means that in conditions of minority governments formation in the systems of negative parliamentarism the governmental and some/all non-governmental parties of the parliament should support the government cabinet by vast or relative majority of its composition (depending on specific country), or not to deny the feasibility of the government cabinet formation by a vast majority. But it all takes place formally provided that except for the government parties all other parties supporting the government cabinet do not form its part and do not receive portfolios in it.

Minority governments, as well as other party governments, are divided into two varieties – single-party and coalition governments. *Single-party minority government* is such a government cabinet, the party of which (which forms part of the government, and thus receives portfolios) does not constitute the vast majority of mandates in the parliament, that is, independently has support of less than fifty percent of the deputies of complete composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or informal silent confidence in the government cabinet is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies in general). *Coalition minority government* is such a government cabinet, the parties of which (which form part of the government, and that is why they receive portfolios) do not constitute the vast majority of mandates in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, and independently have support of less than fifty percent of the deputies of complete composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or informal silent confidence in the government cabinet is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies

¹² V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191–212.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Government Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227.; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, nr 11, s. 583–605.; C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29.; T. Bergman, *When minority governments are the rule and majority coalitions the exception*, [w:] W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225.; C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the 'Danish Miracle'*, "Journal of Public Policy" 2002, nr 21, s. 63–80.; B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41–62.; M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 2002, nr 25, s. 259–280.; A. Skjæveland, *Modeling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond*, "Party Politics" 2009, nr 15, s. 715–735.

in general). T. Shmachkova believes that it is reasonable to dichotomize all minority government cabinets (single-party or coalition – *author*) into *two models: minority government cabinets with unstable support by virtue of one-time agreement* (when certain examples of minority governments are encountered rarely and are not common in an inter-institutional environment) and *minority government cabinets with a stable support by virtue of multiple-time agreement* between government and non-government/opposition parties in exchange to some concessions of government parties to non-government/opposition parties (when certain examples of minority cabinets are encountered permanently, and that is why they are common in the inter-institutional environment)¹³. But such dichotomy usually concerns minority coalition governments, in which the structures of inter-party relations and competition are more noticeable and much wider, including in respect to the provision of support to coalition cabinets in the course of their formation and functioning.

It is theoretically and empirically known that minority governments can be a mandatory way out or a common phenomenon of inter-institutional political process, and also of the relations of political parties, which have been elected to the parliament (provided that none of them possesses a vast majority in the parliament), but with regard to various reasons they can not or do not want to form the *majority coalition governments* (minimally victorious or excessively victorious, but mostly under the formula of “minimum range coalitions”). As a result, in most cases (particularly in the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism) a rule comes into action, subject to which an incapacity or reluctance of the parties, which individually do not have any vast majority in the parliament, to form the majority coalition government (minimally victorious or excessively victorious, but mostly under the formula of “minimum range coalitions”) is a reason for delivering *several alternatives* to these parties, political system and the country: to form a majority government cabinet in the format of “*grand coalition*” or “*national unity coalition*” (which, as experience shows, except for Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, is mostly not characteristic of the systems of negative parliamentarism); to form a *single-party or minority coalition government* (which in the system of negative parliamentarism is often characteristic of Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Sweden, and sometimes of France); to form a *non-party government cabinet* (sometimes among the European systems of negative parliamentarism it is characteristic of Finland, but minority governments are also sometimes formed in this country); *early parliamentary election* (in the European systems of negative parliamentarism the term “early election” is arguable, since the government of the day can cause dissolution of the parliament and appointment of a new parliamentary election, but the latter is not the consequence of the government cabinet non-formation). It is obvious that the formation of minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism is preferable, but by no means the only approach to

¹³ T. Shmachkova, *Teoriya koalitsiyi y stanovleniye rossiyskoi mnogopartyinosti (Metodyky ratsyonalyzatsyyi vibora)*, «Polys» 1996, vol 5, s. 28–52.

resolving the situations, when the parliament parties, which individually do not have the vast majority in the parliament, are not able to form majority coalition governments.

But in their activity, particularly in conditions of negative parliamentarism, single-party and minority coalition governments carry out the *same functions* that the majority cabinets. A key distinction consists in the fact that the head of parliament has to pay attention more closely to *the threat of possible early resignation* of the cabinet, caused by a refusal of silent confidence or denial of negative confidence in the minority government cabinet (equated with the vote of no confidence in the systems of positive parliamentarism). It means that the heads of minority governments have to pay substantial part of their attention to *interrelations with parliamentary parties* (at the same time with government parliamentary parties and non-government parties, which provide a silent confidence in the minority government, as well as with opposition parties) and non-party deputies (when such are available in composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament), which is less characteristic of the majority governments. The fact is that an inadequate attention on the part of the cabinet head, for example, to non-government parties and non-government deputies of the parliament, which provide formal and informal silent confidence in the minority government (in terms of resolving their election promises), can result in refusal to the silent vote of confidence or in denial of negative confidence in such government (which is the most common reason for the early termination of the minority governments powers in the systems of negative parliamentarism). With regard to this fact in particular it is clear enough that minority governments (single-party or coalition governments) are *institutionally more flexible* in carrying out their political course, as well as *more open* in the context of considering the interests of basic political (particularly parliamentary) groups, than the majority governments. This, for example, is caused by the fact that the systems of negative parliamentarism possess constitutional standards in relation to governments formation, which provide *wide powers to an opposition*¹⁴. In addition, the consent or non-refusal of parliament parties to the formation of minority governments in some European systems of negative parliamentarism is also based on the existence of *wide possibilities of parliamentary committees and commissions* to affect an interior or exterior life of the country. Under these conditions it is quite acceptable for the parties, which have party factions in the parliament, to concentrate their influence on the activity of parliamentary commissions. The situation in the context of hypothetical nature of the minority governments

¹⁴ Therefore, it is held that in those European systems of negative parliamentarism, where minority governments are often formed, the parliamentary opposition has a rather specific status. It takes very active part in the activity of legislative/parliamentary committees and is engaged in the procedure of adopting the parliament agenda. At the same time in view of the party systems nature (for example, in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and etc.) in the presence of large amount of small parties and their clearly delineated electoral bases, the party or parties, which are represented in the government, are often minority governments, and the opposition as a whole constitutes a majority in the government. This regulates that under condition of the minority governments functioning in the system of negative parliamentarism a formal role of opposition is not likely to be institutionalized, but informal rules and usages can facilitate the parliamentary (non-parliamentary) minority/opposition (which is actually the "majority") in affecting the legislative activity of the parliament and executive activity of the government. Refer to: M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, nr 2, s. 270–271.; F.J. Christiansen, E. Damgaard, *Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia*, "Journal of legislative Studies" 2008, vol 14, nr 1, s. 46–76.

formation in negative parliamentarism systems is slightly simplified by competitive interrelations between the parliamentary parties, which can possibly constitute a permanent or situational parliamentary majority. The fact is that provision of the right to form a minority government to one parliamentary party will be the “evil of the lesser kind” for the remaining parties, and that is why they will be interested in saving the existing ratio/balance (status quo) of the level of active parliamentary parties’ political weight. It means that the minority governments can by virtue of the influence of non-governmental parties have a rather strong (resistant) support of parliamentary majority, be fully viable and even stable¹⁵. An example is presented by separate Danish minority coalition governments, formed by the Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre) and the Conservative People’s Party (DKF) with an extra-governmental parliamentary support of the Danish People’s Party (DPP). It is also necessary to mention single-party minority governments of the Labour Party (DNA) in Norway and the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) in Sweden.

Taking this into consideration, T. Bergman¹⁶ points out that in the systems of negative parliamentarism the minority government cabinets became a stereotyped and very common phenomenon. The scientist argues that the negative parliamentarism, in view of the peculiarities of silent/negative vote of confidence in the government cabinets, facilitates the process of minority governments formation¹⁷. Instead, J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin and B. E. Rasch¹⁸ assert that it is impossible to reach a single clear conclusion that the minority governments in particular prevail in the systems of negative parliamentarism. Scientists note that as of 2009 the minority governments amounted to 74 percent of the cases of the total terms of party governments functioning within a time sample in the systems of positive parliamentarism, and, instead, in the system of parliamentarism this value amounted to 64 percent of the cases of total terms of party governments functioning. It is obvious that it is a minor time difference, especially in view of the fact that except for Iceland, Denmark and Norway (that is, classic examples of the systems of negative parliamentarism) a share of the term of majority governments functioning in negative parliamentarism systems increased up to 92 percent (as of 2009 as well). And this leads to the

¹⁵ Sometimes researchers argue that such position is quite logical, when the right to form the minority government is granted to centre parties, and the parliamentary majority is possessed by the parties, which belong to different parts of the left or right ideological party spectrum. This is partially characteristic of minority governments in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (they are not centrist, but left-of-center or center-right governments). It means that formation of the minority government is a regular way out of the situation of ideological opposition between parties in the parliament. Undoubtedly, in a similar situation the government can be criticized for its activity on both sides of spectrum, but the ideological opposition will be a retaliatory deterrent hindering the unification of opposition parties representatives for the purpose of overthrowing the government. Alternatively, in similar situations there are quite a lot of examples of blocking the government in order to oppose to ones ideological opponent.

¹⁶ T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 61.

¹⁷ Other scientists support similar conclusions. Refer to: L. De Winter, *Parties and government formation, portfolio allocation, and policy definition*, [w:] K.R. Luther, F. Muller-Rommel, *Political Parties in the New Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 171–206.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Doring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 115–151.; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; T. Saalfeld, *Members of parliament and governments in Western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversight*, European journal of political researches 2000, vol 37, s. 353–376.

¹⁸ J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

conclusion that the minority governments, except for Scandinavia, are even more time-tested in conditions of parliamentary democracy (particularly in the countries of Central Eastern Europe) in the systems of positive, but not negative parliamentarism¹⁹. This is evidenced by the data of table 1, which represents the statistics of formation and functioning of minority governments in the negative parliamentarism systems in European parliamentary democracies within 1942–2014.

As *practice* shows, the government minority cabinets in the European systems of negative parliamentarism *do not constitute a consolidated phenomenon*, because in some countries they have already become a common/institutionalized phenomenon (Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Sweden), whereas in other countries it is rather rare (Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, Finland, France and the United Kingdom) or even unproven (Luxembourg) phenomenon. The largest amount of minority governments within the period of 1942–2014 (including provisional or acting governments) has been formed in Denmark (34), Norway (20) and Sweden (22). Minority governments constitute the largest percent among other government cabinets (including provisional or acting governments) in Denmark (91,9), Sweden (73,3), Norway (62,5) and Portugal (40,9). The smallest amount of minority governments within the period of 1942–2014 (including the provisional or acting governments) has been formed in Austria (2), United Kingdom (3), Iceland (6), the Netherlands (8), Portugal (9) and Finland (9). Minority governments constitute the smallest percent among other government cabinets (including provisional or acting governments) in Austria (5,8), the United Kingdom (12,5), Finland (16,7), Iceland (17,7), France (21,3), and the Netherlands (24,2). No minority governments have been formed in such country with the system of negative parliamentarism as Luxembourg (for details see table 1). Among all the government minority cabinets, which have been formed in the European systems of negative parliamentarism within 1942–2014 (and there are 127 such cabinets together with provisional or acting governments), most of them (113, or 89 percent) are presented by the permanent government minority cabinets. This regulates that in those countries, where minority governments are often formed, they have become a common phenomenon of inter-institutional (parliament-government) relations long ago (this, for example, is characteristic of the part of negative parliamentarism systems in Scandinavian countries²⁰). Among the minority governments there

¹⁹ Also refer additionally to: K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; M. Taylor, M. Laver, *Government coalitions in Western Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1973, vol 1, s. 205–248.

²⁰ D. Arter, *Parliamentary Democracy in Scandinavia*, "Parliamentary Affairs" 2004, vol 57, nr 3, s. 581–600; B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41–62.; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, nr 11, s. 583–605.; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; F. Janson, *Minority Governments in Sweden*, "American Political Science Review" 1928, vol 22, s. 407–413.; V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191–212.; F. J. Christiansen, *Consensus or Conflict? Legislative Behavior of Opposition Parties during Minority Government in Denmark*, Paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Association, Palermo, 8–10 September 2011.; F. J. Christiansen, H. H. Pedersen, *Minority Coalition in Denmark*, Paper prepared for ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, August 25–27, 2011.; C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the 'Danish Miracle'*, "Journal of Public Policy" 2002, nr 21, s. 63–80.; C. Green-Pedersen, L. H. Thomsen, *Bloc Politics vs*

are no or almost no provisional or acting governments in Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Finland, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. Instead, half or even more minority governments are formed by the provisional or acting governments in Iceland and the Netherlands: this fact repeatedly reasons that the minority governments are not characteristic of these countries, but if they are still formed, then exclusively as temporary anti-crisis/crisis phenomena. It should also be noted that among all minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism (and 127, or 32,7 percent of all such governments, including provisional governments, have been formed within the period of 1942-2014): the majority of permanent governments consist of single-party governments (67 to 46); the majority of provisional governments consist of coalition governments (10 to 4). There are more single-party minority governments than coalition minority governments in Iceland, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and Sweden; there are more coalition minority governments in Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and France; the total amount of single-party and coalition minority governments in Austria (see details in table 1). It is worthy of note that in cases where minority governments became institutionalized, very often they represent the cases of cabinets with *a stable support by virtue of a multiple-time agreement*. In addition, the non-governmental parties, which provide parliamentary support/majority to minority governments, openly and publicly state of the same. In those countries, where minority governments are formed rarely or even occasionally, they are usually the cabinets *with unstable support by virtue of one-time (ad hoc) agreement*.

Table 1. Statistics of minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism (1942–2014)²¹

Country	Number of all (provisional) governments, №	Number of all single-party (provisional) minority governments	Number of all coalition (provisional) minority governments	Percent of all single-party (provisional) minority governments	Percent of all coalition (provisional) minority governments
Austria (since 1945)	34 (6)	1 (0)	1 (0)	2,9 (0,0)	2,9 (0,0)
Denmark (since 1945)	37 (1)	14 (0)	20 (0)	37,8 (0,0)	54,1 (0,0)
Iceland (since 1942)	34 (3)	4 (2)	2 (1)	11,8 (66,7)	5,9 (33,3)
Luxembourg (since 1944)	22 (3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0,0 (0,0)	0,0 (0,0)
The Netherlands (since 1945)	33 (10)	0 (0)	8 (7)	0,0 (0,0)	24,2 (70,0)
Norway (since 1945)	32 (2)	13 (0)	7 (1)	40,6 (0,0)	21,9 (50,0)
Portugal (since 1975)	22 (3)	8 (2)	1 (0)	36,4 (66,7)	4,5 (0,0)
Finland (1944-2000)	54 (7)	3 (0)	6 (0)	5,6 (0,0)	11,1 (0,0)
France (since 1944)	66 (5)	6 (0)	8 (1)	9,1 (0,0)	12,2 (20,0)
The United Kingdom (since 1945)	24 (0)	3 (0)	0 (0)	12,5 (0,0)	0,0 (0,0)
Sweden (since 1945)	30 (0)	19 (0)	3 (0)	63,3 (0,0)	10,0 (0,0)
Total	388 (40)	71 (4)	56 (10)	18,3 (10,0)	14,4 (25,0)

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and*

Broad Cooperation? The Functioning of Danish Minority Parliamentarism, "The Journal of Legislative Studies" 2005, vol 11, nr 2, s. 153–169.

²¹ The analysis includes provisional (acting) minority governments.

Interestingly, the minority governments *should not be regarded as a solely true and comprehensive version of inter-institutional balance* of legislative and executive power provided that it is impossible to form single-party majority governments and coalition majority governments of “minimum action range” format in the European systems of negative parliamentarism. The fact is that subject to the approaches to resolving the situations, where the parliament parties, which individually do not have the vast majority in the parliament, can not form the majority coalition cabinets (minimally victorious or excessively victorious coalitions of “minimum action range”), the systems of negative parliamentarism should be divided into *two groups*: “grand coalitions” or “national unity coalitions” are traditionally formed *in the first group* (Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg); minority governments are traditionally formed *in the second group* (Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and France). The non-formation of single-party majority governments and majority coalition governments in the format of minimally-victorious or excessively-victorious coalitions of “minimum action range” is uncharacteristic/rarely characteristic of the remaining systems of negative parliamentarism (Iceland, Finland up to 2000, and the United Kingdom).

The analysis of the European systems of negative parliamentarism, of which minority governments are permanently or sometimes characteristic, or not characteristic at all, gives reasons that there exist several *key reasons and motives* for parliamentary parties and parliaments in general to form the minority governments. *Firstly* (as it was indicated above), minority governments are formed more often in the case of political systems, in which a strong parliamentary opposition was formalized or stereotyped/made common. Political and legal delineation of the status and rights of parliamentary minority and/or formation and functioning of the systems of strong parliamentary committees are usually the key attributes and resources of a strong parliamentary opposition²². *Secondly*, minority governments are formed

²² K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Governments and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Oxford 2008; T. Bergman, K. Strom, *The Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Scandinavia*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2010; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Government Solutions*, “Comparative political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, “Legislative Studies Quarterly” 1986, nr 11, s. 583–605; K. Strom, *Norway, Sweden, and the New Europe*, “Scandinavian Studies” 1992, vol 64, nr 4, s. 498–528; K. Strom, J. Leipart, *Policy, Institutions, and Coalition Avoidance: Norwegian Governments 1945–1990*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, vol 87, nr 4, s. 870–887; K. Strom, I. Budge, M. J. Laver, *Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1994, vol 38, nr 2, s. 303–335; K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1998, vol 4, nr 1, s. 21–59; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, *The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements in Parliamentary Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1999, vol 5, nr 3–4, s. 255–282; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 249–307; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Committee Effects on Legislation*, [w:] H. Döring, M. Hallerberg, *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation Across Western Europe*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 91–111; W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *The Keys to Commitment: Coalition Agreements and Governance*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Governments and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 159–199; B. G. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000, s. 34; H. Döring, *Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 223–246.

more often in the case of political systems, in which interest groups are mostly determined not by pluralistic, but by corporate relations²³. The pluralistic relations of interest groups are usually executed when the interest groups contend/compete in a political market beyond the scope of a formal process of policy creation. Instead, corporate relations of interest groups take place mostly when the key social and economic entities, such as employment, business and agriculture, are integrated in the formal process of policy formation. As a consequence, the institute of corporatism facilitates and simplifies the process of minority governments formation, since it makes the minority governments cooperate with labour, entrepreneurial and agricultural interest groups. It should be noted that such groups should not be represented in the government cabinet, particularly in the format of parliamentary parties, because in the systems, where corporate relations of interest groups gained a wide-spread occurrence, the non-parliamentary/non-governmental mechanisms of interest groups impact on a political process have been approved. This actually means that a non-parliamentary political opposition has a substantial impact on the minority governments functioning. This fact is stipulated by a bilateral dependence: interest groups and the non-parliamentary opposition are interested in implementation of their aims and purposes and, instead, minority governments are interested in extra-parliamentary support of their political activity and their political programs. *Thirdly*, what has been incorporated from the peculiarities and consequences of the European negative parliamentarism systems is that the minority governments are hypothetically (but not always practically, for which fact there are particular reasons – historical, social and political) more frequently used in the case of political systems, where an institute of positive vote of confidence is formally not regulated, and the institute of silent vote of confidence in the government (for example, Denmark and Norway) or the institute of negative vote of confidence in the governments on the part of parliament (Portugal and Sweden) are regulated instead. The fact is that the silent or negative vote of confidence in the government does not make the opposition parliamentary parties directly or openly support the minority government. As a result, some opposition parliamentary parties, which not necessarily support the minority government publicly, can turn out to be loyal to the minority government in case if it enjoys support of other opposition parties. This is manifested in the silent confidence or the opposition parties non-rejection of minority government. It dichotomically distinguishes minority governments in the European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism: for positive parliamentarism systems in terms of a necessity of the government minority cabinet to receive a positive (necessarily formal) vote of confidence a political responsibility is imposed on the minority government in particular, which has to prove that it enjoys approval and support of a majority in the parliament; for negative parliamentarism systems in terms of the absence of the government minority cabinet necessity to receive a positive vote of confidence, and, instead,

²³ G. M. Luebbert, *A theory of government formation in multiparty democracies*, Wyd. Stanford University 1983.; G. M. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Government Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

in terms of a necessity to receive the silent or negative vote of confidence the political responsibility has been imposed on the parliamentary opposition, which has to demonstrate that the minority government does not have a strong majority. *Fourthly*, minority governments are formed more often in the case of political systems, in which a strong but not dominant parliamentary party exists. The fact is that a feasibility of formation and duration of the minority governments operation directly depends on the fact that opposition (weak) parliamentary parties can not agree on alternatives to minority governments. The situation is clarified by an ideological positioning²⁴ of strong/mainstream and weak (but relevant) parliamentary parties. Relatively large (strong/mainstream) parliamentary parties, which ideologically gravitate toward centrism (conditionally left-of-centre, centrist and centre-right parties), but individually do not have any majority in the parliament, form single-party or coalition minority governments more often than the parties, which are centrist (left-wing or right-wing) in ideological context and oppose each other.

Social-democratic left-of-centre minority governments prevail in the European systems of negative parliamentarism in a party and ideological context. Minority governments are sometimes formed with participation of Christian and democratic, conservative (or liberal-conservative and social-conservative), liberal (social-liberal) parties and etc. In Austria minority governments are mostly represented by social-democratic left-of-centre or Christian-democratic/conservative right-of-centre cabinets; in Denmark these are mostly left-of-centre social-democratic or social-liberal or right-of-centre conservative-liberal cabinets; in Iceland these are usually social-democratic left-of-centre cabinets; in the Netherlands these are usually right-of-centre Christian-democratic/conservative cabinets; in Norway these are right-of-centre liberal-conservative or left-of-centre social-democratic cabinets; in Portugal these are mostly social-democratic left-of-centre and liberal/liberal and conservative right-of-centre cabinets; in Finland these are mostly agrarian-liberal/social-liberal centrist cabinets; in France these are mostly social-democratic left-of-centre social-democratic/social-liberal and conservative centrist cabinets; in Sweden these are mostly social-democratic left-of-centre cabinets.

Key reasons for termination of powers and resignations of minority governments in the European negative parliamentarism system traditionally are: scheduled/early parliamentary elections, loss of the silent vote of confidence or termination of the negative vote of confidence in the government cabinet on the part of parliament, voluntary resignation of the prime minister and a change in the government cabinet composition. Such terminal factors of the termination of government minority cabinets powers regulate the stability of minority governments.

²⁴ C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50; N. Schofield, *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, s. 1–33.

What constitutes a trend in operation of the minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism (even with no regard to the fact that some of the minority governments among them are already institutionalized) is their *shorter period of existence*, than in case of majority governments. Thus, A. Romaniuk points out that as of 2004 the mean value of single-party majority governments duration in the countries of Western Europe amounted to 45 months, whereas the duration of coalition minority governments amounted to only 19 months²⁵. Only Scandinavian countries were exceptions, Denmark and Sweden in particular. In their case an opposite phenomenon could be observed. Particularly in Sweden the average duration of coalition minority governments was half a year larger than an average term of powers of majority governments (30 to 24 months). This is a result of not only specially developed routine procedures, but also of a stability of economic situation and arranged cooperation, ability to reach a compromise between various parliamentary parties, which present different ideological courses and doctrines²⁶. Nevertheless, as of 2014 in the European systems of negative parliamentarism the level of minority governments stability was not fully equal to the mean all-European value of governments stability (for details refer to table 2).

Table 2. Stability of minority governments in the system of negative parliamentarism (1942–2014)

Country	Stability of all minority governments, year	Stability of provisional minority governments, year	Stability of permanent minority governments, year	Stability of provisional single-party minority governments, year	Stability of provisional coalition minority governments, year	Stability of permanent single-party minority governments, year	Stability of permanent coalition minority governments, year
Austria	1,46	–	1,46	–	–	1,45	1,47
Denmark	1,79	–	1,79	–	–	1,49	2,02
Iceland	0,56	0,58	0,55	0,75	0,23	0,36	0,94
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
The Netherlands	0,65	0,53	1,50	–	0,53	–	1,50
Norway	1,90	0,90	1,96	–	0,90	2,10	1,58
Portugal	1,41	0,39	1,70	0,39	–	1,86	0,75
UK	1,37	–	1,37	–	–	1,37	–
Finland	0,79	–	0,79	–	–	0,89	0,73
France	0,57	0,59	0,56	–	0,59	0,39	0,71
Sweden	2,29	–	2,29	–	–	2,30	2,12
Total	1,28	0,60	1,40	0,57	0,56	1,36	1,31

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.08.2014]

²⁵ A. Romaniuk, *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh system kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy: instytutsiynyi vymir*, Lviv 2004, s. 206.

²⁶ M. Mohunova, *Skandinavskiy parlamentarizm. Teoriya y praktyka*, Moskva 2001, s. 257.

In particular, all minority governments (including provisional or acting governments) within the period of 1942–2014 lasted only for 1,28 years on the average: for the longest period in Denmark (1,79), Norway (1,90) and Sweden (2,29); and for the shortest period in Iceland (0,65), France (0,57) and Finland (0,79). This fact provides a clear argument that minority governments become more long-standing due to their institutionalization. The duration of permanent/non-provisional minority governments shows a similar trend: these governments are most stable in Denmark (1,79), Sweden (2,29) and Norway (1,96); they are slightly less stable in Portugal (1,70), the Netherlands (1,50), Austria (1,46); they are least stable in Finland (0,79), Iceland (0,55) and France (0,56). In some European systems of negative parliamentarism provisional minority governments are less stable than permanent minority governments. This concerns Iceland (from 0,58 to 0,55) and France (from 0,59 to 0,56). On the average, single-party cabinets are usually more stable among minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism. It is characteristic of Norway, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (where only single-party minority governments existed). Single-party minority governments in Sweden (2,30), Portugal (1,86) and Norway (2,10) turned out to be most long-lasting. Instead, among the minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism coalition cabinets usually were more stable in Denmark, Iceland, France and the Netherlands (where only coalition minority governments existed). On the average, the coalition minority governments in Denmark (2,02) and Sweden (2,12) have been most long-lasting within the period of 1942–2014. Single-party and coalition minority governments lasted for approximately the same period only in Austria (from 1,45 to 1,47).

The major *problem of prolongation of the minority governments duration* in the European systems of negative parliamentarism consists in the amount of possible scenarios of the minority governments losing their silent or negative votes of confidence. This takes place as a result of the desire of opposition parties, which actually constitute majority in the parliaments, to impose their rules and political preferences to minority governments without being a part of government cabinets or without taking a direct political responsibility for the decisions, taken by governments. Another important reason for a short duration of minority governments in the systems of negative parliamentarism also consists in the fact that not in all countries with the systems of negative parliamentarism (as it was believed before) minority governments should be treated as institutionalized, because in some political systems (for example, in Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom or France) the minority governments are treated as unique or even critically risk-relevant situations. Small duration of minority governments in the systems, where they have been already institutionalized long ago, is caused primarily by a ratio of government and opposition parties with regard to searching for possible options of the majority governments formation, that is, serving the interests of a larger amount of political players. And this results in initiation of the rule, stereotyped for majority governments, under which the absence of guaranteed support,

and instead the presence of only silent support of the majority in parliament (which is characteristic of minority governments in particular) causes instability of government cabinets, political instability and inefficiency of governance. And that is why in the systems of negative parliamentarism, where minority governments are not institutionalized, they usually do not have strong power, replace each other fast (if they are formed frequently), as a result of which a crisis of governance legitimacy commences. Instead, in the systems of negative parliamentarism, where minority governments became common, they function in more successful and stable way. Z. Maoz and B. Russett believe that in such systems “minority governments are not more limited, than majority governments”²⁷, that is why, as a result, they can be less conflicting than the latter. In their turn B. Prins and C. Sprecher²⁸ prove that the tasks and objectives, which are governed by government coalitions, are likely to be opposed, if pressure on the government cabinet increases. When studying the initiations of system conflicts in the systems of negative parliamentarism they offered (analyzing such competitive aspects of governmental activity) to designate the coalition majority governments as more dangerous in the issues of institutional conflicts escalation than the minority governments – but provided that the minority governments in the indicated political systems are institutionalized²⁹. That is why the stability and frequency of minority governments formation in the systems of negative parliamentarism increases, when political systems of the countries with negative parliamentarism are constructed on the principles of consensus, and when a parliamentary support is provided to the minority governments by parties with different (even opposite) ideologies, and party systems are not characteristic of dominant parties. For example, this is characteristic of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and instead not characteristic of Iceland, Austria and other systems of negative parliamentarism in Europe. A specific character of the former consists in the fact that on the basis of the systems of strong parliamentary committees the involvement in taking the most significant political decisions of the government and opposition is regulated with respect to parliamentary and governmental/management activity, which is usually carried out by minority governments. And that is why a part of functions of the governments is concentrated in various internal structures of the parliaments³⁰.

²⁷ Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, nr 87, s. 626.

²⁸ B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, “Journal of Peace Research” 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.

²⁹ M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, “Journal of Conflict Resolution” 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.

³⁰ For example, an “institute of minority rights” serves this purpose, which operates in the parliaments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and which gives the right to the parliamentary opposition (which in conditions of minority governments functioning actually constitutes the parliament majority) to withhold the adoption of government laws for a certain period of time or to try to transfer them to the following session, pass over for approval or rejection at the discretion of voters by holding a referendum. For example, in the case of Denmark this is formally regulated by the fact, that in 1953 the parliament was with key powers in a state mechanism, its rights in the sphere of legislative activities, finance, defense and foreign affairs were extended, as well as forms of control over the government. This, together with the so-called “institute of minority rights”, is a very significant factor of political process. The fact is that, for example, if the parliament takes a decision, which is not supported by all deputies, one third of the deputies is entitled to address the speaker of the Folketing with

Drawing a conclusion it should be noted that minority governments in the European systems of negative parliamentarism are normal and democratic result of competition between parties. They are particularly widespread in case of absence of several dominant parties in party systems (this is characteristic of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, although minority governments are sometimes formed in the party systems with dominant parties, for example, in Portugal), but instead they are not common in such party systems, where single-party or coalition majority governments (including “grand coalitions”) are formed around several dominant parties (Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, France and the United Kingdom). Minority governments are mostly formed and institutionalized in: political systems with strong parliamentary committees and, accordingly, strong parliamentary opposition; in the political systems, where interest groups are determined not by pluralistic, but corporate relations; in the political systems, where the institute of positive vote of confidence is formally not regulated, and instead the institute of silent or negative vote of confidence in the government on the part of parliament is regulated; in the political systems, where one strong/major, but not dominant parliament party exists, especially if it tends to an ideological centre (that is, it is left-of-centre, centrist, right-of-centre). The minority governments, as compared to the majority governments, in the systems of negative parliamentarism are on average less institutionalized and stable. This is particularly evident in Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg (where minority governments are not characteristic), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland (before 2000) and France. In addition, the institutionalization of minority governments is a key reason for an increase in their stability. This is characteristic of Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.

a demand to hold a nationwide referendum on an arguable draft law. It is obvious that this creates a consensus in a political and party system, and accordingly extends powers of the government minority cabinets, which are common in Denmark, as it was indicated above. A similar practice was also approved in Sweden and Norway, where the rule on “the balance of powers – the Storting and the government with preponderance in favour of legislative power” was adopted. The structure of interrelations of the parliament and the government in these Scandinavian countries in conditions of negative parliamentarism gained the features of consensus democracy or “consensus parliamentarism,” the essence of which consists in the division of power between parties, and also its fair allocation, delegation and formal reduction. For details refer to: M. Mohunova, *Skandynawski parlamentarizm. Teoryia y praktyka*, Moskva 2001, s. 37–38, 104–105.; D. Arter, *Scandinavian Politics Today*, Manchester 1999, s. 211–217.

Соціальна складова програм і діяльності та електоральні успіхи християнсько-демократичних партій у країнах центрально-східної Європи (1990–2014)

Розглянуто феномен християнсько-демократичних партій та їх ідеологій загалом і в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Визначено соціальну складову (соціальну базу та соціальні питання) програм і діяльності християнсько-демократичних партій у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, а також її вплив на електоральні/урядові успіхи християнсько-демократичних партій. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз електоральних успіхів християнсько-демократичних партій у Центрально-Східній Європі у період 1990–2014 рр.

Ключові слова: політична партія, християнська демократія, християнсько-демократична партія, соціальна складова партій, електоральні успіхи партій, ідеологічне позиціонування партій, Центрально-Східна Європа.

Social dimensions of programs and activities and electoral success of christian democratic parties in central and eastern europe (1990–2014)

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of Christian Democratic parties and their ideologies in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The author has determined social dimensions (social base and social issues) of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe, as well as its impact on electoral/cabinet success of liberal parties; carried out the comparative analysis of the electoral success of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe in 1990–2014.

Keywords: political party, the Christian democracy, Christian Democratic Party, social dimensions of party, electoral success of party, ideological positioning of party, Central and Eastern Europe.

Before and after the collapse of the USSR and the regimes of the so-called “*real socialism*” in the post-socialist Central-Eastern European countries¹ (which at that time were called

¹ The notion “Central-Eastern Europe” now covers all former authoritarian/post-totalitarian countries (or those parts of the countries, which today are independent) that geographically belong to Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, which till the end of the

Eastern European countries) appeared a range of new political parties, which criticized the socialist system of social relations, in fact stepping on the way of economic liberalism and the state of general welfare. Consequently, the most popular among electorate became social-democratic, liberal and to a lesser extent conservative political parties. However, some popularity acquired the so-called Christian Democratic parties, which differed from the mainstream parties in their vision of social development and movement. Moreover, Christian Democratic parties in the region have been often formed in accordance with West European patterns, where the phenomenon of Christian democracy is stable and rather successful from the point of view of electorate. Taking this into consideration, as the institutional experience proves, Christian Democratic parties have been approved in all Central-Eastern European countries. But not in all countries of the region they must be interpreted as the identical ones, in the light of the social constituent of their programs and activity, as well as in the context of achieved electoral success. The aim of the current paper is to distinguish differences between the social constituent and electoral results of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern European countries.

Problematics of the program and ideological direction, especially the social constituent of programs and activities, and electoral successes of Christian Democratic parties in general (not only in Central-Eastern European countries) has been described in a number of scientific research, among which, the most famous have been conducted by: P. Mair and C. Mudde², M. Caciagli, L. De Winter, A. Mintzel, J. B. Culla and A. De Brouwer³, M. P. Fogarty⁴, D. Hanley⁵, R. Irving⁶, S. Kalyvas⁷, J. Madeley⁸, M. Gallagher, M. Laver and P. Mair⁹, R. Katz and

80s – beginning of the 90s of the 20th century had been under the USSR's influence, and as a result of the reforms, conducted in the 90s of the 20th century – at the beginning of the 21st century, managed to democratize and largely approached European political values. Among them are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Sometimes such post-communist countries as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are referred to Central-Eastern Europe. In our paper we analyze only those Central-Eastern European countries, which both are parliamentary democracies and during 2004-2013 became the members of the EU. Here belong Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. See: C. Lerman, G. Feder, *Agriculture in Transition: Land Policies and Evolving Farm Structures in Post-Soviet Countries*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2004, s. 4.; J. Swinnen, *Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Ashgate 1997.

² P. Mair, C. Mudde, *The party family and its study*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 1998, vol 1, s. 211–229.

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⁴ M. P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953*, Wyd. Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957.

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Problematics of essence, historical development and prospects of Christian democracy as a political ideology has been revealed in the papers by the following scholars: T. Kselman and J. Buttigieg²⁷, P. Chenaux²⁸, T. Buchanan and M. Conway²⁹, W. Kaiser, H. Wohnout and M. Gehler³⁰, M. Vincent³¹, R. J. Wolff and J. K. Hoensch³², J. Chappel³³, J. Dagnino³⁴, G.-

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In the context of Central-Eastern European countries, Christian democracy and the reasons which stipulated for its appearance in this or that format, have been in the focus of such researchers as: T. Bale and A. Szczerbiak⁵⁰, S. N. Kalyvas and K. van Kersbergen⁵¹, R. Bender⁵²,

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⁵² R. Bender, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce odrodzonej*, in Janusz Żarnowski, *Życie polityczne w Polsce: 1918-1939*, Wyd. Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich 1985.

M. Eberts⁵³, A. Korbonski⁵⁴, A. Karatnycky⁵⁵, K. Chan⁵⁶, R. Monticone⁵⁷, S. Stępień⁵⁸, A. Grzymala-Busse⁵⁹, Z. Enyedi⁶⁰ and others.

Modern Christian Democratic parties (to a greater extent in Western European and Latin American countries, to a lesser extent in Central-Eastern and Eastern European countries) are derivative form catholic confessional parties, which appeared in the 2nd part of the 19th – 1st part of the 20th centuries. They were formed on the basis of antiliberal and antisocial mass catholic movement, which challenged the supremacy of liberalism in Europe in "fundamentalist" and theoretical perspective. Thus, primarily Christian democracy was positioned as an opposition to liberal democracy. At the same time, Christian Democratic parties appeared to be separated from the catholic church. It was promoted by the principles of democracy which were steady in different countries. And this contributed to the fact, that soon Christian Democratic parties realized, that their interests lay in consolidation and further extension of the principles of parliamentary and electoral democracy, i.e. those institutions, which helped Christian Democratic parties to gain social and political authority⁶¹. Consequently, two implications of Christian Democratic parties formation have become apparent. *First of all*, these parties approved religion in the context of their fundamental element and its identity, but religion appeared to be rather an obstacle, than an advantage. *Secondly*, an appeal to religion transformed Christian Democratic parties into non-homogeneous coalitions of interested groups (groups of interest), mainly united by the initial adherence to religion. It makes many scientists state, that Christian Democratic parties appeared not as a result of desire/will of the organized church, but in opposition to the organized structure of the church⁶². Correspondingly, Christian Democratic parties have been determined as anticonservative. It is clearly described by the fact, that in the left-right ideological spectrum, Christian Democratic parties are positioned as right-centrist (centrist-right), because they are conventionally placed between liberal and conservative political parties. In fact, Christian Democrats occupy *an intermediate position between liberal and conservative parties*, what marks their program and activity rhetoric, and distinguishes some issues, including social ones⁶³. Such

⁵³ M. Eberts, *The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland*, „Europe-Asia Studies“ 1998, vol 50, s. 817–842.

⁵⁴ A. Korbonski, *Poland ten years after: the church*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies“ 2000, vol 33, s. 123–146.

⁵⁵ A. Karatnycky, *Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe*, „Foreign Affairs“ 1998, vol 77, s. 13–18.

⁵⁶ K. K.-L. Chan, *The religious base of politics in post-Communist Poland: A case of bounded secularisation*, [w:] D. Broughton, H.-M. ten Napel (eds.), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2000, s. 176–197.

⁵⁷ R. Monticone, *The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945-1985: Forty Years of Church-State Relations*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

⁵⁸ S. Stępień, *Christian-Democratic Movement in Poland (1945-1989)*, [w:] K. Krzywicka, E. Olszewski (eds.), *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, Wyd. Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press 2000, s. 215–235.

⁵⁹ A. Grzymala-Busse, *Why There is (Almost) no Christian Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, University of Michigan 2010.

⁶⁰ Z. Enyedi, *The contested politics of positive neutrality in Hungary*, „West European Politics“ 2003, vol 26, nr 1.

⁶¹ S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.

⁶² S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 185–186.

⁶³ Earlier Christian-democratic parties were not singled out as a separate family of ideological parties. As opposed they were determined

a conclusion nowadays is peculiar of Christian Democratic parties in both “old” (Western), and “new” (Central-Eastern and Eastern) European countries. Thus, it is necessary to carry out in detail political analysis of Christian Democratic parties, their social problematics and electoral success in Central-Eastern European countries.

First Christian Democratic parties within the historical boundaries of *modern Central-Eastern European countries* appeared at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. Among them one can name: the Democratic Party (DP) in Bulgaria, the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP). In Hungary the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) was created during WWII (1943). After the establishment of the “real socialism” regimes, these parties were mostly ruined and renewed their activity at the late 80s – early 90s of the 20th century, when the Soviet regime and regimes in the USSR’s satellites collapsed. At that time, new Christian Democratic parties in all countries of Central-Eastern Europe started their formation. Among them, in Bulgaria – the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), in the Czech republic – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), in Estonia – the Estonian Christian Democrats (EKD), in Latvia – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), in Lithuania – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA), in Poland – the Christian and Nationalistic Union (ZChN), the Party of Christian Democrats (PCD), the Centre of Comprehension (PC), the Christian Democracy (ChD), the Electoral Action of Catholics (WAK), the Movement for the Republic (RdR), the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR), the Catholic Electoral Committee “Homeland” (O), the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (AWS), the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (NCD – BdP), in Romania – the Christian Democratic National People’s Party (PNT-CD), the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD), in Slovakia – the Democratic Party (DS), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM), the Christian Social Union (KSU), the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), in Slovenia – the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), the Christian Socialists (KS). Some more parties have been formed since 2000 up to nowadays (despite the fact, that a large number of Christian Democratic parties, which had been created earlier, stopped their activity). Among them: the Croatian Growth (HR), the “Pro Patria” and “Republic” Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Christian Conservative Social Union (KKSS), the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and the Christian Party (KP) in Lithuania, the National Electoral Committee

as the parties “on the crossroads”, conservative parties or parties, determined by pragmatism and opportunism. This distinctive position can be observed much more rarely nowadays. For instance, see: H. Kriesi, E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschier, T. Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2008.; R. S. Katz, W. J. Crotty, *Handbook of Party Politics*, Wyd. Sage 2006. The situation changed, when the Christian democratic party was analyzed in theoretical and comparative perspective. In particular, see: K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.; S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.; N. Kalyvas, *From pulpit to party. Party formation and the Christian democratic phenomenon*, „Comparative Politics” 1998, vol 31, nr 3, s. 293–312.

(NKWW) in Poland, the Civil Force (FC) and the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS) and the "Beautiful Slovakia" (MS) in Slovakia, the "New Slovenia" – the Christian People's Party (NSI) in Slovenia. The above mentioned political parties mainly and primarily positioned themselves as Christian Democratic. However, in Central-Eastern Europe existed several parties which treated Christian Democratic ideology as a secondary one, together with the ideologies of nationalism and national-conservatism (the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ), liberalism and liberal-conservatism (the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland and the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania), and also agrarianism and social-conservatism (the Polish People's Party, PSL) (for detailed information see Table 1).

In general, in the ideological context the phenomenon of party Christian democracy in Central-Eastern Europe countries in 1990–2014 was not homogeneous. Due to this, it is necessary to distinguish several groups of ideological positioning of political parties, which used principles of Christian Democratic ideology. *The first group* consists of political forces, which are mainly oriented on Christian Democratic principles (some of them still exist, and some stopped their activity): the Democratic Party (DP) in Bulgaria, the Christian Democratic Union – People's Party (KDU-CSL) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in the Czech Republic, the Estonian Christian Democrats (EKD) in Estonia, the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in Latvia, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in Lithuania, the Centre of Comprehension (PC), the Party of Christian Democrats (PCD), the Christian Democracy (ChD), the Electoral Action of Catholics (WAK), the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR), the Catholic Electoral Committee "Homeland" (O), the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (NCD – BdP) and the National Electoral Committee (NKWW) in Poland, the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) and the Civil Forces (FC) in Romania, the Democratic Party (DS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and the Christian Social Union (KSU) in Slovakia. *The second group* consists of those political forces, which combine ideological principles of Christian democracy and national-conservatism (as a kind of conservatism or combination of conservatism and nationalism): the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Christian Conservative Social Union (KKSS), the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) in Lithuania, the Christian and Nationalistic Union (ZChN), the Movement for Republic (RdR), the Electoral Action "Solidarity" (AWS) in Poland, the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD) in Romania. *The third group* is represented by the political parties, which synthesize principles of Christian democracy, social-conservatism (a kind of conservatism or combination of conservatism and socialism) and agrarianism: the Croatian Growth (HR), the Christian Party (KP) in Lithuania, the Polish People's Party (PSL), the Christian Democratic National

People's Party (PNT-CD) in Romania, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the "Beautiful Slovakia" (MS) in Slovakia, the Slovenian People's Party (SLS), the "New Slovenia" – the Christian People's Party (NSI) and the Christian Socialists (KS) in Slovenia. *The fourth group* consists of the political parties, which combine ideological principles of Christian democracy and liberal conservatism (synthesis of liberalism and conservatism or a kind of conservatism): the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) and the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania, the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland. The Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary ideologically combines the principles of Christian democracy, national-conservatism and social-conservatism, and the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) incorporates ideology of Christian democracy and the principles of protection the Poles in Lithuania (for detailed information see Table 1).

Table 1. Christian Democratic Parties, Their Ideological Positioning and Electoral Success in Central-Eastern European Countries (1990–2014)⁶⁴

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Party	The year of party foundation	Ideological positioning of a party	Position within the left-right ideological spectrum (0 = max left, 10 = max right)	Participation in parliamentary elections, number of times; years of elections (percent of votes/number of mandates)	Participation in European parliament elections, number of times; years of elections (percent of votes/number of mandates)	Participation of a party in government cabinets or positioning of a party as a governmental one, number of times; years	Level of electoral support
DP	1896 (1989)	Center-right, Christian democracy	9,4	5: 1991 (k/+), 1994 (k/+), 1997 (k/+), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+) 8: 1991 (34,4/110), 1994 (24,2/69), 1997 (28,8/69), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+), 2009 (k/+), 2013 (1,4/0), 2014 (k/+)	–	1: 1997–2001 (k)	Falls/absent
SDS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy, conservatism, national-conservatism, anticommunism	6,1	3: 2007 (4,7/0), 2009 (k/-), 2014 (k/-)	3: 2007 (4,7/0), 2009 (k/-), 2014 (k/-)	2: 1991–1992, 1997	Falls
HDZ	1989	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, nationalism, national-conservatism, conservatism	7,1	7: 1990 (41,9/205), 1992 (44,7/85), 1995 (45,2/75), 2000 (24,4/46), 2003 (33,2/66), 2007 (35,9/66), 2011 (23,5/41)	2: 2013 (32,9/5), 2014 (41,4/6)	5: 2003–2006, 2006–2007, 2008–2009, 2009–2010, 2010–2011	Falls

⁶⁴ Legend: k – in the composition of electoral coalition or to provide support for governmental coalition; “+” – if is represented in the parliament; “-” – if is not represented in the parliament; DP – the Democratic Party (Аџвоспартицка партија); SDS – the Union of Democratic Forces (Унија на демократичне сили); HDZ – the Croatian Democratic Union (Хрватска демократска заједница); HR – the Croatian Growth (Хрватски раст); KDU-CSL – the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (Кришћанска а демократска унија – Цркостованска странка ливаџ); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кристанска демократска странка); EKD – the Estonian Christian Democrats (Естни Кришћидемократид); IRL – the “Pro Patria” and “Republic” Union (Ераконд Исмааја Реџ; Република Лиџ); KDNP – the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Кристанска демократска странка); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кристанска демократска странка); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кришћидемократска странка); KKSS – the Christian Conservative Social Union (Кришћидемократска социјалне сјужа); KP – the Christian Party (Кришћидемократска партија); LKDP – the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (Литовос кришћидемократска партија); TS-LKD – the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Тевynes сјужа – Литовос кришћидемократска партија); LLRA – the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Литовос литванска акција); AWS – the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (Акција Виборца Солитарност Павеи); BBWR – the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (Безпартијни Блок Вспераня Риформ); ChD – the Christian Democracy (Хришћидемократска Демократија); O – the Catholic Electoral Committee “Homeland” (Католики Комитет Виборчы Олчужна); NCD – BdP – the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (Народово Хришћидемократска Демократија); NKWW – the National Electoral Committee (Народови Комитет Виборчы Виборчы); PC – the Party of Polish People’s Party (Полске Стромичтво Лудове); PC – the Centre of Comprehension (Позумиение Центрум); RdR – the Movement for the Republic (Рух дла Речезыпозитце); WAK – the Electoral Action of Catholics (Виборца Акција Католики); ZChN – the Christian and Nationalistic Union (Зъедноzenie Хришћидемократска Народоџ); PO – the Civil Platform (Платформа Обыварска); PSL – the Polish People’s Party (Полске Стромичтво Лудове); CDR – the Romanian Democratic Convention (Конвенция Демократска Романа); FC – the Civil Force (Форца Циџика); PMP – the Party “People’s Movement” (Партидул Мишчереа Популара); PNT-CD – the Christian Democratic National People’s Party (Партидул Национал Кристанска Демократска); PNG-CD – the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (Партидул Нова Генератије – Кристанска Демократска); PD-L – the Democratic Liberal Party (Партидул Демократска Либерал); DS – the Democratic Party (Демократска странка); KDH – the Christian Democratic Movement (Кристанска демократска движење); MS – the “Beautiful Slovakia” (Magnificat Slovakia); SDKU-DS – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (Словенска демократска кристанска унија – Демократска странка); SDK – the Slovak Democratic Coalition (Словенска демократска коалиција); KS – the Christian Socialists (Кристански социјалисти); NSI – the “New Slovenia” – the Christian People’s Party (Nova Slovenija – Кристанска људска странка); SLS – the Slovenian People’s Party (Словенска људска странка).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
HR	2010	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	-	2: 2013 (2,6/0), 2014 (k/-)	-	Falls
Czech Republic							
KDU-ČSL	1919 (1992)	Centrism, Christian democracy, regionalism	5,8	8: 1990 (8,4/15), 1992 (6,3/15), 1996 (8,1/18), 1998 (9,0/20), 2002 (14,3/22), 2006 (7,2/13), 2010 (4,4/0), 2013 (6,8/14)	3: 2004 (9,6/2), 2009 (7,6/2), 2014 (10,0/3)	10: 1990-1992, 1992, 1993-1996, 1996-1997, 1998, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2007-2009, 2014	Stable
KDS	1990	Right ideology, Christian democracy	8,1	2: 1990 (k/2), 1992 (k/10)	-	3: 1990-1992 (k), 1992 (k), 1993-1996 (k)	Falls/absent
Estonia							
EKD	1998	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, Euroscepticism	7,6	3: 1999 (2,4/0), 2003 (1,1/0), 2007 (1,7/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
IRL	2006	Right ideology, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, conservatism	8,5	2: 2007 (17,9/19), 2011 (20,5/23)	2: 2009 (12,2/1), 2014 (13,9/1)	3: 2007-2009, 2009-2011, 2011-2014	Grows
Hungary							
KDMP	1943 (1989)	Right ideology, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, social-conservatism	7,4	6: 1990 (6,5/21), 1994 (7,0/22), 1998 (2,3/0), 2006 (k/23), 2010 (k/36), 2014 (k/16)	2: 2009 (k/1), 2014 (k/1)	4: 1990-1993, 1993-1994, 2010-2014, 2014-current	Stable
Latvia							
KDS	1991	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	6: 1993 (5,0/6), 1995 (k/5), 1998 (k/-), 2002 (k/-), 2006 (k/-), 2010 (0,4/0)	-	4: 1995-1997 (k), 1997 (k), 1997 (k), 1998 (k)	Falls
Lithuania							
LKDP	1890 (1989)	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	4: 1992 (12,6/18), 1996 (10,4/16), 2000 (3,1/2), 2004 (1,4/0)	1: 2004 (2,8/0)	4: 1992, 1996-1999, 1999, 1999-2000	Falls/absent
KDS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	2: 1996 (3,2/1), 1996 (4,2/1)	-	-	Falls/absent
LLRA	1994	Centrism, Christian democracy, Euroscepticism, Poles' ethical issues	3,9	5: 1996 (3,1/1), 2000 (2,0/2), 2004 (3,8/2), 2008 (4,8/3), 2012 (5,8/8)	3: 2004 (5,7/0), 2009 (8,4/1), 2014 (8,1/1)	1: 2012-current	Grows
KKSS	2000	Center-right, Christian democracy, Christian-conservatism	6,5	3: 2000 (2,0/1), 2004 (2,0/0)	2: 2004 (2,6/0), 2009 (2,9/0)	-	Falls
Ts-LKD	2008	Center-right, right ideology, conservatism, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, liberal-conservatism, nationalism	7,4	2: 2008 (19,7/45), 2012 (15,1/33)	2: 2009 (26,9/4), 2014 (17,4/2)	1: 2010-2012	Falls

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
KP	2010	Center-right, Christian democracy, Christian-conservatism, social-conservatism	6,5	1:2012 (1,2/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
Poland							
ZChN	1989	Right ideology, nationalism, national-conservatism, Christian democracy	7,4	1:1991 (10,7/49)	-	3: 1991–1992, 1992–1993, 1993	Falls/absent
PC	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy, anticommunism	5,6	2: 1991 (8,7/44), 1993 (4,4/0)	-	2: 1991, 1991–1992	Falls/absent
PCD	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	3: 1991 (1,1/4), 1993 (k/-), 1997 (k/+)	-	2: 1992–1993, 1993	Falls/absent
ChD	1991	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 1991 (2,4/5)	-	-	Falls/absent
WAK	1991	Right ideology, Christian democracy	7,5	1: 1991 (k/+)	-	-	Falls/absent
RdR	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy, conservatism, anticommunism	6,2	1: 1993 (2,7/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
BBWR	1993	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 1993 (5,4/16)	-	-	Falls/absent
O	1993	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 1993 (6,4/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
AWS	1996	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, conservatism	7,1	2: 1997 (33,8/201), 2001 (5,6/0)	-	2: 1997–2000, 2000–2001	Falls/absent
NCD – BdP	1997	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 1997 (1,4/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
NKWW	2004	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 2004 (1,6/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
PO	2001	Center-right, liberalism, liberal-conservatism, Christian democracy	6,2	4: 2001 (12,7/65), 2005 (24,1/133), 2007 (41,5/209), 2011 (39,2/207)	3: 2004 (24,1/15), 2009 (44,4/25), 2014 (32,1/19)	3: 2007–2011, 2011–2014, 2014–current	Stable
PSL	1990	Center-left, agrarianism, social-conservatism, Christian democracy	4,2	7: 1991 (8,7/48), 1993 (15,4/132), 1997 (7,3/27), 2001 (9,0/42), 2005 (7,0/25), 2007 (8,9/31), 2011 (8,4/28)	3: 2004 (6,3/4), 2009 (7,0/3), 2014 (6,8/4)	11: 1992, 1992–1993, 1993, 1993–1995, 1995–1996, 1996–1997, 2001–2003, 2004–2005, 2007–2011, 2011–2014, 2014–current	Stable
Romania							
PNT-CD	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy, agrarianism	5,5	5: 1990 (2,6/12), 1992 (k/41), 1996 (k/83), 2004 (1,8/0), 2012 (k/1)	3: 2007 (1,4/0), 2009 (1,5/0), 2014 (0,9/0)	3: 1996–1998, 1998–1999, 1999	Falls

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
CDR	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,3	3: 1992 (20,0/82), 1996 (30,2/122), 2000 (5,0/0)	-	-	Falls/ absent
PNG-CD	1999	Center-right, Christian democracy, Romanian nationalism	6,2	2: 2004 (2,2/0), 2008 (2,3/0)	2: 2007 (4,9/0), 2009 (k/-)	-	Stable
FC	2004	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 2012 (k/3)	1: 2014 (2,6/0)	-	Falls
PD-L	2007	Center-right, liberal-conservatism, Christian democracy	5,4	2: 2008 (32,4/115), 2012 (16,5/52)	2: 2009 (29,7/10), 2014 (12,2/5)	4: 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2012, 2012	Falls
PNMP	2013	Center-right, Christian democracy, classic liberalism	6,2	-	1: 2014 (6,2/2)	-	Grows
Slovakia							
DS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	4: 1990 (4,4/7), 1992 (3,3/0), 1994 (3,4/0), 1998 (k/+)	-	2: 1990-1991, 1991-1992	Falls/ absent
KDH	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	7,1	8: 1990 (19,2/31), 1992 (8,9/18), 1994 (10,1/17), 1998 (k/+), 2002 (8,3/15), 2006 (8,3/14), 2010 (8,5/15), 2012 (8,8/16)	3: 2004 (16,2/3), 2009 (10,9/2), 2014 (13,2/2)	6: 1990-1991, 1991-1992, 1994, 2002-2006, 2010-2011, 2011-current	Stable
MKDM	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,7	3: 1990 (k/+), 1992 (k/5), 1994 (k/7)	-	-	Falls/ absent
KSU	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,7	2: 1992 (3,1/0), 1994 (2,1/0)	-	-	Falls/ absent
SDK	1997	Center-right, Christian democracy, liberal-conservatism	7,2	1: 1998 (26,3/42)	-	1: 1998-2002	Falls/ absent
SDKU-DS	2000	Center-right, Christian democracy, liberal-conservatism	7,4	4: 2002 (15,1/28), 2006 (18,4/31), 2010 (15,4/28), 2012 (6,1/11)	3: 2004 (17,1/3), 2009 (17,0/2), 2014 (7,8/2)	3: 2002-2006, 2010-2011, 2011-current	Falls
MS	2012	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	-	1: 2014 (1,2/0)	-	Falls
Slovenia							
SLS	1988	Center-right, conservatism, agrarianism, Christian democracy	6,7	8: 1990 (12,6/11), 1992 (8,7/10), 1996 (19,4/19), 2000 (9,5/9), 2004 (6,8/7), 2008 (5,2/5), 2011 (6,8/6), 2014 (4,0/0)	3: 2004 (8,4/0), 2009 (3,6/0), 2014 (k/1)	7: 1990-1992, 1997-2000, 2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2008, 2012-2013	Falls
KS	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	1: 1992 (1,1/0)	-	-	Falls/ absent

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
NSI	2000	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	7.9	8: 1990 (13,0/11), 1992 (14,5/15), 1996 (9,6/10), 2000 (8,7/8), 2004 (9,1/9), 2008 (3,4/0), 2011 (4,9/4), 2014 (5,6/5)	3: 2004 (23,6/2), 2009 (16,6/1), 2014 (16,6/2)	6: 1990–1992, 1993–1994, 1994–1996, 1996, 2004–2008, 2012–2013	Falls

Źródło: D. Almeida, *The Impact of European Integration on Political Parties: Beyond the Permissive Consensus*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2012.; E. Bakke, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.; E. Bakke, *20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. BWV Verlag 2011.; R. Bakker, C. de Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Romy, M. Steenbergen, M. Vachudova, *Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010*, "Party Politics" 2012.; K. Benoit, M. Laver, *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.; J. Bugajski, *Political parties of eastern europe: a guide to politics in the post-communist era*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2002.; J.–M. De Waele, A. Paczesniak, *The Europeanisation of Poland's political parties and party system: Europeanisation and Party Politics*, Wyd. ECPRI Press 2012.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlCo): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt:01.02.2015].; S. Hanley, A. Szczerbiak, T. Houghton, B. Fowler, *Explaining Comparative Centre-Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe*, "Party Politics" 2008, vol. 14, nr 4, s. 407–434.; J. Haynes, A. Hennig, *Religious Actors in the Public Sphere: Means, Objectives, and Effects*, Wyd. Routledge 2013.; V. Houšek, L. Kopeček, *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East-Central and Western Europe Compared*, Wyd. Ashgate 2010.; L. Hooghe, *Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol. 49, nr 5, s. 687–703.; T. Jansen, S. Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party*, Wyd. Springer 2011.; S. Jungerstaam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 2006.; H.–D. Klingemann, J. Bata, J. Budge, M. McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.; P. Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2000.; J. Magone, *Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2010.; J. Maher, *Europa World Year Book 2*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2004.; W. Nordsieck, A. Ramonaitė, *Parties and Elections in Europe: The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*, <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].; K. Paszkiewicz, *Partie i lojalność polityczna III Rzeczypospolitej*, Wd. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2004.; I. Peters, *20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. BWV Verlag 2011.; R. Rose, N. Munro, *Parties and Elections in New European Democracies*, Wyd. ECPRI Press 2009.; L. Stan, *From Riches to Rags: The Romanian National Christian Democrat Peasant Party*, "East European Quarterly" 2005, vol. 39, nr 2, s. 179–227.; M. Steenbergen, G. Marks, *Evaluating expert judgments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, vol. 46, nr 3, s. 347–366.; T. Zarycki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2014.

Significantly, that Christian Democratic parties are usually interpreted as the “overall” parties, as they are based on the social support of various groups of voters and different social groups. But simultaneously, Christian Democratic parties can keep and in the case of necessity can *allay their religious identity*, which is interpreted as an initial peculiarity of such parties formation processes. R. Irving⁶⁵ states, that in their program plan Christian Democratic parties are based on the several independent principles as: Christian adherence to the simple human rights and liberal democratic values, class and transnational reconciliation. K. van Kersbergen⁶⁶ adds, that the main principles of Christian Democratic parties are integration, class compromise, accommodation and pluralism. It means, that Christian Democratic parties by all means try to reconcile and integrate many social groups (or even nations, when we speak of the EU level), whose interests differ. Namely this, makes Christian democracy isolated in the party-ideological context. It is mainly caused by the inner-party nature of Christian Democratic parties in most Central-Eastern European countries: these political forces have descended from an unusual organizational structure, which is divided into institutional factions and “wings” from the inside, and which has close organizational connections with trade unions, employers, women and youth organizations etc. The reason for such *heterogeneity* lies in the programs of Christian Democratic parties, where they accentuate the ideological attractiveness of religion from the perspective of various social classes. As a result, it is obvious, that Christian Democratic parties reveal great skills in developing and implementing the policy of *mediation*. This conclusion proves, that the political world-view of Christian Democratic parties is presupposed by the factual balance of power in the inner structure of these parties. In this light, the change of policy within the frames of Christian Democratic parties should be studied as the representation of the inner-party balance of power.

Along with this, social ideology (component) of Christian Democratic parties activity steps outside the doctrine of the catholic church (the so-called “great tradition”), because Christian Democratic political and civil movements stay beyond the social and political theory and practice of the Church⁶⁷. Correspondingly, Christian Democratic parties are simultaneously interpreted as *religious and secular oriented*. At the same time, religion has always been the bearer of political attractiveness of Christian Democratic parties, mainly, due to the fact that it steps outside the boundaries of the social class. Respectively, Christian democracy is positioned as a *deeply integrative party ideology*. Together with this, on the basis of

⁶⁵ R. E. M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, Wyd. Allen & Unwin 1979, s. 18–19.

⁶⁶ K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.; K. van Kersbergen, *Contemporary Christian democracy and the demise of the politics of mediation*, [w:] H. Kitschelt, G. Marks, P. Lange, J. D. Stephens (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 346–370.; K. van Kersbergen, *The Christian democratic phoenix and modern unsecular politics*, „Party Politics” 2008, vol 14, nr 3, s. 259–280.; K. van Kersbergen, A. Hemerijck, *Christian democracy, social democracy and the continental ‘welfare without work’ syndrome*, „Social Policy Review” 2004, vol 16, s. 167–186.

⁶⁷ K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.

such projects as "Comparative Manifesto Data"⁶⁸, "Manifesto Project"⁶⁹ and "Comparative Political Data Set"⁷⁰, which analyze party organization, political ideology, electoral appeals, governmental potential of the main political parties, it is empirically represented that Christian Democratic parties are non-structural⁷¹. However, these political forces, using the label "Christian Democratic" usually share characteristics and principles of conflict accommodation ideology, they are internationally connected via the Christian Democrat International/Centrist Democrat International/European People's Party.

The peculiarity of the *social constituent* of Christian Democratic parties activity and program orientation in Central-Eastern European countries is that most of them have succeeded in incorporating social-democratic (earlier socialist) models of the *state of general welfare*. At the early stage of their development Christian Democratic parties adhered to the stable principles of such models. The most important among them were: fair salaries for families and sympathy with poor people⁷². Moreover, the researchers state, that many social principles of Christian Democratic parties, mainly those, which concern the problems of social and political ethics, and workers' rights, have already been incorporated into the model of the state of general welfare⁷³. But soon, some problems of the stable models were disclosed, as a result of which Christian Democratic parties' attempts, aimed at modification of current rules of social policy, have been revealed (similar processes take place in Western European countries⁷⁴). In particular, the most interesting positions of Christian Democrats in the context of the state general welfare, concern not the problem of the amount of spent resources, but the goals they are spend for, and which social institutions are responsible for this. Thus, Christian Democratic parties are still the adherents of the models of the state of general welfare, but insist on their qualitative improvement. The question is, that there are different types of welfare regimes, i.e. different ways of combining social institutions with the aim to provide work

⁶⁸ I. Budge, H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, R. Fording, D. Hearl, H. M. Kim, M. McDonald, S. Mendez, *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.; H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, I. Budge, M. McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990–2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

⁶⁹ A. Volkens, P. Lehmann, N. Merz, S. Regel, A. Werner, O. P. Laceywell, H. Schultze, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2013b*, Wyd. WZB Berlin Social Science Center 2013.

⁷⁰ K. Armington, P. Leimgruber, M. Beyeler, S. Menegale, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004*, Bern 2006.

⁷¹ T. Frey, *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg*, Wyd. Nomos 2009.

⁷² F. X. Kaufmann, *Religion und Modernität. Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven*, Wyd. JCB Mohr 1989.; B. Fix, *Religion und Familienpolitik. Deutschland, Belgien, Österreich und die Niederlande im Vergleich*, Wyd. Westdeutscher 2001.; K. J. Morgan, *Working Mothers and the Welfare State: Religion and the Politics of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe and the United States*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2006.; M. Opielka, *Christian foundations of the welfare state: strong cultural values in comparative perspective*, [w:] W. van Oorschot, M. Opielka, B. Pfau-Effinger (eds.), *Culture and Welfare State: Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2008, s. 89–114.

⁷³ S. Kahl, *The religious roots of modern poverty policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant traditions compared*, „European Journal of Sociology” 2005, vol 46, nr 1, s. 91–126.; S. Kahl, *Saving the poor: how religion shapes welfare-to-work policy in Europe and the United States*, Wyd. Yale University 2007.; K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.

⁷⁴ M. Seeleib-Kaiser, S. van Dyk, M. Roggenkamp, *Party Politics and Social Welfare: Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2008.

and social security: state services (compulsory insurance, social services, protection of labor rights), market mechanisms (professional pensions, private insurances), social organizations (religious charitable organizations for voluntary work), family (informal care)⁷⁵. Nowadays, parties of Christian democratic orientation do not just advertise the model of the state general welfare (as social-democratic parties), but stand for such a state of general welfare, where the key characteristics, incorporated from the social-democratic, and also conservative-liberal regimes of social policy, systematically differ. All this is usually done in the context of *social Catholicism ideology*. As a result of this, the regime of Christian Democrats' social policy is "generous, but passive and transfer-oriented"⁷⁶. *The crucial features of the Christian democratic state of general welfare are*: substitution of incomes, but not protection or creation of work places, privileges for families, but not individuals; fragmentation and partially public character of the main aspects of governance and implementation of social security policy, but not their centralization and state control; reproduction of social status, but not shuffle of social structure; "relative" obstruction of women access to the labor market. In the Christian democratic model the following points are *regulated*: professional insurance; combination of high-tempo of substitution and strict levels of employment protection; financing on account of special-purpose payments of employers' and employees' salaries.

Deeply analyzing the social constituent of activity and program orientation of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe, we single out several *key patterns*, which are in the foundation of such parties' social orientation. These are justice, respect to life, conciliation, active sympathy, guardianship, ethic education, health and welfare, provision of housing, social revival, personality, family and community. Leading economic model of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe is the *social market economy*, which involves combination of market economic principles and social services, which serve establishment of fair social equality. Consequently, the grounds of the social market economy are the principles of liberty and responsibility, competitiveness and solidarity. According to the Christian democratic ideology, a person has conscience and *social responsibility*. As a result, any society is socially responsible for its weak members. And because of that, Christian democracy strives not only for solidarity, but for solidarity as a goal of the social market economy. In this context, social policy is considered by parties of Christian democratic orientation as an instrument for social adaptation. First of all, it is aimed at such measures as preservation of the main income and worthy life in case of illness, early incapacity to work (accident or disability), death of a bread-winner, old age or periods of unemployment. Social policy includes maintenance of families, public housing, as well as youth and social security. While implementing it, inequality between people from various social groups, with various housing conditions or different

⁷⁵ G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Wyd. Polity 1990.

⁷⁶ S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 198.

levels of education must be taken into account. It must constantly pay attention to the risks, inherent in the market. But even in spite of this, parties of Christian Democratic orientation in different ways interpret social inequality and approach its security. The common thing is, that Christian Democrats justify social services, taking into consideration the necessity to protect human's dignity, paying no attention to the temporary positions on the labor market. Consequently, adjustment of social differences is not and has never been in the focus of Christian Democrats' social policy. On the contrary, social policy of Christian Democrats is aimed at ensuring temporary facilitation for those, who need it, in particular if they or their families cannot provide themselves. This approach corresponds with the principle of solidarity, which is in the centre of Christian social ethics or Christian democratic interpretation of the *subsidiary* principle. The main goal of the principle is to extend the person's abilities to take their own decisions and stay independent of the constant state's support.

What concerns *social insurance*, Christian Democrats do not depend on the state system of redistribution, which is financed from the tax proceeds repartition. On the contrary, Christian Democrats' approach is based on the form of social insurance, which is financed on account of employers' and employees' payments and is regulated irrespective of the state. It represents fundamental Christian democratic principles of personal responsibility, decentralization and subsidiarity. It is also actual in the context of demographical changes, increase in expenses in economy, growing globalization, when the system of matching insurance contributions becomes of great importance. Being devoted to the social market economy, parties of Christian democratic orientation often stand for introduction of elements of private and additional insurance. For instance, some Christian Democratic parties suggest financing the so-called "passive" policy on the labor market, i.e. unemployment and early retirement, on account of the contributions; other Christian Democratic parties – on account of training and retraining of elderly unemployed. However, in every approach freedom of individual life in the context of personal responsibility and dignity, and not dependence on social "gratuity" is clearly presupposed. That is why, the aim of Christian democratic social policy is to provide people with abilities of free development on the market, and to defend market mechanisms with the help of supervision and/or framework legislation. It allows every person to build their own life on the basis of freedom, social security and personal and social responsibility. The experience shows, that in spite of cyclic movements and temporary failures, which are almost inevitable in the course of market regulation, Christian Democrats' approach brings considerable success.

What concerns *family policy*, Christian Democrats stand for the ideas, which help families to become prosperous. Family policy is aimed at ensuring free development of a family and social justice, and offers stability and reliability of the family as a social institution. The family in the programs of Christian Democrats plays a fundamental and unchangeable role in upbringing personality and society in general, guarantees continuity of generations, undertakes

the crucial role in the processes of upbringing and education, ensures main needs of its members and helps to strengthen the feeling of solidarity between generations. It influences the comprehension of the family as a form of social policy, which provides social order on the basis of parental relations between parents and offspring. It is rather actual in the context of the issue, when family policy faces serious problems, which include demographical changes, changes in a family structure, and also cultural and ethnic interpretations of what the family and family life is. Usually, Christian Democrats in Central-Eastern Europe (on the analogy of Christian Democrats in Germany) determine the family as a social unit, where parents are responsible for their children and vice versa. Thus, the family covers all generations. At the same time, marriage is treated in the spirit of Christian democratic paradigm as a union between man and woman. Correspondingly, such definition of the family is based on the principle of subsidiarity, as for most people the family is a social institution, where children feel community and unity, as well as welfare and solidarity. However, in Christian democracy, a state is not the only supplier of family policy, as the services of family policy are provided via many interested parts, including government, church and private persons. All together they offer a wide spectrum of services, which represent numerous family actions and appropriate requirements. As a result of this, Christian democrats treat family policy in the future perspective and very often put it beyond the boundaries of social policy. The key rule of family policy, given by parties of Christian democratic orientation, is that the state must provide all families with more money. In equivalent, if possible.

But, in spite of this social orientation of Christian Democratic parties, they in course of 1990-2014 had different *electorate success*. The general conclusion is that Christian Democratic parties are less popular in Central-Eastern Europe, than in Western European countries. The least successful in electoral sense have been Christian democratic parties in such countries of Central-Eastern Europe as Latvia and Poland, moderately successful in Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and the most successful in Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia. It is also clear, that among all parties in the region, which have used Christian democratic ideology, the least successful in the electoral field were “pure” Christian Democratic parties (occurred in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Among them, the most successful in the electoral sense have become the following political forces: the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR). A bit more successful are parties, which have synthesized the principles of Christian democracy, social-conservatism (socialism and conservatism) and agrarianism. Among them, one can single out: the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia, the “New Slovenia” – the Christian People’s Party (NSI) and the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS). Even more successful are those parties, which have synthesized Christian democracy and

national-conservatism (nationalism and conservatism). Among them, it is necessary to name the following: the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD), the Electoral Action "Solidarity" (AWS). The most successful appeared to Christian Democratic parties, which have synthesized the principles of Christian democracy and liberalism/liberal conservatism. Among them we can name: the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD), the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania, the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS). The key conclusion is, that in general, electoral success of Christian Democratic political forces (of different ideological meaning) has been reduced from elections to elections. Comparatively stable electoral success have such parties of Christian Democratic orientation (or political forces, which secondary use the ideology of Christian democracy) as: the Christian and Democratic Union – People's Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the Polish People's Party (PSL) and the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland, the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD) in Romania, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia. As of 2014 electoral success of the following parties increased a bit: the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania. Classic parties of Christian democratic orientation had greater electoral success just after the collapse of the "real socialism" regimes. On the contrary, the parties, which combined Christian democracy with other traditional political ideologies, appeared to be more successful after the 2nd or 3rd elections. Parties, which combined the principles of Christian democracy and liberal conservatism were more successful after 2000, those, which united the principles of Christian democracy and social-conservatism and agrarianism had success during 1994–2010, and those, which combined the principles of Christian democracy and national-conservatism were popular during 1994–2010. Christian Democratic parties (with the elements of other ideologies) steadily belonged to the government parties in Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia (since 2007), Hungary (since 2010), Lithuania (since 2010), Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland (though in the latter there are no Christian Democratic parties in their classical interpretation⁷⁷).

One of the reasons for weakness of Christian Democratic parties in the region is that in Central-Eastern Europe still exist secularized countries, and correspondingly, any fully religious oriented, in particular Christian Democratic, political forces have rather vague electoral chances for parliamentary representation. As T. Bale and A. Szczerbiak⁷⁸ state, there is only

⁷⁷ S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 194-195.

⁷⁸ T. Bale, A. Szczerbiak, *Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland – and why should we care?*, „Party Politics, 2008, vol 14, nr 4, s.479–500.

one exception in such an interpretation, namely Poland. This is the country, where “virtually” all people are Catholics. Besides, half of population go to the church regularly, and a lot of citizens are engaged in rural economy. Moreover, in Poland there is a strong social-conservative trade union movement, and since early 90s of the 20th century anticlerical left-wing political forces have started their formation. The abovementioned conditions are rather favorable for establishing and flourishing of Christian Democratic parties⁷⁹, but in fact they have not appeared. At the beginning of 90s of the 20th century there were several attempts of self-manifestation and formation of Christian Democratic political forces, but the closest to the start of their formation were absolutely/fundamentally religious parties (for instance, the Christian National Union) or non-religious right-center (center-right) parties. However, none successful Christian Democratic party has appeared in Poland. Among the conditions, which usually promote formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, only two existed in Poland: a great number of practicing Catholics and presence of the left-wing anticlerical political forces. But there were at least five factors, which prevented Christian democracy from appearing and flourishing: electorate of Christian Democratic parties was absent or was shared with other political parties (for instance, women-voters disproportionately voted for right-center parties and peasant-voters usually stood for agrarian parties); all potential participants of any electoral campaign in the right ideological spectrum were not discredited by participation or association in organizations of totalitarian/post-totalitarian past; Catholic idea and hierarchy did not wish to support one Christian Democratic party; the most important organizations of civil society, in particular the trade union “Solidarity”, in its time, refused to back up any of the right-center parties; in spite of anticlericalism, there was no special need to protect the interests of church, as nearly all right-center political parties have had much in common with Christian values, and have been the adherents of various social and political issues which were on the agenda. Even more negative factors existed in other Central-Eastern European countries. As a result of this, not classical or “pure” Christian Democratic parties are formed, but political forces, which despite their primary ideology, additionally use Christian and democratic principles in their programs and activity.

In general, in the context of electoral success of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern European countries the following conclusions should be made. First of all, Christian Democratic parties (classic Christian Democratic parties are mentioned here) were the most successful and notable, and had a high electorate level just after the collapse of the “real socialism” regimes. But in most cases from elections to elections the influence of Christian Democratic parties started its gradual and considerable reduction. It can be chiefly explained, by the fact, that in early 90s of the 20th century Christian Democratic parties faced a dilemma, whether to keep their inner-party and strategic flexibility or to address appeals towards the narrower, but

⁷⁹ S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.; T. Frey, *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg*, Wyd. Nomos 2009.

potentially more religious and loyal electorate. Those parties, which chose limited and narrow identity, faced the situation, when the number of voters was extremely short. Consequently, they underwent collapse after the 1st or 2nd elections. However, those parties, which made a choice in favor of strategic flexibility, variability of party politics and "insufficient" determination of party identity (what was peculiar of most political parties and party policy in general in Central-Eastern European countries), managed to attract more considerable and stable support of electorate. But these political forces can be hardly interpreted as Christian Democratic, as in their case it is difficult to determine what ideology is a primary one for them.

Secondly, in spite of clearly manifested social orientation of Christian Democratic parties, in Central-Eastern European countries they have faced the problem, that the voters interpret the phenomenon of "Christian democracy" as the threat to cultural divergence (for instance in case of perception of abortions, religious lessons in schools, clerical influence on political life), not as the grounds for the social model of the market economy and the variant of supporting traditional values. Consequently, the union of political parties and church appeared to be very inefficient. That is why, Christian Democratic parties have become more secular and integrative, and as a result less structural. In some countries, it stabilized the level of electoral support for Christian Democratic parties, but in general the phenomenon of party Christian democracy in Central-Eastern European countries appeared to be ineffective in electoral perspective and conceptually vague.

In general, in the context of unity of the social policy principles in the program constituent and activity of Christian Democratic parties, but taking into consideration little electoral success of these parties in Central-Eastern European countries, the conclusion, offered by R. Leonardi ÷ P. Alberti⁸⁰, seems to be rather reasonable: there are two approaches towards the study (theorization) and interpretation of parties of Christian and democratic orientation. The first is called rational, and treats Christian democracy as a "unitary player with a specified set of advantages and interests due to the problem of expenditures and profit". The second one is called reflective (reflexive), and interprets Christian democracy as a "conventionally political phenomenon with a successive set of notions, in fact, its representation in the political identity". In other words, it is reasonable to speak of constructivist and institutional vision of the essence of Christian Democratic parties as the articulatory phenomenon, which is characterized by political moderation and springs from the "consociation" pattern "more or less institutionalized over time and space"⁸¹.

⁸⁰ R. Leonardi, P. Alberti, *From dominance to doom? Christian democracy in Italy*, [w:] S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004, s. 21–22.

⁸¹ R. Leonardi, P. Alberti, *From dominance to doom? Christian democracy in Italy*, [w:] S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004, s. 24.

Ідеологічна складова діяльності урядових кабінетів у Країнах Східної Європи (1991–2014)

У статті запропоновано теоретико-методологічний і емпіричний аналіз ідеологічної складової діяльності урядових кабінетів у країнах Східної Європи впродовж 1991–2014 рр. Проаналізовано суть феномену політичної ідеології та партійної поляризації, виокремлено та верифіковано сім'ї ідеологічних партій як складову діяльності урядів у різних країнах Східної Європи. Визначено, як партійні і непартійні уряди кореспондують з ідеологічними детермінантами парламентських партій, які їх підтримують.

Ключові слова: політична ідеологія, партійна поляризація, урядовий кабінет, Східна Європа.

The ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of the ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European countries (in 1991–2014). The author analyzed the essence of the phenomenon of political ideology and party polarization, singled out and verified the families of ideological parties as a component of cabinet activity across Eastern European countries, determined how party and non-party governments correspond with ideological determinants of parliamentary parties that support them.

Keywords: political ideology, party polarization, government cabinet, Eastern Europe.

The regularity of political development of the most countries of the world (including post-Soviet ones in Eastern Europe, namely Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) is concentration of main authority in line with the institutions of executive power. Scientists interpret this phenomenon as an objective result of contemporary statehood evolution. It is logically to remark, that executive power is a totality of state administrations and institutions, which carries out authoritative-political, and authoritative-administrative functions. The apex of the executive power system, depending on the constitutional systems of government, can be president alone (which is not distinctive of Eastern European countries, as nowadays there are no classical presidential

republics in the region), unilaterally government, represented by the prime-minister (what is natural for Moldova, which is a classical parliamentary republic) or the president and government simultaneously (what is distinctive of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, which formally are half-presidential republics, that is in dependence of the presidential and prime-minister's formal and factual power and authority, realize constructions of dual executive power, where the institutional roles both of the president and government can be observed). In this context, evaluation of governments, in *particular ideological components and determinants of governments activity*, is of great importance within the frames of Eastern European countries selection. The main point is, that nowadays in the region, the practice of party governments formation, which operate with political party ideologies as one of the main factors of institutionalization of governments, has not been institutionalized yet. However, very often one can encounter non-party governments, where the place of political party ideologies has a secondary meaning. Most governments in Eastern European countries, first of all, are formed in the light of fulfillment of the constitutional requirements as to getting the support of parliamentary majority. But, as today non-democratic (authoritarian) political regimes can be found in the region, where the specificity of government formation is based on the support of the predominant or hegemonial presidential party, which usually has its own parliamentary majority, ideological questions as the components of governments activity pale into insignificance. And the simple rule of quantitative/dimensional overrepresentation of the party or parties, which form the governments, comes to the foreground. But even in this case ideological parameters of governmental activity should be taken into consideration, as the formal and factual government cabinets in the context of their formation, functioning and responsibility are not isolated from the parliaments, which consist of political parties. The latter are the political organizations, which a priori are characterized by political ideology. That is why, depending on the type of the constitutional system of the government and government cabinets, peculiarities of political party structuring of the parliaments, especially, peculiarities of party and non-party political forces in the parliaments etc., the ideological constituent of governmental activities in Eastern European countries, in particular in the period of 1991-2014, i.e. since the moment of declaration of independence, proclaimed by the countries of the region, and till nowadays, becomes more or less remarkable in the political context and significant in the context of political analysis.

Problematics of analysis of the ideological component of the governmental activities in Eastern European countries in contemporary political science is little-investigated. Even despite the fact that many researchers have handled the investigations in Eastern Europe, they usually had nothing to do with the government cabinets activities. Among such investigations

it is necessary to distinguish such personalities as: R. Fawn¹, H. Giliomee and C. Simkins², A. Arian and S. Barnes³, S. Cornell⁴, U. Backes and P. Moreau⁵, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott⁶, A. Kulik and S. Pshizova⁷, G. Nodia and A. P. Scholtbach⁸, P. Lewis⁹, P. Culeac¹⁰, J. Bugajski¹¹, S. Ramet¹², J. Hahn¹³, J. Löwenhardt¹⁴, J. K. White¹⁵, M. Bader¹⁶, S. Birch¹⁷, P. D'Anieri¹⁸ and others. Also it is significant to take into consideration general and theoretical ideas, dedicated to the scientific analysis of party ideological influence on the government cabinets activities (in particular beyond the borders of Eastern European countries). Among the most actual and cited researchers one should mention: J. Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton¹⁹, B. Powell²⁰, Z. Maoz and Z. Somer-Topcu²¹, P. Warwick²², B. Nyblade²³, A. Blais, E. Gidengil, R. Nadeau and N. Nevitte²⁴, P. Converse and R. Pierce²⁵, I. McAllister and M. Wattenberg²⁶, E. Browne,

¹ R. Fawn, *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

² H. Giliomee, C. Simkins, *The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy*, Wyd. Harwood Academic Publishers 1999.

³ A. Arian, S. Barnes, *The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability*, „The Journal of Politics” 1974, vol 36, s. 592–614.

⁴ S. Cornell, *Democratization Falters in Azerbaijan*, „Journal of Democracy” 2001, vol 12, nr 2, s. 118–131.

⁵ U. Backes, P. Moreau, *Communist and post-communist parties in Europe*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2008.

⁶ K. Dawisha, P. Parrott, *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997.; K. Dawisha, P. Parrott, *Russia and the new states of Eurasia: the politics of upheaval*, Wyd. University of Cambridge 1994.

⁷ A. Kulik, S. Pshizova, *Political Parties in Post-Soviet Space: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics*, Wyd. Praeger Publishers 2005.

⁸ G. Nodia, A. P. Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects*, Wyd. Eburon Delft 2006.

⁹ P. Lewis, *Party development and democratic change in post-Communist Europe: the first decade*, Wyd. Routledge 2001.

¹⁰ P. Culeac, *Contradictory electoral behavior and the post-Soviet party-system in Republic of Moldova*, Wyd. ProQuest 2007.

¹¹ J. Bugajski, *Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-Communist era*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2002.

¹² S. Ramet, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹³ J. Hahn, *Democratization in Russia: the development of legislative institutions*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1996.

¹⁴ J. Löwenhardt, *Party politics in post-communist Russia*, Wyd. F. Cass 1998.

¹⁵ J. K. White, *Political parties and the collapse of the old orders*, Wyd. SUNY Press 1998.

¹⁶ M. Bader, *Against All Odds: Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine*, Wyd. Vossiuspers UvA 2010.

¹⁷ S. Birch, *The social determinants of electoral behaviour in Ukraine, 1989–1994*, Wyd. University of Essex 1998.

¹⁸ P. D'Anieri, R. Kravchuk, T. Kuzio, *Politics and society in Ukraine*, Wyd. Westview Press 1999.; P. D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian politics: power, politics, and institutional design*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2007.

¹⁹ J. Lane, D. McKay, K. Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

²⁰ B. Powell, *Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, nr 2, s. 357–378.

²¹ Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945–98*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2009.

²² P. Warwick, *Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western Democracies*, „Comparative Political Studies” 1992, vol 25, s. 332–361.; P. Warwick, *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

²³ B. Nyblade, *Reconsidering Ideological Diversity and Government Survival*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association 2004.

²⁴ A. Blais, E. Gidengil, R. Nadeau, N. Nevitte, *Measuring party identification: Britain, Canada and The United States*, „Political Behavior” 2001, vol 23, nr 1, s. 5–22.

²⁵ P. Converse, R. Pierce, *Measuring Partisanship*, „Political Methodology” 1985, vol 11, s. 143–166.

²⁶ I. McAllister, M. Wattenberg, *Measuring Levels Of Party Identification – Does Question Order Matter?*, „Public Opinion Quarterly” 1995, vol 59, nr 2, s. 259–268.

D. Gleiber, C. Mashoba and J. Frendreis²⁷, A. Heath and R. Pierce²⁸ and others. But the above-mentioned researchers have not paid much attention to the ideological component of governmental activity in Eastern European countries, and in particular to the problematics of evaluation of government cabinets in the light of such correlation as “ideological positioning of the government – parliamentary support of the government – party rivalry in the context of the government formation and responsibility – composition of the government». The solution of this problem, which belongs to the scope of contemporary academic literature, is in the focus of our research.

Proceeding with the analysis of the governmental component in governmental activity in Eastern European countries, it is necessary to refer to the general and theoretical peculiarities of political ideology and party polarization influence on government cabinets activity. It should be mentioned that *political ideology* is usually interpreted as the system of conceptually formalized notions, ideas and views on political life, which reflects people’s, classes’ nations’, societies’, parties’ interests, world-views, ideals, dispositions, and consequently can be considered to be a form of social consciousness and cultural phenomenon. Political ideology includes knowledge about political life and evaluation of political processes from a bearer’s of ideology point of view, i.e. contains various preconceptions. In any case, ideology is a variety of corporate consciousness, which reflects merely group’s point of view towards the course of political and social development. From the standpoint of political functions, ideology is aimed at uniting, integrating of the society on the basis of certain social group’s interests or goals, which are not grounded on any specific layers of the society. Thus, in accordance with various types of ideological grounds for politics, place and role of the state in the society, interrelation between a person, society and state, ways and means of public changes, there are good reasons to single out several crucial *types of political ideology* (they are mainly distinguished in accordance with the “from left to right” principle in the ideological spectrum): anarchism, national-bolshevism, communism, socialism, ecologism/environmentalism, social-democracy, liberalism, centrism, agrarianism, Christian democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, national socialism (Nazism). It is notable, that various types of political ideologies are often mutually exclusive. It means that in the context of cross-party rivalry, which is mostly distinctive of democratic political regimes and shrinks in various types of autocracy, one can often observe active confrontation between parties of different ideological orientation or generally prevailing political ideologies. It is especially described in the light of party polarization, i.e. support, expressed by voters to “extremist” parties, whose ideological orientation greatly

²⁷ E. Browne, D. Gleiber, C. Mashoba, *Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory: Western European Cabinet Coalitions 1945–80*, „British Journal of Political Science” 1984, vol 14, s. 1–32.; E. Browne, J. Frendreis, D. Gleiber, *The Process of Cabinet Disolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, s. 628–650.

²⁸ A. Heath, R. Pierce, *It Was Party Identification All along – Question Order Effects on Reports of Party Identification in Britain*, „Electoral Studies” 1992, vol 11, nr 2, s. 93–105.

differs from the orientation, which is traditional for the system²⁹. Z. Maoz explains polarization as the existence of ideologically bounded and distinct parties (blocs/coalitions), which possess practically equal shares of parliamentary mandates³⁰. This is especially actual for the countries, where the process of government formation requires support of parliamentary majority, that under ordinary conditions is native to all Eastern European countries. Taking into consideration this fact, it is theoretically obvious that the governments, which are less ideologically diversified/differentiated and party polarized, must be more effective and stable in their activity. But party and ideological polarization is a relative distance, and is not an absolute value of ideological difference between parties, which form or support government cabinets, i.e. it is defined as a “party horizon” or the degree of political compromise in the context of government cabinets formation and responsibility, as well as evaluation of their stability and effectiveness³¹.

Relativity of “party polarization” category, especially in the context of analysis of ideological constituent of the governments activity, is proved by the fact, that the degree of polarization can be evaluated in different ways: by means of calculation of party lists, percentage of electoral places in the parliament; by means of calculation of proportion of places, represented by parties, which are “extremist” towards each other; on the basis of “preconceived party identification”, where the role of the party is considered to be rivalry in the left-right spectrum; by means of measuring the “divergence” from the ideological centre within the frames of party systems; by means of ideological comparison of the biggest political parties in the system; by taking into consideration standardized left-right differences of all parties in the system. In this context P. Warwick offered to consider party polarization on the basis of party ideology, which is implemented through such dimensions as: left-right, secular-clerical, support/absence of support for regime, and also materialists-post-materialists³².

But the abovementioned approach is not effective in the context of analysis of ideological components of governmental activities in Eastern European countries, where (in comparison with Western European countries, which were the first to use these methods) party systems are weakly institutionalized and do not always comply with all declared dimensions of party ideology. Besides, the level of party polarization in Eastern European countries is analytical-variable, as it depends on several criteria: degree of party rivalry and ideological closeness (especially in the cases of “situational” coalition formation in the countries, which are not

²⁹ M. Mareš, *Extremist Parties in East Central Europe during post-communist transformation process*, Paper has been written as part of the Research Plan „Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies”, Atlanta, June 11-13 2008.; B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.; B. Powell, *Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1986, vol 30, nr 2, s. 357–378.

³⁰ Z. Maoz, Z. Somer-Topcu, *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945–98*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2009.

³¹ P. Warwick, *Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

³² P. Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

characteristic of party government cabinets); historical heritage of party systems, which includes continuity of traditional parties and mobilization of new ones; different institutional roles of parties in the process of government formation; specificity of structures of party organizations, which in Eastern Europe hugely require self-development of parties and political systems; sufficient number of specific channels of cross-party communication, where the customer-based relations are of great importance; influence of special types of electoral systems etc. on ideological differentiation of political parties/party systems. The situation is complicated by the fact, that in case of Eastern European countries, transit societies are in the focus, and none of them as of 2014 could not be classified as a fully democratic one (authoritarian and hybrid political regimes are represented in the region). That is why, the experience of parliamentary democracy in Eastern Europe is insignificant or absent at all. Besides, non-party government cabinets are very often formed in the region, and because of this, politicians often have their own interest concerning the essence of governmental policy and try to bring it nearer to their own benefits and interpretation, and this lowers the role of political party ideologies. It means, that ideological difference between partners in the parliamentary and governmental coalitions in case of formation of party governments or parliamentary majority constructions in the course of non-party formation appeared to be extremely vague.

That is why, party and ideological polarization in the context of Eastern European countries does not always effectively affirm the existence of the ideological constituent in governmental activity. Sometimes, the ideological constituent in governmental activity can be efficiently evaluated on the grounds of simple consideration of various ideological peculiarities of different political parties, which form or support government cabinet. It is especially urgent in the light of the fact, that in the region the process of party government formation is not a norm of a political process, and on the contrary, in most cases in 1991-2014 non-party government cabinets prevailed (for detailed information see Table 1). But even despite this, it is quite obvious, that the more ideological distance between government/pro-government parties is, the more possible are the conflicts within the system of executive power and the more complicated is activity of government cabinets. To determine, the extent to which government or pro-government (which just provide support for the government cabinet) parties are ideologically remote, the category of “the level of parties ideological diversity” is applied, i.e. the search for and acquisition of empirical information are carried out, and on the basis of which the “ideological disposition” (from left to right) of all parties is determined. In case of one-party or nonparty governments, which possess support of one parliamentary party (what is rather peculiar of Eastern European countries), determination of ideological vector in government cabinets activity is rather simple, on the grounds of one-line determination. For the party governmental coalition or coalition as a means of ensuring parliamentary majority for

nonparty government, the situation is proportionally complicated, depending on the number of participants in such a coalition³³.

Consequently, concerning Eastern European countries, in particular in the context of parties and government cabinets, it has been decided to apply adjusted methodology of political ideology evaluation, proposed by J. Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton³⁴. The researchers have classified parties and government cabinets (which are usually backed up by these political parties) as to their ideological orientation into several "families." Among them are communist, social-democratic or socialist, ecological, agrarian, liberal, conservative, nationalistic, religious, personalistic, and regional³⁵. Besides, the scientists have singled out several additional categories of ideological/non-ideological positioning of political parties and electoral blocs. These are alliances or electoral coalitions of different ideological character and parties without strict ideological affiliation. Thus, the comparative analysis of governments and parliamentary parties, which provide support for governments, is significantly different. In this context, Eastern European countries are not the exception (for detailed information see Table 1).

³³ Methodologically it is described in the following studies: R. Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.; M. Taylor, M. Laver, *Government Coalitions in Western Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1973, vol 1, s. 205–248.

³⁴ J. Lane, D. McKay, K. Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

³⁵ Regionalism is interpreted as a political ideology, which is focused on the interests of any particular region or a group of regions, distinguished traditionally or on the basis of formal data (on the grounds of political or administrative division, positioning of subnational units). Regionalism becomes apparent during the activity, concerning the growth of influence and political significance of a certain region or a group of regions, and on the basis of ideas implementation, concerning limited (regions' rights, decentralization etc.) or broadened forms of autonomy (separatism, independence etc.). Regionalists often prefer loose federation or confederation, but not a unitary state with strong centralized power (depending the fact whether the parties of this ideological spectrum are in power).

Table 1. The Ideological Component of the Governments Activity or Parameters of the Governments Ideological Support by the Parliamentary Parties in Eastern European Countries (1991–2014)³⁶

1	2	3	4	5	6
Prime-Minister	Terms of government cabinet staying in power	Prime-minister's party	Type of government	Type of government specification	Leading ideological component of governments activity or parameters of leading ideological support of governments by parliamentary parties
AZERBAIJAN					
H. Hasanov	18.10.1991 – 04.04.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
R. Huseynov	16.06.1992 – 30.01.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
P. Huseynov	28.04.1993 – 30.06.1993	AXC	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
S. Huseynov	30.06.1993 – 07.10.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
F. Guliyev	07.10.1994 – 20.07.1996	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 1	26.11.1996 – 11.10.1998	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 2	11.10.1998 – 04.08.2003	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
I. Aliyev	04.08.2003 – 04.11.2003	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 3	04.11.2003 – 29.10.2008	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 4	29.10.2008 – 22.10.2013	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
A. Rasizade 5	22.10.2013 – current	YAP	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic
BELARUS					
V. Kebich	19.09.1991 – 21.07.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
M. Chigir	21.07.1994 – 18.11.1996	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
S. Ling	19.02.1997 – 18.02.2000	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
V. Vermoshin	14.03.2000 – 01.10.2001	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic

³⁶ Legend: n/p – non-membership of the prime-minister in any party (non-party); AXC – Azerbaijan National Front; YAP – Party „New Azerbaijan“; AzHM – National Democratic Union; PANM – Pan-Armenian National Movement; H – Republican Bloc; M – Bloc „Unity“; HHK – Republican Party of Armenia; RT-FG – „Round table – Free Georgia“; UCG – Civil Unity of Georgia; Union of Citizens of Georgia; NMD – National Movement – Democrats; ENM – United National Movement „For Prosperous Georgia“; KO – „Georgian Dream“; FPM – Popular Front of Moldova; PDAM – Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova; CDM – Electoral Bloc „Democratic Convention of Moldova“; PCRM – Communist Party of the Moldova Republic; PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova; NDR – Party „Our Home – Russia“; ER – Party „United Russia“; VOH – All-Ukrainian Association „Community“ (Hromada); NDPU – National Democratic Party of Ukraine; PPPU – Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine; PR – Party of Regions; B – All-Ukrainian Union „Fatherland (Batkivshchyna)“; NU – Bloc „Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina)“; NF – „People's Front (Narodnyi Front)“.

1	2	3	4	5	6
G. Novitsky	10.10.2001 – 10.07.2003	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
S. Sidorsky 1	19.12.2003 – 08.04.2006	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
S. Sidorsky 2	10.04.2006 – 27.12.2010	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian and nationalistic
M. Myasnikovich	28.12.2010 – 27.12.2014	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
A. Kobiakov	27.12.2014 – current	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian
ARMENIA					
V. Manukyan	13.08.1990 – 22.11.1991	AZHM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
G. Harutyunyan	22.11.1991 – 30.07.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
K. Harutyunyan	30.07.1992 – 02.02.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
H. Bagratyan 1	03.02.1993 – 29.07.1995	PANM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	liberal
H. Bagratyan 2	29.07.1995 – 04.11.1996	H	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Sargsyan	04.11.1996 – 19.03.1997	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
R. Kocharyan	20.03.1997 – 03.02.1998	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Darbinyan	10.04.1998 – 11.06.1999	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Sargsyan	11.06.1999 – 27.10.1999	M	party	single party minority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Sargsyan	03.11.1999 – 02.05.2000	M	party	single party minority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Margaryan 1	12.05.2000 – 05.03.2003	M	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Margaryan 2	05.03.2003 – 25.03.2007	HHK	party	coalitional minority	nationalistic
S. Sargsyan 1	25.03.2007 – 12.05.2007	HHK	party	coalitional minority	nationalistic
S. Sargsyan 2	12.05.2007 – 19.02.2008	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 1	09.04.2008 – 27.04.2009	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 2	27.04.2009 – 06.05.2012	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
T. Sargsyan 3	06.05.2012 – 13.04.2014	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
H. Abrahamyan	13.04.2014 – current	HHK	party	coalitional majority	nationalistic
GEORGIA					
Z. Gamsakhurdia	09.04.1991 – 26.05.1991	RF-FG	party	single party majority	nationalistic

1	2	3	4	5	6
B. Gugushvili	23.08.1991 – 06.01.1992	RT-FG	party	single party majority	nationalistic
T. Siguia 1	06.01.1992 – 11.10.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation
T. Siguia 2	11.10.1992 – 05.08.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
O. Patsatsia	20.08.1993 – 05.10.1995	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
N. Lekishvili	08.12.1995 – 26.07.1998	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Lortkipanidze	07.08.1998 – 11.05.2000	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
G. Arsenishvili	11.05.2000 – 21.12.2001	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
A. Jorbenadze	21.12.2001 – 27.11.2003	UCG	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
Z. Zhvania 1	27.11.2003 – 28.03.2004	NM-D	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
Z. Zhvania 2	28.03.2004 – 03.02.2005	NM-D	party	single party majority	nationalistic
Z. Noghaidei	17.02.2005 – 16.11.2007	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
L. Gurgendze 1	22.11.2007 – 20.01.2008	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
L. Gurgendze 2	20.01.2008 – 01.11.2008	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
G. Megaloblishvili	01.11.2008 – 30.01.2009	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
N. Gilauri	06.02.2009 – 04.07.2012	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Merabishvili	04.07.2012 – 25.10.2012	ENM	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
B. Ivashvili	25.10.2012 – 20.11.2013	KO	party	single party majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
I. Garibashvili	20.11.2013 – current	KO	party	single party majority	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
MOLDOVA					
V. Muravtschi	27.08.1991 – 01.07.1992	FPM	party	coalitional majority	religious
A. Sangheli 1	01.07.1992 – 27.02.1994	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
A. Sangheli 2	27.02.1994 – 24.01.1997	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
I. Ciubuc 1	24.01.1997 – 22.05.1998	PDAM	party	single party majority	agrarian
I. Ciubuc 2	22.05.1998 – 01.02.1999	CDM	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
I. Sturza	19.02.1999 – 01.12.1999	CDM	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
D. Braghij	21.12.1999 – 25.02.2001	n/p	non-party	technocratic (cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
V. Tarlev 1	19.04.2001 – 06.03.2005	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist
V. Tarlev 2	19.04.2005 – 20.03.2008	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist
Z. Greceanii 1	31.03.2008 – 10.06.2009	PCRM	party	single party majority	communist

1	2	3	4	5	6
Z. Greceanii 2	10.06.2009 – 09.09.2009	PRM	party	single party majority	communist
V. Filat 1	25.09.2009 – 28.11.2010	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
V. Filat 2	14.01.2011 – 25.04.2013	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
I. Leancă	31.05.2013 – current	PLDM	party	coalitional majority	liberal
RUSSIA					
B. Yeltsin	25.12.1991 – 15.06.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
Y. Gaidar	15.06.1992 – 14.12.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 1	15.12.1992 – 23.12.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	nationalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 2	20.01.1994 – 09.08.1996	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
V. Chernomyrdin 3	10.08.1996 – 23.03.1998	NDR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
S. Kiriyenko	24.04.1998 – 23.08.1998	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
Y. Primakov	11.09.1998 – 12.05.1999	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
S. Stepashin	19.05.1999 – 09.08.1999	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially liberal, communist, socialist/social democratic, personalistic
V. Putin 1	16.08.1999 – 26.03.2000	NDR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
M. Kasyanov	17.05.2000 – 24.02.2004	n/p	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic + conservative
M. Fradkov 1	05.03.2004 – 07.05.2004	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
M. Fradkov 2	12.05.2004 – 12.09.2007	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
V. Zubkov	14.09.2007 – 07.05.2008	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
V. Putin 2	08.05.2008 – 07.05.2012	ER	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
D. Medvedev	08.05.2012 – current	ER	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	personalistic + conservative
UKRAINE					
V. Fokin	24.08.1991 – 01.10.1992	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
L. Kuchma	13.10.1992 – 21.09.1993	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
Y. Zvyahilsky	27.09.1993 – 16.06.1994	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	communist
V. Masol	16.06.1994 – 04.04.1995	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal

1	2	3	4	5	6
Y. Marchuk	08.06.1995 – 27.05.1996	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
P. Lazarenko 1	28.05.1996 – 05.07.1996	VOH	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
P. Lazarenko 2	11.07.1996 – 02.07.1997	VOH	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
V. Pustovoitenko	16.07.1997 – 30.11.1999	NDPU	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
V. Yushchenko	22.12.1999 – 28.04.2001	n/p	non-party	non-party (not a cabinet of experts)	without ideological affiliation + partially agrarian, nationalistic, socialist/social democratic, liberal
A. Kinakh	29.05.2001 – 16.11.2002	PPPU	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
V. Yanukovych 1	21.11.2002 – 05.01.2005	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological + partially socialist/social democratic
Y. Tymoshenko 1	04.02.2005 – 08.09.2005	BYT	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
Y. Yekhanurov	22.09.2005 – 26.03.2006	NU	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/dissimilar-ideological
V. Yanukovych 2	04.08.2006 – 17.10.2006	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
V. Yanukovych 3	17.10.2006 – 18.12.2007	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
Y. Tymoshenko 2	18.12.2007 – 03.03.2010	BYT	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological
M. Azarov 1	11.03.2010 – 09.12.2010	PR	party	coalitional majority	socialist/social democratic
M. Azarov 2	09.12.2010 – 03.12.2012	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
M. Azarov 3	13.12.2012 – 28.01.2014	PR	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	socialist/social democratic
A. Yatsenyuk 1	27.02.2014 – 27.11.2014	B	non-party	half-party (not a cabinet of experts)	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological (right centre)
A. Yatsenyuk 2	02.12.2014 – current	NF	party	coalitional majority	electoral coalition/ dissimilar-ideological (right centre)

Źródło: <http://zarate.eu/countries.htm> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; <http://en.wikipedia.org> [odczyt: 01.09.2014]; Z. Bialobloski, *Stabilnist to efektywnist uradiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy: Monohrafia*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.

Thus, in Azerbaijan during 1991–2014 one can observe the application of two ideological constructions, viz. nationalistic and personalistic. The first was peculiar of the party-governmental system in 1991–1994 and based on the influence of the Azerbaijan National Front (AXC). The second one was initiated by H. Aliyev in 1994 (and formally in 1995) and it still exists under the influence of the personalistic party “New Azerbaijan” (YAP).

In Belarus, due to the mainly non-party representation in the parliament, it is very difficult to determine ideological constructions of the government cabinets. It was especially noticeable in 1991–1996, when there was the parliament, elected as a result of the Soviet system regime in 1990. During this period the constructions of cabinets without ideological affiliation were used. In 1997–2000 agrarian parties (in particular the Agrarian union of Belarus, ASB) were prominent (as a result of a low number of mandates). Since 2000 despite non-ideological orientation of Belarus governments, the influence of communist ideas became more and more marked, especially of the Communist Party of Belarus (PKB), which used modification influence of agrarian (the Agrarian union of Belarus, ASB), and earlier (till 2010) nationalistic parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, LDPB). But in general the ideological component of governments in Belarus is characterized by the absence of strict ideological affiliation.

In Armenia during 1991–2014 several ideological constructions of governments were created: 1) 1990–1995 – with liberal parties support (the National Democratic Union, AZhM; the PanArmenian National Movement, PANM); 2) 1995–2003 – support of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalitions (the Republican Bloc, H³⁷; the “Unity”, M³⁸); 3) since 2003 – together with the leading support of nationalistic parties (the Republican Party of Armenia, HHK³⁹).

Within the context of Georgia in 1991–2014 it is necessary to single out the following types of government ideological constructions: 1) predominance of nationalistic parties’ influence (the “Round Table – Free Georgia”, RT-FG) (during 1991); 2) without ideological affiliation (1992); 3) influence of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalitions (during 1992–1995⁴⁰ and 1995–2003⁴¹); 4) influence of nationalistic parties (the National Movement – Democrats, NM-D, and the United National Movement, ENM) (in 2004–2012); 5) influence of dissimilar-ideological electoral coalition the “Georgian Dream” (KO)⁴² (since 2012).

³⁷ The union between the PanArmenian National Movement (PANM), “Intellectual Armenia”, “Republican Party” (HHK), Christian and Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party (Hu), Democratic Liberal Party (HRAK) was formed.

³⁸ Formed by the Republican Party (HHK) and the People’s Party (HZhK).

³⁹ Used modification influence of other parties: 1) liberal (the “Country of Law”, OEK); 2) socialist (the Armenian Revolution Federation, HHT); 3) personalistic (the Party of Prosperous Armenia, BHK).

⁴⁰ On the basis of political positions of such political forces: 1) electoral coalitions (the Bloc of Peace, BM; the Bloc of “October 11”, 11.10) and others; 2) ecological parties (the Party of Greens, SMP).

⁴¹ In this period the leading one was the coalition of the Civil Union of Georgia (UCG). On the other hand, this bloc positioned itself as a consultative member of the Socialist International, and this affirmed socialist orientation of the political force. The coalition in 1995–1999 used modification influence of such parties as: national-conservative (the National Democratic Party, EDA); regional (the Adzharian Union for Revival of Georgia, DAP).

⁴² Ideological orientation of electoral coalition is not unidirectional. One part positions itself as pro-market and pro-western liberal, and

In Moldova during 1991–2014 the following ideological models of government cabinets can be singled out: 1) with predominant influence of religious parties (the Popular Front of Moldova, FPM⁴³) 1991–1992; 2) with predominant influence of agrarian parties (the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, PDAM) in 1992–1998⁴⁴; 3) with predominant influence of socialist parties (the Party of Democratic Forces, DFP; and the Democratic Party of Moldova, PDM) in 1998–2001⁴⁵; 4) as a result of influence of communist party (the Communist Party of the Moldova Republic, PCRM) in 2001–2009; 5) with influence of liberal parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, PLDM; Liberal Party, PL; the Alliance “Our Moldova”, AMN⁴⁶), since 2009.

In Russia during 1991–2014 existed the following ideological constructions of government cabinets: 1) predominance of nationalistic parties (the Democratic Party of Russia, DPR⁴⁷) – in 1991–1993; 2) without ideological affiliation and predominance of certain types of ideological parties in government cabinets, and in constructions of government support (partial influence of such families of ideological parties as liberal (the “Choice of Russia”, VR; the Party “Apple”, Yabloko; the “Democratic Choice of Russia”, DVR), socialist (the Agrarian Party of Russia, APR; the Party of Russian Unity and Consent, PRES; the party “Our Home – Russia”, NDR; the Interregional movement “Unity”, Y), communist (the Communist Party, KPRF) and personalistic (the party “Go Ahead Russia!”, V-R) was observed) – in 1994–1999; 3) predominance of socialist parties (the “Fatherland – the Whole Russia”, OVR; the Interregional movement “Unity”, Y) – in 2000–2003; 4) predominance of personalistic and conservative party (the “United Russia”, ER), since 2003⁴⁸.

another as radically nationalistic with elements of xenophobia rhetoric.

⁴³ The modification by the members of the former (abandoned in 1991) Communist Party of Moldova (PCM) took place.

⁴⁴ The governments were usually modified by the electoral coalitions (the Electoral Alliance “Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals”, BTI) and religious parties (the Electoral Bloc “Alliance of the People’s Christian and Democratic Front”, FPCD).

⁴⁵ The cabinets during this period were modified by the influence of the conservative bloc “The Democratic Convention of Moldova” (CDM).

⁴⁶ The governments were formed under the influence of socialist parties (social-democratic parties), in particular, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM).

⁴⁷ Due to the prohibition of the Communist Party of the USSR (KPRS), the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was considered to be the one, which had the majority of party mandates in the parliament during 1991–1993.

⁴⁸ T. Brader, J. Tucker, *The emergence of mass partisanship in Russia, 1993–1996*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 69–83.; P. Chaisty, Party Cohesion and Policy-Making in Russia, „Party Politics“ 2005, vol 11, nr 3, s. 299–318.; S. Del, *Parties, Media Control and Power in Post-Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan*, Paper presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin 30 August – 1 September 2010.; G. Golosov, Who survives? *Party origins, organizational development, and electoral performance in post-communist Russia*, „Political Studies“ 1998, vol 46, nr 3, s. 511–543.; H. Hale, *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2006.; J. Ishiyama, „Red versus expert“: *candidate recruitment and communist party adaptation in post-Soviet politics*, „Party Politics“ 1998, vol 4, nr 3, s. 297–318.; H. Kitschele, R. Smyth, *Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging Postcommunist Democracies: Russia in Comparative Perspective*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 2002, vol 35, s. 1228–1256.; H. Oversloot, R. Verheul, *Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia*, „Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics“ 2006, vol 22, nr 3, s. 383–405.; J. Pammert, J. DeBardleben, *Citizen orientations to political parties in Russia*, „Party Politics“ 2000, vol 6, nr 3, s. 373–384.; J. Riggs, J. Schraeder, *Russia’s Political Party System as a (Continued) Impediment to Democratization: The 2003 Duma and 2004 Presidential Elections in Perspective*, „Demokratizatsiya“ 2005, vol 13, nr 1, s. 141–151.; M. Urban, V. Gelman, *The development of political parties in Russia*, [w:] K. Dawisha, B. Parrott (eds.), *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 175–219.

In Ukraine during 1991–2014 were formed the following ideological constructions of governments: 1) predominance of communist ideology during 1991–1994 (on the basis of composition of the parliament, formed in 1990, and as a result of the Communist party formation, KPU); 2) without ideological affiliation and predominance of certain types of ideological parties in government cabinets, in constructions of government support (partial influence of such families of ideological parties as: agrarian (the Peasant Party of Ukraine, SelPU; the Peasant Bloc, SB), nationalistic (the National Movement of Ukraine, NRU), socialist (the Socialist Party of Ukraine, SPU; the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine, NDPU) and liberal (the All-Ukrainian Association "Community" (Hromada), VOH) was observed) in 1994–2001; 3) the period of predominance of social parties (SPU, NDPU and the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o)) – in 2001–2002; 4) predominance of electoral coalitions – in 2002–2005⁴⁹, 2005–2006⁵⁰ and 2007–2010⁵¹; 5) predominance of parties of socialist orientation (social democratic) in 2006–2007 (the Party of Regions, PR, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, SPU, the influence of the left Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU, should be mentioned as well)⁵² and since 2010 (predominant influence of the Party of Regions, PR, limited influence of the Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU)⁵³; 6) predominance of electoral coalitions since 2014.

In relation to democratizatonal and authoritarian processes in Eastern European countries, one rather interesting conclusion can be observed – in the countries, which are striving

⁴⁹ In accordance with the influence of the Bloc «For United Ukraine» (ZYU), formed on the basis of such families of ideological parties: 1) agrarian – the Agrarian Party of Ukraine (APU); 2) socialist – the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (PPPU), the "Labor Party of Ukraine" (TU), the Party of Regions (PR) (at that time was rather close to the principles of social-democracy). Also there was support on the basis of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united). Therefore, the shift of support towards the left ideological centre took place.

⁵⁰ In accordance with the influence of the Bloc «Our Ukraine» (ZYU), formed on the basis of such families of ideological parties: 1) nationalistic – the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), the People's Movement of Ukraine (NRU), the Christian People's Union (HNS), the Ukrainian People's Movement (UNR); 2) liberal – the Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU), the Party "Reforms and Order" (PRP), the Party "Solidarity" (Sol); 3) religious – the Republican Christian Party (RHPU), the Party "Go Ahead, Ukraine!" (VU); 4) parties without ideological affiliation. Besides, during this period the governments were formed under the influence of the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), the "Fatherland" (B) (till 2007), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (PPPU) – mostly of socialist orientation.

⁵¹ In accordance with the influence of the electoral coalition "Yuliia Tymoshenko's Bloc" (BYT), which was formed on the basis of the following families of ideological parties: 1) nationalistic – the Ukrainian Platform "Sobor" (Sob), the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), 2) social democratic – the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP); 3) conservative – the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP); 4) religious – the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UHDP); 5) liberal conservative – the Party "Fatherland" (B). Ideological affiliation of the party "Fatherland" is extremely interesting. Till 2007 it had been left-centrist political force, but in 2008 became the observer of the European People's Party (EPP), and then the associated member of the International Democratic Union (IDU). Consequently, this party should be determined now as liberal-conservative, pro-European or moderate-conservative, the ideological positions of which get into the boundaries of right-centrism. However, in 2007–2010 the dissimilar ideological character of the electoral coalition "Yuliia Tymoshenko's Bloc" (BYT) was generally noticed. Besides, the influence of another also dissimilar-ideological electoral coalition "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense" was observed.

⁵² Due to the modified influence, parties of the following orientation: communist – the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU); socialist – the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). During this period the Party of Regions is considered to be close to the socialist and democratic ideals, though it has mainly revealed since 2010.

⁵³ Due to the modified influence, parties of the following orientation: communist – the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU); electoral coalitions – Lytvyn's Bloc (the People's Party (NP) and the party "Strong Ukraine" (SU)), which were close to the centrist positions. The peculiar place was occupied by the dominating governmental force – the Party of Regions. In 2010–2013 it should have been interpreted as a left-centrist social democratic one.

for establishing and consolidation of democratic political regimes, the role of liberal, agrarian and religious parties or parties with right-centrist ideological orientation, as the constituent of government activity, grows. As opposed, in the countries, which aim at conservation of current authoritarian and hybrid regimes, grows the role of communist and personalistic political forces. The conclusion, concerning socialist/social democratic and nationalistic parties within the composition of the government or support of the government in Eastern European countries is ambiguous, as such parties interpret themselves as intermediate between two declared political regimes and governmental policy in the countries of region. It is interesting, that centrist parties, especially in the context of government activity and support, are not native to Eastern European countries (in particular, in the interpretation, which is popular in the West). It can be explained by numerous factors, for instance by transition period, instability of party systems, and young party and electoral systems. Besides, centrist parties are also personalistic. But the biggest problem is the existence of government cabinets without ideological affiliation in some Eastern European countries. Their practice should have corresponded the process of non-party governments formation (in particular of technocratic type), but in Eastern European countries this process is reduced to the problem of determination of the ideological vector of government (pro-government) parties. All these prove general weakness of party system development in the region. As opposed in Eastern European countries non-party governments are very often personalistic. Personalization of party systems is a result of the peculiar process of presidential elections⁵⁴ and leads to the weakness of party systems. The point is, that under such conditions the process of party formation occurs on the basis of rivalry during presidential elections (one can observe the dependence of parliamentary parties formation on the fact that at first these parties were created as “satellites” in the course of presidential elections⁵⁵, and the leading role belongs to the “customer-based relations”⁵⁶).

One of the problems of strict ideological positioning of governments in Eastern European countries, in particular in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia (earlier in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine), lies in the fact that among the governments, which were formed in the region during 1991-2014, non-party governments prevail. Traditionally, among them one singles out two types – governments, formed by experts (usually they are interpreted as technocratic, technical, transitional or auxiliary, as the expert constituent of such governments and appointments

⁵⁴ J. Linz, *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 11.; S. Mainwaring, L. Torcal, *Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democracy*, [w:] R. Katz, W. Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, Wyd. Sage Publications 2006, s. 204–227.; S. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of Brazil*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1999.; D. Samuels, *Prezidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior*, „Comparative Political Studies” 2002, vol 35, nr 4, s. 461–483.

⁵⁵ H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, G. Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Competition*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; E. Sulciman, *Presidentialism and political stability in France*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 137–162.

⁵⁶ S. Piattoni, *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2001, s. 205–206.

within them are primary and mostly depend on parliamentary support of several parties) and non-party governments (in which the role of expert appointments in departments is of small and secondary importance, and governments are supported by predominant or hegemonial parties, which possess absolute and independent majority in parliaments). The former (they are not peculiar of Eastern Europe, though were applied in Moldova and Georgia) are usually based on partial or full support or delegation from several parliamentary parties, which cannot create party government, i.e. depend on parliamentary and party constituents, however the crucial role in such government formation is the ability to solve efficiently all tasks, raised for the cabinet of ministers or separate ministers (especially in the context of system reforms and avoidance of political crisis). It means, that in such governments some ministers-experts, being technocrats, at the same time can represent certain party and ideological motives of those political forces, which support them. The latter (they usually represent the phenomenon of non-party governments in Eastern Europe and permanently are native to Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, and earlier were peculiar of Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine) in the process of their initialization and formation are focused on exclusion of any or all party and ideological components, as in their presence the ability to solve effectively the tasks, imposed before the government, is usually predetermined on the basis of its non-party composition. The additional peculiarity of ideological constituent of such governments activity (being more precise its formal absence) in eastern Europe is the fact that non-party character of the government is a stabilizing factor of power systems and current political regimes. It is especially actual in the context of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, which apply practice of the “absence” of ideology within the frames of non-party governments formation (not as cabinets of experts) as a stabilizing factor of authoritarian/personalistic political regimes. The common conclusion, adherent to all expert governments (technocratic governments) and non-party governments in the light of attribution to ideology, is that predominant (in comparison with party governments) absence of ideological commitments and obligatory party principles of such governments activity, transform institutional loyalty of non-party and technocratic governments into one, which is especially dependent on the sanctions and rules, mentioned in the constitution.

However such reasoned “biased” aloofness of governments from ideology leads to the interdependent result of the political process, as technocratic and non-party governments are marked by the existence of party-electoral systems weakness and the absence of institutional stimuli to consolidate the latter, and vice versa – party-electoral systems stay uninstitutionalized and undeveloped as a result of permanent formation of technocratic and non-party governments. It gives an opportunity to make a conclusion, that the absence of rivalry within the environment of party ideologies (in particular in the context of government cabinets formation), especially within the systems, characterized by technocratic and non-party governmental cabinets, leads to formation of party-electoral systems, which are established not on the

basis of ideological, but of customers lines⁵⁷ (it does not refer to Moldova, where technocratic cabinets were formed extremely rarely). It is rather actual for nondemocratic, especially authoritarian, political regimes in Eastern European countries, where the “absence” of ideology (in political party interpretation), within the context of government cabinets activity, must be considered as manifestation of loyalty to the political regime, ability to participate in strategic manipulations and the idea of adherence to the specific (ruling) political rhetoric or the so called ideology of “political class”.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned, that nowadays in Eastern Europe the ideological constituent of governments activity in most cases is a secondary one (the exception is Moldova, and to some extent Ukraine and Georgia). It makes clear, that democratization of political regimes contributes to ideologization of government cabinets, however authoritarianization of political regimes leads to de-ideologization and personalization of governments. In Eastern Europe, according to the character of government cabinets support, predominate personalistic patterns (Azerbaijan, Russia), and constructions on the basis of dissimilar ideological electoral (Georgia) and parliamentary (Ukraine) coalitions. As of 2014 such classical ideological patterns as the constituents of government cabinets activity were reflected in Armenia (nationalism) and Moldova (liberalism). Belarus is predetermined by permanent non-ideology, i.e. the absence of ideological affiliation of political forces and politicians, who form and support government cabinets.

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⁵⁷ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, „Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr 4, s. 447–472.; O. Prot-syk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, „Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077–1095.

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The Influence of Social Factors on the Electoral Success of the Labour Party of the United Kingdom in the late XX century

The article is dedicated to analyzing the social factors, which influenced the electoral process and the election results of 1997 in the United Kingdom. The author highlighted the features of the socio-political system of the United Kingdom of the late twentieth century and determined the social changes, which affected the electoral behavior of voters on the eve of the 1997 elections.

Keywords: psephology, electoral behavior, party identification, class voting, frozen political system, the Labour Party, the party system of the United Kingdom.

Чорняк З.С. Вплив соціальних чинників на електоральний успіх Лейбористської партії Сполученого королівства наприкінці ХХ ст.

У статті проаналізовані соціальні чинники, що вплинули на характер виборчого процесу та результат виборів 1997 року у Сполученому королівстві. Окреслено особливості соціально-політичного устрою Сполученого королівства наприкінці ХХ ст.. Виокремлено соціальні зміни, що вплинули на секторальну поведінку виборців напередодні виборів 1997 року.

Ключові слова: псефологія, електоральна поведінка, партійна ідентифікація, класове голосування, заморожені політичні системи, Лейбористська партія, партійна система Сполученого королівства.

After World War II, the British political landscape was dominated by two political parties – the Conservative and Labour Party of the United Kingdom. At a more or less regular turnout of 70%, the total number of votes cast for the two parties was around 90%, which according to the United Kingdom electoral system meant about 98% of the seats in the parliament. Psephologists noted that the nature of party affiliation and identification did not change significantly until the 1970's. What varied was the number of voters present at the election. However, in the late 1970s, researchers noticed that the British electorate became less-predictable. Research pointed out that the Labour Party began attracting votes of an electorate, which was “unconventional” for it. These changes affected the electoral success of the Labour Party in the

late XX century. In this article we have tried to find out which factors influenced the change in voting behavior of the British voters.

In the second half of the XX century psephologists pointed out that the nature of electoral behavior of voters, depends largely on a wide range of factors - social class, age, gender, place of residence, religion, race and ethnicity, but stressed that social class had the greatest impact on electoral behavior. This led the Austrian scientist P. Pulzer to write in his book *Political Representation and Elections* (1967) that “class is the basis of British party policies: all else is embellishment and detail.” (Pulzer, 1967) Indeed, till the end of the 1970’s, the party system of the United Kingdom was a classic example of a S. Lipset’s and S. Rokkan’s (1967) *frozen party system*¹. The British society was ruled by deeply rooted socio-political divisions and political parties successfully used these divisions for their electoral purposes, which also helped maintain this steady polarization.

These patterns of political behavior, namely the relationship between social class and voting behavior were explained and expressed in the *identification model of voting behavior*, which arose from the studies conducted in the 1940’s and 1950’s at the University of Michigan, and was significantly developed by D. Butler and D. Stokes (1974).

The research and findings led the scientists to the following conclusions:

- About 90% of respondents identified themselves with a certain party and this picture has remained fairly stable during the elections, and sometimes throughout life. The growth of “bias” with age was also identified.
- There was a significant and stable correlation between the electoral behavior of the respondents with party identification.²
- The majority of respondents were willing to “self-identify” themselves with a particular class (working class, middle or upper class)³

When respondents were asked about their social status and class, this subjective data was compared with the objective data on their class, according to employment and income. By comparing the data side-by-side, the researchers did not find a perfect match. However a large percentage of data did indeed match, although there were some differences. After obtaining

¹ *Frozen party systems*, is a concept developed by S. Lipset and S. Rokkan, according to which the modern party systems do not undergo changes since their introduction in the 1920’s. After studying the party system of the 70s, these authors argue that it reflects the structure of sociopolitical divisions that existed half a century earlier.

² For example during the 1963 local elections 85% of the Conservative electorate, 95% of Labor voters and 88% of the Liberal electorate voted in accordance to their party identification.

³ Generally, the definition of social class and its determinants is a complex and broad issue. However, the researchers of the aforementioned period did not greatly resort to detail, typically characterizing classes according to employment areas (A, B, C1, C2, D, E). A - Higher professional, managerial and administrative; B - Intermediate professional, managerial and administrative; C1 - Supervisory, clerical and other non-manual; C - Skilled manual; D - Semi-skilled and unskilled manual; E - Residual including casual workers, dependents on the state).

empirical data, the researchers concluded that a strong correlation between class and voting behavior during the aforementioned period indeed existed.

Let's try to analyze how this behavior was explained, according to the identification model:

D. Butler and D. Stokes (1974) believed that the majority of voters of this time period had "very limited knowledge and understanding of key policy issues and the British economy" (Butler & Stokes, 1974) and that their understanding of party policy was based on a spectral division (right, left and centrist). The scientists noted that the voters conducted the analysis of various parties not based on their own values, but through a social filter. This led to the conclusion that "in the United Kingdom of the 70's, social groups were subjects who voted in the election and not individuals" (Butler & Stokes, 1974). For this reason, the "identification model" is often called the social voting model. Although, of course, D. Butler and D. Stokes did not exclude the impact of other more "informal" factors on the choices of, such as short-term issues and events, they viewed long-term social relationships as the main factor of influence.

The *party identification model* dominated in the scientific community, when it came to explaining voting behavior, for quite a long time. However, in the 1970's there started to develop a notion that despite the significant influence of social class on electoral behavior in the United Kingdom, (which exists even today), that electoral behavior cannot be viewed only through the prism of the party identification model. According to this new wave, the traditional social class range could not cover all modern variations and voter sub-groups anymore. The voter himself was also becoming more and more unpredictable. The scientists noticed a change in the way of how voters started to identify themselves. This led them to the idea that since 1970's, because of the growing heterogeneity in society, Britain entered the era of *class dealignment*⁴ and *partisan dealignment*⁵. According to this new wave of scientists, these phenomena occur when voters no longer massively support their "natural" class party. To support their claim they pointed at the significant social changes which happened in Britain, such as the increase of the "white collar" workers (that is, the middle class), and a decrease in employment in amongst the "blue collar" workers (that is, the working class). They also argued that absolute class voting⁶ and relative class voting⁷ started to significantly decline as well.

Class dealignment was first explored and measured, after researchers started observing a decline in absolute class voting. The first attempts to measure absolute class voting and relative

⁴ *Class dealignment* is a phenomenon, which occurs when voters no longer identify themselves with a certain class, for example, when the working class begins to identify themselves as middle class.

⁵ *Partisan dealignment* is a phenomenon, which occurs when voters do not vote according to their traditional class, that is, if, for example, when the working class massively votes for the Conservatives or Liberals.

⁶ *Absolute class voting* is the overall proportion of the electorate who vote for their "natural" class party.

⁷ *Relative class voting* is the relative strength of the parties in different classes.

class voting and other related phenomena, were measured by the so-called *Alford Index*⁸. In the late 80's, A. Heath, R. Curtice and J. Jowell in their study *How Britain Votes* (1985) highlighted the need for a more detailed formula for calculation, besides the Alford Index and proposed *The Odds Ratio*⁹. With this new formula the researchers could calculate the odds of people from "opposite" classes voting for the opponent-party.

Class dealignment was also studied I. Crewe (1984), who explained this issue, though the affiliation of voters with the "new" or the "old" working class. He divided the Labour electorate into two parts, according to a number of criteria and their inherent characteristics. Based on the 1980's elections, he made an assumption that it is more likely that voters living in the north and/or rented accommodation and/or were members of trade unions and/or working in the public sector (the old working class) would vote for Labour, and therefore less likely that voters who lived in the south, and/or owned property, and/or were not union members and worked in the private sector would have voted in support of the Labor Party. I. Crewe (1984) also proposed a similar model for the Conservative Party electorate, suggesting that voters who come from the middle class, with a secondary or incomplete higher education, employed in the public sector are more likely to support Labour in the elections. Based on these assumptions, the scientist later suggested that these voters (middle class) were the ones who most likely supported New Labour in 1997.

Class deviations were also explained by means of a *radical model of electoral behavior* by P. Dunleavy and C. Husbands (1985). This theory combines the traditional model of party identification with *issue voting*¹⁰. These researchers believe that "the main determinant influence on electoral behavior and the formation of class deviation is employment in various sectors" (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985). They believe that regardless of affiliation and education, voters, who work in the public sector, will recognize the Labour Party as a the defender of their rights and needs. Accordingly, those working in the private sector - give priority to the Conservatives.

It is important to try to analyze the causes and effects of *class dealignment* and *partisan dealignment*. We tried to examine and illustrate in our study the different approaches and theories aimed at analyzing the above phenomena:

Class dealignment among the working class can be explained through a number of potential causes and factors, like: social changes in the structure of the class, especially the working class, the erasing of boundaries between the public and private sector, access to other areas of work, which made it possible to advance up the pyramid of class and so on. The influence of

⁸ *The absolute class voting* index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of middle class voters, who vote for Conservatives, from percentage of the working class, who vote Labour.

⁹ *The Odds Ratio* is calculated by taking the odds of a middle class person voting for the Labour Party, divided by the odds of a working class person voting for the Labour Party. The Conservative index is calculated the same way, but with "mirrored" variables.

¹⁰ *Issue voting* – is a type of voting behavior, when voters vote for a particular issue of policy, regardless of the party which presents it.

the above mentioned factors started to become more and more prominent in the late 50's and 60's. During the elections of 1951, 1955 and 1959, many working class voters did not consider themselves as working class anymore, so consequently did not support the Labor Party, which at that time looked like a traditional proletarian party. However, the Labour failures of the 60's were not simply influenced by class dealignment. A great role was played by the changes in *party loyalty* of Labour and Conservative voters. According to the polls, conducted by J. Goldthorpe and D. Lockwood (1969), who also paid special attention to the class dealignment issue, 80% of their respondents from different classes, actually voted in accordance with his class. However the Labour electorate was more tenuous and started to become less loyal to their party. In other words, specific political events or changes in party policy, made the Labour voters rapidly change their loyalty. Later on, these types of voters became known as *deviant* voters.

The 1979 elections marked a significant decrease in Labour support, when only 41% of the C2 voters and 49% of the DE voters (the largest groups of Labour support) voted for the Labor Party. In 1983, Labour lost voters again, but this time their electorate "ran away" to the Liberals. According to above mentioned data, we can speculate that J. Goldthorpe and D. Lockwood (1969) were right about the increase of deviant voters among the Labour electorate. This can be explained by the fact that M. Thatcher, despite the relatively strong meritocratic position, was able to raise the standard of living of many workers. This "traditionally" Labour electorate, benefited from M. Thatcher's politics and continued voting for the Conservatives, confirming that amongst the ranks of Labour voters there exists a significant proportion of deviant voters and voters with a shaky party loyalty. These voters preferred the Conservatives over Labour in the 1980's, because the Conservatives proposed a more attractive policy. On the other hand, there exist other groups of scientists who do not fully support J. Goldthorpe's and D. Lockwood's (1969) statement about the "embourgeoisment" of the working class in the 80' and 90's, because objective research also pointed to a rise in social inequality at this time.

In order to explain the partisan dealignment phenomenon, it would be appropriate to distinguish two groups of factors, which influenced the decline of party identification: long-term sociological factors and short-term political factors. We considered several most important ones, which in our view, would help better characterize this approach.

Social factors:

- Rising incomes of the working class;
- The decline of traditional proletarian communities;
- The development of the "new working class" and the growing importance of sectoral divisions among the working class;
- The deformation of traditional process of political socialization;

- Access to alternative sources of information and alternative views, which occurred because of a more active intersection of social groups, inter-class marriages and dating, etc., which significantly reduced the traditional party loyalty.

Political factors:

- Since 50-60's the role of media began to grow, giving individuals access to alternative sources of information. Viewing various analytical broadcasts shook the foundation of the party identification of voters, hence weakening the traditional party loyalties.
- At the end of 1960's and 1970's, voters in the United Kingdom started judging the parties based on their ability to reform the economy and ensure a sustainable and positive economic growth. In other words, party identification during the corresponding periods of history was influenced by so-called *valence issues*.
- The changes in party leadership, the changes in party ideology and policy and the way how parties handled the economy after each election played a great role in determining electoral behavior.

Besides the above mentioned factors, it is also worth noting that there were many other factors, which added to the changes in voting behavior. Voting behavior is a very complex issue, and cannot be simply explained by a few factors, so it is very important to consider other possible influences, like changes in *priority values* of voters for example. With the gradual growth of income in the country, voters began to pay more attention to *post-material values* such as ecology, quality of life, civil rights, nuclear disarmament etc. Many voters did not view any of the dominant parties as competent subjects, regarding the above mentioned issues, which led to the weakening of party identification, promoting instead a greater involvement in pressure groups.

The end of the twentieth century in the United Kingdom was a time of great social change. Since the 1970s, due to changes in the structure of employment, access to education and the improvement of quality of life, the share of the working-class amongst the British population dropped from 50% to 33%. The share of middle-class, on the other hand, greatly increased. The increase in education and the development of mass media formed a new social group of people, who started to analyze the parties and their policies. This group of people started voting for specific policies and issues, instead of voting for "a party". A growing share of these so-called "deviant" voters was effectively used by the Labour party in the end of the XX century. Labour aimed their new policies at these people, in order to attract them and to gain their votes. This was achieved by creating a universal centrist election program, which managed to cover the entire social spectrum of voters and engage the support of deviant voters.

To summarize, the following should be noted: the period of 1945-1970 in the United Kingdom can be described as a period of *electoral stability* and *strong party identification*, in terms of electoral behavior. This period can also be described as a period of *class voting*. Since the 1970's, Britain entered a new era, known as the period of *class dealignment*, which features

an increase in the share of voters who do not vote according to their “natural” social class. Since the late 1970s a relatively large minority of voters, began voting unexpectedly and unpredictably (so-called *deviant voters*). This attracted the attention of researchers towards more “informal” factors of influence on electoral behavior.

The relatively stable period of 1945-1970 was replaced by a period of *increasing electoral volatility*, which, in our opinion, continues to this day. The growth electoral volatility triggered a *decrease in party identification* and the shift of voters focus towards post-material values. In the late twentieth century the Labour Party successfully analyzed the social changes, which occurred in Britain and moved towards centrist policies. This way they managed to attract an electorate, from social strata which were was not typical for her. This move was risky, but electorally justified - the Labour Party won the elections of 1997 and lasted in power for three consecutive terms.

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Etnolingwistyczne aspekty podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie

W artykule przeprowadzono analizę struktury etnicznej i lingwistycznej ludności Ukrainy z uwzględnieniem zróżnicowania regionalnego i trudności w zdefiniowaniu pojęcia języka ojczystego. Autorka wyznaczyła przyczyny transformacji etnolingwistycznej heterogenności ukraińskiego społeczeństwa w jeden z czynników podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jej wpływu na zjawisko separatyzmu w południowo-wschodniej części kraju.

Słowa kluczowe: podział socjopolityczny, podział etnolingwistyczny, język ojczysty, separatyzm

Ethnolinguistic aspects of the sociopolitical cleavage in Ukraine

In this article the analysis of the ethnic and linguistic structure of the Ukraine's population, considering the regional differentiation and difficulties with the definition of native language has been provided. The author defined the reasons of the transformation of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity of the Ukrainian society into one of the factors of sociopolitical cleavage in Ukraine, with special consideration of its influence on the phenomenon of separatism in the South-Eastern part of the country

Keywords: sociopolitical cleavage, ethnolinguistic cleavage, native language, separatism

Od samego początku istnienia niepodległego państwa ukraińskiego wielu badaczy zwraca uwagę na położenie tego kraju na granicy kręgów cywilizacyjnych. Problem ten znajduje swoje wyraźne odzwierciedlenie w życiu politycznym kraju. Z jednej strony, przyczyniają się do tego technologie manipulacyjne, stosowane przez ukraińskich polityków w kampaniach wyborczych w celu zaostrenia podziału na linii Wschód-Zachód. Z drugiej strony, należy stwierdzić, że Ukraina jest obiektywnie krajem o zróżnicowanej strukturze etnicznej, językowej, religijnej, a także światopoglądowej, co oczywiście ma wpływ na elektoralne preferencje mieszkańców kraju. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza czynników etnicznych i lingwistycznych w kształtowaniu się podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie. Podział ten występuje i odtwarza się na wszystkich wyborach, odbywających się na Ukrainie od 1991 roku, natomiast w 2014 roku nastąpiła jego transformacja w konflikt zbrojny. Wydaje się, że właśnie kwestie etniczne

i językowe odgrywają pierwszoplanową rolę w istniejącym konflikcie i dlatego warto poświęcić im szczególną uwagę.

Po raz pierwszy zjawisko podziałów socjopolitycznych opisali w swojej klasycznej pracy „Osie podziałów, systemy partyjne oraz afiliacje wyborców” S. Lipset i St. Rokkan, nie dając jednak konkretnej definicji tego zjawiska, a opierając się przede wszystkim na badania empiryczne. Obecnie jako podział socjopolityczny rozumiemy występowanie pewnych różnic między grupami osób w społeczeństwie, które prowadzi do kształtowania się u nich tożsamości grupowej (poczucia odrębności od innych grup) i potrzeby wyrażania jej na scenie politycznej. Oznacza to, że nie wszystkie różnice i konflikty między grupami społecznymi transformują się w podział socjopolityczny. O jego istnieniu możemy mówić tylko wtedy, gdy spełnione są pewne warunki. Istnienie podziału socjopolitycznego możemy stwierdzić wtedy, gdy istnieje związek między grupą społeczną a pewną partią polityczną. Związek ten musi również być trwały: powinien on występować co najmniej w trakcie dwóch następujących po sobie wyborów.¹ Oczywiście, taki podział nie formuje się z dnia na dzień, natomiast przechodzi kilka faz swojego rozwoju.

Ukraiński politolog A. Romaniuk określa trzy fazy formowania się podziałów socjopolitycznych. Pierwsza z nich, latentna, charakteryzuje się istnieniem pewnych obiektywnych odmienności między grupami społecznymi i linii podziału między nimi, co powoduje powstanie w społeczeństwie dwóch lub więcej grup z różnymi interesami. Na tym etapie osoby, należące do poszczególnych grup interesów, nie są jednak jeszcze świadome swojej odrębności od ogółu społeczeństwa. Druga faza formowania podziału socjopolitycznego charakteryzuje się pojawieniem świadomości grupowej. Osoby, należące do określonej grupy społecznej, już nie tylko uświadamiają sobie własne interesy i fakt swojej odrębności, ale także zaczynają postrzegać się w opozycji do innych grup. Trzecia faza charakteryzuje się instytucjonalizacją istniejącego w społeczeństwie podziału – każda z grup zaczyna odczuwać potrzebę istnienia instytucji politycznej, reprezentującej jej interesy. Na tym etapie możliwe są dwa scenariusze – grupa może utworzyć własną partię polityczną, ale może się również zdarzyć, iż już istniejąca partia zacznie reprezentować interesy danej grupy, włączając jej interesy do własnego programu politycznego i publicznie wyrażając swoje poparcie.²

Należy jednak zauważyć, że w nauce politycznej nie ma jednoznacznej definicji pojęcia podziału socjopolitycznego, chociaż termin ten jest wykorzystywany już od ponad 40 lat. W ciągu ostatnich kilku dziesięcioleci pojawiło się kilka głównych koncepcji i interpretacji owego terminu. Jedną z nich można umownie nazwać konfliktologiczną. Niemiecka politolog A. Römmele określa podziały socjopolityczne jako „długotrwałe strukturalne konflikty,

¹ Романюк А. С. Порівняльний аналіз політичних систем країн Західної Європи: інституційний вимір. – Львів: Тріада плюс, 2004. – 392 с., с.39

² Романюк А.С., Сокирка Ю.М. та ін. Від соборності до незалежності: стан та динаміка інтеграції українського суспільства у контексті європейських процесів. – Львів: ЦПД, 2009. – 140 с.

będące przyczyną przeciwstawnych pozycji, które są reprezentowane przez organizacje polityczne, zmagające się między sobą”.³ Według zwolenników koncepcji socjostrukturalnej, do których należą m.in. Bartolini i Mair, podziały polityczne są spowodowane strukturą społeczeństwa. Definiują oni podział socjopolityczny jako „związek pomiędzy strukturą społeczną i porządkiem politycznym” oraz wyodrębniają trzy jego poziomy: empiryczny (czyli istnienie obiektywnej dyferencjacji między grupami społecznymi, która jednak niekoniecznie musi być uświadomiona i nie tworzy identyfikacji grupowej), normatywny (kiedy grupa nabywa świadomości swojej tożsamości i uświadamia sobie konieczność działania) oraz organizacyjny (czyli proces tworzenia się organizacji politycznych, reprezentujących interesy grup, odmienności między jakimi leżą u podstaw podziału socjopolitycznego).⁴ W literaturze spotykamy również koncepcję organizacyjną, zgodnie z którą podział socjopolityczny nie jest po prostu podziałem, który może potencjalnie doprowadzić do konfliktu, natomiast jest zorganizowanym konfliktem wewnątrz społeczeństwa.

Niestety, problematyka podziałów socjopolitycznych na Ukrainie wciąż nie jest wystarczająco dogłębnie zbadana i zwykle ogranicza się zagadnieniami regionalistyki. Analizując istniejący podział socjopolityczny na Ukrainie, należy zwrócić uwagę na liczne przyczyny, które sprzyjały jego powstaniu. W pierwszej kolejności należy uwzględnić czynniki historyczne, ponieważ powstanie podziału na linii „Wschód-Zachód” jest niewątpliwie związane z przynależnością tych regionów do różnych państw w przeszłości oraz z rozwojem odmiennych typów kultury politycznej. Historyczne doświadczenie mieszkańców różnych regionów Ukrainy charakteryzuje się długimi okresami bezpaństwowości i częstymi zmianami przynależności państwowej. W ciągu swojej ponadtysiącletniej historii, naród ukraiński niezwykle rzadko miał okazję żyć we własnym, niepodległym państwie. Po upadku Rusi Kijowskiej, możemy mówić tylko o krótkich okresach ukraińskiej niepodległości w czasie Powstania Chmielnickiego oraz istnienia Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Co więcej, owe organizmy państwowe nie obejmowały wszystkich terytoriów, które można uznać za etnicznie ukraińskie. W ciągu wieków poszczególne ziemie współczesnej Ukrainy były terytorialnie rozdzielone i należały w różnych okresach do Imperium Rosyjskiego, Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, Cesarstwa Habsburskiego, Węgier, Rumunii i Czechosłowacji. Zjednoczenie ziem, wchodzących obecnie do składu państwa ukraińskiego, nastąpiło dopiero w ZSSR. Doświadczenie historyczne, które znajduje swoje odbicie w pamięci historycznej narodu, jest niewątpliwie jednym z najważniejszych czynników formowania tożsamości narodowej. W związku z tym, tożsamość narodowa mieszkańców Wschodniej Ukrainy znacznie różni się od tożsamości mieszkańców zachodnich regionów. Terytorialny podział na „Wschód” i „Zachód” został umocniony polityką państw, do których należały ziemie ukraińskie. Państwa te, zgodnie z klasyfikacją S. Huntingtona,

³ Реммеле А. Структура размежеваний и партийные системы в Восточной и Центральной Европе // Политическая наука. – 2004. – № 4. – С. 30-45.

⁴ Шведя Ю. Р. Теорія політичних партій і партійних систем: Навч. посібник. – Львів: Тріада плюс, 2004. – 528 с, с.398-399

należały do dwóch różnych cywilizacji – europejskiej i prawosławnej. Sam Huntington, analizując problem wewnętrznego podziału na Ukrainie, pisał o ukraińskich terytoriach, wchodzących do składu różnych państw: „Siły odpychania rozdzielały je na kawałki i przyciągały do cywilizacyjnych magnesów innych społeczeństw. To kształtowało u nich poczucie, że są różnymi narodami i należą do różnych terytoriów”.⁵ Ze względu na swoje geograficzne i geopolityczne położenie, naród ukraiński kształtował się na styku cywilizacji, prawosławnej i katolickiej tradycji kościelnej, na skrzyżowaniu kultur. Rozbieżności w doświadczeniu historycznym spowodowały różnice w uczuciowości, mitach i archetypach, a z czasem pojawiły się kolejne czynniki regionalnego podziału, takie jak wartości, mentalność i typy kultury politycznej. U ludności zachodnich regionów Ukrainy przeważa indywidualizm (typowy dla cywilizacji europejskiej), który warunkuje uznanie wartości osoby, orientację na własne cele i umiejętności, a także wybór własnych form gospodarowania, co w sferze politycznej przejawia się w krytycznym stosunku do władzy, często graniczącym z anarchizmem, samoorganizacją lokalnych wspólnot i tworzeniem stowarzyszeń. Natomiast na Wschodniej Ukrainie dominuje mentalność kolektywna, warunkująca orientację na egalitaryzm, przynależność do wspólnoty i wspólne formy gospodarowania, nie nadając wysokiej wartości osobie z jej potrzebami. Kultura polityczna Wschodniej Ukrainy charakteryzuje się orientacją na państwo i służenie w pierwszej kolejności jego interesom, w tym także interesom politycznych liderów. W masowej świadomości można zaobserwować pewną sakralizację władzy, która ma całkowicie odpowiadać za rozwiązanie wszelkich problemów społecznych, jak również za zaspokojenie potrzeb konkretnych osób. Autorytarne formy sprawowania władzy i wykorzystanie twardych metod w celu zagwarantowania porządku i stabilności są tolerowane, idealizowana jest władza „silnej ręki”. W związku z istnieniem znacznych rozbieżności w mentalności i orientacji politycznej Wschodniej i Zachodniej Ukrainy, partie polityczne, które pojawiły się na ukraińskiej scenie politycznej po rozpadzie ZSRR, zwykle tworzyły swój program z myślą o mieszkańcach pewnych regionów, nie licząc na równomierny poziom poparcia w skali kraju. Partie nacjonalistyczne zazwyczaj orientują się na elektorat zachodnioukraiński, natomiast socjalistyczne – na mieszkańców regionów wschodnich. W ten sposób istniejący podział socjopolityczny jest wciąż podtrzymywany i odnawiany przy okazji każdej kampanii wyborczej. Jednym z centralnych problemów, poruszanych przez ukraińskich polityków w ich programach wyborczych, jest prawne uregulowanie statusu języka rosyjskiego (oraz innych języków mniejszości narodowych) na Ukrainie. Ponieważ kwestia ta niezmiennie wywołuje skrajne emocje w ukraińskim społeczeństwie i nie udaje się znaleźć kompromisu, można stwierdzić, że czynnik etnolingwistyczny odgrywa ważną rolę w kształtowaniu i rozwoju podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie.

Złożony proces historycznego formowania ukraińskiej państwowości stał się powodem niejednorodnej struktury etnicznej, lingwistycznej i wyznaniowej ludności Ukrainy.

⁵ Хантингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций и преобразование мирового порядка/Новая постиндустриальная волна на Западе. Антология / Под ред В.А.Иноземцева. – Москва : Academia, 1999, С. 532, с. 244

Niewątpliwie, do najbardziej charakterystycznych i łatwo rozpoznawalnych oznak podziału między regionami Ukrainy należą kwestie językowe. Źródłem lingwistycznego podziału na Ukrainie należy również upatrywać w odmiennym rozwoju zachodnioukraińskich i wschodnioukraińskich tożsamości. Z historycznego punktu widzenia, regiony zachodnie kształtowały się jako przeważnie ukraińskojęzyczne, natomiast na Wschodzie językiem dominującym zwykle był rosyjski. To natomiast jest przyczyną istnienia w społeczeństwie ukraińskim takich tożsamości, jak „ukraińskojęzyczni” i „rosyjskojęzyczni”, które nakładają się na pozostałe czynniki dyferencjacji regionalnej.

Struktura entolingwistyczna ukraińskiego społeczeństwa charakteryzuje się znaczną złożonością, a jej analizę utrudnia fakt, iż tożsamość etniczna nie zawsze przekłada się na biegłą znajomość języka ojczystego i posługiwanie się w nim w życiu codziennym. Wyniki ostatniego spisu ludności na Ukrainie, który został przeprowadzony w 2001 roku, świadczą o tym, iż terytorium kraju zamieszkują przedstawiciele ponad 100 narodów i grup etnicznych, aczkolwiek dominują etniczni Ukraińcy – przynależność do narodu ukraińskiego zadeklarowało 77,8% osób. Najliczniejszą mniejszością narodową są Rosjanie, którzy stanowią 17,3% ludności Ukrainy. Do innych mniejszości należą m.in. Białorusini (0,6%), Tatarzy Krymscy (0,5%), Mołdawianie (0,5%), Bułgarzy (0,4%), Węgrzy (0,3%), Rumuni (0,3%), Polacy (0,3%), Żydzi (0,2%), Grecy (0,2%), Ormianie (0,2%), a także Romowie, Niemcy, Gagauzi i inni.

Tablica 1. Największe grupy etniczne Ukrainy według ostatniego spisu ludności z 2001 roku.

Narodowość	Udział w ludności Ukrainy (2001)
Ukraińcy	77,8%
Rosjanie	17,3%
Białorusini	0,6%
Tatarzy Krymscy	0,5%
Mołdawianie	0,5%
Bułgarzy	0,4%
Węgrzy	0,3%
Rumuni	0,3%
Polacy	0,3%
Żydzi	0,2%
Grecy	0,2%
Ormianie	0,2%

Ukraińcy stanowią większość we wszystkich regionach kraju, za wyjątkiem Krymu, gdzie ponad dwie trzecie mieszkańców deklaruje przynależność do narodu rosyjskiego, natomiast Ukraińcy stanowią około 25% ludności półwyspu. Ponadto, w 2001 roku 12,6% mieszkańców Krymu stanowili Tatarzy Krymscy, jednak należy uwzględnić, iż ich liczebność wciąż się zwiększa. Jest to uwarunkowane dwoma czynnikami: znaczną ilością Tatarów Krymskich

powracających do swojej historycznej ojczyzny po deportacji do krajów Azji Środkowej, która miała miejsce w 1944, oraz wyższy współczynnik dzietności, niż u Ukraińców i Rosjan. Oprócz Krymu, znaczna ilość ludności rosyjskiej zamieszkuje także południowo-wschodnie obwody Ukrainy: dniepropietrowski, doniecki, zaporoski, ługański, odesski i charkowski. Procentowy udział Rosjan w ludności tych regionów waha się od 18% w obwodzie Dniepropietrowskim do 39% w obwodzie Ługańskim.

Najbardziej jednorodnymi etnicznie są obwody Zachodniej Ukrainie gdzie etniczni Ukraińcy stanowią ponad 90% ludności. Wyjątek stanowią obwody zakarpacki i czerniowiecki, ludność których charakteryzuje się większą heterogennością etniczną. Zakarpacie, ze względu na swoje położenie na południe od głównego łańcucha Karpat, przez wiele wieków było odizolowane od reszty ziem ukraińskich nie tylko geograficznie, ale również kulturowo. Region od IX wieku należał do Królestwa Węgier i aż do 1919 roku znajdował się pod władzą węgierską, chociaż większość jego ludności zawsze stanowili Słowianie wschodni. W okresie międzywojennym Zakarpacie należało do Czechosłowacji, by wreszcie wejść do składu ZSRR w 1946, jako ostatni z regionów Ukrainy. Złożona historia Zakarpacie znajduje swoje odzwierciedlenie w jego strukturze etnicznej: 80,5% stanowią Ukraińcy, 12,1% Węgrzy, 2,6% Rumuni, 2,5% Rosjanie, stosunkowo liczni są również Romowie, Słowacy i Niemcy. Charakterystyczne dla Zakarpacia jest również zamieszkiwanie mniejszości narodowych w dość zwartych rejonach – Węgrzy mieszkają głównie w przygranicznym pasie wzdłuż rzeki Cisy, w którym stanowią zdecydowaną większość, istnieje również kilka miejscowości z prawie wyłącznie rumuńską ludnością, położonych w pobliżu granicy ukraińsko-rumuńskiej. Choć ludność Zakarpacia charakteryzuje się wysokim poziomem tolerancji, wypływającej z wielowiekowego współistnienia różnych narodowości i kultur, zdarzają się konflikty na tle etnicznym między przedstawicielami węgierskiej mniejszości narodowej i ukraińskimi organizacjami nacjonalistycznymi. Kontrowersyjną kwestią pozostaje również przynależność etniczna wschodniosłowiańskiej ludności Zakarpacia. Współcześnie jej większość deklaruje przynależność do narodu ukraińskiego, jednakże przedstawiciele ruchu rusińskiego na Zakarpaciu starają się o uznanie Rusinów za odrębną narodowość i twierdzą, że Słowianie wschodni, zamieszkujący tereny na południe od Karpat, są w istocie Rusinami. W 2006 roku rada obwodu zakarpackiego zwróciła się do Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy z prośbą o uznanie Rusinów za odrębną narodowość na poziomie państwowym, natomiast w 2007 roku rada obwodu samodzielnie postanowiła wpisać Rusinów na listę narodowości i grup etnicznych, zamieszkujących region. Ponieważ jednak, zgodnie z prawem, kwestia uznania tej czy innej mniejszości etnicznej nie należy do kompetencji organów samorządowych, prawny status Rusinów pozostaje niejasny. Postulat o uznanie ich za odrębną narodowość jest uzasadniony o tyle, że zgodnie z ustawą „O mniejszościach narodowych na Ukrainie”, obywatele Ukrainy mają prawo do wolnego wyboru swojej narodowości, a zmuszanie obywateli do zrzeczenia się swojej narodowości w dowolnej formie jest

zabronione.⁶ Dodatkowym argumentem jest to, iż Rusini są oficjalnie uznani za jedną z mniejszości narodowych w Wojwodinie, autonomicznym regionie Serbii, a także, jako Łemkowie, w Polsce.⁷ Ruch rusiński na Zakarpaciu charakteryzuje się zdecydowaną orientacją prorosyjską i jest wspierany przez miejscowych duchownych Ukraińskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego.

Historycznie tereny Północnej Bukowiny, czyli współczesnego obwodu czerniowieckiego, wchodziły do składu różnych państw: Gospodarstwa Mołdawskiego, Cesarstwa Habsburskiego i Rumunii. W 1940 roku region wszedł do składu ZSRR. Podobnie jak w przypadku Zakarpacia, zdecydowaną większość ludności stanowią Ukraińcy (75%), jednak znaczny jest również udział mniejszości narodowych, w szczególności Rumunów (12,7%), Mołdawian (7,3%), Rosjan (4,1%), a także Polaków, Białorusinów, Żydów i innych.⁸ Należy zaznaczyć, że Rumuni i Mołdawianie są często traktowani jako jedna wspólnota narodowa, ponieważ język mołdawski jest *de facto* tożsamy z rumuńskim. Rumuni zamieszkują przeważnie rejony, przylegające do granicy ukraińsko-rumuńskiej (w rejonie hercańskim stanowią zdecydowaną większość – 91,5%), natomiast Mołdawianie stanowią większość (57,5%) ludności w rejonie nowosielickim, graniczącym z Mołdawią. Pomimo etnicznej heterogenności Północnej Bukowiny, w regionie nie obserwuje się poważniejszych konfliktów na tle narodowościowym.

O ile skład narodowościowy ludności Ukrainy i poszczególnych jej regionów jest stosunkowo łatwy do ustalenia na podstawie samoidentyfikacji narodowej obywateli kraju, kwestia podziałów lingwistycznych i ich wpływu na sferę polityczną jest o wiele bardziej złożona. Niejednoznaczny jest sam termin „język ojczysty” – zgody co do jego znaczenia nie ma nawet w literaturze naukowej. Filologowie, mówiąc o języku ojczystym, mogą mieć na myśli: 1) język, w którym rozmawiała matka; 2) język, w który osoba najczęściej słyszała we wczesnym dzieciństwie; 3) język, w którym osoba najwcześniej zaczęła rozmawiać; 4) język, którego osoba najczęściej używa w rzeczywistości; lub 5) język grupy etnicznej, do której należy osoba.⁹ Ukraiński socjolog M.O. Szulha proponuje, by za język ojczysty uznawać ten język, w którym osoba może najlepiej wyrazić swoją kompetencję językową i w którym myśli. Jednakże nie oznacza to, że właśnie tę interpretację pojęcia języka ojczystego mają na myśli respondenci, odpowiadając na pytania na spisie powszechnym i w badaniach socjologicznych. Zdaniem socjologa O. Wyszniaka, z pytań spisu ludności należałoby wyłączyć to, dotyczące języka ojczystego, ze względu na jego niejednoznaczność, i zamienić je pytaniami o język,

⁶ Закон України «Про національні меншини в Україні» <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=2494-12> [28.09.2014]


⁷ Ustawa z dnia 6 stycznia 2005 r. o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20050170141> [28.09.2014]

⁸ Етнічні громади Чернівецької області http://buktolerance.com.ua/?page_id=182 [28.09.2014]

⁹ Шульга Н.А. Базовые принципы и ценности европейских стандартов языковой политики // Проекты законов о языках – экспертный анализ. – с. 12-13

w którym rozmawiali rodzice, i „wewnętrzny język” – czyli język, w którym osoba myśli.¹⁰ Oficjalne dane wspomnianego już spisu ludności z 2001 roku mogą sugerować, że język ukraiński jest dominującym na Ukrainie – 67,5% respondentów wskazało na ukraiński jako na swój język ojczysty, 29,6% – na rosyjski. Jeżeli nawet uznamy te dane za wiążące, możemy zauważyć, że odsetek osób uważających język ukraiński za ojczysty jest niższy, niż odsetek osób identyfikujących się z narodem ukraińskim. Przeciwną tendencję obserwujemy w przypadku języka rosyjskiego – odsetek osób, uważających go za język ojczysty, znacznie przewyższa odsetek etnicznych Rosjan. Osoby, uważające ukraiński za język ojczysty stanowią zdecydowaną większość w zachodnich i centralnych obwodach Ukrainy, szczególnie na Galicji i Wołyniu, gdzie ich odsetek przekracza 95%. Z drugiej strony, w obwodach Donieckim i Ługańskim, a także na Krymie, językiem ukraińskim jako ojczystym posługuje się zdecydowana mniejszość mieszkańców. Najmniej, zaledwie 6,8%, w mieście Sewastopolu.

Table 2. Ukraiński jako język ojczysty (2001)



Źródło: http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8_%D0%B2_%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%96#mediaviewer/File:Ukraine_census_2001_Ukrainian.svg

Jednakże dane spisu ludności nie odzwierciedlają rzeczywistych preferencji językowych Ukraińców. Badania, przeprowadzone grupą „Research & Branding” na początku 2012 roku wśród mieszkańców wszystkich regionów Ukrainy, pokazały, iż jedynie dla 44%

¹⁰ Вишняк О. Мовна ситуація та статус мов в Україні: динаміка, проблеми, перспективи (соціологічний аналіз) – Київ, Інститут соціології НАН України, 2009 – s. 20-21

ludności Ukrainy ukraiński jest głównym językiem, używanym w domu, a dla 42% – w pracy lub w szkole. Dla języka rosyjskiego wyniki wyniosły odpowiednio 35% i 36%, natomiast co piąty respondent zadeklarował, że posługuje się w równej mierze językiem ukraińskim, jak i rosyjskim zarówno w domu, jak i w pracy lub szkole.¹¹ Podobne wyniki pokazują również inne badania opinii społecznej, świadcząc o tym, że nie wszyscy respondenci, którzy nazywają ukraiński swoim językiem ojczystym, posługują się nim w życiu codziennym. Największe rozbieżności między odsetkiem osób, wskazujących ukraiński jako język ojczysty i jako język codziennej komunikacji można zaobserwować u regionach południowych i wschodnich, a także w Kijowie, gdzie w rzeczywistości na codzień językiem ukraińskim posługuje się zaledwie 10-25% ludności. Zjawisko to uwarunkowane jest wieloletnią dominacją języka rosyjskiego w tych regionach, szczególnie w sferach, uznawane za prestiżowe (nauka, prawo, polityka), i jednocześnie przeważnie ukraińską samoidentyfikacją miejscowej ludności. Kolejnym czynnikiem, utrudniającym jednoznaczne stwierdzenie, jaki odsetek ludności Ukrainy posługuje się językiem ukraińskim, a jaki rosyjskim, jest powszechne występowanie tak zwanego „*surżykii*”, czyli mieszanki języka ukraińskiego i rosyjskiego, która najczęściej spotykana jest wśród mieszkańców centralnych regionów. Podsumowując, można stwierdzić, iż wielu respondentów, deklarując ukraiński jako język ojczysty, wyraża swoją tożsamość narodową i częściowo również orientację polityczną, ponieważ kwestie języka ojczystego i urzędowego na Ukrainie są wysoko spolityzowane.

Oprócz ukraińskiego i rosyjskiego, w niektórych regionach Ukrainy w powszechnym użyciu są również inne języki. Są to przede wszystkim węgierski (na Zakarpaciu), rumuński i mołdawski (w obwodzie czerniowieckim i w mniejszej mierze zakarpackim), krymskotatarski (na Krymie), bułgarski (w obwodzie odeskim), a także rusiński – język zakarpackich Rusinów, uznawany przez większość ukraińskich filologów za dialekt języka ukraińskiego. Jednakże istnienie owych „wysp” na lingwistycznej mapie Ukrainy nie ma znaczącego wpływu na podział socjopolityczny w skali całego kraju, ponieważ stosunkowo niewielka liczebność mniejszości, posługujących się językami innymi, niż ukraiński i rosyjski, nie pozwala im znacząco wpływać na życie polityczne kraju. Można zaobserwować lokalne podziały, prowadzące okazjonalnie do konfliktów na tle etniczno-językowym, jak ma to miejsce na Zakarpaciu, jednak nie wychodzące poza granice danego regionu.

Wciąż aktualną i wywołującą najwięcej kontrowersji pozostaje kwestia statusu języka rosyjskiego na Ukrainie, a w szczególności w regionach południowo-wschodnich, gdzie jest on językiem dominującym. Temat ten był szeroko wykorzystywany w kampaniach wyborczych różnych sił politycznych od czasu uzyskania niepodległości przez Ukrainę, co spowodowało ewolucję podziału etnolingwistycznego w jeden z czynników podziału socjopolitycznego.

¹¹ Проект «Мови спілкування українців» http://www.rb.com.ua/upload/medialibrary/PR_Ry_Ukr_2012.pdf [28.09.2014]

Od czasów ogłoszenia niepodległości przez Ukrainę w 1991 roku, problematyka języka urzędowego wielokrotnie stawała się przedmiotem dyskursu politycznego, jednak nadal nie udało się znaleźć w tej kwestii kompromisu. Artykuł 10 Konstytucji Ukrainy, przyjętej w 1996 roku, nadaje językowi ukraińskiemu status urzędowego, jednocześnie gwarantując wolność rozwoju i wykorzystania, a także ochronę językom mniejszości narodowych, zamieszkujących Ukrainę, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem rosyjskiego.¹² W Konstytucji znajduje się również zapis mówiący o tym, że państwo ukraińskie sprzyja nauce języków komunikacji międzynarodowej. Sformułowanie to może brzmieć niejednoznacznie, zwłaszcza dla obserwatora z zewnątrz, ale warto zaznaczyć, że w ZSRR miano „jęzka komunikacji międzynarodowej” należało do rosyjskiego. Można więc uznać, że zapis ten również gwarantuje zachowanie szczególnej roli języka rosyjskiego na Ukrainie. Jednakże, ze względu na powszechność używania języka rosyjskiego na Ukrainie i jego zdecydowaną dominację w niektórych regionach, w programach partii politycznych, orientujących się na elektorat Wschodniej Ukrainy, często pojawia idea nadania mu statusu języka urzędowego lub regionalnego. Na przykład, w programie wyborczym Partii Regionów z 2012 roku znajdujemy postulaty „ustawodawczego zapewnienia prawa obywateli do języka ojczystego” i „nadania językowi rosyjskiemu statusu drugiego języka urzędowego”.¹³ Próba uregulowania tej kwestii została podjęta przez rządzącą wówczas Partię Regionów w 2012 roku, kiedy to uchwalona została ustawa „O zasadach państwowej polityki językowej”. Ustawa, pozostawiając ukraiński jedynym językiem urzędowym, wprowadziła pojęcie „języków regionalnych”, które mogłyby być używane w przypadku, jeśli ponad 10% mieszkańców pewnej jednostki administracyjnej (obwodu, rejonu, miasta lub nawet pojedynczej wsi) deklaruje język ojczysty inny, niż ukraiński.¹⁴ W tym przypadku język ojczysty definiowany był jako „pierwszy język, który osoba opanowała we wczesnym dzieciństwie”. Przewidziane została możliwość użycia na poziomie regionalnym 18 języków, w tym rusińskiego, który tym samym po raz pierwszy został oficjalnie uznany za odrębny język na Ukrainie. Biorąc pod uwagę wyniki spisu ludności z 2001 roku, z prawa do wprowadzenia rosyjskiego, jako języka regionalnego mogłoby skorzystać 10 obwodów południowo-wschodniej Ukrainy, Krym oraz miasto Kijów, na Zakarpaciu językiem regionalnym mógłby się stać węgierski, a w obwodzie czerniowieckim – rumuński. W rzeczywistości nie wszystkie jednostki administracyjne, ustawowo uprawnione do wprowadzenia języka regionalnego, skorzystały z tego prawa. Rosyjski oficjalnie uzyskał status języka regionalnego w obwodach donieckim, ługańskim, dnipropietrowskim, zaporoskim, chersońskim, mikołajowskim i odesskim, a także w Sewastopolu. Język węgierski uzyskał status regionalnego jedynie w dwóch rejonach obwodu zakarpackiego, a rumuński – w jednym rejonie obwodu czerniowieckiego i dodatkowo w kilku sołectwach w obwodach

¹² Конституція України, ст. 10 <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80> [28.09.2014]

¹³ Передвиборна програма Партії Регіонів <http://parliament2012.com.ua/programa-partii-regionov/> [28.09.2014]

¹⁴ Закон України «Про засади державної мовної політики», ст. 7 <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17> [28.09.2014]

czerniowieckim i zakarpackim. Ustawa spotkała się z ostrą krytyką ze strony partii opozycyjnych, a także ukraińskich działaczy nauki i kultury. Rady pięciu obwodów na Zachodniej Ukrainie (Iwowskiego, iwano-frankowskiego, tarnopolskiego i rówieńskiego) przyjęły postanowienie o niewykonaniu ustawy na swoim terytorium, chociaż wprowadzenie w nich języków regionalnych tak czy inaczej byłoby niemożliwe, jako że użytkownicy języka ukraińskiego stanowią ponad 90% ludności. Wśród przyczyn protestów przeciwko ustawie było naruszenie procedury głosowania w parlamencie w trakcie jej przyjmowania, aczkolwiek nie ulega wątpliwości, iż głównym powodem była niechęć części ukraińskiego społeczeństwa do nadania jakiegokolwiek oficjalnego statusu językowi rosyjskiemu. Proces uchwalania „ustawy językowej”, jak również reakcje na nią, dobitnie świadczą o tym, jak głęboko spolityzowana jest kwestia języków mniejszości narodowych na Ukrainie. W społecznym obiorze ustawa od samego początku kojarzona była z Partią Regionów, a niechęć do tej siły politycznej automatycznie przekładała się na negatywny stosunek do idei języków regionalnych. W trakcie kampanii przed wyborami parlamentarnymi jesienią 2012 roku partie opozycyjne, w tym „Ojczyzna” Julii Tymoszenko, wykorzystywały argument jednego języka urzędowego jako czynnika, jednoczącego Ukrainę, chociaż takie spojrzenie mija się z rzeczywistością, gdyż nawet dla obserwatora zewnętrznego oczywistym jest fakt bilingwalizmu ukraińskiego społeczeństwa i ogromnego zróżnicowania regionalnego w tej kwestii. W programie wspomnianej partii „Ojczyzna” przed wyborami w 2012 roku znalazło się sformułowanie: „Nadamy prawdziwy sens statusowi języka ukraińskiego jako jedyne go języka urzędowego”.¹⁵ Natomiast nacjonalistyczna partia „Swoboda” w swoim programie bezpośrednio wzywała do anulowania „antyukraińskiej” ustawy o językach regionalnych i do przyjęcia nowej ustawy „O ochronie języka ukraińskiego”.¹⁶ Ponadto, status języka rosyjskiego i innych języków mniejszościowych na Ukrainie wymaga uregulowania również w świetle Europejskiej karty języków regionalnych lub mniejszościowych, ratyfikowanej przez Ukrainę w 2003 roku. Analiza sytuacji językowej na Ukrainie i prób jej politycznego uregulowania pokazuje, że czynniki językowe odgrywają ważną rolę w kształtowaniu podziału socjopolitycznego. Możemy dokonać podziału ukraińskiego społeczeństwa na grupy ze względu na preferencje językowe i zaobserwować, że użytkownicy języka rosyjskiego (i, w mniejszym stopniu, innych języków mniejszości narodowych) odbierają Partię Regionów (od 2014 roku – Blok Opozycyjny) i Komunistyczną Partię Ukrainy jako swoich przedstawicieli na scenie politycznej, natomiast ludność ukraińskojęzyczna jest bardziej skłonna głosować na partie, które sprzeciwiają się nadaniu jakiegokolwiek szczególnego statusu językowi rosyjskiemu. Te same zależności występują także na wyborach prezydenckich, na których zwykle wylania się dwoje głównych kandydatów, jeden z których reprezentuje rosyjskojęzyczny „Wschód”, a drugi – ukraińskojęzyczny „Zachód”. Różnice między upodobaniami wyborczymi

¹⁵ Передвиборна програма ВО «Батьківщина» <http://parliament2012.com.ua/programa-vo-batkivshhina/>

¹⁶ Передвиборна програма Всеукраїнського Об'єднання «Свобода» <http://parliament2012.com.ua/programa-vo-svoboda/> [28.09.2014]

mieszkańców poszczególnych regionów mogą być wręcz drastyczne. Za przykład niech posłużą wybory prezydenckie w 2004 roku, na których w drugiej turze zmagali się ze sobą Wiktor Janukowycz i Wiktor Juszczenko. O ile w „trzeciej” (czyli powtórzonej po wydarzeniach Pomarańczowej Rewolucji drugiej) turze wyborów W. Janukowycz zdobył 93,54% głosów w obwodzie donieckim, to w obwodzie tarnopolskim W. Juszczenko zwyciężył z wynikiem 96,03%. Zróżnicowanie regionalne elektoratu jest zjawiskiem normalnym i występującym w bardzo wielu państwach, jednakże istnienie takich skrajnych różnic świadczy o istnieniu bardzo głębokiego podziału socjopolitycznego. Sytuacja ta powtarzała się na wszystkich kolejnych wyborach a linia „podziału” pozostawała praktycznie niezmienna aż do 2014 roku, kiedy wskutek aneksji Krymu i wojny na Donbasie zachwiana została równowaga między „Wschodem” i „Zachodem” – siły „wschodnie” straciły sporą część swojego elektoratu, ponieważ wybory nie odbywały się na terytoriach, gdzie owe partie tradycyjnie cieszyły się największym poparciem. Wydarzenia 2014 roku zasługują na głębszą analizę w kontekście podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie, ponieważ wydają się być jego skutkiem.

23 lutego 2014 roku, bezpośrednio po obaleniu prezydenta Wiktora Janukowicza przez siły opozycyjne, Rada Najwyższa Ukrainy uchwaliła ustawę, anulującą wprowadzone w 2012 roku przepisy o językach regionalnych.¹⁷ Decyzja ta wywołała falę negatywnych reakcji wśród mieszkańców Południa i Wschodu Ukrainy, w związku z czym Ołeksandr Turczynow, wykonujący wówczas obowiązki prezydenta, odmówił podpisania nowej ustawy. Wydaje się jednak, że sam fakt próby uchylecia „ustawy językowej” miał katastroficzne skutki dla jedności ukraińskiego społeczeństwa, która była już nadwyrężona na skutek wydarzeń „Euromajdanu”. Zaledwie kilka dni później rozpoczął się proces aneksji Krymu przez Federację Rosyjską. Stwierdzenie, że bezpośrednią tego przyczyną była nieudana próba zmiany przepisów, dotyczących języków mniejszości narodowych, byłoby oczywistą nadinterpretacją. Aczkolwiek wydarzenie to niewątpliwie zostało wykorzystane przez rosyjskie media i propagandę w celu udowodnienia, że nowe władze Ukrainy są wrogo nastawione do swoich rosyjskojęzycznych obywateli oraz że kierują się ideologią faszystowską. Sam fakt, iż kwestia językowa została ponownie podjęta przez ukraińskich polityków w tak krytycznym momencie dla kraju, świadczy o tym, jak wielkie emocje wywołuje ten temat w społeczeństwie. Zrozumieć, dlaczego „ustawa językowa” znalazła się ponownie w centrum uwagi w okresie, kiedy Ukraina przeżywała najpoważniejszy kryzys polityczny w swojej historii, można tylko biorąc pod uwagę głębokość podziału etnolingwistycznego w tym kraju. Politycy partii opozycyjnych znajdowali się pod presją tej części społeczeństwa, która popierała „Euromajdan” i która oczekiwała uchylecia ustawy, nadającej językowi rosyjskiemu oficjalny status na części terytorium kraju, tym bardziej, że wspomniane już programy wyborcze owych partii zawierały obietnicę anulowania „ustawy językowej”. Wśród mieszkańców zachodnich, i w mniejszym stopniu centralnych regionów Ukrainy,

¹⁷ Рада скасувала мовний закон Колесніченка <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/23/7015948/> [28.09.2014]

powszechną postawą jest brak akceptacji dla możliwości urzędowego zastosowania języka rosyjskiego, nawet jeśli miałyby to dotyczyć jedynie części terytorium kraju. Postawa ta wynika po części z lęku przed kontynuacją procesów rusyfikacyjnych, które miały miejsce w Ukrainie SRR, jak również z popularności organizacji nacjonalistycznych, definiujących naród jako wspólnotę etniczną.

Tragiczne dla Ukrainy wydarzenia 2014 roku – aneksja Krymu i działania wojenne na Donbasie – świadczą o istnieniu niezwykle głębokiego podziału socjopolitycznego, którego nie udało się złagodzić żadnej z sił politycznych, rządzących krajem po 1991 roku. Podział ten jest zjawiskiem złożonym i składa się na niego wiele czynników, nie tylko etnolingwistycznych. Ważne znaczenie mają również względy historyczne, geopolityczne, ekonomiczne oraz religijne. Tym niemniej, można zaobserwować korelację między odsetkiem ludności rosyjskojęzycznej i nasileniem nastrojów separatystycznych w regionach Ukrainy. Integralność terytorialna kraju została naruszona w tych trzech regionach, w których jedynie mniejszość ludności deklaruje ukraiński jako swój język ojczysty, czyli na Krymie, a także w obwodach donieckim i ługańskim. Należy również uwzględnić to, że jednym z najczęściej stosowanych przez rosyjskie władze argumentów dla uzasadnienia aneksji Krymu i pośredniego wsparcia dla ruchu separatystycznego na Donbasie jest „ochrona ludności rosyjskiej na Ukrainie”. To z kolei wywołuje szereg pytań na temat granicy między ukraińskim i rosyjskim etnosami, która zawsze była trudna do zdefiniowania. Czy powinniśmy uznawać za etnicznych Rosjan wszystkich obywateli Ukrainy, którzy uważają rosyjski za język ojczysty lub deklarują posługiwanie się nim w życiu codziennym? Jak należy klasyfikować tę część ukraińskiego społeczeństwa, która posługuje się językiem rosyjskim, ale deklaruje przynależność do narodu ukraińskiego i neguje działania władz rosyjskich na Ukrainie? Z pewnością, te kwestie będą łatwiej poddawać się naukowej analizie z perspektywy czasu. Ale już teraz można zaobserwować powstanie i umacnianie się nowej tożsamości – rosyjskojęzycznych Ukraińców, którzy nierzadko reprezentują patriotyczne postawy i gotowość do uczestnictwa w zbrojnej walce na stronie Ukrainy, jednocześnie posługując się językiem rosyjskim zarówno w sferze prywatnej, jak i publicznej. Może to świadczyć o stopniowej transformacji narodu etnicznego w polityczny, w którym oznaką przynależności jest przede wszystkim obywatelstwo i lojalność wobec państwa, nie zaś etniczne pochodzenie.

Jednocześnie koniecznym jest również uwzględnienie procesów, zachodzących wśród innych mniejszości etnolingwistycznych w świetle aktualnych wydarzeń na Ukrainie. Większość Tatarów Krymskich zajęła zdecydowaną proukraińską pozycję w reakcji na rosyjską aneksję ich historycznej ojczyzny, pomimo tego, iż przedstawiciele tej grupy etnicznej posługują się językiem rosyjskim znacznie częściej, niż ukraińskim. W tym przypadku względy historyczne i polityczne wydają się odgrywać o wiele większą rolę, niż etnolingwistyczne i religijne. Z drugiej strony, na Zakarpaciu obserwuje się nasilenie nastrojów separatystycznych wśród Rusinów, którzy wykazują prorosyjską orientację i popierają ideę federalizacji Ukrainy.

Ponownie została również podjęta kwestia ewentualnego nadania autonomii ludności węgierskiej, zamieszkującej południowe rejony Zakarpacia. Idea ta jest propagowana nie tylko przez działaczy politycznych mniejszości węgierskiej na Ukrainie, ale również przez władze węgierskie, które od kilku lat umożliwiają etnicznym Węgrom z Zakarpacia uzyskanie węgierskiego obywatelstwa w uproszczonym trybie. W przypadku mniejszości węgierskiej nie obserwuje się silnej identyfikacji z Ukrainą, co może być związane z naturalną barierą językową i geograficzną bliskością Węgier. Obecnie nie wydaje się, by nastroje separatystyczne na Zakarpaciu mogły prowadzić do oddzielenia regionu od Ukrainy, ale niewątpliwie świadczą one o wadze czynników etnolingwistycznych i ich konfliktogenności. Transformacja narodu etnicznego w polityczny jest procesem długotrwałym, wymagającym zmian w mentalności i sposobie samoidentyfikacji narodowej, więc zróżnicowanie etnolingwistyczne ukraińskiego społeczeństwa prawdopodobnie jeszcze długo będzie jednym z głównych czynników podziału socjopolitycznego na Ukrainie.

Types of cabinets and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies (1990–2013)

The article is dedicated to analysing types of cabinets and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. The author proposed several classifications of cabinets and analysed which types of cabinets in each classification are more stable. The scientist analysed the experiences of 147 cabinets in ten Central and Eastern European countries and argued that majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets, single-party cabinets are more stable than coalition cabinets. The researcher also suggested the logic of different types of cabinets' stability. Special attention was focused on stability of different types of coalition cabinets.

Keywords: cabinet, cabinet stability, party and nonparty cabinets, single-party and coalition cabinets, majority and minority cabinets, minimal winning and surplus coalitions, Central and Eastern Europe.

Віталій Литвин

Типи урядів і урядова стабільність у парламентських демократіях Центрально-Східної Європи (1990–2013)

The issue of cabinet types and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries is largely explored in contemporary political science. It was raised in the studies of such scholars as F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fetzelschloss and P. Harfst¹, C. Conrad and S. Golder², V. Lytvyn³. However, explorations of these researchers usually do not go beyond 2008. That is why they

¹ P. Harfst, *Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties*, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Copenhagen, 14–19 April 2000, 34 s.; F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fetzelschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990–2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, nr 6, s. 869–893.; F. Mueller-Rommel, *Types of Cabinet Durability in Central Eastern Europe*, Paper posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California Irvine 2005, 13 s.; K. Fetzelschloss, *Continuity and Change of Ministers and Ministries: A Comparative Analysis for Eleven CEE Countries*, Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, University of Budapest, September 8–10, 2005, 19 s.

² C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research", 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119–150.

³ V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist kriz pryzmu partiinykh determinant krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriya: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filozofia“, 2009, vol 13, s. 110–118.

need some clarification and expansion, including statistical context. They are necessarily to be implemented given the existing general theoretical parameters of cabinet stability and patterns of cabinet stability in Western Europe, which were revealed in the reserve of such scholars as E. Zimmerman⁴, M. Laver and K. Shepsle⁵, E. Damgaard⁶, D. Sanders and V. Herman⁷, M. Taylor and V. Hermann⁸, G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns and M. Laver⁹, P. van Roozendaal¹⁰, V. Lytvyn¹¹, Z. Bialoblotskyi¹² etc. On this theoretical basis of the study, we aim to clarify and update the parameters of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. Especially in the context of different types of cabinets.

It is clear that there is no equality in structure of cabinets when we try to observe them from party and political determinants. They are divided into *party* and *nonparty cabinets*. Nonparty cabinet formation takes place when parties in parliament cannot agree about formation of single-party or coalition-party cabinet and dissolution of parliament or its lower chamber is undesirable. Such cabinets are technocratic or transitive. They include experts who belong or not belong to parties, but their affiliation with parties has no value. Duration of such cabinets is often insignificant; they spend current affairs until formation a cabinet on a party basis. It also happens that technocratic cabinet is formed to prevent country from crisis, when trust to basic political parties is too low. Therefore, the overwhelming majority among the cabinets of Central and Eastern European countries is constituted with the party cabinets. They make up over 98 percent of all Central and Eastern European cabinets in 1990–2013 (see details in table 1). Thus, there were technocratic cabinets only in Bulgaria (Lyuben Berov cabinet, 1992–1994) and the Czech Republic (Jan Fischer cabinet, 2009–2010)¹³. There were also several party cabinets with nonparty prime ministers. For example, the cabinets of Andres Tarand (1994–1995) in Estonia, Gordon Bajnai (2009–2010) in Hungary, Andris Šķēle (1995–1997 and 1997) and Guntars Krasts (1997–1998 and 1998) in Latvia, Nicolae

⁴ E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.

⁵ M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1998, vol 42, nr 1, s. P. 28–54.

⁶ E. Damgaard, *Cabinet Termination*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Muller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Style in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.

⁷ D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, „Acta Politica“ 1977, vol 12, nr 3, s. 346–377.

⁸ M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, „American Political Science Review“ 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.

⁹ G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, „American Journal of Political Science“ 1970, vol 34, nr 3, s. 846–871.

¹⁰ P. van Roozendaal, *Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability*, Wyd. Thesis Publishers 1992, s. 103–112.

¹¹ V. Lytvyn, *Konseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist“*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriya: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia“ 2008, vol 10, s. 37–42.

¹² Z. Bialoblotskyi, *Stabilnist' ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. Vydavnychiy tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.

¹³ There were also several interim nonparty cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries. For example, the cabinets of Reneta Indzhova (1994–1995) and Marin Raykov (2013) in Bulgaria and the cabinet of Jiří Rusnok (2013) in the Czech Republic. However under traditional requirements we do not include interim cabinets into the comparative analysis.

Văcăroiu (1992–1994, 1994–1996 and 1996) and Mugur Isărescu (1999–2000) in Romania and the interim cabinet of Josef Tošovský (1998) in the Czech Republic. Some scholars interpret them as semi-party cabinets, but they are formed with parliamentary parties and majority of ministerial positions in such cabinets are occupied by the members of the governing parties. That's why we treat them as party cabinets.

Table 1. Types of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)¹⁴

Country	Cabinets	Party cabinets	Nonparty cabinets
Bulgaria	10	9	1
Czech Republic	13	12	1
Estonia	13	13	–
Hungary	10	10	–
Latvia	20	20	–
Lithuania	14	14	–
Poland	16	16	–
Romania	21	21	–
Slovakia	15	15	–
Slovenia	15	15	–
Total (%)	147 (100%)	145 (98.6%)	2 (1.4%)

Žródlo: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

The statistics regulates that the main classification of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries concerns the party cabinets in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of governments. Such cabinets' structuring is carried out by the criterion of cabinet parties' quantity into the next groups: single-party cabinets and coalition cabinets. According to the quantity calculations of the deputies from the cabinet parties, single-party cabinets share on majority single-party cabinets and minority single-party cabinets. Coalition cabinets are also divided into majority and minority cabinets.

Single-party majority cabinets usually form in presidential republics where president appoints ministers from the members of his own party. However, single-party majority cabinets are also often found in semi-presidential republics, parliamentary republics and parliamentary monarchies when one of the parties has an overwhelming majority of mandates in the parliament or its lower chamber. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013,

¹⁴ Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. That is why they were calculated on the basis of party cabinets' classification. This means that semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

single-party majority cabinets were peculiar for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and constituted above 5 percent of all party cabinets (see details in table 2).

Coalition majority cabinets usually form in parliamentary republics, semi-presidential republics and parliamentary monarchies, when any party does not singly manage to get parliamentary majority or to enjoy the support of it. Therefore, a parliamentary party enters a coalition with other parliamentary parties and their representatives in process of cabinet formation and given the necessity of the vote of confidence reception in the parliament¹⁵. Consequently any cabinet resignation does not lead to dissolve parliament and announce new elections in countries where coalition cabinets exist. The head of state in such situation mainly gives the leader of the largest parliamentary party the right to form new cabinet. If any new cabinet is not formed then the right to do it goes to the other party. If the head of state sees that attempts are vain, he/she can dissolve parliament and call an early elections. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013, coalition majority cabinets were peculiar for all countries and constituted above 57 percent of all party cabinets in the region (see details in table 2).

Despite the formal paradoxes of *minority cabinets*, they are actively formed in many European countries after the World War II¹⁶ and after the collapse of the USSR. In Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013, the frequency of minority cabinets' formation is above 37 percent of all party cabinets. Examining the primary factors of minority cabinets' formation, we refer to the remarks of A. Romanyuk¹⁷ that the permission on minority cabinets' formation of parties, which are represented in parliament, can be based on the possibilities of parliamentary committees and commissions influence on the internal and international life of the country. The frequency of minority cabinets' formation also depends on the activity of interests groups in those countries where corporatism received considerable distribution¹⁸. Finally, the character of mutual relations between the parties also takes important role in minority cabinets' formation¹⁹. Therefore, according to M. Laver and K. Shepsle, minority cabinet is a natural way-out from a situation of party competition in a parliament²⁰. K. Strom researches this type of cabinets in the European parliamentary democracies and considers that the practice of minority cabinets' existence has proved that they need to be measured as a normal result of political competition, because

¹⁵ P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics: Second Edition*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998.

¹⁶ M. Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 189.

¹⁷ A. Romanjuk, *Urvady mensosti v krizynach Zahidnoyi Jevropy*, „Visnyk Lvivskoho Universytetu: Filosofs'ki nauky“ 2002, vol. 4.

¹⁸ G. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

¹⁹ M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

²⁰ M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

they are peculiar for many countries²¹. The reason, which predetermines parties to select an opposition variant, is shown in possibilities to realize their party courses.

Single-party minority cabinets are formed by a party, which has no absolute majority in parliament. Coalition minority cabinets are formed by two or more political parties, which totally have no absolute majority in parliament. However, minority cabinet in any case (single-party or coalition cabinet) should get support of the parliament majority for its statement and functioning. Milosz Zeman cabinet (1998–2002) in Czech Republic, Mart Siimann cabinet (1997–1999) in Estonia, Adrian Nastase cabinet (2003–2004) in Romania and other cabinets are the examples of *single-party minority cabinets*. Cabinets of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu in Romania (2004–2006, 2006–2007 and 2007–2008) and Gediminas Kirkilas in Lithuania (2006–2008) are the basic examples of *coalition minority cabinets*. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013, single-party minority cabinets were peculiar for all countries excluding Lithuania and Slovenia and constituted 11 percent of all party cabinets in the region. In return, coalition minority cabinets were peculiar for all countries excluding Hungary and constituted above 26 percent of all party cabinets in the region (see details in table 2).

Table 2. Types of party cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)²²

Country	Party cabinets	Single-party majority cabinets	Single-party minority cabinets	Coalition majority cabinets	Coalition minority cabinets
Bulgaria	9	2	2	4	1
Czech Republic	12	–	2	7	3
Estonia	13	–	2	9	2
Hungary	10	–	2	8	–
Latvia	20	–	1	11	8
Lithuania	14	3	–	8	3
Poland	16	–	2	11	3
Romania	21	2	3	7	9
Slovakia	15	1	2	8	4
Slovenia	15	–	–	10	5
Total (%)	145 (100%)	8 (5.5%)	16 (11.0%)	83 (57.3%)	38 (26.2%)

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

²¹ K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–226.

²² Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

Almost 60 percent of party cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries are constituted with coalition majority cabinets. Coalition cabinet is the most widespread form of cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe. Coalition majority and coalition minority cabinets constitute above 80 percent of all party cabinets, which have been generated in ten analysed Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013. However, party concentration on coalition cabinets' formation is also interesting. Hungary is an indicator in this disposition, because its coalition cabinets are presented only with coalition majority cabinets. Only 2 cabinets were not coalition cabinets in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. Only 1 cabinet was not coalition cabinets in Latvia.

One more classification of cabinets concerns coalition majority cabinets. Parties based on various configurations under conditions of parliamentary majority support can form some variants of cabinets. For the sake of our ideas' explanation we use the approach and the method of cabinet structure. We make an assumption that formation of cabinet coalition demands from its participants to observe the conditions that: a) basic political parties and electoral blocks search for natural associates to form parliamentary majority; b) all parliamentary partners understand basic directions and purposes of their future activity; c) posts and jobs in coalition cabinet are distributed and programs of cabinet activity are coordinated²³. Therefore, coalition majority cabinets should be divided into minimal winning (minimal) coalitions and surplus winning (surplus or undersized) coalitions.

Cabinet is considered as *minimal winning coalition* if it is formed with two and more political parties, which constitute the parliamentary majority in sum of their parliamentary mandates, and if exit of at least one cabinet party from parliamentary majority leads to destruct cabinet majority and coalition cabinet. The theory of minimal winning coalitions suggests that desire to receive a maximum quantity of parliamentary supporters is basic motive of parties' activity. This nomination constitutes the purpose itself. Therefore, winning coalition supervises majority of places in parliament. Therefore, there are no parties, which are not obligatory for majority achievement in structure of minimal winning coalition. For example, the cabinet of Robert Fico in Slovakia was formed with three parties after elections to National Council, which took place on July 17, 2006.

Cabinet is considered as *surplus winning* (surplus or undersized) *coalition* if it is formed with two and more political parties, which constitute the parliamentary majority in sum of their parliamentary mandates, provided with the condition that if party (parties), which has surplus status in coalition, leave parliamentary majority, it does not destruct the coalition majority (although destruct the structure of the coalition cabinet). For example, the cabinet of Viktor Orban in Hungary, which was formed on July 6, 1998.

²³ M. Laver, I. Budge, *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

P. Roosendaal, who investigated the differences of mentioned types of coalition majority cabinets, notices that if there is minimal winning coalition than each cabinet party has identical threat to lose public levers of political influence. In return, surplus party, which voices are not critical, can leave cabinet without forcing it to lose parliamentary majority. The primary causes of surplus coalitions' formations are the following: 1). There is a desire to guarantee clever safety of winning coalition status when some party or parties are not considered as reliable (small surplus parties are involved for the sake of safety²⁴); 2). There are specific institutional conditions that, for example, are illustrated with the condition demands that some parties and groups should be presented in cabinet. A. Lijphart gives the additional reason for surplus winning coalition formation. Every political party desires to occupy the ideological position in the middle of a cabinet and to strengthen its own party position at the expense of cabinet force.

The distinctive types of coalition majority cabinets are *grand coalitions* and *coalitions of national unity*. Grand coalition is a coalition majority cabinet, which is formed and consolidated with the largest and equal (in the electoral disposition) parliamentary parties. The given term is used for countries where two (or more) dominating and relevant parties with different ideological orientations and a number of small parties present parliament. For example, the cabinet of Sergei Stanishev in Bulgaria, formed on July 16, 2005. Coalition of national unity is a coalition majority cabinet, which is formed and consolidated with all or almost all parliamentary parties. The given term is used for countries where all or almost all relevant parties with different ideological orientations combine cabinets all together. For example, the cabinet of Dimitar Popov in Bulgaria, formed on December 7, 1990. It is necessary to consider the reasons for grand and national unity coalitions' formation: a) national (political or economic) crisis when there are conditions and requirements of national unity and stability, and overcoming ideological differences between parties; b) high fragmentation of small parliamentary parties. Grand coalitions are also the result of comprehensions of grand parties that they have much more similar ideas in their ideologies among themselves than among them and small parties. However even despite this, grand coalition and coalitions of national unity structurally are always the examples of minimal winning or surplus winning coalitions.

²⁴ D. Remy, *The Pivotal Party. Definition and Measurement*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1975, vol 3, s. 295–298.

Table 3. Types of coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)²⁵

Country	Coalition majority cabinets	Minimum-winning coalitions	Surplus-winning coalitions	Grand coalitions and coalitions of national unity
Bulgaria	4	2	2	2
Czech Republic	7	4	3	–
Estonia	9	9	–	–
Hungary	8	3	5	–
Latvia	11	5	6	1
Lithuania	8	4	4	–
Poland	11	8	3	–
Romania	7	1	6	2
Slovakia	8	7	1	–
Slovenia	10	6	4	–
Total (%)	83 (100%)	49 (59.0%)	34 (41.0%)	5 (6.0%)

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

The absolute mainstream among coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe is constituted with minimal winning coalitions, which give almost 60 percent of all coalition majority cabinets in all countries of the region (see details in table 3). It is interesting that there were no minimal winning coalitions in Romania in 1990–2008, because it was represented only with surplus winning coalitions. The first minimal winning coalitions in Romania was formed by Emil Boc on December 22, 2008. However, there were no surplus coalitions in Estonia and the only one surplus coalition in Slovakia. Romania and Hungary are the only countries in the region where surplus coalitions constitute an absolute majority of coalition majority cabinets. Instead, there is a parity among minimal winning and surplus coalitions in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania.

Consideration types of cabinet brought us to necessity of their combination with *cabinet stability*. This direction of comparative researches is associated with M. Laver and N. Schofield ideas. They offered the procedure how to determinate cabinet stability and duration depending on the type of cabinet²⁶. Taking into account the ideas of W. Riker²⁷, L. Dodd combined influence of coalition cabinets' types on cabinet stability. Consequently, the scientist checked a hypothesis that duration of cabinet is a measure function, to which it deviates from the minimal

²⁵ Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

²⁶ M. Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 207.

²⁷ W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

support, overcoming its previous status²⁸. This approach smoothly passes into conception and substantiation that means maximum duration of minimal winning coalitions. For example, P. Roosendaal noticed that if a cabinet is minimal winning coalition then each party in a cabinet has an identical threat to lose its powers. On the contrary, the party, which voices are not critical, may presume to leave cabinet, rushing a cabinet resignation. B. Grofman offered a controversial approach and confirmed that relations between minimal winning coalitions and their duration are conditional²⁹. He made an idea that minimal winning status of coalition cannot explain essential changes of cabinet duration within countries. He also approved that relations between cabinet duration and its minimal winning status grow out substantially of high average cabinet duration in countries, where there are only two or three essential political parties and minimal winning coalitions are traditional. In return, low cabinet duration is peculiar for countries with significant amount of parties where minimal winning coalitions are not often.

Proceeding such reasoning, we come up to the conclusions, received by E. Zimmerman: majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets; single-party cabinets are more stable than coalition cabinets; stability of cabinets grows up in minimal winning coalitions, decreasing from big to small coalitions and it is the least in minority cabinets; stability of single-party majority cabinets is higher than stability of minimal winning coalition cabinets, decreasing according to reduction of voices quantity, on which minimal winning coalition leans and is the least if cabinets leans on minority in parliament; cabinet stability decreases, if opposition increases its representation quantity in parliament³⁰.

Based on the analysis of the duration and stability of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013 (see details in table 4), we argue that the cabinets in Bulgaria and Hungary are considered as the most stable. The cabinets in these countries exist on the average more than two years. The cabinets in Latvia, Poland and Romania are the least stable, because the average duration of their offices is close to the rate in one year. On the average, cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries exist 496 days that is a little bit less than year and a half (1.36 year), and it is less than in Western-European consolidated democracies (even less than in these countries during 1945–1990, when cabinets in Western-European countries lasted on average 680 days)³¹. Proceeding from the calculation of cabinet stability indexes, we receive a similar situation. The highest indexes are reserved to Bulgaria and Hungary (more than 0.50), and the lowest indexes are reserved to Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia (less than 0.40). The average index of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern

²⁸ L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.; L. Dodd, *Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game Theoretic Analysis*, „American Political Science Review” 1974, vol 68, s. 1093–1117.

²⁹ B. Grofman, *The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-Country and Within-Country Effects*, „British Journal of Political Science” 1989, vol 2, s. 291–302.

³⁰ E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.

³¹ J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *The Stability of Parliamentary Democracies. Duration, Type and Termination of Governments*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1993, vol 24, s. 108.

European countries constitutes 0.39. It means that most cabinets in the region do not pass half of their legal executive terms and finish before regular parliamentary elections.

Table 4. Cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)³²

Country	Cabinet duration, years	Index of cabinet stability	Party cabinet duration, years	Nonparty cabinet duration, years	Index of party cabinet stability	Index of non-party cabinet stability
Bulgaria	2.10	0.63	2.15	1.65	0.64	0.53
Czech Republic	1.46	0.41	1.50	0.96	0.42	0.25
Estonia	1.48	0.40	1.48	–	0.40	–
Hungary	2.11	0.53	2.11	–	0.53	–
Latvia	0.92	0.31	0.92	–	0.31	–
Lithuania	1.46	0.37	1.46	–	0.37	–
Poland	1.22	0.36	1.22	–	0.36	–
Romania	1.03	0.29	1.03	–	0.29	–
Slovakia	1.35	0.41	1.35	–	0.41	–
Словенія	1.34	0.39	1.34	–	0.39	–
Total	1.36	0.39	1.37	1.31	0.39	0.39

Žródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

It is also clear that party cabinets are more stable than nonparty (technocratic) cabinets. Average duration of party cabinets is about 1.37 year (500 days) while nonparty cabinets last on the average 1.31 year (478 days). However, the indexes of cabinet stability stay down by the analogy: technocratic and party cabinets receive the index 0.39, but it does not influence the frequency rate of different cabinet types' formation. It was argued earlier that technocratic cabinets are not the basic model of governance for the Central and Eastern European countries and we can meet them rarely.

Nevertheless, we received unexpected results, which essence is reduced to the fact that single-party majority cabinets are not the most stable party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe. They last for 0.03 year less than coalition majority cabinets. In return, single-party cabinets (both majority and minority) are more stable than coalition cabinets both majority and minority. Because of it, Zimmerman's conclusion, which successfully works in Western-European countries, partly verifies data in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, another hypothesis is correct, because majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets (see details in table 5).

³² Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

Table 5. Party cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)

Country	Single-party majority cabinet duration, years	Single-party minority cabinet duration, years	Coalition majority cabinet duration, years	Coalition minority cabinet duration, years
Bulgaria	3.01	2.32	1.95	0.93
Czech Republic	–	1.97	1.49	1.21
Estonia	–	1.09	1.56	1.51
Hungary	–	0.96	2.44	–
Latvia	–	1.25	1.11	0.57
Lithuania	1.27	–	1.73	1.00
Poland	–	0.92	1.48	0.56
Romania	0.64	1.14	0.93	1.15
Slovakia	–	0.48	1.86	0.78
Slovenia	–	–	1.90	0.33
Total	1.59	1.26	1.62	0.85

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krain Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

Simultaneously, the hypothesis that stability of single-party majority cabinets is higher than stability of coalition majority cabinets, decreasing accordingly to reduction of quantity of coalition cabinets voices of parliamentary support, and is the least if a cabinet has support from parliamentary minority, also does not work correctly. The matter is that single-party majority cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries usually last for 1.59 year, whereas coalition majority cabinets function more than 1.60 year, although single-party minority cabinets last for about 1.26 year. Because of calculations, we are to make conclusion and characterize Central and Eastern European countries as countries with a partly specific situation in the interpretation of cabinet stability, which appreciably differs from the situation in Western Europe: although majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe last longer than minority cabinets, however one-party cabinets last less than majority coalition cabinets. In addition, minority coalition cabinets are also relatively stable. Therefore, Z. Maoz and B. Russett consider that “minority cabinets are not more limited than majority cabinets”³³. Moreover, minority cabinets can be less conflictive than majority cabinets. B. Prins and C. Sprecher agree with such theoretical statement and try to argue that there is a resistance to the tasks and purposes, which coalitions operate, when there is growth of pressure upon cabinet³⁴. Exploring

³³ Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946–1986*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, vol 87, s. 626.

³⁴ B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946–1989*, “Journal of Peace Research” 1999, vol 36, s. 271–287.

initial system conflicts and analysing competing aspects of cabinet activity, the authors offer to define coalition majority cabinets as more dangerous in institutional conflicts escalation³⁵. This is supplemented with the information that coalition majority cabinets are not the most stable in terms of indexes of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Table 6 argues that the stability of different types of cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe corresponds to the theory of cabinet stability and to the logic of cabinet stability in Western Europe. The difference is that single-party majority cabinets are here more convincible in comparison with coalition majority cabinets. The difference between average indexes of stability of single-party majority cabinets and coalition majority cabinets constitutes 0.02.

Table 6. Indexes of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)

Country	Index of single-party majority cabinet stability	Index of single-party minority cabinet stability	Index of coalition majority cabinet stability	Index of coalition minority cabinet stability
Bulgaria	0.91	0.65	0.60	0.24
Czech Republic	–	0.50	0.40	0.42
Estonia	–	0.28	0.44	0.39
Hungary	–	0.24	0.62	–
Latvia	–	0.54	0.37	0.18
Lithuania	0.33	–	0.44	0.25
Poland	–	0.29	0.43	0.19
Romania	0.28	0.29	0.26	0.32
Slovakia	–	0.21	0.56	0.23
Slovenia	–	–	0.54	0.11
Total	0.48	0.36	0.46	0.25

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

This results in a logical order of different types of cabinets' stability: single-party majority cabinets, coalition majority cabinets, single-party minority cabinets and coalition minority cabinets. However, it also makes us to address K. Strom's ideas that it is necessary to consider that party cabinets' agreements according to the expenses of political parties are the basic motive powers of formation processes and cabinet dissolutions³⁶. The researcher explains that institutions, which considerably affect opposition parties (for example, in parliamentary committees), can characterize countries where minority cabinets are regular. If party benefits from joining a cabinet are doubtful, it will obviously support a cabinet, not entering it. If party

³⁵ M. Ireland, S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, vol 45, s. 547–568.

³⁶ K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

gets surplus benefit through such alternative, it makes a cabinet more desirable and stable. If value of an external choice increases for at least one party in a cabinet, it becomes a necessary condition of cabinet instability. Therefore, the main idea is that cabinet breaks up, when its accessible benefits had been used.

We checked this hypothesis during the analysis of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries. Besides, D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson filled it with the completions³⁷. The authors proved, that the size of the “pie” that is accessible in a cabinet, is also the main determinant of cabinet stability. Majority cabinets finish their existence so often, how often formatter is deviated through the status and position of parties. In return, minority cabinets finish their existence when status-quo is comprehensible for formatter. Therefore, M. Laver and K. Shepsle foresee formation of minority cabinets only in the cases when formatter has strong positions in period of cabinet initiation. Unique theoretical model, which connects party expenses with cabinet unity, does not concentrate on minority or majority cabinets, but pays attention on a unity of legislative coalitions and cabinet expenses³⁸.

Table 7. Coalition majority cabinet duration in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)³⁹

Country	Coalition majority cabinets, years	Minimum-winning coalition duration, years	Additive-winning coalition duration, years	Grand coalition duration, years
Bulgaria	1.95	1.53	2.37	2.37
Czech Republic	1.49	1.69	1.22	–
Estonia	1.56	1.56	–	–
Hungary	2.44	1.87	2.87	–
Latvia	1.11	0.80	1.34	1.13
Lithuania	1.73	2.20	1.38	–
Poland	1.48	1.63	1.13	–
Romania	0.93	0.80	0.95	0.94
Slovakia	1.86	1.58	3.84	–
Slovenia	1.90	2.28	1.15	–
Total ⁴⁰	1.62	1.64	1.58	1.55

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

³⁷ D Diermeier, R Stevenson, *Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events*, “American Political Science Review” 2000, vol 94, s. 627–640.

³⁸ T. Persson, G. Roland, G. Tabellini, *Comparative politics and public finance*, “Journal of Political Economy” 2000, vol 108, s. 1121–1161.

³⁹ Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

⁴⁰ The estimation is based on the arithmetic mean sum of all cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013.

Behind the results of table 7, which displays the third classification of cabinets, which have been carried out to the Central and Eastern European countries, we come to the conclusion, that minimal winning coalitions are considered as the most durable cabinets in comparison with other types of majority coalitions. This result coincides with the research of B. Powell, concerning cabinets in Western-European countries⁴¹. We explain such tendency with the fact that duration of minimal winning coalitions is a measure function, to which coalitions deviate from a minimal support. If cabinet is a minimal winning coalition, then each party in the cabinet has an identical irresistible risk to lose imperious powers. On the contrary, the party, which voices are not critical, may leave a cabinet, thus technically accelerating cabinet dissolution. However, the duration of surplus winning coalitions in Central and Eastern European countries is also essential and differs from minimal winning coalitions only for 0.06 year. Therefore, we should take on attention on the specified designs of coalition majority cabinets as the most perspective.

Concluding, it should be noted that *cabinet stability is an abstract concept*, which is to be defined with help of the following specifications. It is an ability of a cabinet to remain at performance in any situations of shifting from equilibrium's state of political system and to return to the previous condition. We notice two parameters in such definition of cabinet stability. Internal parameter is an infringement of balance based on cabinet contradictions. External parameter is an influence of institutional/contextual criteria of political system.

Based on the techniques and toolkit to define cabinets' types, we carried out comparative analysis of 147 cabinets' stability in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013 (see details in Annex A) and concluded that: 1) party cabinets are the overwhelming majority among cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 2) party cabinets are more stable than nonparty governments; 3) coalition cabinets are the overwhelming majority among party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 4) single-party majority and coalition majority cabinets are the most durable party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe, however single-party cabinets are more stable than coalition cabinets; 5) minimal winning coalitions are the overwhelming majority among coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 6) minimal winning coalitions are considered as the most durable cabinets in a comparison with other types of coalition cabinets.

⁴¹ B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

Annex A

Types and stability of cabinets in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies⁴²

Table A.1 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Bulgaria (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Dimitar Popov	07.12.1990 – 08.11.1991	BSP + SDS + BZNS + n.p.	CMJ/SWC (CNU)	n.p.	371/400	331	0,91	0,69
Philip Dimitrov	08.11.1991 – 28.12.1992	SDS	SPMN	SDS	110/240	410	1,12	0,36
Lyuben Berov	30.12.1992 – 02.09.1994	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	602	1,65	0,53
Reneta Indzhova	11.10.1994 – 25.01.1995	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	104	0,28	0,09
Zhan Videnov	25.01.1995 – 28.12.1996	BSP	SPMJ	BSP	125/240	693	1,90	0,82
Stefan Sofiyanski	12.02.1997 – 20.05.1997	SDS	SPMN	SDS	69/240	98	0,27	0,12
Ivan Kostov	21.05.1997 – 23.07.2001	ODS	SPMJ	ODS	137/240	1502	4,12	1,00
S. Sakskoburggotski (I)	24.07.2001 – 10.03.2004	NDSV + DPS	CMJ/MWC	NDSV	141/240	946	2,59	0,65
S. Sakskoburggotski (II)	10.03.2004 – 21.02.2005	NDSV + DPS	CMN	NDSV	117/240	341	0,93	0,24
S. Sakskoburggotski (III)	22.02.2005 – 15.08.2005	NDSV + DPS + NV	CMJ/MWC	NDSV	141/240	173	0,47	0,11
Sergei Stanishev	16.08.2005 – 05.07.2009	KzB + NDSV + DPS	CMJ/SWC (GC)	KzB	169/240	1399	3,83	0,96
Boyko Borisov	27.07.2009 – 20.02.2013	GERB	SPMN	GERB	116/240	1283	3,52	0,93
Marin Raykov	13.03.2013 – 29.05.2013	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	76	0,24	0,06
Plamen Oresharski	29.05.2013 – acting	KzB + DPS + n.p.	CMN	n.p.	120/240		acting	

⁴² Legend: CD – cabinet duration; d. – in days; y. – in years; ICS – index of cabinet stability; n.p. – nonparty (prime minister, composition of cabinet); SPMJ – single-party majority cabinet; SPMN – single-party minority cabinet; CMJ – coalition majority cabinet; CMN – coalition majority cabinet; MWC – minimal winning coalition, SWC – surplus winning coalition, GC – grand coalition; CNU – coalition of national unity; T – technocratic (nonparty) cabinet; * – refer to the party as part of cabinet, which is not represented in the parliament or is represented in the parliament, but not for the parliamentary elections and because of the results of the political processes in the parliamentary arena. Grey colour allocates interim cabinets.

Table A.2 Features of cabinet composition and stability in the Czech Republic (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions/design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Václav Klaus (I)	02.07.1992 – 31.12.1992	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA + KDS	CMJ/MWC	ODS	105/200	179	0,49	0,12
Václav Klaus (II)	01.01.1993 – 01.06.1996	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA + KDS	CMJ/MWC	ODS	105/200	1230	3,37	0,86
Václav Klaus (III)	04.07.1996 – 30.11.1997	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA	CMN	ODS	99/200	506	1,39	0,68
Josef Tošovský	02.01.1998 – 20.06.1998	KDU/CSL + ODA + US* + n.p.	CMN	n.p.	31/200	168	0,46	0,23
Miloš Zeman	17.07.1998 – 15.06.2002	CSSD	SPMN	CSSD	74/200	1408	3,86	0,98
Vladimír Špidla	15.07.2002 – 01.07.2004	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	706	1,93	0,49
Stanislav Gross (I)	04.08.2004 – 30.03.2005	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	236	0,65	0,17
Stanislav Gross (II)	31.03.2005 – 25.04.2005	CSSD + US/DEU	CMN	CSSD	88/200	25	0,07	0,02
Jiří Paroubek	25.04.2005 – 03.06.2006	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	398	1,09	0,29
Mirek Topolánek (I)	04.09.2006 – 03.10.2006	ODS + n.p.	SPMN	ODS	81/200	29	0,08	0,02
Mirek Topolánek (II)	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	ODS + KDU/CSL + SZ	CMN	ODS	100/200	795	2,18	0,55
Jan Fischer	07.06.2009 – 29.05.2010	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/200	352	0,96	0,25
Petr Nečas (I)	28.06.2010 – 17.04.2012	ODS + TOP09 + VV	CMJ/MWC	ODS	118/200	649	1,78	0,53
Petr Nečas (II)	27.04.2012 – 17.06.2013	ODS + TOP09 + LIDEM (VV)	CMJ/MWC	ODS	101/200	410 1,12 0,33		
Jiří Rusnok	10.07.2013 – 25.10.2013	n.p.	T	n.p.	4/200	105	0,29	0,09

Table A.3 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Estonia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Mart Laar (I)	21.10.1992 – 26.09.1994	RKI + ERSP + SDE	CMJ/MWVC	RKI	51/100	695	1,90	0,79
Andres Tarand	03.11.1994 – 05.03.1995	RKI+ERSP+SDE+P*+n.p.	CMJ/MWVC	n.p.	51/100	122	0,33	0,14
Tiit Vähi (I)	17.04.1995 – 11.10.1995	EKK + EK	CMJ/MWVC	EKK	57/101	174	0,48	0,12
Tiit Vähi (II)	03.11.1995 – 20.11.1996	EKK + Ere	CMJ/MWVC	EKK	60/101	377	1,03	0,26
Tiit Vähi (III)	01.12.1996 – 25.02.1997	EKK	SPMN	EKK	41/101	84	0,23	0,06
Mart Siimann	14.03.1997 – 07.03.1999	EKK	SPMN	EKK	41/101	713	1,95	0,49
Mart Laar (II)	29.03.1999 – 08.01.2002	I + Ere + SDE	CMJ/MWVC	I	53/101	999	2,74	0,70
Siim Kallas	28.01.2002 – 09.04.2003	EK + Ere	CMN	Ere	46/101	431	1,18	0,30
Juhan Parts	10.04.2003 – 13.04.2005	ResP + Ere + ERL	CMJ/MWVC	ResP	60/101	723	1,98	0,50
Andrus Ansip (I)	13.04.2005 – 04.04.2007	EK + Ere + ERL	CMJ/MWVC	Ere	60/101	711	1,95	0,49
Andrus Ansip (II)	05.04.2007 – 21.05.2009	Ere + IRL + SDE	CMJ/MWVC	Ere	60/101	766	2,10	0,53
Andrus Ansip (III)	22.05.2009 – 05.04.2011	Ere + IRL	CMN	Ere	50/101	673	1,84	0,47
Andrus Ansip (IV)	05.04.2011 – acting	Ere + IRL	CMJ/MWVC	Ere	56/101		acting	

Table A.4 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Hungary (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
József Antall	23.05.1990 – 12.12.1993	MDF + FKgP + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	MDF	229/386	1279	3,50	0,86
Péter Boross	21.12.1993 – 29.05.1994	MDF + FKgP + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	MDF	229/386	158	0,43	0,11
Gyula Horn	15.07.1994 – 24.05.1998	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/SWC	MSzP	278/386	1389	3,81	0,97
Viktor Orbán (I)	06.07.1998 – 21.04.2002	Fidesz + FKgP + MDF	CMJ/SWC	Fidesz	213/386	1365	3,74	0,97
Péter Medgyessy	27.05.2002 – 19.08.2004	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWVC	MSzP	198/386	802	2,20	0,56
Ferenc Gyurcsány (I)	29.09.2004 – 23.04.2006	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWVC	MSzP	198/386	564	1,55	0,39
Ferenc Gyurcsány (II)	09.06.2006 – 26.04.2008	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWVC	MSzP	210/386	677	1,85	0,46
Ferenc Gyurcsány (III)	01.05.2008 – 28.03.2009	MSzP	SPMN	MSzP	190/386	327	0,90	0,22
Gordon Bajnai	14.04.2009 – 25.04.2010	MSzP + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	190/386	371	1,02	0,25
Viktor Orbán (II)	29.05.2010 – acting	Fidesz + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	Fidesz	263/386		acting	

Table A.5 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Latvia (1993–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Valdis Birkavs	03.08.1993 – 14.09.1994	LC + LZS	CMN	LC	48/100	401	1,10	0,48
Māris Gailis	15.09.1994 – 20.12.1995	LC + TPA*	SPMN	LC	36/100	455	1,25	0,54
Andris Šķēle (I)	21.12.1995 – 12.02.1997	DPS + LC + TB + LVP + KDS* + LNNK + LZP* + LZS* + n.p.	CMJ/SWC (GNU)	n.p.	65/100	412	1,13	0,38
Andris Šķēle (II)	13.02.1997 – 28.07.1997	DPS+LC+TB+KDS*+LNNK+LZP*+LZS*+n.p.	CMJ/MWC	n.p.	57/100	165	0,42	0,15
Guntars Krasts (I)	07.08.1997 – 08.04.1998	DPS + LC + KDS* + LZS* + TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	TB/LNNK	53/100	241	0,66	0,22
Guntars Krasts (II)	09.04.1998 – 03.10.1998	LC+KDS+TB/LNNK+LZS	CMN	TB/LNNK	35/100	174	0,48	0,16
Vilnis Kristopans (I)	26.11.1998 – 03.02.1999	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMN	LC	46/100	67	0,18	0,05
Vilnis Kristopans (II)	04.02.1999 – 15.07.1999	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMN	LC	46/100	161	0,44	0,11
Andris Šķēle (III)	16.07.1999 – 03.05.2000	TP + LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	TP	62/100	287	0,79	0,20
Andris Bērziņš	05.05.2000 – 02.11.2002	TP + LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMJ/SWC	LC	70/100	899	2,46	0,62
Einars Repše	07.11.2002 – 05.02.2004	JL+ZS+LPP+TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	JL	55/100	448	1,23	0,31
Indulis Emsis	09.03.2004 – 01.12.2004	TP + ZS + LPP	CMN	ZS	42/100	262	0,72	0,18
Aigars Kalvītis (I)	02.12.2004 – 08.04.2006	JL + TP + ZS + LPP	CMJ/SWC	TP	68/100	486	1,33	0,34
Aigars Kalvītis (II)	09.04.2006 – 06.11.2006	TP + ZS + LPP	CMN	TP	42/100	207	0,57	0,14
Aigars Kalvītis (III)	07.11.2006 – 19.12.2007	TP + ZS + LPP/LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	TP	59/100	402	1,10	0,28
Ivars Godmanis	20.12.2007 – 20.02.2009	TP + ZS + LPP/LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	TP	59/100	420	1,15	0,29
Valdis Dombrovskis (I)	26.02.2009 – 17.03.2010	TP + ZS + JL + PS* + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	JL	67/100	381	1,04	0,27
Valdis Dombrovskis (II)	17.03.2010 – 02.10.2010	ZS+L+PS*+TB/LNNK	CMN	JL	44/100	195	0,53	0,14
Valdis Dombrovskis (III)	03.11.2010 – 17.09.2011	V + ZS	CMJ/MWC	V	55/100	332	0,91	0,96
Valdis Dombrovskis (IV)	25.10.2011 – acting	V + ZRP + TB/LNNK	CMN	V	50/100		acting	

Table A.6 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Lithuania (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Bronislovas Lubys	02.12.1992 – 15.03.1993	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	103	0,28	0,07
Adolfas Šleževičius	16.03.1993 – 08.02.1996	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	1042	2,85	0,74
Launynas Stankevičius	23.02.1996 – 03.11.1996	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	250	0,68	0,18
Gediminas Vagnorius	04.12.1996 – 03.05.1999	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	869	2,38	0,61
Rolandas Paksas	18.05.1999 – 27.10.1999	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	159	0,44	0,11
Andrius Kubilius (I)	03.11.1999 – 08.10.2000	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	335	0,92	0,23
Rolandas Paksas (II)	26.10.2000 – 20.06.2001	LLS + NS	CMN	LLS	63/141	234	0,64	0,16
Algirdas Brazauskas (I)	03.07.2001 – 24.10.2004	LDDP + NS	CMJ/MWC	LDDP	79/141	1191	3,26	0,82
Algirdas Brazauskas (II)	14.12.2004 – 11.04.2006	DP + LSDP + NS + LVLS	CMJ/MWC	LSDP	80/141	477	1,31	0,33
Algirdas Brazauskas (III)	12.04.2006 – 01.06.2006	DP + LSDP + LVLS	CMN	LSDP	69/141	49	0,13	0,03
Gediminas Kirdejas	18.07.2006 – 26.10.2008	LSDP + LiCS + LVLS + PDP*	CMN	LSDP	55/141	818	2,24	0,57
Andrius Kubilius (II)	27.11.2008 – 21.09.2010	TS-LKD + TPP + LRLS + LiCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LKD	79/141	654	1,79	0,45
Andrius Kubilius (III)	21.09.2010 – 14.10.2012	TS-LKD + LiCS-TPP + LRLS	CMJ/MWC	TS-LKD	78/141	743	2,04	0,52
Algirdas Butkevičius	22.11.2012 – acting	LSDP + DP + IT + LLRA	CMJ/MWC	LSDP	85/141		acting	

Table A.7 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Poland (1991–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Jan Olszewski	23.12.1991 – 04.06.1992	ZChN + PC + PL	CMN	PC	121/460	161	0,44	0,24
Waldemar Pawlak (I)	05.06.1992 – 07.07.1992	PSL	SPMN	PSL	48/460	32	0,09	0,05
Hanna Suchocka (I)	11.07.1992 – 28.04.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PL + PPG* + PCD	CMJ/SWC	UD	241/460	287	0,79	0,42
Hanna Suchocka (II)	29.04.1993 – 28.05.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PPG* + PCD	CMN	UD	217/460	29	0,08	0,04
Hanna Suchocka (III)	28.05.1993 – 19.09.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PL + PPG* + PCD	CMJ/SWC	UD	241/460	111	0,30	0,16
Waldemar Pawlak (II)	26.10.1993 – 07.02.1995	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PSL	303/460	461	1,26	0,32
Józef Oleksy	06.03.1995 – 24.01.1996	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	SLD	303/460	318	0,87	0,22
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	7.02.1996 – 21.09.1997	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	SLD	303/460	584	1,60	0,40
Jerzy Buzek (I)	31.10.1997 – 06.06.2000	AWS + UW	CMJ/MWC	AWS	261/460	936	2,56	0,65
Jerzy Buzek (II)	07.06.2000 – 18.10.2001	AWS	SPMN	AWS	201/460	491	1,35	0,34
Leszek Miller (I)	19.10.2001 – 03.03.2003	SLD + PSL + UP	CMJ/SWC	SLD	258/460	494	1,35	0,34
Leszek Miller (II)	04.03.2003 – 02.05.2004	SLD + UP	CMN	SLD	216/460	418	1,15	0,29
Marek Belka	24.06.2004 – 25.09.2005	SLD + PSL + UP + SDPL*	CMJ/SWC	SLD	257/460	451	1,24	0,31
K. Marcinkiewicz (I)	10.11.2005 – 04.05.2006	PIS	SPMN	PIS	155/460	174	0,48	0,23
K. Marcinkiewicz (II)	05.05.2006 – 10.07.2006	PIS + SRP + LPR	CMJ/MWC	PIS	245/460	65	0,18	0,09
Jarosław Kaczyński (I)	14.07.2006 – 13.08.2007	PIS + SRP + LPR	CMJ/MWC	PIS	245/460	389	1,07	0,52
Jarosław Kaczyński (II)	13.08.2007 – 19.10.2007	PIS	SPMN	PIS	155/460	66	0,18	0,09
Donald Tusk (I)	16.11.2007 – 09.10.2011	PO + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PO	240/460	1403	3,84	0,98
Donald Tusk (II)	18.11.2011 – acting	PO + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PO	235/460		acting	

Table A.8 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Romania (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Petre Roman (I)	28.06.1990 – 30.04.1991	FSN	SPMJ	FSN	263/396	302	0,83	0,36
Petre Roman (II)	30.04.1991 – 16.10.1991	FSN	SPMJ	FSN	263/396	166	0,45	0,20
Theodor Stolojan	16.10.1991 – 18.11.1992	FSN + PNL + MER + PDAR	CMJ/SWC (CNU)	PNL	313/396	392	1,07	0,46
Nicolae Văcăroiu (I)	13.11.1992 – 17.08.1994	FDSN + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	117/341	634	1,74	0,43
Nicolae Văcăroiu (II)	18.08.1994 – 01.09.1996	FDSN + PURN + n.p.	GMN	n.p.	147/341	733	2,01	0,50
Nicolae Văcăroiu (III)	02.09.1996 – 11.12.1996	FDSN + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	117/341	99	0,27	0,07
Victor Gorbea (I)	12.12.1996 – 05.02.1998	PNITCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	CMJ/SWC	PNITCD	200/343	413	1,13	0,28
Victor Gorbea (II)	06.02.1998 – 30.03.1998	PNITCD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	GMN	PNITCD	157/343	54	0,15	0,04
Radu Vasile (I)	15.04.1998 – 29.10.1999	PNITCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	CMJ/SWC	PNITCD	200/343	554	1,52	0,38
Radu Vasile (II)	30.10.1999 – 13.12.1999	PNITCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR	CMJ/SWC	PNITCD	195/343	43	0,12	0,03
Mugur Isărescu	21.12.1999 – 26.11.2000	PNITCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + n.p.	CMJ/SWC	n.p.	195/343	335	0,92	0,23
Adrian Năstase (I)	28.12.2000 – 19.06.2003	PSD + PUR	GMN	PSD	160/345	891	2,44	0,62
Adrian Năstase (II)	19.06.2003 – 28.11.2004	PSD	SPMN	PSD	155/345	519	1,42	0,36
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (I)	29.12.2004 – 03.12.2006	PNL + PD + UDMR + PUR	GMN	PNL	153/332	694	1,90	0,48
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (II)	04.12.2006 – 01.04.2007	PNL + PD + UDMR	GMN	PNL	134/332	117	0,32	0,08
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (III)	02.04.2007 – 30.11.2008	PNL + UDMR	GMN	PNL	86/332	598	1,64	0,41
Emil Boc (I)	22.12.2008 – 13.10.2009	PDL + PSD	CMJ/MWC (GC)	PDL	225/334	291	0,80	0,20
Emil Boc (II)	23.12.2009 – 06.02.2012	PDL + UDMR + UNPR	GMN	PDL	153/334	763	1,09	0,53
Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu	09.02.2012 – 27.04.2012	PDL + UDMR + UNPR	GMN	PDL	158/334	78	0,21	0,05
Victor Ponta (I)	07.05.2012 – 09.12.2012	PSD + PNL + PUR	GMN	PSD	147/334	212	0,58	0,15
Victor Ponta (II)	21.12.2012 – acting	PSD + PNL + PC (USL)	CMJ/SWC	PSD	273/412		acting	

Table A.9 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Slovakia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Vladimír Mečiar (I)	24.06.1992 – 01.01.1993	HZDS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	89/150	187	0,51	0,22
Vladimír Mečiar (II)	12.01.1993 – 18.03.1993	HZDS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	89/150	66	0,18	0,08
Vladimír Mečiar (III)	19.03.1993 – 16.11.1993	HZDS	SPMN	HZDS	66/150	237	0,65	0,28
Vladimír Mečiar (IV)	17.11.1993 – 11.03.1994	HZDS	SPMN	HZDS	81/150	114	0,31	0,14
Jozef Moravčík	16.03.1994 – 01.10.1994	SDL + KDH + APR* + AdS* + NDS*	CMN	APR*	71/150	195	0,53	0,23
Vladimír Mečiar (V)	12.12.1994 – 26.09.1998	HZDS + ZRS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	83/150	1364	3,74	0,95
Mikuláš Dzurinda (I)	30.10.1998 – 21.09.2002	SDK + SDL + SMK-MKP + SÖP	CMJ/SWC	SDK	93/150	1401	3,84	0,98
Mikuláš Dzurinda (II)	16.10.2002 – 08.12.2003	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH + ANO	CMJ/MWC	SDKU	78/150	412	1,13	0,31
Mikuláš Dzurinda (III)	08.12.2003 – 01.09.2005	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH + ANO	CMN	SDKU	71/150	623	1,71	0,46
Mikuláš Dzurinda (IV)	02.09.2005 – 06.02.2006	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH	CMN	SDKU	55/150	154	0,42	0,11
Mikuláš Dzurinda (V)	07.02.2006 – 17.06.2006	SDKU + SMK-MKP	CMN	SDKU	48/150	130	0,36	0,10
Robert Fico (I)	04.07.2006 – 12.06.2010	SMER + SNS + HZDS	CMJ/MWC	SMER	85/150	1418	3,88	0,99
Iveta Radíčová (I)	08.07.2010 – 11.10.2011	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CMJ/MWC	SDKU-SD	79/150	453	1,24	0,72
Iveta Radíčová (II)	20.10.2011 – 10.03.2012	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CMJ/MWC	SDKU-SD	79/150	140	0,38	0,22
Robert Fico (II)	04.04.2012 – acting	SMER	SPNU	SMER	83/150		acting	

Table A.10 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Slovenia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Janez Drnovšek (I)	11.01.1993 – 29.03.1994	LDS + SKD + ZLSD + SDSS	CMJ/SWC	LDS	55/90	438	1,20	0,31
Janez Drnovšek (II)	29.03.1994 – 26.01.1996	LDS + SKD + ZLSD	CMJ/MWC	LDS	51/90	657	1,80	0,46
Janez Drnovšek (III)	27.01.1996 – 10.11.1996	LDS + SKD	CMN	LDS	37/90	283	0,78	0,20
Janez Drnovšek (IV)	27.02.1997 – 08.04.2000	LDS + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	49/90	1121	3,07	0,79
Andrej Bajuk	07.06.2000 – 15.10.2000	SLS + SDSS	CMN	SLS	35/90	128	0,35	0,09
Janez Drnovšek (V)	30.11.2000 – 02.12.2002	LDS + ZLSD + SLS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	54/90	722	1,98	0,51
Anton Rop (I)	19.12.2002 – 07.04.2004	LDS + ZLSD + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/SWC	LDS	58/90	468	1,28	0,33
Anton Rop (II)	08.04.2004 – 02.12.2004	LDS + ZLSD + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	49/90	234	0,64	0,16
Janez Janša (I)	03.12.2004 – 21.09.2008	SDSS + NS-KLS + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	SDSS	49/90	1368	3,75	0,96
Borut Pahor (I)	21.11.2008 – 09.05.2011	ZLSD + Zares + DeSUS + LDS	CMJ/MWC	ZLSD	50/90	888	2,43	0,77
Borut Pahor (II)	09.05.2011 – 27.06.2011	ZLSD + Zares + LDS	CMN	ZLSD	43/90	48	0,13	0,04
Borut Pahor (III)	27.06.2011 – 20.10.2011	ZLSD + LDS	CMN	ZLSD	33/90	113	0,31	0,10
Janez Janša (II)	28.01.2012 – 23.01.2013	SDSS + DL + SLS + DeSUS + NS-KLS	CMJ/SWC	SDSS	50/90	355	0,97	н.д.
Janez Janša (III)	23.01.2013 – 22.02.2013	SDSS + SLS + DeSUS + NS-KLS	CMN	SDSS	42/90	29	0,08	н.д.
Alenka Bratušek	20.03.2013 – acting	LZ+PS + ZLSD + DL + DeSUS	CMJ/SWC	LZ+PS	52/90		acting	

Політичний гепенінг як протестна форма політичної участі

Аналізується політичний гепенінг як протестна форма політичної участі. Гепенінг розглядається як напрямок акційного мистецтва (акціонізму); це певна форма дій, акцій, учинків, під час яких митці намагаються залучити глядачів до гри, сценарій якої окреслений лише приблизно. Доводиться особливість політичного гепенінгу — це не просто видовище, а зовні спонтанне (спровоковане, імпровізоване, непередбачуване і под.) дійство, учасниками якого стають не лише актори, але й цілком випадкові люди.

Ключові слова: акціонізм, політичний гепенінг, політична гра, постмодерн.

Political happening as a protest form of political participation

Political happening is analyzed as a protest form of political participation. The happening is the direction of the promotional art (Actionism); this is a certain form of acts, actions, works in which artists are trying to attract viewers to the play. It is shown that peculiarity of political happening is not just sight, but outside spontaneous action (provoked, improvised, unpredictable and similar), participants of which are not only actors, but also completely random people.

Key words: actionism, political happening, political game, postmodern.

Happeningi polityczny jako forma protestu w życiu politycznym

Happeningi polityczny jest analizowany jako uczestnictwa forma protestu politycznego. Happeningi uważa się za promocyjną kierunkowo sztuki (akcjonizm); jest to pewna forma aktów, działań, prac, w których artyści starają się przyciągnąć widzów do gry, scenariusz, który jest w przybliżeniu. Pokazano, że osobliwość happeningu politycznego nie tylko wzrok, ale poza spontaniczne działania (sprowokowane, improwizowane, nieprzewidywalne i podobne), uczestnicy, które są nie tylko aktorzy, ale także zupełnie przypadkowych ludzi.

Słowa kluczowe: akcjonizm, happeningi polityczny, gra polityczna, postmodernistyczna.

Age of postmodern actualized study of the effectiveness of traditional forms of political participation and shifted the emphasis from traditional political practices (voting, meetings, etc.) to different form of social and political participation. In postmodern reality political action is fragmented and provocative; it is based on the play, and the range of social and political roles of a man is constantly expanding. It seems that modern political action can achieve efficiency by giving it emotional colouring. The ways of such “colouring” are art technologies of actionism (happening, performance, etc.). The goal of our research is to explore possibilities of aesthetization of political by means of actionism, and in particular via political happening.

Philosophical and methodological basis of analysis were studied by G. Arendt, J. Butler, S. Sontag, J.-P. Sartre, and others. Based on the understanding of happening as an art form, it is important to analyze its kind – political happening, and figure out the potential of these artistic and cultural forms of social and political life of modern society.

There is understanding of the nature of the *action* as an act underlies in the base of the various forms of actionism. Action is a planned artistic performance (often with ideological or social colouring), performed by an artist (a group of artists), that aims to achieve a specific, meaningful for the artist, goal.

The American philosopher post-structuralist J. Butler, interpreting events of “Arab Spring”, wrote: “For politics to take place, the body must appear”. But the political actionism is not all the diversity of bodily gestures; first and foremost, action is deed. Fulfilling any political tactics or realizing any artistic device, the action seeks its form and its meaning, focusing on the dynamics of direct links, rather than on institutional rules of the play. The action is a public act – or rather, it creates direct publicity through direct action. Actionist cannot always assume what will the action be, but s/he always knows what effect (outcome) s/he wants to achieve.

All practices of actionism are avant-garde; radical artist intrudes into the unprepared for this public area, and is followed by a public scandal, with this provoking government to react, and audience to think. “*Provocative*” nature is its distinguishing feature. Actionism is mostly asocial, but it is such for something common and higher; it is going over the limit of law or public morality, but actionists do this declaring something socially meaningful (for example, criticism of the government in terms of suppression of political opposition). Forms of life and forms of public actions of actionists challenge existing social order. For example, violent reaction is caused by actions of feminist punk-rock band “Pussy Riot”, art group “War”, the representative of the Russian radical art Pavlensky P., etc. The last, in particular, in his public art events (“Carcass”, “Fixation”, “Liberty”, “Separation”) shocks Russian society and raises the question of its (society’s) inability to resist the government; in the “Carcass” artist, naked and wrapped with barbed wire, laid in front of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg; with this symbolized “human existence in repressive legal system”; supporting sentenced participants

of feminist punk-rock band “Pussy Riot”, P. Pavlensky sewed his own mouth near the Kazan Cathedral.

With their actions actionists affirm the value of politics. Making public action (by G. Arendt) is politics¹. This politics creates common world that lots will join. Political actionism can represent politics beyond its classical forms, and sees a political role of art in a new way. Forms of life and forms of public actions of actionists challenge state government, criticize imposed myths in the form of publicly performed acts as artistic events. In contrast they develop special community relations and public action practice in the eyes of many. The art community becomes political when the community itself becomes part of the political situation.

Representatives of actionist art believe that an artist should not create static objects, but organize events, processes, performances, and therefore in all actionists’ forms main emphasis is made not on a specific artistic product, but the *process* of its creation. This artistic ideology encouraged artists to explore new means of artistic expression, namely – dynamics, processing, dramatization, intensification of play components, audience appeal.

Political happening (*eng. Happening* – event, occurrence, that takes place) is little-studied protest form of political participation. This form is often perceived as not serious because of its theatrical nature. Happening in the broadest sense is the direction of actionism; this is a certain form of acts, actions, works in which artists are trying to attract viewers to the play, scenario of which is outlined approximately. *Happening* (in art) is understood as a kind of theatrical performance, in which event and action are the aim themselves and not part of the plot; this is a type of movable work, a playful improvisation that gives out various unconscious impulses. This is a kind of view of life; happening is often defined as “*active*” (“*effective*”) pop art.

Theory and practice of happening are based on artistic experience of Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Theatre of the Absurd. J.-P. Sartre calls A. Artaud’s “theatre of cruelty” to be the forerunner of the happening, the basic tenet of which was the negation of theatricality as such in the name of real sense of the events in which (at the level of inner feelings) audience is engaged. Happening was born on the edge of modernism and postmodernism (founded in 1952), American musician and philosopher J. Cage (1912-1992) was the founder of the practice of happening, and his student – A. Kaprou (1927-2006) – author of the term (suggested it in 1958). J. Cages silent “musical” plays, A. Kaprou’s choreographic composition were aimed at provocation viewer to act; art was the manipulation of objects and people in space.

Of course, the play is one of the fundamentals of human life and culture since archaic times². “The whole world – theatre, and people in it – the actors” (Shakespeare). In this theatre a man is a permanent player with dynamic role rotation (voter, volunteer soldier, politician, bureaucrat, party member, volunteer, etc.). Play is a device of mastering certain socio-cultural

¹ J. Butler, *Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street* <http://cipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/uk> [15.03.2015]

² X.Арендт, *Vita activa, или О десятилетней жизни*. — Санкт-Петербург 2000, s. 14-16.

experience and skills, a powerful force that actively creates social and political relations. It foresees free-expression rights and can be deployed in various ways, including political ones. Socio-political life of democratic society has a powerful origin of a play. Politics as a field of competition cannot exist without elements of a play.

Man of the XXI century, according to K. Stanislavska, is “a subject of visual representation, living his life in the atmosphere of total visualizing and feeling himself both as audience and as performer”³. Art involves (encourages participation in the action) viewer who consciously or unconsciously tries the role of co-author and co-creator. Modern public does not want just to watch – the viewer needs stronger impressions and feelings, and this “pursuit of emotions” ensures that he becomes a full-fledged member of the visual action.

Political happening as a kind of “action art” is based on improvisation, simultaneous coexistence of different artistic and non-artistic actions and spontaneous reaction of participants. It combines spaces of different kinds of art and artistic activity: music, dance, poetry, visual art, video, movie, direct environmental phenomena (weather phenomena, street noise, etc)⁴. Mixing various theatrical elements (use of colour, music and lighting effects when body movements, gestures and facial expression become the sense of separate compositions), and their combination with life objects and phenomena – is a distinctive feature of happening. There is no plot and logical connection between its separate parts. Happening is played in galleries, railway stations, squares and other places not designed for performances; emphasis is made on environmental conditions – and then breaks the stereotype of “audience – scene”. Cultural specialists emphasize that city is an open platform for spectacular and playful, creative experiments in public space and enables communication between particular artist and viewer within contemporary street art⁵ [8]. Analysis of various happening shows: in all cases, artists offer to identify life and stage, spectacle and reality, preferring street to traditional auditoriums and halls. For example, “Pussy Riot” in their actions settled in underground, on the roofs of trolleybuses, in temples, on surface of railway transport tanks, etc, to address to the widest audience, and to break traditional ideas about the role of musician-artist. Architects emphasize that modern theatre tends to return to open urban space with specialized facilities; it can be regarded as a fundamental and essential element of creative public spaces of a city⁶.

During happening positions of viewer and performer shift: authors-artists tend to erase the boundaries between them, therefore provocative actions to the public are normal in order to involve everyone into action. Space of the play is central in the happening, as everybody can

³ О. Андриєнко, *Ізрове начало у бутті демократичного суспільства*, „Наука. Релігія. Суспільство”, 2009 nr 2, s. 123–127.

⁴ К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністської видовищної культури*, “Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого”, 2013 nr 13, s.180-189.

⁵ М. Перверзева, *Хэппенинги Джона Кейджа*, “Нагmony: Международный музыкальный культурологический журнал”, <http://harmony.musigi-dunya.az/rus/archivereader.asp?s=1&txid=114> [12.03.2015].

⁶ К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністської видовищної культури*, “Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого”, 2013 nr 13, s.180-189.

express themselves in it that is action within the spectacle⁷. Stress behaviour of the public in the context of “accidental” rebuilds relations between people, between man and thing (including streets, shops, products, images of popular culture and urban folklore).

The purpose of art in happening is the political process itself, and artistic origin during its performance should manifest itself within all “players” – both author – artists and audience. For everyone – it is emersion of energy, awakening of sudden emotions, test of reaction to unforeseen events. In political happening significant emphasis is placed on the improvisational origin; there if no specific event scenario: development of storylines and situation is foreseen partially, and the results of the play are not always known. Events take place in real time, always for the first time and are never repeated. All the preparatory work in political happening is performed by artists themselves – those, who are invited to participate – directly appear within the “event”. Peculiarity of political happening is not just spectacle, but outside spontaneous action (provoked, improvised, unpredictable, etc.), participants of which are not only actors, but also completely random people (such participation is mandatory in political happening).

American researcher of happening, S. Sontag identifies two features of it: 1) *behaviour with audience* (provocations towards public, which often go beyond allowable and decent limit, actionists expect to embarrass public – and via shock “drawn” emotional feedback from the viewer. It can direct the course of the happening in a different direction, and a viewer – can become co-performer); 2) *behaviour towards time* (it is impossible to forecast how happening will develop and for how long it will last, even experienced audience of happening does not always understand whether it is finish or not)⁸.

Organizers of political happening often unite into quasi-party organizations, activity of which is directed at disclosure of illusiveness of particular ideology. In particular, pioneers of political happening in Ukraine were considered to be “Rays of Juche” actions (since September 1990). “Rays of Juche” is considered to be the first (it originated in 1988 among Ukrainian Students’ Union) parody(orange) type party (such organizations parody activity of political parties and movements, adopting the outward features of political parties, they make frankly ridiculous and absurd goals as program ones) in the Soviet Union after Perestroika. There took place symbolic M. Gorbachev’s book burying, there also were round-dances around the monument of V. Lenin, editors of insufficiently communist newspapers were called to ideological fight, etc.

On the post-Soviet territories to such pseudo-organizations belonged following: “Dictatorship of Pluralism Party”, “Orange Alternative” movement “Subtropical Russia”. As examples of political happening can be considered activity of following: 1) Party of Beer Lovers

⁷ А. Хір, Б. Гой. *Театральне мистецтво як формівний чинник громадського простору на прикладі м. Ужгорода*, “Вісник Національного університету “Львівська політехніка”, 2014 nr 793, s. 201-207.

⁸ Е. Станиславская, *Хэппенинг как действенно-зрелищная форма искусства XX в.*, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZJTM42EwHtMJ:www.actual-art.org/en/k2010-2/st2010/96-viz/201-kheppening-dejstvenno-zrelischnaya-forma-iskusstva.html+&cd=1&chl=uk&ct=clnk&gl=ua> [15.03.2015]

(for example, sending remedies to relieve hangover effect as a birthday present to B.Yeltsin in 1995); 2) “Dictatorship of Pluralism Party” (celebration of third anniversary of miraculous escape of B.Yeltsin from unknown river, that took place on September 28, 1992 on Pushkin Square in Moscow, and where two participants of celebration officiated the ceremony of “*Yeltsinization*”, during which they were thrown into the fountain with sacks on their heads); 3) movement “Violet” (declared: “Violets will come – lots will go!”, “The future is either violet or there is no future at all”, etc.); 4) “Subtropical Russia” (improvement of political climate by increasing minimum temperature of the environment to +20 ° C and reduction of the water boiling point to +50 ° C).

2014-2015 predetermined conduction of series of political happenings to support Ukraine. In particular, activists of Russian movement “Blue Rider”, who were popular because of a row of outstanding actions, one of which was held to support Ukraine (Moscow, November 2014). The happening was held with the participation of two participants (O. Basov, E. Avilov): one, covered with Ukrainian flag, was lying on the ground at the pedestal of the monument to the city-hero of Kyiv, and the other one with a can of red liquid offered to sample “Ukrainian blood.” Flag reminded that protesters, killed on the Square, were wrapped with it and blood imitation symbolized protest against those who rejoice at deaths of Ukrainians. On August 6, 2014 Petersburg activist Kado went on Nevsky Prospect as “blind Russia with blood on her hands.” Woman dressed in the colours of the Russian flag and blindfold, uttered loud crying on one note and fell on the asphalt. On November 21, 2014 political happening to commemorate the anniversary of the beginning of Euromaidan with burning of the stuffed animal with the face of Putin took place near Moscow Kremlin.

Playfulness and humour of happening border with horror to social reality and at the same time help to overcome it. Political happening gives possibility to laugh over the fact that in everyday life has features of the highest formality and seriousness, and in such way helps understanding of the conventionality of many phenomena in social and political life⁹.

Political happening embodies communication model «artist – viewer”; it is an interactive form of artistic practices with social and political orientation. In the form of happening the idea of erasement of boundaries between artist and audience is very clear¹⁰. Happening is a good example of how the play (the embodiment of the freedom of human spirit) obtains aesthetical look and becomes a spectacle. “The desire for spontaneity, direct physical contact with public, increased efficiency of art has resulted in the concept of life carnivalization”¹¹ – unity of fear and laughter ambivalence of life and death, rebirth through self-destruction.

⁹ С.Зонтаг, Хепенинги: Искусство безоглядных сопоставлений. Мысль как страсть: Избранные эссе 1960–70-х годов, Москва 1997, с. 37-45.

¹⁰ О. Андриенко, *Ізrove начало у бутті демократичного суспільства*, “Наука. Релігія. Суспільство”, 2009 nr 2, с. 123–127.

¹¹ К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністської видовищної культури*, “Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого”, 2013 nr 13, с. 180-189.

Despite some frivolity of political happening, we emphasize the need for scientific understanding of this form of political activity, as well as other forms of postmodern political actionism, because contemporary art is politics of freedom. Various forms of actionism can provide politics beyond its classical forms. Actionism allows a new answer to questions about the political role of art.

Formation and Evaluation of Parliamentary Opposition in Ukraine

Evolution of the political opposition in Ukraine analyzed. Presented by the parliamentary and no parliamentary forms of opposition. Stages of the parliamentary oppositions in 2014 years. The evaluation of the latest stage of the parliamentary opposition in 2015 year in Ukraine.

Key words: political opposition, parliamentary opposition, non-parliamentary opposition, political authority, political actor.

А.Романюк

Становлення та оцінка парламентської опозиції в Україні

Розглянуто еволюцію політичної опозиції в Україні. Представлено два основні різновиди: парламентську та позапарламентську. Проаналізовано особливості опозиції після «Революції гідності». Дана оцінка актуальному стану парламентської опозиції.

Ключові слова: політична опозиція, парламентська опозиція, позапарламентська опозиція, політична влада, політичний актор.

The issues of formation and functioning of political opposition in Ukraine have become the objects of a number of studies. Mainly, current publications have obtained the form of setting and outlining the certain problem: S. Bondar¹, V. Varenko², D. Zubrytska³. The problems of institutionalization of opposition in Ukraine have come into the focus of studies by I. Polishchuk⁴, T.

¹ Bondar S. S. The Criteria of Oppositionality in the Political System of Ukraine / S. S. Bondar // Uzhhorod National University Bulletin. Series: Philosophy, Political Science, Sociology. – 2007. – № 7-8. – Pp. 344–350 (in Ukrainian).

² Varenko V. Formation and Development of Political Opposition in Ukraine during 1991-2002 / V. Varenko // Education of the Region: Political Science, Psychology, Communication. – 2008. – № 1. – Pp. 59–63 (in Ukrainian).

³ Zubrytska D. Smart Social Reality in the Programs of Oppositional Political Parties / D. Zubrytska // Collection of Research Papers. Ukrainian National Idea: Realias and Prospects for Development. – 2009. – № 21. – Pp. 71–76 (in Ukrainian); Zubrytska D. Theoretical and Methodological Grounds for Political Opposition Activity / D. Zubrytska // Ivan Franko National University of Lviv Bulletin. Series: Philosophical and Political Studies. – 2010. – Issue 1. – Pp. 205–210 (in Ukrainian).

⁴ Polishchuk I. O. The Institution of Political Opposition under the Conditions of Transitive State Regime in Ukraine / I. O. Polishchuk // State Building. – 2011. – № 1. – P. (in Ukrainian).

Tkachenko⁵ and V. Sychova⁶. The legal foundations of Ukrainian opposition activity have been studied by I. Pavlenko⁷. The format of parliamentary opposition has been described in the works by S. Kononchuk and O. Yarosh⁸ and V. Chumak⁹. The typologies of opposition have been reviewed by N. Vinnychuk¹⁰ and F. Rudych¹¹. The issues of political opposition activity in Ukraine have been studied in the monograph by Z. Bialoblotskyi¹² and papers by Yu. Shveda¹³.

The notion of political opposition in Ukraine is predominantly defined as: «...the complex of political forces, which oppose some views or actions in politics to the other or resist the official state policy or ruling party's course and propose alternative policy or another way of solution to various problems»¹⁴. In fact, this definition is considered to be a universal one and covers both parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition. Parliamentary opposition is leading in Ukraine, but non-parliamentary opposition, at the same time, is considerably associated with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Such connections mainly have two formats. The first one is applied to the political parties, which were represented in the parliament and according to the results of the next elections have not entered the parliament (the Progressive Socialist Party (the leader N. Vitrenko)¹⁵ after 2002, the SDPU (o)¹⁶ after 2006, the All-Ukrainian Association (VO) «Svoboda»¹⁷ after 2014 etc.). The

⁵ Tkachenko T. V. Opposition as a Political Institution and Form of Social Protest / T. V. Tkachenko // Political Management. – 2007. – № 5. – Pp. 40–45 (in Ukrainian).

⁶ Sychova V. V. Institutionalization of Ukrainian Opposition as a Factor of Renewal of the System of State Administration of Ukraine [Electronic Resource] / V. V. Sychova // Kharkiv Regional Institute of State Administration of the National Academy of Public Administration Attached to the Office of the President of Ukraine, 2009. – Access Mode: <http://www.kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/apdu/2009-2/doc/1/07.pdf> (in Ukrainian).

⁷ Pavlenko I. Activity of Non-Parliamentary Opposition and Possible Forms of Its Legal Regulation [Electronic Resource] / I. Pavlenko // Analytical Proceedings Concerning Problems and Events of Social Development, December 2010. – Access Mode: <http://www.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/Desember/09.html> (in Ukrainian); Pavlenko I. Legal Status of Opposition. Experience of Developed Democracies and Ukrainian Prospects / I. Pavlenko // Political Management. – 2005. – № 5. – Pp. 16–30 (in Ukrainian); Pavlenko R. Opposition: Rights and Authority / R. Pavlenko // Person and Politics. – 2002. – № 4 (22). – Pp. 3–10 (in Ukrainian).

⁸ Kononchuk S. Parliamentary Opposition in Ukraine: Model and Implementation: Research of the Problem / S. Kononchuk, O. Yarosh. – K.: Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, 2006. – 64 p. (in Ukrainian).

⁹ Chumak V. Activity of Parliamentary Opposition: Useful Experience for Ukraine [Electronic Resource] / V. Chumak // Political Reform through Experts' Eyes: the Significance of Public Advice: Collection of Papers. – K.: International Centre for Policy Studies, June 2007. – Access Mode: <http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/46/79/VChumak-ed11.pdf> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁰ Vinnychuk N. Typology of Political Opposition / N. Vinnychuk // Political Management. – 2007. – № 3. – Pp. 51–59 (in Ukrainian).

¹¹ Rudych F. Political Authority and Opposition in Ukraine: Methodological Context // Viche, 2013, № 17 (in Ukrainian).

¹² Bialoblotskyi Z. Stability and Effectiveness of Governments in Political Systems of Eastern European Countries. – Lviv: Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, 2013. – 470 p. (in Ukrainian).

¹³ Shveda Yu. R. Elections and Electoral Systems. European Standards and Experience for Democracy Consolidation in Ukraine / Yu. Shveda. – Lviv: Taras Soroka Publishing House, 2010. – 462 p. (in Ukrainian); Shveda Yu. Party System of Ukraine: State, Tendencies and Prospects for Development / Yu. Shveda // Lviv University Bulletin. Series: Philosophical Studies. – 1999. – № 1. – Pp. 198–201 (in Ukrainian).

¹⁴ Political Encyclopaedia. Ed.: Yu. Levenets (head), Yu. Shapoval (deputy head) and others. – K.: Parliamentary Publishing House, 2012. – P. 513 (in Ukrainian).

¹⁵ The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine was created in 1996. During the parliamentary elections in 1998 it gained 4,05%. During the consecutive elections it got insufficient results to enter the parliament. Members of the party actively participated in numerous pro-Russian and anti-Western mass actions, mainly in the Crimea and in southern and eastern Ukraine.

¹⁶ The SDPU (o) «the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)» was created in 1990, received its current name in 1996. During the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002 the party entered the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and joined the «ruling party». During the next elections it could not clear the electoral threshold, though actively participated in a number of political actions as the oppositional force.

¹⁷ All-Ukrainian Association (VO) «Svoboda» was registered in 1995 (till February 2004 it was called the Social and Nationalistic Party of Ukraine). During the long period of time it was the most noticeable oppositional nationalistic political force. For the first time ever it entered the parliament in 2012 (10,74 %). Based on the results of the early parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in

second one is peculiar of the parties, which have already been formed and aspire to get into the parliament (the VO «Svoboda» till 2012). Simultaneously, we share the point of view, that political opposition in Ukraine is represented by parliamentary opposition, which, under certain conditions, must take different non-parliamentary actions. But it happens, when parliamentary practice does not allow official factions/parties to fulfill their functions (the example of such a state is the campaign «Ukraine without Kuchma»¹⁸). Otherwise, non-parliamentary forms of activity, carried out by the actors, not represented in the parliament, are rather limited in the format.

The legal foundations of opposition activity in Ukraine involve: the Law of Ukraine «On the Status of the National Deputy of Ukraine» d.d. 1993, the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine «On Political Parties in Ukraine» d.d. April 5, 2001, the Law «On Procedural Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine» d.d. September 19, 2008. In the law «On Political Parties in Ukraine»¹⁹ the freedom of oppositional activity, possibility to articulate and assert in public their position, concerning the issues of the state and social life, to make offers to the bodies of state authority and self-governing authorities, which are obligatory for consideration by the appropriate authorities, to criticize and evaluate government actions in mass media and etc. have been guaranteed. Chapter 13, dedicated to the activity of parliamentary opposition, was introduced in the law on procedural regulations²⁰. In particular, in Article 68.1 the notion of parliamentary opposition was given: «...the deputy faction, quantitative representation of which consists of more than the half of people's deputies, who have not entered the coalition, and the head or deputy head of which, during the plenary assembly of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, announced their oppositionality to the political course of coalition, and/or to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, formed by it». The procedural regulations presupposed the existence of only one oppositional deputy faction or the union of oppositional deputy factions. Article 72 of the procedural regulations stipulated formation of the shadow/oppositional government by the representatives of opposition. On October 8, 2010 after the decision of the Constitutional Court about abolition of the constitutional changes of 2004²¹, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the new wording of the law on procedural regulations. The deputies excluded from the regulations all clauses concerning formation of coalition and

2014 it gained 4,71% of votes and did not clear 5% electoral threshold.

¹⁸ «Ukraine without Kuchma» is a number of protests in Ukraine in 2000-2001 aimed at forcing the president L. Kuchma to resign. The grounds for protests became the fact of information disclosure, made by O. Moroz (leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine) on November 28, 2000, concerning the accusation L. Kuchma of kidnapping and murdering the oppositional journalist H. Honhadze. The politicians' public performance took place both in the parliament and beyond it. All together 24 political parties and civil organizations took part in the protests under the slogan «Strive for Truth». The climax of the protest actions was marked by the mass conflicts between the activists and enforcers on March 9, 2001.

¹⁹ The Law of Ukraine «On Political Parties in Ukraine» [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14>

²⁰ The Law of Ukraine «On Procedural Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine» [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17>

²¹ The Constitutional Court by its decision resolved that Law № 2222-IV d.d. December 8, 2004 «On Introduction of Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine» was non-constitutional due to the violation of the rules of examination and adoption procedure. Therefore, it meant revalidation of the previous wording of the Constitution, which was changed and amended during the «Orange Revolution» on December 8, 2004.

opposition. Besides, the regulation concerning the traditional «day of opposition», which presupposed formation of agenda by opposition on Wednesdays, was abolished.

The appropriateness of adoption of the special law on opposition has been discussed for a long time by the representatives of parliamentary political parties. One of the first laws was the draft law «On Organized Political Opposition», brought in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 2, 1998 by the people's deputies Yu. Tymoshenko and O. Yeliashkevych. In the course of 1998-2007 eighteen draft laws aimed at regulating activity of political opposition were introduced to the parliament. One peculiar feature, concerning the initiatives of introducing the laws, is that in most cases the projects were initiated by the parties, which were not in power. Consequently, not approving the proposed law was not the bases for backing up own, already worked out project, when a political party came in power. The examples are the draft legislation «On Parliamentary Opposition» (№2214-3 d.d. February 11, 2004) introduced by V. Filenko, the deputy from the party «Our Ukraine», and the draft legislation «On Oppositional Political Activity» d.d. May 25, 2006, proposed by R. Bohatyrova, M. Komar, T. Chornovil and V. Bevzenko, the deputies from the Party of Regions. On March 19, 2014 due to the reestablishment of some regulations of the Constitution of Ukraine in wording of 2004, the draft law № 4494 «On Parliamentary Opposition», introduced by the people's deputies V. V. Novynskyi, Ye. B. Heller, VV. Pysarenko was adopted in the first reading. The elaborated variant of this law (№0948) by the same authors was repeatedly registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on November 27, 2014 with respect to the second reading²². In article 1.3 of this law there is a definition of parliamentary opposition: «voluntary deputy union of factions (deputy faction) in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and (or) people's deputies of Ukraine, who have not entered the parliamentary majority, have placed a request for passing into the opposition and who do not agree with the official policy of the parliamentary majority and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and (or) the way of its implementation, who take control over the activity of parliamentary majority and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, criticize their activity and propose an alternative program of development of Ukraine and the ways of its implementation»²³. According to this document the oppositional activity, aimed at elimination of independence of Ukraine, change of its constitutionalism with the help of force, infringement of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, destruction of national security, unconstitutional seizure of power, advocacy of violence, incitement of ethnic, racial, religious hatred, encroachment on people's rights and liberties, people's health, and formation of paramilitary forces are considered unacceptable. It is presupposed, that deputy factions and separate deputies, who have not entered the parliamentary majority and have not claimed their entrance into the parliamentary opposition, will not be viewed as the representatives of opposition. Thus, to become a part of opposition, except non-alignment

²² On March 2, 2015 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the basis of the negative resolution made by the Committee on Procedural Regulations and Administration rejected the mentioned bill.

²³ The Draft Law on Parliamentary Opposition [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf35. – Actualized on 1.03.2015

to the ruling majority, it is necessary to identify oneself publicly as a representative of opposition, by means of declarations, made by deputy factions and people's deputies as to their adherence to the parliamentary opposition, which must be officially announced by the chairman during the session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Moreover, the draft law stipulated that the personal membership of the parliamentary opposition must be published in the newspaper «Voice of Ukraine». The rights of opposition were presupposed. In particular, as to filling the posts of the chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of committees, including the position of the first deputy chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

In Ukrainian political science there are various approaches towards periodization of opposition activity. To F. Rudych's point of view, the first stage starts in 1990 and is related to the election of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1990²⁴. The classification is based on the legal foundations of opposition activity²⁵. To our mind the key determinants of formation and activity of opposition are the form of the government and election legislation. The form of the government on the constitutional level determines the structure of authority, system of interrelation and influence of authoritative institutions – the president and the parliament – on government formation, the amount of their power and the place of opposition respectively. The election legislation determines the procedure of the parliament formation, correspondingly its structure and importance of political actors, who enter the parliament. Thus, in the process of evolution of political opposition in Ukraine four stages can be singled out.

The first stage had covered the period till 1998. The presidential-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism with the predominating role of the president in the system of executive power functioned at that time. The parliamentary elections occurred in accordance with the majority election system, what ensured a great number of non-affiliated deputies in the parliament²⁶ and determined weakness of the main political parties. Consequently, determination of opposition depended on the president, who determined the format and personal composition of the government. Opposition, due to the weak structuring of the parliament, did not have a strictly formed prolonged construction, but in many cases it was an ad hoc one.

The second stage covered the period from 1998 till 2006. In 1998, for the first time ever, the elections to the Verkhovna Rada occurred on the majority-proportional basis, what promoted strengthening of the party structuring of the parliament. At the boundary between 1997 and 1998 the final formation of the phenomenon, known as the «ruling party»²⁷ took place. V. Pustovoitenko was the first head of the government, being the member of the political party. During his

²⁴ Rudych F. Political Authority and Opposition in Ukraine: Methodological Context // *Viche*, 2013, № 17 (in Ukrainian).

²⁵ F. Rudych has singled out four stages: I - 1990-2006, II – 2006-2007, III – 2007 – 2010 and IV – after 2010.

²⁶ Number of non-affiliated deputies under the conditions of the majority system in the course of parliamentary elections: 1994 – 168 non-affiliated deputies among 338 deputies; 1998 – 117 among 450; 2002 – 94 among 450 deputies.

²⁷ Romaniuk A. Government of Ukraine: between Non-party and Party Formats // *Face a Choice. Future of Ukraine under the Conditions of the Systematic Destabilization*. Ed. A. Gil, T. Stempnevski. – Lublin-Lvov-Kiev, 2013. – P. 260 (in Russian).

appointment as Prime Minister, the NDP (the People's Democratic Party)²⁸ declared its responsibility for the Prime Minister's activity²⁹. Nowadays, we can reckon the existence of experience among a number of «ruling parties». Besides the NDP, after L. Kuchma's re-election for the second presidential term and V. Pustovoitenko's resignation of the head of the government, the position of the «ruling party» was occupied by the SDPU (o), headed by V. Medvedchuk, presidential chief of staff. The period of its predominance in political life lasted to the presidential elections of 2004 and V. Yushenko's election to the presidency. After the presidential elections in 2004, the role of the «ruling party» belonged to the presidential party People's Union «Our Ukraine».

Despite the formation of the «ruling party», which was represented in the government, real power belonged to the president. Correspondingly, the opposition was determined as the president's opponent. Thus, in the draft law №2214-1 d.d. February 3, 2003 «On Parliamentary Majority and Parliamentary Opposition in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine»³⁰ opposition was defined as «voluntary union of the people's deputies of Ukraine – members of deputy factions (groups), non-affiliated people's deputies of Ukraine, who do not support political and social and economic policy of the President of Ukraine, activity of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and offer the society an alternative program of development». It should be mentioned, that the absence of party affiliation of the president and the head of the government, existence of a great number of non-affiliated deputies, largely influenced the opposition. Left (the Communist and Socialist parties) and/or right parties (the NRU (the People's Movement of Ukraine), the URP (the Ukrainian Republican Party), «Sobor» etc.) acted as the opponents to the head of the state. The parliamentary opposition was parted and its functional strain consisted in criticizing the policy of the current authority, real alternatives were not offered. At the same time, very often representatives of the opposition, at the personal level, cooperated with representatives of the authority, trying to get some ruling positions in the country. In general, the parties, which showed their opposition to the president, were characterized by various models of conduct: demonstration of oppositionality, neutral position and ad hoc cooperation.

The third stage of Ukrainian opposition development started in 2006. The grounds were the following: firstly, in accordance with the law of Ukraine «On Introduction of Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine» d.d. December 8, 2004, a number of the Constitutional changes were to be implemented on January 1, 2006. In particular, the system of government formation was changed. According to Article 83, subsequent to the results of elections and coordination of political positions, the coalition of deputy factions, consisted of the majority of people's deputies form the constitutional composition of the parliament, had to be formed in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Correspondingly, the majority coalition was to submit an offer to the president as to

²⁸ The People's Democratic Party was created in 1996 as a result of the union between the Labor Congress of Ukraine and the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine involving a number of civil structures. V. Pustovoitenko was the head of the People's Democratic Party during 1999 - 2006.

²⁹ Vysokyi Zamok, № 111/112 d.d. 18/20 1997.

³⁰ The project was prepared and introduced by the people's deputies of Ukraine S. Havrysh, O. Karpov and K. Vashchuk.

the head and composition of the government³¹. Secondly, the regular elections of 2006 were to take place without a majority constituent, solely on the basis of party lists.

The fourth stage of opposition transformation started as a result of the Constitutional Court's decision, d.d. September 30, 2010. In accordance with paragraph 5, part 6 of this decision, the Constitutional Court considered the Law of Ukraine № 2222 – IV «On Introduction of Amendments to the Constitution» to be unconstitutional due to the violations of examination and adoption procedure. Thus, it meant revalidation of the previous wording of the Constitution of Ukraine, which was changed and amended by the mentioned law. Simultaneously, all norms concerning parliamentary opposition were excluded from the law «On Procedural Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine». The additional factor of the qualitative change of the situation was reestablishment of the mixed electoral system, which became the basis of the parliamentary election of 2012. To the already distinguished formal and legal determinants, one should add significant qualitative changes, which lay in strengthening the authoritarian tendencies of V. Yanukovych's regime, concurrently with reduction of democratic practice. It resulted in restriction of mass media activity, criminal prosecution and conviction of a number of oppositional leaders (Yu. Tymoshenko, Yu. Lutsenko and others), factual isolation of oppositional deputies in the parliament, winning some deputies from the oppositional factions over to the ruling or formally neutral deputy groups, neglection of the parliamentary procedural regulations while adopting the laws, which were of benefit to the authority. Rather demonstrative was voting for laws on January 16, 2014, which were acquired in the society as the dictatorial ones (the representative of the counting board named the necessary number of deputies' votes without preliminary counting). Under such conditions, oppositional parliamentary factions/parties had to cooperate closely. On June 15, 2013 took place the congress, where the party «Batkivshchyna» united with the party «Front of Changes» and a chain of other parties. The additional factor was the preparation to the presidential elections of 2015. On the one hand, pro-presidential political forces started comprehending the complexity of achieving positive results by means of fair elections and began taking a complex of measures, in particular aimed at isolation and discrediting of the opposition. This, in its turn, determined the necessity of coordination of actions among the oppositional parliamentary parties, their gradual transformation into a single oppositional bloc, comprised of the «Batkivshchyna», «UDAR», «Svoboda». Despite their ideological and program differences, the leaders of these three political forces managed to stay united, taking into consideration the threat on the part of the powerful authority. The parliamentary opposition during 2012 – February 2014 appeared to be a complex unity. It consisted of the party factions of the mentioned above political parties and deputies elected on the basis of a majority rule. If the representatives of the oppositional party factions were more or less consolidated, due to

³¹ The Constitution of Ukraine Amended and Revised by the Law of Ukraine d.d. December 8, 2004 № 2222-IV. – Kyiv: Atika, 2006. – Pp. 24-25.

party control and discipline, then non-affiliated deputies could cooperate or were made to cooperate ad hoc with the ruling party. Thus, the opposition at this stage was characterized as the opponent both to the president and government. In general context, the confrontation in the line of «authority – opposition» stepped out the desire to change authority and took the format of anti-system opposition to the authoritarian power in Ukraine. As a result, the opponents represented their counterpart as an enemy, while addressing people with the dichotomy of choice between good and evil. The confrontational format of relations between the authority and opposition became stronger due to the absence of tradition and culture of compromises in the Ukrainian political life. All this logically led to the large political crisis and acute street confrontation during the end of 2013 – February 2014. The most dramatic were the events of February 18-20, 2014, when the confrontation grew into the power struggle. According to the Ministry of Health's data during that period 82 people (71 demonstrators and 11 law enforcers) were killed and 622 persons got hurt in Kyiv.

Under the conditions of V. Yanukovich's and a number of executives' escape from Ukraine, on 21 February, 2014 the Verkhovna Rada reinstated the wording of the Constitution of Ukraine d.d. December 8, 2004. On February 22 acting chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine V. Rybak, of his own free will, resigned the post and O. Turchynov was appointed new Speaker of the parliament. At the same time, by 328 of votes, people's deputies dismissed V. Yanukovich from the position of the President of Ukraine and this gave the grounds to announce early presidential elections. By this, Ukraine has returned to the construction of prime minister-presidential model of semi-presidentialism. It gives the basis to state the next stage of Ukrainian opposition evolution. The reformatting of deputies in the Verkhovna Rada took place without new parliamentary elections, which resulted in the formation of the new parliamentary majority and the PRU's (the party of Regions of Ukraine) and the KPU's (the Communist Party of Ukraine) official declaration, d.d. February 24, as to their passing into opposition. Despite a short period of time between the end of February 2014 and March 2015, within the limits of the mentioned stage two substages can be singled out. To our mind, the early parliamentary elections in October 2014 became the symbolic boundary line. During the first substage, the political opposition, represented in the parliament by the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, was to a large extent demoralized and organizationally parted. The complex of internal and external factors was the grounds for this. To the external factors belong: annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation; formation and development of separatist movements in a number of regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, which were traditionally the electoral regions for the PRU and KPU; power struggle and human losses and finally armed conflict in the part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which led to the extensive military operations between separatists, which were fully backed up by Russia, and Ukrainian military forces. In public consciousness «The Revolution of Dignity» and social shock from the numerous victims in Kyiv were supplemented by the shock from the

annexation of the Crimea and military operations in Donbass. All this led to intensification of Ukrainian national identity on the one hand and on the other hand to the increase of requirements for political responsibility on the part of various parties, which were the cornerstones of V. Yanukovich's regime and stood on the course for closer cooperation with Russia. The internal factors are: departure of many members and party organizations from the PRU, withdrawal of many members «into the shadows» (just to be forgotten), active discussions within the party over the reasons and ways out from the situation, as well as the process of overestimation of the Russian Federation's role in the events which occurred in Ukraine, controversial attitude towards some party members, who in public backed up the events in the Crimea and separatist movement in eastern Ukraine etc. Similar processes were peculiar of the KPU as well. The additional factor for this party was the conflict between the top echelon of the party and its leader P. Symonenko, who was accused by the party members of financial fraud, concerning party funds. As a result, oppositional position and activity were less native to these two parties as organizations and were more characterized by the non-system actions of separate politicians, namely N. Shufrych and Yu. Vilkul. This process logically ended with the statement made by the secretary of presidium of the Party of Regions B. Kolesnikov on September 14, 2014, that the party would not participate in the early parliamentary elections.

To some extent intensification of oppositional activity took place on the eve of the early elections. The key oppositional actors were the revived party «Strong Ukraine» headed by S. Tyhipko, the KPU and the party «Oppositional Bloc», which was created in September 2014 on the basis of the «Party of Development of Ukraine», parties: the «Centre», the «New Politics», the «State Neutrality», the «Forward Ukraine», the «Labor Ukraine» and a part of the representatives from the Party of Regions. Despite the classical activation of pre-election confrontation, the critical constituent within the activity of three oppositional actors was rather moderate. The main peculiarity of their oppositionality concerned their positioning as the adherents of the peaceful solutions to resolve the military conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, avoiding the question of the Crimea's future and membership and evaluation of the Russian Federation's role in the conflict of 2014 in Ukraine. They also actively accentuated the necessity of preservation and development of social programs and social protection for people. It was latent opposition to the position of the ruling coalition, which stood for continuation of the antiterrorist operation, conviction the role of the Russian Federation's annexation of the Crimea and declaration the necessity of reforms. The significant constituent of the pre-election activity of these three forces was their electoral geography – they referred to and worked with the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, which traditionally, during the previous elections voted for the PRU and the KPU. The results of the early parliamentary elections were rather interesting. Firstly, the KPU with the result of 3,88 % and the party «Strong Ukraine» with the result of 3,11% within the frames of the national multi-mandate constituency did not manage to clear the electoral threshold and did not enter the Verkhovna

Rada. Secondly, the «Oppositional Bloc» gained 9,43% and their two deputies were elected on the majority basis. Besides, the «Oppositional Bloc» in a single national electoral constituency won the first place in the following regions: Donetsk (38,69), Luhansk (36,59), Kharkiv (32,16), Dnipropetrovsk (24,27) and Zaporizhzhia (27,18).

Table 1. Voting of Deputies' Factions and Groups (in %)³²

	Faction/Group	«For»	«Against»	«Abstain»	Absent	Vote withheld
1	Faction of the party «Petro Poroshenko Bloc»	62,45	0,54	0,79	17,06	19,16
2	Faction of the party «People's Front»	75,19	0,35	0,11	7,87	16,47
3	Faction of the party «Oppositional Bloc»	8,06	3,52	0,17	43,04	45,21
4	Faction of the party «Samopomich» (Self-Reliance) Union	58,22	1,86	0,54	15,17	24,21
5	Faction of Oleh Liashko Radical Party	69,29	0,92	0,59	10,12	19,08
6	Faction of the All-Ukrainian Association «Batkivshchyna» (Motherland)	63,36	0,93	0,45	20,11	15,15
7	Group «People's Will»	20,31	0,45	0,17	52,75	26,32
8	Group «Economic Development»	20,91	0,91	0,5	33,25	44,44
9	Non-affiliated Deputies	28,98	4,03	1,29	45,59	20,12

The second substage was characterized by the change of political actors in the newly elected parliament of Ukraine. The factions of the parties «Petro Poroshenko Bloc», «People's Front», «Samopomich» Union, All-Ukrainian Association «Batkivshchyna» and Oleh Liashko Radical Party signed the coalition agreement and created the parliamentary majority and the government. In total they numbered 303 deputies. The short work period of the Verkhovna Rada of the eighth convocation does not give grounds for the precision evaluation of the opposition. The opposition can be defined on the basis of self-identification (when a faction/group announces its oppositionality in public) and according to the results of activity, concerning voting for the laws, initiated by the government/majority. As to formation and functioning of the opposition, we can single out a number of characteristics. Firstly, negative treatment of the opposition is still kept on the part of the parliamentary majority. The basis for this are: 1) besides the tradition of letting the opposition hold the posts of chairmen of a number of parliamentary committees (in the Verkhovna Rada of the sixth convocation the opposition headed 10 committees, during the seventh convocation it headed 12 committees) and in the newly elected parliament the representatives of the «Oppositional Bloc» were not appointed chairmen of any committee. Such situation causes a number of questions, as in accordance with Article 81 of the Law on procedural regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine quotas on the chairman of the parliamentary committees are fixed on the proportional amount to the quantitative composition of parliamentary factions as to the overall composition of

³² GO «OPORA»: The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: the First 100 Days of Activity [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: http://opora.ua.org/index.php?option=com_conter

the parliament. Taking into consideration the numerical composition of the faction, the «Oppositional Bloc» (40 deputies) was to have headed at least three committees. The opposition also did not get any post of the deputy head of a committee; 2) as we have already stated the parliament rejected the draft law on parliamentary opposition (№0948), introduced by the oppositional deputies and did not propose any alternative project. Such situation does not correlate with P. Poroshenko's pre-election promises, when he was a candidate for President of Ukraine: «The law on parliamentary opposition will be urgently introduced to the Verkhovna Rada»³³. However, the majority, in spite of all oppositional experience, gained in the course of V. Yanukovych's regime, does not want to limit itself with the fixed power of opposition.

Secondly, in the parliament of Ukraine formally there is only one oppositional party, namely the «Oppositional Bloc», which had publicly announced its opposition to the government majority coalition. Mainly, the representatives of the opposition do not give their support to the governmental laws, are critical of new appointments, oppose the process of bringing to responsibility former top-level state and party officials etc. The alternation of the state development policy, chiefly concerns social issues, which is treated by many experts as unabashed populism, and the problems of war and peace in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Thirdly, ad hoc oppositional position is occupied by the group «Revival»³⁴ (headed by Khomutynnyk V.) and the group «People's Will» (headed by Yermeev I.). Oppositionality of these groups is characterized by the fact, that they usually do not support the laws, initiated by the ruling coalition. Such policy can have different explanations, including an extortion/pressure attempt towards the government, aimed at achieving some desirable benefits.

Development of political situation in Ukraine is presupposed by the military events, threat of destabilization on behalf of the Russian Federation, difficult social and economic situation and expected deprivation of many people, due to tariff increase, reduction of budget expenditure, absence of reforms, high level of corruption etc. Under these conditions, we believe that there are two main tendencies. The first one is a good chance for the «Oppositional Bloc» to accumulate their electorate support, especially in southern and eastern regions. The paradox is that such an increase is possible not due to the activity of the party, but as a result of its successful name and opposition to the government. The second one lies in the attractiveness of the oppositional status for a number of parties, which, in the context of future elections to the local authorities (in accordance with the current legislation, the elections to the local authorities in Ukraine are to be held at the end of October 2015), do not have high chances for a good result. It can «de facto» provoke strengthening of oppositional activities on the part of some members of the parliamentary majority. Such actions can be represented by negative

³³ Poroshenko P. Live in a New Way! P. Poroshenko's Pre-Election Programme of the Candidate for Presidency [Electronic Resource]. – Access Mode: www.cvk.gov.ua/vp2014/wp009pt021f01=134pt001f01=702 doc.

³⁴ After the early parliamentary elections the deputy group «Economic Development» was created, which was re-registered under the name «Revival» («Vidrodzhennia») on March 06, 2015.

voting for government legislative intentions, not to be responsible for them and criticizing the position and activity of the government institutions at the regional and local levels. Thus, the period of formation and existence of independent Ukraine has been marked by the process of institutionalization of political opposition, its mastering immanent functional attributes. Concurrently, this process has been delaying due to a number of factors, among which one can single out: absence of legislative definition of opposition, existence of various practices aimed at restriction of opposition's activity in the parliament etc.

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