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Shift in Electoral Support at the 2019 Presidential and Snap Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine

The article contemplates universal tendency in regard of a significant increase in electoral volatility peculiar for developed democratic countries. The present study proposes a methodological toolkit for measuring shifts in electoral support, as well as the correctness of its application to the behavior of Ukrainian voters, comparing and correlating electoral volatility indicators for all election cycles. The reasons for a high level of M. Pedersen index in the recent snap parliamentary elections, as well as peculiarities of volatility at the regional level have been analyzed. The present article elucidates the velocity of electoral support shift along with the influence of population paternalism on the change of political agents support as based on the analysis of the results of a sociological survey.

Keywords: elections, electoral volatility, Pedersen index, regional dimension of electoral support change, paternalism

ZMIANA POPARCIA WYBORCZEGO PODCZAS WYBORÓW PREZYDENCKICH I PRZEDTERMINOWYCH PARLAMENTARNYCH NA UKRAINIE W 2019 ROKU

Rozpatrzona została powszechna tendencja charakterystyczna dla rozwiniętych krajów demokratycznych odnośnie znacznego zwiększenia chwiejności wyborczej. Przedstawiono zestaw narzędzi dla pomiaru zmian poparcia wyborczego i poprawności jego zastosowania w odniesieniu do zachowania wyborców na Ukrainie. Porównano wskaźniki chwiejności wyborczej w odniesieniu do wszystkich cykli wyborczych. Przeanalizowano przyczyny wysokiego poziomu indeksu M. Pedersen podczas ostatnich przedterminowych wyborów parlamentarnych, cechy chwiejności na szczeblu regionalnym. Na podstawie analizy wyników badań socjologicznych określono szybkość zmiany poparcia wyborczego oraz wpływ paternalizmu części społeczeństwa na zmianę poparcia przedstawicieli politycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: wybory, chwiejność wyborcza, indeks Pedersen, regionalne pomiary chwiejności wyborczej, paternalizm.

The 2019 presidential and snap parliamentary elections in Ukraine have become a true electoral quake that not only resulted in the election of a new head of state, V. Zelensky, who

prior to the election had been involved in political life as an ordinary citizen, yet defeating outstanding Ukrainian politicians, having been key political actors for quite a while. Moreover, the elections brought to the parliamentary stage brand new parties, neither previously known to the general public, nor present in the political life of the state, one of which having won a stable majority for the first time in history, with more than two-thirds of the deputy corps suddenly replaced. Thus, various dimensions of this phenomenon require a thorough analysis. Respectively, the objective of the present study is to contemplate the state and tendencies of electoral support shift in Ukraine in the light of world processes, as well as determine the criteria of electoral volatility and its determining factors.

Researchers S. Geers and J. Strömbäk point out that one of the key trends in the changes, typical of advanced industrial democracies is a significant increase in electoral volatility¹. In their study, the researchers claim that over the span from 1960 to 2014, the proportion of voters who changed the party between elections (intra-election volatility) increased from 11% to 36%. In the article the authors analyzed on the example of the 2014 parliamentary elections in Sweden, how typical of this Scandinavian country the tendency is. Herein, they stated that only 58% of the respondents remained loyal to the same political party throughout the election campaign; 19% of respondents either hesitated or changed party preferences several times, including the issue of voting - not voting; 15% changed their preference / position once and 7% did not intend to vote at the beginning of the election campaign, however made the decision to vote during the campaign. In fact, the proportion of voters who changed electoral preferences between the elections, including the election campaign period, constituted 41%. In the course of the research, the authors employed the methodology, proposed by Mogens Pedersen in 1979. M. Pedersen understood volatility of the electorate as «a pure shift in individual voting preferences», which illustrated «a certain extent to which party power is redistributed between the winning and defeated parties from one election to the other. He proposed a formula for calculating electoral volatility:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{|V_i(t) - V_i(t+1)|}{2}$$

The index is calculated on the basis of the results of two consecutive elections. All results of the political parties (n) gained at the two elections are taken into account. In case Party A participated in two consecutive elections, the difference in the gained results is measured. That is, if party A gained a result at the previous election $V_i(t)$, consequently gaining a result $V_i(t+1)$ at the next election, then it is the difference between the two results that is measured. If Party B has participated in only one election, regardless of whether it is the previous or the next, then its result is regarded as a change. The index is calculated in the range from 0 (no changes) to

¹ Sabine Geers, Jesper Strömbäk, Patterns of intra-election volatility the impact of political knowledge // Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, T.29, 2019, Vol.3. – P.361-380.

100 (total change). The author presented the European party systems volatility results for the period from 1948 to 1977 (Table 1).

Table 1. Volatility of European Party Systems in 1948-1977

	Country	1948-59	1960-69	1970-77	Average	Number of elections
1	Austria	4,1	3,9	3,1	3,7	8
2	Belgium	7,9	10,3	5,5	7,9	9
3	Denmark	5,5	8,9	18,7	11	12
4	Ireland	10,9	6,8	5	7,9	8
5	Italy	10,3	8	6,8	8,4	6
6	Netherlands	6,3	7,9	12,7	9,1	8
7	Germany	15,2	9,5	4,9	9,8	7
8	Norway	3,4	5,2	17,1	8,1	7
9	United Kingdom	4,4	5,2	7,9	5,9	8
10	Finland	4,4	6,9	9,1	6,8	8
11	France	21,8	11,9	10,6	16,9	7
12	Switzerland	1,9	3,7	6,4	4	6
13	Sweedeen	4,8	4,3	6,6	5,2	9
	Average	7,8	7,3	9,2	8,1	

As we can see, the average party volatility for these countries constituted only 8.1%. The period, analysed by M. Pedersen in order to calculate the electoral support shift for political parties, was later defined in Political Science, particularly partology, as «freezing of party systems». Such assessment was largely affected and conditioned by sociopolitical divisions in Western Europe, where there long existed a strong bond between social groups and certain political parties. Respectively, starting with the mid-1970s a new period has begun by analogy described as “thawing,” marking an increase in electoral volatility. The parameters of this growth were proposed in the research by S. Geers and J. Strömbäk. Among the reasons, stipulating the rise in electoral volatility, the authors mentioned the following: a decrease in the value of traditional sociopolitical divisions, attended by simultaneous weakening of the connection between parties and voters; an increase in the level of education that determined the acquisition of the necessary skills of independent political choice without paying heed to traditional party loyalty, and the factor of the very election campaigns, which differently but sensitively influenced various categories of voters.

Ukraine does not belong to developed industrial democracies. However, upon gaining independence, even despite slight differences and transformation of the political process vectors, among the prevailing tendencies one should mention democratization of public life. Accordingly, M. Pedersen’s methodology should be particularly applied with regard to elections with a proportional component within the national voting district. Since party lists in the mixed electoral system were first employed in 1998, those elections can actually serve as a starting point to calculate volatility.

Table 2. Changes in the volatility level (Pedersen index) at the parliamentary elections²

1998/2002	2002/2006	2006/2007	2007/2012	2012/2014	2014/2019
62,56	63,13	15,81	35,93	82,14	67,76

Except for the two election cycles following the Orange Revolution, in other four cases the volatility index exceeded 50%, presupposing that at the scheduled parliamentary elections more than a half of Ukrainians shifted away from their previous election choice to give preference to a new political agent, i.e. changing their choice. From our perspective, this situation has been caused by the following reasons: firstly, citizens' dissatisfaction with the activities of political actors in power. Since the political parties, holding a majority in the parliament, in accordance with the constitution and in practice, form a government and together with the president exercise dualistic executive power, in particular through senior personnel appointments and determination of the social development directions. Accordingly, the level of satisfaction / dissatisfaction is manifested in indicators of trust in the key government institutions.

Table 3. Dynamics of Ukrainian citizens who display trust in state and political institutions (2013–2018) in %³

Government Institution	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Militia/police since 2016	8,8 (2012)	6,5	6,5	12,1	22,8	12,5
Prosecutor's Office	7,1	4,8	5,2	5,7	9,2	8,1
Courts	7,0	5,3	6,2	6,4	7,9	7,1
President	10,9	33,9	17,6	10,6	11,2	7,8
Verkhovna Rada	4,6	8,6	8,3	5,7	5,3	4,7
Government	8,1	17,2	8,7	6,5	7,1	7,2
Local authorities	13,8	18,7	16,1	19,8	27,9	18,4
Political parties	6,6	3,8	5,0	4,7	6,0	5,5

As seen in Table 3, the citizens of Ukraine, under the influence of the Revolution of Dignity, significantly increased the level of trust in the Institute of the President of Ukraine, the Government and the Parliament of the country. There is also noticeably growing confidence in the police / police institute after the first year of the police activities (2016), as well as in local authorities upon decentralization programme implementation, especially after local governments received increased budgets and experienced growing financial capacity. Despite these peculiarities / exceptions, as a rule there can be traced a decreasing level of trust following the election / formation of the Institute of the President and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the overall low level of confidence in other political institutions.

² The results were obtained on the basis of the Central Election Commission data [Electronic resource] - Access mode: cvk.gov.ua

³ Таблиця складена на підставі опитувань Інституту соціології НАН України. Див.: Моніторинг 2018: основні тенденції змін громадської думки [Електронний ресурс] – Режим доступу: dif.org.ua/article/monitoring-2018-osnovni-tendentsii-zmin-gromadskoi-dumki

The second reason is a low level of trust in political parties in Ukraine. The evolution of electoral law eventually led to the political parties securing a de facto monopoly on the nomination of candidates at the elections of the president, members of parliament, and local authorities. The provision of the norm on nomination and registration of self-nominees in the law on presidential elections and following the election of deputies within the majority voting districts under the conditions of mixed / parallel electoral system, failed to pose an alternative to the exclusive right of political parties, only concealing their party affiliation / party bias. That is, for the majority of citizens of Ukraine, it is quite obvious that during the elections, the political parties offer promising political platforms, that voters respond to/ “buy”, the parties identify and make all major senior personnel appointments; together with the incumbent state leaders, party leaders define and direct social development. However, despite such omnipotence of parties in Ukraine along with merely formal resemblance to political practices in democratic countries, there emerged a situation that significantly differs from that of developed countries. Firstly, parties may lose power / worsen their results at the next regular election, yet they only exercise suppositional political responsibility. Party leaders remain untenably in power for quite a while. Secondly, severe criticism of the policy of powerful political actors by the opposition, even with the subsequent former opposition’s coming to power, does not lead to overcoming drawbacks / problems in social development (a prime example of corruption). Predominantly, even with the changed names of parties and party representatives in governmental institutions and to a lesser extent at the level of local self-government, the nature of their behaviour and basic parameters of their activities remained unchanged. All this created a closed-loop format of the political process. Respectively, in fact, it created an image of «old politicians» and «old policies.» The underlying meaning of these concepts implies an exclusive struggle for power, which has been a goal in and of itself, and the electoral programmes as well as the activities of political parties served as an instrument of a race for power. Therefore, most citizens were dissatisfied with the results of the country’s course of development, and they placed this responsibility, along with specific authorities, on a wider range of political actors who jointly pursued such a policy with no visible results.

Table 4. What, in your opinion, is the general direction of matters in Ukraine, right or wrong? in %⁴

Date of survey	Right	Hard to say	Wrong
09.2014	29,0	20,0	51,0
09.2015	17,0	13,0	68,0
09.2016	11,0	17,0	72,0
09.2017	19,0	13,0	69,0
09.2018	15,0	12,0	73,0
01.2019	15,0	12,0	73,0

⁴ Electoral mood monitoring of Ukrainians, February 2019 [Electronic resource] - Access mode: ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_electoral_02.2019_press.pdf

In their overwhelming majority existing parties do not meet the democratic countries standards. They were established not as structures, intended to reflect interests of large groups of people. On the contrary, for the most part, the parties are leader-focused, i.e. aim at protecting / representing the interests of a particular politician, or a small group of party leaders \ financial and industrial structures. A number of studies illustrate that in the present-day Ukraine socio-political demarcation with stable ties between certain parties and electoral groups never occurred. In a leader-type party, winning seats in the parliament involved mobilizing citizens' support, which is mainly achieved not through articulation of group / public interests, but through large-scale populist projects, including electoral programme, designated as a set of promises to give voters what they wanted / they expected at the time of the elections. As a result, all such projects proved to be of one-off nature (exemplified by the history of the «Batkivshchyna» electoral programs at the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections). Obviously, such projects did not presuppose their implementation. During the regular elections, the parties presented another promising projects, while avoiding to report on the previous ones. Expendability of such programmes, a lack of follow-up reporting, as well as accountability for their implementation do not contribute to securing the electorate, discouraging voters from re-supporting the same party.

In addition, political parties, as the main political actors in Ukraine for the most part never became democratic structures, remaining highly centralized with a limited / controlled level of internal democracy. Party leaders and party rules declared a commitment to democratic foundations, yet the practical dimension of most parties met the standards of democratic centralism, guaranteeing permanent control of party leadership both over the party and its members. Accordingly, the vast majority of Ukrainian parties has been closed to the emergence of new, authoritative leaders within their party environment. The emergence of new leaders has always been controlled by party authorities. Thus, party leaders transferred the abovementioned state of affairs to Ukrainian politics, undertaking everything possible to keep the political class a closed environment. All mentioned above formed the essence of the “old politicians” and “old politics” phenomena, designated to block democracy within the party and prevent new authoritative leaders from entering the political class. Active populism and irresponsibility of the political class became a striking feature of this policy. As a result, a series of successive elections, with changed party names and officials' names without a significant improvement of the situation in the country, conditioned a strong demand for «new parties» and «new politicians.» The main indicator of novelty was not being in power / in the main political institutions prior to the elections.

In fact, it is the factor of the confrontation between the «old» and «new» politics, as well as «fresh faces» of politicians, that posed the main paradigm of the 2019 presidential and snap parliamentary elections. Refusal to support / weak support for «old» political parties and politicians from that environment, as well as prevailing active support for «new» parties

and their representatives, can be considered a form of shifting the blame and responsibility for either low or insufficient results the country's previous course of development on «old» political parties and, respectively, politicians. These parties lost voters' support. Instead, new parties actively relying on populism, yet not obliged to report for the time being, were acceptable to a large number of citizens. Their main advantage was not previously being in power, attended by harsh criticism of the «old» parties and politicians, that appeared to be enough for the the «fresh faces» to gain such support.

Technically, a wide coverage / use of the Internet (more than 70% of the population as of the beginning of 2019⁵) by avast majority of the population has become another significant factor. Indeed, Internet resources and channels have created strong competition for party information. The parties lost their monopoly on spread of information about themselves prior to the election. With the involvement of the traditional media, the wide spread of paid journalism, infomercials as well as and customized, promotional information, access to information from the network has created a powerful resource / channel for campaigning and voter mobilization. Diminishing trust in the traditional media, having long been the mouthpiece of the «old» parties, was an additional benefit, simultaneously attended by a growing loyalty to the Internet sources, both alternative and more democratic yet less biased. The combination of these and other factors led to a high level of electoral volatility at the national level in Ukraine in 2019.

Traditionally, the regional parliamentary elections results somewhat differ from those at the national level. The most benchmark case occurred at the 2019 presidential and snap parliamentary elections, when the results in the Lviv region fell into the individual case category compared to the national ones. On the whole, traditional support of parties and candidates of national-democratic orientation is characteristic of the voters of this region. Accordingly, parties that focus on supporting / expanding ties with the Russian Federation, regardless of the level of support for these parties nationwide, gain minimum voting support. Therefore, we could assume that electoral volatility in the region should have been substantially lower than national ones. We calculated the volatility level for the two recent parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2019 in the Lviv region and the result obtained constituted 59,72⁶. As you can see, the difference between the national and regional indicators is neither dramatic, nor appreciable. In our opinion, this can be accounted for by the versatility of the factors, having led to the shift in electoral preferences, both for the Lviv region and the rest of Ukrainian citizens.

⁵ The number of Internet users in Ukraine has increased [Electronic resource] - Access mode: www.443742/kilkist-internet-korystuvachiv-v-ukrayini-zbilshylas-infografika

⁶ The results were calculated by the author based on the data, provided by the Central Election Commission [Electronic resource] - Access mode: cvk.gov.ua

Table 5. The level of trust in the key political institutions in Lviv region⁷

	Trust	Hard to say	Mistrust
President	16,2	26,7	57,1
Verkhovna Rada	8,0	25,2	66,9
Government	9,0	28,3	62,8
Prosecutor's Office	8,0	20,8	71,2
Court	8,7	23,3	68,1

The analysis of electoral volatility implies a step value of duration of the break / cleavage between the two parliamentary elections. Accordingly, the absolute factor in changing electoral support is the time period over which an average voter can compare his expectations with the outcomes of his chosen political agent. The result will never presuppose 100% satisfaction / approval. In addition, over this period, there is a natural movement / change of voters, when young citizens become entitled to vote whereas senior representatives leave. As a span of 4-5 years is appreciable enough for a number of events to occur so as to provoke various reactions / assesment, the issue of the citizens' political choice stability remains urgent.

In 2019, Ukraine held two rounds of regular presidential elections (on March, 31 and April 21), as well as snap parliamentary elections on July, 21. We intend to contemplate fluctuations in electoral preferences at the presidential election and over the period between the two elections with the help of a poll, carried out in Lviv region. Respondents were asked to indicate who they voted for in the first and second rounds of presidential elections and at the snap parliamentary elections. Two-dimensional tables enabled us to determine the major overlaps. We selected supporters of P. Poroshenko at the first presidential election as a reference group. Such a choice is due to the fact that Poroshenko participated in the two rounds of the presidential elections and his party had a certain history of existence, a relatively formed party structure, but the party structure of V. Zelensky was a novelty. Hypothetically we assume that voters who supported Poroshenko in the first round should have confirmed their choice in the second round. However, among the voters of Poroshenko in the second round, only 83.6% confirmed their choice, whereas 10% voted for V. Zelensky, with 5.8% not voting at all. Presumably this shift happened due to the course of the election campaign, when the arguments or position / behaviour of the candidates affected the choice of the voter. We can also assume that the change of an agent was typical of voters who doubted the correctness of their previous choice.

With regard to the results of the snap parliamentary elections, our reference group was also represented by P. Poroshenko's electorate, as well as and those, having supported the political party «European Solidarity», led by P. Poroshenko. Respectively, we hypothesize that the overwhelming majority of respondents were to have supported the then-president's

⁷ The «Socioinform» Agency poll in December 2018

party, for whose leader they voted at the presidential election⁸. Such an assumption is based on the hypothesis on the consistency of one's choice protection, especially under the conditions of another candidate's victory and the threat to the course, declared by P. Poroshenko. Only 48.6% of the respondents, having given their vote for Poroshenko in the first round⁹ of the presidential election, supported the «European Solidarity» at the snap parliamentary elections. Of the options / positions indicated, 2.6% did not remember who they voted for, while 8.4% responded they had not voted. Since the turnout in the Lviv region was 68.91% in the first round and 67.34% in the second round, according to the CEC, we can assume that 11% of the above mentioned citizens found / offered a soft form of refusal to directly state their political stance even in an anonymous Questionnaire. Alternatively, 40.6% of respondents voted for another political agent. In this case, the period over which the shift occurred was only four months long. The reasons for such a rapid and large-scale change could be the following: firstly, disappointment in P. Poroshenko's political stance / activity upon the presidential election, or holding him responsible for the voters' poor state of affairs, or low standard of living of a citizen; secondly, a high level of support of V. Zelensky by most Ukrainian citizens, accompanied by the belief in the possibility of his team changing the present situation in the country, positioning himself as belonging with the majority as an option of solidarity with the majority; thirdly, the impact of arguments and events during the election campaign.

As a separate factor, simultaneously closely related to the abovementioned ones, we would like to emphasise the setting for an agent, capable of realizing paternalistic attitudes, i.e., finding a new and successful political agent who would solve the socio-economic problems of citizens, dissatisfied with their current state of affairs. Since, following the presidency of P. Poroshenko and his party being in power, some of the citizens remain dissatisfied with their conditions, among this category a significant number is not ready to look into the causes of such a situation, beginning to look for a new agent to solve their problems, instead¹⁰. The paternalistic sentiments of this part of the population underlie / determine the search for a permanently new political agent, capable of dramatically improving the lives of this category of voters.

Thus, from our perspective, a high level of electoral volatility at the parliamentary elections in Ukraine has been predetermined by the following factors: firstly, by dissatisfaction with the outcomes of activities of certain politicians and political parties in power; secondly, the

⁸ Voting at the first presidential election was selected as the bottom-up position. We agree with the common view that, in the first round, voters overwhelmingly vote according to their preferences, and in the second round, a large proportion of voters vote tactically, focusing on preferences or «lesser evil» that did not matter for them in the first round.

⁹ We deliberately took the results of the first round, when voters voted for different candidates, representing distinct political parties / projects, since voting in the second round of the presidential election is already dichotomous and the voter must discard his political sympathies / preferences. Instead, at the parliamentary elections, the voter again faces up to the need to choose between a number of parties according to their advantages.

¹⁰ During the survey, respondents, dissatisfied with their / their family's economic situation, were asked the following questions: If you are not satisfied with your family's financial situation, which of the following is your intention? The following responses were obtained: 29.0% - I am looking for extra earnings or other job in Ukraine; 23.8% - I plan to require additional social allowances from the state (subsidies, benefits, etc.); 18.6% - I am not going to change anything; 13.8% - I intend to look for a job abroad; 14.8 - Difficult to answer.

weakness / condition of the existing political parties in Ukraine, which are leader-driven by nature and governed by the principles of democratic centralism, restricting the possibility of new, authoritative political leaders emerging in the parties, thus changing the ruling and opposition parties and politicians within the majority and those in power did not lead either to overcoming the shortfalls, inherent in Ukrainian society or to a visible improvement of the standard of living of the majority of citizens; thirdly, a high level of paternalism of the bulk of voters, expecting political agents to provide desired benefits without being personally eager to achieve them.

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Lisbon Treaty (2009-2019) on the Journey to Achieve the European Union as an Effective Global Actor

The aim of the article is a deep analysis of the role and importance of the Lisbon Treaty during 10 years of operation for the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the global position of the European Union. The study conducted by the authors assumed that the treaty gave the European Union more institutional tools, but without political impulses and the political will to deepen cooperation and integration in this area. Scientific research was based on specific examples, which clearly showed, in conclusions, that the European Union is still not ready to build strategic autonomy, and the Treaty of Lisbon has even stopped this process.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty, CFSP, CSDP, EU as a global actor

Traktat z Lizbony (2009 – 2019) w drodze do osiągnięcia pozycji skutecznego globalnego aktora przez UE

Celem tego artykułu jest wnikliwa analiza roli i znaczenia Traktatu z Lizbony na przestrzeni 10 lat jego funkcjonowania w zakresie wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa oraz ze względu na pozycję Unii Europejskiej w polityce globalnej. Przeprowadzone przez Autorów badania zakładały, że Traktat dał Unii Europejskiej więcej narzędzi instytucjonalnych, ale żadnych impulsów politycznych oraz woli politycznej do pogłębienia współpracy i integracji w tej dziedzinie. Badania naukowe zostały oparte na konkretnych przykładach, które wyraźnie wykazały we wnioskach, że Unia Europejska nadal nie jest gotowa do stworzenia strategicznej autonomii, a Traktat lizboński nawet zatrzymał ten proces.

Słowa kluczowe: Traktat z Lizbony, WPZiB, WPBiO, UE jako globalny aktor.

Introduction

The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007 marks the end of a particular review process that began after the Nice Treaty, signed on 26 February 2001. This faced with the need

¹ Ambassador Adam Krzymowski, is a former Ambassador of Poland to the United Arab Emirates, Representative to the International Renewable Energy Agency, Senior Advisor to Expo2020 Dubai and Professor (part time) at Sorbonne University, New York University (Abu Dhabi), and University of Sharjah, as well as professor of WSGK.

² Kinga Krzymowska graduated BA, International Studies with French at the University of Buckingham in UK. Currently she is conducting a research in international law as a LLM student at University of East Anglia in UK.

to get the European Union out of the crisis caused by French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty. This amending treaty is the result of a compromise, which makes it possible at the same time to safeguard the main “acquis”³ of the European Constitution. Moreover, the speed of the process of drafting and ratifying the treaty symbolises the existence of a certain weariness of heads of state or government in European institutional debates. The Reform Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty remains independently of the constitutive process that is characterised with an international treaty⁴. There is a clear evolution on the political level, a change of philosophy which finds a translation blatant legality in a return to the forefront of the State, and more precisely the sovereignty of Member States, within the European Union. This deep national withdrawal into the treaties can be seen as the legal translation of a message aimed at assuring citizens that the European Union does not tend to question the sovereign powers of their nation-state. In this respect, it is not surprising that the “new” Union established by the Lisbon Treaty is based solely on the wishes of the signatory states. It is no longer mentioned, as did Article 1 of the European Constitution, the will of citizens as a founding source of the European Union. Hence, it has been witnessing a consolidation of state legitimacy at the expense of democratic legitimacy, while the democratic deficit is one of the usual criticisms of the Union⁵.

On December 1, 2019, will be 10 years of the functioning of the Lisbon Treaty. The subject of the research is the Lisbon Treaty, CFSP as primary legislation with additional analysis of secondary legislation in the context of the EU actions to address global challenges within the CFSP. Therefore, the present work investigated initiatives on European strategic autonomy as well as the interference of the Lisbon Treaty on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, understanding and pointing out the difficulties of European foreign policy could serve as a basis for understanding regional integration processes in the rest of the world, or even follow the line of EU studies as a future global player unitary⁶. In this sense, we first analysed the legislative-institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon to the rules relating to the “Foreign Policy and Common Security Policy (CFSP)”, in order to assess whether these changes have concrete actions of the EU, as a unitary actor, outside the borders of Europe; from these two points, the limits and possible perspectives of the European Union as a unitary actor, though, also, the contribution of theories of International Relations, and finally asked what the difficulties of the bloc were.

The research focuses on enhanced cooperation, which can be implemented under the “non-exclusive EU competences”, taking into account the provisions of art. 10 and following the procedure set out in article 280a-280i. Another important area of research is the solidarity

³ The accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the totalbody of EUlaw. (<https://www.yourdictionary.com/acquis>)

⁴ See: F.Laursen, “The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Lisbon Treaty: Supranational Revolution or Adherence to Intergovernmental Pattern?;Laursen F. (ed.) in *The EU’s Lisbon Treaty*, Routledge, 2016, pp. 67-87.

⁵ See: J.Howorth, “The Lisbon Treaty, CSDP and the EU as a security actor” *The EU’s Foreign Policy*, 2016, pp. 83-94.

⁶ S. Maxwell, “What Role Does the European Union Play in International Development?; Rapid Response, Issue 14, 2016,

clause (new Title VII and article 188r). According to art., 28a, paragraph 7, if any Member State is subjected to armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall be under an obligation to provide assistance and assistance by all means available to them under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The research was conducted using a descriptive-analytical method. The researchers analysed source materials, research materials on the subject, as well as observations of personal diplomatic activities in multilateral fora. Besides, a wide range of theoretical instruments is used to investigate this issue, to analyse the problem in the multilevel approach to international relations. Moreover, this research on the neorealist theory of international relations, the concept of international constellations analysis. The theory of neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, allowed for precise typologisation of general and specific functions of international security institutions. Even though the constructivist theory is primarily based on national constellations, it ascribes even more significance to international institutions and their supernationally anchored norms and ideas than the rational institutionalism does. For that reason, it was also taken into consideration. In these analyses, the school of the social constructivism theory was also utilized. Authors put research questions: What was the problem with regarding CFSP to which the Treaty of Lisbon was proposed as an answer? Has the Treaty of Lisbon contributed to the success of the CFSP? Conducting the research, authors put a thesis that the Lisbon Treaty contributed to the expansion of the CFSP administrative apparatus, while it was decreasing the process of building strong Union's common foreign and security policy. In the following years, there will be a broader and deeper discussion on the Treaty changes, which will cause further regression of CFSP.

Research Background

In the post-Second War earliest years, western European countries have started the process of economic and institutional consolidation and political strengthening of itself. However, the United States of America utilised European integration to realise American interests. The EU was then focused on strengthening itself through "internal" policies such as the common market, monetary union and European agricultural policy. However, after the end of the Cold War, the world changed. Despite the crisis, internal institutionalisation is already reasonably strong, so that no setbacks can be discerned in the horizon large to affect the overall structure of the block⁷.

However, the main dispute regarding the future of EU is among the proponents of supranational federalism and advocates of inter-governmentalism, without renouncing national states. Since the 1990s, EU has already concluded numerous agreements with most of the countries, which denotes an international presence⁸, even if the Treaty of Maastricht (1992)

⁷ See: H. Mayer, 'The challenge of coherence and consistency in EU foreign policy', *The EU's Foreign Policy*, 2016, pp. 123-136.

⁸ An example of it is Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their member states, and Ukraine (signed 14/06/1994). Another example is Association Agreement with Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Israel, South Africa, Chile.

did not explicitly recognise this possibility and that the international legal personality was, questioned. However, the Common Foreign and Security Policy still need to be modified and strengthened. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European states decided to pay more attention to non-economic points of integration in the light of new challenges they could encounter. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) defined the Union of (1948), an organisation created for the defence of the continent during the Cold War, part of the EU in a field of defence. Although the European Union had brought a more political integration, until the decisions relating to this intergovernmental rather than community and supranational, the EU cannot have effective Common Foreign and Security Policy⁹. This occurrence was because EU had strategic ambitions as a civilian power to reduce tensions and achieve lasting peace on the continent, between member states and potential new members in Eastern Europe; rather than being strengthened with the use of hard power¹⁰.

Shortly after the decision EU leaders on building Common Foreign and Security Policy, Yugoslav civil war occurred with ethnic cleansing and genocide. Europeans could not participate in the solution because of a lack of political will and internal cohesion, and once again they needed US help. The concept of civil power¹¹ was insufficient and the factor of threats changed and became global: instead of Soviets; thus the Europeans began to worry about illegal mass migrations, fundamentalism and organised crime and terrorism. In this context, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), brought two major innovations; the Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Petersberg, which regulated the European Union's role in humanitarian missions, evacuation, peacekeeping and crisis management. Amsterdam Treaty encouraged member states on the development of an autonomous capacity to enable the EU to respond to international crises¹², as well as strengthening the EU's operational capabilities outside¹³. A few months after the Office of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana introduced the CSDP / ESDP as the EU's major project of the next century¹⁴.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the task of building European defence capabilities has become more urgent and increasingly complex¹⁵. February 1, 2003, the Treaty of Nice entered into force. Its provisions have strengthened and developed operative CSDP components already

⁹ See: A. Krzymowski, 'The beginnings of the construction process of European autonomy in security and defence' *Academy of National Economy Scientific Journals* No 9, 2007, pp. 171-181.

¹⁰ See: M. Riddervold, '(Not) in the hands of the member states: How the European Commission influences EU security and defence policies', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Wiley Blackwell 54(2), 2016, pp. 353-369.

¹¹ The collective power of the people or the commonwealth. (<https://www.yourdictionary.com/civil-power>)

¹² L. Lonardo, 'The political question doctrine as applied to common foreign and security policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 22(4), 2017, p. 575.

¹³ C. Grant, 'A European view of ESDP, 10 September 2001', Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 2001, pp. 1-2. (<http://www.endec.org/grant.htm>)

¹⁴ C. Hill, 'What is to be done? Foreign policy as a site for political action', *International Affairs* no 2, 2003, p. 239.

¹⁵ N. Gnesotto, 'Terrorism and European integration', *Newsletter* 35 ISS – Paris, 2001.

as an independent project of the European Union¹⁶. The Treaty of Nice was a political compromise. The mutually exclusive concerns of EU members reached on the one hand concerns about the reduction of the civilian element at the expense of the expansion of the EU military component. On the other hand, others advocated a clear profile of the CESDP as a natural element in building the EU's autonomous military power with its global involvement. Still, others represented the view that Europeans should make a greater contribution to NATO, and that its foundation would be a CSDP¹⁷.

Assembly and argued that the international community had come to a "fork in the road". Consequently, as early as 2003, the EU intends to put CSDP at the service of United Nations peace operations. Two concepts of operation are then born: Bridging model and Stand-by mode. The first designates the operations to ensure the "interim" during the reinforcement of a UN peace operation or preceding its deployment. The second refers to the possible support, by an EU force in rapid reaction mode or "*beyond the horizon*", to a UN operation. This approach undoubtedly favours operations under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. In the case of bridging operations, if the possibility exists to make some of its contingents available to the UN once the EU operation is over (re-hatting), this option is left to the discretion of each Member State and is not the subject of a European position¹⁸. The EU in December 2003 adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS)¹⁹ - a first for the EU - not only provides a broader scope for the crisis management and conflict prevention policy that the EU is then starting to take on the ground. US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at EU level. Moreover, on 1 May 2004 ten new countries with a combined population of almost 75 million joined the EU. The 25-member EU now forms a political and economic area with 450 million citizens and includes three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), four former satellites of the USSR (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), a former Yugoslav republic (Slovenia) and two Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta). It was new opportunities as well as new challenges for the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU²⁰.

European Constitution

The next step in the consolidation of EU foreign policy was the European Constitution (2004), which sought to make continental integration more explicit, between all States. A new strategic concept emerged that the EU should not only act as a civil power but as a global

¹⁶ EPastore, 'Internal – external security policy coordination in the European Union', *Occasional Paper* 30, Institute for Security Studies, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁷ J.Mawdsley, *Die Europäische Sicherheit- und Verteidigungspolitik in einer kooperativen Weltordnung*, in C. Hauswedell/Ch. Weller/U. Ratsch/ R.Mutz/ B. Schoh (ed.), Münster, Hamburg, London, 2003.

¹⁸ See: Y.Devuyt, 'The European Parliament and international trade agreements: Practice after the Lisbon Treaty' in I Govaere, E Lannon, PV Elsuwege & S Adam (eds) *The European Union in the World*, Leiden/Boston: MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 171-189.

¹⁹ <http://ue.eu.int/solana/docs/031208ESSIIIDE.pdf>

²⁰ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ac50017>

power. Since the Constitution was rejected in France and the Netherlands, A new strategic concept emerged that the EU should not only act as a civil power. Since the EU Constitution was rejected in France and the Netherlands, the European leaders had a new option of bringing as many innovations as possible into the Treaty of Lisbon²¹. However, a unitary foreign policy is a matter more sensitive to the sovereignty of States than the domains of intra- blockade or freedom of movement, and it is understandable that further progress slowly than the integration steps already overcome.

The Treaty of Lisbon virtually recaptures the content and substance of the Constitutional Treaty and leaves behind the elements of a more federalist and symbolic nature²². Thus, the Reform Treaty abandons the term ‘constitutional’, the reference to the EU anthem, flag and motto, the existence of ‘laws’ instead of regulations, and the figure of the EU Foreign Minister. In addition to these elements, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is also removed from the text of the Treaty, with only a reference to it giving equivalent legal value. However, the letter will not apply to the United Kingdom or Ireland at the will of the two Member States. In short, what the Reform Treaty does not have, regarding the Constitutional Treaty are the symbolic elements. Moreover, at first sight, in practical terms, it may not mean much with the lack of these elements. However, it should be remembered that power is symbolic, and the symbol creates power. For example, name of the treaty as a constitution (Constitutional Treaty) or position of the president of the European Union (according to the Lisbon Treaty president of the European Council) are very symbolic because this terminology mainly belongs to a state and demonstrates the realization of the federalization process. And that mark was lost by not transposing those elements into the Reform Treaty. The European construction consists of small steps, advances and retreats, negotiations, agreements, and political and diplomatic concessions²³. And this treaty mirrors this increasingly complex and difficult EU consensus reality as the EU is increasingly being extended to a greater number of States.

In the draft Constitutional Treaty, the ESDP evolves into the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which is considered an integral part of the CFSP, and which includes the progressive definition of a common EU defence policy which will lead to a common defence when so decided by the European Council. The new PSDC deals with the so-called ‘Petersburg missions’, but extends its scope to stabilization missions at the end of the conflict, to the fight against terrorism, including actions in third countries. The Constitutional Treaty also provides for ‘structured cooperation’ which allows groups of Member States to make stronger commitments on security and defence, including mutual defence commitments. This possibility

²¹ See: M.Riddervold, and G.Rosén, ‘Trick and treat: How the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies’, *Journal of European Integration* 38(6),2016, pp. 687-702.

²² G.Majone, ‘European integration and its modes: Function vs. territory’, *BlogActiv EU*, the Academic Research Network on Agencification of EU Executive Governance (TARN), 2016.

²³ See: A.Herbel, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’ *West European Politics* 40(1), 2017, pp. 161-182.

of structured cooperation, even more, restrictive than the so-called enhanced cooperation, is pointed out by critics as the consecration of a Europe at various speeds that would result from the Constitutional Treaty.

The same author also mentions that in the draft Constitutional Treaty, the common commercial policy is replaced by cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid. The principles and objectives of the CFSP (Article III-195) are strengthened concerning existing provisions, emphasizing the need for greater Union cohesion in international relations. The CFSP legal instrument will be the European decision and unanimity remains the general rule of decision making, although some cases will be considered where a qualified majority (Article III-201) will suffice. But the big news is the EU MOU²⁴.

Lisbon Treaty

On 1 December 2009 entered into force the Treaty of Lisbon (signed on 13 December 2007). The Treaty of Lisbon was not as ambitious as the European Constitution but also sought to bring more coherence to the EU. In this regard, Koutrakos²⁵ stated that among the prior problems to the treaty, such as legal personality of bloc and its discrepancies at the end make differences at European level on the CFSP. As per above statement²⁶, illustrates that the union must ensure the consistency of its external activities in a context of its external relations and its economic, security and development policies, thus observing horizontal coherence. The Council (intergovernmental executive) and the Commission (supranational executive) is responsible for compliance with this principle. On the other hand, member states need to support foreign and solidarity, and mutually, without opposing the interests of the Union or to impair its effectiveness at the international level, thus vertical coherence. The researcher identified that the Council is responsible for compliance with the abovementioned principle.

The Lisbon Treaty maintained the principles of horizontal and vertical coherence, with slightly modified language. According to article 21, paragraph 3 of Lisbon (horizontal coherence); "*The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies*". Article 24, paragraph 3, states on vertical coherence: the Member States shall actively and unreservedly support foreign and security of the Union in a spirit of loyalty and mutual action in this area²⁷. The Member States shall act in a concerted manner to strengthen and develop mutual political solidarity. The Member States shall refrain from taking any action contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as

²⁴ See: J. Jokela, 'The European Union as an international actor: Europeanization and institutional changes in the light of the EU's Asia policies', in Warkotsch A. (ed.) *The Role of the European Union in Asia*, pp. 57-74, London: Routledge, 2016.

²⁵ P.Koutrakos, *The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon*, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2017.

²⁶ See: F.Laursen, 'The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Lisbon Treaty: Supranational Revolution or Adherence to Intergovernmental Pattern?', F. Laursen (ed.) in *The EU's Lisbon Treaty*, 67-87, Routledge, 2016.

²⁷ See: M. Smith, 'Does the Flag Still Follow Trade? Agency, Politicization and External Opportunity Structures in the Post-Lisbon System of EU Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 13(1), 2018, pp. 41-56.

a coherent force in international relations. In this regards²⁸, observed and stated that the High Commissioner is also responsible for the Commission and Council, and vertical consistency with the Council. It is also noted that neither Article 21 nor Article 24 of the Treaty of Lisbon is legally enforceable since they are not under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, unlike Articles 3 and 11 of the Treaty of Nice. Besides, the obligation of States to provide support and loyalty to the Union is relativised by declarations 13 and 14 of the Treaty of Lisbon concerning the CFSP.

Lonardo²⁹, pointed out the statement 13 of the treaty and provides: The Conference stresses a provision of the Treaty on European Union relating to common foreign and security policy do not affect member state responsibilities. Statement 14 reiterates the provisions relating to common foreign and security policy, affect the current legal basis, responsibilities and powers of each Member. Concerning the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic services, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, in particular as a member of the United Nations Security Council. Erdağ³⁰, questioned how to further convergence and solidarity would be possible if the CFSP explicitly addresses the formulation of foreign and security policies of member individually. In this regard, an Article 34 of Lisbon treaty, on the other hand, states that if the Union has an opinion on a United Nations agenda, member states in the Security Council should request the presence of the high representative to discuss the issue, which conflicts with Declaration 14.

Legal personality

Bevir and Phillips³¹ points out that unlike the draft of the constitution for the EU (2004), the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) retained the dichotomy present in the Treaty Maastricht (1992) concerning the Union's basic legal documents. The Treaty on European Union [Maastricht] was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Then, the members of the EU decided to keep also the foundations of Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) by renaming it as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the CFSP continues in the inter-governmental sphere of EU (new union treaty, unanimity); was not integrated, such as "Judicial and Police Cooperation" for a question. The Treaty on Functioning of the EU, which, in turn, defines supranational operates by qualified majority.

Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a discussion on whether or not the European Union had a legal personality. Since even though there is no mention of expressed; there were defenders

²⁸ See: A. Maricut, 'With and without supranationalisation: the post-Lisbon roles of the European Council and the Council in justice and home affairs governance', *Journal of European Integration* 38(5), 2016, pp. 541-555.

²⁹ See: L. Lonardo, 'The political question doctrine as applied to common foreign and security policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 22(4), 2017, 571-587.

³⁰ See: R. Erdağ, 'Towards European Security Integration: Boundaries of European Security and Defence Policy', *Journal of European Integration* 38(2), 2016, pp. 211-217.

³¹ See: M. Bevir, and R. Phillips, 'EU democracy and the Treaty of Lisbon', *Comparative European Politics*, 15(5), 2017, pp. 705-728.

and opponents of an implicit legal personality³². Lisbon brought express reference to legal personality in Article 47, which has undoubtedly made the EU an actor in the international arena³³ elucidates that being an actor meant that the Union came to have an authority over diplomatic representations and actions that came external action, replacing the Commission's action by "*High Representative for Foreign Affairs*"; which strengthened the image of EU as an independent figure abroad. By virtue of its legal personality, the Union became an actor of international relations. Therefore, the EU as an international organization began signing the treaties, as well as agreements³⁴. Before this legal framework, the EU did not exist outside the European continent and Member States ended up participating in joint actions on behalf of the Union, which decentralisation and often less coherence.

Article 216 paragraphs 1 of Treaty on the Functioning of EU, clarifies the Union's ability to conclude international treaties when competent to do so, obliging all Union institutions and the Member States to as agreed. However, CFSP continues to operate unanimity³⁵, and this includes the signing of treaties, even if EU has prerogatives for treaties, in general, independently of the States. In this context, Herbel³⁶ identified that the High Representative participation in the Union's supranational executive (Commission) at the same time as which is appointed by the intergovernmental executive (Council), participating in its meetings, in addition to integrating the Legislative Council (Foreign Affairs Council). This position was established by the Treaty of Lisbon, unifying in a single position the "old High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the Chair of the General Affairs and Relations Council External Relations".

The European Council, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, became formally an EU institution, although there had been previous meetings, generating statements which served as a reference to Commission decisions; In addition, the President of Council, to be chosen by Council itself for a mandate of two-and-a-half years, renewable once, instead of the rotating presidencies, as was the case previously. The President of Council is especially important to have a responsibility to manage differences and to unify the positions of Member States of Union, as far as possible, because of the Council intergovernmental form. In turn, Article 27, paragraph 3 of Lisbon, stipulates that the High Representative shall be assisted by European External Action Service to ensure the coherence of European externalities³⁷.

³² There was no legal personality in recognition by international environment, international law as well as member states of the EU.

³³ G.Majone, 'European integration and its modes: Function vs. territory', BlogActiv EU, the Academic Research Network on Agencification of EU Executive Governance (TARN), 2016.

³⁴ Treaty of Accession of Croatia (2012); Agreement between the European Union and NATO on cooperation in promoting good governance in the defence and security sector (2018).

³⁵ Article 24 paragraph 1 of the TEU underline that: "The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise".

³⁶ See: A.Herbel, 'Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy' *West European Politics* 40(1), 2017, pp. 161-182.

³⁷ See: J. Jokela, 'The European Union as an international actor: Europeanization and institutional changes in the light of the EU's Asia policies', in Warkotsch A. (ed.) *The Role of the European Union in Asia*, pp. 57-74, London: Routledge, 2016.

EU as Civilian Power

As already stated in the Constitutional Treaty, the preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon immediately begins by referring to the universal values of inviolable and inalienable rights. That is, the Treaty begins first by referring to universal values as the inspiration for the European project. To give importance to the Values of the Union, Article 2 (Values of the Union) is inserted at the beginning of the Treaty, with values being the elements on which the Union is based. Subsequently, in Article 3 (Objectives of the Union), in paragraph 1), it states that the Union's objective is to promote the peace, values and well-being of its peoples³⁸.

Within these EU values are undoubtedly human rights, since 'this EU commitment to human rights is and should continue to be a fundamental element of its identity to which it must be faithful'. Because in this "world so uncertain and uncertain in which we live, you need a strong and united European Union, around great values, that you know where you are going; that speaks unambiguously, to a single voice; that he does not hesitate to proclaim his values whenever it is necessary". Through the Treaty of Lisbon, another important step is taken in the defence and proclamation of the common values of the EU.

In the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 7a (1) is inserted, according to which the EU establishes privileged relations with its neighbours, to create an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, based on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations, based on cooperation³⁹. That is to say, the Union makes it clear that it intends to establish good relations with its neighbors but, based on the values of the Union, thereby obliging other States to respect and adopt the values of the EU to establish relations with it. If the Constitutional Treaty provided for the institutionalization of the MFA, accumulating the functions of the current High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, and being one of the main innovations of the Constitutional Treaty, especially concerning the EU's external action.

However, in the Treaty of Lisbon this figure is withdrawn, with only the person responsible for EU external action being called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 9-E), and in accordance with Article 9e (2), 'the High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy'⁴⁰. It shall act in the same way as regards the common security and defense policy'; The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 9-E, paragraph 3); is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and ensures the coherence of the Union's external action (Article 9e, paragraph 3).

The objectives of CFSP enable the European Union to play a greater role on the international scene: safeguarding common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity

³⁸ See: C.Lequesne, 'The European External Action Service: Can a New Institution Improve the Coherence of the EU Foreign Policy?' in *The EU's Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2016, pp97-104.

³⁹ See: C.Lequesne, 'The European External Action Service: Can a New Institution Improve the Coherence of the EU Foreign Policy?' in *The EU's Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2016, pp.97-104.

⁴⁰ See: J.Howorth, 'The Lisbon Treaty, CSDP and the EU as a security actor' *The EU's Foreign Policy*, 2016, pp. 83-94.

of the Union, consolidating and supporting democracy and the rule of law, preserving peace, fostering economic and social development, encouraging the integration of all countries in the world economy, including through the elimination of measures to preserve the environment, the protection of natural resources on a global scale, the provision of assistance to populations, countries and regions confronted with natural or man-made disasters and the promotion of multilateral cooperation⁴¹.

EU as a civil power advocates human rights and democracy abroad and besides, multilateralism and cooperation can be the only possible response to weak cohesion, enabling to force interests through economic and military resources. Moreover, Whitman and Juncos (2009) identified that non-application of qualified majority voting in defence and security matters makes the EU hostage to the division of opinions. This is bound to occur perpetually, which in a way, to act as a civil power. In addition, Woolcock⁴² added that expenses in defence of Member States reach 200 billion euros, behind only the USA, whose are the largest in the world. In this stance, EU together is the largest economy in the world contain at least two nuclear powers, suggesting the EU civilian power is more a bureaucratic and “choice” issue rather than obligation and necessity.

On the other hand, the distance between the EU as civil power and its necessity to act with force as hard power is an attempt to demonstrate an internal division. This enlightened the European image rather than truly applying only these principles in foreign policy. In the absence of overt supranationalism, their core values internationally may be an attempt to place to be a prescription for foreign policy. Thus, a mismatch between words and actions is to be expected. An international identity that does not take into account supranational states and entities need to be concerned about potential threats to the security and economic order, in a globalised world, is doomed to failure in the world. In the current world there can be an observation that in the process of globalisation, there is a process of regionalisation. Societies are searching own identities. In that communicated world, in the era of the fourth industrial revolution, there is a lack of vertical as well horizontal of serious global communication to face common current and future challenges.

Lisbon Treaty's and CFSP

Ten years after its launch in Helsinki, the policy has seen an expansion of its missions, its area of intervention and its operational capabilities, both civilian and military. The EU has also taken a significant step with the establishment, since the beginning of 2011, of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which brings together most of the dimensions of the Union's external action. However, for many observers, the EU's foreign policy remains evanescent, too

⁴¹ See: R.Erdağ, 'Towards European Security Integration: Boundaries of European Security and Defence Policy', *Journal of European Integration* 38(2), 2016, pp. 211-217.

⁴² S.Woolcock, *The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union external trade policy*. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2007.

little “*strategic*”. Yet, in a decade, the EU has not only developed common, autonomous, civilian and military capabilities, and unified its external action resources. The “*powerless*” Europe of the Bosnian years seems to have fizzled; some 20 military and civilian operations - of varying size and ambition - have been launched since 2003 as part of a policy that now covers much of the spectrum of conflict and crisis: prevention, management and reconstruction⁴³. Above all, the EU has developed a security vision, endorsed by all of its Member States, the European Security Strategy. To the question: “an ESDP, what for? The Europeans seem to have refined their response.

However, this question remains: soldiers and gendarmes who go on patrol along the cease-fire lines of the Caucasus or reassure a “peace without reconciliation” in the Balkans, police officers working in Kosovo or training forces Security Council: Do they serve the consensus of a “safer Europe in a better world “ or do they also have the traits of a strategic tool, helping to influence the Union’s partners, supporting its common diplomatic choices? , cementing the loopholes of too economic power and not enough political? In other words, are ESDP and CFSP missions and ersatz for UN peace operations, in which many EU states do not commit more or less? Or is the CFSP rather an instrument serving the objectives of European foreign policy? The question, which may seem Manichean, nevertheless refers to the very nature of the Union’s international security action, which sometimes aims to be impartial in the manner of United Nations peacekeepers. Sometimes at the service of international interests of the Union, and of its Member States in the best of all worlds, these two options coincide, in the best of all worlds, only⁴⁴. All the means available to the Union must be put in place to counter these so-called “hard” and “soft” threats, considered as interdependent, and to promote international peace. The European strategic response is not only based on the CFSP or the CSDP but on all the instruments, structural and operational policies that form its external action. In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty is a giant leap in unifying under one heading all the dimensions of the EU’s external action and creating the European External Action Service to ensure coherence⁴⁵.

Lisbon Treaty in International Challenges

The Treaty of Lisbon has brought changes to the functioning of the EU and the lack of a unifying formal mechanism for foreign policy. This continues to the unanimity of Member States’ positions, clutters and integration of the continent which, apart from the arrival of new members, does not seem too likely to advance in the short term. The legal and political mechanisms for a common foreign policy do exist, however. Europe lacks a common strategic

⁴³ S.Woolcock, *European Union economic diplomacy: the role of the EU in external economic relations*, Routledge, 2016.

⁴⁴ See: A.Servent, ‘The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (4), 2014, pp. 568-586.

⁴⁵ C.Bickerton, *European Union foreign policy: from effectiveness to functionality*. Springer, 2015.

objective that is agreements on the way the bloc together should follow. There are contrary positions within the EU on the position on Russia, Turkey and the Middle East example⁴⁶.

The first months of European External Action Service (EEAS, established on December 1, 2010) coincided with events in the Middle East and North Africa, so-called the Arab Spring. The new, most important operational diplomatic instrument of CFSP, set up based on the Treaty of Lisbon, had major challenges from the very beginning in almost all Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of European Neighbourhood Policy' countries. Due to the structures and procedures that were not developed at that time, EEAS could not demonstrate the effectiveness of the Treaty of Lisbon and CFSP.

Libya and Ukraine case

In 2011, in Libya, once again via NATO, France, the United Kingdom and the United States engaged in military action - questionable, but decisive - with other European states, to "avoid a bloodbath in Benghazi". Admittedly endorsed by a UN resolution, the NATO war in Libya hardly withstood the examination of its objectives: responsibility to protect civilians in the speech, politico-military support to the insurgents and the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in facts⁴⁷. Two objectives not necessarily contradictory, but constituting an agenda that the EU could not assume.

The provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon expressed the ambition of the EU to change its role in world politics. The new solutions applied, including the creation of a new scope of competences for the position of the High Representative and the diplomatic service subordinate to him and the President of the European Council, were to contribute to increasing the effectiveness of activities of individual institutions on the international arena. The changes were to be primarily a response to the lack of coherence in the implementation of the external dimension of EU policies. After 2011, the new situation in the near southern neighbourhood of the EU has revised the real possibilities of reaction and the current strategic approach. The practice of applying new solutions during events called the 'Arab Spring' highlighted the real possibilities of EU action and weaknesses, the defeat of which was not a derivative change of treaties, but the attitude of the leaders of the member states to conduct joint actions with divergent political visions based on a particular interest in the crisis region.⁴⁸

The following years brought about the strengthening of the European External Action Service (EEAS) structures and the dynamics, opening of new delegations in many places around the world. Besides, procedures and coordination mechanisms have been established between

⁴⁶ See: M. Smith, 'Does the Flag Still Follow Trade? Agency, Politicization and External Opportunity Structures in the Post-Lisbon System of EU Diplomacy', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 13(1), 2018, pp. 41-56.

⁴⁷ See: M. Pieper, 'Taking Stock of the "Common" in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy' in de Zwaan, J., Lak, M., Makinwa, A., Willems, P. (eds.) *Governance and Security Issues of the European Union*, pp. 273-289, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2016.

⁴⁸ B. Przybylska-Maszner, *Uwarunkowania reorientacji polityki Unii Europejskiej wobec Afryki Północnej po roku 2011*, Poznań 2014, p. 51.

the EU diplomatic missions and the EEAS headquarters. After three years of operation of the EEAS and four of the Treaty of Lisbon, at the beginning of 2014, CFSP and ENP faced another challenge. Ukraine, the key country of the Eastern Partnership, the second foundation of the ENP, was attacked by Russia. Also at that time, the CFSP, strengthened by EEAS under the Treaty of Lisbon, did not demonstrate the effectiveness of the impact on the immediate international environment and effectively support the strategic partner and potential EU member, which was Ukraine. The EU's response to Russia's actions proved inadequate to the ambition of being an important security actor and limited itself to diplomatic pressure and visa, financial and economic sanctions. However, in the face of increasing conventional war threats, the question arises as to how and how the EU security policy should change and how⁴⁹. The military deficiencies of the European Union and its Member States have been a serious problem long before 2014 and the explosion of an interstate armed conflict at the EU's borders.

Paris 2015 and EU New Security Strategy

On the night of 13 November 2015, in Paris were a series of terror attacks. On 17 November 2015 for the first time, France invoked Article 42.7 of the Treaty of European Union, which is the mutual defence clause. It states that: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, following article 51 of the United Nations charter". Article 42.7 was used for the first time. The invocation of Article 42.7 was unanimously approved in a meeting of EU defence ministers.

28 June 2016 at the Brussels Summit High Representative Federica Mogherini presents EU leaders with a global EU strategy in the field of foreign and security policy. The new Strategy has been titled "Common vision, joint action: a stronger Europe". The document is an attempt to define a strategic vision of the role of the EU in the world and common beliefs and directions for further actions⁵⁰.

Brexit and CFSP

On June 24, 2016, the day after the British referendum and a few days before the EU summit, during which the EU Security Strategy was announced, German Foreign Ministers, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and France, Jean-Marc Ayrault adopted the joint document "Strong Europe in uncertain world, in which they presented their vision of changes following the UK's withdrawal from the EU: strengthening the CSDP, deepening the economic and monetary union and establishing a common asylum and migration policy. Ministers also underlined the necessity of permanent EU engagement in Africa, without however referring to the threat from

⁴⁹ K. Sobczyk, *Konflikt na Ukrainie – porażka czy szansa dla Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE?*, *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe* 2015/1, p. 37.

⁵⁰ http://www.eecas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

Russia. They suggested taking action to deepen cooperation in the area of security and defence⁵¹. Postulated, among others joint regular reviews of the security environment, which would be discussed at the General Affairs Council and the European Council, development of common strategic priorities for foreign and security policy, the establishment of a civil-military chain of command or launching permanent structured cooperation in some areas (eg permanent naval forces). The document also includes provisions on the establishment of a “European semester” in the field of military capabilities, as well as the creation of a defence research program to support the innovative defence industry. The Franco-German document indicated the need to fight terrorism through dialogue and cooperation with African and Middle Eastern countries⁵².

Next, the defence ministers of Jean-Yves Le Drian and Ursula von der Leyen on 13 September 2016 emphasized the need to strengthen Europe’s security and defence by: creating a permanent CSDP command (military and civilian), medical logistics command for missions and operations, strengthening EUROKORPUS, development European transport capacity (and in the future - a European logistics hub), as well as the strengthening of situational awareness, especially at sea, widening the scope of joint mission financing through the Athena mechanism and supporting the building of military capabilities of African countries⁵³. Ministers also intend to accelerate the implementation of the European Council conclusions of 2013 and 2015, including the initiatives: building capacity in the area of security and development (CBSD), research program in the 2021-2027 financial perspective focused on CSDP capabilities, financed from EU funds, deepening cooperation NATO-EU, increasing the capability of EU Battle Groups and strengthening the force generation process. The authorities in Berlin and Paris pay a lot of attention to the strong European technological and industrial defence sector (EDTIB)⁵⁴. In their opinion, Member States should strive to allocate 20% national defence budgets for investment in armaments and military equipment, and create financial incentives (eg support from the European Investment Bank) for cooperation between the Member States in the defence sector. They also encourage them to coordinate and increase transparency in the development of defence budgets, to create further joint European arms programs (the so-called European Semester in the field of defence).

In the context of the Treaty of Lisbon and CFSP, it should be stressed that the ambitious goals of the European Global Strategy are likely to be difficult to achieve without Britain in the EU. Great Britain is the second-largest economy in EU countries. Besides, it has the largest defence budget in the Union. Yes, therefore, Brexit weakens the EU’s ability to achieve the objectives adopted in the Strategy. Also, it will affect its image and its impact on the world.

⁵¹ <https://www.diplomatique.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/events/article/a-strong-europe-in-a-world-of-uncertainties-28-06-16>

⁵² See: A. Marrone, *Brexit and European Defence: Between Uncertainty And Cooperation*, *The Progressive Post* 5 – Summer, 2017, p. 31. <file:///F:/Pendrive%20Toshiba/Mathab/brexit-european-defensepdf.pdf> (19.12.2017)

⁵³ <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135022> (07.07.2018)

⁵⁴ See: S. Besch, *EU defence, Brexit and Trump The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*, *Centre for European Reform*, December 2016.

Besides, the United Kingdom was the foundation of CFSP. Together with Brexit, CFSP will be based mainly in France, Germany and Italy.

Conclusion

Through the development of the CFSP and the unification of its external action, the member states of the European Union have defined a specific role for it in matters of international security. A primary role focused on conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as the reconstruction and democratic transition of war-ravaged states. This role is now partly beyond the control of the Member States, which have made the Union a full player and generated expectations on the international scene. It is indeed all the Union's institutions and policies - from the Council to the Commission, from the Political Dialogue to Development Cooperation - which is now called upon by the European Security Strategy within the framework of the European external action⁵⁵.

However, this role, defined by the member states, is still marked by its dilemmas, which stem from the hybrid nature of the EU - an organization with an intergovernmental and a supranational architecture - as well as the common values that underpin its relations at international. Along with strategic objectives, the Union's structural policies have a definite impact in the long term - what some have called normative power or "structural foreign policy". However, the same objectives, applied to the CFSP and CSDP, generated operations that were often reactive, limited and uneven, suffering in some respects from a "strategic" deficit.

Notwithstanding the question of European defence, the Lisbon Treaty has nevertheless broadened the nature of CSDP missions, which could theoretically take the form of coercive "international security" operations - in times when the term "war" is less and less used by States. However, ten years of CSDP show that when member states consider that war is necessary, they have alternative options - outside the EU framework. As in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, the EU can also use its civilian missions, its financial resources, and its structural policies. In this respect, the EU is ahead of NATO because it can use its many civilian instruments to intervene in crisis or post-conflict situations - bypassing the reluctance of the member states, or parties to the conflict, in front of the military involvement of a third party⁵⁶. However, it is generally confined to prevention, crisis management, and reconstruction, with emphasis on supporting the capabilities of states.

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⁵⁵ H.Blanke, *The European Union after Lisbon: constitutional basis, economic order and external action*, Springer, 2012.

⁵⁶ L. Rossi, 'A new revision of the EU Treaties after Lisbon?' in Rossi L.S., Casolari F. (eds.) *The EU after Lisbon*, Springer, 2014, p. 17.

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THE FEATURES OF THE METHOD AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING THE STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE: THEORETICAL CUT

The article is devoted to systematization and generalization of the peculiarities of method and methodology of studying stability and efficiency of governments in comparative Political Science. It is based on an appeal to available studies of stability and efficiency of governments that do apply different methodological approaches. It was argued that the problems of stability and efficiency of governments were reflected on the basis of the use of methods and methodology of not only Political Science, but also of Law, Sociology, History, Economics, etc. Nevertheless, it was stated that the problems of stability and efficiency of governments are primarily an interest, which is solved by methods and methodology of comparative Political Science, and thus a comparative method of research. In general, the author found that the issues of stability and efficiency of governments are interdisciplinary, and therefore there is a need for a comprehensive disclosure due to the methods of comparative analysis.

Keywords: government stability, government efficiency, method, methodology, comparative Political Science.

CECHY METODY I METODOLOGII BADANIA STABILNOŚCI I EFEKTYWNOŚCI RZĄDÓW W POLITOLOGII PORÓWNAWCZEJ:

PRZEKRÓJ TEORETYCZNY

Artykuł poświęcony jest usystematyzowaniu i uogólnieniu cech metody i metodologii badania stabilności i efektywności rządów w politologii porównawczej. Opiera się ona na odwołaniu do istniejących badań stabilności i efektywności rządów, które już stosują różne podejścia metodologiczne. Argumentowano, że problematyka stabilności i efektywności rządów znalazła swoje odzwierciedlenie w oparciu o stosowanie metod i metodologii nie tylko nauk politycznych ale także prawa, socjologii, historii, ekonomii itp. Stwierdzono jednak, że sama w sobie problematyka stabilności i efektywności rządów jest głównym przedmiotem zainteresowania, które interpretuje się poprzez metody i metodologię politologii porównawczej, a zatem i metodą porównawczą badań. Ogólnie stwierdzono, że problematyka stabilności i efektywności rządów jest uznana za interdyscyplinarną i dla tego wymaga kompleksowego badania za pomocą metod analizy porównawczej.

Słowa kluczowe: stabilność rządów, efektywność rządów, metoda, metodologia, politologia porównawcza.

Contemporary comparative Political Science is characterized by a considerable amount of research that focuses on the issues of the stability and efficiency of governments. Moreover, these studies are both theoretical, and also practical and empiric, since they concern individual countries¹, as well as entire regions and even parts of the world, including Western Europe², Central and Eastern Europe³, Eastern Europe⁴, Asia⁵, etc. In this respect, Political Science has accumulated an enormous array of theoretical, statistical and empirical data on the stability and efficiency of governments. However, a variety of methods and methodologies for investigating and comparing the governments' stability and efficiency has remained quite diffuse, liberal and not systematized. Eventually, various researchers have suggested very different approaches not only to theoretical aspects, yet to the toolbox and ways (methods and methodologies) of comparing the stability and efficiency of governments. Therefore, the proposed study primarily focuses on the theoretical definition and systematization of the peculiarities of the method, and respectively methodology of studying the governments' stability and efficiency in comparative Political Science.

This theme is utterly topical, given that Political Science is by default not research-oriented from the perspective of using the methods and methodology of cognition and obtaining reliable

¹ Например: Cox G., *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.; Grofman B., van Roosendaal P., Toward a Theoretical Explanation of Premature Cabinet Termination with Application to Post-War Cabinets in the Netherlands, *European Journal of Political Research* 1994, vol 26, s. 155-170.; Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones 2002.; James O., Boyne G., Moseley A., Petrovsky N., *Performance, Stakeholder Stability and the Survival of UK Executive Agencies*, Paper presented to Public Management Research Conference, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, June 2011.; Protsyk O., Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, *Europa-Asia Studies* 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077-1095.; Wolf P., A case survey of bureaucratic effectiveness in U.S. cabinet agencies: Preliminary results, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 1993, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 161-181.

² Например: Browne E., Frendreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, nr. 3, s. 628-650.; Héritier A., *New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Capacity and Policy Effectiveness?*, [w:] Börzel T., Cichowski R. (eds.), *The State of the European Union: Book 6 – Law, Politics, and Society*, Oxford 2003, s. 105-126.; Lee S-Y., Whitford A., Government Effectiveness in Comparative Perspective, *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 2009, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 249-281.; Lijphart A., Measures of Cabinet Durability: A Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation, *Comparative Political Studies* 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 265-279.; Maoz Z., Somer-Topcu Z., *Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems: A Social Networks Analysis of European Parliaments 1945-1998*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2009.; Sanders D., Herman H., The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe, *Acta Politica* 1977, vol 12, nr. 3, s. 346-377.; Scharpf F., *Governing Europe: effective and democratic?*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.; Warwick P., The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies, *Comparative Political Studies* 1979, vol 11, s. 465-498.; Zimmerman E., Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations, *European Journal of Political Research* 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 23-52.

³ Например: Conrad C., Golder S., Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies, *European Journal of Political Research* 2010, vol 49, nr. 1, s. 119-150.; Harfst P., *Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties*, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Copenhagen, 14-19 April 2000.; Lytvyn V., *Porivniabnyi analiz stabilnosti uriadiv kraiiv Tsentralnoi Yevropy ta Ukrainy*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2010.; Müller-Rommel F., *Types of Cabinet Durability in Central Eastern Europe*, Paper posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California Irvine, 2005.; Nikolenyi C., Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe, *Party Politics* 2004, vol 10, nr. 1, s. 123-150.; Toole J., Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe, *Party Politics* 2000, vol 6, s. 441-461.

⁴ Białobłocki Z., *Stabilność i efektywność rządów u politycznych systemach krajów Środkowej Europy*, Wyd. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego imienia Iwana Franka 2013.

⁵ Например: Brewer G., Choi Y., Walker R., Accountability, Corruption and Government Effectiveness in Asia: an Exploration of World Bank Governance Indicators, *International Public Management Review* 2007, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 200-219.

knowledge, generally applied to exact sciences. Accordingly, one of the main peculiarities of Political Science, particularly comparative political studies, is the fact that in its evolution it cannot rely solely on experimental research data and experimentally verify the conclusions and results obtained⁶. Researchers, for instance, cannot propose a particular country to change its electoral system to a mixed, majoritarian or, say, proportional in order to see whether it would increase the number of parties in the relevant parliament⁷, or “ask Mrs. Margaret Thatcher to resign in 1983, in order to find out whether any other Conservative party leader or the prime minister himself would have pursued a less radical policy than Mrs. Thatcher did under similar political and economic circumstances»⁸. Therefore, comparative methods, pivotal in the formation of scientific knowledge of political institutions and processes, or of political life on the whole, are rarely realised in the form of experimentation. Instead, their essence is limited to detection of common and peculiar features of phenomena, institutions and processes under consideration. This is of utter importance, since in the process of comparing “things or phenomena are placed aside..., then “made equal”, i.e. they are being compared. Meanwhile, there arise similarities («moving towards one point»), coincidences («overlapping each other»), along with differences («multiplication of points», that is, masks, or semblances of the single⁹»). For this reason most Political Science comparisons are made on the basis of a single principle: correlation of phenomena with a certain standard that may reveal concepts, ideal structures or models, etc.

In this light worth mentioning is the fact that existence of more than two hundred independent states, and consequently their accumulated political experience of both successful and problematic development, is the backbone that allows to test existing theoretical concepts, produce new interdependencies on the basis of practical analysis and comparison, identify trends, formulate theories, and seek solutions to current political situations. Thus, the comparative method is one of the components of modern Political Science which, undoubtedly, focuses on comparison itself, as well as the manner and reasons for making correlations between political phenomena¹⁰. Moreover, a brief review of the comparative Political Science history illustrates that, given the significant value of its results, the research method and methodology remain the major systemic and determinant components of such a field of research as comparative Political Science (including related disciplines, employing an array of comparison methods and tools). Highly overlooked is the fact that Political Science has almost always taken advantage of methods of comparative political studies with a purpose similar to the manner the exact sciences exploit the experiment as such. The reason lies in the fact that comparative method

⁶ Romaniuk A., *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh institutiv krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2007.

⁷ Hague R., Harrop M., *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Palgrave 2001, s. 23.

⁸ March D., Stoker G., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Wyd. Macmillan Press and St.Martin's Press 1995, s. 174.

⁹ Ilin M., *Sravnitel'naya politologiya: nauchnaya komparativistika v sisteme politicheskogo znaniya*, „*Polis*“ 2001, vol 4, s. 164.

¹⁰ Mair P., *Comparative Politics: An Overview*, [w:] Goodin R., Klingemann H-D. (eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

in Political Science provides opportunities to describe and classify, organize and explain various combinations of events and phenomena that either have occurred or are under way in the politics of different countries¹¹.

With regard to comparative method and methodology in the study of the governments stability and efficiency, the authors of most papers on the subject have adopted the ideas of the 1955 Evanston Seminar. In this respect, comparison is made at an abstract level, as a rule. Respectively, particular situations and processes are not typically comparable and cannot be compared as standalone objects. Each phenomenon is regarded as one of a kind, each discovery is considered unparalleled, and each process and institute is treated as unique. Otherwise, to compare them means to select certain types and concepts, thus interfering with their authenticity and specificity. Secondly, researchers typically assume that prior to establishing specific comparison categories and concepts, it is necessary to identify hallmarks, indicators, markers of components of a particular political situation or institute, related to the governments stability and efficiency in a certain analytical case. Thirdly, scholars are attempting to establish criteria and parameters to adequately reflect those components, which are part of the overall analysis of the stability and efficiency of governments. Fourthly, scholars make hypotheses, arising directly out of their own or already existing and adopted conceptual scheme, as well as from the formulation of the problem posed. Fifthly, understanding that linking hypotheses and means of their research may find no evidence whatsoever, researchers frequently insist that hypotheses or hypothetical relationships, concerning the contemplated objects should be considered proved until denied or falsified. Penultimately, scholars endeavour to formulate lists and sets of hypotheses, rather than put forward individual ones, since in each and every case, the connecting link between the list of hypotheses and related political relations and institutions is formed by means of clarifying the conditions, stipulating some of or even the entirety of the possibilities listed in the proposed hypotheses set. Last but not least, scholars have traditionally been aware that comparison, collation and opposition, even failing to meet the expectations of a current theory, can create favourable conditions for consistent development of a theory with the help of other tools of hypotheses-making, as well as means of testing them. Simultaneously, researchers have generally realised that one of the dangers in creating lists of hypotheses is the unlimited plane of presumable interrelations between political institutions and processes¹². Hence, scholars should by all means avoid this by proposing samples and collections of facts, contributing to creation of hypotheses lists before they are actually formulated.

However, it is of utmost importance to compare the stability and efficiency of governments in the light of an array of additional features of the comparative method and methodology of Political Science. Among them connotations should be given priority, in accordance with those: political structures (institutions and processes) constantly reveal fluctuating and complex

¹¹ Almond G., Powell B., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, Wyd. Little, Brown and Company 1984, s. 15.

¹² Macridis R., *A Survey of the Field of Comparative Government*, Wyd. The Free Press 1969.

pictures of political reality; political views appear to be complicated, variable and probabilistic, so explanatory questions put focus primarily on the likelihood of peculiarities, attending certain political phenomena, institutions and processes; the impact of the environment and political networks being rather complex and interactive than simple and straightforward, interaction between citizens is characterized by a non-linear nature of communication; determinant criteria and features of political institutions, processes and decisions hinder further results of the political process; political protests, revolutions, and crises reveal the political process instability, often describing their emergence in the political picture as unpredictable and nondeterministic; a determinant of a particular case has a significant impact upon the overall political picture and actual political process, because a particular case is an inherent part of the political process, to always take into account¹³.

This suggests that in the political comparative studies of the governments stability and efficiency, the political world, being not fully embraced by a simple ontology of cause-effect relationships, yet involving a variety of cases as products of objective and subjective factors instead, must be investigated and coherently determined. Therefore, a proper and systematic comparative study of the governments stability and efficiency should combine common characteristics and specific / deviant details / cases to the fullest extent, and the use of formal benchmarking models should require a combination of abstract theoretical constructs contemplation with simultaneous explanations of specific examples and individual (even deviant) cases, illustrating these examples. Consequently, upon such a comparison, there should necessarily follow identification and comparison of the nature, determinants and parameters of the stability and effectiveness of governments with a particular (specifically defined) class and cluster of tangent phenomena, as well as outlining their common and distinct characteristics. It is therefore quite obvious that the process of constructing a theory on the basis of comparative studies is utterly complex. For, on the one hand, it is impossible to carry out a comparative study without the theory, but on the other hand, it is absolutely impossible to create a theory without the operational data obtained as a result of such a comparative analysis. In addition, there is a whole range of methodologic and methodical properties and parameters to address in the course of comparative political analysis of the governments' stability and efficiency.

Alongside, it is advisable to understand that the comparative method in the Political Science of the governments stability and efficiency not only creates new typologies, but also corrects existing ones. For instance, in the scientific literature there are many classifications of forms and systems of government, with further differentiation of numerous types and subtypes, ranging from two to several dozen. A similar logic applies to outlining the number of government types and dimensions of such typologies. The reasons for such ambiguity are hidden not as much in the classified object itself, as in the "traps" that scholars, ignoring logical rules

¹³ Zukerman A., Reformulating Scientific Understanding and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics, "Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics" 1997, vol 8, nr. 1.

and procedures, frequently fail to avoid. It is therefore of utmost importance that the choice of irrelevant criteria of any typology, the coincidence of the distribution objects, the “leap” in the course of abstraction, distribution mismatch, strained interpretations of concepts and substitution of classification logic for the gradation logic can significantly affect the comparative results obtained. Thus, a thorough analysis of previous errors is a prerequisite for creating a new typology¹⁴”.

Moreover, it should be noted that comparison as a method of Political Science is of axiological value. In various countries objects of study are judged against the background of perfect ideas, while deviations from certain norms give impetus for further studies of political institutions and phenomena, including the stability and efficiency of governments. Thus, a researcher investigating only one country may interpret as normal something that seems to be anomalous from a comparative perspective¹⁵. In addition, comparative analysis plays a significant role in the political projects evaluation, as it helps to understand advantages and disadvantages of varied attributes of institutions and processes in the political system, consequently identifying the potential pros and cons of hypothetical change¹⁶ more accurately.

Accordingly, the applied value of comparative method and methodology is indisputable in the study of the governments stability and efficiency. Analysing and taking into account the accumulated world experience enables us to make the best possible, reliable and effective administrative and political decisions, avoid mistakes in the construction of political and social institutions and processes, create an appropriate form and system of government, as well as an effective system of power distribution. Therefore, constitutional engineering presupposes borrowing the best practices of other systems, provided they are applicable and adaptable to the country under analysis. However, even though comparative research, including the governments stability and efficiency, gives the opportunity to imitate the valuable experience of other foreign countries, especially those more advanced and relatively “exemplary”. It is fair to mention that in real life there always exist limits to justifiableness of these borrowings and the boundaries that set the specific historical environment in which the social system operates|громадська|¹⁷. A striking example of this is the fact that in numerous countries around the world there occur instances of direct replicating of institutions, processes and norms without evaluating the possibility of their “transplantation and implantation” into national systems, such as mechanistic implementation of the separation of powers principle at all levels up to local self-government|самоуправління|¹⁸, or imitation of certain types of governments, regarded as optimal. Moreover, the authors of such “transplants” do not actually take into account that

¹⁴ Zaznayev O., Tipologiya form pravlēniya: rabota nad oshibkami, „*Polis*” 2006, vol 1, s. 92-103.

¹⁵ Dogan M., *Sravnitel'naya politicheskaya sotsiologiya*, Moskva 1994, s. 19.

¹⁶ Bari D., *Poverkh granits: praktika sravnitel'nykh issledovaniy*, [w:] Mangeym D., Rich R. (eds.), *Politologiya. Metody issledovaniya*, Wyd. Ves mir 1997.

¹⁷ Farukshin M., *Sravnitel'naya politologiya i sravnitel'nyy metod*, [w:] *Metodologicheskiye problemy politicheskoy nauki*, Kazan 1996, s. 9.

¹⁸ Tikhomirov Y., *Kurs sravnitel'nogo pravovedeniya*, Wyd. Norma 1996, s. 5.

these structures, norms, institutions and processes, formed over long historical periods and having originated in a different political culture, belong to another stage of socio-economic development. Therefore, the comparative method enables us to avoid negative outcomes in the creation of new political institutions, including governments, because by comparing, correlating and contrasting the peculiarities of various mechanisms, a researcher can gain an insight into problems, typical of a particular country¹⁹.

In addition, a prognostic value of the comparative method and methodology for the governments stability and efficiency investigation should not be underestimated. The fact is that comparison, correlation and contrasting help to predict the potential results of the transition to one or the other form of existence and performance of political systems on the whole, and political institutions, government offices, in particular; to the introduction of political and constitutional innovations, especially concerning relations in the triangle «Head of the State - Government - Parliament», including the introduction of restrictions on parliamentary votes of confidence / investiture and no-confidence in the government. Despite a number of problems, arising in the course of any comparative Political Science study, the nature of these, as well as ways of their solution is thoroughly described in the comparative Political Science methodology. In this particular case, we will only briefly focus on the methodological and methodical difficulties, most peculiar for the analysis of the stability and efficiency of governments.

Ideally, an expert in comparative studies should select countries, identical in all aspects, except for the one that he intends to explore. However, this is hardly feasible in practice, as we have to compare countries with both common and distinct features. As a result, the question is whether the analysed phenomena, institutions and processes, especially those government-related, should be either similar or different. From such an angle, the majority of scholars in the domain of the governments stability and efficiency adhere to the largest similarity approach, based on the fact that comparing indicators of the governments stability and efficiency may suggest “blurring” of individual differences between countries in order to better analyse other cases²⁰. Thus, the solution to the problem of comparability lies in the fact that phenomena, institutions and processes can be compared with each other with at least one common feature available, for instance, positioning of an analysed country as democratic or autocratic, or the practice of either parliamentary or presidential government formation, etc.

Another problem of comparative Political Science research methodology is the ratio of a multitude of variables to a small number of cases. It may seem that two hundred world countries, or all countries of a particular part or region of the world, present a sufficient number of cases for political comparison. However, it poses a difficulty to find countries similar in all respects except for the one or several, being actually studied. This suggests that there are always

¹⁹ Riggs F., *Sravnitel'naya otsenka prezidentskoy formy pravleniya*, [w:] *Sravnitel'naya sotsiologiya. Izbrannyye perevody*, Wyd. Academia 1995, s. 152.

²⁰ Dogan M., *Sravnitel'naya politicheskaya sotsiologiya*, Moskva 1994, s. 19.

too many factors, affecting a researcher's scientific interest, while the case studies for identifying relationships between particular variables under study are partly or completely missing. Therefore, in the case of investigating the stability and efficiency of governments against the background of individual countries, parts or regions of the world (there are no universal studies in this context), the traditional problem is generally treated in the following ways: a direct increase in the number of cases on account of time, that is by means of inclusion of countries at different historical intervals; "largest similarity" strategies to reduce the number of variables in the study; reducing the number of variables by focusing on the most significant factors; "Models of economy", in particular the use of ideas of the rational choice theory²¹.

Simultaneously, the existing studies of the governments stability and efficiency often pose a reverse problem of availability of too many cases with few variables. Its solution requires the opposite action: reducing the number of cases to the most relevant while increasing the number of indicators to a minimum sufficient set and list of values, without which the analysis will be incomplete²². In addition, it seems quite logical to apply the strategies of largest similarity or greatest difference.

Further on, within comparative studies there also arises a problem of biased selection. In frequent cases, a researcher appears to be arbitrary while selecting cases. These may present countries that randomly fall within the scope of a research scheme or some kind of borrowed comparative theory. However, the distortion in the case selection often leads to erroneous results of the comparative study. Therefore, in the course of researching the stability and efficiency of governments of individual countries, parts or regions of the world, it is advisable to bear in mind the necessity to select dependent variables (indicators / markers), whose distinct indicators enable grouping and subsequent selecting of the analyzed countries. In addition, in the choice of countries it is worth remembering parallel cases. For instance, when examining the stability and efficiency of governments in Central and Eastern Europe or exclusively Eastern Europe, one should rely on similar practices in other world countries, specifically Western Europe²³. There occur incidents when a researcher interprets concepts, selects variables and comparison criteria according to his or her own values and beliefs. For example, in defining the "strength" of presidents and prime ministers, many authors mainly emphasize their formal authority, given the absence of a serious gap between the law and its actual implementation in developed democracies. This poses a problem of value neutrality, whose solution is either on the way of changing the relation to the historical method and history in general, or on the way of being introduced into political studies of the scientific realism methods.

Research practice, however, proves that for the best result of the comparative method and Political Science methodology in the study of the governments stability and efficiency, scholars

²¹ March D., Stoker G., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Wyd. Macmillan Press and St.Martin's Press 1995, s. 174.

²² Ilin M., Osnovnyye metodologicheskiye problemy sravnitel'noy politologii, „Polis“ 2001, vol 6, s. 140-143.

²³ Landman T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

often employ such comparison variants within comparative studies, as the case method, binary analysis, comparison of similar and contrasting states in terms of systemic parameters, etc.²⁴

The case study method is used to study countries, presenting peculiar or, on the contrary, deviant instances of a standard situation. Complementarily, this method is applied to verify formulated generalizations as well as theories, based on a variety of similar countries. Correlation of the findings obtained by comparing a plethora of similar states with the exception of a deviant state allows not only to reexamine previously accepted generalizations, but to better explore a range of other parameters, including the indicators of the governments stability and efficiency. This type of comparison is employed to test, intensify and further develop the scientific hypothesis. The study of the stability and effectiveness of governments typically embraces all kinds of definitions of single comparative cases, such as: an explanatory case study, involving application of the existing theory to explain a specific case; case study for hypothesis generation; case study to question or verify a scientific theory; case study for consolidation of a scientific theory; case study, deviating from a scientific theory (demonstrative, prototype, deviant, decisive and typical cases²⁵). At the same time, case studies of the governments' stability and efficiency are mostly treated as comparative, since the data, valid for one country are presented in a broad comparative context, the identification of which is not outlined as a separate research task [задача]²⁶. Besides, the study of governments identifies and evaluates usefulness of concepts, designated in other cases (other countries in respect to other objects in given countries at different time periods), tests the general theory or hypothesis, creating concepts that can be applied to other testable theories and hypotheses.

Instead, binary analysis involves exploring two countries or two country samples. Hence, it is advisable to apply direct and indirect binary analysis. Indirect comparison implies that a particular country is analysed through the prism of another country. This could be, for instance, Poland at the background of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, or Germany at the background of all the countries of Western Europe, or Europe as a whole. In such a manner, the "ideal" model of the state is not applied.

In its turn comparison of similar countries provides prolific material to explain cause and effect relations, find out the impact of indicators, and highlight peculiarities of the governments stability and efficiency, detected in similar systems. Conversely, comparing contrasting countries involves juxtaposing political systems with opposite political, legal, economic, and other characteristics. These distinctions are of utter significance, hence comparing them suggests that one of the study objectives is to analyse countries with divergent indicators of the governments' stability and efficiency. Therefore, it is feasible to find out the influence of the essential features

²⁴ Dogan M., *Sravnitel'naya politicheskaya sotsiologiya*, Moskva 1994, s. 168-207.

²⁵ Lijphart A., Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, *"American Political Science Review"* 1971, vol 65, nr. 3, s. 691-693.

²⁶ Golosov G., *Sravnitel'naya politologiya*, Wyd. Izd-vo Novosib. un-ta 1995.

of different political systems on the governments stability and efficiency, as well as determine the nature and direction of development of political institutions and processes.

According to another approach to the study of the governments' stability and efficiency, it is prudent to use such varieties of comparisons as: single-country and case analysis; analysis of similar institutions and processes of a limited range of countries, shortlisted by analytical criteria of the governments' stability and efficiency research; typological and classification schemes to compare, collate and contrast the governments stability and efficiency indicators in particular groups of states; a statistical and descriptive study of a particular sample of states in a certain part or region of the world, pointed out in terms of geographical and social and evolutionary markers, verification of hypotheses about the change in the stability and efficiency of governments; global statistics analysis to identify structures and validate relationships for a specific sample of political systems²⁷. It is noteworthy that regional and cross-temporal comparisons are absolutely appropriate in the study of the governments' stability and efficiency. The primary reason behind the application of these methods is a peculiar source of conceptual and methodological problems in comparative Political Science, related to the expansion of a range of political systems²⁸. However and most interestingly, a spectrum of political systems includes diffuse polities, being at different stages of their differentiation, liberalization and consolidation, or contrarily, authoritarianism and deconsolidation.

From such a perspective, a regional study involves comparing a group of countries in a particular region or part of the world according to certain indicators of the governments stability and efficiency (for instance, Western European countries relevant to Central European countries, or Central European countries relevant to Eastern Europe). Scholars emphasize the viability of this research type that provides an opportunity to solve a whole range of problems, existing in scientific comparisons. The fact is that all the analysed countries are selected on the basis of similarity of their economic, social and political characteristics. Unlike other types of comparisons, this research method involves a larger number of cases, thus being less detailed and more versatile. Instead, the so-called cross-temporal comparisons involve the study of objects, phenomena, and processes over time, i.e. by comparing the characteristics of the analysed states or groups of states at different time periods²⁹. In this regard they fall into two types: synchronous and asynchronous. A synchronous comparative study of the governments stability and efficiency involves correlation and measuring the stability and efficiency of governments in one or more countries at different time periods. Asynchronous comparison involves the study of indicators and measurements of the governments stability and efficiency in relevance to different countries or groups of countries at different time intervals.

²⁷ Hempel C., *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1952, s. 10.

²⁸ Braibanti R., Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered, *"The Journal of Politics"* 1968, vol 30, nr. 1, s. 36-37.

²⁹ Smorgunov L., *Sovremennaya sravnitel'naya politologiya*, Wyd. ROSSPEN 2004.

On the whole, it should be noted that virtually all of the traditionally outlined types of comparisons are system-integrated by nature, since they cover internal and external environment of the governments stability and efficiency study to the fullest extent, comprehensively assess the nature and extent of the impact of various phenomena, institutes and processes on the government and other institutions under consideration³⁰. Generally speaking, a comparative analysis of the governments stability and efficiency involves examining this problem, firstly, in a particular sample of countries, and subsequently, in a particular country in relation to a pre-determined sample of countries. It should be borne in mind that the number of countries, selected for comparative analysis is a limiting factor in the comparative study of the governments' stability and efficiency.

Simultaneously, it should not be neglected that among the priority tasks of the methodology of the governments stability and efficiency comparative study, is to identify the current trends in the development of the institute of government and the cabinet, regardless of the country, parts or regions of the world. For this purpose, comparative studies should make use of the analysis of structural components, mechanisms and functions of the Heads of State, Parliaments, Governments and political parties as leading political institutions of the countries analysed. In addition, elections are a key driving force of the political process, related to the main activities of parties, as parliaments and governments are formed through their mechanism. It should also be noted that comparisons of political systems are usually conducted at the macrolevel of national states, regarded as sovereign entities. Therefore, a comparative study of the governments stability and efficiency in a particular country or region helps distinguish between common and different governmental cabinet systems, point out indicators for their determination, formation and functioning, as well as identify common ground in activities of various political structures and processes. This presupposes that in the course of a comparative study of the governments stability and efficiency, review of the constitutions of countries under analysis should receive considerable attention, due to the fact that fundamental laws are documents or groups of documents, designating structures of the political systems in these countries. The constitutions define the main political institutions of states, including governmental ones, their competence and functions, as well as systems of interrelations and control.

In turn, to determine factual characteristics of government cabinets, designated in the political systems of the countries under study, it is essential to process a wide array of statistical information, directly relevant to the categories and phenomena under study. However, given that not all political phenomena and processes relevant to the study of the governments stability and efficiency can be analysed by means of bare facts, it is also useful to use index-mathematical comparisons, accumulated and applied by Political Science over the recent decade, and refine the comparative political analysis methodology to better understand the relevant political institutions and processes from the research viewpoint. In such a case, the comparative method

³⁰ Ilin M., Osnovnyye metodologicheskiye problemy sravnitel'noy politologii. „*Polis*“ 2001, vol 6, s. 140-143.

in the study of the governments stability and efficiency best of all synthesizes the methodologies of behaviourism and neo-institutionalism. Although, by way of contrast, too superficial and nebulous use of the mode of quantitative comparisons stipulates exsession of the level to which comparative Political Science is subject to quantification. So, there arises a necessity to use a kind of conventional demarcation line between quantification and the use of appropriate classification language, according to which quantitative analysis begins with numbers and occurs only in the case of the appropriate application of numbers, according to their arithmetic properties³¹. As a rule, three options for the meaning of quantification are commonly used in the studies of the governments stability and efficiency: metering (calculations), statistical operation, and formal mathematical processing. However, among those, the first two options are most frequently employed in the practice of analysing the stability and efficiency of governments. The point is that researchers have traditionally applied the metering. This means that quantification of the governments stability and efficiency lies in the following: providing internal and external indicative governments' positions (i.e. net metering) with numerical / quantitative values; using numbers and scale rankings to indicate positions in terms of certain aspects and dimensions of the stability and efficiency of governments (i.e. order scale); measuring discrepancies or distances between positions in individual cases of government offices as well as their stability and fictitiousness (i.e. interval scale).

In addition to simple metering techniques, experts in the governments stability and efficiency comparisons have at their disposal statistical techniques that not only help avoid errors in sample selection and metering, but also allow us to identify meaningful relationships between analytic variables. However, the process of statistical processing of the governments stability and efficiency can begin exclusively after a sufficient number of numerical / quantitative indicators have been obtained for the required number of items and indicators that need metering. These conditions are rather complicated to comply with, since a thorough analysis of statistical "discoveries" in terms of their theoretical significance and Political Science relevance illustrates a huge gap between relativities and the real state of affairs³². However, processing of numerical / quantitative indicators of the government stability and efficiency must be based on and tackle evidence, valid merely within conceptual reflections and refinements, only to hint scholars what constitutes the "reality" of the stability and efficiency of governments. Therefore, researchers cannot measure absolutely anything without pre-awareness of what an object of metering is. The degree of any indicator presence neither carries information about an object of analysis. Therefore, prior to detection of availability or absence of any properties, as well as classifying and metering them in terms of a variable, a researcher must elaborate a concept for that variable³³. The main problem is that a quantitative analysis of the stability and efficien-

³¹ Sartori G., Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, *"The American Political Science Review"* 1970, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 1033-1053.

³² Lijphart A., Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, *"American Political Science Review"* 1971, vol 65, nr. 3, s. 691-693.

³³ Lazarsfeld P., Barton A., *Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classifications, Typologies and Indices*, [w:] Lerner D., Lasswell H. (eds.), *The Policy Sciences*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1965, s. 155.

cy of governments should only be applied, following the formation of both a concept of the governments stability and efficiency, as well as their analytical variables. It is worth considering that material for quantitative analysis (objects, supported by figures and facts), cannot be collected by quantification alone. Respectively, the rules for generating concepts are irrespective of those for processing quantitative data and quantitative ratios, thus being impossible to be derived from them.

After all, it is fair to argue that in the analysis of the methodology of the governments' stability and efficiency comparative studies, one cannot dispense with the methodology of classifications. Classifications, despite numerous restrictions, have remained a prerequisite for any scientific discourse. Classification concepts can be used to describe the data obtained during the observation phase and formulate primary empirical generalizations³⁴. Besides, creation of classifications is regarded as a mainstream tool for bringing analytical clarity to indicators of the governments stability and efficiency, because classifications compel scientists to speak the same at one and the same time, and about different things at different times. It is precisely through classifications and the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative comparisons that cause and effect relationships, used in comparative political studies, should be successfully ensured. According to these, correlations should be verified in case (of): there are many / few reasons for the same comparative effect; there exists or does not exist dependency of causes on time; validity or invalidity of the principle, according to which identical reasons lead to different results; validity or invalidity of the principle, according to which results are indeed effects of various causes, depending on each other³⁵.

Concludingly, it is a valid proof that, based on the analysis and comparison of a number of scientific advances on the issues of the governments stability and efficiency, it can be argued that this scope of scientific interests of many political scientists makes impact on the application of not only Political Science methodology, but also Law, Sociology, History, Economics, etc. However, the stability and efficiency of governments is primarily an interest that can be solved by the comparative Political Science methodology, and hence by the comparative research method, particularly by the single-case method, binary analysis, regional comparisons and comparison of similar and contrasting countries, use of typological and classification schemes, statistical and descriptive study of country samples, cross-temporal comparisons, appropriate for implementation when based on qualitative and quantitative analysis methods, including those in the form of quantifications and statistical operations. Although, this does not contradict the view that problems of the governments stability and efficiency can be solved by means of functional, institutional, systemic, structural, cybernetic methods, etc. In general, the issues of

³⁴ Hempel C., *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1952, s. 54.

³⁵ Hall P., *Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research*, [w:] Mahoney J., Rueschemeyer D. (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2003, s. 373-404.

the stability and efficiency of governments are multidisciplinary, therefore requiring comprehensive exploration through comparative methods.

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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

The author proves that the first post-Communist party system of the Republic of Bulgaria underwent significant changes after the parliamentary elections of 2001. The right bloc was stratified; the transformation of the Bulgarian socialist party was completed, which led to the transition to a new party system. The second post-Communist party system, which was born as a multi-party system, has also undergone dynamic changes after the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2009. Its evolution depends on new cleavages (that appeared and will appear), what will happen in the inner party relations, how it will affect the change in electoral preferences and party identification. The evolution of the party system is a long process, which is influenced by the new social structure of the society, its values, changes in the political culture of citizens and political class, as well as “political construction” due to changes in the electoral legislation and the electoral system in Bulgaria.

Keywords: Republic of Bulgaria, political parties, party system, cleavages, the stability of governments, the opposition, party relationships.

СПЕЦИФІКА ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СУЧАСНИХ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ ПАРТІЙ ТА РОЗВИТКУ ПАРТІЙНОЇ СИСТЕМИ В РЕСПУБЛІЦІ БОЛГАРІЯ

Автор доводить, що перша посткомуністична партійна система Республіки Болгарія зазнала суттєвих змін після парламентських виборів 2001 р. Відбулося розшарування правого блоку, завершилася трансформація Болгарської соціалістичної партії, що і зумовило перехід до нової партійної системи. Друга посткомуністична партійна система, яка зародилася як багатопартійна, вже також зазнала динамічних змін після виборів до парламенту у 2005 та 2009 рр. Її еволюція залежить від того, які нові клівіджі (з'явилися і ще з'являться), як будуть складатися внутрішні партійні взаємини, як це позначиться на зміні електоральних уподобань і партійній ідентифікації. Еволюція партійної системи – тривалий процес, на який впливають нова соціальна структура суспільства, його ціннісні установки, зміни в політичній культурі громадян і політичного класу, а також «політичне конструювання» через зміни у виборчому законодавстві і виборчій системі Болгарії.

Ключові слова: Республіка Болгарія, політичні партії, партійна система, клівіджі, стабільність урядів, опозиція, партійні взаємини.

During the years of transformation, since 1989, a real multi-party system has emerged in the Republic of Bulgaria. Since the early 90s this small Balkan country had more than 200 political parties (in the twenty-first century - 250). In outlining the objectives of their activities, it is necessary to take into account the special circumstances and prerequisites that had a great influence on the transformation processes and ideological pluralism in the Republic of Bulgaria. When studying the organizational and functional problems of multi-party system and the formation of the party system in the Republic of Bulgaria, certain correlations between the state and prospects of the system and the type of political relations that dominate the political system of society are needed.

Analyzing this phenomenon, the author relied on the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria¹, which defined the general legal basis of the electoral process, the Act "On elections of people's representatives"², which pointed to the conditions and procedure for the election of people's deputies, and the Act "On political parties"³ (the order of their formation, legal status, goals and objectives, principles of internal organization, mechanisms and procedures for participation in elections).

The phases of dismantling the party's monopoly on authority. The long reign of the Bulgarian Communist party (BCP operated in 1948-1989) ended with the removal of its leader T. Zhivkov from the authority on November 10, 1989. In Bulgaria, we can pinpoint three stages of dismantling the party monopoly on power. At the first stage (November 10, 1989 – January 13, 1990) a liberalization of the regime took place. At the same time, there were attempts to maintain the position of the BCP, despite the fact that the first political parties and organizations were beginning to be created, which denied the monopoly of the BCP and fought for the democratization of the political system in the country.

The second stage (18 January – 10 June 1990) was the formal democratization of the political system. At this time, representatives of various political forces worked on the creation of a new Constitution, from which the provision on the leadership role of the Communist party was removed, and new articles regulating the activities of political parties were introduced. The main merit of the democratization of the political system belongs to the activities of the "Round table" (January 3 – may 15, 1990), which was attended by two parties – the BCP and the Union of democratic forces (SDS – newly created anti-Communist coalition of 17 parties and public organizations). Most of the decisions that were taken at the Round table had a decisive influence on the creation of new laws and the formation of a new Constitution, on the activities of political parties in Bulgaria, on the deprivation of the political monopoly and control of the BCP. The agreements reached during the round table (the Act "On elections to the Great National Assembly", the Act "On political parties", etc.) subsequently made it possible

¹ Конституция на Република България. Приета от Великото народно събрание 12 юли 1991 г. София: Нова звезда, 2002. 40 с.

² Закон за избори. София: Нова звезда, 2001. 47 с.

³ Закон за политическите партии. Държавен вестник. 1990. 13 април.

to form the legal basis for a new democratic political system in Bulgaria, the core of which was political pluralism⁴.

In the third stage (June 1990 – July 12, 1991), the Bulgarians overcame all formal and factual grounds for the existence of a party monopoly in the country. Elections to the Great National Assembly were held (June 1990), which had to adopt a new Constitution of Bulgaria. Of the 40 parties that participated in the elections, the Bulgarian socialist party (BSP), the former BCP, won the majority of seats (54%) in a coalition with its partners. The SDS became the second political force with 36% of the votes. Bulgarian agrarian people's Union, a partner of the Bulgarian Communist party from the time of socialism, came in third place. It was followed by a new political party representing the interests of the ethnic minority of the Turks in Bulgaria – the Movement for rights and freedoms. Therefore, the process of forming a multi-party system took place in the conditions of maintaining strong positions and great influence of the BCP; the transformation of the BCP – BSP into a democratic party for a long time had a significant impact on the formation of a multi-party system in the country. “The processes that took place in the BCP – BSP, especially at the initial stage – the Bulgarian political scientist G. Karasimeonov wrote – led to the evolution of party pluralism, including the opposition”⁵.

The peaceful transition from one political system to another let to avoid a civil war in Bulgaria, but it also led to the long-term influence of the BCP – BSP on the multi-party system and the political process. Compared to other CEE countries, the slow changes in the Republic of Bulgaria have resulted in a long-term “asynchronous pluralism in favour of the BCP – BSP”⁶.

The leader of the opposition Z. Zhelev won the presidential election in August 1990 (SDS), who actively contributed to the creation of a new regulatory framework of public administration in Bulgaria⁷. Many positions in the Executive branch were occupied by representatives of the opposition, which influenced management decisions in the country and gradually stopped the monopoly of the BCP – BSP in the institutions of the Executive branch.

Development of political pluralism in the Republic of Bulgaria. The adoption of the new Constitution on July 12, 1991, meant the official recognition of the principle of political pluralism, the ban on the monopoly of one party to hold all positions in state institutions, the ban on the existence of parties which purpose was the forcible seizure of state government.

In January 1992, during the presidential elections, the fight was again between the two main political parties in Bulgaria – the BSP and the SDS, however, Zhelev was elected to be the President for the second time. The first free democratic elections in the Republic of Bulgaria, according to the new Bulgarian Constitution, were held on October 13, 1991, together with

⁴ Кръглата маса: Стенографическ и протоколи 3 януари – 15 май 1990, София. София: Фондация Д-р Желя Желев, 1990. 716 с.

⁵ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. София, 2003. С. 47.

⁶ Ibid. P. 48.

⁷ Голяев А. Президент Желя Желев: «България после 1989 г. взела ориентир на Запад». Вести Европы. 1995. 9 декември.

local elections of public councilors and kmets. They were exceptional, because they had to solve the question of power and the balance of political forces in the center and on the ground. The election campaign took place in the context of a sharp struggle between the BSP and the SDS, and led to a “historical change in the balance of power”⁸. SDS won with a minimum advantage, receiving 34.36% of the votes and 110 seats (out of 240 seats), BSP received 33.14% of the votes and 106 seats. The third political force – the RPS – received 7.55% and 24 mandates. The election results showed that the parties focused on the “center” of the party system did not have serious support of the electorate. At the same time, the elections revealed special features of the post-Communist party system – an acute confrontational struggle between the BSP and the SDS, which had almost equal support of voters; their territorial advantages: the voters of the SDS are mainly residents of big cities, and the supporters of the BSP are residents of small towns and villages⁹.

When the process of formation of a new party system began in 1989, the Republic of Bulgaria was “an alternating, exclusively economic, political and spiritual environment, transforming radically”¹⁰. Conditions of formation of parties of the Republic of Bulgaria differed from the conditions in the countries of the developed democracy. In Bulgaria, the link to the political tradition that existed until 1934, when the beginnings of party pluralism appeared in the country, was severed. After 1947, all the foundations of democracy and civil liberties were destroyed in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. The economic monopoly of the state has created a social structure specific to socialism. Ideological monopoly deformed public consciousness and the possibility of establishing democratic values. Therefore, the party system, which was formed after 1989, was a product of society, despite the fact that it became an active factor that influenced the course and direction of transformation.

Social cleavages of the transformation period. Exploring the period of transformation in the Republic of Bulgaria, we should note certain public cleavages (stratifications), with the conflict potential and impact on the form and the essence of the new party system. According to the well-known methodological approach of S. Lipset and S. Rokkan in which scientists have deduced a typology of cleavages¹¹, it is obvious that for the countries of transitional period, which were in a situation similar to the Bulgarian after 1989, the emergence of historical cleavages was typical. They determined the configuration of the party of the socialist period, which had an especially sharp class cleavage (workers – capitalists); in addition, religious cleavages had also been sharp (Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, etc.), national-ethnic cleavages, the opposition of center and periphery (urban – rural) and the like.

⁸ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. София, 2003. С. 70.

⁹ Ibid. P. 71.

¹⁰ Карасимеонов Г. Партийна система в Болгарии в 2001-2009 гг.: трансформация и эволюция политических партий. Вестник Московского университета. Серия 12. Политические науки. 2011. № 1. С. 24.

¹¹ Lipset S. et al. *A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy*. International Social Science Journal. 1993. Vol. 45. № 136. P. 155-176.

In some post-Communist countries, “authentic” parties with their historical party tradition have emerged. In the Bulgarian historical parties these traditions were weak, almost destroyed during the years of socialism. Recovery of such parties as the BSDRP, the BZNS, the Democratic party and the like in the 90’s did not significantly affect the new political reality, and the old identity merged with their new image – the founders of the SDS. An attempt by the parties to participate independently in the elections, outside the SDS, showed that the Bulgarian electorate supports them minimally, and they moved to margins¹². The only historical party that retained political influence, but radically changed its essence is the BCP, which occupied the social democratic space.

The new party system of the Republic of Bulgaria was almost unaffected by the religious and ethnic cleavages. But decisive was the influence of a new type of cleavage, which is manifested in the transition period – ideological, value. Ideological and value differences (communism – anti-communism) formed the basis of the line of division along which there were party divisions and which led to the confrontation of political parties. This cleavage had absorbed the contradictions of the two political blocs (the BSP and SDS) for the assessment of the former regime and the future of communist leaders, current pace and nature of changes, the nature of the constitutional structure of the country, the way of the government reconstruction (revolutionary and evolutionary), geopolitical orientation. The duration of the cleavage and its manifestations in the acute form led to the hegemony of the BSP and the slow processes of transformation in the Communist party in the first years of changes, which, in turn, increased the radicalization of its main opponent – the SDS¹³.

Ethnic cleavage led to the emergence of the party Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Ethnic problems have worsened in Bulgaria in the 80’s because of the BCP’s assimilation policy towards the Turkish minority. First, the reason for the emergence of an ethnic party was the protection of the rights of the Turks in Bulgaria, the restoration of their civil and political freedoms. The SDS supported the RPS as an ally in the anti-Communist struggle. However, this ethnic cleavage did not become a source of ethnic confrontation due to the flexible policy of the BSP¹⁴. The RPS was integrated into the party system with the status of a third party, small, but able to balance between two large blocks, to influence the management of the country, supporting one of the leading forces. The electoral system with a 4% barrier, which limited the possibility of small parties, contributed to the strengthening of this party configuration¹⁵.

By the end of the century these two cleavages have been exhausted. The main reforms carried out in the country clearly indicated the irreversibility of the transition of the Republic to

¹² Карасимеонов Г. Партийная система в Болгарии в 2001-2009 гг.: трансформация и эволюция политических партий. Вестник Московского университета. Серия 12. Политические науки. 2011. № 1. С. 25.

¹³ Генев Н. Рискове на прехода. София: Национално и регионално развитие, 1994. С. 23.

¹⁴ Четвърта Национална конференция на Движението за права и свободи. София, 2000. С. 11-12.

¹⁵ Герджиков С. Хаос и ред след комунизма. София: Екстрем, 1998. С. 127.

a political system of democracy, market economy, foreign policy orientation to the European Union and NATO. By the end of the century, society had reached a certain consensus on the basic values of the new economic and political systems. The relations between the leading Bulgarian parties – SDS, BSP and DPS – have become more civilized. However, the bipolar model of the party system that was formed – proved to be very unstable. The presence of a third political force – the RPS, contributed to the frequent change in the balance of power between the main parties and influenced the formation of the Executive power in the Republic of Bulgaria. Although the confrontation of the main political actors of the Republic of Bulgaria, which has continued since the beginning of the transformation throughout the post-Communist years, has somewhat reduced the tension, but its negative impact on the activities of the Bulgarian political parties and those in opposition and in power is noticeable¹⁶.

The specifics of the process of formation of Bulgarian power institutions at the beginning of the new century and their impact on the development of the party system. Parties, the electoral and party systems, by transferring various forms of pluralism in civil society to the sphere of power relations, constitute a single mechanism for obtaining power. Modern democracy is impossible without them. The main parties in their interaction, struggle and rotation in power are considered as a single party system, which determines the effectiveness of the entire political system.

The June 2001 parliamentary elections for the first time completed a full four-year cadence of the National Assembly (Parliament of the Republic of Bulgaria). Contrary to the expectations of the fight of the main political actors in the elections – BSP, SDS and their coalitions, a new political force – the National Movement Simeon II (NRSD) – entered the arena and won the elections. His appearance had a number of reasons. First, it is the existing vacuum due to the decline in the legitimacy of the main political parties in the party space – the BSP and the SDS. After all, almost 50% of voters did not intend to vote for the main parties in 2001. Secondly, the consequences of reforms after the crisis of 1996-1997 caused acute social and material problems among citizens, disappointment and discontent with the policy of the ruling SDS, which contributed to the victory of the new NRSD. Third, a specific factor – the appearance of the personality of Simeon the Second (Simeon Saksoburgotski – former tsar of Bulgaria), his popularity and charisma contributed to the rapid approval of NRSD in the Republic of Bulgaria. He represented a new type of leader, free from the burden of party politics of the post-revolutionary years, and focused good expectations in the social life of the Bulgarians; he carried a new political culture, cleansed from the confrontation of the past. These are the main specific factors that created in the policy of the Republic of Bulgaria preconditions for a unique “wedging” of the NRSD into the party space only two months before the elections¹⁷.

¹⁶ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. София, 2003. С. 55.

¹⁷ Карасимеонов Г. Новата партийна система в България. София, 2003. С. 99.

Despite the fact that in the program declarations of the three main political formations (NRSD, Coalition Association of democratic forces (SDS), the Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP) there were no significant differences in the priority areas of development of the state, the results were determined primarily by the expectation of changes related to NRDS. The elections caused a sharp change in the balance of party forces and in the configuration of parliamentary groups in the 39th National Assembly. But the main consequence was the break of the current bipolar model of the party system, which was based on the dominance and continuity in the power of the SDS and BSP. They received less than 20% of the vote, and became medium-sized electoral parties, with relatively equal public support. Therefore, the transitional party system, which emerged in Bulgaria in 1989, exhausted itself after the 2001 elections.

In subsequent years, a new party system was formed, which is typical for consolidated democracies, in which there is a new configuration of party formations and a new type of relationship between them. The establishment of a certain party system as a subsystem of a democratic political system reflects the processes of stratification of this society, leading to the formation of conscious political interests and behavior, political orientation and identification with the relevant party. The formation of a certain type of party system is a consequence of the purposeful normative activity of the political elite, its influence on the political process and party activities. An example of such activities are the laws on political parties and elections, the adoption of a certain type of electoral system. The behavior and culture of the new political elite are of particular importance in times of social change. These factors are crucial in the formation and development of the party system, operated in the early XXI century in the Republic of Bulgaria and facilitated the transition to a new (second) party system.

NRSD is the largest political force by the electoral influence, unconventionally and quickly pushed aside other leading parties of the Republic of Bulgaria. Members of the NRSD formed a parliamentary group, which had an almost absolute majority. Not having any party history, NRSD was being built, created an organization, ideology, team leaders and management policies. The main structure of the NRSD – a parliamentary group, became the core of the party within the movement. Therefore, the elections of 2001 created a fundamentally new political situation, which had an important impact on the party system. It changed the party configuration from 2+2 (two big – BSP and SDS, and two smaller parties – RPS and Eurolivitsia) to 1+2+1 formula (one dominant formation – NRSD, plus two medium sized parties – BSP and SDS, plus one smaller party –RPS).

Despite the fact that during the administration of the NKSD, National Assembly's deputies expressed their vote of no confidence six times in a row, the opposition could not win. Even when in February 2005 some of the deputies moved to the opposition from the majority and, expressing a vote of no confidence, they achieved the resignation of the head of Parliament, the situation has not changed. Prime Minister S. Saksoburgotski used his own leverage and some of the deputies, changing their opinion, voted for confidence in the government. He was able

to fully use the management mandate and come to new elections with some success – Bulgaria became a member of NATO and was able to gain recognition among the EU member States, which decided on the date of its adoption in its organization – January 1, 2007.

NRSD managed to keep the majority of supporters among the voters and to come in second among 22 parties which took part in the 2005 elections. It testifies that, despite all difficulties and forecasts of the first years of board, NRSD gained recognition and kept a certain rating in society, proved the ability to operate the state. All previous elections in the Republic of Bulgaria showed that the authority of the ruling party during the years of rule fell sharply and in the new elections citizens voted for another party, depriving the current government of the mandate. But NRSD received only half as many votes as in 2001.

In the 2005 elections, the socialists won. They created a coalition government and elected the BSP leader S. Stanishev as Prime Minister. A year remained before the presidential elections and the current President G. Pyrvanov was also a socialist, so during the year Bulgaria was ruled by the BSP – left wing party, which made certain changes in the internal and foreign policy of the state. With this government, the Republic of Bulgaria became a member of the European Union. For the admission the government of the Republic took urgent measures to complete the reforms, so that the so-called “safety clause” didn’t come into action and Bulgaria’s membership would not be postponed for another year.

Negative impact on the rating of the government had the changes caused by the global financial crisis in 2008, the Government was unable to solve most of the societal problems, so in the parliamentary elections in 2009 only half of the citizens voted for the ruling socialists. The Bulgarians at the rallies criticized the government’s activities towards fighting the crisis and corruption, for which the country could not claim assistance from the European Union. Therefore, it is not surprising that the victory in the elections was won by the new opposition party “Citizens for European development of Bulgaria” (GERB), which voters gave almost 40% of the votes. “Coalition for Bulgaria” (BSP) was supported by 17.72% of citizens, RPS – 14.47%, the party “Attack” – 9.37%, “Blue coalition” (SDS) – 6.73%, the party “Order, law and justice” – 4.13%. Other parties failed to overcome the 4% barrier and failed to enter Parliament¹⁸. Following the elections of 2009, a center-right government was formed in Bulgaria. BSP went into opposition.

The leader of the opposition, the Chairman of the party GERB – Boyko Borisov became the new Prime Minister. The former guard, and later the mayor of Sofia won the favor of the Bulgarians through the image of a man of business and politics that worries about ordinary citizens¹⁹. This image of the leader of the government allowed the GERB to win again the elections to the National Assembly in 2013. But this party did not secure an absolute majority of

¹⁸ Партия ГЕРБ («Граждане за европейское развитие Болгарии») победила на выборах в парламент Болгарии. URL: <http://www.prime-tass.ru/news/0/%7B8BA676E-78C7-42DF-946D-469F3733D585%7D.uif> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

¹⁹ На парламентських виборах у Болгарії впевнено перемогла опозиція. URL: <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=48&clid=94355> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

votes and could not create a government coalition. Therefore, on May 23 Borisov returned to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria the right to form a government, which he forwarded to the BSP, which won the second place in the elections. On May 29 the National Assembly elected P. Oresharski as a Prime Minister. However, from the first day of his work protests arose against the new government, the demonstrators demanded the resignation of the Cabinet. During 2013-2014, the opposition initiated five unsuccessful votings regarding the vote of no confidence in the government (October 2 and 17, 2013, February 12, May 30, 13 June, 2014). In the end, the Chairman of the BSP S. Stanishev stated the need for elections to legitimize the government²⁰.

Early elections to the Bulgarian Parliament in 2014 and their consequences. On July 27, the leaders of the four parties – GERB, BSP, DPS and non-parliamentary “Bulgaria without censorship” – agreed on the appointment of early elections to the National Assembly on October 5, 2014 and the President agreed with this date²¹. 7 coalitions and 18 parties took part in the elections. More than 17 thousand observers watched the voting²². The votes were distributed among the parties as follows: GERB received – 32.67%, BSP – Left Bulgaria – 15.40%, RPS – 14.84%, Reformist bloc – 8.89%, the national front for the salvation of Bulgaria (in the coalition “Patriotic front”) – 7.28%, Bulgaria without censorship – 5.69%, “Attack” – 4.52%, the Alternative for the Bulgarian revival – 4.15%²³. For the second time Borisov became the Prime Minister of Bulgaria – the first time was in 2009-2013 and since November 7, 2014. Therefore the coalition government of the right political forces acted in the country.

However, in November 2016, regular presidential elections were held in the Republic of Bulgaria. The political parties hoped that the elections would give them the expected opportunity to adjust the balance of power that had developed at that time in Parliament. However, it was questionable whether such changes were possible or not. After all, since 2014, power in Bulgaria has been concentrated in the hands of the party GERB, as B. Borisov had been the Prime Minister at that time, and the President of the state was his nominee – Rosen Plevneliev. For a long time the GERB ruled the state in a coalition with the former right forces of the Union of democratic forces (it was headed by former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov). Sometimes they were supported situationally by the radical party “Attack” with its leader Vilen Siderov. Other parties represented the opposition, led by the Bulgarian socialist party with leader Sergei Stanishev, in a coalition with the ethnic Turkish party DPS and NSD. GERB party, first won

²⁰ *BSP Leader Stanishev Demands Government Resignation, July Elections*. URL: <http://www.novinite.com/articles/161192/BSP+Leader+Stanishev+Demands+Government+Resignation%2C+July+Elections> [odczyt: 09.03.2019].

²¹ Президент Болгарии подтвердил дату внеочередных выборов. URL: <http://rus.bg/obschestvo/89-obschestvo/9316-prezident-bolgarii-podverdil-datu-vneochednyh-vyborov-5-okt> [odczyt: 03.03.2019].

²² В Болгарии начались досрочные парламентские выборы. URL: <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1486969> [odczyt: 03.03.2019].

²³ Резултати от избори за народни представители 05.10.2014 г. за страната. URL: <http://results.cik.bg/pi2014/rezultati/> [odczyt: 09.03.2019].

election in 2009 and until 2016, it consistently won in all election races²⁴. The only serious rival of party GERB could be considered a spontaneous expression of discontent of citizens who took to protest actions on the streets of many cities of the state. However, the leaders of the party GERB managed to build such tactics and strategy that none of the existing parties in Bulgaria could seriously claim the role of the opposition.

In the National Assembly in 2014, seven parties acted together with GERB. The Bulgarian press wrote that each political movement was represented by two parliamentary forces²⁵. In addition to GERB, the right-liberal spectrum was represented by the Reformist bloc (RB). From the parties of the nationalist spectrum “Attack” and its competitor – the Patriotic front entered the Parliament. The forces of the left were represented by the BSP and the party of Georgi Pyrvanov “Alternative for Bulgarian Renaissance” (ABV), which has moved away from the socialists. This list of parliamentary political forces was completed by the RPS ethnic party, which at the end of 2015 divided into two, and thus two Turkish parties – the RPS and the “Democrats for responsibility, freedom and tolerance” (DVST) fought for seats in the National Assembly in 2017.

So, each parliamentary party had its competitor who applied for the same electorate (except for, perhaps, the ruling party GERB, voters of which vote rather for the person of its leader Boyko Borisov, than for the program or ideology). According to G. Pyrvanov, the main opposition force, which traditionally challenged the championship of the GERB – BSP, was in opposition not to the government, but rather to its main competitor from the left flank – ABV. Potential rival of the GERB in the fight for the right wing voters, the Reformist bloc, fit into the role of his younger partner, and dutifully accepted the resignation of its Ministers, which B. Borisov prudently appointed to the most problematic ministries²⁶. Other parties (ethnic Turkish RPS and nationalist Patriotic front and “Attack”) were engaged in inter-party struggle, and therefore not so much criticized GERB but rather sought its support.

In the end, an effective enough party system was created where the leader of GERB B. Borisov kept all potential competitors under control. Almost every decision of the ruling party could create a majority in Parliament, playing on the contradictions of their younger partners. Weakened opponents were not even trying to dispute its rights, they were happy with their own place in the system, which was created by B. Borisov. Most analysts at the beginning of 2016 believed that the system of political relations built by the Prime Minister would allow his party to lead its presidential candidate without any difficulties, while maintaining a dominant position. However, subsequent events refuted these forecasts.

²⁴ *Граждани за европейско развитие на България* (ГЕРБ). URL: http://www.gerb.bg/bg/news/spisyk-standovishta_i_pozicii-3.html [odczyt: 09.03.2019].

²⁵ Симеонов П. ГЕРБ и Обединените патриоти по-скоро имат условия в 44-ото Народно събрание да изпълнят заявените политики. 2017. 18 априля. URL: <http://www.focus-news.net/opinion/2017/04/18/42635/parvan-simeonov-politolog-gerb-i-obedinenite-patrioti-po-skoro-imat-usloviya-v-44-oto-narodno-sabranie-da-izpalnyat-za-yavenite-politiki.html> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

²⁶ Георгиев В. Заявка за програмиран провал. 2014. 5 ноември. URL: <http://pogled.info/avtorski/Valentin-Georgiev/zayavka-za-programiran-poval.59572> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

It is known that Bulgaria is a parliamentary Republic in which the powers of the head of state are quite limited, but despite this, the President of the Republic of Bulgaria is elected in nationwide elections. The main contenders for the 2016 presidential election were Tsetska T-sacheva, who represented GERB²⁷, and the candidate from the BSP – Rumen Radev²⁸. At the time of the elections Tsacheva was the speaker of the National Assembly of Bulgaria (this is the first woman speaker in the history of Bulgaria)²⁹. G. Radev – a professional military pilot, who once headed the air force of the state.

Additional significance and intrigue of these elections was added by the fact that the current Prime Minister of Bulgaria and leader of the GERB party B. Borisov stated before the elections that in case of defeat of T. Tsacheva the Parliament will be dissolved. In fact, he decided to turn the election into a referendum to evaluate his policies, linking the results to the future of the current government and the National Assembly.

Such political statements and dispositions are not a new phenomenon in modern politics. Quite often, politicians tie the future of the government according to the results of citizens' voting in elections or referendums, trying to ensure the desired result for themselves. However, such combination of future destiny of the politician and the results of the voting – is a double-edged weapon. It is difficult to predict whether voters will support a functioning government or not. But the defeat of the current government will inevitably entail resignation. In this regard, it is advisable to recall two very recent examples from the development of the electoral process and its results in the UK and Italy.

In the UK, on the eve of the referendum on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, Prime Minister James Cameron said that if the majority of voters vote for the withdrawal of the state from the EU, he will resign³⁰. As you know, the majority of voters voted for Brexit, which forced D. Cameron to keep his own promises and thus end his political career. At the end of 2016 the same move was made by Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who said he would resign if the majority of voters voted in a referendum against his proposed radical reform of the Constitution³¹. The voters did not support the changes proposed by the Prime Minister and the political career of Signor M. Renzi was also sadly interrupted.

In Bulgaria B. Borisov went on the same slippery slope, linking the fate of his government with the results of the presidential elections, which in this case proved to be as disappointing as with his Western European colleagues. Already in the first round, which took place on

²⁷ Антонова Д. Цецка Цачева, вече официално, кандидатът на ГЕРБ за президент. *News.bg*, 2 октомври, 2016.

²⁸ БСП отрязва АБВ от преговорите за обща коалиция за президентските избори. От столетницата не са съгласни с предложението от партията на Първанов проект за коалиционно споразумение. *Blitz.bg*, 23 август, 2016.

²⁹ Борисов обяви официално Цецка Цачева за кандидат-президент на ГЕРБ: Нацията има нужда и от майка (допълнена). *Дневник.bg*, 2016, 2 октомври.

³⁰ Почему британский премьер ушел в отставку? URL: <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20160627/236990095.html>; Дэвид Кэмерон освобождает для Терезы Мэй пост и квартиру. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-36781539> [odczyt: 05.04.2017].

³¹ Итальянцы отклонили конституционную реформу, премьер-министр Маттео Ренци уходит. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3840538> [odczyt: 05.04.2017].

November 6, 2016, the protege of Prime Minister Tsacheva took only second place, gaining 3% less votes than R. Radev. Before the second round of elections, all government forces and administrative resources were thrown to ensure the victory of Tsacheva, to which the Bulgarian society has a rather ambiguous attitude. Indeed, during the electoral campaign “not so charismatic T. Tsacheva could not get out of the shadow of B. Borisov, because of what she gave an impression of a weak candidate who is devoid of independence”³².

During the election campaign, R. Radev was credited with “special ties with the Kremlin”, as the BSP is considered a pro-Russian party. However, R. Radev answered these accusations by the fact that not only is he not a member of the BSP, but moreover, he is the first Bulgarian military man who received military education in the United States. The moment of truth came on November 13, when in the second round R. Radev won a convincing victory, receiving 59.37% of the vote and became the President of Bulgaria³³. The next day, November 14, B. Borisov, following this word, resigned³⁴. Two days later, the National Assembly accepted his resignation with 218 votes “for” and 0 “against”³⁵. Therefore, Bulgaria had an urgent need for early parliamentary elections.

Reasons for the resignation of the Prime Minister and the announcement of new early elections to the National Assembly. These topics were very actively discussed in the Bulgarian press and look obvious. The ruling party overestimated its resources, putting forward a presidential candidate personality, devoid of its own charisma, but loyal and manageable. It caused irritation in society: voters, it seems, already didn’t ask, but the President was appointed, as an ordinary official. The opposition quickly took into account these protest public sentiments and proposed a candidate who was the complete opposite of the candidate from GERB – R. Radev – general officer, pilot-ACE, non-party, and therefore not responsible for the problems faced by the state in recent years, respectable, well-educated and intelligent³⁶. In the end, R. Radev was supported by representatives of almost all political parties, while the candidate from GERB failed to mobilize even the electorate of their own party.

If with the defeat of GERB everything looked quite transparent and it could be explained, then much deeper changes that occurred during the presidential elections – changes in political rhetoric – are undoubtedly more difficult to track. On the eve of the elections, the only unconditional and universally recognized reference point of Bulgarian policy was “Euro-Atlantic values”, which meant a wide range of concepts, both geopolitical and purely domestic. During the election campaign, there was a transition to a new paradigm in which the reference point was recognized as “national interests”.

³² Час на полити мѝни в Болгарѝи. URL: [http://www.global-analytik.com/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%](http://www.global-analytik.com/%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%[odczyt: 10.03.2019])[odczyt: 10.03.2019].

³³ Резултати от избори за президент и вицепрезидент на републиката 2016 (III тур). Централната избирателна комисия на Република България. URL: [https://www.cik.bg/\[odczyt: 10.03.2017\]](https://www.cik.bg/[odczyt: 10.03.2017]).

³⁴ *Bulgarian PM Borisov tenders his government resignation*. Reuters. 14 November 2016.

³⁵ *Bulgarian MPs Accept PM Borisov’s Resignation*. Novinite.com. Sofia News Agency (16 November 2016).

³⁶ България: выборы, до которых не дотянулась вездесущая «рука Москвы». URL: [http://izbircom.com/2017/04/23/%D0%B1%](http://izbircom.com/2017/04/23/%D0%B1%[odczyt: 12.11.2017])[odczyt: 12.11.2017].

Just before the elections, the Wall Street Journal published a document intercepted by the special services of the Republic, which contained a 30 pages of detailed strategy developed by political strategists of the Russian Federation, which may have helped R. Radev win the presidential election. Whether the publication of this document influenced the distribution of the electorate's sympathies is difficult to determine. But in the early parliamentary elections of March 26, 2017, the center-right members of GERB significantly bypassed the Moscow sympathizers of the socialists, receiving 32.65% of the vote, against 27.2%, which received the BSP. Although the entire election campaign opponents went toe to toe³⁹. Therefore, this trend, which arose in the presidential elections, was further developed in the early parliamentary elections of 2017.

Bulgarian journalists noted the unprecedented intensity of the patriotic rhetoric in these elections⁴⁰. The political parties changed their names to include the word "Bulgaria" or "Bulgarian"; came up with new slogans that sounded patriotic; accused each other of not paying enough attention to national interests and of "low-worshipping" the representatives of the European Union and NATO.

Following the parliamentary elections to the National Assembly in 2017, deputies from five political parties were elected. Bulgarian analysts note that the new Parliament is a simplified version of the previous one: each political direction is now represented by only one party, that is, the reserve parties have disappeared from the Parliament⁴¹. BSP after the victory of R. Radev has gained great popularity and became a worthy rival of the ruling party (GERB). The second left party of ABV this time could not overcome the 4% barrier and did not pass to Parliament. A similar situation has developed in the parties-duplicates from the legal sector (the Reform bloc broke up into small movements, which also could not overcome the electoral barrier) and among the representatives of the ethnic Turkish minority. Analyzing the activities of these two parties of the Turkish minority, it should be noted that during the election campaign, a scandal broke out regarding Turkey's participation in it. By that time, the Turkish authorities, preparing for a national referendum on constitutional reform, had already quarreled with Germany, Netherlands and Austria. On the verge of a quarrel were relations with Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. Subsequently, neighboring Bulgaria was added to this list. But if problems with West-Europeans arose through the prohibition of Ministers of the Turkish government to officially to agitate ethnic Turks to vote for the extension of the powers of Recep Erdogan, the official Sofia was outraged by the direct intervention of Ankara in the election process in relation to announced on the 26 March parliamentary elections on the side of one of the political parties.

³⁹ Вибори в Болгарії: тиха поразка симпатиків Кремля. URL: <https://politeka.net/ua/reading/analytics/420336-vybory-v-bolgarii-ti-hoc-porazhenie-simpatikov-kremlya/> [odczyt: 12.04.2018].

⁴⁰ Бойчева М. Конкуренция по родолюбие в именована на партиите. 21 февруля, 2017. URL: <https://trud.bg/> [odczyt: 12.04.2018].

⁴¹ Симеонов П. ГЕРБ и Обединените патриоти по-скоро имат условия в 44-ото Народно събрание да изпълнят заявените политики. 2017. 18 априля. URL: <http://www.focus-news.net/opinion/2017/04/18/42635/parvan-simeonov-politolog-gerb-i-obedinenite-patrioti-po-skoro-imat-usloviya-v-44-oto-narodno-sabranie-da-izpalnyat-za-yavenite-politiki.html> [odczyt: 11.04.2018].

The Bulgarian government accused Turkey of interfering in the elections by campaigning for the DVST party created shortly before the elections. Thus, the Turkish Ambassador to Bulgaria Suleiman Gokce starred in the propaganda video “DVST”, although Bulgarian legislation does not allow the participation of representatives of foreign States in the electoral process. Therefore, the CEC banned the screening of videos, and the court confirmed the legality of this decision. The next step in the campaign was made by the Turkish Minister of social Affairs and labor Mehmet Muezzinoglu, who met with a delegation of the Bulgarian Turks Diaspora, urged them in the upcoming elections to vote for the DVST and advised them to agitate their relatives and friends in Bulgaria to do the same. The conflict also occurred due to the insufficient number, according to Turkey, of the polling stations intended for Bulgarian citizens who were in Turkey. Ankara with a great dissatisfaction took the fact that Bulgaria intends to open only 35 polling stations in Turkey in these elections, whereas in the previous parliamentary elections they were more than 180. The Bulgarian side, justifying its decision, said that this time there were three times fewer applications for participation in the elections than in 2014. In addition, it referred to the recommendations of the European Union for the member States regarding voting abroad.

As a result of the conflict the Ambassador of Bulgaria was withdrawn from Turkey, the conditions of stay of Turkish citizens on the territory of Bulgaria became stricter, and there was also a number of Turkish citizens sent out of the country who campaigned for DVST. It is likely that the scandal affected the election results and the DVST party did not pass to the National Assembly. Therefore, the RPS was the only representative of the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria⁴².

From the nationalist spectrum in Parliament there was also only one movement: “Attack”. This party United with the Patriotic front, creating a coalition party “United patriots”. The party of eurosceptics “Attack” continues to agitate voters for Bulgaria’s withdrawal from NATO, for the revision of the conditions of its membership in the European Union. “Attack” is also in solidarity with Putin’s policy, supports the annexation of Crimea, the abolition of anti-Russian sanctions. Its leader, V. Siderov is in contact with the leader of the French far-right party “national front” Marine Le Pen, and their views are similar on rapprochement with Russia and strengthening the migration regime⁴³.

A political debutant also entered the Parliament – a liberal party “Freedom”, which has no clear political identity. This is the personal project of businessman Veselin Mareshki. He was a candidate for the presidency in the 2016 elections. More than 400 thousand Bulgarian citizens voted for him at that time. In the parliamentary elections of 2017, the achievements of

⁴² Чурсин А. Турция вмешалась в болгарские выборы. В отношениях двух стран – новый кризис. URL: <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/03/18/71827-turtsiya-vmeshalas-v-bolgarskie-vybory> [odczyt: 11.04.2018].

⁴³ Выборы в Болгарии: Кто здесь «тройанский конь» Кремля? URL: <https://112.ua/statji/vybory-v-bolgarii-kto-zdes-troyanskiy-kon-kremlya-379909.html> [odczyt: 11.04.2018].

“Freedom” turned out to be more modest, since a little more than 140 thousand people voted for the party⁴⁴.

The results of the parliamentary elections only confirmed the existence of a new trend in Bulgarian politics. For one reason or another, the most loyal adherents of the previous Euro – Atlantic paradigm – former members of the reform bloc – turned out to be outside the National Assembly. Of the parties that remained in Parliament, two – GERB and the new party “Volya” – are built around the personality of the Prime Minister and easily adapt to new conditions. For these parties, ideological issues are not a priority. GERB, for example, as a partner in the ruling coalition took the party “United patriots” instead of the Reformist bloc. Analysts believe that this choice of the GERB party in these conditions can be regarded almost as a symbol of the changes taking place in Bulgarian society.

Thanks to the political power of the “United patriots” nationalist parties for the first time in recent Bulgarian history received a place in the government. The BSP, whose popularity has increased after the victory in the presidential elections of R. Radev, tries not to lose its rating and continues the course of patriotism and pragmatic policy initiated by the President. Following the events of December 2015, when the FTA broke away from it, the RPC resolutely abandoned the role of a conductor of Turkey’s interests and declared Bulgaria’s security and prosperity as its top priority. Since then, its political rhetoric has often seemed even more patriotic than that of nationalist parties.

Summary. Thus, the first post-Communist party system of the Republic of Bulgaria underwent significant changes after the parliamentary elections of 2001. In Bulgaria there was a stratification of the right bloc, the transformation of the BSP was completed, which led to the transition to a new party system. The second post-Communist party system, which was born as a multi-party system, has also undergone dynamic changes after the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2009. Its evolution depends on new cleavages (that appeared and will appear), what will happen in the inner party relations, as it will affect the change in electoral preferences and party identification. The evolution of the party system is a long process, which is influenced by the new social structure of society, its values, changes in the political culture of citizens and political class, as well as “political construction” due to changes in the electoral legislation and the electoral system of the Republic.

The victory in the 2016 presidential election of R. Radev had a significant impact on new alliances in the political arena. Prior to the elections, GERB collaborated with the Reformist bloc, which had disputes about whether to continue to cooperate with B. Borisov. The Turkish minority and nationalist parties, which until recently provided GERB with partial support in Parliament, are likely to develop cooperation with the left political forces, and their electorate strongly supported R. Radev in the presidential elections.

⁴⁴ Новый болгарский парламент будет состоять из представителей пяти партий. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4128450> [odczyt: 11.04.2018].

The Bulgarian Parliament quickly changed to a new paradigm of political rhetoric, while almost without changing its structure (GERB still leads the government coalition, the BSP and the DPS, as before are in opposition, and the nationalists – support GERB). “Pro-Euro-Atlantic” parties (Reformist bloc, DVST) failed to pass to Parliament, and those that are represented in the National Assembly (GERB, BSP, RPS) quite quickly and painlessly shifted to “patriotic” or “statist” rhetoric. The nationalist parties, which are most in line with the new situation, were able to understand the situation in time: they united and in a new form were able to get seats in the government. Therefore, the nationalist political forces have made a bid to say goodbye to their previous role in Bulgarian politics and to join the respectable participants of the political process.

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ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND IDEOLOGIES OF AGRARIAN PARTIES IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES (1990–2015)

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European parliamentary democracies. The author carried out the comparative analysis of the electoral success of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern Europe in 1990–2015; determined social dimensions (social base and social issues) of ideologies of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern Europe, as well as its impact on electoral and cabinet success of liberal parties.

Keywords: political party, agrarianism, agrarian party, ideology of political party, electoral success of party, ideological positioning of party, social base, social issues, social responsibility, social and electoral profile, Central-Eastern Europe.

SUKCES WYBORCZY I IDEOLOGIE PARTII ROLNICZYCH W DEMOKRACJACH PARLAMENTARNYCH EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ (1990-2015)

Rozważania dotyczą fenomenu partii rolniczych w demokracjach parlamentarnych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Przeprowadzona analiza porównawcza określa sukcesy wyborcze partii rolniczych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1990-2015. Zidentyfikowano czynnik społeczny (baza społeczna i kwestie społeczne) ideologii partii rolniczych w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, a także jego wpływ na sukcesy wyborcze i rządowe partii rolniczych.

Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, rolnictwo, partia rolnicza, czynnik społeczny działalności partii politycznych, sukces wyborczy partii politycznych, ideologia partii, baza społeczna, kwestie społeczne, odpowiedzialność społeczna, społeczno-wyborczy profil, „Manifesto Project”, Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia.

Immediately in advance of and after the collapse of the USSR and the regimes of the so-called “real socialism” in the post-socialistic countries of Central-Eastern Europe (which at that time were referred to as Eastern European countries) appeared a great variety of new political parties, which strongly criticized the socialist system of social relationship. As to their ideological positioning one could single out: liberal, conservative, social-democratic, Christian-democratic, nationalistic, ethnic, agrarian etc. Special place among the, is occupied by

the phenomenon of agrarian political parties, as in some countries of the region they were functioning during the interwar period and till the collapse of socialist regimes, but in most cases they appeared in late 80s – early 90s of the 20th century¹. Thus, appeal to the agrarian parties' experience in formation, functioning, social justification and replenishment (i.e. social component of ideology) and their electoral successes make one of the tasks in the kaleidoscope of events of party-electoral politics in Central-Eastern European countries.

Before we start analyzing the problem, it is necessary to comprehend some theoretical and methodological nuances. The main is that, a political party is determined as a voluntary and organizationally regulated unity of citizens, which represents interests of certain social groups of people, has a program of social development and acts on the basis of corresponding ideology to achieve/realize political power. Therefore, the social component of any political party's ideology, which can be successfully evaluated in the light of party's electoral success, is the social base, social questions and social responsibility of political parties. These are those perspectives of the political party's activity, which, on the basis of ideology, directly connect voters (social environment of the party) and electoral result (institutionalized environment of the party). They can be described in the form of the following relationships: between the society in general and the political party, which supports interests of a separate social sphere (appeal to the social base of party's activity); between the party masses (electorate) and the party apparatus (appeal to the social issues, which show whether the party executes social demands of its voters); between the party apparatus and a part of the party, which in case of election win holds high offices (appeal to the social responsibility of the party before its party masses and party apparatus). These components are summing up into a social constituent/social infrastructure of the political party's ideology, evaluation of which answers the question how the party and party system successfully accumulate and implement current social interests. In this case it is obvious that the social base of the party's ideology makes the grounds for party's transformation in power structures (first of all into government and parliament parties); social issues of party's ideology are those social problems, for solving which parties participate in the political process, in particular in the sphere of program-creative activity, electoral participation and possible governing of the party; social responsibility for party's ideology means readiness of the parties to take responsibility for nonfulfillment social and other liabilities before their voters (first of all in the mentioned case it is worth appealing to the categories of government parties, which are politically responsible before their electorate and the whole country), on the basis of which the ideological positioning of parties in the system is changing, and the furthestmost political success of the parties depends namely on these factors.

The combination of social components of the political party's ideology is accompanied by distinguishing social functions of political parties. First of all, it means: representation of

¹ A. Batory, N. Sitter, *Cleavages, competition and coalition building: Agrarian parties and the European question in Western and East Central Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, s. 523–546.

interests of various social groups of citizens; contribution to satisfy their interests; extension of the party's social base; social integration and smoothing over differences in the society; political socialization of a personality; realization of social initiatives and work with youth; implementation of interaction between authoritative institutions and institutions of a civil society; ensuring of connection between the people and state institutions and strengthening of control over their activity and activity of a party. Electoral successes, social component of ideology and social functions of the party are interrelated categories, evaluation of which can be named thorough, only when it is both successive and parallel.

Next theoretical and methodological nuance in the context of evaluation of electoral success and social constituent of agrarian parties' programs and activities is a scientific comprehension of agrarianism as philosophy and ideology of some political forces. The notion of "agrarianism" acquires two meanings. According to the first one, agrarianism is social or political philosophy, which appraises agricultural society as those which surpasses an urban one as well as evaluates independent farmers as those who exceed employees. Within the limits of this philosophy, farming is considered as a way of life, capable of creating ideal social values². Therefore, agrarianism prefers a simple rural life to a complicated life in a city. According to the second meaning agrarianism means political proposals, concerning land redistribution, especially redistribution (from rich people) in favor of poor and landless people³. The latter definition of agrarianism is also known as an "agrarian reform"⁴.

In due time social and philosophical, political and ideological principles of agrarianism were proposed by T. Inge⁵, who determined agrarianism by means of the following basic mutual correlations as: rural economy is a single occupation, which ensures complete independence and self-sustainability; urban life, capitalism and technologies demolish independence and dignity, conniving at weaknesses; farming society (with its genius of labor and cooperation community) is a standard society; farmers have firm and stable world views, as they have a sense of historical and religious traditions, sense of appliance to a certain family, religion, which psychologically and culturally beneficial, harmony of a farmer's/peasant's life resists the intentions of the modern fragmented/alienated community; land cultivation "has positive spiritual welfare in it", due to which farming acquires virtues of honor, courage, self-confidence, moral integrity and hospitality (this is the result of a direct contact with the nature, and through nature it has direct and close relations with God, that is why a landowner imitates the example of God, who

² P. Thompson, *Interview Eighteen*, [w:] R. Raffaele, W. Robinson, E. Selinger (eds.), *Sustainability Ethics: 5 Questions*, Wyd. Automatic Press 2010.; T. Govan, *Agrarian and Agrarianism: A Study in the Use and Abuse of Words*, "Journal of Southern History" 1964, vol 30, nr 1, s. 35–47.; T. Brass, *Peasants, Populism and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian Myth*, Wyd. Psychology Press 2000.; T. Brass, *Class, Culture and the Agrarian Myth*, Wyd. BRILL 2014.; T. Inge, *Agrarianism in American Literature*, Wyd. Odyssey Press 1969.; P. Quinn, *Agrarianism and the Jeffersonian Philosophy*, "Review of Politics" 1940, vol 2, nr 1, s. 87–104.; P. Thompson, T. Hilde, *The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism*, Wyd. Vanderbilt University Press 2000.; P. Sorokin, C. Zimmerman, C. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology: vol 1*, Wyd. University of Minnesota Press 1930, s. 1–146.

³ H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68*, Wyd. Routledge 2013.

⁴ T. Mulhall, *The State and Agrarian Reform: The Case of Ireland 1800-1940*, Wyd. University of London 1993.

⁵ T. Inge, *Agrarianism in American Literature*, Wyd. Odyssey Press 1969.

puts chaos in order)⁶. The above described principles and correlations of agrarianism create the social basis and social constituent of nearly all agrarian parties' programs and activities, in particular in Central-Eastern European countries (both historical and modern agrarian parties), with the exception of those political parties, which do not have ideology of agrarianism as the initial one (see below in detail).

Taking into consideration all theoretical and methodological peculiarities of investigation of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries allows working out its logic/tasks. One of the tasks of the research is to analyze particular qualities of uprising and development of agrarian parties, as well as their electoral and governmental successes in parliamentary democracies of Central-Eastern Europe (and also their predecessors). Another task is to compare and amplify the findings obtained as a result of the previous task with the peculiarities of the social dimensions of ideological positioning of agrarian parties in the regions. According to the above-mentioned logic and tasks, it is offered to carry out analysis in the format of single case methods' synthesis and regional comparison.

Starting to solve the tasks of the research, first of all we argue that in the party-ideological context philosophy of agrarianism is quite actual, namely in Central-Eastern European countries, as the first European agrarian parties appeared there⁷. These are the cases of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia. Thus, in 1899 in Bulgaria the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (Bălgarski Zemedelski Narodni Săjuz, BZNS) was established with the aim to resist taxation/creation of cooperatives, and which in 1919 came to power and implemented a number of economic, social and legislative reforms⁸. During the period of "real socialism" the BZNS acted as a communist marionette⁹. The situation has changed only after 1989, when it was reorganized into an independent party. In Romania the first agrarian-oriented party appeared in 1919. It was the National Peasants' Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc, PNT), which united the oldest parties of Transylvania, Moldova and Walachia¹⁰. The party was liquidated by communists in 1947, but it was renewed and underwent reorganization in 1989. In Poland during the period of the "real socialism" regime, in particular over 1949-1989, existed the puppet party the United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL), which was a permanent satellite of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR). In Serbia in late 19th – early 20th century (precisely in 1904) the so-called Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS) was established and functioned. It had strong nationalistic disposition, due to which it soon changed into the nationalistic

⁶ D. Eliot, *A companion to world philosophies*, Wyd. Wiley Blackwell 1999, s. 183.

⁷ F. Gross, *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*, Wyd. Philosophical Library, s. 391–481.; F. Merlan, *Tracking Rural Change: Community, Policy and Technology in Australia, New Zealand and Europe*, Wyd. ANU E Press 2009.; P. Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660: Volume I, Agrarian and Urban Rebellions: Society, States and Early Modern Revolution*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1982.

⁸ J. Bell, *Peasants in Power: Aleksander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 1899-1923*, Wyd. Princeton 1977.

⁹ N. Oren, *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1973.

¹⁰ H. Roberts, *Romania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1951.

party, which represented Croatian people in Yugoslavian/Serbian parliaments¹¹. On the other hand, Estonian, Latvian and Czechoslovakian agrarian parties represented solely rural interests in their national parliaments, and because of that they gained stronger political positions and became reliable partners in many coalitional governments. However, in Estonia and Latvia in 1930s namely agrarian parties formed the foundation for the authoritarian regimes, when political systems of these countries failed to cope with economic crises and competition on the part of right extremism¹².

One of the most conspicuous was the history of agrarian parties in Czechoslovakia. The most famous one – the Republican Party of Agricultural and Smallholder People (Republikánská strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu, RSZML), appeared in 1899, often was a leading partner in coalition governments¹³, and its leader A. Svehla was Prime Minister for a couple of times¹⁴. In Czech the party was established under the initial name the Czech Agrarian Party (Česká strana agrární, CSA), and in Slovakia (since 1904) was known as the Czech Agrarian Party for Moravia and Silesia (Česká strana agrární pro Moravu a Slezsko, CSAMS). In 1905 these two parties were combined into the Czech-Slavic Agrarian Party (Československá strana agrární, CSSA)¹⁵, which only in 1919 was renamed into the Republican Party of Agricultural and Smallholder People, and in 1922 became known as the Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants (RSZML). Routinely it was called the “Agrarian Party” (“agrárníci”), and to attract votes of the middle class representatives, the party left its boundaries of a “basic” agrarian ideology¹⁶. It managed to do that, as in 1920–1935 the RSZML traditionally received a high rate of electoral support at the elections: for instance, in 1920 – 9,7%, in 1925 – 13,7%, in 1930 – 15,0%, in 1935 – 14,3%. As a result, the “Agrarian Party” was a member of all coalitional cabinets in Czechoslovakia during the interwar period, and its representatives were Prime-Ministers in these governments during 1922–1938. Along with it, in Czechoslovakia since 1905 existed the so-called German Agrarian Party (Deutsche Agrarpartei, DAP), which at some parliamentary elections was rather successful¹⁷. Much weaker were positions of such Czechoslovakian agrarian parties as the Czechoslovak Peasant Unity (Československá rolnická jednota, CSRJ), which appeared in 1919, and the Czechoslovak Agrarian and Conservative Party (Československá strana agrární a konzervativní, CSSAK),

¹¹ R. Livingston, *Stjepan Radic and the Croat Peasant party 1904-1929*, Wyd. Harvard University 1959; M. Biondich, *Stjepan Radic, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928*, Toronto 2000.

¹² M. Small, *The Czechoslovakian republican Party of Smallholders and Farmers 1918-1938*, Wyd. Pennsylvania State University 1973, s. 9; A. Palecke, *The Rise and Fall of the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party*, “East European Quarterly” 1971, vol 2, nr 5, s. 177–201.

¹³ V. Hloušek, L. Kopeček, *Konfliktní demokracie. Moderní masová politika ve střední Evropě*, Wyd. Masarykova univerzita 2004.

¹⁴ J. Malíř, *Systém politických stran v českých zemích do roku 1918*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 17–57.

¹⁵ J. Rokoský, *Agrární strana*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 415–420.

¹⁶ A. Kubricht, *The Czech Agrarian Party, 1899-1914: a study of national and economic agitation in the Habsburg monarchy*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 1974; S. Rivera, *Historical cleavages or transition mode? Influences on the emerging party systems in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia*, “Party Politics” 1996, vol 2, nr 2, s. 177–208.

¹⁷ J. Šebek, *Německé politické strany v českých zemích*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 476.

which was established in 1925. The same relates to the agrarian parties of national minorities in Czechoslovakia, among them one can name: the German Union of Peasants (Bund der Landwirte, BL) and the Sudetengerman Union of Countryside (Sudetendeutscher Landbund, SDL)¹⁸. All Czechoslovakian agrarian parties were prohibited during and after the WW2¹⁹, and their electorate, in its majority, started to support the Communist party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). As a result of this, the whole agrarian philosophical and political component was constantly and officially expelling during 40 years of the “real socialism” regime from Czechoslovakian political life, and it eventually specified general weakness of agrarian parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the collapse of the USSR and the system of the “Warsaw Pact”²⁰, as well as Czechoslovakia dissolution (what will be mentioned afterwards).

The specificity of agrarian parties’ development in the region (in the countries they were native to) at that time was the fact that usually they were influential, but not marionette political structures. For instance, it resulted in formation of the so-called “Green Internationalism” or the International Agrarian Bureau, which included agrarian parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Serbia²¹. This interparty structure functioned as an informational center, which spread ideology and philosophy of agrarianism, but resisted radical demonstrations of socialism and conservatism. It is often believed, that the social grounds and program basis of agrarian parties during the interwar period in Central-Eastern Europe were represented by the philosophy of the Czechoslovakian Republican Party of Agricultural and Smallholder People (RSZML). Its program basis was founded on the principles and ideas of agrarianism. In particular, the “core” of the party’s philosophy was the idea and image of a peasant as a “breadwinner of the whole nation”²², who supports national development of the country. That is why, agrarian parties at the same time were conservatively oriented, i.e. mainly right-of-center. As a result, interwar agrarian parties in Central-Eastern Europe traditionally had well-developed organizational structures, as they had a great number of ideological satellites and they were influential in the midst of various agrarian companies²³,

¹⁸ J. Šebek, *Politické strany německé menšiny*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 881–885.

¹⁹ J. Pecka, *The Czech Resistance, the Party System and Party Allegiance during World War II*, [w:] D. Paton (ed.), *The Prague Yearbook of Contemporary History 1998*, Wyd. Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 1999, s. 69.

²⁰ M. Trapl, *Politické strany v exilu*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. II díl. Období 1938-1961*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 1333–1356.

²¹ F. Merlan, *Tracking Rural Change: Community, Policy and Technology in Australia, New Zealand and Europe*, Wyd. ANU E Press 2009.

²² J. Hama, *Republikánská strana*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. I díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 556.

²³ First and the most influential agrarian parties were formed in the Scandinavian countries. The common feature for Central-Eastern European and Scandinavian countries was the fact that in late 19th – early 20th century there wasn’t many highly-developed cities, and as a result, “agrarian proletariat” predominated. Agrarian parties appeared as a reaction towards the process of modernization, defending the interests of peasants against old and new urban classes. They opposed rapid industrialization and emphasized traditional values. That is why (as it is mentioned below) agrarian parties during the interwar period were very often conservatively-oriented. For further detail, see: J. Rothschild, N. Wigfield, *Return to Diversity*, Wyd. OUP 2000, s. 11–14.; M. Spinner, *Continuity and Change: Adaptation Strategies of Agrarian Parties in Scandinavia and Central Eastern Europe Compared*, Wyd. GRIN Verlag 2007.; J. Eellend, *Agrarianism and Modernization in Inter-War Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Södertörn University College 2008.; D. Warriner, *Economics of Peasant Farming*, London 1964, s. 19.

including international ones²⁴. Even despite this, it is quite notable that in all Central-Eastern European countries, where during the interwar period agrarian parties were formed and were successfully developing, they (the parties) became the result of the society's incorporation of transition political regimes – not consolidated democracies and not autocracies, not urbanized or modernized, not backward regimes and so on.

During the communistic period of Central-Eastern European countries' development, agrarian parties, as a rule, made the exceptions in the party-political spectrum. Their reincarnation, as well as revival of agrarian ideology in general in the region, started only in late 80s-early 90s of the 20th century, but in different Central-Eastern European countries it occurred in different ways. Consequently, in 1990s – 2000s agrarian parties have been formed in many ways and gained various electoral successes in different countries of the region, but not simultaneously. Before we analyze electoral successes and misfortunes of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries and divide them in accordance with the parameters of their ideological positioning, it is necessary to name all agrarian parties in the countries of the region. In Bulgaria in 1990–2015 the following agrarian parties have been functioning: the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (Bŭlgarski Zemedelski Narodn Sŭyuz, BZNS), the Agrarian People's Union (Zemedelski Narodn Sŭyuz, ZNS), the United Agrarians (Obedyneny zemedeltsy, OZ), the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union „Nikola Petkov“ (Balgarski Zemedelski Narodn Suyuz „Nikola Petkov“), the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“ (Balgarski Zemedelski Narodn Suyuz „Alexandar Stamboliyski“, BZNS-AS), and the Agrarian Union „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“ (Zemedelski sayuz „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“, ZS-AS). They were formed (or renewed as historical one) both in 1990s, and in 2000s. The same temporal logic of agrarian party formation is inherent to the Baltic countries, where the abovementioned political forces were formed both in early 90s of the 20th century, and at the beginning of the 21st century, especially in Lithuania, where the majority of agrarian parties appeared after 2001. Among the examples of agrarian parties in these countries are: in Estonia – the Union of Farmers (Pöllumeeste Kogu, PK), the Estonian Rural Centre Party (Eesti Maa-Keskerakond, EMK), the Estonian Country Union (Eesti Maaliit, EM), the Estonian Farmers Party (Eesti Talurahva Erakond, ETE), the Estonian Democratic Justice Union (Eesti Demokraatlik Ōigusliit, EDOL); the Estonian Pensioners' and Families' Union (Eesti Pensionäride ja Perede Liit, EPPL), the Estonian Party of Pensioners and Families (Eesti Pensionäride ja Perede Erakond, EPPE), the Estonian Country People's Party (Eesti Maarahva Erakond, EME); the People's Union of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvaliit, ERa), the Conservative People's Party (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE); in Latvia – the Farmers Union of Latvia (Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība, LZS), the Union of Latvian Farmers (Latviesu Zemnieku Savienība,

²⁴ J. Hama, Republikánská strana, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vŭvoj politických stran a bmutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. 1 díl. Období 1861-1938*, Wŭd. Doplněk 2005, s. 586–587.

LZ), the Green and Farmers' Union (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, ZZS); in Lithuania – the Lithuanian Peasant Party (Lietuvos valstiečių partija, LVP), the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga, LVLS), the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga, LVŽS), the Liberal and Centre Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga, LiCS)²⁵.

In Croatia such agrarian parties as the Croatian Democratic Peasant Party (Hrvatska demokratska seljačka stranka, HDSS), the Croatian Peasant's People's Party (Hrvatska seljačka narodna stranka, HSNS) and the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS), were formed only in late 80s – early 90s of the 20th century. The same tendency can be observed among Czech and Slovakian (as well as Czechoslovakian) agrarian parties, which appeared only in the mid of 1990s. We are referring to such political forces as: the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemědělská, ČSSZ), the Republican Party of Czechoslovakian Countryside (Republikánská strana československého venkova, RSČV), the Czechoslovakian Urban and Rural Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemědělská měst a venkova, ČSZMV), the Free Peasants' Party (Svobodná rolnická strana, SRS), the Party of the Czech Countryside (Strana českého venkova, SČV), the Party of Moravian Countryside (Strana moravského venkova, SMV), the Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenectví zemedelcu a venkova, SZV), the Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenestvo poľnohospodárov a vidieka, SPV), the Peasant Party of Slovakia (Rolnícká strana Slovenska, RSS), the Movement of Peasants of Slovakia (Hnutie poľnohospodárov Slovenska, HPS), and the New Agrarian Party (Nová agrárna strana, NAS). Similar logic is native to the agrarian parties in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. Among them one can name: in Hungary – the Agrarian Alliance – National Agrarian Party (Agrárszövetség – Nemzeti Agrár Párt, ASZ), the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt, FKgP); in Poland – the United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL), the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), the Peasants Agreement (Porozumenie Ludowe, PL), the Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SRP); in Romania – the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (Partidul Democrat Agrar din România, PDAR), the Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat, PNT-CD); in Slovenia – the Slovenian Peasant Union (Slovenska kmečka zveza, SKZ), the Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS) (for more detailed information, see Table 1).

²⁵ A. Batory, N. Sitter, *Cleavages, competition and coalition building: Agrarian parties and the European question in Western and East Central Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, s. 523–546.

Table 1. Agrarian parties, their ideological positioning and electoral success in parliamentary democracies in Central-Eastern Europe (1990–2015)²⁶

Party	Year of party establishment	Party's ideological positioning	Position on the left-right ideological spectrum (0=Max left, 10=Max right)	Participation in parliamentary elections, number of times; years of elections (percentage of votes/number of mandates)	Participation in the elections to the European parliament, number of times; years of elections (percentage of votes / number of mandates)	Party membership in governments or party's positioning itself as a governmental one, number of times; years	Voters support level
Bulgaria							
BZNS	1899 (1990)	Right-of-center, agrarian	5,5	5: 1991 (3,9/0), 1994 (7,5/18), 1997 (k/+), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+)	–	2: 1995–1997 (k), 1997–2001	Middle / Falling
ZNS	2006	Right-of-center, agrarian, conservatism	5,5	2: 2009 (k/+), 2014 (k/+)	3: 2007 (1,5/0), 2009 (2,3/0), 2014 (k/-)	–	Low / Falling
OZ	2008	Right-of-center, agrarian, conservatism	5,5	–	–	–	Low / Falling
BZNS-NP	1990	Left-of-center, agrarian	4,5	2: 1991 (3,4/0), 1997 (k/-)	–	–	Low / Falling
BZNS-AS	1993	Left ideology, agrarian, progressivism	4,0	4: 1994 (k/+), 1997 (k/+), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+)	–	–	Low / Falling
ZS-AS	2005	Left ideology, agrarian, progressivism	5,3	2: 2009 (k/+), 2014 (k/+)	3: 2007 (k/-), 2009 (k/-), 2014 (k/-)	–	Low / Falling

²⁶ Legend: k – a part of electoral coalition, to provide support to government coalition or as a government coalition without parliamentary mandates; “+” – if it is represented in the parliament; “-” – if it is not represented in the parliament; BZNS – Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (Bŭlgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sŭyuz); ZNS – Agrarian People's Union (Zemedelski Naroden Sŭyuz); OZ – United Agrarians (Obedinyeni zemedeltsy); BZNS-NP – Bulgarian Agrarian National Union „Nikola Petkov“ (Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sŭyuz „Nikola Petkov“); BZNS-AS – Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“ (Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sŭyuz „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“); ZS-AS – Agrarian Union „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“ (Zemedelski savez „Aleksandar Stamboliyski“); HDSS – Croatian Democratic Peasant Party (Hrvatska demokratska seljaska stranka); HSNS – Croatian Peasant's People's Party (Hrvatska seljaska narodna stranka); HSS – Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljaska stranka); CSSZ – Czechoslovak Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemedelská); RSCV – Republican Party of Czechoslovakian Countryside (Republikánská strana československého venkova); ČSZMV – Czechoslovakian Urban and Rural Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemedelská měst a venkova); SRS – Free Peasants Party (Svobodná rolnická strana); SCV – Party of the Czech Countryside (Strana českého venkova); SMV – Party of Moravian Countryside (Strana moravského venkova); SZV – Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenectví zemedelcu a venkova); PK – Union of Farmers (Pöllumeeste Kogu); EMK – Estonian Rural Centre Party (Eesti Maa-Keskerakond); EM – Estonian Country Union (Eesti Maaliit); ETE – Estonian Farmers Party (Eesti Talurahva Erakond); EDOL – Estonian Democratic Justice Union (Eesti Demokraatlik Oigulsiit); EPLP – Estonian Pensioners' and Families' Union (Eesti Pensionäride ja Perete Liit); EPPE – Estonian Party of Pensioners and Families (Eesti Pensionäride ja Perete Erakond); EME – Estonian Country People's Party (Eesti Maarahva Erakond); ERA – People's Union of Estonia (Eestiraa Rahvaliid); EKRE – Conservative People's Party (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond); ASZ – Agrarian Alliance – National Agrarian Party (Agricultors' – Nemzeti Agrár Part); FKGP – Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Part); LZS – Farmers Union of Latvia (Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība); LZ – Union of Latvian Farmers (Latviesu Zemnieku Savienība); ZZS – Green and Farmers Union (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība); LVP – Lithuanian Peasant Party (Lietuvos valstiečių partija); LVLS – Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga); LVZS – Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga); LiCS – Liberal and Centre Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga); ZSL – United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe); PSL – Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe); PL – Peasants Agreement (Porozumienie Ludowe); SRP – Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej); PDAR – Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (Partidul Democrat Agrar din România); PNT-CD – Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat); SPV – Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenectvo polnohospodárov a vidieka); RSS – Peasant Party of Slovakia (Rolnícká strana Slovenska); HPS – Movement of Peasants of Slovakia (Hnutie polnohospodárov Slovenska); NAS – New Agrarian Party (Nová agrárna strana); SKZ – Slovenian Peasant Union (Slovenska kmečka zveza); SLS – Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka).

Croatia						
HDSS	1994	Centrism, agrarian, conservatism	5,3	1: 2003 (1,0/1)	-	Low/ Falling
HSNS	-	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 2000 (1,4/0)	-	Absent/ Falling
HSS	1904 (1989)	Right-of-center, agrarian,	6,2	6: 1992 (4,3/3), 1995 (18,3/10), 2000 (15,6/17), 2003 (7,3/10), 2007 (6,4/6), 2011 (0,6/1)	2: 2013 (3,9/0), 2014 (k/+)	Middle/ Falling 6: 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011
Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia)						
ČSZ	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
RSCV	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
ČSZMV	1989	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
SRS	1989	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
SCV	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
SMV	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (k/-)	-	Absent/ Falling
SZV	1989	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (4,1/0)	-	Absent/ Falling
Estonia						
PK	1921 (1992)	Left ideology, agrarian	2,2	2: 1992 (2,9/0), 1995 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
EMK	1990	Centrism, agrarian, social-democracy	5,6	2: 1992 (k/+), 1995 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
EM	1991	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	2: 1995 (k/+), 1999 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
ETE	1994	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1995 (1,5/0)	-	Low/ Falling
EDOL	1991	Centrism, agrarian, pensionary ideas	5,3	-	-	Low/ Falling
EPPL	1994	Centrism, agrarian, pensionary ideas	5,3	1: 1995 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
EPPE	1997	Centrism, agrarian, pensionary ideas	5,3	1: 1999 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
EME	1994	Centrism, agrarian	4,6	2: 1995 (k/+), 1999 (7,3/7)	-	Middle/ Raising
ERa	2000	Centrism, agrarian	4,6	3: 2003 (13,0/13), 2007 (7,1/6), 2011 (2,1/0)	2: 2003-2005, 2005-2007 2: 2004 (8,0/0), 2009 (2,2/0)	Middle/ Falling
EKRE	2012	Centrism, agrarian, conservatism	4,6	1: 2015 (8,2/7)	1: 2014 (4,0/0)	Middle/ Raising

Hungary						
ASZ	1989	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	2: 1990 (3,1/2), 1994 (2,1/1), 1998 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
FKgP	1908 (1988)	Right ideology, Hungarian nationalism, national-conservatism, agrarian	9,0	7: 1990 (1,7/44), 1994 (7,8/26), 1998 (13,8/48), 2002 (0,8/0), 2006 (2,2/0), 2010 (0,0/0), 2014 (0,2/0)	-	Low/ Falling
Latvia						
LZS	1917 (1991)	Left-of-center, agrarian	4,4	5: 1993 (10,7/12), 1995 (k/+), 1998 (2,5/0), 2002 (k/+), 2006 (k/+)	-	Low/ Falling
LZ	1994	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1995 (1,4/0)	-	Low/ Falling
ZS	2002	Centrism, agrarian, ecological conservatism, Euroscepticism	5,3	5: 2002 (9,4/12), 2006 (16,7/18), 2010 (20,1/22), 2011 (12,2/13), 2014 (19,5/21)	3: 2004 (4,3/0), 2009 (3,7/0), 2014 (8,3/1)	High/ Raising
Lithuania						
LVP	1990	Left ideology, agrarian	2,6	2: 1996 (1,8/1), 2000 (4,1/4)	-	Middle/ Raising
LVS	2001	Left-of-center, agrarian	3,3	2: 2004 (6,6/10), 2008 (3,7/3)	2: 2004 (7,4/1), 2009 (1,9/0)	Middle/ Falling
LVZS	2012	Left-of-center, agrarian, environmentalism	3,3	1: 2012 (3,9/1)	1: 2014 (6,6/1)	Middle/ Raising
LCS	2003	Right ideology, conservative liberalism, agrarian	7,8	3: 2004 (9,2/18), 2008 (5,3/8), 2012 (2,1/0)	3: 2004 (11,2/2), 2009 (3,5/0), 2014 (1,5/0)	Middle/ Falling
Poland						
ZSL	1949	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1989 (7,6)	-	Middle/ Falling
PSL	1990	Centrism, agrarian, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	4,2	7: 1991 (8,7/48), 1993 (15,4/132), 1997 (7,3/27), 2001 (9,0/42), 2005 (7,0/25), 2007 (8,9/31), 2011 (8,4/28)	3: 2004 (6,3/4), 2009 (7,0/3), 2014 (6,8/4)	Middle/ Stable
PL	1991	Left-of-center, agrarian, Christian democracy	3,3	3: 1991 (6,5/28), 1993 (2,4/0), 1997 (k/+)	-	Middle/ Falling
SRP	1992	Centrism, agrarian, populism, economic nationalism, social-conservatism	4,0	6: 1993 (2,8/0), 1997 (0,1/0), 2001 (10,2/53), 2005 (11,4/56), 2007 (1,5/0), 2011 (0,1/0)	3: 2004 (10,8/6), 2009 (1,5/0), 2014 (0,0/0)	Low/ Falling
Romania						
PDAR	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,6	2: 1990 (1,8/9), 1992 (3,0/0)	-	Low/ Falling

PNT-CD	1976 (1989)	Centrism, agrarian, Christian democracy, monarchism, liberalism	5,5	6: 1990 (2,6/12), 1992 (k/+), 1996 (k/+), 2000 (5,0/0), 2004 (1,8/0), 2012 (k/+)	2: 2007 (1,4/0), 2009 (1,5/0)	3: 1996–1998, 1998–1999, 1999–2000	Low / Falling
Slovakia (Czechoslovakia)							
SPV	1990	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1990 (2,5/0)	–	–	Low / Falling
RSS	1992	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1992 (k/-)	–	–	Low / Falling
HPS	1992	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	1: 1992 (k/-)	–	–	Low / Falling
NAS	1994	Centrism, agrarian	5,3	–	–	–	Low / Falling
Slovenia							
SKZ	1988	Right-of-center, conservatism, agrarian, Christian democracy	6,7	1: 1990 (12,6/11)	–	1: 1990–1992	High / Falling
SLS	1992	Right-of-center, conservatism, agrarian, Christian democracy	6,7	7: 1992 (8,7/10), 1996 (19,4/19), 2000 (9,5/9), 2004 (6,8/7), 2008 (5,2/5), 2011 (6,8/6), 2014 (4,0/0)	3: 2004 (8,4/0), 2009 (3,6/0), 2014 (k/+)	7: 1990–1992, 1997–2000, 2000, 2000– 2002, 2002–2004, 2004–2008, 2012–2013	Middle/ Falling

Źródło: D. Almeida, *The Impact of European Integration on Political Parties: Beyond the Permissive Consensus*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2012.; E. Bakke, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.; E. Bakke, *20 Years since the fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. BWV Verlag 2011.; R. Bakker, C. de Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Romy, M. Steenbergen, M. Vachudova, *Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010*, „Party Politics” 2012.; K. Benoit, M. Laver, *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.; J. Bugajski, *Political parties of Eastern Europe: a guide to politics in the post-communist era*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 2002.; J.-M. De Waele, A. Paczesniak, *The Europeanisation of Poland's political parties and party system: Europeanisation and Party Politics*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2012.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParliGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://www.parligov.org/> (odczyt: 01.10.2015).; S. Hanley, A. Szczeciński, T. Haughton, B. Fowler, *Explaining Comparative Centre-Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe*, „Party Politics” 2008, vol. 14, nr 4, s. 407–434.; J. Haynes, A. Hennig, *Religious Actors in the Public Sphere: Means, Objectives, and Effects*, Wyd. Routledge 2013.; V. Hloušek, L. Kopeteck, *Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East-Central and Western Europe Compared*, Wyd. Ashgate 2010.; L. Hooghe, *Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning*, „European Journal of Political Research” 2010, vol. 49, nr 5, s. 687–703.; T. Jansen, S. Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party*, Wyd. Springer 2011.; S. Jungestam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 2006.; H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bana, J. Budge, M. McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.; P. Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2000.; J. Magone, *Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2010.; J. Maier, *Europa World Year Book 2*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2004.; W. Nordšiek, A. Ramonaite, *Parties and Elections in Europe: The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe*, Źródło: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/> (odczyt: 01.10.2015).; K. Paszkiewicz, *Partie i koalicje polityczne III Rzeczypospolitej*, Wd. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2004.; J. Peters, *20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany*, Wyd. BWV Verlag 2011.; R. Rose, N. Munro, *Parties and Elections in New European Democracies*, Wyd. ECPR Press 2009.; L. Stan, *From Riches to Rags: The Romanian National Christian Democrat Peasant Party*, „East European Quarterly” 2005, vol. 39, nr 2, s. 179–227.; M. Steenbergen, G. Marks, *Evaluating expert judgments*, „European Journal of Political Research” 2007, vol. 46, nr 3, s. 347–366.; T. Zayzacki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2014.

Summing up, we can observe (for more detailed information, see Table 1), that the majority of agrarian parties were formed in early 90s of the 20th century, and only some of them appeared in 2000s and 2010s. Among the countries, where such parties emerged in 80s of the 20th century, i.e. where the parties appeared first are Croatia, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Among the countries, where agrarian parties were established mainly in 2000s, i.e. the latest one is Lithuania. In Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia agrarian parties appeared both in 1990s and in 2000s. The highest frequency of agrarian parties' formation was peculiar of Bulgaria (6 parties), Czech (especially in Czechoslovakia – 7 parties), Estonia (10 parties). However, it is quite notable, that high frequency of agrarian parties' formation is connected with their low electoral successes, and repeated renaming of the agrarian parties. The average frequency of agrarian parties' formation is inherent to Croatia (3 parties), Latvia (3 parties), Poland (4 parties) and Slovakia (4 parties), and the low frequency is peculiar of Hungary (2 parties), Romania (2 parties) and Slovenia (2 parties). In this light, it is of great interest that lowering of frequency of agrarian parties' formation does not directly influence their electoral successes.

The reason for such a frequent formation of agrarian parties in some Central-Eastern European countries and, at the same time, their low electoral support is policy of peasants' collectivization, which took place during the “real socialism” regime, and led to creation of an influential layer of peasants (though not farmers) as an autonomous and confident part of a society. But despite this, the processes of decreasing the number of people involved into rural economy as well as general depopulation of rural country²⁷ were native to the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. The exception is Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic countries, where the following agrarian parties have been or still are rather influential: the People's Union of Estonia (ERa), the Conservative People's Party (EKRE), the Green and Farmers' Union (ZZS), the Lithuanian Peasant Party (LVP), the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (LVLS), the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (LVŽS), the Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS), the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), the Slovenian People's Party (SLS). It is quite notable, that these are mainly parties from the countries, where agrarian political forces are formed with a low or an intermediate frequency²⁸. It should be also mentioned, that during the interwar period agrarian parties existed in nearly all of them, and however they did not always receive great electoral support.

The opposite tendency was peculiar of Czech and Slovakia (and of Czechoslovakia during the last years of its existence). The specific characteristic of these countries was the fact that agrarian parties are the weakest among all modern Central-Eastern European countries. It

²⁷ L. Kopeček, *Politické strany na Slovensku 1989-2006*, Wyd. Centrum pro stadium demokracie a kultury 2007, s. 97.

²⁸ B. Szajkowski, *Poland*, [w:] B. Szajkowski (ed.), *Political Parties of the World*, Wyd. John Harper Publishing 2005, s. 479–485; P. Fiala, P. Suchý, *Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová*, [w:] J. Malíř, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Výchov politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. II. díl. Období 1938-2004*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 1433–1453; M. Grün, K. Stankiewicz, *Spielarten des polnischen Rechtsradikalismus – die Liga der polnischen Familien und die Selbstverteidigung in ihrem politischen Umfeld*, [w:] M. Minkenberg, D. Sucker, A. Wenninger (eds.), *Radikale Rechte und Fremdeindlichkeit in Deutschland und Polen. Nationale und europäische Perspektiven*, Wyd. Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften 2006, s. 170–199; T. Thieme, *Politischer Extremismus in Ostmitteleuropa – Entstehungsbedingungen und Erscheinungsformen*, [w:] U. Backes, E. Jesse (eds.), *Gefährdungen der Freiheit. Extremistische Ideologien im Vergleich*, Wyd. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, s. 321–358.

is greatly stipulated by the policy of the USSR regime, aimed at forcing out their ideological opponents during the postwar period. The point is that, over the interwar period, as it was mentioned above, agrarian party's ideology was quite popular in Czechoslovakia, and due to this it threatened the regime of "real socialism" in the country. Therefore, at first after the collapse of the USSR and the "Warsaw Pact", and after formation of Czech and Slovakia (dissolution of Czechoslovakia) the intensive attempts to return to the agrarian ideology were made. It could be clearly seen in formation of a number of agrarian-oriented parties and blocs. Among them there were: the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemědělská, ČSSZ), the Republican Party of Czechoslovakian Countryside (Republikánská strana československého venkova, RSČV), the Czechoslovakian Urban and Rural Agrarian Party (Československá strana zemědělská měst a venkova, ČSZMV), the Free Peasants' Party (Svobodná rolnická strana, SRS), the Party of the Czech Countryside (Strana českého venkova, SČV), the Party of Moravian Countryside (Strana moravského venkova, SMV), the Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenectví zemedelcu a venkova, SZV), the Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside (Spojenstvo poľnohospodárov a vidieka, SPV), the Peasant Party of Slovakia (Rolnícká strana Slovenska, RSS), the Movement of Peasants of Slovakia (Hnutie poľnohospodárov Slovenska, HPS) and the New Agrarian Party (Nová agrárna strana, NAS). However, all of them failed in the electoral context, and as a result in the mid 90s of the 20th century, the attempts to revive agrarian ideology in Czech and Slovakia were ceased and have not been renewed yet²⁹.

Naming these two groups of countries, where agrarian parties were successful or unsuccessful, makes us speak in detail about parameters of agrarian parties' electoral results, in particular at the level of the national parliaments, European parliament and national governments. General (in other words prevailing) tendency towards the electoral effectiveness of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries shows that these parties are extremely unrepresentative. It means that they very rarely manage to enter their national parliaments or the European parliament, not to mention the processes of government formation. The comparative analysis of agrarian parties' electoral successes in parliamentary democracies in Central-Eastern Europe during 1990-2015 affirms the following: 1) in 1990s they were represented in the national parliaments of Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia; 2) in 2000s they were represented in the national parliaments of Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia; 3) after 2004/2007 and 2013 they were not represented in the European parliament, except agrarian parties of Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia (while half of them entered it not on the basis of individual participation in the elections, but on the grounds of electoral coalitions); 4) during 1990–2015 they did not take part in government formation processes in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

²⁹ L. Kopeček, Strana zelených, [w:] J. Malíš, P. Marek (eds.), *Politické strany. Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. II. díl. Období 1938-2004*, Wyd. Doplněk 2005, s. 1579–1591.

Romania and Slovenia, though they positioned themselves as predominant governmental parties; 5) in 1990–2015 governments which included representatives of agrarian parties more often functioned in Croatia, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia, more rarely in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania, and agrarian parties did not even once participated in government formation in Czech and Slovakia. In general, representation of agrarian parties in the countries of the region is extremely small, at least in comparison with the parties of social and democratic, conservative or liberal ideological orientation.

Appealing to the notion of electoral support of agrarian parties, which can be high, medium, low or absent, we argue that in Central-Eastern European countries the average level of support is rather low. Medium level of electoral support has been or is inherent to such agrarian parties as: the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BZNS) in Bulgaria, the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) in Croatia, the Estonian Country People's Party (EME), the People's Union of Estonia (ERa) and the Conservative People's Party (EKRE) in Estonia, the Lithuanian Peasant Party (LVP), the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (LVLS), the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (LVŽS) and the Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS) in Lithuania, the United People's Party (ZSL), the Peasants Agreement (PL) and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) in Poland, as well as the Slovenian People's Party (SLS) in Slovenia. High level of electoral support has been or is peculiar of such agrarian parties as: the Green and Farmers' Union (ZZS) in Latvia and the Slovenian Peasant Union (SKZ) in Slovenia. Thus, in accordance with the relative calculations the biggest electoral successes and the highest electoral support of agrarian parties have been native to such countries as: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, medium/average level has been observed in such countries as: Croatia, Estonia and Romania, and the lowest level is peculiar of the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary and Slovakia. Making a conclusion, we argue that the specificity of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries lies in the fact that they adhere to the same models of development. In most countries of the region agrarian parties have not participated in formation of national anticommunist "umbrella" organizations, but tried to take part in the political process individually, what usually predetermined their electoral failures. After that, most agrarian parties in Central-Eastern Europe made an attempt to reform themselves, and due to this the second stage of their development was marked by numerous cross-party/intra-party splits and mergences, especially in different formats of electoral coalitions. But even this, in most cases across the countries of the region, has not yielded any essential dividends to agrarian parties. As a result, they do not often participate in government formation, and within the cabinets they are considered as minor partners, which do not obtain key positions in the governments. One common conclusion is, that due to the weakness of the agrarian parties' social base, they are not able to form stable and consolidated party organization and realize stable electoral support, which can ensure "survival" and obtaining of parliament mandates by agrarian parties (independently, not through electoral coalitions) during more than two electoral cycles in succession. The exceptions are such parties

as: the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), the People's Union of Estonia (ERa), the Independent Smallholders, the Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKgP), the Green and Farmers' Union (ZZS), the Lithuanian Peasant Party (LVP), the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (LVLS), the Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS), the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), the Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (SRP), the Slovenian People's Party (SLS).

Some kind of differentiation of ideological positioning does not contribute to the agrarian parties' electoral successes either. The absolute majority of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries are centrist parties. There are 30 centrist parties (for more detailed information see Table 1) and in their majority they are classical agrarian, sometimes in combination with ideological principles of conservatism, Christian democracy, social-democracy, economic-nationalism, social-conservatism, pensionary ideology, liberalism, environmentalism or Euroscepticism. There are only 6 right-of-center agrarian parties, which combine the ideology of agrarianism and conservatism or agrarianism, conservatism and Christian democracy. However, 5 left-of-center agrarian parties amalgamate ideological principles of agrarianism and environmentalism, or are classical agrarian ones. In the region there are only 4 left agrarian parties, which synthesize classical agrarianism and progressivism, or are based on the principles of classical agrarianism. Finally, 2 right agrarian parties of the region combine classical agrarianism, nationalism and national-conservatism or conservative liberalism. Moreover, not all political parties in Central-Eastern European countries, which appeal to the ideas and principles of agrarianism, are agrarian as to their initial nature. The point is that most agrarian parties use the ideology of agrarianism as the initial and party-forming one. But some parties (for instance the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKgP), the Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS), the Slovenian Peasant Union (SKZ) and the Slovenian People's Party (SLS)) have not been or are not initially agrarian as to their nature, because agrarianism is a minor ideology for them. Fundamental exceptions from the ideological positioning in Central-Eastern European countries are such agrarian-oriented parties as: the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKgP) in Hungary, which combines the principles of Hungarian nationalism, national-conservatism and agrarianism; the Green and Farmers' Union (ZZS) in Latvia, which unifies the principles of agrarianism, environmental conservatism and Euroscepticism; the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) in Poland, which synthesizes the ideas of agrarianism, Christian democracy and social-conservatism³⁰; the Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (SRP) in Poland, which is based on the principles of agrarianism, populism, economic nationalism and social-conservatism³¹; the Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party (PNT-CD) in Romania, which at the same time is the agrarian, Christian-democratic, monarchist and

³⁰ P. Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2000, s. 51.; J. Magone, *Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2010, s. 457.; J. Haynes, A. Hennig, *Religious Actors in the Public Sphere: Means, Objectives, and Effects*, Wyd. Routledge 2013, s. 17.; P. Wiróbel, *Historical Dictionary of Poland 1945-1996*, Routledge 2014, s. 248.; D. Nohlen, P. Stöver, *Elections in Europe: A data handbook*, Wyd. Nomos 2010, s. 1511–1513; A. Szczerbiak, *The emergence and development of political parties in post-Communist Poland*, Wyd. University of London 1989.

³¹ J. Magone, *Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2010, s. 386

liberal party³²; the Slovenian People's Party (SLS) in Slovenia, which is conservative, agrarian and Christian democratic as to its nature³³.

As the performed analysis shows, the phenomenon of agrarian parties in Central-Eastern European countries is quite underdeveloped and only in some cases is represented by electorally successful political forces. As a rule, such parties exist in the countries, where agrarian ideologies were rather successful during the interwar period, but it is not a general rule. In their ideological context, agrarian parties in the region are heterogeneous; however there is a tendency towards the ideological center. Ideological positioning of agrarian parties does not influence their electoral successes, but from the point of view of statistics, the political parties, which combine the principles of agrarianism and other traditional left-right ideologies, are more prosperous.

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³² D. Caramani, *The Europeanization of Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2013, s. 310.; L. Stan, *From Riches to Rags: The Romanian National Christian Democrat Peasant Party*, „East European Quarterly“ 2005, vol 39, nr 2, s. 179–227.

³³ A. Day, R. East, R. Thomas, *Slovenian People's Party*, [w:] *A political and economic dictionary of Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2002, s. 533; D. Zajc, T. Boh, *Slovenia*, [w:] *The handbook of political change in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Edward Elgar Publishing 2004, s. 351; S. Jungerstam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties And Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing 2006, s. 215.

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THE EVOLUTION, LOGICS, VARIATIONS AND IMPROVING OF THE ACTUAL (POLITICAL AND BEHAVIORAL) TYPOLOGY OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THE ORGANIZATION AND MANIFESTATIONS ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Semi-presidentialism is a very common and heterogeneous system of government, since it can be typified both formally (institutionally and procedurally) and actually (politically and behaviorally), but the dynamics of semi-presidentialism is less dependent on institutional and constitutional norms than on political and behavioral factors. These typological factors (in particular, the dualism, legitimacy, party affiliation and responsibility of the executive and the compositions of legislatures) create the grounds for the mediation of semi-presidentialism on the basis of political and behavioral models of the evaluation of norms and manifestations. Therefore, the study primarily focuses on the updated and expanded theorization of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism and on the practical consequences, risks and prospects for its operationalization within the framework of the European cases (from the moment of semi-presidentialism's introduction and as of December 2017). As a result, it is argued that semi-presidentialism (based on a presidential party positioning against the types of cabinets and the parameters of inter-party and intra-party relations) should be alternatively typified on the fully or partly unified majority systems, fully or partly unified minority systems, divided majority systems and divided minority systems, which provide various political implications.

Keywords: semi-presidentialism, system of government, actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, European countries.

EWOLUCJA, LOGIKA, ODMIANY I UDOSKONALENIE RZECZYWISTEJ (POLITYCZNEJ, BEHAWIORALNEJ) TYPOLOGII SEMIPREZYDENCJI: TEORETYZACJA I PRZEJAWY NA PRZYKŁADZIE KRAJÓW EUROPY

Semiprezydencjalizm – jest bardzo rozpowszechnionym i heterogenicznym systemem rządów, ponieważ można go typologizować zarówno formalnie (instytucjonalnie i proceduralnie), jak i faktycznie (politycznie, behawioralnie). Ale dynamika systemu semiprezydenckiego zależy w mniejszym stopniu od instytucjonalnych i konstytucyjnych norm, niż od politycznych i behawioralnych czynników. Takie czynniki typologiczne (w szczególności dualizm, legitymizacja, przynależność do partii i odpowiedzialność władzy wykonawczej oraz skład organów ustawodawczych) tworzą podstawy do identyfikacji semiprezydencjalizmu na podstawie

politycznych i behawioralnych modeli oceny jego norm i przejawów. Prezentowane badania w zasadzie skupiają się na zaktualizowanej i rozszerzonej teoretyzacji rzeczywistej (politycznej, behawioralnej) typologii systemu semiprezydenckiego, a także na praktycznych konsekwencjach, ryzykach i perspektywach jej operacjonalizacji w sprawach europejskich (od momentu wyboru semiprezydencałizmu do grudnia 2017 roku). W rezultacie argumentuje się, że system semiprezydencki (opierając się na pozycjonowaniu partii prezydentów względem typów rządowych gabinetów oraz parametrów wewnątrz partyjnych i pozapartyjnych relacji) musi być określony w systemach całkowicie lub częściowo zjednoczonej większości, całkowicie lub częściowo zjednoczonej mniejszości, podzielonej większości i podzielonej mniejszości, które warunkują różne konsekwencje polityczne.

Słowa kluczowe: semiprezydencałizm, system rządowy, faktyczna (polityczna, behawioralna) typologia systemu semiprezydenckiego, państwa europejskie.

Semi-presidentialism is the most widespread variation of systems of government among all the countries of Europe. At the same time, semi-presidentialism is a very heterogeneous system of government, since it can be categorized and typified both formally (i.e. institutionally and procedurally) and actually (i.e. politically and behaviorally). Thus, in spite of the very common and relevant for Political Science institutional and procedural typology of semi-presidentialism within the framework of president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism, it is necessary to appeal to the factors (the only partially developed) of typology of semi-presidentialism, which mostly turn around the issues of dualism, legitimacy, party affiliation and responsibility of the executive and the compositions of legislatures. This is extremely important, first of all, in view of the fact that these factors are able to outline the real (actual) powers of political institutions and the patterns of inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state–cabinet–parliament". Therefore, they can certify the actual (political and behavioral) dynamics and diversity of semi-presidential system of government¹, in particular through the prism of the real political (party and electoral) process and the goals (objectives) of the main political actors. On the other hand, these factors solve the main problem of the formal (institutional and procedural) typology of semi-presidentialism, i.e. its excessive concentration on the norms of law and constitutionalism, and make it possible to outline a system of government not only legally (i.e. institutionally and procedurally), but even politically (i.e. politically and behaviorally). Consequently, they create the grounds for the mediation of semi-presidentialism (in particular, through the prism of democratization or autocratization, stability and efficiency) on the basis of political and

¹ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Siaroff A., Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction, "European Journal of Political Research" 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287-312.

behavioral models of evaluation of its legal norms, manifestations, consequences, risks and prospects for operationalization².

Accordingly, the study of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism is extremely important, but it must be carried out in stages. Initially (in the first part of the article) the attention is paid to the theoretical peculiarities of the initial evolution of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the studies of a number of scholars. Subsequently (in the second part of the article) the emphasis is placed on the common logics and variations of the actual (political and behavioral) typologies of semi-presidentialism. Eventually (in the third part of the article) the attention is focused on the updated and expanded approach to the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism and on the practical manifestations, consequences, risks and prospects for operationalization of the actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism, in particular within the framework of its European cases.

1. The theoretical peculiarities of the initial evolution of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism

Historically, the first (or initial) actual (political and behavioral) typologies of semi-presidentialism belong to Duverger³, Frison-Roche⁴, Martinez⁵, Nica⁶, Pasquino⁷, and Sartori⁸. These scientists began researches on the placement of semi-presidential institutions of president and cabinet (prime minister) in the environment of distribution of powers and responsibilities in the executive and of the party and personal compositions of legislatures.

The principal importance and the initial relevance of Duverger's⁹ and Sartori's¹⁰ scientific position is that these researchers, primarily considering whether a president and prime minister (cabinet) have the support of majority or minority in legislature, highlighted (according to the tradition of the researches of presidentialism) the semi-presidential systems with unified and divided government, which subsequently became the clusters of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism. The first ones are determined by the fact that both a president and a primeminister belong or tend to identical and related (close) political parties in legislature, and therefore significantly

² Wu Y.-S., *Exploring the "Power-Sharing" Mode of Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the 1st IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2011.

³ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165-187.; Duverger M., *Bréviaire de la Cohabitation*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986.

⁴ Frison-Roche F., *Le "Modèle Semi-Présidentiel" Comme Instrument de la Transition en Europe Post-Communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Wyd. Bruylant 2005.; Frison-Roche F., *Semi-Presidentialism in a Post-Communist Context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: a Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 56-77.

⁵ Martinez R., *Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Mannheim 1999.

⁶ Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-Presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998.

⁷ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128-146.

⁸ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

⁹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 186.

¹⁰ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

limit the executive dualism. Instead, the latter ones are characterized by the fact that a president and a prime minister are political opponents of each other, belong or tend to different and unrelated (not close) political parties in legislature, and therefore considerably increase the executive dualism.

In this regard, Duverger¹¹, appealing primarily to the traditional experience of semi-presidentialism in France and other European countries, argued that the systems of unified government are initiated and operationalized in the case when semi-presidentialism is characterized by the perfect match of the party and political positioning of a president and a majority in legislature. As a result, such a political and behavioral type of semi-presidentialism transforms the analyzed system of government into the “duet” of two representatives of the executive, who are able to “sing the same song” even though there may be some political differences, tensions and even conflicts between them¹². Instead, the systems of divided government are determined by the fact that a president, who is the leader of a political majority and popular legitimacy, is opposed by a prime minister, who is the leader of a majority in legislature that is completely composed of the parties, which act against a president and his or her political party (if available) in legislature. As a result, such a political and behavioral type of semi-presidentialism transforms the analyzed system of government into the “duel” of two representatives of the executive and requires, according to Shugart and Carey¹³, the maximal textual clarity of constitutions, in particular regarding the powers and responsibilities of the main political institutions in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”, which can limit the potential and desire of each of them to compete for legitimacy and prerogatives in the executive. In view of this, it is clear that the systems of unified government are stabilized mainly politically (behaviorally), and the system of divided government both politically (behaviorally) and institutionally (procedurally). That is, on the basis of institutional and procedural mechanisms of limiting the actual personal ambitions and motivations of presidents and prime ministers (directing them towards the achievement of systemic goals), taking into account the electoral expectations (within different types of electoral systems) of each of them and considering the established traditions of inter-institutional relations.

By analogy and in the form of supplements, but with some theoretical, methodological and terminology differences, Sartori¹⁴ attempted to determine semi-presidential system of government based on the referral to critical scenarios of its functioning in the event of situations of divided government. As a result, it was argued that the systems of divided government are capable of generating at least three consequences of political and behavioral positioning of semi-presidentialism: a) when the system of divided government inevitably leads to the conflict between a president and a prime minister (backed by legislature) in the system of the executive dualism; b) when the system

¹¹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 186.

¹² Elgie R., Machin H., France: The Limits to Prime-Ministerial Government in a Semi-Presidential System, *“West European Politics”* 1991, vol 14, nr. 2, s. 62.

¹³ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 56-58.

¹⁴ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

of divided government confirms that semi-presidentialism is not a synthesis of parliamentarism and presidentialism, but rather an alternation between the parliamentary and presidential phases of a separate system of government¹⁵ (with the condition that the systems of unified and divided government can approximate semi-presidentialism both to presidentialism or parliamentarism); c) when the system of divided government may not violate the mechanism of the distribution of power and inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”, and therefore may promote or interfere stabilization and democratization of semi-presidentialism.

A similar result and a similar theoretical and methodological logics (in particular, against the backdrops of Duverger¹⁶) was achieved by Pasquino¹⁷ who distributed all political and behavioral cases of semi-presidentialism into the systems of support and non-support of presidents in legislatures and noted that some of them (to a greater or lesser extent) testify the conclusion that the dual structure of the executive under semi-presidentialism can generate a “competitive diarchy”, which can be easily transformed into a “confrontational diarchy”. Additionally, the scientist identified four scenarios of the deployment of the systems of support and non-support systems of presidents in legislatures: a) when a president is elected by one and the same political majority, which controls most of the mandates in legislature, and is the leader of a majority party or majority coalition (as a result, a president is an effective leader of political and parliamentary majority and may enjoy conditional freedom in obtaining additional executive powers); b) when a president is elected by a political majority composed of several political parties, which control most of the mandates in legislature, but is not the leader of the largest party of this majority (resulting in a legislative and administrative contrast among a president and the leaders of other political parties of the parliamentary majority, especially if one of them is a prime minister); c) when a president is elected by a political majority, but a parliament manages a cabinet on the basis of a completely different and controversial (in relation to a president) parliamentary majority (as a result, a president will as soon as possible try to react to the actions of a cabinet and parliament threatening to dissolve the latter); d) when a president is given a certain freedom of actions due to the fact that there is no clearly expressed leader of the largest party, and the majority in a legislature is composed of several political parties. Based on this, the scholar contended that the system of divided government (or the system of non-support of a president) is the most variational in the case of semi-presidentialism (and not presidentialism, for which it may also be inherent). Since it can lead (as necessarily in the case of presidentialism) or not lead to problems of governance and law-making in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. In addition, it is not always known who is responsible for the conduct of political actions and inaction in the system of semi-presidential executive dualism under the

¹⁵ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 186.

¹⁶ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165-187.

¹⁷ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128-146.

conditions of the systems of divided government. This, relying on the theoretical and methodological remarks of Shugart and Carey¹⁸, means that the system of divided government in the conditions of semi-presidentialism does not necessarily create a more or less durable, reliable and repetitive inter-institutional stalemate and electoral confusion¹⁹, but is quite flexible.

Similarly, but more diversely and structurally, Nica²⁰ highlighted political and behavioral variations of semi-presidentialism, under which: a) a president enjoys the support of a single-party majority in legislature; b) a president enjoys the support of a coalitional majority in legislature; c) a president is opposed to a coherent (cohesive) majority in legislature; d) a president opposes a fragmentary majority in legislature. Supplementary, the scientist noted that each of the listed variations of the systems of unified and divided government under semi-presidentialism can be characterized both by optimal (or the best) and negative (or the worst) political and behavioral scenarios. They totally affect the positioning of semi-presidential system of government in the context of specific institutional and procedural attributes (the details of this are shown in the table 1).

Table 1. Political and behavioral variations of semi-presidentialism and their optimal and negative scenarios based on the positioning of presidents towards majority in legislatures (Nica's model)

The option or situation of semi-presidentialism	Optimal (the best) scenario	Negative (the worst) scenario
A president enjoys the support of a single-party majority in legislature	Presidential domination is provided only to the extent that the majority party ensures a stable party support to the head of state	A president cannot count on the stable support of his/her party (because of discipline in it and the positioning of individual deputies), and therefore forced to be involved with situational support of other parties and deputies
A president enjoys the support of a coalitional majority in legislature	Presidential domination is provided only to the extent that the majority parties ensure stable coalitional support to the head of state (in the conditions of coalition stability)	A president cannot count on the stable support of a coalition (because of stability and discipline in it and the positioning of individual parties), and therefore forced to be involved with situational support of other parties and deputies
A president is opposed to a coherent (cohesive) majority in legislature	A president recognizes the demands of parliamentary majority concerning the control of a cabinet and prime minister, and therefore performs a subordinate role. A legislature does not challenge the powers of a president, which derive from his/her constitutional prerogatives	A president and legislature compete on the control of the executive and law-making
A president opposes a fragmentary majority in legislature	There is no effective political opposition in parliament, so factions and parliamentarians prefer to endure the domination of the head of state, especially if it is constitutionally grounded	There is an inter-institutional conflict, when neither a president nor a legislature (or anyone else) is empowered to govern and make a decisive influence on law-making

Źródło: Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-Presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998. Adapted by the author.

¹⁸ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 56.

¹⁹ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128-146.

²⁰ Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-Presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998, s. 19.

A similar conclusion was reached in the researches of Martinez²¹, in which it was argued that semi-presidentialism, based on the comparison of presidential party affiliation and majority party/parties composition in legislature, may be subjected to the trichotomy of systems of government, where: a) a parliamentary majority is created and functions in favor of a president; b) a parliamentary majority is created and operates against a president; c) a parliamentary majority is created and operates in support of a president, but does not recognize his or her leadership in political system, in particular in the executive vertical. The indicated correlations of the indicators of political and behavioral typology of semi-presidentialism are important given the fact that they can predict different parameters of the successes and failures of the analyzed system of government²². This, for example, is clear on the basis of Duverger's²³ comment on the assessment of real (actual) powers of the heads of state in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, since they are defined not by constitutions, but by the existence of an invincible and united pro-presidential majority (which is faithfully subordinate to a president) in a legislature. As a result, the scientist observes that if a party is endowed by both a presidency and a majority in both chambers of a parliament then this practically excludes the constitutional separation of powers²⁴. Conversely, if a presidency and majority in legislature are in the hands of different parties, then the official constitutional separation of powers, in particular due to the competition among the opposing forces, substantially expands. In general, this means that the separation of powers is the result of the combination of a party system and a constitutional framework of a political system's functioning²⁵, and also that the functionality and dynamics of semi-presidentialism are less dependent on institutional and constitutional norms than on political and behavioral factors²⁶.

In a similar theoretical and methodological context, as well as interpreting semi-presidentialism as a transit tool of a system of government's movement from presidentialism to parliamentarism and vice versa²⁷, Frison-Roche proposed and tested the scheme that describes the actual, political and behavioral variations in the powers of presidents depending on their relationship with cabinets/prime ministers and majority in legislatures²⁸. Thus, the scientist typified semi-presidentialism primarily on the basis of determining and taking into account the political positioning and party affiliation of presidents regarding the composition of a majority in legislatures. In view of this, it is established that the party affiliation of a prime minister, the composition of

²¹ Martinez R., *Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Mannheim 1999.

²² Duverger M., *Breviaire de la Cohabitation*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986; Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3-87.

²³ Duverger M., *Breviaire de la Cohabitation*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 8.

²⁴ Duverger M., *Los Partidos Politicos*, Wyd. Fondo de Cultura Econmica 1957, s. 422.

²⁵ Duverger M., *Los Partidos Politicos*, Wyd. Fondo de Cultura Econmica 1957, s. 420.

²⁶ Bogdanor V., *Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561.

²⁷ Frison-Roche F., *Le "Modèle Semi-Présidentiel" Comme Instrument de la Transition en Europe Post-Communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Wyd. Bruylant 2005.

²⁸ Frison-Roche F., *Semi-Presidentialism in a Post-Communist Context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 68.

acabinet and legislature have a decisive influence on the practical realization of the powers of a president, in particular, in comparison with the volume of powers enshrined in the constitution of any semi-presidential country. For example, it is contended that the presence of a pro-presidential majority in legislature substantially strengthens the actual (political and behavioral powers) of a president, while the reverse situation leads to a narrowing of the possibilities of a president's political maneuver and his/her "coercion" to seek compromise solutions with an opposition (the details of this are shown in the table 2). The situation is complemented by the fact that under the conditions of operationalization of undeveloped democratic culture, leader and clientelist tendencies in politics (under such a scenario of semi-presidentialism), the danger of abusing presidential powers increases that leads to strengthening the autocratic tendencies in political development of countries²⁹.

Table 2. The matrix of the actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism based on the positioning of presidents regarding the compositions of majority in legislatures (Frison-Roche's model)

The composition of a majority in legislature	The positioning of a president towards the composition of a majority in legislature			
	Is the head of a majority	Is in opposition to a majority	Is the member of a majority	Is neutral
Monolithic (single-party)	Absolute powers of a president	A president as a regulator	Symbolic functions	A president as a regulator
A coalition with a dominant cabinet party	Limited powers	A president as a regulator	Symbolic functions	A president as a regulator
A balanced or equilibrium coalition	Diarchy	A president as a regulator	Symbolic functions	A president as a regulator
A quasi-coalition	Limitations in decision-making	A president as a regulator	Symbolic functions	Diarchy
A majority in legislature is not typical	–	–	–	–

Źródło: Frison-Roche F., *Le "Modèle Semi-Présidentiel" Comme Instrument de la Transition en Europe Post-Communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Wyd. Bruylant 2005. Adapted by the author.

2. The common and verified logics and variations of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism

At the same time, the typological, theoretical and methodological logics of the above-mentioned scientific positions is complemented by the fact that semi-presidentialism is not necessarily characterized by the formation of majority cabinets, and therefore it should not appeal exclusively to the comparison of party affiliation of presidents and prime ministers in the cut of the composition

²⁹ Roper S., Are all Semi-Presidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes, *"Comparative Politics"* 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253-272.

of a majority in legislatures. The explanation is that minority cabinets quite often are formed in the European semi-presidential countries. These are the cabinets that still do not form parliamentary majority by the influence of exclusively cabinet parties, although they rely on the situational or permanent support of a majority in legislature. Accordingly, in the context of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, this is interesting given that the systems of unified and divided government can be determined by the types (i.e. majority or minority) of cabinets, which help to diversify political and behavioral types of semi-presidentialism within the framework of unified majority or minority systems and divided majority or minority systems. Therefore, the initial researches on the proposed topic were supplemented by Skach³⁰, Jung-Hsiang³¹, Garrido³², Wu³³ and other scholars who systematized the indicators of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, as well as distinguished its various scenarios and phases.

The outlined attributive requirement of political and behavioral typology of semi-presidentialism and generalization of the early political and behavioral taxonomies of semi-presidentialism was initially (but not fully) noted in the scientific researches of Skach³⁴. She, based on the disposition that semi-presidentialism recognizes the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two executors (or centers of the executive), i.e. a popularly elected president and an indirectly elected (appointed) prime minister, tried to find out the influence of dualism, legitimacy, party affiliation and responsibility of the executive and the composition of legislature through the prism of the situations of parliamentary majority and minority on the analyzed system of government. Such theoretical and methodological logics is conditioned primarily by the fact that the executive is traditionally positioned as dualized and distributed between a president and a prime minister in classical (or “Duvergerian”) and post-classical (or “post-Duvergerian”) definition of semi-presidentialism, as well as in all of their reinterpretations. Even though the head of state may not be constitutionally positioned as a carrier of the executive, and a prime minister is a primary center or the head of the executive. Accordingly, such a division of the executive makes impossible an elegant or clear delimitation of powers of prime ministers and presidents in most cases of semi-presidentialism, and therefore often leads to constitutional ambiguity of the analyzed system of government. As a result, when the executive powers of the heads of states and the heads of cabinets are

³⁰ Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.; Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

³¹ Jung-Hsiang T., Sub-Types of Semi-Presidentialism and Political Deadlock, “*French Politics*” 2008, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 63-84.

³² Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: a Comparative Perspective*, Paper presented at World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago de Chile 2009.

³³ Wu Y.-S., *Exploring the “Power-Sharing” Mode of Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the 1st IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2011.

³⁴ Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.; Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

markedly divergent and inconsistent, it is often not entirely constitutionally, institutionally and procedurally clear who of the executors (the centers of the executive) is authorized to implement a final decision, even in such areas of policy as national defense and international or interstate relations³⁵. In turn, the legitimacy, party affiliation and responsibility of the two executors are also significantly different, since: a prime minister and cabinet in their functioning and responsibility (but not always in formation) depend on the procedures for the delegation of certain powers and obligations by a parliament; a president, in particular on the basis of electoral and rationalized legitimacy, has an independent and popular mandate that is autonomous from a legislature and can act in the absence of its support or approval. The outlined institutional and constitutional autonomy establishes certain “stimulus-reactions” for a president, on the basis of which the head of state is at least interested in the formation and offering an own program and order of actions, even if it provides for the mechanism of interference in the sphere of powers of a prime minister and cabinet³⁶.

Accordingly, the tense relations between the institutions of president, prime minister/cabinet and parliament (even if they share an identical political program), which are conditioned by the above-mentioned additional division of the executive under semi-presidentialism, are potentially unconditional, structural and even permanent in the conditions of the considered system of government, since they are caused by the structure and institutional/procedural logics of semi-presidentialism³⁷. If such relations are continued, then presidents who enjoy institutional and constitutional autonomy can transform semi-presidential democracies into “constitutional dictatorships”³⁸, i.e. situations when executors (the centers of the executive) widely apply the mechanisms of emergency, reserve and discretionary powers³⁹, shifting the political regimes from democratic to hybrid or autocratic ones. This is especially true in the case when political regimes in semi-presidentialism are already (in advance) hybrid or autocratic ones, and presidents institutionally, procedurally, politically and behaviorally affect constitutional courts, because they may endanger the functional powers and terminality of legislatures. On the other hand, the presence of a majority in legislature and mutually friendly relations among it, a president and a prime minister or cabinet reduce the probability of an overgrowth of strained relations, which are internally immanent for semi-presidentialism, in serious conflicts in the system of the executive dualism.

In this regard, it should be noted that it is necessary to distinguish/taxonomy and hierarchize several variations of coexistence (balances, imbalances and conflicts) of the centers

³⁵ Skach C., *Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2005.; Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.

³⁶ Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

³⁷ Lytvyn V., *Systema Unifikovanoi Menshosti yak Variatyvnyi Riznyovyd Napivprezidentalizmu: Perevirka Dotsilnosti Vyokremlemnia ta Kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy Zvitnoi Naukovoii Konferentsii Filozofskoho Fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117-122.

³⁸ Rossiter C., *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in The Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1948.; Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

³⁹ Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

of the executive within the framework of semi-presidentialism. On the basis of this, Skach⁴⁰ highlights the following actual (political and behavioral) variations of semi-presidentialism as the unified majority system, the divided majority system and the divided minority system. Each of these actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism is the result of the synthesis of institutional and procedural attributes of the analyzed system of government and party/electoral peculiarities of political process. Since the listed types are formed on the basis of the interaction, on the one hand, of constitutional norms and procedures and, on the other hand, of the preferences of voters, as well as social and political characteristics of particular countries.

The first, in the form of the unified majority system, and the least contentious or the most stable (for political regime) variation of semi-presidentialism provides that the head of state is a member or supporter of the prime minister's party, as a result of which a president and a prime minister/cabinet are supported by an identical majority in legislature. Such a case can be described by the procedures of "full power" or successive change (alternation) of the representatives of different parties in power. It traditionally (but not necessarily, depending on the inter-party and intra-party structuring of political process) demonstrates that a president or a prime minister is considered the undisputed leader of the nation. Thus, the probability that the two executors (the centers of the executive) will follow an identical political agenda and cooperate to achieve a common goal is the maximum⁴¹. Accordingly, the head of state or the head of cabinet in such conditions is the center of the executive depending on the roles and powers formally foreseen for them (in particular, regarding the implementation of president-parliamentarism or premier-presidentialism as formal institutional and procedural type of semi-presidentialism)⁴², as well as historical experience of prevailing of someone from them in political (including executive) process. At the same time, cases are more frequent when a president is the leader of the nation and a prime minister carries out the duties of the chief of presidential staff⁴³, as a result such a version of semi-presidentialism is configured mainly by the logics of presidential system of government. This is manifested primarily in the fact that a majority in legislature follows the same political orientation as a president and recognizes him/her as a leader. That is why a president actually appears as the head of political (political and parliamentary) majority and dominates a legislature in practice⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ Skach C., The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, *"International Journal of Constitutional Law"* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 104-105.

⁴¹ Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, *"Constitutional Political Economy"* 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, *"International Journal of Constitutional Law"* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

⁴² Lytvyn V., Napivprezidentska Systema Pravlinnia u Konteksti Respublikanskoi Formy Pravlinnia: Typolohizatsiia, Konstytutsiino-Pravovi i Politychni Vykylyky ta Perspektyvy Reformuvannia v Ukraini, *"Studium Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej"* 2014, vol 2, s. 156-181.

⁴³ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 171-172.

⁴⁴ Krysenko O., Napivprezidentska Forma Pravlinnia: Model Instytutsionalnoi Stabilizatsii Vlady dlia Ukrainy, *"Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnoho Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina. Seriia: Pytannia Politolohii"* 2008, vol 825, s. 114-122.; Movchan U., Prezydent, Partiina Systema ta Uriad: Potentsiini Konflikty ta Shliakhy Yikh Podolannia, *"Stratehichni Priorityty"* 2012, vol 25, s. 53-57.

In contrast, in the cases (which some scholars call “the divided executive” of the unified majority system and other scholars nominate as “semi-cohabitation”⁴⁵), when a majority in legislature is only partially of the same political orientation as a president (if a president and a prime minister are from different cabinet parties within the same majority in legislature), but does not consider the head of state to be its leader, at least because he or she is not the leader of the largest (usually a prime ministerial one) party of the coalition cabinet supported by a majority in legislature, then it turns out that the execution of presidential constitutional powers in practice may be limited by the will of the leader of a majority (first of all, by the will of a prime minister) in legislature⁴⁶. This means that it is expedient to distinguish the fully unified majority systems and the partially unified majority systems among the unified majority systems in general. Moreover, it is obvious that the positioning of presidents and prime ministers in the system of party hierarchy significantly influence the dynamics of semi-presidentialism under the conditions of the unified majority system. Usually, when the party leader becomes the head of state, he or she dominates the system of the executive. Instead, if the head of state is not a leader of a political party and the latter is headed by the head of cabinet, then the format of their inter-institutional relations depends on the intra-party parameters of a governing/cabinet party. That is why it often happens that the head of cabinet, but not the head of state prevails in the aforementioned construction of semi-presidentialism (for example, in Poland during Komorowski’s presidency and Tusk’s premiership from the party “Civil Platform”). Accordingly, in the cases of the unified majority systems, the logics of presidentialism or parliamentarism actually works, but the system of government is formally, institutionally and procedurally still positioned as a semi-presidential one (even regardless of whether it is president-parliamentary or premier-presidential one)⁴⁷.

The second, in the form of the divided majority system, and moderately conflicting or moderately stable (for political regime) variation of semi-presidentialism provides that the head of state is not a member or even a supporter, but rather an opponent of the course of the political party (parties) of a prime minister and cabinet as a whole (or is not represented or associated with any party in a parliament) and is not supported by a majority in legislature (although, there is such a theoretically possible, but empirically extremely unpopular case of semi-presidentialism, when a president is supported by a majority in legislature, and a prime minister and cabinet are not characterized by this feature)⁴⁸. Such a case is outlined by the procedure of cohabitation when the most important executive decisions are traditionally (but not necessarily) taken by a prime minister (provided that a president and prime minister represent

⁴⁵ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81-97.; Lytvyn V., *Teoriia ta Praktyka Kohabitatsii v Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh Yevropy*, “*Osvita Rehionu: Politolohiia, Psykholohiia, Komunikatsii*” 2011, vol 4, s. 140-149.

⁴⁶ Movchan U., *Prezydent, Partiina Systema ta Uriad: Potentsiini Konflikty ta Shliakhy Yikh Podolannia*, “*Stratehichni Priorytety*” 2012, vol 25, s. 53-57.

⁴⁷ Gschwend T., Leuffen D., *When Voters Choose Regimes: The Issue of Cohabitation in the French Elections of 2002*, Wyd. Arbeitspapiere Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung 2003.

⁴⁸ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81-97.; Schmidt M., *Wörterbuch zur Politik*, Wyd. Alfred Kröner Verlag 2004, s. 138.

mutually opposing parties, but the presidential/pro-presidential party is not a member of a cabinet and does not provide parliamentary support to a cabinet and/or prime minister). As a result, even with a possible loss of controllability of inter-institutional relations and political process and the reduction of the level of legitimacy of political institutions, the logics of parliamentary system of government prevails in this variation of semi-presidentialism (even regardless of whether it is president-parliamentary or premier-presidential one)⁴⁹. Thus, the latter is described with exceptional and temporary transformation of the dualistic structure of the executive (i.e. of the potential or real executive dualism) in the direction of the competitive (i.e. conflict or harmonious)⁵⁰ diarchy⁵¹. In such a cut, a president is traditionally limited exclusively to his or her constitutional powers or even in them⁵², although the head of state may have his or her own domestic policy program and does not want to give up his or her executive power to a prime minister and cabinet⁵³. This is particularly relevant in the case when political and ideological differences, which distinguish between a president and a prime minister, are very deep, and when a prime minister carries out or at least intends to execute his or her powers and to direct the work of a cabinet without consulting a president.

In contrast, a president may be interested in using extraordinary, reserve or discretionary powers as counter-weights to a pro-cabinet majority in legislature. Accordingly, there is a possible case when the actual powers of the head of state increase in the divided majority system. The most often this happens during the periods when a parliament cannot form a cabinet on a party basis or when it manages to form a cabinet composed of several parties, none of which is able to offer an obvious leader of a majority in legislature. Therefore, in order to avoid a political crisis, the head of state (who does not have the support of a parliamentary majority) proposes a candidate for a subordinated non-partisan prime minister, who receives (if necessary) an investiture vote in legislature, or simply acquires a certain additional (unlike the constitutional regulation) freedom of actions⁵⁴.

In view of this, it is noteworthy that all semi-presidential systems in Europe should be divided into three groups depending on how their constitutions formalize and outline the procedures of cohabitation (the divided majority systems): a) the first group of constitutions obliges a president to consult with a parliamentary majority, a majority in legislature or the largest party in legislature when he/she nominates a candidate for a prime minister, and therefore cohabitation (the divided

⁴⁹ Knapp A., Wright V., *The government and politics of France*, Wyd. Routledge 2001, s. 9.

⁵⁰ RÜB F., *Schach dem Parlament!: Regierungssysteme und Staatspräsidenten in den Demokratisierungsprozessen Osteuropas*, Wyd. Westdeutscher 2001, s. 296.

⁵¹ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 130-131.

⁵² Movchan U., Dualizm Vykonavchoi Vlady: Problema Rozpodilu Povnovazhen u Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh, *Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnogo Universytetu Imeni V.N. Karazina. Seriya: Pytannia Politolohii* 2011, vol 984, s. 102-108.

⁵³ Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, *Constitutional Political Economy* 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

⁵⁴ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 132-133.

majority system) automatically takes place when the party (the coalition of parties) is opposed to a president and dominates (is the main one, since it has an absolute majority of seats) in parliament; b) the second group of constitutions does not stipulate the conditions for resolving differences between a president and a parliament regarding the candidacy of a prime minister, and therefore cohabitation (the divided majority system) may or may not be operationalized; c) the third group of constitutions actually makes impossible cohabitation (the divided majority system), because a president can dissolve a parliament (or at least the leading chamber of a parliament), when the latter rejects the presidential candidacy for a prime minister: although formally, institutionally and procedurally cohabitation (the divided majority system) cannot be avoided if a president agrees on its scenario⁵⁵. Moreover, the European cases of semi-presidentialism under the conditions of cohabitation (the divided majority system) should be divided into⁵⁶: the systems of “monistic bi-presentation” when only one of the two centers of the executive (i.e. a president or a prime minister) is a controlling institution; the systems of “dualistic bi-presentation”, when a prime minister and a president are equal players of the executive relations in the conditions of cohabitation.

Finally, the third, in the form of the divided minority system, and the most controversial or the least stable (for political regime, especially during reforms) variation of semi-presidentialism provides that neither a president nor a prime minister, who are the political opponents of each other (and none in this sense in general), does not have a stable support of a majority in legislature. Such a case synthesizes the attributes of the most problematic model of presidential system of government (i.e. the divided system) with the most problematic model of parliamentary system of government (i.e. the system of minority government), when a president (even regardless of whether semi-presidentialism is president-parliamentary or premier presidential one) is partly distanced from a parliament and a prime minister, and a legislature is internally divided itself⁵⁷. This, according to the researchers⁵⁸, quite often, at least in the face of the other actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism, leads or creates the preconditions for a “drive” from a democracy or hybrid political regime to a “constitutional dictatorship”, autocracy

⁵⁵ Lytvyn V., *Napivprezidentski Systemy v Krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: Determinanty Definiuvannia*, [w:] Bialoblocki Z., Romanyuk A. (eds.), *Transformacje ustrojowe w Europie Srodkowej i Wschodniej*, Wyd. WSGK 2012, s. 207-225.

⁵⁶ Movchan U., Dualizm Vykonavchoi Vlady: Problema Rozpodilu Povnovazhen u Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh, “*Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnoho Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina: Seriya: Pytannia Politolohii*” 2011, vol 984, s. 102-108.

⁵⁷ Alesina A., Rosenthal H., *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995, s. 257.; Colton T., Skach C., *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, Paper presented at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 2004.; Laver M., Shepsle K., Divided Government: America is Not “Exceptional”, “*Governance*” 1991, vol 4, nr. 3, s. 250-269.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996, s. 269.; Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

⁵⁸ Elgie R., The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?, “*Democratisation*” 2008, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 49-66.; Elgie R., MacMenamin L., *Divided Executives and Democratisation*, Wyd. Dublin City University 2006.; Movchan U., Dualizm Vykonavchoi Vlady: Problema Rozpodilu Povnovazhen u Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh, “*Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnoho Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina: Seriya: Pytannia Politolohii*” 2011, vol 984, s. 102-108.; Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

and personalization (mostly by presidents) of political power⁵⁹. This conclusion is especially true primarily in the case of the so-called substantiveminority cabinets, which are determined by the status of minority even when other parties guarantee them situational additional parliamentary support. On the contrary, this conclusion almost does not apply to the so-called formal minority cabinets, which receive a stable external support of legislature and tend to the construction of majority cabinets by their status⁶⁰.

The main reasons for this are: a distancing of a president from a parliament and a prime minister; excessive fragmentation of a parliament and frequent changes of coalitions and composition of cabinets; continuous intervention by a president in a cabinet's activities and the use of emergency, reserve and discretionary powers (governance and law-making without cabinets); a president's desire to establish personal control over the political system directly on the basis of a popular legitimacy. The outlined and determined inter-institutional relations are capable of generating a kind of "vicious circle" of legitimacy and conflict of the executive dualism in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Since the greater is the instability and passivity of a legislature, the greater is the pressure and desire of a president to feel about the possibility of using extraordinary and reserve powers as a substitute of a majority functions in a legislature, automatically weakening and undermining the potential of the latter⁶¹. This, in turn, forces legislature and parties to refuse their control over the executive/cabinet, and citizens to evaluate the identified political institutions as illegitimate or less legitimate than the institution of presidency, automatically increasing the role and purpose of the latter⁶² (especially through the actual impossibility or extreme difficulty of removing the head of state from the powers on the basis of impeachment procedures in an excessively fragmented parliament). Finally, this determines that high intensity of competition within the dual/dualistic executive in the conditions of the divided minority system predetermines institutional, procedural, political and behavioral vulnerability of semi-presidentialism. Accordingly, the main "fuses" of this is the presence of a stable majority in legislature and the full integration of a president into a party system of a semi-presidential country⁶³. Based on this, the divided minority system, as scientists⁶⁴ point out, may not lead to a fall, decline or destabilization of democracy and personalization of political process.

The proposed (Skach's) logics of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism is to a large extent repeated or foreseen, but essentially supplemented in

⁵⁹ Linz J., *Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*, [w:] Linz J., Stepan A. (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regime: Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1978, s. 27.

⁶⁰ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University 1990.

⁶¹ Parrish S., *Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-1995*, [w:] Carey J., Shugart M. (eds.), *Executive Decree Authority*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998, s. 62-103.

⁶² Protsyk O., Politics of Intra-Executive Conflict in Semi-Presidential Regimes in Eastern Europe, *"East European Politics and Societies"* 2005, vol 19, nr. 2, s. 156.

⁶³ Boban D., *Polupredsjednički Sustavi Rusije i Poljske: Komparativna Analiza Polupredsjedničkih Sustava Vlasti u Rusiji i Poljskoj*, Wyd. Fakultet Političkih Znanosti 2011, s. 40.

⁶⁴ Elje R., The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?, *"Democratisation"* 2008, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 49-66; Movchan U., Dualizm Vikonavchoi Vlady: Problema Rozpodilu Povnovazhen u Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh, *"Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnogo Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina: Seriya: Pytannia Politolohii"* 2011, vol 984, s. 102-108.

the researches of other scientists⁶⁵. This is the most noticeable in the case of Garrido⁶⁶ who synonymizes the unified majority systems, the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems in accordance with the cases, when: a) a president heads or can head a party or coalition that has a majority in legislature; b) a majority formed in a legislature is in opposition (in the form of conflictual cohabitation or peaceful coexistence) to a president; c) a legislature lacks any clear form of majority, but instead situations of minority cabinets' formation prevail. The scientist observes that taking into account the type of a party system, in particular a structured or unstructured (i.e. complicated) one, has a decisive influence on the testing of a certain actual (political and behavioral) type of semi-presidentialism. Since a structured party system is capable of generating a legislature that supports a cabinet. Instead, it is substantially complicated in the case of an unstructured party system, which is marked by an increase of the instruments of presidential influence on a cabinet and by a counter-action of an excessively fragmented legislature⁶⁷. Moreover, scientists believe that political and behavioral logics of semi-presidential system of government is determined and complemented by affiliation or non-membership (or at least by association) of a president to a party in legislature. Since if the head of state is non-partisan or not associated with a parliamentary party (or, as in the case of some European countries, is positioned as one that is over parties), then semi-presidentialism is affected by additional conflicts, and vice versa⁶⁸. This is at least due to the fact that a legislature is a traditional platform for reconciling the interests of various political parties, and therefore the setting-up of inter-institutional relations in the triangle "the head of state–cabinet–parliament" usually occurs precisely through a legislature. Otherwise, when the interests of a non-partisan president and a partisan legislature cannot be reconciled, then the political and behavioral nature of semi-presidentialism becomes or has the potential to become delegative, leading to autocratization of inter-institutional relations and political regime in general⁶⁹. Accordingly, it is clear that democracies are encouraged by such political and behavioral scenarios of

⁶⁵ Jung-Hsiang T., Sub-Types of Semi-Presidentialism and Political Deadlock, *French Politics* 2008, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 63-84; Stepan A., Suleiman E., *The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil*, [w:] Chehabi H., Stepan A. (eds.), *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies*, Wyd. Westview Press 1995, s. 393-414.

⁶⁶ Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: a Comparative Perspective*, Paper presented at World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago de Chile 2009.

⁶⁷ Arter D., Government in Finland: A "Semi-presidential" System?, *Parliamentary Affairs* 1985, vol 38, nr. 4, s. 472-495.; Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3-87.; Nousiainen J., *Semi-presidentialism in Finland in comparative perspective*, Paper presented at the 16th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin 1994.; Pesonen P., The First Direct Election of Finland's President, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 1994, vol 17, nr. 3, s. 259-311.

⁶⁸ Beichelt T., Die Konsolidierungschancen des Russischen Regierungssystems, *Osteuropa* 1996, vol 6, s. 597-609.; Beichelt T., Un Exécutif Bipolaire en "État D'exception Permanent", *Problèmes Politiques et Sociaux* 1996, vol 772, s. 43-49.; Chase J., *Placating the President: Legislative Struggle and Surrender in Russia, 1993-1996*, Wyd. Columbia University 1999.; Divillec A., *Parlamentarisme Dualiste: Entre Weimar et Bayeux*, *Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel* 1994, vol 20, s. 749-758.; Garrido A., Los Riesgos del Semipresidencialismo: Polonia y Rusia Desde una Perspectiva Comparada, *Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Cátedra Fadrique Furió Ceriol* 1999, vol 26-27, s. 195-226.; Harris J., *President and Parliament in the Russian Federation*, [w:] Mettenheim K. (ed.), *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1997, s. 204-236.; Lepsius R., *From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany*, [w:] Linz J., Stepan A. (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regime: Europe*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1978, s. 48-49.

⁶⁹ Kubicek P., Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 1994, vol 27, nr. 4, s. 423-441.

semi-presidentialism, which are primarily party-determined. Conversely, if semi-presidentialism is non-party or supra-party, then its political and behavioral logics and attribution contribute to autocratization of a political regime.

Summarizing this, it is obvious that the distinction among the unified majority systems, the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems lies in the fact that semi-presidentialism (being rather vulnerable to the threats of democracy and political stability, hypothetically and in general) can move from one political and behavioral variation to another depending on certain constitutional powers of political institutions in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”, especially depending on the features of electoral systems, the results of presidential and parliamentary elections, party membership of the centers of the executive and party (or political) composition of a legislature⁷⁰. On the one hand, different electoral systems and even electoral formulas diversely influence the probability of forming a more or less coherent, dimensional and stable majority in legislature and, as a result, the authorization of a more or less actually (politically and behaviorally) strong prime-minister and president⁷¹. On the other hand, separate (asynchronous) presidential and parliamentary elections make it possible for political institutions to oppose each other when a parliamentary majority opposed to a president is formed, or vice versa⁷². In turn, the actual (political and behavioral) logics of semi-presidentialism depends on the so-called “active” and “reactive” powers of presidents: the first ones, in particular in the form of decrees, allow presidents to establish or change the inter-institutional status quo; the second ones, in particular in the form of hypothetical dissolutions of legislatures, make it possible for presidents only to defend their status quo from the attempts of a majority (or minority) in parliaments to change it⁷³. Accordingly, it is quite obvious that weaker presidents can be positioned as stronger and strong presidents can be positioned as weaker not because of their constitutional powers, but because they, respectively, have or do not have the party (or political) support of legislatures, i.e. they (in one way or another) control or do not control a majority in legislatures in the relations in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”.

The consequence is conjecturing that the inter-institutional relationship among a president, a prime minister/cabinet and a parliament (i.e. a cabinet majority or minority in legislature) depend to a large extent not so much on a certain formal (institutional and procedural) structure and variation of semi-presidentialism, that is on the constituted volume of powers of political actors and patterns of relations among them, but on the actual (political and behavioral) context, that is on the relationship between a president and a majority or minority in legislature and

⁷⁰ Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, *“Constitutional Political Economy”* 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.

⁷¹ Lijphart A. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: a Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 21-46; Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *“European Journal of Political Research”* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 135-136; Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1967, s. 114-125; Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 226-229.

⁷² Movchan U., Dualizm Vykonavchoi Vlady: Problema Rozpodilu Povnovazhen u Napivprezidentskykh Systemakh, *“Visnyk Kharkivskoho Natsionalnoho Universytetu Imeni V. N. Karazina. Seriya: Pytannia Politolohii”* 2011, vol 984, s. 102-108.

⁷³ Movchan U., Prezydent, Partiina Systema ta Uriad: Potentsiini Konflikty ta Shliakhy Yikh Podolannia, *“Stratehichni Priorityty”* 2012, vol 25, s. 53-57.

on the nature of such a majority or minority in legislature. This is manifested in the fact that if the head of state is able to generate a majority in legislature, if a president can be integrated into a party system and if certain institutional, procedural, political, behavioral and socio-psychological factors (associated with elections and stable or institutionalized electoral and party systems) contribute to the coincidence of a presidential political majority and a cabinet parliamentary majority⁷⁴, then semi-presidentialism can actually be operationalized as a minimally conflictual option, first of all within the framework of the unified majority system.

3. The updated and expanded approach to the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism and its manifestations, consequences, risks and prospects within the framework of the European cases

At the same time, summing up the early (initial) and late (synthetic) attempts of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, we still notice their incompleteness or non-finalization, even in the submission of Skach⁷⁵ and Garrido⁷⁶. Firstly, the problem lies in the fact that the scientists do not fully typify the different variations of the unified majority systems, divided majority systems and divided minority systems. This, for example, is evident in view of the fact that three versions of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, already interpreted in Political Science (in addition to the situations when presidential and/or prime ministerial positions may be non-party or may be only associated with parties), can be hypothetically, schematically, theoretically and methodologically presented and attributed at least in the way shown in the table 3.

Secondly, the point is that the proposed variations of semi-presidentialism do not fully satisfy the theoretical and methodological diversification of political and behavioral types of semi-presidentialism into the unified majority systems or the unified minority systems and the divided majority systems or the divided minority systems unqualified majority and minority, which is partially outlined above and can be schematically presented with the help of the matrix of the generalized types of the analyzed system of government as in the table 4.

As a result, the theoretical and methodological series of the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, which is outlined and analyzed in Political Science and in various ways was or can be implemented in the political practice of different European countries, is incomplete. Since there are such variations of semi-presidential system of government, when neither a president nor a prime minister (and no one in this sense in general) has a stable support of

⁷⁴ Mainwaring S., Scully T., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1995; Millard F., *The Anatomy of the New Poland: Postcommunist Politics in Its First Phase*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 1994, s. 128.; Millard F., Executive-Legislative Relations in Poland, 1991-2005: Institutional Relations in Transition, *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2008, vol 14, nr. 4, s. 367-393.; Sartori G., *Political Development and Political Engineering*, [w:] Montgomery J., Hirschmann A. (eds.), *Public Policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1968, s. 261-298.

⁷⁵ Skach C., Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, *Constitutional Political Economy* 2005, vol 16, nr. 4, s. 347-368.; Skach C., The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93-121.

⁷⁶ Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: a Comparative Perspective*, Paper presented at World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago de Chile 2009.

a majority in legislature, but a president and a prime minister are from an identical party, are associated with an identical party or are the political associates of each other. This, for example, took place in Finland in 1976–1977, when there was the minority coalitional cabinet of Miittunen, which functioned as part of the Centre Party, the Liberal People's Party and the Swedish People's Party, and the position of president was occupied by Kekkonen from the Centre Party. This was despite the fact that the three-party centrist cabinet relied on the sustained support (in the form of the number of parliamentary mandates of the cabinet parties) of only 57 (of the 200) deputies of the Finnish legislature.

Table 3. Hypothetical political and behavioral variations/attributes and party patterns of semi-presidentialism within the framework of the unified majority systems, divided majority systems and divided minority systems

The variation of semi-presidentialism	The party of a president	The party of a prime minister	The parties of a cabinet	The type of a cabinet	The share of parliamentary mandates of the parties of a cabinet
The unified majority system. Variation 1	$A / (A)$	$A / (A)$	$A + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The unified majority system. Variation 2	$A / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$A + B + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The unified majority system. Variation 3	$A / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$A + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The unified majority system. Variation 4	$A / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$(A) + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The unified majority system. Variation 5	$- / (A)$	$A / (A)$	$A + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The unified majority system. Variation 6	$- / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$(A) + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The divided majority system. Variation 1	$A / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$B + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The divided majority system. Variation 2	$- / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$B + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The divided majority system. Variation 3	$A / (A)$	$- / (B)$	$(B) + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The divided majority system. Variation 4	$- / (A)$	$- / (B)$	$(B) + n$	Majority cabinet	$\geq (50\% + 1 \text{ mandate})$
The divided minority system. Variation 1	$A / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$B + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\% \text{ of mandates}$
The divided minority system. Variation 2	$- / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$B + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\% \text{ of mandates}$
The divided minority system. Variation 3	$A / (A)$	$- / (B)$	$(B) + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\% \text{ of mandates}$
The divided minority system. Variation 4	$- / (A)$	$- / (B)$	$(B) + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\% \text{ of mandates}$

"A", "B" = the parties of a parliament; "n" = the parties or separate deputies of a parliament; "-" = non-partisan status of a president or a prime minister; "()" = the marking of parties associated with presidents or prime ministers; "/" = the marking of an alternative of affiliation or non-affiliation with a party.

Źródło: The author's own interpretations and calculations.

Table 4. The matrix of the generalized actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidential system of government

The indicators of political and behavioral typology of semi-presidentialism		The systems and types of cabinets supported by legislatures	
		The majority system	The minority system
The correlation of party affiliation of presidents and prime ministers	The systems of unified government	The (fully or partly) unified majority system	The (fully or partly) unified minority system
	The systems of divided government	The divided majority system	The divided minority system

Źródło: The author's own interpretations and calculations.

The similar cases of functioning of semi-presidentialism have also occurred in other European countries that provides theoretical, methodological and empirical basis for naming them as the unified minority systems. In addition, we insist that the unified minority systems are not necessarily characterized by more intensive conflict in the system of the executive dualism than the divided majority systems and the divided minority system. The point is that such political and behavioral variations of semi-presidentialism tend to be largely inherent for consensual democracies, in which the structures of minority cabinets, in particular of their formal, but not substantive type, are usually stereotyped and institutionalized⁷⁷. Accordingly, the unified minority systems (in addition to the situations when presidential and/or primeministerial positions may be non-party or may be only associated with certain parties) can be hypothetically, schematically and theoretically represented and attributed at least in the way shown in the table 5.

Table 5. Hypothetical political and behavioral variations/attributes and party patterns of semi-presidentialism within the framework of the unified minority systems

The variation of semi-presidentialism	The party of a president	The party of a prime minister	The parties of a cabinet	The type of a cabinet	The share of parliamentary mandates of the parties of a cabinet
The unified minority system. Variation 1	$A / (A)$	$A / (A)$	$A + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates
The unified minority system. Variation 2	$A / (A)$	$B / (B)$	$A + B + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates
The unified minority system. Variation 3	$A / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$A + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates
The unified minority system. Variation 4	$A / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$(A) + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates
The unified minority system. Variation 5	$- / (A)$	$A / (A)$	$A + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates
The unified minority system. Variation 6	$- / (A)$	$- / (A)$	$(A) + n$	Minority cabinet	$\leq 50\%$ of mandates

"A", "B" = the parties of a parliament; "n" = the parties or separate deputies of a parliament; "-" = non-partisan status of a president or a prime minister; "()" = the marking of parties associated with presidents or prime ministers; "/" = the marking of an alternative of affiliation or non-affiliation with a party.

Źródło: The author's own interpretations and calculations.

⁷⁷ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University 1990.

In summary, the conducted analysis gives grounds to allocate such political and behavioral variations of semi-presidentialism (in the order of increasing the possibility and strength of conflicts within the framework of the executive dualism) as the fully or partly unified majority system, the fully or partly unified minority system, the divided majority system and the divided minority system. All of the above-mentioned variations of semi-presidentialism have been used in various European countries (the details of this are shown in the table 6). In particular, on the basis of the correlation between the number of the cases of inter-institutional relations (or relations primarily between a president and a prime minister in the system of the executive dualism) in the framework of the actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism (in particular, the fully or partly unified majority system, the fully or partly unified minority system, the divided majority system and the divided minority system) and their average stability, it was observed that among the semi-presidential countries of Europe (from the moment of the introduction of semi-presidentialism and at least as of December 2017): a) the most frequent cases are the situations of the fully unified majority systems, somewhat rarer cases are the situations of the partly unified majority systems and the fully unified minority systems, much more rare cases are the situations of the divided majority systems and the rarest cases are the situations of the partly unified minority systems and the divided minority systems; b) much more represented are: the majority systems, but not the minority systems; the systems of unified government, but not the systems of divided government; the fully unified systems, but not the partly unified systems; the divided majority systems, but not the divided minority systems; c) summarily, the most stable cases are the situations of the fully unified majority systems, somewhat less stable cases are the situations of the partly unified majority systems and the divided majority systems and the least stable cases are the situations of the fully or partly unified minority systems and the divided minority systems; d) much more stable are the majority systems, but not the minority systems and somewhat more stable are: the systems of unified government, but not the systems of divided government; the fully unified systems, but not the partly unified systems; the divided majority systems, but not the divided minority systems. Thus, it was found that the frequency and stability of the various cases of inter-institutional relations within the actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism are primarily driven by the greater uniformity/unity of the latter, as well as (to a lesser extent) by their attraction to the status of the majority.

Table 6. The statistics on the number and average stability of the cases of inter-institutional relations within the framework of the actual (political and behavioral) types of ongoing semi-presidentialism in Europe and the average types of political regime inherent to them (from the moment of the introduction of semi-presidentialism and as of December 2017)

Semi-presidential country	The number of the cases of inter-institutional relations within the framework of the actual types of semi-presidentialism, #										The average stability of the cases of inter-institutional relations within the framework of the actual types of semi-presidentialism, dd.										The average type of political regime in the cases of inter-institutional relations within the framework of the actual types of semi-presidentialism (the "Polity IV" project / the "Freedom in the World" project)									
	FUMJS	PUMJS	DMJS	FUMns	PUMns	DMns	FUMJS	PUMJS	DMJS	FUMns	PUMns	DMns	FUMJS	PUMJS	DMJS	FUMns	PUMns	DMns	FUMJS	PUMJS	DMJS	FUMns	PUMns	DMns						
	9*	7**	0	0	0	0	516	511	-	-	-	516	511	-	-	-	+2/	+5/	-	-	-	+2/	+5/	-	-	-				
Armenia (since 1995)	20	25	5	2	0	1	537	446	519	265	-	536	+10/	+10/	+10/	+10/	+10/	4.5	4	-	-	-	4.5	4	-	-	-			
Austria (since 1945)	8*	0	0	0	0	0	1121	-	-	-	-	-	-7/	-	-	-	-	5.5	-	-	-	-	-7/	-	-	-	-			
Azerbaijan (since 1995)	8*	0	0	0	0	0	934	-	-	-	-	-	-7/	-	-	-	-	6.5	-	-	-	-	-7/	-	-	-	-			
Belarus (since 1996)	7	21	7	2	2	3	275	225	150	279	127	134	4	4	4	4.5	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995)	2	0	4	9	0	2	1433	-	701	271	-	655	+9/	-	+9/	+9/	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-			
Bulgaria (since 1991)	9	2	3	5	1	1	582	437	137	457	473	523	+1/	+8/	+9/	+9/	+8/	3	2	2	1.5	2	3	2	2	1.5	2			
Croatia (since 1991)	0	0	1	1	0	2	-	-	1353	105	-	99	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Czechia (since 2012)	22	25	10	19	3	8	415	490	509	222	309	387	+10/	+9/	+10/	+10/	+10/	1.5	1.5	1	2	-	1.5	1.5	1	2	-			
Finland (since 1919)	24	4	3	7	1	0	494	838	1102	264	25	-	+8/	+8/	+9/	+9/	+9/	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5			
France (since 1962)	17	0	1	1	0	0	284	-	382	41	-	-	+7/	-	+7/	+7/	+7/	3.5	-	3	3.5	-	3.5	-	3	3.5	-			
Georgia (since 2004)	29	5	2	6	0	0	728	796	622	148	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Iceland (since 1944)	12	2	6	10	1	7	908	1120	596	772	891	433	+10/	+10/	+10/	+10/	+10/	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			
Ireland (since 1937)	12	0	1	6	0	0	510	-	435	384	-	-	+10/	-	+10/	+10/	+10/	1.5	-	1.5	1.5	-	1.5	-	1.5	1.5	-			
Lithuania (since 1992)	24	2	5	0	0	0	317	35	348	-	-	-	+8/	+6/	+9/	-	-	3	3.5	3	-	-	3	3.5	3	-	-			
Macedonia (since 1991)	4*	0	4	0	1	3	247	-	389	-	333	150	+7/	-	+7/	+7/	+7/	3.5	-	3	-	-	3.5	-	3	-	-			
Moldova (since 2016)																														

Montenegro (since 2006)	9	0	0	1	0	0	428	-	-	89	-	-	+9/ 3	-	+9/ 3	-	-	
Poland (since 1990)	11	0	7	2	0	5	457	-	462	277	-	200	+10/ 1	-	+9/ 1.5	-	+9/ 2	
Portugal (since 1976)	2	0	11	5	3	7	953	-	640	482	224	296	+10/ 1	-	+10/ 1.5	+9/ 2	+10/ 1.5	
Romania (since 1991)	6	0	3	9	2	4	411	-	296	416	406	347	+8/ 2.5	-	+9/ 2	+9/ 2	+9/ 2	
Russia (since 1993)	7*	5**	1	0	0	0	737	367	241	-	-	-	+5/ 5.5	+3/ 4	+3/ 4.5	-	-	
Serbia (since 2006)	4	2	0	2	4	2	371	192	-	674	169	309	+8/ 2.5	+8/ 2.5	+8/ 2	+8/ 2	+8/ 2.5	
Slovakia (since 1999)	6	1	0	4	0	0	694	1176	-	241	-	-	+10/ 1	+9/ 1.5	+10/ 1	-	-	
Slovenia (since 1991)	9	2	2	5	0	0	564	408	582	153	-	-	+10/ 1	+10/ 1	+10/ 1.5	-	-	
Turkey (since 2007)	6	0	0	0	0	0	603	-	-	-	-	-	+2/ 4	-	-	-	-	
Ukraine (since 1996)	4*	4**	6***	5	4	2	459	324	225	516	275	176	+6/ 3	+6/ 3	+6/ 3	+6/ 3	+6/ 3.5	
Total data	271	107	82	101	22	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average data	10,42	4,12	3,15	3,88	0,85	1,81	599	526	509	319	323	327	+6,3/ 2,7	+7,7/ 2,3	+8,6/ 2	+9,1/ 2,3	+8,7/ 2,3	+8,9/ 2,1

FUMJS = the fully unified majority system; PUMJS = the partly unified majority system; DMJS = the divided majority system; FUMmS = the fully unified minority system; PUMmS = the partly unified minority system; DMmS = the divided minority system; * = including the combined fully (technically) unified minority and majority systems; ** = including the combined partly (technically) unified minority and majority systems; *** = including the combined technically divided minority and majority systems.

Source: The author's own interpretations and calculations. The table is compiled on the basis of averaged counts due to the authors' use of data for each country. In 2017, it was known about the regulation of the changes in the way of electing presidents from popular to unpopular and of the changes of the systems of government from semi-presidential to parliamentary in Armenia and Georgia, but at the time of the analysis they actually remained semi-presidential countries because the positions of unpopularly elected presidents had not been replaced yet. It was also known about the transformation of semi-presidentialism into presidentialism in Turkey in 2017, but formally it was made only in 2018, i.e. after the new presidential election and the oath of the president.

Instead, it was shown that all the outlined actual (political and behavioral) variations and options of semi-presidentialism in the European countries (the details of this are shown in the table 6) have a great impact on the indicators of democracy or autocracy of their political regimes. In particular, it was found that (from the moment of the introduction of semi-presidentialism and at least as of December 2017) the most democratic cases are the situations of the fully unified minority systems, somewhat less democratic cases are the situations of the partly unified minority systems, the divided minority systems and the divided majority systems and the least democratic and accordingly the most autocratic cases are the situations of the fully and partly unified majority systems. As a result, it was revealed that democracies in the European semi-presidential countries are contributed: by the minority systems, but not the majority systems; by the systems of divided government, but not the systems of unified government; equally by the fully unified systems and the partly unified systems; equally by the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems. Therefore, this argued for the need for a more detailed (hypothetically in other studies) consideration and comparison of the actual (political and behavioral) variations and options of semi-presidential system of government, in particular of such variations as the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems. They, on the one hand, are positioned as the least stable cases of inter-institutional relations within the framework of semi-presidentialism, but, on the other hand, they are positioned as one of the most democratic cases of inter-institutional relations in the analyzed system of government.

Conclusion

The article clarifies that the actual (political and behavioral) typology of semi-presidentialism, which outlines the real powers of political institutions and the peculiarities of relations among them in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”, was initiated to place the institutions of a president and a prime minister in the environment of the distribution of powers and responsibilities in the executive and party (personal and political) composition of legislatures. Thus, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism can be represented both in the form of the systems of unified and divided government (or the systems of support and non-support of presidents in legislatures), as well as their variational derivatives that have different consequences. Accordingly, it was found that the functionality and dynamics of semi-presidentialism are less dependent on institutional and constitutional norms than on political and behavioral factors.

In the expanded form, based on the types of cabinets (i.e. majority or minority) and the parameters of inter-party and intra-party relations, it was argued that semi-presidentialism should be typified on the unified majority systems, the divided majority systems, the divided minority systems and the unified minority systems. In turn, on the basis of how a presidential party is positioned in a cabinet and against the background of a majority or a minority in legislature, it was singled out such refinements of the actual (political and behavioral) variations of semi-presidentialism as: the fully or partly unified majority systems, the fully or partly unified minority systems, the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems.

It was motivated that semi-presidentialism can politically and behaviorally move from one variation to another. In practice, this is reflected in the fact that among the semi-presidential countries of Europe (from the moment of the introduction of semi-presidentialism and at least as of December 2017), the most frequent cases were the situations of the fully unified majority systems, somewhat rarer cases were the situations of the partly unified majority systems and the fully unified minority systems, much rarer cases were the situations of the divided majority systems and the rarest cases were the situations of the partly unified minority systems and the divided minority systems. Much more represented were: the majority systems, but not the minority systems; the systems of unified government, but not the systems of divided government; the fully unified systems, but not the partly unified systems; the divided majority systems, but not the divided minority systems. Instead, summarily the most stable cases were the situations of the fully unified majority systems, somewhat fewer stable cases were the situations of the partly unified majority systems and the divided majority systems and the least stable cases were the situations of the fully or partly unified minority systems and the divided minority systems. In parallel, it was found that the most democratic cases were the situations of the fully unified minority systems, somewhat less democratic cases were the situations of the partly unified minority systems, the divided minority systems and the divided majority systems and the least democratic and accordingly the most autocratic cases were the situations of the fully and partly unified majority systems. On the basis of their comparison it was recognized that: frequency and stability of the various cases of inter-institutional relations within the actual (political and behavioral) types of semi-presidentialism are primarily driven by the greater uniformity/unity of the latter, as well as (to a lesser extent) by their attraction to the status of the majority; democracies in the European semi-presidential countries are contributed by the minority systems, but not the majority systems, by the systems of divided government, but not the systems of unified government, equally by the fully unified systems and the partly unified systems and equally by the divided majority systems and the divided minority systems.

Moreover, the divided majority systems and the divided minority system theoretically and methodologically are the most problematic and practically and empirically the most remarkable within the framework of the European semi-presidentialism. On the one hand, such variations of semi-presidentialism can reduce the effectiveness of political process and governance, since they are capable of generating conflict situations in the triangle “the head of state–cabinet–parliament”. On the other hand, the divided party control over inter-institutional relations, the work of the executive vertical and political process as a whole is maximally constitutional and effective and corresponds as much as possible to the separation of power and the mechanisms of its checks and balances. Thus, the importance of the systems of divided government is diversified by the variability of the formal and actual powers of presidents and prime ministers/cabinets depending on the institutional, procedural, political and behavioral frameworks of their operationalization.

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MIT JAKO INSTRUMENT MANIPULACJI POLITYCZNEJ

W niniejszym artykule omówiono mit polityczny jako jeden ze sposobów wpływu na świadomość polityczną oraz na mobilizację elektoratu. Przeprowadzono analizę podstawowych typów mitu politycznego, z których korzystają różni liderzy polityczni oraz organizacje polityczne. Wyznaczono główne założenia teorii mitu politycznego G. Sorela oraz E. Cassirera. Omówiono najbardziej rozpowszechnione mity, wykorzystywane we współczesnych technikach wyborczych.

Wyrazy kluczowe: mit polityczny, manipulacja, kampania wyborcza, elektorat, świadomość polityczna, świadomość masowa, odrodzenie narodowe

MYTH AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION

In the article political myth as one of the means of influence on political conscience and electorate mobilization has been observed. The main types of political myths, which are used by different political leaders and organisations, have been analysed. The main principles of the theory of political myth by G. Sorel and E. Cassirer have been defined. The most popular myths used in modern election technologies have been examined.

Keywords: political myth, manipulation, election campaign, electorate, political consciousness, mass consciousness, national revival.

W ujęciu tradycyjnym mit jest dawną opowieścią narodową o legendarnych bohaterach, bóstwach, o pochodzeniu zjawisk przyrody. Jest to fikcja, wyjaśniająca układ świata. Mit opowiada o tym, jak rzeczywistość dzięki wyczynom istot nadprzyrodzonych doszła do swojej realizacji, czyli stała się taka, jaka jest. Bohaterowie mitu – istoty nadprzyrodzone, są powszechnie znane, istnieją i działają w legendarnych czasach. Zazwyczaj podstawowy mit łączy w sobie dwa aspekty: diachroniczny (opowieść o przeszłości) i synchroniczny (wyjaśnienie świata współczesnego, niekiedy również przyszłości). Treść mitu odbierana jest przez współczesną świadomość jako rzeczywistość.

Mit z punktu widzenia naukowego badano jeszcze w czasach starożytności. W Antyku mit był nie tylko przedmiotem wierzeń zespołowych, a również występował potężnym narzędziem teoretycznym dla badania procesów społecznych. Współczesny wygląd teoria mitu otrzymała w Nowożytności.

Dla Thomasa Hobbesa, Johna Locke'a, Jeana-Jacquesa Rousseau mit był wzorcem moralnym, wspieranym przez autorytet starożytnych bogów i bohaterów. Epoka oświecenia z jej absolutnym racjonalizmem nieco zastąpiła świadomość mitologiczną, ponieważ wolała umysł, kiedy chodziło o badanie zjawisk naturalnych i społecznych. Ale skrajna racjonalizacja poznania świata przyczyniła się do pojawienia się nowych koncepcji mitologicznych „świata niewidzialnego” (czyli irracjonalnego) Josepha de Maistre'a, „światowej woli” Arthura Schopenhauera, „filozofii życia” Henri Bergsona. Ważną rolę we współczesnym rozumieniu mitu odgrywa twórczość Friedricha Nietzschego, który stworzył własną koncepcję mitu, przemyślając tradycyjne wartości kultury europejskiej i religii chrześcijańskiej. Ogólnie, wymienione wyżej koncepcje ukształtowały filozoficzne podstawy dla formowania teorii mitu, w tym i politycznego. Główną cechą charakterystyczną badania mitów w Nowożytności jest to, iż wtedy nie są one już traktowane jako coś absolutnie nierealne, iluzoryczne i dziwaczne, ale jako coś, co koniecznie charakteryzuje nowoczesność z jej kultem racjonalności.

XX wiek wprowadza pewne zmiany w rozwój nauk społecznych. Teoria polityczna doskonalili zarówno uniwersalne podejście teoretyczne oraz metodologiczne, jak i swój zakres przedmiotowy. Mitologia staje się integralną częścią teorii politycznej. Obecnie badania mitów często mają charakter wielodyscyplinarny. Jeśli wcześniej mit był badany głównie przez filozofów, teraz do badań dołączyli historycy, socjologowie, psychologowie i inni.

Wychodząc z założenia, iż teoria mitu politycznego została zapoczątkowana przez Georges Sorela w pracy „Refleksje o przemocy” (1906 r.), należy przede wszystkim traktować mit jako zjawisko społeczne. W swojej książce G. Sorel dokonuje koniecznego rozróżnienia mitu o powszechnym oburzeniu rewolucyjnym a wydarzeń, które z dużym prawdopodobieństwem wystąpią w rzeczywistości. Mit według niego jest czymś intuicyjnie całościowym i symbolicznym. Jest to niezbędny element postrzegania świata pewnej grupy społecznej, przejaw pragnienia władzy wiodącej siły społecznej. On zaznacza: „uczestnicy wielkich ruchów społecznych wyobrażają sobie najbliższe swoje działania w postaci bitew, które spowodują ich zwycięstwo. Te ważne dla historyka konstrukcje sugeruję, by nazwać mitami”¹. On podkreślał też, że mity mają wielki potencjał mobilizacyjny. Uważał również, że „społeczne” jest w dużej mierze zdeterminowane przez irracjonalne aspiracje duszy, które są mistyfikowane przez wizję sprawiedliwości, ale nie determinuje się ich przez racjonalne pomysły czy obliczenia analityczne². G. Sorel podkreśla, że „mitu nie można sprostować, ponieważ jest on identycznym przekonaniem pewnej grupy. Wchodząc na terytorium mitów, otrzymujemy ochronę przed jakimkolwiek sprostowaniem”³. W rezultacie dochodzi do wniosku, że „mity powinny być traktowane po prostu jako sposób wpływu na teraźniejszość”⁴.

¹ G. Sorel, *Refleksje o przemocy*, Moskwa 2013, s. 43

² G. Sorel, *Refleksje o przemocy*, Moskwa 2013, 293 s.

³ G. Sorel, *Refleksje o przemocy*, Moskwa 2013, s. 51-52

⁴ G. Sorel, *Refleksje o przemocy*, Moskwa 2013, s. 128

Spoleczność naukowa odebrała myśl G. Sorela niejednoznacznie, a to właśnie jego idee aktualizowały przemyślenie problemów rozwoju społecznego, stosunku ideologii do mitologii, wyjaśnienie roli mitu politycznego w polityce.

Podstawową koncepcją rozumienia istoty mitów politycznych stała się symboliczna teoria Ernsta Cassirera. Symbolizm mitu opiera się na fakcie, że przedmioty, nie tracąc swojego znaczenia specyficznego, mogą zamienić się w pewne znaki odzwierciedlające inne przedmioty lub zjawiska, czyli służyć ich symbolicznym analogiem (hymn, flaga, „wieczny ogień” itp.).

W swojej pracy „Mit państwa” (1946) E. Cassirer, nie odwołując się bezpośrednio do G. Sorela, rzeczywiście podziela jego punkt widzenia, uważając, że mit jest potężną siłą, która działa w każdym społeczeństwie i jest systematycznie wykorzystywana do celów politycznych. Jednak w innych aspektach problemu poglądy E. Cassirera i G. Sorela nie są takie same. E. Cassirer analizował fenomen mitu politycznego jako zjawiska ściśle związanego na przykład z totalitaryzmem, konfliktami międzynarodowymi. Szczególnej uwagi udzielił nazistowskim Niemcom. Zauważa, że tak zwane myślenie mitologiczne odrodziło się w epoce Nowożytności po długim okresie historycznym, kiedy było na peryferiach: „Być może najważniejszą i najbardziej trwoźną cechą współczesnego myślenia politycznego jest jego nowa cecha - mitologiczność”. E. Cassirera przerażają nie tylko konsekwencje rozkwitu mitologicznego myślenia w XX wieku, ale także wyzwania, które współczesny mit polityczny rzuca jego koncepcji intelektualnej historii ludzkości.

Z punktu widzenia E. Cassirera istnieje zasadnicza różnica między tradycyjną a współczesną funkcją mitu. W tradycyjnych społeczeństwach twórcy mitów i ich „użytkownicy” uważają mit za prawdę, którą biernie postrzegają. We współczesnych społeczeństwach tworzenie mitów, któremu towarzyszą hasła, neologizmy, przekręcenie znaczenia słów, stało się skomplikowanym procesem, świadomą działalnością; dla tworzenia i rozpowszechnienia mitów korzysta się z najnowocześniejszych technologii. E. Cassirer zaznacza: „Mit zawsze był definiowany jako wynik nieświadomej działalności, produkt wolnej wyobraźni. Ale w naszym wypadku mit tworzony jest według planu. Nowe mity polityczne nie pojawiają się samodzielnie, jako dziki owoc czyjejs wyobraźni. Są one artefaktami, tworzonymi przez mistrzowskich i chytrych rzemieślników. Losem XX wieku, naszego wielkiego wieku technicznego, jest stworzyć technologię tworzenia mitów. Teraz mit jest produkowany w tym samym sensie i z wykorzystaniem tych samych metod, co dla produkcji jakiegokolwiek broni współczesnej”⁵. Właśnie podkreślenie technologiczności mitów politycznych jest cechą szczególną koncepcji E. Cassirera.

Chociaż ani G. Sorel, ani E. Cassirer nie podają precyzyjnego opisu mitu jak takiego, oni próbują zdefiniować typ wyznania, który jest podstawą mitu. Filozofowie uważają, że są różnice między siłą umysłu i siłą uczucia. Moc mitu wynika z faktu, że on może stać się przedmiotem wiary, emocjonalnym ucieleśnieniem wiary, która wiąże człowieka mocniej, niż racjonalne argumenty, oraz która mniej poddaje się empirycznemu zaprzeczeniu. We współczesnej polityce mit staje się potężnym czynnikiem, ponieważ może służyć siłom, które preferują mobilizację

⁵ E. Cassirer, *Techniki współczesnych mitów politycznych* (z książki „Mit o państwie”), Rocznik polityko-filozoficzny, nr 4, 2011, s.118.

mas. Ale może pełnić tę funkcję tylko dlatego, że są ludzie, którzy potrzebują wiary. Naukowcy zgadzają się, że tendencja świadomości społecznej do mitologizacji jest zdeterminowana kontekstem historycznym i społecznym.

Nie mamy na celu omówić wszystkie podstawowe teorie mitu politycznego. Zatrzymanie się na tych dwóch badaczach umożliwiło określenie podobieństwa i różnicy między mitami archaicznymi i współczesnymi. Podobieństwo polega na tym, że:

- zarówno archaiczne, jak i współczesne mity mają na celu nie tylko wyjaśnienie istniejącej, a również tworzenie wizji nowej rzeczywistości, którą należy jeszcze urzeczywistnić;
- podstawowym przedmiotem mitologizacji w obu przypadkach jest przeszłość danej społeczności, która zachowuje swoją aktualność dla teraźniejszości. Jednak analiza współczesnych mitów wykazuje, że coraz częściej mitologizowana jest nie tylko przeszłość, a też współczesność;
- i tradycyjne, i współczesne mity, jako skuteczna siła, która organizuje zachowanie jednostki i mas ludzkich, są realizowane w rytuałach społecznych i wzmacniają więzi społeczne.

Jednak nie mniej ważna jest różnica między tymi mitami:

- w tradycyjnych mitach obiektem mitologizacji są bogowie, bohaterowie kultury lub przodkowie, w mitach współczesnych – realni ludzie czy wydarzenia teraźniejszości lub bliskiej przeszłości;
- polityczne mity nie są dziedziczone z głębi wieków, ale tworzone przez konkretnych ludzi czy grupy osób;
- polityczne mity w przeciwieństwie do mitów archaicznych rozpowszechniane są nie ustnie, a głównie przez środki masowego przekazu.

Podobny punkt widzenia ma ukraiński naukowiec Y. Shajgorodskyy. Jego zdaniem „jeśli archaiczna mitologia jest w przeważnie zmodelowana kosmologicznie, to współczesna cechuje się orientacją społeczną. Głównym zadaniem archaicznego mitu było wyjaśnienie świata, budowa jednego całościowego obrazu światopoglądu. Celem współczesnego mitu politycznego jest swego rodzaju uzasadnienie życia społecznego, pewna interpretacja procesów społecznych”⁶.

Należy również przytoczyć definicję mitu politycznego, których dzisiaj jest wiele. Y. Shajgorodskyy podaje następującą definicję mitu politycznego: „jest to całościowe, uproszczone, przeważnie irracjonalne odzwierciedlenie w świadomości indywidualnej i masowej rzeczywistości politycznej oraz głównych wartości społecznych, swoisty symboliczny sposób ich interpretacji, modelowania świata i życia społecznego”⁷.

⁶ J. Shayhorodzkyy, *Polityka: interakcja mitu i rzeczywistości*, Kijów, 2009, s. 82

⁷ J. Shayhorodzkyy, *Polityka: interakcja mitu i rzeczywistości*, Kijów, 2009, s. 86

Rosyjski badacz A. Czuladze uważa, że „polityczny mit jest mitem, stosowanym w celu realizacji bieżących celów: walki o władzę, legitymizację władzy, sprawowania władzy politycznej”⁸. Kolejny rosyjski badacz M. Shestov uważa, iż mit socjalnie-polityczny można zdefiniować jako „stały i naładowany emocjonalnie stereotyp postrzegania rzeczywistości politycznej w przeszłości i współczesności, stworzony poprzez potrzebę orientacji osobowości i struktur społecznych w procesie politycznym”⁹. Precyzując tę definicję, dodaje, że jest to również „forma twórczej działalności politycznej, której treść polega na konstruowaniu stereotypowych poglądów na temat politycznych realiów przeszłości i teraźniejszości”¹⁰.

Angielski badacz Christopher Flood definiuje mit jako „ideologicznie zaznaczoną opowieść o wydarzeniach z przeszłości, teraźniejszości i przewidzianej przyszłości”¹¹. Jego zdaniem możemy mówić o istnieniu mitu politycznego w przypadku, gdy mamy do czynienia z różnymi historiami o tych samych wydarzeniach, o tych samych ludziach, które interpretują te wydarzenia w podobny sposób i rozpowszechniają się w konkretnej grupie społecznej. Mówiąc „naznaczony ideologicznie” C.Flood ma na myśli, że mit niesie ze sobą odcisk akceptacji założeń, wartości, zadań przyjmowanych za podstawę określonej ideologii lub systemu powiązanych ideologii, a zatem zawiera wyraźne lub ukryte wezwanie do przyjęcia pewnej ideologicznej pozycji.

Szczególnym rodzajem mitów politycznych są mity historyczne, mające swoje osobliwości, a zwłaszcza: produkują nacjonalizm i są jednym z czynników tworzenia nacjonalizmu. Te dwa procesy są ze sobą związane i zasadniczo są kontynuacją siebie nawzajem. Wspomniano już, że mit jest ideologicznie zaznaczoną historią o wydarzeniach historycznych. Ale które wydarzenia historyczne są zazwyczaj mitologizowane? Nie ma wątpliwości, że niektóre wydarzenia historyczne są celowo „zapomniane”, podkreślił to jeszcze Joseph Renan. Profesor Uniwersytetu Oksfordzkiego D. Miller zauważa, że „historia narodowa zawiera elementy mitów do tego stopnia, w którym wyolbrzymiają one znaczenie jednych wydarzeń i zmniejszają znaczenie innych”. Anthony Smith zaproponował następującą strukturę mitów historycznych:

- mit o pochodzeniu czasowym (kiedy pojawiliśmy się);
- mit o miejscowości i imigracji (jak dostaliśmy się do własnego terytorium);
- mit o rodowodzie (kim byli nasi przodkowie i w jaki sposób rozwijaliśmy się);
- mit o epoce heroicznej (jak zostaliśmy majestatyczni);
- mit o upadku (jak okazaliśmy się w stanie upadku);
- mit o odrodzeniu (jak odzyskaliśmy przeszłą wielkość).

Analizując mity o pochodzeniu czasowym, Smith zauważa, że jednym z głównych zadań historyków nacjonalistycznych jest datowanie pojawienia się społeczności. Bardzo często mit

⁸ A. Czuladze, *Mitologia polityczna*, Moskwa, 2004, s. 56

⁹ N. Shestov, *Mit polityczny teraz i kiedyś*, Moskwa, 2005, s. 79

¹⁰ N. Shestov, *Mit polityczny teraz i kiedyś*, Moskwa, 2005, s. 79

¹¹ K. Flood, *Mit polityczny. Badanie teoretyczne*, Moskwa, 2004, s. 41

ten sprowadza się do poszukiwania czasu stworzenia własnej państwowości. Jako przykład Smith przytacza Rütlichswur- narodowy mit Szwajcarii, zgodnie z którym przedstawiciele trzech społeczności Uri, Schwyz i Unterwalden (podstawowe kantony Szwajcarii) w pobliżu Jeziora Czterech Kantonów w 1307 r. złożyli przysięgę wzajemnej pomocy i wspólnie wygnali Habsburgów z ich ziem. W szwajcarskiej wyobraźni historycznej ta data jest uważana za początek istnienia Związku Szwajcarskiego, chociaż z prawnego punktu widzenia taka data to 1291, kiedy podpisano Unię.

Mit o miejscowości staje się bardzo ważny, gdy istnieją roszczenia dotyczące pewnego terytorium, ponieważ przestrzeń jest kolejnym ważnym środkiem niezbędnym dla granic samoidentyfikacji. W tym przypadku historia dostarcza nacjonalistom „dowodów” w walce o autonomię i niezależność. Na przykład znaczna część historii kulturowej konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego może być opisana w kategoriach twierdzeń historycznych na terytorium między Jordanią a Morzem Śródziemnym. Smith zauważa, że „dla identyfikacji etnicznej przywiązania i skojarzenia są ważniejsze niż życie na konkretnym terytorium lub posiadanie ziemi. Jest to miejsce, do którego należymy. Często występuje jako święta ziemia... Ponadto święte miejsca ojczyzny przyciągają członków grupy etnicznej lub inspirują ich z daleka, nawet jeśli ostatni przez długi czas przebywają w wygnaniu. A więc nawet po długiej rozłące z ojczyzną, grupa etniczna może zostać zachowana dzięki silnej nostalgii i więzi duchowej”¹². Dotyczy to w dużej mierze losu takich społeczności diaspory jak żydowska i ormiańska.

Mit o rodowodzie zajmuje bardzo ważne miejsce w nacjonalistycznej wyobraźni. W rzeczywistości nie ma znaczenia, czy wspólny przodek lub ojciec-założyciel, był osobą mityczną lub quasi-historyczną.

Kolejnym elementem schematu Smitha jest mit o epoce heroicznej. Podczas gdy definicje wielkości i sławy są różne, każdy nacjonalizm potrzebuje kryteriów cnót i heroizmu, aby skierować i nadać znaczenie zadaniom odrodzenia. Przyszłość społeczności etnicznej może otrzymać znaczenie i ukształtować się od „złotego wieku”, w którym wszyscy ludzie byli „bohaterami”. Bohaterowie tworzą model postępowania moralnego, ich wyczyny inspirują ich uciskanych potomków do wiary i odwagi. Najbardziej ilustrujące przykłady można znaleźć w Antyku na Bliskim Wschodzie: uwolnienie Żydów przez Mojżesza z Egiptu i późniejsza chwała królestwa Dawida, czy wyzwolenie Aten i Grecji od tyranów i inwazji perskiej, mające swoją kulminację w czasach Peryklesa.

Co dotyczy mitu odrodzenia, ma on swoją specyfikę. W tym przypadku przechodzimy od sfery wyłącznie wyjaśniającego mitu do normatywnej ideologii: od wyidealizowanej, epickiej historii do zestawu „niezbędnych działań”, do uzasadnienia zbiorowej mobilizacji.

W ten sposób na przykład rosyjski historyk Wiktor Shnirelman, analizując rosyjskie, ukraińskie i białoruskie historyczne mity, stwierdza, że są one zasadniczo podobne. Wspólne cechy nacjonalistycznego mitu trzech narodów wg Shnirelmanato:

¹² E. Smith, *Identyczność narodowa*, Kijów, 1994, s. 32

- Twierdzenie o nie zwykle dawnej historii pewnej kultury i języka, jeśli w ogóle nie istnienie od zawsze. Ten autochtoniczny akcent jest bezpośrednio związany z walką o terytorium i może być konwencjonalnie nazywany „zespołem Robinsona Crusoe”;
- Chęć tworzenia wizji bardzo dawnych granic etnicznohistorycznych i rozszerzenia dawnych terytoriów życia swojej grupy etnicznej o ile się da;
- Bezwzględna identyfikacja swojej grupy etnicznej z konkretnym językiem, właściwym dla tej grupy od dawnych czasów.
- Pewność tego, że terytorium własnej grupy etnicznej było miejscem powstawania nie tylko tej grupy etnicznej, ale także innych pokrewnych grup, które później osiedliły się na innych ziemiach. Tak więc własna grupa etniczna w odniesieniu do innych jest uważana za „starszego brata”, co pozwala jej ubiegać się o ważne przywileje i czyni te roszczenia naturalnymi i legalnymi.
- Próby identyfikacji własnych przodków z jakimkolwiek „sławnym” narodem, znanym ze źródeł pisanych lub folkloru.
- Pretensje o priorytet historyczny niektórych kulturalnych (system pisma) lub politycznych (państwowość) osiągnięć swoich przodków w porównaniu do przodków sąsiedzkich narodów. W tym, wszyscy nacjonałiści uważają za ważne podkreślenie tego, że ich przodkowie są twórcami najbardziej dawnych państw.
- Powiększenie stopnia konsolidacji etnicznej w dawnych czasach.
- Tworzenie wizji „wroga zewnętrznego”, walka z którym konsoliduje grupę etniczną.
- Włączanie do swojej wspólnoty innych grup etnicznych, co powinno uzasadnić siłę własnej grupy etnicznej¹³.

Wszystkie wspomniane cechy nacjonalistycznych mitologemów mają całkiem zrozumiałą podstawę „funkcjonalistyczną”: są one skierowane na legitymizację terytorialnych czy politycznych ambicji pewnej grupy etnicznej, stworzenia dla niego komfortu psychologicznego oraz prestiżu, co ułatwia konfrontację tej grupy etnicznej z innymi, wzmacnia jego solidarność wewnętrzną itp.

Wspierając konsolidację wspólnoty etnicznej, mity wykonywały jeszcze jedną bardzo ważną funkcję – były one sposobem na oddzielenie „nas” od „nich”, nasz naród - obcy naród, nasza historia - ich historia, itd.

Radziecka mitologia historyczna również miała charakter imperialny, a podstawą istnienia państwa radzieckiego był rosyjski nacjonalizm. Ale radziecka wersja mitologii historycznej zmieniła się w porównaniu z Imperium Rosyjskim. Jak wiadomo, Imperium Rosyjskie oficjalnie posiadało doktrynę „zjednoczonego i niepodzielnego” narodu rosyjskiego, zgodnie z którą Wielcy Rosjanie (Rosjanie), Mali Rosjanie (Ukraińcy) i Białorusini byli częścią zjednoczonego narodu. Pojęcia Ukraina, język ukraiński itp. ogólnie w oficjalnym dyskursie władzy cesarskiej

¹³ V. Shnirelman, *Mit nacjonalistyczny: charakterystyki podstawowe. Wersja rosyjska, ukraińska oraz białoruska*, źródło: <http://urokiistorii.ru/history/soc/52008>

nie używano. Zgodnie z tą doktryną, „małorosyjskim” językiem, historia „Małej Rosji” była tylko regionalną wersją języka i ogólnej historii rosyjskiej. Więc rosyjska doktryna imperialna „zaprzeczyła” narodowi ukraińskiemu na jego własną osobną egzystencję.

Radziecka rzeczywistość zmieniła tę oficjalną doktrynę. Oficjalnie Związek Radziecki był federacją republik, które w swoich granicach, przede wszystkim, były narodowe. W przeciwieństwie do Imperium Rosyjskiego, Państwo radzieckie „uznało” istnienie odrębnego narodu ukraińskiego z własnym językiem i własnym terytorium. Niemniej jednak radziecka mitologia historyczna, podobnie jak w przeszłości, odmawiała Ukrainie niepodległości od Rosji. Najlepiej ilustruje to sowiecki mit Rady Perejasławskiej z 1654 roku.

Idea rosyjskiego świata jest ściśle związana z tak zwaną koncepcją „zagranicznych rodaków”. Zagraniczni rodacy w rosyjskim dyskursie społeczno-politycznym – to osoby wywodzące się z wcześniej zjednoczonego państwa (RFSRR, ZSRR), mówią po rosyjsku, identyfikują siebie z Rosją i są do niej lojalne. Współczesne władze rosyjskie przyjęły misję mesjańską – chronić swoich rodaków za granicą. W praktyce oznacza to ingerencję Rosji w wewnętrzne sprawy innych krajów pod pretekstem ochrony „rosyjskiego świata”.

Mit polityczny, oddziałujący na najgłębsze warstwy ludzkiej psychiki, obniża racjonalne postrzeganie świata do poziomu krytycznego, gdzie dominują komponenty emocjonalno-sensoryczne. Z tego powodu wpływ mitu jest ogromny, a jeśli zostanie poprawnie przedstawiony i zaakceptowany przez ludność, zaspokoi rzeczywiste potrzeby społeczeństwa i zaproponuje ich rozwiązanie, będzie mógł radykalnie zmienić sytuację polityczną, odgrywając rolę w dystrybucji i redystrybucji portfeli władzy i legitymizować siły, które doszły do władzy oraz nowy porządek polityczny.

Mit socjalny jest podstawą manipulacji świadomością masową poprzez twierdzenia i idee, które są postrzegane głównie bez krytycznej refleksji. W każdym społeczeństwie są mity, które są aktywnie wspierane przez koła rządzące, w szczególności za pośrednictwem środków masowego przekazu.

Celem manipulowania politycznego poprzez wykorzystanie mitów jest otrzymanie i zachowanie władzy. Podobne cele są osiągnięte w sposób wyborów, ponieważ żadna kampania wyborcza nie odbywa się bez wykorzystania tych i owych mitów, a sukces na wyborach nie jest możliwy bez wsparcia społecznego. Ze względu na to, celem manipulatorów jest formowanie u wyborców wizji konieczności wspierania pewnej siły politycznej lub kandydata. Manipulator musi odgadnąć społeczne oczekiwania i zaoferować optymalny obraz kandydata lub program polityczny.

Ważną rolę w czasie wyścigów wyborczych odgrywają media, więc nie jest zaskakujące, że te ostatnie działają jako najskuteczniejsze narzędzie dla wkorzenia w świadomości ludzi mitów politycznych. I, jak zauważa ukraiński socjolog Oлександр Bazarov, chociaż „nie są zdolne do transformacji samej rzeczywistości, ale są w stanie zmienić jej wizję”¹⁴.

¹⁴ O. Bazarov, *Mit polityczny jako instrument współczesnych technologii wyborczych*, źródło: http://www.rusnauka.com/ESPR_2006/Politologia/1_bazarov.doc.htm

Technika tworzenia mitów opiera się na zrozumieniu stopnia wpływu na świadomość, stan psychiczny i oczekiwania ludzi, i właśnie to dokładnie pozwala wykorzystać je w celu mobilizacji dużej ilości ludzi w wyborach, wsparcia niepopularnych decyzji politycznych, władz, a nawet antynarodowych reżimów. Jurij Shaihorodzky uważa, że „mit jest zdolny do ustabilizowania środowiska politycznego, obniżenia poziomu niepewności procesów politycznych, zatem od przywódców politycznych zależy, czy rozpowszechniane przez nich mity będą pozytywną zasadą integracyjną, czy staną się manipulacyjną technologią wpływu na „świadomość wyborców”¹⁵.

Zatem mit polityczny jest fenomenem świadomości masowej i istnieje tylko w jej obrębie. Odwoływanie się do uczuć, irracjonalność, łatwość percepcji i nasycenie obrazu - wszystko to skierowane jest na zbiorową świadomość oraz kontroluje zachowanie mas. Przynależność do zbiorowej świadomości pozbawia osobę możliwości logicznego postrzegania dostarczonych informacji. Stąd - wielka rola sugestii jako masowej hipnozy i bezkrytyczność wobec przepływów informacji.

Każde społeczeństwo ma swoje własne mity polityczne, które są związane z konkretną osobowością lub wydarzeniem oraz są wspierane i rozpowszechniane przez pewną siłę polityczną w celu osiągnięcia własnych korzyści.

Wśród najbardziej rozpowszechnionych mitów używanych w nowoczesnych technologiach wyborczych można wymienić następujące: mit istnienia „polityka moralnego”, celem którego jest osiągnięcie wspólnego dobra i ustanowienie sprawiedliwości, przekazanie interesów własnych dla interesów społeczeństwa, państwa itp. Istnieje wiele przykładów wykorzystania tego mitu, nawet biorąc pod uwagę Ukrainę. Największe rozpowszechnienie tego mitu występowało podczas kampanii wyborczej w 2004 r. dzięki wysiłkowi zespołu Wiktora Juszczenki, jednak inni politycy nie przestają spekulować wykorzystując i rozpowszechniając tę koncepcję.

Podobnym do poprzedniego jest mit o wyjątkowości poszczególnych polityków, ich cechach wyróżniających, umiejętności rozwiązywania bolesnych problemów społeczno-politycznych i wyprowadzania kraju z kryzysu. Osobny polityk pojawia się w opinii publicznej jako bohater lub mesjasz. Zostało to wyraźnie zademonstrowane również na wyborach w 2004 r., kiedy aktualną stała się potrzeba jaskrawej osobowości, bohatera, rolę którego odegrał W. Juszczenko, stała się pilna. Niestety, ujawnienie tego mitu było szybkie i wcale nie bezbolesne dla ukraińskiego społeczeństwa.

Kolejny mit – mit o istnieniu prawdziwego społeczeństwa demokratycznego, podstawą którego jest zabezpieczenie wolności i równości obywateli, osiągnięcie sprawiedliwości społecznej, demokratyczna władza polityczna. Prawie wszystkie siły polityczne mają na celu zbudować naprawdę demokratyczne społeczeństwo, jednak po przyjsciu do władzy wątpliwie uda się znaleźć wyniki rzeczywistej realizacji tych idei.

¹⁵ J. Shaihorodzky, *Mity polityczne w kampaniach wyborczych*, źródło: <http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/707770/1/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B%D1%96%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%96%20%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%84%D0%B8%20%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%85%20%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%B9.pdf>

Związany z poprzednim, nawet może być uważany za jeden z jego elementów, to mit o wolności słowa czy o pluralizmie mediów, o którym, między innymi, mówił jeszcze Herbert Schiller w pracy „Sternicy świadomości”. A dokładnie zauważa, że „ten właśnie mit jest głównym mitem, który zapewnia sukces manipulacji”¹⁶. Aby wprowadzić go w życie, przeprowadzane są różne badania społeczne, sondaże wyjazdowe, zapraszane są niezależni eksperci. Jednak powstaje pytanie, skąd bierze się te informacje i czy mogą one odpowiadać rzeczywistości. Niezależne kanały telewizyjne, które emitują niezależną postawę wobec różnych sił politycznych i kandydatów - są także tylko złudzeniem, ponieważ za każdym z nich jest wpływowa osoba, która popiera konkretną siłę polityczną lub w ogóle do niej należy.

Niektórzy naukowcy, w tym Dmytro Arabadzhyev, wyodrębniają „narodowe” jako rodzaj mitu politycznego. Spekulacje na temat takich abstrakcyjnych idei jak naród, świadomość narodowa, narodowy charakter i język, idea narodowa mają, według naukowca, mitologiczny charakter. Spekulacje na temat tych kategorii są aktywnie wykorzystywane w kampaniach wyborczych przez prawie wszystkie siły polityczne. Można dodać, że skuteczność tego mitu jest najwyższa, ponieważ według statystyk popiera go 52–55% Ukraińców.

Oprócz wyżej wymienionych można przytoczyć jeszcze wiele mitów funkcjonujących w dzisiejszym społeczeństwie. Na przykład patriotyczny mit, mit konfrontacji Wschód-Zachód, mit obrońcy ojczyzny itd. One różnią się swoją treścią, ale mają jedną orientację funkcjonalną - mają na celu manipulowanie masową świadomością obywateli w celu osiągnięcia zamierzonego rezultatu. Jak już wspomniano, mity polityczne istnieją na głębokich poziomach świadomości, a zatem trudno je zniszczyć. Walka z nimi jest praktycznie niemożliwym zadaniem. Jedyne, co można tutaj zrobić, to określić dystans między rzeczywistymi zdolnościami polityków, ich wolą polityczną a mitami politycznymi, które proponują i propagują.

Tworzenie mitów było i pozostaje integralną częścią procesów politycznych. Technologia tworzenia mitów (jako sztuka, umiejętność, metoda przekształcania rzeczywistości w to, co jest potrzebne) opiera się na rozumieniu stopnia wpływu mitu na świadomość i jego cechach szczególnych, zwłaszcza na fakt, że nie opiera się on na rzeczywistości, ale na stanie psychologicznym i oczekiwaniach ludzi¹⁷.

Nataliya Probyholovaza uważa, iż za dobrze przygotowanym wizerunkiem członkowi społeczeństwa trudno jest odróżnić rzeczywiste biznesowe i moralne cechy kandydatów, określić ich pozycje polityczne. Ten rodzaj działalności manipulacyjnej i reklamowej przekształca wybór obywateli z swobodnej i świadomej decyzji w formalny akt, z góry zaprogramowany przez ekspertów w tworzeniu masowej świadomości. Autorka zaproponowała następujące typy mitów:

1. Mit „o ratowniku-mesjaszu”. Kandydat, dookoła którego tworzy się ten mit, odbierany jest jako człowiek, który pod warunkiem jego przyjścia do władzy, będzie

¹⁶ H. Schiller, *Sternicy świadomości*, Moskwa, 1980, s. 36.

¹⁷ J. Shayhorodzkyi, *Mit polityczny jako środek badania polityki*, 'Współczesna polityka ukraińska i politologia o niej', 2010, nr 21, s. 32-38.

mógł wyprowadzić kraj z kryzysu lub trudnej sytuacji. Przykładem z kampanii politycznych Ukrainy jest postać Wiktora Juszczenki jako kandydata na prezydenta.

W tym kontekście Y. Shajgorodskyy wskazuje, że mitologiczna świadomość wyborcy jest bezkrytyczna wobec odniesień, które wydawało by się zaprzeczają sobie nawzajem: „swoją chłopak, jest mesjaszem”. W kontekście tego mitu rozgrywa się mit „o wrogu (wrogach)”, którego musi pokonać „bohater”¹⁸. Właśnie takimi „bohaterami” ostatnich dwóch kampanii prezydenckich w 2014 i 2019 roku stali się P. Poroszenko i W. Zełenski.

2. Mit „o konspiracji” dość mocno ustalony w świadomości masowej. Eksploatacja tego mitu w świadomości masowej pod czas wyścigów politycznych występuje dość często i w różnych postaciach, które nie zawsze są ukierunkowane politycznie. Podstawą tego mitu jest archetypowa konstrukcja relacji „swoi-cudzy”, „przyjaciel-wróg”.
3. Mit „próba losu” jest wyraźnie przedstawiony w ludowych przysłowiach: „Za jednego bitego dwóch niebitych dają”, „Przeszedł przez ogień, wodę i miedziane rury” itp. Z reguły dzięki próbom osoba zdobywa wielkie doświadczenie osobiste, głębokie ludzkie cechy. To właśnie jest akcentem w kampanii konkretnego kandydata - jego wcześniejsze doświadczenia i osiągnięcia powinny stać się kluczem do sukcesu w przyszłych działaniach politycznych.
4. Mit „o życzliwej współpracy” korzysta z przekonania, że zawsze jest pewne dobre towarzystwo, „inni ludzie są tak samo dobrzy jak ja”, „ktoś nam pomoże”. Jest to kształtowaniem wizerunku dobrego bohatera, podkreśleniem znaczenia wzajemnej pomocy. Ta kategoria mitów ma bardzo długą historię (bajki Słowian, Skandynawów i innych narodów o dobrych bohaterach). Używa się przekonania o tym, że udzielana pomoc wraca jeszcze większą miarą od innych. Ogólnie lista stałych mitów w środowisku społeczno-kulturowym jest bardzo duża.

Wśród współczesnych mitów politycznych znajduje się mit o „reformach”, społeczeństwie równych możliwości, wyboru europejskiego i integracji z Europą, „jedynej Ukrainie” itp. We współczesnych warunkach Ukraina balansuje między znalezieniem sposobów na swoje „odrodzenie” i „europejskim wyborem”, który staje się kolejnym mitem. W masowej świadomości europejski wybór nabywa mitycznej postaci rajy i bezproblemowego życia („euro-remont”, „euro-okna”, „ruch bezwizowy” itp.)¹⁹.

¹⁸ J. Shayhorodzkyy, *Mity polityczne w kampaniach wyborczych*, źródło: <http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/707770/1/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B%D1%96%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%96%20%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%84%D0%B8%20%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%85%20%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%B9.pdf>

¹⁹ O. Korobanova, *Mity i rzeczywistość w politycznej świadomości młodzieży*, 'Czasopismo Odeskiego Uniwersytetu Narodowego im. I. Miecznikowa', Seria: psychologia, 2016, nr1, s. 125-136.

Współczesny mit polityczny jest postrzegany jako jeden z mechanizmów oddziaływania na świadomość społeczeństwa, jako sposób politycznej manipulacji pod czas przeprowadzania wyborów, jako czynnik w procesie wyborczym, proces wykorzystywania wyborów jako mechanizmu wdrażania mitu politycznego²⁰.

Odwołując się do typologii mitów, zaproponowanej przez Natalię Talalay, możemy wyodrębnić w społeczeństwie cztery mity: mit odrodzenia narodowego, komunistyczny, demokratyczny oraz imperialny mit. Te mity spotykamy praktycznie w każdym kraju, jedyną różnicą jest to, gdzie jaki mit dominuje. Według niej w USA i krajach Europy dominuje mit demokratycznego rozwoju, w Chinach – komunistyczny mit, w Rosji – imperialny. W Ukrainie tego typu mity również są popularne, i w różnych okresach dominacja tych lub innych mitów się zmieniała, w szczególności: 1) mit odrodzenia narodowego (na polu tego mitu pracowała J. Tymoszenko, W. Janukowicz, W. Juszczenko, A. Jaceniuk). Wymagania do kandydatów: samowystarczalny mężczyzna w średnim wieku, brak własnej działalności gospodarczej, profesjonalny polityk, zainteresowanie kulturą i historią swojego narodu); 2) demokratyczny mit (S. Tihipko, A. Jaceniuk, P. Poroszenko, W. Zelenskiy). Wymagania do kandydatów: dobre wykształcenie, a lepiej dwa, jest bogaty, ma własny biznes, skuteczny, zdrowy, wykazuje się posłuszeństwem wobec prawa i ustawy, ma twardą pozycję); 3) komunistyczny mit (P. Symonenko, O. Moroz. Wymagania: oddanie ideałom partii i komunizmu, ubogi wygląd (brak własności prywatnej) i przestrzeganie wysokich standardów moralnych); 4) imperialny mit (O. Tiahnybok, D. Korchynsky. Wymagania: mężczyzna w średnim wieku, stara się o stworzenie jednego centrum władzy i sztywnego systemu kontroli państwa)²¹.

W tym kontekście należy zaznaczyć, że kreacja lidera, który całkowicie odpowiadałby temu czy innemu mitowi jest praktycznie nierealnym zadaniem. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, mentalność ukraińskich obywateli jest taka, że zawsze oni szukają tak zwanych idealnych władców, którzy byliby w stanie rozwiązać wszystkie ich problemy, niezależnie od tego, czy należą do ich kompetencji. Zostało to potwierdzone w ostatnich wyborach prezydenckich na Ukrainie w 2019 roku.

W związku z tym kampania przedwyborcza i wyborcza przewiduje cały szereg działań organizacyjnych, organizacyjno-politycznych, mających na celu zapewnienie zwycięstwa kandydata (partii, bloku partii politycznych) w procesie wyborczym. Ważne w tym procesie jest etap tworzenia programów i strategii marketingowych. Cechą charakterystyczną prawie wszystkich kampanii, zaczynając od aspektów organizacyjnych i kończąc publiczną analizą wyników wyborów, jest to, że towarzyszą im pewne polityczne mity. Mit pomaga politykom „zamieniać się” w „bohatera narodowego”, „wybawcę”, który nie tylko może przezwyciężyć wszystkie trudności obecnej sytuacji gospodarczej lub politycznej, ale także „pokonać” wszystkich przeciwników, skorumpowanych itp. Kluczem jest tu całkowity zbieg charakterystyk prawdziwej osoby

²⁰ Świadomość polityczna. Polityczny słownik encyklopedyczny, red. Shemchuchenki J., Babkina V., Horbatenka V, Kijów, nr 2, 2004, s. 510-511.

²¹ N. Talalay, *Polityczna mitologia Ukrainy: wizerunek kandydatów*, źródło: <https://www.unian.ua/politics/284997-politichna-mifologiya-ukrajini-imidj-kandidativ.html>

z mitologicznym bohaterem, co z jednej strony zwiększa szanse na zwycięstwo, a drugiej – polityk staje się zakładnikiem stworzonego dla niego mitu.

Mity na przestrzeni postradzieckiej w takich czy innych wersjach mają miejsce we wszystkich kampaniach wyborczych na Ukrainie, ponieważ za lata sowieckiej władzy obywatele przyzwyczaili się myśleć w kategoriach mitów. W kampanii wyborczej i przedwyborczej mit, będąc centralną ideą, staje się sposobem wpływu na świadomość wyborców i zachęca ich do dokonania konkretnego wyboru. Jest to spowodowane zarówno treścią i formą mitu, jak i cechami świadomości zbiorowej.

Mit zawsze jest uproszczeniem rzeczywistości, prostym wyjaśnieniem sensu i celu życia; jest to walka bohatera ze złem, z antybohaterem; jest to przekonanie, że poprzez szybkie pokonanie trudności, w nagrodę, otrzymamy tę przyszłość, w której wszyscy będą mieli to, czego najbardziej pragną. Mit zawsze opiera się na wierze, nie na argumentach, zaskakująco, nie na faktach, a na emocjach, a nie na logice. Siła mitu polega na jego prostocie, w tym, że czyni życie bezpiecznym i wygodnym. Dla przeciętnego człowieka, zwłaszcza w trudnych okresach przemian społeczno-politycznych, mit tworzy tło uczuć, stanów emocjonalnych i złudzeń, które chce się zachować, ignorując przy tym zdrowy rozsądek, a nawet zgadzając się na oszustwo / samooszukiwanie. Mit zawsze tworzy spójny obraz, łącząc niepołączalne, prawdę i wymysł.

W jakiegokolwiek kampanii wyborczej używa się centralnego mitu, który przede wszystkim powinien dotyczyć kwestii, najbardziej aktualnych dla wyborców w tej chwili. Ponadto, taki mit powinien być prosty, konkurencyjny i odpowiednio zrozumiały dla obywateli. Centralny mit musi też podkreślać wyjątkowość kandydata, jego niezwykle cechy i umiejętności, aby być jasnym i bogatym emocjonalnie. W takim micie wyborca nie tylko odegra pewną rolę, ale, co ważniejsze, stanie się współautorem swojego mitu.

Mity można pokonać tylko wtedy, gdy masową świadomość zastąpi indywidualna, zwiększają się krytyczne nastroje w społeczeństwie i rozwijają się niezależne środki masowego przekazu. Oczywiście, nowe mity pojawią się na miejscu starych, ale powinny to być mity skierowane na rozwój świadomości politycznej, kiedy „mit traci swój charakter zbiorowej wiary i staje się metodologiczną podstawą teorii rozwoju społeczeństwa”²².

Dlatego w przyszłości z mitów nadal będzie się korzystało w zależności od sytuacji społeczno-kulturowej i historycznej, i nadal będą one potężnym źródłem manipulacji świadomością ludzi.

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²² A. Petrucciari, *Fikcja i nauka*, 'Utopia i myślenie utopijne: antologia literatury światowej', Moskwa, 1991, 405 s.

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12. Shayhorodzkyy, *Mity polityczne w kampaniach wyborczych*, źródło: <http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/707770/1/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%96%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%96%20%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%84%D0%B8%20%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%85%20%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%B9.pdf>
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THE FEATURES, PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIANS' ETHNIC IDENTITY AND POLARIZATION IN THE POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES (1991-2000)

The article is dedicated to analyzing the peculiarities of ethnic identity, polarization and politicization of Russians in the post-Soviet space and as one of the factors of geopolitical positioning of some countries of the region. The author determined what was the essence of the policy of identity and polarization of Russians in the post-Soviet space (in particular, in the period of 1991-2000) and found out why in some countries it led to catastrophic consequences, while in others it did not prevent the change of geopolitical priorities and «separation» from the post-Soviet space. It was proved that ethnic identity, polarization and politicization of Russians in different post-Soviet countries were formed gradually and multi-vectored and were determined both by political and socio-economic factors and psychological effects.

Keywords: ethnic identity, polarization, politicization, Russians, post-Soviet countries.

CECHY, PRZESŁANKI I KONSEKWECJE TOŻSAMOŚCI ETNICZNEJ I POLARYZACJI ROSJAN W KRAJACH POSTSOWIECKICH (1991-2000 RR.)

W artykule przeanalizowane zostały cechy tożsamości etnicznej, polaryzacji i upolitycznienia Rosjan na obszarze postradzieckim oraz jako jeden z czynników usytuowania geopolitycznego niektórych krajów regionu. Ustalono, na czym polega istota polityki tożsamości i polaryzacji Rosjan w obszarze postradzieckim (w szczególności w latach 1991-2000 r.) i dlaczego w niektórych krajach doprowadziła ona do katastrofalnych skutków, podczas gdy w innych nie zaszkodziła zmianie geopolitycznych priorytetów i „oderwaniu” od obszaru postradzieckiego. Ustalono, że tożsamość etniczna, polaryzacja i upolitycznienie Rosjan w różnych krajach postsowieckich kształtowały się stopniowo i w różnych kierunkach, uwarunkowane zarówno czynnikami politycznymi i społeczno-ekonomicznymi jak i skutkami psychologicznymi.

Słowa kluczowe: tożsamość etniczna, polaryzacja, upolitycznienie, Rosjanie, kraje postradzieckie.

After the Soviet collapse, the geopolitical reality on the geographical territories of the new States began within the so-called “post-Soviet space” and Russian political pressure. Nevertheless, due to various social-economic and political processes, at the beginning of the 20th

century, there occurred a change in the vector of geopolitical development of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which ceased to be regarded as post-Soviet and became a part of the EU, accompanied by significant fluctuations in the geopolitical development of some countries of Eastern Europe, in particular Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which despite declaring their Euro-Atlantic orientation have been under the significant influence of Russia (due to military actions). Thus, some former post-Soviet countries ceased to be such, some certainly remain the same, while others were volatile in their efforts to either escape from the post-Soviet past or to return it, that is, at the “geopolitical frontier and crossroads.” There are numerous endogenous and exogenous reasons accounting for this, but one of the crucial and highly artificial is the reason that revolves around ethnic identity and polarization of the Russians (as the former “largest union of ethnicity”) in Post-Soviet countries outside Russia. The fact is that when all the new States belonged to the post-Soviet world, ethnic identity, status, and consequently the polarization of the Russians was a key tool of artificially created tensions in the region. Accordingly, the processes, accompanying the creation of a stance on the role of ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet space, mainly in 1991-2000 due to the influence of Russia, were largely catalyzed during the “geopolitical split” in the region. Consequently, their serving as factors of future geopolitical reality need to be understood and thoroughly examined, since ethnic identity and polarization of Russians in the post-Soviet countries in 1991-2000 played a cruel and purposeful “political joke” at some post-Soviet politicians in the future.

The stated problems are explored in the scientific refinements by such researchers as A. Aasland¹, V. Arutiunian i L. Drobizheva², I. Bremmer³, R. Brubaker⁴, L. Diamond i M. Plattner⁵, G. Evans⁶, A. Kappeler⁷, A. Khazanov⁸, P. Kolstoe⁹, D. Laitin¹⁰, T. Raun¹¹, V. Zaslavsky¹², and others. They have comprehensively explored the issues of ethnic identity and polarization of Russians in the post-Soviet space. However, as of present it is extremely important to return

¹ Aasland A., *Russians in Latvia: Ethnic identity and ethnopolitical change*, Glasgow 1994.

² Arutiunian V., Drobizheva L., Russkie v raspadaushchemsia Soiuze, “*Otechestvennaia istoriia*” 1992, nr. 3, s. 3-15.

³ Bremmer I., The politics of ethnicity: Russians in the new Ukraine, “*Europe-Asia Studies*” 1994, vol 46, s. 26-83.

⁴ Brubaker R., Aftermaths of empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives, “*Ethnic and Racial Studies*” 1995, vol 18, s. 189-218.; Brubaker R., *East European, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Nationalisms: A Framework for Analysis*, [w:] Weil F. (ed.), *Research on Democracy and Society*, Wyd. JAI Press 1993, s. 353-378.; Brubaker R., *Political Dimensions of Migration from and Among Soviet Successor States*, [w:] Weiner M. (ed.), *International Migration and Security*, Wyd. Westview Press 1993, s. 39-64.

⁵ Diamond L., Plattner M., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994.

⁶ Evans G., Ethnic schism and the consolidation of post-communist democracies: The case of Estonia, “*Communist and Post-Communist Studies*” 1998, vol 30, s. 57-74.; Evans G., Need A., Explaining Ethnic Polarization over Attitudes towards Minority Rights in Eastern Europe: a Multilevel Approach, “*Estudio Working Paper*” 2000, vol 146.

⁷ Kappeler A., *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*, München 1992.

⁸ Khazanov A., *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Wyd. University of Wisconsin Press 1995.

⁹ Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, “*Ethnic and Racial Studies*” 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.

¹⁰ Laitin D., Identity in formation: the Russian-speaking nationality in the post-Soviet diaspora, “*European Journal of Sociology*” 1995, vol 36, s. 281-316.

¹¹ Raun T., *Estonia and the Estonians*, Wyd. Hoover Institute Press 2001.

¹² Zaslavsky V., *The Neo-Stalinist State: class, ethnicity, and consensus in Soviet society*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1994.

to this issue through the prism of geopolitical repositioning of some countries in the region so as to gain insight into the essence of the policy of identity and polarization of Russians in the post-Soviet space (especially in the period 1991-2000), as well as the reasons why in some countries it led to grave consequences, whereas in others it was not able to prevent the change of geopolitical priorities “detachment” from the post-Soviet space.

To solve the highlighted issues, it is necessary to clearly recognize the fact that ethnic, as any other identity bears volatile nature of the qualities and characteristics of society¹³, although the velocity, direction and depth of change within the framework of ethnic identity depends on a number of factors, including cultural, linguistic, socio-economic, political/geopolitical, thus these changes can either accelerate or inhibit the politicization of ethnicity. In this light the early post-Soviet society was even more specific, since it was characterized by a fast and deep pace of change in its entirety, but most of all in political, economic and cultural domains. Respectively, after the world of “Soviet reality” had collapsed, it affected most, if not all, aspects of the identity of the former Soviet citizens. This was particularly evident in terms of the isolation, and subsequently, the institutionalization and politicization of the Russian ethnic / national minority in the post-Soviet countries of Europe and Asia at the time (after the collapse of the USSR). Moreover, the outlined processes occurred in at least two dimensions, in particular political and ethnic, that is, around the search for answers to the issue of which states and ethnic cultures would become the focus of the new identity of the Russians. In addition, “loyalty” in the case of the political axis and “self-awareness” in the case of the cultural or ethnic axis became the categories that allowed extrapolation of the outlined framework to the scientific plane, since they have begun to be associated with the process of assessing the identity, polarization and politicization of Russians in the post-Soviet world.

This occurred due to the fact that ethnic groups of Russians from the USSR, that is, ethnic Russians throughout the post-Soviet space, have encountered different variations of the identity crisis. On one hand, ethnic Russians, as a former dominant nation of a non-existent state, felt the political option of an identity crisis, on the other hand, various groups of Russian expat community became part of the population of nationalized states, where they began to be regarded as “cultural anomalies”, consequently feeling the cultural option of identity crisis. Therefore, the entire Russian diaspora, according to official statistics, comprised 25 million people, living outside Russia, was wanted to take advantage of both of these two options and therefore suffered the blow of a post-Soviet identity crisis in a double size¹⁴. Thus, a number of Russians and their environment on the territory of the Soviet system were designated in a limited sense as the “property” of other major ethnic groups (titular nations of non-Russian union republics), that is, the fact that the Russians were connected with the central leadership

¹³ Keyes C., Ethnic Adaptation and Identity, *Journal of the Siam Society* 1983, vol 70, s. 23.; De Vos G., Romanucci-Ross L., *Ethnic identity in cultural continuity and change*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1982.; Gellner E., *Nations and nationalism*, Wyd. Wiley-Blackwell 2006.

¹⁴ Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.

of the USSR, even being a kind of collective agent outside the RSFSR, posed the problem of their research after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as central to any comparative analysis of ethnic relations in the post-Soviet Union area.

Thus, many researchers of the Soviet problem of nationality and identity were interested in the way the presence of Russians affects the feelings, attitudes, and behavior of non-Russians¹⁵. Feedback got much less attention. For instance, in May 1978 Columbia University organized Colloquium on “Ethnic Russia Today: is the identity crisis undergoing?”¹⁶. Two analytical prospects for the development of the Russian Diaspora identity have been formed. Interestingly, they came with almost opposite conclusions. In particular, W. Kory noted that, despite the fact that Russians are minorities in different countries, and despite the great distance from the “Russian core,” ethnic Russian migrants retain their language, and ethnic identity, and the ethnic identity of the Russian population does not decrease with increasing distance from the “Russian heart”¹⁷. In contrast, M. Pavlovich suggested that Russian diaspora was in the process of obtaining its own identity as different from the central Russian identity: a broad demographic dispersion from Russia’s traditional core over other Soviet Union republics created two different Russian groups, i.e. the basis and periphery, which eventually will lead to weakening of Russian ethnic cohesion and probably change the future of both groups. The scholar addressed the fact that Russian settlers were ultimately forced to adapt to the environment and traditions that dominated in a new place of residence, separating them from the main group¹⁸. However, the hypothesis of M. Pavlovich contradicted the more general idea that members of an ethnic group come into close contact with neighboring groups, forming a feeling of attachment to their own nation. Therefore, according to the generally accepted theory, national identity is largely constructed through the prism of the “we – they” opposition. In case a core group is less likely to confront “them” then it has less identity than “we”¹⁹. On this occasion R. Pearson has unequivocally stated that “border”; residents and ethnicities are more sensitive to national identity and loyalty because of the proximity of state borders, so they will develop stronger commitment due to growing awareness of alternatives and higher propensity to neurosis due to change of territory and national security²⁰. Consequently, R. Pearson, on the periphery, not only had not changed or weakened national identity, but even strengthened it, which was quite relevant in the case of Post-Soviet countries.

¹⁵ Carrere d’Encausse H., *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*, Wyd. Newsweek Books 1981.; Karklins R., *Ethnic Relations in the USSR*, Wyd. Allen & Unwin 1986, s. 80-81.

¹⁶ Allworth E., *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance*, Wyd. Pergamon 1980.

¹⁷ Kory W., *Spatial diffusion of the Russians in the USSR*, [w:] Allworth E. (ed.), *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance*, Wyd. Pergamon 1980, s. 288.

¹⁸ Pavlovich M., *Ethnic Impact of Russian Dispersion in and Beyond the RSFSR* Allworth Edward, *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: the Dilemma of Dominance*. Wyd. Pergamon 1980, s. 294-305.

¹⁹ Allworth E., *Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance*, Wyd. Pergamon 1980, s. 306-307.

²⁰ Pearson R., *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945*, Wyd. Macmillan 1983.

Also, it is worth mentioning that the new political map (following the collapse of the USSR) has influenced not only the methodology of the study but also its relevance. The fact is that in 1978, the differences between Russian base group and the diaspora group became an analytical tool for academic discussion. However, upon the collapse of the USSR, that is, in the early 1990s, these issues have been directly relevant to the political / geopolitical process. For example, if the Russian diaspora, considers itself “the Latvians of Russian origin” in Latvia, it affects political discourse and political stability in the region in a completely different way than, for example, if they consider themselves “Russians who were forced to live in Latvia”²¹. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, Western scholars addressed the topic of “comparative diasporas”²². Yet very few new ideas were applied to the study of the Russian minority in the former Soviet republics, as the diaspora was defined as a community of migrants far from their homeland and not from the population of multinational states that were formed in Eastern Europe in the twentieth century. For example, J. Armstrong excluded from the definition of Diaspora groups that are not “completely devoid of political commitment in their larger communities”²³. Therefore, it was only in the early 1990s that post-Imperial diasporas became the object of comparative theoretical analysis²⁴, although to a very small extent they were associated with the aspect of ethnic identity and polarization.

At the beginning of the study of the Russian Diaspora following the collapse of the USSR, of course, there was no reason to believe that all its members and representatives would act and respond to events in the same way. On the contrary, the term “Russian diaspora” was quite problematic, as there were various options for its interpretation, affecting the peculiarities of status and differences within groups. Therefore, we should concentrate attention on both the observation of the varieties within the Russian diaspora, as well as its attributes, especially in the context of establishing patterns. It should also be noted that any attempt to predict the trajectory of identity development in the Russian diaspora in different republics of the former USSR will necessarily provoke speculations, since identity formation is a lengthy process that spans over decades and generations. Therefore, one should be cautious in the process of mechanical extrapolation of current and past trends into the future. Despite this, it is common knowledge (typical for most countries of the world) that third-generation immigrants usually reject cultural preferences of their parents or, conversely, consciously try to return some of the ethnic preferences of their grandparents (explaining this by their roots). In addition, since a person is not a socially programmed machine, many separate stories, of course, can differ materially from the probability of calculating the actual results in any way. This is accompanied by the

²¹ Aasland A., *Russians in Latvia: Ethnic identity and ethnopolitical change*, Glasgow 1994.

²² Sheffer G., *A new field of study: Modern diasporas in international politics*, [w:] Sheffer G. (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1986, s. 1-15.

²³ Armstrong J., Mobilized and proletarian diasporas, *American Political Science Review* 1976, vol 70, nr. 2, s. 395.

²⁴ Brubaker R., *Political Dimensions of Migration from and Among Soviet Successor States*, [w:] Weiner M. (ed.), *International Migration and Security*, Wyd. Westview Press 1993, s. 39-64.

fact that culturally the Russian diaspora has faced up to a choice of three identities: identification with the dominant culture of the foreign homeland (Russia); the development of a new, mostly Russian, self-awareness; identification with the dominant culture in the country of residence (new nationalized countries). The political options can be considered in the model of four options: loyalty to the historical borders of the Russian state (even to the attempt to restore them); loyalty to the new Russian state (the Russian Federation); the desire to create a new nation-state; loyalty to the state nationalization of new places of residence of Russians²⁵.

However, the difference between political loyalty and cultural self-awareness is all about the speed of change. Political loyalty can change faster than cultural awareness. The radical changes, having led to the collapse of the USSR, are a striking example of how the speed of political reorientation can vary in exceptional situations. In reality, the Russian Diaspora has found it difficult to respond to an attempt to portray its cultural identity or its political loyalty. Accordingly, the responses of Russians depend significantly on the context in which the question is raised. In case the reference system (the dominant culture) in the country of residence describes what they call themselves simply "Russian", then the context of the external homeland, as a rule, may contain the various unique features that distinguish them from the main group of Russian (those living in Russia). Therefore, it is expedient to analyze the most likely variations in the identification of Russians in the countries of the near Russian expatriate community, and in particular in the post-Soviet space, since they have definitely been making a significant impact upon the political and geopolitical processes around the region.

One of the options has been the cultural (ethnic) point of view of the external homeland of the Russians through the prism of cultural identification. Thus, in the USSR, each person was characterized by a double identity: political, as a citizen of the Soviet Union, and ethnic, as a member of a certain nationality. This dual character was reflected in the internal passport, where citizenship and nationality were entered separately²⁶. Therefore, Soviet citizens living outside their own "republics" had not only the right but also the obligation to identify ethnicity with the main group. Accordingly, representatives of the Russian Diaspora, which fell under the cultural option, mastered the official nationality, which was assigned to them. Simultaneously, there are several correlations: 1. Political loyalty to historical borders and traditional Soviet identity. It is worth noting that the "historical borders" of Russia have changed significantly over time, and one of the qualitative features of the Russian Empire was the constant expansion of its territory. This implied loyalty to the Soviet state within the limits that it had at the time of its collapse. We are talking about political loyalty in a territorial sense, but not in an ideological sense. This means that anti-Communist Russians, who identified themselves in this way and wanted (or still want) to restore tsarist Russia, also fall into this category.²⁷ 2. Irredentism. The

²⁵ Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.

²⁶ Zaslavsky V., *The Neo-Stalinist State: class, ethnicity, and consensus in Soviet society*, Wyd. M.E. Sharpe 1994.

²⁷ Kappeler A., *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*, München 1992.

Russians of the non-Russian former Soviet republics could accept the collapse of the Soviet Union as irreversible, but nevertheless could not accept their identity as citizens of the new nationalized states. Instead of the USSR, their territorial focus of identity was Russia in the narrow sense, that is, Russia, which is regarded as a Russian nation-state. Therefore, representatives of the Russian Diaspora that lived or are living in the territories adjacent to Russia could and can demand a revision of the borders so that eventually Russia received a "right" to them. 3. Integrated national minority. The Russians could and could accept political identity as citizens of the successor states, while preserving their cultural identity as Russians. This option should be called an "integrated minority", in terms of which the Russian diaspora have striven to actively participate in the social and political system of the state of residence, using their voice in the struggle for reasons that can ensure their continuous existence as a separate group.

The next option is also a cultural (ethnic) point of view, but about a new Russian self-awareness. Representatives of the Russian diaspora could and still can retain their identities as Russians, but, nevertheless, believed or considered themselves Russians of a particular type. Having lived for generations in a culturally alien environment, these Russians have adopted some of the habits, customs and lifestyles that are common in the region.²⁸ Politically, this identity can go hand in hand with loyalty to the foreign homeland, with the desire to get their statehood, with loyalty to the state of residence of Russians. Methodologically, this approach has been reflected in several basic and paradigmatic planes, which have even received practical implementation: 1. "New Cossacks". This position of an identity is very close to that of the former Russian Cossacks. Cossacks are Russian-speaking (in contrast to the Ukrainian Cossacks), ethno social group, which was formed in the ethnic Borderlands in the southern part of the Russian Empire. Historically, this group was a mixture of several ethnic groups, but in culture they had the greatest affinity to the Russian ethnic group (at least this opinion is shared by Russians). Nevertheless, they have developed a number of peculiar traditions in terms of social organization, crafts, ideas. This is reflected in self-consciousness. They are keenly aware of the fact that they are different from ordinary Russians, although in reality they can hardly explain what this difference really is. Structurally, such an identity of the "new Cossacks" is accepted and is a part of modern Russian settlers in the Russian ethnic periphery. However, the Cossack concept of the Russian state usually refers to the imperial variety and is identified with the tsarist Russia. However, some newly-emerged Cossacks, inside and outside Russia, are guided by the new and modern Russian power as a purposeful manifestation of their identity. This feature is inherent in the identity of the "new Cossacks". Often they do not make obvious distinctions between two concepts of the Russian statehood which conditionally can reflect their "maximum" and "minimum" desires (programs). 2. "Transnistrian Syndrome." Russians also often form an identity that presupposes the formation of their own new and independent state, a natural consequence of their cultural identity. In recent decades, there have been at least a few attempts to create nation-states with

²⁸ Arutiunian V., Drobizheva L., Russkie v raspadaushchemsia Soiuzе, "Otechestvennaia istoriia" 1992, nr. 3, s. 3-15.

the participation of the Russian diaspora: the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the DPR and the LNR in Ukraine (and prior to the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation and the adoption of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic in 1998) this was a similar issue in Ukraine as well). All of them have unregulated international status and unclear political aspirations. The political leaders of these territories insist that their populations, having strong historical, cultural and emotional ties to Russia, have produced a similar identity. 3. “Integrated new Diaspora”. The sense of cultural identity in the Russian diaspora should not be transferred to the political plane. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the Russian diaspora, precisely with a sense of difference from the Russian main group, more easily perceives the post-Soviet political system, because it is different in its own way from the main group of Russians. Thus, the identity of the “integrated new Diaspora” is progressing.

Finally, the third context of positioning Russian identity is the fact that they accept the dominant culture of the nationalized states of modern residence. The most striking form of the process is assimilation. In most cases, this occurs through the “inculturization” (acceptance of culture) of the titular nation. Simultaneously, the main issue is the change of the native language. Assimilated representatives of the Russian Diaspora not only learn the language of the titular nation, but in one generation forget their former native language. It is too early to speak about the results of this process (especially in countries located in the Russian border), although there are many cases when this turned out to be a *fait accompli* (especially in countries located far from Russia)

Considering this, an important methodological task in this context has been to determine the factors that made an impact upon the formation of national identity and polarization of Russians in the territory of the former USSR. Their essence is to evaluate the set of factors of influence, but, according to P. Kolstoe²⁹, some of them are related to the entire groups of Russians in certain territories, and some of them are only separate strata. At the same time, the researcher argued that the most important among them were the following:

- Geographical distance to Russia: when the outer homeland is only restricted by direct borders between two new countries, the identity of this homeland and the existing diaspora (Russian national minority) is less likely to be torn (altered) than when the homeland is far away. In the latter case, it should be expected that the local diaspora will develop its own identity or adopt a local culture;
- Cultural distance: in cases where local culture is perceived as such, which obviously differs from Russian culture, the convergence of identities is less likely than when two ethnic and cultural groups are perceived as varieties of the same basic type;

²⁹ Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.

- The number and compactness of the population: the population of Russia and the countries of the world, in particular, a high probability of success in the formation of their own independence (independence). On the contrary, small diaspora only constitute “non-threatened cases”. However, if small groups are fairly compact, they can resist assimilation. If diaspora groups are spread over large territories and mixed with other ethnic groups, it is easier to accept the basic characteristics of other groups, including language;
- Rooting: the longer Russians live in a certain geographical area, the more closely they identify with this territory. “Newcomers” (representatives of the Diaspora, who briefly live in a certain territory) will not experience the same territorial attachment. But not only residents of centuries-old Russian settlements can have a strong sense of rooting, it can also be felt for the third or second generation of Russians;
- The absence or presence of other pressing issues, except for the national one, if wealth and social status in society are unevenly distributed between different ethnic groups, and / or the economic policy of the state is deliberately aimed at the uneven distribution of wealth along ethnic lines, then the ethnic issue will not only be revived, but also even supported by economic factors;³⁰
- Bilingualism or monolingualism: Russians, having no or little knowledge of the language of the titular nation of the residence country are more likely to form either a restitutional or irredentist Russian identity. Alternatively, it is much easier for bilingualists to adapt to a dominant culture. In many new nationalized states, language laws and language proficiency requirements are a major issue in the confrontation between the titular nation and minorities. In most cases, the difference between those who speak and those who do not speak the language of the titular nation reinforces the contrast between the indigenous population and the Diaspora;
- The development of other ethnic minorities identity, given that quite a few members of the non-Russian diaspora are russified. In the post-Soviet space and discourse, the concept of “Russified” is often used in a derogatory sense, which means the absence of ethnic identity. Russified non-Russian should be considered as a group in the process of changing their ethnic identity. Although people who share a common language are not themselves an ethnic group, they can eventually be turned into one. If we think of ethnic groups as groups with common cultural traits and common interests, then the Russians on the one hand, and the Russian Diaspora, on the other hand, may eventually merge into a common group, the “Russian-speaking Diaspora” (in the case under study – in the post-Soviet space);
- Endogamy or exogamy. In the USSR, children from ethnically mixed families were those who faced the choice of identity, because when they reached the age of 16, they

³⁰ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Wyd. University of California Press 1985, s. 20-21.

had to choose the citizenship of one of their parents. Moreover, “mixed” or “new” identity was not considered as an option. When a mother or father were a member of the title nation in the Republic of their residence, children tended to choose her or his nationality³¹. For example, descendants of mixed Latvian-Russian couples living in Russia, of course, chose Russian identity, and in Latvia – Latvian. This continued in the post-Soviet countries. Therefore it is very problematic to bring the Russians from intercultural families to common denominator – Russians³². A large number of mixed marriages were concluded between representatives of the Russian diaspora and representatives of other groups of diasporas. In post-Soviet realities, a high percentage of such marriages contributed or still contributes into the development of a “Russian-speaking” or “new Russian” identity. The frequency of exogamy is related to the factor of cultural distance. The smaller is the distance, the greater the number of marriages we have. In addition, if the cultural distance in the dominant culture is large, then it may lead to greater unification between related national minorities in the state.³³ Large ethnic groups are also more comfortable with ethnic intermarriage than small groups;

- The presence of the elite among the local Russians. A diaspora with a weak elite structure will be less able to formulate common interests and maintain a shared identity than groups where elites are able to play a leading role in the ethnic community. The formation of the elite is related to the level of modernization and urbanization. Compared to most post-Soviet nationalities, Russians have a high level of formal education and, with the exception of Jews, are also the most urbanized “post-Soviet people”. If this is so in the general sense, then this also characterises the Russian diaspora. Most of them live in large cities, occasionally constituting the majority of them. However, while the Russian diaspora has a numerically strong intellectual elite, the professional structure of modern Russian intelligentsia in the diaspora is prone to technology and the exact sciences - engineers are more often less interested in supporting national culture than members of the cultural intelligentsia;
- The policy of nationalized states. State bodies of nationalized countries offer a number of policy options regarding national minorities in general and to Russian, in particular, from attempts to deliberate elimination of minorities (exile or forced assimilation), protection of some minorities, Apartheid, etc. We can assume that the primary task of any State power is to ensure the political loyalty of all members of the community about the state. The minority response to such a policy is the result

³¹ Karklins R., *Ethnic Relations in the USSR*, Wyd. Allen & Unwin 1986, s. 154.

³² Brubaker R., *Political Dimensions of Migration from and Among Soviet Successor States*, [w:] Weiner M. (ed.), *International Migration and Security*, Wyd. Westview Press 1993, s. 39-64.; Brubaker R., *East European, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Nationalisms: A Framework for Analysis*, [w:] Weil F. (ed.), *Research on Democracy and Society*, Wyd. JAI Press 1993, s. 353-378.

³³ Horowitz D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Wyd. University of California Press 1985, s. 40.

of a choice of identity type. In general, it should be noted that the latter can develop in parallel with the national line: excessive assimilation can lead to political disloyalty and restorative sentiments;

- The country's foreign policy on the Diaspora ranges from selflessness to insisting on protecting the rights of the Russian minority in "Russia's near abroad" and in its most complicated form, to military intervention to protect them. Unselfishness makes the Diaspora less willing to choose an external homeland as the main topic of its identity. In contrast if Russia acts in such a way that the Russian Diaspora considers itself, as before, "citizens of Russia", then the behavior on the identity formation changes significantly;
- Attitudes of Russians in Russia. Ethnic unity is a "two-way street" that requires the active participation of both sides – the main Russian group and the Diaspora. If Russians in Russia show a high degree of indifference to the fate of their ethnic brothers outside of Russia, the Diaspora is more likely to develop their own identity. But, on the other hand, the visits of Russian nationalist agitators to the new country of Russian residence reinforce the sense of their common destiny;
- Migration flows. Russian Diaspora's replenishment with fresh immigrants, coming from Russia has contributed to the creation of strong cultural or political ties with Russia and the Russian core group. If migration flows are reversed, a large number of Russians leave their countries of residence, which encourages the integration of Russians who remained in their countries of residence. There are two reasons for this: first, emigrants tend to be the least willing and able to adapt; second, after their departure, the Diaspora becomes smaller. But the limited and large outflow of population affects the structure of the Diaspora in different ways.³⁴

The synthesis of certain factors enables us to argue that ethnic problems in many post-Soviet (primarily in the current Central and Eastern European) countries of the 1990s were reflected with considerable force after the elimination of their Communist power structure. Consequently, in Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe, ethnic heterogeneity has remained the norm rather than the exception. That is why immediately upon the collapse of the USSR, and not accidentally, it can be expected that ethnic and minority groups differ in their acceptance of the significance and principles of inclusive citizenship. In addition, they were expected to differ in the level of tolerance for political and social differences.³⁵ First of all, because different countries in the region differed in their willingness to grant rights to other ethnic groups, in

³⁴ Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, *"Ethnic and Racial Studies"* 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.

³⁵ Diamond L., Plattner M., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994 Stepan A., When democracy and the nation-state are competing logics: Reflections on Estonia, *"European Journal of Sociology"* 1994, vol 35, s. 127-141.; Bremmer L., The politics of ethnicity: Russians in the new Ukraine, *"Europe-Asia Studies"* 1994, vol 46, s. 26-83.; Evans G., Ethnic schism and the consolidation of post-communist democracies: The case of Estonia, *"Communist and Post-Communist Studies"* 1998, vol 30, s. 57-74.

particular in the light of the model rule that what a minority required was not always supported by the majority. Thus, former communist regimes gave rise to the potential of ethnic polarization at a level, that weakened collective actions in the community and provoked inter-group antagonisms and weakened the ability of the country to govern the conflict of interest.

Therefore, the concept of political polarization at the level of national minorities in the post-Soviet space has become one of the leading manifestations of political institutionalization of minorities. It is also worth noting that there were numerous attempts to explain ethnic relations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia due to the experience of ethnic polarization. Many of them have had historical nature, mostly focused on the behavior of dominant ethnic groups in relation to ethnic minorities³⁶. Others, on the contrary, explored the situation of previously existing minorities and their response to the change in status after the collapse of the communist regime³⁷. In this context, it is obvious that if we want to understand the sources of ethnic polarization and expand our knowledge about its political implications, it is not enough to simply examine the question of how majority groups hold a positive and negative attitude to the rights of ethnic minorities, since the positioning of minorities themselves should also be taken into account. In other words, factors that may be taken into account the degree of tolerance of the majority towards minorities as well as the degree of opposition of the minority towards the majority should be considered. The latter remark is particularly important in view of the fact that ethnic differences are likely to be translated into political issues when minorities have clear differences in positions to the majority. If, for example, the minority and the majority agree with the need for education in the dominant language, the problem is unlikely to be the basis for political mobilization minority. On this occasion, scholars are apt to believe that the result of divergences of interest is ethnic polarization. Most of the modern scientific literature concentrates on differences in relations between ethnic groups, primarily through the prism of sources of negative attitude towards minority groups among the majority (that is, the titular ethnic group). However, these theories should still be expanded to provide characteristics of the conditions under which minorities accept or reject majority positions. In empirical analysis, it is necessary to check the effectiveness of at least four explanations of minority rights polarization: danger, alleged threat, social differences, social distance³⁸. Each group of factors has its own specific properties and attributes.

³⁶ Bugajski J., *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Westview 1995.; Jowitt K., *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*, Wyd. University of California 1992.; Khazanov A., *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Wyd. University of Wisconsin Press 1995.; Park A., Ethnicity and independence: The case of Estonia in comparative perspective, *Europe-Asia Studies* 1994, vol 46, s. 69-88.

³⁷ Brubaker R., Aftermaths of empire and the unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectives, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1995, vol 18, s. 189-218.; Kolstoe P., The new Russian diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1996, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 609-639.; Laitin D., Identity in formation: the Russian-speaking nationality in the post-Soviet diaspora, *European Journal of Sociology* 1995, vol 36, s. 281-316.; Stepan A., When democracy and the nation-state are competing logics: Reflections on Estonia, *European Journal of Sociology* 1994, vol 35, s. 127-141.

³⁸ Evans G., Need A., Explaining Ethnic Polarization over Attitudes towards Minority Rights in Eastern Europe: a Multilevel Approach, *Estudio Working Paper* 2000, vol 146.

Danger (or insecurity) is seen as a key factor in ethnic and racial conflicts or disputes. It reflects some forms of psychological dynamics that are usually defined in terms of frustration and aggression³⁹ and the influence of rational interests in competition for scarce resources.⁴⁰ Among the uncertainties and difficulties associated with the transition to a market economy in the post-Soviet countries, one should expect instability in the ethnic issue, either. Alternatively, the availability of security, whether economic or other, could reduce the opposition sentiment of the title majority towards the rights of minorities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the danger has been and still exists in the economic and political spheres. Economic danger (insecurity) has received the most attention in studies of ethnic minorities. As economic experience and expectations vary from country to country, so do the⁴¹ attitudes of majority and minority groups towards their attitudes and minority rights. Accordingly, it is obvious that positive economic experience and expectations lead to a decrease in the level of polarization regarding the protection of the rights of national minorities. Political danger (instability) reflects the degree to which the rights of people (including non-citizens) are ensured in the event of the failure of democratic regimes. Thus, the level of satisfaction with the work of the political system is changing in the inter-ethnic vector⁴², which is why a positive assessment of the political system leads to a decrease in the level of polarization regarding minority rights.

The perceived threat is the next factor of ethnic political polarization. In relation to it,⁴³ the researchers discuss the role of threats from national minorities in emphasizing the negative reaction of the titular nationality. This can only be explained in terms of objective factors such as the size of minorities (the reason of their presence in the country⁴⁴), or more subjectively, in particular in terms of the perception of threats and conflicts between ethnic groups⁴⁵. In this case, the perceived threat depends on such determinants as: 1) the size of the minority (the larger is the size of the minority group, the higher the degree of polarization about minority rights); 2) perception of conflict (the higher is the level of ethnic polarization regarding the protection of minority rights, the faster ethnic conflict is perceived).

Social differences are, in turn, the socio-psychological aspects of group relations that focus on social characteristics but do not necessarily determine ethnicity. The degree of resemblance

³⁹ Dollard J., *Frustration and Aggression*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1989.

⁴⁰ Sherif M., *Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology*, Wyd. Routledge and Kegan Paul 1967.

⁴¹ Duch R., Economic chaos and the fragility of democratic transition in former communist regimes, *Journal of Politics* 1995, vol 57, s. 121-158; Evans G., Whitefield S., The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies, *British Journal of Political Science* 1995, vol 25, s. 485-514.

⁴² Evans G., Whitefield S., The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies, *British Journal of Political Science* 1995, vol 25, s. 485-514; Rose R., Mishler W., Haerpfer C., *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*, Wyd. Polity Press 1998.

⁴³ LeVine R., Campbell D., *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior*, Wyd. Wiley 1972.; Sullivan J., George M., Feldman S., Pierson J., The sources of political tolerance: a multivariate analysis, *American Political Science Review* 1981, vol 75, s. 92-106; Quillian L., Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe, *American Sociological Review* 1995, vol 60, s. 586-611.

⁴⁴ Blalock H., *Towards a Theory of Minority Group Relations*, Wyd. John Wiley and Sons 1967.

⁴⁵ Blumer H., Race prejudice as a sense of group positions, *Pacific Sociological Review* 1958, vol 1, s. 3-7

between the culture and way of life of the titular majority and the national minority explains the degree of their polarization in the form of relation to each other. In countries where majority and minority groups have similar language, religion and socio-economic status, the majority is likely to show less sympathy for minority issues, and the demand for distinct social differences for minority rights will be weakened. Moreover, if these characteristics do not coincide, then ethnic differences and divisions will not be easy to overcome. Thus, in some post-Soviet countries, such as in Ukraine, relatively moderate linguistic and cultural differences between Russians and Ukrainians could help to reduce ethnic differences⁴⁶. In particular, in comparison to other post-Soviet countries, such as Estonia, where linguistic differences and the lack of a common culture, historically formed between ethnic Estonians and Russians, gave rise to each group ethnic identity⁴⁷. It is worth assessing the two types of social differences: 1) Cultural differences (larger language differences between the title majority and the national minority conduct a higher level of ethnic polarisation regarding the rights of minorities); 2) Structural differences (a large socio-economic identity between the title majority and the national minority conducts a higher level of polarization on the rights of minorities⁴⁸).

The last explanatory factor is a social distance. Past relationships between groups are likely to have and will have an impact on future relationships between them. There is, in other words, a form of dependence of inter-ethnic relations as a result of imitation of more or less enmity. It is about the historical and current impact of such pronounced factors as the absence or presence of mixed marriages, the absence or presence of interethnic social interaction. A higher level of social distance between the titular majority and the ethnic minority leads to a higher level of ethnic polarization regarding minority rights. In general, ethnic polarization is reflected at three levels: individual, regional and state.

It has been found that ethnic identity, polarization and politicization of Russians in different post-Soviet countries have been formed according to a phased approach and in different dimensions, due to both political and socio-economic factors and psychological effects. Therefore, the peculiarities, prerequisites and consequences of the ethnic identity, polarization and politicization of the Russians on the territory of the former USSR have significantly affected the geopolitical positioning and potential diversification of this region in the future.

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⁴⁶ Bremmer I., The politics of ethnicity: Russians in the new Ukraine, *"Europe-Asia Studies"* 1994, vol 46, s. 26-83.

⁴⁷ Kirch M., Kirch A., Ethnic relations: Estonians and non-Estonians, *"Nationalities Papers"* 1995, vol 23, s. 43-59; Raun T., *Estonia and the Estonians*, Wyd. Hoover Institute Press 2001.

⁴⁸ Hechter M., Group formation and the cultural division of labor, *"American Journal of Sociology"* 1978, vol 78, s. 293-318.

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Influence of external and internal factors on the information space of modern-day Ukraine

The article considers the importance of information space as a component of national security of each state. The authors state that the information space of Ukraine contributes to the formation of the consolidated Ukrainian society and is part of the European and global information space. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze the factors that influence its functioning in modern-day Ukraine. The following objectives are set: to analyze the main approaches to defining the concepts of “information” and “information space”; to consider the external and internal factors that make it vulnerable: destructive influence of the Internet, presence of foreign media, information and psychological war, etc. The authors have come to conclusion that establishing the national concept of national information policy can help to strengthen and protect the information space of modern-day Ukraine.

Keywords: information, information space, the Internet, social networks, regional media, European integration, information and psychological war.

Wpływ czynników zewnętrznych i wewnętrznych na przestrzeń informacyjną współczesnej Ukrainy

Artykuł poświęcony jest znaczeniu przestrzeni informacyjnej jako integralnej części bezpieczeństwa narodowego każdego państwa. Przestrzeń informacyjna Ukrainy przyczynia się do powstania skonsolidowanej społeczności ukraińskiej, która jest częścią europejskiej i światowej przestrzeni informacyjnej. Dlatego celem tego badania była analiza czynników wpływających na funkcjonowanie przestrzeni informacyjnej we współczesnej Ukrainie. Podstawowym celem badania jest analiza głównych pojęć – „informacja” i „przestrzeń informacyjna”; wzięto pod uwagę czynniki zewnętrzne i wewnętrzne, wywołujące ich zagrożenie, mianowicie destrukcyjny wpływ Internetu, obecność zagranicznych mediów, informacyjna i psychologiczna wojna etc. Stwierdzono, że wzmocnienie i ochrona przestrzeni informacyjnej współczesnej Ukrainy pomoże w ustanowieniu krajowej koncepcji państwowej polityki informacyjnej.

Słowa kluczowe: informacja, przestrzeń informacyjna, internet, sieci społeczne, media regionalne, integracja europejska, wojna informacyjna i psychologiczna.

Rapid development of the informatization of society and information techniques and their wide penetration into all spheres of human life are the hallmarks of modern civilization. Information technologies help to form a specific information field, which is an integral feature and an objective component of the efficient functioning of any state. "Information space is an area in the modern public life of the world, in which information communications play a key role. In this sense, the concept of information space is close to the concept of information environment"¹ "People have always existed in the information space, surrounding them. The expansion of the information space was facilitated by the emergence of book printing and mail, the invention of telegraph and telephone, the discovery of radio and television. A considerable and decisive contribution to the globalization of the information space was made by the wide use of modern information and communication technologies in all spheres of human activity. They can significantly change not only the methods of producing goods and services, but also the organization and forms of leisure activities, the realization of human civil rights, the methods and forms of upbringing and education. They affect the social structure of society, economy, policy, and the development of social institutions"²

The issue of the information space in the aspect of forming the images of the information society is studied in the Ukrainian science by the experts and sociologists V. Shcherbina, O. Lobovikova and others. Socio-political dimensions of the information space are considered by A. Chichanovskyi, A. Marushchak, G. Pocheptsov, S. Chukut, V. Karpenko, Yu. Nesteriak, Yu. Bondar. The investigations of the socio-psychological aspects of the information space are performed by O. Lishchynska, V. Malimon, A. Lobanova, O. Zlobina and others. The first philosophical studies of the information space as a phenomenon of culture belong to the first President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Professor V. Vernadskyi and the modern Russian scholar O. Sieriogin. These studies mainly describe the peculiarities of the information space in the field of culture. The Ukrainian researchers (M. Yakovenko, S. Dovhyi) are only beginning to study the semantic clarification of this concept. The peculiarities of forming the modern information space in Ukraine are studied by V. Ivanov, V. Lyzanchuk, I. Krupskyi, T. Prystupenko, V. Rizun, O. Chekmyshev, B. Cherniakov, V. Shkliar, O. Kondratenko and others. The information space as a dominant component of the modern cultural space is also considered by foreign scholars, in particular D. Robertson, Yu. Shrainer. The investigations of the phenomenon of information networks as a means of destructive influences on society are performed by K. Bieliakov, V. Butuzov, V. Havlovskyi, A. Marushchak, O. Poliarush, G. Pocheptsov, V. Shelomentsev, S. Chukut, O. Yurchenko and others.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the content of the concept of "information space" and the factors that affect its functioning in modern-day Ukraine.

¹ *Informatsiynyi prostir*. <http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki>.

² S. Dovhyi, *Instytut telekomunikatsii i globalnoho informatsiinoho prostoru*. <http://www.itel.nas.gov.ua>.

The peculiarity of the concept lies in that it combines two terms: “space” and “information”. The concept of “information space” appeared quite late when information became an integral feature of human existence. “The word “information” (“informacioun”) appeared in English for the first time in the XIV century. Only in the middle of the XX century “information” became a general scientific concept, which still remains extremely controversial. There is no generally accepted definition of information and it is used mainly at the intuitive level. The problem with the unambiguous definition of the concept of information is due to the fact that this term is used in many spheres of human activity, that is, is multifaceted. Depending on the field of use, the term “information” has many definitions, the most appropriate among which is the definition by UNESCO, according to which information is a universal substance that permeates all spheres of human activity, transmits knowledge and thoughts, is a tool for communication, mutual understanding and cooperation and creating the stereotypes of thinking and behavior.³ D. Robertson calls information “modern civilization”. He substantiates his point by stating that “information resources restrict civilization more than physical factors”.⁴ The peculiarity of information is that despite its continuously increasing use, it is constantly accumulated in increasing amounts. This is what stimulates the development and improvement of the technology of using information resources – the technologies for the accumulation and dissemination of information, called “information and communication technologies”. Information technologies are the basis for forming a specific information field, which becomes a means of introduction and implementation of government strategies in the state and a powerful global integrating factor.

First reflections on filling the space with information and the development of the “intelligent” space – the noosphere – belong to the first President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Professor V. Vernadskyi, who identified the following socio-cultural factors that form the noosphere: distribution of people all over the planet; development of the means of communication and exchange that unite people; discovery of new energy sources (nuclear, solar, etc.); mass democratization of the state system; explosion of scientific creativity in the XX century.⁵ Yu. Shrayner states: “Due to the cultural assimilation of technology, the information environment is an indispensable means of forming the unity of the human mind – building the noosphere, predicted by V. Vernadskyi. The information space allows to turn the knowledge systems of individuals and groups of people into the public domain, the access to which is practically unlimited by the barriers of space and time. This sets a fundamental cultural task for society – the integration of knowledge, which allows to use the entire experience of humankind in practice, rather than contrast the pieces of knowledge accumulated in different cultures”.⁶

³ *Informatsiia*. <http://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki>.

⁴ D. Robertson, *The Information revolution. Communication research*, New York 1990.

⁵ V. Vernadskyi, *Neskolko slov o noosfere*. <http://lib.ru/filosof/Vernadskij/noos.txt>.

⁶ Yu. Shrayner, *Kontsepsii intellektualnykh sistem. Nauchno-informatsionnyy obzor*. Moskva: Nauka 1988. 134 s.

The main characteristics of the information space are its “transhistoricity” (the ability to unite generations) and cultural dynamism. Thus, if we consider the space first of all as a diverse world of culture around us, that each person gives his or her personal interpretation, which reflects a certain level of developed or assigned axiological component of culture, then the information space can be defined as a dominant component of the modern cultural space that determines the level, character and direction of cultural development and defines its main elements: scientific, spiritual and aesthetic.⁷

Modern sociological science defines “the information field” or “the information space” as “a generalized description of the information environment, which is external to the individual and is connected with his or her execution of certain political functions”, and “the information political space”, according to O. Soloviov, is “a set of different message flows in the field of public authority in state decision-making processes”.⁸ The term “communication space” appeared due to the globalization of mass media. Virtual space appeared in the middle of this space as an opposition to social space. It is a new and therefore a little-studied form of social space. It arose in the process of development of both technological and social capacities of the social system and forms a unique type of social interaction, a new type of identity. The varieties of virtual space are “cyberspace” as a collection of all electronic systems, in fact the global information space, and “the Internet space” as a decentralized communication system, a network of networks. Using the term “global information space”, M. McLuhan indirectly sets the physical parameters of this space – “global village”.

Doctor of Sociological Sciences S. Barmatova singles out one of the forms of social space – “information and communication space of politics” – and considers it as a combination of information and political spaces that have identical spatial parameters and characteristics and create their own specific forms of interaction. This is a completely new state of political space that goes beyond the purely political space and is responsible for the organization of communication. This space is permeated with communication (the information) and communicating (carriers of information) components and ensures the representation of politics in the social space of society. The information and communication space of politics, containing part of the territory as a political, information and communication space, forms its boundaries, aspires to autonomy and performs specific functions in the system of society, in particular, it promotes the adaptation of political space to the changing realities of the modern world and the adequate response to the challenges of globalization. Thus, this space embodies the characteristics of the social, political and information spaces and functions according to the laws of social communication and modern culture.⁹

⁷ M. Yakovenko, *Informatsiynyi prostir: filosofski aspekty formuvannia poniattia*, «Visnyk Natsionalnoho universytetu Lvivska politekhni-ka» 2011, № 692, s. 26.

⁸ *Politycheskiye kommunikatsii*, red. A.I. Solovyev. Moskva: Aspekt Press 2004. 332 s.

⁹ S. Barmatova, *Informatsiino-komunikatyvnyi prostir polityky: obhruntuvannia osnovnykh strukturnykh kharakterystyk*, «Aktualni problemy sotsiologii, psykholohii, pedahohiky» 2013, Vyp. 18, s. 27-31

Another Ukrainian scholar V. Karpenko emphasizes that “information space (field)” is a socio-political concept. It is the environment, in which and due to which the information appears, exists, circulates and rotates. It combines the territorial, cosmic, technical, economic and human factors, because public information is intended for a person, and a person is its consumer, without whom it loses its sense. When it comes to the information field of a particular state (and each state has it), its boundaries are usually identified with state borders and cover the national territory, water area, air space, and economy. Mass media function in these areas, they “inform”, that is, report, describe and create an image of something. However, what exactly they report, how exactly they represent it and what kind of image they create concern the realm of politics and depend on the informer. In general, the concept of the national information space is beyond the territory of the country. The structure of this concept includes its subjects, the whole material and technical environment, the intellectual and information property of these subjects. This is a fairly large and sophisticated complex.¹⁰ The state has to ensure the use of its information field in its own interests and for the benefit of its citizens.

With the development and spread of the means of accumulation, storage and transfer of information resources, the information space acquires new features and significance in shaping public opinion, education, and, finally, loyalty or non-support of the current regime. That’s why, it plays an important role, especially in societies in the transitional period, to which Ukraine belongs. The information space should be considered first of all not as a territorial and physical, but as a social space that does not have the usual boundaries and area. Its structure is defined by the information, knowledge, and people, who are in the state of information exchange. The information space is the scope of activities of mass media, news agencies, individual journalists, specialists of certain organizations, and institutions that produce and distribute information and knowledge. The development level and content of the information space have a major influence on all spheres of society, consciousness and behavior of people, formation of value orientations of citizens. The main components of the information space are the information fields, which include all information, accumulated in a certain amount of space and time, and the information flows, containing the information that is transmitted by the information channel, which largely determines the content of information. The important actors in the information space can be social groups, public authorities, mass media and mass communication means.

Within the state, the informational space, according to A. Chichanovskyi, is a combination of mass media, that is, the national system of mass communication means, to which the scholar refers newspapers, magazines, other periodicals, books, printed materials, news agencies, films, television, radio, other electronic media and communication services, all types of technologies for the preservation and dissemination of information.¹¹ This interpretation of the

¹⁰ V. Karpenko, *Informatsiina polityka ta bezpeka*, Kyiv: Nora-Druk 2006, s. 241

¹¹ A. Chichanovskyi, *Natsionalna derzhava ta yii zasoby masovoi komunikatsii u hlobalizovanomu sviti*, Ukraina na shliakhu do Yevropy, uporiad. V. I. Shkliar, A. V. Yurychko, Kyiv: Etnos 2006, s. 218.

national system of mass communication means helps to redefine the problems associated with it, their relation to the processes of statehood development and preservation of the national and socio-cultural identity of the Ukrainian information space.

A contemporary Ukrainian researcher I. Krupskyi adds that “the information space is not only a combination of all types of mass media that are in the territory of the state, regardless of their subordination, structure or typology, but also the mass media that produce their own products abroad and specially, due to some political or economic interests, spread over the whole territory of another state”.¹² It is natural that the information space of any state is aimed at forming an appropriate opinion, and propaganda of a certain idea among “its” citizens. That is, as O. Dubas states, the information space substantially defines and forms the identity. If the information space is powerful and consolidated with a strong idea, then it can adapt or reject foreign values and hegemony without catastrophic consequences.¹³ Therefore, care for the national information space is an integral part of the national security of each state. It is a powerful state-strengthening and nation-building leverage that each country lays emphasis on.

Based on the definitions, the main elements of the information space are: information resources, information infrastructure, information and telecommunication structures, mass media systems, information technology market, interaction system of the state information space with the global open networks, information security system, and information legislation system.

The information space of Ukraine is viewed as a combination of national information resources and information infrastructure that on the basis of common principles and general rules promote the information interaction of citizens, society and the state and provide them with equal access to open information resources and satisfy the information needs of the subjects of state throughout its territory, taking into account the balance of their interests in entering the global information space and providing their information security in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and international legal norms. The effective information space facilitates the development of the information society in the country and its entry into the world information community. It should be noted that the information space is also considered effective if it is open to the public. This will help to pursue the interests of citizens, society, and the state within a complex and systematic framework. An effective information space can be created and developed on the basis of the appropriate national information policy, which ensures the country’s progressive movement to the formation of the information society. This movement should be based on the latest information, computer, telecommunication and communication technologies, the development of which has led to the appearance of the open information networks, primarily the

¹² I. Krupskyi, *Bezpekovi imperatyvy informatsiinoho prostoru Ukrainy*. <http://old.journ.lnu.edu.ua/vypusk7/visnyk07-20.pdf>

¹³ O. Dubas, *Informatsiyni rozvytok suchasnoi Ukrainy u svitovomu konteksti*, Kyiv: Heneza 2004, s.19

Internet. This opens fundamentally new opportunities for the international information exchange and, as a result, the transformation of various types of human activity.¹⁴

A significant factor, determining the integrity of the national information space, is the domestic political situation in the country and the ability of the state to maintain the information security. Controversies, contradictions, internal political conflicts and wars negatively affect the information security of the state and make it vulnerable to the external information aggression, which, in its turn, can lead to the territorial and other losses. A striking example can be the loss of the Crimean Peninsula by Ukraine in 2014. The important factors in developing the national information security are mass media and communication means, creating the conditions for their functioning, their legislative protection and the safety of journalists. In the developing countries like Ukraine mass media play a key role in society, because they are responsible for covering events, informing society, producing relevant symbols, stereotypes, guidelines, shaping the general mood of the audience, and being an agent of socialization.¹⁵

The information space of Ukraine affects all spheres of public relations. It is a factor in the formation of the consolidated Ukrainian community and an integral part of the European and global information space. The latter includes an extensive system of structures that provides for the production, storage and use of information both inside and outside the country.¹⁶ The adaptation to the global information space is one of the main issues of the domestic and foreign policies of Ukraine and consists in regulating the exchange of public and restricted information, the export of goods and export-controlled technologies in accordance with the international obligations of Ukraine. The development of the information society envisages bridging the so-called “digital divide”, creating the “knowledge economy”, continuing the evolution of the journalistic environment and mass media in Ukraine. It should also contribute to strengthening the security of information and telecommunication systems.¹⁷ The integration of Ukraine into the European information space goes in parallel with its integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures of the EU and NATO.

An indispensable prerequisite for this process is the adaptation of the Ukrainian information space to the European standards and the objectivity of the Ukrainian mass media in informing the population about the potential of the Euro-Atlantic integration, as they are active actors in creating the objective image of the domestic and foreign policies of the state.¹⁸ In this regard, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Action Plan for 2019 on the Implementation of the Communication Strategy in the Field of European Integration for 2018-2021, which provides for a number of information campaigns to increase the level of support

¹⁴ N. Pelepci, *Formuвання інформаційного простору і державної інформаційної політики в Україні*, «Naukovyi visnyk. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats» 2005, № 1 (28), s. 16-25

¹⁵ A. Rudnieva, *Faktory i metody zabezpechennia informatsiinoi bezpeky Ukrainy v umovakh zbroinoho konfliktu*, «Hileia: naukovyi visnyk» 2016, Vyp. 113, s. 399-400

¹⁶ *Informatsiina sfera v Ukraini, zakhyst informatsii: problemy i perspektyvy rozvytku*. <http://checkreferat.com/referati-4162/>.

¹⁷ S. Hnatiuk, *Media-prosir Ukrainy v umovakh globalizatsii*, «Stratehichna panorama» 2007, № 1, s.184.

¹⁸ L. Huberskyi, *Informatsiina polityka Ukrainy: yevropeiskyi kontekst*, Kyiv: Lybid 2007, s. 51.

of Ukrainian citizens to the state policy in the field of European integration and the level of trust in NATO as an institution that plays a key role in strengthening the international security. The support for the membership in NATO and the EU started growing rapidly in 2014 and has been a trend since then. If in 2012 only 13% of Ukrainians viewed NATO as a source of security, then in 2018 about 42% hold this view, and 52% of Ukrainians consider it necessary for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union. In terms of regions, as in previous years, most supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration live in the west of Ukraine.¹⁹

The information field of modern-day Ukraine is formed under the daily influence of numerous external and internal factors that make it extremely vulnerable. Total informatization of the world is characterized by the intensification of struggle between states for domination in the information space and the extensive confrontation of their interests in this environment. The latest technologies have given impetus to the emergence of non-traditional forms of confrontation between states: the organization of a broad or local information war, that is, infringement of the information sovereignty of another state.²⁰ In view of the geopolitical and regional location of Ukraine, it is subject to the political, economic and other interests, and also the information influence of leading and neighboring countries, which exacerbates the issues of national and information security.

Nowadays other countries are conducting the information and psychological war in the modern information space of Ukraine in order to achieve their foreign policy goals. Modern countries with powerful information and communication resources are constantly exacerbating the issue about the need to ensure the complete openness of the global information space and the national information space of each country for the free and uncontrolled dissemination of information flows.²¹ In addition to the positive factors in information processes, media space researchers observe the tendency of mediatization in the policies of leading states that execute and spread their influence through mass media, new media, and communication technologies, which, quite the opposite, leads to the actual politicization of mass media and their use as a means of global expansion. Therefore, state institutions of modern-day Ukraine should create proper conditions for ensuring the free circulation of information that would comply with the constitutional right of its citizens to access, disseminate and protect information. At the same time, they should create an effective regulatory and legal framework, develop their information and technology production and means of monitoring the information environment, which would limit the use of the Internet and mass media to disseminate false or biased information that may destabilize the situation in the country. At present, there is a rapid increase in access of the population to the global information space. In 2018, the number of Internet

¹⁹ *Uряд zatverdvyv plany zahodiv na 2019 rik shchodo komunikatsii u sferi yevropeiskoi ta yevroatlantychnoi intehnatii Ukrainy.* <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/uryad-zatverdvyv-plani-zahodiv-na-2019-rik>

²⁰ A. Polyarush. *Informatsionnaya voyna protiv Ukrainy: prichiny i sotsialno-politicheskiye tekhnologii.* Kyiv: Kyi 2011. s. 11.

²¹ *Mezhdunarodnaya strategiya po deystviyam v kiberprostranstve.* <http://кибервоин.рф/strategiya/mezhdunarodnaya-strategiya-ssha-vkiberprostranstve>.

users in Ukraine amounted to 58% of the total population, which accounted for 25.59 million Ukrainians. Social networks were used by 29% of Ukrainians. Last year the number of active Facebook users increased by 71% and amounted to 13 million, with 42% using it for news. According to statistics, every day 72% of people use the Internet as a main source of information.²²

It should be noted that many problems arise due to the lack of users' knowledge of network security basics, non-observance of the established norms of behavior in the network space (low information culture of the population) and absence in central and local authorities of specially trained personnel capable of solving these problems in a quick and effective way. Very often the Internet search engines are used for the destructive work in the information space of Ukraine. For this purpose, on social networks and web-sites, containing the information necessary for users, certain forces simultaneously publish and distribute the manipulative content, which forms protest moods, aggressive behavior or other destructive manifestations in society.²³

Another negative aspect is that the information services of Ukraine, including the Internet and media resources, are located very unevenly, mostly in large cities, regional centers and the capital. Therefore, one of the priority domestic political objectives for Ukraine is to create appropriate conditions for the development of the information space, in particular to create the full-fledged Internet infrastructure, information technologies, mass media and the national information product with its further advance into the international market.²⁴ To a large extent, the problems of the destructive use of Internet services are connected with the ambiguity of the legal status of online media in Ukraine and the limited capacity of Ukraine to affect those information actors that operate from the territory of other countries. The Ukrainian legislation in this area is perhaps the most liberal of all European states, which sometimes threatens the social harmony and national security of the country.

The role of national mass media is weakened by the presence of foreign mass media, which dominate in some regions. For example, the media space in Zakarpattia oblast is "covered" by the television and radio stations from Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland; in Odesa and Chernivtsi oblasts – from Romania; in Volyn and Lviv oblasts – from Poland and Belarus. The diversity of foreign media, present in the information space of Ukraine, on the one hand, facilitates the diversification of information sources, development of the local information market, establishment of the principles of freedom of speech, but, on the other hand, this penetration makes Ukraine vulnerable to the negative (including information and psychological) influences from foreign institutions and states.

The information dominance of the aggressor state, the Russian Federation, in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas is a threat to the information space of

²² Lyshe 58% *ukraintsiv korystuutsia internetom – doslidzbennia*. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2018/01/31/633590/>

²³ O. Hida, *Faktory, shcho vplyvaiut na formuvannia vyklykiv natsionalnym interesam Ukrainy v informatsiynomu prostori*, «Borotba z orhanizovanoi zlochynnistiu i koruptsiieiu (teoria i praktyka)» 2013, № 2, s. 228-236.

²⁴ O. Kondratenko, *Informatsiynyi chynnnyk u formuvanni vnutrishnoi i zovnishnoi polityky Ukrainiskoi derzhavy*, «Naukovyi visnyk Instytutu mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn NAU» 2010, № 2, s. 100-108.

modern-day Ukraine. Despite the gradually renewed network of television and radio broadcasting for spreading the Ukrainian news in these territories, Russian information is still largely shaping the worldview of the inhabitants of the occupied Ukrainian territories. Among the reasons for this phenomenon is the insufficient development of the national policy on the occupied territories, which complicates the creation of specialized content for their inhabitants and counteraction to Russia's destructive influence in the information sphere. To resolve this issue, in 2018, a complex system of countering anti-Ukrainian broadcasting was launched in the area of the Operation of Joint Forces, which by means of special technical solutions would block the distribution of the television broadcasting signal of the aggressor state and its controlled entities on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The main problem remains the issue of the Ukrainian mass media presence on the Crimean Peninsula, where the main sources of information about Ukraine are satellite television and the Internet.

The development of the national information security is regulated by the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine,²⁵ adopted in 2017, which made it possible to restrict the broadcasting of Russian television channels and Russian media product, control the printed literature, introduce the economic sanctions (restricting the activities of certain Russian social networks), deport the workers of Russian propaganda media, etc.²⁶

One of the most important tools for protecting national interests in the information sphere is the policy of creating the pro-Ukrainian national and cultural space. This policy regulates, in particular, the provision of full-fledged domestic television and radio broadcasting in all regions of Ukraine and the protection of its citizens from the television products of other states that use the vulnerability of the information space of the Ukrainian border areas in their interests. They fill the gaps in the local information coverage with powerful signals and with their mass media they actively influence the formation of public opinion in the places of compact residence of ethnic communities and local population by means of disseminating false information and provoking protest moods and interethnic hostility. According to the data of the Department of Television and Radio Broadcasting of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, almost one million citizens in the border areas do not have access to the local digital television. For example, in Volyn oblast about 65% of the territories have access to the local digital broadcasting, and the remaining broadcasting vacuum is filled with the programs from Poland, Belarus and the Russian Federation; in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast this rate is 33%, in Lviv oblast – 60%, in Zakarpattia oblast – about 40%, etc. Besides, only about one in ten readers of print media or television viewers or radio listeners and only 3% of Internet users in the south and east of Ukraine prefer only Ukrainian-language media resources. The life of

²⁵ *Pro risbennia Rady natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy vid 29 hrudnia 2016 roku «Pro Doktrynu informatsinoi bezpeky Ukrainy»*. <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374>

²⁶ *Analitychna dopovid do Shchorichnogo Poslannia Prezidenta Ukrainy do Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy «Pro vnutrishnie ta zovnishnie stanovyshe Ukrainy v 2018 rotsi»*, Kyiv: NISD 2018, s.44. http://www.niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2019-/Analit_Dopovid_Poslannia_2018.pdf

residents of the border areas in the foreign cultural and information environment can become one of the potential factors of the internal political destabilization of the country.

Poor content quality and low ratings of regional and local media as the main source of information for the local population, in particular in the border regions, do not contribute to the integration of regional audiences into the national information space. Due to that the entertainment and educational materials dominate in the regional mass media and make up 32.4%, only 13.1% of materials tell about the life of the local community. The information about crimes and law enforcement activities dominates on news sites and makes up 22% of the content, then goes the information about local news (14.9%). That is why, the main sources of news for the local population are: rumors – 63%, local TV channels – 37%, local press – 32%, the Internet – 29%. Spreading rumors and false news creates additional opportunities for foreign states to manipulate the opinion of the local population, spread the interethnic hostility and prejudice. These risks should be counteracted by means of state support for the production of high-quality content by regional mass media, increasing the capabilities of the Public Broadcasting to disseminate true information and high-quality media products not only in the border areas, but also throughout the information space of Ukraine.²⁷ In this regard, in 2018 the National Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine adopted “The Concept of Broadcasting on the Topic of National Minorities”, which would prevent all manifestations of discrimination on ethnic grounds in the content of the public broadcaster and contribute to the creation of a positive image of multinational Ukraine within the country and in the world arena.²⁸

At present, the negative factor for the information space of Ukraine is that (according to the monitoring of the Ukrainian regional media, held in 2019 by Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy), most local state media are still dependent on the authorities and demonstrate their willingness to “serve them with information.” The positive result of monitoring is an almost complete absence of pro-Russian messages, propaganda, fakes, which could threaten Ukraine’s information security. However, little attention is paid to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Operation of Joint Forces, and more attention is paid to the life of the local community, social problems, and local self-government. However, the political, scientific or international issues are almost not covered. The privatized local media do not want to create their own image and their niche in the information space of regions. Among the possible reasons for this phenomenon the experts of Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy name lack of understanding of the principles of media business management, absence of marketing strategies and communication skills with the audience, lack of working capital, small and underdeveloped local advertising

²⁷ *Analitychna dopovid do Shchorichnoho Poslannia Prezidenta Ukrainy do Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy «Pro vnutrishnie ta zovnishnie stanovyshche Ukrainy v 2018 rotsi»*, Kyiv: NISD 2018, s.98-99. http://www.niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2019-/Analit_Dopovid_Poslannia_2018.pdf

²⁸ *Nabliadova rada suspilnogo shvalyala Kontseptsiyu movlenia z tematyky natsionalnykh menshyn*. https://www.nrada.gov.ua/nstu_documents/naglyadova-rada-suspilnogo-shvalyala-kontseptsiyu-movlennya-z-tematyky-natsionalnyh-menshyn/

markets. As a result, local authorities remain the main advertising clients of regional media, and therefore they can affect the content and style of local press.²⁹

Since 2014, the priority area of activity of the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine has been taking urgent measures to counteract Russia's information aggression, carried out with the use of foreign and some domestic media. During the period of 2014–2017, the broadcasting of 80 television programs of the Russian Federation was stopped, as they did not meet the requirements of the laws of Ukraine. Thus, in recent years the Ukrainian media landscape has changed dramatically, in cable networks the information product of the aggressor state has been replaced by the international and national programs. According to the data of the performed monitoring, in 2018 the share of Ukrainian television programs was 79%, and of the programs produced by the EU, the USA and Canada – 14%, and by the aggressor state – only 7%. The average rate of the Ukrainian language on television channels reached 92%.³⁰ In this regard, according to the survey, conducted by the sociological company InMind, the level of trust in national and regional mass media in Ukraine increased for all types of media. As before, national television media remained the number one source in the structure of media consumption, with 61% of the population trusting them. The Internet media audience – both of news sites and of social networks – grew considerably and made up 58%, the audience of print media decreased to 39%, and only 33% of the population trusted radio broadcasting. The levels of trust in Russian television (4%), radio (3%), Internet (10%) and press (4%) were low.³¹

Thus, in order to have the protected information, the country should have a state-controlled media structure (Internet resources, mass media, and television), a national system of propaganda and information attacks and counterattacks on attempts to exacerbate the external effects on the socio-political situation in the country. At present, the concept of introducing public broadcasting as an alternative to state and privately-owned services is topical in Ukraine. It should promote human and social development and be a counterbalance to the manipulations and propaganda in the media. The Law of Ukraine “On Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine” was adopted in 2015 with the purpose to create the legal basis for the activity of the Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine and to define the principles of activity of the state-owned National Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine UA: Public Broadcasting (created in 2017), public in content, but national in form. The defined the mission of a public broadcaster is: “Protection of freedom in Ukraine. Providing reliable and balanced information about Ukraine and the world to society, building a public dialogue in order to strengthen public trust, develop

²⁹ *Analitychnyi zvit monitoringu rehionalnykh ZMI*. <http://idpo.org.ua/reports/2618-monitoring-report-april-2019>.

³⁰ *Zvit Natsionalnoi rady Ukrainy z pytan telebachelorstva i radiomovlennia za 2018 rik*. <https://www.nrada.gov.ua/reports/>

³¹ *Stavlennia naselennia do ZMI ta spozhyvannia riznykh typiv ZMI v Ukraini*. https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-MCS_FULL_UKR.pdf

civil responsibility, and support the Ukrainian language and culture, Ukrainian people and each individual”.³²

In the process of creating an effective system of public broadcasting, the main purpose of national mass media is to form and support the national identity, which involves the introduction into the citizens' inner world of the values of the nation, national historical memory and culture. As public television and radio should meet the general tastes and interests of citizens, pay special attention to the development of national identity and the general purpose of consolidating society, its improvement and democratic transformations,³³ then they should (in contrast to the private interests of commercial television channels) facilitate a solution to the problem of preserving and restoring the national identity of the Ukrainian information space and strengthening the ideological platform of the state. Creating an independent journalist environment and promoting Ukraine's interests in the European and global spaces of the global information field and their protection are the priorities of the national concept of state information policy.

In general, nowadays the main negative trends in the domestic and foreign policies of Ukraine are: lack of prudent information policy and weakness of the state's position as an actor on the information market; insufficient development of the information infrastructure and low level of modern information technologies; partial involvement of Ukraine in the processes of globalization and low level of its information presence in the world; information expansion of other countries on the territory of Ukraine and its non-competitiveness in the field of information technologies on the world market.

Strengthening and protecting the national information space of Ukraine is an integral part (along with political and economic components) of ensuring its national security and sovereignty. The entry of Ukraine into the global information space requires the harmonization of the national legal framework with the international legislation in the information sphere, the regulation of interstate relations and cooperation in information activities. It is also necessary to legislatively define the range of external and internal information threats and enshrine in law the concept of the national information sovereignty, determine its limits, the competence of the state to protect it, and to create and introduce a mechanism to counteract its violation. Thus, it is important to adopt a consolidated “Information Code of Ukraine”, which would not only coordinate the legal field of the information sphere, but would also adequately correspond to the realities of the national and global information space, and trends in the information sphere.

³² *Suspilne telebachennia i radiomovlennia Ukrainy*. https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Суспільне_телебачення_і_радіомовлення_України

³³ O. Zernetska, *Hlobalnyi rozvytok system masovoi komunikatsii i mizhnarodni vidnosyny*, NAN Ukrainy, In-t svit. ekonomiky i mizhnar. vidnosyn, Kyiv: Osvita 1999, s. 88.

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THE FEATURES, STATISTICS AND VARIETIE OF EMIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP

The article is devoted to analyzing the features, statistics and varieties of emigration processes in the countries of Visegrad Group, i.e. in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The author argued that emigration processes from the countries of the region before and during their integration into the EU were conditioned primarily by differences in social and economic development. It is observed that before and after the collapse of the USSR and changes in the labor markets and societies of the Visegrad countries, they were economically and socially dependent on Western European countries, and therefore key emigration processes were (and still are) directed to them. At the same time, it is motivated that emigration processes from the countries of the region lead to a shortage of labor, but due to the fact that the more educated is a population of a country the higher is an emigration flow from a country. Accordingly, it is recorded that the emigration activity of immigrants from the Visegrad countries changed after their accession to the EU. It is concluded that the countries of the region are summed up by the "liquid" migration in the form of transnationalism and mobility, since emigrants leave the countries not forever and not for a long time, but for a short time. At the same time, it is found that emigration from the countries of the region has both positive and negative consequences for them.

Keywords: migration, emigration, countries of the Visegrad group, the EU.

CECHY, STATYSTYKI I RODZAJE MIGRACYJNYCH PROCESÓW W KRAJACH GRUPY WYSZEHRADZKIEJ

W artykule przeanalizowane zostały cechy, statystyki i rodzaje procesów migracyjnych w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej – w Polsce, na Słowacji, na Węgrzech i w Czechach. Udowodniono, że procesy migracyjne z krajów regionu przed i podczas ich integracji z UE były spowodowane przede wszystkim różnicami w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym. Zaobserwowano, że przed i po upadku ZSRR i zmian na rynkach pracy i społeczeństwach krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, były one ekonomicznie i społecznie zależne od krajów Europy Zachodniej, dlatego kluczowe procesy migracyjne były (i nadal są) skierowane właśnie do nich. Jenocześnie motywuje się, że procesy migracyjne z krajów regionu prowadzą do niedoboru siły roboczej na rynkach pracy, a wynika to z faktu, że im lepiej wykształcone jest społeczeństwo, tym wyższy strumień migracyjny z kraju. W związku z tym, odnotowano, że migracyjna aktywność osób

pochodzących z krajów wszechradzkich zmieniła się od czasu ich przystąpienia do UE. Podsumowując, we wszystkich krajach Grupy Wszechradzkiej występuje «płynna» migracja pod postacią transnarodowości i mobilności, ponieważ emigranci opuszczają kraj nie zawsze i nie na długi okres czasu, a raczej krótkoterminowo. Jednocześnie stwierdzono, że migracja z krajów regionu ma dla nich zarówno pozytywne, jak i negatywne skutki.

Słowa kluczowe: migracja, emigracja, kraje Grupy Wszechradzkiej, UE.

The peculiarities of emigration processes in the contemporary Visegrad countries lie in the fact that they reached their the present-day format as late as the early 90's of the previous century, having historically proved to be utterly diversified and disparate. Therefore, following the experienced state-administrative and social-economic changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, east-west migration became a major problem for the Visegrad countries. In the aftermath of initial stages of significant emigration from this former communist region, Western European countries subsequently adopted restrictive rules. This occurred largely due to rising unemployment figures and the burden of «eastern» immigrants on the welfare systems of the West. Simultaneously with the rise of emigration processes from the Visegrad countries, they themselves became the destinations for immigration influx from the east¹. However and most interestingly, the strict EU regulations on the Visegrad countries and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (particularly, prior to their accession to the EU) consequently set an example of the desired legislature, regulating migration from newly democratic states, thus resulting in elaboration of certain migration management mechanisms². Hence, the anticipation of emigration from the countries of the Visegrad Group (especially in early 1990s) turned out to exceed its actual outcomes, as migration processes began to occur in different directions, in lieu of the east-west vector alone, being both short- and long-term, as well as legal and illegal. All this stipulated the necessity for scientific (theoretical, empirical and statistical) determination of the features and varieties of emigration processes in the Visegrad countries.

The alleged issue has been elucidated in influential scholarly treatises by such researchers as M. Bahna³, T. Bauer and K. Zimmermann⁴, J. Bijak and I. Korys⁵, K. Bodnar and L. Szabo⁶,

¹ Okólski M., Topińska I., *Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: Final Country Report Poland*, 2012.; Wallace C., Chmouliar O., Sidorenko E., The eastern frontier of western Europe: mobility in the buffer zone, "New Community" 1996, vol 22, nr. 2, s. 259–286.

² Epstein G., Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate, "IZA Discussion Paper" 2002, nr. 445.

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⁴ Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, "IZA Research Report" 1999, nr. 3.

⁵ Bijak J., Korys I., Statistics or reality? International migration in Poland, "CEPR Working Paper" 2006, nr. 3/2006.

⁶ Bodnar K., Szabo L., The Effect of Emigration on the Hungarian Labour Market, "MNB Occasional Paper" 2014, nr. 114.

K. Budnik⁷, I. Czerniejewska and E. Goździak⁸, E. Duda-Mikulin⁹, J. Friberg¹⁰, M. Garapich¹¹, T. Hardy¹², A. Hárs¹³, K. Iglicka¹⁴, J. Marešová i D. Drbohlav¹⁵, B. Nowok¹⁶, M. Okólski and I. Topińska¹⁷, M. Pytlikova¹⁸, E. Sik¹⁹, D. Stola²⁰, P. Trevena²¹, C. Wallace²² and others. However, they did not manage to provide a systemic overview of the features and varieties of emigration processes in the Visegrad countries. Therefore, the proposed article is aimed primarily at eliminating the identified gaps through the prism of methods and toolbox of Political Science.

In this light the features of emigration in the Visegrad countries are worth discussing, especially through the prism of their orientation, activity, structure, geography, as well as varieties. The orientation of emigration processes from the countries of the region under consideration, i.e. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, is conditioned primarily by their accession to the EU, both prior and posterior. It was found that the main destination of emigrants from the Visegrad countries has traditionally been Germany. Simultaneously, other neighboring and nearby countries are among the key destinations, e.g.: Austria is a typical target for the Czech Republic, with Slovakia

⁷ Budnik K., Migration Flows and Labour Market in Poland, "NBP Working Paper" 2007, nr. 44.

⁸ Czerniejewska I., Goździak E., "Aiding Defeated Migrants": Institutional Strategies to Assist Polish Returned Migrants, "International Migration" 2014, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 87-99; Goździak E., Biała emigracja: variegated mobility of Polish care workers, "Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture" 2016, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 26-43; Goździak E., Polish Migration after the Fall of the Iron Curtain, "International Migration" 2014, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 1-3; Goździak E., Pawlak M., Theorizing Polish Migration across Europe: Perspectives, Concepts and Methodologies, "Sprawy Narodowosciowe: Seria nowa" 2016, vol 48, s. 106-127.

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¹⁰ Friberg J., The States of migration: From going abroad to settling down: Postaccession Polish migrant worker in Norway, "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies" 2012, vol 38, nr. 10, s. 1589-1605.

¹¹ Garapich M., *Odysean refugees, migrants and power – construction of "other" within the Polish "community" in the UK*, [w:] / Reed-Danahay D., Brettell C. (eds.), *Immigration and citizenship in Europe and the U.S.: Anthropological perspectives*, Wyd. Rutgers University Press 2007.

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¹⁶ Nowok B., Evolution of international migration statistics in selected Central European countries, "CEFMR Working Paper" 2005, nr. 8/2005.

¹⁷ Okólski M., Topińska I., *Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: Final Country Report Poland*, 2012.

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²⁰ Stola D., *Międzynarodowa mobilność zarobkowa w PRL*, [w:] Jazwinska-Motyłska E., Okólski M. (eds.), *Ludzie na bustawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu*, Wyd. Scholar 2001, s. 62-100; Stola D., *Two kinds of quasi-migration in the Middle Zone: Central Europe as a space for transit migration and mobility for profit*, [w:] Wallace C., Stola D. (eds.), *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2001, s. 84-104.

²¹ Trevena P., "New" Polish migration to the UK: A synthesis of existing evidence, "ESRC Centre for Population Change Working Paper" 2009, nr. 3.

²² Wallace C., Opening and closing borders: migration and mobility in East-Central Europe, "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies" 2002, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 603-625; Wallace C., Chmouliar O., Sidorenko E., The eastern frontier of western Europe: mobility in the buffer zone, "New Community" 1996, vol 22, nr. 2, s. 259-286.

and Hungary; Czech Republic for Slovakia; Slovakia in its turn for the Czech Republic; Switzerland for Hungary and the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States for Poland, etc. Interestingly, emigration processes in Germany are noticeable due to almost complete (at least half) coverage by Poland, amongst the rest of the Visegrad countries. This was especially common in the early 1990s, when a number of Germans, being Polish citizens, returned to their ethnic motherland. During the second half of the decade, emigration flows from Poland to Germany stabilized at the level of about 70,000 people a year. However, given the extent of the Polish immigrants influx and the fact that in 2000 there were 300,000 Poles settled in Germany, it can be claimed that migration from Poland to Germany has primarily been a temporary phenomenon, that is, most Polish immigrants move to this country either for a short time stay, or en-route²³. The situation slightly differs in the USA and Canada, with fewer Visegrad countries citizens migrating, however on long-lasting stays, as a rule. On the whole, it is noteworthy that in 1990-2000 the largest percentage of emigrants in the region came from Poland, whereas the Czech Republic was the least prone to migration (see Table 1).

Table 1. Emigration flows from the Visegrad countries by destination-countries in 1989-2000 (average annual figures in absolute numbers and as a population percentage of the destination-countries)

Major destination-countries	HUNGARY		Major destination-countries	POLAND	
	Average annual number	Percentage of the destination-country population		Average annual number	Percentage of the destination-country population
Germany	18 290	0,180	Germany	110 279	0,287
Austria	2 219	0,022	USA	17 104	0,045
USA	1 102	0,011	Canada	6 720	0,018
Canada	644	0,006	Austria	4 416	0,012
Netherlands	405	0,004	Italy	3 673	0,010
Switzerland	383	0,004	France	1 530	0,004
Total	24 359	0,239	Total	152 179	0,396
Major destination-countries	SLOVAKIA		Major destination-countries	CZECH REPUBLIC	
	Average annual number	Percentage of the destination-country population		Average annual number	Percentage of the destination-country population
Germany	7 827	0,146	Germany	12 163	0,118
Czech Republic	3 835	0,072	Austria	1 388	0,014
Austria	1 756	0,033	Slovakia	942	0,009
USA	555	0,010	USA	570	0,006
Hungary	333	0,006	Canada	450	0,004
Canada	273	0,005	Switzerland	342	0,003
Total	15 626	0,291	Total	17 197	0,167

Žródło: Pytlíková M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, Presented at SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005.

²³ Pytlíková M., *Where Did Central and Eastern European Emigrants Go and Why?*, Presented at SOLE/EALE world conference, San Francisco 2005.

As for the emigration processes from the Visegrad countries prior to and immediately following their accession to the EU, particularly in 2002-2007, they occurred in accordance with the abovementioned scheme, however retaining some peculiarities of their own²⁴. The main peculiarity was that after being granted the rights and freedoms of movement within the Union of European Countries, significant restrictions were imposed on the Visegrad Group labour market. Thus, on one hand, the EU membership of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic had a positive impact on migration activity in each of the countries, on the other hand, the intensity of emigration proved rather low²⁵. The point is that the countries of the region anticipated that Western Europe would open new markets for them and their citizens would be able to work freely and without restriction in the "old" EU Member States. This would harmonize with the standard economic migration model by A. Roy²⁶, in terms of which the outflow of emigrants (primarily as labour force) from the four Visegrad countries had to increase, as more people had decided to move and work in the western countries owing to obvious advantages of the "old" EU Member States. In contrast, the latter expressed concern that an influx of relatively "cheap" yet skilled workers from the east could reduce the opportunities and social-economic status of their own workers. For this reason, Western countries were reluctant to agree on identical freedoms and job-opportunities for both newly acceded countries and the "old" EU Member States²⁷.

It was further argued that regulating the labour market and bringing the Visegrad Group countries closer to the EU level were crucial for them to achieve a European level of economic development in the future. However, even so, the first decade after the EU accession, the Visegrad countries tended to increase the number of emigrants to Western Europe. In the period from 2002 to 2006, for instance, the ratio of temporary emigrants to the overall population of Poland increased from 2 to 6%²⁸. Similarly, 11.3% of qualified Slovaks, Hungarians and Czechs were ready to emigrate to Western Europe, although merely 1.1% intended to do so on a permanent basis²⁹. In general, researchers anticipated that approximately 3% of the eastern population (not just from the Visegrad countries) would migrate west after their countries joined the EU, assuming that the migration flow was expected to rise to about 3 million people³⁰. Most of them had to focus on one destination-country, primarily Germany or the United Kingdom³¹.

²⁴ Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

²⁵ Wallace C., Opening and closing borders: migration and mobility in East-Central Europe, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2002, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 603-625.

²⁶ Roy A., Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings, *Oxford Economic Papers* 1951, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 135-146.

²⁷ Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

²⁸ Budnik K., Migration Flows and Labour Market in Poland, *NBP Working Paper* 2007, nr. 44.

²⁹ Hárs Á., Simonovits B., Sik E., The Labor Market and Migration: Threat or Opportunity? The Likely Migration of Hungarian Labour to the European Union, *TARKI Social Report Reprint Series* 2005, nr. 15.

³⁰ Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, *TZA Research Report* 1999, nr. 3.

³¹ Gilpin N., Henty M., Lemos S., Portes J., Bullen C., The impact of free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK labor market, *Department for Work and Pensions Working Paper* 2006, nr. 29.

On the whole, statistics prove that emigration activity from Visegrad countries has significantly changed since their accession to the EU. On one hand, the outward migration flow of workers from the four countries increased precisely in 2004, but began to vary after they joined the EU. It has been found that EU membership has had a significant impact on the Polish labour market, since emigration from the country to the EU doubled during the period of 2002-2005. Thus, in 2002 every 3rd out of 1000 people emigrated to the EU, in 2005 - every 6th out of 1000 people, and in 2007 - every 7th out of 1000 people in total. Identically, in 2007, emigration from Poland started to decrease, reaching the 2004 level. As far as Hungary is concerned, the outflow of labour in this country increased from 1 person to about 3 per 1000 citizens, and this increase has been partly continuing. This means that Hungary's EU accession has had a positive, albeit rather slight, impact on the outflow of labour force. Essentially, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic European integration proved positive immediately upon the EU accession, however weakening slightly in 2005. Therefore, in 2006 only 1 person per 1000 in the Czech Republic, as well as 5 people per 1000 in Slovakia emigrated to the EU (but first and foremost to Germany), thus reaching its 2002 level in total. On the whole, it resulted in the idea that in the long run the EU accession had little to no impact on the emigration activity of the Visegrad countries population³².

At the same time, it was found that Germany has remained the main target destination of immigrants from the Visegrad countries, both before and after their accession to the EU: on average, 2-3 people out of 1000 emigrated to this country in the given period. Emigration to the United Kingdom illustrated substantial growth once the Visegrad countries joined the EU. It may be accounted for by the fact that the UK was one of three European countries to have opened its labour market immediately after 2004. Austria has also become a popular destination country, as the number of emigrants has nearly doubled since joining the EU. Germany and Austria have become important destinations for immigrants from the east, at least because they are located in the centre of Europe, i.e. the closest to the emigrants' countries of origin³³. Hence, it is analytically proved (see Table 2) that the Visegrad countries EU accession has positively affected the outflow of labour from the region over a six-year period. This has demonstrated that since 2004, on average, more and more people are seeking to move and work in Western Europe. Among the positive-correlation factors, first of all, GDP per capita and the unemployment rate should be mentioned, whereas the minimum wage is a major negative-correlation factor. With a deeper insight, this is reflected in the fact that the average minimum wage does not affect the choice of emigration destination whatsoever, while the GDP per capita plays a decisive role in the case of emigration from Hungary and the Czech Republic, it being the unemployment rate in the case of Slovakia. Complementing the picture is the fact that the possibility of free movement of labour (against the background of the mobility of the region's population in the EU) does not affect the

³² Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

³³ Wallace C., Opening and closing borders: migration and mobility in East-Central Europe, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2002, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 603-625.

outwards labour flow. However, such an analytical effect, peculiar for the Visegrad countries is purely qualitative, not quantitative, since the outflow of labour from the region is diversified and with a different intensity, typical of each of the countries: the most intensive emigration processes, judging by the accession to the EU were observed in Poland (several times higher than in other Visegrad countries), with much less intense consequences in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and the least intense in Slovakia³⁴.

Table 2. Statistics and Econometrics of the Reasons for Emigration from the Visegrad Countries to the EU (2002-2007) by the Number of People per 1 Million of the Population

An Indicator of statistics and econometrics of the emigration causes	Середнє значення	Стандартне відхилення	Максимальне значення	Мінімальне значення
The number of people, having moved to the EU countries from Hungary	94,24	347,96	2272,96	0
The number of people, having moved to the EU-25 countries from Poland	184,14	695,88	4288,67	0
The number of people, having moved to the EU-25 countries from Slovakia	234,95	666,04	45.33,23	0
The number of people, having moved to the EU-25 countries from the Czech Republic	58,58	180,71	1092,45	0
The number of people, having moved to the EU-25 countries from the Visegrad Group countries	154,08	526,28	3175,51	0
Indicator of whether the country of origin was already a EU member-state at the point of analysis: 0=no, 1=yes	–	–	1	0
GDP per capita, in Euro	20403,99	14645,92	78100	2100
Average annual unemployment rate,%	7,74	3,6	20	2,6
Minimum monthly wages, in Euro	388,71	469,09	1570,3	0

Źródło: Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

On one hand, such a statistical situation, has been a favourable prospect for the Western countries, anticipating constant immigration of workers from the Visegrad Group countries in search of better working and living conditions. On the other hand, however, there arose concerns in the realm of economy, regarding the fact that emigrants would be able to diversify the labour market in Western Europe. Nonetheless, in reality the situation took a different turn, as immediately after the EU accession, emigration from the Visegrad countries increased at initial stages, significantly decreasing later on. This was predetermined by the increasing convergence of the Visegrad countries with the EU, resulting in the threat of a drastic decrease in the number of emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the light of

³⁴ Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

meeting the demographic requirements of the Western Europe³⁵. Poland proved to be an exception, with traditionally higher number of emigrants than that of immigrants, since before the EU accession, the migration balance had been negative, and this trend continued after 2004. Alternatively, in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as of 2004 the migration balance was positive, which meant that more people arrived than left³⁶. This corresponded to the emigration causes³⁷, including the search for better economic and social-economic benefits (wages and social security), as well as indicators of human development and capital. Additionally, the EU has traditionally felt anxious about a simultaneous increase in supply as well as cheapening of labour due to emigrants from the Visegrad countries (compared to higher rates of unemployment and payments of Western Europeans), whereas the Visegrad countries were disquieted by a large outflow of highly skilled workers.

Political and economic barriers, the appropriate migration policy, accompanied by introduction of the respective migration restrictions by both the EU and the Visegrad countries have therefore resolved mutual concerns³⁸. The socio-cultural and ethnolinguistic restrictions imposed have differently affected the emigration processes in the countries of the region. In particular, over time migration from Poland intensified, remaining at a relatively low level in the outwards direction from Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Also, as a result of emigration from the Visegrad Group countries to the EU, immediately following its expansion, wages increased and against the background of the decrease in the number of inefficient jobs. Another consequence was a gradual inflow of additional capital into the Visegrad countries, stipulating similar processes to those of Western Europe. For this reason, the emigration expenses began to make up for benefits and wages in Western Europe over time, with people beginning to return to the «new» EU Member States. This transformation process, in turn, has been the wealth maximization in the entire European Union, compelling the EU and national economies to substantially liberalize migration processes in Europe. This proved that the overall economic impact of emigration from Visegrad countries was insubstantial, yet positive, on the whole, reflecting flexibility and speed of immigrants' adaptation to the labour market. In addition, it has illustrated that income allocation plays an important role in structuring the influx of emigrants, because in case it is more equal in the destination country than that of the country of origin, then the least skilled are likely to emigrate to that country and vice versa³⁹. Moreover, the higher the distribution of wages is more typical of wealthy countries, as a rule, thus emigrants from a poorer country will be «disadvantaged» in terms of their knowledge and

³⁵ Wallace C., Opening and closing borders: migration and mobility in East-Central Europe, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2002, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 603–625.

³⁶ Stola D., *Two kinds of quasi-migration in the Middle Zone: Central Europe as a space for transit migration and mobility for profit*, [w:] Wallace C., Stola D. (eds.), *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2001, s. 84–104.

³⁷ Hardy T., *Labor Outflow from the Visegrad Countries after the EU Accession*, Wyd. Central European University 2010.

³⁸ Bauer T., Zimmermann K., An Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, *IZA Research Report* 1999, nr. 3.

³⁹ Borjas G., Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, *American Economic Review* 1987, vol 77, nr. 4, s. 531–553.

skills that match their preferences on the labour market⁴⁰. This, in turn, can directly account for the low intensity of emigration from the Visegrad countries right after their accession to the EU (at least until 2006-2007), since the analyzed countries are on average less wealthy than the «old» EU Member States, respectively, their citizens (with the exception of the Polish) fear that they will be unable to do work that meets their expectations and skills⁴¹.

Finally, emigration along with emigration processes from the Visegrad Group countries diversified, having largely inherited the patterns of previous development, i.e. from 2004-2005 to the present day. There were a number of determining factors, in particular: enhanced cooperation within the EU; the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008; migration crisis, drastically intensifying in 2014. In general, as seen in Table 3, emigration processes from the Visegrad countries on the whole are gaining momentum for the following reasons: the total annual number of long-term immigrants from the Visegrad is growing from year to year, especially in Hungary, Poland (though not so rapidly and with some fluctuation), Slovakia and overall in the region (at least over the period from 2007 to 2012); the average annual number of emigrants from the region was relatively stable in 2004-2007, then increased sharply, finally stabilizing since 2008; the number of emigrants from the Visegrad countries grew, particularly in 2008-2009 and continued to rise in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (although the latter soon experienced a sharp decline). The Czech Republic exemplifies a country where the number of emigrants is extremely variable and volatile, since at its peak during the analyzed period it was in 2008–2012, and during 2004–2007 and 2013–2015 it was almost at the same level. In terms of statistics, the largest total and annual number of emigrants in the region during 2004–2015 was observed in Poland, much less in the Czech Republic and Hungary (in descending order) and the least in Slovakia, respectively. Overall, over 2.5 million people (both nationals and transit migrants) emigrated from the region in 2004–2015 (excluding return statistics). Among them almost 2 million migrated from Poland, more than 0.45 million moved from the Czech Republic, more than 0.2 million came from Hungary, with only 0.025 million from Slovakia. On average, more than 160,000 people emigrate from Poland each year, almost 40,000 from the Czech Republic, more than 17,000 from Hungary, and just over 2,000 from Slovakia. An additional fact that serves as a proof of the continuation of previously established emigration patterns was the dynamics of change in the total and annual number of emigrants from the Visegrad countries, particularly the 2015 to 2004 ratio. It was found that on the whole over this period (year to year) the total number of emigrants in the region increased by 5.6 times; the average annual number of emigrants in the region has also increased by 5.6 times. Moreover, the annual number of emigrants from Poland increased by 13.7 times, by 11.3 times in Hungary, and by 2.4 times in Slovakia. Instead, in the Czech Republic, the number

⁴⁰ Brücker H., Defoort C., Inequality and the (Self-)Selection of International Migrants: Theory and Novel Evidence. *“LAB Discussion Paper”* 2007, nr. 26/2007.

⁴¹ Brücker H., Defoort C., Inequality and the (Self-)Selection of International Migrants: Theory and Novel Evidence. *“LAB Discussion Paper”* 2007, nr. 26/2007.

of emigrants in correlation of 2015 to 2004 decreased, estimating for only 74% of the period, immediately following the country's EU accession.

Table 3. The Annual Number of Long-Term Emigrants from the Visegrad Countries (2004–2015, Annual Snapshot)

Year	Hungary, №	Poland, №	Slovakia, №	Czech Republic, №	Totally in all Visegrad countries, №	On average in all Visegrad countries, №
2004	3 820	18 877	1 586	34 818	59 101	14 775
2005	3 658	22 242	1 873	24 065	51 838	12 960
2006	4 314	46 936	1 735	33 463	86 448	21 612
2007	4 500	35 480	1 831	20 500	62 311	15 578
2008	9 591	30 140	1 705	51 478	92 914	23 229
2009	10 483	229 320	1 979	61 782	303 564	75 891
2010	13 365	218 126	1 889	61 069	294 449	73 612
2011	15 100	265 798	1 863	55 910	338 671	84 668
2012	22 880	275 603	2 003	46 106	346 592	86 648
2013	34 691	276 446	2 770	25 894	339 801	84 950
2014	42 213	268 299	3 644	28 468	342 624	85 656
2015	43 225	258 837	3 870	25 684	331 616	82 904
Total for the whole period, №	207 840	1 946 104	26 748	469 237	2 649 929	662 482
On average annually for the whole period, №	17 320	162 175	2 229	39 103	220 827	55 207
The ratio of 2015 to 2004	11,3	13,7	2,4	0,7	5,6	5,6

Źródło: Population (Demography, Migration and Projections): Main tables, Eurostat, Źródło: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/main-tables> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).

The Visegrad countries emigration structure traditionally does not bear traces of unilateral prevalence of either women or men (see Tables 4 and 5). However, generally, the majority of emigrants are predominantly male, both in the region as a whole, and in individual countries of the region, except for Slovakia. However, a gradual rise (unilaterally in Hungary and gradually, yet with fluctuations in the Czech Republic, and through the entire region) or stabilization (in Poland and Slovakia) of the percentage of female emigrants from the Visegrad countries was primarily observed in 2006–2015. As of 2015, the largest number of female emigrants came from Poland, with the smallest number coming from Slovakia (which corresponds to the overall emigration statistics). In turn, among all the countries in the region, Slovakia was the country of origin of the largest percentage of emigrants, significantly fewer emigrants came from the Czech Republic and Hungary, and the least number moved from Poland. This determines that emigration from the Visegrad Group countries is subject to modification by gender, being gradually feminized. Nevertheless, the emigration estimate by sex has proved male prevalence,

largely due to the structure of the destination-countries labour markets. It is also noteworthy that the proportion and number of female emigrants began to increase mainly after 2008, when Europe reached the «peak» of the financial and economic crisis, affecting the need for employment, not only for men, but also for women (simultaneously unemployment rate in Western Europe rose, leading to the search for additional migration resources).

Table 4. Generalized gender characteristics of emigration from Visegrad countries (2006–2015, annual snapshot)

Country	2006	2009	2012	2015
<i>Annual number of emigrants from the Visegrad countries (2006–2015, for one year), No.</i>				
Hungary	4 314	10 483	22 880	43 225
Poland	46 936	229 320	275 603	258 837
Slovakia	1 735	4 753	2 003	3 870
Czech Republic	33 463	61 782	46 106	25 684
Total	86 448	306 338	346 592	331 616
<i>Annual number of female emigrants in correlation to the annual number of emigrants from Visegrad countries (2006–2015, for one year), No.</i>				
Hungary	1 633	4 449	10 049	19 540
Poland	19 699	114 132	135 017	109 958
Slovakia	1 030	1 833	1 225	2 316
Czech Republic	13 108	22 896	20 474	12 318
Total	35 470	143 310	166 765	144 132
<i>Annual percentage of female emigrants in correlation to the annual number of emigrants from the Visegrad countries (2006–2015, for one year), %</i>				
Hungary	37,9	42,4	43,9	45,2
Poland	42,0	49,8	49,0	42,5
Slovakia	59,4	38,6	61,2	59,9
Czech Republic	39,2	37,1	44,4	48,0
Total	41,0	46,8	48,1	43,5

Annual percentage of female emigrants in correlation to the annual number of emigrants from the Visegrad countries (2006–2015, for one year), %

Źródło: *Trends in International migrant stock 2015: Migrants by Destination and Origin*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015. Źródło: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).; *Population (Demography, Migration and Projections): Main tables*, Eurostat, Źródło: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/main-tables> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).

It is noteworthy that the proportion of female emigrants differs in terms of age, since most of them, at least as of 2015, were under 14 both in the entire region, and in Poland, in particular (see Table 4). In contrast, Hungary illustrates the highest proportion of female emigrants under the age of 29, in the Czech Republic between the ages of 15 and 29, whereas in Slovakia between the ages of 20 and 39. Alternatively, the smallest proportion of emigrant women in the region is aged from 15 to 19, and from 30 to 54, though with significant variations by country: in Hungary - from 35 to 49, in Poland - from 15 to 24, in Slovakia - up to 19 years, and in the Czech Republic - from 45 to 64 years. In general, by age estimate, emigrants from the Visegrad countries most often belong to the age group of 25-39 years old, rarely to the age group of 20-24 and 40-49 years, and most rarely to the age category of 19 and 50. Totally, this means that the «lion's share» of emigrants from the countries of the region are persons of both working and middle age, and the least represented age group is children, adolescents, pre-retirement and retirement age. Slightly different is the situation in the snapshot: Poland, where the number of able-bodied emigrants decreases when they are 40 years old; Slovakia, where the number of able-bodied emigrants decreases after they reach 45; The Czech Republic, where the number of emigrants decreases when they turn 55 years old. Also, in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, the number of emigrants aged more than 65 is larger than those aged 55-59 or 60-64.

Table 5. Quantitative characteristics and percentage of the age and gender structure of emigration from the Visegrad countries (as of 2015, in annual snapshot)

Country/age of emigrants	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65+	Total	
	Total number	215	469	325	744	6 691	9 804	6 918	5 489	4 205	3 135	1 905	1 310	680	1 335	43 225
Number of females	104	234	158	352	3 477	4 959	3 086	2 136	1 588	1 248	785	556	278	579	19 540	
percentage of females	48,4	49,9	48,6	47,3	52,0	50,6	44,6	38,9	37,8	39,8	41,2	42,4	40,9	43,4	45,2	
Poland	Total №	11 828	14 999	9 580	13 422	18 394	31 149	40 134	31 963	23 681	17 016	13 075	10 604	8 235	14 577	258 837
	Number of females	5 731	7 430	4 730	4 454	7 244	13 586	16 197	13 247	9 967	6 953	5 578	4 761	3 744	6 336	109 958
	percentage of females	48,5	49,5	49,4	33,2	39,4	43,6	40,4	41,4	42,1	40,9	42,7	44,9	45,5	42,9	42,5
Slovakia	Total number	194	358	179	132	138	425	726	705	410	197	136	101	86	83	3 870
	Number of females	85	172	81	63	86	268	500	461	247	108	79	60	52	54	2 316
	percentage of females	43,8	48,0	45,3	47,7	62,3	63,1	68,9	65,4	60,2	54,8	58,1	59,4	60,5	65,0	59,9
The Czech Republic	Total number	590	744	595	1 380	3 611	4 162	3 130	2 826	2 345	1 843	1 547	1 088	690	1 133	25 684
	Number of females	288	352	289	748	2 111	2 212	1 419	1 258	1 070	739	580	419	280	553	12 318
	percentage of females	48,8	47,3	48,6	54,2	58,5	53,1	45,3	44,5	45,6	40,0	37,5	38,5	40,6	48,8	48,0
Total	Total number	12 827	16 570	10 679	15 678	28 834	45 540	50 908	40 983	30 641	22 191	16 663	13 103	9 691	17 308	331 616
	Number of females	6 208	8 188	5 258	5 617	12 918	21 025	21 202	17 102	12 872	9 048	7 022	5 796	4 354	7 522	144 132
	percentage of females	48,4	49,4	49,2	35,8	44,8	46,2	41,6	41,7	42,0	40,8	42,1	44,2	44,9	43,5	43,5

Zdroj: *Trends in International Migrant Stock 2015, Migrants by Destination and Origin*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015. Zdroj: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).; *Population (Demography, Migration and Projections)*, Main tables, Eurostat, Zdroj: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/main-tables> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).

Previously established migration patterns related to the structure of emigration directions from the Visegrad countries have preserved. As of 2015 (see Table 6), emigrants from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have traditionally moved in the direction of the EU countries, preferably Western Europe (excluding re-emigrants). In total, more emigrants from the Visegrad countries (excluding re-emigrants) were moving towards the non-EU countries (although they could be in Western Europe). This is true for the region as a whole, and particularly for Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, emigrants (yet not re-emigrants) from Hungary and Slovakia mostly headed for the EU. On the other hand, totally (including re-emigrants and cyclical migrants), most of the permanent or temporary migrants from (or through transit countries) from the Visegrad Group travelled to the EU and Western Europe, similarly to previous years.

Table 6. Structure of emigration destinations (by number of emigrants) from the Visegrad countries (as of 2015, in annual snapshot)

Country	Emigration country (re-emigration)	EU countries (except for the analysed country)	Non-EU countries	Non-governmental association	Other	Total
Hungary	32 852	7 104	3 269	0	0	43 225
Poland	169 375	34 320	54 961	18	163	258 837
Slovakia	3 835	30	5	0	0	3 870
Czech Republic	6 803	3 830	15 051	0	0	25 684
Total	212 865	45 284	73 286	18	163	331 616

Źródło: *Population (Demography, Migration and Projections): Main tables*, Eurostat, Źródło: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/main-tables> (odczyt: 25.05.2019).

The situation is further reiterated by the fact that most of the emigrants from the Visegrad countries moved to countries, such as Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the like. Nevertheless, the causality of the emigration processes in the analysed countries, in spite of bearing a number of similarities, was frequently conditioned by the national criteria of migration and economic policies of certain countries. Therefore, their contemplation may further testify to the peculiarities of emigration from Visegrad.

The emigration situation in Hungary is determined by particular intensity since 2008, which, on one hand, coincided with the financial and economic crisis, yet the Hungarian economy became more flexible⁴². Such a tendency clearly differentiates between the prior and posterior to the EU accession⁴³ situation in Hungary, since during this period the country was characterized by a moderate (against the background of the Visegrad countries) population outflow, even despite

⁴² Bodnar K., Szabo L., The Effect of Emigration on the Hungarian Labour Market, "MNB Occasional Paper" 2014, nr. 114.

⁴³ Sik E., *The sociological aspects of migration to and from contemporary Hungary and accession to the European Union*, Prepared for the World Bank 1998.

the gradual removal of restrictions on labor emigration in the EU. Therefore, as of 2011, a large part of Hungarian citizens, to be precise more than 460 thousand or 4.6% of the population, lived abroad, with 400 thousand, living in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, primarily Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, United Kingdom, and more. This occurred due to the fact that Hungary's GDP and other social-economic indicators are much lower than in the highly developed countries of the world, hence emigration from Hungary has traditionally been economically⁴⁴ and labour-determined. On the other hand, contemporary Hungary has been characterized by re-emigration (return of emigrants) and less intensive long-term and more intensive short-term emigration, which is caused by the intended improvement of the social-economic environment in the country.

Emigration from Poland (where national statistics are extremely complicated, and not always meeting international requirements⁴⁵) is traditionally defined as perhaps the most vivid against the background of the rest of the Visegrad countries⁴⁶, as emigration, both political and economical, has remained an inherent phenomenon, rooted deeply in the history and public consciousness of the Poles⁴⁷. For instance, during 1871–1913 almost 3.5 million Polish people emigrated (approximately 14% of Poland's population of those times), whereas another 2.1 million people left Poland in the interwar period (1918–1939). As a consequence, a number of Polish emigration networks were established abroad, contributing to immense volumes of international migration, the final institutionalization of emigration as well as the development of targeted national migration programmes. Nevertheless, after the Second World War emigration processes in Poland were strongly politicized⁴⁸. Therefore, since the 1990's emigration (including re-emigration) processes have become the main form of international mobility in Poland, which is primarily reflected in the long-term population outflow. The emigration trend in the country has proved that emigration processes are regular, circular and purposeful, as a rule, targeted at Germany, the USA, Canada, Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and the like⁴⁹. Notably, the inhabitants of the southern provinces of Poland are most prone to emigration. However, the EU accession and consequently further opening up of all EU labour markets have led to one of the largest emigration flows in the postwar history of Poland⁵⁰, which has become one of the

⁴⁴ Sik E., *The sociological aspects of migration to and from contemporary Hungary and accession to the European Union*, Prepared for the World Bank 1998.

⁴⁵ Nowok B., Evolution of international migration statistics in selected Central European countries, "CEFMR Working Paper" 2005, nr. 8/2005.

⁴⁶ Bijak J., Korys I., Statistics or reality? International migration in Poland, "CEFMR Working Paper" 2006, nr. 3/2006.

⁴⁷ Morawska E., Labour Migrations of Poles in the Atlantic World Economy, 1880–1914, "Comparative Studies in Society and History" 1989, vol 31, nr. 2, s. 237-272.

⁴⁸ Stola D., *Międzynarodowa mobilność zarobkowa w PRL*, [w:] Jazwińska-Motyłska E., Okolski M. (eds.), *Ludzie na bustawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu*, Wyd. Scholar 2001, s. 62-100.

⁴⁹ Jazwińska E., Filhel A., Praszatowicz D., Weinar A., Kaczmarczyk P., *Studies of mechanisms of emigration from Poland after 1989*, [w:] Kicingier A., Weinar A. (eds.), *State of the art of the migration research in Poland*, "CEFMR Working Paper" 2007, nr. 1/2007, s. 18-36.

⁵⁰ Gozdzik E., Pawlak M., Theorizing Polish Migration across Europe: Perspectives, Concepts and Methodologies, "Sprawy Narodowosciowe: Seria nowa" 2016, vol 48, s. 106-127.; Gozdzik E., Biała emigracja: variegated mobility of Polish care workers, "Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture" 2016, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 26-43.

largest labour-providers in the expanded EU⁵¹. Another inherent feature of the country is that it is characterized by negative net migration (a negative migration balance), receiving significantly fewer immigrants than emigrants⁵². In addition, if in the 1990's Polish emigrants mainly consisted of middle-aged people without higher education, today mostly young and highly skilled workers are apt to emigration⁵³. Therefore, to conclude one should say that Poland manifests the so-called "liquid" migration⁵⁴ in the form of transnationalism and mobility, with emigrants leaving the country for short-term stays. This is what differentiates the present situation from the historical one, when Poles traditionally would leave either forever or for a long time. The emigration directions have also changed, since earlier the US used to be the key destination for the Poles, whereas modern-day Poles prefer Western Europe, primarily Germany and the United Kingdom⁵⁵. This substantially modernized the inherent public discourse of comprehending emigration in Poland, because in terms of politics it is mostly perceived as a "sacred act of the fight for freedom" while, in the economic context, as "a necessary evil, a manifestation of weakness, or simply cowardice, selfishness, and an ambiguous act of aversion from the Destination of the Nation"⁵⁶. It manifested itself in the fact that people, having previously emigrated to various foreign countries, were increasingly returning to Poland. Even if they contemplated the option of emigration, it would mostly be circular, i.e. still returning home⁵⁷. As a result, emigration began to be socialized and highly mobile, starting to be conditioned by a certain "liquid culture" and "transnational consciousness".

Interestingly, both Slovakia and the Czech Republic are characterised by the fact that emigration there was mainly the result of the 1989-1993 political changes, when Czechoslovakia ceased to be socialist and subsequently split into two countries. Hence, the emigration processes in the analyzed countries were marked by their accession to the EU, which resulted in Slovakia becoming mainly an sending-country, whereas the Czech Republic became a transit-emigration / transit country. This presupposes that emigration from Slovakia has been conditioned by Slovaks themselves, while in the Czech Republic it occurred on account of emigrants who have used the country as an interim destination in the east-west movement. It therefore clarifies that Slovakia tends to emigrate more (as it did during the period of population movement

⁵¹ Gozdziaek E., Polish Migration after the Fall of the Iron Curtain, *"International Migration"* 2014, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 1-3.

⁵² Iglicka K., Mechanisms of migration from Poland before and during the transition period, *"Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies"* 2000, vol 26, nr. 1, s. 61-73.

⁵³ Czerniejewska I., Gozdziaek E., "Aiding Defeated Migrants": Institutional Strategies to Assist Polish Returned Migrants, *"International Migration"* 2014, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 87-99.

⁵⁴ Engbersen G., *Migration transitions in an era of liquid migration: Reflections on Fassmann and Reeger*, [w:] Okolski M. (ed.), *Europe: The continent of immigrants: Trends, structures and policy implications*, Wyd. Amsterdam University Press 2012, s. 91-105.

⁵⁵ Gozdziaek E., Polish Migration after the Fall of the Iron Curtain, *"International Migration"* 2014, vol 52, nr. 1, s. 1-3.; Trevena P., "New" Polish migration to the UK: A synthesis of existing evidence, *"ESRC Centre for Population Change Working Paper"* 2009, nr. 3.; Duda-Mikulini E., *Citizenship, migration and gender: Polish migrant women in the UK and Poland*, Paper to be presented at the Joint Annual Conference of the East Asian Social Policy Research Network (EASP) and the United Kingdom Social Policy Association (SPA), University of York 2012.

⁵⁶ Garapich M., *Odyssean refugees, migrants and power – construction of "other" within the Polish "community" in the UK*, [w:] / Reed-Danahay D., Brettell C. (eds.), *Immigration and citizenship in Europe and the U.S.: Anthropological perspectives*, Wyd. Rutgers University Press 2007, s. 7.

⁵⁷ Friberg J., The States of migration: From going abroad to settling down: Postaccession Polish migrant worker in Norway, *"Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies"* 2012, vol 38, nr. 10, s. 1590.

within Czechoslovakia), and the Czech Republic shows propensity to immigration and transit emigration. Moreover, most emigrants from Slovakia (see Table 7) are moving to the Czech Republic alongside Germany, proving that migration processes are primarily affected by the country's past as a part of Czechoslovakia. Alternatively, Czech emigrants (especially since 2002) are moving in very diversified directions, proving that the country is primarily transit. Such variability of the Slovak and Czech situations is due to the fact that the two countries started to diversify since 1993: Slovakia due to problems of democracy, and in contrast the Czech Republic with the benefits of democracy. The main reason for the Czech emigration and transit status was political stability, the evolution of democracy, attended by preserved or even rising standards of living, as well as the Czech mentality, which stimulated mostly casual and temporary emigration to highly developed countries of the world, as well as immigration of other foreign countries to the Czech Republic⁵⁸. As opposed to that, Slovakia over the 1990s was regarded as unstable, with deficiencies of democracy, therefore failing to attract immigrants, instead causing the outflow of its own population (of different ages, yet mostly university graduates) abroad⁵⁹.

Table 7. Logics and statistics of migration processes in the Czech Republic (partly Slovakia) (1990–2006, in annual snapshot)

Year	Emigrants to the Czech R. KRreREpub, №		Emigrants from the Czech R. Republic, №		Net migration, №	
	Total	From Slovakia	Total	To Slovakia	Total	Incl. Slovakia
1990	12 411	10 073	11 787	7 674	+624	+2 399
1991	14 096	8 334	11 220	7 324	+2 876	+1 010
1992	19 072	11 740	7 291	6 823	+11 781	+4 917
1993	12 900	7 276	7 424	7 232	+5 476	+44
1994	10 207	4 076	265	56	+9 942	+4 020
1995	10 540	3 845	541	140	+9 999	+3 705
1996	10 857	3 450	728	213	+10 129	+3 237
1997	12 880	3 088	805	260	+12 075	+2 828
1998	10 729	2 887	1 241	356	+9 488	+2 531
1999	9 910	3 235	1 136	336	+8 774	+2 899
2000	7 802	2 826	1 263	413	+6 539	+2 413
2001	12 918	3 050	21 469	8 671	-8 551	-5 621
2002	44 679	13 326	32 389	14 455	+12 290	-1 129
2003	60 015	24 410	34 226	18 316	+25 789	+6 094
2004	53 453	15 788	34 818	21 152	+18 635	-5 364
2005	60 294	10 133	24 065	1 935	+36 229	+8 198
2006	68 183	6 795	33 463	629	+34 720	+6 166

Źródło: The table is based on the internal statistics of the Czech Republic as of 2008.

⁵⁸ Marešová J., Drbohlav D., Fenomén pendlerství – z Chebska do Bavorska a zpět (stav a podmínčnosti), „*Demografie*“ 2007, vol 49, nr. 2, s. 96-107.

⁵⁹ Zelinsky T., *Chudoba a deprivácia na Slovensku: Metodologické aspekty a empiria*, Wyd. Equilibria 2014.; Bahna M., *Migrácia zo Slovenska po vstupe do Európskej únie*, Wyd. VEDA 2011.

In conclusion, it is worth stating that emigration from the Visegrad countries since 1990, that is, after the collapse of «real socialism», has proven unique in numerous ways. Firstly, it was unprecedented in the realm of velocity, scale and perseverance, compared to emigration from other countries, largely owing to the nature of the former communist countries' reintegration into the world economy. Secondly, it has been determined by the fact that the emigrants from the Visegrad countries are comprised of young and highly skilled people (with lower average age, and higher education level than that of the remaining population in the sending-country⁶⁰). In this respect, the so-called «brain drain» coincided with the population aging in the Visegrad countries, which had a far-reaching impact on their efficiency and productivity. Thirdly, emigration from the analysed countries seems more permanent than emigration from other foreign countries⁶¹. On one hand, Visegrad is characterized mainly by economic emigration, on the other hand, the movement of emigrants from the countries of the region is traditionally directed to Western Europe and North America. And the reasons, accounting for this fact are the following: the difference in per capita income levels, quality of institutions and employment prospects. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that the situation among the countries under analysis is more favorable in Hungary and the Czech Republic, which demonstrate a significant level of migration within Central and Eastern Europe, herein these countries are usually determined by positive cumulative migration. The situation is accompanied by the fact that improvement of social-economic indicators contributes to re-emigration, which is more typical for Hungary and the Czech Republic. Ultimately, emigration from the Visegrad countries is socio-economically advantageous for the countries of Western Europe, not Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic themselves, therefore requiring a comprehensive response at both national and regional political levels.

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⁶⁰ Ariu A., Squicciarini P., The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration, "IRES Discussion Paper" 2013, nr. 2013/010.

⁶¹ Atoyan R., Christiansen L., Dizioli A., Ebeke C., Ilahi N., Ilyina A., Mehrez G., Qu H., Raci F., Rhee A., Zakharova D., Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe, „IMF Staff Discussion Note“ 2016, nr. 16/07.

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PARTY AND IDEOLOGICAL DETERMINATION AND POSITIONING OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

The article deals with the peculiarities of party and ideological determination and positioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. It is stated that minority governments in this context considerably differ from majority governments, and therefore they are formed, functioning and responsible within the specific logics. The researcher found that party and ideological determinants and particularities of minority governments' positioning are peculiar "motivators" or "safeguards" of minority governments, since they define and identify different strategies for the formation or non-formation of minority governments, according to which minority governments operate. In this context, it was explained how minority governments are involved with the support of oppositional (non-governmental) parties, but instead guarantee them some political benefits, which makes it possible for minority governments to legislate.

Keywords: government, governmental cabinet, minority government, party, ideology, opposition, European parliamentary democracies.

PARTYNO-IDEOLOGICZNE CECHY ORAZ POZYCJA RZĄDÓW MNIEJSZOŚCI OWYCH W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PARLAMENTARNYCH

W artykule omówiono cechy systemu partyjnego oraz ideologicznego określenia rządów mniejszościowych w europejskich demokracjach parlamentarnych. W tym kontekście okazało się, że rządy mniejszościowe znacznie różnią się od rządów większościowych, a to oznacza, że są powoływane, funkcjonują i są odpowiedzialne wg. konkretnej, właściwej tylko im logiki. Ustalono, że partyjno-ideologiczne uwarunkowania i funkcje pozycji rządów mniejszościowych są tzw. «motywatorami» lub «bezpiecznikami» rządów mniejszościowych, bo to one ustalają i potwierdzają właściwe strategie, zgodnie z którymi są powoływane lub nie rządy mniejszościowe, a także zgodnie z którym rządy mniejszościowe funkcjonują. Podsumowując, wyjaśnia to w jaki sposób rządy mniejszościowe są zaangażowane w poparcie partii opozycyjnych (pozarządowych), w zamian otrzymując niektóre korzyści polityczne, które umożliwiają proces przyjmowania aktów prawnych rządów mniejszościowych.

Słowa kluczowe: rząd, rząd mniejszościowy, partia, ideologia, opozycja, europejskie demokracje parlamentarne

Contemporary party theory has traditionally stipulated that governmental party ideologies play an essential role in conditioning political outcomes. Basically, leftist governments (government cabinets) are pursuing leftist policies and leftist political decisions, with respectively rightist governments pursuing rightist policies and rightist political decisions. However, this conclusion can be reached only with regard to competition within two-party systems, where one party tends to gravitate to the left spectrum, while the other party belongs to the right spectrum, as a rule. Accordingly, the formation of one-party majority or minority governments is inherent in such systems, so they do not delineate ideological specifics of the majority and minority coalition governments, peculiar for nearly all European parliamentary democracies. The latter depend on the criteria of the multiparty systems partisan and ideological nature, where, in parliamentary democracies, no party consistently (except for some cases, e.g. the United Kingdom, Spain and Malta) exercises control over the proportion of parliamentary mandates, sufficient to form a single-party government. This is the reason why the lack of parliamentary mandates to form one-party majority governments in multi-party systems leads to the alignment of formalized or non-formalized parliamentary / legislative coalitions that can be incorporated in majority coalitions or single-party coalitions.

In the light of ideology, such governments are peculiar, because any alternatives of legislative coalitions, incorporated by various government types, combine political parties that depend on an outside party parliamentary support to promote their own policies and political decisions. In this regard, they should ideologically focus not only on their own programmatic and political goals, but also on the programmatic and political goals of other parliamentary parties, and vice versa. Therefore, the ideologies of such parties and the governments they form are much more dependent than the ideologies of parties, endowed with a majority of parliamentary seats¹. Primarily, it has a profound effect on the party theory, as the ideologies of governments, formed around parliamentary / legislative coalitions in European multi-party parliamentary democracies cannot be homogeneously identified as leftist (leftish) or rightist (rightish), especially at the background of single-party governments in bipartisan systems. The point is that in bipartisan systems, the ideology of the government coincides with the party ideology, whereas multi-party systems are characterised by much more complex relationships, arising and evolving between the parties involved: between governmental (in case of majority coalition governments), or governmental and non-governmental (in single-party and minority coalition) parties. For instance, in multi-party parliamentary democracies, governments can be formed by both left-wing and right-wing parties simultaneously. It may

¹ Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe: How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 89.

occur that government parties are ideologically commensurate, as they tend to gravitate either to the left or the right ideological spectrum more than other parties do. However, essentially, it is more complicated to assess the level of governmental gravitation towards the left, right or middle spectrum than in bipartisan systems. Moreover, it is utterly complex to predict policies, political preferences and political decisions that may result from the association of polar parties in minority governments. However, addressing this perplexing problem in respect of minority governments is extremely important, since designating their ideological focus and positioning of governments in parliamentary democracies helps to determine functional characteristics of minority governments, as well as parameters of their policies implemented and decisions taken.

In this light, crucial is the intention of parties either to form or not to form single-party or coalitional minority governments, as well as the parties' expectations of participating/not participating in establishment and functioning of such governments. It is occasionally more advantageous for a parliamentary party to be in opposition, in situ supporting minority governments, rather than form governments and directly implement their political agenda². On the contrary, the choice of the party largely corresponds to a particular type of party system, in particular to ideological positions of the parties in the system. Such party and ideological preconditions, determination and peculiarities of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies occur due to their construction on the basis of party-political representation. The fact is that the voters' power is delegated to the representatives of parties in parliaments and governments, thereby the parties determine the state policy in the process of exercising the executive power, and the executive power is responsible to voters through the parties³. In this respect, the political and ideological position of the minority government always results from inter-party compromise, making it more complicated for a party to implement its own program. For this reason the left-right ideological positioning of each minority government (being a form of coalition by nature) is hypothetically placed between individual parameters of the ideological positioning of the parties that are members of the minority government, facilitating its formation, support and functioning⁴. This affects the entire political and administrative process carried out by the minority government⁵. It is of utmost importance that peculiarities of party-ideological determination and positioning of minority governments presuppose that the likelihood of their formation is positively higher when the benefits of receiving ministerial portfolios are fewer than advantages of the parties' implementing their political programmes and ideological principles⁶. Consequently, minority

² Artés J., Bustos A., Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study, *European Journal of Political Research* 2008, vol 47, nr. 3, s. 307-333.

³ Mair P., The Challenge to Party Government, *West European Politics* 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 225.

⁴ Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe: How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 91.

⁵ Keman H., *Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds.), *Handbook on Political Parties*, Wyd. Sage 2006, s. 160-174.

⁶ Kalandrakis T., *Minority Governments: Ideology and Office*, APSA conference, Boston 2002, s. 2.

governments in Western Europe are more frequently formed within a strategy to achieve political and ideological goals, regardless of the cabinet membership, whereas Central and Eastern Europe are more likely to adhere to the strategy of achieving political and ideological goals solely as a result of membership in the cabinet.

Therefore, some minority governments are more likely to occur when the largest parliamentary party is growing in size, thus becoming more centrist ideologically. In contrast, other minority governments are predominantly dependent on the anticipated utilitarian benefit / benefit for the party participation in governmental cabinets⁷. This is in behalf of the fact that parties that are not hypothetically governmental (or do not form the so-called proto-coalitions) may receive positive benefits in the form of non-political ones (not ideological), but other benefits in the form of cabinet offices that are decisive in the context of the formation and further functioning of minority governments⁸, reflecting a scientific viewpoint, asserting that parties as representatives of voters' interests care primarily about their political-ideological and power and authority goals⁹. Correspondingly, parties almost always encounter government-forming contradictions, resolving them on the basis of a consensus of political advantages, ideology and powers. Herein, the ideological dimension of the formation and functioning of minority governments by one party is of more significance when other parties, refusing to participate in governmental cabinets (office-based goals), show patience and ability to influence the politics of the parliament and also count on competitive elections. As a consequence, minority governments in terms of party ideology are predominantly defined within the framework of inter-party competition, or sometimes additionally defined by the institutional criteria of political systems.

On the whole, it is evident that through the prism of ideology minority governments are formed and functioning because the parties, involved in negotiating the government-forming process are radically different in their political views and, therefore, do not contribute to the emergence of majority governments. Undoubtedly, minority governments should not be expected to be formed under the circumstances when politicians and parties seek to achieve not political and ideological goals, but purely office-related goals and powers¹⁰. In other words, minority governments are traditionally formed when parties seek to fulfil merely their own political (political-ideological) goals, or concurrently both political and power (government) ones, however, they are not, as a rule, formed when parties seek offices and authority. Traditionally, with such a remark European parliamentary democracies positively bring into correlation the following conclusions and assumptions. Firstly, political and ideological polarization of

⁷ Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 27.

⁸ Kalandrakis T., *Minority Governments: Ideology and Office*, APSA conference, Boston 2002, s. 5.

⁹ Ström K., *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 583-605.; Ström K., *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr. 2, s. 199-226.

¹⁰ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 4.

parliaments contributes to the increase in the minority governments occurrence, since in such a case opposition parties have no alternative but to support minority governments, if demanded to act so by minority party governments¹¹. Secondly, minority governments are more likely to be formed in the environment of ideologically divided and polarized opposition. As a matter of fact, the stances of party/ies, forming minority governments are more centrist and stable. Moreover, ideological composition of parliamentary opposition increases the polarization of parliaments, yet the presence of a central or centrist party facilitates the formation of not only minority governments but coalitional majority governments, as well¹². Thirdly, regardless of the minority governments' ideological composition along with their ideological environment (ideological stance of the opposition), minority governments are accustomed to relying on and counting on non-governmental parliamentary parties. This is indispensable in view of the adoption of both the laws of government initiatives and as stipulated by ensuring the survival of incumbent governments in the event of parliamentary procedures of confidence and no-confidence votes. It is easier to act in this manner in conditions of highly polarized parliaments. Fourthly, ideological determination of minority governments does not always unambiguously attest to the benefits of their formation, since even in projected cases coalition majority governments can be formed instead of minority governments¹³.

Therefore, we argue that minority governments in the midst of strong ideological opposition within parliaments, may face severe criticism for their activities. However, ideological confrontation of oppositional/ non-governmental parliamentary parties in such a case would hinder the early termination of minority governments. Instead, the blockade of a non-governmental party together with a minority government cabinet to counteract its ideological opponent is more frequent. However, another interesting point is that minority governments in European parliamentary democracies (particularly in systems of positive and negative parliamentarism) ideologically replicate majority governments (at least in those countries where majority governments are prevalent or frequently occurring). Accordingly, when contemplating the ideological stance of minority governments in the regional context, and in the realm of parliamentary democracy types (systems of positive and negative parliamentarism), the conclusions are not always unambiguous, especially in case of single-party and coalition minority governments.

For instance, in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism in regard of parties' ideology, one-party minority governments prevail over Christian-democratic ones, and among coalition minority governments, those that ideologically synthesize the principles of Christian democracy, liberal conservatism or liberalism, and social democracies. However, this situation is far from identical in all Western European systems of positive parliamentarism (see Table 1).

¹¹ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 10.

¹² Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

¹³ Indridason I., *Coalition Formation and Polarization*, Wyd. University of California 2010, s. 25-26.

Table 1. Ideological Positioning of Minority Governments in European Parliamentary Democracies (snapshot based on regions and types of parliamentary democracies) (as of December 2016)

Country	Ideological positioning of single-party minority governments (the number of governments)	Ideological positioning of coalitional minority governments (the number of governments)
<i>POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>		
Belgium (since 1946)	Social democracy (1) / Christian democracy (1)	Social democracy + liberalism (3) / Christian democracy + niþeþanizm (2)
Greece (since 1974)	Christian democracy (+ liberal conservatism) (2)	–
Ireland (since 1944)	Conservatism (6)	Christian democracy + liberal conservatism + social democracy (3) / conservatism + liberalism (3)
Spain (since 1977)	Social Democracy (4) / Christian Democracy (+ Liberal Conservatism) (5)	–
Italy (since 1945)	Christian Democracy (15)	Christian democracy + liberalism + social democracy (11)
Malta (since 1962)	Christian democracy (+ liberal conservatism) (1)	–
Germany (since 1949)	–	–
Finland (since 2000)	–	–
France (1945–1958)	Social democracy (1)	Social democracy + liberalism + conservatism (2)
<i>POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE</i>		
Bulgaria (since 1990)	Conservatism (+ Christian democracy) (3)	Social Democracy + Liberalism (1) / Social Democracy + Conservatism (1)
Estonia (1992)	Liberalism (2)	Social democracy + conservative liberalism (1) / conservatism + liberalism (1)
Latvia (1990)	–	Liberalism + Conservatism (4) / Nationalism + Liberalism + Christian Democracy (5)
Lithuania (1990)	–	Conservatism + Christian Democracy (2) / Liberalism + Social Democracy (+ Social Liberalism) (4)
Poland (since 1989)	Conservatism (+ Christian democracy) (3)	Social Democracy (1) / Christian Democracy + Conservatism (2)
Romania (since 1990)	Social Democracy (4)	Social Democracy + Liberalism + Conservatism + Christian Democracy (10)

Slovakia (since 1990)	Conservatism (1)	Social Democracy + National Conservatism (2) / Christian Democracy + Liberal Conservatism (2)
Slovenia (since 1990)	–	Social Democracy + Social Liberalism + Liberalism (4)
Hungary (since 1990)	Social Democracy (2)	–
Croatia (since 2000)	Christian democracy (+ national conservatism) (2)	Social Democracy + Liberalism + Christian Democracy + National Conservatism (2)
The Czech Republic (since 1992)	Social Democracy (1) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Liberal Conservatism + Christian Democracy + Social Democracy (3)
<i>NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>		
Austria (since 1945)	Social Democracy (1)	Christian Democracy + Social Conservatism (1)
Denmark (since 1945)	Social Democracy (12) / Liberal Conservatism (3)	Conservatism + Liberalism (11) / Social Democracy + Liberalism (9)
Iceland (since 1946)	Social Democracy (3) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Social democracy + agrarianism + environmentalism (2)
Luxembourg (since 1945)	–	–
Netherlands (since 1946)	–	Christian democracy + liberal conservatism (7) / social democracy + liberalism (1)
Norway (since 1945)	Social Democracy (12) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Liberal conservatism (+ Christian democracy + agrarianism) (7)
Portugal (since 1975)	Social Democracy (7) / Liberal Conservatism (2)	Liberalism + Liberal Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (2)
United Kingdom (since 1945)	Conservatism (2) / Social Democracy (1)	–
Finland (1945–2000)	Social Democracy (2) / Social Liberalism (1)	Agrarianism + Social Liberalism (6)
France (since 1958)	Social Democracy (6)	Liberal Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (2)
Sweden (since 1944)	Social Democracy (18) / Liberal Conservatism (1)	Social Liberalism + Conservatism (+ Christian Democracy) (4)

Źródło: Panchak-Bialoblińska N., *Uряды menshosci v yevropejskych parlamentskych demokraciakh*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2017.; Ierac G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUI Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, Źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WNP-DISES-4-2013_full-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.05.2019].; Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments databases: Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, ParlGov, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org> [odczyt: 01.05.2019].; Armington K., Weissstanner D., Knöppel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universität Bern 2014, Źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armington/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.05.2019].

For instance, Belgian single-party minority governments tend to be left-wing Social Democrats or right-centrist Christian Democrats, while coalition minority governments combine ideological principles of Social Democracy and Liberalism, or Christian Democracy and Liberalism (occasionally Christian Democracy, social democracy, and liberalism). In Greece, however, minority governments are predominantly right-centrist Christian-Democratic and liberal-conservative. Irish single-party minority governments are typically conservative-populist right-centrist governments, whereas coalition minority governments combine the ideologies of Christian democracy, liberal conservatism, and social democracy, or conservatism and liberalism. Instead, in Spain, where single-party minority governments prevail, the latter are usually social-democratic or liberal-conservative (or Christian-democratic). Italy's single-party minority governments gravitate to Christian democracy, while coalition minority governments gravitate to Christian democracy, liberalism, and social democracy. The French single-party minority governments used to be social-democratic (until 1958), yet coalition minority governments predominantly adhere to principles of social-democracy, liberalism and conservatism (see Table 1 for details).

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the realm of positive parliamentarism proves to be miscellaneous, as well. In this region, on the average and in total single-party minority governments are predominantly conservative (with elements of liberal conservatism and Christian democracy), and social democratic, whereas coalition minority governments tend to combine ideological principles of social democracy and liberalism (particularly of social liberalism). Nevertheless, other ideological constructions of minority coalition governments are also widespread. However, in this region the overall situation also tends to be ambiguous. For instance, in Bulgaria, one-party minority governments are, as a rule, conservative (with elements of Christian democracy), and coalition minority government cabinets are prevalently social-democratic and liberal, or social-democratic and conservative. In Estonia, for example, single-party minority governments are mainly liberal, while coalition minority governments combine the principles of social democracy and conservative liberalism, or liberalism and conservatism. The minority governments in Latvia combine ideological principles of liberalism and conservatism, or nationalism, liberalism and Christian democracy, consequently being right-centrist or right-wing. Lithuanian minority governments synthesize conservatism and Christian democracy, or liberalism and social democracy, thus appearing primarily right-centrist or left-centrist. Polish single-party minority governments gravitate to conservatism, with coalition minority governments leaning to social democracy or Christian democracy, and social conservatism. In Romania, single-party minority governments are most frequently social democratic, while coalition minority governments combine ideologies of social democracy, conservatism, liberalism, and Christian democracy. Slovak minority governments are ideologically social-democratic and national-conservative, or Christian-democratic and liberal-conservative. Contrary to that, Slovenian minority governments synthesize social

liberalism and liberalism, while in Hungary minority governments have been mainly left-wing social-democratic. In Croatia, single-party minority governments appear Christian-Democratic and national-conservative, while coalition minority governments are Social-Democratic, Christian-Democratic, and Liberal and National-Conservative. Finally, the Czech single-party minority governments pose themselves as social-democratic or liberal-conservative, while the coalition minority governments tend to be liberal-conservative, Christian-democratic and social-democratic (see Table 1 for details).

It is only in the systems of negative parliamentarism in Western Europe that the situation looks more homogenous, since in this region nearly everywhere social-democratic minority governments prevail among single-party minority governments, and among coalition minority governments prevailing are those combining ideologies of liberalism and conservatism. Among countries with single-party minority governments, the only exception proves the United Kingdom, where conservative single-party minority governments prevail. As far as coalition-type minority governments are concerned, the situation is somewhat diversified. In Austria, these being Christian-Democratic and Social-conservative right-centrist cabinets, in Denmark - conservative and liberal, or Social-Democratic and liberal, in Iceland - Social-Democratic, agrarian and environmental, in the Netherlands - almost always Christian-conservative, and only occasionally - social democratic and liberal, in Norway - liberal-conservative, in Portugal - liberal or liberal-conservative (with elements of Christian democracy), in Finland - agrarian and social liberal, in Sweden - social-liberal and conservative (see. Table. 1 for details).

Such an ambiguous situation is complemented by the ideological positioning of the largest minority and second largest parties of both single-party and coalition minority governments. As illustrated by the European experience, the ideologies of the largest governmental parties that form minority governments are most often Social Democracy, and much less (but almost identically) Liberalism, Christian Democracy and Conservatism. Nationalist parties do not as a rule form minority governmental cabinets. Simultaneously, the ideologies of the second-largest government parties, forming minority governments, are most often liberalism, much less so conservatism, Christian democracy, and social democracy. In total, among the largest governmental parties of minority governments in European democracies are those whose ideologies are Social Democracy and Liberalism, and twice as less often Conservatism and Christian Democracy. However, this seemingly average logic works merely within Western European systems of negative parliamentarism, where the largest governmental parties of minority governments are traditionally social democratic. This applies, in particular, to Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, France and Sweden, and does not apply to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Finland (see Table 2).

Table 2. Minority Governments Statistics by Ideological Positioning of the Largest Government Parties in European Parliamentary Democracies¹⁴

Country	Governmental party	Social-democratic	Liberal	Christian-democratic	Conservative	Nationalist	POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Belgium (since 1946)	First	3	1	3	-	-	
	Second	1	2	2	-	-	
Greece (since 1974)	First	-	-	2	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Ireland (since 1944)	First	-	-	3	9	-	
	Second	3	3	-	-	-	
Spain (since 1977)	First	4	3	-	2	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Italy (since 1945)	First	3	-	23	-	-	
	Second	6	2	3	-	-	
Malta (since 1962)	First	-	-	-	1	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Germany (since 1949)	First	-	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
Finland (since 2000)	First	-	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	
France (1945–1958)	First	3	-	-	-	-	
	Second	-	2	-	-	-	
Total	First	13	4	31	12	-	
	Second	10	9	5	-	-	
	Total	23	13	36	12	-	
POSITIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE							
Bulgaria (since 1990)	First	1	-	2	2	-	
	Second	-	1	-	1	-	

¹⁴ Among the liberal parties there are social-liberal and conservative-liberal, and among the conservative ones - social-conservative, liberal-conservative and national-conservative parties Hartmann S., *Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe. How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies*, Wyd. Springer 2015, s. 89.

Estonia (since 1992)	First	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Latvia (since 1990)	First	-	5	-	3	1	-	-
	Second	1	4	-	2	2	-	-
Lithuania (since 1990)	First	1	3	-	2	-	-	-
	Second	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
Poland (since 1989)	First	1	-	3	2	-	-	-
	Second	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
Romania (since 1990)	First	8	6	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	9	-	-	1	-	-
Slovakia (since 1990)	First	2	-	2	1	-	-	-
	Second	-	2	-	2	-	-	-
Slovenia (since 1990)	First	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	2	-	2	-	-	-
Hungary (since 1990)	First	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Croatia (since 2000)	First	1	-	-	3	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
Czech Republic (since 1992)	First	1	-	1	3	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
Total	First	19	19	9	16	1	1	1
	Second	5	21	7	9	3	3	3
	Total	24	40	16	25	4	4	4
<i>NEGATIVE PARLIAMENTARISM SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE</i>								
Austria (since 1945)	First	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Denmark (since 1945)	First	21	9	-	5	-	-	-
	Second	-	13	-	7	-	-	-
Iceland (since 1946)	First	4	1	-	1	-	-	-
	Second	2	-	-	-	-	-	-

Luxembourg (since 1945)	First	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands (since 1946)	First	1	2	5	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	4	3	1	-	-	-	-
Norway (since 1945)	First	12	-	2	6	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	1	6	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal (since 1975)	First	7	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom (since 1945)	First	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland (1945–2000)	First	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
France (since 1958)	First	6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Sweeden (since 1944)	First	19	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Second	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	First	74	25	8	18	-	-	-	-
	Second	3	27	9	13	-	-	-	-
	Total	77	52	17	31	-	-	-	-
ALL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES									
Total	First	106	48	48	46	1	-	-	-
	Second	18	57	21	22	3	-	-	-
	Total	124	105	69	68	4	-	-	-

Žródło: Panchak-Bialobloška N., *Uрядy mєnšostvi v єvropejskych parlamentskych demokraciách*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2017; Ieraci G., Poropat F., *Governments in Europe (1945–2013): A Data Set*, Wyd. EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2013, Źródło: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/bitstream/10077/9195/1/WP-DISPES-4-2013_ful-text.pdf [odczyt: 01.05.2019]; Döring H., Manow P., *Parliaments and governments database: Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies: Experimental version*, ParlGov, Źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org> [odczyt: 01.05.2019]; Armingeon K., Weisstauber D., Knöppel L., *Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960–2012 (36 OECD countries and/or EU-member Countries)*, Wyd. Universitat Bern 2014, Źródło: http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html [odczyt: 01.05.2019].

The second largest governmental minority parties are as usual liberal (however, this is not the case for Iceland and Norway, on the average). Although, there is no ideology balance among the largest governmental parties even in the present sample of countries, as social democracy prevails over liberalism with a significant «gap». A completely different situation can be observed in Western European systems of positive parliamentarism. In this group of countries, Christian democracy is the most widespread ideology among the minority governments largest parties. It is especially true for Greece and Italy, but not peculiar or less so for Belgium, Ireland, Spain and France. The second largest government cabinets of minority cabinets most often ideologically adhere to Social Democracy and Liberalism, which is most typical of Ireland, Italy and France. With regard to Central and Eastern European systems of positive parliamentarism, it is complicated to single out the most common ideology of the minority cabinets largest governmental parties, for the largest governmental parties whose ideologies are liberalism, conservatism and social democracy tend to illustrate the highest frequency of minority governments formation, except for Poland, Romania and Hungary, where the ideologies of the largest governmental parties of minority governments are most often Christian democracy (Poland), and social democracy (in Romania and Hungary). Instead, the ideology of the second largest minority governments parties in Central and Eastern European countries is normally liberalism or conservatism (although the regional situation in this case appears disproportionate) (see Table 2).

Such ambiguous (and rarely unified and systematic) conclusions about the patterns of party and ideology determination and positioning of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies make a significant impact upon the parameters of ideological relevance / congruence of party systems to the very essence of minority governments in various types of parliamentary electoral systems.

The fact is that in the light of ideological positioning of minority governments, as estimated on the basis of the individual government parties' ideological positions proportionally to a fraction of their parliamentary mandates or ministerial portfolios, minority governments are, on the average more distant from a median voter than majority governments¹⁵. Thus, minority governments are to a lesser extent determined by centrist parties, but by those, which are the largest in size (obviously, which is not the same). In contrast, some researchers argue that the minority governments announcement of their programs, along with the influence of parliamentary committees on the modification of government bills does not actually affect the determinant influence of median parties. In reality, however, minority governments, being compelled by non-governmental parliamentary parties that provide formal/informal support to minority governments¹⁶, often make an ideological shift towards or from the median voter. This confirms the classic conclusion that, in case of minority governments, there exists a wide range

¹⁵ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 1.

¹⁶ Martin L., Stevenson R., *Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy and the Coalition Compromise*, *American Journal of Political Science* 2014, vol 58, nr. 4, s. 979-996.; Martin L., Vanberg G., *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011.; Warwick P., *Voters, Parties, and Declared Government Policy*, *Comparative Political Studies* 2011, vol 44, nr. 12, s. 1675-1699.

of varied mechanisms and agreements that is capable of linking government cabinets and non-governmental (opposition) political parties, making a particular influence on the procedures and consequences of adopting administrative and political decisions. Therefore, minority governments may distort ideological congruence between the stance of voters and exercise of executive power, which in fact violates the fundamental criterion of political democracy as reflected by political representation¹⁷.

In this light it is particularly obvious that peculiarities of minority governments lie in the fact that given their ability to impose the their parties' election promises is decisive in the political and administrative process, they differ significantly from the majority governments. Essentially, minority government parties formally head various ministries, agencies, and departments, that is the key institutions of political and administrative process, through which they can in a relatively simple manner fulfil numerous election promises. However, minority government parties cannot just as easily implement other, perhaps most significant and innovative election promises, including those requiring legislative and parliamentary approval. In order to pass legislation, including the budget approval, minority governments must gain support of other non-governmental, parliamentary parties. The same applies to parliamentary procedures for confidence / investiture and / or inconfidence votes, which may result in the formation and / or termination of minority governments in European parliamentary democracies. Therefore, minority governments are vulnerable to parameters and consequences of voting by other, non-governmental, parliamentary parties, hence they often agree to all sorts of political-ideological and authority compromises. As a consequence, the parameters of ideological positioning and ideological conformity of minority governments are frequently changing.

Therefore, based on various methods of analysing the ideological positioning and ideological conformity of governments, it is apparent that, on the average, minority governments are substantially farther from median electoral positions than majority governments, especially in countries with proportional electoral systems. However, distinct (in terms of political positions and ideologies) parties have diversified effects on the minority governments «distance» from the position of the middle or median voter. Firstly, the formation of minority governments and the position of those, determining the political and administrative process are influenced by middle / median (centrist) parliamentary parties, even regardless of government alignment of such parties. Secondly, the parties with the largest parliamentary representation have a substantial influence on the formation of minority governments and the position of those who determine the political and administrative process, merely in the case when such parties are governmental. Penultimately, parliamentary parties with the most favourable ideological position and size, make the most significant impact upon the formation of minority governments. Herein, these are the parties that are both median centrist and having the largest parliamentary representation.

¹⁷ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Strom K., The Presthus Debate: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway, *American Political Science Review* 1994, vol 88, nr. 1, s. 112-127.

After all, in fact they are always governmental, therefore most significantly affecting political and administrative process. Last but not least, other parliamentary parties endowed with government cabinet portfolios control the political and administrative process in proportion to the number of parliamentary mandates or ministerial portfolios they hold (in terms of the mandates or portfolios of other and all parties in accordance with the «Gamson's Law of Proportionality»¹⁸).

In addition, it is quite obvious that the parameters of the minority governments ideological conformity can be discussed on the basis of other scientific assumptions. As researchers claim¹⁹, the stability of governments is a prerequisite for the parties with government portfolios to influence political and administrative process. Therefore, in order to fulfil its program and achieve political and ideological goals, the government must hold power over a certain period, exercising its authority. It is necessary for the government to draft relevant legislation, pass it through parliament and subsequently implement it. Even the political and ideological tasks of governments, settled without the parliamentary involvement, yet implemented in accordance with regulations and decrees, need time to be secured by the bureaucratic apparatus. Accordingly, more stable governments are on average more successful in changing their own status quo in terms of their desires and commitments²⁰. As minority governments are theoretically less stable than majority governments, and can be easily (or always) dismissed from office by parliamentary vote-of-confidence procedures, they are also less successful in changing their own status quo in terms of their personal wishes and obligations. This is more true for «short-lived» minority governments and less common for «long-lived» minority governments (more similar to majority governments). Nevertheless, minority government parties, as well as majority government parties, are significantly focused on fulfilling their election promises.

In addition, researchers note that in parliamentary democracies, parties without government portfolios can, under certain conditions, influence government policies. The fact is that the so-called «parties of vivid external support», which affect the formation and functioning of minority governments, have more political and managerial influence than other non-governmental parties. Minority governments operating on the basis of inter-party compromises logic and particularly oriented to the formal commitments of non-governmental parties, are referred to as «pseudo-minority governments» or «formal minority governments»²¹. These normally do not need to negotiate adoption of bills, initiated by minority governments, with other oppositional parliamentary parties. Therefore, minority governments are more functionally similar to majority governments. Although this is not quite the case, the role of non-governmental parties that formally support such minority governments has remained peculiar. Therefore, «vivid foreign support» parties from

¹⁸ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *American Sociological Review* 1961, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 363-382.; Bäck H., Persson T., *Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: A Study of the Mechanism Underlying Gamson's Law of Proportionality*, Prepared for delivery at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Granada, 14–19 April 2004.

¹⁹ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 9-12.

²⁰ Thomson R., Royed T., Naurin E., *Explaining the Fulfilment of Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Government Institutions*, Paper Presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington 2014.

²¹ Andeweg R., *Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition*, [w:] Mueller W., Narud H. (eds.), *Party Governance and Party Democracy: Festschrift to Kaare Strom*, Wyd. Springer 2013, s. 99-114.

minority government have a significant impact on the announced government policy²². In addition, these parties are increasingly expressing their support of minority governments²³. However, the proportion of minority governments, opting to use the services of «parties of vivid external support» has not increased significantly. The fact is that minority governments can also create opportunities to influence the political process for opposition parliamentary parties that do not have any formal commitments to minority governments²⁴. This may concern the interaction correlation between minority governments and different types of opposition parties, in particular the middle (median) parliamentary parties or all opposition parliamentary parties.

In case of median parliamentary parties as opposed to minority governments, an anticipated and empirically correct assumption is that minority governments themselves offer the middle / median parties greater amounts of political influence. This coincides with the theory of coalitions, in terms of which the importance of median parties is decisive even without their being governmental. Such parties should always be regarded as particularly influential in negotiations, supporting legislative initiatives in parliaments, between minority government parties and other, non-governmental, parliamentary parties²⁵. It should be noted that at times minority governments are parliament-controlled, so in such a case the middle or median (centrist) party is theoretically the key legislative actor. When it comes to correlating all opposition parties with minority governments, the empirically correct assertion would be that minority governments also guarantee all opposition parties greater political influence. This occurs due to the fact that minority governments can make political and administrative decisions, diverse in terms of their ideological convictions and may not always be supported by identical opposition parties. Accordingly, minority governments may need parliamentary support from different opposition parties to ensure adoption of their political and administrative decisions. As a result, nearly all non-governmental parties in proviso of minority governments functioning, may be determined by the amount of political influence²⁶.

Finally, researchers argue that parameters of the ideological conformity of minority governments can be discussed on the basis of the parliamentary committee structures analysis, providing opposition parties in different types of government, including minority governments, with the opportunity to influence the expected legislative results. Various studies demonstrate that in some legislative bodies the structures of parliamentary committees and other institutions can determine the criteria for modifying bills, including governmental ones.

²² Warwick P., Voters, Parties, and Declared Government Policy, *Comparative Political Studies* 2011, vol 44, nr. 12, s. 1675-1699.

²³ Christiansen F., Damgaard E., Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia, *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2008, vol 14, nr. 1-2, s. 46-76.; Andeweg R., *Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition*, [w:] Mueller W., Narud H. (eds.), *Party Governance and Party Democracy: Festschrift to Kaare Strom*, Wyd. Springer 2013, s. 99-114.

²⁴ Powell B., *Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence*, Prepared for presentation at the 2014 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28 August 2014, s. 10.

²⁵ Carey J., Hix S., The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems, *American Journal of Political Science* 2011, vol 55, nr. 2, s. 387-388.

²⁶ Powell B., Election Laws and Representative Government, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 36, nr. 2, s. 291-315.; Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 108-109.

They may even serve as mechanisms, assisting opposition parties in formulating, modifying and defining legislation²⁷. This is particularly peculiar for institutional scenarios for minority governments. Therefore, ideological patterns of minority governments should always be thoroughly analyzed. In this respect, it is obvious that minority governments in European parliamentary democracies are almost always (except for other factors) formed and operating on the basis of judiciously predetermined and relevant party and ideology determinants, hence they are defined by a specific ideological positioning. Such a state of affairs is more common in Western Europe and less typical of Central and Eastern Europe. Such determinants are derived from the party ideologies along with their aspirations for the parliamentary elections, since they serve as critical structural constraints on the government-forming process.

From such a perspective, we support the scientific arguments, claiming that party and ideological determinants, as well as peculiarities of minority governments positioning serve as both «motivators» and «safety levers», depending on the specific institutional environment, and minority governments. Indeed, they identify various strategies under which minority governments are formed / not formed, as well as operate²⁸. As a matter of fact, these strategies are interpreted through the prism of legislative parliamentary (not necessarily governmental) coalitions and based on them, and therefore are legislative strategies of minority governments. They depend, at least in European parliamentary democracies, on the institutional conditions, government-forming and negotiating power of parties, political and ideological aims of parties, involving the minority governments use of the policy of compromise and concessions in the form of a «bargaining chip» to construe alliances and legislative coalitions around certain government bills. As a result, minority governments are attracted by the support of opposition (non-governmental) parties, yet, in their turn, they guaranteeing some political benefits²⁹, thereby enabling adoption of the legislation, initiated by minority governments.

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²⁷ Ström K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.; Döring H., *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995.

²⁸ Godbout J.-F., Hoyland B., Coalition voting and minority governments in Canada, "Commonwealth & Comparative Politics" 2011, vol 49, nr 4, s. 457-485.; Godbout J.-F., Hoyland B., *Legislative Coalitions and Minority Governments in Canada*, Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Meeting Ottawa, 29 May 2009.

²⁹ Budge I., Laver M., Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, vol 11, nr 4, s. 485-506.

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PARTY AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION, PROXIMITY AND CONVERGENCE: THEORIZATION IN A TWO-PARTY AND MULTI-PARTY ELECTORAL AND GOVERNMENT COMPETITION

The article is dedicated to analyzing the logics and models of party and ideological polarization, proximity and convergence, in particular from a theoretical point of view for the conditions of bipartisan and multi-party electoral and government competition. It was stated that political parties, based on the constructions of their formation and functioning (in the struggle for power and being in power), are variational, since they are determined by different ideological positions in the left-right spectrum. Therefore, they are naturally characterized by covariance (coalitions) or opposition, which are tangential to such categories as party polarization, proximity and convergence. It is argued that it is always advisable to understand the expected number of parties in legislature and their ideological positioning in the left-right spectrum when assessing party competition. The relevance of this conclusion is enhanced from bipartism to multipartism, as well as from majoritarian electoral systems to proportional electoral systems, but in general it is reduced to the statement that the more parties are in party system, the greater is the expected ideological range of their party and ideological positioning in the left-right spectrum.

Keywords: party, party system, elections, government, competition, left-right spectrum, polarization, proximity and convergence of parties.

ПАРТІЙНО-ІДЕОЛОГІЧНА ПОЛЯРИЗАЦІЯ, БЛИЗЬКІСТЬ ТА КОНВЕРГЕНЦІЯ: ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЯ В УМОВАХ ДВОПАРТІЙНОЇ І БАГАТОПАРТІЙНОЇ ЕЛЕКТОРАЛЬНОЇ ТА УРЯДОВОЇ ЗМАГАЛЬНОСТІ

W artykule przeanalizowano logikę i modele partyjno-ideologicznej polaryzacji, bliskości i konwergencji, zwłaszcza w teoretycznej perspektywie, w warunkach dwupartyjnej i wielopartyjnej, wyborczej oraz rządowej rywalizacji. Ustalono, że partie polityczne pod względem powołania i funkcjonowania (w walce o władzę i będąc przy władzy) są różnorodne, ponieważ określone są poprzez różne poglądy ideologiczne w lewo-prawym spektrum. Dlatego oczywistym dla nich jest zawieranie koalicji lub konfrontacji, w odniesieniu do takich kategorii jak partyjna polaryzacja, bliskość (procesy proksymalne) i konwergencja. Uzasadniono, że w ocenie partyjnej rywalizacji wskazane jest zrozumienie oczekiwanej liczby partii w parlamencie i ich

ideologicznego umiejscowienia w lewo-prawym spektrum. Znaczenie tych wniosków zwiększa znaczenie systemów od dwupartyjnych do wielopartyjnych, a także od większościowych systemów wyborczych do proporcjonalnych, ale w sumie sprowadza się do stwierdzenia, że im więcej partii w partyjnym systemie, tym większy oczekiwany zakres ideologiczny ich partyjno-ideologicznego usytuowania w lewo-prawym spektrum.

Słowa kluczowe: partia, system partyjny, wybory, parlament, rywalizacja, lewo-prawe spektrum, polaryzacja, bliskość i konwergencja partii.

The real political process, especially in democratic countries, is based on permanent competition of political parties, being regarded as key agents and channels of power delegation from voters to governments. However, the very phenomenon of political parties' competitiveness implies that the process is utterly divergent, since the parties themselves are quite variable politically and ideologically. In this light the competitiveness of political parties is characterized by inherent phenomena of polarization, proximity and convergence of their political-ideological positioning in the left-right spectrum, determining the typical peculiarities of the political process, especially with regard to electoral and government / power aspects. Respectively, the present article aims to address the theoretical issues of essence, logic and models of party-ideological polarization, closeness and convergence in electoral and governmental contexts. On the grounds of such theoretical knowledge it is possible to efficiently predict the criteria, as well as characteristic features of the interaction and competitiveness of parties in practical and empirical terms.

The stated problems have been in the focus of Political Science for quite a considerable period of time. For instance, this is reflected in scholarly works of the following researchers: P. Aranson and P. Ordeshook¹, A. Alesina and H. Rosenthal², R. Axelrod³, M. Berger, M. Munger and R. Pothoff⁴, E. Browne, J. Frendreis i D. Gleiber⁵, R. Calvert⁶, L. Dodd⁷, A. Downs⁸, J. Enelow i M. Hinich⁹, J. Frendreis, A. Gitelson, S. Jenkins, F. Roscoe¹⁰, D. Green and I. Shapiro¹¹,

¹ Aranson P., Ordeshook P., *Spatial strategy for sequential elections*, [w:] Niemi R., Weisberg H. (eds.), *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, Wyd. Merrill 1972, s. 298-331.

² Alesina A., Rosenthal H., *Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995.

³ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.

⁴ Berger M., Munger M., Pothoff R., The Downsian model predicts convergence, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2000, vol 12, nr 2, s. 228-240.

⁵ Browne E., Frendreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, nr 3, s. 628-650.

⁶ Calvert R., Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidates' motivations, uncertainty and divergence, *American Journal of Political Science* 1985, vol 29, nr 1, s. 69-95.

⁷ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

⁸ Downs A., *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wyd. Harper 1957.

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¹⁰ Frendreis J., Gitelson A., Jenkins S., Roscoe F., Testing spatial models of elections: the influence of voters and elites on candidate issue positions, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2003, vol 28, nr 1, s. 77-101.

¹¹ Green D., Shapiro I., *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theories*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1994.

S. Merrill and B. Grofman¹², M. Laver and K. Shepsle¹³, and others. However, they have not yet elaborated a comprehensive and unanimous view of the very logic, as well as models of party-ideological polarization, proximity and convergence in electoral and governmental contexts. Herein, we aim at solving this problem in the present article, which should become an efficacious example of systematizing the existing knowledge on the outlined problems.

In order to present a comprehensive overview of the essence, logic and models of party polarization, proximity and convergence, it is necessary to embrace the fact that political parties vary in terms of their formation and functioning (in the struggle for power and authority), being determined by different ideological positions in the left-right spectrum. Therefore, they are characterised by covariance (coalitioning) or confrontation, relevant to such political categories as party / inter-party polarization, proximity, and convergence. Although, in fact, the essence of each of these concepts is somewhat different or even peculiar, each requiring thorough consideration, in particular through the prism of their logic and implementation models.

In this light we primarily address the category of party / inter-party polarization, which has been in the focus of interest of Western comparative Political Science since the 1980s. Thus, in his study «Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence» (1982)¹⁴, B. Powell, in fact, being the founder and the main concept-maker of the term «party polarization», stated that this process was a measure of support for the so-called «extremist» or radical parties, or rather one of their key determinants. Hence, it negatively correlates not merely with stability at the electoral and governmental levels, but at the level of political process, especially in countries with a high level of support for the so-called anti-system or semi-system parties. P. Warwick came to a similar conclusion in his study «Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Democracies» (1992)¹⁵, arguing that party or inter-party polarization is a significant factor in destabilizing the political process, specifically its electoral and governmental spheres. Likewise, A. Alesina and A. Drazen in «Why are Stabilization Delayed?» (1991)¹⁶ suggested that it is precisely the factor of party or inter-party polarization that plays a decisive role in defection of elections and electoral process, being preconditioned by polarization in the country's socio-political system. Since that time it has become evident that party polarization presupposes share of support, expressed by voters for the so-called

¹² Merrill S., Grofman B., *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; Adams J., Merrill S., Grofman B. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: Party Strategies and Policy Representation in France, Britain, Norway, and the United States*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

¹³ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Shepsle K., *Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition*, Wyd. Harwood Academy 1991.

¹⁴ Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

¹⁵ Warwick P., Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western European Democracies, "Comparative Political Studies" 1992, vol 25, s. 332-361.

¹⁶ Alesina A., Drazen A., Why are Stabilization Delayed, "American Economic Review" 1991, vol 81, s. 1170-1185.

«extremist» or radical parties, that is, those parties whose political and ideological orientation is in a radical counter-political contradiction to the existing party system¹⁷.

Empirically, given the experience of the 1950s and 1980s, it has been found that, as a rule, the most frequently polarization-prone parties are the parties, either exposed to, or polarized in the context of national elections, for instance: markedly communist and neofascist parties; parties with independent or special (for instance, the Northern League in Italy) ideological orientation and positioning; parties with ranking to the left of the 2.5 point mark, and to the right of the 8.5 point mark within the traditional left-right ideological spectrum (from 0 (most left-wing parties) to 10 (most right-wing parties)); parties with unambiguously extremist ideological orientation and positioning.

On one hand, such reasoning was in line with the Political Science method of determining party positioning, whereas on the other hand, it was slightly controversial, being largely based on an alternative explanation for the inter-party rivalry phenomenon. Since the time E. Downs' phenomenal study "An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)"¹⁸ emerged, Political Science literature commenced to delineate the positions of parties in the left-right ideological spectrum on the basis of a critical bias, rather than a strategic assessment of the peculiarities, roles and criteria of party competition in the left-right ideological spectrum¹⁹. In a nutshell, political parties and their competitiveness in the political system have a rather specific definition, since the strength of support for political parties and the political system on the whole largely depends not on society, but on political actors²⁰. In this light, the level of biased party identification within the left-right spectrum in different countries varies in accordance with such factors as: a degree of party competition and political-ideological polarization around key political problems; the historical inheritance of party systems, including the continuity / extent of traditional political parties, attended by mobilization of new political forces; performance of political parties in power, mainly in the governmental cabinet; structure of party organizations; systematic organizational and ideological differences within party families; primary (initial) and secondary (established) channels of inter-party communication; type of electoral system and electoral formula; constitutional, institutional and procedural measures, along with discrepancies between systems and forms of government (presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary, and state structure (federal, confederate or unitary), etc.

From a theoretical perspective it goes without saying, given the fact that peculiarities of parties and electoral systems, likely to be linked with establishment of strong party support, are directly tangential to political and institutional stability. Indeed, rational institutional choices suggest that political actors, party leaders, election campaigners and candidates for different

¹⁷ Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

¹⁸ Downs A., *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wyd. Harper 1957.

¹⁹ Fiorina M., *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1981.

²⁰ Schmitt H., Holmberg S., *Political Parties in Decline?*, [w:] Klingemann H.-D., Fuchs D. (eds.), *Citizens and the State*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995.

electoral positions (especially future legislators-to-be) must respond to electoral incentives in a broad context, especially given the logic of electoral rules and party competition. In this regard, J. Carey and M. Schugart in the paper «Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas» (1995)²¹, emphasise that considerable volatility of electoral parties along with emotional commitment of voters is traditionally regarded as an electoral advantage for individual parties to mobilize voters' support at any rate. Although, it undoubtedly depends on the certain party behavior in a respective country, together with a set of criteria for measuring party identity²². Likewise, R. Axelrod's theory of coalitions works, as disclosed in «Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics» (1970)²³, which demonstrates that government cabinets in multi-party democracies are typically the least dependent on election victory, which results in the formation and stability of ideologically linked, minimum-winning coalitions rather than surplus majority and more ideologically dispersed coalitions. Verifying the hypothesis of R. Axelrod, M. Laver in the work «Dynamic Factors in Government Coalition Formation» (1974)²⁴, as well as E. Browne, D. Gleiber and K. Mashoba in their research «Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory: Western European Cabinet Coalitions, 1945-80» (1984)²⁵ failed to confirm it, simultaneously arguing that government cabinets of minimal ideological distance and diversity were more stable than government offices that gravitated to the centrist position within the left-right ideological spectrum. Eventually L. Dodd in the treatise «Coalitions in Parliamentary Government» (1976)²⁶ and P. Warwick in his 1979 paper «The Durability of Coalition Governments» (1979)²⁷ found that fractionalization, minimal ideological distance and party diversity negatively correlate with political and institutional stability, while the minimally victorious and minimally ideologically linked status of government cabinets and inter-party interaction, on the other hand, tend to have a positive impact on political and institutional stability, though not in all statistical and empirical samples, but on average.

In contrast, E. Browne, J. Frendreis, and D. Gleiber in the study «The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies»

²¹ Carey J., Shugart M., Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, *"Electoral Studies"* 1995, vol 14, s. 417-440.

²² Converse P., Pierce R., Measuring Partisanship, *"Political Methodology"* 1985, vol 11, s. 143-166.; Heath A., Pierce R., It Was Party Identification All Along – Question Order Effects on Reports of Party Identification in Britain, *"Electoral Studies"* 1992, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 93-105.; Johnston R., Pattie C., The strength of party identification among the British electorate: An exploration, *"Electoral Studies"* 1996, vol 15, nr. 3, s. 295-309.; McAllister L., Wattenberg M., Measuring Levels of Party Identification – Does Question Order Matter?, *"Public Opinion Quarterly"* 1995, vol 59, nr. 2, s. 259-268.; Blais A., Gidengil E., Nadeau R., Nevitte N., Measuring party identification: Britain, Canada, and the United States, *"Political Behavior"* 2001, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 5-22.

²³ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.

²⁴ Laver M., Dynamic Factors in Government Coalition Formation, *"European Journal of Political Research"* 1974, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 259-270.

²⁵ Browne E., Gleiber D., Mashoba C., Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory: Western European Cabinet Coalitions, 1945-80, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 1984, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 1-32.

²⁶ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

²⁷ Warwick P., The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies, *"Comparative Political Studies"* 1979, vol 11, nr. 4, s. 465-498.

(1986)²⁸ made quite a bold assumption that generally non-ideological variables are important determinants of political and institutional stability, with ideology having little to no effect. In turn, J. Wright and A. Goldberg in their «Risk and Uncertainty in the Durability of Political Coalitions» (1985)²⁹ exemplified a model of risk preference, thus accounting for the fact that ideologically unrelated coalitions and politics could also be fairly stable. Finally, P. Warwick provided an updated and profound analysis of the government cabinets' ideological diversity effects on the stability of the political and institutional process, arguing that ideological factors played an excessively significant role in clarifying the stability of policies and governments in comparison with non-ideological ones. He noted that among the aspects of the ideological diversity of government cabinets and inter-party rivalry (left-wing, secular-clerics, regime support or non-support, post-materialists), all but the latter, though correlating in reality, are statistically vital predecessors of political and institutional stability.

The fact is that the political process, specifically in terms of government coalitions, is permanently formed and realised by ideologically opposing parties, especially in transit societies with little experience of parliamentary democracy. M. Laver and K. Shepsle in the studies «Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies» (1996)³⁰ and «Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Governments»³¹ argued that exactly for this reason even highly motivated politicians are interested in the government-formed policies, attempting to bring it closer to their own privileged political position. Herein, it is important to look into the extent to which party ideologies differ among government coalition partners. The larger the ideological gap, the more likely the conflicts, and the slower the process of government policy-making, as well as overall political process. The explanation is that the policy, formed by a government coalition is always the result of an agreement game between the coalition partners, and therefore it is frequently an unknown stake, made long before negotiations are over. In this light it is evident that supposing ideologically close parties enter the game, there is at least some confidence in the future course of the political process. However, in case the game attracts somewhat ideologically-distant parties, a range of potential outcomes of the coalition pricing process expands, stipulating growth in governmental and political uncertainty that automatically distorts the allocation of resources.

In this context, it is extremely interesting and important to take into account the different ways of determining the ideological diversity not only of government cabinets, but also of the political process as a whole. The degree of ideological diversity of parties in the political process was explained by M. Taylor and M. Laver in the study, «Government Coalitions in Western Europe»

²⁸ Browne E., Frensdreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, nr. 3, s. 628-650.

²⁹ Wright J., Goldberg A., Risk and Uncertainty in the Durability of Political Coalitions, *American Political Science Review* 1985, vol 79, s. 704-718.

³⁰ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

³¹ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

(1973).³² Scientists have gathered information from several studies and identified the ideological positioning (from left to right) of the parties. For each of the coalition parties, they calculated the “places” of separation of partners, determining the intervals of such a separation of partners and proposed an indicator of ideological diversity, which can be interpreted as a variable or indicator of governmental, institutional or political stability of any given state or sample of States. A more difficult way to explain the ideological diversity of party partners is based on a study by R. Axelrod “Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics” (1970)³³ and his theory of malpractice. The fact is that calculating the degree of abuse of power requires radial development of the left-right party-ideological spectrum. However, in this case, more information is needed in comparison with the calculation of ideological variability in the abovementioned degree of ideological diversity. For the previous conditions, a simple reflection of parties was sufficient, and there must be a defined position of abuse of power. Therefore, this method is a side effect of a statistical metering of the ideological positioning of the coalition. [загалом] It contemplates [розглядає] only the location of parties and their weight in the coalition, without paying attention to the distribution allocation of portfolios among partner parties, which is probably [певно] [з’являються] [кеу] [джерельним] factor [фактором] in determining the effective ideological positioning of the government cabinet and the political process in general. It must be understood that the outlined approach to determining the ideological diversity of parties is applied only by coalition governments and coalition policies, because it can additionally provide a clarification of the importance of individual minister positions in the cabinets and the concepts of electoral variability and ministerial rearrangements. J. Huber in the paper “How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance Study: Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies” (1998)³⁴ argues that portfolio volatility plays a relevant role in shaping government policy and the entire political process. Indeed, with considerable variability, Ministers remain on duty for a relatively short time, and thus have no time to demonstrate their knowledge. Senior civil servants, on the contrary, experience much lower variability and accumulate valuable information. Thus, a high job variability is a potential cause of poor and inefficient decision-making. This is especially exacerbated in the case of the ideological distances of partner parties who delegate their officials on different political and managerial roles.

A special meaning in the context of the study of logic and patterns of party and ideological polarization, proximity and convergence in electoral and governmental contexts has the determination and consideration of the role of the so-called dominant centrist and sustainable major political parties, which, by definition, should be established as a government (each, the dominant and the main party of government is used). This is supplemented by the assumption that, within the framework of left-right party competition, they are centrist or middle (that is, located

³² Taylor M., Laver M., Government Coalitions in Western Europe, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1973, vol 1, s. 205-248.

³³ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.

³⁴ Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, “*American Political Science Review*” 1998, vol 92, nr. 3, s. 577-591.

in the center of the party-political ideological spectrum), thus they should be members of an ideologically connected coalition. In this regard, E. van Deemen Gulf in his exploration "Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games"³⁵ (1991) hypothesized that the political coalition, comprising|утримують| centrist parties is more resistant than those coalitions without centrist parties. Similarly B. Peleg in his work "Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players" (1982)³⁶ hypothesized that in systems where one political party combines the power of the dominant and centrist parties, political coalitions that include this "dominant centrist" party, is more stable than the coalition "without a dominant centrist" party. In the course of an empirical analysis of political coalitions in which such dominant centrist parties are present, P. van Roosendaal identified this hypothesis as true.³⁷ Alternatively, in a system where there is no party that combines "Central power," the researcher demonstrated that|находить| political coalitions|із| with dominant or centrist parties are not more stable than coalitions without such parties.

Additionally, Political Science shows that it is important to take into account the ideological position of the so-called "main" party. Definitely, the main party (not necessarily being dominant) |позичає, посідає| occupies a position |становище| that cannot be overcome by a majority vote of other parties. In one-dimensional left-right spectrum, а|вимірі| party whose coalition support includes a middle voter will be the main party. On this occasion, N. Schofield, B. Grofman and S. Feld in the study "The Core and Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games" (1988)³⁸ put forward the hypothesis that the dynamics of party positioning will be such that the parties will work to determine the position in which they will be major parties, as it would ensure |тому що| membership in any process of any political coalition forming. Researchers have also shown that having a|із| stable mainstream party can increase the stability of the coalition and the political process, giving the mainstream party a strong "closing" position|становище|. At the same time M. Laver and K. Shepsle suggest|передбачають| that the results of the political process are also determined by the allocation of ministerial portfolios, and therefore allocation of ministries to specific parties generates a result that is consistent with the prevailing policies of these parties over the responsibilities of such ministries and ministerial portfolios³⁹. In this regard, researchers have developed the concept of "strong parties", similar to those of major parties and centrist parties. They believe the party is regarded as "strong" if it participates in every government cabinet and every political coalition. However|однак|, even if a strong party has considerable market political power, it can still be expelled from the|із| political coalition, both ideologically and non-ideologically. In this context the probability|ймовірність| of existence of the main party and in general

³⁵ van Deemen A., Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games, "Journal of Theoretical Politics" 1991, vol 3, s. 139-162.

³⁶ Peleg B., Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players, "International Journal of Game Theory" 1982, vol 10, s. 11-33.

³⁷ Van Roosendaal P., The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1992, vol 17, s. 103-125.

³⁸ Schofield N., Grofman B., Feld S., The Core and Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games, "American Political Science Review" 1988, vol 82, s. 196-211.

³⁹ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, s. 873-889.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

the expected size of [сподіваного] parties, associated with dimension Party system. It is scientifically established that the larger the size of the party system, the lesser the chance that the largest party will be a stable main party. In addition, the larger the size of the party system, the greater the expected size of the gap in the strength of the parties. [сподіваний] Accordingly, the larger is the dimension of politics and the larger is the size of the party system, the less is the expected stability of the coalition political process. [сподівана] In this regard, since a large number of parties associated with the volatility of the political process, the relationship between the dimension of the party system and the effective number of parties determine that equilateral party conflicts are related to the instability of the political process⁴⁰.

In this context, the polarization and ideological diversity of political parties within electoral and governmental competition depends largely on the parameters of the electoral system and the institutional environment, and is also outlined by the features of inter-party competition in a two- or multi-party system. However, the simplest models and explanations of party rivalry are peculiar for bipartisan systems in which elections are based on the formula of the so-called plurality or relative majority (plurality voting or FPTP). A simple model of two-party competition within the abovementioned electoral systems can be regarded as a prediction of party convergence in terms of the median voter-focused political process, thus being a political competition. However, as some researchers have pointed out⁴¹, such a prediction of party convergence seldom meets expectations and actual political reality, since electoral policies of many countries with outlined electoral systems often operate beyond the scope of bipartisanship, yet based on multi-party parameters. Therefore, simple models of party convergence for bipartisan systems serve as means of forecasting in multi-party systems.

Interestingly, as the researchers argued, in case one constituency elects members of opposing parties, the difference in voting between the heads of offices of various parties can be enormous⁴². Nevertheless, the standard result of the party convergence, pointed out in the theory of E. Downs⁴³, is based on a sufficient number of assumptions that the parties are motivated solely by the search for benefits, yet voters make their choice solely on the basis of the party proximity to their own policy. When one or more assumptions of such correlation are not justified, the usual result of party convergence may simply fail to work. Herein, there are numerous models and approaches for explaining the discrepancies between candidates and parties in the elections, which can be synthesized into a general structure that exemplifies the standard model of conformity of party

⁴⁰ Taagepera R., Shugart M., *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1989, s. 94.; Taagepera R., Grofman B., Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems – Parties Minus Issues Equals One, *European Journal of Political Research* 1985, vol 13, s. 341-352.

⁴¹ Frendreis J., Gitelson A., Jenkins S., Roscoe F., Testing spatial models of elections: the influence of voters and elites on candidate issue positions, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2003, vol 28, nr. 1, s. 77-101.; Stonecash J., Brewer M., Mariani M., *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment and Party Polarization*, Wyd. Westview 2003.

⁴² Bullock C., Brady D., Party, constituency, and roll-call voting in the U.S. Senate, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1983, vol 8, s. 29-43.; Erikson R., Erikson R., Wright G., *Voters, candidates, and issues in congressional elections*, [w:] Dodd L., Openheimer B. (eds.), *Congress Reconsidered*, Wyd. Congressional Quarterly Press 1997.; Green D., Shapiro I., *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theories*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1994.

⁴³ Downs A., *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wyd. Harper 1957.

competition⁴⁴ Accordingly, virtually any violation of such conformity results in bipartisan convergence and, perhaps, supersedes convergence by a level of divergence in party positioning in the ideological spectrum. This determines that in order to talk about party convergence as such, it is necessary to use the ideal model, which includes two parties, proceeding with a multidimensional and multi-party analysis of party contradictions. In this case, the standard model by E. Downs requires|слідуючі| the following conditions: only т|лише| two political parties; the only election of any authority; election of only one candidate; holding elections within on a single constituency basis; |вибіркового| holding elections within plurality or relative majority systems; definition of a political process within the framework of a linear and one-vector left-right spectrum; transparency and clarity of the political positioning of candidates and parties; voter's focus on elections alone; the care of voters only about a candidate or a party that |преференції| pursues a policy, close to their advantages; the same hypothetical support for candidates or parties if there is no difference in politics between them; the focus of parties and candidates solely|жодних| on gaining mandates and posts; orientation of parties and candidates no further than single elections; candidates are positioned as a part of a united party team. Bearing in mind what can happen to convergence in case one or more of the abovementioned assumptions change, one can assess what level of convergence can be expected. In addition, the researchers note that party convergence is directly affected by centripetal or centrifugal tendencies in the party system that cause narrowing or stretching of the political process and space⁴⁵.

In this light it is worth emphasising that the standard model of party convergence by E. Downs differentiates only two parties. However, the author also appeals to the case of elections based on the electoral system of plurality or relative majority, presupposing that two or more parties compete and win (or receive mandates). In this regard, M. Duverger⁴⁶ and W. Riker noted that in explaining party convergence, there is a tangible theoretical involvement of arguments of the psychological and mechanical effects of electoral systems, so electoral systems based on multiplicity and a single transitional voice lead to a bipartisan competition.⁴⁷ However, B. Heine argues that in real politics, multiplicity elections do not necessarily lead to "pure" and classic two-party competition⁴⁸. Moreover, even in the case of the customary bipartisanship of these systems, the two main parties often conspire in secret to adopt formal rules that impede the electoral success of new parties. Finally, there are other incentives for candidates from these two

⁴⁴ Adams J., Merrill S., Grofman B. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: Party Strategies and Policy Representation in France, Britain, Norway, and the United States*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.; Grofman B., *Toward an institution-rich theory of political competition with a supply side component*, [w:] Grofman B. (ed.), *Information, Participation and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1993, s. 179-193.

⁴⁵ Adams J., Merrill S., Grofman B. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: Party Strategies and Policy Representation in France, Britain, Norway, and the United States*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

⁴⁶ Duverger M., *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, Wyd. Wiley 1967.; Duverger M., *Duverger's law: forty years later*, [w:] Grofman B., Lijphart A. (eds.), *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, Wyd. Agathon 1986, s. 69-84.

⁴⁷ Riker W., The two-party system and Duverger's law: an essay on the history of political science, *American Political Science Review* 1982, vol 76, s. 753-766.

⁴⁸ Gaines B., Duverger's law and the meaning of Canadian exceptionalism, *Comparative Political Studies* 1999, vol 32, nr 7, s. 835-861.

major parties to act in order to reduce the influence of candidates from other political forces. Instead, when there are more than two parties, the basic E. Downs's argument about party convergence simply does not work. Accordingly, until recently, the simulation of multi-party competition with the free "entry" of new political forces either did not find a stable equilibrium in terms of the expected number of parties and party mandates, or obtained implausible results, because per any location in the ideological spectrum where a new party is positioned, there exists a party with identical location in the ideological spectrum⁴⁹. Instead, only recently it was argued that the standard party convergence model by E. Downs⁵⁰ can be applied to multi-party competition or contestability in a multi-party system, that is, can be empirically verified.

In this context, we appeal to the intuitive model of party convergence by A. McGann, which was presented in the study "The Advantages of Ideological Cohesion: A Model of Constituency Representation and Electoral Competition in Multiparty Democracies" (2002).⁵¹ Here the researcher explores an intuitive situation when two political parties with membership and candidates that do not overlap and do not intersect ideologically, looking for such ideological positioning when the leftmost voter of the rightmost party will be indifferent to the position of the median voter in his own party and the median voter in another party. In such a case, and in any distribution of the ideological positioning of the parties, the two parties will always be differentiated in a selective way, which researchers call "moderate extremism".⁵² Even more disagreements arise when elections are held not in one, but in two rounds, because in this case centripetal tendencies become even more evident.⁵³ The point is that in a two-round election process, the degree of inter-party disagreement depends on the nature of the distribution of preferences and voters' assumptions about which parties should dominate.

On this occasion, Political Science has developed many models of party convergence in the context of bipartisan competition, put forward by such researchers as P. Aranson and P. Ordeshook⁵⁴, J. Coleman⁵⁵, G. Owen, B. Grofman and T. Brunel⁵⁶, E. Gerber and R. Morton⁵⁷

⁴⁹ Cox G., Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1990, vol 34, nr. 4, s. 903-935.; Shepsle K., *Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition*, Wyd. Harwood Academy 1991.; Enlow J., Hinich M., *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

⁵⁰ Schofield N., Martin A., Quinn K., Whitford A., Multiparty competition in the Netherlands and Germany: a model based on multinomial probity, *"Public Choice"* 1998, vol 96, s. 257-293.; Schofield N., Sened I., Nixon D., New equilibrium in multiparty competition with "stochastic" voters, *"Annals of Operations Research"* 1998, vol 84, s. 3-27.

⁵¹ McGann A., The advantages of ideological cohesion, *"Journal of Theoretical Politics"* 2002, vol 14, nr. 1, s. 37-70.

⁵² Merrill S., Grofman B., *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

⁵³ Bernhard D., Ingberman D., Candidate reputations and the incumbency effect, *"Journal of Public Economics"* 1985, vol 27, s. 47-67.

⁵⁴ Aranson P., Ordeshook P., *Spatial strategy for sequential elections*, [w:] Niemi R., Weisberg H. (eds.), *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, Wyd. Merrill 1972, s. 298-331.

⁵⁵ Coleman J., *The positions of political parties in elections*, [w:] Niemi R., Weisberg H. (eds.), *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, Wyd. Merrill 1972, s. 332-357.

⁵⁶ Owen G., Grofman B., *Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions with and without expressive voting*. Presented at Conference "Strategy and Politics", Center for the Study of Collective Choice, University of Maryland, April 12, 1996.; Grofman B., Brunel T., *Explaining the ideological differences between the two U.S. senators elected from the same state: an institutional effects model*, [w:] Galderisi P. (ed.), *Congressional Primaries in the Politics of Representation*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield 2001, s. 132-142.

⁵⁷ Gerber E., Morton R., Primary election systems and representation, *"Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization"* 1998, vol 11, nr. 2, s. 304-324.

, D. Granberg and E. Brent⁵⁸, D. Austen-Smith⁵⁹, M. Berger, M. Munger and R. Pothoff⁶⁰, R. Calvert⁶¹, and others. Some models point out that voters always vote for candidates from parties that are closer to them ideologically, while other models state that voters evaluate both the ideological positioning of parties as well as their ability to win elections. Therefore, some models are purely ideologically determined, while others depend on the expected benefit of voting in the elections imposed on personal ideological preferences of voters⁶². Therefore if voters “balance”, they can provide support for non-middle parties, the purpose of which will be an attempt to balance some other non-middle (non-center) parties. Accordingly, in assessing inter-party competitiveness, it is always advisable to understand the expected number of parties in the Legislature and their ideological positioning in the left-right spectrum. The relevance of such a conclusion intensifies from bipartisanship to multiparty systems⁶³, as well as from majoritarian electoral systems in proportional, but on the whole, it comes down to stating that the more parties are in the party system, the greater is the expected ideological range of their party-ideological positioning in the left-right spectrum. This is even more evident when political parties are directly affiliated with historical and current socio-political divisions in a country.

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THE MODELS OF COALITIONAL PROCESS IN THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENTAL CABINETS: THEORETICAL CUT AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The article offers a review of literature on the theorization and systematization of models of coalitional process in the formation of governmental cabinets. It was demonstrated that all models of coalitional process can be divided into institutional and non-institutional, but most of them are characterized by game theories and theories of rational choice. At the same time, it was found that the models of coalitional process should be divided into formal and empirical as well as pragmatic and ideological. Nevertheless, it was stated that the isolated models of coalitional process in the formation of governmental cabinets are not exhaustive. Since the real coalitional process should be perceived as a gradation based on the ranking of various influence, which can be determined nationally and regionally.

Keywords: coalition, government, governmental cabinet, coalitional process, coalition bargaining, model of coalitional process.

MODELE PROCESU KOALICyjNEGO POD CZAS TWORZENIA RZĄDÓW: TEORETYCZNY PRZEKRÓJ I PRZEGLĄD LITERATURY

W artykule przedstawiony został przegląd literatury na temat teorii i systematyzacji modeli koalicji podczas powoływania rządów. Ustalono, że wszystkie modele procesu koalicyjnego można podzielić na instytucjonalne i pozainstytucjonalne, ale większość z nich określona została poprzez teorię gier i racjonalnego wyboru. Jednocześnie stwierdzono, że modele procesu koalicyjnego należy podzielić na formalne i empiryczne, a także pragmatyczne i ideologiczne. Niemniej jednak, w artykule zauważono, że pojedyncze modele procesu koalicyjnego podczas powoływania rządów nie są wyczerpujące, ponieważ wskazane jest postrzeganie realnego procesu koalicyjnego jako pewnej gradacji opartej na podstawie rankingów różnych wpływów określonych na szczeblu krajowym i regionalnym.

Słowa kluczowe: koalicja, rząd, proces koalicyjny, negocjacje koalicyjne, modele procesu koalicyjnego.

Coalitions and coalitional governmental cabinets have ceased to be perceived as political innovations or anomalies, having long become the norm of the political process in most countries of the world (especially when it comes to minority coalitional governments). For

some countries, coalitional governments are a necessary prerequisite, while in others they do not exist as such. Regardless of their type, sometimes coalitional governments tend to occur more frequently, occasionally they are not formed whatsoever. However, it is quite obvious that coalitional governments are stipulated by varied parameters. Therefore, coalitional governmental cabinets not only differ in typology, but can also be determined by diverse models of the coalitional process, resulting in the formation of the former. Moreover, in Political Science there exists a plethora of models, which in turn interpret features and stages of coalitional governments formation in a different manner. The present study is devoted to theoretical synthesis and review of the literature, dealing with the problems of various coalitional process models in forming governmental cabinets.

In theoretical advances on the theory of coalitions, it is a common belief that this scope of Political Science originated in the work «The Theory of Political Coalitions»¹ by V. Riker. The scholar took advantage of abstract mathematical calculations based on the «Game theory» principle, which respectively disregarded social-political and ideological factors. Further on, they were significantly influenced by the theory of «rational choice», as they required thorough contemplation of various factors in conditions of maximum and minimum equilibrium by the main political actors, emphasised in the ideas of G. Tsebelis², M. Petracca³, L. Smorgunov⁴, etc. As a result, the issue of forming coalitional governmental cabinets has gained considerable scientific interest⁵, especially given that the issue under analysis reflects strenuous interrelation between theoretical and empirical levels. Also, up till present the most widely recognised theoretical calculations and connotations made use of various versions of the «game theory», serving as the background of the formal methodology of the coalitional process in the formation of governmental cabinets⁶. Later on, the theory of non-cooperative games found reflection in the theoretical insights by such renowned researchers as A. Merlot⁷, D. Baron⁸, D. Diermeier⁹, and many others.

¹ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

² Tsebelis G., *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, Wyd. University of California Press 1991.

³ Petracca M., The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic Theory, *"The Review of Politics"* 1991, vol 53, s. 289-319.

⁴ Smorgunov L., *Ratsionalnyy vybor v politike i upravlenii*, Wyd. Izd. SPb. un-ta. 1998

⁵ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments. Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

⁶ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments. Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Muller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

⁷ Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101-131

⁸ Baron D., A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, *"American Political Science Review"* 1998, vol 92, s. 593-609.; Baron D., Government Formation and Endogenous Parties, *"American Political Science Review"* 1993, vol 87, s. 34-47

⁹ Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *"Journal of Economic Theory"* 2000, vol 94, s. 46-79.; Diermeier D., Merlo A., Eraslan H., A Structural Model of Government Formation, *"Econometrica"* 2003, vol 71, s. 27-70.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, *"American Political Science Review"* 2000, vol 94, s. 627-640.

However, the year 1990 became a turning point in the study of governmental coalitions. M. Laver and N. Schofield in the study «Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe»¹⁰, proposed a comprehensive and detailed overview of developments in this field of comparative Political Science up until the late 1980s. In addition, a wide range of new research articles brought to an end the established traditions of Political Science research that had developed over decades. Thus, D. Baron in the study «A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions»¹¹ suggested application of «non-cooperative game theory» (later referred to as the «Baron-Ferejohn scheme»¹²) in the study of governmental coalitions. In their turn, M. Laver and K. Shepsle in the article «Coalitions and Cabinet Government»¹³ made use of the structural equilibrium model to investigate the formation of governmental cabinets. Ultimately, in his monograph «Minority Government and Majority Rule»¹⁴, K. Strom suggested an exhaustive report on minority governments and the overall stability of coalitional governmental cabinets. As A. Lupia and K. Strom¹⁵ point out, this methodological approach laid foundations for its further use in the research of the coalitional governments duration. In this regard, it was argued that coalitional cabinets should be contemplated within the framework of institutional equilibrium over a specified period of time in case of potential destabilization of political and economic climate, and more specifically of the so-called critical events. Other scholars have also elucidated this idea, such as E. Brown, J. Frensdreyse and D. Gleiber¹⁶, G. King, J. Alt, M. Laver¹⁷, P. Warwick¹⁸, and others.

On one hand, the new approach offered promising changes in the study of governmental cabinets. The main point was that specification of empirical models of inter-party / coalition bargaining largely focused on the role of the political environment institutional peculiarities, accounting for the formation of governmental cabinets as not only based on the list of governmental cabinets' attributes of certain party systems, highlighted in empirical literature on coalitional governments¹⁹. On the other hand, the given approach has evoked various stimulating methodological problems. In particular, D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson²⁰ proved

¹⁰ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

¹¹ Baron D., A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, «American Journal of Political Science» 1989, vol 33, s. 1048-1084.

¹² Baron D., Ferejohn J., Bargaining in Legislatures, «American Political Science Review» 1989, vol 83, s. 1181-1206

¹³ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, «American Political Science Review» 1990, vol 84, s. 873-889.

¹⁴ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

¹⁵ Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, «American Political Science Review» 1995, vol 89, s. 648-665.

¹⁶ Browne E., Frensdreyse J., Gleiber D., An «Events» Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability, «Comparative Political Studies» 1984, vol 17, s. 167-197.

¹⁷ King G., Alt J., Burns N., Laver M., A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, «American Journal of Political Science» 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.

¹⁸ Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

¹⁹ King G., Alt J., Burns N., Laver M., A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, «American Journal of Political Science» 1990, vol 34, s. 846-871.; Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

²⁰ Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, «American Political Science Review» 2000, vol 94, s. 627-640.

that validation of the model, suggested by A. Lupia and K. Strom requires careful elaborations of the stochastic model, which fended off methods of single cases research. Contrary to that, A. Merlot²¹ argued that changing expectations of governments' duration through exogenous events and factors could force party leaders to hinder the process of forming governments, to be seen as the outcome of the strategic choice of future governmental coalition members. Ultimately, D. Diermeier and A. Merlot²² theoretically confirmed that expectations about governmental duration could affect the type of government to be formed. The results of the governmental cabinets formation have illustrated that the type of governmental cabinet, the timeframe to form a governmental cabinet and its durability are simultaneously defined as equal. Thus, the attitude towards the concept of government through the prism of equilibrium required a radical departure from the existing empirical approaches, traditionally applied to reduce the specification of governmental types in regressive models.

It is important to remember that all new research into coalition policy models and government formation after 1990 is characterized by one key element: they focus on the role of institutes in the study of governmental coalitions. Respectively, new institutionalism has become the basis of coalitional governmental cabinets investigation. Interestingly, political institutes (party systems and electoral rules, constitutional peculiarities and determinants) have always played a considerable role in the study of governments, yet a new requirement to enhance their significance was purely methodological: formal political models must have institutionally predictable attributes in order to be unequivocal and empirically accurate. This is overtly evident in the study «Institutionalism as a Methodology» by D. Diermeier and K. Krehbiel²³. In addition, this is obvious, given the peculiarities of governments in parliamentary democracies (providing the empirical basis for research), as heads of government earn mandates and are politically accountable to the legislature, resulting in at least two important issues. Firstly, unless one party wins a majority in parliament by a proportional representation election system, the government is not only formed on the basis of the election result, but is the consequence of a complex process of setting political prices among the parties, represented in the legislature. Secondly, governments in parliamentary democracies (irrespective of government forms and regimes) may at any time lose the confidence of parliament, leading to their termination.

Thus, the study of coalitional governments has historically been dominated by two questions: what governments are formed and how long they generally function. In this light, it is worth mentioning that institutionalism is identified on the basis of political institutions analysis. In this regard, R. McKelvey²⁴ believes it to be a methodological approach, whose

²¹ Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *Journal of Political Economy* 1997, vol 105, s. 101-131.

²² Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *Journal of Economic Theory* 2000, vol 94, s. 46-79.

²³ Diermeier D., Krehbiel K., Institutionalism as a Methodology, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2003, vol 15, s. 123-144.

²⁴ McKelvey R., Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 283-314.

common element is a deviation from the selected research programme towards the discovery of properties beyond institutes. Additionally, apparent is the fact that institutionalism consists of different research programmes, originating within various methodological approaches. In the context of the present study, institutionalism (neoinstitutionalism) aims at reassessing the existing theoretical traditions, despite being implemented absolutely differently. One of the fundamental and initial variants of implementation of such a methodology in the governmental coalitions modelling was proposed by R. Axelrod²⁵ within the framework of the «theory of proto-coalitions». However, R. Axelrod's theory of proto-coalitions is not the only example of a «beyond the institute» approach to governmental coalitions. Other instances include the cooperative coalition bargaining theory and the theory of social choice²⁶, combining the social choice of coalitional models by the formula «beyond the institutes» with the formation of governmental cabinets, and equilibrium at the electoral level.

R. Axelrod's model illustrates how ideologically linked proto-coalitions are being phased out, attracting / adding new parties until political viability is reached. An important aspect of the model in question is how this explanation actually works. It should be noted that R. Axelrod's calculation is based only on the number of parties, their number of seats, as well as the location within the left-right ideological spectrum. Other aspects of the process of forming governmental cabinets are irrelevant: for example, it is of no importance who proposes the government and how long the government institutionalization process takes. A problem of formal modelling neglects the existing structure. Therefore, the question arises whether such a model for forming coalitional governments can be empirically accounted for. The response to this question is purely intuitive and logical. Prior to the change in approaches in the early 1990s, a large amount of empirical research on governmental coalitions had focused solely on the issue of forming governments. Thus, supposing the number of parties, the share of their mandates, and the ideological position in the left-right political spectrum are known, the question which governments are formed is ambiguous. Although it lies in the interaction of theoretical and empirical components, the «beyond the institutes» model is by no means able to predict which governments will be formed.

Although this scope has undergone some refinement, in particular in the research papers on issues of minority government by K. Strom, and of the government stability by E. Browne. The former scholar, in his groundworks «Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies»²⁷ and «Minority Government and Majority Rule»²⁸ focused on a specific case of coalition-forming, particularly minority governments, noting that their

²⁵ Axelrod R., Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, *American Political Science Review* 1972, vol 66, s. 11-20.

²⁶ Schofield N., Sened I., Nixon D., Nash Equilibria in Multiparty Competition With "Stochastic" Voters, *Annals of Operations Research* 1998, vol 84, s. 3-27.

²⁷ Strom K., Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1984, vol 79, s. 738-754.

²⁸ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

existence is not a rarity (about one-third of all coalitional governments are minority cabinets), they not necessarily being a crisis phenomenon. However, the scholar has found that existence of minority governments has become a complication for the existing theories of coalitional governments forming. Concurrently, the impact of K. Strom's research went far beyond the simple definition of minority governments, making important methodological implications for the study of coalitional governments in general. Firstly, the research elucidated the issue of government formation, embracing numerous problems, ranging from «which government is formed» to «what type of government is being formed», which has become a factor, compelling some countries to elect minority governments on a regular basis, while other countries nearly permanently opt for bare-majority governmental coalitions, with some countries even giving preference to surplus governmental coalitions. Secondly, the research provided a report on minority governments using institutional explanations, specifically existence of the system of strong parliamentary committees²⁹.

The latter researcher in «The Events» Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability»³⁰, «The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies»³¹ and «Contending Models of Cabinet Stability: A Rejoinder»³² addressed the empirical traditions, unravelling the issues of the governments stability, and viewed the survival of a governmental cabinet as a critical event, an accidental external shock that destabilizes the existing government. Such an accidental shock, S. Mershon³³ argued, follows a process of constant, level of danger for the completion of governmental cabinets forming. In contrast, K. Strom³⁴ identified a set of variations that determine inconsiderable duration of governmental offices, particularly appealing to types of government.

Lastly, G. King put forward a combined model of governmental cabinet dismissals, which combined the «peculiarity approach» by K. Strom and the «event approach», introduced by E. Brown. As opposed to that, P. Warwick in the explorations «Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western Democracies»³⁵, «Rising Hazards: An Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government»³⁶, «Economic Trends and Government Survival in West European

²⁹ Diermeier D., Merlo A., An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures, *Journal of Public Economics* 2004, vol 88, s. 783-797.

³⁰ Browne E., Frensdreis J., Gleiber D., An «Events» Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability, *Comparative Political Studies* 1984, vol 17, s. 167-197.

³¹ Browne E., Frensdreis J., Gleiber D., The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 628-650.

³² Browne E., Frensdreis J., Gleiber D., Contending Models of Cabinet Stability: A Rejoinder, *American Political Science Review* 1988, vol 82, s. 923-930.

³³ Mershon C., The costs of coalition: coalition theories and Italian governments, *American Political Science Review* 1996, vol 90, s. 534-554.

³⁴ Strom K., Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1984, vol 79, s. 738-754; Strom K., Contending Models of Cabinet Stability, *American Political Science Review* 1988, vol 82, s. 923-941.

³⁵ Warwick P., Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western Democracies, *Comparative Political Studies* 1992, vol 25, s. 332-361.

³⁶ Warwick P., Rising Hazards: An Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government, *American Journal of Political Science* 1992, vol 36, s. 857-876.

Parliamentary Democracies»³⁷, and «Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies»³⁸ provided a sound proof that a combined model is just a special case of combining an entire class of government survival models, on the basis of which P. Warwick and S. Easton³⁹, D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson⁴⁰ proposed absolutely unique models.

In the study «Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models»⁴¹, K. Shepsle formally identified the institutional structure as a model of the parliamentary committee system. The crucial idea is to impose additional restrictions in the domain of political decision making. K. Shepsle assumed that each legislator was appointed to settle exclusively one issue, hence such an appointment could be interpreted as an option within the parliamentary committee system. It is intuitively evident that a parliamentary committee has exclusive jurisdiction over the problem. On the grounds of J. Kremer's⁴² conclusions, it can be easily proved that equilibrium structures exist for each appointment in the parliamentary committee⁴³, and the basic idea is to have the committees consistently appointed for each individual problem. With each problem corresponding to one scope of the mandates composition, the median voter theorem guarantees that the nucleus exists in that dimension. The final result presents a combination of a sequence of parliamentary committees decisions. Thus, the key methodological idea of this theory is to transform the problem of social choice with no nucleus whatsoever into a more structured problem with the existence of a nucleus.

M. Laver and K. Shepsle⁴⁴ made use of this methodology in the exploration of governmental cabinets. In the light of a coalitional government, the crucial political decision-makers are not committees and individual parliamentarians, but cabinets and parties. M. Laver and K. Shepsle interpreted the outline of the problem (dating back to K. Shepsle's idea) as a model of portfolio allocation among political parties in a government cabinet. Therefore, portfolio owners can unilaterally determine the choice of policy in a certain policy dimension. Researchers attempted to ascertain what conditions of appointment and portfolio allocation are at the core of the majority in the voting «game» for the appointment of a governmental cabinet. In their template there are three political parties A, B and C with ideological positions along two dimensions of politics. Each combination of parties is a potential coalitional government cabinet. Supposing, all two-party coalitions are the majority, then each one-party government is

³⁷ Warwick P., Economic Trends and Government Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1992, vol 86, s. 875-887.

³⁸ Warwick P., *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

³⁹ Warwick P., Easton S., The Cabinet Stability Controversy: New Perspectives on a Classic Problem, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1992, vol 36, s. 122-146.

⁴⁰ Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1999, vol 43, s. 1051-1098.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, *"American Political Science Review"* 2000, vol 94, s. 627-640.

⁴¹ Shepsle K., Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1979, vol 23, s. 27-60.

⁴² Kramer G., Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces, *"Journal of Mathematical Sociology"* 1972, vol 2, s. 165-180.

⁴³ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Positive Political Theory II: Strategies and Structures*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2005.

⁴⁴ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, *"American Political Science Review"* 1990, vol 84, s. 873-889.

a minority government. The idea behind the model is that it models a government as a portfolio allocation to describe the real process of forming a governmental cabinet. For instance, The BA model government is stable, since there is no alternative government in the institutional formation process, even though there is a policy, giving the priority to the policy of the BA government coalition. However, according to M. Laver and K. Shepsle model, this policy does not offer plausible alternatives to BA since it cannot be implemented by the government. Thus, M. Laver and K. Shepsle illustrate that not only portfolio appointments and allocations can be stable, but also stable appointments can be of the minority type. In addition, scholars in the «Events, Equilibria and Government Survival»⁴⁵ hint at giving an explanation to the governmental cabinets stability. The researchers have succeeded in addressing all the renowned abovementioned empirical themes. In addition, the methodology of the authors shed light on the issues of agents, forming a specific governmental cabinet. The attraction of the model lies in the fact of supporting the basic characteristics of spatial models using the «beyond the institute» formula, simultaneously adding a sufficient number of structures to explain new theoretical and empirical claims.

However, D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks in the research “Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios”⁴⁶ confirmed that in case of three parties, the advantages, stipulated by the structural equilibrium of the game, intended to gain portfolios, may not exist as such. The following example demonstrates such an exception. In the researchers’ version, there is one large D party with 49 percent of seats in the legislature and three smaller parties with 17 percent of seats each. It should be noted that parties D and C prefer cabinet D to cabinets A, B, and AB, while parties A, B, and C, together forming the majority, prefer the BD version government. Concludingly, A and D favour D over C. Therefore, the nucleus of the problem of appointing members is empty. The methodological issues, disclosed by D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks lie in the ability to penetrate into the essence, which cannot be guaranteed by the Laver-Shepsle model. It is worth mentioning that in case of an empty nucleus, there is no empirical content in theory, since it does not imply anything. In this regard, Mr Plott believes that differently placed agenda constraints, outlined in the Laver-Shepsle model are not sufficient enough to avoid major “problems of non-existence”⁴⁷. The root cause of these problems lies in the use of a nucleus as a political decision concept, whereas a non-cooperative game theory (with equilibrium as a political solution) does not solve similar problems. One might, for instance, re-formulate the structure of Laver-Shepsle model as a non-cooperative model of bargaining in party leadership, yet the literature on government formation does not follow this path, offering a number of alternative structures based on the non-cooperative game theory, instead⁴⁸.

⁴⁵ Laver M., Shepsle K., Events, Equilibria and Government Survival, *American Journal of Political Science* 1998, vol 42, s. 28-55.

⁴⁶ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios, *American Political Science Review* 1990, vol 84, s. 891-906.

⁴⁷ Plott C., A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule, *American Economic Review* 1967, vol 57, s. 787-806.

⁴⁸ Diermeier D., Krehbiel K., Institutionalism as a Methodology, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2003, vol 15, s. 123-144.

Among those is the Baron-Ferejohn model⁴⁹ or the so-called “legislative bargaining scheme”. It is one of the most widespread formal structures in legislative politics research. One of the first direct applications of this model in relation to a particular problem in Political Science is the issue of cabinet-forming, reflected in such studies by D. Baron as “A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions”⁵⁰ and “A Spatial Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems”⁵¹. In all variants of the Baron-Ferejohn model, projection is made in terms of the rule that it proposes a respective policy and “benefits allocation” to a group of voters. In accordance with this voting rule, a proposal is either accepted or rejected. In case it is accepted, at the end of the game, all actors receive “payment” according to the offer accepted. If other project is selected, the process will proceed until the proposal is accepted, or at the very end of the game. For instance, a simple version of this model is when there are three political parties without the party, having earned the majority in the parliament. The model presupposes that the bidding party will suggest a minimum-winning coalition, consisting of itself and one additional (additive) party, leaving the third party with zero winnings. The party, proposing a coalition provides the potential coalition partner with the number of portfolios, required to ensure political decision-making process. The number of portfolios will be equal to the expected winnings of the coalition partner in case of the offer rejection and continuation of the bidding. Bids are always accepted in the first round. Therefore, the proposing party maximizes its payment by selecting one of the parties with the lowest value of the bidding continuation as a coalition partner to form a coalitional governmental cabinet.

Another vivid example of a two-period model is the one with three parties sharing one hypothetical pie in the form of a governmental cabinet. If the pie is not divided after two negotiation periods, neither party receives anything. Provided each party holds an equal number of seats and in the course of each negotiation period for the government formation the probability of any of both to be selected as an initiator of a governmental coalition is proportional in order to increase its share, that is, each party is selected with an approximate probability of 1/3. In the final negotiation period, each of the recognized formators will offer to get the entire cake, without allocating anything to the remaining two parties. This offer will be accepted by other parties. Consider a case when each party approves the decision during one negotiation period. If the offer is rejected, the probability of each party to be selected as a formator in the second negotiation period equals to 1/3. However, we have illustrated that in this case a formator gets the entire cake. The expected benefit of rejecting the offer is one-third for each party. Such an expected payment is called the “value of continuing negotiations” on forming a coalitional governmental cabinet. Therefore, the Baron-Ferejohn model has numerous methodological advantages over the Laver-Shepsle model. Due to the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game

⁴⁹ Baron D., Ferejohn J., Bargaining in Legislatures, *American Political Science Review* 1989, vol 83, s. 1181-1206.

⁵⁰ Baron D., A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, *American Journal of Political Science* 1989, vol 33, s. 1048-1084.

⁵¹ Baron D., A Spatial Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, *American Political Science Review* 1991, vol 85, s. 137-165.

theory, competition exists even in an environment with an empty nucleus. These peculiarities make the model suitable for political analysis. However, compared to the Laver-Shepsle model, this model is much more complicated, especially if we overlook the allocation of the environment and focus on political advantages. In this respect, only the simplest environment with three symmetric parties can be reasonably controlled. Besides, this model concerns solely coalitional governments formation, not the government stability.

These methodological shortcomings of the Laver-Shepsle model along with technical claims to the Baron-Ferejohn model determined the search for alternative models, concerning the coalitional government agreement. The demand for a change in the approach to coalitional government research originated in the model by M. Morelli ("Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining"⁵²). In terms of the given approach, agents do not make consistent offers (like in the Baron-Ferejohn model), yet require compensation for their participation in a certain coalition. It is apparent that it is the President to choose the first formator. However, if no coalition variant emerges after all the players have put forward their variants, the new formator definitely satisfies his own political needs. Instead, the previous requirements become invalid until a common set of political demands is supported by the majority governmental coalition. The rules of the game are randomly determined by those who have not yet demanded a proportional likelihood of recognition of a future governmental coalition. So, unlike the Baron-Ferejohn model, in case of this model, formators do not receive any benefits. Intuitively, each party has the same market power of its demands to change the game, and this is reflected in the equilibrium results.

An alternative approach was suggested by A. Merlot⁵³, being based on the work "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information"⁵⁴. Similarly to the Baron-Ferejohn model, in the model by A. Merlot, a number of players make an agreement on absolutely divisive payments, making offers only after being recognized. If the offer is accepted by all the parties or government groups, the bargaining is ceased. However, there are two differences. Firstly, all players must agree on the offered allocation. Secondly, the value of the prize (or allocation) is altering over time. M. Merlot treats such a variable as a change in general expectations in regard of the elected governmental coalition duration. M. Merlot and C. Wilson in the exploration "Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining"⁵⁵ demonstrate that such a game has a constant unique level of equilibrium that meets the allocation principle: every equilibrium pay vector must be efficient; the set of cases with all the parties agreeing must be irrespective of the formator. With respect to changing payments, the model implies that in some countries parties are more secured against disruptions, concerning the coalitional agreement. Therefore,

⁵² Morelli M., Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining, *"American Political Science Review"* 1999, vol 93, s. 809-820.

⁵³ Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101-131.

⁵⁴ Merlo A., Wilson C., A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information, *"Econometrica"* 1995, vol 63, s. 371-399.

⁵⁵ Merlo A., Wilson C., Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining, *"Economic Theory"* 1998, vol 11, s. 39-55.

bargaining due to disruptions may occur even in equilibrium. Unlike earlier calculations, which have long interpreted the formation of a new governmental cabinet as evidence of a coalitional crisis⁵⁶, M. Merlot and C. Wilson have shown that disruptions may be optimal in terms of coalitional parties. In addition, there is one common feature of the models by M. Morelli, A. Merlot and C. Wilson, bringing them closer to the empirical data. For instance, M. Morelli's approach is stipulated by V. Hamson's law, which presupposes that cabinet portfolios among members of the governing coalition should be allocated in proportion to their normalized percentage of seats. Contrary to that, the Baron-Ferejohn model fails to explain this regularity, since it implies a formator's benefit, even regardless of the portfolio allocation⁵⁷. M. Morelli's model does indeed imply the Hamson law, because the choice of a formator is fulfilled proportionally in order to increase the percentage and chances of parties. A. Merlot and C. Wilson also presuppose a portfolio allocation, resembling the Hamson law in case of patient parties. Provided parties are impatient, the formators are capable of earning higher rewards.

Another variant of rather an efficacious model of coalition bargaining was suggested by D. Baron and D. Diermeier in the work "Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems"⁵⁸. Their model focuses on an environment, where parties come to an agreement not only on allocation rewards, but also on multidimensional implementation of the political process. The formator party is selected on the basis of the proportional distribution of mandates. It chooses a governmental "proto coalition"⁵⁹, i.e., a list of parties that agree to negotiate under the unanimity rule. If the proposed coalition agreement fails to win a majority in the parliament, the interim government pursues the status quo. Bargaining within a proto coalition is effective, leading to a unique outcome of the political process, in its turn guaranteeing that no matter how structured the coalitional bargaining process is, parties must agree on effective policies. Herein, unlike previous models of coalitional bargaining, the policy position is independent of the details of the bargain formation process, particularly the likelihood of acceptance and devaluation of political factors. In fact, it depends on ideal positions of the proto coalition members. This fact enabled D. Baron and D. Diermeier to incorporate their model of governmental coalition formation into a more complex and complete equilibrium, a model that includes elections on a proportional representation basis and analysis of the dynamics of the political process in legislative periods.

Generally, on the grounds of coalition models research, it is worth stating that there are several basic approaches to classifying coalition policy models. From the perspective of A. Antoshevsky, two main directions should be distinguished from the overall array of theories, namely formal and empirical. Formal theories assume that coalition policy is a form of game,

⁵⁶ Strom K., Contending Models of Cabinet Stability, *American Political Science Review* 1988, vol 82, s. 923-941.

⁵⁷ Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *American Sociological Review* 1961, vol 26, s. 373-382.

⁵⁸ Baron D., Diermeier D., Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2001, vol 116, s. 933-967.

⁵⁹ Axelrod R., *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics*, Wyd. Markham Pub. Co. 1970.

whose participants apply appropriate strategies, aimed at maximizing benefits and minimizing “costs”. Opposed to that, empirical theories take into account not only arithmetic (mathematical) variables, but also a number of other factors: political traditions; long-term strategies of parties, assessed as potential participants in possible governmental coalitions; the system of relations in parties and intra-party conflicts; their leaders’ ambitions and relationships among party elites; the nature of the political regime; internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous) factors, and the like⁶⁰. T. Shmachkova, for her part, believes that all theories of government coalitions should be regarded as formal and should be divided into two groups, depending on: the impact parameters or importance of the actors, joining efforts to form coalitions in diverse configurations; a degree of political closeness of actors in a situation, favorable to coalitional interaction⁶¹. These approaches are quite similar in practice. Moreover, they refer to the same models, differing only in the interpretation of coalition indicators in governmental activity. As A. Romanyuk argued, it is worth asserting that the existing models of the governmental coalition theories are classified into two groups: pragmatic, taking into account the number of mandates, held by potential coalition party-members in the first place, the formation of governmental coalitions; ideological, giving priority to the degree of ideological closeness (compatibility) factor and competition of potential partners in a governmental coalition.

The basic model in the former group is a minimum-winning coalition, which stipulates that a government can be formed on the minimum-number-of-participants basis, the main prerequisite being the fact that their joined efforts will provide at least a minimum, yet a majority in the parliament. For this reason the minimum-winning coalitions “do not take passengers aboard,” consisting solely of parties whose parliamentary votes are essential for the majority instead⁶². In the present model, governmental control is understood as a kind of reward for those entitled to form it. Respectively, the minimum membership is explained by the desire to reduce the number of participants to divide the reward. Therefore, the resignation of the entire governmental cabinet occurs with even one party with the lowest number of votes leaving the coalition. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that parties in the minimum-winning coalition model view joining the cabinet as a self-sufficient goal. It means that having joined the government, the party thus fulfilled its political task and its further role in the government should be restricted to purely instrumental, being a condition of retaining a seat in the government the next time. Pertaining to such a pragmatic conduct, programmatic provisions and previous political declarations do influence the party behaviour, however, their role is secondary. Hence, the formation of a minimum-winning governmental coalition requires from its members: to seek natural allies to form a parliamentary majority; to understand essential directions and

⁶⁰ Antoszewski A., *Koalicje gabinetowe w Europie*, [w:] Bokajła W. (ed.), *Politologia XX. Studia z teorii polityki, kultury politycznej i myśli politycznej*, Wrocław, 1996, s. 59-60.

⁶¹ Shmachkova T., *Teorii koalitsii i stanovleniye ruskoy mnogopartynosti. Metodiki ratsionalizatsii politicheskogo protsessa*, „*Polis*” 1996, vol 5, s. 32-33.

⁶² Gallaher M., Laver M., Mair P., *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 186

goals of their future activities; to allocate positions in the coalition government and coordinate its agenda of activities⁶³. An additional model for the first group is the model of surplus coalitions. A government is regarded as a surplus coalition in case it is formed of two or more political parties that, in total of their parliamentary seats constitute a parliamentary majority, provided that the exit of a separate party (-ies) with a surplus (additive) status in the coalition from the majority does not lead to the governmental coalition majority collapse. Among the main reasons for the formation of surplus coalitions the following are to be mentioned: a desire to guarantee the security of twinning cabinets status with some parties being considered unreliable⁶⁴; a desire of a particular party to take a position within a governmental cabinet, hence strengthening its own position by means of government weight; other specific conditions.

Underlying the second group of theories is the understanding that forming a coalitional government implies that ideological proximity (a kind of “range”) of future partners in a government coalition should serve as a criterion whether to join a coalition. The “range” means the ideological proximity of parties within the “left-right” spectrum. As a result, such coalitions are ideologically more powerful in the sense that they consist of parties, having the closest position on ideology, possible in the party spectrum. In this model, the party’s joining a government coalition is seen as a mechanism, allowing the party to achieve the declared political goals, and the coalitional interaction within the government will not contradict it. Although, it should be emphasized that this situation is extremely rare and governmental coalitions often shift from the minimum range of activities to the desire to gain portfolios in a cabinet. Accordingly, it is possible to form governmental coalitions from diverse in the left-right spectrum parties.

Such a contraposition of the two fundamental models of governmental coalitions is, undoubtedly, only hypothetical in its “pure form”. In practice, both models are more frequently manifested in their mixed version, differing only in the dominant, either pragmatic or ideological. Herein, the minimum-winning government coalitions are above all formed from the perspective of gaining power, being simultaneously ideologically compact. A. De Swaan drew attention to this, pointing out a minimally coincidental winning coalition. The scholar emphasized that the activities of parties in the parliament are conditioned by the desire to determine the directions of the governmental cabinet policy, regarding the party priorities and obligations to voters. Therefore, the party is making an attempt to become the cause of the victorious coalition, to which it belongs and due to which it hopes to pursue a policy as close as possible to its own⁶⁵.

Herein, the smaller the ideological distance between potential coalition partners, the greater the chances of forming a government coalition. The given model is characterized by the union of a minimum yet sufficient number of parties as close as possible to each other in the left-right

⁶³ Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

⁶⁴ Remy D., The Pivotal Party, Definition and Measurement, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1975, vol 3, s. 295-298.

⁶⁵ Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: a study of formal theories of coalition formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973, s. 25.

spectrum, provided the ideological criterion is decisive in the process of its forming a coalition government. B. Grofman, being a proponent of such an idea, argues that the number of dimensions, typical of a particular party is irrelevant. The process of government formation, governed by the party's desire to create a coalition with a minimal ideological differences, is implemented in successive steps⁶⁶. The process proceeds until a government coalition is formed. Theoretically, the scholar recognizes that the coalition government is in no need of control over the legislative majority, yet in practice he concurrently makes a reference to the criterion of the majority, made of MPs from parties, being members of governmental coalitions in the parliament. On this assumption, J. Budge and M. Laver concluded that the centrist party, or an "effective political dictator,"⁶⁷ is the most likely to form a governmental coalition of ideologically close parties, since it possesses better opportunities to involve ideologically close partners. Additional factors include a size of a potential government coalition, as well as a size of a centrist party⁶⁸. Ultimately, this presupposes that an ideological model of governmental coalition formation is possible where inter-party ideological differences are not as striking as to block governmental coalition formation. Ideological determinants are therefore able to influence arithmetic speculations and calculations of potential coalition partners and, accordingly, generate political leverage by compelling politicians to form government coalitions, or otherwise by allowing them to rationalize the party positions. In addition, the factors identified in the research on government coalitions modelling are far from exhaustive, and therefore our suggested order of presentation is arbitrary and should not be perceived as a certain gradation, based on the influence ranking. Especially, given that these or the other factors may operate as a whole, or in arbitrary combination, determining the specificity of the coalitional process development within each country.

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⁶⁶ Grofman B., A dynamic model of proto-coalition formation in ideological nspace, "*Behavioral Science*" 1982, vol 27, s. 78.

⁶⁷ Budge L., Laver M., The Policy Basis of Government Coalitions: A Comparative Investigation, "*British Journal of Political Science*" 1993, vol 23, s. 501.

⁶⁸ Warwick P., Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies, "*British Journal of Political Science*" 1996, vol 26, s. 475-476.

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THE CONCEPT OF “LOCAL DEMOCRACY” WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FORMS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: CORRELATION, FORMALIZATION AND SCHEMATIZATION OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS

This article analyzes the basic categories of the democratic processes in the local space, correlativeness in its framework and defined their basic parameters. According to this were considered works of the native scientists in aspect of the defined scientific problem in accordance with the global trend of its evolution. Processed the legal base of its regulation and defined the specificity of institutionalization in differentiated forms. Suggested the look at the formalization of these concepts, as well as attempt to their schematization as the general vector of human development which intend its immediate realization in practice in a local context.

Keywords: local democracy, legal status, legal modus, municipal self-government, correlate of the local environment.

Pojęcie „demokracji lokalnej” w ramach wdrażania instytucjonalnych i prawnych form samorządu lokalnego: korelacja, formalizacja i schematyzacja głównych koncepcji

W artykule przeanalizowano podstawowe kategorie procesów demokratycznych w lokalnej przestrzeni, związek w jego określonych granicach i ich podstawowe parametry. Zgodnie z tym było przeanalizowano prace lokalnych naukowców w zakresie niektórych zagadnień naukowych, zgodnie z globalnym trendem jego ewolucji. Opracowano bazę prawniczą jej regulacji oraz wyznaczono specyfikę deferencyjnych form instytucjonalizacji. Zaproponowano pogląd na formalizację tych pojęć, a również zrobiono próbę ich schematyzacji jak ogólnego kierunku rozwoju ludzkości, cointencjonuje jego bezpośrednią realizację na praktyce w kontekście lokalnym.

Słowa kluczowe: demokracja lokalna, status prawny, modus prawny, samorząd lokalny, korelat lokalnego środowiska.

ПОНЯТТЯ «ЛОКАЛЬНА ДЕМОКРАТІЯ» В РАМКАХ РОЗГОРТАННЯ ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛЬНО-ПРАВОВИХ ВИЯВІВ МІСЦЕВОГО САМОВРЯДУВАННЯ : СПІВВІДНОШЕННЯ, ФОРМАЛІЗАЦІЯ ТА СХЕМАТИЗАЦІЯ ОСНОВНИХ ПОНЯТЬ

У статті аналізуються базові категорії демократичних процесів у локальному просторі, корелятивність у його межах та визначено їх основні параметри. Відповідно до цього були розглянуті напрацювання вітчизняних вчених в аспекті визначеної наукової проблематики згідно з світовою тенденцією її еволюції. Опрацьовано правову базу її регулювання та визначено специфіку інституціоналізації у диференційованих формах. Запропоновано погляд на формалізацію цих понять, а також здійснено спробу їх схематизації як загального вектора розвитку людства, що інтенціює його безпосередню реалізацію на практиці в локальному контексті.

Ключові слова: локальна демократія, правовий статус, правовий модус, місцеве самоврядування, корелята локального середовища.

In the time of global processes of modernisation, the world became so unified and “close” and, on the other hand, unique and heterogeneous that the question of common space for external communication system is as vital necessity, natural expediency in interactions, for spreading of information streams that link all the idiomatic subsystems of global world and thus cooperate the humankind entity. World democracy is a formalised language that dictates the tendency in organising of political life not only in the subsystems but also in turbulent international scope.

Nevertheless, due to democratisation of human life in the world as a general vector of human evolution there is a problem its direct realisation on practice. In our opinion, this practice in spite of its systemacy and integrity obtain specific determined universally, characteristics of categories such as hierarchisation, casual metamorphosis and mutual convertibility. The hierarchy proper structure the system inside as well as optimise, maximise efficiency of its functioning. In this context level system of formalised world language – democracy – as an organisation of political life of humankind. Processes that are connected cyclically and are directed to one another within subordination are basic in self-reproduction, self-existence and self-functioning. We think that these are processes of global and local levels that exist within their own limits that incorporate peculiarity that, certainly, determine another “higher-lower” level and vice versa.

The local level of democracy is the fundamental dimensional sphere where the principles and mechanisms of organising political life of society in democratic form of general type are directly and efficiently realised. Actually, in our opinion, it is a diminutive trivial copy of world democracy at local level in its peculiarity. In this local environment existential functional and institutional form of social life (non-institutional as well but it is not studied due to the subject

of the research) through specific group and differential positive particularly intentional ways of subjects' life of local level is developed.

Nowadays science uses the concepts of new governance, social capital, space as a natural and socio-cultural phenomenon, local democracy to analyse phenomena and processes at local level. From the end of XX century within the researches devoted to local processes scientific concepts of local democracy and local politics proper, in particular the concepts of new localism, municipal regimes and municipal self-government were formed.

The concept of local democracy has a system of specific features that are peculiar to it as an institutional form of organising political life in community in spite of general democratic and universal characteristics. The scientists M. Lend'el and M. Tokar distinguish:

1. belonging to the community. In such a manner an activation of citizen participation in it happens;
2. deliberation. Effective dialog between different interest groups is essential for democratic process;
3. political education. It is necessary for realized participation of citizens and for knowledge about politics on the same level with local elite in order to be equal in the educational level;
4. control over government's actions by people and highly qualified and high-quality execution of good government and social well-being.¹ In general we think that scientific conceptualisation of the notion «local democracy» is being realised in the process of short by time research but evolutionary weighed and scientifically well-founded, theoretical ground work (since the beginning of 90s XX c.). The analysing process of local democracy recently considerably intensified but it is not rather mechanic compilations from work to work, however, it also happens and is observed, but in most cases unique specialised research of this or that problem. Local democracy is a complex social political cultural and legal phenomenon that should be studied by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, economists and other branches of specialised knowledge. This problem requires investigation not only because any subject is to be studied but because of the fact that problems of its studying practically is necessary for optimising and increasing of efficient government in country in particular at its local level.

It is worth mentioning that the process of establishment and development of local democracy and its institutional manifestation represented by local self-government is directly correlated to the problematics of people's rights and freedoms, in particular, at the local level. The realisation of democratic social life at the micro level of state actualises intentional and stimulating ways of behaviour concerning the model of that behaviour at the macro level. As a conclusion the retransmission or

¹ Lendel M., Tokar M. *Regionalni ta mistsevi aspekti politiki* / Naukoviy visnik Uzhgorodskogo universitetu. Seriya: Politologiya, sotsiologiya, filosofiya. - Vol. 15. - Uzhgorod : Vidavnistvo UzhNU "Goverla", 2010, s. 204-210.

reinterpretation of legal status and legal modus in the valid coordinate system that is from «state-human» to «human-municipal self-government-state». In such a way a new but latently known legal status-modus way of behaviour with its own functional existential filling self-reproduces from itself. The process of formation is done by determining of a number of factors such as firstly, establishment and development of local democracy; secondly, the process of institutionalisation of local self-government system; thirdly, legitimation in the society and legalisation of the state through the right of priority of rights and freedoms of human. H. H. Tanadzhi distinguishes these conditions.²

In our opinion, the arrangement of peculiar system of human rights and freedoms at local level is an objective process that is initiated by the human subjectivism in practice. The peculiarity of local level of community political life clearly demonstrates that in spite of the universality of legal status and modus there also exists own uniqueness and own ontologisation of functioning in space.

Analysing of this subject-matter started at the same time with establishment public self-governing authority in local scope. Only in that time objective process of development of legal statuses and moduses at local level, their peculiarity compared with general legal similar phenomena was made possible. This problems are reflected in the works of M. O. Baymuratov³, Y. Y. Baltsiy, O. V. Batanov⁴, T. M. Buryak, V. F. Pohorilko, V. A. Hryhor'yev⁵, O. A. Kovalenko and others. In our opinion among all the authors we should mention the works of M. O. Baymuratov⁶ that are devoted to the themes of essence and establishment of local human rights system; works of V. A. Hryhor'yev and O. V. Batanov regarding the formation of the system of human municipal rights within public local self-government.

In general, the concept of human municipal rights is on the stage of intense scientific analysis but now considerable part of scientists distinguishes in their objective characterological description. In particular H. H. Tanadzhi and M. O. Baymuratov in joint article distinguish these peculiarities (parameters):

1. dimensional parameters – local level of society functioning where territorial community exists and functions that is certain territory of country, its administrative territorial link (territorial aspect) and certain territorial community (subjective aspect);
2. theological (object) parameters – these are people's rights that affect and positively decide essential questions of its functions as a human and a member of local society;
3. functional parameters – existential instructions of objective needs of human existence that arise at micro society level;

² Tanadzhi G. G. *Vidova barakteristi kamunit sipalnih pravlyudini* / Naukoviyvisnik Akademiyi munitsipalnogo upravlinnya. - Zbirniknaukovihprats. : Seriya «Pravo». - Vol. 1. - 2010, s. 1.

³ Baymuratov M. O. *Lokalna sistema zabistupravlyudiniiv Ukrainyini : sutnistastanovlenmya* / M. O. Baymuratov // Yuridichnaosvitaipravvaderzhava : Zb. nauk. prats. - Odesa, 1997.

⁴ Baymuratov, M. O., Tanadzhi G. G. *Munitsipalnipravlyudini // Konstitutsiyini prava, svobodi i obov'yazki lyudini i gromadyanina v Ukrainyini./ Zared. akademika NAN Ukrainyini Yu. S. Shemshuchenka. – K.: Vid-vo «Yuridichnadumka», 2008.*

⁵ Baymuratov, M. O., Tanadzhi G. G. *Munitsipalnipravlyudini // Konstitutsiyini prava, svobodi i obov'yazki lyudini i gromadyanina v Ukrainyini./ Zared. akademika NAN Ukrainyini Yu. S. Shemshuchenka. – K.: Vid-vo «Yuridichnadumka», 2008.*

⁶ Baymuratov M. O. *Lokalna sistema zabistupravlyudiniiv Ukrainyini : sutnistastanovlenmya* / M. O. Baymuratov // Yuridichnaosvitaipravvaderzhava : Zb. nauk. prats. - Odesa, 1997.

4. ontological parameters – realisation of certain specific interests of individual or group character that are generated by profile subjects-producers at local level of society and are connected to the solving of minimal circle of problems of everyday life;
5. axiological parameters – municipal rights of individuality are essential value of society and state as because of them and thanks to them the society and its state organisation exists and functions stably;
6. gnoseological (epistemological) parameters – through municipal individuality rights human philosophy develops in the best way that functions all a local society level by and with other members of human community with an aim to existence and survival of people popularisation.⁷

This parametrical characteristics of the system of human municipal rights that are actualised and are found in its specific nature and are displayed in institutional form, actually, in local self-government within local democracy, proves the necessity, firstly, to study this problems and, secondly, proves the real existence of this concept in the life of local community.

Parametrical features of municipal right give qualitative and quantitative opportunity to distinguish types (political, economic, social, cultural etc.) and groups (individual and joint) of municipal rights, freedoms and responsibilities.⁸ It by-turn leads to exact internal structuring, "publicity" of relations in "status-modus" system and theoretical typology of this system, thus, ad hoc we can talk about mechanisms not only practical implementation at local level (they de facto already exist) but also about processes of optimising and increasing the efficiency of their functioning.

In our context "status-modus" system plays the key role in its display at local level. We think that for our research we should analyse correlate between these elements of the system in order to understand their typological and externally visible image.

The initial meaning of the word "status" is both general situation of a certain human in society and complex of all or a part of its legal rights and responsibilities.⁹ The notion "legal status" indicates subject's role in jural relationships system that are characterised, first of all, by its rights and responsibilities. That is why in scientific circle an opinion was formed that legal status is legally pronounced social position of an abstract not a certain person.¹⁰ In our opin-

⁷ Baymurotov M. O., Tanadzhi G. G. *Munitsipalni prava lyudini* // Konstitutsiyini prava, svobodni i obovyazki lyudini i gromadyanina v Ukrayini. / Zared. akademika NAN Ukrayini Yu. S. Shemshuchenka. – K.: Vid-vo «Yuridichnadumka», 2008, s. 183-193.

⁸ Tanadzhi G. G. *Vidova harakteristi kamunit sipalnih pravlyudini* / Naukoviyvisnik Akademiyi munitsipalnogo upravlinnya. - Zbirnik naukovih prats. : Seriya «Pravo». - Vol. 1. - 2010, s. 3.

⁹ Bartoshek M. *Rimskoepravo: ponyatie, terminyi, opredeleniya* / M. Bartoshek; [per. scheshskogo]. – M.: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1989. – 448 s.

¹⁰ Aleksandrov R. G. *Obschestvo, gosudarstvo, lichnost* / R. G. Aleksandrov // Sovetskaya yustitsiya. – 1967. – Vol.17, s. 4-5. ; Voevodin L. D. *Pravo E Polozhenie lichnosti naukesovetsko gogosudarstvennogo prava* / L. D. Voevodin // Sovetskoe gosudarstvoi pravo. – 1965. – Vol. 2, s. 44. ; Matuzov N. I. *Lichnost. Pravo. Demokratija*. / N. I. Matuzov. – Saratov: Izd-vo Saratovskogo universiteta, 1972. – 294 s. ; Popkov V. D. *Sovetskiy grazhdanin (pravovo y statusi otvetstvenost)*. / V. D. Popkov // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta (Seriya «Pravo»). – 1968. – Vol. 1. – s. 3-15.

ion, it is appropriate to distinguish peculiar features of legal status; in particular scientist O. I. Harytonova sees them like this:

1. state's will is reflected and expressed in it;
2. its content that has certain stability changes not by the people's will but by the legislator's will;
3. elements of legal status - general rights and responsibilities of the subject of objective right, its juridical responsibility – form and exist in the form of legal directions.¹¹

So, we should remember that the category of “legal status”, special as well as general, is a notion that is peculiar to abstract subjects. However, scientists and lawyers more frequently on the basis of home and foreign experience offer a thesis to detail differential forms of legal status or its certain parts in realisation of general and specific legal statuses through the notion “legal modus”.¹² V. A. Patiulin introduces this category into scientific use and register it in the form of a definition as a complex of objective right norms that consolidate the rights and responsibilities of subjects that belong to certain social groups and are distinguished by certain criteria. Extrapolating V. A. Patiulin's statement onto our subjects, we can cross in the “status-modus” system from general legal status of a citizen to its specific determination in the form of features (age, sex, occupation etc.) in the form of types and groups of municipal right that is in the external form that we will talk about later. He on the level of theoretical intentions identifies such notions as “specific legal status”, “legal modus” on the one hand, and general and specific, on the other hand.¹³

Among other researchers that studied the problems of legal modus we should draw attention to R. P. Manankov and S. A. Zinchenko's thoughts that interpreted it as a «gradational level towards specification of legal modus». ¹⁴ V. V. Rovnuy states that he views the need to «dialogue» with «legal modus» and expediency of its scientific practical expropriation as a positive step as it is directed towards, firstly, enrichment of legal vocabulary and secondly towards solving a big number of private juridical and technical questions.¹⁵

Legal modus modifying within local level in the variation of human municipal rights acquires specifically existential and functional features. This modification is made in the institutional form through local self-government institute on the basis of fundamental democratic principles that are spatially limited in the level perception namely at local level. The last condition is a system of determinants that objectively dictate the logic of legal modus transformation.

¹¹ Haritonova O. I. *Administrativno pravovividosini (problem i teorii): monogr.* / O. I. Haritonova. – Odesa: Yuridichnaliteratura, 2004. – 324 s.

¹² Patyulin V. A. *Sub'ektivnoepravovogvzhdan: osnovnyiechertyi, stadii, garantiirealizatsii* / V. A. Patyulin // Sovetskogo sudarstvo i pravo. – 1971. – Vol. 6, s. 24-32.; Belkova E. G. *Statussub'ektaprava* / E. G. Belkova // IzvestiyalGEA. – 2007. – Vol. 1, s. 44-47.

¹³ Vitruk N. V. *Pravo E Polozhenie lichnosti: sodержanieividyi* / N. V. Vitruk // Problemyi gosudarstva i prava (Trudyinauchnyihisotrudnikoviaspirantov). – 1974. – Vol. 9, s. 43-50.

¹⁴ Zinchenko S. A. *Yuridicheskie fakty v mekhanizme pravovogo regulirovaniya* / S. A. Zinchenko. – M.: VoltersKluver, 2007. – 152 s.; Matuzov N. I. *Lichnost. Pravo. Demokratiya.* / N. I. Matuzov. – Saratov: Izd-voSaratovskogouniversiteta, 1972. – 294 s.

¹⁵ Rovnuy V. V. *Problemyi edinstva rossiyskogo chastnogo prava* / V. V. Rovnuy. – Irkutsk: Irkutskiy gosudarstvennyiy universitet, 1999. – 310 s.; Rovnuy V. V. *Okategorii>>pravovoymodus>>ieesoderzhanii* / V. V. Rovnuy // Gosudarstvo i pravo. – 1998. – Vol. 4, s. 86-88.

In the joint article «Human municipal rights» M. O. Baymuratov and H. H. Tanadzhi distinguish a number of peculiar features of specific or legal modus, human rights, in particular:

1. the form of legitimate possible and necessary behaviour of subject that is a member of territorial community is realised with its help;
2. mentioned legal modus acquires local localisation emanating to the level of relations «a member of territorial community-body of local self-government»;
3. it is characterised by theological approach to the needs and intentions of human that are connected with her and accompanies them within all the time by its functioning within certain local macro group regardless of human legal state;
4. launching the mechanism of local realisation of system complex of subject's (a member of territorial community) municipal rights is done with the help of this modus;
5. this legal modus a priori is established by legislation because it determines legal form of subject's appropriate behaviour;
6. relation of a person with a state and local society becomes vividly apparent with the help of this modus through the realisation of complex of subject's municipal rights;
7. this legal modus demonstrates the level of subject's legal culture in the process of its realisation;
8. formation and social significance of human legal modus in the context of acknowledgement of local self-government and territorial community as its primary subject appears as a pragmatic evidence of actualising «municipal rights of individuality».¹⁶

We think that from the above mentioned we can make a conclusion that legal modus legal specific intentional existence of the subject of the local level, namely of two levels: the level of citizen and the level of community that are the representatives of that group of the political life of society. These two levels of municipal rights, freedoms and responsibilities: collective and individual are distinguished within neo-institutionalism.

Public self-governing authority that is the institute of local self-government realises members of territorial community in group form. It is worth noting that this group (collective) is the primary implementation of municipal liberty and democracy. In the Constitution of Ukraine all the spectrum of municipal rights and freedoms in all specific differential system that we talked about above are fixed. Among included rights and freedoms we can also mention such as «right of territorial community on independent solving problems of local importance», «right to implement municipal authority directly and through the bodies of local self-government», «right to conduct local referendum», «right to initiate establishing bodies of population self-organisation», «right of members of territorial community to initiate consideration of any question at local level in the rada according to the rights and the Constitution of Ukraine»,

¹⁶ Baymuratov M. O., Tanadzhi G. G. *Munitsipalni prava lyudini* // Konstitutsiyini prava, svobody i obov'yazki lyudini i gromadyanina v Ukraini. / Zared. akademika NAN Ukrainy Yu. S. Shemshuchenka – K.: Vid-vo «Yuridichnadumka», 2008, s. 183-193.

“right to organise public attending”, “right to own, use and dispose of municipal property” etc. Generally, all the rights and freedoms are regulated and standardised by the laws of Ukraine (“About local self-government in Ukraine” from 21.05.1997, “About All-Ukrainian and local referendums” from 03.07.1991, “About the election of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, local radas and country and town chair” from 10.07.2010, “About bodies of population self-organisation” 11.07.2001, “About general meeting of citizens at the place of residence in Ukraine” 17.12.1993)¹⁷ and the Constitution of Ukraine (28.06.1996 - first edition).

Individual municipal rights and freedoms as a group of rights, freedoms and responsibilities of municipal right consolidate themselves through legitimisation of the institute of local self-government within local democracy. Local self-government proper is a form where these rights as legal modus in their typological variation exist as a level of public authority in its functional and existential nature. Indirect character that is mediation that is realised, demonstrated and manifested through group form is the key feature of this group of rights and freedoms. Individual system of rights and freedoms is guaranteed, regulated and standardised by the same normative basis as a collective group and certainly by Constitution of Ukraine. In addition to this Statute of city territorial community where certain territorial community is its subject, is a normative and legal document that may become the source of guarantee of human rights and freedoms. We think that this form (individual) in spite of subject’s primacy as a citizen instate is all the same at local level more evicted (derived) than primary that is group form. It doesn’t mean that we level the role of individual subject because it is the “filling” of group but emphasise on specific character of local level. Therefore, we think that individual is a part of group, it opens a way and continues functional and existential human nature at different level and different form - in the group within its dimensional existence.

On investigating conceptual logistics of local scope basic categories we will try to analyse such notions as “local democracy”, “local self-government” and “legal modus” in correlative form, in such a way to construct the formula of their interaction and mutual determination in the system of human reality. In our opinion, we should use discursive approach within this analysis. In the light of this set of instruments, firstly, we will be able to see the mechanics of interactions of three components in theoretic formalisation schematic form and, secondly, we will be honoured to interpret our scientific view upon this phenomenon.

The principles of theory of political discourse were laid by the representatives of English philosophic school, in particular, in Cambridge and Oxford in the middle of XX c., that analysed linguistic context of public opinion in political life, its differential aspects. E. Laszlo’s publication “Philosophy, politics and society” which he started in 1956 was one of the first studies of political discourse.¹⁸ In the 70s the notion “discourse” is widely used in the analysis of political processes, institutes and interactions between political actors. In the 80s the centre of semiotic researches that is connected with

¹⁷ *Zakonodavcha baza Ukrainy*. - Rezhim dostupu : <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws> [20.10.2014.].

¹⁸ *Stattiya Vikipediya «Ervin Laslo»*. - Rezhim dostupu : http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laslo,_Ervin [20.10.2014.].

the analyses of political discourses appears. It is concentrated around T. van Dijk.¹⁹ The researchers of the centre begin to pay attention not only to meaningful aspects but also to techniques and technology of political discourse analysis, its dynamic constituent. Since this moment we can talk about the establishment of independent methodological approach of political processes analyses and political phenomena. The representatives of this methodological school widely use the methods of semiotic analysis as well as rhetoric and literary criticism for the studying of political discourse. Here we should also mention key figures that cannot be missed. They are Ch. Piers and F. de Saussure, namely their philosophical²⁰ and linguistic²¹ methods within semiotic analysis that are dominant in the contextual analysis of phenomena, events, solutions as well as in the political world. Extrapolation of the methods from philosophic and linguistic discourse to political is the fundamental criteria of our analysis. Certainly, investigation of any scientific phenomenon is carried out within certain approach, however, because of intensive development of scientific researches, we in discursive approach will make an allusion to certain method – “frames” that is expressed by intentionary idiomatic set of instruments in general contextual structure of the subject of research.

Human as a being in all the display of his incarnative “I” exists in spite of formalism within the boundaries that, on the one hand, confine him and, on the other hand, totally identify him in the widest abstraction. In particular, the thing is about reality that, in our opinion, identifies with two worlds, namely the sphere of nature and sphere of human specialisation, in fact, with civilised dimension²², that is the constituent that always strives for detach from nature into the world of humanised rules, ideals and standardised values. This matrix that keeps in itself dichotomy “in-finiteness-finiteness” through the form of human intelligible activity, constructs “narrower” but generally realised boundaries of its existence that identify themselves in specified forms of human “I” rather than immanent belonging to humankind. Thus, we can distinguish its “humanised” constituent - human reality without objecting P. Holbach’s thesis that “human is a work of nature, she lives in nature, obeys its rules, cannot free itself from the nature.”²³ (But nominally human keeps his plainness in the primary state - individual. By then researches of individual psychology haven’t developed categorical apparatus a kind of “individual” and “individuality”).

Generally, we think that it will be appropriate to identify human reality and human political sphere as such. As an argument we should recall Pericles’ words (orator and public political figure of Ancient Greece) that “if you do not take interest in politics, then politics will take interest of you.”²⁴ This thesis is dialectically internally reversible that reverses externally subject’s activity in correlation to object and vice versa in political work that keeps in itself all the displays

¹⁹ T. Van Deyk. *K opredeleniyu diskursa.* - Rezhim dostupu : www.psyberlink.flogiston.ru/internet/bits/vandijk2.htm [20.10.2014].

²⁰ Pirs, Ch. S. *Nachala pragmatizma. Tom 2. Logicheskie osnovaniya teorii znakov* / Per. s angl. V. V. Kiryuschenko, M. V. Kolopotina, poslesl. Suhacheva V. Yu. – SPb.: Laboratoriya Metafizicheskikh Issledovaniy filosofskogo fakulteta SPbGU; Aleteyya, 2000. – 352 s.; Pirs, Ch. S. *Chto takoe znak?* // Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya. – 2009. – Vol. 3(7).

²¹ Sossyur F. de. *Kurs zagabnoyi lingvistiki.* – K.: Osnovi, 1998. – 324 s.

²² Toynbi A. Dzh. *Postizhenie istorii: Sbornik* / Per. s angl. E. D. Zharkova. – M.: Rolf, 2001–640 s.

²³ Golbah P.-A. *Osnovni vseobshchey morali, ili Katehizis prirodni.* // On zhe. Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvuh tomah. T.2. M., 1963.

²⁴ *Perikl.* - Rezhim dostupu : www.afor.ru/by_author.php?aut_id=547 [20.10.2014].

of human “I”. Interaction with a human in our time is an object of influence in social relations and also through the state regulation mechanism of organising public life. Politics is a sphere that has contacts with everything that is human. Consequently, we think that this identification is scientifically authentic and we will use it as a point to make a start from.

There are a lot of political regimes and systems of ways to organise political life in the human history but in the end of XX c. the democracy itself “proved” and became that form that was recognised as the most suitable for human existence. Thus, we observe a tendency in the time of globalisation that eludes democratic principles on a level with universal, synonymise them in some cases. So human reality can completely correspond to democratic way of organising life in practice but because of scientific discussions and debates we will add that this view is totally directed by the principle of “mezotes”²⁵ where holistically golden mean is more valuable than rims but does not forget about them.

We approached to the thesis that democracy is a form or matrix that dictates, determines and demonstrates in practice aspect of human striving in compromissary variant. We also noted that democracy as a system has four levels of its display where the last link is local gradational level that is the sphere of our scientific research in the article. We also mentioned that democracy in these frames is a general form and determining filling or content of development of intentionary idiomatic will in differentiated group manifestations - group or individual. Now we will try to find correlative place in this scope regarding the categories of “local scope” and “legal modus” that determining in it develop its own functional existential life. Thus, we will also make an attempt to formalise basic categories of scientifically objectively and adequately.

Institutional and non-institutional displays of human activity exist within local democratic scope. Local self-government is the realisation of that form that determines by fillings and specifically in this context by democratic principles of organising localised type of community life. In this context, we think that we should also mention the criteria of “height” of local self-government institute. We know from the history, in particular, Soviet experience that the existence of such institutional form of manifestation on governance, can be formal model in practice although in theory was “the right of territorial community... on independent solving the questions of local level”²⁶ We think that group - collective and individual - level of political and legal culture is an indicator that influences upon the character of “height” of local self-government institute. Knowledge that has active citizen and on the whole it is a system of legal norms that guarantees and protects his rights and freedoms and consolidates certain responsibilities: political culture with the help of which an individual can orient oneself in the need of some politician, his election will be considered grounded not on the level emotional perception or category “mine-yours” but on the appropriateness of representing individual’s (group) interests, individual himself will

²⁵ Aristotel. *Metafizik. Politika. Chitanka z Istoriyi filosofiyi: v 6-ti kn. – Kn. I. Filosofiya starodavnogo svitu* / Pid red. G. I. Volinki // Ukrayinskiy pedagogichnij universitet im. M. P. Dragomanova, Kafedra filosofiyi. – K.: Dovira, 1992. – 207 s.

²⁶ *Konstitutsiya (Osnovniy Zakon) Ukrayinskoyi Radyanskoyi Sotsialistichnoyi Respubliki vid 20.04.1978. Rozdil IV. Radi narodnih deputativ Ukrayini i porjadok yih obranmya. Glava 9. - Rezhim dostupu: <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/888-09> [20.10.2014.].*

take part in the thing of local level not on the principle of representation but on realised direct will every time when the problem appears; high moral valuation of person's character when he is being controlled more by humanistic and anthropological values than by utilitarian, power or normative.²⁷ Thus, local self-government is a dynamic institutional form of realisation of public and state interest by territorial community on the basis of fundamental principles of organisation and basis of local democracy that is limited in space, and is determined by its own principles of solidarity and complementarity, its criteria of growth is political and legal culture and serves as a mechanism of legitimating political regime within these local functional existential boundaries.

Legal modus within local democratic scope is displayed through two groups such as: collective as a primary subject of realising municipal rights and freedoms and individual as an indirect member of municipal community. Legal modus is a positive specific intentional existence of the subject of the local level. The latter through the forms – institutional and non-institutional – put it into practice. Thus, local self-government is an institutional legal status as a system of differential typological legal moduses.

We think that the question about the dynamism of local scope as a local democracy and what determines it that is the primary engine is especially interesting. We think that this question is of dialectical character where two systems interact: "general" and "specific" that is: the first is the scope where institutional forms of legal moduses as a whole (we should not forget about non-institutional forms) that is local democracy that dictates conditions that were accepted by humankind and are accepted a priori by the subject proper; the second is the primary group as a collective or indirect member of territorial community or element (individual) that gives tone from the bottom, being the representative of specific legal moduses. In this system self-denial takes place: thesis changes into anti-thesis but never levels – a new thing as a legal behaviour is constructed – synthesis. Generally we think that dynamics of space is directly proportional to the dynamics of specifically intentionary and idiomatic manifestation and demonstration in the form territorial community subject – collective.

One of the article tasks became to find the formula that would correlate these three notions. The idea of this formalised representation extrapolates from prominent politicalist H. Lasswell. He in his work "Power and Personality"²⁸ deduces the formula of political individuality.

Our formula which we called "Correlate of local environment", is as follows:

$$1 - G x („D”}, „S”}, „M”) / („M”}, „S”}, „D”) x I = K,$$


We depicted this formula graphically, where D is development of local democracy, S is a state of local self-government institutionally, M is the degree of developing differentiation and grouping

²⁷ Amitai Etzioni. Statya » *Novoezoloie pravilo. Soobschestvo i mnavstvennost demokraticesko mobschestve*. » – Rezhim dostupu : www.iir-mp.narod.ru/books/inomezcev/page_1309.html [20.10.2014.].

²⁸ Lasswell H. D. *Power and Personality*, Wesiport, Conn, 1948, p. 223.

of legal moduses, G is the degree of municipal rights and freedoms, I is the degree of individual municipal rights and freedoms realisation, 1 - ideal index of local environment development, K - correlate of local environment, x - mathematical operation, } - determined transformation or casual metamorphosis. The explanation of the formula: depending on the idiomatic intensity and mutual determination of local environment elements and general nature of the process the degree of realisation of differential legal moduses of certain group is conveyed - collective or individuality - through instotutionary form of local self-government in correlation to absolute ideal. The notion "absolute ideal" is taken as a correspondence to M. Weber's ideal type.

(**Pic. 1.** Schematically graphical representation «Correlates of local environment»)



(made by the authors themselves)

Notes:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. General reality. | 9. The criteria of "height" of local self-government institute. |
| 2. Sphere of nature. | 10. Individual group type of municipal rights and freedoms. |
| 3. Sphere of human activity. | 11. Collective group type of municipal rights and freedoms. |
| 4. The process of socialisation of a human. | 12. Reversible cyclic mechanisms of institutionalisation of legal muduses. |
| 5. Objective process of turning to the nature. | 13. Internal communication relations in the individual group legal modus. |
| 6. Institute of local self-government. | 14. The relative division of the reality into the sphere of nature and the sphere of human reality. |
| 7. The limits of local democracy. | |
| 8. Local environment. | |

So, the notions «local democracy», «local self-government» and «legal modus» are within local environment in the complex mutual determined relations. According to the research we made an attempt to formalise the correlation of basic categories of local scope as well as to reflect schematically this interaction.

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THE PREREQUISITES AND PECULIARITIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF TRANSPORT SYSTEM, LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE COUNTRIES OF VISEGRAD GROUP: FROM THE PERIOD OF POSTCOMMUNISM TO THE PRESENT TIME

The article analyzes the preconditions, stages and peculiarities of the development and modernization of transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the countries of Visegrad Group, in particular from the period of Postcommunism to the present time. The factors that accelerated and slowed the development of transport system in the countries of the region were established. It is argued that the regulatory framework in the field of regulating the transport services in the Visegrad countries during the period from Postcommunism to the present time was harmonized with the legal requirements of the EU and profile international organizations that affected the modernization of transport system, logistics and infrastructure. However, transport systems, infrastructure and logistics in the countries of Visegrad Group are different, in particular in the categories of financial and investment components, condition of development and modernization, as well as the results obtained on the basis of this.

Keywords: transport, transport system, transport infrastructure and logistics, modernization, the countries of Visegrad Group.

ZAŁOŻENIA I CECHY ROZWOJU ORAZ MODERNIZACJI SYSTEMU TRANSPORTOWEGO, LOGISTYKI I INFRASTRUKTURY W KRAJACH GRUPY WYSZEHRADZKIEJ: OD CZASÓW POSTRADZIECKICH DO WSPÓŁCZESNOŚCI

W artykule przeanalizowano założenia, etapy i cechy rozwoju oraz modernizacji systemu transportowego, logistyki i infrastruktury w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, w szczególności od czasów postradzieckich do współczesności. Określono czynniki, które przyspieszyły lub spowolniły rozwój systemu transportowego w krajach tego regionu. Uzasadniono, że w okresie od postkomunizmu do chwili obecnej w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej ramy prawne w zakresie regulacji usług transportowych były zharmonizowane z wymogami prawnymi UE i odpowiednimi organizacjami międzynarodowymi, które wpłynęły na modernizację systemu transportu, logistyki i infrastruktury. Jednak w wyszczególniającym przekroju systemy transportowe, infrastruktura i logistyka w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej są odrębne i zmienne, w szczególności w kategoriach finansowo-inwestycyjnych a także pod względem rozwoju i modernizacji.

Słowa kluczowe: transport, system transportowy, infrastruktura i logistyka transportowa, modernizacja, kraje Grupy Wyszehradzkiej.

The transition from the «real socialism» to post-communism regime, and subsequently European integration of the Visegrad Group countries, were both predetermined by an entire range of qualitative and quantitative changes of political-institutional and social-economic nature, which ultimately stipulated specific prerequisites, peculiarities, as well as transit and modernization of the transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the region. The fact is that political and social-economic transition in the Visegrad countries, manifesting itself in shifting priorities from public to private transport, made an impact upon both the new transport geography and the new transport system, logistics and infrastructure in the region. Having at least partially identified and overcome transport problems, inherited from the communist period, in the course of transit and post-transit periods the development of the transport system in the Visegrad group countries was aimed at constructing new organizational, management and logistical structures, new transport links and routes, new equipment and technology, as well as infrastructure and services upgrades. Shortly after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system, new market conditions in the Visegrad Group countries created a multi-vector system of transport competition directly between the countries of the region in question, and between those (as a new transport node), and Western countries.

Nonetheless, awareness of the current state of the transport system, infrastructure and logistics in the Visegrad countries required effort in the realm of their development, transit and modernization, hence this process was consistent, yet controversial at times. Upon the collapse of the intergovernmental Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for Socialist Countries and the subsequent collapse of the old Soviet economy, the inflow of Western investment and technology, accompanied by the continual political instability in the region, initially gave little hope of a successful reconsideration of the structure of trade relations and the transport system in the region. Especially given that by mid-1989, the “people’s democracy” regimes, run by the Communist party had, after decades of relative inertia and command system, pursued an utterly rigid economic and social policy, characterized by large-scale state ownership, considerable employment figures, however, population personal mobility remained at a low level. As a consequence, the transport system of that period was almost completely state-owned, and therefore it bore attributes of congestion, poor quality of service, outdated technologies and low productivity¹. This conditions that insufficient and underdeveloped transport infrastructure and logistics in the Visegrad countries, established in the socialist period and inherited in the period of post-communism, appeared to put one of the main obstacles in the way of economic modernization, increasing international

¹ Hall D., Impacts of economic and political transition on the transport geography of Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal of Transport Geography* 1993, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 20-35.

trade flows and foreign investment in the region². This is clearly proved by the findings of E. Ehrlich, who compared the state of transport infrastructure development in the region under analysis with other contemporary post-communist and developed countries of Europe since the initial stages of transformation in the Visegrad Group countries (see Table 1 for details)³. The scholar based his research on the following criteria: length of roads and railways in proportion to the total area and population size, the number of vehicles per capita, etc., which primarily reflected the available resources of transport systems rather than the quality (speed, reliability) of services and the state of transport infrastructure. Such data being nearly the only information available at that time, it was the crucial to use them for the purpose of comparison. Moreover, the country rating was carried out on a relative scale from zero (lowest development level) to one hundred (highest level of development) points. In particular, it was found that the Visegrad countries lagged significantly behind the Western countries, simultaneously considerably outperforming other post-communist European countries. At the same time, the state of transport infrastructure development in Poland and the former Czechoslovakia was at the Central European level, slightly ahead of Hungary. It is noteworthy that the region under analysis was quantitatively characterized by quite a developed railway infrastructure, as well as high rates of passenger and freight traffic. However, in terms of quality, the region was positioned as low-performing in terms of production traffic intensity, density of highways, relative fares for transport services, average age of vehicles, speed of delivery of people, goods and services, etc.

It could be accounted for by the fact that even in the period of “real socialism”, the centralized planned economy was characterized by underdeveloped transport infrastructure, particularly in respect of its correlation with the GDP level. There were several reasons for this, such as: investment policy focused on the “productive sphere”, while the development of transport infrastructure was kept to a lower limit, often resulting in shortfalls and hindering the efficient functioning of other industries⁴; neglect of the transport development in the postwar period made a sharp contrast with the situation in the late nineteenth century and during the interwar period, when transport (primarily railways) construction preceded and promoted industrial development; transport services in the central planning system had to meet structurally different needs than those during the transition to a market economy; industry and agriculture were dominated by materials-intensive industries that targeted large manufacturing sites, resulting in higher transport tonnage than similar market economies; poor specialization of government agencies, a static assortment of products and a high level of the transport sector inventory were peculiar for production, which required, above all, transportation of large quantities of goods (particularly railway transport)

² Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, “*Communist Economies & Economic Transformation*” 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

³ Ehrlich E., *Infrastructure development in Eastern Central Europe, 1920-1990. An international comparison*, Paper presented at the symposium “Politische Desintegration und Wirtschaftliche (Re)Integration”, Graz, 14-17 September 1994.

⁴ Ehrlich E., *Infrastructure*, [w:] Kaser M., Radice E. (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1985.

rather than the speed and timeliness of transportation; transport services were provided by monopolistic rather than competing companies, and the construction and maintenance of transport was financed by expenditures from the state budget; given the prices for transport infrastructure services were extremely low, large industrial consumers additionally benefited from heavily subsidised prices; infrastructure networks in the transport system reflected the hierarchical nature of communications in society.

Table 1. Comparison of the state of transport infrastructure development in the Visegrad Group countries and other European countries at the point of «real socialism» regimes collapse

Rating number	Country	Overall scores of the transport infrastructure development
1	Germany	51,5
2	Luxembourg	49,2
3	Norway	45,5
4	Belgium	45,4
5	Netherlands	43,8
6	Denmark	40,9
7	France	39,5
8	Italy	39,2
9	Austria	36,7
10	Czechoslovakia	35,5
11	Sweeden	34,5
12	Spain	32,1
13	United Kingdom	31,4
14	Poland	30,5
15	Finland	28,7
16	Ireland	27,6
17	Hungary	25,9
18	Greece	25,7
19	USSR	24,4
20	Bulgaria	24,1
21	Yugoslavia	19,9
22	Portugal	16,3
23	Romania	16,0
The average score for Europe		33,2
The average score for Western Europe		36,8
The average score for post-communist countries		25,2
The average score for the Visegrad group countries countriespyni		30,6

Źródło: Ehrlich E., *Infrastructure development in Eastern Central Europe, 1920-1990. An international comparison*, Paper presented at the symposium "Politische Desintegration und Wirtschaftliche (Re)Integration", Graz, 14-17 September 1994.; Hunya G., *Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition*, "Communist Economies & Economic Transformation" 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

However, in the course of and yet more following the collapse of the communist regimes in the region, transport geography and the very system began to alter, particularly in the following directions: new organisational and administrative structures originating from the processes of decentralisation, demonopolisation, privatisation, emergence of new independent countries, resulting in the increase in foreign economic activities; (b) new communication links and routes, having begun their development as a result of removal of constraints on personal east-west traffic, given the significant growth of tourism, and in view of the creation of new trade links as well as western orientation; c) new equipment and technologies that have been obtained within cooperation with Western partners, in particular through the direct sale or lease, or purchase of production licenses for the production of new transport technologies within the region; d) quantitative and qualitative modernization of infrastructure and services such as catering, retail, ticketing, fuel supply, equipment maintenance, owing to the market-orientation of the region's economy, joint ventures with Western companies, and growing trade and political cooperation with the West⁵. This by and large created favourable conditions for the transformation of the Visegrad Group countries into a competitive regional transport hub.

Right at that time major systemic changes in transport infrastructure and logistics began to emerge. The fact is that in the late 80's - early 90's of the XX century the Visegrad countries faced an "unexpected challenge" to the existing transport structures and infrastructure, along with crucial political and social-economic reforms. This was primarily reflected in the processes of economy contraction all on the rebound of transformational shock, which had a double effect on the transport system. On the one hand, depression in manufacturing diminished demand for transport services, as some utilities had not previously required urgent expansion, yet needed maintenance operations. On the other hand, home investment resources decreased as well, leaving little room for the transport sector restructuring. In addition, the social-economic processes of the early 90's were characterized by the monetary and fiscal constraints in the region, intended to stabilize the devalued inflationary resources, necessary to finance investments. Therefore, investment in transport infrastructure, despite being considered a priority, was initially substantially reduced. Of utter importance was the fact that in the Visegrad Group countries the price liberalization and reduction of subsidies for transport services were commenced not so sharply as in other sectors of the national economy, thus transport fares were frequently lower than transport costs, in particular for social reasons. Also, due to high level of the transportation tariffs subsidization, the increase in fares for transport services was often higher than consumer goods. It was also augmented by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact trading system, leading to a redirection of trade links and a change in the geography of demand for transport infrastructure services. Among the positive points one cannot but mention the liberalization of passenger flows, which

⁵ Hall D., Impacts of economic and political transition on the transport geography of Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal of Transport Geography* 1993, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 20-35.

caused a significant increase in cross-border travel, as the Visegrad Group countries opened themselves to international tourism and their citizens gained access to unlimited travel opportunities. Similarly, economic liberalization has led to numerous structural and qualitative alterations to transport infrastructure, for over the course of several transit years the number of business organizations has increased against the background of their decreased size, causing a shift in transport demand towards the supply of fewer goods and services, but in a more flexible way and at a more flexible speed. This was reflected in the fact that the region was characterised by an increase in the share and competitiveness of private road transport, in particular at the expense of other modes of communication.

On the other hand, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact the region faced up to a number of problems in the transport sector, dating back to the «real socialism» era⁶, specifically: insufficient infrastructure servicing in all transport sectors, particularly traffic network, traffic lanes capacity, poor road surface, maintenance and road signs, as well as insufficient roadside services - gas stations, catering, retail stores etc; b) low technologies, starting with costly aircraft, outdated vehicles and telecommunications systems, regarded as endemic symptoms of the Soviet economic system in the region's transportation systems; c) organizational and structural impediments, manifesting themselves in tension between public transport and economic development agencies, between public and private sectors, as well as between old and new public sector organizations; d) human resources neglect, reflected in the low quality of passenger services in the region in comparison with Western standards, which resulted in poor working conditions, low levels of employees' morality and lack of incentives for self-development; e) obstacles to transport mobility, since even following 1989 a number of travel bans for citizens of the Visegrad Group countries were abolished, yet some existed until the countries of the analysed region joined the EU. The fact is that after the collapse of the USSR the single European market was confined to Western Europe, consequently the countries of the Visegrad Group seeking EU membership had to modernize their cross-border checkpoints in order to cope with the indirect outcomes of potential accession to the EU membership. This led to the necessity to integrate local border economies in the shortest possible time so as to facilitate the traffic currents of both goods and passenger transportation; e) fiscal problems, manifested by the lack of stable exchange rates in the region, which resulted in currency problems in investment planning, joint venture development and export pricing; (g) neglect of environmental considerations, which reflected in the fact that the transport infrastructure development was not in fact determined by environmental concerns, in spite of both science and the public awareness of the environmental challenges; g) unbalanced investments, conditioned by the fact that during the period of "real socialism" regimes, the focus was

⁶ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *"Communist Economies & Economic Transformation"* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

on quantity rather than product quality, due to which investments focused on several grand projects rather than on quality improvement and overall infrastructure support⁷.

Moreover, upon the collapse of the “real socialism” regimes, the transport system of the Visegrad Group countries even seemed to experience some short-term deterioration. This was reflected in: (a) the outflow of large state / government subsidies (during the privatization process) from public transport; b) modal shift in freight transport from inaccessible railways to highways; c) deterioration of roads condition, both as a result of insufficient funding, and the rapid increase in use of personal road transport, which was a reflection of a change in modalities, increased tourism and free cross-border traffic; d) increase in transit traffic through the countries of the region, which in the early 90’s bordered on the military conflict zones and areas of political conflict (for example, in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova / Transnistria, etc.); e) significant stagnation and lasting process of replacement of the aviation fleet, and reconstruction or expansion of airports; e) uncertainty in the private sector and international financing of the region transport system and infrastructure. Even though, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system, Visegrad Group countries initiated far-reaching economic restructuring processes, manifested in: privatization⁸; elimination of institutes of the planning and command and administrative system, as well as the system itself, that governed the centralized economic branch; implementation of currency convertibility related to market-based reform of the price system; creation of a private banking system; introduction of a tax system relevant to the market economy; reform of domestic investment and regulation of foreign trade⁹. They were conditioned by the fact that transport systems and institutions, inherited from real socialism regimes and, were attended by high overhead expenditures and often extremely inefficient in terms of technology and labour. On the other hand, attempts to privatize large parts of the national economies of the Visegrad countries in a very short period of time, were not decisive, as they lacked the institutional, legal and even mental prerequisites and background¹⁰.

Nonetheless, the entire concept of the transport system restructuring resulted from the assumption that privatization, or at least partial private-state ownership, creates greater competitiveness and, consequently, higher efficiency of transport enterprises¹¹. Moreover, such reasoning, along with transport system and infrastructure modernization in the early 1990s (especially automobile transport), was realised (both independently and through concessions with other states and corporations) in the Visegrad countries, even though accompanied by

⁷ Sawiczewska Z., *The impact of economic and political change on Polish sea transport*, [w:] Hall D. (ed.), *Transport and economic development in the new Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Belhaven 1993; Taylor Z., *Recent transport development and economic change in Poland*, [w:] Hall D. (ed.), *Transport and economic development in the new Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Belhaven 1993.

⁸ Milanovic B., Privatization in Postcommunist societies, *“Communist Economies and Economic Transformation”* 1991, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 5-39.

⁹ Hall D., Impacts of economic and political transition on the transport geography of Central and Eastern Europe, *“Journal of Transport Geography”* 1993, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 20-35.

¹⁰ Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, *“Transport Policy”* 1999, vol 6, s. 207-224.

¹¹ Knowles R., Hall D., *Transport policy and control*, [w:] Hoyle B., Knowles R. (eds.), *Modern transport geography*, Wyd. Belhaven 1992, s. 33-50.

some propensity towards conflicts in the state-to-state relations in post-communist Europe. In particular, in 1990 Hungary held a debate, regarding the expediency of constructing more than 500 kilometers of new highways in the direction of the western countries, attended by charging fares, since at that period only 218 km of dual roads accounted for 10 thousand km of state roads in the country¹². Similarly in Czechoslovakia, and later in the Czech Republic, there arose a need to expand the existing highway network from 540 km to 1800 km by the end of the twentieth century, which required and envisaged an estimate of more than \$ 8 billion with the attraction of foreign (Western) investors. Likewise, in April 1992, Poland intended to build at least 2,000 km of roads, estimated to cost nearly \$ 5 billion, a significant share of which was to be drawn from the national budget and financial assistance from the World Bank, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This presupposed that, on the whole, the process of renewing transport infrastructure in all countries of the region commenced upon ensuring that they are effectively and reliably integrated with the West, which was regarded as a crucial and most effective precondition for economic growth. On the contrary, these processes had been constantly criticized for their impact on the quality of public transport deterioration and the potential generation of enormous environmental conflicts¹³. It was supplemented by permanent conflicts between neighbouring countries and the European Commission over the expediency and amount of payment for the transit of goods and services through their territories. The fact is that, by increasing the transit fee, the governments of the Visegrad Group countries (primarily Hungary) planned to use and eventually used the accumulated funds to further develop the transport system and infrastructure, making them environmentally-friendly, in particular for the construction of bimodal transport systems and for intensifying container transportation (first of all, river and rail), which hardly existed during the period of «real socialism» regimes.

From the political and social-economic point of view, the processes of early transport system restructuring in the Visegrad Group countries in the early 1990s occurred within the framework of certain algorithms and prerequisites. Firstly, given the political and economic instability in post-communist Europe, the Balkans and Transnistria in particular, having conditioned the disintegration of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, so their further collaboration with Poland and Hungary within the Visegrad Group, was perceived as a certain catalyst, intended to facilitate the growth of domestic and foreign investment in their own and regional transport system on the whole¹⁴. Secondly, in view of the emergence of two new competition levels: on the one hand, the Visegrad Group countries initiated increasing competition with each other, specifically in order to gain the advantage and status of a regional transport center; on the other hand, the Visegrad Group countries, primarily in capacity of one region, began to compete for trade and political influence with some Western European

¹² Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, *"Transport Policy"* 1999, vol 6, s. 207-224.

¹³ Hall D., Impacts of economic and political transition on the transport geography of Central and Eastern Europe, *"Journal of Transport Geography"* 1993, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 20-35

¹⁴ Hall D., Czech mates no more?, *"Town and Country Planning"* 1992a, vol 61, nr. 9, s. 250-251.

countries, including the new transport destinations organization, as well as the improvement of the transport services quality. This was primarily determined by low labour costs in the countries of the region, at least against the background of Western countries, which tempted investors to get in the European market through the «back door»¹⁵.

Herein, upon the completion of the social-economic and partial transport recession of 1993-1994, all the Visegrad countries anticipated the increasing transport demand in the future, resulting from the European integration processes intensification. Moreover, it began to be realized mainly in the format of a constant reorientation of transport flows not to the east, but towards the west, and therefore resulted in the growth of transport volumes not from north to south, but from east to west, and vice versa¹⁶. In addition, the trend of planning the development of transport infrastructure and logistics in the countries of the Visegrad Group presupposed awareness of the two following facts: a) freight and passenger rail traffic will not be restored to the previous level; b) freight and passenger road traffic will be steadily increasing, in particular by at least three times between 1990 and 2000¹⁷. This agreed with steady trends, concerning the increase in the density and quality of road transport in the countries of the region, as well as in the overall rapid development and modernization of transport production in the region by national and foreign economic entities (see Table 2 for details). Simultaneously, there remained the problem that the whole of the transport policy of the Visegrad Group countries within the period of the early – mid-1990s had not changed, having been designed mostly to ensure the consumer demand forecasting. Normally, the region did not actually have the courage to take steps to limit the rapid increase in the road traffic, and lacked the skills and resources to make alternative vehicles more competitive¹⁸.

Table 2. Dynamics of the change in transportations tonnage (in tonne-kilometers, as of 1990 = 100) by rail and road transport in the communist and post-communist countries of the Visegrad Group (1985-2000)

Country	1985		1990		1992		1993		1995		2000	
	RT	RoadT	RT	RoadT	RT	RoadT	RT	RoadT	RT	RoadT	RT	RoadT
Czech Republic	117	99	100	100	н.д.	н.д.	62	83	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.
Hungary	145	96	100	100	60	79	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.	н.д.
Poland	144	122	100	100	н.д.	н.д.	77	136	н.д.	н.д.	87	311
Slovakia	110	97	100	100	72	155	60	н.д.	56	н.д.	60	н.д.

Źródło: Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, "Communist Economies & Economic Transformation" 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

¹⁵ Hall D., Impacts of economic and political transition on the transport geography of Central and Eastern Europe, "Journal of Transport Geography" 1993, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 20-35.

¹⁶ Richter S., Tath G., *Perspectives for Economic Cooperation among the Visegrad Group Countries*, Wyd. Franco-Austrian Center for Economic Rapprochement in Europe 1994.

¹⁷ Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, "Transport Policy" 1999, vol 6, s. 207-224.

¹⁸ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, "Communist Economies & Economic Transformation" 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

As a result, over the last communist decade and the first years of the post-communist one, the Visegrad Group countries were aware, on the one hand, of their low performance in the field of transport logistics and infrastructure, yet, on the other hand, of the importance of transport services for their social and economic sector modernization. Respectively, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system, an investment policy in the transport system of these countries appeared to be scattered and non-standardised because, on one hand, national governments failed to pay sufficient attention to transport, but on the other hand demanded assistance from the EU and other organizations and investment funds (in particular in the form of subsidised foreign loans and direct investments). The situation began to alter in the mid-1990s, when the share of transport in GDP, investments and even employment of the Visegrad Group countries began to significantly increase, considerably stabilizing national economies. This occurred due to the 1989-1993 trend, when gross fixed capital formation in the Czech Republic decreased by 11 percent, and in Hungary by 22 percent, and investment in transport actually did not decrease and even increased¹⁹. A resembling situation was observed in Poland and Slovakia, but since the early 1990s it was increasing mainly due to investments in road transport.

Therefore, in the Visegrad Group countries of the early and mid-1990s, that is, in the period of post-communism, there began internal competition between the road and rail transport, representing the two main clusters of freight and passenger transportation of the present and past respectively. Concurrently, the development of railway transport in the countries of the region was supervised both nationally and through the so-called TER project (Trans-European Railways)²⁰. Moreover, in the early 90's the Visegrad Group adopted European standards in the rail transport development projects, however, in reality the sector lacked investment to modernize it. The main reason was absence of a realistic strategy for the development of rail transport, which could respond to a decrease in demand for rail services, attended by growing costs of the rail network maintenance. Consequently, likewise in the «real socialism» period, the revenues from railway services failed to even cover the costs of railway transport operation, even though by the mid-90s railways in the Visegrad countries had partly undergone privatization or communalization²¹, especially in Poland and Hungary, to a lesser extent in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Instead, the development of road transport in the countries of the region followed completely different patterns. On the one hand, it was almost entirely privatized, on the other hand, it laid foundations for the formation of a future international road system, consisting of separate national units primarily in the east-west direction, less towards

¹⁹ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *“Communist Economies & Economic Transformation”* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

²⁰ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *“Communist Economies & Economic Transformation”* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

²¹ Hook W., The political economy of post-transition transportation policy in Hungary, *“Transport Policy”* 1999, vol 6, s. 207-224.

north-south. Although, such a system was developed in the late 70's of the twentieth century, it began to be implemented in the TEM project format (Trans-European Motorway) starting with the early 90's of the twentieth century. However, it encountered a range of challenges, for instance: from the intended length of more than 13,000 km of motorways in post-communist European countries (specifically in the Visegrad countries), only 2,5 thousand km of roads had been built by 1993, another 800 km of roads were under construction. Moreover, there occurred numerous interstate disputes over the direction and manner of the key highways in the region. On the whole, it proves that in the post-communist period, the development of transport, as well as transport system and infrastructure in the Visegrad Group countries took place with a prospect of the EU membership. Hence, in the early 90's of the twentieth century the Visegrad countries participated in the European Conference of Ministers of Transport and East-West Relations and were therefore included in the Pan-European Transport Corridors Development Plan²². Simultaneously, they were notified of all the shortcomings of their transport systems with formulated requirements to improve the situation in the future²³.

The core problem of both the transport systems and infrastructures of the Visegrad countries of the transit (post-communist) and post-transit (post-European integration) periods has always been mainly institutionally determined. This is primarily illustrated by the fact that transport infrastructure of the analyzed region during the period of «real socialism» regimes, especially by the end of the 1980s, had adapted to economic, social and geopolitical conditions within the framework of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Therefore, regardless of the differences in the level of development as well as standards (both with the western countries and among each other), this transport infrastructure largely met the contemporary existing needs. However, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system and the Fall of the Iron Curtain, the existing transport system continued to operate under entirely new external and internal circumstances, in most cases hardly withstanding their challenge. Essentially, the development and modernization of the transport system became a priority goal, reaching which stipulated the ultimate success of the transformation processes in the region.

However, even at the beginning of the 1990s specific, including institutional, barriers to the development of transport emerged. They became particularly noticeable against the background of the change in an entire range of criteria of the Visegrad countries' transport infrastructure performance. The internal factors were as follows: a) a sharp acceleration of the transport structure change rate of both freight and passenger transport, first of all due to the diminished importance of railways and inland water transport, accompanied by dynamic growth of road, pipeline and air transport importance b) decentralization and privatization of the economy, including trade (primarily due to the increased demand for short-haul freight) and transport (primarily through

²² *Documents of the Second Pan-European Transport Conference*, Crete, 14-16 March 1994.

²³ Hunya G., Transport and Telecommunications Infrastructure in Transition, *«Communist Economies & Economic Transformation»* 1995, vol 7, nr. 3, s. 369-384.

the automobile cluster); c) lesser role of heavy industry and, hence, the demand for bulk freight; d) rapid growth in the number of passenger cars; e) financial complications (along with associated reduction in the range and quality of service) of major state carriers²⁴. External factors included: a) opening of borders and the increase in cross-border traffic of people and vehicles; b) change in the main directions of foreign trade and transit, since the Germany and other EU countries became the main trading partners in the early 1990s instead of the USSR in the late 80's; c) the emergence of competition for seaports and air ports with similar sites in Western Europe, particularly Hamburg, Trieste, Rotterdam, Berlin and Vienna; d) negotiating the the EU membership of the Visegrad Group countries along with integrating them into the European Transport Corridor System (TINA). This was determined by the adoption of the transport corridor system, determining potential investment priorities²⁵ by the countries of the region.

It should be mentioned that the main drawback of the transport infrastructure of the countries of the region over a lengthy time span of the transit and post-transit periods (and even today) was the fact that the planned or intended institutional infrastructure, directly or indirectly affecting transport and likewise transport itself, did not adapt to new conditions. Shortly after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system, especially in 1994-1999, the state of transport infrastructure development seemed to underperform in comparison with the economic development alongside altered lifestyles of most of the Visegrad countries' population. This puts forward arguments in favour of the fact that the transport system of the countries of the region proved less resilient exactly when facing institutional, social-economic and political transformations of the post-communist period. Therefore, transport infrastructure frequently acted as a hindrance and impediment to foreign investment and overall economic growth for the Visegrad Group countries²⁶. At times there were various reasons to account for that, however, the decisive role could be attributed to institutional barriers, identified during the transport development process in the course of transformation and post-communism.

An important institutional impediment to the transport development in the Visegrad countries in the 1990s was lacking or insufficient consistency of means to achieve the transport policy goals. The fact is that at that time there were virtually no rules to force the state budgets of the analyzed countries to allocate any part of their revenues to the development and modernization of transport infrastructure. Even though in the mid-90's of the twentieth century an existing road tax, included in the price of fuel, and for the most part going to local budgets in the form of a road subsidy, tax funds were often spent not on the very transport, but on local administration, education or health care, etc. Equally, excise taxes were also directed towards other needs or

²⁴ Komornicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

²⁵ Komornicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

²⁶ Namysłak B., *Spatial condition for foreign investment in Poland*, [w:] *Rozwoj regionalny i lokalny a procesy globalizacji*, Wyd. Uniwersytet Wrocławski 2002, s. 135-146.

to increase government revenues, rather than attracted as investments in the transport sector. Therefore, at the time a limited amount of transport infrastructure funding had to be incorporated in the choice of a particular direction or model of public transport policy, in particular European or American. The first model has traditionally been defined by a clearly defined priority of “ecologically clean” modes of transport, a higher degree of regulation and higher taxation on fuel. Instead, the second model was restricted to establishing the role of private road transport as essential for meeting the household transport needs, a much lower level of regulation and lower fuel taxes²⁷. However, in practice, there was no clear choice of a state transport policy model of in the Visegrad Group countries, since elaboration of a transport policy in the region was permanently conditioned by an excessive burden of social expenditures from the state budget, which, on the one hand, did not presuppose refusal from revenues, the road transport development, however, did not leave room for an efficient and comprehensive transport investment policy. The fact that the decision-making process regarding individual enterprises, related to transport infrastructure was mainly carried out at the parliamentary level, was not justified, either. Along with this and a lack of funds in the process of adopting state budgets compelled deputies to simply transfer funds from one transport project to another. The desire for a «budgetary consensus» thus facilitated the further allocation of funds, which were in any case limited. This was accompanied by the irrational «better-and-more-efficient» use of the existing infrastructure», since in the long run it posed a significant threat to the EU’s support for the transport sector, especially given that such an approach failed to overcome the already-existing disparity in the density of modern transport networks between the old and new EU member-states.

The Visegrad Group countries faced yet another institutional barrier on the way of the transport infrastructure development, namely the passivity of spatial development plans in the industry in question. Since the initial days of the social-economic transformation in the countries of the region, there arose an acute need for rapid improvement of road infrastructure, in particular the construction of national roads and first-class motorways. However, while devising highway construction programmes hardly any effort had been made to change the existing concepts and fundamental models of essential international and domestic infrastructure links. Likewise, the internal structure of foreign trade and spatial distribution of cross-border traffic illustrated that in the 1990s most attention was focused on parallel communications, with slightly less attention to diagonal connections, and least attention to meridional connections. Thus, insufficient adaptation of planned routes to domestic and international consumer demand was one of the reasons to account for the failure of the entire highway and local highways programme in the region, at least in the 1990s. Such inertia also explicitly affected the problem of sustainable transport development. However, such predicament depended primarily on the financial deficit in the considered sector, as well as significant political risks, associated with governance (particularly, induced by citizen discontent).

²⁷ Komornicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

An additional institutional barrier to the development of transport infrastructure was, in its turn, the reluctance of major state-owned carriers, reflected in the absence of government subsidies, accompanied by the absence of either sweeping changes, or errors in the course of implementing such alterations during transport restructuring²⁸. It is common knowledge that the poor state of major public carriers, attended by degradation of rail transport in the Visegrad countries have always been associated with a sharp reduction in budget subsidies. In practice, however, the declining demand for transport services for both freight and passenger transportation noticeably affected these processes. In addition, in the 1990's the region received an apparent positive feedback, regarding the correlation between the decline in demand, the curtailment of state subsidies, and the associated increase in transport rates. Moreover, a change in the ratio of fuel prices and public transport tariffs is regarded as one of the factors, having contributed to the car boom in the Visegrad countries. A rapid decentralization of public / national transport did not emerge as a result of rapid privatization and «shock therapy». However, it is worth reiterating that all the negative effects of road restructuring across the countries of the region were considerably lesser than those of rail transport, which immediately started operating under the resource and cost-saving scheme.

One should not overlook such an institutional barrier as excessive liberalization of procedures for protesting and blocking investment projects by local social groups. The so-called «social protests» against transport investment projects in the Visegrad countries were extremely heterogeneous, having been clustered according to various types of participating actors. These included individuals and their groups, local governments, and other bodies (organizations and associations). Meanwhile, their protests were realised both through court procedures, and through lobbying processes aimed at self-government or central government, as well as through the media²⁹. Therefore, both the subject-matter and the objects of the protest were utterly important in assessing the social and legal rationale for anti-transport protests. Hence, it is obvious that low performance of the Visegrad Group judicial system at that period appeared to be an institutional impediment to the efficient development of transport infrastructure.

Finally, a relatively rigid policy in the area of improving road safety has remained one more barrier. A significant increase in the use of motor vehicles was among the reasons for making amendments to the relevant traffic legislation, particularly in relation to traffic itself, along with parking systems. However, practical changes were being introduced in a slow and controversial manner. Hence, as of the 1990's, the existing 1970s and 1980s traffic rules, when the number of cars on the roads was considerably smaller, were not actually able to cope with the trends stirred by mass development of private transport in the region. It was succeeded by reducing the quality of cars on the roads; deterioration of road infrastructure quality; increasing the number

²⁸ Komomicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

²⁹ Komomicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

of inexperienced drivers; reducing the level of social recognition of legislative regulations. As a result, the countries of the region under analysis had to resort to approbation of a minimally flexible and spatially indistinguishable policy in the realm of vehicle traffic regulation.

Respectively, institutional barriers, hindering the transport infrastructure development have mostly negatively affected the potential prospects for achieving sustainable transport development in the Visegrad countries. This was particularly noticeable at the background of a rapid development of the social-economic sector in the region. As a result, transport infrastructure in the early 21st century found itself in relative margins in terms of lost opportunities³⁰ (however, considerably outperforming transport infrastructure in the rest of the post-communist countries of Europe). Consequently, in 2004, the Visegrad Group countries gained the EU membership, yet retaining a slightly different transport infrastructure than that of 1989. Moreover, the infrastructure had even undergone some deterioration, resulting from a substantial wear due to the “efficient use of an existing network” policy³¹. This was especially observable in Poland, which during the end of post-communism period was in the worst situation among all the Visegrad countries, even in comparison with Slovakia and Hungary (especially considering the square footage of the area as well as the demographic potential of the latter). This partly explains that the differences between Western and Visegrad countries have remained dramatic even following reintegration of the transport networks of the latter into the single EU transport system³¹. In the intra-regional context, it largely complicated competition with other European countries, especially for Poland and Hungary, and to a lesser extent for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This, in turn, proved that, additionally to the market size and the cost of labour, the importance of transport accessibility became a very important factor in the allocation of foreign investment³².

Nonetheless, starting with the late 1990s, but mainly since the beginning of the 21st century, particularly upon the Visegrad countries EU accession, the situation with transport in general, transport systems, logistics and overall infrastructure in the region started to significantly improve, largely owing to a new range of opportunities for public-private partnership, created by the EU and further facilitated by the national legislation. Despite the fact that the very concept of public-private partnership in the countries of the region was adopted or initiated as early as the 1990s, little attention was paid to the ways and means of realizing public partnership and its consequences, or rather how the national political, legislative and administrative context influences the success of public-private partnerships³³. The situation visibly changed only after 2004, when the governments of the Visegrad countries formulated their own strategies not

³⁰ Taylor Z., *Zmiany w polskiej polityce transportowej ostatnich lat*, [w:] *Wybrane zagadnienia geografii transportu*, Wyd. Uniwersytet Szczeciński 2002, s. 72-83.

³¹ Banister D., Stead D., Steen P., Akerman J., Dreborg K., Nijkamp P., Schleicher-Tappeser R., *European Transport Policy and Sustainable Mobility*, Wyd. Spon Press 2000.

³² Komornicki T., *Specific institutional barriers in transport development in the case of Poland and other Central European transition countries*, Wyd. Polish academy of sciences 2005.

³³ Witz P., Leviakangas P., Lukasiewicz A., Szekeres K., Implementation of transport infrastructure PPPs in the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Slovakia – a comparative analysis on national contexts, *International Journal of Management and Network Economics* 2015, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 220-237.

only for real implementation, but also for improving public-private partnership models in the transport sector³⁴, due to the impact of the EU institutions. This was particularly evident in the case of Poland and Hungary, where public-private projects had become standard practice, and to a much lesser extent in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where there were either few or no public-private transport projects whatsoever³⁵.

In general, it was found, that compared to the 1990s, the public-private partnerships development in the Visegrad Group countries was initiated, conditioned and accelerated in response to social-economic depression and turbulence of the post-communist period, particularly following insufficient investment in government infrastructure and logistics, including transport³⁶. Prior to the Visegrad countries EU integration, unstable political and social-economic environment restricted implementation of public-private partnership projects, since neither state nor private transport associations were fully prepared for such tasks and methods. In addition, the public stance was quite peculiar, albeit natural under such circumstances, since, upon the collapse of «real socialism», it was expected that the state would by itself proceed with taking care of transport infrastructure, which used to seem accessible and free to all. Yet after the political and social-economic systems of the Visegrad countries had relatively stabilized, they began to implement public-private partnership transport projects, albeit to varying degrees. This was the main reason accounting for the fact that the capital deficit in the region was increasing, especially against the background of growing demand for capacity and quality of infrastructure, as well as wealth and living standards of the population. Thus, in all the Visegrad countries, almost immediately upon their accession to the EU (or even prior to that), extremely influential lobby groups, led by large international transport, construction and consulting companies, began to form, pushing the idea of public-private partnerships. Even though the development of public-private partnerships in the Visegrad countries was unified at first glance, it was indeed significantly correlated in respect of success rate, as well as timeliness of implementation. In this context, Poland and Hungary had always been at the forefront (with somewhat delayed project implementation, though), whereas Slovakia and the Czech Republic, with frequently failing and facing colossal penalties public-private partnership transport projects, lagged behind.

When it comes to political and administrative support for public-private partnership in transport, it is always appropriate to distinguish between rhetorics and the actual state of affairs. The fact is that active support of major parties has always been an indispensable prerequisite for successful implementation of public-private partnership projects in any country of the Visegrad Group. Since not all planned projects can prove worth the expenses at the initial stages, it is quite

³⁴ Lukaszewicz A., *PPP in Poland*, [w:] in Verhoest K. (ed.), *Public-Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory*, Wyd. COST 2014.

³⁵ Szekeres K., *PPP in Slovakia*, [w:] in Verhoest K. (ed.), *Public-Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory*, Wyd. COST 2013; Witz P., *PPP in the Czech Republic*, [w:] Verhoest K. (ed.), *Public-Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory*, Wyd. COST 2013.

³⁶ Witz P., Leviakangas P., Lukaszewicz A., Szekeres K., Implementation of transport infrastructure PPPs in the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Slovakia – a comparative analysis on national contexts, *“International Journal of Management and Network Economics”* 2015, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 220-237.

common for politicians to take responsibility for the current state of affairs and, upon signing contracts, ensure successful implementation, preventing certain projects from failing, even given a completely different attitude towards such politicians on the part of the public. On the other hand, the situation is less complicated by the fact that, in the wake of populism at its highest in the countries of the region, even after a specific public-private partnership project receives final approval, there inevitably occurs a situation when any change in government or public service will neither affect implementation or even undermine the future of such a project. This determines a sufficient level of confidence of private investors, being able to count on fairly reliable conditions of their business starting with the tender until the termination of the contract³⁷. Yet, there have occurred numerous cases when public-private partnership transport projects in the region were not implemented upon an in-depth analysis of their potential and expediency³⁸, and in view of potential political risks³⁹ (especially in the Czech Republic). This is accompanied by the fact that the norms, regulating public and private procurement, and hence public-private partnership, appear to be quite volatile in the Visegrad countries. Accordingly, it sometimes leads to erroneous perception that public-private partnership is a procurement method, calling for specific legal mechanisms⁴⁰.

In general, from the period of post-communism to the present day, the legal and regulatory framework in the Visegrad countries in the scope of public and private regulation of the entire transport service package has been congruent with the legal requirements of the EU, the provisions of the WTO, as well as the relevant international organizations. Therefore, in their law-making activities, as well as in law enforcement practice, the Visegrad Group countries take into account all the EU initiatives and recommendations. However, this does not imply the absence of peculiar features of the public and private transport sector regulation. Ultimately, it stipulates that the Visegrad countries have gone through a similar path of developing and reforming their transport systems, thus frequently facing quite similar problems. However, in detail, the transport systems, infrastructure and logistics in the Visegrad Group countries are quite distinct and variable, particularly regarding financial and investment component along with conditionality of development and modernization, as well as findings, obtained on the basis of their analysis.

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³⁸ Lukaszewicz A., *PPP in Poland*, [w:] in Verhoest K. (ed.), *Public-Private Partnerships in Transport: Trends & Theory*, Wyd. COST 2014.

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RISK MANAGEMENT IN BUSINESS: THE PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Abstract

The definition of the concept of «risk management in entrepreneurship», formulation of the stages of risk management, the study of the state of legal regulation for risk management and of the proposed ways to improve it are the objectives of this article. The article considers three phases of legal risk management: information analysis, assessment, assumption and implementation of the risk.

The article suggests the necessity of developing and adopting for the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine of the Regulation on the risk management procedures for business entities.

Keywords: risk, risk management, risk assessment, business entity, international risk management standards.

УПРАВЛІННЯ РИЗИКАМИ В ПІДПРИЄМНИЦТВІ: ПРОБЛЕМИ НОРМАТИВНО-ПРАВОВОГО РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ

Анотація

У сучасних умовах господарювання необхідним для дослідження є поняття, етапи управління ризиками у підприємстві, стан нормативно-правового регулювання управління ризиками в Україні та напрями його вдосконалення. В статті розглянуто три стадії правового управління ризиками: інформаційно-аналітична; оціночна; прийняття та реалізація ризику.

У статті доведено, що в законодавстві України закріплено поняття та форми управління ризиками лише стосовно певних видів суб'єктів господарювання або здійснення певного роду господарської діяльності.

У результаті було обґрунтовано необхідність розробки та прийняття Міністерством економічного розвитку і торгівлі України Положення про порядок управління ризиками суб'єкта підприємницької діяльності, запропоновано його складові частини.

Ключові слова: ризик, управління ризиком, оцінка ризику, суб'єкт підприємництва, міжнародні стандарти управління ризиками.

1. Introduction

In today's business environment, it is extremely important to correctly identify the risks and choose the forms of risk management to effectively perform entrepreneurial activity. Risk management is an integral part of managing business entity on the whole, whose purpose is to early predict the risk, identify factors that influence the situation, and take appropriate measures regarding their respective impact. Given the above, it is important to study the means of providing legal regulation for risk management in business, since for the time being it is fragmented.

According to Hooman Attar (2010), traditionally the concept of risk is a statistical one and risk management in its most general sense finds its place in the practice of probabilistic reasoning. It is based on an assumption that there is or can be a clear definition of the problems, future events, alternatives, or the objects at stake¹.

As P. Willumsen, J. Oehmen, V. Stingl, J. Geraldi (2019) state, risk management is a common and widely adopted project practice. Practitioners use risk management based on a common assumption that risk management adds value to projects². The risk management goal of product development is to ensure the realize project goals. By identifying risk and measuring risk, enterprises discover all kinds of risks, control risks through various methods and techniques and properly handle the adverse consequence of risk accident (Zhang Hanpeng, MA Yongbo (2011))³.

Dr. Frithjof Mueller, Dr. Andrea Mueller (2019) indicate that organizational risk management is a complex and important task for managers; particularly as the consequences of poor risk management is becomingly increasingly visible through financial loss⁴. Thus, a company needs to develop effective risk policies and procedures, a business continuity plan, a balance scorecard to improve the ability of the organization to address all types of risk within the competitive business environment (N. A. Manaba, N. A. A. Aziza (2019))⁵.

¹ Hooman Attar. *Product Innovation and the Games of Uncertainty and Risk*. Journal of Applied Sciences, 2010. No. 10, P. 802. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3923/jas.2010.801.812> [odczyt: 08.04.2019].

² PWillumsen, J. Oehmen, V. Stingl, J. Geraldi *Value creation through project risk management*. International Journal of Project Management, 2019, 13 February. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2019.01.007> [odczyt: 08.04.2019].

³ Zhang Hanpeng, MA Yongbo. *Product Development Risk Management in Product Development Process*. International Business and Management, 2011, Vol. 3, No. 1, 101–102. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3968/j.ibm.1923842820110301.1Z0723> [odczyt: 08.04.2019]. [odczyt: 05.04.2019].

⁴ Dr. Frithjof Mueller, Dr. Andrea Mueller. *Knowledge Risk Management – How to Manage Future Knowledge Loss*. Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2019. P. 5679. URL: <https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/60003/1/0563.pdf> [odczyt: 08.04.2019]. [odczyt: 08.04.2019].

⁵ Manaba N. A., N. A. A. Aziza. *Integrating knowledge management in sustainability risk management practices for company survival*. Management Science Letters, 2019, No.9, P. 587. URL: <https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2019.1.004> [odczyt: 09.04.2019].

It is necessary to study concepts, stages of risk management in entrepreneurship, the state of legal regulation for risk management in Ukraine.

2. Brief Literature Review.

The issue of business risk management has always been studied very actively by the scientists in the world economy. Particularly, the issues of business risk management during implementation of business projects were investigated by Marle F., Gidel T. (2014)⁶; Taube, Daniel O., Scropo, Joe, Zelechowski, Amanda D. (2018)⁷; P. Willumsen, J. Oehmen, V. Stingl, J. Gerdali (2019)⁸ and others. The issues of business risk management in the process of product development were actively studied by such scientists as Ferreira V. V., Ogliairi A. (2005)⁹; Hooman Attar (2010)¹⁰; Zhang Hanpeng, MA Yongbo (2011)¹¹ and others. Risk management in the various types of the business entities was the subject of research by such scientists as: Meulbroek, Lisa K. (2002)¹²; E. Sira, I. Kravcakova Vozarova, K. Radvanska (2016)¹³; Schulte Jesko, Hallstedt Sophie I. (2018)¹⁴; N. A. Manaba, N. A. A. Aziz (2019)¹⁵; Joseph C. Near (2019)¹⁶ and others.

The issues of risk management were addressed in their writings by scholars, mainly representatives of economic science, such as: Vitlinskyi V. V., Hermanchuk A. M., Holovanenko M. V., Doba N. M., Krasnokutska N. S., Laburtseva O. I., Lukianova V. V., Matviichuk A. V., Posokhov I. M., Starostina A. O., Steshenko O. D., Shehda A. V. etc. Among the representatives of legal science, the issue of risk management was studied by Andreieva O. V., Horiachkyna D. O. and others.

⁶ Marle F., Gidel T. *Assisting Project Risk Management Method Selection*. International Journal of Project Organisation and Management, 2014, Vol. 6, No. 3, 254–282. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPO.2014.065255> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

⁷ Taube, Daniel O., Scropo, Joe, Zelechowski, Amanda D. *Nine risk management lessons for practitioners*. Practice Innovations, 2018, Vol. 3(4), 271–283. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pri0000078> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

⁸ Willumsen P., J. Oehmen, V. Stingl, J. Gerdali. *Value creation through project risk management*. International Journal of Project Management, 2019, 13 February. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jiproman.2019.01.007> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

⁹ Ferreira V. V., Ogliairi A. *Guidelines for a risk management methodology for product design*. Product: Management & Development, 2005, Vol. 3, No. 1, 23–27. URL: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.1908&rep=rep1&type=pdf> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

¹⁰ Hooman Attar. *Product Innovation and the Games of Uncertainty and Risk*. Journal of Applied Sciences, 2010, No. 10, 801–812. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3923/jas.2010.801.812> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

¹¹ Zhang Hanpeng, MA Yongbo. *Product Development Risk Management in Product Development Process*. International Business and Management, 2011, Vol. 3, No. 1, 99–103. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3968/j.ijbm.1923842820110301.1Z0723> [odczyt: 12.03.2019] [odczyt: 11.03.2019].

¹² Meulbroek, Lisa K. *Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager's Guide*. Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2002, No. 02-046. URL: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/02-046_1b2591d5-909c-41c8-8b09-7d605110fa35.pdf [odczyt: 19.03.2019].

¹³ Sira E., I. Kravcakova Vozarova, K. Radvanska. *Using of risk management at small and medium-sized companies in the Slovak Republic*. Ekonomickij Casopis-XXI (Economic Annals-XXI), 2016, 156(1-2), 71-73. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21003/ea.V156-0016> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

¹⁴ Schulte Jesko, Hallstedt Sophie I. *Company Risk Management in Light of the Sustainability Transition*. Sustainability, 2018, No. 10, 413/. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114137> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

¹⁵ Manaba N. A., N. A. A. Aziza. *Integrating knowledge management in sustainability risk management practices for company survival*. Management Science Letters, 2019, No. 9, 585–594. URL: <https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2019.1.004> [odczyt: 18.03.2019].

¹⁶ Joseph C. Near. *Quality Management System and Risk Management*. Good Manufacturing Practices for Pharmaceuticals, Seventh Edition, edited by Graham P. Bunn (2019). URL: https://books.google.com.ua/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=Lc2GDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT32&ots=lwSQB3rlPN&sig=onmwnw3G23DzVSnqPA3FqHwmg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

A risk-management system is an exposure accounting system and a control system. An exposure-accounting system is a dynamic system that gives managers an opportunity to assess the effects of changes in economic factors such as interest-rate movements, yield-curve shifts and reshaping, currency and commodity price moves, and stock price movements, on the economic profit and loss of the entity. It determines the firm's need for capital to support its positions (Scholes Myron S., 2000)¹⁷.

Joseph C. Near (2019) states that risk management can be implemented at several different levels within an organization, including setting an organization's strategy, a unit's objectives, or running daily operations¹⁸.

Meulbroek, Lisa K. (2002) has argued that companies have three fundamental ways of implementing risk management objectives: modifying the firm's operations, adjusting its capital structure, and employing targeted financial instruments (including derivatives)¹⁹.

Taube, Daniel O., Scropo, Joe, Zelechowski, Amanda D. (2018) accent that effective risk management blends a utilitarian focus on the potential costs and benefits of particular courses of action, with a solid foundation in ethical principles. Awareness of particularly risk-laden circumstances and practical strategies can promote safer and more effective practice²⁰. An important role is played by prevention which reduces the consequences of wrong decisions and represents a planned and targeted action, set by rules that aim to minimize the possibility of erroneous decision (E. Sira, I. Kravcakova Vozarova, K. Radvanska (2016))²¹.

Based on the bibliographical review and critical analysis of risk management by Ferreira V. V., Ogliari A. (2005) present general and specific guidelines that will be used in the proposition of a risk management methodology for the product design process. General:

- I. Guide the project team in the complete and detailed management of possible risks that can obstruct the course of the project;
- II. Aid the company in the improvement of the product design process and in the best definition of the knowledge areas relating to the project management.

For the proposition of the risk management methodology for the product design process:

¹⁷ Scholes Myron S. *Crisis and Risk Management*. American Economic Review, 2000, Vol. 90 (2), P.18. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.17> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

¹⁸ Joseph C. Near. *Quality Management System and Risk Management. Good Manufacturing Practices for Pharmaceuticals*. Seventh Edition, edited by Graham P. Bunn. 2019. URL: https://books.google.com.ua/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=Lc2GDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT32&ots=IwSQB3rIPN&sig=onmwnew3G23DzVSnqPA3FqghWmg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

¹⁹ Meulbroek, Lisa K. *Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager's Guide*. Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2002, No. 02-046. URL: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/02-046_1b2591d5-909c-41c8-8b9-7d605110fa35.pdf [odczyt: 19.03.2019].

²⁰ Taube, Daniel O., Scropo, Joe, Zelechowski, Amanda D. *Nine risk management lessons for practitioners*. Practice Innovations, 2018, Vol 3 (4), P.271. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pri0000078> [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

²¹ Sira E., I. Kravcakova Vozarova, K. Radvanska. *Using of risk management at small and medium-sized companies in the Slovak Republic*. *Ekonomickij Casopis-XXI* (Economic Annals-XXI), 2016, 156(1-2), P. 72. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21003/ea.V156-0016> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

- III. Consider the technical risks of the activities of the product design process comprising the following stages, according to the Consensual Model: design specification (the outcome of this process being the product design specifications), conceptual design (that generates a product conception that meets, in the best possible way, the requirements identified in the previous phase), embodiment design (optimizes the product layout) and the detailed design (leading to the final documentation and procedures);
- IV. Consider the managerial risks of the following knowledge areas: integration, scope, time, cost, quality, human resources, communications and procurement proposed by the PMI (2000); and
- V. Elaborate methods, techniques and practical tools for the planning process of risk management, identification and qualitative/quantitative analysis of the risks, risk response development and risk monitoring and control. Based on the guidelines above, a partial and general conceptual vision of the scope of the methodology to be developed is proposed, with its principal elements and relationships²².

Marle F., Gidel T. (2014) argue that risk management consists of the treatment of project uncertainties through a structured, four-step generic approach:

1. Risk identification describes identifiable risks, that is to say the potential events that could occur and lead to negative or positive impact on the project.
2. Risk analysis analyses causes and consequences of identified risks, in order to evaluate their criticality, mainly by assessing probability and impact.
3. Risk treatment or response planning makes decisions about tasks, budgets and responsibilities in order to avoid, mitigate or transfer the most critical risks.
4. Risk monitoring and control regards the follow-up by the corresponding responsible people identified in the previous steps. This follow-up concerns the risks and the execution of planned actions, including the real impact of these actions on the criticality of the risks²³.

Usually, the following algorithm (principles) of risk(s) management is proposed to obtain a rational cost / income ratio²⁴: 1) significant values (interests, needs, etc.) that require protection, as well as those unfavorable circumstances (actions, events, etc.) that could potentially pose a threat to these values should be identified; 2) it is necessary to assess the probability (risk) of the adverse circumstances (threats) occurrence, as well as the degree of their negative impact on

²² Ferreira V. V., Oglhari A. *Guidelines for a risk management methodology for product design*. Product: Management & Development, 2005, vol. 3, n 1, P. 26. URL: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.1908&rep=rep1&ctype=pdf> [odczyt: 11.03.2019].

²³ Marle F., Gidel T. *Asisting Project Risk Management Method Selection*. International Journal of Project Organisation and Management, 2014, Vol. 6, No. 3, P. 256. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPOM.2014.065255> [odczyt: 11.03.2019].

²⁴ Bushev, A. Yu. *On the question of the legal doctrine of risks*. In: V. F. Popondopulo, & O. Yu. Skvortsov (Eds.). Topical problems of science and practice of commercial law. 2005, Vol 5, P. 139–140. Moskva: VoltersKluver [in Russ].

the protected value (effects of influence). The ratio of probability and negative impact on a value determines the intensity of measures taken to minimize the risk. The greater the probability and the negative impact, the more active (faster, more intense) countermeasures (risk minimization) should be taken. The study of risk management, in the applied aspect, recommends establishing quantitative (measurable) indicators of the manifestation of the risk situation, which should result in certain consequences (for example, in case of a payment delay by the debtor for a specific number of days – additional written notice of the violation, negotiations, legal action, etc.). In legal models of behavior quantitative economic indicators are expressed in terms of, for example, the timing of any actions, norms of funds formation, etc.; 3) the range of measures that are usually applied successfully in such situations (for example, termination of risk activity, acceptance of risk, etc.) should be defined. In the absence of methods that are specific to a particular situation and / or before their discovery, general risk minimization measures should be selected analytically: asserting control over the situation development course, collecting additional information, redistributing risks among interested parties, creating a reserve (compensation) fund, diversifying decision-making functions, strengthening the “weak link”, introducing procedures for coordinating inter-related interests, etc.; 4) selection of specific measures should take into account their feasibility and cost (the amount of all costs for the person concerned in case of counteraction (observance of the chosen behavioral patterns) should be lower than the cost of the protected value or the cost of its restoration).

In legal literature in general, risk management is defined as an active, purposeful activity of a participant in legal relations, aimed at identifying (assessing) the degree of probability (possibility) of risk implementation and selecting effective ways to prevent negative consequences of such implementation, and in the case of risk implementation, is aimed at fair distribution of negative consequences among the participants in legal relations²⁵.

Relevant literature distinguishes three stages of legal risk management: 1) information analysis (its purpose is collecting, summarizing and studying reliable, necessary and sufficient information regarding the expected risk, using methods of analysis and synthesis, experiment and observation); 2) assessment, the essence of which is to evaluate the situation, the likelihood of a risk, its effects (including definition of qualitative and quantitative risk parameters, its detailed identification using methods and techniques of legal statistics, comparative studies); 3) acceptance and implementation of risk – selecting legal risk management strategies: liquidation, transfer, minimization, preservation, each of which is characterized by its own purpose and tools²⁶. At the same time, defining legal instruments in order to reduce the level of risk appears rather complicated because economic law theory does not pay enough attention to the issues of legal regulation of economic and legal measures of reducing risk in business operations.

²⁵ Andreieva, O. V. *Ryzhyk u dohovirnykh zobov'iazanniyakh [Risk in contractual obligations]*. Abstract of candidate's thesis. Kyiv: Kyivskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, 2015. P. 6 [in Ukr.].

²⁶ Kriuchkov, R. A. *Risk in law: genesis, notion and management. Abstract of candidate's thesis*. Nyzhnyi Novhorod, 2011. P. 19–23 [in Russ.].

The issue of risk management in entrepreneurship is not sufficiently disclosed in legal science. Therefore, it is necessary to study this concept from the legal point of view, evaluate the state of legal regulation for the risk management in entrepreneurship, identify gaps in current legislation and propose ways for their elimination.

3. Purpose.

The purpose of this article is to formulate the concept of “risk management in entrepreneurship”, to distinguish the stages of managing these risks, to study the state of legal regulation of risk management and to suggest ways to improve it.

4. Results.

Risk assessment is an important part of risk management in entrepreneurship, since choosing effective measures to minimize risks is possible only if a comprehensive, complete and objective assessment of the risks is made. Miller Kent D. (1992) has argued that integrated risk management perspective provides a framework for identifying and assessing the many types of uncertainties relevant to strategy formulation²⁷.

N. Bäuerle, T. Shushi (2019) accent that risk maybe originate from different sources and therefore, to investigate the risk by measuring and managing it, one should track down these sources of the risk, and conclude the influence of each source to the total amount of risk²⁸. Lueg R., Knapik M. (2016) state that amount of risk depends on the strength of the cause-and-effect relationship between the underlying risk driver (e.g., the weather) and the consequence (e.g., agricultural harvest)²⁹.

Risk assessment consists in obtaining information and data necessary to make managerial decisions on the feasibility of performing particular action by the business entity, as well as in developing means for securing against possible losses (damages) owing to performing certain actions, refraining from performing them, etc. When making any decision, a business entity usually tries to calculate the degree of risk that may affect the final result of its activity. The ability to identify the risk in time, minimize it is an important task for the successful development of an enterprise.

There are following *risk assessment methods: statistical* – mostly used in stable conditions, when possible losses are estimated from previous periods. According to the statistical method, the risk is calculated by the formula: $R = n : N$, where **R** is the risk for a certain period of time, **n** – the number of actual manifestations of danger, **N** – the theoretically possible number of

²⁷ Miller Kent D. *A framework for integrated risk management in international business*. Journal of International Business Studies, 1992, Vol. 23, No. 2(2nd Qtr.), P. 328. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/154903?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents[odczyt: 17.03.2019].

²⁸ N. Bäuerle, T. Shushi. *Risk management with tail conditional certainty equivalents*. (2019). URL: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.06941.pdf> [odczyt: 16.03.2019].

²⁹ Lueg R., Knapik M. *Risk management with management control systems: a pragmatic constructivist perspective*. Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, 2016, Vol. 13, Issue 3, P. 73. URL: <https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i3p6>[odczyt: 17.03.2019].

hazards for this type of activity or entity. This formula allows you to calculate the size of the overall and group risks. In the **overall risk** assessment, N determines the maximum number of all events, and in the case of **group risk** assessment, the maximum number of events in a particular group, selected from the overall number on a certain basis (e.g., a group may comprise vehicles of the same type, one class of economic entities, etc.); *expert* – used in the absence of the necessary statistical data or due to the sharp change in operational environment, includes involvement of highly qualified professional assessment actors and reliance on their conclusions; *analytical calculation* – based on the theoretical model of business development, requires a large amount of knowledge and qualifications of developers, considerable material costs, and, therefore, is acceptable only for large enterprises, although it is most probable and accurate.

The cost of risk (**CR**) in the most general terms can be defined as the difference between the projected (planned without risk) profit from a particular business enterprise (**Pp**) and the profit with probable risk (**Pr**), that is, by the formula: **CR = Pp – Pr**³⁰.

One of the main indicators of the effectiveness of risk management is the economic effect, which confirms the superiority of risk management results over costs to minimize these risks.

In general, in the process of adopting any risk management decisions, the conditions of the following inequality must be met:

$$L \geq C,$$

where L is the cost estimate of expected losses in the event of a risk (i.e. the projected cost of losses in case of a negative event), and C is the combined value of the measures aimed at preventing the risk.

That is, the implementation of certain risk management measures will be justified only if the amount of expected losses exceeds the cost of managing these risks³¹.

The concept of “risk management” is contained in separate legal acts of Ukraine both in laws and in subsidiary legislation. In particular, according to paragraph 18¹, section 1, article 1, of the Law of Ukraine “On Depository System of Ukraine” dated July 6, 2012 No. 5178-VI the system of risk and guarantee management of a person carrying out clearing activities is a set of measures aimed at reducing the risks of non-fulfilment or untimely fulfilment of obligations arising out of transactions with financial instruments³². In accordance with paragraph 43, section 1, article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of the Proceeds from Crime, Terrorist Financing and Financing the Proliferation of

³⁰ Rieznikova VV., Kravets IM. *Types and functions of business risks*. Jurnal uljuridicnacional: teorie și practică, 2018, № 6 (34), P. 141 [in Ukr.].

³¹ Ministry of Defence Ukraine. *Methodology for estimating the economic effect and key indicators of the effectiveness of the risk management system from July 5*. (2017). URL: http://www.mil.gov.ua/content/pdf/vnytr_control/metoduka.pdf [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 19.03.2019].

³² Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. *Law of Ukraine on Depository System of Ukraine from July 6*. (2012). URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5178-17> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 19.03.2019].

Weapons of Mass Destruction” dated October 14, 2014, No. 1702-VII, risk management consists in measures implemented by the entities of initial financial monitoring regarding creation and operation of a risk management system, which includes, in particular, the identification (detection), assessment (measurement), monitoring, risk control, with a view to reducing them³³.

In Ukraine on January 1, 2019 came into force the National Standard ISO 31000:2018 “Risk Management. Principles and guidelines” (to replace ISO 31000:2014), which, was harmonized with ISO 31000: 2018, IDT³⁴.

The methodology for developing criteria for assessing the degree of risk from conducting business activities and determining the frequency of planned state supervision measures (control) was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine under Resolution No. 342 dated 10.05.2018. In accordance with Clause 2 of the above-mentioned Methodology, the criteria are developed by the state supervisory (control) authority in the sphere of its competence and in accordance with the requirements of the legislation, taking into account the Methodology, data on the ensuing of negative consequences of the economic activity of economic entities, proposals of public associations, and such criteria are subsequently to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine³⁵. As an example, we can cite the Criteria for assessing the degree of risk associated with conducting business activities in the field of professional activity in the securities market subject to licensing³⁶, telecommunications³⁷, rail transport³⁸ and periodicity for carrying out planned state supervision (control) measures is determined by the relevant state supervision (control) bodies in the spheres of their competence. Taking into account the analysis of the aforementioned legal acts, it should be emphasized that the relevant criteria for assessing the degree of risk involved in conducting business in the relevant field are used mainly for the purpose of effective implementation of state supervision (control).

³³ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. *Law of Ukraine on Prevention and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime, Financing of Terrorism and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from October 14(2014)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-18> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 18.03.2019].

³⁴ Ukrainian Research and Training Centre of Standardization, Certification and Quality. *Order on Adoption and Cancellation of National Standards, Adoption of an Amendment to the National Standard from November 29(2018)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v0446774-18/conv> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 18.03.2019].

³⁵ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *Methodology for developing criteria for assessing the degree of risk from conducting business activities and determining the frequency of planned state supervision measures (control) from May 10(2018)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/342-2018-n> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 17.03.2019].

³⁶ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *Criteria for assessing the degree of risk associated with conducting business activities in the field of professional activity in the securities market subject to licensing and determining the frequency of planned state supervision measures (control) by the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market from January 23(2019)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/39-2019-n> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

³⁷ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *Criteria for assessing the degree of risk associated with conducting business activities in the field of telecommunications and determining the frequency of planned state supervision measures (control) by the National commission, which carries out state regulation in the field of communication and informatization from February 6(2019)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/191-2019-n> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

³⁸ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *Criteria for assessing the degree of risk associated with conducting business activities in the field of rail transport and determining the frequency of planned state supervision measures (control) by the State Transport Security Service from March 6(2019)*. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/298-2019-n> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 19.03.2019].

Sub-legal acts contain requirements for the risk management system of certain types of business entities: insurers³⁹, Central Securities Depository and professional stock market participants that carry out activities specified in clause 2 of the “Regulation on Prudential Norms of Professional Activities in the Stock Market and Requirements for Risk Management Systems”, approved by the Decision of the National Securities and Stock Market Commission dated October 1, 2015, No. 1597⁴⁰. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine defined the concept and forms of risk management in the implementation of public-private partnership⁴¹.

That is, we can conclude that at the regulatory level, the concept and forms of risk management in relation to certain types of economic entities, or to the carrying out of certain types of activities, are fixed. The criteria for assessing the degree of risk from conducting business activities in the relevant field were approved for the purpose of proper implementation of state supervision (control) in the certain spheres of economic activity.

So, this brings us to the conclusion that the legislation of Ukraine does not have a holistic and integrated regulation of business risk management. It seems necessary for the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine to develop and adopt the Regulation on the risks management procedures for business entities, which would extend its effect to all entities engaged in entrepreneurial activity, regardless of the form of ownership and subject of activity. In this Regulation, the concept of risk management in entrepreneurship, principles risk management, risk identification of business entities, taking into account the classification of risks, the definition of permissible limits of risk, forms and stages of risk management in enterprise should be reflected. Adoption of such a Regulation would facilitate effective entrepreneurship by its participants.

Another main challenge with both researching and conducting risk management is to assess the effectiveness of current risk management practices. At the same time, this is a prerequisite for continuous improvement of processes and tools. This is due to the nature of risk and uncertainty: the true existence, likelihood, and consequences of a risk remain unknown, which results in a lack of feedback on the effectiveness of risk management practices. For example, there might be a substantial risk, which a team fails to identify. However, if the event does not occur, the team remains unaware of the risk and the potential ineffectiveness of their risk management activities. This is also true for the assessment and mitigation of risks. For instance, a team might identify and assess a threat and put mitigation actions in place. However, independently

³⁹ National Commission for State Regulation of Financial Services Markets. *Requirements for the Organization and Operation of the Risk Management System for the Insurer from February 4*(2014). URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0344-14> [in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

⁴⁰ National Commission on Securities and Stock Market. *Regulation on Prudential Norms of Professional Activity in the Stock Market and Requirements to the System of Risk Management from October 1*(2015). URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1311-15>[in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

⁴¹ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *The Techniques for Identifying the Risks of Public-private Partnership Implementation, Assessing Risks and Defining Forms of Risk Management from February 16*(2011). URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/232-2011-n>[in Ukr.]. [odczyt: 10.03.2019].

of whether the event occurs or not, the team cannot know whether the assessment was correct and whether the mitigation action was effective. Therefore, there is a need to identify criteria and characteristics of successful risk management that provide guidance and clear objectives for companies to work towards (Schulte Jesko, Hallstedt Sophie I. (2018))⁴².

According to Stulz René M. (2008), if risk management has been mistakenly identified as the culprit in many cases, current risk management practice can be improved by taking into account the lessons from financial crises past and present. In particular, such crises have occurred with enough frequency that crisis conditions can be modeled, at least to some extent. And when models reach their limits of usefulness, companies should consider using scenario planning that aims to reveal the implications of crises for their financial health and survival. Instead of relying on past data, scenario planning must use forward-looking economic analysis to evaluate the expected impact of sudden illiquidity and the associated feedback effects that are common in financial crises⁴³.

Relating to the effective implementation of commercial risk management in commercial and trading activities, the researchers emphasize that the cycle of commercial risk management at a trading company begins with collecting information about possible sources and factors of commercial risk that exist both in the internal environment of the trading company and in its external environment. On the basis of the collected information, a list of possible risks (commercial risk situations) during trading operations is formed. Considering the assessment of commercial risks as a process of comparing and identifying the extent of deviation of its actual level from the normative level, the question of determining evaluation criteria is coming to the fore. The most common criteria are the probability of a commercial risk situation occurrence, the degree of deviation in the result of the procurement, transportation, sales or customer service, as well as the amount of affordable losses from commercial transactions. The results of the assessment of identified commercial risks are the basis for the development, adoption and implementation of managerial decisions regarding the impact on the risk situation⁴⁴.

One of the risk groups in commercial and trading activities is marketing risks, which are a set of risks arising in the marketing activities of trading companies due to the influence of controlled and uncontrolled factors that have the potential for not achieving the objectives of the given activity at its individual stages or in general⁴⁵. According to P. T. Kotler and K. L. Keller, for retailers, the most important marketing decisions concern the target market, product range, purchases, service and store atmosphere, pricing, product promotion, store location⁴⁶.

⁴² Schulte Jesko, Hallstedt Sophie I. *Company Risk Management in Light of the Sustainability Transition*. Sustainability, 2018, № 10, P. 413. URL: <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114137> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

⁴³ Stulz René M. *Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They Happen?* Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 2008, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 39–48. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2008.00202.x> [odczyt: 12.03.2019].

⁴⁴ Krasnokutska, N. S., Lachkova V. M. *Management of Commercial Risks in Retail Enterprises*. Kharkiv: Fort, 2014. P. 40 [in Ukr.].

⁴⁵ Laburseteva, O. I. *Marketing risk management of trading enterprises*. Ekonomika Ukrainy. (Economy of Ukraine). 2016. No. 4 (653). P. 81 [in Ukr.].

⁴⁶ Kotler, F., & Keller, K.L. *Marketing management*. (12nd ed., rev.). Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2007. P. 544-553 [in Russ.].

For wholesalers, the most important marketing decisions are decisions about target markets, product and service assortment, pricing, product promotion and location of businesses⁴⁷.

5. Conclusions.

Risk management in entrepreneurship is the activity of business entities aimed at analyzing, forecasting and assessing the probability of risk occurrence under conditions of uncertainty including selection of preventive measures in order to minimize possible property losses, and in case of their occurrence – distribution of the burden from such losses among the participants of business relationship.

Risk management is carried out in the following sequence:

1. carrying out a complex of measures aimed at collecting and analyzing information on possible risks, forecasting risks and / or risk situations under conditions of uncertainty;
2. selection of economic and legal means of minimizing risks and / or their negative effects;
3. elimination of the causes and consequences of risks.

Since the requirements on risk management at the regulatory level are established only for certain types of business entities, it is necessary for the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine to develop and adopt Regulation on the risk management procedures for business entities. The relevant Regulation should include the concept of risk management in entrepreneurship, principles of risk management, risk identification of business entities, taking into account the classification of risks, the definition of permissible limits of risk, forms and stages of risk management in enterprise. This Regulation should be universal, i.e. extend its effect on all entities engaged in entrepreneurial activity, regardless of the form of ownership and subject of activity.

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Przed Policją Państwową. Geneza formacji.

This year Poland's Police force celebrates the centenary of the founding of the Polish National Police. On July 25, 1919, National Police was called into existence by an Act the Polish Diet (Sejm.). Before the National Police was formed, the law and order organizations kept evolving to result in the formation of a centrally controlled police force. This author discusses the functioning of the organizations and units which maintained public safety under the conditions that prevailed at the time. The paper shows how these different services interacted with each other during the period of 1918/1919 in the context of the political and legal transformations the country was undergoing. The novel character of this presentation lies in its use of contemporary sources, in conjunction with archival documents from the second decade of the 20th century, including laws passed, trade publications, diaries, to study developments in police work.

Keywords: State Police in the Second Republic of Poland, security.

Współczesna polska Policja obchodzi swój jubileusz pod hasłem 100. rocznicy powstania Policji Państwowej. Miało to miejsce 24 lipca 1919 r., gdy Sejm Ustawodawczy uchwalił ustawę o Policji Państwowej. Zanim do tego doszło, trwała ewolucja polskich organizacji i służb porządku publicznego, której wynikiem było powołanie pierwszej, po odzyskaniu przez Polskę niepodległości, scentralizowanej służby o charakterze policyjnym. W niniejszej pracy autor wskazuje na ówczesne realia praktycznego działania organizacji i służb działających na rzecz bezpieczeństwa publicznego, ich wzajemne relacje, pragmatykę służbową na tle zmian prawnych i politycznych przełomu lat 1918/1919. Oparcie treści o współczesne publikacje, ale również o liczne źródła z okresu lat dwudziestych XX wieku, takich jak akty prawne, prasa resortowa, zapisy pamiętnikarskie i ujęcie w tym kontekście praktyki policyjnej tamtego czasu stanowią o prekursorskim charakterze tego opracowania.

Słowa kluczowe: policja państwowa II Rzeczypospolitej, bezpieczeństwo,

W roku 2019 przypada 100. rocznica powstania Policji Państwowej, pierwszej polskiej formacji policyjnej jednolitej w skali całego państwa. Współczesna Policja, która swoją strukturę i metody pracy kształtuje na bazie zmian prawnych jakie przyniosła Ustawa z 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji. Swoje tradycje lokuje w poprzednicze z okresu XX-lecia międzywojennego. Był jednak taki czas w historii polskich organizacji bezpieczeństwa, że proces ich kształtowania trzeba było zacząć od absolutnych podstaw. Ustawa z 24 lipca 1919 r., którą powołano Policję

Państwową rozpoczęła kształtowanie scentralizowanej policyjnej służby w niepodległej Polsce. Proces ten trwał co najmniej do roku 1922 i był niezwykle trudny biorąc pod uwagę spuściznę zaborczych mocarstw.

Droga do zbudowania, nowoczesnej służby policyjnej nie była prosta i nie zawsze oznaczała ewolucję w budowie i scalaniu w jedność wielu funkcjonujących w jednym czasie służb, mających za zadanie stanie na straży bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa i ochronę obywateli.

Na ogół znane są nazwy organów policyjnych z przełomu lat 1918/1919, określanych wtedy jako służby porządku publicznego lub straże bezpieczeństwa. Jednak w powszechnie dostępnych publikacjach trudno doszukać się ówczesnych realiów działania tych służb, ich wzajemnych relacji, informacji o skuteczności. Stąd też podjęcie tych kwestii w artykule może mieć charakter prekursorski. Materiał znajduje swoje oparcie w publikacjach poświęconych Policji Państwowej, ale o jego „życiowym wymiarze” świadczą przede wszystkim źródła z początku lat dwudziestych XX wieku, spośród których oprócz prawodawstwa wymienić należy prasę resortową i zapisy pamiętnikarskie.

Ustawa z 24 lipca 1919 r. o Policji Państwowej¹ (dalej PP) była pierwszym krokiem państwa dla zbudowania nowoczesnej, scentralizowanej służby porządku publicznego, której zadaniem było stanie na straży bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa i jego obywateli. Początki organizowania i działania PP były bardzo trudne. Był to proces, którego otwarcia można dopatrywać się już wraz z wybuchem I wojny światowej i rozpoczęciem działań wojennych na terenach polskich objętych zaborami.

Wybuch I wojny światowej i przebieg działań wojennych na ziemiach polskich stanowiły wyzwanie dla służb zajmujących się ochroną porządku i bezpieczeństwa. Wraz ze zmianami w obszarze funkcjonowania administracji państw zaborczych, jakie niosły działania wojenne, zaczęły powstawać polskie organizacje bezpieczeństwa o różnym zasięgu i strukturze, zajmujące się ochroną ludności i infrastruktury przed przestępczością pospolitą i kryminalną. Ich działania stały się podwaliną dla zbudowania nowoczesnej, scentralizowanej służby policyjnej.

Zanim do tego doszło, społeczeństwo polskie rozpoczęło gwałtowne zmiany związane z przywracaniem struktur państwa. Państwa, które po 123 latach niewoli tworzyło swoje instytucje od podstaw. Jak zauważa Janusz Żarnowski: Były to więc, oczywiście, przede wszystkim instytucje związane z państwem, wynikające z porządku konstytucyjnego w ustroju: sejm i wybory; rząd; sądownictwo; siły zbrojne; administracja wszelkich rodzajów i szczebli². Niepodległość oznaczała zmiany w funkcjonowaniu życia publicznego. Za zgodne trzeba uznać twierdzenie, że: Niektóre przedtem wykształcone instytucje traciły swą dotychczasową rolę. Różne organizacje społeczno-gospodarcze, spółdzielcze i oświatowe w czasach zaborów pełniły rolę daleko wykraczającą poza ich statutowe cele³. Dotychczas działające organizacje społeczne,

¹ Ustawa o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 r. Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego, R 1919, nr 61, poz. 363

² J. Żarnowski, *Dwudziestolecie międzywojenne 1918-1939 jako etap rozwoju narodu polskiego*, w *Polska Niepodległa 1918-1939*. Wszechnica PAN, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1984, k. 14.

³ Tamże k. 14.

czy społeczno-gospodarcze, które podczas zaborów prowadziły działalność znacząco szerszą niż statutowa wraz z organizowaniem się państwa zaczęły tracić na znaczeniu. Sytuacja taka bezpośrednio dotyczyła również działalności społecznych organizacji działających na rzecz bezpieczeństwa. O ile u progu uzyskania niepodległości znacząca część z nich powstawała jako straże obywatelskie czy milicje luźno związane z aparatem państw zaborczych - chociaż działające za ich zgodą⁴, o tyle odrodzenie się państwowości wiązało się z przejęciem ich zadań przez struktury państwa. W tej „społecznej” fazie organizacji służb bezpieczeństwa nie należy zapominać o ich pro-niepodległościowych orientacjach, mając na uwadze chociażby budowanie zaplecza kadrowego dla przyszłych, już państwowych służb bezpieczeństwa.⁵

Zasadniczo powstawanie służb bezpieczeństwa na ziemiach polskich w czasie trwania działań wojennych miało dwa główne nurty: społeczny (straże obywatelskie) i instytucjonalny. W tym drugim powoływane służby miały różną genezę i nie zawsze czysto policyjny charakter, czasami mając swoje korzenie w partiach politycznych np. Milicja Ludowa Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej oraz wiele organizacji o charakterze samorządowym takich jak, milicje miejskie, milicje powiatowe. Często tworzenie i działania tych organizacji były organizowane w porozumieniu z urzędującymi jeszcze władzami zaborczymi, czego przykładem mogą być losy tych służb w Warszawie. Stąd też warto podzielić okres ich tworzenia i funkcjonowania na ten trwający jeszcze pod kontrolą państw zaborczych i ten, gdy organizacje te funkcjonowały już w strukturach odradzającego się polskiego bytu państwowego.

Obraz kształtowania się polskich organizacji porządku publicznego jeszcze w czasie działania policji państw zaborczych i w latach najbliższych odzyskaniu niepodległości prezentuje Henryk Wardęski⁶ w tytule „Moje wspomnienia policyjne”. Autor w swojej pamiętnikarskiej pracy ukazuje ewolucje tych organizacji i ich działań, oddaje skomplikowaną materię budowania polskich służb porządku publicznego, przede wszystkim na przykładzie miasta stołecznego Warszawy⁷. Na podstawie tych pamiętników łatwiej jest zrozumieć, jak potrzebną stała się unifikacja i centralizacja służb policyjnych zaraz po odzyskaniu niepodległości przez Polskę.

Pierwsze Straże Obywatelskie zawiązywane zazwyczaj przez Komitety Obywatelskie zaczęły być tworzone na terenie byłego Królestwa Polskiego wraz z wycofywaniem się administracji rosyjskiej. Często straże rozpoczynały swoje funkcjonowanie pod okiem carskiej administracji,

⁴ Przykładem działań zmierzających do tworzenia polskich organizacji bezpieczeństwa przy aprobacie ze strony państw zaborczych może być delegacja do ich tworzenia zawarta w dekrete Rady Regencyjnej z 3 stycznia 1918 r. o tymczasowej organizacji władz naczelnych w Królestwie Polskim. Jego art. 24 mówił, że do kompetencji ministra spraw wewnętrznych należało przygotowanie, a następnie objęcie i prowadzenie wszelkich spraw wchodzących w zakres ogólnego zarządu krajowego i dozoru nad samorządem miejscowym, policji wszelkiego rodzaju (...).

⁵ Więcej o roli powstającego państwa i jego oddziaływania na społeczeństwa w *Społeczeństwo międzywojenne: nowe spojrzenie*, pod redakcją W. Mędrzeckiego i J. Zarnowskiego, Instytut Historyczny PAN, Warszawa 2015.

⁶ Henryk Wardęski – prawnik i autor „Moje wspomnienia policyjne” wydane nakładem Stowarzyszenia „Policyjny Dom Zdrowia” Warszawa 1925. (rok 1925 widnieje w stopce wydawniczej, rok 1926 na okładce książki). H. Wardęski funkcjonariusz wielu polskich służb porządku publicznego. W latach 1914-1919. m.in. w Straży Obywatelskiej m.st. Warszawy, Milicji Miejskiej, Policji Komunalnej. W Policji Państwowej piastował m.in. funkcje komendanta PP Okręgu I Warszawskiego, zastępcy komendanta głównego PP w latach 1922-1929.

⁷ J. Paciorkowski, *Zapomniany komendant*, miesięcznik Policja 997, numer 106/01.2014.

aby następnie prowadzić swoją działalność po wkroczeniu wojsk niemieckich czy austro-węgierskich. Nie oznacza to, że organizacje te były w pełni akceptowane przez okupantów.

Tolerując naogół działalność Straży, dążyły jednak władze okupacyjne do uszczuplenia ich zakresu działania, a przede wszystkim do uzależnienia od własnych organów wojskowych. Wytworzona na tem tle walka o polski stan posiadania uwieńczona była poważnym skutkiem: zarówno Straże jak i późniejsze Milicje uchowały czysto polski charakter i możliwie niezależną pozycję.⁸ Przykłady tak organizujących się straży datuje się już od lipca 1914 r.

Za mającą największy wpływ na organizacje straży obywatelskich uznać należy Milicję zorganizowaną w Warszawie (określana początkowo jako warszawska Straż Obywatelska a następnie – od 1 lutego 1916 Milicja Miejska (m. st. Warszawy)). Wpływ ten to m.in. wzór organizacyjny dla innych straży. Ale przede wszystkim załóżek centralnego charakteru służb bezpieczeństwa publicznego stołecznej straży, którego przejawem było kierowanie instruktorów milicyjnych do innych miast, gdzie stawali się naczelnikami tamtejszych straży. Cytowane wcześniej Dziesięciolecie Służby Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Odrodzonej wymienia naczelników straży z następujących miast: Lublin, Kielce, Piotrków, Radom, Płock, Łuków, skierowanych tam z warszawskiej Milicji Miejskiej.

Z kolei za pierwszą chronologicznie funkcjonującą straż obywatelską uznana jest Straż Obywatelska Zagłębia Dąbrowskiego.

W dniu 30 lipca zorganizowana pośpiesznie Straż rozpoczęła obejmowanie posterunków, w obliczu urzędującej jeszcze, jednak w coraz szczuplejszym składzie, policji rosyjskiej. W ten sposób dzień 30 lipca 1914 r. stawał się nie tylko dniem rozpoczęcia działalności Straży Obywatelskiej Zagłębia Dąbrowskiego, ale jednocześnie dniem rozpoczęcia działalności pierwszej polskiej organizacji bezpieczeństwa, jaką stawały się „Straże” Zagłębia pozostające pod jednolitym kierownictwem Komendy Okręgu Straży Obywatelskich Zagłębia na czele której stanął prezes okręgu Sokoła, ś.p. Kazimierz Srokowski.⁹

Straże obywatelskie były organizacjami społecznymi, nieumundurowanymi (zazwyczaj oznaczeniem była opaska na lewym ramieniu), pełniącymi na ogół służbę bez broni lub wyposażonymi w prywatne pałki lub laski. Ich ewolucja do instytucji milicji mających prawnie uregulowane uprawnienia najczęściej w zakresie utrzymywania porządku, spraw sanitarnych, przemysłowych, handlowych, budowlanych i posiadających umundurowanie i wyposażenie głównie w postaci broni białej oraz opłacanych z kas miejskich trwała aż do wycofania się wojsk i administracji państw zaborczych. Od pierwszych dni listopada 1918 r. polska administracja przystępuje poprzez działania powołanego jeszcze w lipcu przez Radę Regencyjną w Ministerstwie Spraw Wewnętrznych referatu do spraw policyjnych (od września wydziału), do powołania i organizowania jednolitej służby policyjnej. Jednak z uwagi na wielość i różnorodność funkcjonujących służb

⁸ E. Grabowiecki (red.), *Dziesięciolecie Służby Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce Odrodzonej*, Wydawnictwo „Gazety Administracji i Policji Państwowej”, Warszawa 1925, (pisownia oryginalna), k. 2.

⁹ Tamże, k. 2.

oraz niezwykle dynamicznej sytuacji związanej z przejmowaniem i kształtowaniem się władzy politycznej w niepodległym państwie zadanie to będzie rozwinięte w czasie aż do lipca 1919 r.

Sprawy związane z zapewnieniem porządku publicznego i bezpieczeństwa były od początku stawiane jako zasadnicze dla sytuacji odbudowującego się z ruin państwa. Świadczą o tym zapisy Manifestu rządu lubelskiego z 7 listopada 1918 r. wydanego przez Tymczasowy Rząd Ludowy Republiki Polskiej: 9) po ukonstytuowaniu się ostatecznym przystąpimy natychmiast do reorganizacji na zasadach szczerze demokratycznych rad gmin, sejmików powiatowych i samorządów miejskich, **jak również do organizowania po miastach i wsiach milicji ludowej, które by zapewniały ludności ład i bezpieczeństwo, a posłuch** i wykonanie zarządzeń naszych organów wykonawczych i należyte postawienie sprawy aprowizacji ludności.¹⁰

Zapowiedzi związane z podniesieniem stanu bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa miały swoje źródła w drastycznym spadku tego bezpieczeństwa związanego z sytuacją nowego stanu prawnego państwa i rezultatem działań wojennych na ziemiach polskich. Jednym z rezultatów tych działań była również sytuacja ludności. Zwraca na nią uwagę Jan Molenda w kontekście rozbicia społeczeństwa na skutek powołań do służby wojskowej państw zaborczych. Podkreśla skalę tego zjawiska w kontekście źródeł go obrazujących: (...) kilka milionów Polaków żyło w rozłące z rodzinami w wyniku głównie powołania do służby w armiach zaborczych i masowych migracji i w niepewnych czasach czekało z niecierpliwością na wiadomość o losie najbliższych.¹¹

Duże ilości broni i posługujące się nimi bandy przestępcze, słabo chronione, nieuregulowane jeszcze granice państwa, brak autorytetu polskich służb policyjnych, stanowiły duże wyzwania dla młodej polskiej państwowości. Dlatego władze z regulacjami policyjnymi nie zwlekaly i dążyły do uporządkowania tej materii działalności państwa. Niemal od początku kolejne rządy dążyły do unifikacji i centralizacji służb policyjnych na pozaborowych ziemiach polskich.

Nie było to zadanie łatwe, biorąc pod uwagę liczbę funkcjonujących w tamtym okresie formacji porządku publicznego, wśród których były m.in. Milicja Ludowa PPS, Straż Narodowa (związana z endecją), Milicja Ludowa (dalej ML), Milicja Miejska (samorządowa), Żandarmeria Krajowa¹², Żandarmeria Polowa, Straż Kolejowa. Katalog działających ówczesnie służb przytacza również Juliusz Kozolubski wymieniając jeszcze Straże Ziemskie (na wsiach), Żandarmerię Obrony Lwowa, Straż Rzeczną, Prezydium Policji w Poznaniu i tak opisuje sytuację:

Stan taki dawał powód do częstych zatargów kompetencyjnych; poza tym obfitość organów bezpieczeństwa groźna była dla drobnych rzezimieszków, lecz poważni przestępcy uchodzili

¹⁰ Manifestu rządu lubelskiego z 7 listopada 1918 r., pkt. 9.

¹¹ J. Molenda, *Polska w Wielkiej Wojnie 1914-1918. Kilka refleksji w sprawie stanu badań (cz. I 1914-1939)*, *Dzieje Najnowsze, rocznik XLVI – 2014*, 3, k. 64. Przegląd literatury naukowej o stanie społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie poprzedzającym odzyskanie niepodległości. Autor m.in. zwraca uwagę na masowe zaangażowanie Polaków w armiach zaborczych i prezentuje liczne źródła mogące stanowić podstawę do badań, także stanu porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego, a co za tym idzie, na sytuację w jakiej rozpoczynały działalność polskie organy policyjne.

¹² J. Suliński, Żandarmeria Krajowa załóżkiem Policji Państwowej (1918-1922), *Kwartalnik Policyjny CSP*, nr 2/2014; więcej o żandarmerii M. Przeniosło, Żandarmeria w Galicji Zachodniej w początkach niepodległości (1918-1919), *Dzieje Najnowsze, rocznik XL – 2008*, 4.

ręki sprawiedliwości wskutek braku jakiegokolwiek koordynacji wysiłków tych wszystkich organizacji bezpieczeństwa.¹³

Podobnie sytuację ilustruje prasa codzienna z tamtego okresu, która donosi o wydarzeniach, jakie mają miejsce w związku z działalnością wielu organizacji bezpieczeństwa motywowanych politycznie i nie wahających się użyć wszelkich środków w konfrontacji z konkurencyjną służbą. I tak ówczesne tytuły warszawskie wciąż informowały o incydentach w których wątpliwymi bohaterami byli funkcjonariusze organizacji porządku publicznego.

W tytułach czytamy: „Robotnik” nr 291 z 12.11.1918: dowborczycy przeprowadzili brutalne rewizje u kilku socjalistów, nr 296 z 15.11; członkowie Straży Narodowej pobili członka ML PPS zrywającego odezwy „Armii Wyzwolenia”; nr 302 z 18.11; dowborczycy wtargnęli do klubu robotniczego im. Bronisława Grossera, przeprowadzając rewizję. „Kurier Warszawski” nr 314 z 14.11; ML PPS rozbroiła II Komisariat MM, nr 315 z 14.11: socjalistyczna bojówka rozbroiła oddział SN. Sytuacja była jeszcze bardziej zaogniona na prowincji, gdzie dochodziło do starć pomiędzy ML PPS a wojskiem, żandarmerią i POW. „Różne zbrojne formacje – pisał Moraczewski – potworzone samorzutnie, wytwarzały w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa bałagan nie do opisanie.”¹⁴

Do starć dochodzi zarówno pomiędzy organizacjami bezpieczeństwa jak i pomiędzy nimi a wojskiem.

Już 5 grudnia 1918 r. wydany został pierwszy akt prawny w zamyśle dążący do powołania rządowego organu policyjnego o ogólnokrajowym zasięgu. Wydane przez Tymczasowego Naczelnika Państwa Józefa Piłsudskiego Przepisy¹⁵ jednoznacznie wskazują na kierunek centralizacji służb policyjnych u progu formowania się niepodległego państwa polskiego: Przy przystąpieniu do formowania Milicji Ludowej rozwiązuje się wszystkie dotychczas samorzutnie zorganizowane ochotnicze formacje straży i milicji obywatelskich. Przepis ten nie rozciąga się na Milicje ciał samorządowych miejskich i powiatowych. Członkowie rozwiązanych formacji znajdą miejsce w szeregach wojska, Milicji Ludowej lub milicji ciał samorządowych.¹⁶ Komendantem Głównym Milicji Ludowej został Ignacy Boerner¹⁷. Powołana została Komenda Główna Milicji Ludowej składająca się ze sztabu i czterech wydziałów tj. służby czynnej, rezerw, informacyjno-wywiadowczego, administracyjnego.

¹³ J. Kozulubski, *Dwudziestolecie Policji Państwowej w Polsce*, w *Przeglądzie Policyjnym* – dwumiesięczniku pod redakcją nadinspektora dra Leona Naglera, Warszawa, listopad 1938, nr 6 (18), rok III, k. 404.

¹⁴ J. Kochanowski, *Zapomniany prezydent... : życie i działalność Ignacego Boernera 1875-1933*, Wydawnictwo DiG, Warszawa 1993, k. 78 i 81.

¹⁵ Dz.U. MSW, R. 1918, nr 2, poz. 18, Przepisy o organizacji Milicji Ludowej z 5 grudnia 1918 r.

¹⁶ Tamże, § 6.

¹⁷ Więcej o osobie Ignacego Boernera pisze J. Kochanowski. Tytuł nawiązuje do wydarzeń z roku 1905, kiedy to I. Berner stanął na czele Komitetu Rewolucyjnego w proklamowanej 27 grudnia Republice Ostrowieckiej. Nieco później utarła się nazwa jego funkcji jako „Prezydent Republiki Ostrowieckiej”. 1914 - żołnierz Legionów Polskich, dowódca plutonu w 1 Kompanii Kadrowej, 13 grudnia 1918 r. awansowany do stopnia kapitana i mianowany na stanowisko Komendanta Głównego Milicji Ludowej. Od maja 1919 w WP w Oddziale II. Wielokrotnie kierowany przez Józefa Piłsudskiego do misji krajowych i zagranicznych. Przeniesiony do rezerwy w stopniu pułkownika dyplomowanego w roku 1929. W tym roku objął funkcję ministra poczty i telegrafów, którą pełnił do roku 1932. Poseł na Sejm II RP, działający w Bezpartyjnym Bloku Współpracy z Rządem.

Szczególne znaczenie posiadał Wydział III Informacyjno-Wywiadowczy, który zajmował się wywiadem politycznym oraz informowaniem rządu o stanie bezpieczeństwa w kraju.¹⁸ W ślad za Przepisami (które w istocie były traktowane jak dekret Tymczasowego Naczelnika Państwa), Minister Spraw Wewnętrznych Stanisław Thugutt wydał rozporządzenie regulujące działania Milicji Ludowej.

Analiza zapisów Przepisów jak i Rozporządzenia Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych z dnia 16 grudnia 1918 r.¹⁹ jednoznacznie wskazuje, że są one pierwszą próbą zbudowania służby o charakterze centralnym, organizowaną i szkoloną na wzór wojskowy, choć podległą Ministrowi Spraw Wewnętrznych. O jej centralnym charakterze, jasno decydują zapisy o rozwiązaniu wszystkich dotychczasowych samorządnie zorganizowanych ochotniczych formacji w postaci straży obywatelskich czy milicji obywatelskich pozostawiając margines na działania w tym obszarze dla samorządów miejskich i powiatowych.

Pogląd o pierwszym w pełni policyjnym charakterze Milicji Ludowej podziela Bolesław Sprengel: (...) za pierwszą państwową, ponieważ podległą ministrowi spraw wewnętrznych, formacją policyjną należy uznać utworzoną 5 XII 1918 r. Milicję Ludową. (...) Na uwagę zasługuje powołanie w jej strukturach pionu informacyjno-wywiadowczego, podzielonego po pewnym czasie na trzy sekcje, Dwie z nich realizowały zadania operacyjne przewidziane dla policji politycznej i kryminalnej, a trzecia zwalczała spekulację. Specyfika ML polegała na nadaniu jej charakteru „wykonawczej siły wojskowo zorganizowanej zależnej bezpośrednio od MSW”.²⁰

Samo Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych również przekształcało swoje struktury, wśród których znajdowały się wydziały odpowiedzialne za sprawy bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa i policji.

Pierwszą strukturę organizacyjną Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych znamy z końca listopada 1918 r. Tworzyły ją 4 sekcje (niemające nazw) i 18 wydziałów. (...) Sekcja II to: 6) wydział spraw personalnych w urzędach powiatowych i policji, 7) wydział policji i bezpieczeństwa publicznego, 8) wydział prasowy.²¹ Taka struktura ministerstwa przetrwała do 20 maja 1919 r. W nowej strukturze sprawy policyjne umiejscowione zostały w Sekcji III – Bezpieczeństwo i Obyczajność Publiczna, w ramach której funkcjonował wydział 11) policji państwowej, 12) bezpieczeństwa publicznego. O ile zmiany strukturalne MSW postępowały w tempie dość umiarkowanym (kolejna reorganizacja 2 styczeń 1920 r.), to zmiany ministrów spraw wewnętrznych,

¹⁸ A. Misiuk (red.), *Kształtowanie się instytucji policyjnych w odradzającej się II Rzeczypospolitej (1915-1922)*, w *Powstanie Policji Państwowej w odradzającej Rzeczypospolitej 1915-1922*, Szczepko 2009, k. 18.

¹⁹ Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych z 16 grudnia 1918 r., *Monitor Polski* z 1918 r., Nr 232, zamieszczone m.in. w Nr 2 *Gazety Urzędowej dla Powiatów Łowickiego i Sochaczewskiego*.

²⁰ B. Sprengel, *Policja Państwowa a organy władzy publicznej w polityce ochrony bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w Polsce w latach 1918-1939*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2011, k. 42.

²¹ W. Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych w Polsce Odrodzonej 1918-1939*, Dzieje Najnowsze, Rocznik XLII – 2010, 2. Publikacja wymienia m.in. kolejnych, od uzyskania niepodległości ministrów spraw wewnętrznych, spośród których jako ważnych dla tematu publikacji wymienić należy: Stanisława Thugutta (17.11.1918 – 16.01.1919), Stanisława Wójciechowskiego (16.01.1919 – 23.06.1920), Józefa Kuczyńskiego (23.06. – 24.07.1920), Leopolda Skulskiego (24.07.1920 – 28.06.1921), Władysława Raczkiewicza (28.06 – 19.09.1921), Stanisława Józefa Downarowicza (19.09.1921 – 10.03.1922), Antoniego Kamińskiego (10.03. – 11.12.1922), Ludwika Darowskiego (11-16.12.1922), Władysława Sikorskiego (16.12.1922 – 28.05.1923).

którym podlegały sprawy bezpieczeństwa i policji nie mogły pozostać bez wpływu na kształt służb za tobezpieczeństwo odpowiedzialnych. Tym bardziej, że na przyszły kształt służb miały wpływ zmiany kierunków politycznych w rządzie.

Szybko jednak okazało się, że zmiany polityczne na szczytach władzy państwowej zmieniają akcenty zaufania do służby bezpieczeństwa tak mocno związanej z tymczasowym rządem socjalistycznym jakim była Milicja Ludowa. 9 stycznia 1919 r. powołana zostaje nowa formacja służby bezpieczeństwa, Policja Komunalna (dalej PK), nawiązująca bardziej do milicji miejskich niż do ML. Powołanie PK było kolejnym krokiem w kierunku unifikacji i centralizacji służb bezpieczeństwa. Świadczy o tym zapis z Dekretu o organizacji policji komunalnej: Wszystkie obecnie istniejące w Państwie Polskim organizacje bezpieczeństwa publicznego z wyjątkiem milicji ludowej należy natychmiast przekształcić w policje komunalne podług przepisów dekretu niniejszego.²² Był to również element zmian politycznych w rządzie, którego premierem został Ignacy Jan Paderewski a ministerstwo spraw wewnętrznych objął Stanisław Wojciechowski. W ministerstwie funkcję dyrektora Policji Komunalnej i szefa sekcji bezpieczeństwa objął Jan Jur – Gorzechowski, któremu podlegały wszystkie organy bezpieczeństwa MSW, w tym PK i ML.

Na czele Policji Komunalnej stanął Marian Borzęcki²³, późniejszy komendant główny Policji Państwowej, a trzon jej kadry stanowili w dużej mierze dotychczasowi milicjanci miejscy. Borzęcki stanowisko Naczelnego Inspektora Policji Komunalnej objął 20 stycznia 1919 r.

To, co próbowało uporządkować prawo policyjne nie oznaczało łatwego przejścia od teorii do praktyki. Policyjna praktyka przełomu lat 1918/1919 była bowiem mocno niedoskonała. Na niedoskonałości te składały się zarówno niedostatki, co do jakości kadry, jak i chaos związany z nieuporządkowaniem prawnym kompetencji między policyjnymi organami rządowymi i samorządowymi oraz z efekty walki politycznej.

Przykłady sporów kompetencyjnych wynikających z braku silnej, centralnej organizacji porządku publicznego przytacza w swoich pamiętnikach Henryk Wardęski: W tych miastach, gdzie były wszystkie trzy, a nawet cztery organizacje bezpieczeństwa, musiały istnieć ustawiczne nieporozumienia, a nawet starcia tych organów między sobą. Tak w Ostrowcu doszło do formalnej potyczki pomiędzy Milicją Ludową, a Strażą Kolejową. Strzelano tam do siebie wzajemnie ostrymi ładunkami. (...) Z powodów błahych (pisownia oryginalna) często starć i nieporozumień Milicja Ludowa napadała na posterunki policji i rozbrajała je. To samo robiła Policja Komunalna, jeżeli stwierdziła jakiś nielegalny czyn Milicji. Wojskowa Straż Kolejowa,

²² Dekret o organizacji Policji Komunalnej, Dz.PPP., R. 1919, Nr 5, poz. 98, art. 16.

²³ A. Misiuk o osobie Mariana Borzęckiego w *Komendanci Główni Policji 1918 – 2009*, pod redakcją Piotra Majera, WSPol Szczytno 2009, k 55 i dalsze. Inspektor PP Marian Borzęcki pełnił funkcję Komendanta Głównego PP od 01.07.1923 do 05.11.1926. Ze służbą na rzecz bezpieczeństwa publicznego związany od roku 1915, kiedy to wstąpił w szeregi Milicji Miejskiej w Warszawie. Rozpoczął swoją służbę jako szeregowy funkcjonariusz MM. Następnie zdobywał doświadczenia na różnych stanowiskach w tej formacji. Od stycznia 1919 r. skierowany do służby w Naczelnej Inspekcji Policji Kryminalnej. Brał udział w przygotowywaniu struktur zunifikowanej Policji Państwowej, w której najpierw pełnił funkcję zastępcy komendanta głównego (od 17.06.1919 do 09.11.1920 r.). Piastował również wysokie stanowiska w administracji m.in. komisarza rządu na m.st. Warszawę. Po zwolnieniu ze stanowiska komendanta głównego PP i odejściu ze służby zaangażował się w działalność polityczną. Po wybuchu II Wojny Światowej zaangażował się w obronę Warszawy, a w czasie okupacji niemieckiej w pracę konspiracyjną – został pierwszym przedstawicielem Rządu RP na kraj. Aresztowany w marcu 1940 i osadzony na Pawiaku, skąd przewieziony do obozu koncentracyjnego Sachsenhausen. Zginął w obozie koncentracyjnym Mauthausen w 1942 r.

zorganizowana nader słabo, uważała strefę kolejową za nietykalną. Na teren ten nie pozwalała wkroczyć Policji Komunalnej ani Milicji Ludowej. Jeżeli policjant komunalny tropił złodzieja lub bandytę, a ten uciekał mu na stację kolejową, policjant był zmuszony zaniechać dalszej czynności, gdyż chcąc dalej kontynuować swe wystąpienie musiał się meldować u dyżurnego oficera i prosić o zezwolenie tropienia przestępcy. Jeżeli z braku czasu lub wskutek innych okoliczności tego nie uczynił, Straż aresztowała takiego zuchwalca, odbierała mu broń i wypędzała ze swego królestwa. Policja Komunalna odpłacała się Straży wet za wet na terenie miasta. Rozumie się, że sprawa bezpieczeństwa musiała na tym cierpieć.²⁴

Obraz rzeczywistości funkcjonowania służb bezpieczeństwa z początku 1919 r. w relacji bezpośredniego świadka najlepiej chyba oddaje sytuację bezwładu i chaosu, jaki wywołuje dublowanie się uprawnień, brak funkcjonowania zasady hierarchiczności i istnienia kilku nieskoordynowanych służb bezpieczeństwa. Do sporów i konfliktów z udziałem organizacji zajmujących się ochroną bezpieczeństwa publicznego dochodziło na terenie całego kraju i czasami przybierały one charakter poważnych incydentów podczas których używana była broń.

W marcu 1919 r. w czasie strajku w Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim funkcjonariusze Milicji Ludowej stanęli po stronie strajkujących robotników przeciwko prawicowym bojówkarzom i wojsku, natomiast 10 kwietnia 1919 r. w Siedlcach doszło do otwartego konfliktu pomiędzy urzędami Policji Komunalnej i Milicji Ludowej. Podobne zdarzenia miały również miejsce w Ostrowcu i Łomży, a w powiecie krasnostawskim doszło do rozbrojenia funkcjonariuszy Milicji Ludowej przez policjantów z Policji Komunalnej.²⁵

Brak skuteczności, w kontekście obszarów kompetencji poszczególnych służb i nadzoru nad nimi nie pozostawał bez reakcji rządu centralnego. Kolejną próbą, która jednak nie doprowadziła do uporządkowania tych spraw, było wydanie przez Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych Okólnika w sprawie Milicji Ludowej i Policji Komunalnej z 3 kwietnia 1919 r. Czytamy w nim, że: Inspekcja Policji Komunalnej oraz Komenda Główna i Komendy Okręgowe Milicji Ludowej nie mają prawa dysponować policją i milicją w zakresie służby bezpieczeństwa. Zwierzchnia ich władza dotyczy organizacji, administracji, zaopatrzenia i wyszkolenia.²⁶ Działanie to nie doprowadziło do poprawienia stanu porządku publicznego w państwie. Sytuacja powojenna sprzyjała przestępcom mającym łatwy dostęp do broni palnej, takżemiska jakość wypełniania obowiązków przez nieskuteczne w obliczu chaosu kompetencyjnego służby działały na korzyść przestępców.

Niedoskonałości w działaniach służb bezpieczeństwa stały się przedmiotem debaty publicznej, której wyrazem może być głos Stefana Urbanowicza zamieszczony pod tytułem *Niektóre nasze dekrety w świetle krytyki ich praktycznego stosowania*²⁷. W oparciu o treści artykułu,

²⁴ H. Wardęski, *Moje wspomnienia policyjne*, wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenie „Policyjny Dom Zdrowia”, Warszawa 1925, k. 257 i 258.

²⁵ A. Misiuk, *Historia Policji w Polsce od X wieku do współczesności*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008, k. 99.

²⁶ A. Misiuk, A. Peplowski, *Organizacja instytucji policyjnych w II Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1926. Wybór źródeł i dokumentów. Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji. Szczytno 1992*, k. 23.

²⁷ S. Urbanowicz, *Niektóre nasze dekrety w świetle krytyki praktycznego ich stosowania*, Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska, red. Henryk Konic, 1919, Nr 20-18/42, k. 194 i 195.

które odnoszą się do podstaw prawnych organizacji i kompetencji do działania Milicji Ludowej i Policji Komunalnej jasno wynikają niedoskonałości ówczesnych propozycji odnoszących się do centralnego organ o charakterze policyjnym. Chociażby z tego powodu, że jak dowodzi autor, Milicji Ludowej brak jest nie tylko podstawprawnych do działań o charakterze śledczym, to i praktyka pełnienia służby przez ML daleka była od oczekiwań społecznych w zakresie wykrywania sprawców przestępstw.

Analiza podstaw prawnych powołania i działania ML (powołanej w celu ochrony i zapewnienia spokoju i bezpieczeństwa miast i wsi oraz walki z wszelkimi przejawami bezładu społecznego jako też dla przeprowadzenia zarządzeń władz państwowych) w kontekście takich, dotyczących Policji Komunalnej i milicji samorządowych, wskazuje na zbyt wąskie nadanie uprawnień „typowo policyjnych” ML, jak chociażby prowadzenie dochodzeń w sprawach karnych. Reasumując ML postrzegana była jako siła, której głównym zadaniem stawało się chronienie mienia państwowego, występowanie w czasie rozruchów i przeciw aktom anarchii, wystawianie służby w postaci posterunków w newralgicznych punktach miejscowości. Jej „uwojskowanie” przejawiało się nie tylko w zakresie sposobu szkolenia, skoszarowaniem, ale przede wszystkim w oddaniu pod sądownictwo wojskowe spraw dyscyplinarnych milicjantów ML.

Ten charakter wystąpień służbowych ML, których dochodzenia karne – jak wskazuje autor - było marginalną i mało efektywną (z uwagi na niski poziom szkolenia w tym obszarze) częścią działalności, określić należy jako bliższe współczesnym policyjnym oddziałom prewencji. Oddziałom, które swoje policyjne zadania realizują w strukturach opartych na wzorach wojskowych, a formy wystąpień służbowych mają przede wszystkim charakter działań o charakterze prewencyjnym i zwartym.

Zupełnie inny obraz policyjnych kompetencji rysuje się na podstawie analizy jednego z dokumentów wskazujących na organizację działania Policji Komunalnej - Okólnika (281) Naczelnego Inspektora Policji Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych do wszystkich Urzędów Policji Komunalnej w sprawie wprowadzenia ksiąg w urzędach policji komunalnej²⁸ z 13 maja 1919 r. Dokument ten reguluje kwestie dokumentacji prowadzonej na różnych szczeblach organizacyjnych przez Policję Komunalną. Wymienia m.in. jaki rodzaj dokumentów podlega rejestracji przez tą służbę. Wśród nich są: kontrola protokołów zawierająca dane oskarżycieli lub poszkodowanego (nazwisko, imię i adres), dane oskarżonego (nazwisko, imię, imię ojca, adres), dane świadków, treść protokołu, dowody rzeczowe, gdzie skierowano sprawę. Ponadto PK zobowiązano do prowadzenia skorowidzu oskarżonych, skorowidzu oskarżycieli lub poszkodowanych, skorowidzuposzukiwanych (kto poszukuje, na jakiej podstawie, gdzie przekazano sprawę), kontroli dowodów rzeczowych, kontroli aresztowanych, kontroliposterunków w miastach i miasteczkach, kontroli ruchu funkcjonariuszy policji.

Wnioski z tego dokumentu są jasne. Policja Komunalna zadania realizować miała w oparciu o przede wszystkim policyjne działania, a wśród nich z pewnością były te z podstawowego

²⁸ Dz. U. MSW 1919, Nr 35, poz. 450, Okólnik nr 281.

kanonu policyjnego tj. przyjmowanie i rejestrowanie zawiadomień o przestępstwach, kierowanie oskarżeń do właściwych organów, zabezpieczanie dowodów rzeczowych towarzyszących zawiadomieniom, prowadzenie poszukiwań osób, aresztowanie osób (dziś zatrzymywanie), kontrola posterunków (dziś pełnienie służby patrolowej), kontrolę ruchu funkcjonariuszy policji (dziś prowadzenie dyslokacji służby). Miała więc PK w oparciu o swój policyjny warsztat spore zadatki na podniesienie skuteczności służb porządku publicznego.

Jednak przeszkód różnej natury, które uniemożliwiały w tamtych okolicznościach skuteczne współdziałanie służb nie brakowało. Były wśród nich zmiany polityczne we władzach państwa, które rzutowały na preferencje kompetencyjne i kadrowe poszczególnych formacji, niedoskonałość lub też brak przepisów prawa określających współpracę pomiędzy nimi.

Stan ten wywoływał słuszne obawy najwyższych władz państwa o kierunki rozwiązań systemowych dla służby bezpieczeństwa – jak wówczas często określano obszarydzis określane mianem policyjnych.

Na najwyższych szczeblach władzy prezentowane były właściwie dwa pomysły na scentralizowaną, państwową służbę bezpieczeństwa. Zorganizowanie jej na sposób wojskowy i oddanie pod bezpośredni nadzór ministrowi do spraw wewnętrznych lub też rozwiązanie dotychczas istniejących organizacji i zorganizowanie policji na wzór Żandarmerii Polowej²⁹ podległej ministrowi do spraw wojskowych, ale będącej jednocześnie organem wykonawczym ministra do spraw wewnętrznych.

Relację tak formułowanych rozważań zawiera fragment zapisku W sprawie Służby bezpieczeństwa w Polsce datowany na 4 marca 1919 r., prawdopodobnie autorstwa Mieczysława Skrudlika³⁰.

Powołanie przez Sejm Ustawodawczy 24 lipca 1919 r. Policji Państwowej było ważnym krokiem do podniesienia w państwie stanu porządku publicznego. Przede wszystkim PP stała się zdecydowaną wiodącą państwową organizacją służby bezpieczeństwa, będącą organem wykonawczym władz państwowych i samorządowych. Jej organizacja i szkolenie ustawa określała jako „na wzór wojskowy”, a podległość oddawała Ministrowi Spraw Wewnętrznych.

Ciekawym, z dzisiejszej perspektywy jest nazewnictwo, jakie towarzyszyło pracom nad koncepcją scentralizowanej, ogólnopaństwowej służby policyjnej wypracowywaną w 1919 r.: (...) Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych wydało 26 czerwca 1919 r. okólnik skierowany do

²⁹ W. Śleszyński, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w polityce państwa polskiego na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warszawa 2007, k. 72-78. Żandarmeria polowa działająca pod auspicjami Zarządu Cywilnego Ziem Wschodnich została podzielona na Żandarmerię Powiatową i Żandarmerię Przyfrontową, operującą na terenach bezpośredniego konfliktu zbrojnego. Żandarmeria Powiatowa oddelegowana została do pełnienia zadań w powiatach na zasadach krajowej służby bezpieczeństwa. Była to formacja wojskowa, jednak w zakresie spraw cywilnych w powiatach podlegała ZCZW. Działania Żandarmerii Polowej w przypadku wystąpienia cywilnych oceniano jako mało efektywne i nieprofesjonalne. Chaos kompetencyjny często nie pozwalał na identyfikację oddziałów Żandarmerii Powiatowej i Żandarmerii Przyfrontowej, szczególnie przy liniach działań wojennych. Urzędnicy szybko zorientowali się, że w miejsce żandarmerii sprawami porządku publicznego powinna zajmować się policja. Jednak z uwagi na dopiero rozpoczętą organizację policji stan przejściowy trwał na terenach okręgów wschodnich do połowy 1920 r., kiedy to wraz z powrotem na te tereny po odparciu bolszewików polskimi organami porządku publicznego była już Policja Państwowa.

³⁰ A. Misiuk, A. Peplowski, *Organizacja...*, op. cit., k. 30.

powiatowych komisarzy rządowych. Informując w nim o planach utworzenia Straży Bezpieczeństwa (SB), (...) ³¹. Działania komisji kwalifikacyjnych zmierzały m.in. do przyjęcia do Straży Bezpieczeństwa kandydatów bezpośrednio z ML, PK i innych służb.

Proces centralizacji służb odpowiedzialnych za porządek i bezpieczeństwo w państwie trwał równoległe do prowadzonych w sejmie prac legislacyjnych. Prace te prowadzone były w Ministerstwie Spraw Wewnętrznych, które najpierw powołało wspólną dla Milicji Ludowej i Policji Komunalnej komendę główną w Warszawie, powierzając w dniu 8 kwietnia 1919 r. stanowisko komendanta głównego dla obu formacji kapitanowi Kazimierzowi Młodzianowskiemu - z podległością Ministrowi Spraw Wewnętrznych. Był to wspólny komendy głównej był bardzo tymczasowy, gdyż już 17 czerwca 1919 r. nastąpiło jej rozwiązanie i utworzenie z Naczelną Inspekcją Policji Komunalnej Komendy Głównej Straży Bezpieczeństwa. Stało się to jeszcze przed uchwaleniem przez sejm procedowanego projektu ustawy. W ślad za tym zaczęto przekształcać terenowe jednostki PK, a ich komendanci stawali na czele nowej formacji – Straży Bezpieczeństwa, której podlegały wszystkie służby bezpieczeństwa w całym kraju.

Sejmowy projekt procedowany był pod nazwą „Prawa o Straży Bezpieczeństwa”. Ostatecznie 22 lipca złożony podczas prac sejmowej Komisji Administracji wniosek o zmianę nazwy Straż Bezpieczeństwa na Policja Państwowa doprowadził do uchwalenia ustawy z policją w nazwie. Pierwszym komendantem głównym PP został Władysław Henszel. ³²

O Straży Bezpieczeństwa w kontekście procedowania ustawy policyjnej o charakterze centralnym wspomina również w swoich pamiętnikach H. Wardęski, podając, że miała ona wejść w życie z dniem 1 lipca 1919 r. i wchłonąć dotychczasowe organizacje tj. Milicję Ludową, Straż Kolejową, Żandarmerię Krajową i Policję Komunalną.

W oparciu o Ustawę z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku o policji państwowej (pisownia z oryginału) Minister Spraw Wewnętrznych, często w porozumieniu z innymi ministrami wydał szereg aktów prawnych regulujących policyjną służbę, zakres jej kompetencji i uprawnień, jednocześnie likwidując – często poprzez wcielanie do PP funkcjonujących dotąd służb bezpieczeństwa. Wśród regulacji ważnych dla unifikacji tych służb z pewnością należy wymienić następujące akty prawne: *Instrukcja dla komisji kwalifikacyjnych Policji Państwowej, wydana przez Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych na podstawie art. 25 ustawy o Policji Państwowej* ³³, *Przepisy o organizacji powiatowych komend Policji, wydane przez ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych na podstawie art. 5 i 8 ustawy z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku o Policji Państwowej* ³⁴, *Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie organizacji oddziałów Policji Państwowej, pełniących służbę na kolejach, na*

³¹ R. Litwiński, *Korpus Policji w II Rzeczypospolitej. Służba i życie prywatne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010, k.29.

³² W. Henszel pełnił funkcję komendanta głównego PP od 24.07.1919 do 20.04.1922 r. Swoje doświadczenia zdobywał w carskim wojsku i aparacie administracyjnym. Do Polski wrócił w grudniu 1918 r. i rozpoczął pracę w administracji rządowej. W kwietniu 1919 r. przeniesiony do Biura Bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych. Wraz z uchwaleniem ustawy o Policji Państwowej objął funkcję jej komendanta – w oparciu o przywołaną wcześniej pracę P. Majera (red.) *Komendanci Główni Policji 1918 – 2009*.

³³ Monitor Polski, R. 1919, nr 196.

³⁴ Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, R. 1919, nr 94, poz. 58.

obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego i Białostockiego, wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Kolei Żelaznych na zasadzie art. 9 ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 r. (Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363)³⁵, Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Spraw Wojskowych, Kolei Żelaznych i Skarbu, w przedmiocie wcielenia Wojskowej Straży Kolejowej na obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego, Białostockiego, oraz miasta Warszawy do Policji Państwowej, na zasadzie art. 2 Przepisów przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku (Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363)³⁶, Rozporządzenie wykonawcze Ministra Spraw Wojskowych i Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie wcielenia żandarmerii krajowej i policji wojskowej na obszarze byłej Galicji do Policji Państwowej na zasadzie art. 3-ego Przep. Przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24-go lipca 1919 r. (Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363)³⁷. Już tytuły wymienionych aktów wskazują na ogromny wysiłek organizacyjny państwa, skierowany na tworzenie jednolitych struktur nowej służby.

Pomimo powołania Policji Państwowej unifikacja służb bezpieczeństwa nie przebiegała bez przeszkód. Nieocenione informacje o trudnościach tego procesu przekazuje Henryk Wąrdęski: Widocznie Straż Kolejowa (zapewne Wojskowa Straż Kolejowa) cieszyła się poparciem niektórych stronnictw politycznych, gdyż w 1919 roku nie zdołaliśmy przeprowadzić unifikacji Straży. (...) Po kilku miesiącach jałowych sporów akademickich, samo życie zmusiło kierowników wojskowej Straży Kolejowej do kapitulacji i zdania się na łaskę i niełaskę Policji Państwowej. Straż Kolejowa była bardzo liczna i pozostawała na utrzymaniu Ministerstwa Kolei Żelaznych. Wydatek to był tak poważny, że Ministerstwo Kolei wreszcie odmówiło kredytów na przyszłość. Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych również nie chciało Straży przyjąć na swój etat. Położenie więc organizacji stało się bez wyjścia i siłą rzeczy trzeba było straż zlikwidować. Z dniem 1 lutego 1920 roku wojskowa Straż Kolejowa przestała istnieć. Na jej miejsce utworzone zostały komisarjaty i posterunki policji kolejowej, które z biegiem czasu również pokasowaliśmy i policję na stacjach kolejowych włączyliśmy do komend powiatowych lub komisariatów w miastach.³⁸ Na podkreślenie zasługuje zbieżność dat pamiętnikarskiego źródła jakim są Moje wspomnienia policyjne z datą 1 lutego 1920 r. zawartą w Rozporządzeniu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych wydanym w porozumieniu z Ministrem Spraw Wojskowych, Kolei Żelaznych i Skarbu, w przedmiocie wcielenia Wojskowej Straży Kolejowej na obszarze Województw: (...).

Jednocześnie nie można zapomnieć, że równolegle organizowano pragmatykę służbową Policji Państwowej związaną z jej funkcjonowaniem w terenie, umundurowaniem, uzbrojeniem, zaopatrzeniem itp. Zadanie to było tym trudniejsze, że odbywało się w czasie walk o kształt granic II RP i w tak krytycznym dla bytu państwa momencie, jak wojna polsko-bolszewicka 1920 r.

³⁵ Tamże, R. 1920, nr 6, poz. 42.

³⁶ Monitor Polski, R. 1920, nr 23.

³⁷ Dz.U.R.P., R 1919, nr 97, poz. 475.

³⁸ H. Wąrdęski, *Moje ...*, op. cit., k. 279.

Mimo, że wojna polsko-bolszewicka przypada już poza ramami czasowymi, dla głównych treści tematu publikacji, rocznicowy jej charakter związany ze 100-leciem odzyskania niepodległości oraz powołania Policji Państwowej nakazuje ukłon w stronę tak mało znanych faktów z policyjnej historii. Faktów, które świadczą przede wszystkim o tym, że postawa formacji była wynikiem jej doświadczeń daleko wykraczających przed datę 24 lipca 1919 r. Nie można mieć wątpliwości, że istnieje ścisły związek pomiędzy doświadczeniami zdobywanymi na przestrzeni lat 1914-1919, przez osoby służące na rzecz organizacji porządku publicznego, a działaniami Policji Państwowej, tak krótko od jej powołania. Co więcej, rząd w obliczu wojennej zawieruchy postanowił wrócić do sprawdzonych już metod społecznego wsparcia organów porządkowych, czyli powołanej już Policji Państwowej, strażami obywatelskimi. Jak donosi *Gazeta Policji Państwowej*:³⁹ Wobec trudnej sytuacji w kraju powstał projekt statutu straży obywatelskiej, która stanowiłaby formację cywilną dla współdziałania z władzami administracyjno-policyjnymi i pod ich nadzorem realizowała zadania na rzecz ochrony bezpieczeństwa, spokoju i ładu w państwie. Statut został akceptowany przez: kierownika ministerium spraw wewnętrznych, p. Kuczyńskiego⁴⁰. Statut przewidywał rozwinięcie struktur straży obywatelskich na terenie okręgów i powiatów, a jego wdrażaniem zajęła się komisja w MSW z udziałem m.in. zastępcy komendanta głównego PP. O pilnej potrzebie wsparcia społecznego policji w obliczu zagrożenia bytu państwa świadczy również to, że powołany został komendant straży obywatelskiej, którym został podprokurator sądu najwyższego Stanisław Popowski⁴¹, były komendant straży obywatelskiej m. Warszawy.

Policja Państwowa zdawała swój pierwszy „egzamin dojrzałości”, jakim były działania wojenne w niespełna kilka miesięcy od utworzenia. Szczególnego dobrze stawała policja z okręgu warszawskiego, której potyczki z wrogiem i sprawna organizacja tak zostały opisane przez Henryka Władęckiego: Po oczyszczeniu prawego brzegu Wisły z bolszewików, prezes ministrów Witos w towarzystwie ministra spraw wewnętrznych Skulskiego i Komendanta Głównego Policji Henszla, udali się w objazd miejscowości, które były zajęte przez wroga. Wszędzie skonstatowano, że policja Okręgu Warszawskiego po bohatersku wytrzymała do ostatka na swych stanowiskach, spełniając wszędzie obowiązek swój względem ojczyzny i społeczeństwa. Minister Skulski udzielił pochwały funkcjonariuszom policji powiatów Płońskiego, Płockiego, Rypińskiego i Włocławskiego za energię, mężstwo i gorliwość (...).⁴²

O dominujących w tamtym czasie wśród policjantów postawach, które jednoznacznie określić należy jako patriotyczne, świadczą wystąpienia zarówno wyższych jak i niższych funkcjonariuszy z prośbą o skierowanie ich na front. Zagrożenie dla niepodległości Ojczyzny spowodowało lawinę raportów policjantów PP o skierowanie do służby wojskowej. Ochota do walki

³⁹ *Gazeta Policji Państwowej*, 1920, nr 29 z dnia 10.07.1920, w tytule *Straż obywatelska*.

⁴⁰ Tamże.

⁴¹ Więcej o działalności straży obywatelskich w Warszawie i osobie S. Popowskiego w A. Kroński, *Straż Obywatelska m.st. Warszawy 1915 roku*, Nakładem Związku B. Członków Straży Obywatelskiej m.st. Warszawy 1915 r, Warszawa 1934.

⁴² H. Władęcki, *Moje ...* op. cit., k. 338.

była tak wielka, że Komendant Główny PP Władysław Henszel 9 lipca 1920 r. wydał rozkaz mobilizujący do służby „ (...) na straży ładu i porządku – na tym okopie wewnętrznego frontu. Wobec Ojczyzny spełnicie służbę równą służbie żołnierza (...) „⁴³.

Policjanci tak bardzo chcieli wziąć udział w obronie kraju, że wymogli na kierownictwie KG PP wyjednanie zgody MSW na utworzenie policyjnej ochotniczej jednostki bojowej. Na przełomie lipca i sierpnia 1920 r. rozpoczęły się zaciągi do przyszłego policyjnego 213 pułku piechoty. Dowódcą pułku został nadkomisarz Brunon Betcher, a zastępcą Ryszard Gallera.

O zaangażowaniu policjantów może świadczyć to, że: Pod koniec lipca 1920 na apel Rady Obrony Państwa około 80% funkcjonariuszy II łódzkiego okręgu policyjnego zgłosiło się w charakterze ochotników do służby wojskowej.⁴⁴

Chociaż pułk, jako zwarta jednostka bojowa, nie został użyty do bojowych działań operacyjnych, tym bardziej na przypomnienie zasługuje udział jego jednostek w bezpośrednim starciu z bolszewickimi wojskami w rejonie Włodawy. We wrześniu 1920 r. dowodzący V Kompanią II Batalionu 213 Ochotniczego PP podporucznik Jerzy Komes zasłużył na Krzyż Waleczności Wojsk Sprzymierzonych za prowadzenie ataku na piechotę bolszewicką w rejonie wsi Chrysk.

W stoczonych walce ochotnicy odkryli w sobie drzemiące dotąd nadzwyczajne walory bojowe i męstwo. Po sforsowaniu rzeki Bug kompania świetnie dowodzona przez swojego dowódcę w dalszym natarciu odrzucił broniącą się we wsi Chrysk piechotę sowiecką, zmuszając ją jednocześnie do pośpiesznego wycofania się z zajmowanych pozycji.⁴⁵

Utworzony został również szwadron policji konnej, którego dowódcami zostali komisarz Andrzej Jezierski i podkomisarz Stefan Rozumski (zastępca). Trzon szwadronu stanowili policjanci z Łodzi, których wsparło ochotnikami z Warszawy, Białostoczczyzny, Polesia i Wołynia. Szwadron włączono następnie w skład ochotniczego Dywizjonu Huzarów Śmierci porucznika Józefa Siły Nowickiego.⁴⁶

Przykładem ogromnego poświęcenia i zaangażowania w działania bojowe jest udział policjantów w obronie Płocka w dniach 16-18 sierpnia 1920. Liczne, ale mało znane źródła wskazują, że jednostki PP z Płocka i okolic nie tylko zapewniały porządek publiczny, nie uległy rozsypane wobec nacierającego wroga, ale skutecznie zdobywały informacje wywiadowcze oraz stawaly do walki, także na broń białą. Znane są imienne zasługi wielu policjantów, których nazwiska przytacza H. Wardęski oraz ówczesna lokalna prasa Kurier Płocki i Głos Mazowiecki.

Pomimo, że policjanci płocky w równi z wojskiem czynnie brali udział w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej, to żaden z nich, jak wynika z zebranych materiałów nie został odznaczony podczas

⁴³ J. Biechoński, *W dziesiątą rocznicę zwycięstwa nad Rosją Sowiecką*, Na Posterunku, nr 35, Warszawa 1930, k 3. Pełna treść rozkazu opublikowana została również w Gazecie Policji Państwowej, rok 1920, nr 28 z 10 lipca.

⁴⁴ M. Gajewski, *213 Policyjny Pułk Piechoty wojny 1920 r.*, Ośrodek Badań Historii Wojskowej Muzeum Wojska w Białymstoku, Białystok 2003, k. 17.

⁴⁵ Tamże k. 37.

⁴⁶ R. Litwiński, *Korpus...*, *op. cit.*, k. 361 i dalsze. Szwadron brał udział w walkach pod Serockiem, Nieporętem, Beniaminowem, Kuligowem, Myszyniec. Policjanci bronili również miast. Duże zasługi w walkach o Włocławek i Płock oraz obronę linii Wisły na odcinku od Nieszawy mieli policjanci z okolicznych powiatów.

wizyty Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego w Płocku w dniu 10 kwietnia 1921 r., ani też nie otrzymał odznaczenia w postaci Krzyża za Męstwo i Odwagę.⁴⁷ Wskazany przykład z Płocka nie jest niestety wyjątkiem w zapomnieniu roli PP w walce o niepodległość i jej utrzymanie.

Zaangażowanie Policji Państwowej w działania wojenne 1920 r. i na ogół pozytywne oceny jej działań w tym okresie świadczą o właściwie prowadzonych wysiłkach organizacyjnych scalających siły porządkowe państwa w jedną scentralizowaną formację. Tym bardziej, że proces unifikacji formacji daleki był jeszcze do ukończenia.

Na podkreślenie zasługuje nie tylko wysiłek organizacyjny, ale także troska co światlejszych obywateli, o poziom etyki policyjnej służby i jej służebnej roli wobec państwa polskiego i jego obywateli. Obraz tego stanu i oczekiwań, co do roli policjanta przedstawia m. in. Józef Bek w artykule Policjant – rozsadnikiem kultury.⁴⁸ Autor słusznie wskazuje na niedostatki związane z jakością policyjnej kadry, ale widzi rolę policjanta wśród elity odradzającego się państwa (obok duchownych i nauczycieli), edukatora wartości jakie niesie z sobą prawo, opieka państwa, porządek publiczny i kultura. Wskazuje na ciemną spuściznę policyjnych zwyczajów czasów zaborczych i rysuje wizję rozwoju formacji policyjnej poprzez edukację samych policjantów oraz szeroko rozumianą edukację społeczną.

Z zaprezentowaną wizją zgadzała się ówczesna komenda główna PP, gdyż już na łamach jednego z następnych numerów Gazety Policji Państwowej redakcja w artykule Na posterunku⁴⁹ prezentuje stanowisko kierownictwa policji i zapowiada przygotowywanie materiałów edukacyjnych dla policjantów w formie specjalnego dodatku (tygodnika) dla posterunkowych i niższych stopni policyjnych przy Gazecie Policji Państwowej. Tematyka ujęta w postaci krótkich wykładów z zakresu prawa, administracji, higieny itp. miała edukować zarówno policjantów, jak i **mnie oświecone warstwy ludu**.⁵⁰

Tak więc obok sprawnej organizacji troską rządzących i kierownictwa policji była dbałość o rozwój etyczny nowej formacji i walkę z wszystkimi pozostałymi po zaborcach patologiami policyjnej służby.

Za jeden z umownych punktów prac unifikacyjnych Policji Państwowej możemy uznać rok 1922, kiedy to w granicach państwa znalazły się ziemie pod administracją polską takie jak były Królestwo Polskie, Małopolska, Kresy Wschodnie, Wielkopolska, Pomorze i Wileńszczyzna oraz autonomiczne województwo śląskie z jego powołaną w tym właśnie roku autonomiczną Policją Województwa Śląskiego. Scalenie terytorium państwa postawiło przed Policją Państwową nowe wyzwania. Oprócz doskonalenia własnych kadr i struktur policjanci rozpoczęli ochraniać granicę wschodnią. Faza unifikacji przeszła w fazę rozwoju organizacji Policji Państwowej.

⁴⁷ Łaszczewski A., *Płocka policja okresu międzywojennego, wydanie II uzupełnione i rozszerzone*, NSZZP przy KMP w Płocku, 2019 r., k. 188.

⁴⁸ Gazeta Policji Państwowej, rok 1920, nr 26.

⁴⁹ Tamże, nr 29.

⁵⁰ Tamże.

Powołanie Policji Państwowej ustawą sejmową i określenie jej jako **państwowej organizacji służby bezpieczeństwa** oznaczało początek funkcjonowania w niepodległym państwie struktury odpowiedzialnej za bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa i jego obywateli. Wydarzenie to miało miejsce osiem miesięcy po dacie 11 listopada 1918 r., która powszechnie przyjmowana jest jako graniczna dla odrodzenia się polskiej państwowości. Biorąc pod uwagę wszystkie trudności związane z unifikacją państwa po okresie rozbiorów, sprawność dochodzenia do stworzenia prawnych i organizacyjnych podstaw nowej państwowej formacji policyjnej należy ocenić pozytywnie.

Początkowe niepowodzenia w przywracaniu ładu społecznego i porządku publicznego przy użyciu organów policyjnych młodego państwa wygenerowały doświadczenia, w oparciu o które udało się przyjąć model polskiej policji adekwatny do wyzwań tamtych czasów. Następne dwudziestolecie potwierdziło, że model ten sprawdzał się w realizacji podstawowych zadań policyjnych, jakimi były zwalczanie przestępczości i ochrona bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa. Co więcej, PP szybko rozpoczęła współpracę na forum międzynarodowym. Przedstawiciele dopiero co powołanej polskiej Policji Państwowej uczestniczyli w pracach na rzecz powołania Międzynarodowej Komisji Policji Kryminalnych, co miało miejsce w roku 1923. Był wśród nich Wiktor Ludwikowski, uznany za współtwórcę policyjnej kryminalistyki w Polsce.

Wiodącą rolę w budowaniu tych sukcesów miała kadra, która od lipca 1919 r. weszła w skład i rozpoczęła tworzenie Korpusu Policji. Należy przy tym zaznaczyć, że nie byli to ludzie przypadkowi, bez policyjnych doświadczeń. W tym obszarze spuściznę po zaborach nowo powstałe państwo polskie potrafiło wykorzystać bardzo dobrze, lokując w szeregach PP funkcjonariuszy mających za sobą doświadczenia zarówno w służbie policyjnej państw zaborczych jak i polskich organizacjach porządku publicznego, które działały na ziemiach polskich od samego wybuchu I wojny światowej. Dokładnie obrazują to wspomnienia Henryka Wardęskiego ilustrując także obraz rozwoju i przygotowania kadr, które w dużym stopniu zasilili najpierw ML i PK, a później PP. Takie osoby jak autor „Moich wspomnień policyjnych”, czy Marian Borzęcki, Wiktor Hoszowski (najpierw w Żandarmerii Krajowej, później Komendant Główny PP), Kazimierz Młodzianowski (kapitan WP, komendant ML i PK) i wielu innych, swoje pierwsze policyjne doświadczenia zdobywały jeszcze przed odzyskaniem niepodległości przez państwo polskie. Z kolei doświadczenia wojskowe i wojenne wielu wyższych i niższych funkcjonariuszy szybko podnosiły sprawność i skuteczność nowej policyjnej formacji. Formacji, która nie zapomniała o ludziach, którzy budowali jej zręby, i której towarzyszyła świadomość, że bez doświadczeń z okresu straży obywatelskich budowa polskiej policji nie byłaby możliwa w tak krótkim czasie. Wyrazem tej pamięci, i istotnej roli straży obywatelskich było to, że za rocznicowy dla dziesięciolecia służb bezpieczeństwa w niepodległej Polsce przyjęto rok 1925. Uznając tym samym za początek organizowania się policyjnej służby rok 1915, kiedy to formalnie, jeszcze pod zaborczymi prawami tworzone te organizacje, na bazie których powstały już w pełni polskie formacje policyjne.

Policja Państwowa rozpoczęła swoją misję w porozbiorowej i wojennej rzeczywistości. Początki jej działań przypadły na czas niezwykle trudny, biorąc pod uwagę wojnę polsko-bolszewicką i kształtowania się granic w nowej powojennej rzeczywistości. Kolejne dwadzieścia lat jej służby i ofiara życia złożona przez kilka tysięcy jej funkcjonariuszy po wybuchu II wojny światowej stanowią o tym, że Korpus Policji II RP dobrze zasłużył się Polsce.

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10. Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie organizacji oddziałów Policji Państwowej, pełniących służbę na kolejach, na obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego i Białostockiego, wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Kolei Żelaznych na zasadzie art. 9 ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 r., Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 – Dz.U.R.P., R.1920, nr 6, poz. 42.
11. Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Spraw Wojskowych, Kolei Żelaznych i Skarbu, w przedmiocie wcielenia Wojskowej Straży Kolejowej na obszarze Województw: Warszawskiego, Lubelskiego, Kieleckiego, Łódzkiego, Białostockiego, oraz miasta Warszawy do Policji Państwowej, na zasadzie art. 2 Przepisów przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24 lipca 1919 roku, Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 - Monitor Polski, R. 1920, nr 23.
12. Rozporządzenie wykonawcze Ministra Spraw Wojskowych i Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie wcielenia żandarmerii krajowej i policji wojskowej na obszarze byłej Galicji do Policji Państwowej na zasadzie art. 3-ego Przep. Przejściowych do Ustawy o Policji Państwowej z dnia 24-go lipca 1919 r., Dziennik Praw, Nr 61, poz. 363 – Dz.U.R.P., R 1919, nr 97, poz. 475 .

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