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Wstęp

Państwa Europy Środkowo – Wschodniej, pomimo wspólnych cech geograficznych, historycznych i kulturowych, wykazują wiele różnic. Teoretycznie możemy dokonać podziału na dwie grupy: do pierwszej zalicza się te kraje, które pomyślnie dokonały zmian demokratycznych i rynkowych, i zostały członkami Unii Europejskiej, druga grupa składa się z krajów, które z różnych powodów nie były w stanie wprowadzić zmian i pozostały poza unijnym członkostwem. W większości przypadków, członkostwo w UE było i jest rozważane jako nadrzędny cel sam w sobie, a także narzędzie do dalszych politycznych, gospodarczych i społecznych zmian. W tym kontekście, członkostwo w NATO traktowane było instrumentalnie, jako krok niezbędny w procesie zbliżania się do UE. Wielu badaczy uważa jednak, że nie istnieje współzależność w sekwencji atlantyckiej i europejskiej integracji, i widzą możliwość przystąpienia do UE bez konieczności przystępowania do NATO. Główny nacisk kładą na dążenie kraju wnioskodawcy do kryteriów kopenhaskich.

Wydarzenia z początku 2014 roku na Ukrainie, kiedy Rosja po raz pierwszy po II wojnie światowej zmieniła ustalone granice i przyłączyła Półwysep Krymski, potwierdziły ogromne znaczenie przynależności państw do europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa. Większość krajów Europy Środkowej, które mają swoją własną historię trudnych relacji historycznych z Rosją, wysoko oceniły znaczenie instytucji NATO.

Proponowana publikacja nie jest odpowiedzią na pytania dotyczące bezpieczeństwa państw w regionie. Główny nacisk kładziony jest na kwestie rozwoju instytucjonalnego i porównanie sytuacji politycznej państw. Chociaż większość z publikowanych artykułów nie odnosi się bezpośrednio do wspólnych lub odmiennych kwestii między Europą Środkową i Zachodnią, to pośrednio takie porównania są widoczne. Rozwój tych państw w regionie, które już przystąpiły do Unii Europejskiej, odbywa się przy wykorzystaniu doświadczeń demokratycznych państw europejskich. Młode demokracje w wielu aspektach powtarzają podstawowe cechy, jednocześnie wnosząc wiele swojego, nowego. Publikowany materiał wskazuje na to, że kraje Europy Wschodniej, w okresie przejścia do poziomu skonsolidowanych demokracji, w wielu aspektach powtarzają osiągnięcia państw Europy Środkowej. Można prześledzić swoisty łańcuch powtórzeń, odpowiednich zależności, typowych dla krajów demokratycznych. W związku z tym, badając wspólne i odmienne cechy charakterystyczne, jesteśmy w stanie lepiej zrozumieć naturę zachodzących procesów oraz uzyskujemy zdolność przewidywania tendencji i kierunków dalszego rozwoju. Niektóre z publikacji, poświęcone dość wąskim zagadnieniom, należy rozważyć jako przypadek szczególny, który w żaden sposób nie koliduje z ogólnym kontekstem tego zbioru i pozwala pogłębić naszą wiedzę na temat konkretnego problemu.

Romanjuk A.S.

Парадокс політичного позиціонування/ідентифікації мешканців Львівської області та партій

Розглянуто значення ідеологічного позиціонування основних політичних партій у Львівській області на підставі програмних документів, матеріалів Вікіпедії, оцінок експертів. Окреслено, що ідеологічна складова слабо представлена у зверненні партійних організацій до виборців і носить формальний характер.

Ключові слова: політичне позиціонування, ідентифікація, програма, ідеологія

Romaniuk A.S.

Paradox of political positioning/identification of inhabitants of Lviv region and parties

The significance of ideological positioning of the main political parties in Lviv region has been studied on the basis of policy documents, materials from Wikipedia, experts' opinions. The author outlined that ideological component is thinly represented in address of party organizations to voters and that is of formal character.

Keywords: political positioning, identification, program, ideology

We examine political positioning as a synonym to identification, understanding that the last one is more stable characteristic, since it means conscious choice, it is stable in most cases or it repeats in different situations. Political positioning expects interconnection of succession of components. First of all, we have a citizen/voter. Secondly, there should be a political actor in party/block or candidate format. Thirdly, this political actor should have a sharply defined political/ideological position. In this case the ideological component, in our opinion, has to be interpreted not instrumentally, but as a separate phenomenon, since the world of politics for a long time has been dealing with quite complete and separate ideological constructions. This chain of relations was practiced in many countries of Western Europe. It meant that in conditions of multiparty systems and proportional election system

the absolute majority of political parties took a certain niche and had sharply-defined position. Thereafter the voter, when voting/supporting a certain political party, set his or her choice, support and affiliation to a certain ideology. This approach was realized to the fullest extent in construction of social and political division, which also meant social and group affiliation of the party and ideological orientation. Undoubtedly, the end of the last century led to weakening of significance of ideological affiliation, increase of significance of pragmatic orientation. Also there is a tendency of change of political affiliation from election to election. **However, we ascertain that current weakening of significance of ideological component in political positioning of citizens of European countries is a result of long evolution, when the previous stage was a clear ideological determinacy/affiliation, in many cases based on social and group affiliation.**

We are planning to examine ideological positioning of inhabitants of Lviv region, their voting preferences, and define political positioning of the parties. To define the situation we suggest using the term paradox. The word comes from ancient Greek word meaning unexpected, strange, i.e. the fact that has no logical explanation. Actually, in our opinion, this meaning explains more correctly the situation of this issue.

Ideology/ideological component is one of the main indicator of institution of political party. In most cases party ideology is more or less related to interests of social group or groups, and at the same time it is a reason to position the party as to voters and other political parties. Traditionally, on the basis of ideological constructions political parties define themselves/they are defined by others within left-right spectrum. We use the notion "ideology" out of the context of ideological confrontation, which was peculiar to the world history for a long time. As a basis we take an approach, suggested by Michael Frieden, where ideology is studied in the form of conceptual map of political world. As the author mentioned, ideologies were open constructions, closely related to political activity and mobilization, since one of the main task of ideology was "building bridges between political thought and political action".

Peculiarity of Ukrainian political parties is their ideological weakness, when not always correspondence of formally approved policy documents to political activity is traced in practice. At the same time practical activity immanently requires description of ideological positioning of parties in power. Interestingly, Ukrainian political parties for a number of reasons aim to reach position/status as to existing European party families. Obviously, they take such decision consciously, taking into consideration political or foreign benefits/advantages of interaction with a certain group of political parties and with their leaders accordingly, which can be in power or in opposition, depending on diplomatic landscape of political forces. One of the ways to pay for club affiliation is implicit acceptance of ideological position of chosen European party. As an example we can take the decision of "Batkivshchyna" party. It was

passed in 2008 about qualitative change of party positioning from social and democratic to, actually, opposite - conservative.

We start from ideological positioning from Wikipedia. Materials for this source, in most cases, are prepared or proofread by political parties. Taking into consideration uncertainty of Ukraine regarding its East-West orientation, we paid attention to materials in Ukrainian, Russian and English.

Table 1. Ideological positioning of parliament parties in Ukraine (2013) according to Wikipedia

No.	Party	Ukrainian	Russian	English
1	Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	solidarism, economic liberalism, pro-Europeanism right-centrism	liberal conservatism, right-centrism	liberal conservatism, pro-Europeanism, populism, modern conservatism
2	Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	Ukrainian social-nationalism, anticommunism	Ukrainian nationalism, anticommunism	Ukrainian nationalism, right-populism
3	UDAR	anti-corruption, market economy, pro-Europeanism	right-centrism	liberalism, anti-corruption, pro-Europeanism

As we can see, in most cases, positioning of each party as to chosen resource will differ. Only English version accentuates the significance of populism regarding UU "Svoboda" and UU "Batkivshchyna". Special attention should be paid to UU "Svoboda", which, first of all, in Ukrainian version of identification accentuates affiliation to Ukrainian social-nationalism. A succession of theoretical publications of the party, public speeches of their leaders leave no doubts about the fact that the described cluster, regardless of words order, declares the affiliation to national-socialism with clear anti-liberal orientation.

Our second issue is existing policy documents. Program of UDAR was written in liberalism format, since it was based on declaring values: of freedom and human rights, releasing citizen from "overprotection" of state, building a state from the beginning. Their pro-Europeanism component is properly determined.

The difficulties arise when one makes an attempt to read a program of UU party "Batkivshchyna". There is no program on the official website. However it can be found on the websites of the region organizations. On the website of Donetsk region administration there is a program of 2007, called "Ukrainian breakthrough", on the website of Kharkiv organization — a program that was operating till 2007. In this case the program was written in accordance with parameters of social democracy. As to "Ukrainian breakthrough" this is a program of governmental activity, and it is difficult to describe this program ideologically, yet populist format is presented quite broadly. We should also mention that this program avoids questions about geopolitical uncertainty of Ukraine regarding its East-West orientation. **In other words, program component does not set party identification.**

In case of program of UU “Svoboda” the official website presents a program, passed on XXIII congress of the party on 24 December 2011. The program combines the principles of: ethnic nationalism, social principles, anti-communism and anti-liberalism, some conservative standards (ban of abortions, family protection, strong armed forces, etc.) with some components of populism. Together all this can be defined as National Socialism, if considered not in classic variant, but according to its form. **Thereafter, the party describes its ideology as social nationalism, but not nationalism.**

Then we analyzed election platforms, presented on parliamentary election campaign of 2012. Election program of the party “Batkivshchyna” — “Just state, upright authority, decent life” was actually a program of united opposition, since the party became a platform to which the leaders of some parties had to join, and together they created United opposition. The program can be divided into three blocks. The first one: “responsible authority” is devoted to struggle against existing authority; its task is to solve urgent questions. At the same time, they can be interpreted as instruments that help “Batkivshchyna” to come into power. The second block: “upright authority” and “decent life” provide for some social principles about “welfare” that a voter receives. Regardless of these parameters, they have populist character. The third block describes European choice. **Thus the document does not allow talking about liberalism and right centrism.** Election program of UDAR “From success of a man to success of a state” consists of many blocks that provide for: anti-corruption measures; measures for effective protection of a man; guarantee of equal opportunities for all citizens; development of local authorities; promised standards of life. In other words, in general, the document is positioned within the system of liberalism with some populist promises. Among all political parties the election document of UU “Svoboda” is the closest to the program of the party. There we can find a block of demands about building strong, national state, a lot of tasks on development of a nation, including priorities on development of Ukrainian language; the second block consists of demands about establishing social justice; they provide for return of strategic enterprises, institutions of public ownership and privatized enterprises, which are not managed efficiently, to state ownership; they provide for imposing state control over banking sector, giving an opportunity for employees to acquire a right of ownership, task to overcome sharp cleavage in society between rich and poor. Together this is a combination of nationalism, socialism and a many right positions.

For more precise positioning of ideological parties we have conducted a poll, in which we asked to appraise not only policy documents and statements, but also practical position/implementation of ideological declarations. We questioned 15 specialists (Lviv, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Uzhhorod, Chernivtsi). The absolute majority of the specialists (81,8 %) stated that there was problems with an accurate definition of ideological position of parliamentary parties. Interestingly that in case with UU “Batkivshchyna” most experts did not

pay attention to official party declaration about changing its positioning to right niche and accepting many right values; 54,5 % of the experts described the party ideology as a variety of social democracy; other specialists described it as social democracy, liberalism and national democracy; some experts considered the party ideology as an eclectic combination of different ideological constructions. Ideology of Front for Change is defined by most experts as liberalism. At the same time it was considered as: combination of liberalism and socialism, liberalism and national democracy, eclecticism and Fuhrer format of ideology. As a special case we should study the assessment of UU "Svoboda". Most specialists, i.e. 54,5 %, admitted that for this party national socialist ideology is peculiar; 27,2 % of specialists noted that the party followed the ideology of radical nationalism. Other variants were: nationalism and neo-Nazism. UDAR was defined as liberal party.

Actually here we have a paradox: most voters of Lviv region (38,02 %) supported UU "Svoboda", when their identification level with national-socialism is lower than the level of identification with communism. A considerable part of voters supported UU "Batkivshchyna" (35,48 %), the policy documents of which do not allow us to determine ideological position of the party. In other words we can see that the voters vote for the parties, the ideological positioning of which is not always clearly defined, or the voters do not pay attention to the policy programs, but respond to populist content. Thereafter the parties do not try to help the voters in this matter; they accentuate populist messages, but neglect the program, as in case with UU "Batkivshchyna". We can state that this means the decrease of significance of party ideology in mobilization of voters and in political life. When taking this statement we should understand that formal similarity of situation in Ukraine with situation in democratic European countries is based on different ways of movement and different factors. In Ukrainian case the ideological parameters of our variants of ideologies differ considerably from European ones, excluding populism. Secondly, a refusal of a part of European voters of ideology is based on formation of dominating social group of the middle class and overcoming group affiliations, and also on development of education and political culture. In our case we have a domination of group of "poor" people according to income level and decrease of level of education. That is why we have universalism of populism and symbolism of ideological positioning. The main dominating idea is dichotomy "my" – "somebody else's", mainly concerning authority.

Thus we can state that wide frames of ideological positioning are peculiar for existing parliamentary parties of Ukraine, which is especially obvious on the basis of analysis of election manifestos. The actual common base for all election party documents is populism with some statements of different ideological constructions. That is why we think that its is not possible to make any attempt to describe and position any policy documents of Ukrainian parliamentary parties within one integral ideological construction, which was peculiar

for political parties of the countries of Western Europe for the last century. So it is correct to make an assessment of these documents by determining parameters of ideological mosaic. This situation can be explained, for example, by weak social and group structuring of Ukrainian society. As a result the parliamentary parties appeal not to certain social groups, trying to pay attention to their interests, but to all inhabitants, the dominant part of which is “poor” people.

Технократичні/непартійні уряди в країнах Східної Європи (1991-2013): інституційні детермінанти формування та стабільності

Визначено поняття непартійний і технократичний уряд. Запропоновано розгляд базових теоретико-методологічних та емпіричних атрибутів технократичних урядів у країнах Східної Європи. Досліджено інституційні детермінанти формування і функціонування технократичних (непартійних) урядів у Східній Європі. Визначено різновиди технократичних (непартійних) урядів у регіоні. Окреслено параметри стабільності технократичних урядів у політичних режимах країн Східної Європи.

Ключові слова: виконавча влада, уряд, урядовий кабінет, технократичний/непартійний уряд, президент, президенціалізація, напівпрезиденталізм, стабільність урядів, політичний режим, Східна Європа.

Technocratic/non-party cabinets in Eastern European countries (1991-2013): institutional determinants of formation and stability

The article is dedicated to analyzing the concept of non-party and technocratic cabinets. The author offered a review of basic theoretical/methodological and empirical attributes of technocratic cabinets in Eastern Europe; investigated institutional determinants of technocratic (non-party) cabinets' formation and functioning in Eastern Europe; determined types of technocratic (non-party) cabinets in the region; outlined the parameters of technocratic cabinets stability in political regimes of Eastern Europe.

Keywords: executive, government, government cabinet, technocratic/non-party cabinet, president, presidentialisation, semi-presidentialism, cabinet stability, political regime, Eastern Europe.

Regularity of political development of most of world countries (including post-soviet in Eastern Europe) is the concentration of key authorities beyond the executive power institutes. The scientists view this phenomenon as an objective result of modern sovereignty evolution. It should be noted that *executive power* is the totality of state bodies and institutions which perform governmental and politico-governmental and administrative functions. Government is the apical point of the executive power system – it is one of the supreme power bodies, the competence of which is conditionally reduced to making the laws and fulfillment of tasks in the sphere of management. But still the political practice of post-soviet countries of Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) in this respect demonstrates that their governments are disperse and constitute complex problem of their stability evaluation and the role of governmental and executive process. It is caused by several significant factors: *first of all*, almost all East-European countries, except for Moldova (which was parliamentary republic), as of 2013, were presidentially-parliamentary (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine) and parliamentary-presidential (Armenia and Georgia) half-presidential republics. Therefore, for all of them objective attribute of governmental relations was the concentration of executive power in the hands of presidents and government (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Russian and Ukraine) or only governments (МОЛДОВА); secondly, the “government” phenomenon in East-European countries due to the differentiation of the government system is ambiguous – in some cases the government is actually the continuation of the president’s vertical, and in the others – it is positioned by the independent executive power institute. It is significantly reflected not only on the essence and functionality of the governments in dictatorial vertical but in the formation and positioning of different types of governments – party and nonparty/technocratic governments¹.

In the East-European countries during 1991-2013 non-party/technocratic governmental cabinets prevailed (in most cases). Moreover, these cabinets were more stable than party governments. These cabinets are methodologically inscribed into the government’s classification suggested by A. Lijphart: nonparty cabinets together with the cabinets formed by

¹ In this context, it should be understood that there are some politological delicacies of interpretation of such notions as «*executive power*». The matter is that several notions exist in the science for its designation : «*government*» – organization which conducts the administration in the country or its part; *governmental cabinet* is the form of government where the prime-minister or president form the cabinet of ministers with the consignment of correspondent ministries to the latter; *cabinet of ministers* is the committee formed out of the most important government members, particularly, prime-minister (president) and ministers. We agree (in the context of constitutional governmental systems functioning in the analyzed selection of the countries of constitutional governmental systems) with the determination of the government of M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair. This is the «totality of the older politicians formally appointed by the president, though, practically elected by the prime-minister on condition of consultations with the governmental parties». Though, we state that if it refers to the apolitical actors and formation of nonparty/technocratic governments, the demand should be added about the consultations with the parties and the necessity to support the parliamentary government composition. Therefore, the «*government*» is interpreted as the fixed composition of the leading politicians and/or specialists formally appointed by the president, but actually elected by the prime-minister (or by the prime-minister and president) who have the right to make the decisions on all the issues related to the competence of executive power branch. See more in details.: P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago-London 1998, s. 128.; M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 179.

the experts constitute the technocratic governments (though, it was methodologically more justified, is the use of the term «non-party governments»)². Thus, for this reason, there arises the whole number of theoretical and methodological questions: 1) what is the difference between nonparty cabinets and the cabinets formed by experts; 2) what is the essence of technocratic mechanism in the governmental formation; 3) why the governments and the governments formed by non-party experts in the East-European countries make up most cabinets; 4) why the nonparty governments are more stable than the party governments. Primary place is occupied by the problem of correlation of technocratic governments with the institutional mechanisms of functioning of East-European countries' modern political system (political systems, party systems and electoral systems, etc.). In solving the massive of the said problems it is necessary to gradually approach the issue of what the nonparty/technocratic cabinets are and to the reason of formation and stability of nonparty or technocratic governments in Eastern Europe.

First of all it should be noted that *technocratic government* – is a conventional category as it combines the two types of cabinets: nonparty, and governments formed by experts (not obligatorily nonparty). Based on the fact that technocratic cabinets are not an instantaneous phenomena but play a significant role in many other world countries, two temporal sets of countries should be singled out where such cabinets acquire their implementation: 1) *the countries* where nonparty governments and governments formed by experts have their permanent implementation; 2) *the countries* where formation of technocratic cabinets is an exclusion from the practice of party governments formation (these are usually the countries where the parliamentary model of government formation is employed). In this case the technocratic governments permanence also has its *initial mobility*: very frequently, the formation of such governments is caused by constitutional attributes of political systems (this refers to non-parliamentary way of cabinets formation), political regimes (as it was noticed that nonparty governments are more often formed in the authoritarian and transitional or hybrid regimes), political traditions, aspiration of implementation of social and economic reforms, etc.

In political literature different notions are used for technocratic governments determination: actually nonparty, technical, official, transitional, bureaucratic, expert, ect. On the one hand, there is no sense in defining this or that categorical name – but this applies usually to the countries where technocratic governments are considered the exception. In the East-European countries where, as it was said before, technocratic governments are considered traditional or constant practice (because they constitute relative or absolute majority of governments formation in most countries of the region), determination of their

² A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 90-115.

derived attributes (and varieties within technocratic cabinets) is considered the primary objective as it can differently testify to their stability.

In the technocratic governments determination we proceed from the notion that immanent meaning has the factor that the governments include the professionals who may or may not belong (and usually do not belong) to this or that party, but *their party identification does not matter*. Though, in more detailed context, evaluation of ministerial composition of technocratic cabinets has the additional meaning and can imply the unexpected reasons of prolongation of these or those cabinets operation. Generally, obvious *hypothesis*: existence of technocratic governments in a number of countries for which they are not basic, is usually short-lived (until the party-based government is formed or to resolve the social and economic/political crisis); existence of technocratic governments in the countries for which these cabinets are traditionally dominant, is more long-lasting, because these cabinets are formed for realization of basic political courses.

Technocratic nature in East-European countries has become leading through the prism of formation of consistent executive structures during 1991-2013. In this case let us stress that among the East-European countries the practice of technocratic cabinets formation looks as follows: 1) in Armenia, nonparty cabinets found their implementation at the dawn of independence and actually ceased to exist as basic ones in 1999 when the first party-based government was formed – generally, 50 percent of Armenian governments during analyzed period were technocratic; 2) in *Azerbaijan* the part of nonparty cabinets in the governmental structure is considered absolute (only technocratic governments are formed here); 3) in *Byelorussia* the situation is similar to the previous – nonparty cabinets only; 4) in *Georgia* nonparty cabinets are basic – over 80 percent of the government existing during 1991-2013; 5) in *Moldova* technocratic cabinets are considered the exception from the party construction of governments – only one nonparty government was formed; 6) in *Russia* only nonparty governments are formed, which, in their today's activity are oriented towards the single-party majority, and previously were formed on the basis of situational majority in the parliament; 7) in *Ukraine*, like in Georgia, the technocratic cabinets are dominant, and they are formed different ways through the influence of these or those electoral systems. Generally, it is obvious that only nonparty governments are commonly found in Azerbaijan, Byelorussia and Russia; more nonparty governments (than the party governments) – for Georgia and Ukraine; and formation of nonparty governments is an exception only for Armenia and (especially) Moldova.

Formation of technocratic cabinets in the East-European countries takes place according to the two scenarios: parliamentary and non-parliamentary /presidential. In the course of *parliamentary governmental formation* nonparty governments and expert governments occur most frequently when the politicians (representing different political directions or pragmatic /populist political parties) can not reach a common ground as to the cabinet

formation on traditional party basis (this refers to the single-party or coalitional governments of majority or minority), but the parliament dissolution (second scenario possible) is considered undesirable. Besides, very often non-party cabinets (particularly expert governments) occur when a country undergoes the political and socio-economic crises (when it becomes impossible to form great coalitions and governments of the national unity as an additional scenario of crisis recovery)³. The similar situation was for example in Moldova, when, during 1999-2001 the nonparty government was operating headed by D. Bragish (in this case nonparty government must have political support). Besides, such types of technocratic governments (although on the basis of the other reasons of formation) were popular in Armenia in 1990-1999.

Although, the process of technocratic governments formation by the sample of Moldova in Eastern Europe is an exception, because in most cases non-party cabinets are considered as basic for the rest of the countries of this region – Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and mostly Ukraine (except for 2006-2010). In the latter the nonparty cabinets formation have different reasons: 1) peculiarities of party-electoral systems; 2) peculiarities of political regimes; 3) peculiarities of governmental systems. All the stated requirements and indexes are generally reduced to the determination of a special role of *president* in the process of government formation. Therefore, very frequently, nonparty governments are simultaneously the governments formed (*or headed*) by *presidents* – Byelorussia (from 1994), Azerbaijan (from 1994), Georgia (in 1995-2004), sometimes Russia (six cabinets during 1991-2013) and Ukraine (1995-1996). In this respect on the basis of comparative calculations conducted as based on the example of East-European countries it becomes obvious that the technocratic governments in the parliamentary models of cabinet Formation last generally 1,37 years. (index of governmental stability– 0,34), in presidential (or non-parliamentary) models of cabinets formation – 1,62 years (governmental stability index – 0,41).

In this case it should be noted that the peculiarity of nonparty governments formation (as main type of technocratic governments) in most East-European countries is determined by the fact that this is the type of governments which allows an informal increase of presidential authorities which are anyway very strong. Generally, the following tendency can be noticed: technocratic cabinets dominate in those countries, constitutional systems of which are half-presidential or presidentially-parliamentary and as “purely” presidential. By forming nonparty /technocratic cabinets, the presidents obtain an additional influence on political process determination – it happens on the basis of direct /indirect influence on the choice (appointment) of ministers. It means that prevailing of nonparty ministers (ministers-experts) becomes justified when the president wishes to save his/her authorities. Besides, this is positively reflected in the hypothetical character of the acting president reelection, therewith

³ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras, *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 11.

limiting the chances for obtaining the president's position by the prime-minister (or by the other agent in the plane of power authorization distribution). Thus, informal "authoritarization" of political regimes takes place and becomes stronger. Therefore, very frequently the researchers relate technocratic (nonparty) governments to the existence of *authoritarian and hybrid (or transitional) political regimes*⁴.

The said attribute of appointment /role of nonparty governments is actualized in those authoritarian regimes where the prime-minister does not have the perspectives for obtaining the president's authorities as a consequence of election win (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia). Weakening of the so-called "*personalism*" (on the basis of nonparty governments formation by the presidents) of the head of the state is characteristic of transitional and some authoritarian regimes, when the prime-minister is the member of «forceful» group (the group of «security forces») of the executive vertical (Russia and Ukraine). The matter is that in these regimes prime-minister sometimes is encouraged to increase his political significance from the point of view of electoral preferences over the presidential elections. To sum up, it should be noted that in most East-European countries (especially in those with the authoritarian political regime) nonparty governments are the instrument of transformation of representational democracy ideas into the idea of «*delegational or personal dictatorship*»⁵. The problem is that the delegation contact characteristic of the representational democracy on the basis of systemic unification of political parties does not survive. The best example of parliamentary democracy is the case when the electorate delegates its own preferences to some members of the parliament (certain parties), the members of the parliament (party) – parliamentary majority, parliamentary majority – to the prime-minister, the latter – to the politicians (or ministers) in the cabinets, and only ministers – to the public (nonpolitical) officials. It means that the electorate forms several agents (and not only one). In contrast to this, nonparty governments do not stick to the formula – interestingly, the representativity formula is violated not only in presidential republics (often it is justified and is considered as the sample of such political systems), but also in half-presidential. As to the latter, it should be noted that half-presidentialism can follow different models of party/nonparty governments formation – parliamentary and presidential.

From logical point of view, the assumption is obvious that nonparty (or technocratic) governments in the Eastern Europe are positioned as an *example of presidential cabinets*. Controversial is the conclusion that party governments are parliamentary in their initial composition. This is related to the system of government where party and nonparty cabinets are formed: the first are characteristic to the parliamentary systems (Moldova since 2001) or

⁴ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, s. 619-643.

⁵ K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.; K. Strøm, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

half-presidential premier-presidential systems (Moldova till 2000, Armenia since 2007, Georgia since 2012, Ukraine in 2006–2010) the others are peculiar for the presidential systems (in particular, during some time in East-European countries) and half-presidential presidential-parliamentary systems (the other countries of the region during the other periods and mostly Armenia and Ukraine). It is also empirically obvious that formation of nonparty cabinets or party governments more frequently takes place in *half-presidential* systems. The matter is that the president elected through the procedure of national elections has immanently more influence on the cabinets formation than the president elected within the parliamentary procedures. Besides, it is intuitively understandable that the president's influence on the appointment of new nonparty ministers is determined by the electoral preferences and electoral power of political actors.

Generally, it is hypothetically right to think that *increase of nonparty ministers and accordingly nonparty cabinets takes place*: as a result of implementation of half-presidential (and, especially, presidential-parliamentary) and presidential systems; as a consequence of prevailing of the separated majority and minority systems (but not in the systems of unified majority, at least on condition of premier-presidential variants of half-presidentialism); through electoral changeability increase; through the increase of the number of agents in the process of cabinets formation; through aggravation of the procedure of parliamentary majority acquisition to support this or that government (from the point of view of parliamentary way of governments formation is transformed in the situation of minority governments); on the basis of increasing the fractionalization of the parliament (because the number of political actors is increased who can influence the formation of the single-party majority government and nonparty government endowed with the support of single-party majority); under conditions of socially-economic crises or the periods when socially-economic development was low; in the context of the elements of authoritative and hybrid regimes prevailing where the ministers' non-partism facilitates the presidents' authorities augmentation; in the context of the presidents' legislative authorities increase⁶.

On the basis of complex evaluation of determinants of technocratic cabinets formation the following conclusions were made: 1) such governments are dominating in presidential and half-presidential president-parliamentary systems – number of technocratic governments is decreased in premier-presidential systems, and it is the lowest under conditions of parliamentarism; 2) majority election systems most of all support the formation of non-party / technocratic governments; mixed electoral systems facilitate less the nonparty governments formation; proportional electoral systems least of all implement nonparty governments; 3) the number of technocratic governments and nonparty governments increases from

⁶ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion”, conveners Hanne Marthe Narud, Ola Listhaug, at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002.

democratic regimes to hybrid/transitional regimes, and the greatest – in the authoritarian political regimes. In this case the stability of technocratic governments increases in authoritarian regimes (over 2 years) which is an indirect evidence of the role of nonparty governments as the structures facilitating the personalization /presidentialization of political regimes (despite the hybrid political regimes where nonparty cabinets operate only 1,23 years). Generally, technocratic cabinets in Eastern Europe operate longer than the party cabinets (as above). It takes place simultaneously with the increase of nonparty governments and nonparty ministers (although, not in all countries).

Table 1. Political preconditions of formation and stability of nonparty /technocratic governments in the East-European countries (1991–2011)⁷

Country	Political systems	Electoral system	Political regime	nonparty/all governments, №	Stability of non-party governments
Azerbaijan (1991–1995)	ПР	Mixed	Authoritarian	5/5	0,85 p.
Azerbaijan (1995–2011)	НП1	Majority	Authoritarian	5/5	2,96 p.
Byelorussia (1991–1994)	ПАР	Majority	Hybrid	1/1	2,80 p.
Byelorussia (1994–1996)	ПР	Majority	Authoritarian	1/1	2,29 p.
Byelorussia (1996–2011)	НП1	Majority	Authoritarian	6/6	2,34 p.
Armenia (1991–2007)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	8/12	1,07 p.
Armenia (2007–2011)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	0/4	-
Georgia (1991–1995)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	3/4	1,22 p.
Georgia (1995–2003)	ПР	Mixed	Hybrid	5/5	1,63 p.
Georgia (2004–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	6/6	1,25 p.
Moldova(1991–2001)	НП2	Proportional	Hybrid	1/7	1,16 p.
Moldova (2001–2011)	ПАР	Proportional	Hybrid	0/6	-
Russia (1991–1993)	НП2	Mixed	Hybrid	3/3	0,66 p.
Russia (1993–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Authoritarian	11/11	1,57 p.
Ukraine (1991–1995)	НП1	Majority	Hybrid	4/4	0,88 p.
Ukraine (1995–1996)	ПР	Majority	Hybrid	2/2	0,53 p.
Ukraine (1996–2006)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	7/7	1,32 p.
Ukraine (2006–2010)	НП2	Proportional	Democratic	0/4	-
Ukraine (2010–2011)	НП1	Mixed	Hybrid	1/1	0,96 p.

It is additionally evidenced (as exemplified by the Eastern Europe) by the following political and institutional *determinants*: 1) society segmentation (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine); 2)

⁷ Conventional symbols: ПАР – parliamentary system; ПР – presidential system; НП1 – president-parliamentary half-presidential system; НП2 – premier-presidential half-presidential system. When evaluating the influence of electoral system on formation of party/nonparty governments the stress is made on the temporal component i.e. on what electoral system was prevailing in the said period of time. And therefore the divergences are possible in the current determination of the election system type, as well as the dominating type of the electoral system in its temporal determination. For instance, in Russia the proportional system of lists has been operating since 2007, although, in 1993–2011 parallel mixed electoral system was dominating.

aspiration to provide for the clannish interests (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia at the beginning of 1990-s, Georgia, at the intersection of 1990-s – beginning of 2000-s); 3) providing for the political regime support (especially authoritarian – Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Russia); 4) idea of governmental efficiency increase (Georgia and Russia); 5) provision of the neutralizing position in the systems of divided minority, when the government actor does not have the expressive influence on the political process (different times Armenia, Russia and Ukraine); 6) separation of party systems (Russia before 2003, Ukraine before 2006, Byelorussia, etc.); 7) presidentialization/personalization of political systems (all world countries, except for Moldova); 8) peculiarities of electoral systems, especially majority or minority (Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia before 2007 and Ukraine before 2006 and since 2010); 9) formal and actual «weakness» of prime-ministers (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Ukraine); 10) incompetence of procedures of governmental cabinets responsibility in front of the parliaments (all countries, except for Moldova and Armenia). Consequentially, very frequently “party cabinets” (according to the principles of their formation) in practice can not be defined as such. Along with this, they can not be characterized as technocratic (these cabinets should be considered separately)⁸.

The conclusion can also be drawn that the increase of the amount of nonparty ministers (in a wider context technocratic cabinets) depends upon such *determinants*: 1) increase of party systems fractionalization (especially noticeable in case of presidential and president-parliamental political systems when the impossibility of government formation on the basis of the presidential party leads to the result that the president uses direct (unilateral) instruments of influence on political process/place of governmental cabinet in it⁹; though, in parliamentary and most of half-presidential systems, and particularly, premier-presidential systems, strong parliament fragmentation leads to the temporary and nonparty cabinets formation¹⁰) –according to the party activity index efficiency¹¹; 2) decrease of bureaucratic apparatus professionalization (as the head of the government / president have to be less concerned about the necessity of political inspection of the cabinet decisions¹²);

⁸ Along with this, judging by the fact that the involvement of nonparty ministers takes place not only into the technocratic cabinets, but also into some party governments, it should be assumed that from methodological point of view the formation of governmental nonparty/technocratic cabinets or involvement of nonparty (expert) ministers into the party governments takes place not only in the authoritarian or transitional and hybrid countries but also in democratic. For example, it is particularly stressed by O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, see: O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective*, “Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies” 2010, vol 1, nr 1.

⁹ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr 4, s. 415-440.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr 5, s. 665-693.

¹⁰ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras, *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 11.

¹¹ M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, *The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1979, vol 12, s. 3-27.

¹² L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand, *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand, *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997.

3) aggravation (or negative character) of economic situation in Ukraine¹³; 4) weakening of the country democratization level or the country development in authoritarian direction (through the party system weakening).

Formation of most nonparty governmental cabinets in Eastern Europe, according to O. Protsyk are connected with the fact that in the countries where they are implemented, operating party systems are weak (this in temporal respect applies to all countries of the sample analyzed, majority systems or mixed parallel electoral systems, as mentioned above). And in the countries with more institutionalized party systems and democratized political regimes, usually party governmental cabinets operate – nowadays this is Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine (during 2006-2010), Georgia (from 2012). And vice versa, in the countries with the low party mobilization level (and party systems mobilization) in case of political regimes authoritarianization technocratic (nonparty) governments dominate¹⁴.

According to O. Protsyk, besides nonparty specification of the government members, one of the technocratic governments peculiarities is the factor that main criterion for this or that minister appointment is *technical specialization* in a certain sphere of governmental activity. This does not mean that party official is not taken into account but it means that the party component is always secondary, as party contacts diminish the chances of candidates to the ministers' positions, especially to the positions of the ministers in key economic and «forceful» ministries. With regard to this, logical inclusion of nonparty cabinets and the cabinets consisting of experts into the category of technocratic governments is justified. *The difference between these types of technocratic governments* is in the following comparison: 1) *governments formed out of experts*, can be formed according to the partially party components (i.e. the expert can simultaneously reflect certain party and ideological motives), but still paramount importance in this case is able to efficiently solve the tasks set for the cabinet or ministry; 2) *nonparty cabinets* in the process of their initiation and formation are determined by the primary direction towards exclusion of any (or all) party and ideological components, but here the ability to efficiently solve the problems set in front of the government is determined on the basis of its nonparty composition. It means that the government made out of experts can be a logical project of the party cabinet, but here the positions are acquired not by the politicians as the party functionaries but the experts from the parties who form the government in proportional representation according to the quotas of different parties or party (depending upon the mechanism of how the majority is provided – by coalition or on one-party basis).

Elites and government (usually the presidents, as it refers to the half-presidential president-parliamentary systems where the nonparty cabinets dominate now) in the East-European countries

¹³ O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective*, "Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies" 2010, vol 1, nr 1.

¹⁴ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, "Practice" 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAce Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007.

the technocratic governments are considered as the factor facilitating the *professionalism* of the government operation. Ministers-technocrats (experts or nonparty), as a rule, have good knowledge and enough professional experience in the spheres they are responsible for. Consequently, it is expected that in their decision-making they will be governed by the economic efficiency factor, and not by the specific political interests. It is believed that the ministers of technocratic cabinet are more able to resist the pressure of lobbying groups, and are more ready to introduce the unpopular economic and social reforms. Empirical research shows the contradictory character of the similar expectations. Thus, the examples of more successful activity of technocratic governments as compared to the party governments can be found only in the reforms initiation, but not as to their introduction or provision of irreversibility of such reforms¹⁵.

Technocratic governmental cabinets can introduce the whole number of problems for *their efficient activity* (in the internal and external respect). This is mostly reflected in the following decision-making respects of nonparty cabinets: 1) changing of the state policy and governmental orientation; 2) fragmentation of decision-making process in democratic/transitional regimes, and one-sidedness of the decision in authoritarian/transitional regimes; 3) the idea of ministerial interests limitation. This allows making the following conclusion: specific orientation of certain ministers prevents collegial production of state governmental policy¹⁶.

This is again mainly due to low political role of the party system. Main way out of the situation, as it was clearly demonstrated by the practice of East-European countries where party governments operated or still operate, is the introduction of more proportional varieties of electoral systems (in Moldova proportional system of lists operates; in Ukraine it also operated for the time of party governments formation; in Armenia, where party cabinets are popular, the system of additional membership is used where the proportional representation dominates¹⁷). And this will allow to increase the deputies' responsibility for the cabinets' activity and decrease the variability of deputies' position in operating the parliamentary majority. The common conclusion as to all East-European countries is that technocratic cabinets are the reason of the party and electoral systems weakness and the absence of the incentives of institutional consolidation of the latter: in most countries

¹⁵ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.

¹⁶ O. Protsyk, *Process of decision-making on the central level of governmental authorities: analysis of the problems and suggestions as to their solving*, «Parliament» 2001, nr 2, 17 s.; O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemeč, *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NISPAce 2006, s. 15-26.; E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr 2, s. 132-163.; N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, "ECSPE": Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, "Europa-Asia Studies" 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077-1095.; K. Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2002.

¹⁷ The conditions for strengthening the political component of governmental cabinets technically (formally) exist in the other countries as well (except for Byelorussia). But in their cases (it is especially noticeable in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia) the role of parties in governmental cabinets is decreased on the basis of single-party dominating and implementation of traditional model of nonparty governments. Therefore, dominating parties only provide for the support of cabinets, to be more exact – the regimes. It is most obvious in case of proportional system of Russia: today only the party "Yedinaya Rossiya" («United Russia») (ER) gains more than the half of State Duma, and therefore its influence is enough for conserving the technocraticity of governmental cabinets and regime in the country.

the formation of the party and electoral systems takes place usually through the implementation of clientalist and not ideological lines¹⁸ (it is less related to Moldova, of which the technocratic cabinets are not characteristic). Domination of horizontal/vertical clientalist relations due to this is a main reason of the fact that political parties become especially «vulnerable» depending upon the pressure of the governmental process and provision of the requirements of divergent groups of interests: one group of countries is characterized by the combination of a significant fragmentation of political systems, as well as by the clientalism of the latter in providing it or the other governmental cabinet with the majority (Armenia and Ukraine); in the other group of countries party systems are not significantly fragmented, therefore the said process takes place usually around the clientalist procedures (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Russia).

The other peculiarity of nonparty (technocratic) governments in Eastern Europe is the determination of their *subordination and responsibility*. In the countries where the party systems are weak and technocratic cabinets are formed exclusively due to the clientalist conditions (Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia before 2012, and Russia since 2003¹⁹), the presidents are awarded strong powers. In such states the party and electoral features of responsibility of cabinets acquire minimum meaning. Therefore, technocratic cabinets in these systems are subordinate to and responsible only in front of the president (though, formally, in front of the parliament as well). In the countries with the weak party systems resulting in technocratic governments formation (Ukraine, especially, before 2006, Russia, especially before 2003 and Armenia before 1999), the latter bear double responsibility and subordination. This is clearly testified by the practice of technocratic cabinets resignation in Ukraine: the part of them ceased their authorities on the initiative of the president, and the other part – on the parliaments' initiative. In these systems only the formal procedures are used in correlations between the government, president and parliament (it is related to the unilateral control of governments resignation procedures). In these cases symmetric authorities on the government operation termination in many respects differentiates and “confuses” the activity of the members of latter. This is especially obvious in the situations where the president and the parliament are not considered the representatives of one sphere of political development but are the competing actors of the government resignation procedures. In these cases the efficiency of governmental cabinets

¹⁸ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr 4, s. 447-472.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr 7, s. 1077-1095.

¹⁹ K. Gërçhani, A. Schram, *Clan-based Polarized Voting: Empirical Evidence*, “Journal of Democracy” 2005, vol 14.; K. Gërçhani, A. Schram, *Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence*, “Public Choice” 2009, vol 141, nr 3-4, s. 305-317.; M. Johnston, *Corruption and Democratic Consolidation*, Princeton University: Conference on Democracy and Corruption, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, March 12 1999.; B. Sidikov, *New or Traditional? “Clans”, Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*, “Berliner Osteuropa” 2004, vol 21, s. 68-74.; S. Stokes, *Political Clientelism*, [w:] C. Boix, S. Stokes, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Wyd. Oxford Handbooks Online 2007, s. 604-627.; J. Wedel, *Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking “Transition” in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, “Journal of International Development” 2003, vol 15, s. 427-440.

is immanently aggravated: the latter face the necessity of conducting the controversial or competitive courses of initial actors²⁰.

Therefore, technocratic governments are positioned as the ones contradicting to the idea of «*governmental cabinets*» (to be more exact, the idea of «cabinet administration»). The essence of the latter is that the political and governmental platform is formed, where the prime-minister is usually «the first out of equal», and the cabinet meeting is the arena where all the important governmental decisions are made on the basis of participation of all ministers. In its pure form this model of government is considered ideal but not always practical²¹. Therefore, today some works exist proving that the governments can be more or less collegial²². But collegiality have the double meaning: 1) collective ratification of governmental decisions; 2) collective responsibility of the members of cabinet for governmental decisions. In this respect the technocratic (nonparty and expert) nature of government is positioned as the most significant challenge to the *government collegiality*. Therefore, East-European nonparty cabinets face great amount of problems in the course of consolidated governmental decision -making. The most interesting is the fact that in most of the region countries the idea and practice of technocratic cabinets was becoming popular during first years of their post-soviet development²³. Though, in the course of time and deeper understanding of democracy and democratization (and their practical dimensions) the East-European countries were divided as to the formation and non-formation of technocratic governments: 1) Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Byelorussia and mostly Ukraine still keep to the principles of technocratic governments (in 2012 Georgia refused from this practice but its is too early to speak about the stability of this tendency); 2) Moldova and mostly Armenia focused on the formation of the party governments. In the *first groups* of countries the prime-ministers are positioned as the executive managers in the process of presidential initiatives realization²⁴; in the *second group* the presidents' positions are weakened (it is less characteristic of Armenia as the party of prime-ministers and presidents in this country is equal and the president is actually the "leader of nation"). As to the formation of technocratic governments in the first group of countries it is noteworthy that the role of the ministers there is determined by the presidential position and the strategy (by the sample of purely presidential systems²⁵ and in half-presidential president-parliamentary systems).

²⁰ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, "Practice" 2005.

²¹ P. Weller, *Cabinet Government: An Elusive Ideal?*, "Public Administration" 2003, vol 81, s. 701

²² J. Blondel, N. Manning, *Do Ministers Do What They Say? Ministerial Unreliability, Collegial and Hierarchical Governments*, "Political Studies" 2002, vol 50, s. 455.

²³ O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAce Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007.; O. Protsyk, *The Presidency and the Political Roles of Cabinets in the Western CIS Countries*, [w:] B. Connaughton, G. Sootla, G. Peters, *Politico-Administrative Relations at the Centre: Actors, Structures, and Processes Supporting the Core Executive*, Wyd. NISPAce 2008, s. 113-128.

²⁴ O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 2003, vol 25, nr 4, s. 427-442.

²⁵ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, "Comparative Political Studies" 2006, vol 39, nr 4, s. 415-440.

Generally, it is obvious that there are *two types of technocratic governments initiation* in the Eastern Europe: 1) the agreement between the president and politically non-structured and unstable parliamentary majority (characteristic of Ukraine before 2006, Russia before 2003); 2) reflection of presidentialization of political systems in the countries where the president is considered a main actor in the process of governmental appointments and resignations, and the parliament plays the role of the accompanying actor of the process (it occurs in all presidential and parliamentary systems of the Eastern Europe, when the president gains the support from pro-presidential party which has the majority in the parliament only except for Armenia during 1999–2007 and less for Ukraine since 2010). In this or that case the formation of technocratic governments is the consequence of existence of clientelist and structured parties and party systems. Subordination and internal-party weakness are the main factors of quantitative domination of technocratic governments in Eastern Europe. And the absence of ideological obligations and/or obligatory party principles of activity makes the institutional loyalty of technocratic cabinets especially dependent on the sanctions or rules stated in the constitutions. Therefore, in the president-parliamentary systems the nonparty governments are more presidential (especially in case of East-European countries), and in the premier-presidential systems – more parliamentary.

On the other hand, the president-parliamentary systems in the Eastern Europe are rather *authoritarian* (than transitional/hybrid) than premier-presidential or parliamentary. Therefore, among the East-European countries the cabinets usually have the strong support in the parliaments such as Russia, since 2003, Byelorussia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (this is explained by the specificity of political regimes). Usually weak support is characteristic of Armenia before 1999, Ukraine before 2006, Russia before 2003., Moldova during 1999–2001. Though, in these and other countries through formation of technocratic governments the presidentialization(personalization) of the president's authorities takes (took) place as well as the prime-ministers' elimination as the competitor for «superiority».

All this means that the combination of models of half-presidentialism (or presidentialism) with the elements of majority or mixed election system in East-European countries causes formation of the very technocratic governments. In the countries not characterized by the pluralism tradition, the formation of party governments is also aggravated. This analogically influences the increase of the amount of non-party ministers who gain the positions in the cabinets which are formally considered party cabinets (as exemplified by the party governments in Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine). It means that the political systems where regimes are not institutionalized on the basis of political parties, are most likely to be characterized by formation of nonparty cabinets or party cabinets with the significant amount of nonparty ministers.

On the basis of appeal to different types of political systems (in particularly to the East-European countries) in the context of evaluating the determinants of technocratic cabinets, it should be stressed that the *stability* (or rather «surviving» of the latter) depends on *several factors*: 1) in parliamentary

and premier-presidential half-presidential systems – on the fact that the members of technocratic cabinet can not be governed by the logic of electoral preferences maximization; 2) in the president-parliamentary systems of half-presidentialism (as well in presidential systems) – from the logics of reserving the proactive presidents' authorities through which such governments are formed. In this last case (as exemplified by the East-European countries) *two scenarios* are possible: a) existing (and formation) of nonparty governments based on the logic of one-party majority – is the traditional variant of authoritarian or transitional regimes (or the systems of competitive authoritarianism) appealing for support of the party which is considered pro-presidential (Azerbaijan, Russia, and Georgia), or the support of nonparty agents to provide for the formal support of the government in the parliament (like in Byelorussia); b) existing (and formation) of nonparty governments according to the system of divided majority or minority (majority requirement formally exists) – is the traditional variant of transitional /hybrid political regimes (before 1999 in Armenia, before 2006 and since 2010 in Ukraine before 2003 in Russia, etc.)²⁶.

Consequently, we can make the following conclusion: 1) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe do not integrally incorporate the idea of technocratism as such; 2) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe are traditional sample of government; 3) technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe prolong and enforce the parameters of presidentialization /personalization of presidents' power; 4) formation of technocratic/nonparty governments in Eastern Europe takes place on the basis of political delegation, transfer of rights and authorities – this does not obligatory provide for the efficiency of governments but only the executive power stability.

²⁶ Besides, in different political systems the technocratic (nonparty) cabinets provide for the *diverse articulation of political interests*: 1) in parliamentary or premier-parliamentary systems the articulation of vested interests is weak, except for the cases of economic and political crises; 2) in presidential and parliamentary models (especially those which operate under the presidentialism scheme) articulation of political interests becomes practically invisible or impossible, as in such systems the cabinet in its survival depends only upon the president's position. Besides, such factors of coexistence of the positions of prime-minister and president in the half-presidential systems, as cohabitation, turns out to be impossible for two reasons – formal or actual. *Formal* – those which are not motivated in the texts of constitutions: in case of direct opposition of the president and cabinet, the first has the right to dismiss the cabinet. *Actual* are about the fact that nonparty cabinet in conditions of opposition to the president does not have the articulated and consolidated political support in the parliament which is the cohabitation basis. In this sense, the previous conclusion about the combination of the roles of technocratic cabinets and authoritarian (hybrid) political regime has a special sounding.

Розвиток регіональної етнополітики в Україні

у статті розкрито процес утвердження національної державності, який набуває незворотного характеру, але його інституціалізація проходить складно і важко. У сучасній Україні активніше, ніж будь-коли народи шукають себе в поверненні до свого коріння, до власної історії. Автор вважає, що прийняття Закону України «Про засади державної мовної політики» було завчасним, він специфічно впливає на розвиток регіональної етнополітики в Україні, сприяє не консолідації суспільства, а розмежуванню. Тож владі необхідно виправити неконституційність Закону й інші диспропорції закладені в ньому, а не посилювати їх.

Ключові слова: Законодавство України про права національностей, етносів, етнічних груп, Конституція держави.

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The development of the regional ethnopolitics in Ukraine

The article describes the process of development of national statehood, which becomes irreversible, but its institutionalization is complex and difficult. In contemporary Ukraine more actively than ever looking peoples themselves to return to their roots, to their own history. The author believes, that adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Principles of State Language Policy” was premature, it specifically influences the development of the regional ethnopolitics in Ukraine and it contributes not to the consolidation of the society, but to its separation. So the authorities must amend the unconstitutional nature of the Law and change other disproportions that are in it, but not strengthen them.

Keywords: Ukraine’s legislation on the rights of nationalities, ethnic groups, the constitution of the state.

As a result of political changes in 1991 Ukraine achieved independence, and it logically formed the Ukrainian ethnos and other nations, who lived on the Ukrainian territory, aspiration for establishing the country. For the first time in the centuries-old history of Ukrainian people, the formation of the national state is in the progress. The declaration of the state sovereignty of Ukraine enunciated supremacy, independency, completeness and indivisibility of authority in the republic within its current territory, independence and equality in foreign affairs; the only source of power in Ukraine is its people, composed of citizens who belong to all nations; the supremacy of the Constitution and Ukrainian laws must be ensured throughout its territory; Ukraine is independent of the issues of science, education, cultural and spiritual development of the Ukrainian nation; Ukraine guarantees the nations, who live on its territory, the right to free social and cultural development etc. [1].

On August 24, 1991 these regulations were realized and implemented in the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine. The Act determined the development of independent Ukraine, the sovereignty of authority, inviolability and inseparability of its territory [2]. Next years the government and people's efforts were aimed at developing the sovereign, national state. It should be mentioned that the notion of a national state is not identical with the notion of an ethnic one. The substratum of Ukrainian statehood is made not only of ethnical Ukrainians, but also representatives of other ethnos of Ukraine, which causes the problem of political nation formation, the essence of which the most adequately describes the notion of "Ukrainian people".

The national statehood formation acquires irreversible character, but the process of its institutionalization is difficult and complicated. The same can be observed in other multi-national post-communist countries. And Ukraine is not an exception, as the events at the end of the 20th c. give all grounds to state that the processes of ethnical recognition, self-comprehension and self-awareness are typical for most of the countries. In modern Ukraine people try to recognize themselves in their own roots and history.

Under the constitution Ukraine is a unitary state (despite the fact that it includes an autonomy, namely the Crimea) and such status contributes to its integrity. In comparison with other countries the historical development of Ukrainian statehood caused peculiar "centre – region" relations. To some degree it explains that the existence of the centralized economic system and the fact that the heads of executive power are appointed by the president. At the regional level the main authoritative bodies were regional committees (abolished in 1991), regional councils, the influence of which grew after the elections of 1990, and executive committees of the regional councils, which became a prototype for the regional executive authorities. When Ukraine proclaimed its independence, the post of the president's regional representative, head of the regional executive authorities was introduced and the conflicts between the regional councils, which had not lost their authoritative ambitions and power, and the new structure, became the peculiar feature of that period.

In Ukraine live over 100 nationalities, ethnos and ethnical groups. According to the data of the census in Ukraine in 2001 lived 48 240 902 people, including the Ukrainians – 77.8%, and 22.2% of national minorities. The most numerous were the Russians – 17.3%, the Belarusians – 0.6%, the Moldavians – 0.5%, the Crimean Tatars – 0.5%, the Bulgarians – 0.4%, the Hungarians – 0.3%, the Romanians – 0.3%, the Poles – 0.3%, the Jews – 0.2%, the Armenians – 0.2%, the Greeks – 0.2%, the Tatars – 0.2%, the Gypsies – 0.1%, the Azerbaijanis – 0.1%, the Georgians – 0.1%, the Germans – 0.1%, the Gagauz people – 0.1%, others – 0.4% [3]. As every ethnos strives for self-identification it is difficult to imagine, even theoretically, the absence of any interethnic contradictions. At the same time none of the ethnos openly proclaims any separatist tendencies. That is why, to our mind, there will be no changes in current Ukrainian borders because of national minorities separation and their desire to form own states or to join any other country. Very often ethnical problems are intertwined with slow rates of quality changes in social and economic status of citizens and democratic institutions formation, and this problem is very often exploited by various political parties' representatives, who use nationalism, ethnicity and religion as political devices to satisfy their own ambitions and interests.

But the Ukrainian government aimed its policy at preventing conflicts. In spite of all contradictions Ukraine has managed to keep relative social and political balance during the period of its independence. Unlike the rest former Union republics Ukraine has not dishonored its reputation by interethnic wars or conflicts. Though, as Ukrainian political scientist V. Polokhalo has mentioned, the real basis for such balance is the absence of the developed civil society in Ukraine which can be a real opponent, an opposition to the absolute supremacy of the political authority [4]. Evidently that is the reason why Ukrainian political collisions have nothing to do with ethnic relations, and are focused on the authority, and the impressive multiplicity of parties (more than 100 registered parties) indicates the political demoralization of society, which is encouraged by the elite.

From the beginning of its independence Ukraine has faced an urgent necessity to pursue state policy aimed at reviving of both title ethnos and national minorities. It was necessary to establish effective legal protection of national minorities to suppress aggressive ethno phobias and ethnic offence complexes connected with real or historical insults and humiliations, which were latently present in mass consciousness and could become motives to confrontation. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine conducted a considerable amount of law-making activity and created a political and legal basis, which clearly determined the legal status of national minorities, taking into consideration primordial traditions of Ukrainian people and experience of western democracy.

Even in the first legislative acts, among which the Law of Ukraine on National Minorities (1992) takes an important place, Ukrainian legislators defined the indissolubility of people's and nationalities' rights. Ensuring rights for the citizens, who are national minorities,

the state considers them as an inalienable part of the generally admitted human rights. These principles have much in common with article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principle 7 of Helsinki Final Act 1975, where it is set forth that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.

The rights of the national minorities are specified in the number of laws of Ukraine. All of them have the right for national and cultural autonomy. In the Law of Ukraine on Languages (1989) the right to use the native languages freely, to create and maintain own educational, cultural and religious institutions, to profess own religion, to establish and maintain contacts between each other both in Ukraine and their ethnic motherlands, to spread information, to establish national and cultural communities or associations and to take part in activities carried out by international non-governmental organizations was asserted. Afterwards the Law of Ukraine on Citizenship (1991 and 1997), the Declaration of Nationalities' Rights (1991), the Law on Legal Status of Foreigners, the Law on Refugees (1993), the Law on Education (1996), the Law on Local Self-government (1997) and the new Constitution (the Fundamental Law) of Ukraine (1996) were enacted.

The authorities tried to implement these laws unlike the laws enacted in other spheres of social life (evidently, national minorities' representatives controlled it very carefully) and to create certain securities to help citizens of Ukraine to realize above-mentioned rights from the first years of independence. For instance, it should be indicated that among 2263 newspapers and 347 magazines, which were registered in Ukraine in 1994, 28.5% and 28.9% respectively were issued in national languages.

In articles 10, 11 of the Constitution the democratic rights of the language policy, which determined rights of different languages in Ukraine were declared. The Ukrainian language achieved the status of the state language and the languages of all minorities who lived in Ukraine found themselves under the state protection. Gradually the Ukrainian language supplanted Russian in office administration. To our mind, it was quite fair to confer the state status on the Ukrainian language. This is the language of the most numerous title ethnos and the fact that Ukrainian achieved this corresponding status renewed the historical justice, as during the centuries it was of minor importance or even foreign on its own land. Besides, introduction of the state language simplified the activity of the Ukrainian administrative authorities, made this activity more efficient and rational. Though, this status and the fact that the Russian language moved to the background have made the language problem a stumbling block in every election campaign during the independence of Ukraine.

In speeches and statements made by the representatives of the authorities and pro-governmental mass media it was often mentioned that Ukraine is the least problematic country among the rest former Union countries as for the interethnic relations. National and

social harmony believed to be a great achievement of the political elite, its considered and discreet politics. To some degree we can agree to this, as an unproblematic country is difficult to be found in modern world, which is interwoven with problems and stresses. Commonly, transition of the society to the new political scheme occurs smoothly, without any serious interethnic conflicts, but these transformational processes have stimulated interest and need in national identification, ethnic renaissance. It is proved by the course and results of the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in Ukraine, where one can clearly trace the dependence between the political sympathies of the Ukrainian electorate and its ethnic and cultural inclinations [5, 6].

“Language problem steps outside the issue of granting the Russian language the corresponding official status (which per se would be an open and faithful recognition of its practical role in the development of Ukrainian society), mentioned A. V. Lahutin, but is a strategic part of the national policy under conditions of independence” [7, p. 105]. These words illustrate that nearly all political parties, candidates for president, people’s deputies consider it right to offer their own solutions of the language problem. The Russian language has always been an argument in constant political discussions, debates, TV space bridges between Ukraine and Russia, and sometimes it even was a cause for political speculations. At the same time a large number of ethnic Ukrainians are Russian-speaking, most of them live in the eastern, southern and central parts of Ukraine. At the end of 1980s nearly 12% of ethnic Ukrainians believed the Russian language to be their native one and it predominated even in the regions where Russians constituted minority [8, p. 127]. We reckon this to be the direct evidence and the result of creation of “a new historical community – soviet people” and that great power policy of Moscow in Ukraine, which was conducted in the USSR. It seemed that the discussion over the question of the Russian language usage was necessary not for the language bearers, but for politicians. As in spite of all propagandist speculations and instigations, Russian people in Ukraine do not feel any oppression.

Trying to reduce “language” tension and in accordance with the principles of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Declaration of Nationalities’ Rights, the Law of Ukraine “On Ratification of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages”, on August 8, 2012 the President of Ukraine V. F. Yanukovich signed the Law “On Principles of State Language Policy”, and on August 10 of the same year it entered into force. It is said in the Law that “attaching considerable importance to strengthening the status of the state Ukrainian language as one of the most important factors of the national identity of the Ukrainian people, to guarantee the national and state sovereignty; the fact that only free development and equality of all national languages, high level of language culture is the basis for spiritual harmony, cultural enrichment and consolidation of the society, this Law determines the principles of the state language policy in Ukraine” [9]. Though, unfortunately it has a range of drawbacks and contradictions with the Constitution.

The Law covers 18 languages, namely Russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian, German, modern Greek, Polish, Gipsy, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaite, Krymchak.

In article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine it goes that the state language on the whole territory of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language, and the Law accepts regional languages on the regional level, so it determines that the state language is the Ukrainian language, but in defiance of article 10 of the Constitution it considerably increases the usage of the regional languages, if the number of bearers is not less than 10% of the population of the region, and in some cases it can be even less than 10%. Thus, clause 7 of article 7 of the Law obliges citizens, who live in the region where regional language or the language of minorities function, to develop and use such languages – “within the territory where the regional language or the language of minority is spread, the local state authorities, local self-governments, citizens’ communities, establishments, institutions, companies, their officials, functionaries, and citizens who are economic participants and physical persons are obliged to take measures concerning development, usage and protection of the regional language or the language of minority, which are stipulated by the Law”. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine did not take into consideration that most of the citizens of Ukraine were against these innovations.

Many institutions in Ukraine have critically estimated the new Law: Main scientific and expert department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (23.05.2012), parliamentary committees for cultural and spiritual issues (23.09.2011), for budget issues (03.11.2011), Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (09.09.2011), Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (27.09.2011). This Law was not supported by the main institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: the Institute of linguistics (16.09.2011), the Institute of the Ukrainian language (22.09.2011), the Institute of political and ethnic and national researches (22.09.2011), Taras Shevchenko Institute of literature, Institute of State and Law (05.09.2011), the Ukrainian language and informational fund (09.09.2011), the Academy of Science of the Higher Institute of Education of Ukraine (16.09.2011) and the Institute of philology of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University (16.09.2011). It should be added that the conclusions provided by the leading institutions are backed up by the protests and mass actions in support of the Ukrainian language carried out in the society.

Despite this, the Law contains many faulty references, which is inadmissible (17 times the law-maker refers the reader to clause 3 of article 8 of the Law, where the criteria of the regional languages or the languages of minorities must be mentioned, but in this part none of the criteria is mentioned, and the terms of the regional languages usage are described in clause 3 of article 7 of the Law).

Another drawback of the Law is that it interprets language as a territorial feature, but not as one of the most important ethnic and national characteristics and this contradicts the theory of ethnos and nation. In spite of the fact that in the Constitution the term “the Russian

language” is used in the same context as the category “languages of minorities of Ukraine”, in the Law there is a tendency to provide the Russian language with a special status, as distinct from the languages of other minorities. Besides, we suppose that the Law does not extend, but narrows the rights of the Russian language, as it can be set up as a regional language only in 13 among 27 regions of Ukraine. So, the supporters of the Russian language accentuate that in this way their language loses any chances to be set up in 14 regions.

The new Law allows using the second language in the work of the local authorities, legal proceedings, education, science, documents processing, TV and radio broadcasting, film service, advertising. TV channels and radio stations have got complete language freedom and the right to choose the language independently, regardless of time for broadcasting in this or that language.

Legal collision can be seen in article 10 of the Law, which stipulates, that the acts of the state authorities must be passed in the state language and officially published in the state, Russian and other regional languages or languages of minorities. Here is a problem as the legal application of the regulation is unknown: How will this regulation influence the procedure of enacting new laws (when they will be published in various languages) and how will this regulation be implemented in the official sources: “Official Bulletin of Ukraine”, “Governmental Messenger”, “Voice of Ukraine”, “Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”, “Official Bulletin of the President of Ukraine”?

Thus, we reckon that adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Principles of State Language Policy” was premature, it specifically influences the development of the regional ethnopolitics in Ukraine and it contributes not to the consolidation of the society, but to its separation. So the authorities must amend the unconstitutional nature of the Law and change other disproportions that are in it, but not strengthen them.

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Соціальна складова державної/урядової політики в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи: становлення, моделі та наслідки

Розглянуто особливості становлення моделі соціальної політики в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Окреслено вплив міжнародних і національних інститутів на усталення, а також консолідацію соціальної складової державної/урядової політики в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Визначено проблеми політики соціального захисту в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Дестерміновано відмінності соціальної політики в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи від зразків класичної західноєвропейської моделі соціальної політики.

Ключові слова: Європейський Союз, Центрально-Східна Європа, уряд, соціальна політика, соціальний захист, модель соціальної політики, соціальна допомога, соціальне реформування.

Social component of national/governmental policy in Central and Eastern European countries: formation, models and implications

The article is dedicated to analyzing social policy formation model's features in Central and Eastern European countries. The author outlined impact of international/national institutions on institutionalization and consolidation of social component of national/government policy in Central and Eastern European countries; determined the problem of social protection policies in Central and Eastern European countries; identified differences in social policy among Central and Eastern European countries and the examples of classical Western-European model of social policy.

Keywords: European Union, Central and Eastern Europe, government, social policy, social protection, social policy model, social assistance, social reform.

In constitutions of all Central and East-European countries social protection is one of the main functions of the state/government which means that it assumes the responsibility for providing the assistance to the weak and miserable people, to all those who can not make their living and do not have alternative sources of income. Though, the systems of social policy of countries of the region are not identical, as each of them had its own history of establishment and development. With regard to this, under modern conditions, the analysis of social component of state policy in the countries of the region which achieved different standards of the life quality and the search of possible ways of experience borrowing becomes especially meaningful.

Problematics of researching the social policy, social component of governmental activity in the Central and Eastern Europe and perspectives of establishment and/or development of the welfare states in the region was reflected in the works of the following researchers : G. Bonoli¹, B. Deacon², G. Fajth³, Z. Ferge⁴, E. Fultz⁵, M. Sengoku⁶, G. Standing⁷, J. Aidukaite⁸, M. Bernaciak, A. Duman, V. Rys⁹, V. Šćepanović¹⁰, D. Bohle, B. Greskovits¹¹, A. Cerami, P. Vanhuyse¹², L. Cook¹³, S. Crowley, D. Ost¹⁴,

¹ G. Bonoli, *Classifying Welfare States: a Two Dimensional Approach*, "Journal of Social Policy" 1997. vol 26, nr 3, s. 351-372.

² B. Deacon, *Developments in East European social policy*, [w:] C. Jones, *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 1993; B. Deacon, *Eastern European welfare states: the impact of the politics of globalization*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2000, vol 10, nr 2, s. 146-161.

³ G. Fajth, *Social Security in a Rapidly Changing Environment: The Case of Post-communist Transformation*, "Social Policy and Administration" 1999, vol 33, nr 4, s. 416-436.

⁴ Z. Ferge, *Welfare and 'Ill-fare' Systems in Central-Eastern Europe*, [w:] B. Sykes, B. Palier, M. Prior, *Globalization and European Welfare States: Challenges and Change*, Wyd. Palgrave 2001.; Z. Ferge, G. Juhász, *Accession and social policy: the case of Hungary*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2004, vol 14, nr 3, s. 233-251.

⁵ E. Fultz, *Social security reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: How effective, equitable, and secure?*, Budapest 2002.

⁶ M. Sengoku, *Emerging Eastern European Welfare States: A Variant of the "European" Welfare Model*, [w:] S. Tabata, A. Iwashita, *Slavic Eurasia's integration into the world economy and community*, Wyd. Sapporo 2004.

⁷ G. Standing, *Social Protection in Central and Eastern Europe: a Tale of Slipping Anchors and Torn Safety Nets*, [w:] G. Esping-Andersen, *Welfare States in Transition. National Adaptations in Global Economies*, Wyd. Sage 1996.

⁸ J. Aidukaite, *The Emergence of the Post-Socialist Welfare State: The Case of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, Wyd. Elanders Gotab 2004.; J. Aidukaite, *Welfare reforms and socio-economic trends in the 10 new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 2011, vol 44, nr 3, s. 211-219.

⁹ V. Rys, *Transition countries of central Europe entering the European Union: Some social protection issues*, "International Social Security Review" 2001, vol 54, nr 2-3, s. 177-189.

¹⁰ M. Bernaciak, A. Duman, V. Šćepanović, *Employee Welfare and Restructuring in The Public Sector: Evidence from Poland and Serbia*, "European Journal of Industrial Relations" 2011, vol 17, nr 4, s. 365-380.

¹¹ D. Bohle, B. Greskovits, *Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism: Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe*, "West European Politics" 2007, vol 30, nr 3, s. 443-466.

¹² A. Cerami, P. Vanhuyse, *Post-communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009.; P. Vanhuyse, *Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social Policies and Political Protests in Post-Communist Democracies*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2006.; P. Vanhuyse, *Power, Order and the Politics of Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*, [w:] A. Cerami, P. Vanhuyse, *Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009, s. 53-72.

¹³ L. Cook, *Eastern Europe and Russia*, [w:] F. Castels, S. Leibfried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger, C. Pierson, *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010, s. 671-688.; L. Cook, *Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform politics in Russia and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2007.; L. Cook, *Negotiating Welfare in Postcommunist States*, "Comparative Politics" 2007, vol 40, nr 1, s. 41-62.; L. Cook, M. Orenstein, M. Rueschemeyer, *Left Parties and Social Policy in Postcommunist Europe*, Wyd. Westview Pr. 1999.

¹⁴ S. Crowley, D. Ost, *Workers after Workers' States: Labor and politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Rowman &

J. Draxler, O. Van Vliet¹⁵, H. Fenger¹⁶, S. Haggard, R. Kaufman¹⁷, T. Inglot¹⁸, M. Keune¹⁹, G. Meardi²⁰, M. Orenstein, M. Haas²¹, M. Varga²², I. Vural²³, C. Aspalter²⁴, A. Guillen, B. Palier²⁵, J. Kovacs²⁶, N. Lendvai²⁷, G. Pascall, N. Manning²⁸, P. Laroque²⁹, W. Beveridge³⁰, M. Karhalova³¹, B. Hacker³², L. Deryhlazova³³, V. Sobchenko³⁴, M. Antuofermo, E. Di Meglio³⁵, etc.

Most works suggested (in particular those published after the Central and East European countries joined the European Union) show that the establishment of social policy and

Littlefield 2001.

- ¹⁵ J. Draxler, O. Van Vliet, *European social model: No convergence from the East*, "European Integration" 2010, vol 32, nr 1, s. 115-135.
- ¹⁶ H. Fenger, *Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating Post-Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology*, "Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 1-30.
- ¹⁷ S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Princeton University Press, 2008.
- ¹⁸ T. Inglot, *Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: Adaptation and Reform of the Post-Communist 'Emergency Welfare States'*, [w:] A. Cerami, P. Vanhuysse, *Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2009, s. 73-95.; T. Inglot, *Historical Legacies, Institutions, and the Politics of Social Policy in Hungary and Poland, 1989-1999*, [w:] G. Ekiert, S. E. Hanson, *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: assessing the legacy of Communist rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2003, s. 210-248.; T. Inglot, *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2008.
- ¹⁹ M. Keune, *Welfare States and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe*, [w:] M.-A. Moreau, M. Lypcz, *Restructuring in the new EU member states: social dialogue, firms relocation and social treatment of restructuring*, Wyd. Peter Lang 2008, s. 81-102.
- ²⁰ G. Meardi, *Social Failures of EU Enlargement: A Case of Workers Voting With Their Feet*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2011.
- ²¹ M. Orenstein, M. Haas, *Globalization and the Future of Welfare States in Post-Communist East-Central European Countries*, [w:] M. Glatzer, D. Rueschemeyer, *Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State*, Wyd. University of Pittsburgh Press 2005, s. 130-152.
- ²² M. Varga, *Striking with Tied Hands: Strategies of Labor Interest Representation in Post-Communist Romania and Ukraine*, Wyd. Universiteit van Amsterdam 2011.
- ²³ I. Vural, *Converging Europe: Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey*, Wyd. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd 2011.
- ²⁴ C. Aspalter, *Analysing the welfare state in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia: An ideal-typical perspective*, "Social Policy & Administration" 2009, vol 43, nr 2, s. 170-185.
- ²⁵ A. Guillen, B. Palier, *Does Europe matter? Accession to EU and social policy developments in recent and new member states*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2004, vol 14, nr 3, s. 203-209.
- ²⁶ J. Kovacs, *Approaching the EU and reaching the US? Rival Narratives on Transforming Welfare Regimes in East-Central Europe*, "West European Politics" 2002, vol 25, nr 4, s. 175-204.
- ²⁷ N. Lendvai, *EU Integration and the transformation of post-communist welfare: traversing a 'quantum leap'*, "Social Policy & Administration" 2008, vol 42, nr 5, s. 504-523.
- ²⁸ G. Pascall, N. Manning, *Gender and social policy: comparing welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2000, vol 10, nr 3, s. 240-266.
- ²⁹ P. Laroque, *Social Security and Social Development*, "Bulletin of ISSA" 1966, vol 19, nr 3-4.
- ³⁰ W. Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, Wyd. McMillan 1942.
- ³¹ M. Karhalova, *Sotsyalnaia Evropa v XXI veke*, Wyd. Moskva 2011, s. 371-372.
- ³² B. Hacker, *Hybridization instead of clustering: Transformation processes of welfare policies in Central and Eastern Europe*, "Social Policy & Administration" 2009, vol 43, nr 2, s. 152-169.
- ³³ L. Deryhlazova, *Modernyzatsiia evropeiskoi sotsyalnoi modeli v usloviakh kryzysa*, „Vestnyk tomskogo gosudarstvennogo univversyteta» 2012, vol 1, nr 17, s. 64-74.
- ³⁴ V. Sobchenko, *Osnovni modeli sotsialnoi polityky v krainakh Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy*, «Derzhavne budivnytstvo» 2011, nr 2.
- ³⁵ M. Antuofermo, E. Di Meglio, *Population and social conditions*, Wyd. Eurostat: "Statistics in focus" 2012, nr 9.

Welfare States in the region after the collapse of “public democracy” regimes («real socialism») have passed at least *two stages*.

At first social problems did not occupy a significant place in the cabinets activity in the countries of the region. The matter is that during the first transformational years of post-communist development the governments of Central and East-European countries focused on the solution of first of all political and economic problems. Besides, transformation of the social protection system was not considered the primary task of reformation directions of most of the regional countries³⁶. Consequently, the governments of Central and East European countries have not prepared the systematic and long-lasting strategies of the future development of the social protection systems and projects of Welfare States and focused on the stage-by-stage ad hoc approach to the solution of social development problems. It was especially noticeable in the context of struggle with unemployment and poverty in the region³⁷. It was significantly caused by the peculiarities of the regimes operating during «public democracy» regimes and the first years of post-communist development of the social protection systems in the countries of the region with which the principles of social equality and justice were regulated. And, accordingly, transfer of the countries of the region from “socialist” social protection system established during the decades to any new or reformed model of social policy was needed not to allow the essential recession of social services. Therefore, in the system of social values operating at the early 1990-s the elderly people who remembered the “soviet system” suffered most. The situation was significantly aggravated by the former communist and new post-communist left political parties speculating on social and economic nostalgia (in the first half of 1990-s in some Central and East European countries the influence of post-communist parties was the greatest).

Although, already soon, mostly in the second half of 1990-s. – in the course of preparation for joining the European Union (which was determined by the agreements of Central and East European countries about the association with the European Union), – governments of the regional countries initiated the social policy reformation processes and resorted to the long-lasting strategies of social life planning. All the peculiarities of the social component of governments activity started to be considered in complex and integrally with the challenges of economic, fiscal, ecological, and demographic challenges. Basic parameters of reforming the social life in the region, starting from 1990s came to include the following peculiarities and directions: isolation of the state from the public sector of social protection and implementation of plurality of social protection institutional systems. Consequently, the whole number of allowances on goods and services was cancelled, the healthcare and socio-medical

³⁶ H. Wagener, *The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Accession to the European Union*, “West European Politics” 2002, vol 25, nr 2, s. 156.

³⁷ B. Deacon, *Eastern European welfare states: the impact of the politics of globalization*, “Journal of European Social Policy” 2000, vol 10, nr 2, s. 146-161.

industries were privatized and marketized, as well as the system of social and socio-economic insurance in general, the Voluntary Sector was initiated in the form of voluntary and non-governmental organizations, social protection funds separated from the state budget, pension funds separated from the medical insurance, the authorities of regional and local power bodies were increased in the social policy implementation. The reforms conducted were aimed at demonopolization and pluralization of social assistance, to increase the freedom of social service choice, to decentralize the public administration systems. Consequently, the social policy system was actually based on the social communities' requirements³⁸.

At the same time, the reforms conducted have become the result of some negative tendencies of social development in the Central and East-European countries. Thus, the increase of inequality in the income distribution took place, as well as the poverty and social isolation deepened (especially for the elderly people and unintelligent members of society), aggravation of the demographic situation (stabilization of low rates of population increase, life expectancy decrease, and family life deinstitutionalization) etc.³⁹.

In this context most important is that the social policy reformation of the Central and East European countries was influenced by at least two institutions – *on the one hand, European Union* and *on the other hand – World bank and International Monetary Fund*. Besides, the researchers are more inclined to think that the influences of trans-European structures were bigger than the influence of the European institutions. It was reflected in the fact that it was World bank and International Monetary Fund who suggested the three-component model of pension system in most Central and East European countries, market health insurance system, residual system of protection against unemployment, as well as the social protection system for the people in need⁴⁰. Nevertheless, European Union was not always directly interested in the facilitation of realization of classical strong West-European model of social policy and focused on the macroeconomic stabilization of the region. But, even in spite of this, the EU influence on formation of social policy models in Central and East European countries turned out to be essential. It first of all was reflected in the ideas, interests, and institutes totally unknown for the region. «New» member-states of European Union approved

³⁸ Z. Ferge, *Welfare and 'Ill-fare' Systems in Central-Eastern Europe*, [w:] B. Sykes, B. Palier, M. Prior, *Globalization and European Welfare States: Challenges and Change*, Wyd. Palgrave 2001, s. 135-136.

³⁹ L. Hantrais, *Central and East European States Respond to Sociodemographic Challenges*, "Social Policy and Society" 2002, vol 1, nr 2, s. 145-146.

⁴⁰ Z. Ferge, *European Integration and the reform of social security in the Accession Countries*, „Journal of European Social Quality” 2001, vol 3, nr 1-2, s. 9-25.; F. Bafoil, *Transfert institutionnel et européanisation. Une comparaison des cas estallemand et européens*, "Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée" 2006, vol 13, nr 2, s. 213-238.; B. Deacon, M. Hulse, P. Stubbs, *Global Social Policy. International Organizations and the Future of Welfare*, Wyd. SAGE Publications 1997.; K. Müller, *The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe*, [w:] *Reforming Public Pensions. Sharing the Experiences of Transition and OECD Countries*, Wyd. OECD 2004, s. 23-50.; N. Manning, *Diversity and change in pre-accession Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2004, vol 14, nr 3, s. 211-232.; M. Orenstein, *The new pension reform as global policy*, "Global Social Policy" 2005, vol 5, nr 2, s. 175-202.; B. Sissenich, *The Limits of Networks: The Transfer of EU Social Policy to Poland and Hungary*, [w:] F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2005, s. 156-177.

the «*policy of conditionality*», which has become the direct consequence of European Union expansion, as well as cognitively broadened not only the possibilities but the perspectives of social policy in the region⁴¹. Consequently, the question arises whether Central and East European countries inherited the model of social policy traditional for the Western Europe or approved totally different variant, if yes – which exactly. Traditionally, when they speak about *classical all-European social policy practice, several social policy models are singled out*, which are determined by the practice of their implementation (in pure or mixed form) in these or those countries. Accordingly, it is believed that as the Central and East European countries inherit the institutional heritage of West-European countries, they completely or partially approve the social policy practice characteristic of Western Europe, among which most popular are Bismark's and Beveridge's social policy models⁴².

«*Bismark's model*» establishes the correlation between the level of social protection and the duration of professional activity. Human social rights in this model are conditioned by the deductions paid during the whole active life. It means that social payments acquire the form of unearned revenues (insurance contributions). «*Beveridge's model*» proceeds from the fact that the person has the right to minimum protection in case of the disease, old age and/or other reason of personal self-dependence possibilities⁴³ decrease. The systems of insurance against the disease are the inalienable parts of this model as well as the pension systems which provide for the minimum income for elderly people independent of their past efforts of deductions from the salary (so-called «social pensions» vs. «professional»)⁴⁴. Though, this distribution is quite general and can not completely embrace the peculiarities and types of social policy models. Therefore, the four key social policy models have become most popular in Europe: catholic, liberal, conservative and social-democratic (literature also provides for the other classifications of social policy models and most of them are correlated with the above-mentioned and below social policy models).

⁴¹ H. Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2006.; F. Schimmelfennig, U. Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2005.; Z. Ferge, G. Juhász, *Accession and social policy: the case of Hungary*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2004, vol 14, nr 3, s. 233-251.; N. Lendvai, *Review Essay: The weakest link? EU accession and enlargement: dialoguing EU and post-communist social policy*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2004, vol 14, nr 3, s. 319-333., A. Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Wyd. LIT Verlag 2006.

⁴² P. Laroque, *Social Security and Social Development*, "Bulletin of ISSA" 1966, vol 19, nr 3-4.

⁴³ W. Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services*, Wyd. McMillan 1942.

⁴⁴ Responsibility for financial stability and money preservation in «*Bismark's model*» is born by the «*bank management*». They are not subsidized from the budget as tax redistribution realized through the universal budget approach contradicts to the logic of labor (insurance) participation. Social security is principally independent from the state «financial inflows». It means that the government is only the guarantor of social policy realization. Except for the countries with the lack of possibilities of active labor participation for whom the national solidarity exists which is realized through special social services for disadvantaged families or charity. Activity of these services is considered subsidiary. Nevertheless, «*Beveridge's model*» mostly depends on the governmental activity. The matter is that this model is funded through the taxes. It means that in «*Beveridge's model*» of social policy the principle of national solidarity prevails based on the concept of distributional justice, though, the system of national solidarity is augmented by the additional collective professional or individual levels which gives bases for the social policy models variation.

Table 1. Classification of European models of social policy and their correlation: theoretical perspective

Models			
"Bismark's"		"Beveridge's"	
European/continental		Northern/Nordic	
Catholic	Conservative	Liberal	Social-democratic
Achievements model		Residual	Institutional
Conservative/ethatic		Liberal/ Anglo-American	Social-democratic/ Scandinavian
Catholic	Corporate	Liberal	Northern
Primitive	Institutional	Residual	Modern

Source: H. Brown, H. Smith, *Normalisation: A Reader for the 1990-s*, Wyd. London 1990.

Principles of *catholic social policy model* are determined in the number of encyclicals issued by Vatican during XX cent., particularly in «Populorum progressio» («Peoples development», 1967) and «Sollicitudo rei socialis» («Concern about social matters», 1987). Main principle of this model is «secondarity», which in «Chrisiliche Soziallehre» («Christian social doctrine») means that different problems should be settled by the closest distance. Individual is the closest distance for himself. If he can not help himself, then he addresses his family and relatives. Another instance is a local community, neighbors, church and public organizations. If this does not help, individual should use the insurance services. The last instance in this model are state organizations and state government bodies. In catholic model family and other institutions of civil society in the local community play the main role. It also presupposes the structure of clientalism and patronage, although diffused by the development of market structures, political and social rights of individual⁴⁵.

Liberal model views market as the most important sphere of people's interaction organization. It presupposes "residual" social policy, it means that the people should be able to exist in the society without any social insurance. Therefore, financial social sphere is funded «with whatever funds remain», realization of liberal model depends upon availability of great amount of voluntary and informal assistance. The government is characterized by limited but general responsibility for the people's social protection. Liberal model of social policy is based on two main principles: social insurance is conducted both by the employers and employees; state social assistance is realized due to the different level budgets using the criteria of poverty or low income.

Conservative model focuses on the market and obligatory social insurance under state/governmental supervision. The model is formed/funded by social partners represented by the employees and employers, is based on the achievements principle, when the work determines

⁴⁵ V. Sobchenko, *Osnovni modeli sotsialnoi polityky v krainakh Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy*, «Derzhavne budivnytstvo» 2011, nr 2.

future social protection. It leads to the rehabilitation primacy over the pensioning in order to avoid early retirement due to the disablement. In well-developed spheres the protection level can be high for well-organized workers. The problems arise due to those social groups which are not permanently employed or are not employed at all and therefore are not insured. The citizens belonging hereto should count on local charity organizations and on social assistance which is normally not significant.

Social-democratic model is based on the universalism principle. Social protection is the right of all the citizens, therefore it is provided mainly by the state budget with the participation of government. Funding of social-democratic model is based on stable and high level of profitability, strong trade unions and contractual relations between them, i.e. on the well-developed social partnership. State/governments provides the financial support to the social sphere through the taxation system, in this case it is responsible not only for expansion and funding of social assistance, but also for the operation of different social services, which is possible on condition of decentralized but strong government. Cornerstone of this model is the active redistributive policy on the part of government, which provides for the progressive taxation system which allowed speaking about the poverty elimination, determining only the existence of the so-called «weak groups». Social-democratic model provides for the high level of expenses for the social sphere, therefore, is more “social” as compared to the other social policy models mentioned.

Specificity of social policy models implementation in the West-European countries is that they are usually approved in their pure form. It is usually about implementation of liberal, conservative and social-democratic models (or different modifications of «Beveridge’s» and «Bismark’s» models). Nevertheless, the peculiarity of social policy models in the Central and East European countries, which should logically follow certain (or «pure») samples of social policy models of Western Europe, is that the first are mostly (although differently) based on the principles of the so-called «synthetic» all-European *paradigm of social policy*. Among these principles the following can be singled out: moderate state participation in social warranties provision (it is due to this that the social state phenomenon is differently realized); inclusion and involvement of social warranties in the list of human and civil rights; solidarity of generations, groups and the whole society; justice which is realized in the mechanism of incomes redistribution in favor of the citizens with the low income; social partnership or a dialogue, i.e. active participation of the employees in the solution of organization and employment issues. *Criteria* of eastern-central-European *model of social policy* (which is significantly realized in practice starting from the second half of 1990-s) also include: absence of social protection system, which is characterized by the cost optimization and absence of «universal insurance against all social and economic risks»; inequality of resources distribution, as the social protection system, social justice in the incomes and prevention of poverty risks is the priority; active state intervention into the social policy in case of parallel accumulation

of social functions in the private sector (besides, the state should be responsible for the social warranties and level of people's life); functional role of social partnership (with regard to the fact that social partners influence the national labor legislation and participate in salary negotiations); moderate taxation level (regulated on the level of governmental programs)⁴⁶.

But formal peculiarities of all-European paradigm of social policy are not fully realized in the Central and East European countries. There are objective reasons of this. The matter is that this region for the moment of its joining the European Union was characterized by the process of gradual transfer from centralized (socialist) to the corporate social protection model and social policy in general. Consequently, *social standards*, characteristic of the «old» member-states» of European Union are incompletely but partially inherited by the «new» member-states of European Union. Generally, the EU social policy inheritance by the Central and East European countries takes place with regard to the adherence to the internationally-legal and nationally-legal standards in the sphere. Countries of the region are the EU members, therefore, it is understandable that big role in the regulation and/or realization of social policy is plaid by the international organizations which, in their activity, explore the norms and recommendations implemented with consideration of national peculiarities of each separate country of the region. The reason of different *social standards development* – social risk minimization, facilitation of the social tension diminishing, as well as creating the grounds of stable expected social rehabilitation.

In this case two aspects should be taken into account: standardization of social rights and development of social standards of life quality. International standards implemented in the Central and East European countries first of all include European social charter (1961 and 1996). Nevertheless, national social standards include all the laws approved and operating in certain states. Generally, starting from the second half of 1990-s and even long after joining the European Union, Central and East European countries approved the following standards⁴⁷: average life expectancy (85 years); population literacy (approaches 100 percent); education duration (15 років); real GDP per capita (approaches 40 ths. doll.); aggregate birth rate (average number of children born by the woman in the fertile age between 20 - 45 years) (2,14-2,15); population ageing coefficient (part of population over 65 in general population) (7 percent); correlation between the richest and the poorest (not less than 1 to 10); part of population below the poverty line (not more than 10percent); correlation between the minimum and average salary (not more than 0,33); minimum level of hourly wage (not less than 3 euros.); unemployment rate with regard to the hidden unemployment level (not more than 8-10 percent); human development level (not less than 0,9). All Central and East

⁴⁶ M. Karhalova, *Sotsyalnaia Evropa v XXI veke*, Wyd. Moskva 2011, s. 371-372.; L. Deryhlazova, *Modernyzatsiia evropeiskoi sotsyalnoi modeli v usloviakh kryzysa*, „Vestnyk tomskogo gosudarstvennogo unyversyteta” 2012, vol 1, nr 17, s. 64-74.

⁴⁷ V. Sobchenko, *Osnovni modeli sotsialnoi polityky v krainakh Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy*, „Derzhavne budivnytstvo” 2011, nr 2.

European countries try to follow or achieve these standards. Nevertheless, they manage to achieve social standards differently, which is testified by the table 2 as of 2011-2012:

Comparative analysis of actual and empirical social policy results in the regional countries shows that the social protection level of Central and East European countries does not comply with the indexes established by the European standards. It is obvious in such social defense indexes as: average life expectancy (all countries of the region); population literacy (except for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia; the lowest population literacy out of the countries analyzed is in Romania); average education duration (all countries of region); real GDP per capita (all countries of the region); part of population below the poverty line (except for Czech Republic, Lithuania and Latvia); correlation between minimum and average salary (all countries of the region); total birth rate (all countries of the region); employment level (except for Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia); minimum level of hourly salary (except for Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary); human development index (all countries of the region). Minimum salaries level also essentially correlates the efficiency of national welfare distribution (Genie index) (from 155-160 EUR in Bulgaria and Romania to 780 EUR in Slovenia). The infant mortality rate is also quite sufficient in some countries of the region. Only in Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary GDP costs for social protection policy exceed twenty percent.

While evaluating the social functions of post-Soviet Welfare States of Europe, H. Fenger⁴⁸ associates Central and East European countries with three modal ranges. *First* – hybrid social policy and social state model which appeared according to the patterns of former soviet models, although, it incorporated on the one hand the peculiarities of conservative and corporate model (at least according to the indexes of social policy expenses of the government), on the other hand, social-democratic and liberal model (at least according to the public confidence level indexes in the countries). Among the instances of the countries of this modal range – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Other countries belong to the *second modal range*, which is also a hybrid social policy and social state model, though, originating from the classic European practice. This type includes – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. They are characterized by the faster and smoother economic growth, as well as by the higher social welfare level (first of all it is reflected in the infant mortality rate and in the life expectancy). Besides, these countries are more egalitarian than the countries of the first modal range. The *third modal range* is represented by the countries where the social states and Welfare States only started to appear. The example of such Central and East European country is Romania where the literacy level is the lowest, education duration is the shortest, real GDP per capita is one of the smallest, part of the population below the poverty line is the biggest, birth rate is the smallest, infant mortality rate is the highest, the lowest level

⁴⁸ H. Fenger, *Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating Post-Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology*, "Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences" 2007, vol 3, nr 2, s. 1-30.

Table 2. Compliance of the social policy results in the Central and East European countries with the social standards of Europe (2011–2012)

Stan	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
Bulgaria	7327	70,9	98,3	10,6	15933	28,2	10,6	–	18,8	4,1	1,51	8,5	11,3	1,5	158,5	18,1	0,782
Czechy	10505	75,1	99,0	12,3	26590	26,0	9,0	0,35	16,2	3,8	1,43	2,7	6,7	4,4	312,0	20,1	0,873
Estonia	1340	71,5	100	12,0	23631	36,0	17,5	0,39	17,2	4,5	1,52	2,5	12,5	4,1	320,0	18,1	0,846
Litwa	3008	68,4	100	10,9	23399	37,6	4,0	0,48	18,1	4,6	1,76	4,2	15,3	2,7	289,6	19,1	0,818
Łotwa	2042	68,9	100	11,5	20969	36,6	5,9	0,57	18,6	4,5	1,34	6,6	16,2	2,9	287,1	17,8	0,814
Polska	38538	72,7	100	10,0	22162	34,1	10,6	0,45	13,8	3,6	1,30	4,7	9,7	4,0	376,6	18,9	0,821
Rumunia	21356	71,1	97,6	10,4	16518	30,0	13,8	0,48	15,0	3,3	1,25	9,4	7,4	2,0	157,3	17,6	0,786
Slovenia	2055	77,1	100	11,7	27475	31,2	12,3	0,58	16,8	4,3	1,56	2,9	8,2	7,2	783,7	24,8	0,892
Słowacja	5404	72,5	99,0	11,6	25300	26,0	–	0,46	12,8	2,9	1,45	4,9	13,5	3,9	337,7	18,6	0,840
Węgry	9958	71,6	99,0	11,7	22119	31,2	13,9	0,50	16,9	4,2	1,23	4,9	10,9	3,4	340,6	23,1	0,831
Średnie dane	–	72,0	99,3	11,3	22410	31,7	10,8	0,47	16,4	4,0	1,44	5,1	11,2	3,6	336,3	19,6	0,830
Porządane dane	–	85,0	100	15,0	40000	–	<10	<0,33	>7,0	–	>2,14	–	<10,0	>3	–	–	>0,900

Źródło: *European social statistics. 2013 edition*, Wyd. Publications Office of the European Union 2013.; *UNDP 2013 Development projects*, Wyd. United Nations Development Programme 2013.; źródło: <https://data.unip.org/dataset/UNDP-2013-Development-projects>; *World Development Indicators database*, Wyd. World Bank 2013.; źródło: <http://data.worldbank.org>

Conventional symbols: A – population quantity, ths. people; B – average life expectancy, years.; C – population literacy (in percent); D – average education duration, years.; E – real GDP per capita (in USD.); F – Genie index; G – part of population leaving below the poverty line (in national context); H – correlation between minimum and average salary; I – part of population over 65, %; J – part of population over 80, %; K – total birth rate; L – infant mortality rate; M – unemployment level, %; N – minimum hourly salary rate, in EUR; O – minimum monthly salary, in EUR; P – GDP percent for the social protection policy, %; Q – human development index.

of the monthly and hourly salary, the lowest GDP percent for the social protection policy, one of the lowest levels of human life quality in the region.

Generally, the social protection system of each Central and East European country is based on one out of three basic criteria of assistance provision: check of the demand, control of obligations fulfillment and the fact of simple belonging to the certain group or category of population. In this case, each separate social protection model forms the specificity of social standards. In most countries the desire to have the efficient social protection system based on the guaranteed minimum income and state social standard is obvious. Nevertheless, the financial problems remain pressing which, especially from the beginning of financial and economic crisis (from 2008), do not allow guaranteeing enough minimum income to all citizens. Consequently, during 2009-2014 in some countries of the region the number of people under risk of poverty or below the poverty line increased (on national level)⁴⁹. Besides, the population stratification deepened and the state's incapability to fulfill its social obligations increased. But even despite this, the comparison of regional tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe with the world practices during 1990-2014 does not give the grounds to state that in the selected countries the gap between the rich and the poor people consistently grows and the social protection level goes down. No, despite this, the countries of the region managed to improve their social governmental functions within the said period of time.

It was especially obvious in the context of necessity and certain steps in the social policy sphere in the region after collapse of "public democracy" (or "real socialism") regime in the Central and Eastern Europe – first of all at the end of 1980 – beginning of 1990-s., and later in the middle and in the end of 1990-s. Social policy reformation coincided with the collapse of authoritarian and post-totalitarian political regimes in the region. Most important linear and distributive marker of conducting the social reforms or reform in the sphere of social policy in the region is reflected in the context of considering the peculiarities of social development between the periods to and after the beginning of complex social reforms. *On the ones side of the line* (up to the middle 1990-s or to the beginning of complex social reforms in the region or even in the first years of these reforms introduction) – the situation under which most population of the Central and Eastern Europe belonged to the category of the poor. *On the second side of the line* (from mid 1990- s or from the beginning of complex reorganization of social assistance system and generally the social policy reformation) – tendency was observed as to the decrease of number of the poor and decrease of the gap between the poor, middle class, and the rich. Characteristic features of the *social policy reformation process* in most countries of the region (depending on how fast they could democratize) have become as follows: social assistance under the influence of local authorities, as well as from the budget of special local funds; formation and realization of social protection systems based

⁴⁹ M. Antuofermo, E. Di Meglio, *Population and social conditions*, Wyd. Eurostat: "Statistics in focus" 2012, nr 9, źródło: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-009/EN/KS-SF-12-009-EN.PDF

on social assistance provision on the part of national legislation (central government) and regional legislation (or local government authorities); social policy funding at the expense of central and regional budgets. This made impossible/minimized the possibility of appearance or radicalization of social tension outburst and guaranteed minimum income level practically for all groups of population. Then the system started to include the people's work contributions. It means that in most countries of the region the social protection level depends upon the citizens' labor contribution. To conclude, it should be noted that today the rule of social development in the Central and Eastern Europe has become that every citizen is guaranteed, on the one hand, certain subsistence minimum, on the other hand – possibility for self-realization in the society. It means that each citizen can count on certain number of social services which can be provided both by state and non-state companies.

Nevertheless, the social protection systems and social policy models in the countries of the region are quite diverse, have their peculiarities which need to be specified. *Divergence of models* – is one of the factors that the social protection level in “new” members-states of European Union is somewhat different. Main difference between the models is focused in the structures of social protection systems. In some countries of the region their material support takes place through national taxes and duties, in the other countries there are the sources of financial support (these are the costs of physical entities and enterprises, charity contributions). Noteworthy, the level of the state participation in financial support of the social policy is not a direct guarantee of successful social protection. Besides, there are several factors (different geographical location, national traditions and peculiarities of national economy structure, socially-professional population composition, etc.), related to the functioning of socially-economic mechanism of European Union, which have an essential impact on the national systems of social protection and social policy models (the matter is that EU deals only with the coordination of social protection national policies, leaving the governments as the social protection systems and social policy models to the competence of the states⁵⁰). It was reflected in somewhat diverse approaches of some Central and Eastern European countries to the social issues, namely, social protection issues⁵¹.

⁵⁰ Key peculiarity of *European Union coordination function* in the sphere of social policy is that back in 1992 (when the Central and East-European countries only declared their intentions to join the EU, and became such in 2004 and in 2007) the Recommendations were approved «About approximation of social security systems». They suggested to implement the four-component structure of the social security system and social policy. *The first component* is the provision of the guaranteed income for all the citizens which can be provided according to the principles «what you have» and «who you are». *The second component* – negotiation of worker's income during retirement, in case of the disease and/or under the other conditions with the level of his/her former incomes according to the principles «what you did». *The third and the fourth components* – is the free access to medical assistance and reintegration of marginal groups of population and the ones excluded from the normal life into the society.

⁵¹ For example, in *Czech Republic* at the beginning of 1990-s the classic variants of combination of pragmatic social policy model and economic liberalization model were suggested and approved. (In the first country the government presupposed the performing pensioning and social supply functions). Consequently, starting from 1995 (after the Czech Republic passed the law «About the retirement insurance») the retirement age in the country increased, and the privileges were canceled when granting the increased pension with relation to the labor conditions. Some diversity of Hungary is that when gradual introduction of new pensioning conditions the norms of previous (from the real socialism epoch) law «About social security» (1988) remained in force. The changes took place in 1997 when new laws were passed «about social protection provision»,

Summing up the peculiarities of realization of social component of state/governmental policy in the Central and Eastern Europe, it should be noted that the change of socially-economic conditions in the countries of the former «socialist groups» raised the necessity of introducing new types of protection and/or servicing, as well as wide development of legal control of social assistance to the people with the low income. Though, many principles of social policy realized during the social economy epoch survived, which guarantees the graduality and deliberateness in the process of social protection systems reformation, their approximation the European norms and standards.

«about private pension and private pension funds», «About operation of compulsory medical insurance», «About social services and social security». New legislation has essentially decreased the level of social warranties, increased the retirement age, especially for women, canceled the pensioning privileges related to the working conditions, decreased the amount of social assistance. Final reformation of Hungarian social policy model took place in 2013, when the country resorted to the gradual transfer and partial implementation of accumulation system. The peculiarity of the social policy and social security policy in Poland is regulated by the laws «About social insurance system» and «About pensions from the social insurance Fund», approved in 1998. Due to the adoption of these legislative acts the transfer to the accumulative system of old-age pensioning started. Besides, the equal share system was introduced of insurance contributions payment by the employer and the insured, the order of pensions calculation to the insured was changed. The specificity of the Polish case is that in this country the laws remained in force regulating the social policy which were passed during the period of “real socialism” regime, in particular, the laws «About monetary support in case of disease and maternity» (from 1974), «About security related to the labor injuries and professional diseases» (from 1975) etc. (some of them were approved as amended before joining the European Union or after joining the European Union). See more in detail.: *Zákon o důchodovém pojištění*, Zákon č. 155/1995 Sb., źródło: <http://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1995-155>; *Ustawa z dnia 13 października 1998 r. o systemie ubezpieczeń społecznych*, Dz.U. 1998 nr 137 poz. 887, źródło: <http://prawo.legco.pl/prawo/ustawa-z-dnia-13-pazdziernika-1998-r-o-systemie-ubezpieczen-spolecznych/>; *Ustawa z dnia 17 grudnia 1998 r. o emeryturach i rentach z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych*, Dz.U. 1998 nr 162 poz. 1118, źródło: <http://www.arslege.pl/ustawa-o-emeryturach-i-rentach-z-funduszu-ubezpieczen-spolecznych/k63/>; *Ustawa z dnia 25.06.1999 r. o świadczeniach pieniężnych z ubezpieczenia społecznego w razie choroby i macierzyństwa*, Dz. U. z 2014 r. poz. 159, źródło: <http://www.przepisy.gofin.pl/przepisy,2,17,50,381,,spis-tresci-aktu-prawnego.html>; *Obwieszczenie Marszałka Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 września 2009 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy o ubezpieczeniu społecznym z tytułu wypadków przy pracy i chorób zawodowych*, Dz.U. 2009 nr 167 poz. 1322, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20091671322&type=1>

Політичні аспекти соціальної відповідальності бізнесу в умовах глобалізації

У статті досліджено політичні аспекти соціальної відповідальності бізнесу у посткомуністичних країнах ЦСЄ – нових членах ЄС. Проаналізовано появу нової парадигми цього явища, що включає розширення сфери відповідальності компаній перед суспільством. Сучасний бізнес у країнах-членах ЄС виходить з під тиску влади, а тому бізнес-середовище має можливість не лише відповідати на виклики влади, а й активно впливати на соціально-економічне оточення в своїх цілях. Автор вважає, що соціально відповідальний бізнес у цих країнах включає певні елементи і характеризує основні з них.

Ключові слова: соціальна відповідальність бізнесу, політичні чинники, країни-члени п'ятого і шостого розширення Європейського Союзу, корпоративне громадянство.

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Political aspects of business' social responsibility under the conditions of globalization

The article focuses on political factors of business' social responsibility in the post-communist CEE countries, new EU members. The rise of the new paradigm of this phenomenon, which includes expansion of the area of companies' responsibility to the society, has been analyzed. Modern business in the EU countries get out of authorities' pressure, and that is why business environment may not only take up the authorities' challenges, but also actively influence the social and economic environment for the own purposes. The author considers socially responsible business in these countries to include specified elements and the main of them have been characterized.

Keywords: *business' social responsibility, political factors, country-members of the 5th and 6th enlargements of the European Union, corporate citizenship.*

Over the past years of the 21st century Ukraine and the whole post-communist region have undergone great changes. Most countries of the region have succeeded in transforming their political systems and strengthening market relations and some countries (especially post-Soviet ones) have still been conducting transformational processes. Democratized countries, due to the achieved success, managed to execute pre-election requirements and to join leading international organizations, namely the European Union and NATO. At the same time the world has changed in general and a number of challenges, which influenced the EU development, stimulated transformation of the EU itself and its country-members, have appeared and to some degree they complicate the development of the integration processes.

The last financial crisis considerably weakened the EU members' resources, revealed its weak points. The aim of Lisbon Summit 2000 and its main slogan "To make the EU economics the most competitive and dynamic one in the world" has not been achieved, in spite of all the EU efforts, and mainly has been transferred into the new "Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth: Europe 2020" [25]. The EU and its members suffer from globalization, which penetrates into all political, economic and social relations, and makes both the EU members and the supranational organization itself search for the new way-outs. One of such way-outs, to our mind, is the interconnection of the countries and business, and formation of the socially responsible business, that has already been proved by the practice many developed countries in Europe and the whole world.

The aim of the paper is to analyze the political factors of business' social responsibility under the conditions of globalization.

The problem of business' social responsibility is in the focus of many scientists and has been described in a number of foreign researchers' works. Ph. A. Buari [3], J.P. Boduan [4], W. Ouchi [12], J. Manheim, R. Rich [10], A. Ries, J. Trout [14], J. Riggs [15], K. Eklund [22], M. Amstutz [23], D. Caldwell [24], M. Hancock [26] and others have investigated this problem. The issues concerning theoretical and practical aspects of business' social responsibility have been widely analyzed by the Russian researchers, namely L. B. Moskvina [11], V. I. Speranskii [17], M. I. Liborakina [9], A. H. Zdravomyslov [6], Yu. Ye. Blahov [2], S. Ye. Litovchenko, M. I. Korsakov [16], I. N. Havrilova [5], I. N. Trofimova [19], B. H. Stolpovskii [18], S. M. Fedorov [20], Ye. S. Shymanska [21] and others. In Ukraine this question has mostly been investigated by economists (as opposed to political scientists). Nevertheless, modern political science includes considerable potential, which allows researching interrelation between various spheres of politics, sociology and economics, in particular the basis of state politics and relationship in the system "state – business – society", where the problems of social responsibility are of great importance.

Analyzing methodological approaches to the problem, we would like to mention the existence of three conceptual schools in scientific publications. The first approach is the theory of corporate egoism, according to which whole business responsibility is to increase shareholders' profit. This point of view was represented by Milton Friedman in 1971. We believe it to be called the theory of corporate egoism. M. Friedman states that "there is only one business' social responsibility, namely: to use its resources and energy for the sake of increasing profits, while this is kept in line with the rules" [24, p. 71]. The second approach is the theory of corporate altruism. This concept is quite opposite to the theory proposed by M. Friedman. It appeared nearly at the same time with Friedman's publication in the *New York Times* and belonged to the US economic development Committee. In its recommendations the Committee underlined that "corporations are obliged to make great contribution to improve the quality of American life" [24, p. 76]. The third approach is one of the strongest "centrist" theories, the theory of "smart egoism". The essence of the theory is that business' social responsibility is just "good business", as it cuts down the long-term profit loses. Spending money on social and philanthropic programs, corporations reduce their current income, but in long term perspective they create favorable social environment, and consequently stable profit. Therefore, socially responsible behavior is the opportunity for a corporation to realize its main survival, safety and stability needs [24, p. 79].

Analyzing new EU members, it is necessary to mention, that in these countries as well as in Ukraine the notion of "business" and business as phenomenon appeared after 1990-1991, as a result of liberation from Moscow dictatorship and in some countries only after establishing statehood, democratic political system and radical liberal reforms. In the 21st century business became the independent subject not only from the economic and social, but also from the political life of a country, and this created a problem of business' social responsibility to the state and society. Similar problems of social responsibility in the frames of state and business relations have occupied the leading places in political processes in all modern countries, and the political science searches for the ways of conceptualization and works out new mechanisms and methods of their realization.

There is an urgent necessity to use common principles of business' social responsibility to the society, to comprehend the importance of business structures' social policy as the essential requirement of their acceptance by all groups of people. Business structures, on the one hand, try to work out concrete approaches to social responsibility, implementation of international principles of transparence, ecological safety improvement, development of labour relationship and social and economic support of society. On the other hand, they must work out their policy under the conditions of crisis in the social sphere. The way out in such situation can become the elaboration of approaches and models of business' social responsibility, which would be based on the generally accepted international principles, but which, at the same time, would take into consideration realia of every country. Realization of business' social

responsible policy can actively influence the rise in the level and quality of life, change of consumers' attitude towards the socially responsible corporations, increase in companies' competitiveness on the world's markets due to the usage of common ethic norms and business criteria [10, p. 9].

From the beginning of the new century and up to 2007 many new EU members had been characterized by rather high growth rates in economics, which would have allowed them to catch up with the rest EU countries in 25-30 years, but the crisis period altered their calculations. Economic lag between the countries of the 5th and 6th enlargements and the founding fathers of the EU has grown, see Table 1. If in 1981-1986 when Greece, Spain and Portugal became the EU members the EU territory increased in 30%, population in 18%, and GDP in 15%, then in 2004-2007 when a number of CEE countries, Cyprus and Malta became the EU members, the EU total area grew in 22%, population in 21%, but GDP increased only in 7% [7]. The crisis escalated not only the structural problems of the low and middling developed countries, but also the EU chronic problems, concerning aging of population, low level of its mobility and employment, regions with insufficient energy supply, climatic peculiarities of various regions. All this caused problems in the EU development and acute debates over the future development of the Union, and its regional policy in particular. On the agenda there are items concerning revising the aims, volumes and directions of its financial flows. It should be mentioned that in 2000s the EU could not completely solve both the problem of irregularity in territorial, social and economic development and economic lag in comparison with the USA as its main competitor.

Table 1. The prosperity level of the countries of the 5th and 6th EU enlargement, GDP per capita, 2000-2010 in % in average throughout EU-27

Country	2000	2007	Annual average growth rate of prosperity level, 2000-2007	2010	Annual average growth rate of prosperity level, 2007-2010
Bulgaria	28	40	1,7	44	1,3
Estonia	45	70	3,6	64	-2,0
Cyprus	88	92	0,6	99	2,3
Latvia	36	56	2,9	51	-1,6
Lithuania	40	59	2,7	57	-0,6
Malta	85	76	-1,3	83	2,3
Poland	48	54	0,9	63	3,0
Romania	26	42	2,3	46	1,3
Hungary	54	62	1,1	65,	1,0
Slovakia	50	68	2,6	74	2,0
Slovenia	80	88	1,1	85	-1,0
Czech Republic	71	83	1,7	80	-1,0

Source: *Made up by the author on the basis of Eurostat data* [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>

Over the last years the tendency to the business' social functions enlargement and overrun the usual commitments has appeared and it has been implemented in the post-communist CEE countries. Business consider programs of social responsibility management, increase in quality of corporate management, matching the interests with other participants of the social dialogue to be the crucial elements of their development strategy. The tendencies are formed mainly under the influence of two factors, namely strengthening the role of the internal and external pressure groups, which influence the companies' activity (owners, shareholders, personnel, local communities, business partners, consumers, state and mass media); initiatives of the leading representatives of business partnership in the given area on the corporate and consolidated levels. The key factor of the development of social and social and economic business programs is the presence of the rules, codes and mechanisms accepted by the participants, and besides practical methods and procedures of their realization, which are integrated into the business processes [2, p. 19].

It is important, that the notion of "social responsibility" in CEE countries EU members' legislation, unlike other types of responsibility, has not been regulated yet. Thus, legal responsibility is understood as the state compulsion to comply with rules as it has sanctions. Civil responsibility is one of the types of legal responsibility. It means that the sanctions, established by law or agreement, can be imposed on law breakers, so the latter will suffer from non-value-added consequences, namely compensation for loses; forfeit (penalties, fines, reimbursement). As opposed to this social responsibility does not involve such strict measures. It is a voluntary duty of businessmen to carry out business policy according to the needs of society and willingness of business players to share all fullness of responsibility for the social and economic state of the country with the government [21, p. 100].

In the post-communist countries, members of the EU, a great number of official documents, state program documents, presidents' decrees, governments' enactments and other normative legal documents, aimed at developing socially responsible business in the system of its relation with the state and society, have been adopted and promulgated. In these countries private entrepreneurship and market globalization are not only driving force for economic development that attract investment and create workplaces, but they also create preconditions for society polarization and appearance of considerable disproportion in revenue. In such countries the society is divided, on the one part, into elite, i.e. owners, managers of the big companies, and the rest of society on the other part. Despite this, the problems of overcoming such social disproportions, formation and realization of social responsibility models, professional ethics in business-community have come to the foreground [20, p. 78].

It should be stressed, that business' social responsibility means not only sponsorship support for those who need it, but it is a great complex of models, mechanisms and instruments of social policy, which consists of three layers. The basic level stipulates the realization of the following obligations: opportune tax payment, wage payment, creation of new

workplaces. The second level ensures adequate working and living conditions for workers; improvement of professional skills; preventive medical treatment; development of social infrastructure; housing construction. This type of responsibility is called "corporate social responsibility". The third level of responsibility includes the previous levels and stipulates for charitable assistances, sponsorship and patronage. Hence, business in the new EU members take an active part in political processes of corporate social responsibility, social investment, charitable assistance, sponsorship and corporate civil society [16, p. 93].

Corporate social responsibility is a new notion for business in the post-communist countries. Though, in world practice this notion has also appeared recently, about 20 years ago. From the late 70s of the 20th century the leading US and UK companies realized the necessity of uniting the elements of corporate policy with the external environment, working out holistic approaches to their cooperation with society. In fact having implemented social programs, business, on one hand tried to rehabilitate itself towards society, and on the other hand, hoped to improve its public image, to strengthen the reputation of brands and to increase competitiveness of the products. Nowadays there is no common definition of business' corporate social responsibility. But all researches state that corporate social responsibility includes company's responsibility to partners, responsibility to consumers, responsible policy to employees, ecological responsibility, company's responsibility to society [3, p.16].

The considerable motive for company's social responsibility development is the correlation between the social opinion and the level of company's development. The attitude towards this or that brand is determined not only by the quality of goods and the effectiveness of advertising but also by the company's image and reputation, including its responsible position towards the partners, personnel, environment and society in general. The results of the public opinion poll that have been held in various CEE countries show that a great number of consumers are ready to boycott goods produced by those companies which carry out irresponsible policy towards society [4, p. 63].

Nowadays in the new EU members five main principles of business' social responsibility have been formed, namely: business responsibility to consumers, which means fair pricing policy, the quality of goods and services, care for consumers' health and safety, fair competition and advertising, adhering to the ethic norms of business conducting; social protection of personnel: labour rights and adequate recompense, labour protection, safety at work, personnel development and support; careful treatment of environment: environmental safety, efficient consuming of natural resources and their recycling, waste utilization; partnership with local communities and authorities, which is the compulsory requirement of responsibility, which means business participation in the social and economic development of a region, according to the directions concerning the main business activity of a company, including charity, implementation of social and cultural development program, support of social initiative and institutes of civil society; attitude towards human rights [8, p. 35].

It should be mentioned that corporate management is just a small part of the vast sphere of business' social responsibility, which is also usually called "corporate civil society". Corporate civil society compares modern corporation behavior with the citizens' behavior, who implement their responsibility to society and stipulates the responsibility of companies to personnel and mutual responsibility of the country to its citizens. The main items of this approach are: business searches where and how the social investment can be directed; business finds issues which are the most urgent for society and solves these problems, which trouble the majority of population; business wants to receive economic return and profit from the social investment, gets people involved into the process of social problems solution and gradually starts asserting interests and rights of society.

The biggest problem of business and authority interaction in the new EU members is how to determine the level of responsibility for every subject in solving social problems and social development of society. Thus, the president of Bulgaria R. Plevneliev during his speech in the parliament in November 2012, said that the main strategic plans and priorities alongside with the anti-corruption drive and control on terrorism, state and law-enforcement authorities modernization, strengthening of Bulgaria in the international arena, were the formation of the legal civil society, building up an effective state, which could guarantee safety and deserved level of life for its people and formation of free and socially responsible entrepreneurship [13].

It is necessary to single out several main functions, which are executed by business in the countries of the 5th and 6th EU enlargements: economic, innovational, political, leadership, social and ethical or moral. In the EU, every country and its society among 27 members is the main stakeholder of any business structure. As the state and society are interested in business, they must support its development. At the same time business must be equal in rights partner of the state, while the latter should be an administrator and a guarantor of "fair play" on the market of social services and must stimulate business and make it implement its social responsibility to the society [8, p. 37].

Among political models of the state and business interrelation in the social sphere, which exist in the post-communist CEE countries, one can single out several models. The models of "smothering" and "compulsion" are pointed at administrative smothering of business. According to this model the authorities demand some investment into social programs and projects from business, employing administrative resource and structures aimed at controlling over the business activity. The "patronage" model implies compensation for costs on social programs and projects realization at the expense of the state permission for business to have access to the state controlled resources. This model provides an opportunity to haggle over the terms of business support for social programs and national projects. The next model is called "nonintervention of the government"; in the frames of this model, the authorities do not take an active position as to the social politics, carried out by business. According

to the model of “partnership” the representatives of authorities and business are to achieve compromise. This model in current social and economic conditions of the CEE countries is the most acceptable and workable with the principle “when it is profitable for everyone it is profitable for all”. In the model of “partnership” the subjects carry out mutually-beneficial exchange of resources. So, social partnership is the revision of business’ spheres of activity, authorities and society in solving socially-meaningful issues, liquidation of social dependence, creating mechanisms of civilian control over business’ social responsibilities. Social partnership must be understood as a voluntary and equal interaction between personnel, workers’ association and trade unions, employers and business, who act both on the state and regional levels with the aim to protect rights and interests of the workers, employers and society in general [1, p. 74-75].

Thus, in the post-communist CEE countries a new paradigm of business’ social responsibility comes into being and includes the expansion of spheres of companies’ responsibility to society. Modern business in the new EU-members has come out of the authorities’ pressure and that is why business environment has an opportunity not only to react to the authorities’ challenges, but also to influence on the social and economic environment in its own interests. We consider this new paradigm of business’ social responsibility to include a number of political causes and main elements: corporate citizenship, which presupposes mutual responsibility of business and authorities to society and takes in account entrepreneurs’ interests not only in the economic but also in the social spheres; creation of mutually-beneficial mechanisms of business’ social investment; nowadays the main political model of business’ social responsibility in these countries becomes the model of the social partnership between the government and society; social investment, which expand the notion of business’ social responsibility, meaning the transition from charity to companies’ concrete social investment on the national and regional levels, aimed at solving urgent problems in scope of business activity, war against poverty, improvement of educational system, accommodation, security, health and environmental protection.

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Феномен, ідеологічне позиціонування та оцінювання електоральних успіхів пенсіонерських партій у Країнах Центральної, Південно-Східної та Східної Європи

Проаналізовано суть феномену пенсіонерських партій. Розкрито сутність позиціонування пенсіонерських партій в ідеологічному спектрі на прикладі країн Центральної, Південно-Східної і Східної Європи. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз успіхів партій пенсіонерів у країнах Центральної, Південно-Східної і Східної Європи на основі їхнього електорального й урядового представництва.

Ключові слова: партія, пенсіонерська партія, ідеологічне позиціонування партії, «посіріння партійної демократії», Центральна, Південно-Східна та Східна Європа.

Phenomenon, ideological positioning and evaluation of electoral success of pensioners' parties in Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern European countries

The article is dedicated to analyzing the essence of pensioners parties' phenomenon. The author outlined the essence of pensioners parties' positioning in ideological left-right spectrum in case of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern European countries; carried out the comparative analysis of pensioners parties' successes in Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern European countries on the basis of their electoral and cabinet representation.

Keywords: party, pensioners party, ideological positioning, "greying of party democracy", Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

Transformation processes in post-communist (including post-Soviet) countries of the Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe have a lot of political consequences. For example, these countries to a different degree follow or defeat political traditions and practices pertinent to the Western European countries. Peculiarities of interparty competition and

participation in political life of the region are not exceptions in this context. No wonder that different materialistic and post-materialistic tendencies, which find interpretation on political level in the parties activities have gained or are gaining significant popularity in the Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe. To a large extent it is also reproduced in the attempts to construct so called pensioners parties, which predominantly express interests of voters of older generation or elderly people. At first glance it isn't weird, since a human being of any age aspires to make an influence, through which his/her tasks can be implemented. However, at second glance it isn't so simple, since the phenomenon of pensioners parties for the Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern European countries is relatively new, that's why it hasn't been fully examined. With regard to this, the parties of pensioners or pensioners parties, whose usual voters are people of pension age, need theoretical and methodological and empirical outline. To a large extent the grounds are related with the conclusions, which are incorporated from studies of pensioners parties in the countries of Western Europe. Out of them the following scientists are singled out by authorship: S. Hanley¹, A. Campbell², L. Derfner³, N. Eberstadt and H. Groth⁴, A. Evers and J. Wolf⁵, D. Feltenius⁶, A. Goerres⁷, J. Gynn i S. Arber⁸, M. Henn, M. Weinstein and D. Wring⁹, E. Iecovich¹⁰, J. Lynch¹¹, C. Mukesh, G. Betcherman and A. Banerji¹², E. Phelps¹³, B. Susser¹⁴, M. Tepe and P. Vanhuyse¹⁵, J. Vincent, G. Patterson

¹ S. Hanley, *The emergence of pensioners' parties in contemporary Europe*, [w:] J. Tremmel, *Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational Comparison*, Wyd. Springer Verlag 2010, s. 225-244.

² A. Campbell, *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism in the American Welfare State*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 2003.

³ L. Derfner, *The grand old party*, "Jerusalem Post" 2006, vol 6.

⁴ N. Eberstadt, H. Groth, *Healthy Old Europe*, "Foreign Affairs" May/June 2007.

⁵ A. Evers, J. Wolf, *Political organization and participation of older people: traditions and changes in five European countries*, [w:] A. Walker, G. Naegele, *The Politics of Old Age in Europe*, Wyd. Open University Press 1999, s. 42-61.

⁶ D. Feltenius, *Client organizations in a corporatist country: pensioners' organizations and pensions policy in Sweden*, "Journal of European Social Policy" 2007, vol 17, nr 2, s. 139-151.

⁷ A. Goerres, *Why are Older People more Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral Turnout across Europe*, "British Journal of Politics and International Relations" 2007, vol 9, nr 1, s. 90-121.; A. Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of Our Democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave-Macmillan 2009.

⁸ J. Gynn, S. Arber, *The Politics of Old age in the UK*, [w:] A. Walker, G. Naegele, *The Politics of Old Age in Europe*, Wyd. Open University Press 1999, s. 152-167.

⁹ M. Henn, M. Weinstein, D. Wring, *A Generation Apart? Youth and Political Participation in Britain*, "British Journal of Politics and International Relations" 2002, vol 4, nr 2, s. 167-192.

¹⁰ E. Iecovich, *Pensioners' political parties: the Israeli case*, [w:] J. Durandal, *Cahiers du FIAPA. Volume 1: Grey Power? Political Power and influence*, Wyd. FIAPA 2002, s. 118-132.

¹¹ Lynch Julia (2006), *Age in the Welfare State: The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers and Children*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² C. Mukesh, G. Betcherman, A. Banerji, *From Red to Gray: The "Third Transition" of Ageing Populations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*, Wyd. World Bank 2007.

¹³ E. Phelps, *Young Adults and Electoral Turnout in Britain: Towards a Generational Model of Political Participation*, "Sussex European Institute working paper" 2006, nr 92.

¹⁴ B. Susser, *The Retirees' (Gimla'im): An "Escapist" Phenomenon?*, "Israel Affairs" 2007, vol 13, nr 1, s. 187-192.

¹⁵ M. Tepe, P. Vanhuyse, *Are Aging Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy? Evidence from 18 OECD Democracies, 1980-2002*, "Journal of Public Policy" 2009, vol 29, nr 1, s. 1-28.

and K. Wale¹⁶, A. Walker¹⁷, J. Večerník¹⁸, P. Vanhuyse¹⁹, etc. Nevertheless they don't fully outline the principles of pensioners parties functioning in Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe, which creates the grounds for further scientific surveys.

In most cases pensioners parties are interpreted as a kind of *special parties* or *parties of special/specialized political interests*, which derive from convictions and interests of people of retirement/elderly age. The phenomenon *special parties* in the political science traditionally means the parties, which have the function of aggregation and/or expression of influence of certain social groups of population on how adoption of special and industry political decisions takes place. Besides, special parties are often interpreted in the format of a tool and mechanisms of performing modern legislative lobbying²⁰ (however the mentioned definition mostly concerns the parties, which are represented at the parliament). Special political parties are such parties, whose program activity is based on special/non-traditional values, which can have or not have materialistic/post-materialistic nature. The functioning of special parties has in common non-traditional and little popular program position, as well as very limited circle of voters and supporters. As the result of this, special parties are nonhomogenous.

Pensioners parties make untypical group of special parties in the countries of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The thing is that scientists do not always agree to refer pensioners parties to the parties of materialistic or post-materialistic values. It is so because pensioners parties, representing special political interests, make a separate group first of all on the basis of age structure of their members and electorate, but they don't deny those principles, which are pertinent to sociopolitical divisions of "old policy". Taking this into consideration, it is clear that pensioners parties are positioned in ideological section as such that shift from their materialistic outline to the post-materialistic one: they are traditionally outlined as extra-ideological/post-materialistic, but they are constructed on the issues of resources distribution in the society, i.e. they tend toward classical left and right materialistic ideological range.

Appearance of pensioners parties in the countries of Europe was caused by the fact that the party policy of modern Europe (including Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe) often shows express *generalized prejudices* ("generalized prejudices" mean taking into account prejudices on the basis of generations change). "*Older*" (in the context of their age) *voters* are

¹⁶ J. Vincent, G. Patterson, K. Wale, *Politics and Old Age: Older Citizens and Political Processes in Britain*, Wyd. Basingstoke 2001.; J. Vincent, *Demography, Politics and Old Age*, Paper presented at the British Society for Gerontology Annual Conference, Newcastle upon Tyne, 4-6 September 2003.

¹⁷ A. Walker, *Speaking for themselves: the new politics of old age in Europe*, "Education and Ageing" 1998, vol 13, nr 1, s. 13-36.

¹⁸ J. Večerník, *Changing Social Status of Pensioners and Prospects of Pension Reform in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Institute of Economic Studies: "Occasional Paper" 2006, nr 2.

¹⁹ P. Vanhuyse, *Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social Policies and Political Protests in Post-Communist Democracies*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2006.

²⁰ D. Baron, *Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics*, "Journal of Economic Literature" 2002 vol 40, nr 4, s. 1221-1229.; G. Grossman, E. Helpman, *Special Interest Politics*, Wyd. MIT Press 2001.; N. Martineau, *The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists of Electoral Competition*, "Job Market Paper" 2010.

more determined by participation in the party life and process at least based on two key aspects: firstly, the “older” voters more actively participate in voting for political parties at the elections²¹; secondly, the “older” voters display more initiative in their intentions to receive membership in political parties. And vice versa, “younger” (in terms of their age) voters are more inclined not to participate in official party and election policy. As the result of this they don't raise worries in terms of determining such phenomenon as “graying/darkening of party democracy” and socio-political organizations²² (in most cases “graying/darkening of party democracy” means the process, which denotes relative decadence of the voters' political activity in terms of the voters' solving traditional problems of development on the basis of procedures of participation nature). It is demonstrated by the fact that certain political parties are disproportionately supported by older age groups. For example, in certain cases, at least in terms of evaluating electorate of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) in Czech Republic, which is pointed by S. Hanley²³, specifically voters of elderly age can make majority. Similar situation is peculiar for voters for the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) or Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). As the result of this it is quite obvious that the elderly voters can significantly influence on the process of how the parties understand and/or decide priorities of their own programs further development and/or respond to political calls signaled to them by the voters. However, the possibility of the fact that ageing of population and growing importance of the issues related with ageing of the society can cause appearance and growing up of electoral popularity of “new” pensioners parties, is to a large extent ignored. In many regards it is small wonder, since despite appearance during the last two decades of pensioners parties (or parties of pensioners) on the periphery of European party system, the mentioned “parties of grey interest” (such definition of pensioners parties has been proposed by A. Goerres²⁴), are at first sight evaluated as a phenomenon, which doesn't have big and self-sufficient role²⁵.

However the parties of grey interest represent new socio-political phenomenon and potentially new ideological family of parties in the formed/institutionalized party systems of European countries. As H. Herzog²⁶ points with this regard, despite the potential for receiving voters' votes, new “minority” parties can become marker for appearance of new political issues,

²¹ A. Goerres, *Why are Older People more Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral Turnout across Europe*, “British Journal of Politics and International Relations” 2007, vol 9, nr 1, s. 90-121.

²² M. Henn, M. Weinstein, D. Wring, *A Generation Apart? Youth and Political Participation in Britain*, “British Journal of Politics and International Relations” 2002, vol 4, nr 2, s. 167-192.; E. Phelps, *Young Adults and Electoral Turnout in Britain: Towards a Generational Model of Political Participation*, “Sussex European Institute working paper” 2006, nr 92.; F. Robertson, *A Study of Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania*, Wyd. University College London 2009.

²³ S. Hanley, *Towards Breakthrough or Breakdown? The Consolidation of the KSCM as a Neo-Communist Successor Party in the Czech Republic*, “Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics” 2001, vol 17, nr 3, s. 96-116.

²⁴ A. Goerres, *Why are Older People more Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral Turnout across Europe*, “British Journal of Politics and International Relations” 2007, vol 9, nr 1, s. 90-121.

²⁵ A. Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of Our Democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave-Macmillan 2009.; A. Walker, *Speaking for themselves: the new politics of old age in Europe*, “Education and Ageing” 1998, vol 13, nr 1, s. 13-36.

²⁶ H. Herzog, *Minor Parties: The Relevancy Perspective*, “Comparative Politics” 1987, vol 19, nr 3, s. 317-329.

and also are early indicator, which wide groups of voters can use at redefinition and reevaluation of socio-political identities or in search of mechanisms of implementing protest policy. Moreover, in certain Central, Southern-Eastern European countries the parties of “grey interest” currently enjoy sufficient successes at the elections. That’s why it is even worth to say that those parties receive political/governmental levers of influence.

Without going into the history of pensioners parties formation as such, it is worth to note that the phenomenon of pensioners parties itself has been applied for the first time in the countries of the Western Europe. The first pensioners parties started to form in Europe during post-war period in 1940-1950-ies. Some of their examples were also known during the period between two world wars. The exact form of such organizations is historically manifold and first of all depends on the national context, which demonstrates specific models of “*pillarization*” (mechanism of stable vertical division of the society) and/or “*participation*” (forced inclusion into some party) of social life and specific activities strategies of mass organizations activity. The successive wave of socio-political organizations of “older voters” started in 1970-ies in the context of “new policy of elderly people”, induced by parallel processes of ageing of population, reduction and reconfiguration of the idea of “state of general well being”²⁷. Nevertheless, pensioners parties as established phenomenon were accepted only in the end of 1980-ies – in the beginning of 1990-ies.

Starting from 1990-ies pensioners parties started to form in *Central Europe*. The experience shows that they were applied in the majority of countries of the region (Lithuania is the only exception). Hence, in Bulgaria of different time periods such pensioners parties functioned/have been functioning as the Movement of Social Solidarity (DSS), in Estonia there are the Estonian Union of Pensioners (EPL) and the Estonian Union of Pensioners and Families (EPPL) (renamed into the Estonian Party of Pensioners and Families (EPPE)), in Latvia there are the Party of Pensioners and Elderly People (PSP) and party “Latvian Renaissance” (LA), in Poland there are the Association of Pensioners and the Disabled Persons (O/W Legnica), the Party of Disabled Persons and Pensioners (NER), the National Party of Pensioners (KPEiR), the National Alliance of Pensioners (KPPiR-RP), in Romania there are the Party of Pensioners of Romania (PPR) and the Party of People’s and Social Protection (PPPS), in Slovakia there are the Party of Pensioners and Socially Dependent (SDSO) and the Party of Pensioners of Slovakia (SDoS), in Slovenia there is the Democratic Party of Pensioners (DeSUS), in Hungary there is the Party of Pensioners (NYUP) and in Czech Republic there is Party “Pensioners for Safe Life” (DŽJ) (later renamed into “Party for Safe Life” (SZJ)). As of 2014 among the countries of Central Europe pensioners parties didn’t function only in Latvia, Lithuania and Czech Republic (please see details in table 1).

²⁷ A. Walker, *Speaking for themselves: the new politics of old age in Europe*, “Education and Ageing” 1998, vol 13, nr 1, s. 13-36; A. Evers, J. Wolf, *Political organization and participation of older people: traditions and changes in five European countries*, [w:] A. Walker, G. Naegele, *The Politics of Old Age in Europe*, Wyd. Open University Press 1999, s. 42-61.

As to *Southern-Eastern European countries* it should be noted that they predominantly repeat the experience of the countries of Central Europe. It means that in the majority of countries of the region pensioners parties are applied. For example in Albania there function/functioned Party "People's Union of Pensioners" (PBPPSH), in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are the Pensioners Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SPU), the Pensioners Party of Serbian Republic (PSRS) and the Democratic Party of Pensioners (DSP), in Croatia there is the Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU), in Montenegro there is the Party of Pensioners and Disabled Persons (PPI), in Macedonia there is the Party of Pensioners of the Republic of Macedonia (PPRM), in Serbia there is the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS). As of 2014 among the countries of Southern-Eastern Europe pensioners parties didn't function only in Kosovo (please see details in table 1).

However, the situation is entire different in the countries of *Eastern Europe*. This is so because pensioners parties haven't received experience of formation to a full extent there. Hence, the parties of the mentioned profile are found only in Russia – the Party of Pensioners (PP), the Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP) and the Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice (RPPzS); and in Ukraine – the Party of Pensioners of Ukraine (PPU) and the Party for Ukraine's Pensioners Protection (PZPU). At the same time there are/have been no pensioners parties in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia and Moldova. The noticed correlation, in accordance with which pensioners parties are predominantly met in democratic countries, but have no application in authoritarian or hybrid political regimes (please see details in table 1).

In general, in the selected countries of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe several conclusions are made with regard to the experience of formation and consequences of functioning of pensioners parties: 1) the majority of the selected countries have experience of pensioners parties functioning; 2) in the selected countries pensioners parties were formed at different time periods: in some countries (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Hungary) – in 1990-ies; in other countries (Albania, to a large extent Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Latvia, to a large extent Russia, Romania, Serbia and Croatia) – in 2000s; 3) in the majority of countries the selected pensioners parties are not successful in terms of their representation in parliaments and/or government cabinets: for example pensioners parties were represented in the parliament only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Russia, Serbia and Slovenia, and in government cabinets – only in Slovenia. Also it is obvious that during the period 1990-2014 the dynamics of electoral support of pensioners parties have been increasing/is increasing or remains stable only in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, where pensioners parties are considered as typical participants of interparty competition.

For example, *Croatian Party of Pensioners*, which emerged in 1996 is rather popular. It is a «single-issue party». At the dawn of its functioning the party was often criticized that it was allegedly created exclusively to cut away voices of "pensioners-voters" from Social-Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) and to help the governing/governmental Croatian

Democratic Union (HDZ) of F. Tuđzhan to remain at power. Nevertheless Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU) gradually built its organizational structure in the entire country and expanded its electoral popularity. The reason for this became lack of desire of the government cabinet of I. Račan (2000-2003) to fulfill decision of the Constitutional Court of Croatia on payment of pension arrears from the beginning of 1990-ies. As the result of it Croatian Party of Pensioners was able to receive four percent of votes at the parliamentary elections in 2003 and also to bring its three of its deputies to the legislature. By the election results HSU secured support of governmental cabinet of I. Sanader from Croatian Democratic Union in exchange of execution of the Constitutional Court Decision on payment of pension arrears. In 2007 Croatian Party of Pensioners was able to receive 4.1 percent of votes at the successive parliamentary elections. However, application of proportional system of lists in line with D-Hondt formula allowed the party to receive only one deputy mandate. Nevertheless the party continued to clearly perform its obligations to fulfill obligations of pension arrears payment. The electoral popularity of the party rose after the pension reform, whose essence was in implementation of so called “Swiss formula” of pensions calculation. HSU insisted that new pensions should be recounted to equal the old pensions²⁸. Aggravation of this matter as well as the consequences of financial crisis in 2009 made Croatian Party of Pensioners stop supporting government cabinet of Ya. Kosor. Instead the party became a member of so called electoral block “Coalition kukuriku” (the previous name – “Union for changes”). It is socio-democratic and socio-liberal alliance consisting of four parties: Socio-Democratic Party (SDPH), People’s Party of Liberal Democrats (HNS), Istrijsk Democratic Assembly (IDS), as well as Party of Pensioners (HSU). At the elections in December of 2011 the elective coalition received 40.4 percent of the votes and 80 mandates. Out of them 3 mandates were given to the Party of Pensioners. However the party was never included into negotiations on government cabinet formation, although its election partners formed coalition government of majority.

Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS) is rather popular; it appeared in 2005 and positions itself as «single-issue party» or special party. The program of this party says that it is extra-ideological and ready to cooperate with any political party, which defends interests of pensioners and other socially vulnerable layers of population. The main vectors of activity of Party of United Pensioners are determined as: achievement of economic equality, social justice, reformation of all aspects of pension system and sphere of the pensioners and disabled persons rights protection, ensuring of free education, preservation of healthy environment

²⁸ At the same time the stood (and stands) for: implementation of social justice principles, which are based on the principles of morale; ensuring plebiscitary pattern of social community and democracy; organization of self-regulatory groups to help people; decentralization of budget resources; differentiation of pension provision; protection of disabled persons and pensioners rights, etc. See: *Program Stranke Umirovljenika Za Razdoblje 2011-2015 Godine*, izródlo: <http://www.stranka-umirovljenika.hr/PDF/SU%20-%20PROGRAM%20STRANKE%20UMIROVLJENIKA%202011%20-%202015..pdf> (styczeń 2014).

and rational use of natural resources, etc.²⁹. Such program of the party allowed it to become popular from electoral point of view. Hence, by the results of parliamentary elections in 2007, in which the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia participated in electoral block with the Socio-Democratic Party (SDP), it didn't receive any mandate. In the parliamentary elections in 2008, in which Party of the United Pensioners of Serbia participated in electoral block with the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the party "United Serbia" (JS), it received five mandates in the parliament. By the results of parliamentary elections in 2012, in which the Party of United Pensioners participated in identical electoral coalition, it received 12 mandates. It shows gradual growth of electoral popularity of this political force.

Even despite this, the most politically successful in the analyzed countries is *the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia* (DeSUS), which appeared at the dawn of Slovenian independence in 1991. In the classical left-right ideological range DeSUS is evaluated as center party, which is based on protecting and guaranteeing social justice³⁰. During the period of 1992-2014, this party always participates in parliamentary elections and receives deputies mandates. At that the electoral support of the party ranges from 4 to 7.5% of the voters (or from four to seven mandates in lower part of Slovenian parliament). The most important is the fact that during 1996-2014, when the party was represented in the parliament, it participated in formation of seven government cabinets, i.e. it received ministerial portfolios: for example in 1997-2000 the party was member of minimally victorious coalition of Ya. Drnovšek; in 2002-2004 – of excessively victorious coalition of A. Ropa; in 2004 – it worked in the composition of minimally victorious coalition of A. Ropa; in 2004-2008 – it worked in the composition of minimally victorious coalition of Ya. Yanshi; in 2008-2011 – in minimally victorious coalition of B. Pakhor; in 2012 – in excessively victorious coalition of Ya. Yanshi; in 2013-2014 – in composition of excessively victorious coalition of A. Brasušek. At that it is interesting that the party clearly positioned itself as left-of-center «single-issue party». It is evidenced by the fact that the party more often cooperated with the left/left-of-center political forces.

In general the analysis of program documents of pensioners parties in the selected countries demonstrates that *ideologically the pensioners parties* are usually left and left-of-center political parties. The predominantly articulate forthright short-term material demands, related with resources distribution. However, the parties position themselves as the ones with "non-political niche" of protecting the "older" voters. As the result of this the parties of pensioners have

²⁹ Програм Партије Уједињених Пензионера Србије, *izrodlo*: <http://www.pups.org.rs/images/vesti/program.pdf> (styczeń 2014).

³⁰ K. Benoit, M. Laver, *Party policy in modern democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006.; L. Hooghe, *Reliability and validity of measuring party positions: The Chapel Hill expert surveys of 2002 and 2006*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 5, s. 687-703.; H-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, I. Budge, *Mapping policy preferences II: Estimates for parties, electors and governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD, 1990-2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 2007.; M. Steenbergen, G. Marks, *Evaluating Expert Surveys*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, vol 46, nr 3, s. 347-366.; A. Trechsel, P. Mair, *When parties (also) position themselves: An introduction to the EU Profiler*, "EUI Working Papers RSCAS" 2009, vol 65.

legitimacy mandate and are outlined as “detached from political pressure” on the part of other parties. Key requirements of the pensioners parties are concentrated on a number of program slogans: regular increase of pensions and benefits to elderly and/or disabled persons, improvement of social services level (health care, social security and reduction of taxes) for elderly persons; elimination or decrease of discrimination on the basis of age and providing higher social status to the pensioners. At the same time the pensioners parties present themselves a little more than “single political issues” parties and one special group interest. It is because they often design their political programs as such, which are directed at achieving social agreement, unity and solidarity of generations. It is demonstrated by the fact that pensioners parties often identify themselves as broad political movements, whose purpose is to achieve social justice and equality, and improvement of social security level. A noticeable peculiarity of such parties activity is the fact that when they enter into discussions with institutionalized systemic parties, they predominantly appellate to the issues of social security for pensioners and disabled persons. Instead, when there are discussions between the parties of pensioners and other non-institutionalized parties, the former appellate to the categories of equality, justice and social protection, positioning themselves as the left or left-of-center parties. This (in case of the pensioners parties representation in parliaments) provides them with both “potential for coalition” and “potential for blackmail”.

The main *reasons for pensioners parties formation* are as follows: 1) ageing of population (this trend is especially peculiar to post-industrial societies), which raises the necessity for “older” voters to be heard and/or politically represented³¹; 2) peculiarities of pension systems (in some countries, especially the post-communist ones, different simplifying mechanisms of retiring have been initiated – it is caused by the necessity of industry restructuring processes and prevention of social discontent after collapse of “real socialism” regimes)³²; 3) reconstruction of “state of general welfare” concept (to a larger extent it concerns the countries of Central Europe, in which a shift took place from the idea of state concentrated on resources and representation to the idea of state, which is concentrated on reduction of expenses and reformation), as the result of which large layers of the population felt themselves in social danger³³; 4) construction of sectoral/industry divisions in the generations (“older” voters are not identical in the context of social welfare – some of them receive professional and private

³¹ A. Walker, *Speaking for themselves: the new politics of old age in Europe*, “Education and Ageing” 1998, vol 13, nr 1, s. 13-36.

³² P. Vanhuysse, *Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social Policies and Political Protests in Post-Communist Democracies*, Wyd. Central European University Press 2006.

³³ P. Pierson, *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, “World Politics” 1996, vol 48, nr 2, s. 143-79.; P. Vanhuysse, *Review Article: The Political Economy of Pensions: Western Theories, Eastern Facts*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2001, vol 8, nr 5, s. 853-861.; C. Green-Pedersen, M. Haverland, *Review essay: The new politics and scholarship of the welfare state*, “Journal of European Social Policy” 2002, vol 12, nr 1, s. 43-51.; L. Pop, P. Vanhuysse, *Review Article: Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Theory? Conceptualizing Paths of Change and Patterns of Economic Interaction across Models of Market Democracy*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2004, vol 11, nr 1, s. 167-177.; C. Mukesh, G. Betcherman, A. Banerji, *From Red to Gray: The “Third Transition” of Ageing Populations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*, Wyd. World Bank 2007.

pensions, and others depend on state guarantees)³⁴, which usually play the role of opposing the pensioners potential to express their collective position, that's why they are the resource of socio-political mobilization³⁵. The synthesis of the mentioned reasons influences in a different way on construction of pensioners parties phenomenon. *Firstly*, age contradictions, which are related with the social policy, are often a catalyst of pensioners parties formation, at least based on the fact that they are direct channel of mobilization of moods and feelings of social/public estrangement of "older voters" (such social/political tendencies are perceived as forms of discrimination on the basis of age). *Secondly*, the reason for the pensioners parties formation is deep difference in accepting the concept of "general welfare state" before its upheaval and after it. It is so, because the fact of change of perceiving the established social orders gives birth to different socio-political interests and identities, in particular in the environment of pensioners and non-pensioners³⁶.

As far as the perspectives of probable electoral successes of pensioners parties in the countries of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe are concerned, it should be noted, that they depend to a large extent on the reason of their formation and also on institutional and political factors: peculiarities of political regimes (pensioners parties are predominantly formed in democratic political regimes); parameters of election systems (pensioners parties are usually more successful in the countries, in which proportional systems of lists with low electoral barriers and election formulas, created for the benefit of small parties); level of party systems institutionalization (when the key role in the system is played by large institutionalized parties, appearance of small parties is complicated and problematic).

In general, in the course of considering pensioners parties in the countries of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe we can conclude that: 1) in general the pensioners parties represent peripheral and minority phenomenon of interparty competition (the majority of pensioners parties have no stable electoral support on national level and don't participate in government offices formation, although the pensioners parties in some countries, in particular in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia are not minority anymore, since they permanently have representation in the national parliaments and even are governmental ones); 2) in some countries pensioners parties make a short-term group of parties, at least based on the fact that they cease their existence in ten-fifteen years after their appearance (in Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland); 3) ideologically pensioners parties tend toward left center, although in most cases they position themselves as apolitical organizations.

³⁴ J. Večerník, *Changing Social Status of Pensioners and Prospects of Pension Reform in the Czech Republic*, Wyd. Institute of Economic Studies: "Occasional Paper" 2006, nr 2.

³⁵ A. Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of Our Democracies*, Wyd. Palgrave-Macmillan 2009.

³⁶ S. Hanley, *The emergence of pensioners' parties in contemporary Europe*, [w:] J. Tremmel, *Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970-1985 in a Generational Comparison*, Wyd. Springer Verlag 2010, s. 225-244.

Table 1. Pensioners parties in the countries of Central, Southern-Eastern and Eastern Europe: electoral participation and representation (1990–2014)³⁷

Stan	Party	Date of creation (termination of activity) of the party, year	Participation in parliamentary elections, number of times (years)	The best result of parliamentary elections, % (year)	Result of the last elections, % (year)	The best result of parliamentary elections, number of mandates (year)	Participation in parliament, number of times (years)	Dynamics of electoral support	Participation in European Parliament, number of times (years)	Participation in formation of governments, number of times (years)
Albania	PBPSSH ³⁷	2009	1 (2013–k)	– (k)	– (k)	–	–	decreasing (from 2013)	–	–
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Azerbejdżan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Białoruś	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bośnia i Hercegowina	SPU	2002	3 (2002–2010)	1,48 (2006)	0,10 (2010)	1 (2002)	1 (2002)	decreasing (from 2006)	–	–
	PSHS	2002	3 (2002–2006, 2010–k)	2,49 (2006)	2,49 (2006)	1 (2002, 2010–k)	2 (2002, 2010–k)	decreasing (from 2006)	–	–
	DSP	1998	2 (1998–2000)	1,1 (2000)	1,1 (2000)	1 (2000)	1 (2000)	decreasing (2000)	–	–
	DSS	2007	–	–	–	–	–	decreasing (from 2007)	–	–
Bułgaria	HSU	1996	3 (2003–2007, 2011–k)	4,1 (2007)	4,1 (2007)	3 (2007, 2011–k)	3 (2003–2011)	increasing (from 2003)	–	–
	SU	2013	–	–	–	–	–	increasing (from 2013)	–	–
	PPI	2009	2 (2009, 2012–k)	2,37 (2009)	2,37 (2009)	–	–	decreasing (from 2009)	–	–
Czechy	DŽ	1990 (2006)	4 (1992–2002)	3,77 (1992)	0,86 (2002)	–	–	decreasing (from 1992)	–	–
	EPL	1992	1 (1992)	3,71 (1992)	3,71 (1992)	–	–	decreasing (from 1992)	–	–
Estonia	EPPL	1995	2 (1995–1999–k)	–	–	–	–	decreasing (from 1995)	–	–
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Gruzja	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Kosowo	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Litwa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Łotwa	PSP	2006 (2009)	–	–	–	–	–	decreasing (from 2006)	–	–
	LA	1987 (2009)	–	–	–	–	–	decreasing (from 1992)	–	–
	PPRM	1996	2 (1998, 2008–k)	0,5 (1998)	k (2008)	–	–	decreasing (from 1998)	–	–
Macedonia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	O/W Legnica	1991 (1994)	1 (1991)	0,04 (1991)	0,04 (1991)	–	–	decreasing (from 1991)	–	–
Polska	NER	1991 (1992)	1 (1991)	0,04 (1991)	0,04 (1991)	–	–	decreasing (from 1991)	–	–
	KPEIR	1994	5 (1997, 2001–2011–k)	2,18 (1997)	– (k)	–	–	decreasing (from 1997)	–	–
	KPPiR-RP	1997 (2005)	1 (1997)	1,63 (1997)	1,63 (1997)	–	–	decreasing (from 1997)	–	–

Rošja	PP	1997 (2001)	1 (1999)	1,95 (1999)	1 (1999)	1 (1999)	1 (1999)	1 (1999)	decreasing (from 1999)	-	-
	RPP	2001 (2006)	1 (2003-k)	- (k)	1 (2003)	1 (2003)	1 (2003)	1 (2003)	decreasing (from 2003)	-	-
	RPPzS	2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rumunja	PPR	2000	1 (2000)	0,66 (2000)	-	-	-	-	decreasing (from 2000)	-	-
	PPPS	2008	1 (2008)	0,12 (2008)	-	-	-	-	decreasing (from 2008)	-	-
	PUPS	2005	3 (2007-2012)	k (2007-2012)	12 (2012)	2 (2008-2012)	2 (2008-2012)	2 (2008-2012)	increasing (from 2007)	-	-
Słowacja	SDSO	1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	decreasing (from 1995)	-	-
	SDoS	1995	1 (2002-k)	3,70 (2002-k)	3,70 (2002-k)	3,70 (2002-k)	3,70 (2002-k)	3,70 (2002-k)	decreasing (from 2002)	-	-
Słowenia	DeSUS	1991	6 (1992-k, 1996-2011)	7,47 (2008)	7 (2008)	7 (2008)	7 (2008)	7 (2008)	decreasing (from 2008)	-	7 (1997-2014)
	PPU	1999	3 (2006-2012)	0,56 (2012)	0,56 (2012)	0,56 (2012)	0,56 (2012)	0,56 (2012)	increasing (from 2006)	-	-
Ukraina	PZPU	1998	1 (2007-k)	-	-	-	-	-	decreasing (from 2007)	-	-
	NYUP	1994	3 (1994, 2002, 2006)	0,02 (1994)	0,02 (1994)	0,02 (1994)	0,02 (1994)	0,02 (1994)	decreasing (from 1994)	-	-

Žródło: H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, J. Budge, *Mapping policy preferences II: Estimates for parties, electors and governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD, 1990-2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, 2007; J. Benoit, M. Laver, *Party policy in modern democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2006; *Portal: Polityka*; "Wikipedia"; Źródło: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Politics> (styczeń 2014); H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, Źródło: <http://parlgov.org/> (styczeń 2014).

³⁷ Abbreviations: PBPSPH means Party „People’s Union of Pensioners” (Partia Bashkimi Popullor i Pensionistëve Shqiptar); SPU means the Party of Pensioners of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka Pensionera Umirovljenika BiH); PSRS means the Party of Pensioners of the Serbian Republic (Pensionerska Stranka Republike Srpske); DSP means the Democratic Party of Pensioners (Demokratska stranka penzionera); SSM means the Movement of Social Solidarity of Bulgaria (Movement „Social Solidarity”); HSU means the Croatian Party of Pensioners (Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika); SU means the Party of Pensioners (Stranka Umirovljenika); PPI means the Party of Pensioners and Disabled Persons (Partija penzionera i invalida); DZJ means the Party „Pensioners for safe life” (Duchodci za životni jistroy) (later renamed into „The Party for Safe Life” (Strana za životni jistroy, SZJ), and later – in 2006 – it merged with the party „Independent Democrats” (ND)); EPL means the Estonian Union of Pensioners (Eesti Pensionaride Liit); EPPPL means the Estonian Union of Pensioners and Families (later renamed into the Estonian Party of Pensioners and Families (Eesti Pensionaride ja Perede Erakond, EPPE)); PSP means the Party of Pensioners and Elderly Persons (Pensionari un Senioru partija); LA means the party „Latvian Renaissance” (Latvijsk Atmoda); PPRM means the Party of Pensioners of the Republic of Macedonia (Partija na penzionerite na Republika Makedonija); O/W Legnica means Association of Pensioners and Disabled Persons; KPEiR means the National Party of Pensioners; KPPiR-RP means the National Alliance of Pensioners of the Polish Republic; NER means the Party of Disabled Persons and Pensioners; PP means the Party of Pensioners (Partija penzionerov); RPP means the Russian Party of Pensioners (Российская партия пенсионеров); RPPzS means the Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice (Российская партия пенсионеров за справедливость); PPR means the Party of Pensioners of Romania (Partidul Pensionarilor din Romania); PPS means the Party of Peoples and Social Protection (Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale); PUPS means the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije); SDSO means the Party of Pensioners and Socially Dependent (Strana dôchodcov a sociálne odkázaných); SDoS means the Party of Pensioners of Slovakia (Strana dôchodcov Slovenska); DeSUS means the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (Demokratska stranka upokojenec Slovenije); PPU means the Party of Pensioners of Ukraine (the Party of Pensioners of Ukraine); PZPU means the Party of Protection of Pensioners of Ukraine (Partija захисту пенсіонерів України) (in 2009 it changed the name to „People’s Block”); NYUP means the Party of Pensioners (Nyugdíjasok Partja); k means participation in elections or parliamentary ones on the basis of participation in election coalition (electoral block).

Державна антикризова політика України

Автор статті доводить, що прийнята з початку 2008 р. антикризова політика України, яка містила в собі низку законів, постанов та заходів, не була реалізована. Українські політики вже неодноразово опинялися в аналогічній ситуації. Крім економічної кризи, в Україні розгорнулася ще й політична криза. Спричинені ними негативні наслідки вимагають термінового вирішення, адже від цього потерпає все суспільство і держава в цілому, аж до можливої втрати її незалежності. Тому необхідно провести перемовини влади з опозицією, відкинути власні амбіції, знайти конструктивні рішення, повернутися обличчям до суспільства і його проблем та, зрештою, замислитися про долю Української держави, оскільки питання вже стоїть про її цілісність та виживання.

Ключові слова: Україна, кризові явища, економічна антикризова політика України, антикризові законодавчі документи

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State antirecessionary policy of Ukraine

The author argues, that the antirecessionary policy of Ukraine, which was adopted at the beginning of 2008, and included a number of laws, enactments and measures, has not been implemented. It should be mentioned, that it was not for the first time for Ukrainian politicians to find themselves in such situation. In addition to the economic crisis Ukraine has suffered the political crisis. And all negative effects caused by them must be solved immediately, as the country and society in general suffer from them, and it can even lead to loss of independence. That is why it is necessary to conduct talks between authorities and opposition, to throw away one's own ambitions, to find constructive solutions, to turn one's face to the society and its problems, and finally to become thoughtful about the fate of Ukraine as a state, as now it is the question of Ukrainian territorial integrity and survival.

Keywords: *Ukraine, crisis, the economic antirecessionary policy of Ukraine, antirecessionary legislative documents*

The states, where the market economy exists, are always characterized by the economic crises. The world financial crisis, which in 2008 involved economic systems of nearly all countries, in modern Ukraine has combined with the display of contradictions in market transformations. The investigation of features of crisis occurrences is necessary for grounding the antirecessionary policy of the state, discovering conditions, preventive mechanisms and crisis overcoming.

Analysis of the recent studies and publications. During the last years the researchers have actively investigated the mechanisms of the state antirecessionary policies. They have analyzed the wide range of problems of the antirecessionary policy in general, and some mechanisms concerning its realization in particular. Thus, Ye. V. Tatarenko and O. A. Laktionova in their scientific work analyze general approaches to the antirecessionary management of the financial system [1, p. 43-45]. L. A. Syvolap examines investment mechanisms of the post-crisis adaptation of the Ukrainian national economy [2, p. 316-319]. The problems of the antirecessionary management within the strategy of companies' competitive recovery are investigated by T. H. Heletii [3, p. 95-99]. S. I. Hrytsenko analyzes the general mechanism of functional cycles' management under the condition of the global cluster cooperation [4, p. 99-103]. I. V. Zlenko in his work focuses on the instruments of the tax regulation aimed at ensuring the economic development of the country [5, p. 86-88]. In the multi-author book "Global Economic Crisis 2008-2010: World Experience and the Ways of Its Overcoming in Ukraine" issued by the Academy of Economic Sciences the attention is paid to the problem of the antirecessionary elements of financial stabilization [6, p. 120-138]. So, the carried out review of the issues concerning conduction of the antirecessionary state policy indicates, that in modern economic publications the problem of mechanisms and key factors of the antirecessionary policy have not been fully investigated, and this stresses the topicality of the research and stipulates the necessity of its conduction.

The aim of the paper is to support the conceptual approaches to the usage of measures and key factors in providing the antirecessionary economic development of the country.

Factual material statement. The antirecessionary policy is the set of deliberate and purposeful actions of market participants (first of all the state and to some degree the powerful corporations and supranational bodies) towards the industrial cycle with the aim to reduce the intensity of cyclic vibrations, stabilize economic conditions and enhance the rate of economic growth. The antirecessionary management of the state is the basis for anti-cyclic regulation of economy.

The appearance of the crisis phenomena in Ukraine in autumn 2008 caused the need to implement a number of antirecessionary measures. The government worked out and

submitted to the Verkhovna Rada more than 160 bills aimed at overcoming the crisis phenomena, i.e. the bills which had clear antirecessionary nature.

One of the first strategic normative acts aimed at coping with crisis was the resolution issued by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) "On Urgent Actions Concerning Strengthening the Fiscal Discipline and Minimization of Negative Influence of the World Economic Crisis on the Economy of Ukraine" dated October 20th 2008, which was enacted by the decree of the President dated October 24th 2008 [7]. Taking into account threatening tendencies in the banking sector and real sector of economy, stipulated by the world economic crisis, the NSDCU outlined the main directions of the state antirecessionary policy and determined a number of complex measures, and the government, National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and General Prosecutor Office were responsible for realization of those measures.

The NSDCU, in particular, proposed the following measures to the government: to establish the stabilizing fund and determine the main ways of its filling and usage; to plan the deficit-free budget for 2009; to reduce expenses on the state bodies maintenance at least on 20%; to introduce temporary additional limitations of import goods; to ensure within a month VAT refund for the taxpayers from the State Budget of Ukraine at the rate of the already declared sums, which would be proved by monitoring and the existence of the currency receipts for the export of goods and services returned in 60 days term; to implement a simplified mechanism of VAT refunding for the exporters on the condition of the existing cash receipts; to take necessary measures as to the immediate call of moratorium on agricultural land selling.

The NBU was offered to realize a number of antirecessionary measures in the sphere of the bank control and monetary policy, namely: from April 1st to increase the legal reserve requirements concerning credit operations, information of which had not been mentioned in the credit history documentation; to work out the mechanisms of limitation the upper limit of rates of physical persons' deposits attraction on the domestic market; to reinforce the requirements as to the clarity of the banks' corporate management, in particular to determine the real owners of the banks and to strengthen their responsibility for the financial stability of the banks; not to allow early extinguishment of debts, made by the residents of Ukraine outside the country; to introduce the minimum reserve requirement for the recompensing of possible losses connected with the banks' credit operations at the rate of 100% from the volume of the credits given for consumer needs.

We concur with D. S. Pokryshka, V. O. Povoroznyk, V. B. Shkadiuk, that antirecessionary measures, which had been taken in Ukraine since September 2008, can undergo the following classification [8]:

- measures concerning financial stabilization (financial sector regulation, banking sector support, currency regulation, improvement of the structure of the external balance);

- measures concerning macroeconomic regulation (influence on the real sector of economy, protection and stimulation of the national producers, support for the domestic demand);
- measures concerning social policy (social protection of society, control of the unemployment level).

In the sphere of the actions aimed at financial stabilization, the state antirecessionary measures first of all were directed at settlement of the problematic issues in the bank sector, which had considerably suffered from the liquidity crisis that had been observed on the world financial markets. To prevent the rapid cash withdrawals from the national banking system, the NBU adopted the Enactment № 319 dated October 14th 2008, which prohibited advanced deposits closing for physical and legal persons [9].

To ensure urgent capitalization of banks the NBU's executive board adopted the enactment № 389 dated November 21st 2008 "On Carrying out the Diagnostic Study of the Banks" [10]. The NBU's executive board adopted the enactment № 405 dated December 1st 2008 that approved the Special order of implementation of the measures concerning the financial improvement of the banks, according to which the terms and procedure of changes introduction to the banks' statutes as to the increase in the level of statute capital were simplified [11].

Besides, the NBU's enactment № 413, which standardized the financial improvement of the banks, their diagnostic study in accordance with the specified standards and settling some issues in the currency sphere [12] and the enactment № 960 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU), which gave the banks the possibility to receive money under the terms of transferring the controlling stake to the Ministry of Finance, were adopted. But on February 18th 2009 the Cabinet of Ministers simplified the procedure of recapitalization. The alternative project of the enactment envisaged more flexible conditions according to which the banks could receive additional financial help from the authorities [13].

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on October 31st adopted the Law "On the Priority Measures Concerning the Prevention of the Negative Effects from the Financial Crisis and on Introduction of Changes to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine", which presupposes the creation of the Stabilizing fund on account of the unplanned income from the state property privatization in 2008 and the receipt of these funds in 2009, directed placement of securities, and a number of measures, concerning the state support in the process of national banks capitalization [14]. Despite this, the Law enclosed the list of expenditures, which could be covered by the assets of the Stabilizing fund, in particular extension of credits on repayment, refinancing and servicing the credits taken by the national banking institutions and other economic agents from the foreign creditors up to September 15th 2008; extension of credits on finishing the construction of the buildings, which was carried out with the help of mortgage credits and the compulsory condition of which is co-financing on the part of the banks and property developers; provision of financial aid for the banks (with the aim of enlarging

the statutory capitals), replenishment of the national banks' statutory capitals and the State mortgage institution.

The next Law of Ukraine "On Introduction of Changes to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Prohibition for the Banks to Change the Contract Terms of the Bank Deposits Deals and Credit Deals Unilaterally", adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on December 12th 2008, was aimed at protecting the rights of the banking institutions' clients and preventing the practice of the unilateral introduction of changes to the already concluded credit and bank deposit deals [15]. According to this Law the changes were introduced to the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "On Banks and Banking Activity", which prohibited the banks to change the terms of the already concluded contracts, in particular as to the increase of the interest rate in case of the credit contracts or to the reduction of the interest rate in case of the bank deposits.

To improve the structure of the balance of payments the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine "On Introduction of Changes to the Structure of the Balance of Payments of Ukraine as a Result of the World Financial Crisis". In accordance with the Law it was presupposed to implement the procedure of the temporary markup to the current rate of import duty for some goods, in case when the balance of payments reached the critical situation [16].

At the same time the government considerably increased the statutory funds of the state banks, namely the Government Savings Bank (the CMU's Enactment dated December 27th, 2008, № 1119 "On Increasing the Statutory Fund of the Open Joint-Stock Company "State Savings Bank of Ukraine") and Ukreximbank (the CMU's Enactment № 1116 dated December 17th, 2008, "On Increasing the Statutory Fund of the Open Joint-Stock Company "State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine" and Introduction of Changes to its Statute").

To regulate the relations in the currency sphere and to introduce changes to the order of exchange business transactions, a number of normative acts were adopted: the Enactment of the NBU's executive board № 436 "On Currency Intervention of the National Bank of Ukraine on the Inter-Bank Currency Market of Ukraine till the End of December 2008" [17], the Enactment of the NBU's executive board № 469 "On Implementation of the Currency Auctions by the National Bank of Ukraine" [18], the Enactment of the NBU's executive board № 12 "On Currency Intervention of the National Bank of Ukraine on the Inter-Bank Currency Market of Ukraine in January 2009" [19], the Enactment of the NBU's executive board № 351 "On Fixing an Official Hryvnia to Foreign Currency and Banking Metals Rate" [20]. In particular, the NBU introduced the system of carrying out its interventions on the currency market by means of conducting the currency auctions. It was supposed that biddings on the auctions would be formed on the basis of the existent unsatisfied number of consumers' applications and banks' needs on the inter-bank market.

Measures of macroeconomic regulations, aimed at supporting the national producers in the real sector, included the adoption of a number of laws, which would regulate the enterprises' activity in separate branches of industries: automobile, processing, construction industries. In particular, it was supposed to entitle the enterprises of the processing industry to employ an annual right for the norm of accelerated depreciation of the main funds of the third group at the rate of 25%, to release them from the import duty on equipment and its accessory parts, which were not produced in Ukraine and were imported to the customs territory of Ukraine, and to refer production of automobiles, equipment, accessory parts, development and implementation of new technologies in automobile industry to the strategic lines of innovation activity [21]. The state support for the construction industry consisted in 30% refunding of the building value or buying flats at obtainable prices, ensuring citizens' housing laws, stimulating house building by means of credits extension for the developers and building companies to finish the already started constructions, on account of the State Stabilizing fund [22].

For the enterprises of the mining and chemical industries the following laws and enactments were adopted: the CMU's Enactment № 925 "On High-Priority Measures Concerning Stabilization of Situation in the Mining and Chemical Industries" [23] dated October 14th, 2008, the Memorandum of agreement with the CMU, the Federation of metallurgists of Ukraine, the Association of the Trade Unions dated November the 10th, 2008, which presupposed the state support for the mining industry during the crisis period [24], the Memorandum of agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the enterprises of the chemical industry dated November 17th, 2008, which presupposed to overcome the results of the contraction of chemical production in Ukraine, caused by the reduction in overall consumption and the world financial crisis; preservation of jobs, current level of wages and other social safeguards for employers of the industry; stabilization of domestic prices on the chemical production [25].

In the agricultural sphere, the authorities tried to regulate the situation and adopted the Laws of Ukraine "On Introduction of Changes to Some Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Prevention of the Negative Effects from the Financial Crisis and Development of the Agricultural Sector", which presupposed financial interventions on the agricultural market on account of the Stabilizing fund's assets, and competition-blocking on the domestic market on the part of the importers by means of temporary rising of import tax rates for some kinds of agricultural products, which could create an opportunity to sale crop production at good prices and would protect national crop market. According to the CNU's Enactment № 1565-p temporary import limitation of some kinds of agricultural goods, enforcement of domestic agricultural market protection by means of using elements of non-tariff regulation and reduction of tariffs on transportation of agricultural production were introduced.

Among the antirecessionary activities in the frames of social policy the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine №799-VI dated December 25th, 2009, which presupposed preservation of enterprises' employment potential, non-admission of increase over the planned volumes in the level of unemployment and ensuring social securities for citizens from unemployment, creation of the mechanism, which would support the employees, who were on the edge of dismissal, financing social labors from January 1st, 2009 on account of the state budget. Thus, in 2009 the norm concerning partial redundancy award was implemented. In case, if a worker was transferred to the part time position, it was proposed to compensate him two-thirds of the tariff rate. The Law presupposed realization of infrastructural projects, including Euro -2012 projects, which had to be financed on account of the state budget.

With the aim to balance the Unemployment Trust Fund's budget the Law presumed re-distribution of insurance contributions between the state social insurance funds and additional increase in the sums of contributions. Besides it was planned to strengthen target orientation of the state social care for poor families and improve control over its directness. It was detailed in the Law of Ukraine "On Introduction of Changes to the Law of Ukraine "On State Social Care for Poor Families"", which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on December 24th, 2008.

Hence, since the beginning of the world crisis the highest bodies of Ukrainian power started to adopt laws, legislative and normative acts, enactments and other documents, aimed at counteracting the crisis phenomena and tried to save the banking sector and branches of economy from recession and turmoil. But, in practice these and other measures of the antirecessionary policy were taken rather inconsistently and often did not bring the desired results. At the same time, it is necessary to mention that such measures were worked out and adopted under the conditions of rigid domestic political confrontation and blockade of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and this affected the quality, timeliness and consistency of the antirecessionary policy. One can conclude, that in Ukraine it was difficult to eliminate crisis phenomena, that is why a large number of proposed antirecessionary laws remained just strategic intentions, realization of which had to be carried out by means of adoption the consequent normative and legislative acts. Besides, a lot of antirecessionary measures, proposed by the government and vested in the laws, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, needed budget financial support and thus the effectiveness of these laws much depended on the government's ability to ensure the existence of budget receipts.

In 2011 Central and Eastern European countries managed to overcome the crisis comparatively without losses. Some positive changes took place in Ukraine, due to the growth of indices in metallurgical industry. But as vice-president of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Manfred Schepers declared "One should not be consoled with the illusions that everything is good. The region in general has got out of crisis rather successfully, partly

it can be explained by the recovery of the global economy, which in its turn, is explained by the recovery of the mining industry, and Ukrainian economy has recovered due to the improvement of the metallurgical industry. Besides the financial industry has received support from the IMF and EBRD, as they held up banks in the region. Countries' currency has also received some help. But taking into consideration all this it is impossible to forget about the region's potential to development, countries' export access to the European Union's market, all this helped the post-communist countries to overcome the crisis rather skillfully". But also he mentioned that it was impossible to be lulled into complacency that everything was good in the region: "The crisis is over, but it is necessary to speed up the reforms. There are many reasons why Ukraine will become very important economic power in the region. But to achieve this Ukraine must start carrying out systematic reforms in all spheres. Also, it is necessary to reduce the intervention of the government into the economy, i.e. liberalization must become more active".

We would like to mention that Ukrainian government had just started conducting reforms when the world economy felt the approaching of the second wave of the crisis. Ukrainian officials believed that there wouldn't be any other second wave of financial and economic crisis. "I think the second surge of crisis is scarcely probable, said the presidential first deputy chief of staff I. Akimova. In the EU various special funds for crisis-fighting have been created, all issues concerning Greece debts have been regulated and banking stress-tests have been conducted. Now world community pays great attention to the banking control and fiscal stabilization, and these are two cornerstones, on which the stability of the financial system is based on. After the decrease in economy in 2009, in the year of 2010, according to the NBU's figures, we received 4.5% of increase. The number of foreign investment and retail turnover has increased. Besides, there is a great difference between 17 banks with provisional administration, as it was before, and just 4 banks which now have their provisional administration. In general we started moving forward. According to the international organizations' estimates, the prospects for our GDP increase are 4-4.5%. The optimistic scenario gives 6%, but even 4%, including the solution of problems in the banking sphere is very good. It will give an opportunity to develop our economy in future".

At the same time the growth of foreign economic and political influence on Ukraine did not contribute to development of the economy. A kind of war, aimed at winning Ukraine round, started between the West and the Russian Federation. The President and the government of Ukraine often conducted separate negotiations with Russia, offering it one thing, and simultaneously proposing another thing to the EU. After all Russian pressure appeared to be more powerful and during 2013 EU – Ukraine summit in Vilnius in November 2013, the President of Ukraine stated, that due to the number of economic reasons and crisis phenomena, Ukraine would not sign the association agreement with the EU. The officials' refusal to sign the association agreement provoked the unexpected reaction on the part of Ukrainian society,

namely confrontation with the government, a demand to sign the association agreement, resignation of the government and president, anti-corruption drive, foundation of “Maidan” in Kyiv and other cities throughout the country, which has been asserting its demands.

Thus, the antirecessionary policy of Ukraine, which was adopted at the beginning of 2008, and included a number of laws, enactments and measures, has not been implemented. It should be mentioned, that it was not for the first time for Ukrainian politicians to find themselves in such situation. In addition to the economic crisis Ukraine has suffered the political crisis. And all negative effects caused by them must be solved immediately, as the country and society in general suffer from them, and it can even lead to loss of independence. That is why it is necessary to conduct talks between authorities and opposition, to throw away ones’ own ambitions, to find constructive solutions, to turn one’s face to the society and its problems, and finally to become thoughtful about the fate of Ukraine as a state, as now it is the question of Ukrainian territorial integrity and survival.

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Концепт технократизму та його вплив на формування непартійних урядів: теоретико-методологічні передумови й емпіричні наслідки

Проаналізовано сутність і походження концепту технократизму у світовій політичній думці. Розглянуто теоретико-методологічні передумови та емпіричні наслідки впливу технократизму на формування непартійних урядів. Детерміновано сучасне розуміння непартійних/технократичних урядів. Окреслено особливості урядових посад, зайнятих міністрами-технократами.

Ключові слова: технократія, технократизм, технократичний уряд, непартійний уряд, технократ, політик, управління/урядування.

Magdalena Białobłocka

Concept of technocratism and its impact on non-party cabinets formation: theoretical-methodological background and empirical implications

The article is devoted to analysis of the nature and the origin of the concept of technocratism in world political thought. The author reviewed theoretical and methodological background and empirical effects of technocratism on non-party cabinets formation; determined current meaning of non-party/technocratic cabinets; defined the features of cabinet portfolio, employed by ministers-technocrats.

Keywords: technocracy, technocratism, technocratic cabinet, non-party cabinet, technocrat, politician, management/governance.

The problem of *technocratic governance (technocratism)* is very broad and complex. It cannot be understood within the single specific synthesized scientific research. Especially since there are different approaches to interpretation of technocratism within the modern scientific progress as well as in the context of approbated political practices. There are

many scientific works, devoted to historical, theoretical and methodological, and also empirical definitions of technocracy, technocratic management/governance, ideas of technocracy as such, and also search of nature and attributes of formation and functioning of so-called technocratic/non-party (technocratic, expert, minority) governmental cabinets. Some of them (usually it is the first scientific reflections on the phenomenon of technocracy) refer to the period of the beginning of the XX century, other works (reflections, based on practical implications) refer to the middle and the end of the XX century, and the rest of them (devoted to the study of implementation of technocracy in wider format) belong to the beginning of XXI century. Among them we distinguish the following scientists: G. Peters¹, M. Centeno², E. Bryld³, E. Silva⁴, P. Silva⁵, J. MacDougall⁶, C. Huneeus⁷, L. Stifel⁸, B. Schneider⁹, R. Putnam¹⁰, I. Takashi ra J. Purnendra¹¹, P. Schmitter¹², M. Muramatsu and E. Krauss¹³, M. Cotta, A. Mastropaolo i L. Verzichelli¹⁴, F. Marangoni¹⁵, J. Gunnell¹⁶, J. Burnham¹⁷, W. Akin¹⁸, T. Veblen¹⁹, J. Straussman²⁰, etc.

¹ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, "Comparative Politics", 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339-358.

² M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, "Theory and Society", 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335.

³ E. Bryld, *The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems*, "Development in Practice", 2000, vol 10, nr 5, s. 700-705.

⁴ E. Silva, *The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1996.

⁵ P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research", 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297); P. Silva, *Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks*, "Journal of Latin American Studies", 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385-410.

⁶ J. MacDougall, *The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order*, "Asian Survey", 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1166-1183.

⁷ C. Huneeus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The "ODEPLAN Boys" and the "Gremialists" in Pinochet's Chile*, "Journal of Latin American Studies", 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461-501.

⁸ L. Stifel, *Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand*, "Asian Survey", 1976, vol 16, nr 12, s. 1184-1196.

⁹ B. Schneider, *The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America*, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva, *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1998, s. 77-95.

¹⁰ R. Putnam, *Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy*, "Comparative Political Studies", 1997, vol 10, s. 388-412.

¹¹ T. Inoguchi, J. Purnendra, *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1997.

¹² P. Schmitter, *Still the century of corporatism?*, [w:] P. Schmitter, G. Lehmbruch, *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*, Wyd. Sage 1979.

¹³ M. Muramatsu, E. Krauss, *Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking: The case of Japan*, "American Political Science Review", 1984, vol 78, nr 1, s. 126-146.

¹⁴ M. Cotta, A. Mastropaolo, L. Verzichelli, *Parliamentary Elite transformations along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy 1861-1999*, [w:] H. Best, M. Cotta, *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 226-269.; M. Cotta, L. Verzichelli, *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, "South European Society and Politics", 2002, vol 7, nr 2, s. 117-152.

¹⁵ F. Marangoni, *Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office*, "Bulletin of Italian Politics", 2012, vol 4, nr 1, s. 135-149.

¹⁶ J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, "Technology and Culture" 1982, vol 2, nr 3, s. 392-416.

¹⁷ J. Burnham, *The managerial revolution*, Wyd. Penguin Books 1962

¹⁸ W. Akin, *Technocracy and the American dream: the technocrat movement, 1900-1941*, Wyd. Berkeley 1977.

¹⁹ T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc., 2006.

²⁰ J. Straussman, *The Limits of Technocratic Politics*, Wyd. Edison 1978.

Diversity and ambiguity of wide scientific approaches to interpretation of *technocratism* result in multiple definitions of the last one. *First*, technocratism should be understood as a theory and innovation movement for control of election processes, reform of financial institutions and reorganization of social system, built on the results of works of technologists and engineers. *Second*, this is a control system with the use of technocratic theory and its practical implications on different spheres of social life and economic management. Taking this into consideration, the first definition of *technocracy as management* should be the following, proposed in “Collins English Dictionary”: *firstly*, it is a theory or system of society according to which government is controlled by scientists, engineers, and other experts; *secondly*, it is a body of such experts; *thirdly*, it is a state considered to be governed or organized according to these principles²¹. Close definition has been proposed in «Online Etymology Dictionary»²², where: *technocracy* is a name for a new system of government by technical experts. However, «The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy» describes technocracy as: a type of society marked by the dominant role of people with specialized technical skills, particularly engineers; as a control of government and society by people with such skills. «Encyclopaedia Britannica» defines *technocracy* as government by “technicians” who are guided solely by the imperatives of their technology. Generally, it is obvious that *technocracy* is a form/method of management (governance), when engineers, scientists, health workers and other technical specialists control the decision-making in certain spheres (including political ones)²³. It is particularly remarkable that under conditions of technocracy, the persons, who make technical decisions (including political ones), are elected depending on how highly skilled they are, but not on the powerful capital (including political one) they have²⁴.

Meanwhile, it is clear that in the modern world of scientific inventions and information development the idea of technical decisions, which are used for the rise of efficiency of industrial production and management on the West (mostly in the USA, and in a smaller degree in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Latin America), as well as on the East (mostly in China, Japan and other industrialized countries of Asia), led to the origin of certain new scientific views on the governance formation according to the principles of technocratism. Therefore, in this case *technocracy* means such form of management and governance, which is critically established on the principles of social skills, and also such mechanism of problem-solving (including political one), which is based on the principles of making expert decisions by technocrats. Taking this into account, the technocratic management is often considered to be favorable even in those countries, where it was not or almost was

²¹ *Collins English Dictionary*, Wyd. William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 2009.

²² *Online Etymology Dictionary*, Wyd. Douglas Harper 2010, źródło: <http://www.etymonline.com/> (styczeń 2014)

²³ *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, źródło: <http://www.britannica.com/> (styczeń 2014)

²⁴ T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Batoche Books 2001.; W. Smyth, *Technocracy – Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy*, “Journal of Industrial Management” 1919, vol 57.

not realized. The fact is that there is generally accepted idea that technocratic management is needed in a case of “general collapse of power of all large institutions and inefficiency of governments, which are encumbered with financial problems and complexity of the government facilities”²⁵. However, this conclusion contains important problematic question, and while solving it we start to perceive the meaning of technocracy. It tells us about the relation of technocratic management (technocracy or technocracy) to classic ideological and political management (policy), which is shown in the capacity of political authority to make and realize technical decisions. Often this relation is mutually contradicted, and that is why technocratic management and ideological and political management have a tendency to form to each other “conceptual opposition”: sometimes the ideological and political management denies any principles of technocratic management; and vice versa.

Nevertheless, a comparison of technocracy and politics within theoretical and methodological concepts is not possible. The fact is that politics and technocracy appear and function in the forms of many mutually advantageous relations. Thus, the politics in the light of political regimes and different forms of state needs technocracy for complex development of political process, realization of effective and good political choice and strengthening of all experts’ decisions as well as for implementation of methodological programs, development of well-founded conclusions, passing non-discriminating acts. However, technocracy, which means the use of work of technocrats (that is management by technocrats), requires ideological and pragmatic policy, sanctions of authority, if it wants to be heard, not to mention its efficient and effective use. In the same way we may define such distinctive categories of people, as technocrats/experts and politicians (as intellectuals). *Technocrats/experts* are people, who are experienced and indifferent to politics, and also non-ideological in performing their functions, in particular in the sphere of service of state functions.²⁶ *Politicians (as intellectuals)* are people, who aim to realize group interests, which have mostly a form of ideology; people, who appeal to ideological postulates in their attempts to explain and reach their goal. It is obvious that the consolidation of these categories of people is an effective mechanism of political development of a country. The thing is that technocrats worry about realization of social and economic reforms, and politicians-intellectuals — about political reforms. That is why, theoretically, the politicians use technocracy for clear goals, isolating it from pressure/intervention in such way, that technocracy could function “without fear and passion”.

Theoretical and methodological principles of *synthesis of politics and technocracy* are not new. G. Wilson notices that the condition for making political decisions, based

²⁵ E. Berndt, *From Technocracy To Net Energy Analysis: Engineers, Economists And Recurring Energy Theories Of Value*, “Studies in Energy and the American Economy” 1982, nr 11.; G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics”, 1979, vol 11, nr 3, s. 339-358.

²⁶ Y. Bangura, *Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formation of a Nigerian Technocracy*, “CODESRIA Monograph Series” 1994, vol 1, nr 94.; R. Tirtosudarmo, *Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural factors, technocracy and the politics of rural development*, Paper prepared for the first plenary meeting of Tracking Development Leiden, 25-28 June 2008.

on the principles of technocracy and technocratism, is the fact that such process takes place through attraction of specialists, who have knowledge about “natural iron laws of society and can adapt to them”²⁷. Similar thoughts about relation of politics and technocratism is observed in the works of F. Bacon, who proposed a paradigm of “*knowledge as power*”. It clearly describes a phenomenon of “leader-technocrat” as theoretical “political management” with considerable expert skills in some sphere or other (economics, science, etc.). Besides that, technocratic management is closely related to the concept of M. Weber about “*rationalization of bureaucracy*”²⁸. The point is that management is carried out only on the basis of impersonalism, dehumanization and rationalization²⁹. Using the concept of “rationalization of bureaucracy” M. Centeno formulates the definition of *technocracy*: “administrative and political domination in society of state elite and union institutions, which aim to press a single exclusive paradigm of politics”, based on efficient power implementation methods³⁰. Taking this into consideration, it is obvious that the phenomenon of technocracy is close to the phenomenon of bureaucracy. Their unifying and at the same time differential component is *rationality* — a characteristic of knowledge in the context of its correspondence to certain thinking principles. The fact is that the rationality of bureaucracy is to a greater extent substantive (since it belongs to more generalized value and standards system, integrated in world-view), and rationality of technocracy is formal (it can calculate and estimate when making any decision, including administrative one). The rationality of bureaucracy mostly depends on ideological and world-view beliefs, than on rationality of technocracy. The rationality of bureaucracy mostly refers to political values and beliefs, than to rationality of technocracy.

²⁷ G. Wilson, *Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice*, “Development and Change” 2006, vol 37, nr 3, s. 505.

²⁸ M. Weber, G. Roth, C. Wittich, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology [Volume 2]*, California 1978.

²⁹ Among other concepts, which explain logical, theoretical and methodological propriety of synthesis of politics and technocracy we may distinguish the following: idea of “*new order*” (author — T. Veblen; it means the necessity of revolution or strike being carried out by engineers in order to establish a new system of state governance in the form of “council of technical experts”), thesis about “*end of ideology*” (authors — D. Bell, E. Shils, S. Lipset, J. La Palombara, R. Lane, etc.), *elitist technocratism* (representatives — S. Lakoff, H. Brooks, P. Piccard, N. Calder, D. Schooler, P. Bereano, G. Boyle etc.), *bureaucratic technocracy* (representatives — J. Meynaud, D. Price), concept of “*technostructure*” (author — J. Galbraith, R. Boguslaw, V. Ferkiss), concept of “*depoliticization and repoliticization*” (author — J. Ellul), *neo-Marxism* (authors — M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse, J. Habermas, etc.), *taylorism* (representatives — A. Ranney, J. Kasson), project “*Venus*” (representative J. Fresco), project “*Technate*”, etc. For more details, please, see: T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, Wyd. Cosimo, Inc., 2006.; D. Bell, *The end of ideology: on the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties: with “The resumption of history in the new century”*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 2000.; E. Shils, *The End of Ideology?*, “Encounter” 1955, vol 5, s. 52-58.; S. Lipset, *Political Man*, Wyd. Free Press 1972.; S. Lipset, *Political man: the social bases of politics*, Wyd. Heinemann, 1983.; J. La Palombara, *Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation*, “American Political Science Reviews” 1966, vol 60, s. 5-16.; E. Lane, *The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society*, “American Sociological Reviews” 1966, vol 31, s. 649-662.; S. Lakoff, *Knowledge and power: essays on science and government*, New York 1966.; H. Brooks, *The Government of Science*, Cambridge 1968.; P. Piccard Paul, *Science and Policy Issues*, Wyd. Itasca 1969.; N. Calder, *Technopolis*, New York 1971.; D. Schooler, *Science, Scientists, and Public Policy*, New York 1971.; P. Bereano, *Technology as a Social and Political Phenomenon*, New York 1976.; G. Boyle, *The Politics of Technology*, New York 1977.; J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, New York 1969.; D. Price, *The Scientific Estate*, Cambridge 1965.; J. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Boston 1967.; R. Boguslaw, *The new utopians: a study of system design and social change*, Wyd. Englewood Cliffs 1965.; V. Ferkiss, *Technological man: the myth and the reality*, New York 1969.; J. Ellul, *The Political Illusion*, New York 1967.; J. Fresco, *The Venus Project: The Redesign of Culture*, Wyd. Global Cyber-Visions 1995.; J. Fresco, *Designing the Future*, Wyd. The Venus Project 2007.

³⁰ M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy*, “Theory and Society” 1993, vol 22, nr 3, s. 314.

On the basis of such scientific interpretation of technocracy and technocratism, and also their synthesis with politics, we come to categories “technocratic management/governance”, “technocratic official/leader” and “technocratic government”. The fact is that the term “technocracy” in political context refers to the processes of knowledge examination, reserves for solving political issues and, which is important, neutrality of political decisions for society. That is why technocratic governance, technocratic official, technocratic government and minister-technocrat as categorical components of technocratic management by political processes are *neutral and apolitical phenomena*, which can lead to political results. That is why it is believed that the governmental cabinet can be “dispassionate” or apolitical while performing executive authority, and at the same time it remains collegiate and it even can be caused by political necessity. Besides this, being apolitical, such cabinet can influence political process and social life in general. The only emphasis that should be placed in this context is that such governmental cabinet should consist of ministers and other officials, who are technocrats or follow the principles of technocratism. As a result, it is obvious that impolitic government is a government of technocrats. It consists of non-party/impolitic ministers-technocrats (some ministers in the cabinet can be political, but their party or political affiliation do not matter or it is of second (after expert skills) importance), nevertheless, it has some political consequences.

As a result, *technocratic/non-party government* a priori is determined with such characteristics: 1) in spite of the fact that political/apolitical ministers in technocratic cabinet participate in political process, political parties do not dominate. Actually, this means that any party affiliation of the ministers does not matter, since technical skills of the candidates for ministers are taken into account (by political authority); 2) in technocratic government the key powers concerning control of bureaucratic processes and organizations are executed on the basis of “technocratic management, built on scientific and technological innovations by non-party officials, who are not recruited, and also are not responsible to parliamentary parties; 3) in the process of functioning of technocratic government the most important is not the support of political priorities of parliamentary or other parties, but the support of technologically-oriented interests, associated with the ministers/departments, headed by the ministers-technocrats.

Also it is evident that in technocratic government not only non-party positions can be filled, but also the posts for party ministers. Nevertheless, the candidates from parties do not occupy any important positions in technocratic government, since they do not control important bureaucratic organizations and structures. What is more, in technocratic cabinet the ministers-technocrats are officials, who hold the posts of prime-minister and key ministers. So, the number of party posts in technocratic government is limited: either there are no party posts or just few of them (usually not more than half of the cabinet).

Technocratic governments can be formed in different ways — politically or apolitically, by parliament or head of state (in particular by president). This depends on constitutionally stipulated mechanisms of governmental cabinets formation, and also on constitutional/

formal and political/actual formats of state government systems. In most countries with parliamentary/political method of governmental cabinets formation (where the parliament approves the composition and/or the program of the government), the initial reason for formation of technocratic government is inability of parties of parliament to agree on formation of the cabinet on the party basis. Nevertheless, it does not mean that technocratic government in such constitutional and political systems functions in the same way as other governments do (in particular party governments). The fact is that technocratic governments (as well as party governments) in countries with such systems depend on support of parliaments, associated, first of all, with parties. In most countries, where the head of state forms the government (without approval of composition and/or program of the government in parliament), the initial reason for formation of technocratic governments is position of head of state. This means that functioning of technocratic governments in such constitutional and political systems is not always regulated on the basis of positions and negotiations of parliamentary/other parties. Synthetic non-institutional reason for formation of technocratic governments in countries with different methods of governments formation is periods of social and economic (system) crisis, when the confidence in political parties and leading political actor decreases. As a result it is believed that one of the measure of crisis recovery in these cases is formation of politically neutral governments, which would consist of specialists-technocrats, in other words technocratic governmental cabinets.

Nevertheless, the methods of understanding of technocratism, and so technocratic governance and technocratic governments are fundamentally different — from country to country, from region to region. For example, in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Central Asia (in particular in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine) the phenomenon of so-called technocratic management is quite approbated and has considerable historical background. The fact is that in 1980th in the USSR almost ninety percent of people from political bureau of Communist party were engineers. There was a stereotyped idea that control of society/state should be made on the basis of administrative management, which was built on scientific principles. It did not mean that politics should disappear. On the contrary, its role should increase, but the role of political orders should change essentially. The task of such “politics” was to rationalize the society through strategic use of scientific knowledge. In other words, the politics was supposed to transform in accurate sphere of social life with its own laws and principles. In Soviet and post-Soviet era this did not happen, but an idea of “pseudo-technocracy” is still developing and its result is raising and solving a question about “conservation” of political regimes and elimination of elements of ideological confrontation. The truth is that this practice in most cases was implemented by countries, which appeared on the ruins of Soviet union. Moreover, it still dominates there even now. And this happens despite that idea of technocratic government formation in post-Soviet

countries is called “communist”, it is realized on principle “working class stays in power, and experts administrate.”

The peculiarity of pseudo-technocratic governance in the said countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia is synthesis of classic technocratism and authoritarian (less hybrid) regimes, since they, coexisting in parallels, strengthen each other. As a result, with the help of political apathy and neutrality of government, they ensure, on the one part, the preservation of political system integrity, and on the other part, the improved performance of autocratic centers, represented by heads of state (in all post-Soviet countries, which approbate the experience of non-party governments formation, the constitutional and political leading actors of power-holding processes are elected presidents, who could manage to incorporate elected legislatures). Thus it is obvious that the idea of technocratism in post-Soviet countries is modified and “distorted”. In this regard R. Miliband notices that non-party ministers (who were supposed to be “technocrats”) — are those, who govern and do business as well”. At the same time they easily maneuver between two fields of action³¹. That is why it is evident that post-Soviet countries deformed the classic idea of technocratism to the advantage of their power-holding institutions. As a result, no system of scientific values was created, but substitution of the concepts took place. However, there is an idea in post-Soviet countries that technocratic/non-party management is more important, than implementation of party-ideological principles of political process. Besides this, in political practices of post-Soviet countries a rule of obtaining power-holding authorities by technocrats was broken — the power is taken on the basis of political delegation, assignment of rights/authorities, which do not ensure efficiency of governance, but only prolong the stability of authorities.

At first sight, such dynamics, except the procedures and some elements of electorate (the last one is absent), throughout long period of time was peculiar for authoritarian capitalistic and communist *China*. In addition to that the difference of Chinese model of technocratic government lies in the fact that rejection of idea of general electorate is made by emphasizing on “quality” of appointing governmental community. Nevertheless, the scientists often notice that such interpretation of governance with the help of technocratic cabinets is not a guarantee of organizational effectiveness of governmental cabinets. Probably, the non-party/one-party domination is related to non-party structure of governmental cabinets³². In addition to that, in the case with China, the principle of technocratism is embedded in the activities of Communist party in power. Moreover, the rule of “transformation of engineers into politicians/party members” has been approbated and it proved to be effective. This means that in most cases the experts with scientific degrees in exact, social sciences and the humanities

³¹ R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, Wyd. Merlin Press 2009.

³² L. Cheng, L. White, *China's Technocratic Movement and the World Economic Herald*, “Modern China” 1991, vol 17, nr 3, s. 342-388.; L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, “The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, s. 1-35.; X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr 8, s. 787-803.

become the members of Communist party. Very often such peculiarity of technocratic development of China is connected with modernization of this country.

Nevertheless, there is another aspect of the issue of technocratic governance and authoritarianism correlation. The point is that strengthening of technocratic character of management occurs not only in non-party regimes, but also in countries, which are non-party (in Belarus with weak parties, and party system is actually absent), militaristic or personified dictatorships (now it concerns Egypt, earlier it was peculiar for Singapore (the period of so-called "authoritarian corporatism"³³), Indonesia (especially in 1960th)³⁴, South Korea (in 1960-1970th)³⁵, Turkey (formation of so-called military and technocratic governmental cabinets in the second half of XX century)³⁶, Hong Kong, Mexico, Thailand, Ghana, Philippines³⁷, etc). However, the technocratic management in its classic understanding is rarely approbated in multi-party systems. Even if it is approbated, it happens only in the systems of clientelist type (for example, Ukraine and Russia)³⁸ or systems with dominating parties (for example, Japan³⁹).

The peculiarity of implementation of technocratic management and formation of technocratic governments in democratic/polyarchival political regimes (which usually reflect the models of parliamentary democracy in the form of parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism) is that this phenomenon of filling political process with elements of technocratism is considered to be exceptional. The fact is that in such countries political apathy/neutrality of political process occurs in situations where political, social and economic crises and agitations take place. Thereafter, from a perspective of theory of rational choice, politics and politicians should be neutral to overcome negative crisis consequences as soon as possible. However, since politics is a phenomenon with ideological overtone, it is considered that technocrats can

³³ T. Bellows, *Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore*, "Asian Journal of Public Administration" 1985, vol 7, nr 1, s. 55-69.; P.S. Seet, C. Hampden-Turner, *Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore's National Innovation System*, Paper presented at 4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream), 4-6 July 2005.

³⁴ C. Huneus, *Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The 'ODEPLAN Boys' and the 'Gremialists' in Pinochet's Chile*, "Journal of Latin American Studies" 2000, vol 32, nr 2, s. 461-501.; P. Silva, *In the name of reason: technocrats and politics in Chile*, Wyd. Penn State Press 2008.; P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research" 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297.; P. Silva, *Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks*, "Journal of Latin American Studies" 1991, vol 23, nr 2, s. 385-410.; P. Silva, *Towards Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999-2000 Elections and the 'Lavin Phenomenon'*, "European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies" 2001, vol 70, s. 25-39.

³⁵ P. Silva, *State, Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941*, "Bulletin of Latin American Research" 1994, vol 13, nr 3, s. 281-297.

³⁶ U. Akcay, *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for "The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On" conference, 22 May 2009.; P. Donmez, *Understanding Depoliticisation as Process and Governing Strategy in the Turkish Context*, Wyd. University of Warwick 2010.

³⁷ W. Bello, D. Kinley, E. Elinson, *Development Debauch: The World Bank in the Philippines*, Wyd. Institute for Food and Development Policy 1982.

³⁸ L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1993, s. 73-74.

³⁹ T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California Press 1982.

guarantee neutrality. According to this scenario the governmental cabinets of specialists-technocrats (non-party technocratic governmental cabinets) were formed for several times in Finland, Italy, Iceland, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Moldova.

For a conclusion we should mention that extrapolation of technocracy on the idea of formation of governments of non-party/impolitic type (that is technocratic governments) does not fully correspond to theoretical and methodological determinants of technocracy. The fact is that technocracy is not substantive (relative), even though it may depend on national and regional peculiarities. When the notion of “technocracy” was studied in the science, the scientists paid attention to the idea that state management had to be realized on the principles and achievements of science and technology in those countries, which were considered to be or aimed to be industrialized/modernized. But not in all countries and regions, where state management is ignored, modernization took or is taking place. Apparently, in some cases the sense and the purpose of technical management are changing. It correlates from modernization of social and economic political system (Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Korea, Chile in due time) to the idea of servicing political regime (Georgia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, etc., in due time) or its synthesis (to some extent in China, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia). That is why the understanding of technocrats changes: in some countries they are distinguished on the basis of expert and professional skills, in other countries — on the basis of political apathy and indifference, in third countries — on the basis of loyalty to political regime, in fourth countries — on the basis of synthesis of the abovementioned characteristics. It allows us to distinguish at least two aspects of correlation of technocracy and non-party governments: 1) so-called non-party or apolitical governments not necessarily are governments of experts-technocrats, in other words technocratic governments; 2) technocracy and technocracy may be used as “cover”, under modernization intents of which the mechanisms of keeping loyalty to political regime, and also prolongation of its stability are hiding. On the other side, it means that currently the classic understanding of phenomenon of technocracy becomes blurred because of certain personal or collective demands of some political authors.. As a result, the idea of technocratic management is explained descriptively as governments of non-party cabinets, which do not fully correspond to canons, established in the science.

Перспективи виникнення глобальної цивілізації

Сьогодні як ніколи гостро постало питання подальшої долі цивілізації. Зрозуміти причини й масштаби кризи земної спільноти можна, передусім, за допомогою дослідження цивілізаційної еволюції і насамперед кінця XIX – початку XXI ст., коли почали діяти глобальні процеси і сформувалася планетарна цивілізація. Перед лицем загрозливих глобальних проблем перспектива можливості точного і передбачуваного контролювання людством негативних наслідків своєї діяльності є доленосною. Ось чому вивчення глобальних цивілізаційних проблем являє собою пріоритетний інтерес для сучасного суспільства та визначення його майбутнього.

Ключові слова: цивілізація, глобальна цивілізація, новий світовий порядок, глобальне суспільство, постіндустріальне суспільство.

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Perspectives on the origin of a global civilization

The question of the future destiny of the civilization today has appeared as sharp as never before. It is possible to understand all the reasons and scales of the world crisis by a research of civilization evolution of the end of the XIX – the beginning of the XXI centuries, when the global processes started to act and the planetary civilization was formed. Facing the dangerous global problems, a perspective of the possibility of accurate and estimated control by humanity of the negative consequences of their activity is decisive. Studying of global civilization problems is the foreground interest for modern society in determination of its future.

Keywords: civilization, global civilization, new world order, global society, post-industrial society.

Relevance of the research issues. Human's history is a history of civilizations: from Ancient Egypt and Sumer through Rome, Greece to Christianity and Islam. Civilizations

throughout its history discovered opportunities of identity to people. What is waiting for us in the nearest future: unification of the world nations around the principles of humanism or destructive wars, begging, environmental disaster, clash of civilizations and cultures and as a result death of every living thing on the Earth?

The 20th century changed the outlook of humanity so much that even one individual can decide the destiny of the nation. The First and the Second World Wars, the environmental crisis and other factors influenced the fact that in the 1990's scientists began to talk about global issues (from the Latin "globe" is earth globe), referring to the most important and the most dangerous whole planetary problems of the modern epoch concerning the future of humanity.

The aim of the paper is to analyze developing conceptions of planetary civilization in globalizing circumstances. The main task is to analyze a new world order in the XXI century from the viewpoint of the research based on the global world development in the XIX, XX, and XXI centuries.

Development level of the paper theme. Some aspects of the investigation concerning perspectives of the civilizational space development are represented in works of Zbigniew Brzezinski "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives", A. Toffler "The Third Wave", T. Stonier "The Wealth of Information: A Profile of the Post-Industrial Economy", L. Shershnev "The contours of a new world order XXI century (civilizational approach)", M. Kravchuk "Conceptual evolution of the theory of globalization", Yu. Pavlenko "Civilization aspects of global conflicts in the contemporary world", S. Grymblat "Dialogue of Civilizations: the highest formations – global and regional trends". Aspect of interrelation and development of the leading countries and possibilities of the further evolution of single civilization that will unite the majority of countries all over the world.

The exposition of the main material. At the 2nd part of the 20th century postindustrial and informative civilizations were originated. This became possible due to the success in various spheres of public life, science, technology, culture, and it caused the simultaneous emergence of global problems. These problems appear because of the crisis, particularly in sphere of health protection, education, culture and so on. The presence of a growing tendency to create crises on a global scale suggests the possibility of a global crisis of civilization.

The development of the global community is based on the study of not separate problems, but on their combination and as well on their impact on humanity as a whole. However, there is a question, when the formation of a global civilization will start or when it has started? The 21st century is characterized by global informative technological struggle for authority in the world. Accordingly, we can say that certain political organizations or leaders of the countries can somehow influence the development of humanity. However, if you define a global civilization as an opportunity for equal dialogue between all its members, it is possible to observe deviations from the given rule.

Every unsolved and insurmountable problem is a threat in appropriate spheres of human life. Awareness of this threat allows taking preventive measures for reducing potential danger. This can be achieved first of all by means of adjustment and strengthening of a culture's dialogue in a global civilizational context.

However, contemporary world is characterized by irresistible globalization. The 21st century is characterized by global informative technological struggle for influence in the world. Accordingly, we can say that certain political organizations or leaders of the countries can somehow influence the development of humanity. However, if you define a global civilization as an opportunity for equal dialogue between all its members, it is possible to observe deviations from the given rule. In the "Millennium Declaration" that was adopted in September 2000 by the United Nations, it was proclaimed that globalization will have "...universal and fair character only by means of wide-ranging and urgent efforts on forming joint future based on our common belonging to the human race in all its diversity"¹.

The basis of globalization is the transformation of humanity into a single structural and functional system. However, it should be mentioned that during the formation of a global civilization the gap between the developed West, an international group of leading countries, and somewhat distant East, which is remaining behind the world leaders, is increasing.

The term "globalization" was at first used by an American economist Theodore Levitt to refer the merging of markets, which began to manifest itself actively in the early 80's of 20th century. Later, Japanese strategist Kenichi Ohmae, consultant at Harvard Business School, in his book "World Without Borders" (1990) wrote that "economic mechanism of some countries has become meaningless, global companies act parts of powerful actors on the world stage.

Although researchers perceive globalization ambiguous, ideally it should bring positive results and create universal human society, i.e. global human civilization. We can agree with Zhang Shao Hua, who believes that the global civilization has begun to emerge. He suggests that philosophical ideas form it:

- a. the unity of all things;
- b. the unity of all mankind;
- c. the unity of heaven and human².

These philosophical ideas define the essence of global civilization and its spiritual basis. If civilizations that existed earlier has regional character and show the spiritual features of people living in the region, the new global civilization is the combining element both of all people and for people with the surrounding world.

¹ Декларация тысячелетия ООН // Экология – XXI век. – 2002. – №1-2. – С. 24

² Чжан Шаоуа. Декларация глобальной цивилизации / Чжан Шаоуа; [Перевод с кит. Пэн Минкуаня]. – Пекин, 2001. – С. 14-46.

Global civilization is characterized by the interaction of existing local civilizations. Each of them has its influence on the global civilization, thus contributes to the general civilization of the latter. The interaction between local civilizations assists the process of modernization. Samuel Huntington suggests that the “at first modernization and westernization were closely connected and non-Western societies achieve the progress on the path to modernization incorporating significant elements of Western culture. However, the specific weight of Westernization is decreasing as different ways of modernization are increasing; the revival of local cultures takes place. Thus, further modernization changes the civilizational balance of power between West and non-Western society... The most significant strengthening is due to the Asian civilizations (it will be continuing in such a way) and China, that is gradually emerging as a society, which is likely to challenge the West in the struggle for global domination”³.

Strengthening of the role of westernization generated the idea of gradual “disappearing” of all non-Western civilizations or joining to it. As a result, it is predictable that in time there will be only one global civilization in the world that will be based on the elements of modern Western civilization.

But how world civilizations are developing in the context of globalization? Globalization is an integration of the country into the world economy through the policy of “open doors”, i.e. expanding of production spheres and market exchange, narrowing of the protective measures, etc., that facilitates interrelation and integration of international economic organizations. Globalization is a complex process that has a lot of forms and aspects, the most important is mutual relationship between modern multinationals and sovereign states, superpowers and underdeveloped countries.

The process of globalization cannot be interrupted or stopped because it rapidly continues to develop. More and more countries of different civilizations will be gradually drawn into this process with the unceasing rise of globalization and, certainly, they will feel its effects. Providing the globalization, the world will be gradually changed into a system, where the components of certain civilization behave differently and because of their traditions determine the future of the countries and nations that make up particular civilization.

The globalization of world civilizations actually covers all areas of human life, but developed countries and transnational corporations control it. Giving an opportunity for the best economic development, globalization and at the same time is dangerous for countries that are developing. For developed countries, such as the United States, globalization opens the door for making a pressure on the others. This gives them the opportunity not only to impose their political and economic ideas to other countries, but also not to accept the powers of international organizations of the various types.

³ Хантингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций / С. Хантингтон – М.: ООО «Издательство АСТ», 2003. – С. 107-108.

The state security and welfare of each country depends on the state of the international system. The establishment of the “new world order” will be able to provide the solutions of global problems. “Equal consideration of interests” is a guarantee of its efficiency and reliability. For example, I. Lukashuk suggests that “principal values that are essential to international relations in the twenty-first century should be set into the basis of the world order. They include freedom, guarantee of human rights, the best way of which is a democratic government; equality: no man and no nation can get rid of benefits; solidarity: global problems should be solved at the allocation of the burden according to the principles of social justice; tolerance: people should respect each other in the diversity of beliefs, cultures, languages; respect to the nature: with joint efforts to provide the preservation of nature; common responsibility: liability for world economy and social development managing as well as providing of peace and security should be common for all countries and realized on a versatile basis”⁴. These values called for joining people not only due to regional, local and civilizational character, but also to a global scale, that means association in the global civilizational sense.

Analyzing current world order Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives” wrote that “...American world championship is unique in the scope and nature... France and Germany remain to be main characters in Europe...” Brzezinski also indicates that “...China is likely to play leading role in the Far East of Eurasia...”⁵. The researcher suggests that approximately within 30 years the balance of power in the world will change dramatically.

Japanese researcher Kuzatake Miyahara in his work “The structure of global civilization: testable theory” wrote about the change of world powers in the future and the possibility of the formation of a global civilization. He suggests that in the end of the 20th century humanity began to live in a global society where every nation depends on the other. According to this, researcher considers that humanity began to create a global civilization. It will be formed after the formation of an international civilization.

Miyahara names East Asian civilization to be the first one in which China played the dominant role. This civilization was formed in IV-IX centuries.

The second was an international European civilization. The structure of this civilization brings the United Kingdom to the foreground. It began to form in the XV century, when the influence of Portugal and Spain was widely spread on the international scene. However, despite their prominent role in the colonization, global civilizational system finally was formed only in the 19th century when Britain began to spread the sphere of its influence on dominions. Global international civilization of British sample endeavored to create a highly developed civilization on a multinational basis and common currency and language but not to

⁴ Лукашук И.И. Мировой порядок XXI века // Международное публичное и частное право. – 2002. – № 1. – С. 31

⁵ Збигнев Бжезинский. Великая шахматная доска (Господство Америки и его геостратегические императивы) / Збигнев Бжезинский; [пер.с англ. О. Ю. Уральская] – М.: Междунар. отношения, 1999. – С. 231.

create global society. To the international scene come out other European countries in the end of 19th century, especially France and Germany. However, due to the spreading of languages and sterling (pound), the United Kingdom continued to play a major role on the international scene until the beginning of the 19th century.

The third international civilization was formed in the second half of the 20th century, and the main role in it belongs to the U.S. The international civilization although had a significant impact to the beginning of the 20th century, but it was not stable. Because of the rise of national revolutions and due to the First and Second World Wars, the forming of the third international Civilizations under the aegis of the USA begins. The spreading of the English language and new currency – dollar on the international scene takes place due to the creation of several international organizations, especially the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. At the end of the 20th century due to the spreading of scientific technologies, mass culture, petrochemical industry, automobile manufacturing, energy and electronic industries, began to talk about active process of Americanization that takes place in the world; the new civilization was called American. However, in the second half of the 20th century along with Western civilization has developed an international East Asian civilization, led by the Soviet Union. Yet East international civilization has failed to expand the sphere of usage its own currency and language, and therefore it remains outside the main research focus of world civilization of the 20th century.

According to the prediction made by Kuzatake Miyahara, the fourth international civilization will appear to the middle of the 21st century. To save the current capacity should be created a new international system, on which the Global International civilization will be made. Miyahara in his paper offered approximate schematic image of a new global civilization of the 21st century⁶.

Karl Jaspers, regarding the world history, singled out four heterogeneous periods: the “Promethean” era, the era of “the great cultures of antiquity”, era of “the spiritual basis of human being” (“axial age”) and the era of “the technology development”. He wrote, “Human as if departs from new basis four times. Originally starts from the prehistory, from barely accessible to our cognition Promethean era (the origin of language, tools, ability to use fire) when it just becomes a human. In the second case, it goes from the appearance of major antique cultures. In the third case, it comes from the axial age, when the real human completely forms in its spiritual frankness to the world. In the fourth case, it departs from scientific and technological era, what effect we test on ourselves”⁷.

Leonid Shershnev in his work “The contours of a new world order XXI century (civilizational approach)” suggested a simple scheme of realization of civilizing principle in world

⁶ Кuzатаке Мияхара. Структура международной цивилизации. Пробная теория глобальной цивилизации. [Электронный ресурс] – Режим доступа: <http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Author/Engl/M/Miahara/miahara2.htm>

⁷ Ясперс К. Истоки истории и ее цель // Ясперс К. Смысл и назначение истории. М., 1991. – С. 42-50.

politics. Shershnev confirms that in contemporary world the United Nations Security Council turns into the Council of the United Civilizations. He explains this transformation as the fact that the Security Council consists of five “great powers” that represent different state-nations, i.e. civilization formations⁸.

However, the idea of uniting all nations and civilizations into one universal meets with difficulties. First, it is the desire to eastern countries to preserve their identity. However, at the same time the desire of some countries to transform their own way into the Western can be observed. This westernization is seen primarily in Asian countries where identity and Western elements are intertwined due to various historical factors. The process of uniting into one big community that reminds civilizational organization has partially begun, this formation predicted Kuzatake Miyahara and Leonid Shershnev in future.

The idea of nation unity was observed long ago within borders of Europe. Some scholars believe that the beginning of the united European civilization lies in antiquity; others think that in the Middle Ages, and the rest suggests that from the appearance of capitalism. All these issues are disputable and have their groundings. Since the times of Ancient Rome has been made an attempt to unite the European nations and implant them “civilized” way of life that is inherent to Romans. Modern European civilization has taken the best inheritance from other civilizations that existed on its territory: humanistic values and aesthetic education; “Roman law”; moral principles that are based on love, charity and equality; the principle of “axial age” which should be understood as “revolution” in the sphere of ideas, then the person becomes such as we see now; etc⁹. European civilization is, first of all, was formed by the unique heritage of Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christian traditions.

If we talk about the modern global civilization, it should not be identified exclusively with Western civilization because it includes not only Christian but also Muslim and Buddhist-Confucian countries. Understanding of global civilization as a “Western” is connected with a fact that it is the most widespread in the United States and Europe.

Global civilization is not just a union of countries; it is the interdependence of economies and the unity of cultural development, unity of informative technological development. Those countries and regional civilizations that were not included to the global civilization put up the resistance to its spreading or trying to establish their centers of influence. However, as history shows, exactly this conflict contributes to the development of each civilization.

For effective study of the globalization processes in different civilizations researchers united to the International Society for the comparative study of civilizations that was established by A. Toynbee, P. Sorokin and A. Kroeber. The first conference was held in 1961 in Salzburg and was chaired by A. Toynbee and P. Sorokin, and since the 1970's of the 20th

⁸ Шершньов Л. Контури нового світоустрою XXI століття (цивілізаційний підхід) / Л. Шершньов // Персонал. – 2005 – №10. – С.43.

⁹ Удовік С. А. Глобалізація. / С. А Удовік. – К.: Ваклер, 2002. – С. 14

century annual conference of the society have been held in the U.S.¹⁰. The modern world civilization was formed on the former cultural, economic, social, political and other structures that include the previous (industrial) and new (post-industrial (informational)) civilizations.

Analyzing the current condition of international relations and strategies of geopolitical development, the main parameters of the further development of world civilizational formations can be distinguished. During the last decades is seen the desire to create a single global organization or government entity. However, experience shows that without economical, political, social, cultural and spiritual integration into a single system of values, the desire will remain unrealizable because the modern world organizations are based only on one or several areas. Uniting can have only regional nature. This is due to ethnic, cultural, religious and ideological diversity of nations that live at a certain continent or region. Considering everything given above, we can say that in the nearest future the international community will be developed as a global-local civilization.

Global-local civilization is a civilization of universal nature, which includes a number of local-regional civilizations. Local-regional civilization is a civilization that was formed in certain geographical regions based on common spiritual and religious, economical, social or political values and develops in the spirit of leading world tendencies, but with the preservation of values inherent to certain region.

Conclusion. Civilizations that develop in a globalized world make quite a significant influence on the development of each other, but here with more developed countries do not allow the rapid development of other states. This emerges in the opposition not only of different civilizations (i.e. cultures), but also various economic development. At the same time, it should be admitted that the globalization studies the world as a bilateral sphere of its influence. That is, one part of the world is seen as one that supports the process and the other is observed as that, which does not support it, but the impact is made by the predominant countries.

The formation of a single world civilizational system is such a complex process that includes not only developed countries and countries that belong to given civilization, but also other states. In addition, it should be admitted that global civilization includes local civilizations that integrating in it does not “dissolve” but preserve their identity. The relationship and interaction of local civilizations inside and outside global civilization contribute to its development. According to the interaction of local civilizations, the process of civilizations globalization can be traced back to ancient times, but it became widely spread in the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century, and it has not yet came to the end.

¹⁰ Ерасов Б.С. Цивилизации: Универсалии и самобытность / Б. С. Ерасов. – М.: Наука, 2002. – С. 73

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Уряди меншості в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи: причини формування, політичні наслідки, параметри стабільності (1990-2013)

Запропоновано теоретико-методологічний та емпіричний аналіз урядів меншості у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Виокремлено принципи та атрибути формування урядів меншості в парламентських демократіях на прикладів країн Центрально-Східної Європи. Визначено причини формування, політичні наслідки й параметри стабільності урядів меншості у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж 1990-2013 рр.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, уряд меншості, однопартійний та коаліційний уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, Центрально-Східна Європа.

Minority governments in Central-Eastern European countries: causes of formation, political consequences, parameters of stability (1990-2013)

The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of minority governments in Central-Eastern European countries. The author singled out principles and attributes of minority governments' formation in Central-Eastern European parliamentary democracies; determined basic causes of minority governments' formation, political consequences and stability in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990-2013.

Keywords: government, government cabinet, minority government, coalition and single-party minority government, parliamentary democracy, Central and Eastern Europe.

Parliamentary and semi-presidential republics¹ exist in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe (this region includes Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

¹ R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, nr 33, s. 219-238.

Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic). All of them are *parliamentary democracies*. This stipulates that parliaments (in parliamentary republics) or presidents and parliaments (in semi-presidential republics) have a dominant impact on the formation of *governments*. It goes without saying that “a chain of delegating” the power may be traced, which is directed (through different “veto actors”) for the submission of governments to the parliaments (or to heads of state and parliaments). Consequently we can observe an initial impact on the framework of the governments of the following composition: parliaments of party and non-party composition. In view of the fact that almost all negotiations on the formation of governments and their composition take place particularly in the parliaments, and also taking into account the priority of political parties in forming the governments we can assert that the composition of parliament in particular (although in various degrees) is succeeded as part of the government.

That is why it is necessary to single out different types of governments depending on the *party composition* of the parliaments and their extrapolation to the composition of governments in different parliamentary democracies of the countries in a region. According to P. Hogwood, four *types of party governments* are usually singled out in a political science: single-party majority governments and single-party minority governments, coalition majority governments and coalition minority governments². The majority governments are traditionally formed. They represent the scenarios, where a party or a coalition/bloc of parties has a majority in parliament, which is enough for the expression of confidence in any government. Nevertheless, the scenario of a party and interparty consensus is not always inherent: sometimes we can observe difficulties in the accommodation of interests and positions of the potential subjects of parliamentary/coalition majority. And as a result there emerges a possibility (provided that it is not prohibited by law) of the *minority cabinets* formation under conditions of distinctions in the parliamentary parties. Formation of minority governments is an acceptable recovery from a parliamentary political crisis for a country and its main political actors in case of failure to form majority governments. At the same time in some countries the formation of minority governments is a traditional mechanism for procuring “a chain for delegating” the powers of authority. Taking this into account it is obvious that the minority governments by their nature of formation constitute exclusive and/or institutionalized scenarios of the delegation of power from a legislative branch of power to the executive branch. As a result the object of this research is presented by the governments in parliamentary democracies of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the subject of this research is presented by minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the context of their formation causes, political consequences and stability, and the purpose of research is presented

² P. Hogwood, G. Roberts, *European Politics Today*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2003, s. 145-146.

by elaboration of a clear idea of what the minority governments basically are in Central and Eastern Europe countries in the context of specifying the reasons for their formation, political consequences and parameters of stability.

In the course of elaborating the issue of minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe countries and analysis of the reasons for their formation, political consequences and parameters of stability we handle the theoretical, methodological and empirical data, obtained from the western scientific sources. Among the scientists, who are engaged in the assessment and interpretation of the analyzed terms of reference, we can distinguish the works of the following authors: V. Herman i J. Pope³, K. Strom⁴, G. Luebbert⁵, M. Laver, N. Schofield⁶, M. Gallaher, M. Laver i P. Mair⁷, C. Crombez⁸, T. Bergman⁹, W. Muller i K. Strom¹⁰, G-E. Isaaksson¹¹, M. Ireland i S. Gartner¹², C. Green-Pedersen¹³, F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fetteschloss ra P. Harfst¹⁴, F. Müller-Rommel¹⁵, C. Conrad ra S. Golder¹⁶, B. Rasch¹⁷, M. Mattila i T. Raunio¹⁸, A. Skjæveland¹⁹, Z. Maoz i B. Russett²⁰, B. Prins ra C. Sprecher²¹ and etc.

³ V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191-212.

⁴ K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199-227.; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1986, nr 11, s. 583-605.

⁵ G. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

⁶ M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford 1990.

⁷ M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 1992.

⁸ C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1-29.

⁹ T. Bergman, *When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception*, [w:] W. Müller, K. Strøm, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193-225.

¹⁰ W. Muller, K. Strom, *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

¹¹ G-E. Isaaksson, *Parliamentary government in different shapes*, "West European Politics" 2001, nr 24, s. 40-54.

¹² M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.

¹³ C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the 'Danish Miracle'*, "Journal of Public Policy" 2002, nr 21, s. 63-80.

¹⁴ F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fetteschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 869-893.

¹⁵ F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, "Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen" 2008, vol 39, nr 4, s. 810-831.

¹⁶ C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119-150.

¹⁷ B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41-62.

¹⁸ M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 2002, nr 25, s. 259-280.; M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 270-271.

¹⁹ A. Skjæveland, *Modeling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond*, "Party Politics" 2009, nr 15, s. 715-735.

²⁰ Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, nr 87, s. 626.

²¹ B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.

In order to understand the reasons for formation, political consequences and parameters of stability of the minority governments we'll consider the peculiarities of their functioning by an example of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within 1990-2013 (analysis carried out with regard to ten countries of the region from the time of their receipt/restoration of independence or collapse of "real socialism" regimes before December of 2013). But we will first make some general theoretical and methodological remarks. *The first remark* pertains to the definition of the category of "minority governments."

We understand the "minority governments" as the term, which under the conditions of multi-party system represents the government cabinets, the party or parties of which (that is, those parties, which form part of the governments, and thus receive portfolios) do not represent a vast majority of seats/mandates in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament. It means that the *minority government* is the case where a parliamentary party individually or in coalition with other parliamentary parties, the share of the mandates of which amounts to less than half of complete composition of the parliament /main chamber of the parliament, forms the government. Accordingly, the share of parliamentary parties, which do not form part of the minority government, amounts to more than fifty percent of the total number of deputies from the parliament/main chamber of the parliament. But confidence (support/investiture) in the majority (vast or relative) of the composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (the format of confidence provision to the governments in parliamentary democracies has been constitutionally specified – in its own way in each country).

The second remark pertains to differentiation of the separate *types of minority governments* – single-party and coalition governments. *Single-party minority government* is the government cabinet, the party of which (which forms part of the government and thus receives the portfolios) does contain the vast majority of mandates in the parliament, that is, it individually has less support than 50 percent of the deputies from complete composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (formal and informal or implicit confidence in the government is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies in general). *Minority coalition government* is the government cabinet, the parties of which (which form part of the government, and thus receive the portfolios) do not constitute the vast majority of seats in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, that is, they individually have support of less than 50 percent of the deputies from complete composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (formal and informal or implicit confidence in the government is additionally guaranteed by another/other party/parties of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament or non-party deputies in general).

The third remark relates to the *powers of minority governments*. In their activity the single-party and minority coalition governments carry out the same functions as the majority

cabinets. The distinction consists in the fact that the head of government should focus more on the threat of possible early resignation of the cabinet.

This points to the fact that the head of the government must pay much attention to interrelations with a parliamentary party (with government parties, non-government parties, which provide support to the minority government, and opposition parties) and non-party deputies (if present in composition of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament), which is less common for the majority governments (especially the single-party ones). The fact is that an inadequate attention on the part of the head of the cabinet, for example, to non-government parties and non-party deputies of the parliament, which procure formal and informal/tacit support to the minority government (in the context of determining their election promises), may lead to a refusal in the vote of confidence in such government.

Taking this into account it is clear that the minority governments (both single-party and coalition governments) have more institutional flexibility in executing their line of policy, and are also more open in the context of considering the interests of the main political (particularly parliamentary) groups, than the majority governments.

54 minority governments have been formed in ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe within 1990-2013, which amounts to more than one third of all party government cabinets in the region. Out of the minority governments the coalition cabinets, 38 of which have been formed (more than 26 percent of all party governments and more than 70 percent of all minority governments in the region), traditionally prevail in amount. Such trend of the minority governments formation and interrelation of their types is characteristic for most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, except Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Hungary. In Bulgaria and Estonia the number of single-party minority governments is above/equal to the number of the minority coalition governments.

Single-party governments were exclusively formed among the minority governments in Hungary, and the coalition cabinets were exclusively formed in Lithuania and Slovenia. Most minority governments in Central and Eastern Europe were created in parliamentary republics (Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and also the Czech Republic before 2013). Latvia is an absolute record holder, in which 9 minority governments were formed within 1993-2013. Instead, in semi-presidential republics the minority cabinets are not formed so often. Romania is an exception, in which 12 minority governments were formed within 1990-2013, which amounts to almost 60 percent of all party governments in this country (that is, in Romania the minority governments are formed more often than the majority cabinets). The minority cabinets constitute more than one third of the cases in the context of all party governments in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia; one third or less in Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. In each country of the region the minority governments were not approved within 1990-2013 in less than twenty percent of cases.

Table 1. Minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1990-2013)²²

Country	Number (percent) of minority governments	Number (percent) of single-party minority governments	Number (percent) of minority coalition governments	Number of party governments
Bułgaria (from 1990)	3 (33,3)	2 (22,2)	1 (11,1)	9
Czechy (from 1990)	5 (41,7)	2 (16,7)	3 (25,0)	12
Estonia (from 1992)	4 (30,8)	2 (15,4)	2 (15,4)	13
Litwa (from 1992)	3 (21,4)	-	3 (21,4)	14
Łotwa (from 1993)	9 (45,0)	1 (5,00)	8 (40,0)	20
Polska (from 1991)	5 (31,3)	2 (12,5)	3 (18,8)	16
Rumunia (from 1990)	12 (57,1)	3 (14,3)	9 (42,8)	21
Slovenia (from 1990)	5 (33,3)	-	5 (33,3)	15
Słowacja (from 1990)	6 (40,0)	2 (13,3)	4 (26,7)	15
Węgry (from 1990)	2 (20,0)	2 (20,0)	-	10
Total	54 (25,6)	16 (9,7)	38 (15,9)	145

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2014]

With respect to the frequency of the minority governments formation it should be noted that you may trace an interrelation between the number of minority governments and peculiarities of such governments receiving the votes of confidence/investiture in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Any government (party or non-party, majority or minority, single-party or coalition government) may formally commence its activity only after it (prime minister and/or government program) receives the government support – so-called *vote of confidence* or *investiture*. This requirement is one of the basic principles in the “chain of delegating” the powers/liability in parliamentary democracies of the countries in the region, and is defined by the fact that the procedure of formation and and/or functioning of the governments is determined by the features of so-called “*positive parliamentarism*”²³

²² Temporary and non-party governments are not to be analyzed. Percent of the minority governments should be analyzed only with respect to the amount of party governments. The list of the minority governments prime ministers and their years in office: *Bulgaria* – F. Dimitrov (1991-1992), S. Sakskoburggotski (2004-2005), B. Borisov (2009-2013); *Czechy* – V. Klaus (1996-1997), M. Zeman (1998-2002), S. Gross (2005), M. Topolánek (2006), M. Topolánek (2007-2009); *Estonia* – T. Vahi (1996-1997), M. Siimann (1997-1999), S. Kallas (2002-2003), A. Ansip (2009-2011); *Litwa* – P. Paksas (2000-2001), A. Brazauskas (2006), G. Kirkilas (2006-2008); *Łotwa* – V. Birkavs (1993-1994), M. Gailis (1994-1995), G. Krasts (1997-1998), G. Krasts (1998), V. Kristopans (1998-1999), I. Emsis (2004), A. Kalvītis (2006), V. Dombrovskis (2010), V. Dombrovskis (2011-2013/чинний); *Polska* – J. Olszewski (1991-1992), H. Suchocka (1993), J. Buzek (2000-2001), L. Miller (2003-2004), K. Marcinkiewicz (2005-2006); *Rumunia* – N. Vacaroiu (1992-1994), N. Vacaroiu (1994-1996), N. Vacaroiu (1996), V. Ciorbea (1998), A. Nastase (2000-2004), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2004-2006), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2006-2007), K. Popescu-Tariceanu (2007-2008), E. Boc (2009-2010), E. Boc (2010-2012), M. Ungureanu (2012), V. Ponta (2012); *Słowacja* – V. Meciar (1993), V. Meciar (1993-1994), J. Moravcik (1994), M. Dzurinda (2003-2005), M. Dzurinda (2005-2006), M. Dzurinda (2006); *Slovenia* – J. Drnovsek (1992), J. Drnovsek (1996), A. Bajuk (2000), B. Pahor (2011), B. Pahor (2011); *Węgry* – F. Gyuresany (2008-2009), G. Bajnai (2009-2010).

²³ The vote of confidence in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is a formal regulatory legal act and a specific political action of the parliament/its main chamber, which expresses or does not express (checks in general) support of the program and/or composition of any theoretically new government or status of this program execution, that is, of the line of policy and activity of currently existing government. For more details, see: K. Strom, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000, vol 37, nr 3, s. 261-289; K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.; W. Müller, *Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2000,

– institutional and constitutional scenario, pursuant to which the fact of formation and functioning of any government is based on the confidence in parliament or the main chamber of the parliament. The fact is that the minority governments are formed more often in those countries, which provide for more simple procedures for their receipt of the votes of confidence on the constitutional level. It means that the minority governments are encountered more often in those countries, where a permit from the relative majority of the composition of the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments (format of relative majority in different countries of the region is determined in different way – for more details see the texts of national constitutions) is needed in order to provide the investiture to the governments on the part of those parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments. Out of such countries in Central and Eastern Europe we can point out Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where the average of six minority governments (minimum – three, maximum – twenty) were formed within 1990-2013. Instead, the minority governments are rarely encountered in those countries, where in order to provide the investiture to the governments on the part of parliaments or main chambers of the parliaments a permit from the vast majority of the composition of the latter is required. Out of such countries in Central and Eastern Europe we may single out Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, where less than four minority governments were formed within 1990-2013.

In general it is obvious that *the phenomenon of the minority governments is rather approved* in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in most cases it is believed to be an institutionalized mechanism of the delegation of authorities from legislative to executive body. In most countries of the region the minority governments have been institutionalized immediately or shortly after the receipt/restoration of independence of the countries or after a collapse of the “real socialism” regimes – that is, when post-communistic constitutions were adopted but the party and election systems in the countries of the region have not yet been established. Hungary represents a specific case where up to 2008 only the majority coalition governments have functioned. That is why the formation of two single-party minority governments represented a critical case in the development of Hungarian parliamentarism, which fact contributed to the reversibility of the development of Hungarian political mode after resignation of the minority governments (the deal is that since 2010, according to most scientists, Hungary began to somewhat move away from the values of the liberal parliamentary democracy). That is why it is obvious that in the context of Hungary the minority governments should rather be construed as an exception than an institutionalized practice, which will further be used by the country. In addition, the experience of minority governments formation in Lithuania, which began only in 2006, did not lead to a withdrawal from democratic

vol 34, nr 3, s. 309-333.; D. Diermeier, T. Feddersen, *Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure*, “American Political Science Review” 1998, vol 92, nr 3, s. 611-621.; J. Huber, *The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Political Science Review” 1996, vol 90, nr 2, s. 269-282.

values. Hungary demonstrates a similar conclusion, where the formation of minority cabinets is a permanent phenomenon. This was caused by the attributes of Romanian semi-presidential system, to which the actually commensurable authorities of two executive power centers (the president and prime-minister) are institutionally and constitutionally common. Periodical imposition of these peculiarities on often fragmented composition of Romanian parliament is a reason for more frequent formation of the minority governments that in other countries of the region, and also speaks for the influence of semi-presidential variety of democracies on the dynamics of the minority governments functioning. It proves directly that the minority governments under conditions of parliamentarism and semi-presidential system (in terms of parliamentary democracies in general) have impact on a political process in different way, which is implemented in one or other country.

With regard to the *reasons for the minority governments formation* in the region, most often we may point out the following ones: 1) arguments in the majority or minority single-party or coalition governments, which within the boundaries of one term of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament preceded the minority single-party or coalition governments (as a result of such arguments the governments terminated their powers voluntarily, parties or their parts left the governments, as a result of which the composition of governments was changed, and the votes of no confidence/no reliance were proclaimed to the governments, but what turned out to be undesirable/irrational or impossible was the idea to form new majority governments, non-party governments or the idea of feasibility to carry out the early parliamentary elections); 2) desire to expand the size of the minority government by virtue of engaging other participants in it and to guarantee more reliable conditions of functioning to the government (this refers to the cases of transformation of the minority single-party and coalition governments into the minority coalition governments with larger amount of government parties); 3) results of parliamentary elections, on the basis of which due to a difficulty or impossibility to reconcile the interests of the parties there is no possibility to form the majority single-party/coalition government, and formation of the government on a non-party basis or early elections of the parliament or main chamber of the parliament are undesirable²⁴. In general in a cause-and-effect aspect it is obvious that the minority governments naturally use the option of exiting the state of ideological opposition between the parties in the parliament²⁵. It means that

²⁴ L. Brokl, Z. Mansfeldova, *Czech Republic*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1997, nr 32, s. 339-350.; L. Linek, *Czech Republic*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2006, nr 45, s. 1078-1083.; V. Pettai, *Estonia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2008, nr 46, s. 943-948.; J. Ikstens, *Latvia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2005, nr 44, s. 1077-1085.; G. Ilonszki, S. Kurtán, *Hungary*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 966-973.; Z. Enyedi, *The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary*, [w:] S. Jungerstam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate 2006, s. 177-202.; F. Müller-Rommel, K. Fetteschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, nr 43, s. 869-893.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, „Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen“ 2008, nr 39 (4), s. 810-831.

²⁵ M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

the minority government cabinets should be considered as a normal result of political rivalry²⁶: they perform the same functions as the majority governments.

Instead, the basic institutional *reasons for termination of powers* (termination at a fixed date in case of expiration or reduction of the term for the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, or early termination) of the minority governments are: 1) early resignations of the governments on the basis of a change in composition of the governments and coalition arguments between the government coalition partners (in case of functioning of the minority coalition governments); 2) discrepancies in implementation of the government policy between the parties, which are governmental, and the parties, which provide the minority governments with the vote of confidence in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament – on the basis of these facts they may declare the vote of no confidence or deny the vote of confidence to the government cabinets (single-party or coalition); 3) regular and special/early parliamentary elections (in parliamentary democracies the parliament elections are generally the basis for forming the new government cabinets); 4) early resignations of the minority governments by virtue of voluntary termination of powers by them or the government heads or voluntary change in the compositions of government cabinets (in case of this scenario the new government should receive the votes of confidence in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament)²⁷; 5) inability to form a complete composition of the government cabinet due to the absence of the vote of confidence/investiture from the parliament to the appointed head of government cabinet (in cases when the vote of confidence provides support to the composition and program of the government, rather than the prime minister)²⁸.

²⁶ K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199-227.

²⁷ E. Giatzidis, *An Introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, economic and social transformation*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2002, s. 67.; F. Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, Wyd. Routledge 1999.; A. Banks, T. Muller, W. Overstreet, *Political Handbook of the World: 2005-2006*, Wyd. CQ Press 2006.; F. Müller-Rommel, *Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008*, „Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen“ 2008, nr 39 (4), s. 810-831.; C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, nr 49 (1), s. 119-150.; J. Krzysztof, A. Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, *Poland*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2006, vol 45, nr 7-8, s. 1231-1246.; J. Krzysztof, A. Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, *Poland*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2007, vol 47, nr 7-8, s. 1068-1079.; A. Krupavicius, *Lithuania*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1019-1031.; J. Fitzmaurice, *The Slovenian parliamentary elections of 10 November 1996*, "Electoral Studies" 1997, nr 16, s. 403-497.; P. Kopecký, *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competition and parliamentary institutionalization*, Wyd. Ashgate 2001.; M. Rybář, *Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia*, [w:] S. Jungerstam-Mulders, *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Wyd. Ashgate 2006, s. 147-176.; D. Malová, P. Učeň, *Slovakia*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1096-1106.; M. Popescu, *The parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania, November 2000*, "Electoral Studies" 2003, nr 22, s. 325-335.; W. Downs, R. Miller, *The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania*, "Electoral Studies" 2006, nr 25, s. 409-415.; L. Stan, R. Zaharia, *Romania*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2007, nr 46, s. 1082-1095.

²⁸ Such actual reason of termination of the minority government powers was declared, for example, to the cabinet of W. Pawlak in Poland in 1992. At that time the prime minister failed to draw support of the government parties (this was demanded by the president in office Lech Wałęsa and the constitution) and create a comprehensive government cabinet. Nevertheless, the formal reason for termination of the government powers was presented by a voluntary resignation of the prime-minister, which was supported by the parliament.

The reasons for formation and termination of the minority governments powers pose a problem of assessing their *stability*. Stability of the government is its ability to remain in discharge of official duties; steady state of the government cabinet functioning, which is characterized by an ability of continuous existence, preservation of key internal and external parameters of the government²⁹. The most approved categories of the governments stability assessment are presented by an endurance of the government and the index of government stability. *Endurance of the government* is the time, measured between the “beginning” and the “end” of functioning of a specific government. *The index of government stability* is a percentage-based index, which reflects the work of the government taken as a part of the maximum possible time of the powers validity (in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – depending on the term of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament pursuant to the constitution or in fact). Empirical experience of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe testifies to the fact that the minority single-party/coalition governments are less stable than the majority single-party/coalition governments and party governments in general. Nevertheless, the minority governments are more longstanding than the majority governments in Romania and the Czech Republic: in the first country the minority coalition governments are the most longstanding in the structure of party governments, and the minority single-party governments in the second country. The most longstanding minority coalition governments in the region are presented by the cabinets led by the following prime ministers: A. Ansip – in Estonia, V. Dombrovskis – in Latvia, G. Kirkilas – in Lithuania, N. Vacaroiu, K. Popescu-Tariceanu and A. Nastase – in Romania, M. Dzurinda – in Slovakia, M. Topolane – in the Czech Republic. Instead, the most longstanding single-party minority governments in the region are presented by the cabinets led by the following prime ministers: B. Borisov – in Bulgaria, M. Siimann – in Estonia, M. Zeman – in the Czech Republic.

It should be noted that the minority governments last longer in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which provide for regular, rather than constructive (positive) *votes of no confidence* in the government cabinets (regular votes of no confidence are provided for in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the positive and constructive ones – in Poland, Slovenia and Ukraine). Instead, no difference has been established in the stability of minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe depending on which majority in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament (relative or vast majority) is required for implementing the votes of no confidence

²⁹ V. Lyrtyyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennya ponyattya „uryadova stabilnist”*, «Naukovyy visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu», Seriya: Politolohiya, Sotsiolohiya, Filosofiya 2008, nr 10, s. 38-39.; Z. Byaloblocki, *Stabilnist ta efektyvnist urjadiv u politychnykh systemakh krayin Skhidnoyi Yevropy*, Wyd. Vydavnychyy tsentr LNU imeni I. Franka 2013, s. 15.; E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries During the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.; M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, „American Journal of Political Science” 1998, nr 42, s. 28.

in the governments (relative majority is regulated in the instances of Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary, and the vast majority – in the instances of Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Czech Republic). It also has not been noticed that the minority governments are less long-lasting in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where in the course of the governments functioning a *question of confidence* (receipt of the vote of confidence in the functioning government is no different from the procedure of receiving a vote of investiture in the head, composition or program of the government in the course of its formation) may be put to them. Among such countries in the region we can point out Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Table 2. Stability of the minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1990-2013)³⁰

Country	Endurance of governments (years) / Index of government stability: single-party minority governments	Endurance of governments (years) / Index of government stability: minority coalition governments	Endurance of governments (years) / Index of government stability: single-party majority governments	Endurance of governments (years) / Index of government stability: majority coalition governments	Endurance of governments (years) / Index of government stability: party governments
Bułgaria	2,32/0,65	0,93/0,24	3,01/0,91	1,95/0,60	2,15/0,64
Czechy	1,97/0,50	1,21/0,42	–	1,49/0,40	1,50/0,42
Estonia	1,09/0,28	1,51/0,39	–	1,56/0,44	1,48/0,40
Litwa	–	1,00/0,25	1,27/0,33	1,73/0,44	1,46/0,37
Łotwa	1,25/0,54	0,57/0,18	–	1,11/0,37	0,92/0,31
Polska	0,92/0,29	0,56/0,19	–	1,48/0,43	1,22/0,36
Rumunia	1,14/0,29	1,15/0,32	0,64/0,28	0,93/0,26	1,03/0,29
Slovenia	–	0,33/0,11	–	1,90/0,54	1,34/0,39
Słowacja	0,48/0,21	0,78/0,23	–	1,86/0,56	1,35/0,41
Węgry	0,96/0,24	–	–	2,44/0,62	2,11/0,53
Total	1,26/0,36	0,85/0,25	1,59/0,48	1,62/0,46	1,37/0,39

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2014]

The key *problem of prolongation of the minority governments endurance* consists in the amount of possible scenarios of declaring the votes of no confidence or refusal to provide the votes of confidence to the minority governments. That particular theoretical and methodological attribute of correlation between the government and opposition parties leads to the search of possible options to form not the minority governments, but the majority governments. The point is that we have a stereotyped rule, under which the absence of guaranteed support of the majority in parliament (by way of membership of the majority participants or

³⁰ Temporary and non-party governments are not to be analyzed.

their representatives in the government cabinets) causes instability of the government cabinets, political instability or inefficiency of governance. The minority governments usually do not have strong power, and that is why they quickly alternate with each other and this leads to the crisis of governance legitimacy. But in some countries the minority governments function in successful and stable way. Z. Maoz and B. Russett believe that “the minority governments are less constrained than the majority governments”³¹, and that is why as a result they can be less conflict than the rest. In their turn B. Prins and C. Sprecher³² prove that some resistance will be maintained to the tasks and objectives, which are governed by coalitions, in case of an increase in pressure on the government cabinet. In the course of studying the initiation of system conflicts and analyzing these competitive aspects of government activity, they offered to define the majority coalition governments as more dangerous in the issues of institutional conflicts escalation than the minority governments³³.

On the basis of the conducted theoretical and methodological and empirical analysis of the minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the following conclusions on the attributes of their formation, political consequences and stability parameters have been *drawn*: 1) formation of the minority (single-party or coalition) governments should usually be construed as tactics of behaviour of the political parties, which have been chosen to the parliament, under condition where they can not form the majority government (gain support of the vast or relative majority (depending on the law) in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament in order to form the government)³⁴; 2) formation of the minority governments and their stability depends on the nature of interrelations between the parliamentary parties: the minority governments are possible and more stable when special competitive and ideological interrelations exist between the parties, which can theoretically build up the majority³⁵; 3) the minority government extends the topical field of political awareness,

³¹ Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, “American Political Science Review” 1993, nr 87, s. 626.

³² B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, “Journal of Peace Research” 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.

³³ M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, “Journal of Conflict Resolution” 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.

³⁴ What constitutes a natural sequence to the elections is the formation in the parliament/main chamber of the parliament of the majority, which reflects a relevant support of the majority of voters, provided to the parties or blocs. When the parliament fails to form the majority, an alternative arises to political actors: a minority government, non-party government or early elections. Since the last two options anticipate a lot of unknown politics and risks, and may also be used after a failure related to the formation of minority government, the scenario of formation of the minority governments in particular is more acceptable. For more details, see: G-E. Isaaksson, *Parliamentary government in different shapes*, “West European Politics” 2001, nr 24, s. 45.; W. Muller, K. Strom, *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, s. 560-561.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 212-215.

³⁵ That is why the provision of one party with the right to form the minority government for the remaining parties is the “evil of the lesser kind”, since they will be interested in preservation of the existing balance of the operating parties political weight. Under these conditions the minority government may be stable. The indicated position is particularly logical, when the right to form the minority government is provided to a centre party, and the majority in parliament is held by the parties, which belong to different parts of the left and right ideological spectrum. That is, formation of the minority government is a regular way out of confrontation between the parties of different ideological positions in the parliament. In this situation the government may receive sharp criticism of its activity, but the ideological confrontation will be a constraining factor

creates foundations for a comprehensive interpretation of such phenomenon as a “majority in opposition”³⁶; 4) out of advantages of the minority governments functioning we can single out an institutional sensitivity, accountability (liability) and transparency³⁷, and out of disadvantages – instability, variability and inefficiency³⁸.

In summary, as for today the phenomenon of minority governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, even in spite of different cause-and-effect patterns of their formation, is a traditional and institutionalized variety of party governments. Existence of the governments of this type is related to understanding the politics as a sphere of activity, directed to the achievement and protection of group interests and the implementation of election program. Formation and existence of the governments of such type causes the availability of an adequate political culture of the main political actor. In each country of Central and Eastern Europe the minority governments are not limited by law. Nevertheless, the frequency of their formation points to the fact that in one group of the countries (Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia) the minority governments are more approved, and in the second group of the countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia) they are less approved, and in the third group of the countries (Lithuania and Hungary) they became a frequent practice and gained experience and are believed to be exclusively the emergency scenarios. Formation of the minority government cabinets, causes for creation and termination of the powers of the minority government cabinets, and, accordingly, for the minority governments stability depends largely on institutional parameters of provision and implementation of the procedures for providing the votes of confidence and no confidence in the countries of the region.

against unification of the representatives of non-governmental parties for early termination (vote of no confidence) of the agreement. For more details, see: M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990; M. Gallaher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 1992, s. 192.

³⁶ Parliamentary parties often implement programs not only from the government cabinet, but also from opposition chairs (this immanently is a result of the vote of confidence/investiture as grounds for formation of the minority governments and the governments as such). The fact is that the consent of parliamentary parties and non-party deputies to the minority government formation may be based on the existence of powerful capabilities of parliamentary committees and commissions to have effect on the internal and international life of the country. Under these conditions it is allowable for the parties, which have party fractions in the parliament, to concentrate their impact on the activity of committees and commissions. For more details, see: M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Does winning pay? Electoral success and government formation in 15 West European countries*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2004, nr 43, s. 270-271.

³⁷ Minority governments are sensitive to the opinions of the deputies from the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments, since the government policy is not determined independently/directly by the prime ministers or cabinet members, but by the prime ministers, government members, and also the governmental and opposition parties of the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments. In addition, the opposition parties in particular, which formally constitute a majority of the parliament/main chamber of the parliament, may efficiently raise a question on the vote of no confidence in the minority government, making it work more responsibly. The minority governments accountability to the parliamentary parties consists in the fact that government bills should be brought to the notice of opposition parties, since an adoption or a failure to adopt the latter depends on them. That is why the policy of minority governments is more public and transparent.

³⁸ The minority cabinets can not implement the measures (especially social and economic), provided for by their programs, to the full extent. This is caused by discrepancies in support of these governments in the parliaments/main chambers of the parliaments, and also by the time, spent for the search of support among opposition parties. Making important, particularly budget and reformist decisions is also problematic in the context of minority governments.

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Партійна система України: виклики національної консолідації та європейської інтеграції (деякі методологічні аспекти)

Розглядаються теоретико-методологічні проблеми партійної системи України в умовах національної консолідації та європейської інтеграції. Аналізуються специфічні проблеми формування та взаємодії громадянського суспільства та процесу демократизації, чинники та проблеми національної консолідації, вплив євроінтеграції на внутрішньополітичну ситуацію в Україні.

Ключові слова: партіологія, громадянське суспільство, політичне суспільство, представницька демократія, демократизація, рівень демократії, консолідація демократії, неконсолідований авторитаризм, державний корпоративізм, європейська інтеграція, сноуболізм.

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System partyjny Ukrainy: wyzwania konsolidacji narodowej oraz integracji europejskiej (niektóre aspekty metodologiczne)

Reprezentowane są teoretyczno-metodologiczne problemy systemu partyjnego Ukrainy w warunkach konsolidacji narodowej oraz integracji europejskiej. Analizie zostały poddane kwestie kształtowania się i współdziałania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i procesu demokratyzacji, czynniki i problemy konsolidacji narodowej oraz wpływ eurointegracji na wewnętrzną sytuację polityczną na Ukrainie.

Słowa kluczowe: Partologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, społeczeństwo polityczne, demokracja przedstawicielska, demokratyzacja, poziom demokracji, konsolidacja demokratyczna, niekonsolidowany autoritaryzm, korporatyzm państwowy, integracja europejska, snoubollism.

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Party system of Ukraine: challenges of national consolidation and European integration (some methodological aspects)

Theoretical and methodological issues of party system of Ukraine under conditions of national consolidation and European integration have been examined. The author has analyzed the specific problems of formation and cooperation of civil society and process of democratization, factors and issues of national consolidation and influence of European integration on domestic situation in Ukraine.

Keywords: *Partology, civil society, political society, representative democracy, democratization, level of democracy, democratic consolidation, non-consolidated authoritarianism, state corporatism, European integration, snowballism.*

National theory of political parties (partology) is developing very dynamically. There is a good few of monographs, articles, thesis works, devoted to analysis of this political institution. A number of Ukrainian and international scientific conferences took place. It would seem we should not worry about the situation in this sphere of the national political science. However, it is not all that simple and definite as it seems at first sight.

In scientific sense the appropriate study of any subject of research is based on well adapted and approved methodology. Without the last one all attempts of scientific analyzes will suffer from descriptiveness and they will not make a holistic image of phenomenon or process, which is under study. Actually that is what we observe at the present stage of development of national theory of political parties.

We, as Maurice Duverger wrote, found ourselves in vicious circle, since no proper scientific research can be without methodology, and no complete theory can be created without scientific research. Understanding of importance of methodology in the study of such important political institution as political parties inspired M. Duverger to write his work "Political parties", which created a theoretical foundation of analysis of the last ones, originated modern theory of political parties and party systems.

However, this happened in the fifties of the last century. Modern Ukrainian science about political parties came closely to new stage of development, when quantity was supposed to transfer into quality, and certain studies into complete theories. In a word, we definitely need our own Duverger!

I will illustrate the complexity of this theoretical and methodological task on one example only — understanding of role and place of civil society in the formation of democracy.

Everybody knows that modern Western society was built on developed and well institutionalized civil society. As a result, we have a general notion that establishing effective democracy requires development of civil society. However, the civil society of Western type was formed on the basis of liberal and political culture and traditions, and in our case we do not have such political culture, that is why the current institutions of civil society are totally different.

In his article “Central role of political culture” Seymour Lipset emphasizes the importance of the last one for the democratization process and he also mentions: “It is very difficult to manipulate with culture factors, related to peculiarities of previous development. Political institutions, including election systems and constitutional form of government, change more easily. That is why, those, who worry about consolidation of possibility of transformation into stable democratic government, pay their attention to these institutions. ...however, — he continues, — there are few evidences that efforts in this regard led to impressive results...”¹ Meanwhile, the enthusiasm of constitutional engineering without appropriate development of civil political culture is actually observed in Ukraine today. It is not difficult to predict the results.

Another famous American politologist Larry Diamond in his article “In the direction of democratic consolidation” emphasizes on autonomy of civil society from political one. “Civil Society is a separate and autonomous not only from the state and society in general, - he writes, — but also from fourth sphere of social activity, political society (that is, in fact, a party system). Organizations and networks of civil society can conclude an alliance with parties, — the scientist writes, — but if they are governed by the parties, they change the main unique intermediary and democratic functions².

In the opinion of many scientists the loss of autonomy by institutions of civil society will lead to formation of so-called state corporatism, phenomenon, which in its form is similar to representative democracy, but, in fact, it distorts the democracy. Actually, the authoritarian regimes, including Ukrainian one, successfully use the state corporatism to legitimate its ruling. Civil society in Ukraine is not autonomous from political one, but incorporated excessively.

“Role of it (*civil society – comment of Yu.Sh.*) is not crucial, and even not the most important. — Larry Diamond sums up. — in each case, at the very beginning. ...The only important and necessary factor for consolidation of democracy is not a civil society, but political institutionalization”³.

¹ С. М. Ліпсет, Центральна роль політичної культури, в: Глобальне відродження демократії, за ред. Л. Даймона, М. Ф. Платтнер, Львів 2004, с. 211.

² Л. Даймонд, В напрямку демократичної консолідації, в: Глобальне відродження демократії, за ред. Л. Даймона, М. Ф. Платтнер, Львів 2004, с. 293.

³ Там же, с. 302-303.

In order to assess the level of democratization of society on its individual level in the process of transformation of non-democratic regimes into democratic one in post-communist countries Christian Haerpfer suggested an appraisal, which is generalized on the basis of the attitude towards the following questions: 1) Negative assessment of communist regime; 2) Positive assessment of new democracy and present political regime; 3) Optimism regarding future democratic parliament; 4) Support of the national democratic parliament; 5) Non-acceptance of authoritarian leader as an alternative to democracy; 6) Non-acceptance of military regime as an alternative to democracy; 7) Non-acceptance of monarchy as an alternative to democracy; 8) Non-acceptance of return of communist political regime as an alternative to democracy; 9) Optimism regarding future of democracy.

The scientist thinks that societies, where more than 60 % of citizens can be defined as “democrats”, belong to “consolidated democracy”. If 40-60 % of people can be identified as “democrats”, this society belongs to democracy in the process of formation. All societies with less than 40 % of “democrats” are societies in the process of transformation, and democracy for them is only one way of possible ways of development⁴.

It is believed that so-called Orange revolution of 2004 was a manifestation of society coming of age in Ukraine. However, after a fit of civil disobedience against counterfeiting on the presidential election, the public energy could not self-organize and develop. It is a pity, but civil society in Ukraine as a “sphere of organized civil life, which is spontaneous, self-organized, (in most cases) self-maintained, autonomous from the state and limited by legal order or general rules”⁵ did not realize.

This also led to social apathy and disappointment. As a result the support of democracy, as the best political regime for Ukraine, decreased to critical 38 % before the presidential election, and it almost became equal to support of authoritarian regime – 30 %⁶.

The latest studies of public opinion, conducted by a fund “Democratic initiatives” show that the level of democracy in Ukraine decreased considerably and now it makes 4,5 marks according to the 10-grade grading scale. In the opinion of Iryna Bekeshkina, this confirms that “There is underdeveloped democracy in Ukraine, but it is not yet authoritarianism”⁷. Foreign analysts are stricter in their assessments of present situations in Ukrainian

⁴ Ю. Шведа, *Вибори та виборчі системи. Європейські стандарти та досвід для утвердження демократії в Україні*, Львів 2010, с. 16.

⁵ Л. Даймона, *В напрямку демократичної консолідації*, в: *Глобальне відродження демократії*, за ред. Л. Даймона, М. Ф. Платтнер, Львів 2004, с. 291.

⁶ Ю. Шведа, *Вибори та виборчі системи. Європейські стандарти та досвід для утвердження демократії в Україні*, Львів 2010, с. 174.

⁷ И. Бекешкина, *Демократический транзит Украины: проблемы и перспективы*, в: *Перед выбором. Будущее Украины в условиях системной дестабилизации*, Редакция Анжей Гиль, Томаш Стемпневски.- Люблин-Львов-Киев 2013, с. 165-189.

democracy. In particular, this means the change of non-consolidated (dysfunctional) democracy into non-consolidated authoritarianism⁸.

There is an idea in Ukrainian politicum and society, that European integration of Ukraine will help it to approximate to democratic values and standards, accepted in Europe.

We should not reject the phenomenon of external influence on domestic political processes, which was called “snowballing” by famous American researcher of democratization processes Samuel Huntington, but we also should not overestimate it. “If there are no favorable conditions, — the scientist writes, — snowballism itself is unlikely to cause democratization. Democratization of countries A and B cannot become a reason of democratization in country C till conditions, favorable for democratization in the first two countries, appear in the last one⁹.

Thus, today the party system of Ukraine faces system challenges, related not only to national consolidation, but also to European integration. Time will tell if it becomes an instrument of activation or an obstacle for these processes. The task of partologists consists in proper and close assessment of factors, which impelled it to do this.

⁸ Т. Оляж, Т. Стемпневски, Украина между дисфункциональной демократией и неконсолидированным авторитаризмом, в: Перед выбором. Будущее Украины в условиях системной дестабилизации, Редакция Анжей Гиль, Томаш Стемпневски, Люблин-Львов-Киев 2013, с. 63-105.

⁹ С. Хантингтон, Третья волна демократии, в: Глобальне відродження демократії, за ред. А. Даймонд, М. Ф. Платтнер, Львів 2004, с. 48.

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2. [www: // newsoboz.org/politika/v-ukraine-nedorazvitaya-demokratiya-no-eshche-ne-avtoritarizm](http://newsoboz.org/politika/v-ukraine-nedorazvitaya-demokratiya-no-eshche-ne-avtoritarizm) [28.10.2013].
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Особливості та наслідки впливу концепту «інших» і «чужих» на інституціоналізацію/політизацію української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні (1991-2014)

Проаналізовано особливості та наслідки впливу концепту «інших іншості» на політизацію та інституціоналізацію української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні упродовж 1991-2014 рр. З'ясовано засадничі атрибути, параметри та шляхи впливу концепту «іншості» на процес інституціоналізації та політизації української та російської ідентичності й етнічності в Україні. Розглянуто преференції української та російської етнічності в Україні. Диференційовано ідеї та сутність етнічного українського і східнослов'янського російського/пострадянського націоналізму в Україні.

Ключові слова: «інші», «чужі», політизація етнічності, інституціоналізація етнічності, національна ідентичність, етно-національна група, етнократичну держава, конфедеративність, партія, ідеологія, націоналізм, російська національна меншина, російськомовні українці, Україна.

Features and effects of “others” and “strangers” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of ukrainian and russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine (1991-2014)

The article is dedicated to analyzing features and effects of “other/otherness” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine in 1991-2014. The author discovered basic attributes, parameters and ways of “other/otherness” concept’s impact on institutionalization/politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity in Ukraine; examined the preferences of Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity in Ukraine; differentiated ideas and the essence of ethnic Ukrainian and East-Slavic Russian/post-Soviet nationalism in Ukraine.

Keywords: "others", "strangers", politicization of ethnicity, institutionalization of ethnicity, national identity, ethno-national group, ethnocentric state, confederation, party, ideology, nationalism, Russian minority, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Ukraine.

In the process of ethno- and natiogenesis each actor of the ethno-political process explores his view of solution and positioning of the national issue, motivating it by promoting of certain traditional arguments/ideas. With this in mind, it is understandable that certain ideological commitment is formed, as well as ideology and identity where such notions as «native» (or «identical»), «other» and «strange» frequently occur. They often act as the institutionalization and politicization resources of any national issue at the level of both ethnic core and on the periphery (namely, diasporas and national minorities). In this case, from theoretical and methodological point of view we should note that the *politicization of ethnical or national issue* (ethnicity in general) – is the process of ethnical/national communities' entering the political arena and their turning into the historical actors; *institutionalization of national ethnicity* – is the process of acquisition of main features of political actors by the ethnic groups which presupposes certain level of political acting as the well-formed ability to political activity which is defined by the level of consciousness/ organization of ethnic groups. As a consequence of such definitive understanding of the notions outlined, it becomes obvious that the politicization and institutionalization of ethno-national issue at the level of ethnic groups occurs (or can occur) at the level of formation ideas /ideologies/identities, elites, parties and organizations, society and state. The task of the suggested research is to outline the reasons, attributes, and characteristics of the concept «others» and/or «strangers» from the point of view of national identity formation and institutionalization, as well as politicization of Ukrainian and Russian identity and ethnicity and the people in Ukraine in 1990-2014.

As most modern ethnopolitologists think, formation of national identity of any ethnos always presupposes the coexistence of contrast categories– «identical» and «others». This process is quite natural, and it facilitates the ideological formation/determination of internal and external boundaries of any ethnos. On the basis of this process, any «internally-oriented» *ethno-national group* differs from any «externally-oriented « ethno-national group¹ (in the other words, each ethno-national group differs from the other one). Besides, every state consists of civil and ethno-cultural elements. Due to this, it become obvious that the state as an ethno-national phenomenon is not monolithic, internally different within different ethno-national groups (first of all by the titular ethnic group) on the basis of different stereotypes, features and national specificities. All of them make up the "strangeness" category, and are the reason of relations of the members of one ethno-national group to the representatives

¹ S. Hall, *Ethnicity: Identity and Difference*, [w:] G. Suny, R. Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, s. 339-351.; I. Young, *Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict*, [w:] W. Kymlicka [red.], *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford 1995, s. 155-178.

of the other ethno-national groups as to “the others”. With this in mind, E. Bruckmuller² and P. Duara³ state that this is the “other/strangeness» category which is the one providing for the grounds of national identity formation and is the way of ethnic nation’s comprehension of its national identity on the basis of its separation from the identity of the «other» ethno-national groups.

The feeling of the «other/strangeness» becomes very actual when, for instance, the two ethno-national groups are very close to each other from the ethnical point of view, as well as when one ethno-national group does not acknowledge the existence of the «other» ethno-national group. In such cases the necessity of national identity defined by the difference of mutual apprehension of the «strangeness» of one ethno-national group as to the other becomes attractive for nationality with the prohibited right to exist. Russian view of Ukrainian ethno-national advancement in Ukraine completely corresponds to the described scheme, as most of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine do not perceive the ethnic Russians in Russia as their eastern neighbors. Nevertheless, the ethnic Russians in Russia do not perceive ethnic Russians in Ukraine as “foreigners”. Sometimes the two categories treat Russian and Ukrainian ethno-national groups in Ukraine as all-Russian or Eastern-Slavonic⁴. Nevertheless, quite often ethno-national groups of Ukrainians do not perceive ethno-national groups of Russians as «natives» (as they are more often perceived as «strangers») thus expressing their own right to formation of their personal (Ukrainian) national identity.

In this context, most significant is the fact that national identity is never fixed but dynamic, i.e. developing and changing. Its structure changes with the time and is never complete or finished. This is testified by the practice of most world countries, not only the by problem of mutual perception between the Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. The peculiarity of the latter is that after the collapse of USSR the intensive revival and later development of Ukrainians’ self-consciousness took place. Consequently, Ukrainians, as ethno-national group managed to make national identity more self-confident as to the external world and as to the category of the «others» or «strangers» in Ukrainian ethno-political process. This process was significantly influenced by the official Eurointegrational incline of Ukraine during 1991-2013. It was explained that Ukraine and Ukrainian nation (from ethnic point of view) have to integrate within the European space, with the focus on its belonging to the Central-Eastern Europe. About formation of Ukrainian politico-national identity (as identity of European Ukrainians) explicitly testify to the protest of 2013-2014, when official Ukrainian government ceased the integration process, resulting in the Ukrainian citizens’

² E. Bruckmuller, *The National Identity of the Austrians*, [w:] M. Teich, R. Porter, *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1993, s. 196-227.

³ P. Duara, *Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When*, [w:] G. Eley, R. Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader*, Wyd. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, s. 151-178.

⁴ T. Kuzio, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: The East Slavic Conundrum*, [w:] [w:] T. Kuzio [red.], *Contemporary Ukraine*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1998, s. 221-244.

protest not only against the government but against the Russian approximation, which, from ethno-political point of view would mean the weakening of Ukrainian ethno-political identity. With this in mind, it is quite understandable that even opposition to Russia (moreover, to the Soviet past) is the reflection of the influence of the concept of «strangeness» on formation of national identity of Ukrainian citizens. The divergent position is characteristic of the part of Ukrainian citizens (very often these are ethnic Russians) who view the "pro-European" citizens as traditionally "other".

In this context, special attention should be given to the role of Ukrainian elite in the process of development of new Ukrainian «nation» and «state», as the elite plays the main role in formation of national identities of ethno-national groups according to the top-down principle. Theoretical basis of suggested process interpretation of formation the ethno-national identity – is the constructivist approach as to the manipulation of the public opinion from the side of the elite during the national and state formation process and its significant phases/events. Main idea is that formation of Ukrainian collective ethno-national identity differs from the Russian by the fact that the first, being differential, is still in the process of formation⁵. The thing is that the differentiation is the main constituent of formation of state and political community as such. From this point of view, I. Neumann states that ethno-national identity is impossible without the difference, therefore in the process of new ethno-national identities formation the ruling elites should focus on ethnical identity of the others⁶. J. Armstrong states: «Usually the groups define themselves not by understanding their own characteristics but by elimination method, as compared to the «strangers»⁷.

Thus, when discussing the differences of ethno-national culture the focus is placed on «natives»/»natives» as opposed to the «others»/»strangers»⁸. The relations between «identical» and «the others» – is the substance which by causing the future confrontations⁹ leads to the formation of ethno-national identity of the ones and the others. «Strangeness» and ethno-national identity are interconnected, as they define who «we» are, and who – «they»¹⁰ are. «The others» – are those ethno-social groups who are not considered as a part of ethnic group, ethnical community, ethnic nation or even the citizens

⁵ W. Zimmerman, *Is Ukraine a Political Community?*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 1998, vol 31, nr 1, s. 45.

⁶ I. Neumann, *Russia as Central Europe's Constituting "Other"*, "East European Politics and Society" 1993, vol 7, nr 2, s. 350.

⁷ J. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism*, [w:] J. Hutchinson, A. Smith, *Nationalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 5.

⁸ A. Gupta, J. Ferguson, *Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity and the Politics of Difference*, "Cultural Anthropology" 1992, vol 7, nr 1, s. 6-23.

⁹ J. Penrose, *Essential Construction? The "Cultural Bases" of Nationalist Movements*, "Nations and Nationalism" 1995, vol 1, nr 3, s. 402.

¹⁰ W. Connor, *Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1993, vol 16, nr 3, s. 373-389.; T. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Wyd. Pluto Press, London 2002, s. 11-18.; B. Parekh, *Discourses on National Identity*, "Political Studies" 1994, vol 42, nr 3, s. 492-504.; J. Pieterse, *Deconstructing/Reconstructing Ethnicity*, "Nations and Nationalism" 1997, vol 3, nr 3, s. 365-395.; G. Schopflin, *Obstacles to Liberalism in post-Communist Politics*, "East European Politics and Societies" 1991, vol 5, nr 1, s. 189-194.; R. Taras, *Nations and language-building: old theories, contemporary cases*, "Nationalism and Ethnic Politics" 1998, vol 4, nr 3, s. 79-101.

of the country. Therefore, ethno-national and public (political) national formation includes two processes – excluding of ethnically «other» and including the citizens in the context of «natives». Besides, identity can not be understandable outside the relations with the ethnically «others»¹¹, as without the «strangeness» it is hard to form the “inside groups” within the ethnical identity. Therefore, J. Penrose¹² states: «If the individuals compare themselves to some people and differentiate themselves from «the others», it leads to the formation of relationships between the people who consider themselves “identical”. That is why the task of the state and its creators (elite) is about including and excluding, codification and support of different ethno-national groups¹³, namely into the political nation. Without this, it will be impossible to form the national identity, because this is due to the confrontation with «the others» that ethno-national community lacks “external institutionalization»¹⁴.

At the beginning of its independence (national existence) new states have to establish their ethnical identity and sovereignty against the former metropolitan countries or the other states defined as «the others». If national identity of ethno-national community is threatened, as in some cases in Ukraine, the codification of ethnical borders is much more significant¹⁵ (and then antagonism to the “other/strangeness” is much more obvious). According to A. Finlayson, in order «to be itself» the nation should always produce the idea of antagonistic others who prevent it from «being itself»¹⁶.

Some researchers believe that the «strangeness» can also be created among the communities without any essential ethno-social differences: the communities can even be territorially close, but «the other» can be perceived as the threat to the ethnical *identity*. These «*significant others*» destroy the uniqueness of ethno-national groups and threaten the identity of titular ethnic group. Therefore, I. Neumann and J. Welsh note that “public enemy” «shall not be moral evil, it should not be esthetically ugly, he should not act as the economic competitor, and, probably, it would be even profitable to have business relations with him»¹⁷. Reverse situation is characteristic of the relations between Ukrainian and Russian ethnoses in Ukraine after USSR collapse. It is conditioned both by internally-Ukrainian factors (peculiarity of Ukrainian political elite and aspiration to create the phenomenon of ethnical and not political Ukrainian nation from legislative point of view), and position

¹¹ T. Nieguth, *Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of Membership*, “Nations and Nationalism” 1999, vol 5, nr 2, s. 155-174.; A. Alonso, *The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity*, “Annual Review of Anthropology” 1994, vol 23, s. 379-405.

¹² J. Penrose, *Essential Construction? The “Cultural Bases” of Nationalist Movements*, “Nations and Nationalism” 1995, vol 1, nr 3, s. 402.

¹³ P. James, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, Wyd. Sage, London 1996, s. 33.

¹⁴ S. Hall, *Introduction*, [w:] S. Hall, P. de Gay, *Who Needs Identity? Questions of Cultural Identity*, Wyd. Sage 1996, s. 4-5.

¹⁵ T. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Wyd. Pluto Press, London 2002, s. 68.; A. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*, Wyd. Routledge 1998, s. 182.

¹⁶ A. Finlayson, *Ideological Discourse and Nationalism*, “Journal of Political Ideologies” 1998, vol 3, nr 1, s. 116.

¹⁷ I. Neumann, J. Welsh, *The Other in European Self-Definition: A Critical Addendum to the Literature on International Society*, “Review of International Studies” 1991, vol 17, nr 4, s. 332.

of the former USSR metropolitan, this is what Russia currently is (not as a consequence of implementation of the "compatriot" policy, but as a consequence of geopolitical pressure of Russia on Ukraine). As a consequence the states and Ukrainian and Russian ethnos in Ukraine compete for the territory, history and cultural heritage, stating that specific myths, symbols and origin are the part of their national past. Moreover, the historiography, myths and legends which are culturally structured often form different ethno-political positioning of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine as to who is the titular nation (or group), and who is national (or ethnic) minority in this state¹⁸. Nevertheless, during 1991-2014 with the gradual acceleration in Ukraine quite "new" definition of ethno-national discourse takes place as well as formation of new nationally-political identity of Ukrainians and Russians. They essentially differ from ethnically-national identity of Ukrainians (as «the others») and Russians/Soviet people (as «natives») of USSR epoch and the Russians as «strangers» and Ukrainians as «natives» (Russian-speaking Ukrainians – as the «others») in nowadays' Ukraine¹⁹.

*Language*²⁰ can be an important aspect of difference between the «natives» and «the others». Thus, the elevation of Ukrainian language and decrease of the role of the Russian language at the dawn of Ukrainian independence was used as a differentiating factor between Ukraine and Russia²¹. But the Russians are accustomed to the conclusion: their language is «supreme», it is used by the «cultural» peoples and society where Ukrainians get the access to the external world. For the Russians Ukrainian language is «provincial», «country-like», and unacceptable to the national elite, culture and science. Nevertheless, for Ukrainian principal language difference is less significant and even secondary. They not necessarily identify the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine as the Russians or the «strangers» (although, this differentiation becomes stronger during the elections period, i.e. is politically conditioned at most).

One more significant factor of theoretical discussions designating ethnically «significant others», such as Russians in case of Ukraine, – «the feeling of belonging to the groups,

¹⁸ G. Schopflin, *The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin, *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 20.

¹⁹ A. Wilson, *Myth of National History in Belarus and Ukraine*, [w:] G. Hosking, G. Schopflin [red.], *Myths and Nationhood*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1997, s. 182-197.; C. Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Post-Communist Cultural Studies*, Wyd. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 1998.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998.; J. Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Wyd. Royal Dutch Geographical Society, Amsterdam 2000.

²⁰ But it is not always so. Thus, in Germany and Austria they speak one (German) language, but post-war Austrian national formation has never even created separate identity. In some cases, such as Hyeres (Ireland), which now speaks English, different groups were used in producing the differences from its closest neighbor, Great Britain. Despite this, «the strangeness» can still play the role of the sameness determination even where the people speak the same language (for instance, English in Ireland or Scotland). The other factors work here – history, political culture, foreign policy, etc. They play the role of determination of «strangeness». This happens because, probably, it is hard for individuals to determine their national identity, and possible intuitive feeling – individuals meet the foreigners which causes their differences». This process is accelerated by the formation of titular groups within the states. A. Triandafyllidou, *National Identity and the Other*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1998, vol 21, nr 4, s. 598.; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, Wyd. Routledge, London-New York 1998, s. 110-118.

²¹ T. Kuzio, *Status of Russian Language Again Threatens Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, "RFE/RL Newline" 2001, vol 5, nr 6, źródło: <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/stasiuk/st-articles/an-rus-lang.htm> (lipiec 2013).

as well as demarcation of territory, ethnical and cultural *boarders* «²². Understanding that Russia wants to deplete the strength of Ukrainian political elite in the foreign country, forces to watch the defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty, argue about delimitation and demarcation of the boarders, and disagree with the Russian suggestion as to the «transparent» internal boarders of CIS²³.

Generally, it is obvious that the formation of «the others» is connected with the *internal/external policy*, as well as with the ethnical or political understanding of nation. Thus, for example, during 1991-2013 the integration of ethno-national identity in Ukraine presupposed the national formation from the part of the national elites, stressing internal similarities in the ethno-national group of Ukrainians as opposed to the ethno-national groups of foreigners or «the others» and «strangers» (for instance, Russians). Thus, for the ethnical nation, in order to exist in the from of titular group both unity and homogeneity are necessary. It is due to this that the ideological, ethnical or territorial peculiarities are determined (or their combinations) of the «strangeness» in Ukraine²⁴. The existence of the other causes the «synthesizing of the native» in the ethnical context.

Therefore, growing ethno-national self-identification of Ukrainians at the dawn of independent Ukraine was closely connected with the differential principle of self-differentiation from «the others». Russia is the closest to Ukraine from historical, cultural, lingual and ethnical views. Therefore, it is necessary to make «distances» between Ukraine and Russia in a wider relation than the correlation of Central-Eastern Europe and Russia. For this reason, V. Hryniov in his day said that «main supremacy of Ukrainian policy for a long period of time is ... in demonstration of the tendency «as much as possible « and as «separate as possible» from Russia»²⁵. In this case the language plaid a very important role in Ukrainians' self-identification, because this is a potential symbol of titular ethnos identity. At the same time, the language has not become integral and self-sufficient «symbol» of strangeness in Ukraine from political strangeness in Ukraine from political view or from the point of view of the probability of political nation formation (it will be discussed later).

But still *Russian-speaking Ukrainians* constitute and extraordinary problem. Their language preferences have long been confirmed by the foreign-political orientations, which almost always were Eurasian, therefore, they have become the object of territorial constructions in Russia, which made and makes explicit and implicit attempts to intervene into the ethnical territories of the other titular ethnos, namely into Ukrainian on behalf of the Russians'

²² A. Triandafyllidou, *National Identity and the Other*, "Ethnic and Racial Studies" 1998, vol 21, nr 4, s. 603; A. Motyl, *After Empire: Competing Discourses and Inter-state Conflicts in Post-imperial Eastern Europe*, [w:] J. Snyder, B. Rubin, *Post-Soviet Political Order*, Wyd. Routledge, New York 1998, s. 30-31.

²³ P. D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, Wyd. SUNY Press, New York 1999.

²⁴ S. Shulman, *Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity*, "Political Geography" 1999, vol 18, nr 8, s. 913-939.

²⁵ V. Hryniov, *Nova Ukraina: Iakou ia ii Bachu*, Wyd. Abrys 1995, s. 81.

motherland. The so-called «Russian protection of Russian-speaking population» («compatriots») on the territory of the former USSR, especially in Ukraine, constitutes the serious threat to the safety of this country. It also provides for the attraction for this new country (actually mono-national with two main languages) to go against the russification process (in contrast to the changes in the process of ukrainisation)²⁶.

Therefore, it is obvious that the concept of ethnic «strangeness» in Ukraine was formed by different vectors of influence: first of all external, with the involvement of internal. *External* is significantly bound by the Russia's aspiration to participate in formation of priorities of national and political development of Ukraine (of Ukrainian ethnos through the prism of protection of ethnical Russians and Russian language in Ukraine). *The internal* is usually realized on the basis of functioning of pro-Russian parties in Ukraine, in particular of the Communist party of Ukraine, Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the party «Russian-Ukrainian Coalition (Rus)», «Kyiv Ruis», «Russian Block», «Motherland», Left Coalition, «Union», «Rusichi» and their derivatives, etc. The synthesis of external and internal vectors of ethnical «Russian strangeness» in Ukraine is the position about acknowledgement of inefficiency of Ukrainian national idea first of all by the representatives of Russian ethno-national minority. Additional motive of different times were /are the doubts of world community about probability of successful realization of Ukrainian identity. Along with the economic factors who influence the level of life in Ukraine, Russian national minority obtained the subconscious motive to get institutionalized as internal ethnical (to a lesser extent political) «others» with relation to whom there are very few interpretational ideas of future development. This motivation acquired practical realization in the context of Eurointegrational perspective of Ukraine. It has become the key factor of controversies among the part of the citizens of Ukraine (ethnic Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians independent of the language of communication), particularly, in the context of future development problem solution and its planning in Ukraine²⁷.

At the same time the Soviet past produces totally different emotions for Ukrainian people: this is a positive nomination of «the other» ethno-national groups from the socially-economic point of view, as well as negative positioning of «the other» ethno-national groups in political plane. Political aspect was initiated by Ukraine's obtainment of its independence, as well as by the «zero version» of the law about citizenship. It acquires its permanent particular significance in the context of electoral cycles, as well as in solving the pressing issues of geopolitical choice of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that during 1994-2013 the role of «*Russian others*» has been strengthening in its influence on the political process in Ukraine. At the same time,

²⁶ D. Arel, *Ukraine. The temptation of the Nationalizing State*, [w:] V. Tismaneanu [red.], *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Wyd. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk-NY 1995, s. 157-188.; Kuzio, 'Nationalising states' or nation-building? A critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence, "Nations and Nationalism" 2001, vol 1, nr 2, s. 135-154.

²⁷ O. Haran, O. Májboroda, *Ukrains'ki Livi: Mizh Leninizmom i Sotsial-Demokratieiu*, Wyd. KM Academia 2000.

the level of Ukrainian nationally-political identity has deepened. The reason is that on the one hand the pressure of the Russians' ethnic motherland is increasing and on the other hand more and more people are socialized in new Ukrainian historiography discussing negative sides of the Soviet power and its Russian heritage and possible alternative variants of the future development. Moreover, judging by the situation in 2000 which was the first year of Ukrainian economic growth, this vector is able to minimize the influence of *economic plane* of ethnic «strangeness», and maximize its *political (civil) component*²⁸. The reverse tendency has shown itself starting from 2008-2009 (under financial crisis conditions), when the political component of the “strangeness” has taken the first position. The burst was observed in 2013-2014 when the phenomenon of the “others” and “strangers” synthesized in itself the internal and external economic, ethnical and political components due to which «Ukrainian people» and «Ukrainian political nation» with its own politico-national identity have become the key factor (this will be discussed later in the context of assessment the intermediate consequences of Euromaidan and national establishment in Ukraine). Interestingly, in the said context, ethnic Ukrainians (independent of their communication language) most frequently consider ethnic «strangeness of the Russians « a favorable factor for the development of ethnic identity and national consciousness of Ukrainian people as a titular ethnos. At the same time, the citizens of Ukraine (independent of their communication language and very frequently from ethnic origin) become more and more aware of their political and national significance in the very fact of their existence and future development of Ukraine as an indigenous nation.

Therefore, from the point of view of many ethnic Russians in Ukraine the “strangeness” tendency is dangerous. The matter is that according to this principle, it is suggested to create an *ethnocratic nation* with many positive factors in monoethnic societies, though, according to the ethnic Russians there are no reasons of existence in Ukraine. Ethnic Russians understand that in the ethnocratic nation titular Ukrainian groups occupy the top position of the ideological pyramid of identity in the society. At the same time, the Russians' role is secondary which, from the position of the possibility of their institutionalization, is insignificant. V. Shved says that this idea causes a number of restrictions for the ethnical Russians²⁹. In political process these dichotomies are reflected in positioning of different political forces: 1) *the concept of ethnocratic nation* is expressed by such parties as Rukh (Movement), Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Nationalists Organization, «Svoboda» (“Freedom”); 2) *the confederacy idea* (as an example of the former USSR) is supported by the Communist party of Ukraine, Progressive socialist party of Ukraine, Organization of Russian minority in Ukraine. Despite this, most of political parties of Ukraine keep to the medial position. Though, this slowed

²⁸ J. Urban, *The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Election: Similarities, Contrasts and Interaction, “Democratization”* 1998, vol 7, nr 1, s. 111-134.; T. Kuzio, *Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994*, “Nationalities Papers” 1997, vol 25, nr 2, s. 211-242.

²⁹ V. Shved, *The Conceptual Approaches of Ukrainian Political Parties to Ethno-Political Problems in Independent Ukraine*, “Journal of Ukrainian Studies” 1994, vol 19, nr 2, s. 69-84.

down the process of formation of consolidated Ukrainian national and political or civil identity up to 2013-2014. It was very much influenced by the focus of Ukrainian legislative policy on formulation of the principles of Ukrainian ethnic nation. This problem is aggravated by the positioning of ethno-national issue by the parties in Ukraine.

Interestingly, political parties, depending upon their ideological orientation, consider the idea of the "Strangeness of Russians" differently. *The right and center-right parties* appeal to the idea that one should differentiate between the «Ukrainian Russians» and «the other Russians», living in the Russian Federation outside Ukraine. *Centrist parties* do not deny the fact that Russians who live in Ukraine are the part of political nation (although they do not work enough to provide for the legislative support of political nation phenomenon). In contrast to this, ethnic «other Russians» – is the category of all Russians from Russia and from Ukraine who do not support the idea about formation of Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group, as well as Ukrainian nation as a permanent unity. *The left and left-centrist parties* are inclined to think that Ukraine and Russia should be considered in the context of the unified Europe and Eurasia, and the Russians and Ukrainians as the kindred ethno-national unity. This actually means that the denial of such ethno-national group as Ukrainians (quite frequently the representatives of these parties appeal to the notion of «the people» which is formally deprived of ethno-national association). Extrapolation of these positions of the parties in Ukraine on the perspectives of the future development of Ukrainian sovereignty, namely from the point of view of interethnic relations shows that: 1) most of Ukrainian parties view ethnic Russians in Ukraine as the "strangeness constituting the national minority (except for the radical right parties which view the Russians in Ukraine as the «fifth column»; also sometimes left radical parties also distinguish themselves as they view Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine as the representatives of one Slavonic ethnos, actually denying the right of Ukrainian people to self-identification); 2) political parties treat ethnic country of the Russians (Russia) from different points of view: radical right parties – ethnic, right parties – from ethno-territorial and ideological, centrists – as territorial and ideological, left and radical left parties – as ideological.

Generally the following conclusion can be made: most parties at the national level accept the idea of ethnic «strangeness» of Russian past and Russian national minority in Ukraine. Therefore, institutionalization and politicization of Russian minority in Ukraine in the parties' views is caused by the phenomenon of ethnocratism of some political forces. At the same time, the attitude of official power to the problem of Russians perception in Ukraine varies between territorial and ethno-territorial³⁰. It means that as of 2014 in Ukraine the *formation of integral civil or political national identity failed* (the perspectives of political nation

³⁰ In 1991-1994 . (presidency of L. Kravchuk) Russia as the «strangeness» was the enemy as to the ideological component. In 1994-2004 and 2010-2014 during the presidency of L. Kuchma and V. Yanukovych, the other view of Russian "strangeness" – territorial has formed. The period of 2005-2009 (during V. Yushchenko's presidency) was characterized to the ethnic Russians as to the ethno-territorial differentiation. Partially see.: R. Szporluk, *The National Question*, [w:] J. Colton, R. Legvold, *After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nations*, Wyd. W.W. Norton, New York 1992, s. 105.

formation in the context of ideas at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 are discussed below). From legislative point of view Ukrainian people and national development projects are related with the debates about how Ukrainian identity will be consolidated and how ethnical “others” will be viewed in the context of national establishment. Anyway, there is total tension, as the idea of self-identity requires complex consideration of ethnic and political «strangeness»³¹. Moreover, in case Ukrainian and Russian national identities diverge, this is most obvious in how they perceive the external world. For instance, it is understandable that «Ukrainians ... work for perception of their political world which significantly differs from the respondents in the regions of the European part of Russia «³². Generally, it should be noted that Ukraine is characterized by «transitional ethnic and political identity», which, sooner or later, under the influence of different, including the described factors, will acquire the features of permanence (it bears repeating that the paces of acquisition of permanence of Ukrainian political identity have significantly grown from 1991 to 2014). In 2013, though, the two factors were noticed in the development of identity of Ukrainian people representatives (not ethnons) : 1) hierarchical pattern of several ethnic identities; 2) mutual exclusion of these ethnic values. Inconsistency of ethnic identities which is the reason of institutionalization and politicization of Ukrainians and Russians, is reflected in such tendencies as absence of common history and culture, common legal rights and liabilities, common view of the future.

This is significantly testified to by the differentiated positioning of Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. This is it and political process inflicted on it (namely during the elections period) which constitutes the problem of future geopolitical and foreign-economic establishment of the new nation. The matter is that Russians and Ukrainians identify themselves with different communities:

Table 1. Relation of the ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine to their belonging (as of 2010)

Marker	Ukrainians	Russians	Other	Totally
To Ukraine	56,9	28,3	29,2	48,3
To CIS	5,3	10,4	8,0	6,7
To USSR	15,5	33,0	27,4	20,5
To the region	13,2	15,9	23,9	14,5
To Russia	1,0	5,3	1,8	2,0
To Europe	2,3	2,1	2,6	2,3
Hard to tell	5,8	6,1	7,1	5,7

Źródło: T. Kuzio, *Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2010, vol 30, s. 1-12.

³¹ I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998, s. 18.

³² W. Zimmerman, *Is Ukraine a Political Community?*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 1998, vol 31, nr 1, s. 52.

The difference is noticeable also to the determination and description of peculiarities of nationalism in Ukraine, which should be characterized by the attributes of «banality»³³ in the context of formation of national identity of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. In Ukraine the two nationalism phenomena have spread: «ethnic» (Ukrainians) and «East-Slavonic» (Russian/Post-Soviet). The first one embraces the ideas of the right /radical right parties, the second one – the idea of left/radical parties. *Ukrainian nationalism* is the ethno-political (more frequently ideologically-political) direction which determines Ukraine as the exclusive nation in its narrow (or ethnical understanding). It has the following exponents – Ukrainian National Assembly, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Federation of National independence of Ukraine, the party «Svoboda» (Freedom), Social-National party, organization «Right sector». *Russian nationalism* is very weak in Ukraine. Since imperial and soviet domination the specific intentions of the Russian ethno-national formation have not been formed, but still the idea of general national identity has been realized³⁴. Therefore, Russian ethno-nationalists in Ukraine always felt the weakness during the elections. *Post-soviet nationalism* has become more attractive because it was incorporated in the ideas of the Communist party of Ukraine that the russified Ukrainians avoid the ethnic Russian nationalism³⁵. But despite this, post-soviet nationalism comes from the pre-soviet belief that Ukrainians are ethnographic and regional Russian group, which should be unified with the other ethnic Russians. Thus, quite obviously, ethnic and east-Slavonic nationalisms in Ukraine are mutually strange. Moreover, their identity contradicts to the multi-national composition of Ukrainian population and constitutes the threat of «ethnic domination»³⁶ in Ukraine. The most vivid separation between the types of nationalism in Ukraine occurred in 2004 – during the president's election. From the first sight the similar separation has occurred in 2013-2014 during the conflict due to the expected perspectives of the later geopolitical choice and socially-economic development of Ukraine³⁷. It is also noteworthy that ethnic «strangeness» and «nationalism»

³³ T. Kuzio, *Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2010, vol 30, s. 1-12.

³⁴ A. Lieven, *The weakness of Russian nationalism*, „Survival” 1999, vol 41, s. 53-70.

³⁵ A. Wilson, *Competing models of Ukrainian national identity*, [w:] *Ukraine: Challenges of the Continued Transition*, Conference Report, 30 June 1999, Wyd. National Intelligence Council and Department of State, Washington August 1999, s. 7-10.

³⁶ J. Bugajski, *Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine*, [w:] S.Wolchik, V. Zvighyanich [red.], *Ukraine. The Search for a National Identity*, Wyd. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2000, s. 173.

³⁷ «*Ethnic Ukrainian*» nationalism includes those national democratic parties which, during 2004 elections supported the candidacy of V. Yushchenko, and radical right ethnic nationalists who focused their views and beliefs on the ideals of ethnic nationalism of the epoch of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In 2013-2014 they showed themselves as the proponents of Eurointegrational searching of Ukraine (before that radical right parties declaimed against any integration of Ukraine). «*East-Slavonic*» *Russian/post-soviet nationalism* incorporated at first radical left Communist party, and then left-centrist party of regions as their ideological inspirers. Starting from 2000 East-Slavonic nationalism because of the decrease of the popularity of Communist party in Ukraine and left its radical left orientation for the left-centrist vector incorporated in the Party of regions. This ideological direction appeals to the Russian-speaking population and is «pro-Russian», although to the different extent from the point of view of interpretation this *pro-Russian orientation* – first of all, as to the ideology (left wing, Communist party of Ukraine), but secondly, as to the *pragmatism* (the matter is about centrist wing, which is mostly constituted by the Party of Regions). In 2013-2014 the proponents of Russian/post-soviet nationalism were against the Eurointegrational intentions of Ukraine, but were the proponents of the closeness with Russia.

in Ukraine are territorially-conditioned. Thus, «ethnic» Ukrainian nationalism gravitates toward Western Ukraine, and the east-Slavonic Russian (post-soviet) nationalism – to the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea³⁸.

Though, the events of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 (Euromaidan, its reasons and all the events related thereto) turned out to be more unexpected from the point of view of comparing «natives-others-strangers» in the ethnical and political contexts. For the first time in the history of Ukraine after its independence obtainment the scientists started to talk about the possibility of political nation formation in Ukraine, which reflects totally different system of values, than the one prevailing in Ukraine in the context of ethnic view of Ukrainian natiogenesis. Surely, the changes in perception of significance of ethnic and political factors is the result of the events of two-three months. They are caused by the whole complex of objective and subjective factors of the development of Ukrainian sovereignty, etc. In the end of 2013 it became obvious that the ethnic (ethno-lingual) national component of national understanding and identification of Ukrainian population was stratified by the political component, which should define the natiogenesis perspectives and future nation-building. Main reason is the awareness of non-realization and/or delay of the systemic reforms in Ukraine, which, judging by the practice of the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe should have been implemented in 1990-s. Instead of reforms and changes usual phenomenon has become the concern of Ukrainian government first of all not about the national matters but about their personal enrichment. Thus, usual Ukrainian (as Ukrainian citizen – independent of his ethnic origin, native language and communication language) has become actually isolated from his national resources. These processes, from political point of view, resulted in the decline of confidence in the state government, its identification with «the others» or with «strangers», but not with its own people («natives») as political substance delegating the authorities to the government.

But this political interpretation of differentiation between «native-other-stranger» does not fully coincide with generally-accepted ethno-lingual differentiation between the “native” or “stranger”. Great number of unexpected instances of non-correspondence between ethnic and political interpretation of «native» or «stranger» was noticed at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014. For instance, the question arises of how the part of ethnic Ukrainians supporting Euromaidan perceives ethnic Ukrainians who do not support Euromaidan, but prefer political regime/government. Do ethnic Ukrainians view each other as «natives» or «strangers»? The similar problem arises in how Euromaidan participants belonging to different ethnic nations or to the same ethnic nation but speaking different (Ukrainian and Russian) languages perceive each other. And vice versa, how Euromaidan opponents and government proponents also belonging to different ethnic groups and speaking different languages

³⁸ V. Kipen, Y. Pasko, *Donetsk regional identity: some dimensions of analysis*, „Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona” 2006, vol 1., s. 56-59.

perceive each other. The said dispositions force to think about the nature of not just ethnic or ethno-lingual differentiation in Ukraine (actually, it has become secondary, because ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking population constitute equal parts of those who support or do not support Euromaidan), and about its political governmental and oppositional component. Today for oppositional Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians «the other», but not «the stranger» is ethnic Russian-speaking Ukrainian who does not support the government/ regime. Moreover, quite a great number of oppositional ethnic Ukrainians who do not support the government/ regime, consider each other as «the natives» even despite the fact that they speak different languages (Ukrainian and Russian). The situation becomes even more expressive when comparing oppositional ethnic Ukrainians who speak exclusive Ukrainian and ethnic Ukrainians who can or can not speak Ukrainian on condition that both groups do not support the regime. Instead, the difference between the “natives” and “the others” (but not “strangers”) is more tangible when comparing ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian and ethnic non-Ukrainians who do not speak Ukrainian but support Euromaidan. The worldview distance becomes shorter when comparing the ethnic Ukrainians (who speak and do not speak Ukrainian) and ethnic non-Ukrainians (for instance, Russians, Armenians, Byelorussians) who speak Ukrainian or other language and support Euromaidan. Actually, it means that today the boundary between the “native” and “the other” becomes less separate, it loses its primary ethnic and ethno-lingual nature, shifts to the political plane of understanding the natiogenesis and national building.

In this non-homogeneous composition and/or structuration of Ukrainian people in the context of Euromaidan events the interpretation of “strangers” has become very interesting. They are represented by those citizens or non-citizens of Ukraine who do not support political regime, independent of their ethnic or ethno-lingual belonging. But here certain deviations are noticed. For example, the worldview distance between such variants of cooperation is quite different: 1) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and supports Euromaidan and ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and supports the government/ regime; 2) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks Ukrainian and support Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian who does not speak Ukrainian and supports government / regime (or vice versa); 3) ethnic Ukrainian who speaks or does not speak Ukrainian and supports Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian who, independent of language supports the government/ regime; 4) ethnic non-Ukrainian who, independent of his language, supports Euromaidan, and ethnic Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian who, independent of his language supports the government/ regime, etc. Actually, political “strangers” can embrace ethnical and ethno-linguistical “natives”, “others” and “strangers”.

The suggested patterns of application of the concepts «natives-others-strangers» from ethnic and political view in the context of Ukrainian people structuration at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 allows making the conclusion about gradual transformation of ethno-lingual mechanism of national self-identification of Ukrainians into political mechanism

of national formation. And this shows that the citizens cease identifying themselves as Ukrainians or non-Ukrainians most on the basis of ethnic and ethno-lingual belonging and lingual practice, and instead resort to political self-identification, perception of Ukraine as a “nation”. Main reasons and leitmotifs of the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine today should be considered as follows: consolidated and intended position which unifies most of Ukrainian people and reduces itself to the necessity of conducting the system reforms and facilitating the civil civilizational development; realization of the fact by the representatives of Ukrainian people (independent of its ethnic origin and linguistic practice) that conducting the efficient reforms is possible only according to the results of establishment of efficient governmental institutes; the intention to find and realize innovative for Ukrainian people business model which is different from the previous practice of national establishment, denies it and adopts new alternative (in this respect Eurointegrational intentions of Ukrainian people are most significant, independent of its ethnic and linguistic structuring).

The attainment of the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine today can be considered the efforts to avoid ethnic and lingual extremes – «Ukraine for Ukrainians», «Ukrainian Ukraine», etc. The peculiarity of political nation or political identification of nation is the aspiration to avoid the attempts to form the ideology of «titular nation». Instead, political nation realizes itself in the plane of national and political ideology, which always has consolidated (but not separating) goals and/or objectives, is able to synthesize the phenomenon of «Ukrainian people». It actually means that political nation incorporates the right to self-identification which is constitutionally assigned to people.

The evidence of the beginning of formation of political nation in Ukraine according to the results of the events of the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 there aroused the perception of the civil ideology values by most of Ukrainian people reflected in the feeling of responsibility for the fate of Ukraine, patriotism and humanism, democracy and social justice, education, etc. Moreover, the beginning of political nation formation in Ukraine is testified by the fact that ethnic Ukrainians, despite their language increasingly strive for scientific and objective presentation of history and real events. It means that the phenomenon of political nation bears the potential of ideological difference decrease between «the others», and “strangers”. The aspiration to overcome the corruption, introduce the transparent and independent judicial system, realize the consensus of political class and society on all the primary national issues is the Catalyzer of political nation formation in Ukraine. These 2014 aspirations were reflected in the realization of the fact by Ukrainian people that mutual rapprochement and mutual penetration between the government and civil society should always take place. It means that the first manifestations of political nation in Ukraine should be actually incorporated in the two decentralized processes – national socialization and society politicization. Generally, it is obvious that the concept of ethnic and political «strangeness» constitutes the cornerstone of relations between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine,

though, it can be weakened on condition of political nation formation. With this in mind, it is obvious that the concept of «strangeness» plays an essential role in the national self-identification and should be underwent. First of all politico-national identity is differentiated as a consequence of the influence of the “natives”, “the others” and “strangers” and then consolidated. And only after that it is believed that political nation is full-fledged.

Тетяна Федорчак

Специфіка парламентських виборів 2006 року у Чеській Республіці

Автор статті доводить, що вибори 2006 р. до парламенту Чехії і перебіг всієї виборчої кампанії показали, що громадянське суспільство і демократичні принципи не розвиваються синхронно. Демократичний процес багатограний і відкритий, він припускає визначеність процедур без зумовленості результату. Однак, політичні процеси в умовах демократії сприйнятливі до впливу окремих індивідів і угруповань, що намагаються використати будь-які можливості зловживання владою. У цьому випадку справедливіше говорити не про «павутину влади», а аналізувати мозаїку політичних подій, дій політичних агентів, цивілізаційний досвід.

Ключові слова: Чеська Республіка, демократичні політична та партійна системи, парламентські вибори, внутрішня політика, коаліції партій

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The peculiarity of the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic in 2006

The author argues, that the parliamentary elections of 2006 in the Czech Republic and the course of the election campaign showed, that civil society and democratic principles do not develop synchronously. The democratic process is diverse and overt; it does not concede the precision of the procedures without the stipulated results. But the political processes under the conditions of democracy are sensitive to the influence of individuals and groups, which try to take advantage of any opportunity of power misuse. In this case it is better not to speak about the “authorities’ web”, but to analyze the mosaic of political events, political agents’ actions, civilizing experience.

Keywords: Czech Republic, democratic political and party system, parliamentary elections, the internal politics, the coalition parties

Problem statement and its topicality. The Czech Republic is now in the state of transformation connected with the political and economic changes. Transformation is understood as the system changes ensuring the development of the social and market economy, competition between political parties and their programs which cover the ideologically restricted spectrum from left to right and the political centre. Among the post-socialist countries the Czech Republic is one of the most successful as it has accomplished democratization of the political institutions, economic and market reforms i.e. it had prepared itself to the requirements put forward by the NATO and EU and successfully became a member of these international organizations. So, the experience in holding elections during the time of political changes gained by the Czech Republic is interesting for the post-socialist countries, which periodically hold their own presidential and parliamentary elections (often pre-term elections) and this points out at the topicality of the given problem.

The aim of the paper is to analyze the activity of the political parties in the Czech Republic during the transformational period. Owing to the institutional and conflictological approaches the participation of the parties in the parliamentary elections of 2006 and their influence on the development of the political process in the country have been researched.

Analysis of the recent studies and publications. Traditionally, the problem of role and functions of the political parties in the electoral processes and the development of electoral systems have been actively analyzed in foreign and home political science for many decades. Such interest of the researchers is quite obvious, taking into consideration the exclusive importance of the electoral processes and electoral systems for the full-fledged development of the political system and civil society. In their works M. Wallerstein, R. Dahl, G. Almond, M. Duverger, S. Lipset, S. Rokkan, G. Sartori, R. Taagepera analyze the role of political parties in functioning of the electoral systems, represent the analysis of the correlation between party and electoral processes. The above mentioned processes that occurred in the Czech Republic have also been analyzed by a number of Ukrainian and Russian scientist, namely S. Bostan [1-3], I. Kalinina [4], Ye. Kish [5], O. Pelenska [6], O. Prykhodko [7, 8], S. Troian [10], U. Proiss [9], P. Fedosov [11], Yu. Shcherbakova [12]. But the events that took place in the Czech Republic during the last years have not been ascertained in the works of the researches, so the article is aimed at disclosing this problem.

Factual material statement. More than 20 years have passed since the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia and considerable quantitative and qualitative changes have taken place in the society. On January 1, 1993 on the world map appeared a new country, the Czech Republic, with already applicable democratic political and party systems [13, p.196]. Implementing civilized principles, as a result of the political changes in 1990s, the Civic Forum and a number of other new political parties as opposed to the Communist Party of the Czech Republic, which had already been losing monopoly of power, were created. During the last years they have undergone various changes, some small parties stopped their activity, some

transformed and merged with more powerful organizations. The Civic Democratic Party (CDP) and the Czech Social Democratic Party (CzSDP) have become real political rivalries in modern Czech Republic [13, p.197]. Most parties appeared and existed for several years and then disappeared, proving the belief that on the Czech political scene the scenario, traditional for the CEE countries, is expanded. Political parties take their places according to the “right – left” scale and the great number of them is marginal parties. Here belongs the Czech National Social Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, Republican association – Czechoslovakian Republican Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, Czechoslovakian Social Party, the Democratic Union of the Czech Republic, Freedom Union etc. In addition to the CDP and the CzSDP the political life in the Czech Republic is actively influenced by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM), which was transformed from the former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian National Party (CDU – CzNP) and “the Green Party” [13].

In the political development of the Czech Republic a great role belonged to the government of right and left adherents. In 1998-2002 the country was governed by the CzSDP on the basis of the so-called oppositional agreement with the CDP. A union of this kind is a bit unusual for the political environment of the Czech Republic, which undergoes a number of changes. It was a tactical ploy of the great coalition. In fact within the frames of it one governing party, the CzSDP carried out the preconceived activities, coordinating them with another party, the CDP [14].

The parliamentary elections of 2002 showed the increasing influence of the CzSDP (30.2% of votes). Besides, the leading positions were occupied by the CPBM (18.51% of votes). Voting for the CzSDP, electors voted retrospectively, showing their support to the party and positively estimated party’s policy in the previous electoral cycle. At the same time the electors’ positions were affected by the negative experience of the voucher privatization which had been carried out by the CzSDP and which is criticized even now. It was influenced personally by the former leader of the CDP, and the former president of the Czech Republic V. Klaus. Privatization did not bring in enrichment or material welfare for most of the citizens, who at the beginning had to invest 1000 Czech korunas to buy a voucher book. The voucher privatization was criticized by the experts, scientists and practitioners, namely M. Zelenyi, J. Svejnar, J. E. Stiglitz, J. D. Sachs [16, p.127].

To provide a qualitative analysis of the voucher privatization it is necessary to describe economic and political relations, though it is difficult to do thoroughly in the frames of one article. That is why we just outline the fundamental problem, i.e. insufficient legalization of cardinal proprietary and property changes in early 1990s, which has been depicted by experts from various non-governmental organizations for several years. Gradually, a number of criminal cases, namely intentional bankruptcy of a range of enterprises, various schemes of tax evading,

avalanche-like increase in bank problems (inconsistent credit policy, interweaving of politics and economy), the growth of unemployment, the loss of foreign investors, has been opened.

After the elections of 2002 the left-of-centre coalition between the CzSDP, CDU – CzNP and the Freedom Union managed to seek the social reconciliation and achieve relatively stable economic performance. In 2006 GDP in the Czech Republic was 7.4%, the average inflation index did not exceed 2.4%, and the number of unemployed (in June) equaled – 7.9% [19]. In 2004 the Czech Republic became a member of the EU, having overcome the displeasure of the part of the citizens, which can be considered as the necessity to pay attention to the new demands. It should be mentioned that the Czech Republic has some practical opportunities to realize its suggestions in the EU and together with the other EU members can influence its political and economic indices.

Speaking about its inner politics the Czech Republic has managed to slacken the risks of the changes in the pension scheme, education and health service. Under the Constitution these spheres remained free of charge [21]. This criterion is not exact, as most of the citizens pay taxes to the state, and this, according to the scheme of the secondary transfer of finance, determines the level of material support of the mentioned spheres. At the same time the principle of the free of charge education and health care is effective, though the parties evaluate it from their own ideological points of view. The right wing believes that tuition fee and health care fee must be introduced, the left wing rejects this idea with various levels of publicity. The CzSDP is rather inclined to the principle of “free of charge” social programs, and the CPBM strictly and categorically points it out [8]. The discussions, which could lead to the fruitful result, are non-constructive, as the representatives of various parties tend to political maneuvering and discussions, and the desire to search a compromise and solution, which would be acceptable for all political players, is absent. So, it is necessary to admit that the measures which have been taken considering the problem of ageing (in Europe this index changes at minimal level in comparison with other countries) need more considerable groundings, not only the usage of the theory and experience of other countries, but also practical researches. Besides, to solve social problems it is necessary to take into consideration the level and structure of people employment, necessities in the quality and nature of health care.

In June 2006 the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic were held and the results were the following: civic democrats achieved 35.38%, social democrats – 32.32%, communists – 12.81%, Christian democrats – 7.22%, the Green Party – 6.29% [22]. Nearly 65% of population took part in the elections. The main factors which determined the results of the elections are guarantees and stability. At the same time it is not absolutely clear why the CzSDP, who had left behind its rivals, did not win, and why against the background of the successful economic development of the Czech Republic, the most important factors for electors were the internal political situation and some incidents concerning the CzSDP.

The insufficient level of self-reflection connected with some representatives of the party must be seen as the main reason (thus the head of the party was replaced twice V. Spidla was succeeded by S. Gross). Some superior representatives (M. Kraus, who was the head of the fraction of the party) and officials who were members of the party too actively cooperated with businessmen and in a number of cases were suspected of corruption or excess of power. The CzSDP was criticized for deviation from its political aims in favor of two other parties who were their partners in coalition. The CDP took advantage of the CzSDP's inner conflicts and twice gave a vote of confidence to the government. In the first case the CzSDP substituted the Prime Minister V. Spidla for S. Gross. In the second case M. Kalousek, the head of the coalitional CDU – CzNP, played an important role in this political game. Through his critical speeches, he humiliated the authority of the CzSDP, hoping that the government would resign, and he, at the head of the CDU – CzNP, would guarantee himself a plum place and good chances in case of closer cooperation with the CDP. Some negative role was played by the communists who could not forgive the former Prime Minister V. Spidla the fact that he had not set the minority government, backed up by the CPBM, but preferred coalition to them in 2002. Under the influence of own inner ambitions the communists acted insidiously and did not support the proposal submitted by the CDP [15]. Probably, it influenced the further program cooperation between the CPBM and the CzSDP, but in practice the political game turned out to be a different one.

It should be mentioned that in 2006 an ideological and program (and logical) variant of cooperation between the CPBM and the CzSDP could create among the adherents of the left wing an impression that the CPBM was just a “cover” for some suspicions as to the excess of power by the CzSDP. Such suspicions led to the fact that a part of electors just did not come to the elections, creating an outflow of votes from the communists. The more profound reason for the loss of votes by the communists was the fact that inside the party there was no real influence on the activity of the executive power. A part of the left electors, focused on the effective actions of “their” party, voted for the CzSDP, which, as they thought could become a real rival for the CDP. Besides, a part of electors, who changed their sympathies, probably reacted more sharply to the negative election campaign, which ensured the following displacement in polarization of political prerogatives of society.

The electors who supported the CDP felt danger of the excessive national regulation of production, reduction in individual activity in the sphere of business, the increase in tax pressure. The CDP proposed to implement the so-called “equal tax” and some of the voters made the conclusion that it would help them to get rid of additional tax pressure (double tax).

The fact that the CzSDP gained the second place at the elections has some historical grounds. The activity of two parties on the left wing of the political spectrum, with their constant arguments, which affected their prestige, means the loss of positions in competition with the right wing. It is known that the communists' historical mission failed because of the social reasons and under the conditions of globalization left-of-centre parties cannot successfully

compete on the political scene, if they struggle with the help of old, obsolete and very often inefficient methods. The CPBM and the CzSDP have ideological and program differences as to the classical understanding of the so-called social state with its active role in the society. The CPBM has a weak project of the socially fair society, and the search of the third way (its interpretation is close to the CzSDP's one, and to a part of European social democrats and socialists) is still ineffective both in theory and in practice.

The CDP is a classical conservative party that supports traditional market, family and individual's values. In foreign politics it maintains ties with the USA and NATO and criticizes the EU. Its former head and the former president of the Czech Republic V. Klaus believed this project to be a restriction of the market relations and the foreign interference in the national states' functions of primary importance. The CDP overestimates the role of the national state in the process of globalization. So, we reckon that in the CDP's position there is some violation of logic, i.e. the party stands up for the role of the market, which plays the main part in the process of globalization and that is why its critics of the EU, which, as they think restricts the markets of the countries-members, is ungrounded.

To some degree the new discovery of the parliamentary elections of 2006 became the Green Party. For several years it had been acting on the political scene, but only that year it gained favourable chances to be represented in the parliament. To our mind, the party succeeded thanks to the so-called electors' negative choice, people who refused to vote for one of the parties-leaders, namely the CDP or the CzSDP. The electors voted for the new actors in politics, backed up the discussions over the ecological situation. Among those who voted for the Green Party, there were many people from the ecologically polluted areas. The party found its adherents among the unstable supporters of other parties and the intellectuals. Apparently, the support of the Green Party by the former president V. Havel played its role.

So, as it has been mentioned above during the elections of 2006 the CDP, the CzSDP, the CPBM, the CDU – CzNP and the Green Party surmounted the 5% barrier and entered the parliament. It should be reminded that the electoral system in the Czech Republic is a proportional representation electoral system, and the parties who get more than 5% of votes enter the parliament and gain a certain number of deputy's mandates in accordance with the percentage of votes. The Czech proportional representation electoral system is believed to be pure, though it includes some elements, which are typical for the majority voted system.

The presence of the barrier determines the compulsory number of the electors' votes which is necessary to gain a deputy's mandate. Usually it causes sharp criticism of the political parties, which do not have great influence on the political scene in the Czech Republic. Thus, the Green Party resented that the CzSDP had gained only twice of the Green Party's votes, but had got mandates in four times more than the Green Party. Such resentment was shown by other parties and this caused considerable thoughts concerning the necessity of the electoral system modification to have a fairer distribution of places in the parliament, posts, changes

in the electors' conduct and the nature of the election campaigns, which would ensure the program and ideological distribution according to the axis "left – right".

At the same time, the general political course of the country would hardly be influenced by the elections. According to their results the CzSDP and the CDP have become the most influential in the parliament and a variant of the great coalition between these parties is possible. There were many grounds (foreign-policy and national appraisals of the elections), connected with the economic and political interests, which pushed the parties to compromise and agreements as to the next Czech government. Therefore, the variants of the transitional government, the administrative government and the pre-term elections have been discussed. To our mind none of these variants is optimal, as if politicians embrace one of them it will affirm that they do not accept the electorate's choice and in its turn it can provoke a part of the electorate to the political apathy, absenteeism and passiveness during next elections. We reckon that a deliberate expectation as to the low turnout of voters and hopes on other parties' election victory is the lack of political maturity and culture. Usually, pre-term elections are considered as a disgrace for democracy or as something unusual, but this variant must be used only in case of crisis or deadlocks. Negotiations as the available ways of solving problems have not been settled yet.

But the reflections how to bring conceptual changes into the tactics of work with voters and into the party leaders' political rhetoric were premature. The situation was difficult and it took some time to normalize the political life, to mark off the problems concerning the elections, to focus on the everyday political work, to start implementing election promises. Lately it became obvious, that the CDP tried to carry out its election program. Public opinion and critics by political opponents greatly influenced the party's activity in fulfillment of its engagements.

It should be said, that the election campaign of 2006, as the analysts believe, was distinguished by the greater acuteness in comparison with the previous elections. Sometimes political contest expressed itself in the scandals over the individuals (while criticizing the opponents, politicians made personal remarks). Especially it could be seen in polemics between the CDP and the CzSDP. Both parties used the so-called negative elements, i.e. negative advertising, for instance the advertising device "the Civic Democratic Party – minus" which was used by the CzSDP. The CzSDP's representatives systematically criticized main points from the CDP's program and compared them with the CzSDP's decisions. The main CzSDP's slogan was "Guarantees and Success". The sociologist I. Habal mentioned that the negative campaign influenced not only the party's voters but the rival's adherents. It was the basis of the CzSDP's election strategy. It strengthened after receiving the data as to the election situation, which witnessed to the reduction of the variation in number of votes between these two parties in favor of the CzSDP.

The example of the election campaign, which steps outside “the standards”, can become the notes made by J. Kubice (Jan Kubice was the head of the Department for Organized Crime Control – «Útvar pro odhalování organizovaného zločinu» (ÚOOZ), which were based on the statements, that organized crime interfered in the official governmental structures, in policy, which was carried out by the CzSDP. Even the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic J. Paroubek was accused of sexual relationship with the underage. This dirty case introduced a tangle of inappropriate political struggle, rude manipulation and went beyond the bounds of the democratic principles.

Though the case showed how it was dangerous to ignore the possible penetration of organized crime into the official structures or inadequate, deliberate misrepresentation of information by mass media. It is too difficult for politicians to protect themselves from speculations, deliberate improper use of negative information, which is spread during the election campaign, aimed at discrediting political enemies. At the same time, it is not clear how the Ministry of Internal Affairs as the part of the government formed by the CzSDP (during 8 years) set it aside.

Spread of the faulty information went out of control and caused the loss of votes by the CzSDP. Though the official governmental structures have conducted an inquiry concerning J. Kubice’s notes and any conclusions are premature, but the unpleasant compulsive thoughts still exist. The political scientists repeatedly warned that dirty technologies, connected with defamation and unfair actions are inadmissible, but “negative campaigns have become a stable part of the political process” [3, p. 5]. So, V. Burian and T. Tichak state that it is necessary to accentuate on the differences in programs, to give an elector an opportunity to make the choice deliberately. “Ideological polarization is necessary as the voter must see the minimum difference between the alternatives” [3, p. 5].

The electorate conduct cannot be considered as a measured and predicted value, because it is subordinated to the objective, rational, and subjective, irrational influence, a citizen must make his choice before every election. Extension of the “dirty technologies” increases the number of those who refuse to vote. These groups of absentees must be taken into account by the political parties in their electoral strategies. Usually, most of the absentees are marginal persons, who do not take part in the elections deliberately. Voting procedure is the right of choice for every citizen and one of the main democratic principles, which influences the events and the unwillingness to vote and can hide a range of problems. The analysis of the reasons for absenteeism can become a source of measures for stabilization of the voter turnout, though from elections to elections the voter turnout index continuously falls.

It should be mentioned that in the Czech Republic from time to time the idea to make the elections obligatory (the former Prime Minister M. Zeman backs it up) as they are in Belgium, Luxemburg, Greece or Italy appears. The political scientists and average citizens treat this idea rather negatively. Next idea which is discussed in mass media is to introduce

the compulsory percentage of the voter turnout, namely 50%, as an essential requirement to consider the elections valid. This position is actively supported by the so-called radical left wing. But to our mind the specificity of the electoral systems of the above mentioned countries cannot be a model for other countries. Secondly, the implementation of the mentioned measures would mean the top-down development of the democracy and not an upward one which is the distinctive feature of the Czech Republic. Usually, compulsion does not contribute either to democracy or politicians who try to change it by means of influencing the society.

The experience of the parliamentary election campaign of 2006 in the Czech Republic determined the following direction of political discussions, which in their turn, revealed 3 problems: causes of voting during the democracy development in the country; the presence of some additional factors which can influence the choice of the voters; if it is reasonable to analyze the electorate's behavior only on the basis of the economic theory of democracy proposed by A. Downs (1957), according to which "voting indicates the electors' egoistical interest who choose among the political parties much as the consumer chooses the goods or services, which he receives" [2, p. 256], or they should adhere to the criteria that irrationality predominates in their decisions (custom, social experience, prestige of political parties and actors). The essence of these processes must be based on the multilevel set of symptoms and reasons, which can be revealed in various forms, and which can veil the nature of the phenomenon. Thus, A. Heywood states, that "the point is not in the "goods" proposed by the parties, but rather in "the way the goods are offered", by means of advertising, political campaigns, propaganda and so on" [2, p. 257].

Conclusions. The parliamentary elections of 2006 in the Czech Republic and the course of the election campaign showed, that civil society and democratic principles do not develop synchronously. The democratic process is diverse and overt; it does not concede the precision of the procedures without the stipulated results. But the political processes under the conditions of democracy are sensitive to the influence of individuals and groups, which try to take advantage of any opportunity of power misuse. In this case it is better not to speak about the "authorities' web", but to analyze the mosaic of political events, political agents' actions, civilizing experience.

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Processes of Europeanization in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The article undertakes problems of Europeanization of the foreign common policy and the safety. For purposes of the present article is presenting of the creature and processes of Europeanization's happening in the womb of European Union. An exploratory problem is the definition of the part and the meaning of processes of Europeanization within the framework of the Foreign Common Policy and the Safety.

Particularly the author tries to show positions different to approach exploratory applied in sciences about the safety to the problem of Europeanization of this politics. The exploratory hypothesis lies in ambush on the foundation that although within the framework of the Foreign Common Policy and the Safety exists strong intergovernmentalness then this politics also is subject enough to widely conceived processes of Europeanization within the framework of first of all soft instruments of the influence

Key words; *Europeanization, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union, Public Policy, European Policy*

Recently, in public discourse, numerous scientific publications and also in documents published by certain Institutions of the European Union, there is a lot of references to a phenomenon of the Europeanization. Undoubtedly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its executive in a form of the Common Security and Defence Policy are public policies of the European Union, which are subjected to a quite wide process of Europeanization as a result of actions of different interest groups. That Europeanization uses a top-down or bottom-up approach, and also quite often an ad-extra one. The European Union tries (by means of light methods) to influence member states which consequently introduce to their actions processes of the Europeanization. It also works the other way round – member states influence processes of the Europeanization happening in the European Union. Therefore, it can be said that these actions have a nature of a voluntary isoformism.

The aim of this article is to present a matter and processes of the Europeanization that happen inside the European Union. An appearing research problem is defining a role and meaning of processes of the Europeanization in Common Foreign and Security Policy. In particular, the author endeavors to show positions of different research approaches (used in safety studies) to a problem of the Europeanization of the policy. A research hypothesis is based on an

assumption that even though there is a strong intergovernmentalism in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this policy also comes under quite widely spread processes of the Europeanization, particularly in light instruments of influence¹.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy in scientific theories – a Europeanization attempt

In case of this area, by means of three chosen research models I tried to indicate in what way the European Union wants to ensure security, independence and influences for itself. I referred to realistic school's views, which quite skeptically relates to the project of the European integration. What is more, its representatives claim that international organizations are not essential subjects of international relations².

Therefore, a phenomenon of ignorance of the European Union as an actor of international reality can be easily observed. There are also assumptions that the European Union is a faint organization in case of its meaning for a political cooperation, because conflicts of interests between countries limit the mentioned cooperation, even despite an existence of some kind of interests' convergence³.

Realists come to a conclusion that the European Union did not achieve any significant improvement in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy. International relations are controlled by a so called security dilemma, based on a fact that actions directed at security increase of one country cause a decrease of a sense of security in other member states. In this situation remaining states, while seeing partner's actions, accept an assumption of realization of the worst possible scenario for them⁴.

A similar thesis is spread by neo-realists, who do not believe in a possibility of making significant changes and reforms by the European Union under defense policy of the European Union. A representative of the neo-realists' school is K. Waltz, who assumes that Europe is not able to emerge a sufficient safety and defense policy, because as an international organization it can only do what is allowed by member states. Consequently, that fact makes it impossible to undertake any risky and doubtful actions⁵.

Despite possessed abilities in a form of appropriate resources and also a strong economy, the European Union does not have any collective will to actualize the defense policy. K. Waltz

¹ I mean the Open Method of Coordination, etc.

² T. Łoś-Nowak, *Paradygmat realistyczny – projekcje porządku międzynarodowego w XXI wieku*, [in:] R. Kuźniar (red.), *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku*, Warsaw 2005, p. 21; See also: D. A. Baldwin, *Power and institutional Relations*, [in:] W. Carlsneas, T. Risse, B. A. Simmons (red.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London 2002, p. 177–178; P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, Krakow 2012, p. 15–18

³ Compare: P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, op. cit., p. 17

⁴ J. Czaputowicz, *Bezpieczeństwo w teoriach stosunków międzynarodowych*, [in:] K. Żukrowska, M. Grącik (red.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka*, Warsaw 2006, p. 49–51

⁵ K. Waltz, *Intimations of Multipolarity*, [in:] B. Hansen, B. Heurlin (red.), *The New World Order. Contracting Theories*, Macmillan 2002, p. 3–4

claims that this situation is to some extent a result of a cold war, in which a fear from a Soviet domination did not allow it to create an efficient defense policy. It is very similar nowadays.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that defense of the European Union will always stay in NATO's shadow, that is a main forum of taking actions of a military nature⁶.

A similar thesis is proposed by another representative of the neo-realists' school, J. D. Mearsheimer. He assumes that a military presence of the USA on the European continent holds back countries such as France or Germany from confrontation. Mearsheimer claims also that if the USA left Europe, France and Germany would start to fight for influences in Europe, what could lead to a cold war and maybe even to a conflict. According to the above, presence of the USA in Europe is some kind of an equivalent for the Old Continent⁷.

According to J. D. Mearsheimer, a principal of European Union's functioning is a policy of force and more particularly – a presence of military force of the USA on the continent. That force made it possible for the European Union to develop its economic side.

To sum up, neo-realists reject a possibility of a future development and emancipation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, because they assume that it may work as an element or a supplement of the North Atlantic Treaty⁸.

A last approach in which I've been studying processes happening in a field of defense policy was institutionalism. It is based on an assumption that member states join an international organization due to a variety of benefits⁹. Therefore, people representing institutionalism perceive European integration as a process based on a systematic growth of power, authorization and jurisdiction of transnational institutions, which is also supposed to be followed by a limitation of autonomy, as well as an decrease of exclusive member states' competence. They reject a vision of peace based on an equilibrium of forces and they believe in an assumption that institutions of collective security create some value added in relation to a totality of military potentials of its members¹⁰.

Representatives of institutionalism claim that a change in balance of power after a cold war causes a situation, when countries have to fight limitations associated with their territoriality and actively cooperate to widen a zone of influences, security and political stabilization¹¹.

What is more, they also assume that countries of the European Union will gradually spread their sovereignty (shared with the others) and *ipso facto* lead to internal tensions between members. Consequently, it would lead to a decisive paralysis and an inability of the European

⁶ *Ibidem*

⁷ J. D. Mearsheimer, *Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War*, „The Atlantic” November 1990, p. 24–49

⁸ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Paradygmat realistycznych...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24

⁹ Particularly, these benefits are: joining a cooperative system of conflicts' solving, increasing of possibilities of a force projection, decreasing of transactional costs; see: B. A. Simmons, L. L. Martin, *International Organizations and Institutions*; P. D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 39–40

¹⁰ R. Keohane, *Ironies of Sovereignty. The European Union and United States*, *Journal Common of Market Studies* no. 40, November 2002, p. 743-745

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 746

Union to a quick and effective action. In this situation some roles will be assigned to the USA and the European Union¹².

The USA would feel good in situations requiring quick and determined military actions, while the European Union would take care of negotiations and consensus. According to the above, to quiet down mutual animosities between the USA and the European Union, a perfect solution would be to divide certain roles on the European continent¹³.

As it can be seen, the realistic theory explains a slow development in a field of defense of the European Union and its member states. The neo-realistic approach provides knowledge about a national balance of power, which can reveal in the future and create a completely different view of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Institutionalism shows a lot of essential and also new tools that can be used in studying contemporary international security.

However, in author's opinion none of the presented theories explains the matter and the phenomenon of the Common Security and Defence Policy in a complex and complete way. It results from the fact that origins and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy are heterogenic processes, happening on many surfaces and involving multiple subjects. Their final shape is a derivative of many different factors.

However, a thesis can be risked that a development of the Common Security and Defence Policy is conditioned by dynamics of two competing trends: aspiration to protect sovereignty as well as to maximize influences from a side of certain member states and efforts made to build a collective security system based on a respect of international law. In my opinion, in spite of all the most useful theories for a description of these processes are realistic and neo-realistic ones. Moreover, I find institutionalism very helpful as well.

As history shows, an idea of common defense in a declarative layer has been already a subject of interest right after the second world war. However, a domination of the Soviet Union and a bipolar division of Europe (world) did not allow for making the idea real. Although there have been initiatives in a form of the European Defence Community or the Western European Union, but in the first case it has been rejected by France¹⁴ and the second one was perceived mostly like a lifeless idea working in more declarative aspects than specific actions¹⁵. Despite that they have given a reason for further alterations in the foreign and defense Policy field.

Essential changes were made after 1990, when the bipolar political block slowly started to disintegrate and the cold war has ended. That moment together with circumstances in Yugoslavia caused a situation, when Europe had to deal with a responsibility for an Old

¹² D. Williams, *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 43

¹³ R. Keohane, *Ironies of Sovereignty...*, *op. cit.*, p. 759

¹⁴ E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, London 1980, p. 26–28

¹⁵ C. T. Szyjko, Z. Ślusarczyk, *50-lecie EWG: studium prawnohistoryczne*, „Studia Prawnicze Ius et Praxis” 02 [03]07, *Cywilizacja. Europa. Globalizacja*, Warsaw 2007, Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji, p. 19.–27

Continent's fate. Due to these situations, in 1922 the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty. Despite of it all, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has remained inefficient.

A forthcoming meeting of the European Council in Amsterdam was supposed to solve a problem of ineffective European politics in a field of security and defense. Finally, on the 15th and the 16th of June 1997 heads of states and member states' governments have reached an agreement concerning a novelization of the Maastricht Treaty and problem solving of security policy¹⁶.

In the Amsterdam Treaty it is emphasized that the European Union will create tighter connections with the Western European Union¹⁷. Moreover, it has been assumed that the WEU is not only an integral element together with the European Union and supports the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but it will also have an operational ability that is essential for fulfilling Petersburg missions¹⁸. In exactly this way the Petersburg missions have been included in the Amsterdam Treaty, which meant that the Union will be patronizing their realizations.

During an unofficial meeting on a top of the European Union in Pörtschach on the 24th and the 25th of October 1998, Tony Blair declared that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union cannot be held in a present shape anymore¹⁹. He claimed that there should be created a European military capacity, which will make it possible for member states of the European Union to jointly lead peacekeeping operations, especially military ones which aim to maintain the peace²⁰.

Finally, in autumn 1998, on the European Union's forum functionally associated with the Western European Union, a new episode started – the episode of a discussion on the European military capacity's development, aiming to secure strategic interests of Europe by equipping it in such military capacity, that would enable more independent actions, especially in situations when the USA will not be able to or for some reason will not want to interfere²¹.

Slowly, a climate of consensus in defense policy of the European Union has started to appear²². Three biggest and most significant European countries: Great Britain, France and Germany agreed to strengthening of the CFSP. However, France and Germany still preferred implementing the European Union into their own operational capacity by incorporating the WEU to the EU, while Great Britain was more willing to create a separate pillar in the North Atlantic Treaty, from which the European Union could draw. A culmination

¹⁶ K. Miszczak, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa a rozwój Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, „Polska w Europie” 2003, no. 2 (44), p. 12–13

¹⁷ A. Capiak, B. Kuźniak, *Traktat Amsterdamski – Komentarz*, Krakow 2001, p. 7 and subsequent

¹⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁹ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia*, „Przegląd Europejski” 2003, no. 1, p. 32–33

²⁰ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warsaw 2005, p. 38

²¹ J. Starzyk, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2003, p. 164

²² R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia*, ed. cit., p. 33

of disputes happened at a meeting that took place in Cologne on the 3rd and the 4th of June 1999²³, which also ended German presidency. It introduced a new subject: “European policy in a field of security and defense”²⁴.

What is more, in Cologne there has also been accepted the Declaration of the European Council on strengthening of the common European policy in a field of security and defense. The declaration included intentions to transfer to the Union’s Council a task of decision making in a range of conflicts’ prevention and crisis management operations, meaning the Petersburg’s tasks²⁵.

Therefore, the General Affairs Council has been obliged to prepare appropriate decisions and resources (including a conditions’ specification of accepting operational functions of the WEU by the European Union) indispensable for leading Petersburg’s tasks. For a purpose of a practical implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy, a creation of the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff Committee has been announced²⁶. The WEU transferred its competences and institutions to the European Union. These were the Satellite Centre in Torrejon and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris²⁷.

An official proclamation of the Common Security and Defence Policy happened six months later on a top in Helsinki on the 10th and the 11th of December 1999²⁸. The Helsinki Headline Goal²⁹ has been specified there – it implied a creation (until the end of year 2003) of military forces in size of 50-60 thousand of soldiers, being able to collocate in 60 days and to lead any operations like Petersburg’s missions within at least one year. These forces were also supposed to have aviation and navy components. It has also been decided to develop common command, control, intelligence and strategic transport systems, as well as a cooperation in a range of armament and supplying the army with military equipment³⁰. Moreover, it has been agreed to use existing procedures of defense planning, including procedures NATO and the Partnership for Peace.

A supplement of these preparations for the EU to perform Petersburg’s tasks was creating the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management³¹. It was done on a top

²³ More: K. Miszczyk, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa...*, *op. cit.*, p. 13

²⁴ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia*, *ed. cit.*, p. 37

²⁵ R. Zięba, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2007, p. 86

²⁶ *Idem*, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warsaw 2005, p. 49

²⁷ J. Czuputowicz, *Instytucjonalizacja Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, „Polska w Europie” 2003, no. 2 (44), p. 57

²⁸ R. Zięba, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, *ed. cit.*, p. 87

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 88

³⁰ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia*, *ed. cit.*, p. 40

³¹ R. Zięba, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warszawa 2005, p. 49

of the European Council in Feira in June 2000. Police and state's administrative staff were included in civilian structures³².

An autonomy of the European Union in a range of the Common Security and Defence Policy has been confirmed in the Treaty of Nice signed on the 15th of February 2001.

During ratification processes of the Treaty of Nice, another aims of security and defense policy of the European Union have been accepted. It has been decided to create a group of about 200 experts for a widely understood lawful system, a group of civilian experts in a field of administration and unit in a force of 2000 people dealing with protection from any kinds of cataclysms. Works on procedures of proceedings have also started. It needs to be emphasized that a consolidation process of the Common Security and Defence Policy did not proceed without its disruptions. The EU's position was strongly criticized by Turkey, which was going to participate in building the European safety's structure, however thanks to mediation of the Great Britain the conflict has been resolved³³.

The Treaty of Nice from the 1st of February 2003 has both strengthened and developed operative components of the Common Security and Defense Policy as a practically independent project of the European Union. Since then the European Union could independently define all fields in a range of security and foreign politics. Unfortunately, some discrepancies concerning defense policy appeared. They "smeared" the military component of the common protection's concept, while not defining its final form. The Common Security and Defence Policy was a subject of disputes of the appointed Convent and their records were included in the Project of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. Due to its rejection and coming to existence the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, regulations concerning the policy can be found in this document.

As a result, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been strengthened by creating the European policy of security and defense, which has been renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy due to regulations in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. What is more, its pillar structure has been liquidated and new institutions have been appointed for the purpose of improving functioning of the security and defense policy of the European Union.

The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union introduced institutions of a solidarity clause, common defense, a rule of constructive abstaining from voting. Quite a significant emphasis was put on solutions promoting a convergence of member politics in the CFSP field³⁴.

³² K. Miszczak, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa...*, *op. cit.*, p. 15

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 17

³⁴ It was about establishing a strengthened cooperation in a field of foreign policy and a constant structural cooperation in defense, activity of the European Defence Agency, a duty of a mutual consultation

What is more, the Treaty of Lisbon also standardized a system of lawful acts, introduced a “double-hat” of a high representative, standardized and simplified a decision process and strengthened a representation of the European Union thanks to institutions’ establishments of the lasting president of the European Council and high representative of the Union for foreign and security policy. It also introduced the External Action Service of the European Union.

Summary – conclusions for Poland

The European Union is contemporarily immersed in an economical crisis, which basically met all its states. Thus, an issue of the Common Security and Defence Policy³⁵ is not explored in literature or discourse. These problems were pushed into the side and are not presently in the interest field of the European Union.

Leaders of member states, especially these quarterback ones (France, Germany), wonder how to resolve a problem of the crisis and they do not deal with a defense policy, although in my opinion it is very important. It is even evidenced by a fact of placing it in Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy for years 2012-2016³⁶.

Despite it all, in my opinion the Europeanization, the CFSP and the CSDP have lead to a situation, when the Republic of Poland as a member of the European Union takes an active part in forming them and administers a significant voice co-deciding about their further shape. If processes of Europeanization have failed, Poland would have never had any influence on security and defense policy.

A participation in the CFSP and the CSDP makes Poland bear financial, human and political costs of Polish army soldiers taking part in chosen missions lead by the European Union. It seems that a perspective of achieving a real independence of European Union’s defense policy is quite far away, especially while using an institutional or realistic approach. It is still unknown if it will ever come true.

If it was sure that the European Union achieves a technical operational ability via creating strong European intervention forces, the rule of solidarity would not work here.

Member states will not want to use them. It is caused by a lack of effective political leadership in the European Union, geographically diverse preferences and common priorities of certain member states. Besides, institutionalists claim the Union is characterized by deep pacifism, what can significantly decrease chances for using created intervention forces. According to that, the most possible scenario of the further development of the CSDP will be a tight cooperation and also acting together with the USA or a gradual empowerment of the CSDP,

³⁵ The Common Foreign and Security Policy

³⁶ *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016*, Warsaw 2012, p. 15–16

because autonomic defense policy lead by the European Union will be characterized with higher political legitimization than North Atlantic Treaty.

Nonetheless, it should be noticed that the empowerment will proceed very slowly. According to the above, at present and in future years NATO will be a fundamental tool of collective defense of member states, including Poland.

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18. Zięba R., *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2007.

Республіканізм із посадою суперпрезидента: до з'ясування суті суперпрезиденталізму та диференціації президентських і напівпрезидентських систем правління з суперпрезидентами

Запропоновано концептуальний розгляд сутності феномену республік із суперпрезидентами. З'ясовано суть, генезу й особливості сучасного трактування суперпрезиденталізму. Прослідковано концептуальну різницю поміж системою та формою державного правління у контексті республік з суперпрезидентами. Виокремлено ключові ознаки, різновиди та ризики республіканських систем правління із суперпрезидентами. Прослідковано взаємозв'язок республік із суперпрезидентами та типів політичних режимів сучасності. Зроблено диференціацію республік із суперпрезидентами на президентські та напівпрезидентські системи державного правління з суперпрезидентами.

Ключові слова: дихотомічний підхід, трихотомічний підхід, форма державного правління, система державного правління, республіка, республіканізм, президенталізм, напівпрезиденталізм, парламентаризм, суперпрезидент, суперпрезиденталізм, республіка з посадою суперпрезидента, суперпрезидентський президенталізм, суперпрезидентський напівпрезиденталізм, диктаторські і недиктаторські системи, демократія, напівдемократія, автократія, неопатримоніалізм.

Vitaliy Lytvyn

Republicanism with the office of super-president: towards ascertaining the nature of super-presidentialism and differentiation of presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with super-presidents

The article is dedicated to conceptual analysis and consideration of republics with super-presidents' phenomenon. The author discovered the nature, origin and features a modern interpretation of super-presidentialism; examined the conceptual difference between the system

of government and the form of government in the context of republics with super-presidents; determined the key features, varieties and risks of republican systems of government with super-presidents; examined the relationship between republics with super-presidents and types of contemporary political regimes; divided republics with super-presidents into presidential and semi-presidential systems of government with super-presidents.

Keywords: dichotomous and approach, form and system of government, republic, republicanism, presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarism, super-president, super-presidentialism, republic with office of super-president, super-presidential presidentialism, super-presidential semi-presidentialism, dictatorial and non-dictatorial systems, democracy, semi-democracy, autocracy, neopatrimonialism.

Сьогодні у політичній науці виділяють два великі методологічні підходи стосовно розуміння політичних (або конституційних) систем державного правління – дихотомічний та трихотомічний. У *дихотомічному підході* до уваги взято розгляд таких двох класичних систем республіканської і монархічної форм державного правління, як президенталізм і парламентаризм. У *трихотомічному підході* науковий аналіз додатково доповнено такою системою республіканської форми правління як *напівпрезиденталізм*¹. Із огляду на це, треба зауважити, що в науці дуже часто говорять не про форму державного правління, а про систему державного правління. Це уточнення позиціонується як доволі актуальне, оскільки *форма державного правління* піддається оцінці, більшою мірою, на підставі апелювання до способу формування або заміщення посади глави держави (незалежно від сили повноважень глави держави), а *система державного правління* – на підставі формальних (конституційних) та/або фактичних (політичних) передумов міжінституційних відносин із приводу здійснення державної влади (також незалежно від сили повноважень глави держави). Оскільки глава держави буває виборним та спадковим, то серед форм державного правління виокремлюють республіки та монархії, а також їхні комбінації та різновиди. Натомість, серед систем державного правління, як зазначено вище, виокремлюють президентські, напівпрезидентські та парламентські, які очевидно унаслідують чи відрізняються від республіканської та монархічної форм державного правління. Це зокрема зрозуміло із огляду на те, що президентські та напівпрезидентські системи державного правління (президенталізм і напівпрезиденталізм) становлять зразки республіканської форми державного правління, а парламентські системи державного правління (парламентаризм) – різновиди республіканської та монархічної форм державного правління.

¹ Дуже часто стосовно категорії «напівпрезиденталізм» вживають синонімічні поняття/трактування, зокрема «змішаний республіканізм». Ми вважаємо це методологічно неоправданим кроком, адже змішування може відбуватись як у межах класичного президенталізму, так і класичного парламентаризму, не кажучи вже про напівпрезиденталізм.

Така методологічна структуризація форм та систем державного правління знайшла наукове відображення у доробках С. Делі², М. Дюверже³, Р. Елгі⁴ тощо. Залишаючись прихильниками цієї логічної моделі, дотримуємось визначень конституційних систем у межах республіканської форми державного правління, які запропонував Р. Елгі. Він трактує: *президенталізм* – як конституційну систему республіканської форми державного правління, якій властива посада всенародно (прямо чи опосередковано) обраного на фіксований термін президента й інституту кабінету/адміністрації президента (і навіть можливо прем'єр-міністра), члени якого колективно відповідальні лише перед президентом (разом із цим, члени кабінету чи адміністрації президента можуть бути індивідуально відповідальними також перед парламентом/провідною палатою парламенту, та це не має жодного дефінітивного значення); *парламентаризм* – як конституційну систему республіканської форми державного правління, за якої президент отримує свої повноваження на підставі непрямого вибору (наприклад, у парламенті), а прем'єр-міністр та урядовий кабінет колективно відповідальні перед парламентом (разом із цим, члени урядового кабінету, окрім прем'єр-міністра, можуть бути також індивідуально відповідальними перед президентом і парламентом/провідною палатою парламенту – та це не має жодного дефінітивного значення); *напівпрезиденталізм* – як конституційну систему республіканської форми державного правління, якій властива посада всенародно (опосередковано чи прямо) обраного на фіксований термін президента, а також інституту прем'єр-міністра й уряду, які обов'язково колективно відповідальні хоча б перед парламентом (разом із цим, прем'єр-міністр та урядовий кабінет можуть бути одночасно колективно відповідальними і перед парламентом, і перед главою держави; більше того, міністри урядового кабінету можуть бути ще й індивідуально відповідальними перед парламентом та/або президентом – проте це не має жодного значення).

У підході Р. Елгі не враховано формальних та/або фактичних повноважень президентів⁵. Річ у тому, що повноваження президентів можуть змінюватись залежно не лише від конституційних, а й політичних, історичних чи психологічних передумов (наприклад, від результатів президентських і парламентських виборів, історичних особливостей повноважень інститутів глави держави, соціо-економічних особливостей розвитку країн,

² S. Daly, *The Ladder of Abstraction: A framework for the Systematic Classification of Democratic Regime Types*, "Politics" 2003, vol 23, nr 2, s. 96.

³ M. Duverger, *A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1980, vol 8, s. 165-187.

⁴ R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1998, vol 33, s. 219-238.; R. Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.

⁵ Це видима перевага запропонованого підходу класифікації конституційних систем державного правління, яка полягає у тому, що не потрібно робити жодних посилань на реляційні властивості політичного процесу. Саме тому відбувається уникнення елементів суб'єктивізму в класифікації систем державного правління. Більш детально див.: R. Elgie, *The classification of democratic regime type: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions*, «European Journal of Political Research» 1998, vol 33, s. 219-238.; V. Lytvyn, *Podvijnja vykonavcha vlada: teoriya ta praktyka yevropejs'koho pivprezidentalizmu*, „Osvita rehionu: politolohiya, psyholohiya. Komunikacyi” 2009, nr 3, s. 25-33.

персональних якостей президентів тощо). Внаслідок цього зміна сили повноважень президентів (яку можна вимірювати, опираючись як на якісні, так і на кількісні індикатори та маркери⁶) може впливати на фактичне позиціонування тих або інших конституційних систем державного правління. Можлива президентіалізація чи парламентаризація (загалом персоналізація) різних (президентських, парламентських, а також напівпрезидентських) конституційних систем правління, внаслідок чого одні системи на практиці можуть функціонувати як більше президентські, другі – як більше парламентські, а треті – взагалі як збалансовані, при цьому конституційно залишаючись незмінними. Внаслідок цього цілком очевидно, що розбіжним системам державного правління властивими можуть бути розбіжні за силою президенти. Іншими словами, президенталізм, напівпрезиденталізм та парламентаризм можуть бути репрезентовані посадами дуже слабкого/слабкого (церемоніального/номінального), проміжного (збалансованого), сильного/дуже сильного (всесильного, супер- або гіпер-) президента⁷.

Проте навіть попри вказану теоретико-методологічну диференціацію сили президентів у розбіжних конституційних системах правління досить часто в політичному та науковому дискурсі помічаємо неоднозначне трактування політичних систем, які частково влаштовують різні вимоги парламентаризму та напівпрезиденталізму чи напівпрезиденталізму та президенталізму. Зазвичай непорозуміння спричинені буквально перенесенням посад фактично дуже слабких президентів (незалежно від способу обрання) на системи парламентаризму або посад фактично дуже сильних президентів (також незалежно від способу обрання) на системи президенталізму. Разом з цим, поза увагою часто залишається формальне оцінювання конституційних систем державного правління як президентських, напівпрезидентських або парламентських. З огляду на це, цілком очевидно, що ключовим аналітичним моментом екстраполяцій має бути зіставлення формальних та фактичних повноважень таких владних інститутів як президент, прем'єр-міністр (уряд в цілому) і парламент.

Трансплантуючи вказану особливість на республіканські конституційні системи державного правління, розуміємо, що в окремих із них є суттєва кореляція сили

⁶ Для оцінювання найбільш відомих підходів щодо вимірювання сили президентів див.: J. McGregor, *The Presidency in East Central Europe*, «RFR/RL Research Report» 1994, vol 3, nr 2, s. 12-16.; T. Frye, *A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies*, «Comparative Political Studies» 1997, vol 30, nr 5, s. 523-552.; T. Frye, *Changes in Post-Communist Presidential Power: A Political Economy Explanation*, «University of Notre Dame : Constitutional Design 2000», Wyd. Center for Continuing Education 1999.; A. Siaroff, *Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction*, «European Journal of Political Research» 2003, vol 42, s. 287-312.; A. Krouwel, *Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European Countries*, «Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Working paper» 2003, nr 2, s. 6.; A. Krouwel, *Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries*, «Acta Politica» 2003, vol 38, s. 333-364.; K. Armingeon, R. Careja, *Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2007*, Wyd. Institute of Political Science 2007.; M.S. Shugart, J. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 148-158.; C. Lucky, *Table of presidential powers in Eastern Europe*, «East European Constitutional Review» 1993-1994, vol 2, nr 4, s. 81-94.; E. Taghiyev, *Measuring Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries*, «CEU Political Science Journal» 2006, vol 3, s. 11-21.; J. Hellman, *Constitutions and economic reform in the postcommunist transitions*, «East European Constitutional Review» 1996, vol 5, nr 1, s. 46-56.

⁷ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: Presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies*, «British Journal of Political Science» 2006, vol 36, nr 4, s. 619-643.

повноважень президентів, які, приміром, обираються всенародно. Проблема поглиблюється у тому випадку, коли повноваження президентів республіканських систем державного правління із виборними президентами є *дуже значними*, тобто коли для таких республіканських систем державного правління властиві дуже сильні президенти, які звикло у політичній науці іменують *суперпрезидентами*. Окремі науковці відносять такі республіканські системи правління до президентських, а інші – до президентських і напівпрезидентських. У дихотомічному підході вказані системи державного правління звичайно є випадками президенталізму. Натомість, не вирішеним постає питання трихотомічної класифікації сучасного республіканізму із посадою суперпрезидента. Річ у тому, що деякі вчені виокремлюють такі конструкції республіканських систем державного правління, як *суперпрезиденталізм* (або ж суперпрезидентський президенталізм) та *супернапівпрезиденталізм* (або ж суперпрезидентський напівпрезиденталізм). Синтезуючим атрибутом вказаних таксономій є дуже значні повноваження президентів, що, зі слів С. Холмса⁸, Дж. Ішіями та Р. Кеннеді⁹, С. Фіша¹⁰, служить приводом для класифікації таких форматів систем державного правління як *«республіки із суперпрезидентами»*. Теоретико-методологічне осмислення феномену республіканських систем державного правління з суперпрезидентами, а також дихотомії республіканських систем правління із суперпрезидентами на формально президентські та напівпрезидентські системи правління становить магістральне завдання запропонованої наукової розвідки. Відповідно метою дослідження є з'ясування того, чи необхідно розрізняти запропоновані формати республіканських систем державного правління із суперпрезидентами як аналітично окремі випадки (тобто як суперпрезидентський президенталізм та суперпрезидентський напівпрезиденталізм), чи краще їх тлумачити як єдине дефінітивне ціле (тобто як суперпрезиденталізм).

Значною мірою та безпосередньо проблема республіканських систем державного правління з суперпрезидентами (хоч і в контексті апелювання здебільше до феномену суперпрезиденталізму) отримала відображення у доробках таких науковців: С. Фіш¹¹,

⁸ S. Holmes, *Superpresidentialism and its problems*, "East European Constitutional Review" 1993, vol 2, nr 4, s. 123-126.

⁹ J. Ishiyama, R. Kennedy, *Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2001, vol 53, nr 8, s. 1177-1191.

¹⁰ S. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2005.

¹¹ S. Fish, *The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics*, [w:] V. Sperling, *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, Wyd. Westview 2000, s. 177-192.; S. Fish, *The Perils of Russian Superpresidentialism*, "Current History" 1997, vol 96, s. 326-330.; S. Fish, *When More Is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political Underdevelopment in Russia*, [w:] V. Bonnell, G. Breslauer, *Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?*, Wyd. Westview Press 2001, s. 15-34.

C. Холмс¹², В. Чіркін¹³, Дж. Ішіяма та Р. Кеннеді¹⁴, А. Орлов¹⁵, Т. Колтон та С. Скач¹⁶, І. Клямкін та С. Шевцова¹⁷ тощо. Частково та побіжно проблемою місця й ролі суперпрезидентів у республіканській формі правління цікавились такі дослідники: Г. Хейл та І. Габдрафіков¹⁸, К. Дарден¹⁹, Н. Робінсон²⁰, Т. Ремінгтон, С. Сміт та М. Хаспел²¹, Ж. ван Зон²², Е. Морган-Джонс та П. Шлейтер²³, Я. Бариська²⁴, І. Алексєнко²⁵, О. Процик²⁶, П. Чейсті²⁷, П. Кубіцек²⁸, С. Перріш²⁹, М. Беляєв³⁰, А. Лейпхарт³¹, Г. Сіляновска-Давкова³²,

¹² S. Holmes, *Superpresidentialism and its problems*, "East European Constitutional Review" 1993, vol 2, nr 4, s. 123-126.; S. Holmes, *Sverhprezidentstvo i ego problemy*, „Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropskoe obozrenie“ 1993, vol 4, nr 5.; S. Holmes, *Sverhprezidentstvo i ego problemy*, „Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropskoe obozrenie“ 1994, vol 1, nr 6.

¹³ V. Chirkin, *Konstitucionnoe pravo zarubezhnyh stran*, Wyd. Jurist 1997.; V. Chirkin, *Netipichnye formy pravlenija v sovremenom gosudarstve*, „Gosudarstvo i pravo“ 1994, nr 4, s. 109-115.

¹⁴ J. Ishiyama, R. Kennedy, *Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2001, vol 53, nr 8, s. 1177-1191.

¹⁵ A. Orlov, *Vysshie organy gosudarstvennoj vlasti stran Latinskoj Ameriki*, Wyd. Ankil 2001.; A. Orlov, *Prezidentskie respubliki v Latinskoj Amerike*, Wyd. Jurist 1995.

¹⁶ T. Colton, C. Skach, *Superpresidentialism and Russia's backward state*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 1995, vol 11, nr 2, s. 144-149.; T. Colton, *The Russian predicament*, "Journal of Democracy" 2005, vol 16, nr 3, s. 113-126.; T. Colton, C. Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, Document produced to assist working sessions at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 21 s.

¹⁷ I. Klamkin, L. Shevtsova, *Rezhim Borisa Vtorogo. Osobennosti postkommunisticheskoj vlasti v Rossii*, Wyd. Moscow Carnegie Center 1999.; I. Klamkin, *Rossijskaja vlast' na rubezhe tysjacheletij*, „Pro et Contra“ 1999, vol 4, nr 2, s. 63-87.; L. Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia*, Wyd. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2005, s. 322-352.; L. Shevtsova, *The Problem of Executive Power in Russia*, "Journal of Democracy" 2000, vol 11, nr 1, s. 32-39.

¹⁸ H. Hale, *Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, "World Politics" 2005, vol 58, nr 1, s. 133-165.; I. Gабдрафіков, H. Hale, *Bashkortostan's Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia*, [w:] O. Ieda, T. Uyama, *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, "Slavic Eurasian Studies", vol. 10, s. 75-104.

¹⁹ K. Darden, *Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination : Ukraine under Kuchma*, "East European Constitutional Review" 2001, vol 10, nr 2-3, s. 67-71.

²⁰ N. Robinson, *The Presidency: the politics of institutional chaos*, [w:] N. Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

²¹ T. Remington, S. Smith, M. Haspel, *Decrees, Laws and Inter Branch Relations in the Russian Federation*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 1998, vol 14, nr 4, s. 287-322.

²² H. van Zon, *Political culture and neo-patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma*, "Problems of Post-Communism" 2005, vol 52, nr 5, s. 12-22.

²³ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr 2, s. 123-163.

²⁴ J. Baris'ka, *Novitni nadprezidents'ki respubliki: teoretiko-pravovi aspekti*, „Visnik Akademii pravovih nauk Ukraïni“ 2009, vol 4, nr 59, s. 216-222.

²⁵ I. Alekseenko, *Superprezidents'ka respublika jak paradigma vzaemodii politichnih institutiv*, „Ekonomichnij chasopis-XXI: Naukovij zhurnal“ 2010, vol 7-8, s. 14-17.

²⁶ O. Protsyk, *Ruling with decrees: presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2004, vol 56, nr 5, s. 637-660.

²⁷ P. Chaisty, N. Cheeseman, T. Power, *Rethinking the "Presidentialism Debate": Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective*, Paper prepared for the 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid 2012, 25 s.; P. Chaisty, *The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia*, "Government and Opposition" 2008, vol 43, nr 3, s. 424-453.

²⁸ P. Kubicek, *Delegative democracy in Russia and Ukraine*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies" 1994, vol 27, nr 4, s. 423-441.

²⁹ S. Parrish, *Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-1995*, [w:] J. Carey, M.S. Shugart, *Executive Decree Authority*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998, s. 62-103.

³⁰ M. Belyaev, *Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies*, "Comparative Political Studies" 2006, vol 39, nr 3, s. 375-398.

³¹ A. Lijphart, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*, "Journal of Democracy" 2004, vol 15, nr 2, s. 96-109.

³² G. Siljanovska-Davkova, *The Contemporary "Models" of Government: Dilemmas and Challenges*, "Iustinianus Primus Law

Т. Кларк та Дж. Віттрок³³, Дж. Кілер та М. Шайн³⁴, Х. Лінц³⁵, А. Медушевський³⁶, К. Черкасов³⁷, М. Кармазіна³⁸, Н. Сахаров³⁹, С. Перечина⁴⁰, О. Зазнаєв⁴¹ тощо.

Розгляд та опрацювання згаданої наукової літератури дозволяє висувати, що традиційно в політичній науці під *республікою з суперпрезидентом* (*суперпрезидентською республікою*), яку під впливом дихотомічної традиції класифікацій систем правління іменують *суперпрезиденталізмом*, розуміють формат будь-якої республіканської системи державного правління, за якого в руках президента як глави держави (та/або можливо глави виконавчої влади) відбувається формальне (юридичне) і/або фактичне (політичне) зосередження усіх гілок і важелів державної влади⁴². Зі слів А. Орлова, *суперпрезиденталізм* – фактично незалежна, неконтрольована на практиці виконавчою, законодавчою або судовою гілкою влади система державного управління, основною рисою якої є «гіпертрофовані президентські повноваження»⁴³. З огляду на ідеї Дж. Дербішира і Я. Дербішира⁴⁴, *республіки із суперпрезидентами* – зразки республіканських систем державного правління, які властиві для різних варіантів авторитаризму або тоталітаризму та характеризуються посадами необмежених президентів⁴⁵. При цьому, зі слів О. Зазнаєва та Х. Вандена, важливо те, що сильні (необмежені) повноваження президентів не лише закріплюються у конституціях, а й реалізуються на практиці. Більше того, формально сильний президент на практиці може виконувати додаткові надмірні повноваження, які не властиві йому конституційно⁴⁶. Фактично президент «носить кілька капелюхів» – глави держави, го-

Review” 2011, vol 2, nr 1, s. 1-26.

³³ T. Clark, J. Wittrock, *Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-Communist Systems*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2005, vol 38, nr 2, s. 171-188.

³⁴ J. Keeler, M. Schain, *Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France*, [w:] K. von Mettenheim, *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1997, s. 84-105.

³⁵ J. Linz, *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3-87.

³⁶ A. Medushevskij, *Konstitucionnyj perevorot ili konstitucionnaja reforma: popravki k Konstitucii 1993 goda kak instrument bor'by za vlast'*, „Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropejskoe obozrenie“ 1999, vol 3, nr 28, s. 154-167.

³⁷ K. Cherkasov, *Eshbe raz o „naznachenii“ glav regionov ili o povysbenii jeffektivnosti funkcionirovanija territorial'nyh organov prezidentskoj vertikali vlasti v rukurse administrativnoj reformy*, „Rossijskaja justicija“ 2007, vol 12, s. 6-7.

³⁸ M. Karmazina, *Institut prezidentstva: pobozhennja ta sutnist' fenomena*, „Politichnij mencedzhment“ 2004, vol 3, nr 6, s. 36-50.

³⁹ N. Saharov, *Institut prezidentstva v sovremenom mire*, Wyd. Juridicheskaja literatura 1994.

⁴⁰ S. Parechina, *Institut prezidentstva: istorija i sovremennost'*, Wyd. ISPI 2003.

⁴¹ O. Zaznaev, *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] M. Farukshin, *Dinamika politicheskib sistem i mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij: Vyp. 1*, Wyd. Kazanckij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul'janova-Lenina 2006, s. 186-210.

⁴² Поряд із терміном «суперпрезиденталізм» у науці як синонімічні вживають такі категорії як «надпрезиденталізм» або «гіперпрезиденталізм». Детально див.: J. Linz, *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 5, 76.; Holmes S., *Sverhprezidentstvo i ego problemy*, „Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropejskoe obozrenie“ 1994, vol 1, nr 6.; A. Orlov, *Vysshie organy gosudarstvennoj vlasti stran Latinskoj Ameriki*, Wyd. Ankil 2001, s. 7.

⁴³ A. Orlov, *Vysshie organy gosudarstvennoj vlasti stran Latinskoj Ameriki*, Wyd. Ankil 2001, s. 9.

⁴⁴ J. Derbishajr, J. Derbishajr, *Politicheskie sistemy mira: Tom 1*, Wyd. Ripol Klassik 2004, s. 51, 58-59.

⁴⁵ Прикладами республік із суперпрезидентами Дж. Дербішир і Я. Дербішир назвали Азербайджан, Білорусь, Вірменію, Казахстан, Росію, Таджикистан, Туркменістан, Узбекистан тощо.

⁴⁶ O. Zaznaev, *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] M. Farukshin, *Dinamika politicheskib sistem i mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij: Vyp. 1*, Wyd. Kazanckij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul'janova-Lenina 2006, s. 186-210;

ловнокомандуючого збройними силами, глави виконавчої влади, лідера партії і навіть духовного лідера. Це означає, що множинні фактичні ролі президентів значно посилюють і без того сильні формальні президентські повноваження.

Натомість, парламенти у республіканських системах правління з суперпрезидентами собою становлять повністю або майже повністю дорадчі органи при виконавчій владі, які клієнталістсько штампують рішення суперпрезидентів. Це означає, що *суперпрезидентами* формально/фактично є одночасно глави держав і глави виконавчих гілок влади з надзвичайними й надзвичайно великими повноваженнями, які підпорядковують собі усі гілки (законодавчу, виконавчу та судову) та важелі державної влади. Повноваження суперпрезидентів вважають *гіпертрофованими*, оскільки вони не піддаються стримуванню і противагам з боку законодавчої, виконавчої та судової гілок державної влади. Особливістю посад суперпрезидентів є і те, що їх здебільшого обирають без проміжних органів або інстанцій за результатами прямого та всенародного волевиявлення. Примітно і те, що «гіпертрофованість» повноважень суперпрезидентів традиційно зумовлена формально – текстами законів та конституцій, – та фактично – реальними повноваженнями та діями президентів⁴⁷. Проте буває так, що конституційна сила повноважень суперпрезидентів не відповідає чи відповідає лише частково значно більшим реальним повноваженням суперпрезидентів.

Ознаками республіканських систем державного правління з суперпрезидентами потрібно вважати такі: 1) позиціонування президента як керівника, лідера або «батька» нації (незалежно від типу політичного режиму в тій або іншій країні); 2) безумовне верховенство президента у системі органів державної влади; 3) обрання президента на фіксований термін звично на підставі прямого та всенародного волевиявлення (в окремих авторитарних політичних режимах суперпрезидентів обирають або призначають довічно); 4) позиціонування президента як глави держави та як глави виконавчої влади (завичай такі повноваження президентів мають конституційну регламентацію, але інколи суперпрезиденти формально є тільки главами держав, а фактично виконують ролі глав виконавчої влади); 5) домінування виконавчої (фактично президентсько-виконавчої) влади над іншими гілками державної влади (найперше над парламентсько-законодавчою гілкою влади, яка традиційно дуже слабка; у деяких республіках з суперпрезидентами законодавчу владу формально закріплено спільно й одночасно за парламентами і урядами, проте останні формально чи фактично очолюють президенти), наслідком чого є деформація чи відсутність системи стримувань/противаг та балансу гілок державної влади⁴⁸; 6) наділеність президента унілатеральними (односторонніми) надзвичайними

H. Vanden, G. Prevost, *Politics of Latin America. The Power Game*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 184.

⁴⁷ A. Orlov, *Prezidentskie respubliki v Latinskoj Amerike*, Wyd. Jurist 1995.

⁴⁸ T. Clark, J. Wittrock, *Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Post-Communist Systems*, "Comparative Political Studies" 2005, vol 38, nr 2, s. 176.; J. Ishiyama, R. Kennedy, *Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2001, vol 53, nr 8, s. 1179.; J. Linz, *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy*:

і надзвичайно великими повноваженнями, які можуть бути використані практично у будь-якій сфері політичного процесу (зокрема повноваження президента самостійно і на власний розсуд вводити або ж остаточно впливати на введення надзвичайного та/або військового стану); 7) наділеність президента повноваженнями розпустити парламент або провідну палату парламенту (мова може йти про незалежне від інших інститутів влади право президента самостійно вирішувати розпустити парламент чи ні або ж про підконтрольне іншим інститутам влади право президента розпустити парламент тільки у випадку настання відповідних для цього передумов та подій⁴⁹); 8) наділеність президента унілатеральними (односторонніми) призначальними повноваженнями (приміром, президент може самостійно призначати/звільняти з посад суддів, прокурорів, адвокатів чи керівників органів місцевого самоврядування); 9) наділеність президента правом безпосередньо (опосередковано) видавати нормативно-правові акти, які мають силу закону; 10) підконтрольність державних засобів масової інформації президенту, наслідком чого є унеможливлена або обмежена відкрита критика державної влади; 11) приналежність президента здебільшого до найбільшої та одночасно домінуючої партії, за умови відносної слабкості інших (опозиційних та лояльних до президента) політичних партій⁵⁰.

Але в республіканських системах правління з суперпрезидентами диференційованою може бути роль політичних партій. В *одних країнах* формально інсталювано багатопартійні системи, але суперпрезиденти опираються на вплив домінуючих парламентських партій. У *других країнах* формально усталено багатопартійні системи, проте сила та положення партій у таких системах є нестабільними, незначними і додатковими, тому суперпрезиденти здатні маневрувати між ними, фактично посилюючи свій власний вплив і авторитет. У *третьох країнах* формально-конституційно встановлено однопартійні системи або системи з партіями-гегемонами, внаслідок чого з «партіями влади» формально та/або фактично зливаються дуже значимі державно-політичні повноваження суперпрезидентів. У *четвертих країнах* взагалі заборонено діяльність всіх або більшості партій, а суперпрезиденти здебільше приходять до влади внаслідок військових

Does It Make a Difference?, [w:] J. Linz, A. Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 63.

⁴⁹ Перелік конституційних передумов, які потрібні задля того, щоби в республіці з суперпрезидентом глава держави міг розпустити парламент, є доволі цікавим. Наприклад, президент Білорусії може розпустити палати парламенту на основі висновку Конституційного Суду у випадку систематичного та грубого порушення палатами парламенту конституції (ст. 94 Конституції). Саме тому провадження про визнання конституційності закону в Конституційному Суді може бути причиною дострокового припинення повноважень парламенту. Натомість, у Росії президент має право розпустити Державну Думу (нижню палату парламенту) тоді, коли вона повторно виразить вотум недовіри уряду (який спочатку було відхилено президентом) або триразово віхилить запропоновану президентом кандидатуру на посаду глави уряду. Детально див.: *Konstitucija Respubliki Belarus. Prinjata 24 nojabrja 1996 goda*, [w:] *Konstitucii gosudarstv – uchastnikov SNG, Moskva 2001*, s. 127-170.; *Konstitucija Rossijskoj Federacii. Prinjata 12 dekabrja 1993 goda*, [w:] *Konstitucii gosudarstv – uchastnikov SNG, Moskva 2001*, s. 474.; J. Baris'ka, *Novitni nadprezidents'ki respubliki: teoretiko-pravovi aspekti*, „*Visnik Akademii pravovih nauk Ukraini*“ 2009, vol 4, nr 59, s. 220.

⁵⁰ S. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave Democracies: The Case of Brazil*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1999, s. 274-275.

переворотів та опираються на вплив військових хунт⁵¹. Спільне те, що політичні системи у республіках із суперпрезидентами детерміновані нестабільністю партійних систем, які виступають у ролі додатка державної машини, який підтримується запровадженням адміністративно-поліцейського контролю над діяльністю партій. За слабкої законодавчо-парламентської влади та нерозвиненої партійної демократії немає сили, здатної зрівноважити вплив президента, що фактично перетворюється на центр політичного життя та стає не тільки главою виконавчої гілки державної влади, але й нації загалом⁵². Крім того, у системах з суперпрезидентами відбувається звуження арени владних/державних/управлінських рішень, які традиційно приймають на партійно-політичній арені, до рішень спеціально підібраних непартійних технократів. А процес технократизації рішень перешкоджає розвитку демократичних принципів змагальності та участі, тому й віддаляє президентсько-виконавчу владу від будь-якої структурно-систематизованої відповідальності перед законодавчою владою. Це у свою чергу чітко показує, що незалежно від того, чи формально-конституційно передбачено баланс гілок державної влади, у політичному процесі фактично домінує президент, повноваження якого дуже суттєво перевищують повноваження інших органів державної влади. Очевидно, що це призводить до встановлення режиму автократичного/монократичного типу, якому притаманна орієнтація на президента із боку всіх чи більшості державних структур, в якому відсутня виборча або ліберальна демократія, а права людини і громадянина мають тільки формальний і навіть фіктивний характер.

Але навіть попри це у політичній науці склалось розрізнене трактування кореляцій систем із суперпрезидентами і політичних режимів, які у них функціонують або ж до яких вони призводять. Так, Н. Сахаров зауважує, що республіки із суперпрезидентами у контексті різновидів політичних режимів все ж потрібно розподіляти на диктаторські та недиктаторські. *Диктаторські системи з суперпрезидентами* – це зазвичай республіканські системи правління, у яких суперпрезиденти всю повноту своєї влади отримують на підставі фактичного ослаблення інших гілок/інститутів влади, а також громадянського суспільства. Такі республіканські системи правління здебільшого властиві для тоталітарних та авторитарних режимів. Традиційно суперпрезиденти-диктатори притаманні для президентсько-монократичних, президентсько-мілітарних та президентсько-партократичних республік⁵³. *Недиктаторські системи з суперпрезидентами* – зазвичай

⁵¹ Приклади країн першої групи – Азербайджан (партія «Новий Азербайджан»), Росія (партія «Єдина Росія»); другої групи – Білорусь; третьої групи – КНДР; четвертої групи – Чилі часів режиму «пінкратії» (А. Піночета) тощо.

⁵² А. Orlov, *Prezidentskie respubliki v Latinskoj Amerike*, Wyd. Jurist 1995, s. 9-11.

⁵³ Зазначені різновиди диктаторських систем із суперпрезидентами на підставі врахування природи домінування глав держав у структурі державної влади запропонували виокремлювати В. Чіркін та О. Зазнаєв. Науковці зазначають, що: 1) *президентсько-монократичні республіканські системи* – це такі диктаторські системи із суперпрезидентами, в яких глави держав, що інколи проголошуються довічними президентами, очолюють єдині дозволені в країнах партії, які є носіями проголошеної і обов'язкової офіційної державної ідеології (наприклад, Гана за часів Кваме Нкруме у 1960-1966 рр., Гвінея за часів А. Секу Туре у 1958-1984 рр., Заір-Конго за часів Мобуту Сесе Сесеко в 1965-1997 рр., КНДР за часів Кім Ір Сена в 1972-1998 рр., Екваторіальна Гвінея (з 1979 р.), свого часу Туніс (у 1957-2011 рр.), Уганда (зокрема в 1971-

республіканські системи правління, у яких суперпрезиденти всю повноти своєї влади отримують на основі конституційних регламентацій та лише підтверджують її фактично. Ці республіки не обов'язково автократичні, але для них обов'язково властиві загрози й ризики зміщення виборчої демократії (гібридного режиму) до авторитаризму чи тоталітаризму⁵⁴. Оперуючи визначенням Г. О'Доннелла⁵⁵, а теж зауваженням П. Чейсті, Н. Чісмана і Т. Павера⁵⁶, очевидно, що недиктаторські республіки із суперпрезидентами фактично функціонують за логікою гібридних політичних режимів або так званих «дефектних чи делегативних демократій». «Дефектність» або «делегативність» демократії у зазначеному випадку зумовлена тим, що конституційно передбачено концентрацію повноважень президентів, особливо у виконавчій і законодавчій гілках влади, яка відбувається внаслідок зменшення вагомості/впливу інституційних і політичних обмежень, особливо зі сторони партій і парламентів⁵⁷. Внаслідок цього суперпрезиденти у період між президентськими виборами окреслені як інституційно необмежені політичні актори, а самі вибори детерміновані процесами відритих маніпуляцій. Це призводить до формалізації концентрованих та централізованих повноважень президентів, особливо проактивних законодавчих повноважень, які включають право видавати укази із силою законів, а також право арбітрувати міжінституційні конфлікти в системі поділу державної влади⁵⁸.

Натомість, М. Кармазіна унілатерально ставить республіки із суперпрезидентами в один ряд з такими феноменами як *диктатура* (громадянська чи військова) та *тиранія*. Дослідниця зазначає, що «коли будемо говорити про вивищення інституту

1979 рр.) тощо); 2) *президентсько-мілітарні республіканські системи* – такі диктаторські системи з суперпрезидентами, в яких глави держав отримують суперповноваження у результаті військового перевороту (як, наприклад, в Чилі у 1973-1990 рр. або в Індонезії у 1967-1998 рр. тощо); 3) *президентсько-партократичні республіканські системи* – це такі диктаторські системи з суперпрезидентами, в яких глави держав обирається вищим органом єдиної в державі, зазвичай соціалістичної/комуністичної, партії (наприклад, СРСР, Ангола (з 1979 р.), Бенін (у 1975-1991 рр.), Мозамбик (з 1975 р.) тощо). Доцільність виокремлення недиктаторських республіканських систем з суперпрезидентами очевидна з огляду на висновок І. Алексєєнко. Дослідник частково заперечив класифікацію республік із суперпрезидентами В. Чіркїна та О. Зазнаєва як таку, що є застарілою, бо не враховує особливостей республіканізму з суперпрезидентами у тих країнах, які не є монократичними (однопартійними), партократичними або мілітарними (зокрема на прикладі окремих країн пострадянського простору – Азербайджану, Білорусі, Казахстану, Росії, Таджикистану, Туркменістану, Узбекистану тощо). Більш детально див.: V. Chirkin, *Konstitucionnoe pravo zarubezhnyh stran*, Wyd. Jurist 1997, s. 145-146.; O. Zaznaev, *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] M. Farukshin, *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnyh odnoszenij: Vyp. 1*, Wyd. Kazanckij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Uljanova-Lenina 2006, s. 186-210.; I. Aleksєenko, *Superprezidents'ka respublika jak paradigma vzaemodij politichnih institutiv*, „Ekonomicnij chasopis-XXI: Naukovij zhurnal” 2010, vol 7-8, s. 14-17.

⁵⁴ N. Saharov, *Institut prezidentstva v sovremenom mire*, Wyd. Juridicheskaja literatura 1994, s 14-25.

⁵⁵ G. O'Donnell, *Delegative Democracy*, “Journal of Democracy” 1994, vol 5, nr 1, s. 55-69.; G. O'Donnell, *Illusions About Consolidation*, “Journal of Democracy” 1996, vol 7, nr 2, s. 34-51.; G. O'Donnell, *Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies*, “Journal of Democracy” 1998, vol 9, nr 3, s. 112-126.

⁵⁶ P. Chaisty, N. Cheeseman, T. Power, *Rethinking the “Presidentialism Debate”: Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective*, Paper prepared for the 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid 2012, 25 s.

⁵⁷ S. Fish, *Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies*, “Journal of Democracy” 2006, vol 17, nr 1, s. 5-20.

⁵⁸ P. Kubicek, *Delegative democracy in Russia and Ukraine*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 1994, vol 27, nr 4, s. 423-441.; S. Parrish, *Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991-1995*, [w:] J. Carey, M.S. Shugart, *Executive Decree Authority*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998, s. 62-103.; M. Beliaev, *Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr 3, s. 375-398.

президента над традиційними гілками влади, і навіть більше – про вивищення його над усіма інститутами держави, то більш прийнятним відповідником буде ... одне з таких понять, як суперпрезидентська республіка, диктатура, тиранія тощо»⁵⁹. Схожого висновку дотримуються В. Пугачов⁶⁰ та С. Фіш⁶¹. Проте С. Фіш зазначає, що республіканські системи державного правління із суперпрезидентами не будучи демократичними, можуть бути *напівдемократичними*. Відмінність напівдемократії від «чистого» авторитаризму, на думку дослідника, полягає у тому, що проводяться регулярні та досить вільні вибори. Із однієї сторони, це вірно, а з іншої сторони, поступове посилення повноважень суперпрезидентів веде до того, що в них будуть сконцентровані всі державно-владні важелі впливу, а це більше відповідає принципам не демократії, а автократії. У цьому полягає антиінституційна упередженість республік з суперпрезидентами, яка окреслена тим, що суперпрезидент не зацікавлений розвивати інститути, які потенційно можуть являти загрозу його формальній та/або фактичній силі у системі державної влади. Саме в цьому, з слів Р. Андерсона, С. Фіша, С. Хенсона і Ф. Роедера⁶², й полягає відмінність республіканських систем правління з суперпрезидентами від будь-яких республіканських систем державного правління, яким властиве розосередження владних інститутів. А тому, зі слів С. Фіша, детермінантними ознаками республік з суперпрезидентами є⁶³: 1) наявність потужного апарату виконавчої влади на чолі із президентом, який «затмарює» інші органи державної влади з погляду використовуваних ресурсів; 2) підконтрольність всіх чи більшості державних витрат президентові; 3) право президента видавати укази, які мають силу законів; 4) унеможливленість/ускладненість процедури імпічменту президента; 5) непідконтрольність президентсько-виконавчої влади перед законодавчою владою; 6) підконтрольність судової влади президенту, внаслідок чого президент та його діяльність/бездіяльність не можуть бути предметом судового розслідування.

Внаслідок цього очевидно, що майже всі недемократичні та напівдемократичні республіки з суперпрезидентами є інституційними конструктами так званого «патронімічного президенталізму» чи *неопатримоніалізму*, які, за словами Г. Хейла⁶⁴, комбінують у собі великі формальні й фактичні повноваження президентів зі всім наявним ресурсним потенціалом, який вони одержують від патрон-клієнтських відносин у політиці та економіці тієї або іншої країни. Це прямо означає, що «*уповноважування суперпрезидентів*» та «*обмежування*» механізмів інституційних стримувань та противаг відбувається

⁵⁹ M. Karmazina, *Institut prezidentstva: pobozhbenija ta sutnist' fenomena*, „Politichnij menedzhment“ 2004, vol 3, nr 6, s. 37.

⁶⁰ V. Pugachev, *Vvedenie v politologiju: slovar'-spravochnik*, Wyd. Aspekt Press 1996, s. 199.

⁶¹ S. Fish, *The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics*, [w:] V. Sperling, *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, Wyd. Westview 2000, s. 177-192.

⁶² R. Anderson, S. Fish, S. Hanson, P. Roeder, *Postcommunism and the theory of democracy*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2001, s. 83-84.

⁶³ S. Fish, *The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics*, [w:] V. Sperling, *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, Wyd. Westview 2000, s. 178-179.

⁶⁴ H. Hale, *Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, „World Politics” 2005, vol 58, nr 1, s. 138.

усіма можливими способами, навіть за рахунок альтернативних центрів державної влади. Значною мірою це властиво пострадянським країнам, у яких інститут президента запроваджено на основі спадщини радянської політичної культури, що уможливила владарювання за допомогою механізмів патронажу та персонального правління⁶⁵. Тому дуже сильні (супер-) президенти у цих країнах фактично співіснують з дуже слабкими парламентами, які користуються відносно низькими рівнями довіри населення. Із огляду на це, не завжди спрацьовує зауваження Х. Лінца про те, що нестабільність посади сильного і всенародно обраного президента – це прямий наслідок подвійної легітимності державної влади у конструкції розділених виборів президента та парламенту. Навпаки, джерелом нестабільності посади суперпрезидента є надмірна концентрація в його руках надлишкових владних повноважень і ресурсів, які не ґрунтуються на довірі населення, екстрапольованій у формі підтримки парламентських партій⁶⁶. А тому цілком праві О. Процик⁶⁷, Е. Морган-Джонс і П. Шлейтер⁶⁸, які вказують, що сила суперпрезидентів є найбільш ефективною тоді, коли вона комбінує інші інституційні складові та інструменти. Так наприклад, повноваження суперпрезидентів реалізовувати законодавчий процес і формувати урядові кабінети є вирішальним ресурсом сили глав держав, коли вони наділені довірою парламентських партій та інструментами партійно-парламентського контролю за законодавчим процесом⁶⁹.

⁶⁵ Серед пострадянських країн «патронімічний президенталізм» найперше властивий для Азербайджану, Білорусі, Росії, Киргизстану, Казахстану, Таджикистану, Туркменістану, Узбекистану, а також свого часу для Вірменії, Грузії, України. Звично під *патронімічним президенталізмом* розуміють не республіканську систему правління, а систему управління в республіці, де: президент, якого обирають безпосередньо громадяни, є значно потужнішим, аніж інші органи державної влади; влада глави держави заснована не тільки на формально передбачених повноваженнях, але на патрон-клієнтських відносинах у країні. Детально див.: I. Gabdrakhov, H. Hale, *Bashkortostan's Democratic Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in Russia*, [w:] O. Ieda, T. Uyama, *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, "Slavic Eurasian Studies", vol. 10, s. 75-104.; H. Hale, *Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, "World Politics" 2005, vol 58, nr 1, s. 133-165.; K. Darden, *Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma*, "East European Constitutional Review" 2001, vol 10, nr 2-3, s. 67-71.; N. Robinson, *The Presidency: the politics of institutional chaos*, [w:] N. Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

⁶⁶ P. Chaisty, N. Cheeseman, T. Power, *Rethinking the "Presidentialism Debate": Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective*, Paper prepared for the 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid 2012, 25 s.; T. Remington, S. Smith, M. Haspel, *Decrees, Laws and Inter Branch Relations in the Russian Federation*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 1998, vol 14, nr 4, s. 287-322.

⁶⁷ O. Protsyk, *Ruling with decrees: presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2004, vol 56, nr 5, s. 637-660.

⁶⁸ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr 2, s. 123-163.

⁶⁹ Відображення цього є те, що, наприклад, суперпрезиденти пострадянських країн все більше стають залежними від партій, які вони представляють, а також від деяких інших партій, які оцінюються президентами як інституційно-надійні. Як наслідок, виникають більше-менше сталі зразки коаліційної співпраці в межах парламентів, у які інкорпоровані суперпрезиденти. Ці зразки співпраці можуть бути коаліційними (як свого часу у Вірменії, Україні або Киргизстані), а можуть внаслідок процесів кооптації завершуватись формуванням так званих «партій влади», які включають ті колишні партії, які раніше були незалежними учасниками коаліції (наприклад, Азербайджан, Росія). У тому або іншому випадку саме коаліції та партії влади слугують тим інституційним інструментом, який забезпечуючи соціально-політичну довіру президенту, фактично посилює його законодавчі повноваження або ж взагалі президентські повноваження впливати на діяльність парламенту. З іншої сторони, суперпрезиденти по-різному неформально впливають на формування коаліцій. Зі способів неформального впливу виокремлюють такі: забезпечення парткулярних та лобі-інтересів парламентарів; підкуп, патронаж і залякування виборців і парламентарів. Детально див.: P. Chaisty, *The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia*, "Government and Opposition" 2008, vol 43, nr 3, s. 424-453.; H. van Zon, *Political culture and neo-patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma*, "Problems of Post-

Серед причин інсталяції республік із посадами суперпрезидентів вчені найчастіше виділяють процеси, пов'язані зі згортанням демократичних перетворень у тій або іншій країні. З огляду на це, цілком очевидно, що республіканські системи державного правління з посадами суперпрезидентів приводять до цілої низки негативних наслідків і тенденцій соціально-економічного та політичного розвитку. *По-перше*, феномен і роль суперпрезидента й вертикально-монархічної спрямованості на президента державної влади веде до неможливості встановлення демократичного політичного режиму в середньо- і довгостроковій перспективі. *По-друге*, зосередження влади в руках однієї особи (суперпрезидента) та велика залежність всіх соціально-економічних і політичних процесів у державі від цієї особи (групи осіб – «сім'ї», – які пов'язані з президентом) призводить до відчуття й інституціоналізації практики абсолютизму, в умовах якого республіканська система державного правління нагадує монархічну систему правління. *По-третьє*, підпорядкованість суперпрезиденту усіх гілок влади призводить до фіктивності та нігілізації прав людини та громадянина, слабкості та навіть відсутності політичної (або загалом соціальної) опозиції та маргіналізації партійно-виборчої системи. *По-четверте*, зосередження всієї повноти влади в руках суперпрезидентів призводить до можливості зловживання владою у площині соціально-економічних, політичних та інших питань державного та/чи особистісного розвитку. У цьому зрізі досвід більшості республіканських систем державного правління з суперпрезидентами у світі демонструє, що цей формат республіканізму веде до економічного та соціального занепаду, гуманітарного колапсу та національної деградації. І натомість, вкрай рідко республіканські системи із суперпрезидентами сприяють економічному зростанню й модернізації (поміж прикладів потрібно згадати Чилі часів А. Піночета або Індонезію часів Х. М. Сухарто).

Емпіричний аналіз деяких прикладів республік із суперпрезидентами змушує М. Сахарова, С. Перечину й О. Зазнаєва констатувати, що «суперпрезиденталізм» як категорія не є різновидом «форми державного правління», а швидше є синтетичним форматом «систем республіканського державного правління»⁷⁰. Річ у тому, що *суперпрезиденталізм* як формат державного правління, який характеризує посада фактично всесильного президента, і як наукову конотацію дуже легко віднести до республіканської форми державного правління, проте дуже складно віднести до якоїсь «чистої» або класичної системи державного правління, оскільки у межах кожної з них (найчастіше у випадку президенталізму та напівпрезиденталізму, оскільки для них властиві посади всенародно вибраних президентів) може бути формально передбачено та/чи фактично імplementовано

Communism" 2005, vol 52, nr 5, s. 12-22.; O. Haran, *From Viktor to Viktor: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Ukraine*, "Democratization" 2011, vol 19, s. 93-110.

⁷⁰ N. Saharov, *Institut prezidentstva v sovremennom mire*, Wyd. Juridicheskaja literatura 1994, s. 3.; S. Parechina, *Institut prezidentstva: istorija i sovremennost'*, Wyd. ISPI 2003.; O. Zaznaev, *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] M. Farukshin, *Dinamika politicheskib sistem i mezhdunarodnyh odnosbenij: Vyp. 1*, Wyd. Kazanckij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul'janova-Lenina 2006, s. 186-210.

посаду дуже сильного (супер-) президента, який підпорядковує собі всі гілки державної влади (а не лише виконавчу владу, що може бути/є конституційним атрибутом президентів у всіх президентських та деяких напівпрезидентських системах республіканської форми державного правління). Відповідно в теоретико-методологічному й емпіричному зрізі, особливо з огляду на формально-конституційні параметри та особливості дефініювання систем державного правління, акумулюється необхідність диференціації різних типів республік із суперпрезидентами, зокрема *президентських республік із посадами суперпрезидентів* та *напівпрезидентських республік із посадами суперпрезидентів* (у трихотомічному підході щодо класифікації систем державного правління їх доречно іменувати суперпрезидентськими та супернапівпрезидентськими).

На виокремлення президентських і напівпрезидентських республік із суперпрезидентами, які в трихотомічному підході до класифікації систем державного правління становлять цілком різні аналітичні ракурси, а в дихотомічному підході репрезентують єдине «синтетичне ціле» (яке звикло називають суперпрезиденталізмом), існує декілька причин. *По-перше*, розбіжною є формально-конституційна логіка функціонування президентських і напівпрезидентських систем з посадами суперпрезидентів. Звертаючись до визначення Р. Елгі, треба зазначити, що *президенталізмом* слід вважати конституційну систему республіканської форми державного правління, для якої властива посада всенародно (прямо/опосередковано) обраного на фіксований термін президента й інституту кабінету чи адміністрації президента (і навіть можливо прем'єр-міністра), члени якого колективно відповідальні лиш перед президентом. Натомість, *напівпрезиденталізмом* є конституційна система республіканської форми державного правління, якій властива посада всенародно (опосередковано чи прямо) обраного на фіксований термін президента, а також інституту прем'єр-міністра й уряду, які неминуче колективно відповідальні перед парламентом або перед президентом і парламентом. Саме тому в президентських республіканських системах державного правління уряд президента або адміністрація президента не перебувають в ієрархічних відносинах з парламентом, тобто не формуються ним, не отримують від нього вотуму довіри і не відповідальні перед ним. І навпаки, у напівпрезидентських республіканських системах правління уряд принаймні формально перебуває в ієрархічній залежності від парламенту, оскільки останній надає уряду вотум довіри (бере участь у формуванні/затвердженні складу та/чи програми уряду) та може відправити кабінет у відставку на основі вотуму недовіри. Відповідно в трихотомічному підході до класифікації систем правління аналітичний випадок з посадою дуже сильного президента (чи суперпрезидента) в президенталізмі слід тлумачити як президенталізм з посадою суперпрезидента (чи суперпрезиденталізм), а випадок із посадою дуже сильного (супер-) президента у напівпрезиденталізмі – як напівпрезиденталізм із посадою суперпрезидента (чи супернапівпрезиденталізм).

По-друге, структурно диференційованими у зрізі співвідношення формальних та фактичних повноважень є владні функції та ролі суперпрезидентів у президентських та напівпрезидентських республіканських системах державного правління. Річ у тому, що в президентських республіках інстальовано моністичні моделі виконавчої влади, а повноваження президентів та парламентів є розведеними функціонально, внаслідок чого президенти відповідають за здійснення виконавчої влади, парламенти – за здійснення законодавчої влади. Натомість, у напівпрезидентських системах апробовано різні формати дуалістичної моделі виконавчої влади, а повноваження президентів, урядів і парламентів інколи пересікаються, що, приміром, проявляється в окремих законодавчих прерогативах президентів і/чи урядів тощо. Разом із цим, інколи фактично трапляється так, що в президентських республіках суперпрезиденти можуть втручатись у законодавчі повноваження парламентів, а в напівпрезидентських республіках – посягати на роль парламентів у формуванні та забезпеченні підтримки урядів. Наприклад, у формально напівпрезидентських Азербайджані, Білорусі, Казахстані і Росії (а також свого часу у Вірменії і Грузії), де передбачено посаду сильного (або супер-) президента, регламентовано участь парламенту у забезпеченні вотуму довіри урядові, кандидатуру на посаду прем'єр-міністра якого пропонує президент. Та коли встановлену кількість разів підряд кандидатуру на посаду глави уряду, а тому й факт формування уряду не затверджено у парламенті, президента наділено повноваженням розпустити парламент і самостійно сформувавати урядовий кабінет. Це означає, що перераховані напівпрезидентські системи з суперпрезидентами у якийсь момент часу фактично можуть розпочати функціонувати як президентські системи з суперпрезидентами. Дещо розбіжне проблемне поле у класифікації сучасних республіканських формально напівпрезидентських систем правління зустрічаємо у Білорусі, Росії, Казахстані та Киргизстані (а раніше в Грузії). Як упорядкувати республіканські системи правління, де парламент має право висувати вотум або осуд недовіри урядові, проте останній набуває чинності тільки тоді, коли його підтримує президент. Ці самоочевидні аномалії конституційного напівпрезиденталізму (або ж напівпрезиденталізму як конституційної системи державного правління) з посадами дуже сильних (супер-) президентів досить часто на практиці призводять до того, що напівпрезидентські системи з суперпрезидентами трактують як президентські системи з суперпрезидентами. Зворотна проблема властива для президентських конституційних систем республіканського правління із суперпрезидентами, проте одночасно із посадами прем'єр-міністрів, яких призначають президенти без отримання або через отримання на це згоди парламентів (це, приміром, властиво для Гайани, Гвінеї, Гвінеї-Бісау, КНДР, Узбекистану, Таджикистану, свого часу Білорусі та Грузії тощо). Річ у тому, що в «чистому» чи класичному президенталізмі взагалі немає посади прем'єр-міністра, адже уряд чи адміністрацію президента очолює безпосередньо глава держави. Натомість, президентські республіки з прем'єр-міністрами, які затверджуються парламентами, частково

наближуються до напівпрезидентських. Тому в науковому та політичному дискурсі (навіть в умовах трихотомічного підходу щодо класифікації систем державного правління) помилоково відбувається визначення суперпрезиденталізму як синтетичного формату напівпрезиденталізму та президенталізму із дуже сильними президентами, як формату системи державного правління не на підставі формальних (конституційних) та/або фактичних (політичних) передумов міжінституційних відносин із приводу здійснення державної влади, а лише на підставі врахування всеосяжності повноважень президентів щодо інших гілок державної влади та політичної системи в цілому.

По-третє, феномен суперпрезиденталізму як формату республіканських систем державного правління з суперпрезидентами ініціально було сконструйовано стосовно президентських систем державного правління з дуже сильними президентами. Річ у тому, що в політичній науці термін суперпрезиденталізм вперше запропоновано для виокремлення на базі країн Латинської Америки у ХІХ-ХХ ст. прикладів систем державного правління, які формально будучи президентськими республіками, відрізнялись від «чистого»/класичного президенталізму. Більшість президентських республік у країнах Латинської Америки в цей період надихнулись практикою «американського» класичного президенталізму. Проте з огляду на різні політичні, історичні та соціально-економічні особливості розвитку країн регіону, їхні політичні системи здебільшого не апробували ефективних механізмів стримувань, перевірок, балансів та противаг, а тому усталились як авторитарні режими та квазіконституційні практики з суперпрезидентами. Це, прикладом, проявилось у тому, що посади президентів майже всіх країн регіону виявились тісно пов'язаними зі збройними силами. Більше того, до кінця ХХ ст. саме армія традиційно вважалась ключовим гравцем у поваленні президентів у країнах Латинської Америки⁷¹. Теоретико-методологічна спрямованість суперпрезиденталізму на президентські системи республіканського правління в Латинській Америці зумовлена тим, що в цьому регіоні історично майже не репрезентовано систем правління напівпрезидентського типу. А тому очевидно, що формат суперпрезиденталізму фактично ініціально виник як дотичний лише до конституційного президенталізму⁷². Проблемою стало те, що згодом суперпрезиденталізм як тип або формат республіканізму, виокремлений винятково на підставі посади дуже сильного (супер-) президента, оминаючи інституційні особливості співвідношення гілок державної влади, розпочали застосовувати щодо інших, найперше напівпрезидентських, різновидів республіканських систем державного правління⁷³. Внаслідок цього у політологічному сприйнятті суперпрезиденталізму як

⁷¹ R. Lidija, B. Fleiner, *Governmental Systems in Multicultural Societies*, Wyd. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2005.

⁷² M. Polishhuk, B. Jurdiga, *Osoblivosti porivnjaln'ogo analizu prezidents'koi formi pravlinnja v krainah Latins'koi Ameriki*, „Visnik L'vivs'kogo universitetu. Serija mizhnarodni vidnosini“ 2008, vol 25, s. 82.

⁷³ V. Chirkin, *Netipichnye formy pravlenija v sovremenom gosudarstve*, „Gosudarstvo i pravo“ 1994, nr 4, s. 109-115.; A. Orlov, *Prezidentskie respubliki v Latinskoj Amerike*, Wyd. Jurist 1995.

формату республіканської системи правління виникла значна теоретико-методологічна прогалина, суть якої зводиться до того, що тлумачення суперпрезиденталізму винятково як системи правління з посадою дуже сильного (супер-) президента відбувається несиметрично у площині формального та фактичного оцінювання повноважень президентів та виокремлення республіканських систем правління. Саме тому, з наукового погляду, помилковим виявилось усталене раніше правило, яке зводиться до того, що суперпрезиденталізм односторонньо включає всі формально президентські і напівпрезидентські республіки, для яких формально та/чи фактично властиві посади дуже сильних (супер-) президентів, які інкорпорують собі всі гілки державної влади. Натомість, більш доречно виокремлювати суперпрезиденталізм у широкому та вузькому сенсі, а також проводити різницю між президентськими та напівпрезидентськими системами правління з суперпрезидентами.

У *широкому сенсі* суперпрезиденталізм – це різновид республіканської системи державного правління, для якого властивий повністю чи майже невідконтрольний та дуже сильний (супер-) президент. У *вузькому сенсі* суперпрезиденталізм – це різновид винятково президентської системи державного правління, для якого властивий невідконтрольний і дуже сильний (супер-) президент. Це означає, що у вузькому сенсі суперпрезидентськими системами можуть бути окремі приклади винятково формально президентських республік, а у широкому сенсі – окремі приклади не тільки формально президентських, проте й формально напівпрезидентських республік (парламентські республіки зазвичай не можуть бути суперпрезидентськими принаймні тому, що суперпрезиденти інкорпоровані в посадах всенародно виборних глав держав). Іншими словами, це передбачає, що до феномену суперпрезидентів треба підходити роздільно, зважаючи не тільки на силу фактичних повноважень президентів, але і на формально-конституційні особливості республіканських систем правління, роль і місце президентів та парламентів у структурі гілок державної влади, особливо в контексті формування і припинення повноважень урядів. У широкому сенсі це зумовлює потребу виділення принаймні двох різновидів республіканських систем правління, для яких властивими можуть бути посади суперпрезидентів, – президенталізму та напівпрезиденталізму із посадами суперпрезидентів. Але це не означає, що окремі випадки президенталізму та напівпрезиденталізму з суперпрезидентами одночасно можуть бути прикладами суперпрезиденталізму у вузькому сенсі.

Очевидно, що *президенталізм з посадою суперпрезидента* – конституційна президентська система республіканського правління з посадою всесильного (супер-) президента, який формально будучи главою держави та безпосереднім главою уряду/виконавчої влади (навіть попри те, що він може мати поряд з собою посаду субординованого прем'єр-міністра, який у жодному випадку не відповідальний перед парламентом), фактично підпорядковує собі всі гілки та важелі державної влади. *Напівпрезиденталізм*

з посадою суперпрезидента – це конституційна напівпрезидентська (насамперед президентсько-парламентська) система республіканського державного правління із посадою всесильного (супер-) президента, який формально будучи главою держави та/або главою виконавчої влади (посада прем'єр-міністра, який субординований чи несубординований перед президентом, але відповідальний перед парламентом, є обов'язковою), фактично підпорядковує собі всі гілки й важелі державної влади. Президенталізму з посадою суперпрезидента притаманна незалежність або дуже низька залежність виконавчої вертикалі в особі глави держави (разом або ж без посади прем'єр-міністра) від розстановки партійно-політичних сил у парламенті. Це означає, що незалежно від композиції парламенту президент є всесильними (суперпрезидентом), а будь-яка кандидатура прем'єр-міністра у випадку існування такої посади не впливає на рівень фактичних повноважень суперпрезидента (або на фактичну президенціалізацію президентської республіки). Натомість, напівпрезиденталізму із посадою суперпрезидента властива різної міри (низька/висока) залежність виконавчої вертикалі в особі прем'єр-міністра чи прем'єр-міністра та глави держави від розстановки партійно-політичних сил у парламенті. А це передбачає, що конституційно сильний президент (суперпрезидент) фактично може посилити свої повноваження у випадку розпуску парламенту, що може слідувати за незгодою парламенту із приводу кандидатури прем'єр-міністра (у випадку відмови парламенту у вотумі довіри), запропонованої президентом, або за небажанням президента виконувати рішення парламенту про вотум недовіри уряду. Це означає, що найчастіше у напівпрезидентських системах з суперпрезидентами апріорі посада прем'єр-міністра є політично невагомою, незалежно від того, чи прем'єр-міністр політично та/або партійно субординований або несубординований перед президентом у контексті розстановки політичних сил у парламенті. Із огляду на це, зрозуміло, чому в напівпрезидентських системах із суперпрезидентами дуже часто застосування отримують мажоритарні чи змішані виборчі системи, які призводять до забезпечення представництва непартійних депутатів. Причина у тому, що фактичне посилення повноважень суперпрезидентів ймовірно більш можливе у випадку значної фрагментованості парламентів, які в силу своєї неструктурованості не завжди повноцінно можуть та намагаються виконувати належні функції таких політичних інститутів, які мають стабілізувати повноваження президентів з приводу здійснення ними державної влади. Натомість, тип виборчих систем у президентських системах із суперпрезидентами фактично не має значення у контексті президенціалізації суперпрезидентів. Саме цим пояснено формування такого різновиду президенталізму як коаліційний. Річ у тому, що навіть коаліційно опозиційні до суперпрезидента партії не можуть фактично зменшити або ж збільшити формально-конституційну президенціалізацію глави держави з приводу здійснення ним функцій глави виконавчої влади (меншою мірою це властиво таким системам президенталізму, де поряд із посадами суперпрезидентів передбачено посади прем'єр-міністрів). Висновуючи, треба

зазначити, що президентські системи з суперпрезидентами інституційно є більш стабільними, аніж напівпрезидентські системи з суперпрезидентами: першим немає потреби і/чи сенсу зміщатись до більш президенціалізованого зразку республіканської форми державного правління; а другі мають конституційно зумовлений «потенціал зміщення» в окремих фазах свого функціонування до більш фактично президенціалізованих систем, навіть вдаючись до практики президенталізму з посадами суперпрезидентів.

Порівняльний аналіз реальних прикладів республіканських форматів систем державного правління з посадами суперпрезидентів на підставі апелювання до формально-конституційних та фактично-політичних повноважень глав держав, урядів і парламентів тощо підкріплює теоретико-методологічний висновок про доцільність виокремлення з-поміж них систем президенталізму та напівпрезиденталізму з посадами суперпрезидентів. Ілюстраціями *президенталізму з посадами суперпрезидентів* (суперпрезиденталізму у вузькому сенсі) сьогодні є Ангола (з 1979 р.), Гайана (із 1980 р.), Гвінея (із 1984 р.), Гвінея-Бісау (із 1980 р.), КНДР (із 1948 р.), Узбекистан (із 1991 р.), Таджикистан (з 1994 р.), Туркменістан (з 1991 р.) тощо. Історичними взірцями президенталізму з посадами суперпрезидентів були Бенін (1975-1991 рр.), Гана (1960-1992 рр.), Гватемала (особливо в період 1944-1986 рр.), Гондурас (особливо в період 1956-1982 рр.), Домініканська Республіка (у 1966-1978 рр.), Колумбія (особливо у період 1953-1958 рр.), Коста-Ріка (особливо до 1948 р.), Лівія (у 1969-2011 рр.), Мексика (особливо в 1884-1910 та 1946-1994 рр.), Нікарагуа (особливо у 1937-1987 рр.), Панама (особливо в 1968-1978 рр.), Парагвай (зокрема в 1814-1840, 1940-1948, 1954-1989 рр.), Чилі (особливо в 1817-1826, 1974-1990 рр.), Сирія (в 1971-2012 рр.), Замбія (в 1964-1991 рр.), Зімбабве (в 1987-2008 рр.), Малі (особливо в 1979-1991 та 2002-2012 рр.), Югославія (за часів суперпрезидента Б. Тіто в 1953-1980 рр.), Індонезія (за часів суперпрезидентів А. Сукарно та Х. М. Сухарто в 1945-1998 рр.), Філіппіни (у 1966-1981 рр. за часів суперпрезидента Ф. Маркоса), Малаві (у 1966-1994 рр.), Уганда (зокрема в 1971-1979 рр.), Туніс (у 1957-2011 рр.), Екваторіальна Гвінея (1979-2011 рр.), ЦАР (1966-1976 рр.), Конго (1965-1997 рр.), США (за часів президентства Л. Джонсона у 1963-1969 рр. та Р. Ніксона у 1969-1974 рр.⁷⁴), Білорусь (1994-1996 рр.⁷⁵), Грузія (1995-2004 рр.), Габон (1973-1991 рр.),

⁷⁴ Феномен «американського президенталізму» у XIX ст. В. Вільсон окреслив як «конгресивну систему державного правління». Річ у тому, що в цей час у політичному житті в США домінував Конгрес. Натомість, в XX ст. було прийнято позицію, що США становлять випадок «чистого» або ж класичного президенталізму. Разом з цим, період президентства Л. Джонсона та Р. Ніксона прийнято іменувати «імперіальним президентством», бо тоді було «затямарено» Конгрес.

⁷⁵ Білорусь у 1994-1996 рр. (як і Грузія у 1995-2004 рр. і Україна в 1995-1996 рр.) формально вважалась президентською республікою із прем'єр-міністром. Проте для неї фактично була властива посада суперпрезидента. Річ у тому, що згідно Конституції 1994 р. не було регламентовано колективної відповідальності уряду Білорусі, який очолював «державний міністр» (або прем'єр-міністр), перед парламентом. Різні міністерські посади уряду мали затверджуватись законодавчим органом індивідуально. Однак, як тільки їх схвалювали, звільнити із посади їх міг тільки президент. Модель Білорусі 1994-1996 рр. було сконструйовано як синтетичну на прикладі моделі США й Росії. Внаслідок цього посаду президента було виокремлено «над» гілками державної влади, формально зосередивши за нею функції не тільки глави держави, але й глави виконавчої влади (ідентичний механізм міжінституційних відносин було імплементовано в Грузії у 195-2004 рр. та в Україні у 1995-1996 рр.).

Єгипет (1981-2007 рр.), Мальдіви (1968-2008 рр.), Камерун (1960-1991 рр.), Мозамбік (у 1975-1990 рр.), Перу (особливо в 1919-1930 рр.), Руанда (у 1973-1994 рр.), Того (1967-1992 рр.) тощо. Прикладами *напівпрезиденталізму із посадами суперпрезидентів* (проте не суперпрезиденталізму у вузькому сенсі) були або є: Азербайджан (з 1995 р.), Білорусь (з 1996 р.), Вірменія (1995-2005 рр.), Габон (з 1991 р.), Грузія (2004-2013 рр.), Екваторіальна Гвінея (з 2011 р.), Єгипет (2007-2011 рр.), Казахстан (з 1993 р.), Камерун (з 1991 р.), Мозамбік (з 1990 р.), Намібія (із 1990 р.), Перу (у 1979-1992 рр., із 1993 р.), Росія (із 1993 р.), Руанда (із 2003 р.), Сирія (із 2012 р.), Того (із 1992 р.), Шрі-Ланка (із 1976 р.), Філіппіни (у 1981-1986 рр.), Франція (у 1962-1974 і 1981-1986 рр.)⁷⁶ тощо.

Формальна й фактична відмінність різних президентських і напівпрезидентських республік з суперпрезидентами полягає також у тому, що сучасні суперпрезиденти можуть бути властивими: 1) для тих республік, де суперповноваження президентів встановлено конституційно (зазвичай це президентські республіканські системи); 2) для тих республік, де за президентами безпосередньо не передбачено або не повністю передбачено суперповноважень, але замасковано екстраординарні важелі впливу із приводу поділу державної влади (зазвичай це напівпрезидентські республіканські системи правління). Особливістю *президентських республік з суперпрезидентами* є той факт, що в них діапазон потенціального використання президентами своїх конституційних надзвичайних повноважень більш широкий, ніж у «чистих» чи класичних президентських республіках⁷⁷, а також у напівпрезидентських республіках із суперпрезидентами. Це, наприклад, проявляється у тому, що суперпрезиденти в формально президентських республіканських системах державного правління мають конституційні повноваження видавати укази, які мають силу закону, розпускати парламент своїм унілатеральним рішенням, зміщувати міністрів й керівників адміністративно-територіальних утворень і т. д. Окрім того, обрання і становлення у президентській системі суперпрезидента може призводити до зміни принципу періодичного обрання нового глави держави становленням режиму довічного президентства (через референдум, голосування повністю контролюваного президентом парламенту) чи призначенням нового президента рішенням попереднього президента з наступним формальним затвердженням цього рішення на виборах. Особливістю же *напівпрезидентських республіканських систем із суперпрезидентами*,

⁷⁶ Окремі дослідники запропонували окреслювати політичну систему Франції у період 1962-1974 та 1981-1986 рр. як «гіперпрезидентську фазу» *напівпрезиденталізму*. Фактичний досвід існування посад суперпрезидентів у Франції у цей період часу, а також досвід когабітації став ключовою причиною поступового зменшення формальних повноважень президентів Франції. У 2000 р. із семи років до п'яти було скорочено термін повноважень президентів, а в 2006 р. було регламентовано, що посада президента Франції повинна бути «всесторонньо підконтрольною». Внаслідок цього було зменшено фактичну президентіалізацію політичних партій, політичної конкуренції та політичного процесу загалом. Детально див.: J. Keeler, M. Schain, *Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France*, [w:] K. von Mettenheim, *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1997, s. 84-105.; A. Lijphart, *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*, "Journal of Democracy" 2004, vol 15, nr 2, s. 96-109.; G. Siljanovska-Davkova, *The Contemporary "Models" of Government: Dilemmas and Challenges*, "Iustinianus Primus Law Review" 2011, vol 2, nr 1, s. 1-26.

⁷⁷ A. Orlov, *Prezidentskie respubliki na Marse*, Wyd. Iberoamerikanskij centr MGIMO, s. 10.

за словами С. Фіша та Л. Шевцової, є те, що в них має місце «роздута та надпотужна виконавча влада, яка не врівноважується ані законодавчою, ані судовою владою, а також не підзвітна їм»⁷⁸. Саме це підриває легітимність політичного режиму та системи державного правління, призводить до авторитарних тенденцій, гальмує/зупиняє розвиток недержавних політичних організацій, перешкоджає формуванню ефективної держави та заважає формуванню відповідального уряду.

Як свідчить світовий досвід (частково представлений запропонованими вище прикладами республіканських систем державного правління із суперпрезидентами), доцільність виокремлення напівпрезидентських систем державного правління із суперпрезидентами найперше спричинена практикою пострадянських та інших країн Європи, Азії та Африки, здебільшого після 1990-го р. Із огляду на це, необхідно звернутись до досвіду окремих із них. Насамперед мова повинна йти про формально напівпрезидентські президент-парламентські системи правління в Росії, Білорусі або Азербайджані тощо, які часто іменують зразками авторитарно-олігархічних політичних режимів із суперпрезидентами⁷⁹ (за словами М. Шутарта й Дж. Кері, такі системи треба іменувати президент-подібним президент-парламентаризмом). Їх *атрибутами* і *недоліками* є: 1) опора монократично-суб'єктної влади президентів на силові структури і партії влади або ж на нерозвиненість партійних систем, без чого неможливе зосередження в руках президентів всієї тієї повноти державної влади, якою вони фактично володіють; 2) символічність монократичної суб'єктності влади між галузевим й адміністративно-територіальним центром і периферією, яка ґрунтується на фетишизації виборів; 3) нереалізація принципу політичної відповідальності центральних органів влади (а насамперед президента)⁸⁰. Більше того, недоліком посад суперпрезидентів у напівпрезидентських, а також президентських республіканських системах із суперпрезидентами, який веде до авторитаризації політичних режимів, є те, що спосіб передачі президентської влади тут формально реалізовується виборчо, а фактично – виборчо внаслідок передачі влади, тобто шляхом обрання попередником свого наступника (це, наприклад, було властиво для Азербайджану, Росії тощо). Буває й так, що президентом може бути одна і та ж особа, незалежно від того, скільки разів її (підряд/з перервами) обирають (Білорусь, Казахстан, Узбекистан, Таджикистан, Туркменістан тощо).

⁷⁸ S. Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1995.; S. Fish, *When More Is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political Underdevelopment in Russia*, [w:] V. Bonnell, G. Breslauer, *Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?*, Wyd. Westview Press 2001, s. 15-34.; L. Shevtsova, *The Problem of Executive Power in Russia*, "Journal of Democracy" 2000, vol 11, nr 1, s. 32-39.

⁷⁹ L. Shevtsova, K. Holodkovskij, *Rossija politicheskaja*, Wyd. Moskovskij Centr Karnegi 1998, s. 22-28.; A. Arato, *The New Democracies and the American Constitutional Design*, "Constellations" 2000, vol 7, nr 3, s. 318.; D. Mastro, K. Christensen, *Power and Policy Making: The Case of Azerbaijan*, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, June 1-3, 2006, 10 s.

⁸⁰ I. Kliamkin, *Rossijskaja vlast' na rubezhe tysjacheletij*, „Pro et Contra" 1999, vol 4, nr 2, s. 63-87.

Окрім того, у напівпрезидентських республіках з суперпрезидентами *домінуючий статус глав держав* обумовлено тим, що вони формально виведені за рамки тріади розподілу державної влади, проте фактично стоять над тріадою державної влади, бо мають повноваження у виконавчій, законодавчій та судовій гілках влади. Це проявляється насамперед у тому, що суперпрезиденти напівпрезидентських республік, які законодавчо є «гарантами конституцій», будучи або не будучи формально главами виконавчої влади, фактично очолюють виконавчі вертикалі та порушують баланс розподілу державної влади. Більше того, коли мова йде про легальні інструменти надмірної концентрації влади в руках президентів, очевидно, що політичні системи цілком легально можуть трансформуватись у недемократичні політичні режими. Вагоме значення має і те, що досить часто суперпрезиденти напівпрезидентських республік свідомо намагаються вплинути на корегування конституційних систем державного правління на власну користь. Це відбувається або шляхом більшої конституційної концентрації повноважень у здійсненні державної влади за президентами, або шляхом конституційного збільшення термінів повноважень президентів, чи неконституційним і політичним зростанням повноважень президентів (або одночасно всіма способами)⁸¹. Натомість, у президентських республіках з суперпрезидентами *домінуючий статус глав держав* є більшою мірою формалізованим із огляду хоча б на те, що президенти конституційно виконують одночасно ролі глав держав й глав виконавчих гілок державної влади, тобто самостійно формують свої уряди та контролюють їхню діяльність, незалежно від органів законодавчої влади.

Із огляду на це, зрозуміло, що про республіканізм із посадою суперпрезидента (або іншими словами, про суперпрезиденталізм у широкому сенсі) як про цілісну й «чисту» систему державного правління в теоретико-методологічному контексті говорити не доводиться. Натомість, доцільно зауважувати, що в різних системах республіканського державного правління – в президенталізмі й напівпрезиденталізмі – можуть існувати посади суперпрезидентів. Відповідно це кореспондується із висновком Р. Елгі про те, що різновид конституційної республіканської системи правління (президенталізму, напівпрезиденталізму, а також парламентаризму) безпосередньо не залежить від формальної і фактичної сили ключових владних акторів, а ґрунтується лиш на механізмі розподілу владних повноважень та способі формування й припинення повноважень органів державної влади. Внаслідок цього цілком очевидно, що президенталізм, напівпрезиденталізм та парламентаризм можуть бути представлені посадами слабкого, проміжного, сильного й дуже сильного (або супер-) президента⁸². Саме тому доречно не виокремлювати

⁸¹ А. Medushevskij, *Konstitucionnyj perevorot ili konstitucionnaja reforma: popravki k Konstitucii 1993 goda kak instrument bor'by za vlast'*, „Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropejskoe obozrenie“ 1999, vol 3, nr 28, s. 154-167.; К. Cherkasov, *Eshbe raz o „naznachenii“ glav regionov ili o povyshenii jeffektivnosti funkcionirovanija territorial'nyh organov prezidentskoj vertikali vlasti v rukurse administrativnoj reformy*, „Rossijskaja justicija“ 2007, vol 12, s. 6-7.

⁸² Попри це найчастіше для президентських республік властиві сильні або дуже сильні президенти, для парламентських республік – слабкі або проміжні президенти, для напівпрезидентських систем – слабкі, проміжні та сильні президенти.

суперпрезиденталізм як самостійний різновид системи республіканського державного правління з посадою суперпрезидента, а зводить його до специфічного формату будь-якої самостійної республіканської системи державного правління, для якої властива посада суперпрезидента, що формально/фактично домінує над всіма/іншими гілками державної влади. Річ у тому, що конструкції республіканських систем державного правління (або механізми зіставлення повноважень і взаємовідносин між вищими виконавчими та законодавчими органами державної влади) у різних державах, для яких властиві посади суперпрезидентів, є дуже розбіжними. Відповідно найчастіше треба виділяти *суперпрезидентський напівпрезиденталізм* та *суперпрезидентський президенталізм*⁸³. І один, і другий традиційно тяжіють або ж призводять до автократії (авторитаризму або тоталітаризму), лімітуючи чи скасовуючи такі принципи демократії, як політична участь і змагальність⁸⁴.

Разом із цим, об'єднують президентські та напівпрезидентські республіканські системи державного правління з суперпрезидентами ризики, які спричинені посадами останніх. Відповідно спорідненими є шляхи *мінімізації ризиків* зосередження влади в руках однієї особи, що апріорі веде до автократії. Серед них, за словами О. Зазнаєва, найчастіше виокремлюють такі: заборона на переобрання однієї і тієї ж особи президентом двічі підряд; запровадження інституту колективного президентства; запровадження інструментів парламентсько-урядового домінування (наприклад, «кабінетного правління»); запровадження інструментів квазіпарламентаризму стосовно органів виконавчої влади (приміром, процедури імпічменту стосовно членів урядового кабінету з боку парламенту); використання на практиці механізмів затвердження парламентом всіх або головних кадрових призначень, які здійснює президент; запровадження інституту контрасигнатури актів президента з боку глави уряду чи членів урядового кабінету, а також системи спільного здійснення виконавчої влади президентом й іншими органами державної влади; запровадження чи спрощення інституту імпічменту президента з боку парламенту або провідної палати парламенту; формування і функціонування незалежних урядових

⁸³ T. Colton, C. Skach, *Semi-Presidentialism in Russia and Post-Communist Europe: Ameliorating or Aggravating Democratic Possibilities?*, Document produced to assist working sessions at the III General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, 21 s.

⁸⁴ Яскравим прикладом негативного впливу республіканських систем державного правління із суперпрезидентами на перспективи демократизації став досвід пострадянських країн, зокрема Азербайджану, Білорусі, Вірменії, Казахстану, Киргизстану, Росії, України тощо. І це навіть попри значні успіхи на першому етапі їхнього політичного транзиту та попри те, що президенти цих країн у медіапросторі позиціонувалися як «демократизатори». Приміром, коли Білорусь у 1994 р. перейшла від пострадянського квазіпарламентаризму до президенталізму, а в 1996 р. – до напівпрезиденталізму (а фактично до системи із суперпрезидентом), демократичний експеримент у країні дійшов завершення. Азербайджан, Таджикистан, Туркменістан, Узбекистан тощо, які також здійснили процес «інвестування домінуючої влади саме в руки президентів», сьогодні позиціонуються як автократичні політичні режими. Навпаки, помірні (традиційні) президентські чи напівпрезидентські системи, які мали/мають місце в Грузії у 1995-2004 рр. чи в Молдові (у 1994-2000 рр.) та Литві, а також парламентські системи (зокрема, Естонія, Латвія та Молдова з 2000 р.), у яких відбувалась дисперсія влади поміж різними політичними інститутами, рухаються у напрямі демократичних цінностей (хоча й у різній мірі). Детально див.: S. Fish, *Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and Eurasia*, "Slavic Review" 1999, vol 58, nr 4, s. 803-804.

агентств/відомств, які фінансуються державою; апробація схем коаліційного президенталізму та напівпрезиденталізму⁸⁵.

У цьому контексті, як показує досвід різних республіканських систем державного правління із суперпрезидентами, значно важче мінімізувати ризики зосередження влади в руках однієї особи у формально президентських республіках. Навіть попри запровадження більше виражених та безпосередніх механізмів стримувань і противаг влади президентів, зокрема у контексті поділу виконавчої влади між главами держав і міністрами (прем'єр-міністрами в окремих президентських республіках), які навіть можуть бути почасти/індивідуально відповідальними перед парламентами, зберігається ініціальна природа президентських виборів із «нульовою сумою», за якої може бути тільки один переможець⁸⁶. Натомість, набагато простіше запобігти інституціоналізації посади суперпрезидента та/або обмежити інституційні ризики, які пов'язані із посадою суперпрезидента, у напівпрезидентських республіках. Річ у тому, що в напівпрезидентських системах державного правління сила повноважень президентів значною мірою (більш, як у президентських республіках) залежить від партійно-політичної композиції парламентів. Крім того, у цих політичних системах формалізовано інститут дуалізму (в особі, з однієї сторони, президента, а з іншої сторони, прем'єр-міністра та загалом урядового кабінету) виконавчої влади. Але навіть попри це, дуже часто буває так, що в напівпрезидентських системах президенти виявляються співмірними за силою або навіть реально сильнішими, ніж у президентських системах. Це спричинено тим, що напівпрезиденталізм як республіканська система державного правління є найбільшою мірою політично та інституційно мінливим. Внаслідок цього напівпрезиденталізм може набувати більше ознак або президенталізму, або парламентаризму – залежно від того, чи політична партія президента (чи політична партія, яка асоційована з президентом) є урядовою/коаліційною у композиції парламенту. Проте навіть попри це, з формального погляду, частіше суперпрезиденти властиві президент-парламентським, а не прем'єр-президентським видам напівпрезиденталізму. У випадках президент-парламентаризму з посадою суперпрезидента формально мова йде про напівпрезиденталізм, а фактично дуже часто такі політичні системи окреслюють як президентські. Це передбачає, що у напівпрезиденталізмі із посадою суперпрезидента фактично нігілізовано інститут дуалізму виконавчої влади. Натомість, у президенталізмі з посадою суперпрезидента виконавча влада і без того (формально) моністична.

⁸⁵ Детально див.: О. Zaznaev, *Klassifikacii prezidentskoj, parlamentskoj i poluprezidentskoj sistem*, [w:] M. Farukshin, *Dinamika političeskich sistem i mezhdunarodnyh odnosenij: Vyp. 1*, Wyd. Kazanckij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. V. I. Ul'janova-Lenina 2006, s. 186-210.

⁸⁶ A. Lijphart, *Power-Sharing and Group Autonomy in the 1990s and the 21-st Century*, «Constitutional Design» 2000.

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Активізація студентського руху як передвісник суспільно-політичної кризи

Досліджено активізацію студентських рухів напередодні суспільно-політичних кризових ситуацій, що відбувались на теренах незалежної України. Розглянуто події 1990 р., 2000 р., 2004 р., у яких студенти брали активну участь. Вони випередили співвітчизників у намірах налагодити справедливий стан речей у державі, продемонструвавши свою прогресивність, що дозволяє вважати їх авангардом демократизації.

Ключові слова: студентський рух, суспільно-політична криза.

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The activation of student movement as a precursor of sociopolitical crisis

The activation of student movements before the sociopolitical crisis that took place on the territory of independent Ukraine is investigated. The events of 1990, 2000, 2004, which students actively participated in, are researched. They outstripped compatriots in intent to build a fair situation in the state, demonstrated their progressivity, which lets us consider them the vanguard of democratization.

Keywords: student movement, sociopolitical crisis.

Student movement is a kind of social initiative and public activity. It combines youth organizations, student governments, student unions and students in general and performs a variety of functions, including the involvement of young people in public life, its socialization in complex sociopolitical processes etc.

The topicality of the theme is that the events, which took place in 1990, 2000, 2004 in Ukraine, demonstrated the activity of the students that outpaced other segments of the population in intends to speed up the process of democratization of the political system through

their own organization and participation in nationwide actions. Therefore, the current political elite should objectively evaluate the activities of student youth while taking certain decisions, and political scientists should pay attention to the main students' messages while preparing one or the other prediction.

The examined issues are object of the analysis of many scientists, including V. Barabash, Y. Borodin, V. Burdyak, M. Golovaty, V. Holovenko, K. Zakharenko, A. Zinchenko, M. Kerbal, A. Kruglashov, V. Kulik, D. Melnikov, N. Rotar.

The objective of the research is to determinate and evaluate the student movements' activation in the circumstances of the aggravation of sociopolitical situation.

Ukrainian state-building process involves the participation of all segments of the population in public administration. It is emphasized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives¹. And Constitution of Ukraine fixes the right of every adult to influence the processes that take place in society actively, participate in the administration of state and social affairs².

Youth, particularly students, has made an invaluable contribution to the construction of the Ukrainian state. Through the creation of the student governments, organizations, associations, foundations, sections with political parties, youth activists became an influential force, able to address important socioeconomic and political issues of modernity. Since the beginning of 90-ies of XX century student movement, as a part of the amateur movement in Ukraine, demonstrated itself in the political struggle which resulted in the proclamation of Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine in 1991³.

The process of student movement's conception in Ukraine, which is considered an indispensable condition for the formation of civil society, took place at the turn of two sociopolitical systems of development – the moribund Soviet, so-called «socialist» model and a new democratic one, which began to form in independent Ukraine, the experience of which is even now an example of practical youth action in the important process of building new Ukrainian state.

Three stages of the student movement's conception in Ukraine can be singled out. The first stage, covering the period from 1985 to 1988, is characterized by the appearance of numerous new little informal groups of young people seeking to fulfill their needs through integration into small groups with their peers, supporters, with the help of which they satisfied their personal interests. They were then distributed not only in Ukraine but throughout the whole Soviet Union. Notable members of such groups were fans, punks, rockers, metalists and others⁴.

The second stage of the student movement's development in Ukraine (1989- 1991) is characterized mainly by the emergence of the student governments in high schools and small organizations, the proliferation of youth discussion groups and clubs, that contributed to the preparation of young people to the need to perceive the lessons of history in a new

way, understand the current situation in the country, prepare themselves to an active struggle, work during the society's transition into a qualitatively new stage of sociopolitical development⁵. However, during this period educated youth sought to realize their needs with the help of political activity, confront, to some extent, those social institutions that were unable to organize new job, discard old dogmas and political orientations, understand the goals, objectives and prospects of sociopolitical movement in the country deeper.

The third stage in the conception of the student movement starts from 1991 and continues till nowadays⁶. At this time Ukraine has become an independent state and, as a result of it, youth policy started to be actively conducted. A number of normative acts regulating the social, educational and youth policy were adopted, which gave an impetus to even more powerful development of the student movement.

Understanding the current situation in the republic better than the other categories of young people, feeling the need for their own actions in democratic processes in society students among the first in Ukraine began to form youth groups and organizations, to be active in social and political life directly in educational institutions. Their actions manifested clearly the desire to do away with the old forms of management of higher education institutions, to achieve more rights and freedoms in solving the problems of higher education, the protection of students' interests.

During the years of independence sociopolitical situation in Ukraine has exacerbated three times, turning into crisis ones. These processes were responded in the most efficient and active way by the students, because, as it is known, it is the most progressive part of the population that is most likely to feel the approach of changes.

Thus, the Revolution on the Granite can be considered as the first example of Ukrainian students' foresight⁷.

In December, 1989 at the constituent congress in Kyiv a new student organization started its existence – Ukrainian Student Union (USU)⁸. The program of Declaration of the Union noted that the goal of USU was the fight for the rights of students. In addition, the student union opposed the inculcation of Marxist- Leninist ideology during the educational process, advocated for the rights of Ukrainian and enabling members of ethnic minorities, who were studying in Ukraine, to receive education in their native language etc. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian Student Union was that its membership included representatives of different, often with opposite views, community groups. The members of the USU included members of such political parties as Rukh (Movement), Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, Kom-somol, Green party.

Significant development has been reached by student movement in Western Ukraine. The first of its manifestations was the creation of «Student Brotherhood»⁹ on the initiative of Lviv University's students in May 1989. Subsequently, the centers of student brotherhood began to operate in other colleges of the city. Among the students' program requirements

the following should be highlighted – disappearing of idealization during the process of education, the revival of national traditions of higher education, the protection of students from the university administration misconduct etc. Supporting actions of the regional organization of Rukh, «Student Brotherhood» became its member. Over time, members of the Brotherhood became not only students of the city, but also of other cities of Ukraine: Kyiv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and others¹⁰.

One of the first actions of the «Student Brotherhood» was the organization of the youth strike in February 1990 in response to the arrest of Kyiv students. Students from western regions of the country involved very actively in the strike movement. They not only held mass protests, but also sent members of youth organizations in other regions of the republic to support local strikers¹¹. Not all of them managed to do that, but the fact showed that the students nucleated and began to operate the principles of solidarity in the fight for their rights, the achievement of «Student Brotherhood's» program goals.

The strike showed negative aspects of students' organization also. Absence of unified strike actions' management led to the fact that many students simply went home, leaving their struggle fellows in cities. But despite the existing disadvantages, spring students' strike showed that there was a very powerful political force in the country, which was able to stand up for their rights and interests to achieve radical changes in the sociopolitical life of society.

Thus, in autumn of 1990 the political situation in Ukraine became particularly acute. This was connected with the situation, prevailing in the country in connection with the preparation of the union agreement. Sensing the gravity of the situation in the country and the inability of Parliament to resolve the matter according to the interests of the sovereign state, members of the Ukrainian Student Union and Student Brotherhood launched unprecedented in the political history of Ukraine action on October 2, 1990 – a protest that turned into a political hunger in Kyiv on the October Revolution Square (now the Independence Square)¹². Participants of the hunger set a number of requirements to the Supreme Council of the Republic: to call new parliamentary elections on a multiparty basis; to accept the resignation of the Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers V. A. Masol; to adopt a resolution on the nationalization of the property of the CPSU and LCYLU; to abandon center's claims on signing the Union Treaty; to accept the decision about the return of all citizens of the republic, that perform military service abroad to Ukraine¹³.

Receiving support from the citizens of Kyiv, youth of the republic, experiencing the first physical effects of starvation (some students, who performed dry fasting, were transported to hospital intensive care units), without feeling the desire of Parliament to resolve their demands, the students came into active actions. Thus, on October 10 traffic on Khreschatyk Street was blocked and a meeting was held on the square, where tents of hungry students were placed.

Expressing their protest against the passivity of Parliament to manage the requirements of the students, showing solidarity to them, some deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from amount of the parliamentary opposition joined the youth, began fasting. On October 13-15 a nationwide students' strike was held in many cities of Ukraine in support of their peers. Feeling the solidarity of a large number of young people, citizens of Ukraine on October 15-16 students made a protest in front of the building of Verkhovna Rada.

Fearing an aggravation of the situation in Kyiv, connected with the actions of the students, having considered the requirements of the starving citizens and taking into account the results of the conciliation commission the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution on October 17 «About the consideration of the requirements of students that conduct a hunger strike in Kyiv from October 2, 1990», in which guaranteed the performance of their requirements¹⁴. Students were satisfied with promises, so they stopped fasting on October 18. However, subsequently officials failed to fulfill promises to the fullest.

In his book «Generation of the «Velvet» revolution» Oles Doniy, one of the activists of the Revolution on the Granite, at that time – the fifth year student of the history department of Kyiv University and chairman of Ukrainian Student Union says: «Student starvation became a symbol of birth of a new society. It was October in 1990, when young people acted like completely independent political force and has achieved success and became the starting point, not entirely divorced from the realities August in 1991 or agitated December in 1991. It was October in 1990 when «the generation of 1990» was recognized to be a separate historically social group»¹⁵.

The action of students' political protest through starvation became an important event in the struggle for democratic transformations, the desire of young people for determined radical changes in society. Two weeks of active students' protest showed that the youth of republic was a very significant and powerful force, that was able to stand next to the other layers of the population for the restoring of historical justice, radical political and economic reforms in the society, to fight for their rights and freedoms. Student movement raised to a new level of political consciousness not only of the young generation, but also of older people. Support to hungry students from some members of parliament of the republic, the citizens of Kyiv, Ukraine is a testimony of the solidarity of all layers of society with young people in the fight for national interests and social rights.

Political struggle, some misunderstandings between representatives of student organizations caused a need for a single student union. The Union of Ukrainian Students (SUS) was created¹⁶. Assessing the role of founding a new student union we should emphasize that it had made certain problems in the student movement that resulted in weakening of student youth's activity in spring and summer of 1991, the existence of some opposition between the leaders of student organizations. This led to further division in the students' ranks into separate parts according to their ideological or political views. Such politicization did not go

in favor of the student movement, as it joined the youth movement, becoming only a part of it, that questioned the true power of the students for years.

The second point in the political history of Ukraine, where students outperformed all other segments of the population, being ahead of the national movement, became nationwide action «Ukraine without Kuchma» in 2000-2001, which took place after the presidential elections in 1999, when L. Kuchma had been elected the head of state for the second time.

A researcher N. Rotar in her monograph «The political participation of citizens in systemic transformations during transitional period» examines mentioned above events. The paper notes that during 2000 Ukrainian students occasionally used protest forms of political participation along with other citizens: they took part in the capture of the Communist Party Central Committee building, the «Freedom Waves» and so on. However, these were not the events that could change the political status quo. The impetus for mass demonstrations of citizens against the regime became O. Moroz's statement in Parliament on November 28, 2000, where he published information about audio recordings of N. Melnychenko, that discredited presidential political course, methods, tools and principles for its implementation. It was the thing that had allowed to discuss the real state of democracy, freedom of speech, human rights and the nature of citizen participation in the political management of Ukraine openly¹⁷.

At the initiative of the Public Committee for the Protection of the Constitution «Ukraine without Kuchma», created from representatives of 20 political parties and civil society organizations, the involvement of citizens, among them students, to the perpetual protest began, stressing that «the application for the rally was officially filed by the party «Forward, Ukraine!», not because her looks were close to mass', but because V. Chemerys was a former student activist of the late 80's - early 90's»¹⁸.

So, in protest against the inaction of the authorities in finding missing Gongadze, the campground housed on the Independence Square in Kyiv, which was declared a zone free of Leonid Kuchma. The next day there appeared an alternative, protecting the current President, campsite. A series of peaceful actions where one party demanded the resignation of the President and the security forces, and the other – to support government policy, began. It is worth noting that students participated in activities on both sides of «barricades», which can be explained by the political fragmentation of student groups.

The authority's mobilization of students and other groups of population to support the regime prompted disgruntled citizens to greater use of log structures in the political system. The Parliamentary Committee on Science and Education received deputies' application, which indicated that students, their parents, educators appealed to the deputies «with request to halt pressure of the heads of educational institutions who unlawfully forced them to participate in public events, rallies, meetings» supporting L. Kuchma¹⁹. However, there was no response to these appeals of citizens.

Therefore, a variant of radicalization of citizens' protest forms was selected by the opposition forces, which was implemented on March 9, 2001 during the celebration of 187th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's birthday. Thus, about 500 people from Vinnytsia, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Kyiv regions arrived to Kyiv, who represented regional units of opposition parties and civil society organizations in capital's actions, among them were students of the famous Ukrainian universities²⁰. Several times they performed unsuccessful attempts to pass the police chain, that was aligned for the protection of officials, which 9 people were arrested for. After Kuchma, Yushchenko and other top officials laid flowers to the monument, students from Ivan Franko Lviv National University I. Bulyk and A. Chychelina dropped the baskets of flowers, placed by the state leaders, off the monument, which they were arrested for and taken to the Shevchenko district department of MIA of Ukraine in Kiev.

At the same time a founding congress of Ukrainian public committee of resistance «For the truth!» took place in Kyiv, which included a number of influential non-governmental organizations, namely Young Movement, Student Brotherhood, Ukrainian Student Union. The purpose of the committee identified the fundamental changes of authorities in Ukraine, the main strategy in the near future – creating student committees «For truth!» for the preparing a nationwide student strike. The same evening, at the central railway station of Kyiv police arrested 86 students, mostly from Lviv, Ternopil, Kyiv and Kharkiv, who participated in founding of the committee of resistance. The reason for the detention were badges and scarves with the words «For truth!», national symbols and Ukrainian language; «it was enough to seem quite young, speak Ukrainian language and have Lviv passport registration»²¹; conduct of journalistic activity. For example, a reporter of Lviv newspaper «Progress» D. Shurhala, who was recording on tap the information about the detention of students, that participated in capital actions of UWK and the founding congress of Ukrainian Committee «For truth!», was detained at Kyiv railway station²².

Thus, through student and other online communication channels, as well as in the media, a reference to Ukrainian youth from elder comrades, who participated in the hunger strike in 1990, has been extended. They accused the regime of miserable amount of student scholarships, corruption in educational system, the conditions that made graduates go abroad and so on. The call for young people to support the removal of L. Kuchma's regime was a result²³. Thus, despite the administrative resources, correlation of rating of authorities and opposition was in favor of the latter, so demonstrators still had a chance of success.

Author draws attention to the fact that the protests in 2001 were a rehearsal, some kind of fitting of the forces on the part of students, which by this time until the time of the Revolution on the Granite have not taken an active part in anything, sitting in classrooms.

Thus, the author considers the third example of student predictions of sociopolitical exacerbations the Orange Revolution. In 2004 a noticeable shift in the political consciousness

of young people has happened. Numerous sociological studies have begun to capture the dynamics of the political activity of young people toward growth, and political participation of young people has attained a new focus and new forms of display²⁴. The researchers noted that young people as a social group was characterized by not only the typical «youth» qualities, but also by a number of new features, including a hidden inner potential of political activity, which under certain circumstances could be actualized and influence on political events²⁵.

A civil campaign «It's time!», which with a help of original actions sought to activate society, appeared a few months before the 2004 presidential election, when there wasn't a united orange movement yet. Young people, most of whom were students of domestic universities, organized actions outdoors, not campaigning for any candidate for the presidency, but urging people to be vigilant and the authority – honest.

Some analysts even compared Ukrainian political party «Pora!» with Serbian «Otpor», Georgian «Kmara», Albanian «M'yaft» and Belarusian «Zubr» and predicted to Ukraine Serbian or Georgian variants²⁶. This could not pass without interest of the current government. Raids began to be conducted in the offices of student organizations, during which police found explosive devices, grenades, which allowed to fasten the «terrorists» label on the young people. In Eastern Ukraine students started to be excluded from the universities. members of Lviv party «Pora» said that they were watched day and night. All this contributed to the subsequent development of events that went down in history of Ukraine under the name of «Orange Revolution».

The Orange Revolution started at the election night of the second round of presidential elections in 2004, when it became clear that the government did not promote fair elections and was ready to falsifications. The opposition urged Kyiv citizens to gather at the Independence Square. In the morning, people didn't go to work, the students escaped from classes – there were about three hundred thousand of people of Kyiv citizens alone at the meeting. A network of strike committees started to be created in universities of Ukraine to organize mass strikes in the case of fraud, the campsite was made, the activity of some state authorities was blocked. The Independence Square became a center and symbol of the Orange Revolution. The center of cultural life in the capital and the state shifted there. Another important feature of the Square was that its core and driving force was educated youth – and this was the evidence of the prospect of further development of democratic processes in the country. Viktor Yanukovych hadn't his own considerable electorate in Kyiv, neither did the incumbent President L. Kuchma. Attempts of some enterprises and institutions management to make subordinates to come to pro-government events didn't find the desired reaction.

It was that period when boys and girls, who were standing at the Independence Square or were its ardent opponents, became leaders of public organizations to continue to defend their interests.

After the described events an important factor in student movement in Ukraine became its interaction with political parties. Working with young people is, for sure, one of the major functions of each party. The relationships between them should ideally be built on the basis of mutual understanding, cooperation, and most importantly – autonomy. However, sometimes these relationships become too close. The mechanism of creating pre-party youth structures that involve student leaders for leading positions, promoting the establishment of networks of political parties' supporters, is already worked out in Ukraine today. According to the author, this is an incentive for active students' work, as student governments and social activities are elevators to the political elite. However, this is one of the reasons why student youth becomes overly politicized, and fight for their own rights and interests fades into the background.

Therefore, having considered the three main examples of aggravation of sociopolitical situation in independent Ukraine and participation of students in them, the author comes to the conclusion that students are harbingers of historical changes, because they are ahead of compatriots in recognizing the onset of the right time. Thus, student youth became active even before the Revolution on Granite in 1990, before actions «Ukraine without Kuchma» in 2000-2001, before the Orange Revolution in 2004, which allowed it to be in the front ranks of people who sought to break the course of established political realities.

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