

FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND POLITICS AND PARAMETERS OF LANGUAGE COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: STRUCTURING ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The article is dedicated to analysing the theoretical and methodological preconditions and empirical factors and consequences of the relationship between language and politics, as well as the parameters of language competition in international relations. This was done on the example of structuring the linguistic and interlingual situation in international relations in the European Union at the time of its last enlargement. To do this, the author highlighted the peculiarities of the structuring of interlingual (including interinstitutional ones) issues in the EU, and then proposed options for languages and language systems at the level of relations between the EU member and within the EU institutions. As a result, it was shown that language competition is inherent in the EU as a whole, although today English certainly dominates, even at the background of Brexit. Therefore, it was theoretically concluded that reducing the distance between the status of leading and non-leading languages within the EU increases dissatisfaction with the multilingualism policy, while increasing the distance contributes to the multilingualism policy.

Keywords: language, language situation, interlingual situation, language competition, international relations, multilingualism, the EU.

CZYNNIKI I KONSEKWENCJE ZWIĄZKÓW MIĘDZY JĘZYKIEM A POLITYKĄ ORAZ PARAMETRAMI KONKURENCJI JĘZYKOWEJ W STOSUNKACH MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH: STRUKTURA NA PRZYKŁADZIE UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie teoretycznych i metodologicznych uwarunkowań wstępnych oraz empirycznych czynników i konsekwencji relacji między językiem a polityką, jak również parametrów konkurencji językowej w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Odkryto to na przykładzie ustrukturyzowania sytuacji językowej i międzyjęzykowej w stosunkach międzynarodowych w Unii Europejskiej w czasie jej ostatniego rozszerzenia. W tym celu Autorka zwróciła uwagę na specyfikę strukturyzowania zagadnień międzyjęzykowych (w tym

міжінституціональних) в UE, а наступні запропонувала опції мов і систем мов на рівні відносин між країнами UE та всередині інституцій UE. В результаті встановлено, що конкуренція мов є невіддільним елементом всієї структури UE, хоча сьогодні переважає мова англійська, навіть на тлі Brexitu. В зв'язку з цим теоретично встановлено, що зменшення відстані між статусом мов домінуючих і не домінуючих в UE збільшує незадоволеність політикою мовної політики, а збільшення відстані призводить до розвитку політики мовної політики.

Слова-ключі: мова, ситуація мовна, ситуація міжмовна, конкуренція мов, міжнародні відносини, UE.

ЧИННИКИ І НАСЛІДКИ ВЗАЄМОЗВ'ЯЗКУ МОВИ ТА ПОЛІТИКИ І ПАРАМЕТРИ КОНКУРЕНЦІЇ МОВ У МІЖНАРОДНИХ ВІДНОСИНАХ: СТРУКТУРИЗАЦІЯ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ

У статті проаналізовано теоретико-методологічні передумови та емпіричні чинники й наслідки взаємозв'язку мови і політики, а також параметри конкуренції мов у міжнародних відносинах. Зроблено це на прикладі структуризації мовної і міжмовної ситуації у міжнародних відносинах в Європейському Союзі станом на момент його останнього розширення. Для цього у статті виокремлено особливості структуризації міжмовної (в тому числі в міжінституційному розрізі) проблематики в ЄС, а відтак запропоновано опції мов і мовних систем на рівні відносин між країнами-членами ЄС та в рамках інституцій ЄС. В результаті засвідчено, що для ЄС загалом властива конкуренція мов, хоча сьогодні переважаюче положення неодмінно займає англійська мова, навіть на тлі «Брекситу». Теоретично підсумовано, що зменшення відстані між статусом провідних і непровідних мов у рамках ЄС посилює незадоволення політикою багатомовності, а натомість збільшення відстані – сприяє політиці багатомовності.

Ключові слова: мова, мовна ситуація, міжмовна ситуація, конкуренція мов, багатомовність, міжнародні відносини, ЄС.

Language is known to exert structural-organizational, diplomatic and global influence on international policy and international relations. Hence, the relationship between language and politics is inevitably characterized by various international, supranational and integration factors, as well as the phenomenon of linguistic rivalry in international relations. It can be traced to the fact, that since political actors, institutions and systems interrelate within certain linguistic borders, then international relations can also be referred to as interlanguage

. Besides, it is obvious that, considering the fact that international relations and practices have a certain meaning in a language, it is necessary to adopt a common meaning of such international relations and practices, in particular, with a view to interlanguage relations. In our case the discrepancies in the sense and social and political expectations from international relations can limit the scope and quality of international relations. By contrast, though international relations constantly appeal to interlanguage relations, the former don't lay theoretical foundations for interlanguage relations, instead, such relations exist in real terms, when linguistic divisions and distinctions are either narrowing and acquiring similarities, especially as regards political and diplomatic vocabulary. Hence, in this context, the factors affecting the interaction of language and politics, the consequences of such interaction and the parameters of language competition in international relations require particular attention, in particular on the example of the European Union. It is particularly relevant considering the fact, that the theory of international relations doesn't have answers to the questions: what and how is going on when the claims regarding the legitimacy of this or that political process are shifted from one language to another or when the subjects of a political process are attempting to reach an agreement within existing language barriers. Noteworthy in this respect is that the theory of international relations does not rely on proofs in treating interlanguage relations, but considers them merely in practical terms.

Considering the problem from a theoretical methodological perspective, we may conclude that the theory of international relations, as much as the political theory must appeal to interlanguage relations not only as to a phenomenon in itself but as to the phenomenon which exerts its influence on structuring socio-political interaction. Since the loss of linguistic sense in international relations leads to the loss of their socio-political sense. Therefore, semantic similarities and discrepancies between languages in politics or political languages in international relations always depend on a certain historical context¹, which formalizes the language or languages as a precondition (preconditions) for socio-political intercourse.

Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that the effective understanding of one another will automatically lead to amicable relations, rather, it testifies to the fact that misunderstanding one another will always cause complications in interaction, amicability, cooperation, etc. That is why, international organisations and corporations cannot make up for or eliminate semantic losses², which, in turn, precede financial losses and have another nature which is of linguistic origin, therefore influences socio-political elements of international relations. It is explained by the fact that different languages are categorized as incompatible, in particular due to their practical and stylistic limitations, even though they may be rather often classified and perceived as

¹ Wigen E., Two-level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations, "European Journal of International Relations" 2015, vol 21, nr. 2, s. 427–450.

² Lotman Y., *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, Wyd. Indiana University Press 2000, s. 37.

rather similar or related.³ Moreover, since languages and cultures are constantly undergoing changes, historical and socio-political processes caused by them as well as the international relations resulting from them, are not stable⁴. Hence, the compatibility of senses in language and culture and their socio-political meaning during one period of time does not mean the compatibility during another period. Considering the aforesaid, the processes of mutual exchange of texts and oral communication are vital in international relations, in order to create and maintain the conceptual linguistic compatibility and therefore, promote socio-political compatibility and facilitate international cooperation⁵. Since not all that is legitimate in the international arena, may be so easily legitimized in the international arena and vice versa⁶, especially in conditions of notable discrepancies between the languages and considerable expectations of socio-political implications of international relations⁷, conducted by the political actors with various extent of subjectivity.⁸ Consequently, each interpretation in international relations may be used only for legitimization of a limited number of political actions and events, hence all interlanguage relations and language competition in international relations are viewed as “a two level language game”⁹. In other words, it is evident that the practice of international relations and global politics is relationally-discursive, that is integrated into the action and reuse of discursive knowledge¹⁰.

At the same time, against this background, English plays a huge role in international relations and world politics, because it is the English language that has recently been positioned and perceived as privileged in this area. After all, no other language is more important for political relations than English. This means that there exists a kind of hierarchy of international languages, which substantially reduces the cost of interlingualism.¹¹ This is particularly true considering the fact that most communities in the modern world are bilingual, they use two languages as official or national in certain countries or one national language and one or even several languages of international communication¹².

³ Pernau M., Whither conceptual history? From national to entangled histories, “*Contributions to the History of Concepts*” 2012, vol 7, nr. 1, s. 1–11.; Werner M., Zimmermann B., Beyond comparison: Histoire Croisée and the challenge of reflexivity, “*History and Theory*” 2006, vol 45, s. 30–50.

⁴ Wigen E., Two-level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations, “*European Journal of International Relations*” 2015, vol 21, nr. 2, s. 427–450.

⁵ Putnam R., Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games, “*International Organization*” 1988, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 427–460.

⁶ Jackson P., *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2006.

⁷ Jackson P., *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2011.

⁸ Neumann I., Entry into international society reconceptualised: The case of Russia, “*Review International Studies*” 2011, vol 37, nr. 2, s. 484.

⁹ Wigen E., Two-level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations, “*European Journal of International Relations*” 2015, vol 21, nr. 2, s. 427–450.

¹⁰ Krebs R., Jackson P., Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political rhetoric, “*European Journal of International Relations*” 2007, vol 13, nr. 1, s. 35–66.

¹¹ Bielsa E., Some remarks on the sociology of translation: A reflection on the global production and circulation of sociological works, „*European Journal of Social Theory*” 2011, vol 14, no. 2, p. 205.; Venuti L., *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, Wyd. Routledge 2008, p. 14.

¹² Wigen E., Two-level language games: International relations as inter-lingual relations, „*European Journal of International Relations*” 2015, vol 21, no. 2, p. 427–450.

Moreover, typically, such hierarchical relations in the language systems of the world are not derived from the current influence of individual states, although they indirectly determine them in socio-political dimensions. Instead, the hierarchy itself as well as limited interlingualism in the modern world are the consequences of globalization processes, because the latter even not being the cause of interlingual relations as such, are an important factor in a particular distribution of languages and language hierarchies in a multipolar world. In this context, at least theoretically and methodologically, many scholars share the view that language is not just an epiphenomenon of power, but a component of socio-political reality, which complicates the structuring of interlingual relations and language competition in modern international relations, diplomacy and geopolitics¹³.

As mentioned above, practically and empirically, the suggestion is that it be traced on the basis of assessing the integration and institutional factors and the consequences of structuring the relationship between language and policy in international relations on the example of the European Union (EU). From a purely legal point of view, the EU recognizes the equality of languages of all states, nations and nationalities in its structure and of all nations and ethnic groups inhabiting EU member states. The fact is that legislatively (for example, according to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) and conceptually, multilingualism is an integral factor and tool for protecting democracy, as well as a desirable and effective means of communication in public debate, as it reinforces tolerance and recognition of differences between different social groups, including minorities¹⁴.

In addition, linguistic and cultural diversity is inseparable from the concept of active European citizenship and is therefore a component of European identity. Accordingly, this nature of official multilingualism in the EU is reflected in almost all its actions and events of a ceremonial, declarative and «constitutional» nature, and to a large extent in the work of some institutions, as well as in the publication of decisions concerning citizens of member states and in case of their citizens' appeal to EU institutions¹⁵.

This is due to the fact that throughout the period of the EU's existence (since 1992/1993), which at the time of the analysis had 24 official languages, and previously (since 1957), the European Economic Community had only 4 official languages¹⁶, developed and nominally promoted the relevant language policy, which was declaratively aimed at the development, representation and preservation of the diversity of languages, the maintenance of the balance

¹³ Putnam R., Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games, „International Organization“ 1988, vol 42, no. 3, p. 434.

¹⁴ Dymnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijajlnijstj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajijn-chleniv, „Public Administration and Local Government“ 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

¹⁵ De Swaan A., The language predicament of the EU since the enlargements, [w:] Ammon U., Mattheier K., Nelde P. (eds.), Sociolinguistica: International yearbook of sociolinguistics. Vol. 21, Wyd. Niemeyer 2007, p. 10–11.

¹⁶ Víttores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

of languages and the progress of democracy in the European region¹⁷. The fact is that since its founding (in the 1950s) and transformation (in the 1990s), the EU has been positioning itself as a supranational entity in which its member states must maintain their basic rights and functions, including cultural autonomy. Consequently, this initially limited the powers of the EU institutions, especially in the field of language policy, as language has been seen as an important part of culture¹⁸. In view of this, the principle of multilingualism has always guided the EU's language policy, as the protection of multilingualism has always been perceived as a guarantee of preserving the national identity of EU member states, especially against the fact that after EU accession, their languages acquire symbolic significance due to their role in the formation of nation-states. From the organizational and systemic point of view of the EU, which is not a single state with a single ethnic and linguistic community, support for multilingualism is also symbolic and essential in a structural context, as EU language policy is mindful of such symbolism and translates it by means of numerous manifestations of linguistic diversity accompanied by a mantra of complicated and complex relationship between multilingualism and multiculturalism.

Accordingly, it is appropriate to talk instrumentally about the regulation of language diversity and language policy development within the EU from the very beginning of the formation of this supranational organization, as the language issue has always been inevitable and complicated issue in the course of advancement of individual states and constant complication of kaleidoscopic international relations within the EU. At the same time, the development of EU language policy has always been based on the confrontation of two postulates – the protection of multilingualism and diversity as a symbol of lasting cultural autonomy of EU member states and ensuring a common pan-European (i.e. supranational) communication in achieving common EU goals.¹⁹. On the one hand, diversity and multilingualism are at the heart of European identity and in the very institutional and political process, bringing language perspectives for improving communication through translation, interpretation and personal attitude. On the other hand, steps made towards designing various unity options, in particular through the prism of integration and unification, is a prerequisite for developing the status of a particular language or languages as the most used and international. This is especially true given that the peoples of the EU member states speak their native languages, while the political elite typically (at all stages of EU development) learns and uses several of the most widely used languages. That is why unifying such opposing tendencies, especially in terms of national and ideological identification and

¹⁷ Coulmas F., *A Language policy for the European Community. Prospects and Quanderies*, Wyd. Walter de Gruyter 1991.; Ammon U., *Language policy in the European Union (EU)*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *The Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2012, s. 570–591.

¹⁸ Kruse J., Ammon U., *The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures*, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), *Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work*, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

¹⁹ Bellier I., *European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement*, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2002, vol 1, no. 1, p. 85–114.

their mutual coordination, has always been the task of working out language policy of the EU and constructing the European space which, for one thing would take into consideration all national peculiarities and for another, would not be limited by national and regional borders.²⁰ Besides it should be borne in mind that the EU's language policy is to be theoretically considered as a political entity, since it necessarily involves a combination of language issues of at least three levels – in official policy, in the world of political institutions, within a large European multilingual and nationally rich society. And also on the basis of understanding that linguistically the EU is not a purely «political object» but the result of a subtle game of language difference and political and administrative culture differences within the European institutions and agencies responsible for writing laws and formulating policies²¹.

In this context, perhaps the first attempt to regulate the EU's language policy (a kind of language regime) (even though there is no official EU language policy as such, which is kind of perilous considering the Union's integrative unity) was Regulation № 1 from 15 April 1958 (i.e. within the framework of the European Economic Community), which states that the accession of all new member states must be accompanied by adding their national languages to the list of official languages of the Union (last time it was done with Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013). In contrast, such EU regulation has always been implemented only partially and extremely flexibly, as it has changed significantly under the influence of EU enlargement processes and the desire to ensure the smooth and efficient *functioning* of EU institutions and agencies²². Important in this regard was the adoption of the Recommendation European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1992 (which is still not ratified in all EU Member States), as its main objective was to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe (about 70)²³, especially if they do not have an official status. But it was during this period that the so-called «subsidiary institutions» of various EU member states took over the functions of managing the EU's language policy from the European institutions. Theoretically, this was supposed to have ensured the linguistic diversity that the EU patronized in Europe, which, as a region still tended to be monolingual in its supranational communications, especially due to the complexity of the political and linguistic confrontation between the EU's most widely used institutional languages.

One of the manifestations of such political and linguistic confrontation concerns the language regime in the EU and the correlation of the linguistic and political influence of individual EU member states, especially the United Kingdom and Ireland (since 1973, when

²⁰ Bellier I., European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2002, vol 1, no. 1, p. 85–114.

²¹ Bellier A., La Européenne Commission: du compromis culturel à la culture politique du compromis, „Revue Française de Science Politique“ 1996, vol 46, nr. 3, p. 431–455.

²² Vitores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

²³ Grin F., Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Language, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2003, p. 58.

they joined the EU) and other EU member states. widely use English (for more details, see Table 1), and France and Germany, which are the main opponents of expanding the use of English due to the historical status of their languages as diplomatic ones²⁴. In particular, the French language was dominant and prevalent in international relations from the end of the XVII century until the end of the First World War in 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, whereas the German language lost its leading status in international relations after the Second World War in 1939, but mainly after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Accordingly, the resulting competition over the status and prospects of different languages within the EU is the central political cause of its nominal and official, albeit limited, diversity²⁵. The fact is that there is no unanimous agreement between EU member states on multilingualism, as the United Kingdom (which is no longer a member of the EU at the time of the analysis), Germany and France typically cannot give up the political benefits from representing their national languages in the institutional and non-institutional spheres of the EU.

This has been particularly obvious since the 1990s, when English became the EU's most widely used institutional language, French less widely used, and German the least widely used, even though the latter was still the most widely spoken native language in the EU²⁶. With this in mind, German and French political leaders faced an important challenge and dilemma. On the one hand, if they intended to reform the institutional language EU system, from a purely rational point of view, we would have to focus on the adoption of a certain language of international communication, which would most likely be English, considering its significant international presence. On the other hand, if they were against the development of a consolidated institutional language regime in the EU, then by inertia and the de facto predominant language in the EU institutional sphere would remain English. Accordingly, France and Germany sought to invent a third way of developing the EU's language policy, which would not lead to the loss of their political power due to the reduction of the status and frequency of use of their national languages in EU structures. For instance, since the early 1990s, France has been safeguarding its language by introducing changes into its political – linguistic strategy within the Union.²⁷ It was eventually rooted in *the Maastricht Treaty* which enshrines the linguistic diversity and the above-mentioned principle of subsidiarity as the «cornerstones» of the EU's education policy.²⁸ In other words, France and some other countries have managed to ensure linguistic diversity and its protection at the supranational, national, subnational and regional levels of the EU.²⁹

²⁴ Vitores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics” 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

²⁵ De Swaan A., The language predicament of the EU since the enlargements, [w:] Ammon U., Mattheier K., Nelde P. (eds.), Sociolinguistica: International yearbook of sociolinguistics. Vol. 21: Linguistic Consequences of the EU-Enlargement, Wyd. Niemeyer 2007, p. 1–21.

²⁶ Bellier I., European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement, „Journal of Language and Politics” 2002, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 85–114.

²⁷ Adamson R., The Defense of French: A Language in Crisis?, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 2007, p. 27.

²⁸ Final Report, [w:] High Level Group on Multilingualism, Wyd. European Commission 2007, p. 8.

²⁹ Oakes L., Language and National Identity. Comparing France and Sweden, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2001, p. 130.

and thus partially restore political power in this context to individual EU member states, but mainly by creating and promoting a political basis for a strategy to protect French and some other languages as opposed to English³⁰.

As a result, for some EU Member States, multilingualism policy is «sincere» and genuinely aimed at preserving the diversity of languages, but for some Member States (especially strong ones) it is mainly a tool for political protection and supranational promotion of their own languages, primarily French and German³¹, and their own state or national interests. Although, by contrast, such policies often began to have the opposite effect, i.e. to cause collateral damage to the position of French and other languages as competitors of the English language at the national and supranational levels³². Especially considering the fact that countries, such as France are ardent advocates of multilingualism at the level of supranational relations, but do not do so at the national level, where linguistic diversity is significantly limited³³. A clear example of this is the situation with the above-mentioned European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was adopted in 1992, but France, whose politicians often positioned themselves as «champions of global linguistic diversity», being its main promoter of the Charter at the supranational level, ineffectively promoted and even sabotaged it at the national level³⁴. The culmination of this was the situation in 1999 when the French Constitutional Council declared that France's ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was unconstitutional, was not ratified, since it was recognized as not valid.³⁵ This suggests that the gradual weakening and even disappearance of minority languages not only in France but also in other EU Member States, including Irish in Ireland, may, for example, be quite useful in strengthening the position of French within the EU³⁶. In general, this reflects the close link between national and supranational strategy and political will to act, as some EU member states are ready to uphold European linguistic diversity, but only as long as this diversity strengthens the position of their national languages as languages of international communication in the EU.

This demonstrates ineffectiveness of Franco-German or any other strategies to counter the spread of English in the EU, even in areas where French, German and any other language of the Union were previously dominant. And this is obvious both at the institutional and non-institutional level of the EU. Especially taking into account the fact that the leading position of the English language is obvious outside the institutions and agencies of the EU,

³⁰ PupH., Statut de la langue française et des autres langues en France, "Dialogues Politiques" 2004, vol 2, s. 10.

³¹ Shelly S., Une certaine idée du français: The dilemma for French language policy in the 21st century, „Language and Communication” 1999, vol 19, p. 315.; Giordan H., La question des langues en Europe, „Dialogues Politiques” 2004, vol 2, s. 4.

³² Adamson R., The Defense of French: A Language in Crisis?, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 2007, p. 27.

³³ Wright S., French as a Lingua Franca, „Annual Review of Applied Linguistics” 2006, vol 26, p. 49.

³⁴ Shelly S., Une certaine idée du français: The dilemma for French language policy in the 21st century, „Language and Communication” 1999, vol 19, p. 312.

³⁵ Adamson R., The Defense of French: A Language in Crisis?, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 2007, p. 35.

³⁶ Lalane-Berdouticq P., Pourquoi parler française, Wyd. Fleurus 1993, p. 172.

in particular in the fields of education, science, business, culture and the media. However, the most interesting thing is that development and even dominance of English in the EU were not caused artificially and by imposing a choice, but mainly by the rational behavior of individual actors, including politicians – speakers, institutions, governments, etc. – who decided to acquire or improve their knowledge of English as a tool for strengthening their international presence. This generally means that since the 1970s, multilingualism (or, to put it more clearly, individual bilingualism) has made significant progress in the EU, at least as far as the Union's most important languages are concerned. However, such multilingualism was eventually formed resulting from the Europeans' desire to know, in addition to their native language, another language that they consider the most effective from the standpoint of rational choice. Accordingly, from the perspective of confrontation or competition between the main languages, or the languages of the strongest EU member states, multilingualism has weakened the position of French, German and other languages, but has strengthened the position of English. And this, despite the fact that initially, in particular in the 70s of the twentieth century, the share of people who spoke French, English and German in the EU was almost equal and made up 10 percent³⁷. As a result, it was stated that the expected uniform multilingualism within the EU has led to the progress of monolingualism in supranational relations.

Accordingly, the latest concept of EU language policy at the time of the study (adopted in 2001 and also of a recommendatory nature, as there is no official EU language policy, as it is excessively «politically dangerous» in terms of the integrative unity of the Union), set out in « Pan-European Recommendations on Language Education », is formally comprehensively aimed at: preservation and protection of language heritage; transforming the diversity of languages from an obstacle to communication into a source of mutual enrichment and understanding; facilitating learning and improving the command of modern European languages to promote mobility, mutual understanding and cooperation, overcoming prejudice and discrimination between Europeans; introducing uniform requirements for language learning by the member states of the Council of Europe, with the aim of promoting integration and further cooperation and policy coordination at the pan-European level as well as development of multilingualism and multiculturalism of Europeans³⁸.

That is why its principles and ideas have been repeatedly discussed at meetings and events of the highest level. Besides, the EU has been typically adopting many resolutions and programs aimed at raising citizens' understanding of the need to know foreign languages for the growing scientific, socio-economic and political development of each country³⁹.

³⁷ Vitores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics” 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

³⁸ Pershukova O., Baghatomovna osvita – priorityetnyj naprjam rozvytku jevropejskoji movnoji ghaluzi, „Porivnjalno-pedagoghichni studiji” 2010, vol 3–4, s. 39.

³⁹ Geller-Novak A., *Europaische Sprachenpolitik und Euroregionen: Ergebnisse einer Befragung zur Stellung der englischen und deutschen Sprache in Grenzgebieten*, Wyd. Narr 1993, s. 51–52.

However, for objective reasons, the practical achievement of equality of all languages within the EU is hardly attainable, because integration processes and the need for effective communication in the Union involve achieving and prioritizing common European norms over national ones, and the resulting need for international languages with some of them prevailing⁴⁰. Moreover, only the languages of the most developed and numerous nations of Europe, whose states are not only economically and politically dominant in the EU, but also gravity centers for migration from other countries of the Union and the world, can apply for the status of such languages⁴¹. In this context, it is noteworthy that French, German, Spanish, Italian and English are officially defined as languages of international communication within the EU. However, currently, the English language, even in spite of the Brexit processes (a set of actions that began in 2016 and ended in 2019 and were aimed at the UK's exit from the EU⁴²), is the defining and most widespread and enjoys the status of a kind of «lingua franca»⁴³.

This is reflected, for example, in the fact that despite the requirement to use different (several) languages, some EU institutions, in particular the European Commission, the highest executive body of the EU, prefer English in negotiations with EU member states.⁴⁴ One of the factors, that contributed to the current state of affairs was the President of the European Commission R. Prodi's stance regarding the possibility to solve the institutional problems of multilingualism and translation in the work of the institution by means of using only English. In contrast, the same year, 2001 the European Parliament adopted its resolution denying the possibility of removing some languages for translation, although the list of such languages was reduced.⁴⁵ The situation with the document turnover between the EU and Germany, resulting from such processes as indicated by the data of the Directorate General for Translation of European Commission documents in Germany, is a vivid illustration of such processes. Thus, in 1997, 45 percent of all outgoing documents submitted for translation to this organization were sent from the EU in English, while in 2014, already more than 80 percent of such documents were in English. And even when the position of Commissioner for Multilingualism in the EU in 2007 was held by V. Orban from Hungary (who is typically known for his Eurosceptic ideas in this regard), the share of English-language documents in the work of the Directorate General for Translation in Germany was

⁴⁰ Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijaljnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „*Public Administration and Local Government*” 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

⁴¹ Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijaljnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „*Public Administration and Local Government*” 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

⁴² Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijaljnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „*Public Administration and Local Government*” 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

⁴³ Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijaljnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „*Public Administration and Local Government*” 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

⁴⁴ Bellier I. European Institutions and Linguistic Diversity: a Problematic Unity, [w:] Chopra H., Frank R., Schroder J. (eds.), *National Identities and Regional Cooperation: experiences of European Integration and South Asia Perceptions*, Wyd. Manohar 1999.

⁴⁵ Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijaljnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „*Public Administration and Local Government*” 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, s. 155–162.

70 percent⁴⁶. Accordingly, despite the rhetoric on the diversity of languages in the European Union and even the relevant legislation in this regard, it is English that is gaining ground in the European institutions, in the corporate world, in the media and in many international activities to which it is concerned. EU⁴⁷. As a result, English is now the most widely used official language of the EU, since several decades ago it opened the European institutional door to global market forces and trends that have contributed to the dominance of this language as a tool for international communication outside the EU⁴⁸.

All this gives all grounds to say that *de facto* (rather than declaratively) the EU's language policy and practice is characterized by a combination of several mutually contradictory processes and phenomena. On the one hand, nominally, multilingualism is inherent in the EU, as all national languages of EU member states are without exception the official languages of the EU, and therefore all EU legislation, rules and documents must be concluded and distributed in all official languages of EU member states (as of the end of 2019 there were 24 such languages, despite the fact that 28 European countries were members of the EU). Accordingly, citizens and public institutions of EU member states can address EU structures in their native / national language and have the right to receive an answer in that language. In addition, the official languages of the EU Member States are fully translated in plenary, group meetings and meetings of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council, but first directly into French, English and / or German and then into other languages (the list has been significantly limited of late)⁴⁹. Although, in contrast, this rule applies only to meetings at the highest political level (with Members of the European Parliament, Commissioners, Heads of State, Ministers, etc.). Instead, informal meetings usually use English and French and the language of the host country.⁵⁰

On the other hand, the internal language policy within the EU differs from language policy within EU institutions and institutions, as individual institutions have their own language rules, which are more limited than the logic of constructing interlingual relations within official EU languages. For example, in the European Court of Justice (or the Court of Justice of the European Union) in Luxembourg, only French is the official language due to France's influence on the continental legal system.⁵¹), in The European Central Bank in Frankfurt solely English is used, while the working languages of the European Commission in Brussels are English,

⁴⁶ Translation and additional language Luxembourg: Amt für Veröffentlichungen, Wyd. European Commission 2014

⁴⁷ Behr H., Stivachtis Y., *Revisiting the European Union as Empire*, Wyd. Routledge 2015, p. 141, 146–147.

⁴⁸ Vitores D., *Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe*, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181; Phillipson R., *English-only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

⁴⁹ Gazzola M., *Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy Evaluation for the European Parliament*, „Language Policy“ 2006, vol 5, p. 393–417.

⁵⁰ Dvynych G., *Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijajlnistj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajini-chleniv*, „Public Administration and Local Government“ 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, p. 155–162.

⁵¹ Bellier L., *European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement*, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2002, vol 1, no. 1, p. 85–114.

French and German, and those of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market in Alicante are English, French, German, Italian and Spanish.⁵² In general, the rule is that the more politicians and the stronger the public orientation, the more official languages are used in the EU institutions. In other words, some EU institutions and agencies implement mainly the principles of European linguistic diversity, and some the principles of European integration and unity.⁵³

As a result, among the most common working languages in the European Union are: the languages characterized by demographic, socio-economic and political power (German, English, French, Italian, Spanish); the languages that have the status of international (English, French, Spanish and sometimes German); languages that already have important functions in the work of the EU (English in economics, trade, technology and science and French in internal governance)⁵⁴. At the same time, the numerous informal committees of the various EU institutions, which, among other tasks, prepare formal meetings, generally do not have a generally accepted language regime and do not have or have only a limited number of translators available from the EU budget⁵⁵. As a result, they often, sometimes spontaneously, have to use the language that all the participants understand, or the EU member states themselves decide on the language they are willing to cover the translation costs, which typically only powerful and developed countries can afford (including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, formerly the United Kingdom)⁵⁶. Against this background, it has become obvious that if a certain EU member state is able to continuously promote the use of its national language within the EU structures, it will certainly contribute to the prestige of this language as a foreign language as well as that of the native speakers, and therefore the national identity and communication skills of its representatives.

But if an EU member state does not have the capacity and resources to promote and translate its own language as a working language within the EU, then it typically resorts to reduction of the number of working languages and even chooses one of the most widespread ones. It is on this basis that the English language is gaining special popularity in the formal and informal relations of the EU member states within the EU today.

Finally, yet *another* perspective, the language policy of the EU member states is aimed at promoting the study of foreign languages, since at Union level it is established that in

⁵² Kruse J., Ammon U., The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56; Vitores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

⁵³ Bellier I., European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2002, vol 1, no. 1, p. 85–114.

⁵⁴ Dyvnych G., Vplyv movnoji polityky ES na dijajlnjstj derzhavnoji sluzhby krajyn-chleniv, „Public Administration and Local Government“ 2017, vol 4, nr. 35, p. 155–162.

⁵⁵ Ammon U., Kruse J. Does translation support multilingualism in the EU? Promises and reality – the example of German, „International Journal of Applied Linguistics“ 2013, vol 23, no. 1, p. 15–30.

⁵⁶ Kruse J., Ammon U., The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

the strategic future every EU citizen must know two other official EU languages to better communicate with representatives of other nations and nationalities, and thus to reduce national prejudices and develop the mobility of social and cultural capital. Although, in contrast, despite the regulated linguistic diversity and language options of the various EU institutions, English is currently the most widely spoken and used language within the Union, in particular due to its the perception as the language that best promotes cooperation in multinational and multicultural environment, hence, helps to address national and European issues.

Consequently, as scientists note⁵⁷, today within the EU as a supranational organization, in particular considering the correlation of nominal multilingualism and the actual prevalence of some, primarily English, languages of international communication, there are processes of variable ranking and hierarchy of all official languages depending on the prevalence, power and functionality of languages and their speakers. This is the basis for distinguishing several functional groups of languages within the EU, even though they are variants of certain national languages of individual EU member states. The first group consists of the working languages of the EU institutions and agencies or the so-called «EU procedural languages», which are at the top of the hierarchy, as they typically distinguish up to five languages (not always in identical gradation) depending on the institutions. The second group is represented by the so-called «official languages of the EU», from which the the above referred group of languages is formed. These languages (the 24 of them as mentioned above, at the time of the analysis) are used for official communication between the government and other EU institutions and the Member States. They are also used to authenticate the acts of accession of member states to the EU and all binding acts and regulations. At the same time, the official languages of some EU member states are «working» for some EU institutions, although they are defined by a limited language regime. It is also noteworthy that the number of official EU languages is less than the number of EU member states, because first of all, six of these languages are used by a total of twelve EU member states (for example, Dutch – Belgium and the Netherlands, English – Ireland and formerly the United Kingdom, French – France, Belgium and Luxembourg, German – Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, Greek – Greece and Cyprus, Swedish – Sweden and Finland); secondly, two of the EU member states use additional languages (including Ireland – Irish and Finland – Finnish). Thus, the official languages of the EU are organized according to the scheme where eight languages for twelve EU member states are added to sixteen languages for sixteen EU member states, and a total of twenty-four languages serve twenty-eight (before the United Kingdom left the EU) member states⁵⁸. At the same time, the third group consists of the so-called «national-official languages of the EU member states», of which a separate part is constituted by the previous group of languages within the EU. The peculiarity of this

⁵⁷ Kruse J., Ammon U., *The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures*, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), *Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work*, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

⁵⁸ Kruse J., Ammon U., *The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures*, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), *Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work*, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

group of languages is manifested in the fact that, in contrast to the official languages of the EU, the list of languages in the third group additionally includes the Luxembourgish language in Luxembourg, which does not have the status of an official language in the EU⁵⁹. In general, each EU member state has at least one national official language.

At the same time, some EU member states have more than one national official language, and some languages have the status of a national official language in more than in one EU member state. This is the basis for additional selection and ranking of several other language groups within the EU⁶⁰. Among them, a group of so-called «regional official languages» occupies a special place in other EU member states, such as German in Belgium and Italy, while being nationally official in Germany, Austria and Luxembourg. However, there are cases when regional official languages have such a status in other EU member states, but do not have such a status in the territories of their primary use. These include Catalan, Basque and Galician in Spain, Welsh and Gaelic in the United Kingdom, and West Frisian in the Netherlands or Sorbian (Lusatian) in Germany⁶¹. A special place in the ranking is occupied by the so-called «indigenous (or indigenous) minority languages» of the EU member states, which are protected by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, as they nowhere have the status of national official languages. Examples of such languages are Kashubian, Karaite, Lemko, Romance, Tatar, and Yiddish in Poland, or Danish, Frisian, Low German, Romani, and Sorbian (Lusatian) in Germany, and so on. In turn, the list of language groups in this ranking would not be complete without taking into account the so-called «indigenous (or indigenous) minority languages» of EU member states that are not protected by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, as such EU member states have not ratified this legislation. Finally, the hierarchical list of language rankings within the EU ends with so-called exogenous languages which are not entitled to protection under any *European legal act* or not binding act. The native speakers of such languages are mostly immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers arriving into the EU⁶².

However, in contrast, EU language regulations additionally apply to some other categories of languages, in particular so-called «sign languages», classical languages and modern foreign languages in the respective EU member states⁶³.

⁵⁹ Bellier I., European identity, institutions and languages in the context of the enlargement, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2002, vol 1, no. 1, p. 85–114.

⁶⁰ Kruse J., Ammon U., The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), *Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work*, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

⁶¹ Vitores D., Subsidiarity breeds contempt: How decentralization of policy decision-making favors a monolingual Europe, „Journal of Language and Politics“ 2011, vol 10, no. 2, p. 160–181.

⁶² Edwards V., *Immigrant languages in the UK*, [w:] Ammon U., Haarmann H. (eds.), *Wieser encyclopedia Western European languages. Vol. I*, Wyd. Wieser Verlag 2008, s. 471–487.; Gadet F., *Immigrant languages in France*, [w:] Ammon U., Haarmann H. (eds.), *Wieser encyclopedia Western European languages. Vol. I*, Wyd. Wieser Verlag 2008, s. 459–469.

⁶³ Kruse J., Ammon U., The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), *Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work*, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

Theoretically, this shows that reducing the distance between the status of leading and non-leading languages within the EU increases dissatisfaction with multilingualism, whereas increasing the distance contributes to multilingualism. Accordingly, the commitment or reluctance of EU member states to protect and promote linguistic diversity is a precondition for determining existing language policies within the EU. In this regard, scholars note that several main areas of understanding of language policy in the EU need to be identified: support or non-support of minority languages, promotion or non-promotion of individual multilingualism (mother tongue and at least two other languages), support or non-support of multilingualism in general and ensuring equal status of all official languages of EU member states. The fact is that despite the declaration of linguistic diversity within the EU, the current situation leaves much to be desired, since these gaps exist in nearly all spheres of implementation of European language policy, in particular in the spheres of ratification of international acts and recommendations concerning the protection of minority rights, learning foreign languages and eventually aspiring to true multilingualism especially with regard to the use of different languages and language regimes for the EU institutions (there are numerous examples of this that mostly refer to the relations between the EU and state-members' governments.⁶⁴)

These gaps are particularly noticeable against the background of «economic instrumentalization of language»⁶⁵ and inconsistencies between the status of the official (of which there are 24) and working or «procedural» (mainly English, French and German) languages in the EU⁶⁶, which are inherited from the institutional irrelevance of the EU language policy in the context of understanding this organization primarily as supranational corporation of civil and nation states, which a priori encourages multilingualism⁶⁷. This became especially noticeable in the period from 2014, when the European Commission was headed by J.-K. Juncker, because at this time virtually all visible manifestations of policies for the maintenance of linguistic *diversity* in the EU were stopped, except for educational Erasmus + programs. And even this program did not focus on learning at least two foreign languages, but mainly one, primarily English, foreign language as a second language of EU citizens.⁶⁸, although this has had some expected positive effects on the economy, mobility and EU identity. At the same time, this has especially strengthened the bias, the desire to transition and the practice of communication between citizens, organizations, states and institutions within the EU not so much in national languages but in English since it guarantees «the

⁶⁴ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁶⁵ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁶⁶ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁶⁷ Kruse J., Dichotomies in European language history and possible effects on EU language policy, „Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies“ 2014, vol 5, p. 25–40.

⁶⁸ Ammon U., Why accepting one common language plus preserving all the other languages as national or *minority languages would not resolve the European language conflicts*, [w:] Cillia R., Gruber H., Krzyzanowski M., Menz F. (eds.), *Discourse – Politics – Identity / Discourse – Politics – Identity. Festschrift für Ruth Wodak*, Wyd. Stauffenburg 2010, p. 229–234.

greatest success».⁶⁹ Although, on the contrary, it did not nominally contradict the provisions of official EU documents, because, according to the recommendations and interpretations of Regulation N^o 1 of 1958 by the European Court, each institution, person and organization is able to choose which language is more appropriate to communicate.

Thus, in general, it shows that despite all the calls and statements about the importance of multilingual development of the EU, in fact, progress has recently been made towards a monolingual structure of EU institutions and agencies.⁷⁰ In other words, language equality has not been reached in the EU, as, being able to opt for multilingualism many Europeans still choose to promote English as the most widely spoken (more than half of the EU population) second language in the region (at least compared to French and German) especially when it comes to its prevalence on the Internet⁷¹. This, on the one hand, is especially evident with the view of the European Commission's diminished intent to develop linguistic diversity, but on the other hand, it is particularly politically dangerous and incomprehensible against the background of expectations of a democratic deficit, especially considering the processes of United Kingdom's exit from the EU, the EU's main promoter. Accordingly, it is clear that the importance of English in the EU is not only due to the influence of the United Kingdom, but also a consequence of the perception of English as world, international or global language. In other words, English has become the language of international communication of the EU not only because it is significantly influenced by the United Kingdom, but also because it is the language of international communication on the world stage⁷². On the one hand, this is entirely in line with the «blind survey» of how many languages the EU should use in its institutional life to establish effective communication and cooperation, as almost all EU Member States prefer the language system consisting of as few languages as possible to the one that promotes the diversity of languages. On the other hand, every EU member state certainly wants its language to be among the working languages of the Union⁷³. Therefore, from the standpoint of the theory of rational choice, the option of unanimous solution of the problem of the direction of development of the EU language policy is in principle impossible, because it leads to an «institutional deadlock» that hampers the possibility for *alterations* in language policies of the EU⁷⁴.

⁶⁹ Ammon U., Kruse J. Does translation support multilingualism in the EU? Promises and reality – the example of German, „International Journal of Applied Linguistics“ 2013, vol 23, no. 1, p. 15-30; Kruse J., Ammon U., Language competence and language choice within EU institutions and the effects for national legislative authorities, [w:] Grin F., Berthoud A.-C., Lüdi G. (eds.), Exploring the dynamics of multilingualism: The DYLAN project, Wyd. Benjamins 2013, p. 157–178.

⁷⁰ Kruse J., Ammon U., The language planning and policy for the European Union and its failures, [w:] Chua K., Kheng S. (eds.), Un (intended) Language Planning in a Globalizing World: Multiple Levels of Players at Work, Wyd. De Gruyter 2018, p. 39–56.

⁷¹ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁷² Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁷³ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁷⁴ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

Table 1. Statistics on the possession and use of the most common languages (both native and second) in the European Union, as a percentage (as of 2012)⁷⁵

Country	Knowledge of the most common languages, as of 2012					Application of English languages, 2012
	English language	French language	German	Spanish	Russian language	
Austria	73	11	97	4	2	41
Belgium	38	81	23	5	4	29
Bulgaria	25	2	8	2	23	12
Greece	51	9	9	1	1	33
Denmark	86	9	47	4	0	53
Estonia	50	1	22	1	56	23
Ireland	99	17	7	4	1	98
Spain	22	12	2	98	1	12
Italy	34	4	3	8	0	14
Cyprus	73	11	5	2	4	43
Latvia	46	1	14	1	67	27
Lithuania	38	3	14	1	80	21
Luxembourg	56	96	71	5	0	31
Malta	89	17	3	1	0	62
Netherlands	90	29	71	5	0	38
Germany	56	15	98	4	6	32
Poland	33	4	19	1	26	20
Portugal	27	24	1	10	0	15
Romania	31	23	7	5	3	17
Slovakia	26	2	22	1	17	13
Slovenia	59	3	48	3	5	34
United Kingdom	97	19	9	8	2	94
Hungary	20	3	18	1	4	12
Finland	70	3	18	3	3	45
France	39	97	8	13	1	24
Croatia	49	4	34	2	4	n.d.
Czech Republic	27	1	15	1	13	12
Sweden	86	11	30	5	0	54
On average in the EU	51	26	32	15	6	34

This conclusion is complemented by the fact that, being the most widely spoken or central language of interinstitutional communication in the EU, English is not the language of communication of most European citizens, in particular through the population of EU member states, but is only the most widely spoken second language in the region⁷⁶. (for details,

⁷⁵ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP2012, s. 1–15.

⁷⁶ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP2012, s. 1–15.

see Table 1). This means that the Europeans have a tendency to move towards the phenomenon of multilingualism, but with a clear preference for English as the language they know alongside their mother tongue⁷⁷).

In particular, as of 2012, almost 40 percent of the population of EU member states knew English as a second language, while German and French – only 14 percent each. On the other hand, at that time more than half of the EU population spoke English as a native and second language, while French and German were spoken by less than a third of each⁷⁸.

This is institutionally inherited, as, for example, as of 2015, about 80 percent of legislative proposals in the EU were made initially in English and not in any other language, which ultimately reflects its position in the world as an international, global or world, language, regardless of the Brexit process⁷⁹.

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⁷⁷ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁷⁸ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

⁷⁹ Spolsky B., *What is language policy?*, [w:] Spolsky B. (ed.), *Cambridge handbook of language policy*, Wyd. CUP 2012, s. 1–15.

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