

## **The historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the electoral systems' formation at the local level in the modern countries of the Visegrad Group**

the article is devoted to the comprehensive generalization of the historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level. The problem-descriptive approach and the method of generalization are used in the research, by which the countries were analyzed as separate cases and then subsequently systematized based on this. The unifying factor that influenced the formation of the electoral legislation and electoral systems at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries was the process of transformation and democratization of their political systems as well as the implementation of administrative and territorial reforms and decentralization. The electoral systems used at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries are dependent on several factors. The first one is the type of the elective body of local government, i.e. individual or collective. The second one is the size (depending on the number of voters) of the collective elective bodies of local government. It has been determined that collective elective bodies are usually elected on the basis of proportional electoral systems of lists (including those with preferences), but rarely on the basis of majoritarian electoral systems (either of two-round majority systems or first-past-the-post majority systems or even systems of preferential block voting). On the other hand, for individual elective bodies, mostly a majoritarian electoral system (of two-round or first-past-the-post voting) is common, although sometimes mayors have been elected or are still elected by indirect elections. The throughout logic of the study is the periodization of the transformation of the Visegrad Group countries electoral systems at the local level.

*Keywords: local elections, electoral systems, the formation of electoral systems, countries of the Visegrad group.*

## **ІСТОРИЧНІ І ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЙНІ ПЕРЕДУМОВИ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ФОРМУВАННЯ ВИБОРЧИХ СИСТЕМ НА МІСЦЕВОМУ РІВНІ У СУЧАСНИХ КРАЇНАХ ВИШЕГРАДСЬКОЇ ГРУПИ**

Стаття присвячена комплексному узагальненню історично-трансформаційних передумов та особливостей формування й реформування виборчих систем країн Вишеградської

групи на місцевому рівні. У роботі застосовуються проблемно-дескриптивний підхід і метод узагальнення, з допомогою яких спочатку всі країни проаналізовані як окремі випадки, а згодом на підставі цього систематизовані. Об'єднуючим чинником, що вплинув на становлення виборчого законодавства та виборчих систем на місцевому рівні країн Вишеградської групи виявилась трансформація і демократизація їхніх політичних систем, а також проведення адміністративно-територіальних реформ і здійснення процесів децентралізації. Виборчі системи, які використовуються на місцевому рівні країн Вишеградської групи, залежать від кількох чинників. Першим є тип самого виборного органу місцевого самоврядування – одноосібного чи колективного. Другим є розмір (залежний від кількості виборців) колективного виборного органу місцевого самоврядування. Визначено, що колективні виборні органи на місцях зазвичай обираються за пропорційною виборчою системою списків (у тім числі й з преференціями), а рідше – за мажоритарною виборчою системою (чи то абсолютної більшості, чи то відносної більшості, чи то преференційного блочного голосування). Для одноосібних виборних органів на місцях характерна здебільшого мажоритарна виборча система відносної чи абсолютної більшості, хоча інколи мерів обирали чи досі обирають шляхом непрямих виборів. Наскрізною логікою дослідження є періодизація трансформації виборчих систем країн Вишеградської групи на місцевому рівні.

*Ключові слова: місцеві вибори, виборчі системи, формування виборчих систем, країни Вишеградської групи.*

Legal fixing of favorable and effective norms and procedures for the election of representative bodies of local government and direct involvement of citizens/population of administrative and territorial units of states into the adoption of political and government decisions is a condition for the instituting and proper functioning of local and regional representative and electoral democracy. The main trend in this process is the foundation and consolidation of a constitutional/legal state, which (among the other things) is inherited in the formation or reformation of the electoral system, both at the national and local levels. As the result, the formation or reformation of the electoral system of state, both at the national and local levels, is a part and one of the elements of the implementation of comprehensive national reforms (in particular, of the administrative and territorial one) in this direction. The countries of the Visegrad Group, i.e. the Czech Republic/Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, are not the exceptions to the specified processes. They, due to their political, economic, social and other characteristics, have undergone extremely individual stages of political, socio-economic and systemic transformation. This, among the other things, originally activated the generation (statutory regulation) and subsequently caused the reformation (statutory changes) (or vice versa) of the laws on local government bodies' elections, which comprehensively regulate the electoral

process and outline the essence of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level. In sum, this means that the research of the stated problem is extremely relevant and multifaceted, since it provides the opportunity, on the one hand, to develop a systematic vision of the algorithms, historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the Visegrad Group countries' electoral systems at the local level, and, on the other hand, to create the mechanisms for their hypothetical application in other countries, which are culturally, politically and culturally close to the analyzed region, but are still on the path to the formation of representative and electoral democracy.

The proposed problem of the presented study was primarily reflected in the legislation of the studied countries and in the contributions of such scholars as A. Klaizner<sup>1</sup>, Y. Mansvietov, A. Kliuchkovych<sup>2</sup>, D. Kovryzhenko<sup>3</sup>, M. Lendel<sup>4</sup>, Y. Manilov<sup>5</sup>, S. Rudnytskyi, N. Nyzhnyk<sup>6</sup>, V. Lemak, A. Sauer<sup>7</sup>, I. Savchenko<sup>8</sup>, T. Slobodian<sup>9</sup>, G. Soós<sup>10</sup>, H. Wollmann, T. Lankina<sup>11</sup>, Y. Yuriichuk<sup>12</sup> and many others. However, it should be noted that they, while substantially enriching Political Science, are rather fragmented and are not directed at the systematic and synthetic outline of our research. Therefore, the purpose of the article is not just a review, but a comprehensive synthesis of historical and transformational preconditions and peculiarities of the formation and reformation of the Visegrad Group countries' electoral systems at the local level. The solution to this goal will help to answer the question of how the effectiveness of electoral systems used to form local government bodies (in particular, on the example of the Visegrad Group countries) depends on the sustainability of political and legal rules, which regulate the conduct of the elections.

<sup>1</sup> A. Klaizner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uborschyni, Slovachchyni, Plshchi ta Chekhii: porivnialniy analiz*, źródło: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>2</sup> A. Kliuchkovych, *Partiina systema Slovachchyni: strukturni kharakterystyky ta tendentsii rozvytku*, [w:] Lendel M., Mitriaieva S. (eds.), *Uzhhorodski slovatski naukovi chytannia: istoriia, kultura, polityka, pravo*, Wyd. Polihrafsentr Lira 2014, s. 102-109.

<sup>3</sup> D. Kovryzhenko, *Vyborchi systemy dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Vybory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78.

<sup>4</sup> M. Lendel, *Osoblyvosti vidvorennia mistsevykh politychnykh elit u Slovatskii Respublitsi*, [w:] Lendel M., Mitriaieva S. (eds.), *Uzhhorodski slovatski naukovi chytannia: istoriia, kultura, polityka, pravo*, Wyd. Polihrafsentr Lira 2014, s. 110-116.

<sup>5</sup> M. Lendel, *Osoblyvosti vidvorennia mistsevykh politychnykh elit u Slovatskii Respublitsi*, [w:] Lendel M., Mitriaieva S. (eds.), *Uzhhorodski slovatski naukovi chytannia: istoriia, kultura, polityka, pravo*, Wyd. Polihrafsentr Lira 2014, s. 110-116.

<sup>6</sup> N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reforma v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby” 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

<sup>7</sup> A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper” 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

<sup>8</sup> I. Savchenko, *Elektoralna sytuatsiia v Cheskii Respublitsi v konteksti yevropeiskoi intebratsii*, „Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky” 2009, vol 3.

<sup>9</sup> T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

<sup>10</sup> G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

<sup>11</sup> H. Wollmann, T. Lankina, *Local Government in Poland and Hungary: from post-communist reform towards EU accession*, [w:] Baldersheim H., Illner M., Wollmann H. (eds.), *Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2003, s. 91-122.

<sup>12</sup> Y. Yuriichuk, *Vyborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: shliakhy demokratyzatsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii” 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

In resolving this goal, it is decided to use the problem-descriptive approach and the method of generalization, with the help of which all countries are analyzed as separate cases, for the first, and systematized in the form of a sample, for the second. Moreover, the lower boundary of the study was defined as 1989, when then-existing countries of the not yet obtainable Visegrad Group, i.e. Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and Poland, entered a transformational curve and began to modernize politically, socially, economically and systematically. And on the contrary, the upper boundary of the research is the current situation in these countries. However, with the remark taken into account in the study, according to which the Czech Republic and Slovakia became the independent countries only on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1993, and before that (in particular, in 1989–1992, within the limits of the proposed time sampling), they were formally positioned as the separate parts of the federal Czechoslovakia, although they had already developed quite different electoral systems at the local level. Consequently, they were continuously analyzed both as formally subnational units (until 1992) and as completely independent states (since 1993) leading to the succession of the electoral systems at the local level.

Thus, in **the Czech Republic**, the first local elections in 1990 were conducted in accordance with the law of the Czech National Council on the elections to representative offices in communities, the 1994 and 1998 elections – on the basis of the identical law, but with the amendments approved in 1992<sup>13</sup> and 1994<sup>14</sup>, and the 2002 and subsequent elections – in accordance with the current Law No. 491/2001<sup>15</sup> on the election to local councils and on the basis of changes to some other laws. Moreover, the changes in electoral legislation at the local level mainly concerned the methodology of determining the number of voters' signatures, which must be secured by non-party candidates who want to run for local councils.

Particularly interesting is the fact that the administrative and territorial reform, which was carried out in two stages and lasted for about 10 years, became one of the main reasons for the development of electoral legislation at the local level in the Czech Republic. The first stage of the reform began with the change in the structure of the administrative and territorial division and with the extension of the powers of the local government bodies at the basic level. In 1990, the Czech Republic (formally as part of Czechoslovakia) abandoned the three-tier structure of the administrative and territorial system, i.e. the municipality, the district (the rayon) and the region, introduced in 1960 and turned into a two-tier structure<sup>16</sup>. The region was abolished as a form of administrative and territorial formation that did not meet the traditions of local government in the Czech Republic, and its responsibilities were transferred to districts and

<sup>13</sup> Zákon č. 298/1992 Sb. České národní rady ze dne 15. dubna 1992 o volbách do zastupitelstev v obcích a o místním referendu, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdrojlo: <http://www.epi.sk/zz/1992-298> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>14</sup> Zákon č. 152/1994 ze dne 22. června 1994 o volbách do zastupitelstev v obcích a o změně a doplnění některých dalších zákonů, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1994-152> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>15</sup> Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů, Zákony pro lidi. Cz, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>16</sup> N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administrativna reforma v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yeuropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby“ 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36

communities. Thus, the order of formation and the volume of powers of the local government bodies at the lowest level has also changed. It turned out, first of all, that communities received the right to elect municipal governments, to hold local referenda, to formulate and manage their budgets and to secure their socio-economic, cultural and communal needs. However, in December 1997, the reform process was continued by the adoption of the constitutional law of the Czech Republic, which provided the creation of 14 higher administrative and territorial units of local government<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless, the real introduction of the new administrative and territorial system of the Czech Republic took place only in 2000, in particular after the first regional elections and adoption of the Law No. 129/2000 on the regions, which regulates the definition of their status, powers and relations with local and central government. As the result of the administrative and territorial reform, the distribution of powers between central and local government bodies has also changed. However, the change of powers of local government authorities provided for a change in the quantitative and personal composition of the relevant bodies. According to the Czech law, the councils of 14 lands/regions, including the capital city of Prague as a separate land/region (since 2000, they are characterized by the so-called regional elections) and the municipalities of 76 districts, 75 cities and 6242 other settlements (since 1990, they are characterized by the so-called municipal elections) are the electoral bodies of local government<sup>18</sup>. Each of them is characterized by elective representatives and executive bodies, i.e. committees, departments, councils, magistrates, admirers and village elders.

The first regional elections of the councils of the newly formed administrative entities, i.e. lands/regions, took place in 2000. An exception was the capital city of Prague, where such elections took place only in two years. It is legally established that the citizens who have reached the age of 18 vote in regional elections on the basis of secret, universal, equal and direct suffrage and within the lists of candidates of political parties, movements and electoral coalitions. In addition, they can put four votes of preferences in a candidate list. Voters can change the order of candidates in a list with their help. The number of elective representatives of a land/region depends on the number of its inhabitants and vary between 45 and 65 persons. The mandates are given to the candidates who hold top positions in the electoral rolls and on the basis of votes of preferences, but only for those parties, movements and coalitions that receive 5 percent of the votes at least. Any citizen of the Czech Republic who has attained the age of 18 and permanently resides in the land/region may be elected to the regional council<sup>19</sup>.

At the lowest level, there are 6242 municipalities. The municipal councils include deputies elected by the direct vote for a four-year term. Every council, from among its deputies, elects

<sup>17</sup> N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reforma v krajinakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby” 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

<sup>18</sup> M. Mykhalchenko, Z. Samchuk, *Porivniialnyi analiz yevropeiskyykh vyborchyykh system*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2010, vol 50, nr. 6, s. 267-286.

<sup>19</sup> A. Klazner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uhorsbchyni, Slovachchyni, Plsbchi ta Chekhii: porivniialnyi analiz*, zdrojlo: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

the members of the executive body, i.e. the so-called municipal committee, including the mayor and the deputy mayor. This executive body forms commission. Meanwhile, a mayor is not elected popularly, but by a council and its members for a four-year term, heads the municipal committee, administration and represents the council. The mayor of the capital city of Prague (which is both a separate land/region and a municipality) is not the exception, but the Prague mayor also has the status of “the leader of the region” at the same time. In the municipalities, where the municipal committee has fewer than 15 members, the executive is represented only by an unpopularly elected mayor. This is one of the differences between the Czech Republic and the other countries of the Visegrad Group, since the mayors of the Czech Republic are only unpopularly elected and the mayors of the other countries of the region (at least at the time of the analysis), are popularly elected, in particular using different electoral systems (i.e. two-round majority systems/TRS and first-past-the-post majority systems/FPTP)<sup>20</sup>.

The so-called communal elections, i.e. the elections in city municipalities, are one of the varieties of municipal elections in the Czech Republic. They are held once every four years on the basis of secret, universal, equal and direct suffrage. The settlements are electoral districts in such cases. The electoral districts are territorially divided into electoral sub-districts (polling stations), which organize the informing of residents about the elections, the process of voting, filling of ballots and the peculiarities of votes' counting. Polling stations are formed in such a way that they do not violate the established geographical boundaries of the territorial units and ensure the availability of electoral rooms for voters. The change of the boundaries of polling stations (in accordance with the law of the Czech Republic No. 491/2001 on the election to local councils) is only possible in the case of a significant change in the number of voters (increasing or decreasing in their number by one third) or in the case of changing the boundaries of the settlements. In addition, distant areas of settlements may form independent polling stations, provided they have at least 10 voters<sup>21</sup>.

The institution of list of voters is organizationally linked to polling stations. Lists of voters in the Czech Republic are guided by the principles of official obligation and regularity. This means that such lists are not created separately for each election, but are constantly maintained by the administrations of settlements, and changes to them are made by official duty or at the request of the voters. The control of their correctness and completeness is carried out every year. The specific conditions for the formation of permanent voters' lists are governed by the law of the Czech Republic No. 133/2000 on population registration and identification numbers. Therefore, the citizens who have the right to vote are included in permanent lists at the place of their permanent residence. Each voter can be submitted to only one list of voters. The

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<sup>20</sup> *Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů*, Zákon pro lidi. CZ, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>21</sup> *Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů*, Zákon pro lidi. CZ, zdrojlo: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

authorities, which maintain permanent lists based on their own records, communications with state bodies or complaints results, are empowered to make changes to lists of voters.

It is important that the number of elective representatives in a municipality (regardless of its type) depends on the number of inhabitants of a settlement they represent. In the Czech Republic, the number of deputies in a local council is directly proportional to the number of inhabitants of a settlement: from 10001 to 50000 people – from 15 to 35 representatives/deputies; from 50001 to 150000 persons – from 25 to 45 representatives/deputies; more than 150001 inhabitants – from 35 to 55 representatives/deputies<sup>22</sup>. At the same time, for the election of municipal councils in the Czech Republic, both the first-past-the-post electoral system and the proportional electoral system with preferential lists are used. The first one occurs when it is necessary to choose the municipal councils with the number of elective representatives no more than 15 people<sup>23</sup>. The second one is the situation in all other cases. It is also noteworthy that in the Czech Republic, in addition to political parties, political movements, associations and coalition of parties and movements, independent candidates and unions of independent candidates may be subject of nomination of candidates for local/municipal councils. In the case of the proportional electoral system with preferences, each voter can elect separate candidates from party lists or independent candidates from non-party lists, as well as can vote for lists of parties, coalitions or independent candidates in general. If they are combined by a voter, the advantage is given to independent candidates, and the remainder of votes goes to candidates from the party elected by a voter. If the number of elective representatives is reduced by at least one-third or the number of elective representatives becomes less than seven persons or a new settlement is created, the law provides for early or new elections.

Thus, it can be generalized that the changes to the electoral legislation at the local level in the Czech Republic are conditionally positioned as multi-stage: the first stage took place in the process of democratization and implementation of the administrative and territorial reform in 1990–2000; the second stage is connected with the continuation of the reform of the administrative and territorial system of the Czech Republic and directly with the adoption of the legislation on regions (2000) and local elections (2001).

In **Slovakia**, like the Czech Republic, the basic law on the elections of bodies of local government was adopted in 1990, that is during the Czechoslovak period of democratic transformation and transition. This law was evolutionarily modified by numerical changes, which depended both on the objective needs of the adaptation of the normative base to the conditions of social and political transformation and reality, and on the subjective factors, in particular on the desire of the ruling political elites (especially in the period of the premiership of V. Mečiar, when Slovakia was not positioned as a democracy, but rather as a hybrid political regime) to form an

<sup>22</sup> Zákon č. 491/2001 Sb. ze dne 6. prosince 2001 o volbách do zastupitelstev obcí a o změně některých zákonů, *Zákony pro lidi*. Cz, zdroj: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2001-491> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>23</sup> I. Savchenko, *Elektorálna sytuatsiia v Cheskii Respublitsi v konteksti yevropeiskoi intebratsii*, „Naukovyi visnyk Volynskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukrainky“ 2009, vol 3

institutional design of the electoral system, which is beneficial for them<sup>24</sup>. The 1992 Constitution of the Slovak Republic consolidated the provisions of the basic law on the elections of bodies of local government and regulated the norm, according to which only the citizens who reside in the territory of a particular community for a long period of time, may be the candidates for the positions of local deputies and mayors. Unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia has chosen the model of direct and popular elections of the high-ranking officials of community, i.e. of mayors. Moreover, it was regulated by the two-round majority system. Instead, for the election of councils in all types of Slovak communities, the first-past-the-post majority system with preferential block voting in multi-mandate constituencies is used. In particular, with the rule that a multi-mandate constituency may have a magnitude of no more than 12 deputy mandates. An exception is made only for small rural communities, where only one constituency may be formed (Article 9 of the relevant law)<sup>25</sup>. This system is mostly atypical not only for the Visegrad Group countries (it was also earlier and for a limited time used in Poland, and at the time of the analysis it was also limitedly used in Hungary), but also for the world as a whole.

It is also interesting that the prevalence of a small number of residents in most of the Slovak local communities led to the approval of the 2002 amendments to the basic law, which concerned the reduction of the number of deputies. In the smallest communities, where fewer than 40 citizens live, only 3 representatives are elected, in the communities with a population of up to 500 people – 3–5 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 1 thousand people – 5–7 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 3 thousand people – 7–9 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 5 thousand people – 9–11 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 10 thousand persons – 10–13 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 20 thousand people – 13–19 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 50 thousand people – 15–25 representatives, in the communities with a population of up to 100 thousand people – 19–31 representatives, and in the communities with a population of more than 100 thousand people – 23–41 representatives. Moreover, the exact number of representatives elected at any subsequent elections is determined by the current composition of a local council on the eve of the start of the election campaign. As in the Slovak Republic, as stated above, the maximum district magnitude during local elections is 12 mandates and the number of votes coincides with the number of mandates to be distributed in every constituency, then every Slovak voter may have at most 12 votes<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> D. Kovryzhenko, *Výborchi systeny dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Vybory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78

<sup>25</sup> Y. Yuriichuk, *Výborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: sbliaakhy demokratyzatsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii“ 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

<sup>26</sup> *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]



Since the Slovak system for the election of local councils is the majoritarian one with a preferential block voting, voters can vote for candidates from different subjects of their nomination. This makes the selection by the residents of "their best personalities" they know personally an important principle of local elections. Representatives of parties and non-partisan candidates may apply for local deputies and mayors. However, they must collect the required number of signatures in their petition to the election commission, depending on the number of residents in a constituency. In the communities, where fewer than 50 citizens live, 10 signatures must be collected, 20 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 citizens, 40 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 500 citizens, 100 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 2 thousand citizens, 200 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 thousand citizens, 400 signatures are needed in the communities with up to 100 thousand citizens, and 600 signatures are needed in the communities with more than 100 thousand citizens<sup>27</sup>.

It should also be noted that in Slovakia in 1998, an attempt was made to radically change the design of the electoral system for the election of the bodies of local government communities. Its initiator was the ruling coalition led by the Prime Minister V. Meciar, which before the regular local elections in 1998 tried to increase its representation in local councils. As the result, in March 1998, the Slovak parliament (National Council) introduced the changes to the basic law, the essence of which was the introduction of a proportional system of lists with an election in a single-member constituency, which would cover the whole territory of the community. There was also initiated a novel, according to which all ethnic minorities representing more than 5 percent of the population of a particular community as of 1991 should have representation in local councils. This, in turn, required the registration of the nationality of candidates in the ballot papers. However, the intentions of the ruling coalition with the help of legal changes to influence results of the elections to local government bodies were appealed to the Constitutional Court by different oppositional parties, local government associations and non-governmental organizations and were eventually declared unconstitutional. This happened in parallel with the change of the political regime of V. Meciar at the national level, when after the elections of the Slovak parliament (National Council) in 1998 V. Meciar's political party/coalition ceased to be a government. Thus, it is quite obvious that in Slovakia, the vectors of political and inter-party competition at the national level (and the most in the analyzed region) influenced the process of formation of electoral legal field, including the local level<sup>28</sup>. We mean, in particular, unsuccessful attempts of the most powerful party to create (through the legislation) a system of control over local processes and (as a response) successful attempts to deny the possibility of introducing such a hierarchy from the side of the opposition.

<sup>27</sup> *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]

<sup>28</sup> Y. Yuriichuk, *Výborchi protsesy v postsotsialistychnykh derzhavakh: sbliakhy demokratsii*, „Visnyk Tsentralnoi vyborchoi komisii“ 2006, vol 4, nr. 6, s. 81-86.

It should also be noted that in Slovakia, in the same way as in the Czech Republic, a new administrative and territorial unit, i.e. self-governing land/region, arose in 2001. Self-governing land/region or higher administrative and territorial unit is the highest body of territorial local government in Slovakia. Today there are 8 self-governing lands/regions in the country, including the cities of Kosice and Bratislava. Self-government at the level of land/region is carried out through elected bodies, i.e. the council and the president of every self-governing land/region. The term of their powers during 2001–2017 was 4 years and from the moment of regional elections in 2017 is 5 years. The first-past-the-post majority electoral system is invariably applied at the elections of regional councils. Instead, the correlation of the use of electoral systems was noted at the elections of the presidents of self-governing lands/regions: initially (in 2001–2017) it was the two-round majority electoral system and subsequently (since 2017) it became the first-past-the-post majority electoral system. The reason for the increase of the terms of office and change in the electoral system of representative bodies in lands/regions was a very low turnout of voters in regional elections, as well as changes made to save money for holding the second round of elections<sup>29</sup>.

Summing up the case of Slovakia, it should be emphasized that the transformation of the electoral legislation at the local level (inherent in it) was not primarily in the design of a new electoral law, but in the introduction of amendments to the basic law on local elections. Among the reasons for making changes one should consider the impact of democratization, political reforms and political expediency.

No less interesting, but at the same time more problematic is the case of **Poland**, where the first completely free local elections (after the partly free national elections in 1989) were held in 1990. This was due to the fact that the law on the regulations of elections to the councils of gminas (communes or municipalities), which was adopted on March 8, 1990 and was used in the elections of local bodies in 1990 and 1994, had some disadvantages, but allowed to hold elections to gminas' councils democratically, freely and transparently. It is also noteworthy that this legal act proposed different principles for the formation of local councils, in particular, according to the population size in the communities. For example, in the gminas with a population of no more than 40 thousand people, the first-past-the-post majority electoral system was introduced, resulting in electoral competition unfolding among "personified" candidates who competed in single-mandate constituencies. Instead, for the gminas with a population of more than 40 thousand people, a proportional electoral system of lists was proposed<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> *Zákona č. 303/2001 Z. z. o voľbách do orgánov samosprávnych krajov*: <http://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2001/webdata/slov/metodika/metodika.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017]

<sup>30</sup> T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

Nevertheless, the electoral system initiated in 1990<sup>31</sup> for the formation of local government bodies was not linear and unchanged. The fact is that since its approbation in 1990 and 1994, since 1998, the work has been carried out on electoral legislation and mainly on the administrative and territorial reform of local government, which included the formation of counties/powiaty and the introduction of local government at the level of counties and provinces/voivodeships. Consequently, the implementation of administrative and territorial reform necessarily forced to return to the electoral legislation and to bring it in line with the other legal regulations. Especially considering that fact that at that time, only the elections to the councils of the gminas were, as stated above, legally regulated<sup>32</sup>.

The first detailed and systematic technology of organizing, holding and summing up the elections to representative bodies of local government was defined in the so-called law on the regulations of the elections to councils of gminas, councils of powiaty and sejmiki of voivodeships approved in 1998. According to the regulatory act, a completely new and hierarchical/heterogeneous electoral system was established for the election of various bodies of local governments. The elections to the councils of gminas with a population of up to 20 thousand people took place under the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in the electoral districts with a magnitude of 1–5 mandates (which actually meant the combination of the FPTP majoritarian system (in districts with a magnitude of one mandate) and the majoritarian system of preferential block voting (in districts with a magnitude of 2–5 mandates)). In gminas with a population of more than 20 thousand inhabitants, elections to the councils of gminas were regulated by the proportional electoral system of lists with distribution of mandates on the basis of the D'Hondt method. In the cities on the rights of counties/powiaty, powiaty and voivodeships, the councils and sejmiki were also formed on the basis of the proportional electoral system of lists with a 5 per cent electoral barrier and the D'Hondt method of mandates' distribution. With the fact that in the gminas, which had the status of cities on the rights of counties/powiaty, only those electoral lists, which overcame the designated electoral barrier on the scale of whole cities, were taken into account during the distribution of mandates in councils<sup>33</sup>.

It is noteworthy that the philosophy of Polish legislators, which in 1990 introduced, and in 1998 modified the diversification of the gminas by the criterion of population, was as follows: in small communities, voters traditionally focus on personal (moral, professional, managerial, etc.) qualities of candidates whom, in view of the limited socio-political space, they know personally; in large gminas, that is, in cities, the voting for the effectiveness of individual politicians

<sup>31</sup> *Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19900160095> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>32</sup> A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper“ 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

<sup>33</sup> *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Sejmików Województw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

is illusory, and therefore the targeting of programs presented by organized political forces is more rational<sup>34</sup>.

It is also of the utmost importance that the so-called “election committees”, which may be formed by political parties and their coalitions, associations or other public organizations, as well as individual voters, were defined as the subjects of electoral companies to the bodies of local government in Poland. These structures should be at least of 5 persons, each of which has the right to form the only one list of candidates. At the same time, one and the same person has the right to run for the elective bodies only through one list. To do this, in the communities with a population of less than 20 thousand persons, at least 25 signatures must be collected under the candidate lists. In the case of the population of more than 20 thousand people, at least 150 signatures are required for this.

There is also a differentiated number of members of the councils of different communities, since it directly depends on the number of community inhabitants. In particular, there is a differentiation between the gminas with a population of less than 20 thousand inhabitants, where it was possible to choose from 1 to 5 representatives from each constituency, and the gminas with a population of more than 20 thousand inhabitants, where the number of deputies from each constituency varied from 8 to 12<sup>35</sup>. In 2001, certain amendments to the basic law on local government were adopted on this subject and they concern the reduction of the number of deputies of local councils. For example, if according to the previous regulation, in the gminas with a population of up to 4 thousand people, it was necessary to choose 15 representatives, then, according to the new provision, in the gminas with the number of inhabitants of up to 5 thousand people, it was provided for the election of only 12 deputies<sup>36</sup>. Approximately identical proportions of reducing the number of local representatives have been introduced in communities of all other types and sizes: with a population of up to 20 thousand people – from 24 to 19 representatives, with a population of up to 40 (50) thousand people – from 28 to 21 representatives, with a population of up to 100 thousand people – from 40 to 23 representatives, and in the largest communities – from 60 to 34 representatives. The logic of the legislator was to reduce the cost of maintaining local government structures, but the quantity and quality of service they provided was not proportional to the number of local representatives. This is largely in line with the law on administrative and territorial local government, according to which the division of every gmina into electoral districts/constituencies is carried out by a voivode (article 27). For example, in the case when the number of villages included in gmina does not exceed the number of representatives (elective deputies), then the territory of each village is

<sup>34</sup> Y. Manilov, S. Rudnytskyi, *Místeví vybory v Polskchi: evoliutsiia vyborchoi systemy*, „Osobystisne zrostantia: teoriia i praktyka“ 2016, vol 2, s. 45–48.

<sup>35</sup> *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wzyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Seimików Wójewództw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>36</sup> *Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. Ordynacja Wzyborcza Do Rad Gmin, Rad Powiatów I Seimików Wójewództw*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19980950602>[odczyt: 01.11.2017].

the only one constituency. Since the number of villages belonging to gminas is larger than the number of deputies, at least in half of the village gminas, then a certain part of villages is not represented in councils. In particular, after the 2002 elections, the number of councils where the number of deputies was smaller than the number of villages increased from 40 to 59 per cent. In turn, the division of urban/city gminas into constituencies takes place on the basis of their distribution into administrative districts.

After 2002, Poland introduced some changes to electoral legislation, but they did not have a decisive and systematic impact on the functioning of the electoral systems at local level. The codification of electoral norms became an important moment in the development of Polish electoral legislation, including at the local level. This applies primarily to the Electoral Code adopted in 2011<sup>37</sup>, which includes the laws that had been drafted, adopted and acted before. So it was understandable that they had lost their validity. Despite the almost identical logic of the constructing electoral systems in Poland (in particular, comparing with the period of 1998–2010, as noted above), since 2011 formally (that is, from the moment of adoption of the Electoral Code) and since 2014 actually (that is, from the moment of the first local elections organized according to its rules), an innovation was introduced. Its essence is that in all gminas, regardless of the number of their population (less or more than 20 thousand people, as before), the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in single-mandate constituencies was introduced. In the cities on the rights of powiats, the legislator still regulated the use of the proportional electoral system of lists. In addition, the Electoral Code introduced the rule that all proportional elections in Poland should be conducted using the D'Hondt method to distribute mandates.

The Polish specificity of the formation of the local executive bodies, the same as in the case of the other countries of the Visegrad Group, plays an important role in determining the electoral systems at the local level. It is known that during the period of 1990–2002, the functions of the executive bodies of local councils were carried out by collegial presidencies, led by mayors, which were unpopularly/indirectly elected by the deputies of local councils. In practice, this caused the instability of presidiums' compositions, the dependence of the process of occupying the mayoral positions on the majority compositions in local councils, which, among the other things, had the right to shift/remove mayors from their offices and led to inefficiencies in the processes of local government<sup>38</sup>. The situation was corrected by the law on the direct elections of wojts, burgomasters and presidents of cities, adopted on June 20, 2002. According to it, individual executive bodies are elected (simultaneously with the elections of local councils) by a popular direct vote for a term of four years using the two-round majority system. The position of the head of gmina should belong to the candidate who receives more than half of the actual

<sup>37</sup> *Poland 2011 Election Code*, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, źródło: <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/poland-2011-election-code/view> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>38</sup> A. Sauer, *The System of the Local Self-Governments in Poland*, „Association for International Affairs Research Paper“ 2013, vol 6, 25 s.

votes, which often involves the holding of the second round of elections in practice. The right to nominate candidates for the offices of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities falls to parties and their coalitions, public/civic unions and voters themselves, but using the mechanism of the relevant election committees. Eliminating the person who holds the position of mayor, whose powers have significantly increased in comparison with the previous legal field, is possible only through a local referendum. Consequently, the introduction of direct elections of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities became a truly positive phenomenon in the socio-political life of Poland. It increased the level of democracy of local government, promoted political activation of communities and formation of local political elites<sup>39</sup>.

So, summing up, it is expedient to note that the formation of the electoral system at local level in Poland took place in several periods. The first period (1990–1998) was clearly characterized by the restoration of local government, establishment of the FPTP majoritarian system for the election of councils of *gminas* with a population of up to 40 thousand inhabitants and of the proportional electoral system of lists for the election of councils of *gminas* with a population of more than 40 thousand inhabitants. The second period (1998–2002) was marked by the introduction of the elements of local government at the level of *powiats* and voivodeships and by the establishment of the FPTP majoritarian system in *gminas* with a population of up to 20 thousand and of the proportional electoral system of lists both in *gminas* with a population of more than 20 thousand residents as well as in the cities on the rights of *powiats*, *powiats* and voivodeships. The third period (2002–2011) is determined by the continuation of previously issued electoral rules (with some technical regulations) as well as with the introduction of the TRS majoritarian system in the elections of *wojts*, burgomasters and presidents of cities. The fourth period (from 2011 till now) is marked by the transfer of local elections in all *gminas* exclusively to the FPTP majoritarian system in single-mandate constituencies as well as by elections in all cities on the rights of *powiats*, *powiats* and voivodeships in accordance with the proportional system of lists using the D'Hondt method to distribute mandates<sup>40</sup>.

In the end, the legal status of local government and local elections in **Hungary** are directed by the 1990 law on local government and local elections, as well as by the new Hungarian Constitution, which came into force in early 2012. The last one, among the other things, introduced the changes to the legislation, which regulates local elections, in particular certain limitations regarding the acquisition of passive electoral right, the number of collective elective bodies of local government and the duration of election campaigns, etc., but did not modify the electoral system itself, although it somewhat corrected it<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> *Ustawa z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r. O bezpośrednim wyborze wójta, burmistrza i prezydenta miasta*, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, źródło: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20021130984> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

<sup>40</sup> T. Slobodian, *Transformatsiia vyborchoho zakonodavstva v Respublitsi Polshcha ta Ukraini 1990-2015 rr. (na prykladi mistsevykh vyboriv)*, „Hileia: naukovyi visnyk” 2015, vol 100, s. 281-285.

<sup>41</sup> G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

After analyzing the legislation concerning the administrative and territorial organization and the procedures of local elections' holding in Hungary, it should be noted that there is, at least as of 2017, a two-tier system of local government in this country. The first level is 19 counties and the city of Budapest (which are conventionally united into seven regions) with relevant general assemblies. The second level is villages, towns and cities (except the city of Budapest) as well as 23 districts of the city of Budapest with their respective general assemblies<sup>42</sup>.

In the elections to general assemblies of the settlements with the number of voters up to 10 thousand people, the Hungarian legislation, at least as of 2017, provides for the use of the first-past-the-post majority electoral system in a single multi-mandate constituency, the borders of which coincide with the boundaries of the settlement. Thus, it is a matter of the majoritarian electoral system with preferential block voting. The fact is that each voter has as many votes as there are mandates to be distributed in the constituency. The mandates are obtained by the candidates (according to the number to be elected in the multi-mandate constituency), which received the largest number of votes. In this case, if several candidates receive the same number of votes for their support, but one or more of them may not be elected by virtue of the district magnitude, then the mandate is given to the candidate determined by the draw procedure. Conversely, in the case when the number of candidates is less than the number of seats in the multi-mandate constituency, the law provides for re-election/repeated elections<sup>43</sup>.

With regard to general assemblies' elections in the settlements with more than 10000 voters, as well as to elections of assemblies of districts in Budapest and assemblies of cities with the status of provinces, the Hungarian legislation, at least as of 2017, uses a mixed electoral system. Procedurally it looks like this: the entire territory of the administrative and territorial unit is divided into single-mandate constituencies, in which elections are held by the first-past-the-post majority electoral system; however, in parallel with an application of the mechanism of obtaining "compensatory" mandates, which, as practice shows, are usually about 40 percent of the nominal composition of assemblies. At the same time, "compensatory" mandates are not allocated according to the FPTP component of the mixed electoral system, but instead, only those subjects of the electoral process who nominated their candidates in at least 25% of single-member constituencies are allowed to participate in their distribution/allocation. The votes given for candidates from such parties in single-mandate constituencies are summed up, and the results are divided into divisors ("1,5", "3", "5", "7", "9" and other odd numbers, which in fact outlines the use of the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method)). This continues until all the "compensatory" mandates are distributed among the parties. The distribution of mandates

<sup>42</sup> N. Nyzhnyk, V. Lemak, *Administratyvna reformna v krainakh Tsentralnoi Yevropy: dosvid dlia Ukrainy*, „Visnyk derzhavnoi sluzhby" 2003, vol 2, s. 32-36.

<sup>43</sup> H. Wöllmann, T. Lankina, *Local Government in Poland and Hungary: from post-communist reform towards EU accession*, [w:] Baldersheim H., Illner M., Wöllmann H. (eds), *Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, Wyd. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2003, s. 91-122.

(received by parties) between candidates is carried out in a sequence defined by the “compensatory” party list.

In turn, in the elections to general assemblies of villages, towns and cities (except for the provincial cities mentioned above), the law, at least as of 2017, uses a proportional electoral system of closed lists with voting in two multi-mandate constituencies. The number of mandates distributed in each constituency depends on the number of voters registered in its territory. Each voter has one vote and can vote for only one list of candidates in his or her constituency. Entities of the electoral process are allowed to participate in the distribution of mandates, when their lists in their constituencies received at least 4 percent of the votes. Previously, the division of mandates between parties was based on the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method), and from the 2014 elections it's regulated on the basis of the D'Hondt method. It is also interesting that the distribution of mandates among candidates is unconditionally carried out in the order of priority, defined by the corresponding closed list<sup>44</sup>.

A proportional electoral system with a somewhat different construction and formula is also used in the elections of general assemblies of 19 counties and in the elections of the assembly of the capital city of Budapest<sup>45</sup>. In 19 counties, the distribution of seats between parties is carried out by using the D'Hondt method between those political parties or blocs, which overcame the corresponding electoral barrier. In Budapest, the law determines the use of a proportional electoral system with closed-list voting in a single multi-mandate constituency, which previously (as of 2010) distributed 66 mandates, but starting from 2014 (due to the revision of the electoral law) it distributes 35 mandates. The distribution of seats between parties and blocs previously (by 2010) was made on the basis of the modified Sainte-Laguë quota (method), and from the 2014 elections it's based on the D'Hondt method. Parties that do not overcome the electoral barrier are not allowed to participate in the distribution of mandates. As of 2010, it was 4 percent for all election subjects, and starting from 2014 it is: 5 percent of the votes for parties, 10 percent of the votes for the blocks of two parties and 15 percent of the votes for the blocks of three or more parties. The term of office of these elective bodies was 4 years until 2014, and it is 5 years since 2014<sup>46</sup>.

Finally, with regard to the election of mayors of all cities in Hungary, it must be said that they (from 1994 onwards) invariably and irrespective of the urban population are held on the basis of the use of the first-past-the-post majority electoral system. It is this component of the

<sup>44</sup> G. Soós, *Local government reforms and the capacity for local governance in Hungary*, Paper presented at the Joint International Conference „Reforming local government: closing the gap between democracy and efficiency”, Stuttgart, September 26-27, 2002, 13 s.

<sup>45</sup> D. Kovryzhenko, *Vyborchi systemy dlia parlamentskykh, prezidentskykh i mistsevykh vyboriv v krainakh ES*, [w:] Kovryzhenko D. (ed.), *Vybory v Evropeiskomu Soiuzi*, Wyd. Fada LTD 2006, s. 39-78.

<sup>46</sup> M. Mykhalchenko, Samchuk Z., *Porivniabryi analiz yevropeiskykh vyborchykh system*, „Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy” 2010, vol 50, nr. 6, s. 267-286.



electoral rules that is perhaps the most stable component of the electoral system in Hungary at the local level<sup>47</sup>.

To conclude, it should be noted that the formation and transformation of the electoral legislation at the local level in Hungary took place under the influence of democratization of the countries of the Visegrad Group and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, strengthening of decentralization processes, territorial reorganization and the emergence of new political actors (for example, the introduction of the post of the mayors of cities since 1994). The changes mostly concerned the improvement of election procedures, although the technical parameters and formulas of electoral systems were also sometimes changed. Conditionally, the logic of the development of electoral systems at the local level in Hungary can be submitted as the periodization: the first stage (1990–1994) – general reform and democratization, including some of the electoral rules; the second stage (1994–2010) – application and improvement of legislation along with the formation of new elective bodies; the third stage (since 2010) – improvement of electoral legislation with partial modification of electoral systems.

**So, summing up**, it should be noted that the formation of the electoral legislation and electoral systems at the local level in the countries of the Visegrad Group took place in an identical time period, and the transformation and democratization of their political systems was the unifying factor for all the countries of the region in this section. The implementation of administrative and territorial reforms and of decentralization processes was another common cause for periodic revisions of the election laws and electoral systems of all the countries of the region. Consequently, the expansion of the circle of subjects of the election process, especially of those who have the right to nominate candidates for local elections, was a characteristic of the formation of electoral legislation. In summary, it was noted that the Visegrad Group countries' electoral legislation at the local level is characterized by relative stability. At a time, when the major changes to current electoral laws, in addition to the adoption of new laws, usually relate to the procedures of conducting elections, provisions of the electoral register, methodology for determining the number of voters' signatures, which must be secured by non-party candidates who wish to stand for councils.

However, even despite this, the Visegrad Group countries have developed in markedly different ways of transforming and reforming their legislation on local elections. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic adopted a new legislation on local elections, whereas Slovakia and Hungary used and modified existing/previously adopted electoral laws. In addition, the electoral systems used at the local level of the Visegrad Group countries depend on several factors. The first one is the type of elective body of local government, i.e. individual or collective. The second one is the size (depending on the number of voters) of the collective elective body of local government. In this context, it has been observed that collective bodies are usually

<sup>47</sup> A. Klaižner, Y. Mansvietov, *Munitsypalni vybory v Uhors'chyni, Slovach'chyni, Pl'shchi ta Chėkhi: porivnialnyi analiz*, Źródło: <http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/april/15.htm> [odczyt: 01.11.2017].

elected on the basis of a proportional electoral system of lists (including those with preferences), but instead are rarely operationalized by a majoritarian electoral system (whether a two-round majority system, a first-past-the-post majority system or a preferential block voting). On the other hand, for individual bodies of local government there is an exclusively majoritarian electoral system of a two-round or first-past-the-post voting, with the exception of the Czech Republic, in which mayors are elected through indirect elections. The addition and completion of the synthesis is the fact that reducing the size of representative bodies of local government with a simultaneous increasing the terms of their powers is typical for the transformation of the electoral systems of the Visegrad Group countries at the local level.

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